ISRAEL'S RESPONSES TO HOSTAGE TAKING

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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**Jawaharlal Nehru University**
**New Delhi 110067**
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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled 'Israel's Reponses to Hostage Taking' submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

Minakshi Sardar

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. A K Mohapatra
(Chairperson, CWAS)

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(Supervisor)

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Acknowledgment

you do for me. Finally I want to thank my Dida, for her blessing and love. and read it out to her that I have put her in my acknowledgement, even though see cannot see I am sure that this will make her smile.

Minakshi Sardar

JNU

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Abbreviations

AIC	Arab-Israel Conflict
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
BSO	Black September Organisation
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
HAMAS	Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah Islamic Resistance Movement
ICRC	International Committee on Red Cross
IDF	Israel Defence Force
IMFA	Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
INSS	Institute for National Security Studies
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UN	United Nations

Chapter I

Introduction

Matters related to the security of a citizen have always been a major concern for states. A major threat that a state faces in such a context is the taking of civilians as hostages. Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon and in the recent years, the instances of hostage taking have increased and are accompanied by the use of advance technologies. A hostage can be identified as a person/s, who is/are seized or held by hostage taker/s for the fulfilment of specific political demands. It is usually aimed at citizens of a targeted state by non-state groups or organizations to achieve certain political objectives. The method of hostage taking may refer to the act of seizing or holding a person and state responses to hostage taking indicate its overall approach towards such actions. A hostage situation, therefore, includes the hostage/s, hostage taker/s and rescue unit. Hostage taking is a major security concern for many countries as it involves civilian population whose release the state seeks to secure.

Any research on hostage taking needs mention of incidents like the Munich Massacre of 1972, Williamburg incident of 1973, Entebbe hijacking in 1976, Iranian hostage taking in 1979 or the Moscow theatre crisis of 2002 and such incidents have served as an example to show how hostage taking is a severe challenge to policy making. Such incidents have terrorised a wider population people and making underline security of the citizen as a major concern for states. These incidents have gained wider international attention for its impact on state society and more importantly on the lives of individuals.

The risk of life involved in any hostage taking has created debate on how a state should response to such a situation. While many scholars like Ozgur Nikbay (2007), Suleyman Hancerli (2007) and Mitchell R Hammer (2007) have stressed on the importance of negotiation in such situations. Scholars like Daniel Byman (2011), Michael Bar-Zohar (2012) Nissim Mishal (2012) and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (2008) have suggested that use of military as the appropriate response to prevent any encouragement of such activities. Several incidents of hostage taking and states responses have become a topic of research for scholars.

Article 1 (clause 1) of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979 which came into force on 3 June 1983 states,

> Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (*herein after referred to as "hostage"*) in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organization, and natural or judicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("*hostage-taking*") within the meaning of this Convention (International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979)**.**

The convention strictly condemns any such activity of taking hostages. Several organizations have often taken recourse to hostage taking activities and have violated the international conventions (Hoffman 2006: 26-27). Most of the organisation finds hostage taking as an easy technique to compel the government to accept their demands. They use the hostage as a tool or as a guarantor for their demands (McMains and Mullins 2010:13). Hostage taking is a global threat and not limited to any specific country or geographical area; however Israel has been prone to such hostage taking activities and has been facing several hostage-taking incidents that are linked to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. The contested Arab and Jewish claims over the same piece of territory have been the underlying cause for prolonged hostilities between Israel and its neighbours (Pipes 1987).

The October war of 1973 was the last inter-state war in the Arab Israeli Conflict and instability. Since then Israel has been involved in several conflicts with several militant groups. The struggle of the Palestinians for their political rights, including a sovereign state has given rise to use of various forms of struggle, arms resolutions and other forms of political violence. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964 with the sole intention to liberate the erstwhile mandate Palestine and in 1974 it was recognised by many countries in 1974 as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (JMCC 2009; Schanzer 2008:19). The organisation adopted arms struggle as the means of fight against Israel. The formation of several factions like Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Black September Organization (BSO) was driven by large cause of Palestinian statelessness.

Both individually and as a collaborator (Arab League) the Arab states were unable to further the Palestinian cause and secure the political rights of the Palestinian people. This forced the PLO specially the Fatah to opt for armed struggle as a political instrument in furtherance of

this struggle groups such as BSO opted for a more militant form of protest the aerial hijacking primarily to highlight the Palestinian cause and draw international attention to their statelessness.

In a more daring effort four aircrafts were hijacked in September 1970, taken to deserts in Jordan and blown out. The popular uprising the Intifada which began in December 1987 and the Al Aqsa Intifada which broke out in September 2000 was an integral part of their struggle. There were several other means used by the Palestinian Resistance movement which includes various terror attacks, kidnapping, bombing. Since the formation of Hamas, in 1988 it has pursued a military strategy against Israel and its population (Schanzer 2008).The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to destroy the PLO fuelled the formation of militant group and the groups engaged in armed resistance until Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2005 from Gaza Strip.

The peace initiative such as Camp David Accords of 1978, Madrid Conference of 1991 or the Oslo Process of 1993 have brought not brought about any fruitful solution to the Arab Israeli conflict. For its part, Israel adopted various means to fight such threats and challenges. Among all such activities, the most challenging threat has been hostage taking. Hostage taking has become a major feature in the Arab Israeli conflict and Israel has been a victim of several forms of hostage takings. Some are aerial hijacking and others are hostage taking of civilians and soldiers. This research has identified 13 major incidents of hostage taking that have created havoc for Israel. These incidents are the hijacking of Flight 426 in 1968, hijacking of Sabena Flight in 1972, the Munich Massacre in 1972, Ma'alot Massacre in 1974, the Entebbe Hijacking in 1976, Coastal Road massacre in 1978, Kibbutz hostage taking in (1980), Mother Bus incident in 1988, Kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, Kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000, Abduction of two IDF soldier Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser in 2006, the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006, the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014. These hostage taking acts have been carried out by the Militant Palestinian or Lebanese organizations.

There have been other instances of hostage taking for example the hijacking of aircrafts or abductions in Lebanon in 1980s, where there was indirect involvement of Israel. Their impact

on Israeli decision-making has been limited and hence the research focuses on 13 incidents to examine its policy.

Israel has followed a policy of not negotiating with any non-state actor/s (Kauffmann 2008:64; Boltz et.al 2012:262; Inbar 1999). It has pursued offensive policy to rescue the hostage and not give in to the demands of the hostage takers. The survival of the state has always been the most important goal of any state and there lies the importance of national security. Security as a concept has always been a contested term (Buzan 1998). According to Barry Buzan (1998), security is about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states to use its abilities to function against the forces of change and make way for its survival taking into account the conditions of existence. National security refers to the protection of a nation from attack or other dangers by holding sufficient armed forces and added to that is the necessity to hold the secret information of the State. National security can be viewed as the capacity of a state to control all those domestic and foreign conditions which are believed through public opinion to be essential in the fulfilment of self –determination, prosperity and well-being (Maier:1990).

National security consists of various elements like human security, military security, political security, economic security, environmental security, security of natural resource, cyber security and perhaps more (Gendzier 2015). In case of Israel the national security policy should be understood in the light of geostrategic limit in which the state survives. There have been various factors that influenced Israel's national security policy-making. Some of these factors include hostile neighbour, Israel's size, population and natural resources and the geographical location of the state. Firstly, the hostile environment has been a major contributing factor. Israel shares border with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan Egypt and Palestine and the animosity between them is historically deep rooted. The hostile environment dominated by mistrust and lack of co-operation has resulted in Israel taking offensive military measures as its national security policy. Since Israel is a small state with a population of around 8.1 million (2016) it has to take calculated risk and has followed a policy of pre-emptive strike, to destroy its enemy before they could harm Israel. It has relied on the IDF to achieve air superiority. Another strategy has aimed at keeping the war short and outside its own terrain. The size of the country and combatants to fight its war is small.

The elite group employed in counter terrorism can be grouped under three organizations, namely within the military, the police or the civilian unit. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) was formed on 31 May 1948 (Katz 1988: 6) and consists of Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13 Israeli, Shaldag (Jewish Virtual Library). The Matkal and the Shayetet 13 are the units that have the authority to take action in order to release the hostages. There are also three other hostage rescue units namely the Eilat, Yamam and the Mesada who are entrusted with the task of hostage rescue. The Yamam is a police force unit (Katz 1988:51) and the Mesada is the unit of the prison authorities but can also be categorised under the police force. The task of the special units is to conduct raids and attacks whenever necessary.

Hostage taking posits a severe threat and with its offensive policy and reliance on the military Israel have had a policy of not negotiating with the non-state actors. For example in the wake of hostage taking Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in spite of several losses caused by military response strictly advocated the slogan "No surrender to Terrorism" (Inbar 1999:100).

Similarly after the kidnapping of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, the Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mark Regev stated "We will not negotiate with hostage-takers" (Young 2000). Instances are not rare to show the adherence of such a hard line policy. The rescue operation of the Sabena flight in 1972 or the Entebbe operation of 1976, this policy brought tremendous success and praise to Israel. However Israel also faced failures in its rescue attempt for example during the Ma'alot massacre or Wachsman affair in 1994 the military response has brought disappointments. There has been a pattern to Israel's response to hostage situations. In spite of its offensive policy of not surrendering to the captors, instances show that the state was involved in protracted negotiations. Israel has also rescued hostages through a negotiated settlement that involved exchanges of prisoners through swap deals. Both the approaches however have been the result of bargaining efforts and have been a challenge to Israel's decision-making.

Prisoners of war refer to the capture of a person in a war situation. The difference between hostage taking and that of prisoner of war mainly involved the circumstance of condition of his/her capture. A person captured in war becomes on prisoner of war giving legitimacy to such acts, however in case of hostage taking they are seen as illegal and can be captured at any place or time. A number of Israeli soldiers who were captured as POWs by neighbouring

Arab countries during wars such as 1948 War, June War or October War were exchanged subsequently in return for release of several Arab prisoners by Israeli. The POWs were exchanged once hostilities end. The hostage taking on the other hand is pursued by non-state actors and has been aimed at highlighting the grievances of the Palestinians or Lebanese toward securing the release of prominent prisoners held by Israel.

Israel's willingness to pursue rescue missions or swap arrangements also have a religion dimension and symbolism as Jewish tradition which traces such practices to the Old Testament, lays emphasis on dead persons being given an honourable burial (Book of Genesis 44:29; Book of Jeremiah 22:18 ; Hays 2011: 161-162). In the Acts of the Apostles the Old Testament says **"...**they were carried back to Shechem and laid in the tomb that Abraham had brought for a sum of silver from the sons of Harmor in Shechem" (Acts 7:16). This often results in Israel undertaking protracted negotiations with various non-state actors towards securing the bodies of its citizens through swap arrangements. On 24 November 1983, Israel released 4, 500 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for six IDF soldiers who were held captive by the PLO in Southern Lebanon (IMFA 1983). In 1985, it released 1, 150 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for bodies of nine IDF soldiers who were held by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (*Ha'aretz* 2011; Melman 2004). There were similar swap arrangements in 2004 where in return of the body of three soldiers and release of Elhanan Tannenbaum Israel freed 410 Palestinian prisoners and four Lebanese soldiers to Hezbollah (CNN News 2004; *Ynet news* 2015; Pipes 2004; King 2004). Similar was the case when it secured the release of Shalit in October 2011 and Israel agreed to free 1, 027 Palestinians in return (Kamin 2014; Booth 2014).

The policy of not surrendering to the captors has been highlighted by Israel pursuing a number of military operations to rescue the hostages. At the same time, there are indications that it has also experienced non-military negotiation as a response to hostage taking. In spite of such policy of non-negotiation with non-state actors, Israel did negotiate with Hamas as well as Hezbollah to rescue its citizens or secured their body parts. Hostage takings carried out by the Palestinian and Lebanese groups were limited in scope and were primarily aimed at securing the release of prisoners held in Israeli jails. There has been a mixed response including military operation and negotiated settlements. The focus of the research is to find

out the compelling factors that influence Israel to pursue military option or seek negotiation as a response to hostage taking and the rationale behind such act.

Review of literature

The available literature on the proposed topic can be placed under three major themes, namely, *Hostage Taking*, secondly *Israel and Hostage Taking* and thirdly *Responses to Hostage Taking.*

Hostage Taking

Hostage taking incidents are not a recent phenomenon. The known account of hostage taking can be traced to the *Book of Genesis*, which talks about Abraham leading a military force of 318 trained men to rescue his nephew Lot who was held hostage. The practice of hostage taking continues even in the 21st century and the occurrence of such incidents has increased over time. Over the centuries hostage taking has gained much attention. A hostage can be defined as "a person held as a security for the fulfilment of certain terms" (American Heritage Dictionary 1980). Gary Noesner defines a hostage incident as one in which "a subject holds other people in order to force a third party to comply with his or her substantive demands" (McMains and Mullins, 2010: 463).

The risk of life involved in any hostage taking situation and the terror that is evoked have made scholars to associate hostage taking with terrorism. Acts of hostage taking has not just been placed as a terrorist act but has also brought about much criticism (Perliger and Pedahzur 2006; Laqueur 2001; Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2007).

Bruce Hoffman (2006) while defining terrorism attaches importance to the concept of hostage taking and argues that hostage taking has been a tactic used by terrorists that violates international laws (Hoffman 2006:27). According to Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking Of Hostages 1979, **"**Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (*herein after referred to as "hostage*") in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organization, and natural or judicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("*hostage-taking*") within the meaning of this Convention"

(International Convention on Taking of Hostages 1979). Michael Dartnell while discussing the role a state should play against the non-state actors points out that any act that includes murder, kidnapping or violence is a criminal offence and the 1979 Convention proscribes against specific persons to prevent hostage taking and provide security for the internationally protected persons (Dartnell 2007: 202).

Though there are differences of opinion regarding the best method to deal with such situation, scholars have universally agreed on hostage taking as a severe threat to states. The concept of hostage taking includes three elements, namely, hostage taker, hostage and rescue unit. The execution of any form of hostage taking is risky job and in spite of that hostage takers indulge in such activities and risk their life because a hostage can yield higher pay off or political dividends compared to risks attached to it (Nikbay and Hancerli 2005; Brandt and Sandler 2008). According to Michael J McMains and William C Mullins "The person is held as security for certain terms. This means that there is an expected return—a quid pro quo for the hostage taker. The Hostage taker has needs that he or she expects to be met in return for the safety, security and/or release of the hostage. The principal job of the negotiator is to find alternative term for the hostage taker" (McMains and Mullins 2010:13). I Goldaber (1979) observes that every hostage-taking event can be reduced to two elements who the hostage takers are and what they actually want. The author says that negotiation adds two more elements to that which include what they would take and what the state/ negotiating party was willing to give.

Most scholars on security studies have suggested that in a hostage crisis since the life of the victim is the most important thing the best way to deal with it would be to go for negotiation (Hammer 2007; Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2007). There has been ample work produced in the field of hostage negotiation. Most of them try to emphasize that in hostage situation it is important to keep in mind that the hostage has been taken as a bargaining chip and hence the use of negotiation process could serve the purpose of saving the victim.

Michael J McMains and William C Mullins obverted that in "most hostage incidents, the explicit threat is to the hostage's life. It is not the loss of property, status, or belonging to a community that is at stake. Life itself is at stake" (McMains and Mullins 2010: 464). According to Herb Cohen, negotiation is the use of power and information to affect the

behaviour, which is in a web of tensions where people try to maximise their gains and minimize their losses (Cohen 1982).

Negotiation as a field of study has been evolving and gained much importance since the 1970s Scholars like Randall G Rogan, Mitchell R Hammer and Clinton R Van Zandt opine that "hostage negotiation is rapidly emerging as a field of behavioural science application, poised to move beyond largely anecdotal accounts of effective and ineffective negotiation strategies towards increasing efforts at systematically incorporating alternative disciplinary perspectives and employing more rigorous methodological approaches for analysing the dynamics of crisis negotiation" (Rogan et al 1997:2).

In any negotiation, process communication skill plays a major role and this depends on the capacity and understanding of the negotiator in convincing the hostage taker. As Adam Dolnik and Keith M Fitzgerald argue, "Negotiation ultimately is the use of communication to exercise influence in order to change someone's thinking, behaviour and decision-making" (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2007:1). Resolving hostage taking has always been a major challenge to the state and they place importance to communication process as a mechanism towards a fruitful negotiation. They suggest that it is important for any state to go for negotiation, since it is through dialogue that alternative to military action or force can be achieved.

Negotiation experts like Michael J McMains and William C Mullins emphasise the aim of negotiations and assign a crucial role to the negotiator. They opine, "Communication has a goal that must be achieved. In hostage negotiations, the goals include reducing the emotional level of the hostage taker, keeping alive and unharmed, and talking the hostage taker into surrendering. To be effective, the negotiator must begin with clearly defined goals and always be ready to change these goals and establish new ones" (McMains and Mullins2010:244). The role of negotiator is crucial because it depends on the capacity of the negotiator to deal with the situation. The more the negotiator is trained better is his capacity to deal with the crisis.

There have been several models put forward to carry out hostage negotiation within a specific framework. Michael J McMains and William C Mullins (2010) in *Crisis Negotiations* propose to use negotiation as a viable solution to hostage taking using two models. The two models are REACT model and SAFE model. According to the REACT model proposed by

McMains and Mullins Recognition Engagement, Assessment Contracting and Terminating are the major elements in negotiation. The SAFE model of negotiation strategy was initially proposed by Mitchel Hammer in his book *Saving Lives* and involves Substantive issue, Attunement, Face and Emotions.

Hostage taking has a major impact on the life of the victim. Apart from chances of physical harm or injuries, the hostage faces mental trauma and psychological troubles and often takes time to return to day-to-day routine. Studies have indicated the impact of hostage taking on the life of the victim and mental trauma and the physical injuries associated with it (McMains and Mullins 2010; Thomas 2013). Hostage taking may take place due to several reasons but the general motive may often be a political grievance. In depth study on such aspects can be identified in the writings of Michael J McMains and William C Mullins(2010), J.J.F Forest (2012), Adam Dolnik and Keith M Fitzgerald (2007). According to David Rappoport the major cause for hijacking in West Asia was due to demand for political concessions which includes the release of imprisoned colleagues (Forest 2012: 172).

A major drawback for the state or rescue team in any hostage situation is the Stockholm syndrome identified by the criminologist and psychiatrist Nils Bejerot. This syndrome refers to a situation where the hostage sympathizes with the aims and motives of the hostage taker and supports the hostage taker to achieve his/her goal. Dealing with instances of Stockholm syndrome is sometimes a difficult task for the state.

Israel and Hostage Taking

Since its establishment Israel has been a victim of several hostage taking incidents. The two most important events, the Munich Massacre 1972 and the Entebbe operation 1976, have received the attention of scholars while other incidents were only discussed in the passing. The 1972 Munich Massacre serves as an example for any hostage situation (Klein 2005). The Munich incident had an international impact and made the US focus on law enforcement and train people for better specialization in negotiation skills (McMains and Mullins 2010). Adam Dolnik points out that Munich "shifted the focus of security services to exploring options for peaceful resolution of hostage crises, prompting the development of specialized hostage negotiation teams in many countries of the world" (Dolnik 2007:27).

The Munich incident brought severe losses for Israel and unleashed an assassination campaign against key suspects of the Black September group that was involved. Michael Bar-Zohar (who was a Member of Knesset during 1981-84 and 1988-1992) and Nissim Mishal writes, "Golda Meir had been utterly traumatized by Munich night, when Israel athletes had been murdered. *Once again bound and tied Jews are being murdered on German soil*, she had said, Golda was a strong, tough women: it was clear that she wouldn't let the Munich massacre go without punishment" (Bar-Zohar and Mishal 2012:148; emphasis original). The Munich incident had created much awareness among international system on the security and paved the way for making several documentaries and movies. In 1999 Kelvin Macdonald made the documentary *One Day in September* which was recognised with the Academy award in 2000 as the best documentary. There has also been a movie titled Munich in 2005, which tries to put forward how Israel had reacted to the 1972 incident.

A few years later Israel undertook a rescue operation at the Entebbe Airport following the hijacking of Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens. The plane was hijacked by two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and two members of the German revolutionary cell and diverted the aircraft to the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The rescue operation has been one of the most daring efforts by Israel and has been a topic of research by many scholars (Dustan 2009; Stevenson 1976; Netanyahu 2001).

There were works on this incident even in other languages. Iddo Netanyahu the brother of Benjamin Netanyahu and Yonatan Netanyahu has given his account about Yonatan and his rescue mission in the book *Yonis Last Battle* (2001). The book portrays the role played by Yonatan as the IDF soldier who was killed during the mission. The book was originally published in Hebrew and also translated into English. Several scholars have focussed on this incident for its enormous success Simon Dustan (2009) gives a detailed account and points out that military option was a necessary for rescuing the hostages. Gordan Thomas (2012) while recollecting the Entebbe incident writes, "The attack force lost one officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan Netanyahu, the elder brother of the future Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He would say that his own hard line against all terrorists came as a result of the death of Yonatan" (Thomas 2012:145). There have been several documentaries on the Entebbe operation. The military series in 2012 portrays the operation and movie Delta Force made in 1986 was also influenced by the Entebbe rescue operation.

There have been several other instances of hostage taking but most of them do not have any literature available. The only source for such incidents is the newspaper reports. However certain incidents found place only in Hebrew and has been a major barrier. In the Ma'alot Massacre of 1974 a Palestinian group took control over a school building and took more than 100 students as hostages. It was one of the disastrous incidents and ended with deaths 22 children. Though there is not much literature on the incident a documentary on the incident titled *Their Eyes Were Dry* was directed by Brandon Asanti (2011).

The coastal road massacre of 1978 receives some attention by Aaron Klein in Striking *Back* who called the incident as "one of the bloodiest attacks to strike the Jewish state" where several lives were killed in the highways of Tel Aviv (Klein 2005:12). The Lebanon war of 2006, which was a response to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah, received some attention and scholars have mostly attempted to analyse the relative gains of Israel and Hezbollah (Zisser 2006; Henrisken 2012; Wehrey 2008). Amos Malka (2008) argues that Hezbollah effectively turned residents of northern Israel into its hostages during war and states that Hezbollah "attempted to minimize any expected damage to it from striking at citizens and maximizing its advantage by turning the residents of northern Israel into its hostages" (Malka 2008:6). Most of the books on the second Lebanon war of Israel spoke explicitly on the consequences of the war and focussed on the ideas of Hezbollah. Most of the writings fail to capture or highlight the major factor that led the 2006 war. The cross border raid by Hezbollah and abduction of two IDF soldiers that sparked of the Second Lebanon war receives only limited importance. Rather there has been more work on Israel's decision-making and the consequences of the 2006 war.

Responses to Hostage Taking

Policymaking is one of the core elements of hostage rescue operation. There have often been debates over the policy that a state should adopt to fight such disaster. The approach to be adopted towards hostage crisis has given rise to divergent opinions among scholars. Some argue that the military option is best suited in any hostage situation while others opine that military approach can lead to more violent activities and suggest negotiations as best possible solution. Such debate has found place in the work of Isabelle Duyvesteyn (2008) who argues in support of military assault to fight against hostage taking and states, "the effectiveness of armed force in hostage-rescue missions seems almost unquestioned" (Duyvesteyn 2008:134).

The response to hostage crisis has invited both appreciation and criticisms over the Israeli policy (Melman and Raviv 1990; Byman 2011).

Israel has a policy of non-negotiation with non-state actors in hostage situations. Most of the literature deals about the military option that Israel has used but there is no adequate discussion regarding its negotiations with non-state actors in a hostage situation. Adam Dolnik stressing on the importance of negotiation and suggests, "Never negotiate with terrorists – negotiate with the human beings, for some reasons, have chosen to resort to the tactics of terrorism" (Dolnik 2007:163). Daniel Byman quotes from the advice given to Ariel Sharon by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1953, "The only thing that matters is that we can exist here on the land of our forefathers. And unless we show the Arabs that there is a high price to pay for murdering Jews, we won't survive" (Byman 2011:2).

In terms of its organizational capacity, there are elite IDF units namely *Sayeret Matkal*, *Sayeret 13 and Shaldag*, which have the authority to take action to release the hostages. There are also three other hostage rescue unit, which include the Eilat, which comprises of reserve soldiers, Yamam the police force unit, and the Masada unit of the prison authorities (Katz 1993). Samuel M Katz points out that "The Ma'alot massacre convinced inside Israel's Defence hierarchy that a special hostage rescue force was required to deal with terrorist incidents inside Israel proper" (Katz 1993:124). As Bar-Zohar and Mishal observe "Masada the operational department of the Mossad, was assigned to carry out Wrath of God (in 1972 as a response to Munich Massacre)…. Almost all the hits were to be carried out in Europe where Black September had deployed its men and where they were protected by sophisticated covers" (Bar-Zohar and Mishal 2012:150).

The hostage taking incidents in the early 1970s were met with offensive military actions. Aaron Klein writes that during the hijacking of the Sabena, "Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir had no intention of yielding to extortionate demands-to free 315 convicted Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israeli jails. Dayan just wanted to deprive the terrorists of sleep … Dayan just instructed the unit to cripple the plane and rescue the hostages" (Klein 2005:15). In 2006 on the pretext of the rescuing of two soldiers, Israel launched the Second Lebanon War. Shlomo Brom writes, "At the start of the war there was an expectation, nurtured by the political leadership, that the IDF would defeat Hezbollah and

rescue the hostages ; the aim of disarming Hezbollah was presented as a realistic objective" (Brom 2007:13).

Scholars like Ami Pedahzur (2009) argue that over confidence in the information gathering capacity of the intelligence agencies have led to several problems and that Israel's policy towards the Palestinians is the root cause for any sort of terrorism against the state. When authors like Pedahzur criticizes the IDF as a modern Sparta, works produced by scholars like Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal (2012) and Ian Black and Benny Morris (1992) discuss the functioning of the Mossad and various military operations carried out by Israel.

At times, Israel has been forced negotiate to secure the release of its citizens. The Gilad affair draws much attention as it compelled Israel to go into protracted negotiation with the hostage takers. As Daniel Byman puts it, "The Shalit kidnapping highlighted an area of intense Israeli vulnerability, as well as a motive that terrorist organizations well understand: the Israeli's desire to rescue their own prisoners" (Byman2011:185). The instances of negotiated settlement has found place in several articles and in news reports. There is lack of works on negotiated release. The rationale behind such decision has been debated but factors leading up to such decision-making needs more attention

The major limitation of the available literature on the proposed research is the lack of sufficient discussion on specific hostage incidents. Most of the literature deals with the Munich Massacre of 1972 or the Entebbe rescue operation of 1976. The other hostage incidents do not find much prominence and discussion on other incidents are limited to articles and news reports. Most of the texts on hostage issues deal with negotiation as the viable solution but they fail to provide an alternative to situations, where negotiation cannot lead to any successful outcome.

Definition, Rationale and Scope

Hostage taking has posed severe challenge to Israeli decision-making. The government has a responsibility to uphold the national security of the state and at the same time safeguard the life of individual. The available literature on the proposed topic mainly focus on the policies that Israel has undertaken in hostage rescue operation; but they address 'what' part of the policy and not the 'why' part. Israel has often deviated from its stated policy of not

negotiating with hostage takers. The focus of the research is not only to find their success or failure but also to examine its different responses and understand why a particular course of action was adopted.

Research Methodology

The research is deductive and is based on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources will include reports published by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Defence Forces blog, and documentaries on the incidents and also documents published by UN and personal accounts of authors and charters of the organizations. The secondary sources include books, journals, news articles etc.

Research questions

1. To examine the rationale behind the policy of non-negotiations with hostage takers
2. To evaluate success or failure of the rescue operations
3. To examine the cost of negotiated release of hostages and its impact upon national security.
4. To study how the specific responses to hostage taking has had an impact on Israel's Foreign policy.

Hypotheses

1. Safety of the hostages prevented Israel from pursuing a military response and to seek negotiated release.
2. Non-viability of military option compelled Israel to pursue a negotiated hostage release.

The second chapter discusses various hostage taking incidents that Israel has faced since its inception. The chapter focuses on the thirteen major hostage taking incidents and their categorisations. This includes aerial hijackings, hostage taking of civilians and abduction of military personnel. It discusses motives or influencing factors behind such activities. The third chapter deals the military and operational part of various rescue missions undertaken by Israel. It focuses on the military operations and the factors that compelled Israel to go for such military action.

The fourth chapter highlights the incidents of negotiated settlement and examines the rationale behind such settlements. It also tries to bring out the underlying implications and the costs related to such course of actions. The fifth chapter tests the hypotheses and summarises the major findings of the proposed research.

CHAPTER-II

Hostage Taking Incidents

Since the formation of the State of Israel, it has been the victim of unending terrorist attacks. One of the significant aspects of such attacks is the taking of civilians as hostage/s. The phenomenon of hostage taking is not new but the occurrences of such instances worldwide have been on the raise in the last few decades. It has always remained a major threat, not only to Israel but also to any state as they involve innocent civilian lives. Adam Dolnik, an expert on international terrorism, categorises such hostage incidents into three types. One, hostage barricade attacks, where the hostage taker/s along with the hostage/s operates within an enclosed area; two, kidnapping in which the location of the kidnapper/s or the victim/s remains unknown or secret; and three, the hijacking of vehicle, often aircraft, with passenger/s on board (Dolnik 2008: 29).

Though kidnapping is also assumed as a form of hostage taking, there is however, a narrow but significant distinction between the two. While kidnappings can be driven by personal motives and often involves personal interests or monetary gains, hostage taking is often directed against the state and the motives or demands are mostly political in nature.

2.1 Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Hostage taking has been part of the larger violence witnessed in the Arab-Israeli conflict which has been one of the most well-known protracted conflicts (Ben-Yehuda 2006:1; Bar-Siman-Tov 2010:18-19). The threats faced by the region can be best explained in the context of the hostile relations between the Arabs and Jews. The conflict refers to the rivalry between them that arose due to their common claim over the same piece of territory recognised/identified as Palestine in the early 20th century. However, the justifiability of the claim is historical in nature. Israel's claim over the land can be traced to the verses of the Bible where the reference to 'promise land' has been made. The making of the Jewish state revolves around the religious faith that God had promised to "deliver" his people to the "promise land" where they would reside and the land would be inherited by their following generations (Genesis15:18; Leviticus 25:38). The Arabs claim their legitimacy through their inheritance of the land since the Arab conquest of the city of Jerusalem in the immediate

aftermath of Prophet Muhammad (Auster 2004). While the roots of the problem is not the prime focus of this research, it is important to recognise that the animosity between the two and their nationalist aspirations are the fundamental cause for an environment of hostility and extreme violence and hostility and terror that affect the common lives within and beyond the region.

There has been academic debate over the existence of Israel as a state and this debate continues even today. While many scholars supported the creation of Israel others hold its formation as responsible for the conflict with the Palestinians. Many scholars like Noam Chomsky (1999), Ilan Pape (2012), and Joseph Massad (2006) have criticized the existence of Israel and its expansionist policies. Similarly, scholars like Benny Morris (2004), Alan Dershowitz (2003) a contrary view in the existence of the Jewish state. The struggle over Palestine among the Arabs and the Jews intensified towards the end of the 19th century. Situation became grave with the Balfour declaration of 1917 that became the first legal document for the establishment of the Jewish state.

The first Arab- Israeli war of 1948 brought victory for Israel against the common Arab front. The second major war happened in 1967. As a result, of the war areas namely Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem came under the control of Israel. The vitality of the war is marked by the fact that occupation became a major concern for the region and beyond (B. Oren 2002:258, 306; Segev 2008:117).

Another important event was the 1973 October war that exposed the limitation of the Israeli military and dented its invincibility. In 1982 Israel invaded but with the purpose of defeating and expelling the PLO from that country and ended up occupying in Southern Lebanon for 18 years. Indeed, the October War of 1973 was the last inter-state war in the Arab Israeli Conflict. Since then Israel has been engaged in a conflict with a host of non-state actors. A number of Palestinian and Lebanese military groups have been following a low intensity conflict with a militarily superior Israel.

A major characteristic of the conflict has been the trend of taking hostages and using them as a bargaining tool against the state. Israel has been and continues to be the victim of such actions. Taking Israeli as hostages would make it easier for the release of Palestinian

prisoners in Israeli jail at the same time it helped their policy to bring the Palestinian issue at a larger platform.

Figure 2.1: Number people taken hostages

Number of Hostages

Sources: Adopted form Byman (2007):50, 243; Dunstan and Dennis (2009):7; IMFA 1974; IMFA 1978; Netanyahu 2009:131; Raviv and Melman 2012:109

The above figure tries to illustrate that hostage taking as a tactic continues however there is a gradual shift in the number of hostages.

2.2 Organisations and their resistance to Israel

The establishment of Israel then on 14 May 1948 intensified the hostility. Several Palestinian groups emerged in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in 1948 war. They have used several tactics to disrupt the presence and normalcy of Israel. While neighbouring Arab countries, especially Egypt, pursued war as a legitimate means of confrontation, various organised and amorphous Palestinian and Arab groups being aware of their limited military capacity, pursued low level violence as a means of expressing their political grievances vis-à-vis Israel. What began as individual cross border infiltration, escalated into use of explosives, throwing rackets, missiles and other such attacks. Gradually, this manifested through hostage taking

both to express their sense of grievance and injustice as well as to satisfy the political demands of the International Community Therein lays the problem of hostage incidents, where Israeli civilian has become the target of various Palestinian groups and organizations.

The most important opposition to Israel has come from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO` has been the umbrella organization which has given rise to several factions such as Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Black September Organisation (BSO). All these organizations have actively participated in resisting Israel. These organizations have used violent means to attack Israel especially post 1970s they have been actively using the tactic of hijacking and hostage taking (Schanzer 2008:8). The Hamas has been another major resistance organization whose activities does not limits to attack but also they follow the practise of suicide bombing as a form of protest against the existence of the Jewish State. Another organization that works for the Palestinian cause has been the Hezbollah. Brief profiles of these organizations which carried out or involved in hostage taking are discussed below.

Prolonged Western hegemony and dominance and backwardness of the Arab world largely shaped the Islamic thoughts in the twentieth century (Nusse 1999:8). In 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood was established by Hasan al Bannah as an Islamic movement in Egypt which eventually spread its influence over the region, including several later day extremist organizations (Schanzer 2008: 14; Ibrahim 2013; Halliday 2005:240). The movement did not have its impact on religion alone but also affected the realm of politics and had turned out to be one of the most important movements in the region. The Brotherhood was deeply influenced later by the ideas of Sayyid Qutub and it aimed towards unification of different Arab states into a single Muslim nation. Gradually, it allowed the mushrooming of small factions, which paved the way for the formation of several radical groups (Hroub 2006:7; MEMRI 2005). Palestinian Muslim brotherhood developed in 1946, but after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood got divided into the two factions one being in the West Bank and the other in Gaza Strip (Hroub 2006:9). Gradually, over a period of time these factions developed as major players in shaping the politics of the region. However, there have been differences among the various Palestinian organizations that have evolved gradually over time. The Palestinian politics over the last few decades is a clear reflection of

the disunity and diverse opinions among Palestinians resulting in a power struggle specially between Fatah and the Hamas (Schanzer 2008:2)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

In the wake of the breaking down of the United Arab (UAR) in 1961, the relations among the Arab states were severely hampered. It was against this background that principal Arab players found their hatred and animosity towards Israel as a unifying factor. This was expressed by their support for the Palestinian issue and would also enable them to become active players at that time (Kurz 2005: 35). Towards this end, under the patronage of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established on 28 May 1964 as an umbrella organization that included various Palestinian groups that were operating since the 1950s.

The primary objective of the PLO was that of the liberation of the historic land of Palestine (Kurz 2005:37) and upon joining the organization in 1969, Fatah leader Yasser Arafat became the chairman of the PLO. Gradually PLO gave birth to various other factions. Fatah being the largest faction of PLO took up the task of fighting against Israel. But Fatah's failure to bring about a concrete solution to the Palestinian problem gave rise to a group called Hamas which was more radical and violent than any other group. In the late 1980s the PLO used the Intifada as a weapon to fight against Israel. For the PLO the Intifada was the symbol of strength and victory (Massad 2006:108).

The Black September Organisation (BSO)

The Black September Organisation was the offshoot of the Fatah and the sole purpose of this organization was through the use of violence (Kurz 2005: 68; Byman 2011: 45). After the eviction of the PLO from Jordan in 1970s PLO and its leadership had to be rehabilitated in Southern Lebanon. This eviction from Jordan led to the formation of the Black September Group in 1970. The group identified itself separated from the PLO. The BSO was held responsible for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al Tal in September 1971 (Dustan 2009:7).

The Black September Organization was an active actor till October 1974; however the operations of the organization came to a stand-still following the 1973 October war. Fatah

and the other faction led by PLO created an intense atmosphere in the Arab World that finally pulled down the Black September Organization (Kurz 2005:70).

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

The PFLP was formed immediately after the June war in 1967, with the objective of Liberating Palestine. Both Fatah and the PFLP being factions of the PLO, strived towards liberation of Palestine and manifested their hatred towards Israel but still in spite of such commonality they carried a narrow line of differences. Both PFLP and the Fatah claimed their rights for their leadership over the Palestinians. There is also a difference in approach between the two (Amos 1980:71). Fatah's approach to the Palestinian issue seems to be more nationalistic in the sense that it explains the problem as a struggle to establish nationalism Palestinian nationalism.

The PLFP on the other hand looks at the Palestinian issue through the prism of class struggle. Having a secular approach to the Palestinian issue the PFLP believes that it is the struggle between the imperialist power and the oppressed class. Imperialist power refers to Israel and the depressed class refers to the Palestinians. In case of PFLP, it believed in the idea of Pan-Arabism and liberation of Palestine as a part of the entire national struggle against colonialism (Byman 2011:29; Dunstan and Dennis 2009:8). After the 1967 war the defeat of the Arab armies led to the formation of small militant organizations whose sole purpose was to take forward the Arab struggle against Israel. This struggle manifested itself in the form of kidnapping, killing, hijacking bombing and various other forms of attacks mostly on the Israeli civilians (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015: 10).

A major distinction between the PLO and that of PFLP has been, while PLO believes that the Palestinian issue is local problem should be solved by the Palestinians themselves, while the members of PFLP believes that Palestinian issue is a pan Arab issue and needs worldwide recognition (Amos 1980: 18).

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

The DFLP was an offshoot of PFLP formed in 1969 and was headed by Naif Hawatmeh with the objective to pursue its Maoist political doctrine. The DFLP claimed their doctrine to be more progressive than PFLP (Dunstan and Dennis 2011:8). Apart from ideological

differences there were also differences in the personalities of the leaders which also in a way contributed as a major factor in the formation of DFLP. The different background, from which Habash and Hawatmeh came from, also influenced in shaping their thoughts towards the Palestinian issue.

Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah)

Hamas was founded by Sheikh Yassin and Mahmoud Zahar on 14 December1987, whose idea of resistance to Israeli occupation and liberation of Palestine from Israel forms the core of Hamas ideology. It is the Islamic resistance movement against occupation and draws its origin to the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (Levitt 2006: 19-20, 34).

Hamas envisions building the state of Palestine by the destruction of Israel. While Fatah shared the same view as those of Hamas, the latter was more militant and aggressive in nature. Unlike Fatah which supported the peace talks with Israel, for Hamas there was no room for any peace talk or any sort of negotiation with Israel. The only purpose for Hamas was use of violence to fight Israel. Hamas which stands for resistance movement developed from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and established itself as an organization following the break out of the Intifada in 1987. Since then it has posed a great threat to Israel (Milton Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2008:33)

According to article 15 of the Hamas Charter the use of violence is justified and Jihad is the only possible mean to liberate Palestine and anyone who comes on the path of the struggle should be destroyed. The preamble to the Hamas charter adopted on 18 August 1988 states that, "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it" (Hamas Covenant 1988). The hatred for the Jews is so much deep rooted that the only reason for the existence of Hamas is to erase the existence of the state of Israel. While Fatah advocates Palestinian nationalism as its core principle, Hamas follows Radical Islam (Schanzer 2008:9-10; Nusse 1999: 52).For Hamas, the Israel is a religious state and hence a major threat to the Islamic notion of Ummah. Therefore it is the duty of all Muslim to fight against the Jews and destroy the state of Israel, which would ultimately pave the way for the establishment of the state of Palestine (Nusse 1999: 21).

The Palestinian organizations like Black September, Fatah, PFLP, Hamas and also Hezbollah have often used hostages taking as a tool to get their demands fulfilled specifically to release

their fellow companions from Israeli jails. There were also a few tactics like suicide bombing rocket attacks, killing and similar types.

Hezbollah

The Hezbollah which emerged in Lebanon in 1982 following Israeli invasion of 1982 is primarily Shia Islamic group (Pape and Feldman 2010:194;Norton 2007:34). Hezbollah means "Party of God" a firm believer of the teaching of the Quran and claims the legitimacy of its action from this source (Harik 2005:1). In the 1990s the Hezbollah devoted itself into suicide bombing and it was this organization which influenced the spread of such self-sacrificing actions (Pape and Feldman 2010:195).

Since its inception, it has included the marginalized Shia Muslims as its component. The Hezbollah has been influenced by the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini the leader of the Islamic Republic in Iran and deeply believes in its struggle against Israel and also US and France for their presence in Lebanon. The ideology that Hezbollah propagates is that any sort of control or occupation by any foreign entity can be met with violence. Hezbollah believes that occupation is the cause for the sufferings of the Shias and it is in the rights of Muslims to resist such occupation. The most crucial element to it is that the ideology allows the use of violence as a legitimate means to fight (Harik 2005:16; Wherey 2008: 55).

Hezbollah has been one of the most threatening organizations not just to Israel but to others as well. The Hezbollah was not simply compensation to the fall of PLO rather turned out to be more severe and alarming and in the words of Bob Graham it is "more lethal than Al-Qaida" (Byman 2011:210). The idea of jihad forms the core of Hezbollah's ideology. The organization was gradually successful securing support of the Shias beyond Lebanon in its struggle against Israel (Wherey 2008:56; Azani 2009:242).

In fact the Hezbollah was not merely the result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon rather it was the poverty and powerlessness of the Shia population that paved the way for its birth (Byman 2011:210). It needs to be mentioned at the initial phase of 1980s the Shias of Lebanon were more concerned about the disaster that the presence of Palestinians had caused their country but gradually their attention was directed at the Israeli occupation.

2.3 Categorising Hostage Taking

Hostage-taking incidents faced by Israel can be looked from several perspectives. The incidents can be categorised on the basis of their location (that is, area of operation), methods or the form of operation, quantitative value of the hijacking (number of people taken as hostage/s) and nature of the organizations involved in the hostage taking (political and ideological dimension).

Instances are not rare to show how hostage taking has operated at different levels. The Tehran Embassy Siege of 1979, Entebbe hijacking of 1976 or the kidnapping Patty Hearst or Terry Anderson in Lebanon have created much terror among people and the states. From aerial hijacking to kidnapping of individual civilian has been a practice by the hostage takers.

If one was has to apply the categories within the context of Israel, one could notice certain specific features. In terms of locations, hostage taking has happened in three distinct areas; hostages taken from within the territory of Israel, from the occupied territories like the West Bank and Gaza or from areas outside both of them, normally in the territory or sovereign space of a third country. Most of incidents show that hostages being taken from within Israel are higher than those in other locations. However, handling of hostage situations occurring outside Israel have brought in major threat to its national security than those who were taken from the state. Again from the methodological understanding, one can categorise hostage taking incidents into three major forms; aerial hijacking, hostage taking of civilians, and hostage taking of military personnel.

Analysing the occurrences of hostage incidents one can categorise them in terms of the number of people taken as hostage as hostage taking of individuals, group of people or more than hundred persons at the same time. Categorisation is also possible depending on the type of hostage taken by the organizations and includes three subcategories, mainly hostage taking of children, adults and elderly people. The Munich massacre of 1972 and Coastal Road massacre of 1978 are examples for hostage taking of young and old people, the Ma'alot massacre of 1974 and MisgavAm incident of 1980 indicate that even children have become victim of hostage taking activities.

Both Israeli and non-Israeli Jews have often been victims of hostage taking activities carried out by several organizations. Depending on these type of organizations, hostage incidents can

be streamed into four categories, namely those carried out by the mainstream Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), those carried out by the militant Palestinian group Hamas, by Lebanese Hezbollah and those operated by other smaller or lesser known organizations or splinter groups. Above all, it is possible to classify them on the basis of the outcomes as successful rescue of hostage/s, negotiated release of hostage/s, swap of hostage/s for prisoner/s or death of hostage/s during rescue missions or due to their execution by hostage takers.

There can be several other ways categorise hostage taking incidents directed at Israel and it is essential to recognise that there will be significant overlapping of incidents due to their impacts. In order to minimise this overlapping, this chapter will try to analyse the detail accounts of the incidents by categorizing them into perspectives and seek an organic understanding. It is important to understand that the best possible way to describe hostage taking events is by categorizing them on the basis of the manner in which such hostage taking activities were carried out.

Based on the types of hostage taking, Israel's experiences can be placed under three themes: aerial hijacking, hostage taking of civilians and hostage taking of military personnel. The aerial hijacking would cover the incidents of hijacking of El Al Flight 426 in 1968, Sabena Flight 571 in 1972 and hijacking of Air France flight 139 in 1976. The second theme would include incidents like Munich massacre of 1972, Ma'alot massacre of 1974, Coastal Road massacre of 1978, Kibbutz hostage taking of 1980, Mother's Bus incident of 1988 and kidnapping of three teenagers (Eyal Yifrach, Naftali Fraenkel and Gilad Shaar) in 2014. The third theme of hostage taking of military personnel and would include kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser in 2006 that sparked the second Lebanon war and the abduction of Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006. Hostage taking has always been linked to terrorism and most of the 'hostage taking' activities have been motivated by the Palestinian organizations. Since, its formation, Hamas has posed severe threat to Israel and hostage taking which at some point was an expression of hatred towards Israel has in recent times developed into an effective bargaining tool used by different militant organizations to secure the release of their fellow companions.

Though the 1960s has witnessed Israel, responding to such demand for the release of hostages, from the early 1970s it can be opined that Israel adopted its policy of no surrender to the terrorists. This policy of military rescue is reflected in most hostage situations. Instances show, Israel has agreed to negotiate, as a strategy to make use of the time and prepare itself for a military rescue operation.

The **Table 2.1** shows three incidents of aerial hijacking, six incidents of kidnapping of civilians and four abductions of military personnel.

a. Aerial Hijacking

Aerial hijacking has gained prominence in the 1960s and the 1970s and gradually there was a decline in such incidents. Daniel Byman, a well known figure in the field of security studies writes "From 1968 to 1976 Palestinian groups hijacked sixteen airplanes and attacked thirty – three aviation targets" (Byman 2012: 40). Hijacking of aircrafts has been recognised as one of the most well-known terror tactic (Dolnik 2007: 31). Three incidents of hostage taking met by Israel, can be placed under this theme and they are hijackings of El Al Flight 426 in 1968, Sabena Flight 571 in 1972 and Air France Flight 139 in 1976.

El Al Flight 426, 1968

On 23 July 1968 an El Al Flight initially scheduled from Rome to Israel was hijacked by the members of PFLP (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:5). This incident of aerial hijacking has been a turning point in the international system as this incident marks the start of what scholars suggests as the age of International Terrorism (Dolnik 2007:31; Byman 2011:29). The attackers demanded the freedom of more than thousand Palestinians from Israeli jail in exchange of the safety of 12 hostages. Israel rejected the proposal and released only 16 prisoners. The captors reached a deal through the mediation of external actors like UN, Italy and Airline Pilot Association and the hostages were successfully returned back to Israel (Green 2013).

Sabena Flight 571, 1972

The first recorded instance of aerial attack has been the hijacking of EL Al Flight 426 in 1968. But the hijacking of Sabena flight 571 in 1972 on the basis of its prominence, is widely accepted to be the first example of hostage taking. The hijacking of Sabena flight in 1972 has

been a severe threat to Israeli security. On 8 May 1972, Sabena Flight was hijacked by members of the Black September group, involving two men and two other women from the same organization (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:7; Byman 2011: 45). Arafat was seen as the force behind the hijacking (Kurz 2005:68).

The hijacking of the Sabena Flight was the first operation by the Black September Group against Israel. The flight was carrying 101 passengers from Brussels to Tel Aviv. However after the flight landed at the Ben-Gurion Airport, the hijackers demanded the release of 317 prisoners held in Israeli jails (Klein 2005:14).

The pilot of the Sabena Flight was Reginald Levy and soon after the flight took off he realised that the flight has been hijacked by members of BSO whose members had managed to use forged passport to board the flight. The four members were Abd Aziz el Atrash, Rima Tannous, Theresa Halsa and Ali Taha Abu-Sneina who disguised as Zeharia Greid, Sara Bitton, Miriam Hasson and Captain Rifat respectively (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:96). The hijackers had also carried handguns, hand grenades, explosive belts and detonators all concealed on their bodies and had used the bathrooms of the plane to prepare themselves for the attack.

The demand of the hijackers convinced Israel that the only option was to go for a military response, though as a sign of negotiation the Government had agreed to release few prisoners (Dunstan 2009: 7). The task of rescuing the hostages was laid in the hands of Sayeret Matkal Unit, Israel's special elite force.

To an extent the report of the pilot helped the Sayeret team in identifying one of the female hijackers by the colour of her dress (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015: 100). The hijackers had demanded for the servicing of the aircraft the day after the hijacking. The entire servicing was supposed to be done under the supervision of the International Red Cross Committee. This opportunity was used to rescue the hostages. The Israeli soldiers, disguising themselves as mechanics entered the aircraft and took control of the situation by storming the aircraft. Two male hijackers were killed, the female hijackers were wounded and a female hostage was shot in the process while rest of the hostages were safely rescued by the Sayeret Matkal team.

Air France Flight 139, 1976

However the hijacking of air France flight 139 starts a new chapter in the study of hostage taking. Few years ahead of this the Entebbe operation of 1976 by the Israel Defence Force serves as the best known example of hostage rescue techniques. The Entebbe rescue operation globally re-confirmed the air superiority and capability of the Israel Defence Force (IDF).

The organization that was behind the hijacking of Air France Flight 139 was PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) headed by Dr George Habash (Dunstan and Dennis 2009: 8). The hijacking of the flight took place on 27 June 1976. It was scheduled flight from Tel Aviv to Paris with a halt in Athens (IDF blog; Netanyahu 2002:14). Initially it was carrying 248 passengers (Oren 2016; Netanyahu 2002:15); it stopped at Athens and took a few more passengers (Roffe-Ofir 2006). Fifteen minutes after the take-off, the flight was hijacked by members of PFLP headed by Wadi Haddad and two other Germans who had allegiance to the Red Army Faction (Byman 2011:53; Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:9-10).

The operation started when one male member of the organisation took out small machine guns and pointed at the pilot of the flight. Simultaneously a female member of the group pulled out her gun from champagne bottle and within few seconds, the team took over the fight. The scenario in the economy class was almost same as that of the first class. In the economy class, the two German men who disguised themselves as Middle Eastern men took full control.

The two man took out their machine guns and one of them also vocally expressed to the passengers that he was the new captain of the flight and also introduced himself as Basil Kubaissi and the commander of Che Guevara Commando of the Gaza Strip (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:9) having its affiliation to the PFLP.

An advantage that the hijackers got was the low-level security process at Athens which helped them to board the flight. There were also problems with the metal detectors at Athens airport which enabled them to carry weapons (Dunston and Dennis 2009:11; Byman 2011: 54; Melman 2011). Skyjacking gives a lot of advantages to the hijacker because it gives the hijacker a very mobile platform, but a major problem faced is the constant requirement for air refuelling and this can make the plane come under government control (Dolnik 2007:32).

Hence for refuelling at Benghazi the hijackers changed the route of the flight to Libya and then to Entebbe in Uganda.

Upon reaching Entebbe the hijackers separated the Jews from the non-Israeli passengers and kept 106 Jews who were mostly Israeli as hostages (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:9; IDF blog 2012; Rosenfeld 2016; Netanyahu 2002:22). The separation of the Jews from others confirmed the fact that the real target of the hijackers was Israel. Its motive was to use the hostages as tool to demand the release of 40 Palestinian prisoners under Israel control.

At that time Idi Amin was the president of Uganda. In 1962 Israel established diplomatic ties with Uganda. After that Israel has often rendered possible support to Uganda in various fields, starting from training schools to sending of expertise to Uganda (Dunston and Dennis 2009:15). In fact Amin as a guest of Moshe Dayan had gone through the parachuting training and had personally interacted with Shimon Peres then Defence Minister (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:11).

The president of Uganda did not show any hope to the hostages but rather welcomed the hijackers. Prime Minister Golda Meir refusal to sell jet Phantoms to Uganda in 1971 and this led to the breaking up of Uganda Israel relation (Oded 2006). This provided the necessary explanation for Amin's welcoming attitude towards the hijackers and his involvement in the hijacking conspiracy. He clearly stated that it was Israel, who had to directly deal with the hijackers and get their demands fulfilled to free the hostages (Dunstan and Dennis 2009). Israel followed the policy of not surrendering and in such crisis time served as a great advantage to Israeli government. Some of the Israeli officials (Maj. Muki Betsar, Col. Baruch Bar Lev, Lt. Col. Matetyahu Caspi to name few of them) had prior knowledge about the infrastructure of the Entebbe Airport (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:15).

Soon after Israel came across the news about the hijacking incident, it took minimal time for its intelligence agencies to get information about the captors involved in the hijacking. It was discovered that the four members had used forged passports at Athens airport and faulty security arrangements at the Athens airport made the task easier.

The four hijackers were identified as Wilfried Bose, the female member named Brigitte Kuhlmann, Abu Haled el Halaili and Ali el Miari, while the former two were Germans the

latter two were Palestinians (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:10). The leader of the hijackers Haddad handed a list of prisoners name to Amin that was to be conveyed to Israel and demanded their release from Israeli jail in exchange for the hostages. He also warned that if the demands were not met within the stipulated time then the hijackers would kill the hostages. The list included the release of 40 prisoners who were identified as terrorist and kept in jails (Ha'aretz 2010; Netanyahu 2002:20; Domnitch 2012). This included the release of Kozo Okamoto and also six terrorists who were jailed in Kenya, five imprisoned in Germany, one in Switzerland and one in France.

The hostage crisis brought Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Defence Minister Shimon Peres to decide the fate of the hostages. It was after much debates and discussions with the various members of the security community that Israeli decided upon the possibility of a military option, taking into consideration the knowledge about the strategic location of the airport. However there were still some opposition to the idea of military response especially for Rabin**.**

In such atmosphere of difference in opinion among the ministers the sudden departure of Amin from Uganda to Mauritius made the hijackers to extend the earlier deadline 1 July deadline to 4 July (Dunstan 2009: 18, 24; Lipkin-Shakhak 2006). This gave time to Israel to plan a rescue operation. Since the hijacked flight was owned by France, Peres also attempted to communicate with the French authorities hoping for any possible help for a joint effort in rescuing the hostages (IMFA 1976).

It was soon realised that the execution of the entire plan which called for the Hercules Rhinos to fly from Israel to Uganda, rescue the hostages and bring them back to Israel would be a time taking affair and required aircraft fuelling. Kenya was the only option for Israel in refuelling and Israel successfully convinced the Government of Kenya for help (Reeve 2011:140).

The task of planning the rescue operation was in the hands of Major Amiram Levin, where through various sources the team gathered information about the situation of the hostages. The hostages were kept in the main hall of the old terminal of the airport while the crewmembers of the flight were restricted to the women rest room. The responsibility of freeing 106 passengers held as hostages at the Entebbe airport was assigned to Israel's elite

Commando Unit Sayeret Matkal (Netanyahu 2002:4 ; Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015:11). The commander of the Sayeret Matkal rescue mission unit was Yonatan Netanyahu (also known as Yoni).

The plan was to enter the spot with Israeli troop preceded by a black Mercedes, which would give the impression that it was Amin, who was inside the car. Followed by this would be the ground force who would take control. The first Rhino would land and put off its light, the door of the Rhinos would be open to ensure the rapid transportation of the hostages from the building to the aircraft. The entire operation was strategically planned and the operation lasted for 90 minutes (Dunstan 2009: 31-32). After much exchange of gunfire and explosions on 4 July the aircrafts landed in Israel with the rescued hostages.

The leader of the hijacking operation Wadie Haddad, was not just involved in the Entebbe episode but he was also responsible for several other hijacking and kidnapping including the hijacking of an Israeli aircraft El Al Flight 426 in 1968 (Bar Zohar and Mishal 2015: 10; Plaw 2008:53).

The commander of the rescue unit Yonatan was killed while rescuing the hostages. In commemoration of the courage put up by Yoni who was the brother of later day Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the operation is also named as '*Operation Jonathan*' (Netanyahu 2002:4; IICC 1976). The Entebbe rescue operation serves as a classic example of hostage rescue tactics. The incident establishes the air superiority of Israeli Air Force, capabilities and effectiveness of the air power and the manner in which the entire operation took place. The rescue operation is also, referred as *Operation Thunderbolt*. Since then there was no hijacking of aircraft involving Israel.

b. Abduction of military persons

The four incidents of abduction of military personnel are Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, Tannenbaum in 2000, Shalit in 2006 and two IDF soldier in 2006. While Tannenbaum and Shalit were freed through a negotiated settlement, the military could not secure the lives of the other three.

Nachshon Wachsman, 1994

The kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman was another instance of hostage incident of military personnel. Corporal Nachshon Wachsman who had a dual citizenship of US and Israel was kidnapped by the militant group Hamas on 8 October 1994. Israel was asked to release the Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin along with 200 Palestinians for his freedom (Haberman 1994).

Israel though agreed to meet the demands was actually ready for military rescue operation, what Israel was looking for was just an extension of the deadline put up by Hamas. Even though the Qassam Brigade was ready to negotiate on the extension of the deadline, it was too late when the soldiers reached out to Nachshon.

Wachsman was kept in North of Jerusalem, when the Israeli raid took place and in the struggle between the Israeli soldiers and Hamas resulted in the death of one Israeli soldier and three Hamas members. Several soldiers wounded but Israel captured two Palestinians. Unfortunately, Israel failed in its rescue attempt, Wachsman was killed on 14 October 1994 by the kidnappers before the soldiers could have access to him.

Elhanan Tannenbaum, 2000

In spite of the unilateral withdrawal of Israel Defence Forces from Lebanon in 2000, attack from Hezbollah did not come to a halt. In October 2000 followed by the break out of the Al Aqsa Intifada Hezbollah continued bombing the Israeli borders. It abducted three IDF soldiers Omar Souad, Benny Avraham and Adi Avitan.

The same year witnessed kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum who had served as an IDF colonel and a businessman by profession (Byman 2011:243). He would be used as a trade off later by Hezbollah to secure the release its prisoners from Israeli jails. The abduction of the three soldiers can place under the hostage taking of military personnel. However, the kidnapping of Tannenbaum shows an example of both the combination of civilian and military personnel. In 2004 Israel had to free 400 Palestinians who were held prisoners and also the bodies of 60 Hezbollah members who were buried in Israel in return for the bodies of the three soldiers and release of Tannenbaum.

Gilad Shalit, 2006

Another incident that expresses how these organizations made full utilization of the hostage as a bargaining tool, was the abduction of Gilad Shalit on 25 June in 2006. The joint action by the Palestinian group Hamas and Islamic resistance group spurred the second Lebanon war (Byman 2011: 252).

In return for his release it demanded freeing of 1400 prisoners held in Israel prisons. The Shalit incident started a new chapter in dealing with hostage scenario. After a prolong negotiation of 5 years that took place at various levels Shalit was freed on 18 October 2011 in exchange of 1027 Arabs who were accused of terrorism and kept in prison by Israel

This incident holds tremendous importance. At the time of abduction, Shalit was in military uniform, and for the first time Israel was able to bring back a soldier alive from the captivity. The incident also allowed for a lot of debate regarding the price Israel had to pay to secure release of Shalit. In spite of disapproval from some section of the society Israel did succeed in securing his freedom.

Two IDF Soldiers, 2006

The year 2006 witnessed the second Lebanon war, the first one being the 1982, invasion by Israel. The abduction of the two Israeli soldiers along with the killing of eight other Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah 12 July led to the launch of counter attack operation. This incident marks the launch of second Lebanon war (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2007: 72; Henriksen 2012: 95).

Since 1948, the presence of Palestinians on the Lebanese soil has been a major cause of instability within the country (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2007: 66). Apart from the internal conflicts among the various sects in Lebanon, the Palestinian organizations also contributed to the instability in the state. In 1948 after the first Arab Israeli Conflict there was a huge flow of refugees to Lebanon adding to this was the PLO's search for new bases in Lebanon after its eviction from Jordan in 1971. Since early 1980s it emerged as a major force leading the struggle. The new shelter for the PLO was Lebanon and this dragged Lebanon as an active party in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

The abduction in 2006 led to Israel launching of the Second Lebanon War which war lasted for 33 days (Henriksen 2012: 95). Hezbollah attacked the Israeli border and killed Israeli soldiers and kidnapped two of the wounded Sergeant, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. These two kidnapped soldiers were used by Hezbollah, as a bargaining chip to secure the release of prisoners. After a failed rescue attempt, to bring back the soldiers, Israel waged war against Hezbollah which also proved unsuccessful.

Since Israel had this policy of not negotiating with non-state actors, the negotiation was carried out by a third-party mediator. The demands of Hezbollah included the release of all the Lebanese soldiers imprisoned in Israel and also release of Palestinian soldiers, who were captured during the first Lebanon war, including Samir Kuntar (Schweitzer 2006).

c. Hostage taking of civilians

Hostages taking incidents are plenty in number to show how innocent civilians in Israel have been a victim to the terrorist tactics.

Munich Massacre, 1972

The same year experienced another incident which had a horrifying impact on the state of Israel. On 26 August 1972 started the opening ceremony of the 20th Olympic Games in Munich started. In spite of the fresh wounds of the Holocaust that haunted Israel, it sent an athlete team of eleven members to Munich. On 5 September early morning at 4 am a group of members belonging to Black September Organization headed by Luttif Afif (also known as Issa) prepared themselves to enter the Olympic village where the athletes were located. The area was surrounded by a fence. There was no presence of any guard around the village. The members took advantage of this and entered the village. At the same time some American athletes who were drunk were trying to jump over the fence. This was an added advantage to the BSO whose members helped the American to jump over the fence and at the same time made their way inside (Reeve 2011:12). The reluctance of the security guards has been a great advantage to the group. It has often been argued that it the reluctance of the security at the games in Germany that caused such disaster to Israel (Byman 2011:46).

As Simon Reeve quotes "Several officials, including six German postmen on their way to a temporary post office in the village plaza, saw the group climbing the fence with their sports

bags at around 4:10 AM. But as Issa had assumed, none of the passer by challenged them because they thought the fence- climbers were just athletes returning home" (Reeve 2011:12). After entering the area they spread in their own direction, probably knowing what they were supposed to do according to their previously made plans. Before the start of the operation one of the members told the other members who would take up the task of killing the Israeli athletes, "From now on, consider you dead. As killed in action for the Palestinian cause" (Byman 2011: 46).

The most important advantage that the attackers had was the timing of attack. It was dawn and most of the participants were asleep. The group had carried equipped arms and within few hours of struggle they were in a position to demand the release of Palestinian in Israeli jail in return of the athletes whom they captured as hostages. This incident has been the most glaring example of hostage taking experienced by Israel (Dunstan and Dennis 2009: 6). The incident was condemned worldwide. It also brought into focus the growing danger of such extremist activities (Reeve 2012:109; Hoffman 2006:68).

The Black September Group employed several members especially for the Munich attack. (Byman2011: 46). The demand was release of 250 Palestinians kept in Israeli jails, (Raviv and Melman 2012:109). McMains and Mullins argue the demand was release of 200 prisoners and later demanded to facilitate transportation to Cairo. They also demanded the release of German terrorists namely Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinholf held in prison (Byman2011:46).

The West German officials tried to convey the demands to Israel but could not convince Israel to release the Palestinians accused of terrorism. Prime Minister Golda Meir had often announced in public about her policy of non-negotiation with the terrorists. According to her "This was the main policy…. Not to give in to the terrorist, not to surrender to them" (Reeve 2011:21).

The German police who took up the task to rescue the hostages were not well trained and it was in Germany where athletes lost their lives in the hands of the captors. Controversies have also been there regarding Israeli response. Israel had asked West Germany to allow Israel to send its special force (Raviv and Melman 2012: 1090 but the West German government decided to take care of the incident itself.

The incident had two contradictory impact, at one level it was the Palestinian issue that got global publicity and at the other level there was kind of sympathy and condolence for the Israeli athletes who lost their life on German soil (Raviv and Melman 2012:109). However the incident failed to force Israel to secure the release of Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jails (Byman 2011:47).

The loss of lives of the Jews in the land of Germany was a severe blow to Israel. It was this loss that compelled Prime Minister to launch operation wrath of God *Spring of Youth* (Bar-Zohar and Mishal 2015:111). The main aim of the operation was to secretly hunt down the members of the BSO who were responsible for the Munich killing. Mossad was given the special task to carry out all the assassinations; however this could in no way compensate the loss Israel suffered in Munich. The sorrows brought down from the Munich incident followed by the October 1973 war that affected the prestige of the IDF. It was only after few years later the rescue mission Entebbe in July 1976 helped IDF to regain the confidence of the people.

Ma'alot Massacre, 1974

The Ma'alot massacre of 1974 throws light on the inhumanity and cruelty of the terrorist organizations where even children were not spared from bargaining tactics. On 15 May 1974 which is also the Independence Day in Israel, few members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked the Netiv Meir Elementary School in the town of Ma'alot in Israel. The terrorist had initially dressed up in IDF uniform and entered an apartment where a couple was killed by them and after this they captured the school (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008: 27). The terrorist demanded the release of around 26 Palestinians who were held in Israeli jail. However they also demanded the transportation of the prisoners to Damascus with an ultimate deadline for their release. The negotiation would take place under the supervision of the French and the Romanian Ambassadors in Israel. However with the approval of Israel to release the prisoners in exchange of the hostages, the kidnappers also agreed to release half of the hostages while the rest would be released only after the prisoners had safely reached Damascus..

Surrendering to the terrorist group was not the policy of Israel. In spite of its announced approval for the release some prisoners it had its military option ready for the rescue. Israeli

tried hard to delay the French ambassador who would supervise the negotiations and fifteen minutes before the expiry of the deadline the Sayeret Matkal raided the school building (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008:28). But the rescue attempt could not save all the lives of the hostages. Twenty two children were killed by the kidnappers (Byman 2011: 60; Sweet 2008 : 114), and injured more than sixty people. Ma'alot massacre has been one of the most disastrous episodes in the history of the hostage experience by Israel. It was not just the failure to the IDF but a massive loss that took away innocent lives of children.

Coastal Road Massacre, 1978

Another incident that pertains to hostage taking of civilians was that of the Coastal road massacre of 1978. On 11 March members of the Fatah group hijacked an Israeli bus along the coastal road highway which was travelling from Tel Aviv to Haifa. The hijackers had used the sea route to get access to the bus near Kibbutz Maagan Michael (Ynet News 15 March 2009).

They took control over another bus and made the passengers board. The police force made several road blocks, but they were of no use. Finally at Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv the police could stop the bus and exchange of fire took place between the kidnappers and the police, finally the bus was blown up causing severe damages. The incident killed 38 civilians and some of the Fatah members. This incident eventually led to the launch of *Operation Litani* by Israel in order to destroy the PLO bases in southern Lebanon and was launched in March 1978.

The objective of the hijackers of the bus was to demand the Israeli government to fulfil their demands including freedom for Palestinian prisoners. Their major intention was to stop the peace process between Israel and Egypt. The bus was hijacked when Prime Minister Menachem Begin was about to visit the US to make progress in the peace process with Egypt (Omer- Man 2011)

Kibbutz Misgav Am, 1980

Kibbutz Misgav Am is a community in the upper Galilee , bordered by Lebanon on three sides and is composed of small population, which was started in 1945. On 7 April 1980 a group of five Palestinian militants cut the fences from Lebanon borders and entered

MisgavAm through the Lebanese border and captured eight children of Kibbutz as hostages (Burnstein:1983). They took control of the dormitory in which the children were staying and within few hours the area was surrounded by the IDF. The kidnappers demanded the release of prisoners kept in Israeli jails. Israeli soldiers though failed in its first attempt, but with the help of its special elite Sayeret Matkal force raided and was able to capture the hostage takers.

The attack on the Kibbutz killed three Israelis including the secretary of the Kibbutz Sami Shani, an Israeli soldier Elyahu Tzafrir and a 21 year old named Eyal Gluska, and also wounded many children and soldiers (Jewish Telegraphic Agency 1980).

Mother's Bus Hijacking, 1988

In the 1988 Mother bus hijacking, three members belonging to the PLO armed with guns and grenades hijacked a bus near Negev carrying Israeli civilians. The bus was carrying workers who were heading towards the Dimona nuclear research centre (Fisher 1988). The attackers took nine civilian as hostages which including eight women and they randomly used their grenades and continued firing. The demand of the members was not unusual and demanded the release of fellow companions from Israeli jail. They also killed the single male passenger in the bus.

The attackers were soon confronted with the Yamam Unit, which took control of the situation. Though the kidnappers were killed the incident resulted also in the death of two Israeli civilian (Kauffmann 2008:69). There were several other injuries to the passengers and to the rescue units.

Kidnapping three teenagers, 2014

A recent example of hostage taking has been in 2014 when three Israeli teenagers were taken as hostages. On 12 June teenagers Eyal Yifrah, Gilad Shaer and Naftali Frenkel were kidnapped from Gush Etzion in the West bank. Though the Hamas denied its involvement in the kidnapping Israel has held the militant group responsible for the action. The IDF suspected Amer Abu Aysha and Marwan Kawasme the two Hamas members responsible for the incident. After an intense search lasting eighteen days, on 30 June the bodies of the three teenagers were found buried near Halul (*Times of Israel* 2014). The bodies were found in

Hebron 15 miles away from the spot where they were kidnapped and were buried under rocks.

Reports suggested that they were shot immediately after the kidnapping. Israel with its belief that the Hamas were responsible for the kidnapping, Israel launched operation Protective Edge on 8 July that helped Israel to capture several members of Hamas (The Guardian 2014). The leader of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas while trying to co-operate with Israeli has received criticisms from Hamas. The intension of Abbas to provide support to Israel has been viewed by Israel with scepticism. Most of the right wing members of the Cabinet demanded severe response to such heinous the act.

2.4 Conclusions

A study of the incidents shows that in the 1970s most of the hostage taking incidents meant hijacking of aircrafts. However over time from hijacking it has shifted to kidnapping of civilians or military. Recent trend shows that the location of the hostage has been kept secret to the extent possible. This has been a clear tactics that has developed by the captors probably over the several decades experience with Israel's rescue operations. Where the location of the hostages were in the public domain it was easy for Israel to take a chance and use its military option. But putting a veil over the hostage location has been a major problem for Israel. In the case of the Entebbe hijacking Sabena Flight 571 hijacking or attack on Kibbutz it has been possible for Israel to retaliate with force. In instances like that of Tannenbaum or Shalit it became difficult for Israel to gather information about their location and organise a rescue mission.

Another important observation reveals that the number of the hostages taken reduced from plenty to a handful. For example initially in the 1970s the hijacking would risk the lives of hundreds of people. Gradually in the 1980s and 1990s the number got reduced to group of people ranging from 8 or 9. Since 2000 the hostage takers have concentrated on kidnapping of one or two or a maximum of three individuals. Moreover previously several factions of the PLO had been actively involved in the drama, but from late 90's the Hamas and Hezbollah have evolved as important players in hostage taking.

Chapter III

Military Responses to Hostage taking

Hostage taking has always been a serious security challenge for the state, society and above all the victim/s involved and their family members. Civilian protection is one of the foremost functions of the state. Each state has its own norms and mechanisms in dealing with hostage crises. On the one hand, the state is responsible for the welfare of its citizens and resident population and on the other it has to respond to challenges posed by hostage takers and their demands.

Such situations pose a dilemma for the government which is expected to secure the release of hostages with minimal and socially acceptable concessions. This dilemma has shaped the academic debate in security studies on how a state should respond to a hostage scenario. Scholars differ over the most efficient mechanism to resolve the crisis, namely whether through peaceful negotiations with the hostage takers or through the use of force. Scholars like Mitchell R. Hammer (2007) and Michael J. McMains and Wayman C Mullins (2010) have placed greater emphasis on the idea of negotiation as the best tool to resolve the crisis situation whereas others like Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman (2012) and Michael Bar Zohar and Nissim Mishal (2015) have advocated the use of military force as a more rational response to hostage taking.

The debate between the use of military power or peaceful means have not been new and states often depending on both strategies to meet the demands of the situation. While some states lay emphasis on the use of force, others rely heavily on the negotiation mechanisms. The strategies used in rescue operation have evolved over time through national experiences. A broad survey of various hostage taking incidents since the end of the Second World War shows that military has been widely used to resolve hostage crisis. While the success ratio has been less impressive, states tended to view negotiations as a weak approach and put greater emphasis on military response to rescue hostages. This is manifested in some of the major hostage taking incidents discussed below.

Tehran Hostage Crisis, 1979-81: On 4th November 1979, a group of around 150 Iranian students, who were members of the Muslim Students Association, took control of the American Embassy in Tehran (Quinn 2013). The incident happened minutes after the Islamic revolution that overthrew the Shah who was a close ally of the US. The demonstrations and the planning of the action took place under the leadership of three major figures identified as Mohsen Mirdamadi, Ibrahim Asgharzadeh and Habibollah Bitaraf (Bowden2006:24-25; Shamimi 2009). Six Americans including four men and two women amidst the chaos somehow managed to hide themselves for three months (CBC News 2013;Mendez and Baglio 2012). They were smuggled out by the Canadian embassy. Initially the number of hostages was estimated at 66 which was scaled down to 52 (Bowden 2006:106). Out of the 66 hostages 13 of them were released on 19 and 20 November 1979 and another hostage suffering from Multiple sclerosis named Richard Queen (on the consideration of his bad health) was released on 11july 1980 (Jimmy Carter Library ND; Lewis 2002). The remaining 52 were held as hostages for 444 days (Houghton 2004: 1; Dehghan 2013; Lennie 2014).

The pro-capitalist ideas of the Shah, was seen as a major threat to the idea of an Islamic society. The Shahs arrival in the US on 22 October 1979 for medical treatment added fuel to Iran's animosity towards US. In such a scenario the obvious target to vent out Iran's anger and grievances was the American Embassy (Bowden 2006:26;)

The incident was widely seen as a violation of Article 3 of the International Convention on Diplomatic Relation and Optional Protocol (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols 1961; Cole 2012). The context was the 1979 Islamic revolution that deposed the Shah regime and his exile on 16 January 1979 (Milani 2011:289; Iran Chamber Society 2016). The Shah was brought back in 1953 through a military coup supported by US. The coup was important for US to prevent the possibility of any Russian attempt to take over Iran (Jimmy Carter Home Page ND; Bowden 2006).Since then the US has been viewed as an ally of the shah against whom the people of Iran hold grievances. The Shah at that time in exile was suffering from severe health issues. After temporary refuge in various countries including Egypt and Morocco, on 22 October 1979 he was allowed entry into the US for medical treatment in New York (Phillips1980; Sahimi 2009). The decision of President Jimmy Carter to allow the Shah into the US provided the pretext for the hostage crisis that lasted for 444 days (Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum ND; Milani 2011:290).

In exchange for the release of the hostages, the Iranian groups demanded the return of the Shah.

At that time, the US was preparing for the next Presidential election due on 4 November 1980 and the hostage crisis created immense pressure on Carter who was, seen as a weak leader who could not handle sensitive national security issues. Within weeks after the hostage crisis Carter was confronted with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Hence, Carter was not prepared to giving in to the demands of the hostage takers. Initially, he sought to secure the release the hostages through a host of concessions as well as sanctions. These included, suspension of oil imports from Iran, or freezing of Iranian wealth in the US banks, or employing several prominent officers to mediate with Iran (Garver 2015;Taylor 1981). However this continued and strict approach did not compel Iran to negotiate Even Shah's departure from the US for Panama in December 1979 did not improve the chances of a negotiated settlement. Thus, when these efforts proved futile, Carter took recourse to the military option (Houghton 2004:2).

On 24 April 1980, eight sea stallion helicopters headed by US Delta force took off reaching the deserts of Iran for a rescue operation codenamed *Operation Eagle Claw*. The plan was that the helicopters would land in desert; one, inside Iran and refuel it and reach desert and the other in a mountain area near Tehran. However the operation did not so as planned due to an accident with the helicopter collided in the desert leading to the deaths of eight service men (Bowden 2006; Fong 1980).The use of military did not help in rescuing the hostages but rather made situation worse (Houghton 2004:2). The futile rescue mission only hardened the position of the hostage takers as well as the Iranian regime. The failed military mission adversely affected Carter's electoral prospects and he lost his re-election bid to Republican candidate Ronald Reagan in November 1980s. Finally, after prolonged behind the scene negotiations the 52 hostages, were released on 21 January 1981, hours before Reagan's inauguration as President (Bowden 2006:380)

Moscow Theatre Siege, 2002: One of the most tragic hostage taking incidents took place on 23 October 2002, when a group of militants took control over the Duvrovka Theatre in Moscow (Jeffery 2002; Krechetnikov2012; Oetgen and Balmforth 2012). The incident is known as Nord- Ost siege, because of the theatre performance that was underway during the

siege. A group of armed men entered the theatre and then took around 800 to 979 people as hostages (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2008: 60; Challands 2012). The incident not only brings to the forefront the well-planned tactic of the hostage takers but also their degree of ruthlessness concerning human lives. The group of men and women who were responsible for the Moscow theatre siege were later identified as Chechen rebels having their affinity to the Islamist militant separatist movement in Chechnya. The goal of the organisation was to take a large number of hostages and use them to demand the Russian withdrawal from Chechnya. They declared the hostages would be freed only if Russia would withdraw from Chechnya. The mastermind behind the entire episode was believed to be Movsar Barayev who was closely associated with Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) (Dolnik and Pilch 2003: 586; Leung 2003)

A group of about 22 men and 19 women dressed as civilians took control over the entire theatre building (Tetrault-Farber2014). It was around thirty minutes after the siege that the authorities of the Russian Federation, came to know of the enactment (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2007: 61). It should also be mentioned that the militants were equipped with arms. At the initial stage the Russian authorities showed some positive signs of negotiations with the Chechen group but the real picture was different, the special forces had already started making secret plans to rescue the hostages and not to give up to the demands of the attackers (Challands 2012). It was within an hour that the special unit started rescue operation.

The idea that, going into negotiation would encourage more such incidents convinced the authorities to go for a military option. The use of force in the mentioned incident has been a very controversial. The use of toxic gas by the military to fight the attackers has received some criticisms. In the process of killing the attackers the gas also killed several hostages. The controversy that took place after the incident was whether it was the toxic gas or the Chechens who had caused more damage to the hostages (Walsh 2002;Tetrault-Farber 2014; Politkovskaya 2007:47-48). The operation resulted in the death of more than 120 hostages and injured several others. The military raid was however successful in saving rest of the lives.

Mali Attack, November 2015: The attack on the Bamako Hotel in Mali was another instance to show how military has been used by states to deal with hostage crises. On 20

November 2015 a group of men heavily armed attacked the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako killing around 20 to 27 people and took more than 100 people as hostages (Chandler 2015; *The Indian Express* 2015; Hinshaw 2015). Mali has been a victim of several attacks by the Islamic militant groups in the region. Though there have been varied opinions about the suspect of the attack, Al- Mourabitoun organization, which has its linkages to the Al-Qaeda group, has assumed responsibility for the attack (Walker, English and Agencies 2015; Tilghman 2015). The attackers had randomly fired killing several people (Searcey and Nossiter 2015; Karimi and Burnett 2015; Ed. Payne and Almasy 2015). The Malian Forces were immediately put to the rescue operation. The team also received support from the US and the French military force in its rescue operation (Chandler 2015; Hinshaw 2015). It was within nine hours after the siege that the Malian Force was able to take control over the hotel killing some of the attackers and successfully rescued the rest of the hostages. The military response seems to be the only option available to the Malian Government. The country has been constantly facing several attacks and violent treatment from the several Islamist groups that have found shelter inside Mali. Therefore responding to hostage Crisis through use of military power is not a new or by any means an unusual act. States have often adopted this policy, some brought success while others did not. Any state, which has developed strong military capabilities, finds the use of military to be a rational choice. The use of force also depends on the environment or the location in which the rescue operation in freeing hostage/s take place.

Israel with several security concern and continuous threat from several militant groups has always relied on its military for its security. While studying the different hostage crisis faced by Israel, it can be noticed that the first attempt in crisis has often been rescue attempts by the military.

3.1. Instances of military response

This section of the chapter will try to throw some light on the events which have invited military rescue operation. The study follows a specific pattern while giving descriptions about the incidents. It first gives a factual account of the number of incidents of military response, followed by the location of those incidents, categorisation of the events on the form of hostage taking, and of the attackers in the Crisis.

There have been several incidents of hostage taking faced by Israel. Since Israel has followed the policy of not surrendering to the hostage takers, in most of the hostage events use of military is the primary response. Israel has also gone for negotiation with the hostage takers where the military option was not available or has not brought about any fruitful results.

A close study of all the hostage incidents since 1948 till present indicates there are 13major hostage incidents faced by Israel. These events include the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 in 1968, hijacking of Sabena Flight 571 in 1972, Munich Massacre in 1972, hijacking of Air France Flight 139 in 1976, coastal Road massacre in 1978, Ma'alot massacre in 1974, incident of Misgav Am Kibbutz in 1980, hijacking of Mother's Bus in 1988, kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, hostage taking of businessman named Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000, the abduction of Gilad Shalit followed by abduction of two IDF soldiers in 2006 and the kidnapping of three teenagers in 2014. Out of these incidents, 11 hostage incidents have witnessed a direct military response or rescue operations. The hijacking of El Al Flight 426 (1968) and Munich Massacre (1972) did not meet any direct military response. The hijacking in 1968 being first incident of hijacking resulted in release of all the hostages through negotiated settlement and Munich massacre happened outside Israel and limited its ability to any military operation.

The remaining 11 hostage incidents were met with a military response; four rescue operations involving Sabena hijacking in 1972, Air France hijacking in 1976, Misgav Am hostage taking in 1980 and Mother's Bus hijacking in 1988 and were successful. The remaining seven occasions where military operations were carried—namely Ma'alot massacre in 1974, Coastal Road Massacre in 1978, kidnapping of Wachsman in 1994, Kidnapping of Tannenbaum in 2000, abduction of Shalit in 2006, abduction of two IDF soldiers in 2006 and kidnapping of three teenagers in 2014—were a failure. In some cases, failed military operations were followed by Israeli launching military assaults either on the hostage takers or on their organization bases as retaliation.

The hostage taking events on the basis of the location can be categorised into three levels; inside Israel, in the occupied territories and at the international levels. Among the hostage events seven took place inside Israel including two cross border raids, five were at the

international level and one case of hostage taking, occurred in the occupied West Bank **(Table 3.1)**.

a. International

The hijacking of El AL Flight 426, hijacking of Sabena Flight 571, Munich Massacre, Entebbe operation and the kidnapping of Tannenbaum are the four hostage taking incidents that took place in international territories.

The El Al Flight 426 scheduled from London to Tel Aviv was hijacked on 23 July 1968 and then diverted to Algiers (Coll 2011). This was the first instance of aerial hijacking by PFLP carried out against Israel (Green 2013). The Sabena Flight which was scheduled to fly from Vienna to Tel Aviv was hijacked on 8 May 1972 in between the destinations and the flight was forced to land at the Ben-Gurion Airport (Byman 2011:45; Dunstan and Dennis 2009:7). The Munich massacre of 1972 is another instance, where eleven Israeli lives were lost in the then West Germany. The incident took place within the boundary of the Olympic Village of Munich. Most of the athletes were inside the building, provided by the organizers for the participants. It has served as an important example in the field of research on hostage crisis and a major episode that has an impact on the international security policies. This has been one of the most lamented episodes in the history of hostage incidents faced by Israel.

Another incident that equally serves as an example in the study of hostage taking was the Entebbe operation in 1976. The Air France Flight 139 that was hijacked on 27 June was scheduled from Tel Aviv to Paris with a stopover at Athens. The flight was hijacked after it left Athens and was forced to land at Entebbe the airport in Uganda. It was at Athens, that the perpetrators boarded the flight and within few minutes took control of the flight.

Another instance of hostage taking that operated outside Israel was the kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum. In 2000 Tannenbaum a businessman by profession and had served in the military was kidnapped from Dubai and was taken to Lebanon. While the incident of hijacking of El Al Flight 426, the Sabena Flight 571 and Air France Flight 139 can be categorised as the aerial hijacking. Similarly the Munich massacre of 1972 can be placed under hostage taking of civilians while the kidnapping of Tannenbaum in the year 2000 can be categorised as hostage taking of Military personnel.

b. Inside Israel including two cross border raids

The number of incidents that took place within Israel is more than those outside or in the occupied territories. The seven hostage taking incidents are Ma'alot Massacre (1974), Coastal Road Massacre (1978), Misgav Am attack (1980), Mother's Bus (1988), Wachsman (1994), Shalit (2006) and two IDF soldier (2006).

The Ma'alot massacre in 1974 has been one of the most painful incidents and the death of several children, infants and adults not only created concerns but the incident in a way traumatised the people. Ma'alot is a small town situated inside Israel in Galilee. A group of Palestinian belonging to DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) broke into the school on 15 May taking 85 children as hostages(IMFA1974). Another incident of hostage taking that took place inside Israel was that of the Coastal Road massacre of 1978, the hijacking of the bus on 11 March took place in Tel Aviv near the coastal highways. The incident of Misgav Am in 1980, popularly known as the kibbutz incident, in which the hostage takers on 7 April attacked the kibbutz situated in Northern part of Israel and took control over the building and took the toddlers and children as hostages. The incident of Mother's Bus Hijacking occurred on 7 March 1988 in the southern part of Israel. The bus was carrying workers to the Negev nuclear reactor and was hijacked on its way to Dimona. Wachsman was kidnapped in October 1994 from Bnai Atatrot Junction in Central Israel and was kept in captivity for six days.

Again in 2006, Shalit was kidnapped from the Israel-Gaza border. The same year witnessed the abduction of two Israeli soldiers that resulted in the Second Lebanon War took place at the Israel-Lebanon Borders. The soldiers were abducted from inside Israel and were taken to Lebanon. While the two soldiers were kidnapped by the Hezbollah, Shalit was believed to have been kidnapped by members belonging to Hamas. Among the seven incidents within Israel four , namely Ma'alot massacre, Misgav Am, Mother Bus and Coastal Road massacre can without any doubt be placed under the category of civilians being taken as hostages. While on the other hand the kidnapping of Wachsman and both the incident of 2006 that is abduction of the two soldiers and Shalit falls under the category of hostage taking of military personnel. In both the incidents of 2006 involved soldiers in uniform and Wachsman had already served in the military.

c. Occupied territories

In reference to the hostage incident taking place in the occupied territories, one can find only **one** incident taking place in the West Bank. These incidents include the recent kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in 2014. The three teenagers were students when they were captured and can be categorised as hostage taking of civilians.

While most of the incidents involving the hostage taking of civilians have taken place inside the Jewish state, it is observed that most of these incidents have been planned and carried out by the PLO or an offshoot of the PLO.

3.2. Role of the perpetrators/attackers

It is interesting to note that most of the hostage incidents took place under the leadership of various Palestinian groups. The Black September Group was involved in two major hostage incidents while the Arab Liberation Front was involved in one hostage crisis. Similarly the DFLP was involved single hostage crisis. The PLFP was involved in two hostage crisis. On the other hand the PLO took charge of two major hostage takings. Similarly, Hamas alone has been responsible for 3 major crises. Hezbollah had also been the responsible organization behind 2 major incidents. While the Hezbollah which is composed of militant Islamic group is based in Lebanon the rest of the parties involved in hostage taking are other Palestinian groups.

It is worth mentioning that in the early 70's both the incident of hijacking of Sabena flight 571 and that of the Munich massacre involved the Black September Group. While the former incident was planned by Ali Hassan Salameh and carried out by four members of the Organization, in the latter case the attack was executed under the leadership of Luttif Afif also known as Issa, killing eleven Israeli athletes on German soil, where the athletes were invited to participate in the 1972 Munich Olympics (Reeve 2012: 12).

Every incident of hostage expressed a degree of hatred for the Jewish state. The common goal for all the groups involved in hijacking was to bring the Palestinian issue at the International level and at the same time make way for the release of prisoners captured by Israel. In 1974 the Ma'alot massacre that killed innocent lives was carried out by the DFLP group. The hijacking at the Entebbe airport in Uganda in 1976 was the only incident carried out by the

PFLP group. However during the hostage crisis the PFLP had also received help from the German Revolutionary Cells.

Two incidents directly carried out by the PLO was the Coastal Road Massacre that took place in 1978 and that of the Mother's Bus Affair of 1988. Both the incidents put the live of the civilians at risk. Similar incident that caused severe damage to civilians was the siege of the Misgav Am in the Kibbutz in 1980. The siege was carried out by the Arab Liberation Front with the intension to release prisoners from Israeli jails.

One can see a major shift in the manner of operations in the post 1990s. The period following the start of Oslo Peace Process, saw the rise of hostage taking mostly operated by the Hamas and the Hezbollah group. For instance it was the Hamas that had planned the kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman in the year 1994, Wachsman was an American Israeli who had also served in the IDF. He was kidnapped from Central Israel by a militant of the Hamas group identified as Muhammad Deif (Indyk 2009:342; Miller 2014). This incident also brought out controversy as to whether the PLO and Hamas were actually contesting with each other or rather Arafat was helping the Hamas in serving the same purpose of bringing destruction to Israel. The kidnapping of the businessman Tannenbaum can be cited here as an example. The kidnapping was a well knitted plan was carried out by the Hezbollah but executed in Dubai.

The recent kidnapping of the three Israeli students in 2014 from the West Bank was again carried out by the Hamas. Though there have been several scepticisms in tracing the role of Hamas, but the Israeli authorities have discovered several evidences to link the incidents to Hamas. The year 2006 witnessed two major hostage incidents that had long term impact on Israeli policy making and has led to debates. The first instance was the kidnapping of Shalit near Gaza Strip at Kerem Shalom. The kidnapping was carried out by the Hamas and the location of the captive remained unknown. The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) was not permitted access to the hostage and seen as violation of international law (IDF blog 2013). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu commented that Shalit "is being held by a brutal enemy, Hamas, which refuses to uphold either the minimal demands of the International treaties or humanitarian conditions" (IMFA 2011; Israel Monitor 2011).

The second was the kidnapping of two IDF happened along Israel's border with Lebanon. The abduction of the two soldiers took place under the leadership of Hezbollah (IMFA 2006;

Perry and Crooke 2006). Initially they were aimed at bringing the Palestinian cause at the global level but gradually they drifted using hostage/s as a tool to release their fellow compatriots from Israeli jails. The manner in which the hostages were taken reflects a shift in the purpose of the hostage takers **(Table 3.2)**.

3.3 Military responses

The presence of hostile neighbours and a small population of around 8.1 million (2016 census) have compelled Israel to develop its military strength. Reliance in the military has been a major component in Israel's domestic and international affairs. A study of the 13 hostage incidents reveals that for every hostage crisis the first option proffered by Israel has been the use of military force. This is a reflection of the policy of not negotiating in hostage scenario with the non-state actors. The military option is the culmination of the policy of 'no surrender' to the hostage takers.

The Israel Defence Force which was created in 1948, immediately after the establishment of Israel had the sole task to look after the security of the state. Since military option has been the first response to all the hostage incidents, depending on the consequences one can categorise the incidents into three major themes. It should also be mentioned that the success and failure of the military operation is a subjective view. Two factors should be taken into account for a better understanding of the entire rescue operations. The first factor includes the time taken by the military for the entire operation and the second factor is the quantity of loss in terms of human lives.

Some military response that brought about success; some of the incident brought failure; and some brought partial success. Keeping in mind the time factor and the number of deaths and injuries, there can be five major incidents under the category of successful hostage rescues, two incidents can be placed under the category of partial success while the rest six can be placed under the category of totally failed rescues.

a. Success

This segment of the chapter will focus on the five hostage incidents that have been resolved successfully. These are the hijacking of El Al Flight 426 in 1968, Sabena hijacking in 1972, Air France hijacking in 1976, Misgav Am kibbutz attack in 1980 and the rescue operation of Mother Bus in 1988.

The hijacking of El Al Flight 426 was carried out 23 July 1968 by members of PFLP group. It was a scheduled flight from London to Rome. This is the first instance of aerial hijacking against Israel. The incident can be categorised as complete success because all the 12 hostages were Israel did not agree to release of 16 prisoners as demanded by the hijackers. It was through the mediation of Italy and the Airline Pilot Association (ALPA) that the attackers released the hostages through a negotiated deal that continued for more than a month (Clark 2016; *The Hindustan times 2016*). However some sources reveal that Israel was preparing itself for the military rescue operation, but captors released the hostages before a military operation was put in place (Green 2013).

The hijacking of the Sabena Flight in 1972 opened up another chapter in Israel's military operation. The Black September group hijacked around 101 Israeli passengers and demanded the release of 317 freedom fighters held in Israeli jail. Though Israel responded agreeing to release, some of the soldiers but the Israeli Government was with no second thought would prepare for the military option. The IDF at that time under the then Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and the Chief of Staff named David Elazar was called by the Government for the special Force Unit the Sayeret Matkal to take control over the situation and launch a military operation to rescue the hostages (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:7). The military operation under the name *Operation Isotope* started with the puncturing of the tyres of the aircraft which would manage to prevent the hijackers from flying. It was within ninety seconds that the Sayeret Matkal was able to take control of the entire scenario. Among the four perpetrators, two were shot down while another lady hijacker was severely wounded in the assault. There was only one women hostage who died accidentally. The rescue operation can still be considered as a victory of the Israeli Military for the simple reason it could save the lives of the hostages. The Entebbe operation has served as the best example of hostage rescue operation.

The most illustrative example for a military success of Israel has been that of the rescue operation at the Entebbe. The hijacking of the flight took place on 27 July 1976 by the members of PFLP and German Revolutionary Cell. Going for a rescue mission at Entebbe Airport was not an easy task. At the initial stage, though, Israel showed some sign of negotiation, the ultimate motive was to rescue the hostages by use of its military power. The operation put at stake the live of the hostages. Though at initial stage the authorities were in dilemma regarding the success of the military operation what served as an advantage to the rescue unit was the familiarity with the infrastructure of the Uganda airport. Another important factor added to this was the highly equipped superiority of the Israeli air force. The hijacking of the flight was not sudden news and the hijackers who boarded the flight took control of the flight within few moments. There was a sudden failure in the electronic transmission procedure which made it possible for the monitoring unit to confirm the hijacking. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin placed the Sayeret Matkal on high alert (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:12).

But the problem was that the flight which was supposed to reach Paris from Athens was hijacked to Uganda which the rescue unit had not anticipated about. Rabin with several other members including Defence Minister Shimon Peres and the Chief of Staff Lt Gen Mordechai engaged in several meetings to discuss about the fate of the hostages(Netanyahu 2002:16).The hijackers gave an ultimatum of demands and put forward the deadline of 1 July and threatened to kill the hostages if their demands were not met. The Israeli authorities though decided for a military takeover but needed time for the preparation. Though, Israel agreed to get into negotiation but the ultimate aim was to keep the hostage takers busy. The sudden increase in the deadline by the hostage taker helped the military to prepare better for the assault. In spite of several obstacles in difference in opinion regarding the strategy for the rescue, the rescue unit was finally prepared for the rescue operation. It was within few days of preparation and before the deadline of the ultimatum, that the Israeli Force stormed the Entebbe Airport and rescued the hostages on 4 July 1976. Another time the military option brought fruitful outcome to Israel safely rescuing 103 hostages (Katz and Volstad 1988:20). The success of the military operation named *Operation Entebbe* has been one of the most widely known, and appreciated example of rescue attempt that has established Israel's air power superiority globally. Unfortunately Israel suffered the loss of the commander in charge of the operation. The soldier who sacrificed his life for saving so many hostages was Yonatan

Netanyahu It was in his memory that the operation is also identified as *Operation Yonatan*. Yonatan Netanyahu was the brother of the present Israeli Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu (Netanyahu 2009 :131).

The episode of rescue of the Misgav Am in 1980 and the Mother Bus rescue operation can also be categorised as successful military operations. In the incident of Misgav Am, few members of the Arab Liberation Front took control of the Kibbutz and took 8 children as hostages (The Israeli Special Force Data Base 1980). The militants also attacked the toddlers who were present inside the dormitory of the building. The success of the operation lies in the fact that the Sayeret team was able to take control over the entire building and also over the attackers. Similarly, during the Mother Bus rescue operation of 1988 members of the PLO hijacked the bus carrying passengers to Nuclear Research Center. Immediately within hours the Yamam team took control over the situation. One of the hostage was killed in the event, however the rest of the hostages were safely rescued by the rescue unit killing all the attackers.

b. Partial success

This theme will mainly focus on two incidents of hostage taking, kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000, and the abduction of Shalit in the year 2006. The abduction of the Israeli businessman Elhanan Tannenbaum was a matter of importance for the Israeli security. The man had carried along with him several confidential military documents. So, when the announcement of his kidnapping was made by the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, it not only created concern for the security of the hostage but, Tannenbaum's access to several documents made the issue a serious matter of concern for the IDF (Alon and Melman 2004).

The military was not successful in rescuing Tannenbaum from the clutches of the Hezbollah, but however he was brought back alive through the prisoners exchange deal in 2004 where he along with the dead bodies of three Israeli soldiers who were kidnapped and killed in 2000, were returned in exchange of more than 200 Arabs who were kept as prisoners in Israel (IMFA 2001; *Israel National News* 2004). There were controversies whether the three soldiers were abducted or killed in the attack (Ynet News 2009; IMFA 2001).

The release of Tannenbaum can be cited as an example of partial success of the military because even though successful rescue operation was not possible still the hostage was brought back through a deal with the Hezbollah.

The abduction of Shalit serves as another example of partial military success. The soldier was kidnapped by the Hamas Group on 25 June 2006 from Kerem Shalom near the Israel- Gaza border (IMFA 2006). He was then carried to the Gaza Strip by the Hamas through the use of tunnels (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 25 June 2006; Harel 2011). Immediately, after the abduction Israel launched the military *Operation Summer Rains* (McCarthy 2006; Graham 2011:287). The main objective behind the attack was to compel the Hamas to release Shalit. A major problem faced by the military was that the location of the hostage was maintained secret and the Israeli Military could no way have access to Shalit, this made the military more cautious about its actions. The soldiers after staying in captivity for about five years was finally released through a prisoner's exchange swap in 2011. Israel had to release 1027 prisoners from Israeli Jail to bring back Shalit. For the first time Israel was able to bring back a soldier alive who was kidnapped in its military uniform. Though the price for the release has brought about several debates inside Israel, the success lies in saving the life of the soldier.

c. Total failure

Military operation has also served several examples to show how the offensive policy of Israel has brought about disaster to the state. This theme will deal with those incidents where the military has not been able to achieve any degree of success and resulted in complete failure of the military. These includes the Munich massacre in 1972, the Ma'alot massacre in 1974, the Coastal Road massacre of 1978, Killing of Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, the abduction of two IDF soldier in 2006 and kidnapping of the three Israeli teenagers in 2014.

Placing the incident of Munich Massacre of 1972 under this theme might require various explanations. The incident killed eleven Israeli athletes and not only alarmed the Jewish state but also put forward the growing concern for the international system towards the security of its citizen. An important aspect that needs to be mentioned here is that, the entire assault took place within the territory the then West Germany. The hostage takers which included the members of Black September Group demanded the release of prisoners in exchange of the

lives of the athletes. However Israel strictly refused to agree to enter into negotiation and refused to surrender to the hostage takers. The Israeli Force could no way save the lives of the hostages but just remain as a mere helpless spectator since it was out of the reach of Israel. Prime Minister Golda Meir was furious about the entire incident and ordered for launch of. *Operation Spring of Youth* (Bar-Zohar and Mishal 2012:156).The main goal of the mission was to secretly hunt down the members responsible for the massacre. To a large extent, it was successful in punishing most of the perpetrators, but took years for the Intelligence Unit to gather information, plan and recruit several secret agents and to carry out the assassinations (Caspit 2013; Reeve 2011:124). However the grief and loss that the incident brought to Israel has always been one of those haunted experience. The Munich massacre has opened a new chapter in the field of security studies and has enabled scholars to have a better understanding of the kind of strategy a state should follow in hostage crisis.

The Ma'alot massacre illustrates the failure of the military operation. The hostage takers were armed with explosives and that made the military cautious about its action, as its actions would endanger the lives of the hostages. The rescue operation launched lasted for several hours. At the initial stage when the attackers demanded the release of prisoners, Israel agreed to a partial list of the demands (MFA 1974; Marks 2014). Refusal to agree on the entire list made the attackers kill almost 18 to 24 hostages. After the incident Israel launched another military operation as a response to the massacre (*BBC News*1974).

The Coastal Road Massacre in 1978 was one of the deadliest episodes in which the attackers killed 37 Israeli's. The victims included men, women and also children. Apart from this the attackers also injured 76 people (MFA 1978). As a response to the attack Israel launched *Operation Litani* with the intention to wipe away the PLO bases in southern part of Lebanon. Similarly military failure can be observed in the rescue operation of Wachsman in October 1994. He was an IDF soldier captured by the Hamas from Bnai Atarot Junction in Central Israel and kept in captivity for six days (Levi 2015). By the time the military broke into the building he was already shot by the hostage takers (Kahn 2011; Levitt 2008:80). The military force identified the location where Wachsman was held captive but the rescue attempt was a failure

The military operation following the abduction of two IDF soldiers (NAME) by the Hezbollah in July 2006 has received much criticism, and can be included in the list of failed military operations. The motive behind the abduction of the two IDF soldier was to use them

as bargaining chips vis-à-vis Lebanon prisoners held by Israel (Myre and Erlanger 2006). Using the abduction as the pretext Israel launched the Second Lebanon war that lasted for 34 days. The war could not bring about any fruitful results despite causing internal damage to Lebanon. There have been several explanations for the failure of the military. One major reason being Israel's confidence in its air superiority and its lack of knowledge or preparedness to fight the guerrilla tactics adopted by the Hezbollah during the War (Sullivan and Sullivan 2006:150).

A more recent example of failed military rescue attempt was the operation *Brother's Keeper* in response to the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in 2014 who were assumedly kidnapped by the Hamas. Immediately after the news of the abduction the military was employed in the rescue operation. Immediately Israel launched its military *Operation Brother's Keeper*, in which Israel carried out massive attacks on the Hamas bases and arrested several suspects (Zitun 2014;Beaumont 2014). After several days of search the dead bodies of the three teenagers were discovered, which on investigation revealed that they were shot immediately after the kidnapping. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held the Hamas responsible for the kidnapping and also stated that the group had to pay for such attack. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that "Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay" (Rudoren and Kershner 2014).

3.4. Salient features

A close observation of all the incidents that were met with the military response shows some common characteristics. The use of military has been a fundamental feature of Israel's security policy. In most of the events, Israel has directly responded to the attack through its military. In instances where there has been no availability of military use due to several reasons, Israel has retaliated to the incident at a later date. Eleven out of the thirteen major incidents discussed earlier has received direct military responses. Some of them have been successful while some has been failure. Instances of failed military operation have met with reprisal attacks at a later date. The hijacking of Sabena flight in 1972 or that of Entebbe operation in 1976 has brought about success and appreciation for the IDF. Similar response was also seen during the capture of kibbutz in Misgav Am in 1980 and Mother's bus hijacking in 1988.

During the Ma'alot Massacre in 1974, when the perpetrators captured the Netiv Meir Elementary School, Israel did not opt for the Military operation when it discovered that the hijackers had carried explosives with them. When the perpetrators killed the children as a failed negotiation, Israel bombed several refugee camps in Lebanon as retaliation. Same was practiced in respect to Munich massacre. Another instance of similar reaction was the incident of coastal road massacre on 11 March 1978. Though the intention of the perpetrators was to hijack the civilians, but failure to do that made the attackers kill the hostages. As a response to the incident Prime Minister Begin in the Knesset said "Gone are forever the days when Jewish blood could be shed with impunity" (IMFA 1978).Within a few days of the massacre that Israel launched *Operation Litani* in March 1978 which aimed at destroying several PLO bases in Lebanon

The first rescue attempt by the IDF to release the hostages of Misgav Am failed, the demands of the attackers could not be entirely accepted by Israel. In the second rescue attempt the Sayeret Matkal team which was able to enter the building through various openings were able to take control of the entire situation.

The dealing with kidnapping of Wachsman and Tannenbaum, Shalit and the two IDF soldiers, in all the three hostage incidents Israel has relied on its military power for a rescuing them. While all the rescue attempts failed, Tannenbaum and Shalit were brought back to Israel after going through process of negotiation. Though after the kidnapping of Shalit the then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made a public statement to the Knesset to not to give in to the hostage takers on negotiations of prisoners.

Similarly during the abduction of the two IDF soldier in 2006 Israel retaliated by waging war on Lebanon. Military response has been the foremost priority of the state. The kidnapping of the three teenagers on 12 June 2014, made Israel launch *Operation Brother's Keeper*. The operation caused severe destruction to Gaza Strip controlled by the Hamas. Three hostage taking incidents share a common feature and direct military operation was not successful.

All the incidents have received a military treatment, some at the very spot and some cases where military option was absent, at the latter stages. It responded at a later date, often at place it the base of the hostage taker but the use of military power has been the most common phenomena in all the incidents.

A study of the several hostage incidents bring out certain specificities. One can draw some common linkages between the form of hostage taking and the perpetrators. For instance hostage taking in the occupied territories has been only from the West Bank region. The kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman and the kidnapping of the three Israeli teenagers has been from this region and added to that both the attacks have been carried out by the Hamas. Another common line in both the incident is the hostage/s was/were killed by Hamas before the rescue team could reach them. There has been no incident of hostage from the Gaza Strip. The only instance of Gaza Strip that can be cited is the abduction of Shalit where the perpetrators crossed from the Gaza Strip to Israeli borders. The abduction took place within the state of Israel.

Another unique feature can be drawn from both the cases of aerial hijacking, the Sabena and the hijacking at Entebbe, has been carried out by the Black September Group and the PFLP group, both owe their allegiance to the PLO.

The hostage situation gives a clear picture regarding Israel's policy of not negotiating with the hostage takers. Several statements by political figures have always re confirmed Israel's taken on such issues. Some instances clearly show that Israel has used the negotiation mechanism as a tool to fool the attackers and utilize the time to prepare for its military assault. Only when military attempts failed it was forced to go into negotiation.

Negotiation has often been used by Israel as a strategy to buy time. This can be best explained through the instances of the Entebbe operation and *Operation Isotope*. In both the instances Israel at one level has agreed to enter into negotiation while simultaneously preparing the rescue operation.

The hijacking of Sabena flight on 8 May 1972 clearly shows that Israel continued the negotiation process but had no intention to fulfil them. In fact, they eventually practiced the entire assault on another Boeing flight that stood at the airport (Reeve 2011: 32). The same can be observed in case of the hijacking of Air France airliner on 27 June 1976. The hijackers put forward 1 July 1976 as the deadline to fulfil the demands of the hijackers. It was on 1 July that Israel showed some signs of approval for negotiation which resulted into extension of the deadline to 4 July 1976. This extension of time added advantage to the rescue unit to gather more time to prepare. Finally, on 4 July the IDF successfully rescued the hostages; the assault

lasted for just ninety minutes. The Sabena and Entebbe are clear examples that even though Israel has shown signs of negotiations it has never been its intention. It has just used booby traps to divert the attention of the perpetrators.

Due to concerns related to security of the hostage/s at times Israel refrained from the use of military use and also it did not agree to negotiate either. The Ma'alot massacre has been one instance where the military even after reaching the vicinity of the location, did not carry out its operation. The military discovered that the kidnappers had grenades which could blow up the entire building and kill innocent lives. Security of the civilians compelled them to step back. At such situation Israel agreed to cater to the demands of the kidnappers though only partially.

Third party negotiator

Instances where Israel has not been able to rescue the hostages, it has agreed to negotiate, though, it has never directly negotiated with the attackers. This is a common feature in all the incidents that include negotiation be it for stalling time or out of compulsions. The negotiation for the release of Tannenbaum has been secured with the help of Germany. Similarly the negotiation process to rescue Shalit, Egypt and Germany had played a major role. During the incident of Ma'alot massacre, when the Israeli intelligence discovered that the attackers were carrying explosives which had the potential to blow up the entire school building along with the hostages, the cabinet decided to negotiate with the hostage takers by agreeing to release twenty prisoners from the list of demands. But the proposal was totally rejected by the perpetrators.

Added to this was their threat to kill the mediator send by Israel unless he carried a code word along with him. This condition put forward by the attackers made situation worse. According to a well planned tactic, the attackers demanded the release of 26 prisoners and their safe transport to Lebanon as a pre-requisite for the transmission of the code to the mediator. This would be the first phase of the negotiation which would convince the perpetrators to release few of the children. This demand was unacceptable to Israel. The failure of the mediator to bring any fruitful result and the constant threat of the attackers convinced the cabinet to agree to the launch of military assault (MFA, 1974).

3.5 Conclusions

All the hostage incidents have been the activities of several non-state actors. In events where the military is well informed about the location of the hostage and is familiar with the surroundings of the captive's location has been successful. The knowledge about the location was a major factor in the Entebbe operation. Similar information gathered during the Mother Bus hostage incident in 1988 added advantage to the Yamam elite force. The attack on the kibbutz was an incident where the first rescue attempt was a failure. The knowledge gathered about the several openings in the Kibbutz favoured the Sayeret team to rescue the hostages

This absence of information about the hostage location is the biggest disadvantage for the rescue team. This has been the case during the rescue attempts of Shalit. The military failed to trace the location, where Shalit was held captive. Information failure ultimately left two options for Israel; either to let the hostage suffer in the hand of Hamas or meet the demands of the attackers. But Israel following Shalit's long stay in captivity later stage agreed to negotiate in order to bring back Shalit alive. In such cases where the environment has favoured military operation Israel has used its full military power. In cases where there has been a risk to civilian life or military option seemed to be unfeasible Israel has agreed to go for negotiations. In terms of saving the life of the hostages military operations have been both success and failure as well.

Chapter IV

Negotiated Settlements

Be it inter-state war conflict, or, the hostage taking incidents, negotiation as a strategy has often been used as a mechanism to deal with the situation. Before going into any discussion on hostage negotiation, it is imperative to define the term. The word negotiation, normally, refers to the process of discussion among two or more actors to reach an agreement. Negotiation allows the settlement of any crisis through continuous communication using peaceful means. However, the process starts only with the willingness of the involved actors/ parties. Bargaining process has been a major defining feature of any negotiation. The parties always try to strike a deal that would enable it to have the maximum gains through the settlement mechanism. Negotiation is a process that can continue from few hours to several years. The ultimate aim of the entire process is to reach a settlement, which would benefit all the involved player/s.

Scholars like Adam Dolnik (2007), Roger Fisher (1972), Wayman C Mullins (2010), Michael J McMains (2010), Mitchell R Hammer (2007), and Harvey Schlossberg (1979) have propagated the need and use of negotiation mechanism. Their core argument put up by scholars in favour of negotiation, holds that at the end of the negotiation process both the parties could have some positive outcomes.

Scholars, who advocated negotiation mechanism, argue that the involved parties in the bargaining process cannot be, equally benefited. One would receive more than the other, but both would benefit. The process would always bring out some fruitful outcome. Hostage taking has always posits serious threat to the state, societies and more importantly the victim/s. Countries have often opted for the negotiation mechanism while dealing with the hostage takers. Wayman C Mullins(2010) and Michael J McMains(2010) point out that in hostage crisis, there is an involvement of lives. It also attracts the attention of the public and hence, it is important for the police or the negotiator to be well rehearsed and well trained in the negotiation techniques.

Most scholars have prioritised negotiation as the best tool to deal with hostage crises. They have criticized the basic understanding of negotiation rejecting the common understanding about negotiation that it is through a bargaining tool. For them states that believe in not surrendering to the demands of the hostage takers miss out the fact that negotiation is also a process by which the state can influence the decision-making and the behaviour of the hostage taker through its communication skills (Dolnik and Fitzgerald 2007:9). For example Adam Dolnik and Keith M Fitzgerald in one of their work on negotiation argue that if negotiation skill could be used during the Beslan hostage crisis of 2004, then the scenario would have been different and many lives would have been saved.

4.1. Negotiation Strategy

The negotiation process consists of three major elements: victim, negotiator and hostage taker. In any hostage taking incident, the role of the negotiator is very crucial. The negotiator should possess some specific qualities to deal with the situation. The main objective of the negotiator is to use his/her skills to convince the involved parties. The credibility of the negotiator lies in his/her ability to bargain with the hostage taker, more he/she (or the negotiation team) surrender to the bargaining term more vulnerable situation becomes.

However, the safety of the hostage/s is the foremost priority of the negotiator. Apart from the bargaining skills the negotiator should also be well aware of the social and ideological background of the attacker and must have a well informed knowledge about the motives of the hostage takers. As Adam Dolnik and Keith M Fitzgerald (2008) argues that negotiation is a process of communication through which the minds and thoughts of the hijacker can be influenced.

In this regard, the role of the negotiator stands vital. It is also important for the negotiator to have detailed knowledge about the background of the hostage. This will help the negotiator to be aware of the possible reactions that the hostage might exhibit in certain specific scenario (McMains and Mullins 2010:474). The negotiator should have the quality of being a good listener and the absence of which can be a major obstacle in the negotiation process. He /she should be able to listen to the demands of the hostage taker and active enough to involve in several talks with the captor/s. Another important aspect attached to the role of the negotiator is the willingness to refrain from violence. The negotiator should have firm faith in the entire

process and should believe that negotiation is the means to save the life of the hostage. The outcome of the negotiation process is greatly determined by the capacity and skills of the negotiator.

In any hostage crisis, the ultimate victim is the hostage and when it comes to the question of saving life of the hostage, it becomes more crucial for the negotiator. This is simply because the life of the hostage depends on the abilities of the negotiator to come to terms with the hostage takers. Incidents of hostage taking have some specificity, which differentiates them from other forms of attack like killing or kidnapping of innocent lives. In hostage taking incident the victim is taken as hostage with the intention of achieving specific demand of the captor/s. the captor then uses the hostage to compel the third party (state) to meet the demands which would not be possible otherwise (Noesner 1999).

A major problem with regards to the hostage crisis in any negotiation has been the psychological impact on the hostage. The entire phase of captivity traumatises the victim and this has an impact on the rest of the live of the hostage. Though the degree of impact varies from person to person, but no victim is an exception to this psychological impact. The stress may lead to mental and physical breakdown. Sometimes, the stress and anxiety of the hostage may leads to several sicknesses ranging from headache to frequent looks of hallucination (Lanza 1986; Siegel 1984; McMains and Mullins 2010: 472).

The Stockholm syndrome is another phenomenon that has posed severe threat to the entire negotiation process. A Stockholm syndrome refers to the situation where the hostage gradually develops some sort of sympathy and compassion for the hostage taker. He/she does not hold any animosity towards the captor/s rather supports them in achieving their demands. The term Stockholm syndrome was first popularised by Nils Bejerot in 1973. The syndrome traces its origin from the incident of a bank robbery in 1973 in Stockholm. The incident is a clear example to show how the hostages sided with the captors and developed a compassion for the captors and also assisted the attackers by making their task easier (Bejerot 1974:486). Scholars argue that in certain instances of hostage taking the hostage becomes so stunned that even a mere deed of kindness, for instance not killing or inflicting injuries to the hostage, is enough to evoke within the victim some sort of compassion for the attacker.

The Stockholm syndrome can be explained through three core elements. Firstly, the hostage gradually starts developing some sort of positive affection towards their captor/s. Secondly, as a consequence of the first element the hostage eventually starts developing some negative feelings towards the police or the rescue team. Thirdly, the hostage strongly starts developing some degree of compassion towards their captors (Olin and Born 1983; Strentz 1982; McMains and Mullins 2010: 446).

The kidnapping of Patty Hearst in 1974 has been a well-known manifestation of Stockholm syndrome. Patty Hearst the daughter of Randolph Apperson Hearst and granddaughter of famous newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst was kidnapped at the age of nineteen by the members of Symbionese Liberation Army. She gradually started siding with the captors and indulged in inappropriate activities like bombing, using guns to rescue members of SLA, robbery etc (Rotella 1989; The Federal Bureau of Investigation). Initially she was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, but after two years it was commuted by President Carter and she was granted pardon by President Bill Clinton in 2001(Nizza 2008; Vulliamy and Arlidge 2001).The Stockholm syndrome is unique feature and takes place in rare instances of hostage taking. However in any hostage situation the Stockholm syndrome is not an easy task to deal with and often makes situation critical for the rescue unit.

The hostage takers action is many aimed against the state. Their ultimate goal is to make demands to the state, which are political in nature in exchange for the release of the hostage. The purpose of taking the hostage is just to use him/her as a bargaining tool to achieve goals. The ideological background of the captor is very important. Most of the time the hostage takers are ideologically driven and to achieve their demands or in a way to challenge the state, they attack the innocent civilians. It is very important for the negotiator to study the factors that influence the hostage takers. Knowing this would help the negotiator to understand and response accordingly to the demands of the captor. When states are aware of the capabilities of the hostage taker, it becomes easier in the decision-making process on how to deal with the attackers. Any hostage taking situation requires discussion by policy makers on the type of response the state should adopt. The ideological background of the hostage taker or the reason for taking hostage is a major factor in understanding the way a negotiator should behave in the hostage negotiation process.

Models of hostage negotiation

Several studies on hostage negotiation have put forward various model of negotiation. In this segment the focus will be on two models of negotiation. The first model has been the SAFE model and the other being the REACT model. These two models form the basic framework for any hostage negotiation.

First, The SAFE model was put forward by Mitchell R Hammer (2007) in his book *Saving Lives The S.A.F.E Model for Resolving Hostage and Crisis incidents*. At first Hammer used the FIRE model to explain the strategies related to negotiation. FIRE stands for Face, Instrumental Demand, Relationship and Emotions. But due to differences of opinion with his colleagues he changed the name of the model to SAFE model (Hammer 2007). This model emphasizes the role of communication in any negotiation strategy. The negotiator should be well skilled in communication so that he/she can influence the behaviour of the captor/s. The SAFE model which emphasizes on interaction, revolves around three major elements: first the subject, how and whether the subject is communicating with the police negotiator regarding his/her demands. Second is the police negotiator who should be able to negotiate with the subject and third is the ability of the negotiator to shift from one stage to the other when he/she has been able to achieve some sort of progress in the negotiation process.

The underlying idea behind the SAFE model is to bring out a framework that involves constant interaction process. The role of the negotiator is to understand and deal with the issue that occupies the mind of the captor when he/she is in conversation with the negotiator. The purpose of the negotiator is to build a good rapport with the captor/s so that it becomes easier to talk on the major concerned issues (McMains and Mullins 2010:133).

Second, Michael J. McMains and Wayman C. Mullins along with the contribution of several other authors developed the REACT model which served as a framework for negotiation (McMains and Mullins 2010:125). The REACT model stands for Recognition, Engagement, Assessment, Contracting and Terminating. It is important for the negotiator to communicate with the captors and then gradually proceed after calculating the risk involved in it. He should also develop some degree of trust in the entire negotiation process, so, that it becomes easy to bargain with the hostage taker.

4.2. Hostage Negotiation Incidents

Both the mechanisms of negotiation have often been used by several states to save innocent lives. The responsibility of the state to secure the live of its citizen has often been the driving force behind such policy. Instances are not rare to show how states have been compelled to negotiate with hostage takers and Israel has been prone to such victimization. Here are some global examples to show how states have negotiated with the captors for releasing the hostages.

Laju hijacking 1974

The Laju incident in January 1974 was another example to show how the state has negotiated with the hostage takers to secure the release of hostages. The Laju incident refers to the hijacking of the ferry boat in Singapore named Laju took five of the crew members were taken as hostages. The attack was carried out jointly by Members of Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

The hijackers initially came with the intention of looting the Shell oil refinery complex which was situated in Palau Bukom, so that they could stop the oil supply from the refinery to various other places (Seng 2002). During the operation the news of the attack was known and the attackers in an attempt to escape hijacked the boat Laju, took the five crew members of the boat as hostages and demanded their safe passage to the Middle East.

After several days of negotiation a deal was reached whereby the attackers were safely transported to the desired destinations in exchange of the release of the hostages? The safe passage was guaranteed by a group of thirteen men, headed by S.R Nathan, the director of the Singapore Security and Intelligence Division (Sim 2015 ; Au-Yong 2014). Finally, the hijackers were safely escorted by the government to Kuwait (Tann and Wee 1974:1). Two hostages were successful in escaping while the negotiation process was going on. The rest of hostages were safely released according to the terms of the deal. The negotiation was successfully implemented without causing any harm to human life.

Kandahar hijacking 1999

The hijacking of Indian airline airbus A300 on 24 December 1999, which lasted for seven days, has been a controversial episode concerning India's security. The flight IC-814 was on

a scheduled from Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu to Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi. The pilot of the aircraft on the day of hijacking was Captain Devi Sharan and the Chief flight attendant was Anil Sharma. The flight was hijacked within few minutes after it took off and the pilot was threatened by the hijackers to 'fly West'. There are differences among sources in revealing the exact number of passengers hijacked. It was carrying around 176 to 180 passengers along with 11 to 15 crew members. The hijackers were identified as members of Harkat ul-Mujahideen (Iqbal 2015; Holliway 2010).

The hijackers demanded the release of three militants who were held in India prisons. They were Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Maulana Masood Azhar. The hatred for India has been deep rooted in the minds of these militants. The age-old rivalry between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has been a bone of contention. These militant oppose India's claim over Kashmir and their ultimate mission is to secede Kashmir from India's control. This hatred against India found expression through several activities of this militant organization.

The goal of the hijackers was to secure the release of their leaders who were accused of causing destruction to India. These three were prominent in India's militant lists. As a part of the Kandahar deal, all the three militants were released in exchange of the hostages (Swami 2004; Iqbal 2015). Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar was the chief of Al Umar Mujahedeen group assumed to be involved in more than forty murder cases (Bhat 2015; Umar 2014; Dulat and Sinha 2015:34). Azhar was arrested in 1994 for his alleged involvement in the kidnapping of three Bretons and an American. Since then he has been in jail (BBC 2002). Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh on the charge of kidnapping Western tourists in India has been in jail from 1994 (*The Indian Express* 2014). The three militants had been in topmost positions of the extremist organizations and the hijackers used the hostages as a tool to secure their release.

The activities of these militants did not stop after they were released in 1999. Omar Sheikh was accused of being the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacked. He was also involved in the killing of the Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 (Finn 2011; Mayer 2007; Farmer 2011). Azhar immediately after his release, founded an Islamist extremist group Jaish-e-Mohammad in 2000 (Subramaniam 2008). However the organization has been banned by the

Pakistan authorities in 2002. After his release in 1999 he was also held responsible for the Parliament attack in 2001(Tanner 2001; Times of India 2008).

The three militant responsible for the hijacking initially wanted the flight to be taken to Lahore but due to lack of fuel the captain, insisted on landing at the airport in Amritsar. The plan was to disable the flight from flying from Amritsar. The Punjab police dispatched tanks to restrict the movement which made the hijackers feel insecure and forced the flights take off for Lahore for refuelling. Pakistan and India has always been hostile to each other, so the Lahore Airport authority would not allow the landing of the hijacked flight.

The age-old animosity between the two states turned out to be a disadvantage for India. The Lahore airport authority showed no support for the landing of the flight and the runway were turned off. In spite of this, the urgent need for refuelling forced the pilot to land at the airport even in the absence of the light. The airport authority realised that this would result into crashing of the aircraft, so they switched the lights on. The aircraft was allowed to stay for the minimal time and took off immediately after the refuelling. The Pakistani Government being very much conscious about the situation did not want to draw itself into any sort of controversy and this prevented them from providing any sort of assistance. More over the hijackers themselves belong to the extremist group which had its association with Pakistan. The next destination for the hijacked flight was Dubai Military airport. Here 27 hostages were released, another injured man named Rupan Katyal was also released but he was already found dead at the time of his release (Iqbal 2015; Gupta 2008).

The halting at Dubai could not serve India other than releasing few hostages. The UAE government was fixed on its decision and refrained from involving itself in the hostage incident. This prevented India from carrying out any rescue operation within the territory of UAE. A Former Chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) stated that India at that time was internationally isolated and so the government could not convince the US to pressurize UAE to help India (Gupta 2008; Dulat and Sinha 2015:32).

Finally, the aircraft landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which was under the Taliban regime. India did not recognize the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and this created problem in the communication process. However there have been controversies among analyst regarding the intentions of the Taliban. As soon as the Flight landed in Kandahar, the Taliban forces

surrounded the aircraft. The Taliban assumed to be supporters of the hijackers, justified their action saying it was an attempt to persuade the hijackers to release the hostages. The Taliban feared an Indian Military operation, because such an operation against the hijackers would also allow a raid on the Taliban. So the Taliban played the role of mediator between India and the hijackers (Iqbal 2015).

Jaswant Singh the External Affair Minister at the first instance had no intension to give in to the demands. He suggested that surrender to the hijackers would go against India's national interest (Gupta 2008). But families of the hostages were anxious and agitated for rescuing the hostages and this brought about much pressure on the Government. Jaswant Singh personally met the families of the hostages and promised the furious crowd that he would make every possible attempt to secure the release of the hostages. The decision was taken that Jaswant Singh would go to Kandahar and present when the exchange takes place between India and the hijackers. It was on 31 December 1999, when the three militants were handed over to the hijackers in exchange of the hostages. The hostages along with Jaswant Singh returned to India by a special plane. The External Affair Ministry accompanying the three militants to Kandahar came under criticism (Gupta 2011; *The Economic Times 2013*)

Some analysts argue that the decision was the only option while others view some intentional hindrance on behalf of the authorities to go for military operation. Major criticism focussed on the rationale behind allowing the hijacked flight to fly from Amritsar (Dixit 2002). Sarabjit Singh the Chief Punjab Police at that time was in charge of the entire situation when the hijacked aircraft landed in Amritsar. He stated that there were trained commandos in such operations under his disposal and it was within the capacity of the commandos to carry out the rescue operation. He also made clear that the Crisis Management Group (CMG) did not allow him to carry out any sort of military operation (Iqbal 2015). The former RAW Chief A.S Dulat stated in interview that the crisis could have been managed well, the fault was with the Crisis Management Group (CMG). He also opined that the CMG and the Government in order to avoid collateral damage, had actually goofed up the possibilities to carry out the rescue operation (Raaj 2015; Singh 2015).On the other hand political figure has supported the decision of the Government to release the three prisoners. As the lives of the hostages were 'more precious' than the demands of the hijackers (*Times of India* 2015).

However after the incident the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) charged ten persons for the hijacking. Seven out of the ten had taken shelter in Pakistan. The rest three identified as Abdul Latif, Yusuf Nepali and Dilip Kumar Bhujel has been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Patiala House Court in New Delhi on the charges of hijacking. The militants who were released by India in exchange of the hostages were later involved in several other criminal activities. The entire decision to go for negotiation with the hijackers has allowed room for controversies. The Kandahar episode has in a way defamed the prestige of the country and has raised question on the credibility of the authorities. However the hostages were safely brought back to India in exchange for the release of the three militants.

4.3 Incidents of Hostage negotiation

Negotiation in case of Israel does not mean a single day affair but it refers to a process that at times has taken several years to bring about certain concrete outcomes. A thorough study of all the hostage incidents will show two trends of negotiation. One being the instances of proxy negotiation and the other being a prolonged negotiated settlement. Among the thirteen hostage-taking incidents discussed in the previous chapters only four major incidents can be categorised as negotiated settlements. These are hijacking of Flight 426 in 1968, kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum 2000, two IDF soldier in 2006 and Gilad Shalit in 2006.

Proxy negotiation has also been a major characteristic in hostage incidents. These incidents cannot be classified under negotiated settlement because in these instances, Israel in no intention to surrender to the hostage taker/s. It had only used negotiation as a tool to buy some time for the military to prepare for a rescue operation. It has been a few hours or a few day affairs and not a long continuous process of negotiation. These instances reflect the government's clear policy of not surrendering to the hijackers. This has been a major characteristic of Israel's struggle against such attacks.

There had been two major incidents where Israel applied strategy to buy time. For instance during the hijacking of Sabena flight 571 which took place on 8 May 1972 Israel used this technique of buying time to rescue the hostages. The four hijackers from the Black September group took ninety passengers as hostages and demanded the release of 315 Palestinians held prisoners in Israeli jail (Jewish Virtual Library; Jeffries 2015). Israel pretended to consider the demands but in reality it just used the opportunity to plan a rescue

operation under the code name *Operation Isotope*. The advantage that Israel had was the hijacked flight landed at the Lod Airport. Captain Levy had played a major role in the operation. He somehow managed to divert the attention of the hijackers by engaging them into several discussions. This allowed the Israeli agents to deflate the tyres of the aircraft. The immobility of the aircraft was the biggest advantage. Moreover captain Levy was also able to send secret signals to Moshe Dayan, the then Defence Minister (Reeve 2011:32). The standstill position of the aircraft allowed the Sayeret Matkal Special Forces led by Ehud Barak in disguise and take control over by 9 May. The operation also involved Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak as members of the commando unit, Shimon Peres the transportation Minister at that time and Ariel Sharon as head of an IDF unit (Jewish Virtual Library; Omer-Man 2011; Jeffries2015). Though Israel did not actually go into negotiation but the strategy of proxy negotiation has served its purpose.

Similar tactic has been used by Israel in its rescue operation at Entebbe airport in 1976. The Air France plain was hijacked to Entebbe Airport in Uganda, on 27 June 1976 by PFLP members. They demanded the release of 40 Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jail as a price for securing the life of about 106 passengers.

Initially, the deadline to meet the demand was set at 1 July. After the news of hijacking reached the Israeli authorities, there were differences in opinion between Defence Minister Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin regarding the use of military option. While Peres was keen on using the military, Rabin on the other hand was not confident enough to authorize the military for the assault. But the authority of the Prime Minister was a must for the military, finally he consented to the decision (Netanyahu 2005:97).

Meanwhile, on 1 July the Government expressed its willingness to go for negotiation with the hijackers. The tactic of buying time was again put to work the hijackers extended the deadline to 4 July. There can be possibly two important factors that convinced the hijackers to take such a step. Firstly, they were waiting for the arrival of President Idi Amin who was that time out of Uganda. Secondly, the decision by Israel to go for negotiation gave some signs of hope to the hijackers that their fellow companion would be freed from the jail. Israel under the veil of negotiation was preparing for the assault. The extension of the deadline added advantage to IDF. The intelligence gathering capacity of the Mossad followed by the familiarity of the

structure of the airport to convinced Israel to use its military (Dunstan and Dennis 2009:15).This allowed Israel to use the negotiation tactic for rescuing the hostages. Finally on 6 July Israel was able to rescue the hostages from Uganda Airport.

Israel has always opted for the policy of not surrendering to the demands of the hostage taker. Over the last few decades the hostage takers have shifted their tactics from mere hijacking of group of people to more of kidnapping individuals. At one hand Israel has a stated policy of not negotiating with non-state actors while on the other hand, when its rescue attempts fail, it has no other option but to negotiate. Eventually the desire to secure the life of the hostage/s has compelled Israel to go for negotiation with the captors. The only way out that has helped Israel to indirectly deal with the hostage taker is to seek the help of a mediator. This has in a way paved the way for the involvement of the third party in the negotiation process.

A mediator's role is to communicate between the two parties involved (here Israel and the hostage takers). Since Israel does not deal with the kidnappers directly this has made the mediator/s gain much importance in the process. As nothing comes for free, the same applies to mediator as well. Every mediator has its own vital task to perform in the negotiation process. This has become a major problem for Israel as it not only deals with the hostage takers but also with the mediators. So on the ground it has to meet the demands at two levels; one those of hostage takers and other of mediators. Situation becomes grave when number of parties in the negotiation process increases. Moreover the longer the time of captivity the state become more vulnerable to the demands. This had happened during Gilad Shalit negotiation, when Israel had to meet the demands of too many actors. This section of the chapter will deal with the examples of hostage taking that has compelled Israel to get into negotiations process.

a. Hijacking El Al Flight 426, 1968

The first instance of hijacking by the members of PFLP was in 1968 (Laqueur 2002:108)**.** On 23 July Boeing Flight 426 scheduled from Rome to Israel was hijacked by 3 members of the PFLP. The flight was carrying 48 passengers, the attackers forced the pilot Odeb Abarnell to take the flight to Algiers (Taillon 2002:17; Byman 2011:29)**.** At Algiers the captors separated the Israelis from the rest of the passengers and keeping the twelve Israelis as hostages the remaining were set free. The 12 Israelis composed of 7 passengers and 5 crew members

(Shoham ND). The attackers demanded the release of more than 1000 prisoners in Israeli jail. Immediately Israel rejected the proposal and sought the help of the UN.

In the wake of such an incident the Airline Pilot Association (ALPA) boycotted Algeria. In such circumstance under the pressure of the ALPA and the mediation of external actors like UN and Italy, Algeria agreed to reach a deal and free the hostages. Several sources suggest that Israel Defence Minister had already planned to launch an assault on Algeria (Green 2013). However before they could act the Hijackers agreed to set the hostages free. On 12 September the twelve hostages were released. Israel in exchange returned only 16 prisoners. Through the negotiation all the hostages were safely freed from the hijackers. This was the first experience of Israel with incidents of such attack.

The motives of the hijackers were to simply bring the Palestinian issue at the global platform. The incident had two major impacts firstly the international community condemn the act and secondly it was after this incident that Israel strictly used its retaliatory policy. Israel has a well-built security policy at the airports, this sets the reason for the flights being hijacked outside Israel and not at airport in Israel (Hasisi 2012:14). However the incident convinced Israel to make its security capabilities stronger (Raviv and Melman 2012 :107-108). It was after this incident that Israel followed the retaliatory method and became more alert about such acts, adopted several security measures (Price and Forrest 2013:49). Though Israel planned to carry out a military operation, it was through negotiation, the 12 hostages were set free and successfully rescued back to Israel

b. Kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum, 2004

Elhanan Tannenbaum an Israeli citizen was kidnapped by Hezbollah from Dubai and taken hostage to Lebanon in 2000 (BBC News 2004). He was allegedly involved in drug smuggling along with his friend named Kais Obeid who was an Israeli Arab. Obeid was in close link with the Hezbollah. Taking Tannenbaum to Dubai to deal with some drug related issues, was a part of his pre-planned strategy to kidnap Tannenbaum. The objective for kidnapping Tannenbaum was simply to help Hezbollah to use Tannenbaum as a bargaining chip in dealing with Israel (Harik 2005:155).

Apart from being a businessman by profession he was also a reserved colonel in the IDF (Weinthal 2013). This has created problems for Israel. The knowledge and information that

Tannenbaum had about the IDF could reveal several secrets concerning security issues and he also had several IDF documents under his possession (Alon and Melman 2004). Hence, the military immediately took up the task of finding out Tannenbaum. But was not successful in locating him. It was in 2004 that Tannenbaum was brought back to Israel through prisoner swap. Accused of being involved in smuggling and using forged passport, he was put to jail but Tannenbaum when produced in court asked for immunity from giving details about his business dealings. The petition was rejected and on the assumption that he might work as a spy for Hezbollah Tannenbaum was made to pass through the lie-detector test. Though he did not receive any imprisonment, he had to meet several debts (Luvitch 2006)

However, Since Israel would not negotiate directly with the captors it took the help of Germany to negotiate and the mediation was headed by two Germans, Gerhard Conrad and Ernst Uhrlao (Ha'aretz 2011). The role of mediator accepted by Germany was probably to gain the confidence of Israel and regain international prestige that was under shadows after the Holocaust and the Munich massacre. Another reason was to strengthen the position of the mediator. Along with the release of 435 Arab prisoners the deal also included the release of one German. Germany also agreed to release three prisoners, two Lebanese and one Iranian who were serving life imprisonment in Germany in exchange of any information about Israel's missing soldier Ron Arad (Stern, Ben and Kra 2004).

For setting Tannenbaum after being in captivity of Hezbollah for more than three years, Israel had to release 435 Palestinians including Mustafa Dirani and Sheikh Abdel Karim from the Israeli Jail along with the bodies of 60 Hezbollah fighters (Levitt 2013:225). Along with the life of Tannenbaum Israel also secured the remains of three Israeli soldiers from the Hezbollah (BBC 2004; Murphy 2011 ; JVL 2004; CNN News 2004).

When an army is not successful in rescuing the captive it is bound to give concession to the captors as a price of freedom (McGreal 2006). However during the exchange deal Ariel Sharon made it clear that the state would not allow the captors to make kidnapping a daily habit by which it could compel Israel to release Palestinians (Gutman 2006).

c. Abduction of Gilad Shalit 2006

The release of a combatant is of highest ethos and an Israeli tradition and this has been illustrated by the Shalit affair. Israel will make use of every possibility to release a soldier

who has been taken as hostage (Schweitzer 2010:32). Gilad Shalit an Israeli-French citizen, joined the IDF in 2005 and was abducted from the Israeli borders near Gaza Strip on 25 June 2006. At the time of his abduction he was serving as one of the crew of the crew members of the Merkava tank which was deployed near Gaza at the southern tip of the Israeli Gaza border (Bergman 2011).

A group of people later identified as Hamas member, crept through an underground tunnel and took the soldiers stationed at the border fence by surprise. The sudden bombing of rockets by the attackers killed two Israeli soldiers. The attack wounded Gilad Shalit along with another fellow member stationed there. Immediately Hamas carried Shalit along with them inside Gaza.

The ultimatum given by Hamas in no way convinced Israel to surrender. The then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made it clear that under no circumstance that the government would give in to the extortion by the Hamas or the Palestinian Authority (Benn, Oren, and Issacharoff 2006). Israel with its policy of no surrender immediately launched its military campaign against the Hamas. This was followed by a series of attacks and counter attacks from both sides. The IDF launched operation *Summer Rains* against this in Gaza Strip on 28 June 2006 to secure the release of the abducted soldier (Sher and Kurz 2015:230). This operation could not make the rescue possible. The incident became more controversial because *Operation Summer Rains* was the first attack on Gaza Strip after the unilateral withdrawal in August 2005. The then Prime Minister stated that Israel had no intension to take control over the Gaza strip but the operation would continue until Shalit was freed by Hamas or rescued by Israel (Sofer 2006).

Another added objective to the military campaign was to destroy the Hamas terror infrastructure. But the effort brought no fruitful results (ref). Followed by this was the capture of two IDF soldier by Hezbollah. The major hindrance in the rescue attempts was Israel's inability to spot the location of the captive and in spite of several military campaigns Israel failed to secure Shalit's freedom. He was neither allowed to meet any person nor did the Red Cross Society was allowed any access to Shalit. The Israeli intelligence failed to gather any concrete information regarding his location (Baitel 2011; Eldar2015; Bergman 2011)

Hamas released two video tapes in 2009 as a proof that Gilad was under their control and was still alive. Another thing that came into public domain through the video tape was the special unit of Hamas military wing called the Shadow Unit. The main task of the Shadow unit was to guide the captive (here Gilad) and make every possible action to limit the accessibility of the rescue team to the location of the victim. They carried out the task of hiding Shalit. Hence all the activities by the Unit were done in a secret manner (Khoury 2016).

The two video tapes released by Hamas in 2009 confirmed that the captive was alive. This was also a sign that negotiation could be made for release of the hostage. In exchange of the tape, Israel released 21female prisoners (Schweitzer 2010:31).

Indeed the process of negotiation started in 2006 itself with the help of an Israeli social activist named Gershon Baskin (Baskin 2012). It was after a prolonged struggle, the deal materialised in 2011. Between 2006 and 2011, Israel tried to indirectly negotiate for his release. Most of the time the deal could not be finalised due to the difference in opinion between the parties on the release of particular prisoners. And so negotiations were often suspended, for example in 2007 when Hamas took over of Gaza Strip, immediately the negotiation which was mediated by Egypt that time became in affective. Similarly case of suspension was again visible in 2009 when delegation from both sides met in Cairo. The refusal by the Prime Minister Olmert to release the 125 heavy weight prisoners included in the demand list could not bring a fruitful settlement (Schweitzer 2010:30). The Hamas list of demands consist of prisoners like Shamir Kuntar and others who were involved in violent activities and Israel could not consider the entire list without sounding vulnerable.

Finally, the government under Netanyahu decided to approve the deal. There were several rounds of talks and discussion in the Cabinet regarding the terms of the deal. In spite of the disapproval of several officials, Netanyahu was convinced that if the deal was not sealed then, it would take another few years to release Shalit (Bronner 2011)

Through the emergency cabinet meeting and Netanyahu's request for support of the deal was approved (Ravid 2011). On 11 October 2011 the deal with Hamas for release 1027 prisoners was reached under the mediation of Egypt and Germany. Finally after five years of captivity under Hamas, Shalit was brought back home on 18 October 2011. He on his arrival was

greeted by Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff (IDF Blog 2011).

The swap deal took place in two stages. In the first stage Israel released 477 prisoners and in the second stage it freed 550 prisoners. The first phase was implemented on 18 October when Shalit was eventually brought back to Israel. The 477 prisoners included 280 prisoners who were serving life sentences in Israeli jail. Israel agreed to release 96 of them to the West Bank and 14 to Jerusalem (East Jerusalem). The deal agreed to deport 203 prisoners from the West Bank to Gaza and also send 40 prisoners abroad. Added to this was the release of 131 prisoners from Gaza. Six Israeli Arabs were also released along with 27 female prisoners. This would include the first stage of the deal. In exchange of this, the captors would send Shalit to Israel. Then the final stage of the deal, which according to the deal would include the release of 550 prisoners would take place (Katz 2011; Jewish Virtual Library 2011). In the second stage of the negotiation the 550 prisoners freed by Israel includes 41 prisoners from Gaza, two from Jordon, two from East Jerusalem and remaining 505 prisoners from the West Bank (IMFA 2011; *Ha'aretz 2016*). The tradition to secure the life of a Jew has been deep-rooted in Israel. The sole purpose for paying such a heavy price was just to save the life of the soldier. On the release of Shalit in the official statement by Netanyahu specified the need to save the life of a Jew and the importance to maintain the Jewish tradition of rescuing its people. He also expressed his joy when he escorted the released hostage to his parents and stressing the Jewish tradition he quoted the bible saying that it is the duty of Israel to rescue those from the prison house and he added, "Today, I can say on behalf of all Israelis, in the spirit of the eternal values of the Jewish people :Your children shall return to their own border" (Jewish Virtual Library 2011; MFA 2011).

The secured deals re-enforce the fact that in spite of Israel's stated policy of no negotiating with hostage takers, it would do everything possible within its powers to bring back its sons and daughters. It also reflects the degree of value that the state has endowed upon the service men and women who serve the country. The responsibility of the state to value and respect the life of its people has been deep rooted tradition of the Jewish faith (MFA 2008).

Germany played a very instrumental role in the entire negotiation process (Sofer 2009**).** Initially Egypt played the role of the mediator between Israel and Hamas. In spite of three

long years of negotiation. Egypt failed to influence Hamas to release Gilad Shalit and this convinced Israel to seek help from Germany. Thus in 2009 Germany entered the picture, and took up the task of mediating (Schweitzer 2010:31). It was finally the joint mediation by Egypt and Germany that helped release of Shalit in 2011.

The age old-rivalry between Israel and Egypt is not new, so question arises that why Egypt, whose negotiation unit was headed by Omar Suleiman, showed much interest to strike a deal between Israel and the Hamas over the abduction of Shalit (*CBN NEWS 2009*)**.** The most important goal for Egypt has been to show case its credibility, and the success of the Shalit deal would provide such opportunity for Egypt. A successful deal would confirm Egypt as an important player holding much prominence in the Arab Israeli Conflict. Added to this was Egypt's objective to break down the Israeli and world-wide assumption that Israel was surrounded by hostile neighbours. Egypt's role as a mediator in spite of its well-recognised animosity with Israel, would enable it gain international prestige. Another important factor to this was the vested interest of the negotiator himself. Suleiman wanted to gain power and take over the leadership of Egypt (Bronner 2011). He was opposed to the idea of Gamal Mubarak holding the leadership position after Hoshni Mubarak. Thus he showed much interest in the deal to prove to Israel and US of his potentials. The participation of Suleiman was not merely due to humanitarian concerns, but was a reflection of the power struggle inside Egypt (Ghazal 2009). Moreover Egypt wanted to improve its relation with Israel after much chaos caused after the Mubarak's downfall. Another reason for the involvement of Egypt was to ask Israel for the release of several Egyptians held as prisoners in Israeli jail in exchange of its role in the Shalit affair (Steavenson 2011; Al Jazeera 2011).

This role as mediator has enabled Germany to evolve as an important regional player (Harrison:2014). Germany holds previous experiences of several successful prisoners exchange swaps. For example in the 1980s made a prisoners exchange swap with Hezbollah when Hezbollah had kidnapped two German businessman in Beirut. Similarly in 1992 Germany secured the release of two German aid workers who were captured by the same Lebanese militant group (Harrison 2014). Any negotiation with the Hezbollah would include Iran and this opportunity would give Germany the privilege to strengthen it ties with Iran. Indeed for long period of time Germany has been an important European trading partner of Iran. Negotiating with the extremist groups was something Germany was well-experienced

with and its reputation as a mediator has been quite impressive. Israel and Germany also have close connection on several security projects has been fruitful for both the countries.

Therefore co-operation with Israel has made Germany less dependent on the CIA for any information. This shared co-operation was a convincing reason for Germany to act as a mediator between Israel and Hamas (Harrison 2014). The age old Holocaust has always haunted Germany, added to that was the incident of Munich massacre. Germany would be able to regain much international prestige, which was lost in 1972 if it helped Israel in releasing Shalit. The success of the negotiation would also enable Berlin to act as an important regional power.

Inside Israel people gave full support for the release of Gilad in exchange of the prisoners. At the same time some section of the society protested against the release of those prisoners for whom the IDF had sacrificed their lives. The debate that centred on the exchange deal was not on release of Shalit but on the price that was to be paid for the return of Shalit. While all agreed and showed support for the return of the captive, several were also of the opinion that Israel was paying a very high price for the soldier. The main domestic debate argued on the rationale behind the exchange deal. According to some section of the society who voiced against the deal, freeing more than thousand prisoners in exchange of one life was not at all a justified gain for Israel. They feared that those released in the deal would again take recourse to several activities to harm Israel (Azriel 2011).

Some sections of the society opposed the deal on the basis that their relatives had at some point been killed by those prisoners who were to be released in exchange of Gilad (Cheslow 2011). Some showed disapproval over the release of such high number of prisoners. The opposition mainly came from families who have lost their members in the hands of those prisoners who were supposed to be released in exchange for Shalit (Edelson 2009; Glickman 2011; Hasson, Ravid, Rosengerg 2011; Cheslow 2011). Shvuel Svhijveschuurder who had lost his parents and siblings, Yossi Zur lost his son in a suicide attack were all opposed the deal as it would set the attackers free from Israeli jail (McGreal 2011).

Though there was disapproval for the deal there was massive support for the release of the captive. The incident of Shalit actually turned out to be a national trauma. There was strong support to secure the release of Shalit. Several campaigns were made demanding his release.

What added the fuel to their rescue campaign was the video tape released by Hamas in 2009 that shows clear indication that Shalit was alive. The massive support and attached sentiments of the people towards the release of Shalit convinced several news agencies to bring the live updates of the deal to public sphere (Harman and Izikovich 2011)

Nearly, 2000 foreign journalists stationed in Israel along with several broadcasting outlets which include news agencies like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya covered the entire episode of the exchange (Harman and Izikovich 2011).

According to *Ynet News* a survey of 500 Israeli citizens conducted on 16 October 2011, when asked about their opinion on the Shalit deal 79 per cent supported the deal while 14 per cent opposed it. Among the male members 74 per cent supported the deal while 19 per cent opposed it. Among the female respondent 86 per cent of the female supported the deal while only 5 per cent were against it (Ahronoth 2011 ; BBC News 2011). Another report from the *Ha'aretz* news agency stated that according to the survey poll of 600 Jewish Israeli adult respondents, 63 per cent have supported the swap deal. When asked whether they supported the deal to release the prisoners in exchange of Shalit 63 per cent supported it while 19 per cent opposed it and the rest 18 per cent remained indifferent (Khoury 2011).

The society constantly carried its campaign to free Shalit. The media played a very important role in campaigning for the release. There were protest marches along with the text messaging and use of several social networking sites to express support for the release. The family also sought assistance of the French Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy due to the dual (Israeli-French) citizenship status of Shalit.

Initially the protest did not reach much momentum but gradually after Israel secured the remains of three Israeli soldiers in 2009, the supporters of the campaign protested strongly. There were several protests outside the residence of the Prime Minister to pressurize him to seal a deal with Hamas. The families along with the supporters held regular marches and meetings. Shalit was no more just the son of Noam Shalit and Aviva Shalit but the son of the entire Nation where majority was able to feel and connect to the emotional phase that Shalit family was going through.

The solidarity of the supporters manifested itself through the formation of a non-profit organization Reut and its major task was to make mass campaign for the release of Shalit (Cohen 2011; Einav 2009). For Israel for the price it paid in exchange secured the soldier alive. Several news channels flocked to gather to witness the much awaited prisoner's swap that had created prolong debates. The incident was a watershed in the in the field of hostage studies.

Initially the deal drafted by the German mediator Gerhard Conrad in February 2011 was not accepted by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Probably he was not ready to pay such heavy price for one soldier. However the deal that was finalized with his consent in October 2011 was ninety percent identical to the terms of the February 2011 draft (Steinberg 2011).

d. Abduction of two IDF soldiers, 2006

Immediately after the abduction of Shalit by Hamas on 25 June 2006, another incident that took place was the constant firing of rocket by the Hezbollah army to Israel-Lebanon border. The Hezbollah unit with its intention to release Kuntar though bargaining attacked the Israeli border in 2006. The attack killed three soldiers, two soldiers identified as Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were taken away by Hezbollah as a bargaining chip for future.

This staged the pretext for the 2006 Lebanon war (Byman 2011:9).The military campaign could not bring back the abducted soldiers (Frank 2006; Lambeth 2012:46).Finally with Germany acting as the mediator, convinced Israel and Hezbollah to come to negotiation terms. This negotiation was finalized in 2008 in which Israel released several other prisoners including Kuntar in exchange of the two dead bodies of the two IDF soldiers(Steinberg 2011).

At the initial stage of the abduction Israel assumed that the two abducted soldiers were alive but it was later that the intelligence suspected that the two soldiers were killed by the Captors (Boudreaux 2008). Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese citizens held in Israeli jail along with the release of Samir Kuntar. It also demanded the release of several other Palestinian and Arabs. Israel agreed to almost all the demands except for the release of Samir Kuntar who has been in the top list of prisoners for its several attacks on Israel (Schweitzer 2010:27).

However, after two years of negotiation though the mediation of Germany on 29 June, 2008 the Government of Israel approved the decision to reach an agreement with the Hezbollah. It agreed to release prisoner Kuntar and four Lebanese fighters along with the bodies of few other fighters which included Lebanese as well would be released. This would be done in exchange of the release of the two abducted soldier (MFA 2008; Kais 2012). The negotiation was reached through German mediator Gerhard Conrad who had also been the part of the 2004 swap between Israel and Hezbollah. Conrad had good relations with both Hezbollah and Israel, he was also familiar to Syria accepting the role of negotiator with his recognised negotiating skill reconfirmed his prestige as a negotiation expert and also brought out the vital role of Germany settling in Arab-Israeli conflict (Table 4.1).

4.4. Conclusions

Military has always been the core to Israeli response in any hostage scenario. Sometimes the military option has brought about fruitful results and sometimes it was unsuccessful. But for every hostage incident the use of military as a first resort has been a common Israeli feature. In hostage taking cases where Israel has taken part in negotiation with the hostage takers, it has only taken such course of action when the military has totally failed to bring about any concrete result. The state has certain national interest to save the lives of individuals it cannot give away the prisoners that it has struggled to capture. There are certain limits that the state cannot cross. But one can observe that Israel has often bargained and has paid a high price in its indirect negotiations with the captors. The question arises that why in spite of its policy of no-surrender-to-hostage-takers, it has still opted for negotiation though indirectly.

Prisoners swap has not been a new phenomenon for Israel. Instances are not rare where Israel has paid high prices for the release of its soldier or sometimes just the body parts of the soldiers. The compelling factor for such a deal has some theological base as Judaism strictly follows the tradition of practicing honourable burial. All the exchange deals follow the Israeli tradition of bringing back a Jew or the body parts for burial. This theological linkage has formed the core argument to support the high prices that Israel pays for setting hostages back. It is also important to notice that when the military has failed to rescue hostages Israel had kept on its fight to rescue them. It has simultaneously carried out its search for the victim while negotiating with the captors. The state has always tried every possible way to refrain from negotiation.

Negotiation has been the last resort. It is very evident that the release of prisoners has been a compulsion when the military has not been able to achieve any success and where only option has been to negotiate. For example after the kidnapping of three teenagers in 2014 Israel used its military power to bring back the three teenagers. In its attempt to rescue the victims the military carried out around 800 searches arresting several Palestinians. It re arrested more than 50 prisoners who were released in exchange for Gilad in 2011 (Crowcroft 2014).

Another question that arises is would Israel pay the same price for a civilian as it pays for releasing any abducted soldier. The life of a soldier is valued more and serving in the military has been a matter of social prestige for an Israeli. This has enabled the soldier to gain respect and the state would do everything possible to rescue a soldier. The life of a soldier is given more priority than a civilian. This was also a factor that added as a support base for the deal to rescue Shalit. In case of Israel negotiation has taken place over prolong periods, this shows clear indication of its disapproval for any sort of (even indirect) negotiation with the captors.

A common feature that can be concluded from the several negotiated settlement shows that the longer the span of the negotiation process, the greater has been the vulnerability of Israel. In any negotiated settlement when the time consumed is longer it gives the opposition greater opportunity to demand more favours. This has exactly happened in the case of Shalit. He was captured in 2006 and released in 2011, the duration of the captivity has allowed the Hamas to bargain for a greater deal. Unlike 2004, where Tannenbaum along with three Israeli dead

bodies were released in exchange of few prisoners in the Shalit case 1027 prisoners were released for saving the life of a single hostage. The faster the bargain is made the lesser is the vulnerability of the state. When negotiation is stretched for longer periods it limits the options for the state to bargain. The domestic pressure made Prime Minister Netanyahu realize that if the Shalit deal was not sealed in 2011, then it would take another couple of years which could also limit the choices for Israel. Many news channel quoted Netanyahu saying that 2011 was 'window of opportunity' to conclude the agreement and close the Shalit fate.

Every occasion of negotiation has divided the society where one section supported the deal and the other rejected. The opposition is largely been regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners who were accused of terrorist offenses against Israeli citizens. This difference became more visible during the Shalit deal. However the non-supporters were not against the release of the hostage but against the price that Israel had to pay for the release.

Israel follows the policy of no direct negotiation with the hostage takers. All the negotiated settlement came through the mediation of one or more external parties. This makes the situation worse as no deed is done for free. Israel at one level caters to the demand of the hostage takers while on the other hand it also needs to fulfil the requisite of the mediator. For example Germany had received much prestige and praise for its role as a mediator in the several hostage settlements. This also makes the state dependent on the mediator. This dependency allows the mediator to use its own term and conditions and provides the scope to have much say in the entire negotiation process.

In any hostage scenario as long as the state uses its military force the state is responsible for the consequence of the action. The state acts as a sovereign body and not answerable to any other party. But in case of negotiated settlement, the state losses some degree of freedom. Apart from being dependent on the mediator it also becomes the victim of the dictates of the involved parties. This to an extent undermines the sovereignty of the state. Similarly, the willingness of the state to go for negotiation encourages the captors to indulge more in to such acts and use hostages as a weapon to release more prisoners. After the huge price that Israel paid in 2011, the activities of the captors did not stop rather Israel faced more of such instances. None side there is a dire to return its citizen to Israel while on the other hand, it has

to compromise with its freedom to come in terms with the hostage taker and this has created a dilemma for Israel.

However, the use of military option has been its foremost priority. Dependence on other actors or compromise with the demands of the captors, comes only in circumstance when the military fails to secure the release of the hostage/s.

Chapter v

Conclusion

Deep rooted animosity and hatred has been the major governing factor in the Arab Israeli relation. This hostility finds violent expression through acts of killing, suicide bombing, launch of missiles and rockets and several other such activities. Incidents which risk civilian lives has always been a major concern for every state and one such challenge to human security has been the act of hostage taking. Israel since its existence as a sovereign state has faced several hostage taking incidents.

Israel has a stated policy of not surrendering to hostage taking. Instances of hostage taking reflect its practice offensive policy. The simple explanation behind such policy has been that Israel does not negotiate with non-state actors. These non-state actors…. are militarily weaker and so it is not feasible for them to directly wage a war against Israel. In such circumstances for them hostage taking is the easiest mean by which these groups have put forward their demands and used hostage as a bargaining tool. Hence any surrender by the state to hostage taking would in a way legitimise such acts and also encourage the captor/s to be more optimistic about further gains. Such action would also expose Israel's vulnerability to such situations and convince the perpetrators to indulge more into such activities.

A close study of the 13 incidents, namely, the hijacking of EL Al Flight 426 in 1968, hijacking of Sabena Flight 571 in 1972, Munich Massacre in 1972, Ma'alot Massacre in 1974, hijacking of Air France Flight 139 in 1976, Coastal Road Massacre in 1978, Misgav Am attack in 1980, Mother's Bus Affair in 1988, kidnapping Nachshon Wachsman in 1994, kidnapping of Elhanan Tannenbaum in 2000 followed by the abduction of Gilad Shalit and two IDF soldiers both in 2006 and kidnapping of three teenagers in 2014, finds that hostage taking has been carried out by Palestinian Group namely Fatah, PLFP, DLFP, BSO and Hamas and as well as the Lebanese group. Over the time, there has been a gradual decline in the number of people taken as hostages but the trend of hostage taking continues. This clearly indicates that, the motive of attacker is to use the hostage (irrespective of number) as a bargaining chip against Israel. Another factor that influences Israel's no-surrender policy is its reliance on the military. The military has carried out several successful rescue operations.

Israel has been the best known example of military superiority, and it uses the offensive policy in hostage crisis. An added advantage to military operation is that irrespective of the outcomes it is within the control of the state. The state can act according to its will without delays and is responsible for its decision-making.

The rescue operations had not always been successful. At certain occasions, it has brought success while at some it has been a failure. Accessing the credibility of the rescue mission is a qualitative analysis. Among the thirteen incidents of hostage taking, only the hijacking of Flight 426 in 1968 was a complete success, where Israel was able to secure all the hostages without having to pay much for the hostage release. All other 12 incidents show Israel use of military capability to rescue the hostages and there were instances of total success, partial success or total failures. There have been five incidents of successful rescues, two instances of partially successful rescues and six failed rescues.

Two factors can be taken into account to access the success or failure of the response namely the risk factor involved in the operation and the casualties the operation inflicted in terms of human lives. All the military operation involved varying degree of uncertainties about the outcome but in spite of the risk involved they were successful in securing the release of the hostage. Instances like Sabena Flight (1972) Air France Flight 139 (1976), the mother bus (1988) or during the incident of Misgav Am (1980) brought about total success on the basis of the lives the military was able to save. This also includes the successful release of hostage through negotiation in 1968. Likewise in incidents like Shalit (2006) or Tannenbaum (2000), the military could not bring about any fruitful result but the success is partial because the hostages were brought back alive later through negotiated deals. However instances like Munich massacre (1972), Ma'alot massacre (1974), Coastal road massacre (1978), Nachshon Wachsman (1994), kidnapping of two IDF soldier(2000), kidnapping of three teenagers(2014) has been a total failure because the military could in no way save the lives of the hostages or a large number of them.

The effectiveness of negotiation can be explained on the basis of two factors namely the price paid for such negotiation and the time involved. Israel has released many prisoners to secure the release of the hostage or sometimes even in exchange of bodies or body parts. The exchange of body part is solely on the theological base that is derived from Jewish faith and

practice. In case of hostage negotiation Shalit was released through negotiated settlement in return for 1027 Palestinian prisoners. Similarly for the freedom of Tannenbaum and remaining dead bodies of three soldiers Israel released 435 prisoners and returned 60 bodies of Hezbollah members. Thus negotiations in spite of the heavy compensation had saved lives compared to the military operation that failed to save them. However the number of the hostages to that of prisoners released is highly disproportionate.

The negotiation process is time consuming and the longer the negotiation more is the demands of the attackers. Since Israel does not negotiate with the non-state actors but out of compulsion, it seeks the help of mediators. The more the time taken to strike a deal the state through third party enables the hostage takers to raise their demands. More the actors in the negotiation make the process complex.

Israel's response to each incident has been unique in various ways. The 1968 hijacking of flight 426 was a negotiated rescue, the first and the only instance that did not have any military response probably because that was the first experience with such an act. Successful military operation often received much approval both inside Israel and internationally for example the Entebbe operation(1976) has been one of the best known examples in the history of rescue operation. The incident has internationally established the air superiority of Israel. Similarly instances like the Munich Massacre (1972), Ma'alot massacre (1974) has created world-wide awareness about the rise of such activities and the concern for the safety of innocent lives. The two protracted negotiated release was carried out in 2004 and in 2011 and the release of Shalit after five years of captivity, has received much attention and has been celebrated as success for securing the life of the hostage.

The first hypothesis—*The safety of the hostages prevented Israel from pursuing a military response and to seek negotiated release*—is falsified. The findings of the research suggests that in the entire hostage taking incidents Israel has used force as its first resort. In spite of the uncertainty of the outcomes of such operations or where the probability of success was low the state has still relied on the use of military. Risk taking has been the common feature in all hostage situations. This clearly reflects the priority of the state policy of no-surrender tactic precedence over the lives of individual citizen.

The domestic pressure has a major impact on the government's decision-making. There have been two instances of protracted negotiation. Release of Tannenbaum in 2004 and Shalit in 2011. At the initial stage of abduction of Shalit the government did not agree to negotiate but knowing Shalit held by the captors was still alive a majority of the population turned out in support of the release. The mass mobilization, several protest and campaigns to release the hostage developed an atmosphere of intense pressure compelling the Government to secure the release. Added to this is the Jewish theological practice of giving honourable burial to bodies or body parts. It is observed that the national interest of the state has been prioritised over the individual Israeli citizens. The study suggests that it is not the safety of the people that compelled Israel to go for negotiation, rather it is the domestic pressure and theological factor that compelled Israel to strike a deal and bring back the hostage.

The second hypothesis—*Non-viability of military option compelled Israel to pursue a negotiated hostage release*—holds true. Israel has followed a clear policy of no-negotiation with hostage takers. In all the major incidents of hostage taking the state has used its force as the first response to the attack. Though the military operation has brought both success and failure. Israel has negotiated with the attackers because the military had failed to rescue the hostage. For example in the abduction of Shalit or of Tannenbaum or the two soldiers in 2006 the location of their captivity was not known and military attempts proved futile. As a result of the incapacity of the military negotiation was the only option.

Though Israel has followed an offensive rescue policy in practice it did negotiate for the release. The use of force is still the priority but negotiations happen only in instances where the military has failed to rescue the citizen. In instances of military failures to secure the lives of the hostages it state later attacked the captors or made attempt to destroy their potentials. Such attempt is reflected though a number of incidents like the launching of *Operation Spring of youth* in 1973 in the aftermath of Munich Massacre, bombing of Southern Lebanon in 1974 after Ma'alot massacre, launch of *operation Litani* in 1978 after the Coastal road massacre, launch of second Lebanon war in 2006 as a response to the abduction of two IDF soldiers.

The study suggests that the offensive policy of Israel is the dominating factor in any hostage situation. The use of force has been the first resort. Keeping in mind the price for release of

hostage/s the state often to uses force than engage in negotiated settlement. When military attempt fail, Israel negotiated under the compulsion of domestic pressure and freed the hostages.

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