A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ SINCE 2001

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**A Comparative Study of US Military Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq Since 2001**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

MAYANK SINGH

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

Prof. Abdul Nafey

(Chairperson, CCUS&LAS)

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(Supervisor)

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate for Security (Afghanistan)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	U.S. Agency for international Development
USCENTCOM	US Centre Command

MAP 1: AFGHANISTAN


Source: United Nations

MAP 2: IRAQ

Source: United Nations

MAP 3: IRAQ ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Source: United Nations

MAP 4: AFGHANISTAN ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Source: United Nations

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

It was expected that the war against terrorism post 9/11 was going to be a long and difficult one, but not many knew that, it would ultimately turn into counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars are the longest wars in the history of the US armed forces, but relatively less lethal in nature and had fewer numbers of American casualties than previous major wars. Both wars started as tactical victories, but developed into strategic quandary. US Army had to fight a war for which it was unprepared, lacked any pre deployment training, operational plans and field manuals. After the Vietnam War one thing that was clearly ignored all these years by mainstream strategic thinkers was the response and requirement towards the problem of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare as all lessons learned from the Vietnam War were lost with time. Even academic fraternity left it to dust and moved on to solve and work on new pastures of modern and postmodern warfare. Counterinsurgency strategy had not been taught at West Point or any of the Army's war colleges and apart from an interim Army manual in 2004, no field manual on the subject had been published in two decades prior to 2006, when the war on terror turned into counterinsurgency operations. More time and effort was earlier devoted to how conventional wars were being fought on the ground. Use of large size armed formations capable of delivering devastating force at one point to win wars was conceptualized. Conventional biased was established by swift victory in the First Gulf War. The focus was on revision of military strategy along with the advancement in sensor technologies, precision weapons, communications technology and resulted integration with command & control center. Concepts like strike from far off distance were developed in order to reduce the commitment of ground forces to a minimum level to win a war. Deployments in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans during 1990s were designated as "military operations other than war" and concepts like "light footprint", "spectrum warrior" etc. were used to discuss such operations.

The US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq respectively brought down the Taliban and Saddam regime in remarkably innovative campaigns, but flaws in military logic and

failure to anticipate post invasion instability, lack of plans for stability operations and nation building efforts were the characteristics of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. All of these factors caused widespread turmoil and conflict in both countries, which ultimately resulted in a civil war in the case of Iraq. After two successful military interventions, all that has been accomplished was disintegration of the State; condition of anarchy and corrupt & weak governments.

Following the unanticipated rise in low-level violence in post occupation phase of both campaigns and lack of any pre-deployment training, US armed forces launched a number of initiatives at the operational level. All of these initiatives were bottoms up approaches and limited to the domain of various local commanders. Each commander acted independently and distinctly in their area of operation, some followed classical counterinsurgency techniques based on pacification, by winning hearts and mind, some followed the coercive approach. Amidst all these, departmental instructions, concept papers, war exercises, organizational changes were lacking. An interim Army COIN manual was released in 2004, but worsening security conditions in Iraq in 2006 and the problems caused by periodic rotation of troops shifted focus back to the learning of counterinsurgency and stability operations. New focus, change of leadership in the armed forces at the top level, with Lieutenant Generals David Petraeus and Lieutenant Generals David Petraeus James Mattis taking charge, a new counterinsurgency or COIN manual were ultimately developed. COIN FM was first doctrinal level field manual for US Armed forces and Marines specifically for counterinsurgency since 1980s.

Western classical counterinsurgency techniques were developed in the 1960's and designed to defeat insurgency in a single country, but with time, insurgency became much more complex and complicated in nature. As compared to older insurgencies, where a single domestic actor was involved, modern insurgencies have multiple domestic actors simultaneously competing for contrasting goals, with the backing from external influences as well. Today, winning counterinsurgency involves more than just fighting. It requires military, political and socioeconomic operations and the outcome of all three depends not on the sum of three, but multiplications of three; if one of them became zero, others also become zero. If out of three, one thing failed, the entire campaign would fail. Hence, the counterinsurgency operations required a new integrated approach and

participation of multiple agencies, along with traditional political, military and socio-economic measures in order to suppress insurgency.

The study of US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are worth cases for analysis and research. It requires a comparative analysis, because there are some areas of similarities and many differences. The common factor in both these cases is the role of US Military. However, there are political, socio-economical and geographical diversions that confronted the US counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW:

The Basic goal of research on counterinsurgency is to act as a source of potential insight for researchers of organizational change, irregular warfare, defense strategy &policy and to all those who have to deal with the dangerous, complex, and irregular challenges of the various security environments. Research also acts as a valuable resource for military leaders, strategists and academics to understand what are the true forces responsible for military change. There is enormous literature available on counterinsurgency, how it was practiced in the past and the present. Several theorists and experts are prevalent in the field of the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

According to field manual FM 3-24, "counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic action taken by a government to defeat insurgency". Counterinsurgency theories are divided into coercion and pacification, based on the nature of the techniques used in counterinsurgency operations. The other classification places the theories into classic and contemporary theories. The classical theories of counterinsurgency emerged as a response to the wave of "National Liberation" wars, which followed the Second World War, when the British, French and US confronted and responded to the challenges of insurgencies in Malaya, Indo-China, Philippines, Algeria and Vietnam. When compared to the contemporary theories, classical theories are specific to one country only and are less complex in nature. The initial western counterinsurgency knowledge come from the lessons learned by British, French and US in Malaya, Indo-China, Philippines, Algeria and Vietnam Wars. These insurgencies provided the know how to these nations on how to conduct their operations successfully in the future without wasting much time and effort. Though these countries

may not have been able to successfully carve out a niche during the earlier counterinsurgency efforts, the basic know-how about how to conduct counterinsurgency under hostile conditions is highly valued.

In "The Long, Long War", Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck delivers a livid explanation of the insurgency in Malaya, along with various counterinsurgency actions taken up by the British and Malayan governments. Clutterbuck argues, "that the role of the police has been of utmost importance, the police played major role in controlling the population and to gain intelligence information and information collection during the times of insurgency" (Clutterbuck 1966: 62), which proves a precious weapon in the hands of the government fighting these insurgencies. Clutterbuck also emphasizes on the development of "a close working counsel, consisting of civil government, police and military leaders operating in a coordinated manner to defeat the insurgents" (Ibid: 66).

Robert Thompson in "Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam" offers the six principles indispensable for beating the guerrilla. According to him, government must develop a plan, which covers all the facets of insurgency in detail, i.e., the "social, political, administrative, police, and economic aspects" and plan must address all of these constituents in a mutually supporting manner. Thompson was the first one to demarcate the clear and definite stages of counterinsurgency operations. Thompson states that, "There will be four definite stages; clearing, holding, winning and won" (Thompson 1978: 111). He also emphasizes on the importance of the role of the government in providing civil infrastructure, "the government must begin strong efforts to provide an improved social and economic environment, i.e. Schools, agricultural improvement, clinics, etc." (Ibid: 147). These measures hold importance as they establish the legitimate control of the government in the insurgency-affected area. The government, by providing these basic amenities, loosens the stand of the insurgents and makes it possible for the government to hold firm ground.

Samuel Griffith, one of the leading translators of Sun Tzu's and historian of Asian war also supported the multidimensional aspects and requirements of counterinsurgency operations and remarked that; "military measures alone will not suffice in the conduct of counterinsurgency" (Griffith 1990).

David Galula is another important theorist on the theory of counterinsurgency. In his

treatise Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula point out basic differences between conventional war and insurgency. Conventional warfare is more or less the same experience for all sides concerned, but in the case of insurgency, contestants fight different wars, conducted under different rules. According to Galula, in counterinsurgency operations focus should be on the people as, "you defeat an insurgency by controlling the target population"(Galula 2006: 20). Galula also asserts that, "every military action has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice-versa" (Ibid: 21) as insurgency is a revolutionary war and revolutionary war is a political war. In political wars, politics becomes an active instrument of operation and according to Galula; each and every sweep, each search and destroy mission, every convoy operation has to be planned with paramount consideration for the effects it will have on the population's backing. Galula's work makes for an informed reading on the subject of counterinsurgency, as it provides the reader with useful insights on the subject.

Andrew F. Krepinevich in "The Army and Vietnam" writes a sarcastic indictment of the US Army for failing to fight the Vietnam War as the situation commanded. Throughout the book Krepinevich accuses the Army leaders of failing to appropriately apply the strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency. Writing that, "deeply imbedded in the service's psyche, conventional operations held sway over the Army" (Krepinevich 1986:164), he maintains "that the Army intended to fight an attrition war and gambled that it could vitiate the insurgent forces faster than the enemy could replace them" (Ibid:165). Krepinevich writes about the divisions within the army and the division between the political civilian leaders of the nation and the armed forces of the U.S. Krepinevich contends that the army was all for replication of the processes and the methods of war undertaken by the European nations in the Second World War, but what they did not realize was that this would cause havoc for the nation in Vietnam as those policies were not fit for reproduction in the Vietnam insurgency theatre.

Anthony James Jones contends, "The American military has always had a problem determining which enemy it was supposed to fight. The potential of other armies and navies has forced it to prepare for the large-scale war, due to which Americans need to deepen and sharpen their understanding of what guerrilla war has meant and will mean".

Why US Military opted not to institutionalize the lessons it has paid for with blood and

treasure despite of spending more of its history fighting more small war than conventional war is explained by Douglas Blaufarb (1977) and Richard Downie (1998). The authors' step-by-step traces down how America's top military leaders from George Washington onwards "have demonstrated varying degrees of antipathy towards preparations for irregular warfare and generally viewing it as an uncivilized and irrelevant anomaly". How dabbling in counterinsurgency is commonly seen as a distraction from the more important business of preparing for major combat operations against comparable enemy forces and how counterinsurgency is something of an affront to the organizational culture of America's Military which is explained elaborately in the text.

David Ucko (2009) explains the process by which DOD painfully relearned a number of old lessons about the nature and conduct of successful counterinsurgency campaigns and how it is a much harder task to institutionalize these adaptations so that the arduous and expensive process of relearning counterinsurgency does not have to be repeated and lost, as happened after the Vietnam War.

John Nagl in "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" explains another aspect of non-institutionalization of the lessons from small and irregular warfare. Nagl pointed towards one of the least adequately examined areas of the US army, the "Organizational Learning Culture of US Army". Nagl outlined Organizational Learning Culture as a prime factor, which allowed the "British Army to learn counterinsurgency principles effectively during the Malayan emergency", whereas Organizational Culture of US Army "blocked the learning during and after the Vietnam War". During counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Organizational Learning Culture of US Army was the most decisive determinant in the decision of whether to apply and how to apply force in war and the subsequent development of operational field manuals. Nagl formulated the basic tenets of counterinsurgency warfare and provides some useful insights like "effective means to deal with real grievances; commit sufficient troops; isolate the conflict area; display rectitude toward civilians and prisoners; emphasize intelligence; disrupt the insurgent's food supplies; and divide the leaders from the followers"(Nagl 2008:79).

All contemporary counterinsurgency practices are essentially grounded in classical theories of David Galula, Robert D Thompson, John Nagl and Roger Trinquier etc. By

their experiences in Vietnam, Indo-China and elsewhere, they detailed the nuances of revolutionary guerrilla wars and conceptualized various COIN principles and practices. All these classical works continue to hold ground and guide modern COIN practices. In order to understand the nature of insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is imperative to understand the classical insurgency/counterinsurgency theory. By modifying the classical concepts to highlight the changes and address the new realities, developed the US COIN doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq, which helps us to understand the diversions adapting to existing conditions and to draw the valid generalizations in the form of new analytical perspective.

The nuanced knowledge about revolutionary guerrilla warfare was revolutionized by the works from the likes of eminent theorists like Robert D. Thompson, David Galula, Roger Trinquier and John Nagl to name a few of the theorists. The counterinsurgency operations that have been put in practice world over draw inspirations from the works of these theorists. Their understanding and experiences from the actual fields of action in Vietnam, Indo-China and in other places helped evolve the counterinsurgency practices revered by the governments in the past and in the present. The theories propounded by each of these theorists are still relevant in the current times and have been the guiding principles of COIN practice over the years. To get a better and detailed grasp of the nature of insurgency in modern theatres of insurgency, namely, Iraq and Afghanistan, it is required that we look back at these theories and better understand them. The US COIN Doctrine came into being by the beautifully modifying the classical concepts to stress the changes and adapt to new realities.

David Kilcullen, in "Counterinsurgency Redux", has outlined the broad principles of COIN. While explaining the complexity of modern insurgency, Kilcullen argues that, "rebuild our mental model of this conflict, redesign our classical counterinsurgency and counterterrorism methods and continually develops innovative and culturally effective approaches." In practice, however, it appears very challenging and does not provide any quick-fix solutions but rather points at different plane of ideas. It thus requires intense planning and periodic review of the conflict in the theatre of war due to multidimensional and complex nature of COIN.

David Kilcullen puts forward a number of lessons on contemporary counterinsurgency in

"The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One". First, "the effort has to be population centric, focusing on protecting the population and competing with insurgents for the influence and control at the grassroots level in order to control the environment". On the other hand, counterterrorism by contrast, is enemy centric in nature, focusing on destroying every cell rather than on controlling the environment. This was the core of strategy shift in Iraq in 2006-08 and in Afghanistan 2009 onwards. Contemporary global insurgency gained much of their traction by allying with local insurgency, which have local aims and reflect local interests. Al Qaeda is using its limited cadre co-opted with local and national insurgencies, Taliban in the case of Afghanistan and marginalized Sunni groups in the case of Iraq. But it also offers a way out to the counterinsurgent; "there is always a dispossessed section of local elite that is eager to gain its lost authority". Third, "the unprecedented scale and ambition of this insurgent movement and the unparalleled connectivity and aggregation effect it has achieved through access to the tools of globalization, renders many traditional counterinsurgency approaches ineffective and implies the need for unprecedented international cooperation in managing the terrorism threat". The final major implication is that "an indirect, highly localized approach working with, or through genuine alliances and local partnerships wherever possible would probably be much more successful than a policy of direct U.S. Intervention".

Chao Xian Zhanin's "Unrestricted Warfare" points towards one disadvantage through advancement in conventional weapons and the institutionalization of conventional war, which particularly in case of the United States, "It had created a trap for themselves by their very dominance of conventional warfare". Challenging the United States in direct conventional combat would certainly be a madness, but rather than avoiding conflict, other countries or even non-state actors could defeat the superpower through ignoring Western-defined rules of "conventional" war, instead applying what the authors called the "principle of addition: combining direct combat with electronic, diplomatic, cyber, terrorist, proxy, economic, political, and propaganda tools to overload, deceive, and exhaust the U.S. System of systems" (Zhanin 2002).

Several researchers from RAND outlined that insurgents are acclimatizing and evolving into even more complex organizational structures by combining modern technology with

potent resources and malevolent intentions (Brennan et. al 2005: 162). An important element which classical theorists never confronted as serious component and thus overlooked are the global networks and criminal financing and thus it requires us to identify all the important aspects of contemporary insurgency and to conceptualize them and form requisite countermeasures (Kaplan 2013). The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have initiated a new debate over the need to transform the American Military to meet the needs of the twenty first century irregular Warfare (Jones 2009). Many transformations or Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) theorists have argued that the increasing power of networked information, precision strikes and the speed with which the operations are executed, is erasing the need for massed conventional ground forces (Friedman 2003). On the contrary, Stephen Biddle makes a case that the transformation cannot be credibly tested against the conventionally weak elements like the Taliban/Al Qaeda and Iraqi Army. In other realms of conduct of operations like peace enforcement, transformation is not required (Biddle 2007).

All literature on insurgency and COIN despite having differences over several points, agree on two mutual points on Insurgencies. "Insurgencies are like cancers, they exist in thousands of forms, and there are dozens of techniques to treat them, hundreds of different populations in which they occur". The impression that there is "one single silver bullet solution for insurgency is therefore as unrealistic as the idea of a universal cure for cancer" (Nagl 2014: 18). The "precise approach that any particular government takes to defeat an insurgency depends very much on the character of that government, doing counterinsurgency, at its heart, a form of opposing or contested governance" (Ibid 2014: 19).

In "Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq" William Polk step by step explained how a week into the conflict during the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 US Military realized that the enemy were fighting differently this time, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different from the one we War-gamed against," (Polk, 2009: 27). How during the initial-phase US military was fighting a reactionary War, on being caught flat-footed by virulent Sunni insurgency. Slowly if learned its lesson and codified them into an interim Army counterinsurgency manual was released in October 2004, a year and a half after the start of the War.

The Afghanistan and Iraq counterinsurgency campaigns clearly demonstrate that if in future US armed forces had to engaged in large-scale counterinsurgency operations in the future, it had developed pool of tried and tested techniques, which can work when applied properly and backed by a well-considered political strategy. And, traditional definitions of warfare are outdated and there is a need to be substantially rethought them to meet modern conditions of Warfare. Concepts such as "hybrid Warfare" and "unrestricted Warfare" make lots more sense for future conflicts than "traditional state-on-state, force-on-force concepts of conventional Warfare".

1.2 SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT:

Counterinsurgency Warfare comprises of various possible tactics and strategies. Within this broad spectrum, the analysis will focus on the US Military counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. A major part of the study focuses on the changing operational dynamics of counterterrorism-insurgency-counterinsurgency spectrum, to generate new theoretical insights. This understanding is crucial for analyzing the selective and simultaneous application of the three cardinal dimensions of counterinsurgency strategy, i.e. military, political and socio-economic. The roles of various political, ethnic and regional factors and their interplay with cardinal dimensions of counterinsurgency operations have been analyzed in detail. In depth analysis of origins of the "surge", its causes, outcomes on the ground, and effect on the U.S. Military counterinsurgency operations have been undertaken. The evolution of various reforms and reorganizations in US Military during the institutionalization of formal counterinsurgency doctrine has been embarked on.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1. What was major the motivation of US Military intervention in Afghanistan?
2. Was Taliban considered a terrorist organization before US Military intervention in Afghanistan?
3. Why did US Military counterterrorism operations turn into counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?

4. Was regime change the sole motivation behind US Military intervention/invasion in Iraq in 2003?

5. Did US plan to turn Iraq into a strong military base in the heart of oil rich West Asia?

6. What were the major drawbacks, limitations and difficulties of US Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

7. What were the similarities in strategies adapted by US Military in Iraq and Afghanistan?

8. What were the major differences in strategies adopted by US Military in Iraq and Afghanistan?

1.4 HYPOTHESES:

1. The US counterterrorism operations were responsible for the rise of insurgency in Afghanistan.

2. US Military Intervention accounted for social unrest and rise of terrorism in Iraq.

3. Afghan and Iraqi perception of Americans, as an occupying force explains the failure of US counterinsurgency and nation building strategy.

1.5 METHODOLOGY/ RESEARCH METHODS:

The study tries to understand the complex issues involved in counterinsurgency Warfare through a detailed contextual analysis of a selected number of events, conditions and their interface develop an analytical perspective. Thus, the study undertakes a detailed case study and time-series analysis of US Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The underlying method for this research is essentially inductive, focusing on three dimensions of counterinsurgency operations-military, political and socioeconomic and their interplay with domestic, ethnic and regional factors to build an understanding of the US counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The study makes use of the qualitative research technique, a widely used technique in social science research, which helped in examining the complex situations in both the countries. The study relies on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources comprise selected Government

documents, reports, annual and quadrennial reviews from the Department of Defense, field manuals, interview transcripts, and personal diaries, memoirs Congressional Hearings, White House Reports and State Department Reports. The secondary sources primarily include books, published journal articles, media reports as well as information accessed through the Internet.

1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARIES:

Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

The introductory chapter outlines the scheme of research by narrating the backdrop of various counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Chapter 2:

THEORIES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Chapter outlines the history of irregular and unconventional warfare. It outlines and lists the major theories, concepts available in the existing literature on counterinsurgency, from classical COIN to contemporary COIN. It details the relevance of classical theories and concepts in Contemporary theories and concepts.

Chapter 3:

 US INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: FROM COUNTERTERRORISM TO REGIME CHANGE TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

The third chapter traces the evolution of various counterterrorism strategies in Afghanistan. The chapter lists various reforms and reorganizations in the US Army /NATO forces during the process of the subsequent shift in the strategy from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency. It also outlines the "Nation Building" and "Surge" strategies in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Chapter 4:

 US MILITARY INTERVENTION OF IRAQ: FROM REGIME CHANGE TO

COUNTERTERRORISM TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

The fourth chapter of the study details the evolution of various counterinsurgency strategies at the tactical and operational levels, conceptualized on the post invasion phase experiences in Iraq. The chapter examines the varying approaches adopted by US forces in the absence of any post invasion formal training, operational and doctrinal directives. The chapter explains the new trends in the counterinsurgency campaign under U.S. Army's formal doctrine on counterinsurgency (US Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual). The chapter lists the evolution of various reforms in the US Military during the process of the subsequent shift in the US strategy. It assesses the origins of the "surge" in detail, its outcomes on the ground, and its effect on the U.S. Military's ongoing institutionalization of counterinsurgency.

Chapter 5:

COMPARISON OF US COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

The fifth chapter compares the US Military counterinsurgency operations of Iraq and Afghanistan. The chapter compares the two operations on the basis of types of forces used, their deployment patterns and the type of difficulties encountered by US Military while conducting operations in the absence of any formal doctrine and under formal doctrine of counterinsurgency.

Chapter 6:

 CONCLUSION

Last chapter summarizes the findings of each chapter and elaborates on conclusions.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

2.1 THE HISTORY OF IRREGULAR AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE:

An attempt to oppose or overthrow the regime or a state by the use of arms is as old as of human society itself. Quite often it takes place in the form of irregular and unconventional warfare. "Insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and unconventional conflict have been the most common forms of warfare dating back to the Romans and the Jews in 66 AD" (Boot 2007: 49). Insurgency is the weapon of weak, whose inferiority in strength and equipment makes it impossible to meet their opponent in open conventional battle, hence seeks to wage a protracted conflict. Their main aim is to win small victories by attaining numerical superiority at a critical point in battle through deception and speed, making full use of ambush and then attack supply lines of the enemy.

Irregular and unconventional warfare is always dreaded by any regime or state's regular armies and especially when a leader with the genius of war directs irregular and unconventional warfare. An effective campaign against such might is almost impossible (Callwell 1896: 196).

Irregular and unconventional warfare has had a rich and venerable history. From the numerous instances of unconventional warfare in Peloponnesian War, from the exploits of Judas Maccabeus against Syrians in 166 BC, the revolt of Zealots against Romans, revolts of Bactria, Sogdiana, and Scythia tribes against Alexander (Boot 2007:59) and the unusual guerrilla tactics of Spaniards against Romans (Sutherland 1982:70); are all but a few examples of unconventional wars in the ancient world.

During the middle Ages, with the development of fortifications and castles, 'Siege' warfare became the primary form of warfare giving rise to the great myth of "the knights clashes on their horseback". We see that even during the Middle Ages too the irregular and unconventional warfare did not lose its shine; 'chevauchée'[1] and 'razzia' are one the

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[1] "Roaming the enemy's countryside, burning, stealing, raping, kidnapping, and killing at will. It was above all a tactic of attrition designed to instill fear in the enemy's population and wear down its will to resist."(Boot 2103: 156).
[2] "Cornwallis superior General Clinton coined a famous phrase when he wrote in early 1776 of the need 'to

few methods/tactics of irregular and unconventional warfare widely put into practice by various weak policy institutions of Europe and Arabia against their rivals. The Hundred Years' War, the Eighty Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, the Anglo-Scottish struggle and the Tartan Rebellions are only some of the examples of guerrilla tactics, irregular and unconventional warfare in middle ages.

With the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and emergence of the Nation State, European warfare was completely transformed. Whatever the "dividing line between regular and irregular warfare, which became so blurred as to almost vanish during the Middle Ages, was to grow more distinct after the end of the Thirty Years' War with the spread of standing, national armies. That process, which went hand in hand with the growth of nation-states, reached a critical mass in the second half of the seventeenth century. This period saw the spread of barracks to house soldiers, drillmasters to train them, professional officers to lead them, logistical services to supply them, factories to clothe and equip them, and hospitals and retirement homes to take care of them in times of distress. By 1700 France alone had 400,000 men under arms year-round." (Max Boot 2013: 173).

During this time different monarchical armies started fighting in nearly a similar manner and style and just about under similar rules of operation and conduct. Just on the lines of ancient Greece, detailed procedures were invented and developed to guide and conduct every facet of warfare, which ultimately resulted in "brightly clad lines of troops marching into battle at preplanned maneuvers, without making any attempt at concealment". Soldiers at this time were also trained to cultivate and develop an air of casualness to surround them as bullets whizzed around them. The idea of stooping was considered bad and ungentlemanly (Boot 2006:89). Even the uniforms were standardized to differentiate between combatant and civilians. The seventeenth century also marks the codification of laws of wars, providing protection and other entitlement to soldiers. The nature of irregular and unconventional warfare was such that it again proved its mantle in the war of Austrian Succession during 1740-1748 AD. It was a multifaceted conflict between Austria, Britain, Hanover, Hesse, and the Dutch Netherlands against Bavaria, France, Prussia, Saxony, and Spain. At this juncture, Austria lost some of the early battles of the war, giving up a substantial portion of its territory. Austria soon made a comeback

by the use of hussars from Hungary and Croats, Pandours, and other Christians from the Balkans and their irregular and unconventional warfare tactics.

From the 18th century onwards the power of nationalism, xenophobia gave rise to a sequence of insurgencies against a range of foreign occupations. During the American Revolution, the irregulars played a vital role in turning the tide of the battle and especially after the defeat of the Continental Army in Long Island and Manhattan, in the fall of 1776. In South, irregulars played an even more essential role, especially in the Carolinas. In South, in order to woo the colonists, Cornwallis applied a series of tactics to counter these insurgents, which would be later advocated by future generals battling insurgencies in Malaya, Aden, Cyprus, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Cornwallis wanted to use the "gentlest methods, which the nature of this business will admit of."[2] It was the first recorded use of "hearts and minds" in a counterinsurgency context.

Guerrilla tactics employed by 'Spanish guerrillas' against Napoleon's French Army in Spain and Portugal in Peninsular war is another fine example of irregular warfare. With legitimacy at their back by 1811, irregulars numbered more than 50,000 in the entire peninsula. The Spanish insurgency not only encouraged European resistance against Napoleon but these 'invisible armies' siphoned off valuable French troops that could have been used in other conventional battles. Guerrilla insurgency in western France ultimately helped duke of Wellington to fight on equal terms with Napoleon and cost Napoleon the victory at Waterloo (Lefebvre 1969: 363).

The British tasted this bitter pill, the irregular warfare in South Africa. The British eventually crushed protracted and tricky insurgency of Boer guerrillas under the weight of numbers, but not before excruciating embarrassment, domestic and international opprobrium for the British government.

 The World Wars ushered in a new phase of guerrilla tactics and irregular warfare into the picture. First is a revitalization of 'chevauchée' and 'razzia' by TE Lawrence in Arabian

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[2] "Cornwallis superior General Clinton coined a famous phrase when he wrote in early 1776 of the need 'to gain the hearts and subdue the minds of America,' This phrase would later come to be emblematic of a certain school of "population-centric" counterinsurgency, favored particularly by liberal states such as Britain and the United States. Like later advocates of this approach, from the French field marshal Hubert Lyautey to the British field marshal Gerald Templer and the American adviser Edward Lansdale"(Boot 2013:199).

Peninsula against the Turks. Lawrence's 'war of detachment' and disruption of Turk's supply line forced them to give up the country area and limit themselves to garrisons, making it easy for British troops to achieve their wartime goals more efficiently and easily. Second is the rise of uniformed irregulars 'commandos' during Second World War and the third is the "addition of guerrilla tactics to the arsenals of conventional armies".

Irregular and unconventional warfare again gained currency from 1950 AD onwards, when, fueled with the power of nationalism in a cycle of insurgencies, irregulars from Third World countries by means of guerrilla tactics defeated conventional armies of colonial countries and foreign occupants. The French were decisively defeated in Indochina War (1945-1954) at Dien Bien Phu by the Vietnamese forces. This was a tactical defeat not a strategic one. Its main objective was to weaken the will of the French people to fight and in due course of time it did successfully achieve that. When we look at Algeria, the French counterinsurgency operations against National Liberation Front (FLN) resulted in a virtual army coup defeat and the collapse of Fourth French republic. The protracted conflict in Vietnam destroyed two U.S. administrations and the war in Afghanistan brought to light that the cloak of invincibility USSR thought it had could be breached and was one of the prime causes of its disintegration.

Weaker opponents and poor countries waged guerrilla insurgencies and irregular warfare against their stronger opponents and for the most part of it were able to defeat them tactically and strategically as "iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military strength." Guerrillas and practitioners of irregular warfare were able to maul their stronger opponents primarily because of inherited weaknesses in political will and armed forces of these countries. These countries "were lacking in proper doctrine and were sluggish to adapt to the unforeseen difficulties". All these cases demonstrate one simple point; that "guerrilla insurgency is not simply a scaled-down version of conventional war". Hence, "those who undertake counterinsurgency by treating it as such are a committing an error with possibly grievous consequences" (Jones 2004: 1).

Despite being a key form of warfare, COIN is a grossly neglected subject of warfare. Its professional military study was often neglected in the past. A majority of military theorists such as Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz deliberately avoided it

and considered it as a form of 'people's war' and which had to be avoided at all costs. Marx and Engels made an effort to understand it but did not produce any coherent theoretical position on it, believing that there was hardly any scope for it in rapidly industrializing Europe.

With the expansion of colonial empire and savage warfare of Africa and Asia, a number of soldiers produced few theoretical works like "Small Wars: their principle and practice" (1896), "Imperial Policing" (1934), "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" (1935), "US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual" (1940). This period witnessed that apart from a few academic writers and soldiers not many had interest in irregular warfare and this remained the case for a long duration in time. The literature on war was also filled with lack of mainstream interest and neglect towards counterinsurgency. When we can compare the two editions of "Makers of Modern Strategy" published in 1943 and 1986 respectively, the first edition, edited by Edward Gordon Meade had only one chapter out of 20 and just 25 pages out of 547 on counterinsurgency. No other form of insurgency or counterinsurgency was mentioned in the book. The second edition, edited by Peter Paret had only one chapter out of 28 and just 47 pages out of 871 on "revolutionary war". What is more surprising is the overlook of counterinsurgency by governments, which had faced counterinsurgency and failed to acknowledge and codify their accumulative understanding of how to cope with it.

2.2 THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Classical COIN:

The majority of classical COIN theories apart from 'lists of practices' which are codified in U.S. Marine Corps "Small Wars Manual", 1940' form the comprehensive literature developed in parallel with the theories of insurgency, irregular, and revolutionary warfare. These classical COIN theories are entirely a product of the Cold War and various de-colonial struggles and mainly a product of the interaction between government and academia from the World War II years till the end of Vietnam War. These theories are of inductive nature[3], developed and perfected by the trial and error methods in war

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[3] Insurgency theories are of deductive nature.

over a period of time. Classical COIN theories are essentially developed by the colonizers like the British in Malaya, French in Indo-china and United States as occupying powers in Vietnam. On the other hand, insurgency theories have been developed mostly by the locals from the likes of Mao, Giap, Marighella who laid the foundations of traditional guerrilla warfare to attain their political objectives.

COIN operations in the initial COIN theories are not backed by any sound theory of execution, but guided by a number of lessons and fluid principles learned during the process of fighting insurgency. Hence these principles vary according to the requirement of counterinsurgency but there exists an element of continuity in the patterns of conduct of COIN operations. The COIN paradigm is rightly presented by Shafer in its academic form, "its concepts are highly reified, its variables vaguely specified, and its claims seldom operationalized" (Shafer 1988:

47).

Initially, the COIN operations started as a military enterprise but with time they incorporated various socio-economical and political measures and evolved into a political enterprise. Galula appropriately puts this change from military enterprise to political enterprise when he states that, "COIN is 20% military and 80% political" (Galula 1964). All through this time, a number of scholars focused on the nature and characteristics of various insurgents to propose 'culture-centric' countermeasures.

The theorization and development process of various COIN concepts was begun in the early 1950s at the Rand Corporation and at Center for International Studies (CIS), MIT[4]. The initial focus was on finding the causes of insurgency and once the problems of modernization, economic development[5], and societal change were established as the root cause of insurgencies, the spotlight shifted to finding suitable COIN strategy to restore people's hope and gain back their support for the government. A COIN strategy was then

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[4] CIA sponsors CIS.
[5] Scholars at RAND observed that, "in many societies, the negative consequences of economic development to which the developed nations adjusted over the course of decades and centuries were being experienced in the space of years by the developing countries. As the economic conditions underlying society began to shift, pressure built on traditional society. This, in turn, put pressure on nascent governments, many of which had only recently acquired independence from colonial empires, and on those empires that sought to retain their colonies. In most of the cases governments failed to keep the pace with this societal change, resulting in instability and disorder. Insurgents used this opportunity to gain advantage and popular support".

developed to provide security from insurgents, government predations, increase political rights and reduce corruption. Its main aim was to win people's trust and support for the government. This COIN theory came to be known as "winning the heart and minds of the people."

David Galula further developed this line in his laws of COIN. Galula argued that the support of the populations is a necessity and prime requirement for isolating and eliminating the insurgents. "The support of the population can be gained through the active minority... by maintaining an active but a dispersed and diluted presence within the population. The support from a population cannot be gleaned easily as it requires the intensity of efforts and vastness of means" (Ibid).

During the 1960s an alternate theory also emerged from the works of Charles Wolf Jr. at Rand Corporation and the works of Samuel Popkin. The cost-benefit theory was developed in opposition to various support based concepts of the 1960s era. It is an insurgent-focused concept and gives attention to the insurgent's need for certain inputs. The Cost-Benefit theory considers insurgency as a system and in order to defeat the insurgency, COIN efforts must concentrate to increase the cost of insurgent's inputs by disrupting the procedure by which various inputs are converted into activities resulting in the "decline of the overall impact of insurgent output" (Popkin 1958). According to this concept, COIN forces should focus on "disrupting insurgent recruiting, material acquisition, intelligence, financing and their command and control center", thus increasing costs for insurgent processes.

During the late 1960s and mid 1970s, COIN concepts and theories experience a shift in the approach. The failure of military-centric and insurgents based COIN approaches in insurgencies was primarily responsible for this shift. It is at this time insurgencies also became more complex in nature and conducting COIN operations became much more complex and required unification of multiple agencies, interests and concepts (McCuen 1966). From the 1950s to 1980s researches and analysis at Rand Corporation, CIS at the MIT, British military experiences in the Malayan peninsula and French experiences in Indochina and Algeria gave rise to a number of COIN concepts. Works of various independent researchers like Galula, Robert Thompson, and David Kilcullen also attempted to explain and fill the lacunas present in COIN concepts and theory.

On the basis of 'nature of operations,' these classic COIN concepts are divided into 12 concepts. These concepts are not mutually exclusive but can be used in combination. Various COIN forces use these concepts as in whole or in parts or in combination.

2.3 CLASSIC COIN CONCEPTS:

Classic Hearts and Minds (HAM)

The classic "Hearts and Minds" is a population-centric, development-based approach. HAM concept focuses on "increasing political rights, improvement in standards of living of population and reducing corruption in the government, while following the path of development" (Thompson 1968). It provides a positive stake for the population in public order and governance and ultimately cuts off insurgent support but there is a catch in this approach, which has been thoroughly articulated by Samuel Huntington, who states that, "development and modernity can cause painful dislocations and disruptions in the old institutions of traditional society" (Huntington, 1969). Austin Long provides the most optimum solution, which is, "to win the public's support for the government by ameliorating some of the negative effects of development while speeding up the provision of modernity's benefits" (Long, 2006). The HAM approach agonized from the "chicken and egg" dilemma. Question is, what should done first?, development or security? Empirical evidence from COIN operation in Afghanistan and Iraq too failed to answer this question.

Pacification

Pacification as a concept primarily developed during the Vietnam War. It is a "wide-ranging umbrella term for a handful of population-centric concepts" (Rand 2006) with the focus on the local level. These wide-ranging population-centric concepts, first try to win population's support "on a small scale at the local level by the concurrent pursuit of development and security" (Ibid). A small-pacified area is then extended across various geographical locations. Pacification perfectly balances between the "efforts to reduce the population's motives and opportunities to support the insurgents" (Ibid).

Legitimacy

The concept of Legitimacy in COIN is fundamentally focused on motive and directly proportional to the support of the population. It basically means that the more the legitimacy, the more the support from the population. It is based on the assumption that people tend to offer their support to the side having greater legitimacy. If legitimacy "accrues to the insurgency, it will gain support and have better intelligence but if it appears to be illegitimate, it will lose support and will wither away" (Thompson 1960). Similarly, if it ensues to the government, in that case the government has much better support and intelligence on the insurgents. Perceptions of legitimacy are largely problematical, multidimensional and mostly involve contextual distinctions.

Reform

Reform is a "motive-focused concept", which focus increasing the legitimacy of the state and in that process; undercut the support for insurgents as a better alternative. If an insurgency magnets support from those people who are aggravated with the performance of the government, then improving the government functioning and performance by introducing reforms can reduce that support to insurgency. Reducing corruption can acts as a "force multiplier" in various COIN strategies and critical for earning the trust of the population by increasing its legitimacy.

Redress

Redress is a "motive-focused COIN concept", similar to reform and related to legitimacy. According to Thomas A. Marks, "If insurgencies are based and motivated by a set of grievances, then redress of those grievances should lead to reconciliation and peace as it addressed the root causes of insurgency and increase the legitimacy of host nation government" (Marks, 2004: 34).

Unity of Effort

Unity of Effort is a classic military imperative. The success of any military operation depends upon "the coordinated efforts of all security forces and the government working

towards a unified purpose"(Ibid: 35). Similarly, a successful COIN operation also depends upon the unity of efforts between multiple factors and players. There remains a fact that, "achieving unity of effort is often tricky in COIN, especially when balancing between sometimes-competing actions related to diminishing motive and eliminating the insurgent threat"(Ibid: 37).

Resettlement / Drain the Swamp

Resettlement is a population focused COIN concept, focusing mainly on "denying the population support to the insurgent" (RAND 2006:36) and if "the population cannot be secured in place (Pacification), then it must be re-moved to a location where it can be secure" (Ibid 2006: 37). It involves relocation and resettlement of the population rather than waiting for the population to stop its support to insurgents. According to Kelly Greenhill, "resettlement is likely to work only in those rare cases where promises made by the counterinsurgents actually are fulfilled and the quality of life actually is improved for the displaced population and where a culture of cooperation and co-optation can be inculcated." (Greenhill 2011: 78) Resettlement concept is also known as "draining the swamp" or "draining the sea".

Cost-Benefit

It was developed in opposition to the various support based concepts of the Vietnam War era, the Cost-Benefit is an "insurgent-focused" concept and focuses on insurgent's need for certain inputs. Cost-Benefit considers insurgency as a system and in order to defeat the insurgency, COIN efforts must concentrate to increase the cost of insurgent's inputs by "interrupting the processes by which various inputs are converted into activities resulting in a reduction of the overall impact of insurgent output" (RAND 2006: 39). COIN forces should focus on disrupting insurgent recruiting, material acquisition, intelligence, financing and their command and control center; thus increasing costs for insurgent processes.

Border Control

In COIN operations, Border Control concept is primarily based upon the cost-benefit notion with an aim to increase the input cost to the insurgent. Maintaining and controlling the border can prevent insurgents from obtaining "aid and comfort from outside sources" (Ibid: 41). In this concept, insurgent support is targeted through kinetic/physical means ultimately resulting support reduction.

Initiative

Grabbing the initiative is a "timeless military imperative predicated on striking fast, striking first, and striking hard". Seizing and maintaining the initiative puts the COIN force in position to beat the insurgents back and gain the upper hand in a given phase" (Ibid: 43). In practice of COIN, "there is a difference between seizing the initiative by blindly striking first and seizing the initiative by coupling flexible and dynamic capabilities with actionable intelligence" (Ibid: 43).

Crush Them

'Crush them' COIN effort is a support-based concept and predicates modern era. It primarily talks about the kinetic elimination of both active insurgents and their support base. As suggested by Clancy and Crosses "if diagnosed sufficiently early, a nascent insurgency can be annihilated through the vigorous application of force and repression." It is only applied on nascent insurgencies and on the support-base of insurgents, as repression and unrestrained force can be counterproductive. If applied in an established insurgency, Insurgency would likely to gain additional domestic and international support and legitimacy. 'Crush Them' COIN concept is similar to 'iron fist' COIN concept but the two can't be replaceable with each other. "Iron fist COIN effort focuses exclusively on the insurgents wholly through kinetic means whereas, on the other hand 'Crush them' concentrates both on the application of force to insurgents and on the repression of supporting populations" (Ibid: 45).

Amnesty/Rewards

Amnesty/Reward is nothing more than a modest minute piece of realistic counseling. It is a motive-focused concept to reduce the number of active insurgents. It is first steps,

toward "establishing an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" (Ibid 2006: 47). Amnesty/Reward is a potentially attractive option from the insurgent's point of view, as it reduces their need for a fight to the end.

 However, it is not an independent concept and its effectiveness hinges on the availability and attractiveness of the other available options to insurgents. The potential magnetism of an amnesty proposal mostly depends upon the "insurgent's perceptions of their prospects for success. If they were on a losing side, the insurgents are more likely to accept amnesty" (Ibid: 47).

2.4 CONTEMPORARY COIN

COIN is defined as "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes" (U.S. Counterinsurgency Guide 2009: 12). And insurgency is defined as "Insurgency can be defined as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region" (Ibid: 13). A contemporary COIN practice basically involves complex operations, which integrates a large number of various civil and military agencies. Contemporary COIN is as violent as other forms of conflict and warfare and extremely intricate to conduct, politically very controversial in nature, involves ambiguous events that are extremely complex and difficult to interpret and often requires anabundance of time and resources. In COIN it is very difficult for an intervening government to determine financial cost, military resources, and political capital advance.

In terms of capabilities, COIN is quite similar to "humanitarian assistance with its stabilization operations, development assistance missions and peacekeeping operations" (Ibid: 13) but its main purpose is to marginalize insurgents and build popular support for the government. It is basically an armed political conflict with insurgents. It is different in terms of goals from humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, development assistance missions and peacekeeping operations. The central goals of COIN are a control over the environment, population, security and the enemy. The unique nature of each COIN operation "arises from the complex interaction of three key factors: the characteristics of the environment (physical, economic, political and human) in which it takes place; the nature of the insurgent group (or groups); and the nature of the

counterinsurgent government and its security forces" (U.S. Counterinsurgency Guide 2009).

2.5 THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPORARY COIN

US Government counterinsurgency Guide 2009 classifies COIN based on various factors. It classifies COIN into 'Domestic COIN' and 'Overseas COIN' on the basis of the area of operation. Domestic COIN is when a government is conducting COIN within its own national boundaries. In the case of Domestic COIN, it is not a matter of option. The government facing insurgency has to conduct it. In Domestic COIN a government generally has the "greater strategic patience to stay in the course of a long protracted struggle" (U.S. Counterinsurgency Guide 2009: 27), as it is conducting it in its own territory. The other advantage in Domestic COIN is "detailed understanding of the geography, culture, history, sociology and politics of the country" (Ibid: 28).

Overseas COIN is often conducted in foreign countries for the support of other governments. Intervention to conduct COIN in foreign countries is a "discretionary activity and the government does have a choice to conduct or opt out of it" (Ibid: 28). In Overseas COIN, the forces are vulnerable to insurgent's "home ground" advantage, as they are operating in the territory of another country. The government, which conducts Overseas COIN in the territory of another country, has lesser strategic patience in the course of a protracted struggle. Also, it is very difficult to get the support of the local population in any Overseas COIN operation, as population is always well aware that the insurgents will on no account leave the country, but on the other hand, the intervening force must sooner or later plan its transition and departure some day. Most importantly, in Overseas COIN "home ground" advantage is on the side of the insurgent as the insurgent being local has a "detailed understanding of the geography, culture, history, sociology and politics of the affected country and the intervening country has to go through the learning curve" (Ibid: 30).

Depending upon the number of intervening governments in COIN, US Government counterinsurgency Guide 2009 classifies COIN into 'Bilateral' and 'Multilateral' COIN operations. In a Bilateral COIN operation only one country is prepared to assist the affected country. It is more efficient in terms of management and coordination but lesser

in terms of legitimacy. In Multilateral COIN operations multiple countries as an intervening coalition or UN forces are prepared to assist the affected country. It is more difficult and complex in terms of alliance management, coordination and requires significant effort. It is more legitimate than Bilateral COIN efforts.

COIN intervention can also be classified on the basis of Consent. The nature of COIN campaign also varies with the level of consent provided by affected government. Consent can be the full, partial or complete absence of government. "A final variation is where an insurgency follows a conventional war in which an invading power or coalition overthrows the existing government, then builds a new government from scratch or radically reforms an existing structure while increasingly being opposed by insurgents" (Ibid: 13).

On the basis of this approach, COIN operations are of two types, 'Population-Centric' and 'Enemy-Centric'. The Enemy-Centric COIN approach primarily focuses on the destruction of insurgents and all others efforts are considered of supporting nature. The approach can be further classified into hard vs. soft, direct vs. indirect, decapitation vs. marginalization strategies. Enemy-Centric COIN approaches generally work more successfully against incipient insurgencies.

The population-Centric COIN approach focuses primarily on the population by maintaining the support of the population. A military action against the insurgent is required, but the main aim is to gain the population's trust. Empirical evidence has shown that "population-centric COIN" approaches have a higher chance of success against complex and non-hierarchical insurgencies.

On the basis of 'nature of operations,' contemporary COIN concepts are divided into twenty-four concepts. Similar to classic COIN, contemporary COIN concepts are not mutually exclusive can be used in combination. In practice, contemporary COIN strategies use these concepts as whole or in parts or in combination. Many classic COIN concepts are still used in contemporary COIN strategies and almost all contemporary COIN concepts have roots in classical COIN.

2.6 CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS OF COIN

COIN Field Manual

FM 3-24[6] Counterinsurgency is a hybrid COIN concept. It is a blend of classical and contemporary COIN practices with a focus on population, motive and popular support. FM 3-24's main emphasis is on security, development, positive relations, and legitimacy. According to FM 3-24, "legitimacy is the main objective of COIN forces and, as such, all operations should be undertaken with consideration for the effect they have on the legitimacy of the COIN force and the host-nation government" (FM 3-24: 38). Its central aim is to "provide security, establish government capabilities, basic services, address grievances and reduce corruption with an endeavor to separate the insurgents from the population, gain popular support ultimately resulting in improves intelligence collection and COIN force or government legitimacy"[7].

Clear, Hold, and Build

"Clear, hold, and build" is a hybrid of two COIN concepts; "pacification and development"[8]. It starts with the "clearing of the area by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of the insurgents and holding it with security forces to effectively re-establish a government presence at the local level" (Ibid: 42). "Support for Government is building by protecting the populace and improving economic, social, cultural, and medical services" (Marston 2008).

Beat Cop

The Beat Cop is a population-centric COIN concept and in practice it a subordinate form of pacification concept. Beat Cop works on the similar principle of a traditional urban beat cop and its familiarity with the local population. Beat Cop concept involves the "employment of the COIN forces in the area of conflict and conducting regular dismount patrols" (RAND 2006: 52). Such patrols help COIN forces to become personally familiar

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[6] FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: was released in December 2006 and a collective attempt of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps' to update their doctrine to address the changes in COIN since the end of the Cold War.
[7] Ibid: 39.
[8] Ibid: 40.

with and accepted to the local population and build trust between the COIN forces and the local population, thus offering numerous advantages like intelligence collection, a better understanding of local issues and situation, prevention of criminal activities and insurgent supports. Beat-cop concept is discussed in detail in FM 3-24 and at its core it is all about establishing and maintaining trust with the locals. As asserted by David Kilcullen, "For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security" (Kilcullen 2006: 29). In the beat cop concept, COIN force is primarily deployed in "space dominance role and local militants, irregular forces, police, paramilitary and other nonconventional forces are extensively used community policing. COIN force also employed various counter-gangs, scouts, or ferret forces against insurgents"[9] (Ibid: 31).

Boots on the Ground

According to Boots on the Ground COIN concept, there has to be a "certain minimum force ratio between counterinsurgents and insurgents or between COIN forces and the population" (RAND 2006: 54). FM 3-24 supports a troop density of 20-25 counterinsurgents per 1000 residents. Douglas Ollivant and Eric Chewning advocate "10 to 1 or 20 to 1 ratio of counterinsurgent to the insurgent". Boots on the Ground offers numerous other advantages to a COIN force, like the presence of COIN forces discourages antagonist and reassures the population.

Put a Local Face on It

It is a pacification related, motive-focused concept of COIN and based on the assumption that the "COIN forces are from out of town and considered culturally different and foreign by the locals and the local communities in insurgent-contested areas require security and development and well-prepared indigenous forces perform most effectively" (Ibid: 55). As famously quoted by T. E. Lawrence "Better the Arabs do it tolerably as you do it perfectly" (Lawrence 1917). The concept requires COIN forces to invest in training,

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[9] Historical examples of militias used in COIN operations include the Popular Forces, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, the People's Self-Defense Forces in Vietnam, and the quadrillage in Algeria.

development and equipment of local security forces as local security forces are acquainted with the culture and will be less vexing on population, can form a long-term relationship with the local population. The most difficult task is to find suitable local forces, which are up to the task of conducting COIN operations with COIN force standards. Even after rigorous training the local forces sometimes may not reach the required level of acceptance of COIN forces. This causes dilemma and problems to COIN force timetable for withdrawal and may perceive them as occupiers.

Cultural Awareness

Cultural Awareness is a supporting COIN concept based on the proposition that "cultural awareness is critical to COIN success". In intelligence collection and its efficient application, Cultural Awareness acts as force enabler. Cultural Awareness also makes COIN force less dependent on existing political and social structure, but it is only applicable to a "COIN force, which is not culturally similar to the area of conflict" (Ibid: 56). It prevents COIN force to employ culturally inappropriate practices in the area of conflict and avoid the culturally offensive behavior. It also advises COIN forces "not to invest or commit in unpopular economic and social arrangements and never repress or exclude significant societal groups from state power or resources" (Ibid: 57).

Tangible Support Reduction

Tangible support reduction as a COIN concept is a present-day amalgamation of "cost-benefit and support based concepts". TSR primarily focuses on the reduction or elimination of tangible support to insurgency. "This perspective follows the cost-benefit concept in suggesting that it is the support the insurgents receive, from wherever they get it, that is the real center of gravity" (Paul 2009) and the main aim of COIN force is to "eliminate the tangible support of insurgency and it does not matter whether it is done through reducing motives, capabilities, and opportunities of insurgents or support based concepts" (Ibid: 58). However, it is different from full 'system' concepts of classic cost-benefit concept and whenever insurgents draw significant supports from the population; TSR is more in harmony with popular support-based COIN concepts then cost-benefit COIN concept.

Criticality of Intelligence

Contemporary COIN doctrine also upholds the criticality and importance of actionable intelligence in the success of COIN strategy. Intelligence allows COIN forces to effectively disrupt insurgent operations and conduct capture or kill engagements on their terms. Intelligence mostly works in connection with others COIN connections by supplementing them.

Flexibility and Adaptability

In contemporary COIN 'Flexibility and Adaptability' is the most important component in the success of COIN as "devastating firepower and sophisticated technology can never be the guarantors of success in COIN operations" (Nagl 2013: 33). In today's environment, even insurgents make use the Internet for their propaganda, communication and as a source of knowledge to construct deadly IEDs and use them against COIN forces. Nagl in "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" clearly emphasizes on the "COIN force's ability to adapt quickly and effectively to the changes in warfare and its success in COIN operations" (Ibid: 34). According to Nagl, "COIN is a two-player game against an adaptive adversary" (Ibid: 35).

As part of the GWOT, US forces in christened OEF and OIF showcased the dazzling display of its capabilities and professionalism of the U.S. military in NCW and RMA. But the failure of NCW and RMA in the face of the challenges posed by post-invasion phase in Afghanistan and Iraq. Further, this difficulty in managing with insurgency may encourage the future adversaries to embrace insurgency as the only available option of combating the U.S. military efficiently. Hence, both the present and upcoming conduct of the GWOT demands that the U.S. military must mend its ability to conduct COIN operations. The failure of NCW and RMA in post conflict phase in Afghanistan and Iraq produced a three-fold response in the United States Army and Marines. At a technical level, forces turned towards technology to provide an answer to challenges of problems of irregular warfare. Here, the Forces used various biometric, imagery and communication intelligence to help unmask the insurgent threat. At the tactical level, forces developed the fusion of operations and actionable intelligence. The most important

change was at the strategic level, where forces made the transitionfrom NCW to a counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm.

CHAPTER 3

US INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: FROM COUNTERTERRORISM TO REGIME CHANGE TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Afghanistan is a nation with vast historical underpinnings and has been of significance for its neighboring countries for years due to its strategic location. Afghanistan lacks a coherent system of governance to look out for its domestic and international order, which has made it a fertile breeding ground for various groups like Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its subsidiaries. Out of the many groups, Taliban and Al-Qaeda are of utmost importance for the study of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, as these groups employ terror as a weapon. The often-repeated scenes of violence and then invasion starting from the Soviet invasion in 1979 led the country towards devastation, both economically and politically. Due to the economic distress, the population took to opium farming, which led to opium trafficking and which further aggravates the condition when this money is used for funding illicit activities and the Afghan warlords. Since the country lacks institutions to check such activities, the situation flared up and became worse. Afghanistan has been a nation wrought with continuous violence and regular fighting, with the population seething under corruption and failed efforts at development. When US faced the horror of 9/11, the Bush administration swore to end Al-Qaeda, which led US to Afghanistan. The US wanted to dissolve Taliban regime and cripple Al-Qaeda efforts to use Afghan territory to foil terrorist incidents.

The 9/11 attacks unfurled an absolutely new form of threat for the mighty United States of America, an America that took pride in its secure borders and massive security arrangements. "The threat of emerging trans-national threats showed to the world, that security even of a state as powerful as US is not sacrosanct" (Bush: 2001). In the wake of 9/11, on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush conveyed, "Our nation has been put on notice. We are not immune from attack" (ibid). The underlying principle was to "obliterate Al-Qaeda, its training camps, eliminating the Taliban and its influence in the governance and the administration of the country, which may have made the

policymakers to hope that the perils of terrorism would be brought to a halt to a large extent" (Thornton 2008: 2).

The objective was to depose the Taliban command and start the ball rolling for a substitute government, which would provide the U.S. with an easy access to Al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Subsequently, US made the last offer to Taliban, essentially calling for the Taliban to hand over the Al-Qaeda terrorists over to the US, put up the shutters to terror training camps and full US scrutiny of the training camps.

Taliban quickly responded to the US ultimatum, on 21 September 2001, they proclaimed that the US had no confirmation regarding the alleged role of Osama Bin Laden in the terror attacks of September 11 and outright declined to comply with the US ultimatum[10]. Later in the month of October, Taliban surreptitiously put forward the proposition of handing over of Osama Bin Laden to Pakistan for trial under the Sharia laws and even later it proposed to try Osama inside of Afghanistan itself, but under the umbrella of Islamic laws. The suggestions were declined by the US. What needs to be mentioned is that there was another time that Taliban offered to turn over Osama. It was on 14 October 2001, that Taliban again came up proposition to deliver Osama for trial, but to a third nation and if only the US could bring to the surface, evidence of Osama's involvement in the 9/11 attacks[11]. At the centre of the operation was the US Central Command, which was asked to chalk out the intended purpose of the operations, which were to take place in Afghanistan. The US Central Command's person in command was Gen. Tommy Frank. Gen. Frank's idea of the operations was to tear down the Al-Qaeda under the lead of the US Central Command and termination of the Taliban was an additional prerogative, since the Taliban had been giving refuge to the Al-Qaeda and providing a safe haven to terrorists (Press Briefing Rumsfeld 2002). The plan was to bring to knees the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership and efforts were to be made to strike Taliban army. The plan also included as a next step, humanitarian aid, in President Bush's own words, "We would then begin to stabilize the country and help the Afghan people to build a free society" (Bush 2010: 194).

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[10]"Taliban Won't Turn Over Bin Laden". CBS News. 21 September 2001. Retrieved 27 March 2011.
[11]"Bush rejects Taliban offer to hand Bin Laden over", Guardian (UK). 14 October 2001.

3.1 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The aerial bombardment on the selected Taliban political and military infrastructure, Al-Qaeda training camps and bases started on the 7 October 2001. The Northern Alliance along with Joint Special Operations Teams led the fight against Taliban. Koch has been of the view that the US strategy targeted the Taliban by tactical airstrikes and also critically tearing down Taliban's military capabilities (Koch 2001). Nothing of significance had been realized initially, since Taliban had strongholds in Afghanistan and considerable support from Pakistan. The US soon realized the situation at hand and a change in strategy was called for. By the end of October US changed its tactics and applied the 'Brute Force' as a strategy on the ground and started intense air shelling by B2 and B52 bombers to supplement the United Front troops on ground (Davis 2001).

Faced with such intense air assaults, Taliban could not last long and soon, first the town of Mazar-i-Sharif was captured by the United Front troops. Pakistan was given an ultimatum to provide the US with full assistance and collaboration in the fight against Al-Qaeda, by the Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. By November 12, the forces of the United Front capture the Shomali plains and subsequently, November 13 witnessed the victory of the forces by entering the capital, Kabul city.

Taliban had been weakened by a string of reasons starting from the animosity and dissatisfaction within, due to its intrinsic flaws, to the overwhelming show of air power by the US and the United Forces' swift action on the ground. Taliban was not a coherent force and it clearly lacked national legitimacy. This was now the time that Taliban had taken a step back and decided to retreat to Kandahar but retreating to Kandahar proved to be erroneous for the Taliban, as this made Taliban more susceptible to US air strikes. Air strikes became more ruthless by now, as the main motive for the US was the complete overthrow of the Taliban regime (McInnis 2005:116).

According to Gen. Frank, following the retreat of Taliban towards the south and into Kandahar, the scene was set majorly to track down the remnants of Al-Qaeda and Taliban and to look out for the left over leadership of the insurgents groups. The general scene was one that involved periods of low and intense action (Frank 2002). The flight of Taliban and low level of action meant that it was time for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. One fact also noted during war against Taliban is that the intense aerial

bombings in Afghanistan by the US revealed the mounting friction between the Afghans themselves and with the US. There were even incidents when the US air team was misguided by the Afghan warlords and the native intelligence to settle their own scores (Conneta 2002:16).

The Battle of Tora Bora ensued in December 2001, south of Jalalabad. The battle involved the US and UK forces, supported by Northern Alliance forces, which transpired to pluck out the residual forces of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. March 2002, witnessed the much coveted, code-named, 'Operation Anaconda', when forces of the Afghan military alliance rallied behind the US military to bring to an end to the Al-Qaeda. The operation began on March 2, in the rugged mountainous terrains of Paktia province in the region of Shah-I-Kot.

The intended set up was planned in such a way that troops were placed on the mountains such that insurgents could not flee to east, that is, Pakistan, when the Coalition forces mount an assault on the valley. The shooting was to be sustained by the US Air Force divisions and the French Air Force Mirage 2000Ds and US Navy divisions were to tote up the air defense (Holmes 2012). Even though the Al-Qaeda was not entirely destroyed, they incurred huge losses and defeat in the initial three months of the operation Enduring Freedom, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban regimes in Afghanistan had been stripped of their power and authority and even lost lands from where to operate and conduct insurgent actions.

3.2 SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

Security experts and strategic planners in US have always believed that it was US departure from the Afghanistan and surrounding region after the Soviet pull out in 1989 which was responsible for the descent of Afghanistan into chaos. In order not to repeat similar kind of mistake, after the defeat of Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 2001, the United States and its allies aimed to build a politically and economically strong, democratic Afghanistan, which was headed by central government by dismantling the regional security structures. The first step in the direction of political development and

reconstruction was Bonn Agreement[12], United States of America, Germans, Anti-Taliban leaders and United Nations help secured the Bonn Agreement on December 5, 2001 and set up an Interim Administration (IAI) with Hamid Karzai; an ethnic Pashtun as its leader and backed by a multi ethnic cabinet where most of the crucial security positions are dominated by Northern Alliance.

Once the process to recreate the State of Afghanistan was initiated the focus shifted to 'Security' and to meet that goal, United Nation formulated the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[13] on 20 December 2001 under UNSCR 1386. The main aim of ISAF was to assist the AIA in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas and help infant Afghan state in rebuilding of government institutions. The plan was simple, as soon as the international coalition led by the US in Afghanistan put the last touches on the effort to do away with the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda, the time would be ripe for establishing a democratic set up, start the reconstruction work and set up security apparatus to defend the infant Afghan State. USCENTCOM and Coalition leaders decided to extend the presence of US and troops in Afghanistan. The main aim was to help IAI in matters of security, reconstruction and survival of new Afghan State. At the same time IAI started working on organizing the Loya Jirga[14] and to draft a democratic constitution for Afghanistan.

It soon became evident that the presence of the new provisional administration was not far-reaching. The truth was that almost 30 years of constant fighting started with Soviet invasion in 1979 and the incompetent, ruthless Taliban regime had robbed Afghanistan of its major infrastructure, governmental organization and institutions. "The Taliban regime was so venomous, that it completely banned the education for girls and even the boys were not so encouraged to go to schools" (Rashid, 1999). Health care system of Afghanistan was in shambles and more than half of its population was illiterate. No one else can capture the true state of Afghanistan during these years as President Ashraf Ghani. According to Ghani, "Between 1978, when the Communist coup took place, and November 2001, When the Taliban were overthrown, Afghanistan according to a World

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[12]Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.

[13] The United Kingdom assumed the command and control for ISAF and appointed Major General John McColl to command the organization.

[14]A *loyajirga*is a traditional meeting of Afghan tribal, political, and religious leaders.

Bank estimate lost about $240 billion in ruined infrastructure and vanished opportunities. While the rest of the world was shrinking in the terms of spatial and temporal coordination, the travel time between Kabul and every single province in the country significantly increased… Millions of Afghan children grew up illiterate in refugee camps, where they learned that gun rather than the ballot was the key instrument for the acquisition of power and position" (Ghani and Lockhart 2008:75).

Considering the lack of institutional structures in Afghanistan, and owing to disruptions caused by the Soviets, the Taliban and even to a certain extent by the United States and its allies during OEF the ISAF's reconstruction work went at very slow pace. Infrastructure took forever to come up, the training meted out to the ANP and ANA took many years to conclude, well beyond the planned date. But The NATO and US coalition forces labored hard to give stability to region through their reconstruction efforts and succeed in several cases in Afghanistan. The central issue in Security was lack of numbers to secure the vast population of Afghanistan. About 5000 coalition troops and 10,000 US troops were involved in CT operations throughout Afghanistan but these numbers are grossly insufficient to secure 30 million Afghan people (Hooker and Collins 2015:26). President Bush seems to realize this mistake in his memoirs, "We were all weary of the Soviets and the British, who ended up looking like occupiers. This 'light footprint' strategy worked well at first. But, in retrospect, our rapid success with low troop levels created false comfort, and our desire to maintain light footprint left us short of resources we needed. It would take several years for these shortcomings to become clear" (Bush 2010:234).

In order to overcome the inherent vulnerability of Afghan government in reconstruction work, the US introduced the concept of PRTs[15]. The main motivation to setting up these was to advance the reconstruction process, address issues of governability, boost the security of the country, and to aid the Afghan authorities in governance. The PRTs were

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[15] PRTs consisted of a headquarters, a security element, civil affairs teams, diplomats, aid and assistance experts, and, where possible, agricultural teams. Navy and Air Force officers commanded many U.S. PRTs. Without a nationwide peacekeeping force, these teams were often the only way that diplomats and government aid professionals could get out to the countryside. From 2002 to 2009, the U.S.-hosted PRTs were instrumental in helping to disburse nearly $2.7 billion of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) money and other PRTs designated funds.

intended to "assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified areas of operations and to support the Security Sector Reform and the efforts of reconstruction in the country" (NATO/ISAF PRT Handbook 2006:45).

Following the United States lead, other Coalition partners also set up PRTs in their respective areas of operation. These had varying names and led by respective Coalition partners in their area of operations. Despite of the differences in names, the generic purpose and nature of work of these PRTs remained same: to enhance security, promote construction; augment the work of the NGOs and IOs with Afghan government.

Despite of difficulties and shortage of manpower, the reconstruction work went smooth in many areas like road construction, education, and even agriculture. But all reconstruction work could not hide the simple fact that the elements of Al-Qaeda and Taliban were still re-emerging and disrupting the progress made by aid workers and the international community. The years from 2001 to 2005 witnessed great improvements in the infrastructure, but country was still in the clutches of widespread corruption, poverty and hunger.

Despite of the several attempts of US and Coalition forces to increase the Afghan government's capabilities. The Afghan government was found wanting in various areas of governance, hunger and poverty were nevertheless prevalent extensively. The government simply did not yield significant results in the area of drug trafficking, opium cultivation and its fight corruption. One of the main reasons behind why the Afghan government could not rally the support of the public was widespread corruption at all levels, the local population did not believe that the government could get rid of corruption, and the attempts by the government and the allied forces were only making the belief ever more stronger.

3.3 WHAT WENT WRONG?

In the Bonn Agreement of 2001, it was desired that the Afghan people and the Afghan government would take the responsibility for the protection of its population and the coalition forces would assist them in security, fabricating policies and in training the Afghan people in areas of governance. But this transfer of power brought the inefficiency

of the government to the surface. The corruption prevalent could be clearly evidenced in the area of narcotics and was often seen in the operations of the local police. According to Joseph J. Collins, the war effort in Afghan nation went from bad to worse due to numerous reasons. The first of the many being, ''there was little Afghan government and administrative capacity, and much economic and security assistance bypassed the Afghan government'' (Hooker and Collins 2015). The author tells that the countries engaged in the aid process preferred to channel their work through the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and to a certain extent even through contractors, what this essentially transpired into was a manifold increase in the corruption levels of the Afghan officials.

The second argument put forward by Collins is that corruption and money laundering rocketed to new heights, "President Karzai's brother and some of his subordinates also became the subject of corruption investigations, especially after the Kabul bank fell apart in 2010" (Ibid). The third point regarding the deteriorating efforts in Afghanistan was that the "US intelligence was a problem in the beginning and throughout the war. Human intelligence in particular was difficult to gather. While the national and local intelligence learned more about the enemy's forces, the military leadership had inadequate information about the population the US forces were protecting, a central focus of the campaign" (Ibid).

Collins' fourth argument explains that, "The US light footprint strategy, reinforced by a few years of low level fighting, proved in retrospect to be inadequate to the task and capacity of the threat" (Ibid). Although the coalition forces, ISAF, scored well on the military parameters, their nation-building attempts were lacking in areas like police structure. From select pockets of the southern and eastern regions of the nation, the insurgency mushroomed to the rest of the country, all because of the lack of governance and insufficient coalition troops.

Troops on the ground add to the humanitarian assistance by taking responsibility of security of such workers. The troops are a crucial force for the maintenance of security in any counterinsurgency operation. The larger the number of troops on ground, the larger the area of penetration of aid and security in the region, but the US policy in Afghanistan in the wake of Surge in Iraq, completely put the troop conditions on the backburner in

Afghanistan. The events in Iraq were so intense and were top on the US priority list that Afghanistan had to bear the brunt of the US folly. Since US was leading two wars in two countries, the Department of Defense did not agree to increase the numbers of the Armed forces until 2006.

Another issue was lack of knowledge of Afghan languages and culture. The international community and the forces working on ground weren't well aware of the Afghan culture and their ways of life. Language proved to be a far greater barrier in facilitating the aid work. Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, who served both in Afghanistan and Iraq later, came to admit that: "In Afghanistan, coalition forces struggled to understand the local drivers of conflict and instability. Coalition forces sometimes unintentionally empowered predatory and criminal actors, fostered exclusionary political and economic orders, and alienated thereby key elements of the population. Whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers-US intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decision-makers seeking knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency" (Flynn et. al 2010:75).

3.4 THE RISE OF INSURGENCY

Due to the paucity of the governing institutional structures, to keep an eye on the activities of the insurgent groups, after a period of demoralization and loss of direction, the Taliban began to regain its strength and started regrouping from their havens in south of the country and Pakistan, funded from the money harvested from drug trafficking and Al-Qaeda. A number of other factors also contributed to the rise of Taliban and other insurgencies. Public resentment against corruption in the Afghan government, the limited reach of central government and the lack of security forces in many rural areas, safe haven enjoyed by militants in Pakistan, a backlash against Collateral damage caused by military operations of ISAF and most importantly the unrealized economic expectations of Afghans.

The Iraq war occupied the US attention for long enough for the Taliban to take advantage of the situation and reorganize. The Taliban were not alone in their attempt to wage war against the Karzai government. In the spring of 2002, targeting ongoing security and political processes in Afghanistan, Taliban and other insurgents launched a series of

offensive attacks in Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar and other Afghan provinces[16]. Attacks were increased in number to sabotage on political process, with each positive development in political process insurgents groups launched a new wave of insurgent attacks to sabotage political process in different provinces of Afghanistan[17].

The year 2002 witnessed the Taliban regaining its strength and even specifically obtaining influence in south and its surrounding areas. The insurgents were particularly hostile to the Karzai government and to the foreign forces of the US, UK and NATO who were rallying support to the Karzai government. "The International Security Assistance Force's target was to 'assist the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in maintaining security within its area of operation and to support the Government of Afghanistan in expanding its authority to the rest of the country" (NATO Issue Factsheet 2006:3).

Corruption has really plagued the Afghan nation. The struggle to keep the nation free of its narcotics problems by both the Afghanistan government and the NATO led ISAF did not reap the expected results. The money gained from such illicit activities only helped the Taliban in setting up its infrastructure and to enlarge its resources. Neglect of local elders by central government since its inception in 2001 also provided an opportunity to the Taliban to gain back its influence in rural regions. Elders allowed the Taliban into their territory initially as a way of signaling their displeasure to the central government. It was found that once Taliban establish them-self in a region it has proven difficult to get rid of them (Giustozzi 2008).

When the capabilities of Taliban increased over time and U.S. was busy in Iraq, war efforts of the Taliban intensified, and the number of civilian casualties multiplied at a phenomenal rate. The years from 2004 saw a steady increase in the numbers of Taliban; given that the rate of unemployment was soaring in Afghanistan, there were people from

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[16] There are lots of debates on the beginning of insurgency. Some scholars have argued that the insurgency began in earnest in June 2004. But a number of Taliban offensive operations two years earlier suggest that it was in the spring of 2002.
[17]Insurgents continued their attacks despite of several persons who were formerly associated with the Taliban won Wolesi Jirga (lower house of the National Assembly) seats in the September 2005 elections, including Abdul Salam Rocketi. President Karzai appointed also appointed the former Taliban deputy religious affairs minister, Mawlawi Arsallah Rahmani, along with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's former close ally; Abdul SaboorFarid to the Meshrano Jirga (upper house). Despite these steps, however, the insurgency continued to worsen.

the tribes in the country, which could be easily lured to fight the unredeemable Afghan government and the foreign forces. What also worked in favor of Taliban was that the coalition forces would eventually have to depart from Afghanistan and this is what was exploited by Taliban to muster public support.

3.5 THE INSURGENTS

Taliban was not the only group involved in insurgency but it was a loose network of six insurgents groups Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-e IslamiGulbuddin[18] (HiG), foreign fighters that includes Arabs and Central Asians, various tribes based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a number of criminal networks. All of them had safe sanctuaries in areas of Pakistan. These groups did not follow single strategy, but their primary aim was to control the Afghan population and it could be done using violence as a tool, through intimidation, through provision of some services or combination of all. The role of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan insurgency is quite limited and largely indirect including facilitation, funding and ideological support. Even the presence of Al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan is quite limited. The HiG are enticed by those areas of Afghanistan, which saw the abundance in gems and timber, so their attention is glazed to Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar areas of Afghanistan and across border in Pakistan. Some other groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi are active on the northern front. The central front included a mix of foreign fighters, including Central Asians and Arabs who were located near the Afghanistan Pakistan border from Bajaur in the FATA in Pakistan to Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika in Afghanistan. The Haqqani network was active in the central front. Southern front was based in Baluchistan and the FATA of Pakistan and in the Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, Zabol, and Paktika. A number of drug and tribal groups are also active in Southern front.

3.6 THE INSURGENT'S TACTICS

Insurgents used typical guerrilla warfare tactics initially ambushing, sniping, attack support infrastructure of US and Coalition troops. As insurgency progressed the focus

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[18] The HiG gets its name from the patron of the group; Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, who was once acknowledged as an important partner in the fight against the Soviets, when he proclaimed the leadership of the mujahedin to combat the Soviet forces and even gained aid from the United States back in the days.

shifted to the use of suicide bombings and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which were earlier absent from the fighting scene and only increased the number of casualties on ground. The Taliban had upped its ante by deploying new methods of combat. These methods showed the reality that Taliban was changing its style of waging the war against the coalition forces and the afghan government. Taliban also used information operations and local subversion apart from their standard terrorist tactics.

3.7 COUNTERINSURGENCY

The American forces deployed on OEF after the fall of Taliban regime were primarily tasked with hunting down, capturing, and killing Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgent who continued to create troubles for the Afghan government and US and other Coalition forces in Afghanistan. OEF forces, ISAF forces and Afghan forces were often on offensive against the militants and insurgents. Once the insurgent's attacks increased in the southern and eastern provinces, forces responded as per their conventional warfare training and doctrine. For the safety of troops, forces moved to large bases and camps, abandoning countryside to insurgents. Most of OEF and ISAF forces were not trained in COIN operations. After the spring of 2002, due to the decision of CENTCOM and Coalition leaders conventional units became the core of the Coalition's forces presence in Afghanistan.

In the absence of a formal doctrine, operating procedures and formal training, many commanders started bottom-up approach to tackle the problem of insurgency. In order to obtain better understanding of situation, local culture and build rapport, Coalition military leaders started reaching out to the population and personally met various tribal leaders and elders. On the basis of these interactions Major General F. Hagenbeck[19] proposed 'full spectrum operations' as operational concept for US and Coalition forces. Under this concept "forces conduct simultaneous execution of stability and reconstruction, offensive and defensive operations". It also allows forces to tailor and customize their approach according to the local condition of specific sectors.

Acting on concept in April 2002, the US and Coalition forces launched an offensive operation 'Mountain Lion' in order to terminate the remaining Al-Qaeda and Taliban

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[19]The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain.

remnants to secure the ongoing reconstruction and political process. In the initial ten months of coalition forces' presence in Afghanistan, combat missions had remained at the centre of the overall effort but with the arrival of CJTF- 180, there was a change in situation and focus shifts to CMO.[20] But the broad definition of CMO allowed US and Coalition commanders to approach it without jeopardizing their offensive missions.

In order to overcome the problem of troop deficit to fight insurgents and to have a force which had a better understanding of local culture and power dynamics of Afghanistan, Coalition put their effort in the formulation of ANP and ANA. The aim was to build ANA as a major force in fight against insurgents and stabilizing the country. By June 2003, United States troop levels were increased to 9000 and mostly deployed in RC East, covering much of the eastern border with Pakistan but providing limited degree of security for the local population. Most of these forces operated in offensive mode and due to their heavy-handed approach these forces aggravated the low-level support for the Taliban in the Pashtun regions of east and south. These forces commonly used large sweeps as per their conventional warfare practice which "alienated the local population, encouraged mistrust and creating a further hindrance to intelligence collection"(Lopez 2007:249). In 2003 forces again went on offensive against Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants and launched a couple of operations like operation Mountain viper and operation Avalanche and operation Mountain Storm in March 2004.

The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan made significant progress from 2004 to 2006 in developing and implementing a workable strategy. The U.S., British, and Canadian forces began carrying out counterinsurgency studies in order to learn from the history of COIN operations. The plan was to understand the process of trial and error and how it could be applied to the contemporary situations and much of this re-focus on the basics of COIN was a result of personnel changes within the command structure of CFC-A. After taking the command of CJTF-180 in 2003, Lieutenant General David Barno shifted the attention of effort back on 'Afghan people', as according to him COG of the effort should be on the "Afghan people and not on the hunting down and killing of Al-

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[20] US joint military doctrine in 2001 defined CMO as those activities "that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives.

Qaeda and the Taliban" (Hooker and Collins 2015).

Along with his staff, which included a number of British officers, he created a plan for security and stability for the year 2004 in the Pashtun dominated eastern regions and southern regions of Afghanistan. The plan was based on the principles 'the people as COG' and 'unity of purpose.' Barno's Staff officers went through the various classic counterinsurgency theorists like Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, and David Galula. They studied key COIN campaigns of the past in order to gain a better understanding of COIN theory. As a result, the lessons learned on the ground began to improve along with the coordination among various forces and agencies. The military commanders were able to understand that political, economic, cultural, and tribal questions are more important than religious motivations that had previously been considered the key reason by both the military and politicians.

Military commanders also recognized the importance of ANA and ANP. Well ethnically represented, properly trained, equipped, financed and officered ANA and ANP were critical to establishing a stable and secure civil administration. Until 2006, the two principal coalition organizations operating in Afghanistan were the US-led OEF's CFC-A, and the NATO-led ISAF. Implementation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, created by a British officer and expanded by the United States, provided another key factor in the reconstruction and COIN operation.

From 2006 onwards the US and Coalition forces and their command was a changed organization, much because of the greater emphasis on COIN theory, education, and training of forces and significant reforms. On the lines of Iraq, the strategy of "clear-hold-build" was manifested in Afghanistan. By early 2007, the United States alone had more than 22,000 personnel deployed in Afghanistan and mostly working in CT, COIN, PRTs, and advisory teams to the ANA and ANP. Majority of these troops were under the NATO command. Similarly as on the lines of Iraq, an in-theater COIN Center/School was created for training purpose of officers and troops rotating to Afghanistan. The intention was to implicate proper training of local customs, conditions to incoming troops in order to implement COIN strategies as per their given area of operation. The coalition partners Great Britain, Australia, and Canada had joined the program shortly after its inception.

The efforts aiming at re-establishing the ANP and the ANA saw jumbled outcomes. The

parties involved, mainly the US, the ISAF and the Afghan central government had not succeeded in establishing a suitably skilled and trained police force and structure, which forms a primary force in maintaining a stable and peaceful administration. In the perception of the local masses, the ANP was more similar in nature with the local militia and had a predatory attitude towards the very people it was meant to serve. The situation was so dreadful that the common people relied only on the people from their own community in police roles.

Corruption was widespread in the Afghan nation as there were cases where numbers of police forces were deliberately increased to make more money. These troubles made the coalition to look for other options, which incorporated the locals too. This led them to try out the Afghan National Auxiliary Party and an effort was made to enlist the locals. The ANAP was similar to the Frontier Scouts (20th century) established by the British in the NWFP of Pakistan for reasons almost identical.

There was an element of heterogeneity present in the way responsibility was tendered, with multiple partners working on same projects, which created rifts and divergence over training and the military philosophy. This undermined the development of the country. The problem of insignificant representation of the Pashtun tribe brought out the dilemma of ethnic composition. The British found that the leaders of the Pashtun tribes were reluctant to send their Pashtun men in North to Officer Candidate School in Kabul and it was also found that they were apprehensive of the ANA. Though there emerged signs of improvement, but the overall structure was not in place to look after the economic sustenance.

In Afghanistan the counterinsurgency operation failed initially as the coalition was unable to understand the repercussions of its resolve to send troops to Afghanistan. The real reasons behind the rise of insurgency and the support they received from the local population were not understood. It was only with time that after learning from their experiences in the period from 2004-2007, that the coalition could improvise on the counterinsurgency strategy and other initiatives towards the same.

Many initiatives were taken to address these problems and the chief among them was the PRTs and the subsequent strategies to provide for the security of the local population. These made use of the amalgamation of military and civilian wherewithal to rectify the

problems of the people. It was also necessary to take such measures to gain the trust and the loyalty of the local communities. The coalition field commanders tried to glance at the Afghan insurgency from a new angle by integrating the lessons from the past into the situation at hand. They tried to view the situation through insurgent's views.

The main issue of concern present by 2007 was of decentralization of responsibility as the increase number of coalition partners involved made it very inconvenient to execute a coherent and unified plan of action in the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. This and the details of the plan implantation remained a difficulty for constructing better strategy and forging relations with the Afghans.

A successful counterinsurgency operation may require a long-term commitment, which calls for colossal amounts of money and the political will since it is necessary to understand that casualties are bound to happen to secure the areas of operation and the population. It is crucial to understand the ground realities before jumping to conclusions and making policies for another people, because if there is greater comprehension, only then will there be an opportunity to assimilate the Afghan people, their communities into the process and carving out a policy, which includes people from all realms of Afghan life. Something, which needs to be remembered, is that only by truly including the communities who support the insurgents and the insurgents themselves can a policy taste the sweet taste of success.

3.8 COIN UNDER ISAF

Apart from OPF component, the majority of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan were placed under the command of ISAF. Originally the ISAF was limited to Kabul and surrounding areas and comprised of only 4,500 troops, which was far fewer than the number of troops generally considered necessary to secure the area under its mandate. The main reason of under strength was the lesser contribution of troops and support personals from member nations. Once the NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003, and the Security Council step by step extended its mandate to whole of Afghanistan, the ISAF troops moved to the north in 2004 and to the west in 2005, taking over PRTs and security from US forces. In January 2006, ISAF deployed to Regional Command South, taking over security tasks in that region from American forces. The main intention was to increase

and develop the authority of the Afghan government. Further, the aim was to give greater attention to the counter-narcotic action and to look into the matters of security in the light of the thriving Pashtun insurgency.

Soon there emerged cracks when the command of the U.S. forces changed in the Regional Command in East (2006). The Pashtun areas, which had earlier witnessed lower security, the ground forces began moving in here and there erupted violence in the border areas from the Taliban and the anti-coalition forces. Concern mounted here from the nations, which contributed their troops to the NATO forces, as they did not wish for their troops to be put under situations of severe threats. Though the number of troops neared around 35,000, which were dispensed for the ISAF, the volatile situations made it unacceptable for the full deployment of these forces and also accruing to a lack of appropriate counterinsurgency training. The only troops willing and able to be deployed in Regional Commands East and South as of 2007 were the Americans, Australians, British, Canadians, Danes, Dutch, and Romanians. The rest of the ISAF was limited to Regional Commands North and West and under the command of Lieutenant General David Richards, the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

3.9 PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTs) AND COIN

The introduction of the PRT idea was of great significance for the performance of counterinsurgency in the troubled nation. The central idea behind constituting PRTs was that by the means of collective teams of military and civilian force to aid in the delivery to the people of Afghanistan security, reconstruction and proper governance. Here, the U.S. took the lead to set things moving and soon other coalition nations joined the league, mostly in the areas of North and West. The ISAF took over the control of twenty-seven PRTs, which were spread through the length and breadth of Afghanistan in the year 2006. Though the PRT system has garnered huge praises, but they have also been criticized. What turned out to be major source of inconvenience was that at the early stages, they were answerable to their respective national governments only and not to any Afghan government agency and this resulted in discrepancies over what were the services to be delivered and how were they to be delivered.

3.10 AFGHAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE (ADZ) AND COIN

Accusations were laid on NATO over PRTs, pointing to the fact that these PRTs had not incorporated the local level leaders in the process. Hence, NATO came up with the strategy of Afghan Development Zone (ADZ). This was principally put into operation in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces, Regional Command (RC) South. To assist the international community and the government of Afghanistan on main areas of insurgency, a Policy Action Group (PAG) was set up. The PAG facilitated the spread of governmental works in all areas. Attempts of the PAG have earned praise of the International Crisis Group, which states that, "This is promising, because institution building and listening to representations at this level are needed" (Ibid). The group does not have positive views on the ADZ implementation and regards the training of Afghan forces as a major step in holding areas of contestation in any counterinsurgency operation.

3.11 THE SITUATION DETERIORATES (2005–2009)

Starting from 2005 onwards, regardless of improvement in COIN strategies of US, Coalition and ISAF forces, there were an increase in security incidents nationwide and a forty-fold increase in incidents of suicide bombing. Suicide bombing was absent during the initial years of insurgency in Afghanistan and imported by insurgents from Iraq. The conflict, which was limited to eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan, spread to most of the 34 provinces, but war in Afghanistan primarily remained a war over control of the Pashtun dominated areas of the eastern and southern Afghanistan. By the end of 2005, terrorism and subversion from the Taliban and other groups expanded over many other provinces. The US, Coalition forces and ISAF forces' disappointing failure to combat narcotics growth and production also fueled the insurgent's growth. Coupled with the rampant corruption, it only helped raise the money for insurgent activities. From the beginning of 2005, there was a sizeable increase in the use of IEDs as tactics of the Taliban. The Taliban gained the technical know-how about the IEDs from the Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The detection of IEDs became increasingly a sore for the forces since there was an uninterrupted flow of such components from Pakistan.

IEDs strikes rose from a mere sum of 300 to more than 4,000 by 2009 and resulted in

more than half of all troop casualties in Afghanistan. Suicide bombers that were almost unknown during initial years of insurgency became common. By 2009, there were Taliban shadow governments of diverse strength in just about all provinces. Even in parts dominated by the government or government-friendly tribes, Taliban terror strategy and devices became potent facts of life. Beginning in 2005, the Taliban added more sophisticated information operations and local subversion to their standard terrorist tactics[21]. In addition to subversion, terror tactics remained standard for the Taliban. In October 2008, for example, "the Taliban stopped a bus in the town of Maiwand in the western part of Kandahar Province, forcibly removed 50 passengers, and beheaded 30 of them"(Report CRS). The UN also noted that "anti-government enemies caused three-quarters of the civilian casualties" a marked increase of 53 percent from 2009. While the population held in high regard coalition restraint, the terror schemes of Taliban kept scores of Afghans, especially in Pashtun areas, on the fence.

Civilian casualties drove a wedge between the United States and the Karzai government, which began to harshly criticize the coalition while often ignoring the Taliban's reckless, inhumane behavior.

Human intelligence in particular becomes difficult to gather. Convectional intelligence methods concentrated more about the enemy's forces. The military leadership had inadequate information about the population that U.S. forces were protecting, a central focus of the campaign. The necessary rotation of Combat units was main hindrance in develop cultural awareness. Human Terrain Teams and other specialists who tried to make up for this shortcoming were often unable to bridge the information gap. The lack of information on local people and conditions hampered counterinsurgency efforts, which already hampered by frequent troop rotations. "The Afghan police remained an especially weakest link in the security chain, and the Taliban made attacking them a priority. From 2007 to 2009, Afghan security forces killed in action (3,046) outnumbered U.S. and allied dead in those 3 years (nearly 800) by more than three to one"(Bolger 2015: 418). More than two out of every three Afghan service members killed were policemen.

The coalition operations in Afghanistan also became the victims of "contractorization,"

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[21]"Night letters," a Soviet–Afghan war–era method of warning or intimidating the population, made a comeback, in some places as early as 2003. Letters were aimed at students, teachers, those who worked for Americans, and even children who fraternized with Americans.

with more Western-sponsored contractors, many of them armed, than soldiers present in the country. This in part reflected the limitations of a relatively small volunteer force and the ravages of a protracted conflict. In the end, reliance on contractors proved both a boon and a bane. Contractors extended the force's capabilities but at a much greater cost to the nation.

By 2009, the insurgency spread from its home base in the Pashtun areas in the south and east of Afghanistan to the entire nation. Ironically, "the war spread geographically in part because of the greater presence and more vigorous activities of coalition forces in the south and east after 2009" (Ibid: 372). Taliban infiltration of numerous areas deepened over time. "In areas with scant Pashtun population, the Taliban also used motorcycle squads and IEDs to make headway in controlling the population. In areas under their control, Taliban judges administered Sharia-based (and ethnically and tribally compatible) judgments, trumping Karzai's broken and corrupt civil courts"(Ibid: 390). The Afghan people had little love for the Taliban, but insecurity and government ineptitude made the general population hesitant to act against them.

It is not accurate to say that initial U.S. operations in Iraq in 2003-stripped Afghanistan of what it needed to fight the Taliban but indeed, the year 2004 was the last "good" year for the Afghan people. Both war and simultaneous reconstruction were inherently imprudent and uneconomical. 'Armed nation-building'[22] is for neither the faint of heart nor the impatient.

Also complicating the war was the fact that the regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, and China did little to help the situation. Each had its own selfish interests. In all, by 2009 the regional powers were not the primary cause of the war in Afghanistan, but their policies had not worked towards a solution. Pakistan case is particularly worth mentioning here. While the U.S. policy has been one of patient engagement to wean Islamabad from its counterproductive ways, political analysts from other countries have been openly bitter. One Canadian military historian who served in Afghanistan wrote that "Pakistan was behind the external support to the insurgents in southern Afghanistan and that it was a country with a 50-year history of exporting low-

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[22] Term popularized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies Anthony Cordesman

intensity warfare as a strategy" (Katzman 2012: 234).

When Ambassador Eikenberry returned to Kabul in early 2009[23], he noticed that the security conditions had worsened especially in the south. Training of the ANA and ANP lagged far behind schedule. The challenge from the Pakistani sanctuary had increased multifold and the level of mistrust between President Karzai and the United States was climaxing. Afghan government's corruption further convoluted by excess of foreign aid and assistance and the Taliban "enjoying increasing amounts of political support inside of Afghanistan" (Ibid: 252).

3.12 COIN: 2006 TO MID 2009

A revitalized insurgency by Taliban and other insurgents posed significant problems to the Afghanistan government and Coalition forces. The US/ISAF command went back to old enemy-centric strategy, which heavily relied on airpower. The nucleus shifted from 'the Afghan people and their security' to the 'enemy'. The number of civilian casualties soared as the United States Forces went back to the old combination of light ground forces and overwhelming airpower. This reorientation in strategy was principally owing to two reasons. The US and coalitions forces wanted to trim down the costs of their engagement in terms of manpower and causalities as domestic political support for the war was running thin and they could not bear any more casualties among their own forces. It was not possible to conduct 'people centric approach' COIN operations due to the small number of troops available.

There was a total mismatch between the level of troops available and political commitments, as in 2006-2007, the United States had just over 20,000 troops in the Afghanistan. The United States and NATO had made resolve to stabilize Afghanistan in order to prevent it from becoming a haven for international terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda but the political commitments with time extended to defeat the Taliban. When slowly with time Taliban insurgency gained momentum, it seemed a real possibility that it was a war of attrition that the U.S., NATO and their allies could not win. With their credibility on line, U.S., NATO and allied forces launched a number of major offensives operations from 2006 to 2008.

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[23]since his departure as the military commander there in 2007

In order to recompense for the small number of troops on ground U.S. and NATO forces used 'Aggressive use of airpower' in these operations but such heavy handedness resulted in the rapid increase in civilian casualties[24]. Airstrikes, night raids, ground fire and various 'force protection' measures caused maximum number of civilian casualties and number keep increasing with the intensification of conflict. The rise in civilian deaths provoked strong reactions from not only amongst the people but also from the political class.

Although casualties attributed to government and international forces in 2007 and 2008 were still slightly below those attributed to the insurgents, but this was just scant comfort. Senior-level UN officials started in late 2007 to discuss a potential "UN role in stemming civilian casualties caused by all sides in the war. In March 2008 UNSCR 1806, authorized UNAMA to monitor the civilian casualties of the war continuously in order to ensure their protection"(Maloney 2010: 44). It was a key legitimizing step[25] and forces both ISAF and CENTCOM to issue new tactical directives restricting the use of airstrikes. In order to solve problem of troop shortage, policing and in order to fill security gaps, Karzai in June 2006, authorized arming of some local tribal militias 'arbokai'. Afghan government assessment was that these 'arbokai' would provide security in the areas where Coalition forces presence was thin. Arming these militias was not inconsistent with the disarmament programs and these militias would be loyal to the nation and central government.

3.13 COIN II: POPULATION CENTRIC AGAIN (MID-2009-2012)

In formal terms, due to its experiences and learning in fighting insurgency in Iraq, the US military for some time had been moving towards a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Population-centric counter-insurgency was stated in the new COIN field manual of the US Army and the Marine Corps. Published in December 2006, the doctrine was tried out in Iraq and it came up with what the military considered some success. In

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[24] International human rights monitors recorded 116 in 2006, 321 in 2007 and 552 deaths from airstrikes in 2008.

[25] Armed with Resolution 1806, UNAMA's human rights component worked with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to establish a database that permitted systematic investigation and analysis of civilian casualties

Afghanistan, the situation increasingly seemed ripe for new solution as well as enemy centric counterinsurgency was not yielding any results and in process making situation worse. Repeated offensives by international and Afghan government forces had failed to stem the growth of the insurgency. The militants responded by adapting tactics and expanding to new parts of the country, suggesting at best a long strategic stalemate. Change of leadership was also an important factor in change in strategy in Afghanistan. The new administration under president Obama indicated that it would direct more leadership, attention and time towards war in Afghanistan, as it was not getting its due owing to the prior administration's focus on Iraq. President Obama launched a CPR under Riedel of the Brookings Institute and deployed approximately 17000 addition troops to Afghanistan.

In March 2009, President Obama announced a new "comprehensive strategy", that announced deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces. With new strategy comes the new ISAF commander in June, COMISAF Gen. McChrystal who went ahead step by step and in order to "take a look at the overall strategy and campaign, a detailed 60 days assessments of specific issues such as civil-military integration, detention operations, civilian casualties, and strategic communications"(Katzman 2016: 23). In August based on his assessment he called for a "properly resourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign".

His assessment introduced many innovations in thinking about ongoing campaign. First, "he prioritized efforts to support responsive and accountable governance equally with security efforts, stressing the Afghan people's crisis of confidence in the government"(Ibid: 25). Second, "he advocated raising the target end strengths for the Afghan National Security Forces substantially, to a total of 400,000 forces, and ensuring their effectiveness through radically improved partnership with ISAF forces at every level"(Ibid: 25). Third, "he introduced geographic prioritization of effort across Afghanistan as a whole a significant change from past approaches in which each part of the country was managed de facto as a 'national' campaign led by the Allied country with troops deployed there"(Ibid: 25). And fourth, "he stressed the need to change ISAF's operational culture in two key ways to more closely interact with the population and to significantly improve internal unity of effort" (Ibid: 26).

Keeping COMISAF GEN McChrystal and other reports President Obama announced a 'surge' and sent additional 30000 troops to Afghanistan to "reverse the Taliban's momentum" and strengthen and build up the capacity of ANDSF. Most of these extra forces deployed to the southern Afghanistan. Apart from surge President Obama also announced transition to the stabilization effort and a drawdown of U.S. force levels. Aim was to compel the Afghan government to place greater effort on training its own forces[26]. On accomplishment of a key goal of U.S. mission with Killing of Osama Bin Laden, focus shifted to RSM and further draw down.

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[26] The transition was divided into five "tranches": March 2011, November 2011, May 2012, December 2012, and June 2013. In each tranche, the process of completing the transition to Afghan responsibility took 12-18 months. Then-President Karzai announced on June 18, 2013, that Afghan forces had formally assumed the lead role throughout Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 4

US MILITARY INTERVENTION OF IRAQ: FROM REGIME CHANGE TO COUNTERTERRORISM TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Iraq has been at the center of United States Foreign policy apparatus since the end of the Cold War. Since Iraq has consumed more American attention and political capital than any other country in the world and with the magnitude of investments, it will continue to remain one of the most important countries for the United States in years to come.

It all started with various democratic experiments in Middle Eastern countries. Emphasis should be laid here that apart from Israel no other country in Middle East has democratic elected government. From the start Iraq was centerpiece of United States Middle East policy and a test bed for the spread of democracy in Middle East. The relationship between United States and Iraq went downhill when democratic experiment in Iraq became victim to the Socialist form of authoritarianism in 1958.

Even then Iraq remained essential to United States' interest, primarily due to its location at the centre of the oil-producing Middle East and dependency of world economy on fossil fuels. Iraq is still at the middle of the United States democratic experiments in the Middle East. United States hopes that if such experiments succeed in Iraq then other countries in the Middle East will follow the suit. With the emergence of several different strains of radicalized political Islam in the region and their attempt to establishment a transnational Caliphate based on Sharia law put them into ideological conflict with United States and due to this ideological conflict Iraq became vital for Unites States democratic experiments in the Middle East.

Essentially the roots of the conflict between the United States and Iraq lay in two important events in 1979 these being the Iranian Revolution and consolidation of power by Saddam Hussein in Iraq (Reveron 2006: 23). In 1979, the Iranian revolution stirred up an international crisis based on the fear of the spread of militant Islam, which was openly espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted restatement of United States' interest in the Persian Gulf in the form of Carter Doctrine, "that United States will use the military force in the region if necessary".

Saddam exploited the prevailing chaos in Iran and the general international environment to extend his power through the use of force. Owing to the regional and international concerns about Khomeini's revolution, Saddam was not going to face any serious international opposition due to his aggressive actions. The two events merged and became one when Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. During the Iran-Iraq War, the United States didn't want any party to emerge victorious and hence followed policy of "dual containment" and "lesser of two evil approach" (Ibid: 24). towards Iran and Iraq. This policy was devised to maintain a balance of power between Iraq's Baathist Totalitarianism and Khomeini's fundamentalism in order to prevent any side-gaining upper hand. A first step in the direction of incremental engagement towards Iran and Iraq was UNSCR 479, calling for a peaceful resolution of the dispute between two countries. The battlefield success of Iran in 1982 made United States supply dual-use assistance to help Iraq maintain balance in battlefield. The United States supplied $24 billion to Iraq between 1981 and 1985 and fearing Iranian expansionism in region other countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also loaned billions of dollars to Iraq (Ibid: 25).

The outcome of Iran-Iraq War was as per the desire of United States and other Middle East regional states. On one side the war had successfully blunted Iran's revolutionary fervor by the time it ended on August 20, 1988 as both Iran and Iraq suffered large number of casualties estimated only in the millions terms but on the other side, war had allowed Saddam Hussein to further militarize Iraq to the next level and by the conflict's end, Saddam Hussein had the fourth largest army in the world but it was economically crippled with massive debt to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

4.1 THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

The next phase of liaison between United States and Iraq began when Iraq sought to use its military power to settle its outstanding financial and territorial dispute with Kuwait in the summer of 1990 and to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia that Iraq can invade it as well. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait and to Saudi Arabia supported the Iraq and loaned it huge sums of money. Kuwait loaned $14 billion dollars to Iraq alone. Iraq wanted this debt to be forgiven for the successful defense of the Arabian Peninsula from Iran but in

July 1990, when Kuwait refused to cancel the debt the situation took a different turn. Iraq accused the Emirate of Kuwait for hiking oil production in order to drive down prices and make it even more difficult for Iraq to repay its debt to Kuwait and on August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and occupied whole of Kuwait with much ease. The United States interpreted it differently, instead of a case between Iraq and Kuwait; it feared it as first step in takeover of whole Arabian Peninsula (Long 2004).

The United States responded with 'Operation Desert Shield' to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia and by laying down the foundation of future UN approved military campaign to drive out Iraq from Kuwait in the form of United Nation Security Council Resolution 660 ("condemning the invasion and demanded Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally"). United Nation Security Council passeda number of resolutions[27]in subsequent days to impose economic sanctions, full trade embargo and a naval blockade on Iraq. On November 29, 1990 Security passed UNSCR 678 (authorizing UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area"). All these events had far reaching consequences in future. "At first these UNSCR formed the legal basis of intervention by United States and the Coalition countries under operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm and also for all the subsequent actions and resolutions passed by the Security Council with regard to Iraq over the next 13 years" (Long 2004: 67). Permanent presence of American forces in "Muslim holy lands" from 1990 onwards was the main reason behind the Al Qaeda's declaration of war on the United States in 1996.

4.2 OPERATION DESERT STORM

In the subsequent battle, Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait were decisively defeated and Kuwait was liberated on February 24-27, 1991 and because of its limited mandate the Coalition forces did not attempt to overthrow Saddam's regime and called for ceasefire leaving substantial number of Iraqi forces intact. At this point in time the United States encouraged local resistance groups, Shias in South and Kurds in the North of Iraq to take action against the Saddam regime but due to the absence of international assistance and

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[27]UNSCRs: 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677.

aid these were brutally crushed by Saddam's forces. Today it is often criticized by critics and seen as huge mistake as everyone believes that Coalition forces should have finished the job in the 1991 itself. But President George H.W. Bush and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft was clear on the issue and saw it very differently[28](Hooker, 2015).

The major concern of United States after the First Gulf War was twofold, that is, to limit future regional threats from Saddam regime and prevent Iraq from becoming a regional power in Middle East. The U.S. followed a policy of Dual containment and economic sanctions and under UNSCR 687, as a part of ceasefire agreement, "Iraq was instructed to unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless under international supervision of; All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities; All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km and related major parts and repair and production facilities. Furthermore, Iraq was instructed not to use, develop, construct, or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction and It shall also required to unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any research, development, or manufacturing facilities" (Reveron, 2006: 27). To inspect and verify that Iraq fully dismantled its chemical and biological weapons programs UNSCOM was created and IAEA made responsible for the elimination of Iraq's nuclear program. Iraq was also instructed not to "commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq" (Ibid 206: 28).

The Saddam regime formed a contentious relationship with international community and played a cat and mouse game with UN and IAEA inspectors. Initially it allowed them unrestricted access as per UNSCR guidelines, but within months it started resisting them,

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[28] George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft clearly "hoped that a popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the United States nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Breaking up the Iraqi state would pose its own destabilizing problems. . . (.) Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in mission creep, and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. . . (.) We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad, and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed . . . (.) Had we gone the invasion route in 1991, the United States could conceivably still [in 1998] be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land".

which got more vigorous in the coming years. In 1998 Saddam expelled the inspectors unilaterally and ended all forms of cooperation with UNSCOM. The U.S. and Great Britain responded with Operation Desert Fox. UNMOVIC replaced the UNSCOM but inspectors were not allowed back into Iraq. The act of expulsion of the inspectors marked a change in United States' policy towards Iraq. Firstly, it made international community suspicious about Iraq's WMD programs. Secondly, regime change in Iraq became the official policy of United States[29].

The Bush administration continued the same policy of President Clinton admiration, but with the support of UN, introduced a number of sanctions on Saddam regime. 9/11 provided opportunity to the Bush administration to follow a policy of regime change in Iraq through military means. Although Saddam Hussein's regime had not been even indirectly involved in 9/11 and to Al Qaeda the Bush administration capitalizing on fear of future terrorist attacks argued for regime change. According to Bush administration, military intervention was the only way to force Iraq's compliance with UNSCR resolutions; particularly 1441 eliminate its WMDs and terminate Iraq's ability to support international terrorism.

4.3 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

In Iraq, the United States and coalition forces wanted to conduct something similar on the lines of Afghanistan: a swift, lighting-like operation and quick handover of power to Iraqis. The USCENTCOM prepared a hybrid war plan strongly influenced by edits from the field. It used approximately one-third size of force as compared to Desert Storm and operationally, it focused on the destruction of the Iraqi army, state's war fighting capabilities and Saddam's regime. Postwar planning was done by USCENTCOM's land component. Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), Phase IV was prepared by USCENTCOM's land component but it failed to generate supporting division plans, as it was not shared fully with implementing units. After finalizing the plans for invasion with USCENTCOM, Rumsfeld created the Office of Reconstruction

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[29] Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 - Declares that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government.

and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under lieutenant general Jay Garner, to take care of governance and humanitarian aid in post invasion Iraq (Phase IV).

The Operation Iraqi Freedom began on March 20, 2003 with total invasion force consisting of not more than three Army divisions[30], a Marine division a British division and small number of forces other allied countries[31]. It was a relatively small force, consisting of just 247 Army tanks and about an equal number of Bradley fighting vehicles. The entire ground invasion force amounted to about 145000 troops (Thomas 2014). Only Southern and Western Front was open for invasion as Turkish government under strong public opinion disallowed the use of its territory to open Northern Front. Despite the lack of Northern front Saddam regime kept significant amount of its forces in the North and East, fearing attack from Kurds and Iranians leaving most of the invasion corridor through Kuwait unprotected.

Unlike Afghanistan, in Iraq the CIA lacked the crucial relationship with movements on the ground. "Much of the critical intelligence about Iraq was not verifiable against the sources on the ground. The United States had excellent technical intelligence but apparently lacked a network of agents in the country. There were grave limits on the U.S. ability to confirm judgments that it believed were true. Faulty intelligence estimates on the status of WMD were compounded by numerous misestimates that complicated the post conflict phases of the operation" (Thomas 2014). This lack of unverified intelligence on the ground became the root cause of many problems in Phase IV post invasion.

The U.S. forces hardly encountered any resistance in upfront battles till Bagdad and faced stiff resistance only in small pockets. The Iraqi Army was neglected, demoralized, and poorly trained even by regional standards and was not up to the levels of the First Gulf War. Most of the Iraqis deserted even before making contact with United Forces. Much of the resistance came from paramilitary forces like Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Army[32] and paramilitary irregulars like Fedayeen Saddam[33], both were lightly equipped and poorly

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[30] United States contingent consist of 3rd Infantry Division, 101 Airborne, 82nd Infantry Brigade, 173rd Infantry Brigade and some special operation units.
[31] Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) under the command of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.
[32] Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Army is created by Saddam to defeat Israel, but in reality its was used to defend areas within Iraq where he feared unrest. Although its troops numbered in the hundreds of thousands, the Al-Quds Army had negligible military value. Ba'athist politicians who were almost untrained and were by no means equipped to confront any serious military force commanded it.
[33] It was initially created to repress Shi'ite Arabs and Kurds but subsequently gave it a security mission

trained but yet offered much more resistance in contrast to Iraqi army units. Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Army and Fedayeen Saddam engaged the U.S. troops with complete disregard to the laws of warfare by using public buildings for military purpose and mixing with civilians, thus offering a preview of the insurgency[34].

During the invasion of Iraq, U.S. also deployed small conventional forces along with Special Forces into Kurdish-controlled areas in north. The primary purpose was to prevent Kurds from Iraqi army. Later working closely they attacked Ansar-al-Islam with PeshMerga. Subsequently functioning in coordination with U.S. Air Force PeshMerga broke through the Iraqi Army defenses in north and occupied the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. The U.S. forces avoided bombing and destruction of Iraqi civilian infrastructure unlike Operation Desert Storm and as a matter of fact, the U.S. planners were more worried about protecting the Iraqi civilian infrastructure. Given the experience of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. planners feared that he would order petroleum facilities to be ignited or might blow up a major dam on the Euphrates River.

4.4 THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ

Coalition forces annihilated the Iraqi army's regular and irregular forces in less than three weeks. Saddam's regime collapsed quickly and completely. Saddam Hussein, his sons and top most officers of Ba'athist regime went into hiding. The end of the Ba'athist regime witnessed the collapse of law enforcement and Iraq became an ungoverned space, lacking basic services and security. Iraqi civilians, never having tasted freedom were given an opportunity and reacted to their freedom with looting government offices and installations. The people looted everything movable, electrical wiring and plumbing fixtures. The American forces did nothing to stop the mayhem because no one at USCENTCOM provided any authorizations and directives to restore order. Owing to the small size and mechanized nature[35] of invasion force, the U.S. and coalition forces hardly had any troops present on ground around the metropolitan centers. Force deployment was

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against all enemies of the regime.

[34]"Fedayeen were not part of a deliberate plan to carry on a guerrilla war in the event the regime was toppled, it provided much of the wherewithal for an insurgency: thousands of committed fighters, decentralized command and control systems, and massive caches of arms" (Gordon and Trainor, 2006)

[35]USCENTCOM Expected to fight a conventional war, and thus fielded armored and mechanized battalions that were heavy on M1A1/M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, but light on infantry (armored and mechanized battalions contained 500 to 600 personnel).

especially thin on the ground in Anbar province. Most Iraqi citizens saw this chaos as evidence of United States' incompetence and turned against it as chaos and mayhem wore on. ORHA was first late to arrive in Iraq and later continuously failed to control the situation on ground as it constantly bogged down with the problems of chain of commands and interagency cooperation and ultimately in late April 2003 it was dissolved and replaced by President Bush with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, with a mandate to run the affairs in Iraq until a permanent government elected by its citizens.

The scenes of looting, theft and violence gave way to a rather low tolerable level of resistance through the summer of 2003. There were two main sources of resistance against occupants: remnants of the Ba'athist regime and extremists. The remnants of the Ba'athist regime comprised of deserters from Iraqi armed forces and members of the security apparatus, which chose to fight another day instead of being defeated in battle and surrendering. Extremists consisted of foreign fighters from other Middle East countries. Towards the last months of his regime, Saddam welcomed foreign volunteers into Iraq, some of which fought against U.S. forces during the invasion. After the fall of Baghdad, more foreigners entered Iraq to fight the U.S. forces, but their numbers remained small as compared to the local insurgents, who were entirely made up of Sunni Arabs. Another advantage in the favor of resistance was the availability of weapons and munitions in Iraq. It is important to note that Saddam Hussein and his sons did not exercise much control over the insurgency although they were still at large.

 Three policy decisions of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer swept away many Iraqis who had been industrious in getting the Iraq back on its feet. At first, Bremer banned the top four layers of Baath Party from government service. It included not only top executives of government but also mid level officials, school teachers etc.[36] Second, he disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, putting out approximately 700000 members of armed forces, police and other security units. These Iraqi army units could have helped the U.S. forces to restore order post invasion. Collectively these three policy decisions also destroyed what was central to the United States post invasion policy in Iraq, 'to rely on the Iraqis to carry out most of the construction work' and went beyond what Bush had approved.

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[36]About 100000 of government employees lost their job and most of them were Sunnis.

Woodward presented it correctly, "In place of a quick turnover to Iraqis, a staple of prewar planning, the United States now had a full-scale occupation of Iraq without the requisite increase in resources to carry it off. Deprived of the assistance of over 100,000 Iraqi soldiers, the imbalance between aspirations and on-hand assets would continue up to the Surge" (Woodward 2010: 219). Third, Bremer chose to cancel nationwide meeting for formation of interim government and pursued UNSCR 1483 to become the legal occupiers of Iraq, crushing every dream of reconstruction by Iraqis and the setting up of Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003 added fuel to the fire. The council included prominent leaders of Shiites and Kurd, but lacked Sunni Arabs. It only added to the sentiment of marginalization of the Sunnis. It was not ignored and taken well by Iraq's long-standing Sunni elites and who were in no mood to sit aside idle, while Shiites and Kurds took over the leadership of country with United States help. When insurgent violence erupted across Iraq in August 2003, it was primarily organized by former Baath Party members, security force leaders and predominantly by Sunnis (Fallows 2006: 160).

The intensity of attacks on the U.S. and coalition forces gradually improved at a steady rate from the month of April 2003 onwards and the low tolerable level resistance changed into large number of terrorist attacks on coalition troops especially after President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" Speech[37]. The earliest supporters of the insurgency were Fedayeen Saddam and Remnants of the Ba'athist regime[38], various securities personal and official who had lost most due to the downfall of the Saddam regime.

As soon as the U.S. sponsored, Shiite and Kurd dominated government was formed, resistance by Sunni's changed from nationalist character[39] to defensive character, fearing retribution for years of Sunni rule in Iraq. The 'loss of identity' and need to restore a 'sense of social balance' were most critical factors in the growth of Sunni insurgency (Rich and Duyvesteyn 2012: 56-62). Sunni's who lost their positions in government, their

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[37]On 1 May 2003, President Bush visited the aircraft carrierUSS*Abraham Lincoln* operating a few miles west of San Diego, California. At sunset Bush held his nationally televised "Mission Accomplished" speech, delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck: Bush declared victory due to the defeat
[38]Also known as Former Regime Elements (FRE) or Former Regime Loyalists (FRL).
[39]The majority of early Sunni insurgent groups had a nationalist character in their rhetoric. These are mainly core groups of the secular Sunni nationalists formed around former Ba'athists and are known by Coalition forces as Former Regime Elements (FRE) or Former Regime Loyalists (FRL), with the capture of Saddam in December 2003, the secular nationalists were largely discredited. As they tried to cast off the ties to Ba'ath secularism, many moved towards the Islamist nationalist camp.

primacy in governing given to the Shiite majority also started adding to terrorist attacks on coalition forces and insurgency.

Marginalization of Sunni community provided an opportunity to Sunni clerics and preachers to strengthen their power and radicalize the community on Salafist interpretation of Islam. There was a paucity of political leaders, who could act on behalf of the community or could negotiate with other political forces and so these clerics undertook an active political role in community. Soon these radicals and extremist also joined the Sunni resistance and insurgency and though their number was modest initially but grew with time especially after a handful of senior officers along with many former soldiers joined and returned to religion. Most of the initial attacks happened in various Sunni dominated areas, especially in the "Sunni triangle".

Apart from the political blunders of CPA, the Coalition force's own mistakes at the tactical, operational and strategic levels after the fall of Saddam regime, were also guilty for increasing the Sunni insurgency. The Coalition forces made a chain of errors at the tactical level pertaining to the lack of cultural understanding of the Iraqi society. The insensitive manner in which Coalition forces interacted with the population and conducted house-to-house searches inflamed Iraqi sensitivities. Absence of any post invasion planning and ill-conceived policy to impose the CPA on Iraqi people also contributed to the brisk growth of the insurgency through the summer and autumn of 2003. Another important accelerant to the growth of a nascent Sunni insurgency was shameful actions at Abu Ghraib prison in the autumn and winter of 2003, and its terrible handling.

4.5 INSURGENT'S TACTICS AND METHODS OF OPERATION

Insurgents used variety of tactics to attack large range of targets available to them. The targets included Coalition forces and their associated infrastructure and associated networks, private security companies and foreign workers. Sunni insurgents particularly used terror as a modus operandi along with criminal activities, assassination of individuals and groups, kidnapping and execution of people associated and collaborating with Coalition forces. Extremist and foreign insurgents used suicide bombers and car bombs as weapons to attack both military and civilian infrastructure. By July 2003

insurgent's started using classic guerilla tactics of hit and run, small scale roadside bombing, ambushes, raids, mortar shelling, planned assassinations and crude IEDs. They usually operated in small teams of five to ten men as it facilitates mobility and reduces chances of detection and capture. A smaller group size also offers superior command and control but reduces the amount of firepower. The training of insurgents also improved which is reflected in the presence of written tactical manuals and instructions. Insurgents often distributed these tactical manuals over the Internet for easy access to others. Throughout the duration of insurgency, insurgents had shown remarkable ability to learn and adapt. It was evident in their deployments of IEDs and in their attempts to counter the Coalition forces as they attempted to defeat the IED threat. The first generation IEDs was small, simple and triggered by hand held trigger and often hidden by insurgents in a wall or embankment along the road. Once US troops devised countermeasures to detect these IEDs, insurgents introduced remote triggers to detonate the IDEs and as the insurgency progressed, IEDs grew to be more powerful and by late 2003 the insurgents were using daisy chains, emplacing 155mm rounds in a set of rows and burying these IEDs under roads to blast through the thin floor of armored vehicles. Insurgents keep adapting and started using explosively formed projectiles (Eisler 2007: 119).

From August 2003, insurgents started launching large coordinated on coalition targets and at the same time also started demonstrating a dramatic improvement in small unit fighting skills by start showing ability to stand and fight rather than 'pray and spray' tactics. Insurgent's ability to adapt and learn was also reflected in their ability to launch much larger, more complex and well-executed attacks as seen in the Ramadan offensive, the attempted assassination of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, 2003 Bagdad bombings, destruction of Red Cross headquarter and destruction of Italian police headquarters and the bombing of the Jordanian embassy, destruction of the UN headquarters left little doubt to Coalition forces that a new type of war was beginning[40].

With the capture of top leaders, officers of Baath Party in July-August period and of Saddam Hussein in December insurgency lost its tempo. For next three months attacks were considerably reduced and intensity went into a low phase.

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[40]Till mid-summer of 2003, DOD civilian leadership did not want to admit that there was an insurgency going on; perhaps due to public relations or legal reasons. General Abizaid, the new USCENTCOM commander, publicly and clearly stated that there was an emerging guerrilla war in Iraq.

Witnessing the rise of resistance and terrorist attacks on Coalition forces, Iraq began to attract various foreign Islamists and anti-American terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Jama'at al-Tawhid from the neighboring countries. These terrorist groups found a new and easily accessible battlefield against U.S. and Coalition forces and expected to make a common cause with local Sunni Arab Salafis in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul. The numbers of foreign terrorist acts as a force multiplier. Along with local Sunni extremists, these terrorists were willing to engage in operations that most Iraqi insurgents preferred to stay away from. Their importance along with local extremists lies in two distinct areas as together these are responsible for the increase in prospects of communal violence by waging a campaign of terror and selective targeting of other community leaders, like assassination of Shiite faction leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim in august 2003. These two groups particularly give away a definition of terrorism causing devastation and serious loss of life.

4.6 INFORMAL COIN

The Coalition forces were not prepared for this kind of war. None of its commanders promulgated any plan for Phase IV and insurgency. Struggling with insufficient troop numbers, frequent attacks and confrontation by insurgents, each United States division reacted differently but the response was dominated by use of heavy hand tactics and preference towards conventional style of operations. First and foremost was shifting of forces from population, into large size segregated areas like complexes, camps, FOBs on similar lines of Afghanistan and Vietnam and then minimized casualties, Foot patrols were replaced by Mounted patrols, size of convoys increased and escorted by heavy cavalry.

In response to terrorist attacks and use of guerilla tactics by insurgents, Coalition forces followed classical anti terrorist tactics like the elimination of terrorists by high kinetic means and capturing or killing of their leaders by the use of intelligence. Units started conducted raids based on little intelligence and applied firepower loosely. 4th Infantry Division under Major General Raymond Odierno's command and operating in north of Baghdad around Samarra and Tikrit[41], acquired a reputation for heavy-handedness. 4th

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[41]Salah-ah-din Province of Iraq

Infantry Division commanders focusing on insurgents and Ba'athist leaders launched large-scale sweeps, fired artillery blindly to interdict insurgent activity[42]. Commanders also purposefully leveled homes and detained people to deter them from supporting the insurgents (Ricks 2006: 233). Coalition forces launched operation Iron Hammer[43] to crush insurgence during Ramadan offensive in November. Commander of 82nd Airborne Division, Major General Swannack's comment perfectly summarizes the Coalition forces heavy-handedness approach, "This is war and we're going to use a sledgehammer to crush a walnut"(Rubin McDonnell, 2003). Other United States Divisions more or less followed the same pattern except 101st Airborne Division under Major General David Petraeus[44].Operations of 101st Airborne Division completely diverged from the trend of other Divisions. Petraeus believed for an effective counterinsurgency securing the population will be the key and located entire 101st Airborne at Mosul; the largest population center of province. With aim to minimize the harm to population, he discarded the large sweeps and operated his troops out of outposts in the heart of the city. His troops also focused on collecting detailed actionable intelligence to conducts raids against insurgents. Petraeus also interacted with the Sunni leaders and drew them into political process (Petraeus 2006: 48).

One method, which was common through all United States operations, was high-value targeting, capturing and killing of insurgent leaders by SOF. Even conventional forces tried to follow the same tactics to carry out their operations at ground. Every battalion, brigade, and division developed their own high-value targeting list of wanted insurgents in their area of operations on ground and made use of extensive Intelligence collection assets to find out insurgent and their leaders.

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[42]Also known as 'harassment and interdiction fires'.
[43]"Operation Iron Hammer was launched by Multi-National Division on November 5, 2007. it is a division-level offensive operation and a sub-operation of the corps-level offensive, Operation Phantom Strike. The aim of Operation Iron Hammer was to pursue and dismantle various insurgent groups, by targeting its cell networks, financiers, leadership structure, and transport structure. In addition to these security aims, Iron Hammer also sought to set the conditions for tribal reconciliation efforts, improved governance, and economic progress. Intelligence-driven raids were the primary means for targeting the enemy". (Understandingwar.org).
[44]101st Airborne was working in Ninewa Province.

4.7 THE SHI'A INSURGENCY

In the spring of 2004, surprising everyone, Shi'a elements rose in open rebellion against the coalition under the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and 'Mahdi Army'. Shi'a uprising caught coalition on back foot and shook its control over southern Iraq and threatened to ignite a national resistance against it. The Shi'a did not oppose the coalition as Sunnis, but wanted the occupation to end[45]. On April 4, thousands of 'Mahdi Army' members attacked coalition and Iraqi compounds in Najaf, An Nasiriyah, Al Kut, Baghdad, Al Amarah, and Kirkuk. Fighting also spread to Basrah, Karbala, and Hillah. Over the next few months, the coalition fought to regain control of the southern Iraq. Attacks on coalition and Iraqi forces jumped to 500 from 200 per week. Fighting with 'Mahdi Army' in Najaf and Sadr City temporarily ended in June due to mediation of Ayatollah Ali al-Hussein al-Sistani, but Sadr and his forces still had the control of the two urban areas.

4.8 THE FIRST AND THE SECOND BATTLES OF FALLUJAH

In the early months of 2004 insurgency was low and gaining strength for next phase. But a series of poor strategic decisions made it explode. On March 31, insurgents and people in Fallujah ambushed a small military convoy and murdered four American civilian contractors. People showed high level of ferocity and hatred, savagely abused and burned their bodies beyond recognition. Two bodies were hung from a bridge over the Euphrates[46].

The Bush administration ordered an offensive to clear and occupy Fallujah despite the advice of Major General James Mattis and Lieutenant General James Conway against it. The operation was conducted in two phases due to the protest of members of the Iraqi Governing Council. Phase one[47] from April 4 to May 1, 2004 and Phase two 48 from November 7 to December 24, 2004. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces in order to signal their resolve initiated an operation to seize Fallujah with 2,000 Marines. Operation

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[45]"Moqtada Sadr, a radical young Shi'a cleric with a widespread following who had not been given a role in the coalition's political process, tapped into this vein. His militia, Jaysh al Mahdi, was organized around poor, young Shi'a males throughout the country."

[46]Militants also displayed a sign "Fallujah is the graveyard of Americans" and brandished weapons in a show of defiance.

[47]First Battle of Fallujah code-named Operation Vigilant Resolve.

[48]Second Battle of Fallujah code-named Operation *Al-Fajr* and Operation Phantom Fury.

Vigilant Resolve caused widespread Sunni outrage. Sunnis, considering it as an attack on their society, started pouring into Fallujah from other Sunni areas. Throughout the operation Marines encountered heavy resistance and attacks from coordinated mortar fires, volleys of rocket-propelled grenades and machine-gun fire. Marine commanders responded back by as per their conventional combined arms doctrine creating heavy damage to the city. By the end of April, Marines withdrew from city limits to Camp Baharia unilaterally and handed over charge to Fallujah Brigade. But by September, Fallujah Brigade got dissolved over leadership issues. The First Battle of Fallujah was a turning point for everyone's perceptions, for the U.S. forces and strategists it became clear that reliance upon local, regional militia is not useful and can be disastrous. For insurgents, it was a landmark because for the first time they were seen as chief opponents of U.S. forces. By the end of battle, Musab al-Zarqawi became the most famous commander of anti-Coalition forces in Iraq.

The Second Battle of Fallujah was a coordinated offensive by U.S. Marines and Iraqi Army[49] units to weed out insurgents and secure the city. Learning from their mistakes in first battle Marine commanders pressed forward only after full support of the IIG had been obtained and all other diplomatic and political options were exhausted. However for offensive Marines and Iraqi forces acted as per their conventional combined arms doctrine. Insurgents were methodically cleared out using well-drilled urban combat tactics. The situation worsened and the Sunni members of The Iraqi Governing Council threatened to resign if ceasefire negotiations were not initiated. With complete democratization process in jeopardy, the United States government for the second time halted the offensive mid way and pulled out marines from the city (West 2005). Unlike first offensive, this time coalition decided to work with political and religious leaders to rebuild the Fallujah city. Even city's population was involved in political process. Iraqi government also poured millions in aid to compensation for damages. Unlike last time, about 1000–2000 Marines continued to operate in the city alongside with 1,500 soldiers of the Iraqi Army.

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[49] In order to lessen the image of occupation, Sattler and Natonski, in parallel with Allawi, pressed for Iraqi Army units (The 1st Iraqi Intervention Force Brigade and 3rd Iraqi Army Brigade) to accompany American forces in the assault.

4.9 COUNTERTERRORISM TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

The extent of violence that came along with the rise of Shi'a and Sunni insurgencies in various parts of Iraq forced senior U.S. military authorities and strategists to finally acknowledge that their coalition forces are engaged in counterinsurgency. It also made abundantly clear that the U.S. and coalition forces could not hold and secure Iraq in the absence of an overall COIN strategy. Conventional tactics and counterterrorism can't contain insurgency in effective manner. As in the absence of overall COIN strategy in Iraq, coalition forces focused more on tactical matters. Concept of door-to-door raids mixed with patrols, became effective over time. Moving out forces into secure compounds, supporting Iraqi government and securing back the line of operation are good for reducing casualties, supporting governess, unity for Iraq and to keep military operation running but not in reduction of insurgency and to inform the Iraqi citizenry about the goals of coalition military operations.

The extent of violence throughout Iraq made it clear to Coalition strategists that Iraq could not be secured without an increased number of troops. American commanders and Abizaid were looking towards Iraqis to supply those numbers, as U.S. reinforcements were not politically feasible and it would have only increased the perception of occupation among the Iraqi citizens. The Coalition experiment of creating locally based units[50] to provide security within country until new Iraqi Army was formed turned out to be of little success. National Guard battalions based on the Kurdish militia[51] or Shi'a militias did perform to some extent but Sunni battalions were a total failure. Attempts were also made to build local Sunni forces, cultivating relationships with the warlike tribes in west of Ramadi, but also ended in failure. In a quarter of all engagements, Sunni units with advisers fled or even surrendered like Fallujah Brigade. All these failures forced coalition commanders[52] to look to the Iraqi Army and a formal doctrine of COIN to answer their problems.

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[50] Civil Defense Corps (renamed the Iraqi National Guard after June 2004).
[51] Peshmerga.
[52] Conway said at the end of hard-fought summer: "The situation will change when Iraqi Army divisions arrive. They will engender people with a sense of nationalism. Together with an elected government, they will create stability."

4.10 COUNTERINSURGENCY: BEGINNING AND REFORMS

The formal change in counterinsurgency blueprint started with weeding out the main causes of insurgency one by one. The U.S., on June 28, 2004 granted sovereignty to Iraq and created IIG under Prime Minister AyadAllawi to end people's perception about U.S. occupation of Iraq. For better command and control among coalition forces and Iraqi forces new coalition headquarter 'Mutli-National Forces, Iraq' came into existence under General George Casey and to solve the problem of deficit in numbers of troops to conduct effective operation, Petraeus was handed over the command of MNSTC-I to oversee the creation of Iraqi security forces and Iraqi Army divisions. Instead of following direct conventional approach in ever operation, political negotiations were given preference over military operations.

The first draft of clear-hold-build approach for better counterinsurgency took form during the second uprising in Najaf and second battle of Fallujah. In Najaf, Casey and Qasim Dawood[53], carefully balanced political and military measures and negotiated with Sistani to intercede and put an end to the struggle and once the fight was over Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and General Casey immediately poured $70 million in Najaf for reconstruction and compensation funds.

In the second Battle of Fallujah General Casey pressed forward for military action only when full support of the IIG had been obtained and all other diplomatic and political options were exhausted. Once fighting was over, the coalition decided to work with political and religious leaders to rebuild the Fallujah city. Iraqi government poured in $180 millions to reconstruction and compensation funds. Coalition forces rebuild and repair major water, sewage, health, and power projects. About 1000–2000 Marines continued to operate in the city alongside with 1,500 soldiers of the Iraqi Army.

Once Baghdad and Fallujah were secure, Casey looked towards other institutional factors, which according to experts and planners are the mainstay for effective counterinsurgency. The first was condition of Iraqi security forces. According to counterinsurgency expert Kalev Sepp, formation of Iraqi army needed to be accelerated as it would not only provide vital number of troops on ground but also perform better

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[53]Allawi's NSA.

counterinsurgency operations. Being familiar with the culture and language they could gather intelligence better than coalition forces. Eventually the Iraqi Army shouldered the burden of counterinsurgency and helped coalition forces to withdraw. Based on these assumptions General Casey "directed the coalition forces to shift their focus from fighting insurgents to training Iraqis" (Marston, Malkasian 2012).

Another mainstay factor for effective counterinsurgency was 'handing over the power' to Iraqi people as, "establishment of a legitimate democratic government was considered central in cutting support for the insurgents building cooperation across the sectarian communities" (Marston, Malkasian 2012). General Casey along with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad made every possible effort to ensure that the democratization process took hold its ground in Iraq. During Casey's period CPA's under its TAL scheduled three elections in 2005. First one in January for 'transition government', which was responsible for drafting the constitution; a referendum on the constitution in October; and the third in December for a permanent government.

Once the development of Iraqi Security forces started and democratization process went ahead smoothly, Casey shifted his attention towards another effective counterinsurgency concept- securing country's borders to prevent insurgents' movements and to cut off foreign assistance. According to the Iraqi politicians, to prevent insurgency it is essential to stop the flow of Sunni foreign fighters into Iraq. In the opinion of Kalev Sepp blocking foreign assistance to insurgents was part of effective counterinsurgency practice. General Casey first launched Operation Restoring Rights to clear the Tal Afar[54] in September 2005. It was a classical clear-hold-build operation by 3rd ACR and two brigades of the 3rd Iraqi Army Division. Civilians were evacuated from the town before the beginning of offensive to minimize the casualties and to allow use of artillery and attack helicopters. Once the city was cleared from insurgents, 3rd ACR commander positioned its forces in 29 outposts to hold the city and conducted regular patrols and it also built a police force of Shi'as to involve locals (Packer 2006).

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[54]Tal Afar, a city of 250,000 people located 40 miles from Syria. It had been used by AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq) as a staging ground for foreign fighters entering Iraq since early 2005.

General Casey launched Operation Steel Curtain to clear Al Qa'im[55] in November 2005. It was a stronghold of AQI. Here again the same pattern was followed as used in Tal Afar. Two reinforced Marine infantry battalions and one Iraqi battalion cleared the city roughly killing 100 insurgents. After the operation commander dispersed its Marines and Iraqi Army brigade into small sub-units and placed them into 12 outposts. These forces conducted frequent patrols and gathered intelligence. The main breakthrough was the re-alignment of Albu Mahal tribe with coalition forces. The "Albu Mahal tribe fought as insurgents from past two years, but contributed 700 tribesmen to the resident Iraqi Army brigade and 400 to a newly established police force" (Marston and Malkasian 2012: 252). Apart from reforms in battlefield, General Casey worked towards instituting the lessons learned from various operations since mid-2004. A counterinsurgency academy was established at Taji for all incoming regimental and battalion commanders. In the U.S., services' training programs of Army and Marines were revamped. The changes were also made in Marine Corps' combined arms exercise program at Twenty nine Palms, CA and the US Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. The focus shifted from fighting conventional opponent to fighting insurgents. A training program for its advisors was also setup by the US Army at Fort Riley, KS in 2006. The most key breakthrough in fight against insurgency was release of new counterinsurgency manual (Field Manual 3-24) for the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. Another step forward in effective counterinsurgency was transfer of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)[56] concept from Afghanistan to Iraq.

Despite of all the efforts of General Casey and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, problems in the U.S. COIN operations persisted. Instead of offering solutions to the U.S. COIN tribulations, success at Tal Afar and Al Qa'im actually concealed the problems that still existed in United States' COIN operations. The conduct of forces at these places was exceptional but killing of civilians, frequent use of air strikes, and detainment of innocent along with a lot of other escalation of force incidents by United States forces were common in other parts of Iraq. The focus on mechanized sweeps, air assaults and not

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[55]Al Qa'im, a city of 200,000 that lies on the Euphrates River at the Syrian border.
[56]Concept of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) was developed in Afghanistan, Manned by State Department diplomats, workers from USAID, agricultural experts, and engineers, PRTs primarily focused on providing economic assistance and developing local governmental bodies within each province.

holding up of cleared area is still preferred by most of the commanders. Most of them preferred to operate out form large bases, thus limiting their own ability to work with people.

The problem of inconsistency in the US COIN effort still remained unsolved regardless of the reforms and efforts of General Casey. This was primarily due decentralized command and control structure, which focused more on conventional warfare. Another difficulty was too much focus on 'high value targeting', although it remained the one tactic, which was truly consistent throughout the US forces in time when the U.S. forces were dealing with problem of consistency. The detainment or death of a key leader undoubtedly had some advantages like disruption of insurgents operations, but raids and operations to kill or capture insurgent's leaders tend to cause too much of collateral damage and rarely caused insurgent operations to fall apart. The killing of Zarqawi in an air strike on June 7, 2006 hardly caused any drop in attack levels or long-term injury to AQI's organizational abilities.

The real issue due to which Casey's COIN strategy fell apart was the failure of Iraqi Army on ground. Iraqi Army was the focal point of General Casey's COIN strategy but once Iraqis failed to live up to the expectations, Casey's whole COIN strategy started crumbling down. Iraqi Army had grown up to 10 divisions and actively participated with United States and Coalition forces in COIN operation but owing to the deficiency in their training, advising and equipment level[57], they could not take over the security from United Sates force and coalition forces. The true setback of Iraqi Army was its ethnicity, as it was predominantly Shi'a. Sunnis viewed the Iraqi Army as Shi'a occupation force and government as illegitimate[58]. For the most part because of Shi'a ethnicity in Iraqi army, this posed a serious problem as many soldiers and officers had connections with Shi'a militia and in sectarian wars the Iraqi Army units often turned a blind eye to militia attacks on Sunnis in Baghdad and Diyala Provinces and together with the special police commandos and they also actively participated in ethnic cleansing.

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[57]Only 10–12 advisers were to be too few to train an Iraqi battalion and to go on tactical operations with them. Quality also suffered because these trainers are often reservists or national guardsmen rather than the most capable active-duty personnel.

[58]A poll in 2006 found that 77–90 percent of the respondents in Al Anbar province considered the government to be illegitimate.

4.11 COIN IN CIVIL WAR

Sectarian divide between Shi'a and Sunni communities started with the transition of power to Shi'as and various policies of CPA during the Phase IV post invasion of Iraq in 2003. The divide between the two communities further widened during 2005, especially during the process of democratization and formulation of new Iraqi government. The October 2005 referendum on constitution for federal form of government, which denied Sunni's the share of oil profits, further deepened the rift between the two communities. Although Sunnis participated en masse in December 2005 elections, but this was done in order to maximize their political representation and not in the support of a system, which put power in Shi'a, hands. Various polls at that time by third parties found that majority of Sunnis didn't consider new Iraqi government legitimate[59]. In Baghdad the role of the special police commandos and their active participation in ethnic cleansing and Sunnis response to that started a sectarian conflict that was beyond the control of U.S. and coalition forces but the AQI bombing of Askariya (Golden) Mosque in Samarra, a Shi'a holy site on February 22, 2006 provided a spark and an opportunity to various Shia'a militias like Jaysh al Mahdi and the Badr Corps to openly retaliate against the Sunnis and insurgents in Baghdad. In response more and more Sunnis took to arms to defend themselves.

With a belief that United States reinforcements could further increase the insurgency Casey noted that, "We are the rationale for the resistance and a magnet for the terrorists". Sticking with the original withdrawal plan of United States' forces by year-end Casey relied on the Iraqi Army to put an end to the sectarian violence inside Baghdad but because of its ethnic divide, the Iraqi Army remained unproductive and unable to control the situation. The U.S. and Coalition lost the control of Bagdad. The United States, coalition forces along with Iraqi Army launched two operations[60] to regain the control of Baghdad and its neighborhood but as fate would have it, both ended in attacks on civilians by Shi'a militia, Sunni insurgents and AQI rose further and over 1000 civilians dying each month.

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[59]World Public Opinion Poll, Iraq Poll, BBC, ABC News, ARD German TV and USA Today Poll during March 2007.

[60]Lieutenant General Chiarelli operational commander of Casey launched two operations: Operation Together Forward I form June 14 to July 20, 2006 and Operation Together Forward II from August 8 to October 24, 2006.

From January to October 2006, the situation throughout Iraq further deteriorated, particularly in Al Anbar. Marines fought for months with Sunni extremist and AQI in Ramadi without any positive results. Basrah was also lost due to hand-off COIN approach by the British. Shi'a militias like Jaysh al Mahdi, the Badr Corps, and the Fadhila Party increased sectarian attacks on the city's sizeable Sunni minority in the wake of the Golden Mosque bombings. Rampage killing, sectarian violence undermined attempts at reconciliation between the Sunni and Shi'a communities. The degree of mistrust was so much that a Sunni leader in Fallujah city leader told Marine officers that, "if the United States would not act against the 'Iranians', then the Sunnis must be allowed to defend themselves".

The only positive outcome for the U.S. and coalition forces COIN strategy in 2006 was Sunni uprising against Al-Qaeda in Iraq in Al Anbar province of Iraq. It needs to be mentioned here that Sunni uprising had nothing to do with US COIN tactics. The US and coalition had been trying for long to motivate traditional Sunnis leaders and tribes to fight against foreign insurgents and AQI but it was not possible until local tribal leaders realized that AQI was taking over their economic and political sources of power within society. Many tribes changed sides and in September 2006 when Sahawa Al Anbar was formed by Shaykh Abd al Sittar Bezia Ftikhan al Rishawi to fight against AQI and later joined by other tribes. Once the Sunnis turned over to United States and Coalition's side, it was easy for United States and Coalition forces to implement clear -hold and build COIN tactics. Sunni population provided the required actionable intelligence and manpower to local police (predominantly Sunnis) and coalition.

4.12 COIN DURING SURGE

The February 2006 bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra and the subsequent civil war between Shi'as and Sunnis along with a couple of domestic factors at home forced a major change in US strategy. Mid-term elections resulted in defeat of the Republicans and the Iraq Study Group[61] report made it very difficult for President Bush to ignore the reality of the situation. Iraq Study Group presents three main recommendations to solve

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[61]A team consist of prominent former US policy-makers; Secretary of State James Baker, former Senator Lee Hamilton, and former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates.

Iraq problems. First, greater efforts are required in expanding and training of the Iraqi security forces, Second, a set of benchmarks to measure the progress of the Iraqi government towards political reconciliation, and negotiations with Iraq's neighboring countries particularly with Syria and Iran.

On January 10, 2007, Bush announced the new strategy to ramp up the efforts in Iraq. He announced a 'surge' in troops, a new emphasis on COIN strategy and new commanders overseeing new strategy[62]. The surge of troops consisted of five brigades of US Army and two Marine infantry battalions reinforced the existing forces in Iraq. The approach focused to turn things around and tried to solve all problems, which prevented the process of democratization and COIN operations in Iraq. Additional number US troops decreased the dependency of existing US and coalition forces on Iraqi Army. It solved all the problems related to or caused by Iraqi Army and also issues related to quality, conduct of operations, training and all problems caused by ethnic composition of Iraqi Army. The problem of decentralized decision-making and frequent shift to conventional tactics was solved by new COIN strategy. Bush also replaced Casey, who was due to leave Iraq with Petraeus to execute the surge and new COIN strategy.

Petraeus took command on February 10 and started with Operation Fard al Qanun for the security of Baghdad. It was a mix of best lessons learned from Tal Afar, Al Qa'im, and the new COIN manual. The plan was to move United States troops from their FOBs into 50 small outposts spread throughout Baghdad, where the U.S. forces could directly confront insurgents, limit their using IDEs ability to conduct mass-casualty events, disrupt their ability to move and resupply freely with an aim to provide better security, cooperation and gather human intelligence. In Petraeus' view, "the point of the surge was to create a breathing space in the violence, particularly in Baghdad, in which political reconciliation could take place".

4.13 SPLIT IN SUNNI INSURGENCY

The most important factor behind the success of 'Surge' strategy was change in the Sunni insurgency. During the civil war when Shi'as and Sunnis were busy in sectarian and

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[62]President George W. Bush stated the mission of U.S. forces when he announced the surge in a January 10, 2007 speech: "to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs."

ethnic violence, Sunni insurgency split into two groups-the local insurgents, Sunni tribes and foreign extremist (AQI/MSC/ISI) over difference in their way of life, beliefs and mores, goals, strategies and modus operandi. AQI and other foreign extremists also disrupted the economic activities of tribes; as a result in Al Anbar province by the summer of 2007 several tribal sheiks had created armed 'Awakening Councils' or 'salwa' to fight against foreign extremists.

Petraeus and his local commanders, concentrating on the policy of co-option and accommodation, started by cooperating with moderate Sunni insurgents to provide local security and actionable intelligence and created a series of volunteers like 'Sons of Iraq' on pay roll. It was a different strategy from bribing and arming militias bent on ethnic cleansing, as groups like 'Sons of Iraq' were not cohesive as a force or neither independently strong. It was also dissimilar from the earlier practice of arming local groups during Casey period as these groups were already armed prior to the shift in US strategy.

The combination of U.S. forces and Sunni tribes drove out AQI and other extreme chauvinist Sunni groups from most of the western and central Iraq. They were also driven out from their remaining urban havens in the provinces of Diyala, Nineveh, and Salah ad Din ultimately resulting in remarkable change in Security situation of Iraq. The truce with Sunnis also helped to facilitate cease-fire with key Shiite militias. The improved security situation also helped.

4.14 RETURN OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

With the decline of violence, two big changes in Iraq took place. The first is in military and second is in politics. By means of consistent efforts the U.S. and Coalition forces, ISF finally started growing in numbers and capabilities. Increase in size and capabilities allowed US commanders to maintain the level of security despite of decrease in the US and coalition troops. During this time the US expended its advisory and training efforts. Along with improvement in size and technical proficiency, some changes also took place in ISF politics and leadership. As a result of aggressive recruitment, new amnesty and de-Baathification ordinances; Sunnis were back in ISF, especially officer's corps.

From 2008 spring onwards, ISF launched a series of offensive against Shi'a militia in Sadar district of Bagdad, at Al Kut, at Al Hillah, against Mehdi Army in Basra. In May, ISF with the backing of coalition support launched offensive in Mosul. By mid of 2008, ISF improved to a level of partner to US and coalitions forces in Iraq. Once the security made progress in Iraq, politics witnessed change too. Diverse tensions, mistrust, competitive pressures remained important factors in politics. The process of Democratization also started making slow progress with the reduction of violence, sectarian warfare and militia. Sunnis, which boycotted last round of elections, returned in huge numbers in 2009 provincial elections.

Once Iraq started to stand on its own there came the announced of Exit strategy on February 27, 2009, US Armed forces as per President Obama's announcement shift their focus and role from counterinsurgency operations to training and transition of Iraqi Security Forces, counterterrorism operations and other general support operation.

CHAPTER 5

COMPARISON OF US COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Throughout the last century, beginning from the First World War, the United States' armed forces emerged as an 'over-muscled' giant who won wars through its monstrous strength and technological superiority. This strategy worked perfectly well in conventional wars like First and Second World Wars, partially well in Korean War but failed in Vietnam War completely and then worked again in the First Gulf War mainly due to the favorable terrain, which complimented United States' strengths.

In the new century, under GWOT United States fought two wars: Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Prepared under Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, commander USCENTCOM General Tommy Franks and CIA Director George Tenet, both of these operations, for the most of their combat phases are masterpieces of boldness, and at the same time military finesse and creativity. Operation Enduring Freedom was an example of contemporary 'light footprint' strategy, devised on U.S. strength of air power and precision guided weapons. The aim was to provide logistics and Air support to the Northern Alliance by CIA operators and SOF teams.

Operation Iraqi Freedom too was based on 'light footprint' approach and a hybrid war plan based on edits from the field.OEF plan was to conduct a swift, lighting-like operation and quick handover of power to Iraqis. It used approximately one-third size of force as compared to Desert Storm and operationally, it focused on the destruction of the Iraqi army, state's war fighting capabilities and Saddam's regime.

However both the approaches, based on 'light footprint' approach, revealed their limits in post conflict phase (Phase IV) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan although, had a relative longer calm period, before Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents with their allies regrouped in FATA in Pakistan and gained sufficient strength to launch an insurgency against infant Afghanistan State and Coalition forces. But in Iraq 'light footprint' approach revealed its limitation soon after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and by end of April 2003 started giving up in front of fully fledged Ba'athist, Sunni and Al Qaeda insurgency.

With time both the wars turned into longest wars of the United States history. In order to compare United States Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan five common factors are selected from United States Counterinsurgency operations. They are: Aim of military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, war plans, insurgents, insurgents' tactics and type of operation conducted.

5.1 THE AIM OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

The major motivation and immediate reason for the U.S. Military intervention in Afghanistan was its linkage to Al Qaeda and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Following a refusal of the Taliban regime on October 7, 2001 to hand over Osama bin Laden and to cease providing sanctuary to Al Qaeda[63], the Bush administration decided to intervene militarily in Afghanistan to destroyed the Taliban regime, to disrupt and if possible to destroy Al Qaeda, to prevent the use of Afghanistan by terrorists as a sanctuary and to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. Addressing a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush stated that: "The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate".[64] To achieve a 'specific military objective', OEF was a major military operation born out of the attack of 9/11.

Although the U.S. opened a political dialogue with the Taliban in 1994 under Clinton administration in order to end two decades of civil war in Afghanistan, it was well before Taliban took Kabul but started emerging as a political force. This diplomatic engagement also continued after it took power, but due to several actions of Taliban regime their relations deteriorated with time. A lot of factors contributed to it, the U.S. upheld the

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[63]Taliban provided protection and sanctuary to Al Qaeda for a long time and already reused to extradite Osama bin Laden in past over bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, 1998.

[64]The full list of demands included, "Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently all terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating."

recognition of Taliban regime as legitimate government of Afghanistan and also in August 1997 it closed the Afghan embassy in Washington D.C. but Taliban's hosting and refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden over the bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 became the overriding agenda for Clinton administration and it imposed sanctions on Taliban by executive order[65]. Clinton administration also led the United Nations efforts to sanction[66] the Taliban regime. But despite of all efforts, Clinton administration kept open some contact with the Taliban, believing that a mix of engagement and sanctions could persuade it to turn over Osama bin Laden. Bush Administration also followed almost similar policy towards Taliban till September 11 attacks. The only difference was that, it stepped up its engagement with Pakistan in order to persuade it to end its support to the Taliban. Till September 11, the U.S. kept open some channel of engagements with Taliban. The United States never declared the Taliban a 'terrorist organization' unlike Al Qaeda because in order to do that U.S. would have to recognize it.

On the other hand, the aim of militarily intervention in Iraq was more than regime change. OIF was born out of 'specific political objective' of regime change and democracy promotion in Iraq and in the heart of Middle East. Regime change was the official policy of United States towards Iraq since Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. After 9/11 according to Bush administration, military intervention was the only way to force Iraq's compliance with UNSCR resolutions; particularly 1441, eliminate its WMDs and terminate Iraq's ability to support international terrorism.

5.2 TWO UNIQUE WAR PLANS

The U.S. war planning process for OEF was extremely condensed and wholly in contrast with the lengthy, iterative preparations of the OIF. Operational concepts of OEF were based on the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's vision of defense transformation and 'light footprint' strategy. To compensate and limit the number of conventional troops

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[65] 13129 of July 4, 1999.
[66] UNCR 1267 of October 15, 1999.

on the ground, the concept heavily relied on the air power and use cutting-edge technology and precision-guided weaponry for specific targets.

On ground, the military operations in Afghanistan were preceded and complemented by the work of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with various Taliban opposition Afghan groups in the north and southern parts of Afghanistan.

Initially the U.S. operations relied on the use of JSOC personals, special operations forces (SOF), CIA operators working with and through various indigenous partners, especially the Northern Alliance in north and some anti Taliban Pashtun groups in south. These allies provided ground troops and the U.S. provided the airpower. CIA and SOF operators identified the military and political targets of the Taliban which were to be targeted through air assert and together with their allies they brought Taliban regime on its knees and routed it in about five weeks.

After the destruction of Taliban regime in Afghanistan but before the decisive defeat of Taliban along with Al Qaeda and its allies, DOD started preparing for military intervention in Iraq. In Iraq, instead of some conventional operation, Pentagon wanted to conduct something similar on the lines of Afghanistan. A swift, lighting-like operation based on the 'light foot print' approach and quick handover of power to Iraqis. The USCENTCOM under General Tommy Frank dumped its existing invasion plan 'OPLAN 1003–98[67] and prepared a hybrid war plan[68]. Hybrid plan or Cobra II used only one-third size of force as compared to Desert Storm. Operationally it focused on the destruction of the Iraqi army, state's war fighting capabilities and Saddam's regime. Postwar planning was done by land component of USCENTCOM, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Phase IV was prepared by USCENTCOM's land component but it failed to generate supporting division plans, as it was not shared fully with implementing units. After finalizing the plans for invasion with USCENTCOM, Rumsfeld created the

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[67] OPLAN 1003–98:former Central Command Commander General Anthony Zinni devised it. Recognizing that the real challenge would come not from the Iraqi Army, but from the need to occupy and control a country of 26 million just over twice the size of Idaho.
[68]Rumsfeld sent a memo to General Franks and directed him to develop a Commander's Concept of a new war plan, one that updated OPLAN 1003 so that it included fewer heavy forces, faster deployment timelines, and new technologies and doctrinal lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under lieutenant general Jay Garner, to take care of governance and humanitarian aid in post invasion Iraq.

5.3 INSURGENTS

Out of all of insurgent groups in Afghanistan, Taliban was the dominant force and accounts for about 80 percent of total insurgents. Hezb-e Islami was second group by about 10 per cent of total strength and operated in the eastern part of the country and the rest of the insurgents were marginal in strength and consisted of a number of groups like - few Salafi groups in eastern part of Afghanistan, few independent commanders in western Afghanistan, Central Asian insurgent groups like IMU in north of Afghanistan and some Pakistan based groups like Lashkar-e Taiba and Tehreek-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi in eastern part of Afghanistan. All groups had safe sanctuaries in areas of Pakistan and their primary aim is to control the Afghan population. It could be done using violence as a tool, through intimidation and through provision of some services or combination of all.

The role of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan insurgency is quite limited and largely indirect including facilitation, funding and ideological support. Even the presence of Al Qaeda inside Afghanistan is quite limited.

Iraq too had different types of insurgents and insurgent groups. The most dominant are Ba'athist's, Sunni insurgents, Salafist extremists and transnational extremists. Iraqi insurgents groups are of hybrid structure, 'a mix of hierarchical structures'. These are neither pure hierarchical or completely decentralized. Iraqi insurgent groups also had functional specialization especially Ba'athists and their affiliates had high level of functional specialization. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) also had high level of functional specialization.

5.4 INSURGENT TACTICS

In both the countries insurgents used similar tactics to attack a large range of targets available to them. The targets included Coalition forces and their associated infrastructure and associated networks, private security companies and foreign workers and all insurgents used terror as a modus operandi. Insurgents were also involved in criminal

activities, assassination of individuals and groups, kidnapping and execution of people associated and collaborating with the Coalition forces.

Post invasion in Afghanistan once insurgents regrouped and gained their strength, they started using classic guerilla tactics of hit and run, small scale roadside bombing, sniping, ambushes, raids, mortar shelling, planned assassinations and crude IEDs. Initially the main targets were the U.S. forces and ISAF and their support infrastructure, insurgents gradually moved to civilian and infrastructure targets.

Similarly in Iraq, by May 2003 insurgents started with similar classic guerilla tactics as used by insurgents in Afghanistan. The complexity, techniques and coordination of attacks were more organized and complex in Iraq as compared to Afghanistan. The extremist and foreign insurgents started using suicide bombers and car bombs as weapons to attack both military and civilian infrastructure, which was later, learned by insurgents in Afghanistan.

In both countries the insurgents usually operated in small teams of five to ten men as it facilitates mobility and reduces chances of detection and capture. It also offers superior command and control to insurgents. Training of insurgents also improved with time and throughout the duration of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgents had shown remarkable ability to learn and adapt. With time insurgents started launching large coordinated strikes on coalition targets and its support infrastructure. Insurgents also started demonstrating dramatic improvements in small unit fighting skills by start showing ability to stand and fight rather than 'pray and spray' tactics.

Insurgents in Afghanistan also learned few techniques from Iraqi insurgents: IEDs and suicide bombing. Due to the exchange of information between the two theaters the IEDs also became much more complex and the preferred method against the U.S. and Coalition troops in Afghanistan. Suicide bombing was virtually absent in the initial phases of insurgency in Afghanistan. It was learned by Afghanistan insurgents from Iraq and Arab insurgents of Al Qaeda and used frequently against U.S. and ISAF in the later phases of insurgency. In Iraq, Sunni insurgent's terrorism increased with the insurgency and for some groups frequently used martyrdom operations.

One aspect of insurgency tactics or method that was virtually absent in Iraq, but followed by Taliban insurgents was establishment of 'Shadow government' and courts in their area

of occupation. Insurgents in Iraq many times get hold of various cities and urban areas, but never tried to establish parallel or shadow government.

Iraqi insurgent groups especially al-Abound was responsible for one innovation: the efforts to formulate and implement insurgent chemical warfare in 2003.

5.5 TYPES OF OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

The Coalition forces were not prepared for this kind of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. None of its commanders at USCENTCOM promulgated any plan for Phase IV in Iraq and follow up insurgency. Forget Phase IV plan, Commanders did not even plan to stay back in Afghanistan once their aim to "destroyed the Taliban regime, to disrupt and if possible destruction of Al Qaeda, to prevent the use of Afghanistan by terrorists as a sanctuary and to kill or capture Osama bin Laden" was over. After OEF and OIF, the U.S. and Coalition forces encountered problem of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. At both places in the absence of any doctrine and training on counterinsurgency, forces reacted on similar patterns.

Struggling with insufficient troop numbers, frequent attacks and confrontation by insurgents, each U.S. division reacted differently but the response was dominated by the use of heavy hand tactics and preference towards conventional style of operations. The first and foremost was shifting of forces from population, into large size segregated areas like complexes, camps, FOBs on similar lines of Afghanistan and Vietnam and then minimized casualties, Foot patrols were replaced by Mounted patrols, size of convoys increased and escorted by heavy cavalry.

In response to terrorist attacks and use of guerilla tactics by insurgents, Coalition forces followed classical anti terrorist tactics like the elimination of terrorists by high kinetic means and capturing or killing of their leaders by the use of intelligence. Units started conducting raids based on little intelligence and applied firepower loosely. Commanders also purposefully leveled homes and detained people to deter them from supporting the insurgents (Ricks 2006: 233)

One method, which was common through all operations of United States forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, was high-value targeting, capturing and killing of insurgent leaders by

SOF. Conventional forces in both countries also tried to follow the same tactics while carrying out their operations on ground. Every battalion, brigade, and division prepared their own list of high-value targets in their area of operations and made use of extensive Intelligence collection assets to find out insurgent and their leaders.

Apart from high-value targeting, capturing and killing of insurgent leaders by SOF, a number of other things are also common in two campaigns despite of different in theaters of two campaigns. Iraq insurgency is predominantly urban and Afghanistan one is largely rural in nature.First one is the training of local troops, in both the campaignsUS and Coalition first delayed the training due to many factors, but later in order to fill up number on ground, trained local troops in large numbers. In Iraq focus was on army and in Afghanistan focus was on Afghan National police. Concept of PRTs was also used in both campaigns; it was introduced in Afghanistan and later used in the Iraq. Major difference was in staffing of PRTs, in Afghanistan PRTs are staffed by civilians. On the other hand PRTs in Iraq was mostly staffed by defense personals.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

During OEF and OIF, the U.S. and Coalition forces annihilated the Taliban regime and Iraqi army's regular and irregular forces in matter of weeks. In Afghanistan, Taliban tried to fight conventionally with U.S. supported Northern Alliances in north and anti Taliban Pashtuns in southern parts of Afghanistan. But it was decisively defeated due to large number of defection in cadre, lack of logistic support and lack of centralized command to conduct operations. After the fall of Taliban regime, U.S. and Coalition forces quickly formed interim government in order to gain the legitimacy from afghan people and avoid the tag of foreign invaders.

Similarly Saddam's regime also collapsed quickly and completely and Saddam Hussein, along with senior most officers of Ba'athist regime went into hiding. The ends of the Ba'athist regime cause the complete collapse of government and law enforcement making Iraq an ungoverned space, lacking basic services and security for its citizens. During the looting in Bagdad, Iraqi civilians never having tasted freedom looted everything.The US and Coalition forces on ground and USCENTCOM hardly done anything stop looting and to fill up this power vacuum. Agency responsible for the implementation of Post conflict phase, ORHA arrived quite late in Bagdad as per USCENTCOM plan. ORHA too unable to control the situation on ground as it constantly bogged down with the problems of chain of commands and interagency cooperation.

Most Iraqi citizens saw this chaos as evidence of United States incompetence and turned against it as chaos and mayhem wore on, crushing liberators dream of US.

Both of the US campaigns start derailing from the beginning due to political decisions. After destroying the Taliban regime, US shifted its concentration to Iraq, Afghanistan become another war. This allowed the Taliban and other insurgents to regroup and to start insurgency against Afghan interim government and US forces. Similarly few political decisions by ORHA replacement, CPA under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer instead of controlling the situation, added fuel to the fire. Three policy decisions of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer- banned the top four layers of Baath Party from government service; disbanded the Iraqi armed forces, putting out approximately 700000 members of

armed forces, police and other security units, and Bremer cancelled the meeting for formation of the nationwide interim government and pursued UNSCR 1483 and eventually became the legal occupiers of Iraq, crushing every dream of reconstruction by Iraqis and the setting up of Iraqi Governing Council in July 2003.

Iraqi army units, which could have helped the U.S. forces to restore order, post invasion lost all hopes and joined the insurgents. New political alignments of promoting Shia's only added to the sentiment of marginalization of the Sunnis as the council included prominent leaders of Shiites and Kurd, but lacked Sunni Arabs.

It was not taken well by Iraq's long-standing Sunni elites and who were in no mood to sit aside idle, while Shiites and Kurds took over the leadership of country with U.S. help. When insurgent violence erupted across Iraq in summer of 2003, it was primarily organized by former Baath Party members, Iraqi security forces leaders who were predominantly Sunnis. As soon as the U.S. sponsored, Shiite and Kurd dominated government was formed, resistance by Sunnis changed from nationalist character to defensive character, fearing retribution for years of Sunni rule in Iraq. The 'loss of identity' and need to restore a 'sense of social balance' were most critical factors in the growth of Sunni insurgency (Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012).

Sunnis who lost their positions in government, their primacy in governing handed over to the Shiite majority also started adding to terrorist attacks on coalition forces and insurgency. "People often fight fiercely to protect privileges and positions of dominance as much as they fight to gain more of these resources. Moreover, and just as important, people also fight not only to maintain or advance things that they value materially, they also fight for a set of nonmaterial values that can be sub-subsumed under the rubric of identity"(RAND, 2008: 149).

This marginalization of Sunni community also provided an opportunity to Sunni clerics and preachers to strengthen their power and radicalize the community on Salafist interpretation of Islam. There was a paucity of political leaders, who could act on behalf of the community or could negotiate with other political forces and so these clerics undertook an active political role in community. Soon these radicals and extremist also joined the Sunni resistance and insurgency and though their number was modest initially but grew with time especially after a handful of senior officers along with many former

soldiers joined and returned to religion. This radicalization of Sunni's sown the seeds of up coming communal violence, social unrest and terrorism in coming days.

Apart from the political blunders of CPA, the Coalition force's own mistakes at the tactical, operational and strategic levels after the fall of Saddam regime, were also guilty for increasing the Sunni insurgency. The Coalition forces made a chain of errors at the tactical level pertaining to the lack of cultural understanding of the Iraqi society. The insensitive manner in which Coalition forces interacted with the population and conducted house-to-house searches inflamed Iraqi sensitivities. Shameful actions and incidents at Abu Ghraib prison in the autumn and winter of 2003, and its terrible handling acted as accelerant to the growth of a nascent Sunni insurgency and terrorism in Iraq.

In 2004, surprising everyone Shi'a elements rose in open rebellion against the coalition under the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and 'Mahdi Army'. The Shi'a uprising caught coalition on back foot and shook its control over southern Iraq and threatened to ignite a national resistance against it. The Shi'a did not oppose the coalition as Sunnis, but wanted the occupation to end. Thousands of 'Mahdi Army' members attacked coalition and Iraqi compounds in Najaf, An Nasiriyah, Al Kut, Baghdad, Al Amarah, and Kirkuk. Fighting also spread to Basrah, Karbala, and Hillah. Over the next few months, the coalition fought to regain control of the southern Iraq.

Sectarian divide between Shi'a and Sunni communities further widened during 2005, especially during the process of democratization and formulation of new Iraqi government. The October 2005 referendum on constitution for federal form of government, which denied Sunnis from the share of oil profits further, deepened the rift between the two communities.

Failure of Coalition forces to prevent the sections of Iraqi security forces in their active participation of ethnic cleansing of Sunnis and the Sunni response to that also contributed heavily terrorism and social unrest. By early 2006, sectarian violence started escalating in areas where Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs were mixed, especially the Baghdad area.

Therefore, in most of the neighborhoods, people started relying on militias and less-formal organizations for security because the U.S., Coalition and CPA forces failed to do the same. It also provided an opportunity to AQI and extremist to start a sectarian

conflict, which eventually turned into civil war. AQI bombing of Askariya (Golden) Mosque in Samarra, a Shi'a holy site on February 22, 2006 provided a spark and an opportunity to various Shia'a militias like Jaysh- al- Mahdi and the BadrCorpsto openly retaliate against the Sunnis and insurgents in Baghdad. In response more and more Sunnis took to arms to defend themselves. By early 2006, U.S. officials estimated that Shi'ite militias were killing more people than Sunni insurgents and were becoming the greatest challenge to the Iraqi government.

A series of post invasion policy decisions by US; inactions, failure and conduct of its forces on ground moved a "mere" insurgency by one group and slowly moved it into the realm of the Hobbesian "war of all against all."

The study found out in detail that the Afghan and Iraqi perception of Americans, as an occupying force explains the failure of US counterinsurgency and nation building strategy. The evidence found in the study corroborates that the U.S. military intervention accounted for social unrest and rise of terrorism in Iraq. The strategies adopted by the U.S. made the people in Afghanistan and Iraq wary of the invasion, which, when fuelled by the lack of understanding of the indigenous cultures and language, the atrocities and the mismanagement caused people to turn to help the insurgents. Though the U.S. and coalition forces entered these two troubled nations with the aim of regime change in Iraq, overthrow of Taliban regime, and destruction of Al Qaeda's sanctuaries in Afghanistan, but the psychological trauma that these operations caused for the indigenous populations, only led them to seek refuge in the other side.

Rise of insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq forces US commander and policy planners to change their approaches on ground, a shift from conventional to counterinsurgency approaches, codification and institutionalization of the counterinsurgency concepts and approaches. The main cause of success in Iraq was turning over of Sunnis and their alignment with US and Coalition forces against other extremists and IQA insurgents. Something similar did not happened in Afghanistan. Also in Iraq, after the surge Sunnis were allowed to enter back in armed force and other methods for their political integration was followed and this was totally absent in Afghanistan; cadre of Taliban was not accepted as Iraqi government accepted Sunnis even in limited way.

The United States of America left Iraq after the success of surge and success of ISAF and Iraqi army on ground but with any political solution to the Sunnis and in strategic stalemate. Every one knows the outcome; today Iraq is in a much worse condition than when it was invaded by US and its allies in 2003.

Similarly US is drawing out from Afghanistan leaving it into the hands of Afghans. Afghanistan armed forces can hold against Taliban but can't defeat it fully. According to the US the situation in Afghanistan is such that the war has ended and US troops can go home.

But war has not ended; just the role of US in the war has ended. The war between the Taliban and the ANSF still carries on and there is no clear winner. There cannot be. This is because the Taliban has safe sanctuaries in the neighboring areas of Pakistan and receives huge sums of funding from Saudi Arabia and other sources. Whereas, the ANSF's capability to fight the war in Afghanistan and to continue doing so would depend on the funding they receive. What this means is essentially that, the US Congress would have to fund the operations in Afghanistan, since Afghanistan lacks the economic infrastructure required to do the same and if this fails, then the result would be devastating for Afghanistan.

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