CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION MECHANISMS IN LATIN AMERICA: A STUDY OF ALBA, UNASUR AND CELAC

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation entitled "Constructivist Analysis of Regional Integration Mechanisms in Latin America: A Study of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before examiners for evaluation.

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALADI - Latin American Integration Association

ALBA – Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America

BRICS- Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa Group

CACM - Central American Common Market

CALC - Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development

CAN - Andean Community

CARICOM - Caribbean Community

CSN - Southern American Community of Nations

CELAC - Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

ECLA – United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America

ECLAC – United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EU - European Union

FTA - Free Trade Area

FTAA - Free Trade Area of the Americas

G-3 - Group of 3

IBSA- India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum

IIRSA - Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America

IR - International Relations

ISI - Import Substitution Industrialisation

LAFTA - Latin American Free Trade Association

MERCOSUR - Southern Common Market

NAFTA - North Atlantic Free Trade Area

NRA - New Regionalism Approach

OAS - Organization of American States

SAFTA - South American Free Trade Area

SICA - Central American Integration System

UNASUR - Union of South American Nations

US - United States

WTO - World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Latin America is a complicated geographical and cultural entity. Its continental geographical reality has been conceptualised as a 'jigsaw puzzle.' While mainstream theories have been quick to predict the failure of regionalism in Latin America, the constant mushrooming of regional organisations within the region is emblematic of the fact that the 'will to integrate' remains very strong in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994).

Unlike Europe which had an economic rationale to forge some sort of regional economic cooperation after the Second World War, Latin America had no such immediate reason to embrace regionalism. The impulse for regional integration rather has been historical and remained unforgotten. It dates back to the 'Continental' nature of independence movements, where the slogan of *solidaridad continental* had driven the revolutionary struggle for freedom and the great ideas of the *Libertador,* Simon Bolivar who had proposed the formation of a union of all Latin American republics when he convened the famous Panama Congress for the same in 1826.

The spirit of Pan-Americanism which became noticeable since the last decade of the nineteenth century was enthusiastically embraced as the region hoped for American assistance in the modernization and development of their economies. In the bipolar reality of the Cold War, Latin America stuck to Pan Americanism, reposing faith in American leadership and their hope for economic development so much so that Latin America had gladly agreed to the idea of inter-Americanism as epitomized by the formation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948.

Admittedly, the pendulum had swung in favour of inter-Americanism at the expense of Latin American unity and regional integration. The state-led 'old regionalism' of the time was more an attempt to develop than a concern with security or power dynamics. The security concerns of the United States however, did colour the

perceptions of the region; but these security and defence concerns were taken care of by the Rio Treaty and hosts of other bilateral defence agreements that the Latin American and Caribbean countries signed with the United States.

Latin American regionalism and the idea of 'continental solidarity' were resurrected under the imperatives of the state-led Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model of economic development, which was strongly recommended by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (UN-ECLA) in the 1940s and the 50s. The ISI model demanded further expansion of the industrialization process beyond national borders and its deepening beyond the first stage of manufacturing consumer goods. In order to succeed, ISI had to grow to the stage of production of intermediate and capital goods; and this required more capital, technology and larger sized markets. Not national, but regional markets were ideal for further growth and industrialization. It was the era of state protectionism and regulations, public sector and nation-building. Regional integration schemes of the 1960s such as the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), Central American Common Market, Caribbean free trade area and the subsequent Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) were all premised on the idea of a state-led model of development. It is important to note that the state led old regionalism was an attempt to protect the domestic economy from the pressures of the international realm while inducing competitive development by creation of newer markets.

The oil crisis of the 1970s, coupled with the protectionist trade policies that Latin America had been following led to an economic slump in the region. With the ensuing debt crisis of the 1980s and the transition to democracy that followed in the region, the ISI model and its ability to further development in Latin America was questioned. Consequently, the 1990s saw the region embrace regionalism in what ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) called 'open regionalism.' Non-member countries were also given access to regional markets and the aim was to use the project of regional organizations like the Mercosur to sell the newly enacted neoliberal reforms to their respective domestic economies. While there was a definite growth in terms of intra-regional trade, the institutional build up in these trade oriented regional organisations was scanty at best.

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 followed by a general movement away from neoliberalism in the developing world led to the third wave of regionalism in Latin America or what is being called post-liberal regionalism. Post-liberal regionalism in Latin America is characterised by a 'return of the state' both in foreign policy and in regional integration efforts. This state-led project of development is characterised by a focus on welfare and socio-economic parity. There are of course opposing viewpoints as to the efficacy of this state sanctioned welfare project. The regional integration projects of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC have been termed as post-liberal regional integration arrangements. There are various ideological, economic and political factors which will influence this new project of developmentalism.

Latin America represents multiple physical subgroups along with multiple functional subgroups. The physical sub regions are Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. The functional sub-regions include the Caribbean, the Southern Cone, the Andean states, the states the US recognizes as a part of its extended neighbourhood and the free marketers, to name a few. Regional space in Latin America is highly contested, affected by the ideological bent of the state, the particularities of its geography and economy, its position vis-à-vis the United States and its own self-image. While there are multiple factors which influence the fate of regionalism in Latin America – the policy preferences of the United States, the different political and ideological motivations of the states, the cultural and historical context of the region and ultimately the ambitions of important regional players like Brazil are some which seem to be most important.

There are multiple factors which make Latin America an absolute bedlam of scholarship. These include- the absence of a too marked interest in great power aspirations, in that most states in Latin America that desire a greater international role choose soft power projection over hard power projection; the reality of an uneasy partnership with the United States; the personal ambitions and corresponding self-image of states, for example, Brazil's desire to emerge on the international scene has greatly influenced its orientation towards the project of intra-regional regionalism; the obvious ideological coherence of the shared cultural past and the dissonance, in the foreign policy goals and practice of different states in Latin America.

There is much therefore to be studied and understood. A historical analysis of the development of regionalism in Latin America can shed light on the complexities of regionalism in the region and help explain the forms it has taken in the present context. An analysis of this kind can help understand the persistence of regionalism within the region as well as add to the understanding of the concept.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Scholarship on regional integration in Latin America can on the surface be easily divided into two sets – those who believe that all attempts at integration in Latin America have failed and those who debunk the theories of regionalism itself. Scholarship ranges from 'old regionalism 'to 'new regionalism' and finally to what is now being called as 'post-liberal regionalism'. For the purpose of this study, relevant scholarship may be divided into two sub categories – theoretical scholarship on the concept of regionalism and the specific analysis of Latin American attempts at regionalism.

Theories of Regionalism

The present discussions on new regionalism have accepted the Constructivist view that regions are beyond geography and social construction of shared identities and cultural consonance are important for the construction of a regional space. Katzenstein (1996) suggests that 'regions are not simply physical consonants, but express changing human practices.' Arif Dirlik's (1993) view that 'regions could express collective identities, self-generated and recognized as such by outsiders' offers some explanation for the permanence of the idea of regional integration in Latin America.

Even though present scholarship has moved beyond the restrictions of physical geography and embraced what Vayrynen (2003) calls 'functional regions', the reality in Latin America is a little more complicated. There is little scholarship which is

clearly able to distil the particular brand of regionalism in Latin America (if one even exists) as Acharya (2007) has managed to do in the case of Asian and European regionalism which he characterizes as informal and driven by nationalism in the case of Asia and formal and institutionalized in the case of Europe.

Latin America lacks the history of two World Wars and the consequent distaste for the nation-state model as well as the Asian and African pressures of decolonizing in a fast polarizing world. There are competing visions and theories which different regional projects in Latin America seem to satisfy. Barry Buzan and Nicholas Weaver's (2003) conceptualization of 'regional security complexes' recognizes only South America as a 'standard regional security complex.' While Buzan and Weaver provide for the possibility of the existence of regional powers in said complex, as Sahni suggests, there is difficulty in recognizing Brazil as the obvious candidate for a regional power in South America. Consequently, others scholars like Katzenstein (1996) talk about 'core states.' In this particular conceptualization of regional order, Mexico would obviously be the US backed core state which challenges and is challenged by Brazil's own particular ambitions to be the regional superpower. There is enough evidence therefore, that two competing ideas – those of regional attempts in the region in order to support US hegemony (NAFTA), subvert it (ALBA) and those which recognize one individual country's global ambitions as acting as the pivot for regionalism, as evidenced by Brazil.

It is difficult to fit Latin American regionalism comprehensively into any of the mainstream frameworks on regionalism. Scholars of International Political Economy emphasize that regionalism is both an attempt to further development as well as a method of counteracting the fast pressures of globalization. Acharya (2007) talks of five different regional responses which may be used to characterize the region – normative dissent, regional rivalry between emerging regional power and US backed existing regional power, resistance and exclusion as well as socialization by smaller members, an anti-American agenda and lastly challenging the legitimacy of the global order itself. While several regional organizations may fit in one or more categories, there is definite overlapping of purposes between individual members which makes it impossible to brand even a single member country as achieving a single goal convincingly. For example, an instance of regional rivalry is the Argentine and

Mexican membership in the Uniting for Consensus dialogue against Brazilian claim to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. There is no one clear rival against the Brazilian claim and no single US supported candidate. Motivations and goals are mixed at best.

Andrew Hurrell (2005)'s functional definition of a regional role does provide some clarity as to the purposes that Latin America does presently exhibit. Hurrell (2005) theorizes that regions function as containers of diversity or as poles or as levels in multilevel global governance or as the harbingers of change in the character of international society. The only common constant which may be applied throughout the region, is the historical will to regionalize and the constant efforts that all countries in Latin America have made to arrive at a form of regionalism which allows them to form a common identity.

The lack of institutionalisation has been a constant criticism of Latin American regionalism. Scholars have argued that this lack of institutionalisation has stunted the success of Mercosur. Scholars like Malamud (2012) have explained that this is a deliberate move on the part of Brazil as its global aspirations are threatened by regional rivalry. Mohammad Ayoob (1986) has explained the importance of a dominant and regionally accepted player in order for a stable regional order to develop: "…success in regional order building depends on a consensus regarding the role of the pivotal power within the regional grouping, a consensus shared by the pivotal power itself." Brazil and its vocal presence on the international stage has paradoxically threatened its attempts at regional integration which no doubt are still an important part of its foreign policy but have consequently taken a backseat.
It is safe to say that the will to integrate is the only apparent major commonality among the various regional integration attempts in Latin America. This 'will to integrate' is a function of the history and cultural coherence in Latin America. As Dirlik (1993) suggests: "Regions could also be a function of regionalist ideas and discourses."

With the 'constructivist' turn that social sciences have taken, a certain amount of porosity has been introduced both in the conceptualisation of regions as well as the processes attached to regionalism. Hettne (2003) and other scholars belonging to the

New Regionalism school of thought have differentiated between ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’. There has been an argument made for the importance of the ideational and cultural realm which may lead to a feeling of ‘region-ness’, and the ‘project’ of regionalism may or not be followed by the ‘processes’ of regionalization. The paucity of the theoretical stress on ideas therefore, make constructivism a valuable framework for the analysis of regionalism in Latin America.

Latin American Regional Integration: Problems and Criticism

One of the major critiques of Latin American regional organizations like Mercosur has been the ill-developed institutional structure. Scholars like Malamud (2012) have explained how the absence of a clear regional power has been responsible for the same, especially in the case of Brazil. Malamud (2012) suggests that Brazil had hoped to establish its authority in the Southern Cone which being away from Mexico and in the waning sphere of influence of the United States, increased its own chances of being recognised as a regional power. While in terms of size, population and landmass Brazil is no doubt a giant in the Southern Cone, Sahni suggests that it does not enjoy a clear domination in the region as indicators of life such as infant mortality, human index as well as other socio-political factors are significantly better in Argentina and Uruguay. While Brazil’s defence budget is much higher than most members of the region, its commitment to peace have also disallowed successful projection of hard power. Even small neighbours such as Paraguay have introduced problems in Mercosur by their own ideological identification with Taiwan which makes it difficult to include China as an important partner. Malamud (2012) therefore suggests that with the success of BRICS and IBSA, Brazil has resisted the urge to entangle itself further in institutions which would bind it to jealous neighbours. Through organisations like UNASUR, Brazil has attempted to counteract the political pressures of Mercosur by expanding its economic sphere.

It is important to point out here that there are several authors like Dabene (2009) who have rejected the traditionally accepted norms for judging the efficacy of regional organizations by pointing out that Latin America can never align itself along the lines of security as it is a peaceful area (internal conflicts aside). The security question

which so plagues others regions like South Asia is not quite applicable to Latin America. There are concerns regarding drug trafficking and other environmental concerns which are ultimately more international than regional. Here we may understand the region to function as a level in a multilevel global dialogue.

Scholars have also raised concerns over the 'return of the state' in Latin American regionalism. Andres Serbin (2012) and others have discussed how the post-liberal regionalism in Latin America as apparent in new groupings such as ALBA and UNASUR, not only define the two strands of left political action, in that they are both anti-US but exist nevertheless in two factions – that of developmentalist Brazil and Chávez's revival of Bolivarianism, but also signify a death of civil society participation in regional projects. The state led agenda of development has forced a top-down welfare scheme which raises concerns as far as the space accorded to others actors such as civil society organizations and businesses is concerned. What is interesting here is to unravel the links between historical conception of individual national interests along with a study of present political regime ideology. This is all the more important in the reality of Chávez's death and the hesitant reconciliation between Cuba and Obama led United States.

There is also great difficulty in reconciling the free marketers with the rest of leftist Latin America, if leftist they may be called along a wide spectrum of socialism. The case of Chile is particularly poignant in that its behaviour in the region represents the same diplomatic niche that its behaviour at the international stage. Countries such as Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico also have a strong alignment with the neoliberal world order created by the United States. In light of the new Pacific Alliance, there is much to be observed and surmised in the coming months.

There is also a concern of the smaller states which is especially poignant in the face of the present Greek crisis in Europe. Their motivations for a deepening of regional integration in the region will definitely not adhere to the past patterns sketched by the European Union.

There are immense complexities even in terms of distilling an ideological predisposition on the part of the region. Dabene (2009) talks about the patterns set pre

independence in the region by the colonizers which may be traced to the present transnational networks for drug trade. It need be asked whether Bolivar's dream is echoed throughout the land and the contradictions in the same deserve analysis.

There is immense scope for further analysis especially in terms of reconciling the present scholarship with the recent developments in Latin America including the formation of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC, as well as the death of President Chávez and the improvement in the relationship between the US and Cuba.

DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF STUDY

Latin America, as Dabine (2012) suggests, has a history of regionalism. A revolutionary disavowal of the Monroe Doctrine co-exists with the spirit of Pan Americanism. The regional identity of Latin America is complex not only in as much as there are different ideological and state goals but also in the paths deemed desirable to achieve the same contested goals.

This study proposes to reconcile the historical Bolivarian dream of a united Latin America with the present developing world's cautious approach towards globalization. A historical and analytical survey of the processes of regionalism in Latin America and the identification of patterns within the processes of the same will lead to the clearing up of many important questions such as what are the differences between the present regional organizations and the past experiences of regionalism in the region.

This study proposes to study the organizations of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC from a constructivist lens, in order to identify the regional patterns that repeat as well as to elaborate on the concept of regionalism in Latin America. A historical and cultural analysis of the same can systematically answer the question as to what is the purpose of regionalism in Latin America. This historical approach will be supported be teleological approach towards identifying the various ideological forces behind

new regionalizing impulses along with a historical analysis of important perspectives on integration in Latin America.

This study aims towards decoding the common expectations from regional organizations by member states as well as hopefully decoding the question as to what sustains the very fertile endeavour of regionalism in Latin America.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

(1) Can *Bolivarismo* be conceptualised as a norm of regionalization?
(2) Are there any identifiable patterns in the processes of regionalism in Latin America?
(3) Do free marketers threaten to subvert the anti-hegemonic regional aspirations of Venezuela and Brazil?
(4) Is Chávez's death the end of ALBA?
(5) Are there any continuities between 'old' and 'post-liberal' regionalism?
(6) Is it possible to reconcile the different geographical, economic and social realities of the Caribbean with the rest of Latin America?
(7) Can Brazil emerge as a regional pivot?

HYPOTHESES

1. *Bolivarismo* has been the guiding principle behind the formation of ALBA, CELAC and UNASUR.
2. There is a persistence of regionalism in Latin America.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The proposed research employs a historical and teleological approach to the study of regionalism in Latin America. It will attempt to unearth patterns, processes and features of regionalism and attempt to situate the specific cases of regional integration – those of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC, within the broader historical and international context. The research would also attempt to align the processes of regionalism with constructivist theoretical variables by employing an analytical approach. The research aims to be able to reconcile the complex processes of regionalism in Latin America into identifiable patterns.

CHAPTER SEQUENCE

The second chapter titled *Theoretical Framework* offers an expansive overview of the developments in constructivism and theoretical perspectives on regionalism. The first section examines the evolution of Constructivism in International Relations, identifying its theoretical antecedents, distinguishing between the various versions of constructivist scholarship, identifying the central tenets of constructivism and finally offers a constructivist reconstruction of core variables in International Relations. The second section traces the developments in theoretical perspectives on regionalism and outlines the meanings of important processes of regionalism. It also identifies the constructivist precepts on regional integration. The last section introduces Latin American regional integration and explains why a constructivist perspective is best suited for the study of the same. Finally, it identifies the variables for research and offers a brief conceptualization of the same.

The third chapter titled *Latin American Regional Integration Mechanisms: A Study of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC* evaluates regional integration mechanisms in Latin America. The first section offers a brief historical overview of regionalism in the region and identifies the trends in the same. The second section offers a detailed analysis of the development, processes, principles, politics and functions of the regional organisations of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC. The last section offers a

brief comparison between the three organisations in order to determine the present regional agenda of Latin America

The fourth chapter titled *Analysing Latin American Regionalism Through a Constructivist Lens* provides a normative, ideational and cultural analysis of Latin American regionalism with a special focus on the regional integration mechanisms of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC. The first section analyses *Bolivarismo* as a norm and identifies the driving force behind the recent spurt of region-wide regionalism in Latin America. The second section attempts to unearth the intricacies of the identity of Latin America and utilizes identity analysis to explain regionalism. The last section draws connections between the history of regionalism in Latin America and the present instantiations of regionalism by using the variable of culture.

The fifth chapter titled *Conclusion* presents the summations of the research and tests the proposed hypotheses.

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Regionalism is a vast theoretical category, multifaceted in its scope and myriad minded in its forms. The rationale for regionalism ranges from material variables such as trade and security to ideational aspirations of community building. It is no mean task then, to attempt to distil its 'true' essence in one framework. The discipline of International Relations however has taken a 'constructivist turn' (Guzzini, 2000). It is in light of this increased importance of the pervasive nature of ideas that constructivism is advanced here as a valid theoretical method to range into the inquiry of the pervasiveness of regionalism in Latin America.

Regionalism in Latin America has been particularly puzzling for mainstream theoretical analyses of the phenomenon. States which freely enter into binding regional arrangements with the United States reject the chance of being members of the largest trade arrangement. One organization replaces the other even as the academic community is barely done pronouncing its demise. The 'will to integrate' in Latin America remains strong. It is precisely because of this inexhaustible ability of the region to embrace different conceptualizations of regionalism and its enthusiasm to try out all available formats that the question of regionalism and its persistence is more fascinating to study than attempting to explain regionalism in Latin America. Constructivism is validated yet again as a capable theoretical framework to understand the idea of regionalism in Latin America because of its plurality of methodology.

This chapter outlines the constructivist framework for the present analysis. It is divided into three sections – the first section defines and explains the theoretical position of constructivism in the discipline of International Relations; the second section offers a brief overview of alternative theoretical perspectives on regional integration and underlines the validity of constructivism to study the same; the final section situates both constructivism and the nuanced understanding of regionalism

within the Latin American context and outlines constructivist variables suitable for the present analysis.

SITUATING CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE CANON OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

The end of the Cold War and the consequent ferment within the discipline of International Relations led to a debunking of positivism and materialism, with many critiquing the academic obsession with rationalism in IR. This internal dialogue birthed the third debate of International Relations, where a major conclusion reached was that the discipline had taken a meta-theoretical turn (Lapid, 1989). Constructivism was a product of the changes in the international system as well as the internal dialogue within the discipline.

However, as Maja Zehfuss (2004: 2) succinctly put it "the significance of constructivism is established more easily than its identity." While several scholars have expounded the primacy of the approach and hailed constructivism as a valid theoretical alternative to the mainstream approaches of realism and liberalism (and their many variants), there is also a healthy debate within constructivism, with sometimes far reaching differences and complete disavowals of their peers, so much so that establishing a clear trajectory of its development is riddled with the potholes of eclectic and redundant scholarship. That being said, there remain nevertheless, certain ideas which are central to nearly all variants of constructivist scholarship.

This section attempts to discuss the development of constructivism within International Relations, tracing the historical context in which the theory developed, the central tenets of the approach, distinguishing the many versions of constructivism and finally a comparative overview of the tenets with other important theories of International Relations.

Origin and Theoretical Antecedents

Unlike realism, which bases its primacy on the 'basic nature' of mankind and the international system, or liberalism which has a certain focus on transcendentalism and claims superiority on the grounds of depicting the vision for the future and the possibility of unrestrained freedom of action, constructivists, by the very virtue of their critical and interpretivist orientation, do not seek to ply their theoretical worldview as situated in any form of unimpeachable or unquestionable reality. Constructivists of different veins have traced several sources and inspirations for their scholarship including but not limited to Immanuel Kant, Max Weber, Durkheim, Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci. It is this very vast list of sources and ideas that have caused scholars to vouch for the existence of not 'Constructivism' but *constructivisms.* Adler (2002) has called constructivism "a paradigm of paradigms" due to the uneasy stand the theoretical framework has regarding easy abstraction of principles and ideas and incorrect summations about its character.

That being said, the development of this particular school of thought in International Relations can be pinned down, to some extent, to three important historical conditions – firstly, what Guzzini (2000:152) has called the "sociological and interpretivist turn" in social sciences; secondly, the end of the Cold War and "the certitude of possible change that swept over Europe" (Guzzini, 2000:152); lastly, and most importantly, the reaction of the IR academic community to the above itself.

The 'sociological and interpretivist turn' can be seen as much a product of its context as the aggressive resurgence of realism post the Second World War can be understood as a reaction to the abysmal failure of idealism in the inter-war years. The reality of the decolonization process as well as the critical work done by post-colonization theorists was important in establishing, in no uncertain terms, that the international system as envisaged by early international relations theory was lopsided at best, to put it mildly. Coupled with this realization of an international system inadequately constructed and understood was the work done in critical social theory as well as the new movements in linguistics which established the excesses of materialism along with bringing the issue of the multiplicity of identity and interests to the fore. Poststructuralist and deconstruction theorists like Derrida and Foucault brought to

primacy old sociological ideas which had established the social character of knowledge. For example, they debunked the mythic character of sovereignty, a core concern in international relations - "Poststructuralists deconstructed the practice of sovereignty as the historical solution to the problem of cultural pluralism and universalism" *(*Guzzini, 2000:155). There was also a movement towards what Ulrich Beck has called 'reflexive modernity' especially in light of the developments in nuclear technology and the subsequent bleak predictions of nuclear armageddon. 'Reflexive Modernity' therefore, as Guzzini (2000:153) explains, refers to "the increasing awareness of the inherent limits and ambiguities of technical and social progress."

The existence of 'social facts' and the dangers of accepting any observation as objective were not new concepts, suddenly discovered by constructivists. However, in light of the systemic change at play in the international system, with greater emphasis on intertextuality and intersubjectivity and in light of the post-behavioural movement, the worldviews as presented by the mainstream scholars of IR, namely realists and liberals, were found specious in their description and so was the claim that one worldview could be understood to have the ability to represent the world *as is*.

While other disciplines in the social sciences had embraced the insights of critical social theory, it was the end of the cold war and the preceding discussions during the second detente which can be said to have almost forced the ideological ferment in International Relations which 'birthed' constructivism. Rational Choice approaches were found severely wanting not only in their inability to predict the systemic change then afoot, but more importantly, in their inability to even conceptualize that such a change was in the realm of possibility. The ideational realm had been discarded by both neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism in favour of materialism. The individual ego centric conceptualizations of the self and the state were found to have been dubiously described as universally applicable, especially in light of a theoretical movement which established that reverence to universal principles was a fool's errand.

The most important factor in the creation and permeation of constructivism in the mainstream canon however, was the dialogue within the IR community itself. Not

only were scholars questioning the universality of the structural limits set on the international system in light of the pluralism that the international system had proved it could exhibit, there was also the very real theoretical failure represented by the fall of the Berlin wall which placed the issue of identity at the core of the debate. Responding to the post-positivist movement where they faced the reality of the fact that they were "interpreting an already interpreted world" (Schutz, 1962), theorists argued against the validity and even need for all-encompassing theoretical frameworks. Constructivism therefore, emerged as a framework that accepted the importance of identity and the social nature of knowledge, the plurality of singularly understood concepts such as sovereignty and anarchy and finally, an expression of the possibility of change in the international system.

In light of the above, it is then easier to understand why constructivism is a social and not a substantive theory. Barnett has provided a useful distinction between the two typologies - "Social theory is broadly concerned with how to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structures… Substantive theory offers specific claims and hypotheses about patterns in world politics… a social theory offers a framework for understanding how actors operate with fixed preferences which they attempt to maximize under a set of constraints. It makes no claims about the content of these preferences… nor does it assume anything about the content of the constraints… it offers no claims about the actual patterns of world politics." (Barnett 2008:133)

Constructivism therefore is best understood as "an explanatory metatheory" (Guzzini, 2000) and "remains more of a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations" (Ruggie, 1998:858), necessarily in opposition to the problem-solving theoretical approach employed by mainstream IR theories. It is because of this interpretative, loose structure that the framework was initially met with great scepticism from the IR mainstream as they feared "it was necessarily postmodern and anti-positivist" (Hopf, 1998 :172). These critiques from outside the theory ultimately led to a dizzying array of versions of constructivism. The next subsection discusses the various types of constructivisms in order to unearth the *core* constructivist concerns.

Types of Constructivism

Constructivism cannot be conceptualised as a unified treatise due to the differences its various practitioners have not only in terms of their source material but also because they differ in terms of everything from their commitment to positivism to their commitment to the methodologies of social science. As Guzzini (2000: 156) puts it "the sheer diversity seems to make the category of constructivism explode."

In the 1990s, several constructivists provided categorizations and points of difference among themselves, precisely to help clear the murky waters of internal debate within constructivism. Different typologies employed to distinguish between schools within constructivism include a distinction made between conventional and critical constructivism by Ted Hopf (1998), differences between radical and middle school constructivists (Adler, Guzzini et al.) as well as a distinction made regarding their adherence to different ideational movements and scholarship like Neo-Kantian, Neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist analysis. There seems to be an urgent effort on the part of early constructivists to separate themselves from the 'radicals' precisely to counter the mainstream's accusations of being simply committed to writing meta-theory. For the sake of simplification, two categories of constructivists may be formulated – the middle ground constructivists and the critical or radical constructivists.

Alexander Wendt has often been credited for the popularity of constructivism in post-cold war International Relations scholarship. He belongs squarely in what Guzzini (2000) calls the "middle ground position." Various constructivists have defended the middle ground position, by claiming - "Unlike positivism and materialism, which take the world as it is, constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. Unlike idealism and post-structuralism and postmodernism, which take the world only as it can be imagined or talked about, constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and that there is consequently some foundation for knowledge." *(*Adler, 2002 :128)

Middle ground or conventional constructivists claim that there is the possibility of a close looped theory and that a pre-social moment is available to be accessed by the

theorist. This is the biggest contention between the two schools of constructivism. Critical constructivists like Guzzini and Zehfuss have critiqued the easy abstractions of the middle ground school. They explain that the middle ground was not so much seized by the constructivists as much as they were "allowed to occupy it" (Guzzini, 2000). The middle ground position worked to allow the primacy of rationalism to continue to prevail by making rationalism its apparent object of opposition (and thereby simultaneously legitimising it) as well as allowing a vilification of critical constructivists who were pushed to the margins of the discipline under charges of being 'too radical' and therefore not worthy of serious discussion.

The radical constructivists, or better termed critical constructivists have a very specific anti-positivist stand and debunk the entire idea that a close ended theory is even in the realm of possibility and completely disavow all approaches that "anticipate analysis coming to a close" (Ashley, 1988:53). Critical constructivism is self-reflexive in its theorizing. This reflexivity is precisely the reason why they are so critical of the middle ground position claimed by constructivists which forces constructivism between the rationalist-reflectivist debate. As Hopf puts it - "critical theorists self-consciously recognize their own participation in the reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they observe. They realize that the actor and observer can never be separated. Critical theory thus claims an interest in change, and a capacity to foster change, that no conventional constructivist could make**." (**Hopf, 1998:184**)**

Despite the many important differences between constructivists who may lie anywhere on the spectrum between the two categories mentioned above, there is an ascertainable *core* of constructivism discussed in the next subsection.

Tenets of Constructivism

There is considerable agreement on all quarters that constructivism is preoccupied with the role of ideas in the international system. As mentioned earlier, constructivism developed in response to the mainstream rational choice perspectives of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, which display a general preoccupation with

materialism, with an emphasis on the role of power and wealth in the international system. Constructivism on the other hand, as Michael Barnett explicates – "… highlights how ideas define and can transform the organization of world politics, shape the identities and interests of states, and determine what counts as legitimate action." (Barnett, 2008:132)

Human action and consciousness are an integral pillar of all constructivist analysis which is why Ruggie's formulation about the nature of constructivism, that "constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life" (Ruggie, 1998:856) is often considered a succinct summary of the theoretical perspective. Constructivism therefore, has traits of both idealism and holism (Barnett, 2008:133)

Idealism in constructivism is not concerned with the International Relations theoretical movement and does not amplify the unrestrained possibilities that ideas open for the world. Conversely, it offers a reconstruction. Ideas in constructivism bind the actor to the hidden forces of the social realm, emphasizing the constraints that come attached with social bondage. The ideas in constructivism are not internal or individualistic but social "shaped by collectively held ideas such as knowledge, symbols, language, and rules" (Barnett, 2008:133). Constructivism emphasizes the links between materialism and idealism by observing "that meaning and construction of material reality are dependent on ideas and interpretation." (Barnett, 2008:133) The connection between constructivism and holism on the other hand is the uneasy alliance it has formed between the premise of a socially constructed reality and the existence of what Zehfuss (2004 :10) calls "an a priori reality." This a priori reality is not in reference to some meaning formed by a constructivist *out there* but the assumptions made and taken as given before the start of analysis. This is precisely the criticism offered by critical theorists against constructivism who suggest that due to the pre-social assumptions made by constructivists, their analysis can only be understood as yet another meta-theoretical narrative and not a theoretical game changer. Realists on the other hand, have called constructivists meta-theorists for having been unable to define a unique constructivist theoretical framework, a charge that most constructivists do not mind as they have a problem with the idea of the social sciences itself.

Despite the apparent contradictions within constructivist analysis, the value of the framework remains high due to its core concerns with reflexivity and intersubjectivity. Guzzini (2000 :154) has even gone as far as to suggest that "reflexivity is perhaps the central component of constructivism, a component often overlooked." Constructivism cannot be disregarded as a metaphysical narrative of world politics as it underlines that not only is an actor the product of his/her social environment, but that the actor has the ability to become reflexively aware of the same environment and change his responses on achieving this understanding. This possibility of change, is the core concern in constructivism. To elaborate further on the concepts on reflexivity and intersubjectivity, Guzzini (2000) explains how this possibility of change is not "voluntary" but grounded in "intersubjective rules and norms."

The place of identity and norm analysis is central in constructivism. The framework challenges the idea that an observer can be neutral or that interpretation can ever be unbiased. As Guzzini puts it – "what counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretative construction of the world out there… our interpretations are based on a shared system of codes and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices…the knowledge of reality is socially constructed." Constructivism therefore is both "about the social construction of knowledge… and the construction of social reality." (Guzzini, 2000 :158)

Hence, Constructivism offers significantly new interpretations of core international relations concepts and is an epistemologically different framework of analysis from the mainstream. The next subsection elaborates on the differences between constructivism and other theoretical frameworks in IR as well as discussing variables of constructivist research.

Constructivist Reconstruction of Core IR variables

Any attempt towards a broad summation is necessarily a practice of exclusion. However, to a large extent, the tenets of realism and liberalism may be broadly

contracted to their insistence on the singular defining property of the international system as being anarchic, their preoccupation with the state as a central actor and the struggle that all states must participate in, towards achieving and maximizing power to ensure survival. Realism, especially its most popular variant neorealism, may be summarized to its core concerns of- "statism, survival and self-help" (Dunne, 2008). Liberalism and especially neoliberal institutionalism agrees with neo-realism on the precepts that the international system is anarchic and survival is the core concern of the actors but highlights the role that international institutions may play in securing the state and differs on the understanding of what security necessarily entails as well as the methods of achieving said security. Therefore, it may be said that the core variables in IR theoretical mainstream are – anarchy (ordering principle), power (object of action), the state (unit level variable or the actor) and its predisposition towards self-interest and survival (actor interest and corresponding goal of existence).

As has been already mentioned, constructivism is a social theory as opposed to being a substantive theory like neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. As Barnett explains - "In order to generate substantive claims, scholars must delineate who are the principal actors, what are their interests and capacities, and what is the content of the normative structures" (Barnett, 2008:132). Constructivism therefore does not define the principal actor or the principal object of study. Instead, constructivism offers alternative understandings of the central variables of other theories. Ted Hopf (1998) has provided a systematic constructivist reconstruction of several important IR concerns. This reconstruction is bolstered by the central ideas of constructivism with its focus on reflexivity, intersubjectivity and context-specificity and multiplicity of meaning.

Kenneth Waltz clearly specified that the anarchic nature of the international system is a structural property of the international system and does not relate to the general meaning of the word which implies lack of order. Constructivists have argued that because anarchy is structural, it is "mutually constituted by actors employing constitutive rules and social practices" (Hopf, 1998 :174). For constructivism, "actors and structures are mutually constituted" (Hopf, 1998:171). That is to say, that every structure is dependent on the actor to be reproduced and therefore to survive. However, "meaningful action" is possible only within "an intersubjective social

context." Actors form relationships with others based on the identity they have ascribed to them which is a product of "constitutive norms" and not pre-given as assumed by the IR mainstream. All behaviour therefore, is governed by the intersubjective realm of ideas and norms. Given that the motivations for action themselves are grounded in different constitutive norms and social practices, the corresponding structure therefore has the potential to be plural instead of the single-mindedness of neorealist conceptualizations of self-help and self-interest. As Hopf (1998: 174) puts it "a continuum of anarchies is possible."

Power is also conceptualised differently in Constructivist scholarship. Hopf has distinguished between 'material' and 'discursive' power. The IR theoretical mainstream focuses on the material aspects of power, namely military strength and economic prowess. Constructivism on the other hand, emphasizes both aspects of power, where discursive power is the power of ideas, norms, social practices and knowledge (Hopf, 1998). Recent developments in realism have included the concept of 'soft power' [1]as an important component of the power axis of a state. Constructivist analysis however, emphasizes not just the 'soft' component of state power , but underlining the primacy of identity, goes on to say that social practice and norms control the development as well as the reproduction of intersubjective reality and consequently structures themselves, going beyond the cultural analysis that is often linked with soft power analysis – "The power of social practices lies in their capacity to reproduce the intersubjective meanings that constitute social structures and actors alike" (Hopf, 1998:178). Constructivism problematizes the neorealist conception of a self-interested, security-maximizing state because identities are multiple and more importantly because of the differences in the codes of social practices and norms that govern them. Identity is crucial because as Hopf (1998 :175) puts it - "The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions. A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice."

[1] Joseph Nye (2004) has done extensive work on soft power, and defines the same as "…ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion… [It] arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideal and policies."

It is apparent from the above that identity, interests and norms are the central variables of analysis in constructivism. Constructivism underlines the multiplicity of identity, the importance of the intersubjective context and the difficulty of ascertaining unitary values for any variables in analysis. It is precisely because of its ability to expose the multiplicity of discourse that it becomes a superior framework for analysis. While constructivism seeks to explain and interpret, it distances itself from the formulation of timeless laws and generalizations. Due to this reflexive quality of the framework, social constructivism has gained popularity especially in the analysis of regionalism, a phenomenon guided by a rationale which is privy to easy simplification but grounded nevertheless, in the idea of community and in the idea of unearthing a common but differentiated identity. The next section provides an overview of the developments in theoretical approaches to regionalism and outlines the criteria and methodologies of a social constructivist analysis of regionalism.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSTRUCTIVIST REFORMULATION

Regionalism and the study of the same is not by any means a new project. With the end of the Second World War, the consequent establishment of important international institutions like the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system combined with the slowly building crescendo of globalization as well as the completion of the decolonization process, regionalism has remained on the research agenda, especially in political economy approaches to IR. Different motivations and purposes have been put forth by various scholars belonging to various theoretical disciplines to explain regionalism. In the last several decades however, this understanding has become paramount that "a regionalized world is … not a novelty but an integral part of history" (Bøås, Morten and Marchand, 2003:3). There has been therefore, a monumental shift not only in the conceptualisation of the terminology of regional integration processes but also a significant change in the idea of what constitutes regionalism.

Due to the pervasive character of research on regionalism, especially in light of its present resurgence in a post-cold war, globalized world order, there has been a very complicated debate regarding categories, types and theories of regionalism. This section attempts to establish a clear trajectory in the mutation of terminology in regional integration, developments in theoretical approaches to regionalism and finally underlining the primacy of a constructivist approach to studying regional integration.

Contextualizing the Concepts, Processes and Types of Regionalism

Scholarship on regionalism can be said to have begun in earnest with the end of the Second World War and the start of the European Union experience. From the 1950s onwards to the present resurgence of regionalism in the international system, regionalism has been the battleground of several competing ideas about everything from its form to the concept itself. Out of the various developments in the last several decades, a few are crucial to the present analysis – the mutations in the concept of regional integration, the categorical distinctions made between forms of regionalism, and finally, the purposes for regionalism.

Regionalism as conceptualised in the present context, often as a complementary process to globalization, is mired in a multiplicity of couplet terminology ranging from globalism-regionalism, regionality-globality, to regionalism-regionalization. While the distinctions are important especially because of the contribution they make towards defining the categories of both the processes of regionalism and globalization, the most important result of the same has been to underline the multiplicity of meaning in the processes of structural reconfiguration at work in the present international system. It has been established as well that this multiplicity of meaning is to be embraced as it offers greater insights than all-encompassing definitions. As Bøås, Morten and Marchand (1999) explain – "In our view, there does not exist any single hegemonic definition of any of these concepts. Instead we are confronted with a multitude of competing genres and approaches, which should be cherished rather than perceived as problematic. It is a sign that there exists a lively debate about the future direction of the global political economy. Consequently, we

prefer to celebrate difference rather than trying to come up with 'catch-all' concepts that opt for hegemonic status." However, for the sake of clarity the distinction between regionalism and regionalization is useful. Hveem (2003:83) defines regionalism "as a programme, an ideology, to a situation where there exists a clear idea of a region, a set of goals and values associated with a specific project that an identifiable group of actors wish to realize" and regionalization as "the actual process of increasing exchange, contact and coordination… within a given region." This distinction is important because it ties in with the distinction made between formal and informal regionalization. Regionalism is an idea-centric 'project' whereas regionalization is a 'process' which may or not succeed the idea (Ibanez, 2003). This is not to suggest that regionalization is necessarily the formal, institutionalized aspect of the process of regional integration. As Andrew Hurrell (1995:39) explains regionalization refers to "the growth of societal integration within a region and… the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction."

It is apparent therefore that present scholarship has moved much beyond the early functionalist distinctions made between the categorizations of regions and the processes of regionalism (such as hard and soft regionalism[23]). The understanding of regions itself has mutated from being geographically limited and functionally defined to the present acceptance of their character as being anything but natural or objective. The earlier distinctions made between formal and informal integration therefore have become redundant because there is a clear consensus on the plurality of the regional process. It is because of this "pluralistic" (Söderbaum, 2003) character of regionalism that scholars of the new regionalism approach (NRA) have advanced co-operation as

[2] Depending on the type of variable considered for defining regionalism, there can be multiple types of regionalism. For example, Hurrell defines regionalism by using the variable of policy - "a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the patterns of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues" (Hurrell, 1992: 125) and consequently distinguishes between hegemonic and uncoerced regionalism.

[3] Sergio Santos (2008 :02) distinguishes between hard and soft regionalism as soft regionalism implying a community awareness and hard regionalism referring to international/regional treaties, though both forms would share the same objectives.

a better alternative to the old functional terminology of integration which implied a state-led, top-down agenda. This connects with the distinctions made between 'old' and 'new' regionalism. NRA scholars like Hettne however, displaying a bout of reflexivity have acknowledged that temporal distinctions made between the types of regionalism were an overstatement and that a holistic, historical and contextual analysis of regionalism is better suited for analysis.

Though research on regionalism is considerable, there has been a dearth of clear theoretical analysis of regionalism. This is reflected in the purposes ascribed to the phenomenon itself. While liberal institutionalists and world system theorists have ascribed regionalism to the middle tier of a multi-tier conceptualization of the international system, others have reduced its functionality to security alliances while some have defined the regional level as the possibility for the developing world to cushion themselves against the pressures of globalization. Best and Christiansen (2008:250) have identified three purposes for regionalism – "management of independence, management of interdependence and management of internationalization." [4] Whatever the purposes for regionalism may be, there is consensus regarding the fact that "regions should be treated as emergent, socially constituted phenomena" (Jessup, 2003). The need to understand how actors "perceive their reality and how they seek to deal with it" (Söderbaum, 2003) has directed regional integration analysis away from easy economic and political rationales and towards constructivist analysis of agency and identity formation. The next subsection aims to trace this trajectory in the theoretical analysis of regionalism.

Trajectory of Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Integration

Regional integration has been more of a liberal concern and consequently early theorization on the same was heavily influenced by liberal ideas which emphasized

[4]Management of Independence: settling down by newly-independent states in their relations between themselves, with the former colonial power and with other powers.
Management of Interdependence: Regional mechanisms to guarantee peace and security; responses to 'regionalization'; promotion of cooperation and/or state-led integration.
Management of Internationalization: Regional negotiations in the multilateral system; regional responses to globalization.

the potential for political cooperation if efforts were made to sync economic and security concerns. Cox (1996) traces this link to David Mitrany's conceptualisation of functionalism. Much in line with the constructivist idea of reflexive modernity, Mitrany also theorized about the eroding effects of modernisation and technological progress on the sovereignty of the state. Cooperation between states was then envisaged as a method to overcome the paucity of authority in view of a punishing modernity. The state remains the purveyor of regional cooperation however despite its decreased authority (Santos, 2008).

Functionalism's framework was developed further and improved on by the first serious theorist on regional integration, Ernst Haas. Haas's framework of neofunctionalism birthed the concept of 'spill over' which was largely responsible for the policy preference displayed towards regional integration in most developing states, especially in Latin America. Haas also provided the distinction of 'voluntary' regionalism[5], mostly to distinguish regional integration as a separate phenomenon from earlier efforts at empire amassing. Haas was writing in the backdrop of the start of the processes that ultimately led to the European Union and was critiquing the pessimism of realism as well as the almost other worldly conceptualisation of cooperation envisaged by liberalism. Haas provided a rationale which was grounded in the firm social experiment of the European Union as well as an idea of cooperation which made sense, policy wise. The 'spill over effect' was the idea that as interdependence increases in certain areas, this very process would generate proximity and a 'spill over effect' in other areas. Due to this organic, structural follow through, "the idea of a region with supranational institutions becomes real" and the integration process therefore becomes not a state led project but an "impulse" echoed in policy and polity. As Santos (2008:05) explains – "Haas built the idea of spill over not on economic determinism, but on changes in the attitudes and behaviour of governments, parties, and, especially, labour and business interest groups. His key conclusion was that group pressure will spill over into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse." Another important contribution of neofunctionalism was the introduction of the plurality of actors at work in any regional project. Haas

[5] This distinction has been undermined by constructivist scholarship which emphasizes the informal processes of regionalism which are sometimes intersubjective but contribute to creating 'we-feeling' and 'a sense of region-ness '

acknowledged that the state elite had a major role to play in the processes of integration along with the statesmen – "the characteristic rationality associated to statesmen becomes blurred among a plurality of actors who search for the same objective –integration-, but through different strategies" (Santos, 2008.) The importance of the idea of regionalism to be accepted and promoted from the bottom-up and the multiplicity of regionalizing impulses ties in with present constructivist analysis of regional integration.

Neofunctionalism however, envisioned a highly institutionalised regional apparatus for the generation of 'spill over'. It was heavily criticised for being made to fit the European experience and its relevance was questioned in light of new regional arrangements that cropped up in the rest of the world. Latin America in particular embraced regional integration whole heartedly but found the rationales justified under neofunctionalism scarce and hard to reproduce within its own context. The European experience was a product of their particular context of having lived through two devastating wars, charged and determined by nationalism and therefore sovereignty was not of paramount importance in Europe. The developing world however, was undergoing the rigours of the decolonization processes, the difficulties in reconciling arbitrary new boundaries and hoping to rise up to the challenge of development. Even if we go so far as to suggest that nationalism did not reign supreme in the developing world, there can be no doubt that the state certainly did.

The contributions of peace studies were the next important step in conceptualising regional integration. The context of the Cold War induced bipolarity and the subsequent nuclear arms race it launched placed security on the ideological forefront as nothing before it ever had. Karl Deutsch's concept of 'security community' was an important step in forging the link between regional integration and security. Deutsch brought the variable of identity into regional integration analysis. He explained that through the processes of integration, states could create not just a stable order but "a stable peace" (Adler, 1998). The security community approach highlighted how integration could cause modification in behaviour by establishing norms which thereby regulate behaviour – "*Integration,* then, is a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack" (Deutsch, 1968:159). Deutsch explained how a community

formed to enable more coordinated decision-making could ultimately lead to the development of 'we-feeling' which introduces an organizing principle among the so-coordinated states based on an identity they both recognize and consciously reproduce. This idea has been instrumental in the development of constructivist research.

Two important theoretical treatises that emerged in the 1970s must be mentioned here for though they do not directly theorize on regional integration, the ideas they put forward have immensely helped the cause of regionalism and helped establish it as a viable variable for further analysis, namely Michael Doyle's 'democratic peace thesis' and Keohane and Nye's 'complex interdependence approach.' The democratic peace thesis basically explains that as democracies do not go to war with each other, if democracy were to spread worldwide, the possibilities for peace would greatly increase. Complex interdependence on the other hand, stresses the crucial connection between the domestic and the international and because of this ever increasing interdependence, the fortunes of all are tied together. Both ideas are important because they undercut the self-help character of the international system by emphasizing the role that liberal ideas may play in creating a more stable international system. Regional integration is therefore a 'stepping stone' (Bhagwati, 1991) to this stable world order.

With the subsequent establishment of regionalism as a phenomenon worthy of academic research, the realists were forced to react to it. Realist conceptualizations of regionalism however leave much to be desired. Neorealists grudgingly accepted that regionalism exists, but their focus remained on treating it as a method to form alliances and regionalism remained muted in the discourse of balance of power politics. As Hurrell (1995:47) explains "[f]or the neo-realist, the politics of regionalism and the emergence of regionalist alignments have much in common with the politics of alliance formation." The subsequent hegemonic stability theoretical approach introduced the variable of the hegemon as the provider and purveyor of the regionalizing impulse. 'Regional power' therefore became another variable introduced to define the efficacy and sometimes even possibility of a regional arrangement.

The liberal camp on the other hand countered with Stanley Hoffman's intergovernmentalism. This was later developed into liberal intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik. The most important contribution of the same was bringing the domestic back into the discussion of inter- and supra- national. As Santos (2008 :15) explains "Moravcsik reformulates the neorealist characteristics trying to explain the integration phenomenon from the role of the state and national interest point of view and rejecting any possibility of supranationality or even cooperation politics if they are not subordinated to intergovernmental necessities."

With the end of the cold war and the meta theoretical turn that all social sciences had taken, two new approaches were developed which described the complicated nature of regionalism and the intricacies and complexities of the processes involved, especially in the regional projects of the South. The new political economy approach and the new regionalism approach advanced an agenda for emphasizing the plurality of the processes in regionalism. The new political economy approach stressed the need to understand the 'globalization- regionalization nexus.' The most important idea that emerged here was the insistence on the local component in global restructuring. As Bøås, Morten, Marchand (1999) explain- "if regional organisation is to play a real role in the economies of the South, it has to be embedded in the real-life context of these economies. What is needed, therefore, is a strong commitment to re-attachment between state, market and (civil) society at the national and regional levels… it means that the study of regional organisation in the South will need to set aside universalistic approaches to regionalisation, and start to accept that regional organisations and regional- isms are not developed within the framework of just one rationality, but in several localised ones."

The most important development in regional integration however, may said to the emergence of the new regionalism approach. Led by Bjorn Hettne, the NRA emerged in the 1990s. Responding to the almost global move towards liberalization as well as the certitude of the existence of globalization, NRA scholarship provided an important distinction between 'new' and 'old' regionalism. Old regionalism was necessarily state-centric, a product of a bipolar world order, was state-led, inward-oriented and protectionist and specific and limited in its contents and objectives. New regionalism on the other hand, emphasized the multiplicity of actors, was a product of a multipolar global world order, was driven by the 'urge to merge', outward-oriented and emerged

from a ‘a comprehensive and multidimensional societal process’ (Hettne, 2003:23). NRA rejected the criterion established by old theories of regionalism for defining regionalism and accepted that regions were ‘processes’; secondly, they espoused a complete disavowal of state-centric approaches; thirdly, NRA emphasized “the focus on the real region in the making rather than the formal region defined by the member states of a regional organization” (Hettne 2003:24) and lastly, NRA suggested the study of globalization as an exogenous factor to regionalism. NRA rejected unilateral explanatory frameworks and embraced multiple perspectives to explain the decidedly ‘new’ form of regionalism that had emerged in the post-cold war world order. This emphasis on new regionalism being a qualitatively different variable than old regionalism has been the stress point of NRA scholarship.

Despite the strides made in terms of the multiplicity of perspectives, the identification of the complexity of the regionalism process and the avowal of the importance of identity, the NRA has been criticised for its focus on highly institutionalised forms of regionalism. Moreover, the distinction made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism is itself problematic, and Hettne himself has retraced the distinction and explained how "the identification of new patterns of regionalization (co-existing with older forms)” (Söderbaum, 2003:4) is more relevant. It is because of this return to contextuality and the debunking of the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism that constructivist perspectives are optimum for analysis of regional integration processes, especially in under-institutionalised, community-driven states of the developing world. The next subsection discusses the constructivist perspective on regional integration.

Evaluating the Constructivist Programme of Research on Regional Integration

Given the multiplicity of perspectives employed by NRA scholars, it is not a big leap to suggest that there is an overlap between ideas expressed by NRA scholars and constructivist research. As Fabbri (2005:05) explains however, constructivist precepts have been “thinly applied” in NRA discourses.

The major constructivist idea utilized within the NRA corpus is the redefinition of regions namely, the idea that - "regions must not be taken for granted; that they are not 'natural', objective, essential or simply material objects" or as Hettne puts it- "regions are processes; they are in the making (or un-making), their boundaries are shifting - in the constructivist approach regions come to life as we talk and think about them" (2003, Hettne). While this categorization is both apt and useful for understanding the complex structure of regions in the developing world, the distinction made between old and new as already discussed, is problematic. This distinction is problematic because it establishes an arbitrary timeline [6]and runs the risk of becoming ahistoric and therefore ignoring important patterns. Constructivism emphasizes that the old is very much a part of the new forms of regionalism. Fawcett's definition is useful here – "regionalism should be understood as an evolutionary and cumulative process which has grown and expanded over time to take in new tasks and new domains" (Fawcett, 1996). Constructivism "insists that all data must be contextualised… must be related to, and situated within, the social environment in which they were gathered, in order to understand their meaning" (Hopf, 1998). A historical and contextual analysis therefore has a lot of potential to reveal insights about patterns and practices of regionalism within a region. As Zehfuss (2004) explains – "...in process based research such as constructivism… tracing over time the influence of structures on actors' identities and intentions as well as tracing the impact of actors over the evolution of structure."

Constructivist readings of regionalism were first undertaken in Europe. As Fabbrio explains - "while constructivism does not represent a theory of regional integration per se, it has contributed new insights to our understanding of regional integration… by drawing attention to the importance of studying processes of interaction, socialization and learning" (Fabbrio, 2005). The focus remains on identifying collective meanings and norms shared by the community which birthed the intersubjective context leading up to the realization of regionalism. Important variables therefore remain identifying 'worldviews' and pervasive norms. In the words of Wendt (1992) – "structures which organize our actions are constituted by collective meanings and actors acquire and redefine their identities and interests by

[6] NRA scholars recognize regional arrangements post the 1980s as 'new regionalism.'

participating in these collective meanings." As an actor's identity is directly related to the behaviour displayed by the actor, any factor which can be ascertained to affect identity becomes capable of enabling predictability, which for constructivists is the ordering principle of the international system.

Further, constructivism underscores the importance of language and discourse and therefore the subsequent interaction is a fundamental factor in the collective action undertaken. As Risse (2004) puts it – "it is through discursive practices that agents make sense of the world, construct and select certain interpretations while excluding others and attribute meanings to their activities." Constructivism offers the opportunity to understand and explain how the various regional projects came to be which were relegated to the realm of failure by mainstream theories. The wide scope of constructivism promises to reveal insights which can never be uncovered by rationalist theoretical frameworks.

Ultimately, the 'plural' character of regionalism and the fact that new forms of regionalism are "determined more by agency and less by structure" (Hveem, 2003:81) underline the importance of identifying "how interests, ideas and identities are formed" (Söderbaum, 2003:10). Constructivism therefore, is an ideal theoretical approach to study regional integration, especially the forms integration has taken in Latin America. The next section discusses the suitability of the constructivist approach to study regional integration processes in Latin America and defines the central variables of research.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: IDENTIFYING THE VARIABLES FOR RESEARCH

Regionalism in Latin America has a rich and varied history. Theorization however, has been a difficult task especially as most mainstream theories of integration dismiss Latin American attempts towards cooperation as either mimetic or label them as failures. The persistence and fertility of the regional endeavour however, has continued undeterred. Latin America has always been a challenge to theorists and

Professor Nafey once termed the region as the 'land where theories go to die.' The contradictions and difficulties in reconciling the reality of the region with theoretical worldviews is not due to lack of trying. It is precisely because of this difficult to pin down character of the polity of Latin America that a constructivist analysis is most suited to understanding the intricacies and vagaries of regionalism in Latin America.

This section offers a concise discussion of the salient features required in an analysis of Latin America, the inadequacies of mainstream theories on regionalism and the suitability of a constructivist paradigm for said analysis and finally outlines the variables for the present research.

Determining the Difference in Latin American Regional Integration Processes

Latin America is a difficult region to situate in the international system. While it is a part of the developing world, it differs from Asia and Africa because of its comparatively much earlier decolonization process. Though vast differences abound in the multiple sub regions within it, there is also a shared colonial past which culturally ties the region together. Further, Latin America's geographical position places it squarely within the ambit of the United States' zone of influence which makes the search for autonomy both difficult and at the same time much yearned for. It is precisely because of the threefold concerns of development, autonomy and cultural consonance that regional integration has received so much support from all states in the region (Puntigliano, 2013).

The regionalizing impulse in Latin America is also multifold depending on the identity of the state – from the ideas of Pan-Americanism to the ideas of regional autonomy to global power aspirations and economic rationales. The multiplicity of regional goals is precisely the reason for the confusion faced when an attempt is made to label regionalization processes in Latin America. Further, the colonial creations of provinces, the continental movement for independence and the new competing state imposed goals for integration emphasize that regionalism in the region is not only interconnected but that it cannot be conceptualised in an ahistorical space. As Dabène

(2013) points out "the consistency despite instability, resilience despite crisis' is 'one of the mysteries any inquiry about integration in Latin America should try to unveil."

The constant mutation of one regional arrangement into another therefore undermines any attempt at studying regional integration in isolation. To give an example, if the security backed rationale for regional integration in Latin America is analysed, it becomes evident that security based regional arrangements in Latin America are difficult because of the problems in identifying a clear security threat or a clear security provider. The majority of the conflicts in the region in the last several decades have been internal and not inter-state. Even this conceptualisation of conflict is problematic because the reasons for conflict in Latin America remain narco-terrorism, environmental issues and political and ideological struggle which place these internal struggles within the ambit of the United States global security doctrine. Latin America therefore, is embroiled in a constant struggle of competing definitions. It is precisely because of this complexity of issues in Latin America that grounding any regional arrangement to material variables becomes not only difficult but redundant.

It is important therefore, to analyse Latin America contextually. The multiplicity of interests and identities make easy generalizations difficult which is why the several 'failures' ascribed to regional processes in Latin America are fallacious at best. The need to unearth the ideas underpinning regionalism as well as the mutation of different regional arrangements make constructivism the best framework for analysis.

Identification of Variables for Research

In terms of Latin American regionalism, Louisa Fawcett's formulation – "… although their impact is hard to measure, ideas matter in the history of regionalism, and there is a rich Latin American dimension to explore" (2005 :57) mirrors the objectives of this research agenda as closely as possible. Most mainstream theories emphasize on the development of institutional structure within regional organizations in order to categorize them as successful, precisely because as opposed to ideas, they are easily identifiable. Latin American regionalism is often found wanting in this

category. For instances, in the case of Mercosur, Malamud has provided an interesting explanation of the same. Malamud explains that the absence of binding institutional framework within Mercosur is a deliberate move on the part of Brazil as its global aspirations are threatened by regional rivalry. Even if we assume the states to be unitary actors, there are multiple and competing identities which do not allow regional arrangements in Latin America to fit into existing theoretical categories – "Latin America does not readily correspond to the image of the popular caricature" (Fawcett, 2005 :57).

The one identifiable constant in the case of regional integration in Latin America is the persistence of regionalism. Despite several failures, no state in Latin America has ever taken a stance against regionalism (Putigliani, 2013). This commitment to regionalism therefore becomes an important starting point in an analysis of various regional arrangements in Latin America. Furthermore, this common stand is a valid theoretical question where a constructivist analysis could explore the patterns that have ensured this persistence as well as identify the factors which have thwarted particular visions and may help "explain the totality of interactions in the Americas, where "powerful currents," patterns of consensus and conformity repeatedly recur" (Fawcett, 2005 :58). There are three discernible variables which may be studied in order to elucidate this question – norms, identity and culture. A very brief description of the same follows.

Norms refer to "the standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and may be differentiated into 'regulative' and 'constitutive', where regulative norms 'order and constrain behaviour', and constitutive norms 'create new actors, interests, or categories of action.' There is an interplay between domestic and international norms, where one informs the other. Norms also differ in the strengths of the compliance they garner. For constructivists, 'constitutive norms' are also constitutive in that they are instrumental in ascribing meaning to a context. In general parlance, the term 'norm' is interchangeable with the term 'institution', but Finnemore and Sikkink have explained that while one is the study of behaviour, the other is often an elaboration of a number of norms and practices, and is therefore a much wider category. Norm analysis is an integral part of Constructivism and scholars have explained that the development of a norm is

cyclical and the creation of a norm, a teleological process. The present analysis seeks to identify the norms which regulate the regionalizing impulse in Latin America.

Identity as has already been mentioned is to Constructivism what the state is to realism. The identity of a state is a product of a web of intersubjective meanings. Identity is reproduced both by attribution of a particular identity by one actor to the other, as well as through daily practice by self (Hopf, 1998). Identity defines interests which regulate action in the system. Identity is also reflexive. Latin American identity is a complicated category. An analysis of these complexities can help reveal the interests which drive regionalism in the region. The connection between different regionalising impulses and different state interests needs to be analysed.

Culture in constructivism is emblematic of the social environment which informs, regulates and reproduces both actor identity and interest. Culture therefore, is the most disperse variable and includes customs, knowledge, language and religion. Culture may be conceptualised as the cooptive arm of power as enunciated by Gramsci. The question for analysis is to ascertain whether there exists a culture of regionalism in Latin America as well as identify the efforts towards creating such a culture, if any.

The three variables outlined above are wide both in scope and definition. It is only after a teleological analysis of the various forms of regionalism in Latin America and common historical processes have been distilled and the influences unearthed can a reformulation of the same be offered. The next section offers a descriptive analysis of regional arrangements in Latin America in order to further the research proposition.

CHAPTER 3
LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION MECHANISMS: A STUDY OF ALBA, UNASUR AND CELAC

Regional integration in Latin America has a long and varied past. While several attempts have been made to typify Latin American regionalism, mostly because its persistent pursuit of integration has disallowed the academic discipline to ignore it, not only are mainstream theoretical models unsuitable for such typification, they are also party to the act of reducing an ideologically diverse and ontologically complex phenomenon to a mere footnote of a study on US foreign policy. While there is no doubt that the United States and its policy preferences have been an important modulating counterpart to the home grown responses to regionalism in Latin America, the predominance of the US in the English language literature on the same has led to a "silencing of Latin American initiatives" (Fawcett, 2005:29).

Latin America therefore, has struggled not just against the history of its actual colonization but also, the political, cultural and epistemic imperialism of the United States. The 'orient' has subsequently been reduced to the status of the 'subaltern' [7]in the narratives of American regionalism. Add to this the pressures of economic liberalization, the importance of trade and the new global security agenda and it becomes easy to understand then why the ideational component of regionalism has been pushed to the bottom of the research agenda.

The present academic context however, is plural and the ideational realm no longer remains unimportant. A study of Latin American regionalism and its trajectory has much to offer not only towards providing a better understanding of integration

[7] Gayatri Spivak explains the category of the subaltern as that strata of society or personality whose experiences are voiced and theorized by those who have not lived through them and therefore cannot ever comprehend them. This leads to a double marginalization of the 'subaltern' as the knowledge produced about the experiences of marginalization works to further marginalize those that the discourse claims to speak for.

processes in the region itself, but also promises to add interesting insights to the concept of regionalism as well. As Fawcett explains – "in a more liberal era, where ideas are not held captive by power, this record [of material, Euro- and US-centric explanations of Latin American regionalism] can be set straight by a fuller exposure of the Latin American contribution to the development of continental regionalism" (Fawcett, 2005:29).

This chapter offers a historical and descriptive analysis of regional integration mechanisms in Latin America with special emphasis on the ideational processes at play. The first section offers a historical overview of regional integration mechanisms in Latin America and attempts to identify common trends in the processes of regional integration; the next section elucidates the specific processes within recent regional integration mechanisms of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC); the last section provides a summation of the complementarities and disjunctions within the three organizations.

CONTEXTUALISING REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

This sections attempts to identify the patterns and pathways of regionalism in Latin America. The first subsection traces a brief historical trajectory of regional integration in Latin America, placing the same within the historical and political context of the region. The next subsection summarises the trends in the regionalizing process within the region and situates the 'new' regional integration mechanisms of *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América* (the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America or ALBA), *Unión de Naciones Suramericanas* (The Union of South American Nations or UNASUR) and *Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeño* (The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States or CELAC) in the wider historical context of regionalism in Latin America.

A Historical Overview of Regional Integration Initiatives in Latin America

Most scholars have agreed that regionalism in Latin America has two organizing principles- hemispheric cooperation or inter-American regionalism and intra-regional cooperation between Latin American countries (Hurrell, 1992:122). For the sake of studying formal regional integration mechanisms [8]this distinction provides necessary conceptual clarity. As already mentioned, the project of regionalism in Latin America is plural and highly complex and thus the idea of using easy dichotomies to explain it almost seems like a paradox. However, the literature and processes of regionalism are so vast in the region that the category of regionalism must be streamlined in order to not overwhelm the scope of the research project. Consequently, the focus of this summation is on state-led, macro regional integration mechanisms. This streamlining does not reduce the aims of the study but alternatively, provides a structure to the research design.

The first instantiation of a regional endeavour may be traced to the Congress of Panama held in 1826. Simon Bolivar's vision for an integrated Latin America had excluded the United States, in light of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine [9]in 1823. Bolivar's vision grew organically from the independence movement of Latin America which had been continental in nature. Thus, from the early nineteenth century itself, the uneasy ideational dichotomy between two competing regional visions had been established.

The Congress of Panama did not lead to the fruition of Bolivar's vision for a united Latin America. Over the next few years, Bolivar's vision petered out and the dream was shattered in the eventual breakup of Gran Colombia [10]– "Ultimately neither the recognition of independence, nor the pursuit of commercial interests, were enough

[8] Formal Regional Integration Mechanism is used here to refer to regional agreements which have been institutionalized as opposed to the much wider understanding of regionalism to include integration efforts (both those formalised by the signing of agreements as well as informal agreements in terms of cultural affinity, historic pathways for movement of people and cultural affinity) between macro, meso and micro regions in the Americas.

[9] The Monroe Doctrine, 1823 was articulated by President James Monroe and called for non-intervention in Latin America by European colonial powers and appointed the USA as a protector of the New World. The idea that the Latin America was under the USA's sphere of influence has been traced back to the Monroe doctrine by several scholars.

[10] Gran Colombia comprised the present states of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

either to stabilize the new states or to act as an effective counterweight to an increasingly powerful north" (Fawcett, 2005:30). Though the project of integration did not take off, the ideational rivalry between 'Monroeism' and 'Bolivarianism' was cemented, aided and abetted by the United States' policy actions under the umbrella of 'Manifest Destiny'. As Bolivar himself put it, "United States seems destined to plague America with torments in the shape of freedom" (Bolivar, 1829). Despite the failure of the Congress of Panama, the vision of Bolivar has been a much revered cultural influence in Latin America. It was repeatedly echoed in the writings of various authors of the region, especially to reassert their autonomy in the face of an increasingly hegemonic neighbour.

The next important ideational construct to hit regionalism in the Americas was the idea of hemispheric regionalism. The idea of 'inter-Americanism' came to life in 1889 when the First International Conference of American States was held in Washington. It was at this conference when the US formally stated that it shared a 'special relationship' with Latin America. Under the umbrella of Pan-Americanism, the US advanced an economic and security rationale that Latin America found itself accepting. Pan-Americanism and its conceptualisation of an integrated hemisphere left little room for indigenous Latin American efforts towards intra-regionalism. As Mace and Migneault (2011) put it – "In addition to the focus on commercial matters, the main observation concerning the 1889 Conference is that it not only created a region-wide system of cooperation but that, in so doing, it prevented the establishment of a concurrent Latin American system, thereby securing the US's role as hegemon" (Mace and Migneault, 2011: 161). The conferences that followed established a variety of institutions but the unilateral and heavy handed policies of the USA (such as the occupation of Cuba under the Platt Amendment in 1901, the severance of Panama from Colombia in 1903 and the Roosevelt Corollary [11]in 1904) did not create the sense of regional unity that mainstream literature envisages as a follow up of increasing institutionalisation – "… although the inter-American system had institutions, these were unsatisfactory to the Latin Americans, who were beginning to

[11] The Roosevelt Corollary, 1904 was an addition to the Monroe Doctrine and was articulated by US President Theodore Roosevelt. This was a part of Roosevelt's Big Stick Diplomacy and through the use of the same, the US justified interventions in Latin American affairs and an exercise of its 'international policing power.'

demand changes" (Connell-Smith 1966, 54). By 1910, the Pan-American Union had been established. The Pan American Union became a political forum for discussion of matters on peace and trade (Mace and Migneaulti, 2011:161) but there was increasing dissatisfaction with the US and much criticism of the country in Latin American literature. With the exception of Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 articulation of the 'Good Neighbour Policy' [12] important only due to the fact that Latin American resentment produced a policy change in the United States, "Pan-Americanism had not achieved a great deal" (Connell-Smith 1974, 127) in terms of the regional project.

With the end of the two World Wars and the Great Depression, inter-American regionalism was reformulated and redressed when the Rio Treaty [13]was signed in 1947 soon to be followed in 1948 by the Ninth Conference of American States where the Pan American Union was transformed into the Organization of American States (OAS). In the context of the Cold War, the OAS became an important foreign policy tool for the US to contain communism. The OAS however "was based on a historical compromise between the Latin American countries and the US." (Mace and Migneault, 2011:162); the expectations and understanding of the new regional mechanism were also vastly different for the two regions – "[f]rom the Latin American viewpoint, the OAS was supposed to be a shield against US hegemony, whereas for the United States the organisation was perceived as a vehicle for its foreign policy interests" (Thérien, Fortmann, and Gosselin 1996, 232). With the signing of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the idea of hemispheric regionalism was formalized in a binding agreement. [14]

While the OAS was an effective enunciation of what Mace has called 'executive sovereignty' and established in the next few years several important inter-regional mechanisms like the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959, it had little effect on the nature of the relationship between Latin America and the United States – this

[12] The Good Neighbour Policy, 1932 was articulated by President Franklin D Roosevelt and the main principle of the same was non-interference and non-intervention by the USA in the affairs of Latin American states.
[13] The Rio Treaty or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance outlined a collective security regime in the post war world, where conflict had become global.
[14] The other important event at this conference was the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, an agreement often called the world's first general human rights agreement.

relationship remained one marked by a severe asymmetry of power – " the establishment of the OAS did not necessarily modify the relations between the US and its Latin American counterparts, although it certainly institutionalised them" (Mace and Migneault, 2011:163).

The most important event yet in the history of intra-regionalism in Latin America was the establishment of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL [15]in Spanish) in 1948. The purpose of ECLA was to contribute towards the economic development of Latin America and over the years, its scope has widened to include social development as its objective as well. The most important contribution of ECLA was the idea that a state-led, protectionist model of development could be institutionalised in Latin America to promote industrialisation and modernisation, while protecting it from the eroding pressures of the global free market economic system. Scholars like Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado advanced a state led model of economic development in the form of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI). The ISI model demanded further expansion of industrialization process beyond national borders and its deepening beyond the first stage of manufacturing consumer goods. In order to succeed, ISI had to grow to the stage of production of intermediate and capital goods; and this required more capital, technology and larger markets. Regional markets were preferable to national markets and under this economic rationale, ISI launched an era of state protectionism and regulations and public sector and nation building. The regional level became an instrument to ensure national stability. The 1960s consequently saw the birth of several Latin efforts towards regionalism including the Latin American Free Trade Association [16](LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the signing

[15] ECLA in 1984 included the Caribbean countries into its fold and transformed to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC).
[16] LAFTA was created in 1960 by the signing of the Treaty of Montevideo by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The idea was to form a common market and implement reduced tariffs between member countries.
CACM was established by the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration signed by Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1960. Costa Rica joined in 1962. The aim remained to foster economic development through establishing a free trade area.
The Andean Pact was signed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru. Chile became a member but later withdrew its membership in 1976 claiming economic incompatibilities.
The Caribbean Community was formed in 1973 by the English speaking member states of the Caribbean to promote economic cooperation among members and to coordinate foreign policy endeavors, while ensuring just and equitable distribution of resources among members.

of the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community, which were all instruments and products of the ISI mindset. The economic rationale was used by scholars like Prebisch and Furtado to explain the underdevelopment in Latin America and a regional economic rationale in the form of ISI was used by the populist governments to launch a valiant effort towards attaining regional autonomy. It was intra-regionalism that won over inter-regionalism [17]in this instance at least.

The 1960s were also home to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The revolution in Cuba in 1959 had already sent the United States into a flurry of diplomatic activity and the OAS consequently suspended Cuba in 1962. The Cuban Missile crisis ensured that national security concerns trumped efforts at regionalism for the US. The OAS lost much of its legitimacy in the ensuing years [18]as it was perceived as a mere tool in the hands of the United States government. The OAS, under the aegis of the US supported several right wing authoritarian governments in Latin America and this in turn did not help the negative perception about its efficacy and unbiasedness in the region. The 1970s in Latin America saw the rise of several authoritarian military regimes and hemispheric regional efforts were put on the back burner for the most part. As Mace and Migneault put it – "Thus the logic of power prevailed over the principles of international law for US authorities. Distrust toward the US led to a loss of consensus that, in turn, engendered a paralysis of the inter-American system" (Mace and Migneault, 2011:163).

The 1980s were an important decade for Latin American regionalism, especially in view of the present form it has taken. The authoritarian era was slowly coming to a

[17] The flurry of regional arrangements within Latin America led to yet another policy change in the US. President Kennedy announce the Alliance for Progress in 1961 which envisaged greater economic cooperation between Latin America and the United States. Operation Bootstrap was an important consequence of the same, where the US colluded with the government of Puerto Rico to revitalise Puerto Rican economy.

[18] The period between 1960-1985 has been marked by Latin American disinterest in the OAS. Carolyn Shaw has explained the same as follows – "Latin American disinterest toward the OAS during this period can be explained by three main reasons. First, by acting outside the hemispheric regional architecture, countries could bypass the formal binding procedures of the OAS that greatly slowed negotiations, thereby gaining more flexibility. Second, some states believed that the OAS could too easily be controlled by the US through direct and/or indirect pressure, which rendered negotiations worthless. Third, and surprisingly, the US was also hesitant to use the OAS as a negotiation forum because it feared an anti-American sentiment and lack of support from Latin American states (Shaw 2004, 86)."

close with a number of states slowly transitioning to democracy by the middle of the decade. The United States under President Raegan was a more vocal neighbour and the ensuing debt crisis was the last nail in the coffin of the ISI model. A democratic Brazil began the uphill climb to cement its role as a regional player of great import by the initiation of the process of the Southern Common Market or MERCOSUR. The first step towards this was the transformation of LAFTA into the Latin American Integration Association in 1980. ALADI identified its purpose as to be a driver of socio-economic development with the ultimate goal of establishing a common market. With the background of ALADI, there were also several diplomatic agreements signed between Argentina and Brazil that eventually led to the formation of MERCOSUR in 1991. There was also for the first time, a formal institutionalised response to the interventionist United States was formulated in the region in the form of the Contadora Group that met for the first time in 1983[19]. The Contadora group espoused support for democratization, economic development, regional security and the creation and maintenance of regional peace. However, it also prohibited unilateral action by the United States and was thus not recognised by the same. The idea of Latin American solutions to Latin American problems is a legacy of the Contadora group. This attempt towards formally defining the need for regional autonomy found favour with other states in the region culminating in the formation of the Contadora Support Group [20]in 1985. The two organisations together in 1986 formed the Rio Group. The Rio Group was seen by many as an alternative to the OAS. While there was little to no institutional structure, the Rio Group started a summit culture in Latin America which was exclusively open to only member states. As Andrew Hurrell explains – "The first wave [of regionalism] was essentially political in nature. The regional attempts to secure peace in Central America through the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group were examples of this, as were moves towards increased political consultation and coordination in such forums as the Group of Eight and its successor, the Rio Group, and the improvement in the political relationship

[19]Contadora group was formed by Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Panama. It was a response to what scholars have called the '11 year Central American Crisis'.
[20] Contadora Support Group was formed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. The 1982 conflict between Argentina and the UK over Falkland Island was an important catalyst. This conflict saw the blatant disregard by the US for the norms laid under the Rio Treaty.

between Brazil and Argentina from I980 and particularly from I985." (Hurrell, 1992:132)

It is with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent liberalization and transition to democracy in Latin America that the character of regionalism effectively changed in Latin America. The crippling effects of the debt crisis and the international norms enforced on the region made liberalization the only available option. 'Open Regionalism' [21]therefore, was both a response to the World Bank conditionalities imposed on Latin America for debt restructuring as well as what Hurrell (1992:134) has called 'a fear of marginalization' in US trade markets due to the newly independent East European states. The end of the Cold War also marked the phase where the US embraced regionalism as a valid foreign policy activity as opposed to its earlier treatment of the phenomenon as a safety measure and subsequently pushed hard for the acceptance of the principles of the Washington Consensus. The 'Enterprise for the Americas' speech by President Bush in 1990 proposed the most ambitious articulation yet of the project of hemispheric regionalism – the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) "that creates incentives to reinforce Latin America's growing recognition that free-market reform is the key to sustained growth and political stability" (Bush, 1990). While 'trade not aid' was the mantra of this initiative, the US did stress on important issues to Latin America namely debt restructuring, greater foreign investment and the need for protection of the environment. US policy had definitely taken a regionalist turn and it had consequently employed new variables into its old national security agenda. The first instantiation of this renewed project of hemispheric regionalism was NAFTA. Negotiations that had begun in the Raegan administration with Mexico had finally led to the formation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) comprising the US, Canada and Mexico, and came into force in 1994.

The creation of NAFTA and the consequent processes of liberalization led to a flurry of Free Trade Area agreements (FTA) being signed between Latin American

[21] Open Regionalism is not necessarily concomitant with what theorists of the New Regionalism Approach have called 'new regionalism.' Open Regionalism in Latin America "was based in regional trade agreements with low external tariffs and trade barriers and broad intra-group liberalization, aimed to give markets a bigger role in promoting efficiency and international competitiveness" (Sanahuja, 2012:11).

Countries and the United States. The 1990s also saw the revitalization of old trade blocs as well as creation of important new integration mechanisms. MERCOSUR came into being in 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion and included Uruguay and Paraguay into what had been a culmination of the diplomatic endeavours of a decade between Argentina and Brazil. Further negotiations led to the proposal of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 1993 which in 2000 led to the creation of the South American Community of Nations (CASA/CSN); The Central American Common Market countries formed the Central American Integration System (SICA) in 1993; The Andean Pact was transformed to the Andean Community (CAN) in 1996; Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela formed the Group of 3 (G-3) in 1995. Hurrell's formulation that regionalism in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century was necessarily focused on "proposals for economic cooperation and integration" (Hurrell, 1992:132) is quite apt.

The plethora of free trade area agreements [22]between Latin American States like Colombia, Chile and Peru and the United States however, complicated the character and purpose of several regional initiatives which had been designed to be an expression of the Latin American search for autonomy. Sanahuja (2012) has called attention to the ability of trade negotiations to 'disperse' regional integration intent. Venezuela officially left the Andean Community in 2006 as a mark of protest when Chile signed a free trade area agreement with the US in 2005. It also redacted its membership from the G-3. The old rhetoric was difficult to reconcile with the present international and regional reality and Venezuela under the leadership of Hugo Chávez called for the establishment of 'Our America' which eventually led to the formation of the Bolivarian Alliance of Our America (ALBA) in 2004.

The attacks on 9/11 marked yet another policy change in the United States. The 'benign hegemon' of the Clinton years was to be no more. Scholars have often called the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 as defining the 'unipolar moment' for

[22] Several Latin American countries signed FTAs with the United States in the years following NAFTA. These include - the Chile-USA FTA in 2004, the Dominican Republic- Central America-USA FTA (or CAFTA-DR) in 2005 (includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic), the Peru -USA Trade Promotion Agreement in 2007, the Colombia – USA FTA in 2012 and the Panama – USA Trade Promotion Agreement: 2012

United States foreign policy. With the agenda of the 'global war on terror', Central American states and the Caribbean were officially understood as part of the US 'sphere of influence'. Against a hegemon that no longer wished to remain benign and the rise of charismatic leaders like Chávez, as well as the rise of several leaders who were sympathetic to the ideas of socialism (and consequently promoted a developmental agenda) like President Lula de Silva of Brazil, Nestor Kirchner of Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia along with the dissatisfaction with the US position on intellectual property rights and the issue of agricultural subsidies in WTO negotiations, eventually culminated in the demise of the FTAA negotiations in 2005.

The success of MERCOSUR and a result of the deliberations and discussions held during the negotiations for FTAA provided confidence to the regionalist enterprise in Latin America. Combined with the developmental agenda as mentioned above, the state has been brought back into regional integration in Latin America and there was a definite movement towards post-liberalism. This new wave of regionalism has often been called 'post-liberal regionalism.' Led by Venezuela, the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America or ALBA came into being in 2004 and was posited by the member states as an alternative to the OAS. In 2008, CSN was transformed to the Union of South American Nations or UNASUR and the organization united the whole of South America into one regional organization. Finally, in 2011 the Rio Group was transformed and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) came into being. Several scholars have argued that the absence of the United States and Canada in these organisations could potentially "diminish the role of the present regional system of the OAS or possibly even replace it" (Grabendorff, 2010:110). Intra-regionalism in Latin America seems to have edged out inter-regionalism between the Americas as of now.

New and exciting processes are afoot in Latin America. Before a categorical analysis is done of the same, it is important to recognize the trends and patterns in regionalism in Latin America. The next subsection discusses some of these trends.

Trends in Regionalism in Latin America

Regionalism in Latin America as has already been established in the previous section is a historical process. There are certain trends in the nearly two centuries worth history of regionalism in Latin America which recur and are reinterpreted by the states within the region. The same are outlined below.

There is an ideational opposition between '*Bolivarismo and Monroismo.'* While both may be understood as ideational influences, the more important aspect of this dichotomy is their function as regional integration ordering principles. Further, an increased intensity in hemispheric attempts towards integration has a counter effect on intra-regional efforts in Latin America. Though both principles coexist, the trajectory of regional integration mechanisms shows that concerted efforts towards hemispheric regionalism produce an opposite reaction in terms of intra-regional efforts in Latin America. Increased activity in hemispheric regionalism is followed by a period of stagnation which forms the bedrock of intra-regional agreements within Latin America. Thus Latin American regionalism validates the fact that 'all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested.' (Hettne, 2005:554) This is further proved by the dual trends in US foreign policy towards Latin America reverting between isolationism and interventionism.

The movement in regional integration in Latin America has been from 'old' inward looking protectionist regionalism, to 'open' regionalism which reconfigured the old modernisation agenda and advocated increased liberalisation and finally to post-liberal regionalism which offers a critique of the practices of neoliberalism and marks a vehement return of the state. Despite this movement, there are no clear breaks in regional integration in Latin America as regionalism here is characterised by the constant evolution of the past into present, context specific formulations. Therefore, the several mainstream theoretical accounts that conclude that a particular Latin American regional project has failed are often fallacious. Old regional integration mechanisms are constantly being transformed into newer arrangements to suit new challenges. As Hettne explains (2005:548) "since regionalism is a political project, created by human actors, it may, just like a nation-state project, fail"; but this 'failure' adds to the repertoire of knowledge and customs which inform the next effort of

regionalism. Regionalism in Latin America therefore, is a representation of a historical past.

In light of this mutation, regionalism in Latin America definitely rejects the constrains of the 'old' and 'new' timelines devised to distinguish between regional projects. Guided by cultural and socio political motivations, regionalism in Latin America is simultaneously contemporary and historical, emblematic of a multiplicity of interests. Söderbaum and van Langenhove have put forward the idea of 'generations' of regionalism which understands different strands of regionalism as co-existing and overlapping. The present forms of regional integration in Latin America then necessarily represents the third generation of regionalism, with an acceptance of the co-existence of multiple formats of regionalism in the region.

Finally, the purpose for regionalism in Latin America is informed by the concerns of autonomy (both regional and international), development, domestic stability, and a product of the context of its civilizational past. The modes and methods of the United States have ensured that Latin America has constantly struggled to define its identity. In light of the changing identities of the various sub regions in Latin America, it is quite remarkable the intensity with which regionalism has persisted in Latin America. This persistence underlines the fact that regional integration in Latin America is a form of diplomacy, not merely in its efforts to navigate the uneasy reality of existing in the neighbourhood of a global hegemon but also as a method to reconcile its colonial past and its rich ideational traditions with its geopolitical context.

The third wave of regionalism in Latin America, represented by ALBA, CELAC and UNASUR is emblematic of this cultural shift in regionalism in Latin America. All three have responded to the developments in hemispheric regionalism, all have displayed a certain level of reformulation of the past and all have attempted to define a more a plural agenda for regionalism. The next section discusses the three organizations in detail to discover the new agenda for regionalism in Latin America.

A STUDY OF ALBA, UNASUR AND CELAC

Latin American regionalism has taken an intra-regional and developmentalist turn. The recent initiatives have also explored an interesting combination of states with a focus on pan-regionalism. ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC are unique in their articulation of plural ontologies for the project of regionalism in the region.

This section offers a detailed analysis of the formation, the processes and initiatives undertaken by the regional integration mechanisms of ALBA, UNASUR AND CELAC and situates them in their historical context as well as in the present international system in order to identify the present concerns of the region.

ALBA: Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America[23]

An analysis of ALBA is also primarily an analysis of the rhetoric and foreign policy choices of Hugo Chávez. Chávez came to power in 1999 and as early as 2000, he had articulated the idea of a 'Bolivarian alternative.[24]' Situated amidst a highly volatile rhetoric against the FTAA negotiations , which Chávez called an "annexation plan" the United States had laid out for Latin America, the proposal of ALBA was guided by the motivation to uniquely differentiate it from previous regional efforts, especially from the format that 'open regionalism' [25]had taken: ALBA therefore was conceptualised as a mechanism to promote 'horizontal' development – "… we fully agree that the ALBA will not become a reality under mercantilist criteria or based upon the selfish interests of private profit; or for one nations benefit at the expense of the others…" (Castro and Chávez, 2004). While the desire to distinguish itself was

[23] ALBA originally stood for the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America. The name was changed to its present form in 2009.
[24] The idea of a 'Bolivarian alternative' was first articulated by Chávez at the Association of Caribbean States Summit, Isla Margarita (Venezuela), on 10 December 2001.

[25] Open Regionalism is different from new regionalism in that - "Open Regionalism demands a comprehensive framework of institutions and public policies in the realm of R&D, infrastructure, and market regulation to encourage technological change and to increase productivity and competitiveness in front of the globalization process" (CEPAL 1994)

paramount in ALBA, this difference it so wished to articulate was firmly situated in the grand ideas of the past.

The socialist leanings of Chávez made him a much reviled personality in United States literature. His anti-American and anti-neoliberal stand did not help of course. This has negatively affected the scholarship on ALBA, with prejudiced accounts stemming from both sides. The years preceding the formation of ALBA were marked by the strong stand that Venezuela (ergo Chávez) took on the need for a redefinition of development as well as the need for an autonomous regional union, for the present regional integration efforts were 'no system of integration' (Chávez, 2000). This reopening of the discussion on regionalism included but is not limited to "LAC[26] leadership exercised by the G-3; Venezuela's full membership in MERCOSUR; geographical extension of the 1980 San José Agreement[27], through which Mexico and Venezuela supply eleven Central American/Caribbean countries with 160,000 barrels of oil and derivatives per day under a cooperative financing scheme, accompanied by the creation of a 'University of the Caribbean'; a 'Petroamérica' project, envisaged to integrate the leading oil producers Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, alongside 'Telesur' and a 'University of the South'; a political, social and military 'Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean States'; a 'Latin American Monetary Fund' and a 'Bank of the South', discussed both at Andean Community and MERCOSUR summits; and a Social Charter of the Americas within the Organisation of American States" (Muhr, 2011:103).

Despite this vociferous enunciation of a new regional agenda which would effectively create a regional integration mechanism that went beyond the economic rationale and would include the cultural and political dimensions of development (Muhr, 2011), the neoliberal wave of the 1990s continued to cause economic convergence within the

[26] LAC refers to Latin American and Caribbean countries.
[27] San Jose Agreement (1980): an agreement between Mexico and Venezuela whereby they would jointly supply up to 160,000 b/d of oil to the five Central American nations, plus Panama, Jamaica, Barbados and the Dominican Republic. Under these, 30% of bills would be converted into 5-year, 4% loans, which could be extended to 20-year, 2% loans if the savings were invested in energy and economic development projects. Venezuela gained from this deal as it was considerably less than the commitment it had made under the Puerto Ordaz agreement. It was hoped that this agreement would provide regional stability. (Chamberlain and Gunson, 1991:322)

hemisphere with the signing of several Free Trade Area and Trade Promotion agreements.

Venezuelan resistance to this continuing deepening of neoliberal precepts in Latin America was expressed in the adoption of the Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement in 2000 between Venezuela and most of the members of CARICOM. Venezuela withdrew from the G-3 group as well as the Andean Community in 2006, citing the free trade area agreements signed by Chile with the United States as a major reason for said withdrawal. Venezuela applied for membership to MERCOSUR in the same year, and as Muhr puts it, "these events occurred within the foreign policy objective of re-defining the neoliberal bloc" (Muhr, 2011: 103).

The formation of ALBA is credited to the signing of the Cuba-Venezuela agreement in 2004. This was the first instantiation of the idea of 'cooperative advantage.' As opposed to general economic theory which perpetuates trade on the principles of 'comparative advantage' [28](Ricardo), the idea of cooperative advantage explained that through cooperation, states could effectively solve important issues without entrenching their economies in the traditional patterns of dependency[29]. The agreement entailed the exchange of medical and educational resources and petroleum between the two countries.

By 2006, Bolivia joined the ALBA Peoples' Trade Agreement (ALBA-TCP), followed by Nicaragua in 2007 and Ecuador in 2009. Honduras joined in 2008 but due to a coup withdrew its membership later. As of now, including the Caribbean nations of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint

[28] As opposed to the idea of 'absolute advantage' which was the basis of economic theorization by Adam Smith and explained that countries should produce what they are best suited to produce and such a model of production allows them to negotiate the best trade possible. David Ricardo offered the idea of 'comparative advantage' which basically entailed the idea that "each country should produce not just what it has an absolute advantage in making, but what it is *most* best at, or even least worst at, i.e. what it has a *comparative* advantage in producing"

[29] The Dependency Theoretical School was necessarily writing in response to Modernization theories. Dependistas like Raul Prebisch, Celso Furtado and Andre Gunder Frank (among several others) have identified the core observation that trade as defined by classical theories of Economics is problematized by the technological development and the degree to which a state has modernized. The most important idea was that development and dependency are both historical, where the 'developed core' has caused the 'underdevelopment' of the periphery, and in the 'world capitalist system' the system of relations is such that underdevelopment of a state is perpetuated be its dependent relationship with the developed core.

Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, ALBA has eleven member states. Muhr explains – "to date the initiative has attracted the less developed economies in the area, that seek to transform their productive structure from the primary sector into a secondary sector" (Muhr, 2011: 105). ALBA-TCP attempts to "replace the locational advantage with cooperative advantage" (Muhr, 2011: 105) by following a geopolitical, socioeconomic approach based on the idea of 'endogenous development.'

Endogenous development is by definition, in opposition to neoliberal images of development which conceptualise a reticent and reduced role for the state. It necessarily implies a format of development that "takes a country's own developmental potential and productive resources (capital, labour, natural resources, technology, knowledge and skills) as the basis for a long-term, strategic orientation towards specific domestic and foreign markets" (Sunkel 1993). Muhr has explained the reconceptualization of endogenous development as affected by ALBA, especially in its ideological background of *Bolivarismo*. ALBA enforces a globalist approach on the nationalist basis for the theoretical concept of endogenous development along the lines of – "the idea of the community transcending the local towards the national, regional and global" (MINCI 2008). Muhr explicates this process in an extremely succinct manner- "Seeking to balance out the socio-spatial inequalities (uneven development) produced by capitalism, Bolivarian endogenous development counters neoliberal, deregulatory state reform and curbs the mono- and oligopolistic power of multi- and transnational corporations" (Muhr, 2011).

A comparison may be drawn between the concept of Bolivarian endogenous development and the ISI model of development of the 1960s. The difference however, remains in the global outlook of the former along with the employment of a plural agenda for development, not limited to industrialization - " Moreover, in contrast to ISI, which discriminated against the agricultural sector generally, and against small and medium-size producers in particular as resources were directed towards large-scale domestic and foreign-owned capitalist enterprises, Bolivarian endogenous development seeks to resuscitate production for food sovereignty and security by supporting small and medium-size farmers" (Muhr, 2011:106). An additional component of this restructuring is the acknowledgement in most of ALBA literature

that while the states needs to be brought back in, a differentiated approach must be followed as "it recognizes the diversity of its members" Consequently the membership criteria is open and requires neither the universal removal of protective barriers, tariffs or subsidies nor compulsory adherence to ALBA programs as criteria for membership.

The principles of ALBA-led development therefore, envisage the construction of "an alternative political economy" where MNCs are replaced by Grand National Enterprises (GNEs) – "By drawing on Simón Bolivar's vision of a 'Grand Homeland' (Patria Grande) , GNEs are the counter-hegemonic responses to capitalist MNCs/TNCs in the creation of a regional needs-based social and popular economy oriented towards the production of use value, i.e. goods and services that satisfy basic human needs, by creating production chains and networks that integrate state, private (e.g. cooperatives) and social (e.g. community-owned) forms of organisation, including small and medium sized enterprises and direct social property enterprises (DSPEs)." (Muhr, 2011:106) The ALBA Bank was created as an instantiation of this desire to reformulate political economy in 2008. The purpose has been defined of the same as to channel money to development projects within the region as well as to reduce the historic dependency of the region on international financial institutions. The creation and adoption of SUCRE (Unified System of Regional Cooperation) in 2009 was a further elaboration of the same idea.

This grand project has been supported by the creation of important regional projects like – PetroCaribe and PETROSUR. PetroCaribe was a product of the Caracas Energy Agreement and was launched in 2005; PETROSUR is an intergovernmental alliance between the state owned petroleum companies of Venezuela (PDVSA[30]), Argentina (YPF) and Brazil (PetroBras); These initiatives are defined by their focus on social welfare as well as ensuring funding for the same. [31]

ALBA has also launched several social welfare and cultural programmes. Called 'Grand National Projects', these are joint projects between two or more states. These

[30] PDVSA stands *Petróleos de Venezuela* and YPF stands for *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales* (Fiscal Oilfields).
[31] PetroCaribe Fund is one such funding organization.

state run undertakings are operated by state-to-state Grand National Companies (GNCs[32]) (Hirst, 2011). Some of these are - the education program launched with the support of Cuba's "Yes We Can" literacy program. This initiative has helped reduce illiteracy across the region. Nicaragua has implemented the *Programa Hambre Cero* or the Zero Hunger Program to reduce global acute malnutrition by up to 4 percent. TELESUR, a cultural initiative undertaken by Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua was launched in 2005 and is essentially a news network for ALBA nations. ALBA has also undertaken several cultural programs in the forms of literary fairs, fellowships, literature prizes, movie showings, and starting from 2005, instituted the ALBA Games with the event occurring every two years. ALBA health has facilitated millions of consultations, operations and visits by Cuba-trained community health workers. As Hirst puts it, a little diminutively, to explain the relationship between the petroleum capital of Venezuela and the services sector of Cuba, "President Chávez uses Venezuela's windfall oil profits to fund these projects and significant logistical support and knowhow for the implementation of the ALBA infrastructure comes from the well trained agents of the Cuban government" (Hirst, 2011).

ALBA has been an extremely vigilant and active political participant as well and Hirst has called it "extraordinarily active" in the diplomatic sphere. There has been a flurry of diplomatic activity with several 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary summits' being held regularly. Further, these summits have allowed the members to form a cohesive position on issues in international institutions which has allowed them "to assume marginal political control over the Organization of American States (OAS)" (Hirst, 2011).

ALBA has also addressed traditional concerns of regional security. Members have voiced their support for states demanding the removal of American military bases from their territories; Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have also refused to cooperate with the narco policing efforts of the USA; further, a defence pact was also negotiated in 2007 where the idea of a Regional Defence School was put forward. (Hirst, 2011)

[32] Like the Grand National Enterprises were created in opposition to Multi National Enterprises, the Grand National Companies were formed in opposition to Trans National Companies. (Hirst, 2011).

The institutional structure of ALBA comprising the Social Council, Economic Council, Political Council and Social Movements Council working under the aegis of the ALBA-TCP Presidential Council have therefore displayed their synchrony. With the death of Hugo Chávez there were concerns raised about the possibility of ALBA's survival. It has however, proved to be a tenacious expression of regionalism with a very vehement ideological agenda and an active praxis of integrationist endeavours.

UNASUR: Union of South American Nations

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has been called "by far the most ambitious" of the new wave of regional organizations in Latin America (Mosing, 2012:163). It represents not only an organization that is truly continental in nature, it is also emblematic of an expression of an evolved South American identity, in its celebration of different colonial pasts and a consequent movement away from Ibero-Americanism. The geographical identity of South America has evolved as a meta category in UNASUR, capable of embracing different colonial and cultural pasts into an elaboration of the South American identity. As Sanahuja (2012:08) puts it – "traditional unionism and aspirations of Latin American regional integration are redefined in a South American geographic and ideational framework in UNASUR."

UNASUR officially came to be in 2008 with the signing of the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty. It was however, a reformulation of the South American Community of Nations (CSN) which had been established in 2004. The formation of UNASUR has an interesting and extensive history which can be traced as far back as 1993, when Brazil proposed the creation of the South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Negotiations for SAFTA took a long and lengthy road when eventually, at the First South American Summit in 2000, the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) was launched. IIRSA was an enunciation of the convergence movement between the two major trading blocs in South America – CAN and Mercosur, as well as Chile which had renounced its membership of the Andean Pact in 1976. It was at this summit when Suriname and Guyana, nations traditionally affiliated with the CARICOM as opposed to the rest of

the Ibero-American nations of South America, joined the process towards building a geographically whole South American regional integration mechanism. The SAFTA process was therefore, termed the 'backbone' of South America (Sanahuja, 2012: 17). IIRSA was followed by CSN which in 2008 morphed into UNASUR.

While the trajectory of UNASUR points squarely to CSN, there is a wide difference in terms of the scope identified for the organization in 2004 and 2008. In 2004, the coordination in the region was necessarily affected by nationalist rationales for each of the members – Brazil viewed the organization as both an answer to its economic and domestic concerns of the availability of larger markets as well as an opportunity to cement its role as a regional power; Venezuela viewed the same as a new market for its energy products as well as an attempt to advance Chávez's project of Bolivarianism; Chile and Bolivia hoped to reconcile the increasing tensions between their nations as well as a means to achieve energy security for Chile and larger markets and a platform for Evo Morales' governmental project of social change for Bolivia; Colombia hoped to reduce its dependency on the United States and Peru identified greater economic benefits to be accrued from larger markets; states like Uruguay, Paraguay and Ecuador hoped to correct the asymmetries of their interactions with Mercosur. The most important rationale for the acceptance of CSN ultimately was the economic one with the 'low demands and flexibility in terms of trade and development' as well as an inclusive agenda which did not discriminate between states on the basis of their choice of economic strategy – ""in fact, CSN could be considered the lowest common denominator of the Summit's diplomacy (Sanahuja, 2012: 20). The CSN represented a method to utilize the 'trade achievements' of nearly two decades of trade-based integration between the CAN and Mercosur. The 'proliferation of free trade agreements' in the hemisphere underlined the need for a mechanism which could ensure speedy and simplified trading. This emphasis on economics was a product of the processes of Open Regionalism. With the shift towards post-liberal regionalism, the purposes outlined in 2008 were more heavily situated in the political, social, defence and security realm.

While the outlining of an increased regional role in the polities of both Brazil and Venezuela greatly assisted the regional endeavour in Latin America and thereby the development of UNASUR, the two represent two different ideologies even when they

agree on the importance of developing 'inclusive development policies.' The ALBA nations are opposed to the Mercosur and CAN which 'they see as a product of neoliberalism.' Their vision for UNASUR is necessarily as an alternative to neoliberalism. Brazil and the other members see Mercosur and CAN as processes which can be situated 'under the umbrella' of UNASUR (Sanahuja, 2012:19). The economic rationale though 'seems lost' in the organization's principle, underlining that UNASUR's role was envisaged ultimately to be beyond trade and can 'be better described as an organization of political cooperation' (Sanahuja, 2012:20). While this reduced economic role seems paradoxical in light of the fact that the organisation originated from the negotiations of a Free Trade Area, it is clearly emblematic of the persistence of regionalism and validates the idea that South America is desirous, like the rest of the region, to form a cohesive regional organisation.

The institutional structure in UNASUR has often been called paltry and this has been used as a method to discredit its ability in terms of being able to provide a stable political regional organisation (Mosing, 2012). The institutional structure consists of a Council of Heads of State and Government, the most senior committee in UNASUR's structure and is designed to establish the political links, action plans, and programs needed for South American integration. The executives of each member country in UNASUR serve together on the Council. Collectively they make decisions about the proposals submitted by UNASUR's minister-level councils. A post of a President *Pro Tempore* has been created and his duties entail representing UNASUR at international forums and events, to be nominated annually. The executive body of UNASUR is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a group composed of foreign ministers from UNASUR member countries, and is responsible for implementing the decisions made by the Council of Heads of State. The ministers who serve on the Council work together to coordinate policies on the key areas of South American integration. They also create task groups to focus on specific policy areas. A Council of Delegates that is composed of the representatives from each country implements and adopts the resolutions reached by the other two councils. It is also responsible for promoting public dialogue to help maximize citizen participation in the process of South American integration. The Secretary General, who is elected for a two-year term completes the organizational structure of UNASUR. The Treaty also provided for the establishment of ministerial councils and the most important of these is the Council of

South American Defence established in 2008. The Treaty of UNASUR also provided the possibility of creation of a Parliament though the same has not been formed yet (Flannery, 2012). In light of such active institutionalisation, it hardly seems correct to label UNASUR as a mere instantiation of 'regional rhetoric.'

The renewed focus on presidentialism in post-liberal regionalism is represented in the organizational structure of UNASUR. Further, the members had stated at the very commencement of the organization the dangers of an inflated bureaucracy which consequently explains the streamlined institutional structure of the same. Whether institutionalisation has been entrenched or not, UNASUR has effected several important measures like the creation of the South American Council of Defence, South American Institute of Government in Health and the proposal for the creation of the Bank of South in 2009. Both measures, much like the initiatives under ALBA, are an attempt to reduce South American dependence on the US for conflict resolution, the dependence on international financial institutions and to promote an agenda for social welfare in line with the goals of UNASUR, specifically for instance, to ensure "…social and human development with equity and inclusion in order to eradicate poverty and overcome inequalities in the region." The other important endeavour towards defining regional autonomy has been the creation of the Electoral Council in 2012 that is composed of four representatives from each member country. The council is tasked with visiting countries before elections, communicating with candidates, parties, and monitoring the election process. The Electoral Council and the electoral monitors it appoints have been a deliberate attempt to replace those appointed by the OAS. The Electoral Council oversaw the Venezuelan elections in 2012.

Further, UNASUR has bolstered its international profile by participating in regular Summits with other regional organisations like the African Union and the Arab League. In 2011, UNASUR was granted observer status at the UN General Assembly, barely three years after its creation. These processes, Sanahuja suggests, "have attempted to increase South America's international stance within a multi-polar system and to speed up South-South trade relations" (Sanahuja, 2012: 21).

The most important activity undertaken yet has been UNASUR's role in the resolution of conflicts within the region in order to – "Strengthen political dialogue between Member States in order to reinforce the South American integration." The first crisis under its purview was the 2008 Bolivarian crisis when a conflict ensued after the referendum victory of Morales. A *mesa* ('discussion table') was organized by UNASUR comprising the heads of member states and the crisis was duly resolved, a product of the legality bestowed on UNASUR by the Treaty of UNASUR which effectively makes its decisions and agreements binding. This event marks the replacement of the OAS as 'the protector of democracy' by UNASUR. There has been much criticism of the composition of the *mesa* and scholars like Mosing have suggested that UNASUR is an attempt not towards deepening integration, but a tool to add legitimacy to state leaders – "In any case, UNASUR's very presence indicates a growing political will throughout South America to distance the US from regional affairs, as well as the US' waning hegemonic influence in the continent. However, in displacing Washington from regional governance, the organization has delivered more domestic authority to the presidents of member states, who have driven the process of integration from the beginning" (Mosing, 2012:165). UNASUR effectively mediated several others crises, including a conflict between Colombia and Ecuador in 2008, of which, the New York Times said – "the biggest winner appears to have been the region itself, which resolved its own dispute without outside help and without violence."

Regionalism as a state-led project is an idea inimical to theoretical conceptualisations of the phenomenon. UNASUR has gained added legitimacy which has been afforded to its functioning by virtue of creating space for separate sovereignties and with the ensuing force of this legitimacy, entered into agreements which define important national concerns, thereby ensuring support of the members for the same. Energy agreements, infrastructure agreements under IIRSA (the adoption of 'Agenda of Priority Integration Projects' in 2011), agreements in health and social welfare, agreement on matters of defence (South American Defence Council proposed by Brazil in 2008) are emblematic of a regional organization that has taken domestic concerns of sovereign states and used the same to ensure its functionality. The differences in the priorities and goals of its member states has created problems for the formalization proposals. As Tussie puts it, 'the interaction between the domestic

political economy and the regional economy is a two-way street with constantly intense traffic' (2009, 188).

Nevertheless, cooperation on matters of such a diverse range, has ultimately transformed UNASUR from a proposal for a Free Trade Area to an instantiation of South American identity – in the words of Ricardo Patina the foreign minister of Ecuador "the history of South America is no longer the same, it is a history of permanent engagement . . . I feel that we are a single country, a regional citizenship" (Prensa Web RNV/Prensa Latina, 2011).

CELAC: Community of Latin and American and Caribbean States

CELAC was formed in 2011 and there has been a lively debate around this organization which has effectively brought together the entire continent, with the exception of Canada and the United States. Throughout the history of regionalism, no regional arrangement with the exception of the OAS charter has been able to bring together so many nations under the aegis of one organisation. August (2012) calls it – "the most important regional occurrence in two centuries."

CELAC was formed, in the traditional Latin American fashion by the fusion of older regional integration enunciations – the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC). The Rio Group was formed in 1986 and was the first formalized and institutionalised expression of the resentment with the OAS and more importantly, the United States. The disenchantment with the OAS and a desire to replace the same seems the historical guiding principle of the organisation. As Ecuador's President Rafael Correa put it – "We need another system … where we discuss our problems in the region, not in Washington [headquarters of the OAS], where institutions that are removed from our vision, traditions, values and needs are not imposed on us… [such an organisation] can be much more effective than other instances to solve ourselves, with our own strengths, our own visions, our conflicts."

The ALBA countries of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador specifically, have been extremely vocal about the anti-OAS character of CELAC – "The Monroe Doctrine was imposed on us for two hundred years, now that is over" and CELAC therefore, would be a 'challenge to US interference' (Chávez, 2007). Echoing the same vein, Rafeal Correa, as part of his opening remarks during the first Summit of CELAC (2011) said, - "the Organization of American States, has been historically trapped by the interests and visions of the United States; and its accumulated bias and atavisms render said organization inefficient and unreliable for this new era our America is going through." The organisation for the ALBA countries therefore, is a tool to defeat 'imperialism' and allow for the fulfilment of Bolivar's historic vision of a united Latin America.

As a direct result of this deep seated resentment with the processes of the OAS, especially its insistence on the 'right' model for government and development, CELAC has attempted to embrace a wider and more nuanced understanding of democracy. The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter established "free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties" as a criterion for membership to the OAS. In opposition to this unilateralism, August (2012) has explained how the plural definition of democracy in the founding charter is itself an exercise in defining and defending Latin American autonomy– "…the thrust of CELAC's definition of democracy and constitutional order is to allow and protect the right of each of the 33 member states to establish its own constitutional order. Moreover, all CELAC members are obliged to defend their right against any attempt to disrupt a member state's respective system. There are no conditions or preconceived notions on what democracy is or should be" (August, 2012:3).

However, this anti-OAS stand can be overstated. While the character of the organisation was designed to facilitate the formation of a forum for regional dialogue, several members have been unwilling to align themselves with the ALBA brand of anti-Americanism. President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia, one of the states that has signed an FTA with the USA, said at the first Summit of CELAC- "This integration should not be shaped against anybody. This is definitely not something against the OAS or the Ibero-American Summit. This is an integration for Latin

America and the Caribbean." There is therefore, a definite ideological struggle between the members of CELAC.

While most Latin American countries may not share the concerns for imperialism or profess to be devout followers of anti-Americanism, they are concerned about territorial integrity, respect for state sovereignty and development. Hence, due to these common concerns, "CELAC has emerged as a mechanism for dialogue and agreement aimed at coordinating efforts for integration, cooperation and development both at the Latin American and Caribbean levels" (Segovia, 2013:101).

The agenda therefore, is ideational in most respects, guided by *'Bolivarismo'* and supported by the principles of defining their national autonomy by virtue of a regional identity. The Mexican President Felipe Calderon explained "We cannot remain disunited; we cannot successfully take on the future based on our differences; now it's up to us to unite without discounting the things that make us different … to unite based on our similarities, which far outweigh our differences." This is reflected in the founding declaration of the organization where it outlines "political, economic, social, and cultural integration" as its method "to advance social welfare, the quality of life, economic growth, and to promote independent and sustainable development" (O'Boyle, 2015).

The institutional structure in CELAC is limited and consists of a troika- of the foreign ministers of Chile, Cuba and Venezuela, who are responsible for CELAC between summits. The troika engage in preparatory meetings before annual summits. The post of a President *pro tempore* has also been formed. Decision-making is by consensus and given the differences in the goals of the members, many scholars have argued that the organisation eventually suffers from a lack of institutional structure and the absence of neutral decision makers - "the importance and influence of CELAC is limited by the diversity of its membership and by the natural difficulty of being able to identify mutual interests among more of its participant" (Segovia, 2013:104).

CELAC has been very active since its formation and has initiated several dialogues as- "by mandate of the Heads of State and Government, CELAC is the unified voice of the region on issues of consensus". These dialogues include the European Union-

CELAC dialogue, the Forum of CELAC-China dialogue, engagement with the Russian Federation as well as the Republic of Korea, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, as well as engagement with Turkey and Japan. At the third summit in 2013, EU-CELAC replaced EU-LAC which was a definite acknowledgement of the same as a regional organisation and hence a pivotal moment in the short history of the organisation. Further, CELAC has come up with several proposals for socio cultural projects like the Affordable Housing Programme (which it hopes to develop with technical cooperation from Turkey), education and the provision of ICT (information and communication technology) to students, the modernization of railways from Mexico to Argentina and the proposal for a high speed train between them, improvement of agriculture by modernisation, CELAC scholarships and initiatives in health with cooperation from Cuba, to name a few. CELAC has also outlined a commitment to preserve and protect the cultural heritage of Latin America as well as to promote sustainable development.

The importance of this organisation therefore, is not lost on the global community. However, there are several areas of conflict which lie just under the surface – the announcement in 2015 of the possibility of an FTA between the US and the EU is one such area. It represents Latin America's largest trade partners negotiating trade concessions which would not be applicable to non-members and the economic costs of the same could be catastrophic region-wide but especially for Brazil. The US response to the formation of CELAC has not been warm and there has been little to no recognition of the organisation from Washington. An unbiased research from the US perspective and the subsequent policies it adopts towards Latin America promise important insights for the future of regionalism. For the United States at least, the OAS remains the 'preeminent multilateral organization speaking for the hemisphere' (Toner, 2011).

ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC represent a Latin American attempt towards increasing 'region-ness'. While all three are post-liberal and espouse similar sounding ideas, it is important to summarise the issues of convergence and divergence in order to better understand the present forms that regionalism has taken in Latin America. The next section attempts to do the same.

IDENTIFYING THE PATTERNS IN ALBA, UNASUR AND CELAC

Regionalism has always been a fertile activity in Latin America but it has also been a fragmented geographical effort, a product of the vast diversity in the region in terms of everything from size, population, political practice, ideological context, geographical location to different economic orientations. However, most scholars have agreed that even what seem like straight forward trade agreements in Latin America, need to be studied beyond their economic rationale – as Hurrell puts it "economic factors alone are insufficient to explain either the emergence of regional blocs or their nature" (Hurrell, 1992 :122).

This plural theoretical context becomes increasingly valid in the context of Latin American regionalism. The most recent integration mechanisms of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC are emblematic of the blending of plural economic, ideological, political and social concerns. There are several complementarities and complexities which mark this present 'generation' of regionalism as unique in the history of not just Latin American regionalism, but of the concept itself.

The first available common factor remains the involvement of Venezuela and the overarching influence that Hugo Chávez has had on the development of present regional models. Venezuela, along with Ecuador and Bolivia are part of all three regional integration mechanisms. Consequently, the beginnings of this present regionalism project coincided with the rise of leaders in these countries whose ideological and political recognition was socialist. While Cuba is not a part of UNASUR, Castro's own socialist ideological affiliations along with Cuba's historical alienation in the OAS and the subsequent ideological alignment between Venezuela and Cuba, has been an instrumental factor in defining the anti-OAS stand that all organizations have taken.

This 'pink tide' of leaders eventually effected a de-recognition of neoliberalism region wide. This ties in with the continued importance of developing regional financial mechanisms in order to avert the pressures of the neoliberal economic and

trade regime. Other leaders like President Lula of Brazil and President Kirchner while not socialist, did forge an affiliation with socialism, in the concerns of development and reduction of inequality, an affiliation easy to find in most mixed economies. Their political affiliation was concomitant with the ideological project of the ALBA countries but at the same time, was also a result of the several decades of foreign policy coordination between the two nations.

Brazil's own ambitions to emerge as an international player (as enunciated most prominently in its bid for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council) is cultural and historical. Brazil's 'destiny of greatness' could logically be effected in the most efficient manner through a regional platform. The alignment of its domestic goals and the dissatisfaction with the WTO rounds of negotiation, especially in terms of agriculture and intellectual property rights, allowed the country to embrace regional organisations which hoped to reduce the presence of the United States in its geographical neighbourhood. The slump in Mercosur trade figures were the ultimate cherry on the cake and ensured that widening of regional markets featured on the nation's agenda.

These factors – of contested regional leadership, socialist leanings, US unilateralism post 2001, a developmentalist national agenda coinciding with the Post-Washington consensus, have led to certain commonalities in the three organisations. All organizations therefore, mark a return of the state in matters of foreign policy with a focus on development, spurred on by the dissatisfaction with open regionalism. Nationalism and regionalism have found a way to co-exist under the ideational concept of a regional identity. The widening of the concept of security in the global scenario has outlined the importance of coordination on matters of environment, education, poverty and inequality and have led to an understanding that stability within the region is linked with the resolution of socio-economic issues. The need to ensure efficacy in new economic arrangements within the region has led to a firm understanding of the importance of the development of infrastructure and past mistrials have reinforced this understanding. The search for energy security has allowed a certain level of acceptance to develop between diverse groups of nations and the logic of ALBA. This plural agenda has been represented in the new forms of regional integration being entered into in the region.

At the same time, there are differences between the three organisations as well. ALBA by virtue of being composed by members of a similar ideological mind set has greater coherence in terms of institutional and infrastructural development. UNASUR's mechanisms are often delayed due to the multiplicity of interests of its members. CELAC on the other hand, has barely any infrastructural framework because the sheer diversity of its members does not inspire confidence in Brazil and Venezuela to invest in the same. Apart from these institutional differences, there are also differences in terms of the degree of anti-Americanism felt by members, which has a decided influence on policy matters. While ALBA is an organizational representation of an ideological project that has lost its most prolific leader, the efficacy of UNASUR is marred by the competing interests and identities of its members, and all the while, CELAC suffers due to the fear of US backlash.

Despite the contradictions within the three organisations, they emphasize the three characteristics of Latin American regionalism – the strength and ordering capacity of ideology in the form of *'Bolivarismo',* the search and the project of elaborating an autonomous identity and the primacy of development as an ultimate region wide goal. The next chapter offers a constructivist analysis of the norms, identities and culture of Latin American regionalism and attempts to reconcile them with the regional goals of development, autonomy and cultural coherence as outlined by the regional integration mechanisms of ALBA, CELAC and UNASUR.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSING LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM THROUGH A CONSTRUCTIVIST LENS

The present form that Latin American regionalism has taken is a product of its cultural and historic past. Its development also defies the trajectories assigned to the processes of regionalism by mainstream theoretical approaches. Constructivism offers a unique perspective that aims to understand the processes outlined in ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC instead of attempting to explain them. [33]

The present third generation of regionalism has been driven by Hugo Chávez's project of establishing a 'Bolivarian Alternative' to the neoliberal trade regime as well as the outpouring of fierce anti-hemispheric regionalism rhetoric. The recurring goal of autonomy and an increasing feeling of region-ness [34]has reared its head yet again in Latin America. Due to this recurring pattern of regionalism, history and textuality are of great importance in a study of Latin American regionalism. Constructivism offers an ideal framework for such an analysis.

This chapter attempts to identify norms of Latin American regionalism. It also aims to explore the cultural history of regionalism in the region along with tracing the influence of regionalism on the identity of Latin America. The first section discusses *Bolivarismo* as a norm of present day regionalism in Latin America. The next section attempts to define the 'identity' of Latin America. The last section explores the ideational and cultural continuities in the project of regionalism in Latin America.

[33] According to Hollis and Smith (1990), IR theory is characterized by two competing goals of theory construction – theories that aim to explain (or problem solving theories) and theories that aim to understand (process- based theories). Constructivism belongs to the class of theories that aim to understand a construct, by placing it in its historical context.

[34] Hettne (2000) defines the concept of region-ness as ranging from regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional community to region-state.

NORM ANALYSIS: *BOLIVARISMO*

Most historical analyses of regionalism in Latin America begin with Simon Bolivar and his organisation of the Panama Congress in 1826. Recent efforts of regionalism have called back on the idea of 'Bolivar's vision' and Venezuelan Hugo Chávez espoused the need to establish a 'Bolivarian Alternative' to neoliberal regional integration mechanisms. This idea of bringing back the imagined glory of Bolivar's vision in the form of an integrated 'Our America' is also mentioned in the Cusco Declaration of 2004 which led to the formation of UNASUR as well as in the Declaration of CELAC. Literature on the history of regionalism in Latin America also mentions *'Bolivarismo'* synonymously with descriptions of intra-regional integration in Latin America.

Constructivist scholarship has underlined the role that 'constitutive norms' [35]play in forming the identity of actors and thereby informing their actions. Norms therefore, may be understood as the unit level variable in constructivist analysis. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) defined a norm as 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.' Pitted against each other, the terminology of norms and identity seem to be embroiled in a tautological battle. Constructivists however, reject the possibility of discovering truths and therefore between an analysis of two variables, one variable must be assumed to have a certain amount of constancy in order to divulge the patterns that the other has imbued it with. That is to say, in the case of Latin American regionalism, while the identity of Latin American is itself fluid and difficult to ascertain definitively, it must be assumed to exist before the norms which have constituted it can be unearthed. By this very process, its multiplicity and plurality are revealed.

This section proposed to study the idea of 'Bolivarismo' and the consequent vision of regional unity it entails as a norm, especially in light of its significance in the regional arrangements of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC. This is a not an arbitrary

[35] Norms have been classified as 'regulative' versus 'constitutive', or 'prescriptive' versus 'evaluative norms'. Regulative norms are those 'which order and constrain behavior', and constitutive norms those 'which create new actors, interests, or categories of action.' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

construction, as Bolivarismo is a much defined and studied ideological framework in Latin American regionalism, and taken to mean the attempts towards intra-regionalism in Latin America necessitated by the search for autonomy. The purposes to constitute it as a norm allow for a teleological and historical analysis of intra-regionalism as it exists in the region in the present context.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) have explained that norms are difficult to identify and in most cases, can only be recognised in the form of 'oughtness' of action and 'a shared moral assessment attached to its observance.' The continued insistence on establishing a 'Bolivarian' union by the ALBA nations and the tacit agreement to the same in UNASUR and CELAC by the rest of the region establish this 'oughtness' of action. Further, the distinctly anti-OAS agenda of these regional initiatives (which is characterised as an enunciation of Monroevism or *Monroismo,* the diametric opposite of *Bolivarismo*) established the 'moral assessment' part of the definition, as there is a certain value assessment attached to the present regional projects by their members. This attached value assessment may be understood as the shared belief that the present regional arrangements are better significantly because they are not similar to previous regional projects. Despite these tests of 'oughtness' and 'moral assessment,' the identification of norms remains a difficult task. These tests must be combined with the 'trail of justifications and communications' by actors in order to justify their compliance with a particular norm and rejection of another. The present regional integration effort in Latin America was preceded by FTAA negotiations which came attached with a barrage of news interviews, documents and speeches especially by Hugo Chávez. This process of communication, further helps validate that *Bolivarismo* can legitimately be conceptualised as a norm.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 894-905) have also evolved a mechanism of evaluating a norm, which they have called 'the life cycle' of a norm. The life cycle of a norm is divided into three categories – 'norm emergence', 'norm cascade' and 'norm internalization'. A norm goes through these stages before it has reached the stage where it has become internalized and therefore stops evoking any form of response in its adherents. This cyclical nature of a norm is consequently often compared to a socialization process. Though the fact that Bolivarismo may be conceptualised as a norm of Latin American regionalism seems comparatively undebatable, there is some

difficulty in precisely identifying the norm entrepreneur responsible for the enunciation of the same. While Bolivar has historical precedence on his side, Chávez's active diplomacy to further the regional agenda associated with Bolivarismo make him a likely candidate as well. An analysis of Bolivarismo as a norm and its life cycle is elaborated below, using Finnemore and Sikkink's characterization of a norm life-cycle to identify the norm entrepreneur responsible for *Bolivarismo*.

Norm Emergence

A norm necessarily develops in opposition to a prevailing norm. As has already been established, *Monroismo* is the ideal that *Bolivarismo* opposes. In the historical context of Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine was first enunciated in 1823. While several authors have explained that Bolivar's convening of the Panama Congress in 1826 was an organic result of the continental struggle for independence against the Spanish colonisers, it is interesting to note that the Panama Congress and therefore the first official enunciation of the idea of an integrated Latin America was inaugurated in 1826. Bolivar was then, essentially presenting the idea of a united Latin America in opposition to the 'sphere of influence' argument advanced by the Monroe Doctrine which conceptualised the region of Latin America as its 'backyard.' Simon Bolivar, the liberator, therefore may be conceptualised as the norm entrepreneur for the norm of *Bolivarismo.*

An alternate conceptualisation of a norm entrepreneur is also possible in this context. Hugo Chávez and his conceptualisation of a 'Bolivarian Alternative' where *Bolivarismo* may be understood to mean anti-neoliberal intra-regionalism, was also enunciated in the context of neoliberal open regionalism and the consequent FTAA negotiations. Chávez's idea of regionalism rejected the norms of a reticent state and the neoliberal trade regime, placing it in opposition to its contextual 'norm' of regionalism.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:894-905) explain that "the characteristic mechanism of the first state of norm emergence is persuasion by norm entrepreneur." The norm entrepreneur "calls attention to issues or even 'creates' issues by using language that

names, interprets and dramatizes them." Bolivar's Congress of Panama and the verbosity of ideas like 'Patria Grande' is concomitant with dramatic language. The Treaty of Union, League, and Perpetual Confederation that was formulated at the Congress, is also in agreement with the proposition that Bolivar created the idea of a united Latin American region.

Chávez on the other hand, was extremely vehement in his criticism of the FTAA- "what it has done is to increase poverty and misery in Latin America"; the use of fear and dire predictions as a tactic to reach consensus – "the FTAA is not merely a trade agreement …it establishes a supranational legal and institutional system that will eventually prevail over the current system in our country"; and finally his dramatic pronouncement at the 2005 Americas Summit - "I believe we came here to bury the FTAA. I brought my shovel to join in the burial." Chávez attempted to achieve consensus for the alternative ideal of a 'Bolivarian' regionalist idea by reviling the current system of hemispheric regional initiatives.

'Norm entrepreneurs need a launching pad to promote their norms, and will frequently work from non-governmental organisations and with international organisations and states' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:894-905). The Congress of Panama can be understood as the launching pad for Bolivar's idea of Pan-Latin American unity. Chávez however, from the period of 2000-2006, used all available regional forums to voice his dissatisfaction with the neoliberal regional regime. These included but were not limited to the Summit of the Americas proceedings. Venezuela's exit from the Andean Community and the G-3 group were also political moves towards establishing his opposition to the FTA culture of United States and consequently the new format of *Monroismo* it represented.

Finnemore and Sikkink explain that before the next cycle of norm development can be breached, '… the norm must become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations' and in order to achieve this institutionalization, norm entrepreneurs must persuade a 'critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894-905). As far as Bolivar's entrepreneurial work is concerned, it failed to reach this stage. The Treaty of Union, League, and Perpetual Confederation was only ratified by Gran Colombia and within

five years of the Panama Congress, Gran Colombia had disintegrated. Bolivar's regional endeavour therefore, was left incomplete. It may be argued, that the resuscitation of the project by Chávez represents a rather long emergence stage where Bolivar was able to create 'norm leaders[36],' though not in his time. This argument however, converts Bolivarismo from a norm to an idea. [37]

On the other hand, by 2004, within four years of Chávez's formal announcement of the idea of a 'Bolivarian Alternative', an agreement between Cuba and Venezuela had been signed and ALBA consequently came into being. By 2006, with the formation of the ALBA-TCP, Bolivia had joined the organization and by 2009 Ecuador and Nicaragua were members as well. These states are particularly important, because Ecuador under Rafael Correa, Bolivia under Evo Morales and Cuba under Castro became vocal supporters of the idea of a 'Bolivarian Alternative' and hence, rightly became 'norm leaders.' With the formation of ALBA, *Bolivarismo* was been institutionalised in an international organization. Identifying Chávez as the norm entrepreneur for *Bolivarismo* seems to tick all boxes.

Norm Cascade

Norm cascade essentially refers to the stage where – "norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894-905). In 2004, all countries of South America (with the exception of French Guyana which is a French territory) had signed the Cusco Declaration which affirmed the desire of the members to establish a regional union based on the ideas of the Liberator and an agenda which was clearly post-liberal, if not entirely anti-neoliberal. With the formation of UNASUR, the economic rationale defined under the Community of South American Nations (CSN) was greatly reduced and an increased insistence on

[36] The Panama Congress did inspire several similar Congresses like Alberdi's American Congress to promote continental equilibrium (Fawcett, 2005) but these too failed to effect norm following in a 'critical mass of states.' Hence, Bolivarian vision of intra-regionalism may be considered a norm, but Bolivar cannot be considered a norm entrepreneur – at least, not according to the theoretical framework of Finnemore and Sikkink.

[37] Fawcett, Louise (2005) "However powerful the Monroe imprint loomed in later policy terms, in the realm of ideas, the Bolivarian-as-Latin- American imprint remained salient, if fragmented, represented by regional actors and thinkers who continued the debate about the future direction of the continent and the role the United States would play in guiding it"

political and cultural integration was introduced instead. By 2011 and with the creation of CELAC, the entirety of the region had in some way tacitly agreed to the principles of Bolivarismo, along with affirming the 'Bolivarian legacy' which is necessarily the cornerstone of *Bolivarismo.*

It may be argued that *Bolivarismo* does not enjoy the same level of acceptance by all states of Latin America. Where the ALBA nations are intensely anti-American and anti-neoliberal, states like Chile, Peru, Mexico and Colombia share a meaningful trade relationship with the US. On the other hand, states like Brazil do not espouse anti-American sentiment, at least not to the same degree as the ALBA nations. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:894-905) explain, "norms are continuous, rather than dichotomous, entities. . . [They] come in varying strengths with different norms commanding different levels of agreement."

Norm Internalization

The third stage of a norm cycle is 'Norm Internalization' and here "norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of…debate and thus are automatically honoured" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:894-905).

While *Bolivarismo* may said to have 'cascaded', there is no doubt that intense debate surrounds not only the norm but also the various regional organisations that are instantiations of it – both by those who are disbelievers as well as by those who are part of the same discourse. With the death of Hugo Chávez, there have been dire predictions regarding the longevity of intra-regional arrangements in Latin America.

Nevertheless, by this analysis, it can be argued that *Bolivarismo* is a norm that has guided the present form of regionalism in Latin America. The important point to stress here is that *Bolivarismo* is not the only norm that has structured the processes of regionalism in Latin America. The sociological distinction between 'norm' and 'institution' explains this succinctly – an institution is necessarily a collection of norms and practices. Therefore, other explanations given for the present format of regionalism in Latin America like the power projection ambitions of Brazil may be

understood as different practices that have guided the project of regionalism, and not necessarily invalid or incorrect. Neither does the acceptance of *Bolivarismo* as a norm take away from other explanations.

Constructivism underlines that state practices are essentially a function of their identities. The next section discusses the contours of the category of Latin American identity especially in its relation to regionalism in the region.

IDENTITY: EXPLORING THE DIMENSIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN IDENTITY

Latin American regionalism has been marked by a continued search for autonomy (Puntigliano, 2013). This search for autonomy is not only an expression of its continued struggle against the United States' intervention in its domestic affairs, but also a struggle to define its identity. In the case of Latin America however, its identity is not an easily discernible category. As is the case of with most issues in Latin America, formulations of its identity are mired in contradictory enunciations of the same.

Constructivists define identity as the primary ordering principle of the international system – "Identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic society alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order" (Hopf, 1998:171-200). Identities are formed in a complex web of intersubjective meanings and social norms and "the identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions" (Hopf, 1998:171-200). States organize their behaviour on the basis of their identity as well as their conceptualisation of the identity of another. All predictability and order in behaviour is based on the accurate identification of one's and the other's identity. Therefore, "a world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy" (Hopf, 1998:171-200).

Identity in Latin America therefore, though not apparent or easy to ascertain, remains an important variable to be understood. In the context of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC, the concept of 'regional identity' has gained enormous traction. Further, several competing explanations have been offered as to which interest of a particular state has been the mobilizing factor in the formation of a particular regional organization. As "interests are the product of identity" (Hopf, 1998 :177-201), an analysis of some of the categories of identities attached to the region are discussed.

Regional Identity

Latin America is marked by the existential dilemma of definition that plagues most post-colonial countries. What further complicates the issue of identity, is the neo-imperialism and hegemony of the United States. It is because of this dual imposition, that intra-regionalism has found historical consonance in the region. As Fawcett (2005) puts it – "Regionalism in the Americas, understood both as an expression of regional identity, and as an attempt to give that identity institutional form, dates from the beginning of the Independence period."

Latin America bore the colonial 'civilizing' impulse of the Spanish and the Portuguese[38]. The association with the European powers was not an easy characterization of 'us versus them' as it was in India. There was a cultural, ideological and even social congruence with the colonial rulers. The creole class in colonial Latin America identified with their colonisers so much so that Alexander von Humboldt said of Caracas that no other place in the Americas was as 'European' as the same.

Its rich civilizational past has also disallowed an easy acceptance of the 'New World' idea. With the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, there was an expression of strong revulsion against the United States' obvious display of power. However, when the region first gained independence, the American Revolution was praised by several writers in Latin America as a superior model to the French Revolution. The Latin

[38] The English, French and the Dutch also had colonies in Latin America, but in terms of sheer size of land occupied, the Spanish and Portuguese are referred here as the colonial rulers of Latin America.

American identification vis-à-vis the USA is ever changing, reflecting the subtle changes in their international relationship.

Even the establishment of an easy geographical identity is difficult. If understood simply as a part of the Western hemisphere, Latin America's colonial and civilizational past complicates this distinction. If 'western' is taken to be a reference to the 'West' represented by Europe, then in the East-West discourse, the Americas do not have a geographical position to ascertain for themselves. This process of identity deletion started from the 'discovery' of the Americas. The first contact between the 'West' and these new lands superimposed a European criterion of finding India onto the region. This misdirection was not simply an apolitical decision. It was a refusal on the part of Europe to change its world view, geographical certainties aside.

The 'New World' discourse is especially problematic because it is in a way a US effort at re-imposing the same identity deletion mechanisms onto Latin America. The idea of the 'New World' conceptualizes the Americas as the Western hemisphere, which seems to have emerged in a state of tabula rasa. This acceptance of the burden of being a new civilization simultaneously undoes the histories of the indigenous and 'natives' as well as the civilizational history of the region by its imposition of an arbitrary time line.

Colonial histories aside, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the United States to disrupt the territorial sovereignty of Latin America. The conceptualisation of Latin America as 'America's backyard' and even the near universal acceptance by the world at large, of the term 'America' as being synonymous with the United States is a continuation of the subjugation of the region. It is precisely this subjugation that regional organisations like ALBA have tried to undermine by calling for an organisation of 'Our America.'

Regional integration efforts therefore, have attempted to create a cohesive expression of regional identity. However, the diversity in geographies and interests in the region led to a history of sub-regional arrangements which have further complicated the identity discourse in Latin America.

Sub Regional Identity

Sub regional identity in the present context of Latin America is in flux. Regionalism has been responsible for the movement away from physical sub regions to functional sub regions.

The physical sub regions of Latin America have traditionally been identified as – the Southern Cone, comprising Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil; the Andean nations of Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia; the Central American states of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; the Caribbean[39], North America and South America are the larger sub regions. Latin American Nations have also been done classified on the lines of linguistics with divisions such as Hispanic America, French America [40]and the English speaking Caribbean countries.

The continuous regionalism that the region has engaged in has transformed these divisions. While Chile is geographically a part of the Andean countries, it withdrew its membership from CAN and is therefore geopolitically no longer an Andean country. Along with Mexico, that has always been closer to the USA than Latin America, Colombia and Peru, these four countries are often termed the 'free marketers'; similarly, the ALBA countries have successfully integrated Cuba into a functional region saving it from its geographical and US imposed isolation; CARICOM which had been an organization of English speaking Caribbean states has transformed into a multilingual organisation with the inclusion of Dutch Suriname. Regionalism has therefore, had a transformative effect on the identities of Latin American nations.

[39] The Caribbean is not a unified entity but due to the constraints of this research project, the particularities of the Caribbean do not find a place in the same. This is concomitant with the research agenda which aims to develop a holistic understanding of regionalism.
[40] French America refers to - Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Haiti, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Lucia, Martinique, and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean and French Guiana (Overseas region of France) in South America.

This functional sub-regional identity has been an important driver of the present forms of regionalism in the instantiations of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC. The free marketers [41]and their increasing convergence with the United States acted as a catalyst for the left oriented nations of the region to enunciate and enact their agenda of anti-neoliberalism. UNASUR represents a move away from the Hispanic conception of South America by its inclusion of Suriname and Guyana who have in the past straddled the space between the Ibero-American South America and the Caribbean. CELAC is emblematic of the idea of increasing 'region-ness' in Latin America.

Functional sub-regionality has also created obstacles for the functionality of these new regional organisations. The free marketers have expressed hesitance in accepting the anti-American agenda of the ALBA countries. Divergence of interests and vast diversity among member states has been increasingly cited by scholars as the cause of the imminent malfunction of UNASUR and CELAC. This divergence in interests, draws attention to differences in conceptualisations of national identity and preferences. National identities, especially of Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela have driven the processes of integration in ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC. It seems hardly contradictory that the vision of three states is difficult to reconcile with that of thirty other states.

National Identity

As opposed to the realist conception of a singular identity of a state, that being of self-interest, constructivism has explained that identities are multiple and reproduced through practice (Hopf, 1998). As far as regional integration especially in the format of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC is concerned, it defines a very clear agenda – a cultural component of regional identity, a post-Washington Consensus agenda, a conception of wide regionalism, and a developmentalist socio economic agenda. Most of the mainstream scholarship on these new regional initiatives has emphasized the

[41] The countries of Chile, Mexico, Peru and Colombia have jointly established The Pacific Alliance in 2012, a trade bloc that has been a response to the announcement of the 'Pacific Initiative' by the United States.

struggle for regional leadership between Venezuela and Brazil as the driving force of this wave of regionalization. Others have expressed the anti-OAS stance as a result of Cuba's historical snub from the same organisation. There is definite agreement though that Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba have been important in setting the present regional agenda.

Scholars like Sanahuje (2012) have argued that the creation of UNASUR should be largely credited to the Brazilian Itamarty (the foreign services offices of Brazil). He has argued that the cultural idea of being 'destined for greatness' has informed Brazil's regional efforts in order to eke out a larger role for itself at the international level. Others like Malamud (2012) have explained the hesitance of Brazil in further engagement in Mercosur as its regional role thwarts its international aspirations. Brazil has developed strong and extremely visible extra-regional engagements in the last two decades[42]. Mercosur, for all the financial trouble it is in at present, was largely successful in integrating the Southern Cone economies. The regional player to international star argument seems contradictory especially in light of the troubles Brazil has had to face in the last few years with regards to Mercosur. While there is no doubt that Brazil has identified with the role of a regional power, its regional efforts have not adequately reproduced that identity. This is emblematic of what Hopf suggests as the inability of an actor to control the perceptions it produces – "the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning" (Hopf, 1998). Brazil's recent regional efforts, while ideologically conditioned by its imagined identity, are more attuned to its domestic concerns with access to larger markets and the search for energy security being the winning points of the regional engagement argument. Its active diplomacy towards regionalism goes as far back as the 1980s and has consequently become a part of its foreign policy. Desirous of a decreased role for the United States in its neighbourhood, Brazil has supported the development of regional organisations, in an attempt to 'reproduce its identity (as a regional power) through practice.'

[42] BRICS – is an organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The first summit was held in 2009.
IBSA – is the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum formed in 2003.
These two organisations represent a very important component of Brazil's extra regional cooperation.

The other interesting case is of Cuba. Cuba has been actively involved in ALBA as well as in CELAC. It is a part of the troika of CELAC. Most scholars have attributed the anti-OAS character of CELAC and its redefinition of democracy to Cuba. Guzzini's concept of 'reflexive identity' is useful here. Guzzini (2000) explains that an actor has the ability to become aware of and reflexively adjust its behaviour in accordance with the identity it has been attributed. The historical relations between Cuba and the OAS have been extremely sour. With access to Venezuelan petroleum wealth and Chávez's ideological support, Cuba has attempted to redefine its regional role, though not its ideological bent.

While a lot has been written about Chávez's ideological viewpoint, it needs to be stressed that increasing integration within the region, organised around the principle of energy cooperation has allowed for larger markets for Venezuelan energy products. The success of Chávez's project is a direct result of his politics aligning with the commodity price boom and a general anti-neoliberal trend in the global sphere. Venezuela's identity as a socialist leader of the region seems apparent but the supporting economic logic is often lost in the rhetoric of the politics.

The foreign policies of these three states seem concomitant with mainstream depictions of state behaviour. However, it needs to be stressed that foreign policy choices, as Ashley (1988) explains "… depend on the existence of intersubjective precedents and shared symbolic materials." In light of this importance of 'shared symbolic meanings', a cultural analysis of the concept of regionalism in Latin America can help in holistically defining the phenomenon as it is apparent in the region.

CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN REGIONALISM

Simon Murden (2008) explains that "where ever human beings form communities, a culture comes into existence." In the present interpretivist turn of the social sciences,

cultural analysis has become an established methodological tool. However, the difficulty of defining culture has made it an extremely vague variable for analysis. Culture has been variously defined as 'the sum of all forms of art,' 'the way one thinks, acts and interacts' or as 'the methods employed to succeed.' Along with these extremely general definitions, the category of what constitutes culture, if possible, is even wider – "an awareness of common language, ethnicity, history, religion, and landscape", Murden suggests, "represent the building blocks of culture."

Due to its focus on 'communities', 'networks' and the human actor in general, a cultural analysis falls squarely within the ambit of constructivism in line with the framework's concern with 'human consciousness' (Ruggie, 1998). Scholars like Louise Fawcett have underlined the need to study regionalism in Latin America with an emphasis on a historical analysis of the responses inter-regionalism produced in Latin America in order to understand the concept of regionalism in Latin America.

Fawcett (2005) argues that the present features of regionalism are cyclical, in that they are current enunciations of past ideas. As has already been established, inter-Americanism and intra-Americanism are contrasting but co-existing forces of regionalism in Latin America. The opposition between the two therefore, is also historical.

As early as 1844, Andres Bello had outlined the idea of an American Congress. His project was a direct successor to Bolivar's Congress of Panama. This Congress was to be an attempt to represent the new nations of the region as well as 'regulate their common international interests' – "The different parts of America have been too separate from one another. Their common interests invite them to association… For us, even a common language is a precious heritage that we must not squander. Were we to add to this link the tie of similar institutions, a legislation that recognises substantially the same principles, a uniform international law, the cooperation of all the states in preserving peace and administering justice… would not this be an order of things worthy in every way?" (Bello, Obras Collectivas).

Bello's appeal was based on the similarities between nations of the region which needed be cherished. An argument in the same vein was made by the Mexican

President Calderon after the formation of CELAC – "We cannot remain disunited; we cannot successfully take on the future based on our differences; now it's up to us to unite without discounting the things that make us different … to unite based on our similarities, which far outweigh our differences."

Fawcett argues that Bello laid down the foundations of 'Latin Americanism' which she explains, are – the principle of territorial sovereignty and non- intervention in domestic affairs, an opposition to hegemony and the importance of trade. (Fawcett, 2005). ALBA and UNASUR both have enacted defence mechanisms in the form of the Regional Defence School in Santa Cruz in the case of ALBA and the Council of South American Defence; both have identified with the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention by recognizing the 'diversity of their members', and CELAC has widened the definition of democracy in order to accommodate the different political and economic rationales of its members; all three organisations have positioned themselves in opposition to the mechanisms of neoliberalism and the OAS, thereby opposing hegemony; both ALBA and UNASUR have elaborated an development oriented trade agenda. Therefore, it may be said, that these organisations do exhibit 'Latin Americanism.'

The focus on trade in Latin American regionalism is connected with the issue of development. As Bello put it - "trade has done more to improve international relations than all other causes put together." The new political economy that ALBA hopes to establish is in direct correlation with the assessment that trade is an ordering factor in Latin America. This also gives hope for the sustenance of CELAC which has been doomed to fail by several analysts because it houses the free marketers, whose economic policy is distinctly neoliberal. Thus, trade arrangements in Latin America are seen as a means to the end of development.

Bello also addressed the lack of institutional structure which was a concern even in 1844 - "…the fact that most of the American states do not as yet possess settled institutions is no obstacle. They have de facto governments; they can in consequence, join together." This helps explain why despite the severe criticism several Latin American regional initiatives have been at the receiving end of, CELAC still boasts of

a paltry institutional structure. The will of the state has historically been seen as the force upholding regionalism in Latin America. This reverberates with what Max Weber said about the ability of the 'will' to create significance and meaning - "We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance." It also explains the continuing importance of presidentialism in Latin American regionalism.

The anti-United States stance also has several historical predecessors. After the announcement of the 1889 Inter-American Conference, the Cuban Jose Martí vehemently opposed the same and drew attention to the interventionist impulse which would characterize over a century of US intervention in Latin America - "of the continuous existence there [in the United States] of all the violence, discord, immorality, and disorder blamed upon the peoples of Spanish America." This was further echoed by influential writers like Rodó - "I do not imply that everything they have achieved has been entirely negative… [but] let us refuse to see an exemplary civilisation where there exists only a clumsy, though huge, working model" (Ariel, 1900). This distrust of the growing power of the United States also birthed the Calvo Doctrine which outlined the principle of non-intervention. The US did not recognize it, and with the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, turned Latin American suspicions about its intents into reality.

Fawcett has also traced the EU-US trade nexus back to the 1826 Panama Congress. She argues that the struggle for ownership of Latin American markets and power over the same was established in 1826 itself, where the US and Europe established their continuous struggle for influence in Latin America – "The competitive tensions between European and US interests in defining a regional system, if often occluded, have never entirely disappeared" (Fawcett, 2005). This is acutely reflected in the present context of trade talks between the US and the EU, which if materialized, spell an ominous economic future for Latin America as well as for the surge of intra-regionalism in the region.

Thus, it is evident that there is a precedent for regionalism in Latin America. Fawcett's cultural analysis disproves the various mainstream theoretical models that have labelled post-Second World War attempts at regionalism as mere imitations of

the European model of regionalism. While the processes towards integration may have been modelled on the methodologies that the academic discipline prescribed, the project of regionalism in Latin America is cultural. Despite the several different methods the region has employed towards achieving regional integration, the goals of the endeavour have been the innate goals of its civilizational and developmental history and have remained true to the ideas that have marked its journey towards definition post its independence. These ideas are - trade promotes growth and development, territorial sovereignty is a right that must be protected and ultimately the right to autonomy and the firm belief that Latin America is not a plaything of the US.

If regionalism is a part of the culture of Latin America, this culture is composed of several norms and practices. The most vehemently vocal norm has been that of *Bolivarismo.* The different foreign policy goals of states that are irreconcilable for theoretical models, are understood by constructivism as the practices shaped by this intersubjective realm of different identities, ordered and shaped by both *Bolivarismo* and *Monroismo.*

Latin American regionalism therefore is a product of its historical past and represents its continuous struggle for autonomy and a firm tool of diplomacy. The economic rationale of trade is not suitable to understand regional integration mechanisms in the region, precisely because trade is a tool employed by Latin American states to define themselves in the nebulous international system[43]. Further, the historical context of the region continues to shape the present identities and interests of the region.

The regional arrangements of ALBA, UNASUR and their culmination in the region-wide CELAC are an enunciation of what Puntigliano (2013) calls Latin America's search for a 'supranational cultural-identity space.' The mechanisms for dialogue established in all three of the regional initiatives, as well as their commitment to the historical past of regionalism in Latin America provides hope for the establishment of such a space.

[43] This is to suggest that trade as understood by Constructivism is beyond the impersonalised logic of Economics. Trade is also driven by the power of ideas, even though it seems like the rhetoric or regionalism or the ideas enunciated in the process are driven by trade.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Regionalism in Latin America is a historical process. It is not just a product of the civilizational and colonial history of the land, but an expression of the historical precedent of regionalism embedded in its cultural past. The patterns of present day regionalism in Latin America therefore, are in keeping with the tradition of regionalism in the region.

Regionalism in Latin America is organized around two principles – hemispheric regionalism and intra-region regionalism. These two principles are in a constant state of struggle against each other due to the historic discrepancies between Latin America and the United States, as well as the severe asymmetries of power between the two regions. A historical analysis of the development of regionalism in Latin America conclusively proves that while the two principles are in opposition to each other, they also co-exist.

A historical analysis of the forms regionalism has taken in the region clearly denotes that there is an identifiable pattern in the forms regionalism has taken. The oppositional character of *Monroismo* and *Bolivarismo* has been the ordering principle between state-led intra-regional efforts and US-led hemispheric regional efforts. The present generation of post-liberal regionalism is emblematic of the principle of *Bolivarismo*. An argument may be made that with the formation of regional arrangements like the Pacific Alliance, intra-regional integration may at best be said to co-exist with neoliberal forms of cooperation. However, the sheer size of the organizations of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC is demonstrative of the fact that there is a general consensus, if not a universal consensus, in Latin America that has pitted it against the present format of the neoliberal economic regime.

A constructivist norm analysis of *Bolivarismo* as per the model outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) established that Bolivarismo may be conceptualised a norm of

regionalization in Latin America. As an idea for regionalism, *Bolivarismo* emerged with Simon Bolivar. While several Latin Americans over the years have been inspired by the regional vision of Bolivar and attempted to realize the same, it is with Hugo Chávez that *Bolivarismo,* understood as a principle of intra-regionalism, ideationally opposed to hegemonic power projections and concerned with establishing a pan-regional identity, may said to have emerged a norm of regionalism in Latin America. Chávez therefore, is the norm entrepreneur in the case of the norm of *Bolivarismo*. Further, though with the establishment of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC, the norm of *Bolivarismo* may said to have 'cascaded', the third stage outline by Finnermore and Sikkink of 'norm internalization' has not been reached. Nevertheless, this does not take away from the fact that *Bolivarismo* is not just the ordering principle of regionalism in Latin America, but has formally attached itself to regionalization as a norm guiding the present forms of regionalism in Latin America. The validity of the first hypothesis of this analysis therefore may said to be established.

The 'free marketers', namely Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico have often been identified as states which might threaten the project of post-liberal regionalism in Latin America. Their foreign policy orientation has been marked by a preference for trade arrangements, and their free trade agreements with the United States complicated the anti-neoliberal stand espoused by the ALBA nations. However, all four states are members of both UNASUR and CELAC and like several other nations of the region have found the possibility of larger markets in UNASUR and a decreasing dependency on the United States incentive enough to promote the project of regionalism by their participation. The free marketers in their very signing of the trade agreements with the United States provided added agency and urgency to Chavez's 'Bolivarian Alternative.' Further, guided by the concerns of energy security, these states welcomed the formation of UNASUR. The formation of the Pacific Alliance in 2012 has been conceived by some scholars as a threat to the norm of *Bolivarismo*. Finnemore and Sikkink have explained however that norms generate variable levels of compliance. The shared cultural and historical past of these states combined with the economic rationale of UNASUR and petroleum wealth of Venezuela have been incentive enough for the free marketers to participate in these regional projects.

Most analyses of regionalism in Latin America emphasize that Brazil's leadership has been the necessary pivot around which the project of regionalism has been furthered in the region. However, several scholars have argued that while Brazil's economic and natural resources as well as its own geopolitical ambitions make it the most likely candidate for the status of 'the' regional power in Latin America, it has failed to emerge as one in Latin America. Brazil's own perceptions about its regional and global role have not been mirrored in the region, rather they have produced a certain distrust in its Mercosur fellow states who fear the severe asymmetry of power between their economies and the economy of Brazil. Further, the resent format of regionalism in Latin America has often been attributed solely to Venezuela. It is important to stress that theoretical conceptualisations of regional power involve both the possession and exercise of hard power. Latin America is a nuclear free zone and Brazil's foreign policy has always been committed to peace. UNASUR is a mutation of SAFTA which was a Brazilian initiative. The fact that Latin American regionalism is driven by the search for autonomy along with the lack of inter-state conflict in the region render realist definitions of regional power invalid in Latin America. Brazil's diplomatic efforts have had a very important role to play in Latin American regionalism and without its participation, the economic rationale which has pacified several nations that do not espouse ALBA's anti-America stance would be rendered defunct without the participation of the region's largest economy. Hence, Brazil's continued support for the regionalist initiative is of paramount importance.

Much has been written about the 'return of the state' in Latin American regionalism. This is in continuation with the ISI led model of regionalism where the state advanced a protectionist form of regional integration in order to spur economic development within its economy. While the new state-led regionalism of the post-liberal order is essentially more concerned with socio-economic issues and welfare, the old and the post-liberal formats of regionalism are united in their pursuit of development – only the definition of development has been broadened in the context of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC.

Though these organisations have been formed, there are vast differences not only in individual state goals and preferences but also in terms of the cultural variable which has been assumed to be the organizing principle of regionalism. The cultural past of

Spanish America is quite different from the cultural history of the Caribbean nations. However, in recognition of the same, there has been a movement in regional integration arrangements all over the region to surpass the linguistic and cultural classifications of their regions. With the inclusion of Suriname and Guyana, UNASUR has attempted to displace the old distinction between Ibero-America and the rest of South America. CARICOM itself has moved beyond its description of an organization of English speaking Caribbean states to a new multilingual and multicultural organization with the inclusion of the Dutch Suriname. Assisting this movement towards multiculturalism in Latin America is the agenda of addressing asymmetry. Both ALBA and UNASUR have aimed towards correcting the economic inequalities in the region. This cultural pluralism combined with a more social conception of economics may allow for the geographically, culturally and economically disparate regions of South America and the Caribbean to define a unique regional identity.

The cultural component of the organizations of ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC is very prominent. Not only have they utilized the idea of a shared cultural past to promote their regional project, they have also attempted to adopt policies which promote this feeling of region-ness. The symbolism of the past is being bolstered by the attempts towards achieving greater proximity. These processes of developing congruence allow for the hope that *Bolivarismo* will outlive Chavez.

From the study of the historical development of regionalism it is surmisable that not only is the idea of regionalism a part of the cultural past of Latin America but also that no form of regional integration has developed in isolation from this past. Further, while older regional arrangements that outlive their context give way to newer conceptualisations of regional arrangements, these older organisations are not replaced but rather co-opted into the framework of the new. This continuity in regional integration patterns when viewed in light of the historical processes of regionalism is an avowal of the fact that regionalism is persistent in Latin America. Despite several unsuccessful attempts, no country in the region has given up on the idea of regionalism. The regional project in Latin America is a search for autonomy and a search for development. Regionalism has a nearly two-hundred-year history in Latin America and attempts to integrate have not abated. Regionalism therefore, has

great value for Latin Americans. As Fawcett (2005) puts it – "However powerful the Monroe imprint loomed in later policy terms, in the realm of ideas, the Bolivarian-as-Latin- American imprint remained salient, if fragmented, represented by regional actors and thinkers who continued the debate about the future direction of the continent." Therefore, the second hypothesis is validated in the mythic nature of Bolivar (and consequently *Bolivarismo*) and the cultural currency that regionalism has acquired over centuries in Latin America.

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