

THE IMPACT OF UNIFICATION ON THE EAST GERMANS

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "THE IMPACT OF UNIFICATION ON THE EAST GERMANS" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** at Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Service)	ADN
African National Congress	ANC
Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge	BAMF
Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)	BMI
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	CDU
European Confederation of Executives & Managers Staff	CEC
Coal and Steel Community in Europe	CSCE
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	CSFR
Christlich Soziale Union	CSU
Deutsche Demokratische Partei	DDP
Deutsche Demokratische Republik	DDR
Deutsche Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung	DIW
Deutsches Jugendinstitut	DJI
Deutsche Volkunion	DVU
European Network Against Racism	ENAR
Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Western European Union	FBISWEU
Federal Republic of Germany	FRG
Freikorps	FRY
German Democratic Republic	GDR
International Classification of Diseases	ICD

International Energy Agency	IEA
Institute for Economic Research	IFO
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands	KPD
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	NATO
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	NPD
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/Ausland Organisation	NSDAP/AO
Partia Karkaren Kurdistan	PKK
Pro North Rhine Westphalia	Pro NRW
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty	RFE/RL
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands	SED
Social and Economic Panel	SOEP
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	SPD
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
World Health Organization	WHO

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background

German unification in 1990 is one of the most significant events in world history. The East German regime started to falter in May 1989, when the removal of Hungary's border fence opened a hole in the Iron Curtain. It caused an exodus of thousands of East Germans fleeing to West Germany and Austria via Hungary. The Peaceful Revolution, a series of protests by East Germans, led to the German Democratic Republic's first free election on 18 March 1990, and to the negotiations between the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany that culminated in a Unification Treaty. This whole process affected the east Germans in every aspect of their social life. According to Florczuk et al (2011: 16), the problem of cultural and social differences between the East and the West Germany, either was unnoticed in due time or was disregarded and repressed from consciousness during the euphoria of unification.

In the year 1945, the Third Reich ended in vanquishment resulting in the division of Germany into two distinct zones, the Soviet Bloc of Communism in the east and that of the western Germany becoming an intrinsic part of Capitalist Europe. This was symptomatic of a rift in the military alliance culminating into the formation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, individually. The eras of the 80s witnessed the gradual economic and political passivity of the Soviet Union which inversely reduced their interference in East European affairs. The year 1987 saw US President Ronald Reagan while delivering an address at the Brandenburg Gate, testing Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to demolish the wall which had kept Berlin separated. Till then it had stood as a symbol for the politico-economic segregation between East and West, a severance which in the words of Churchill represented the Iron curtain. The beginning of 1989, initiated a new era where Soviet Union adopted the policies of openness and economic restructuring. This was further driven toward even more neoteric ranks by Gorbachev in tolerating the Polish Solidarity movement which began to spread its wings in earnest. It worked as an active catalyst in painting the variegated images of confrontation through ripples of protest engulfing almost the whole of in that particular time. The removal of the frontier fence by Hungary in May 1989 enabled hundreds of people from east Germany to circumvent into the West. This marked a watershed period in the

chronicles of Germany which came to be known as *Die Wende* (the turn), a Peaceful Revolution (in the form of protest) resulting in the pulling down of the Wall. It enabled both the East and West Germany to afterwards undertake parleying toward abolishing the schism that had been forcefully imposed upon Germans more than four decenniums prior.

Helmut Kohl is widely regarded as the main architect of German reunification. Yet the ruling authority at first hunched the limitation of the Soviet reformative spirit in Communist GDR which in all probability would stall its incorporation into the FRG. Kohl as Chancellor administered a plethora of ingenious schemes and in the wake taking some dubious resolutions in the domain of civic stratagem. According to Spohr (2000: 874) who in referring to Weidenfeld's borrowing from the memoirs of Teltschik, was of the opinion that he in all probability originally drafted the Ten Point programme of overcoming of the division of Germany and Europe which eventually reunified Germany. Meanwhile, events snowballed in rapid way to make Kohl realize that he would have to burst ahead. Succeeding the rupture of the Berlin Wall and the crumbling of the Communist East German rule in 1989, Kohl's management of the issue of east Germany became the decisive moment of his adjudicatorship. He fetched a blunt neo-Adenauerian reaffirmation of the absolute priority of Western integration along with the long-term commitment to reunification. It concentrated on the restructuring of the democratic institution of Germany, its economic amelioration and complete incorporation in the frameworks of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. The logical continuation of it was reflected in the *Deutschlandpolitik* (german politics), a variation of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (eastern politics). The task of ending the two Germanies rested upon multiple and disparate issues of creating an all-European security structure through the CSCE; guaranteeing the limitation of military strength; finding transitional arrangements for the keeping and removal of Soviet Union's forces in an amicable manner from the east part of Germany; qualitative improvements in their relationship ending post-war feud; a determined acknowledgement of frontiers removing any perceived possibility for areal dissidence; reaffirmation of full commitment to NATO alliance and Continent-wise moving toward European Union inside the existing European Community. The fulfilment of all these issues would then bestow the opportunity to create a single Germany. Fully conscious of his objective to achieve the unity of the two Germanies, he instantaneously manoeuvred to make it happen. The

month of February, 1990 saw the visit of Kohl to Soviet Union searching in vain an assurance from Mikhail Gorbachev to the merit of honouring the initiatives to reunite Germany. Nevertheless, less than three weeks after the collapse of the Wall, the former suggested confederate structures to create a federal state order. In the international arena, apart from the support of USA, Soviet Union, Britain and France all expressed their scepticism. It was only the close relation between US Foreign Minister James Baker and its German counterpart Genscher that carried the day.

1.2 Soviet and Anglo-French Repercussion toward Reunification

The controversies within Germany on the issue of reunification brought in a fair amount of angst among the neighbours who became apprehensive about the strength of a reunified State and the resurrection of its race. The Frenchmen were in reality, anxious that Gorbachev's stance of more open and consultative government with stress on a wider dissemination of information (glasnost) would inveigle the Germans to embrace neutralization as the cost of re-joining. Kohl allayed such fears by reassuring Mitterand that reunified Germany would remain tied to the European Community, the ideal of the European integration and Franco-German cooperation. This made possible the signing of the Two Plus Four Powers Treaty (two Germanies, the US, Soviet Union, France and Britain) in Moscow on 12 September, 1990. This, in actuality, bestowed full sovereignty to reunified Germany, an absolute prerequisite for reunification. The image of the Germans as incorrigible militarists persisted in the British psyche making them cynical about reunification. Thatcher was, in fact, on the lookout for allies to slow down if not stall the project of reunited Germany. That she could not materialise her objective was not due to the German question itself, but her overall opposition to the idea of a single currency as the catalyst to greater European integration. The demurring about the probity of the commitment of Germany toward NATO helped in only multiplying the problem. She, however, stuck to her conviction that the Germans are full of angst, aggressive, assertive, bully some, egotistic, suffer from inferiority complex and sentimental. According to the Russian record made by Gorbachev's adviser Chernayev, it was the Prime Minister who said that:

“Britain and Western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany. The words written in the NATO communique may sound different, but disregard them. We do not want the reunification of Germany. It would lead to changes in the post-war

borders and we cannot allow that because such a development would undermine the stability of the entire international situation, and could lead to threats to our security.” (Salmon et al. no.26n cf. Munro, 2009: 57).

Naturally, Thatcher’s sally toward the revolution of 1989 in Germany was an instance of vanity leading, in November 1990 to the pouring of the undoing. Meanwhile, east European people, growingly exhausted in combatting the severe economic drudgery and heartened by the policy of restructuring the economic and political system (perestroika) that Gorbachev had trumpeted and most importantly witnessing the reformative urge in Poland where people more and more actively took to the streets to overthrow the authorities gained courage to follow their heels. In the wake of that intention of succession, the treaty of German reunification created a divergent attitude setting United Kingdom and France, happy to see Germany disunited, in collision course with the United States, supporting the cause and the Soviets, reluctantly agreeing in lieu of some assurances. This orchestrated well with the conservative attitude it still nurtured towards West Germany and the latter too continued its confrontational tactics. At heart, Gorbachev was eager to take up the German issue in the staunch believe that the Wall would stand there for another millennium. Nevertheless, the Soviets advanced a plethora of proposals in rapid succession and often with no compatibility among them, including the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Adomeit in Kaiser, 1991: 192). The fact that the German military status in NATO was similar to that of France, the formation of a centre in Berlin to control all military forces in Germany and German membership in both the alliances made the Soviets quite uncomfortable (Adomeit in Kaiser, 1991: 192). This gave him a certain significant policy orientation towards Germany where military intervention was thought of as useless (Oldenburg in Megas, 2015: 182). In continuation to this development, the Soviet-German policy in 1989 entered a new epoch as has been argued by Megas (2015: 175) that the Soviets had precluded the possibility of repeated foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. Gorbachev, in spite of disfavouring any intervention, desired a reformist leadership to lead the GDR. However, there is no possibility of a miscalculation in the application of force to stall the changes as is evident from Eduard Shevardnadze, the then Soviet foreign minister who Megas (2015: 175) yet again pointed out also atoned that the Soviet Union did not facilitate events in the GDR in any direct way, but only mediated indirectly through the influence of its perestroika,

further validated the independent decision of the east Germans toward unification. This is proof enough that the idea of a manageable intervention in the GDR was a complete myth. Gorbachev, in fact, possessed a centrist view that the German question is open in the eyes of history (Sodaro, 1991: 360). This formed the kernel of the Soviet-German policy as maintaining the two German apartments in the European common home as was said by Dashichev (cf. Megas, 2015: 177) that they would be separate, with equal and independent tenants, yet open to each other just as nowadays Austria and Hungary with their different economic systems, are open to each other. The summer of 1989 was a momentous stage in Moscow's German policy with Gorbachev's visit leaving a vague climate around the question of reunification with the undercurrent of the possibility of everything. Even when Gorbachev rejected to discuss openly the future of a united Germany, the question by then had been made wide open by thousands of east German citizens already travelling through Hungary to the West. In the spate of events, the Soviet ambassador Palazchenko (1997: 286) messaged to Moscow that apart from the Berlin Wall, needed for the internal security of the GDR in the foreseeable future, the East German state wanted an outer Wall too, of German revanchism. Ironically, the new generation in the Kremlin and Gorbachev himself was helplessly tied up in the tenets of perestroika which made the East Germans go their own way. Amidst such turmoil, the SED invited Gorbachev to celebrate the country's 40th anniversary. In the words of Chernyaev (1991: 168), Gorbachev was quite dismissive about Honecker, having the intention to support the Republic and the Revolution. This, however, did not automatically mean the dissolution of the GDR, but a transformed country more in line with social egalitarianism. However, the increasing Western influence by that time had considerably changed the hue of the movement into one of fusing with the FRG. Mass support continued to swell in favour of it, suppressing the initial agitation for a reformative state. In the backdrop of these unexpected twists, the treaty of German reunification, known in German as *Einigungsvertrag* (unification treaty) or *Wiedervereinigungsvertrag* (reunification treaty) was signed between the two German states. It was a fruition of the desire of the people of east Germany toward a choice to live freely and expecting a better society within a united fatherland. These convictions had irreversibly put the country into oblivion to create the reunited Federal Republic.

The world was literally taken by surprise and the significance of the fall of the Wall produced widespread consternation. The British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd after

talks with the West German Foreign Minister dismissed the issue of unification as non-topical. Meanwhile, in the GDR itself, those reformers who paved the way for *Die Wende* became apprehensive of a Western capitalist takeover. As a preventive measure, a considerable constellation of highbrows, authors and maestros came up with a declaration for their country, envisaging the carrying on of a novel and more civilized GDR, while in the same strain the citizens of GDR began to give shape to the dreams of a reunited Germany, clamouring out, we are one people and Germany, united fatherland. Helmut Kohl inclined more toward the multitude came up with the proposal in the West German *Bundestag* (parliament) which was a ten-point programme to reunify Germany. It suggested the abolition of the SED consortium on authority, democratic and economic resumption and a federation of both the parts. Kohl, definitely was a far-sighted and an astute diplomat who made an impeccable timing to do away with the division. However, the epithet ‘Chancellor of Unity’ is undoubtedly an overstatement as he had no long term plan of unifying the two parts, action on the German question continued to develop in accordance with the political factors prevailing at any one time and as late as December 1989, he still believed that it would take another 4 to 5 years to achieve unification, despite his proposed ten-point plan.

France already had a long history of tenuous friendship with Germany interspersed with tensions and consternations. Overall, the then ruling authorities had no opposition whatsoever, over the issue of reunification. As the two chief protagonists of the European Union, France only desired earnestly a more thorough commitment on the part West Germany toward amicability, cooperation and solidarity once it becomes a unified nation. Corroborating such presentiments, the beginning of the 1980s focused more in preventing the politicization of the security matters especially, in the wake of the dual decision taken by NATO in 1979 to recommend the Warsaw Pact to limit the use of all types of nuclear weapons failing which it would then station more middle-range warheads in Western Europe. Under such worsening of the East-West diplomatic climate, Kohl and Mitterand met to initiate a more stringent bilateral assistance in the arenas of defence and security. According to Wolff and Jaspers (2010: 82) in a moving ceremony during a 1984 visit to the battlefields of Verdun Mitterand and Kohl reasserted their solidarity toward peace and harmony. It ultimately led to the formation of a joint brigade and a council to oversee security and defence issues. The earlier anxiety of the French that West Germany might shake hands with the Soviets had by

then been dissolved in the reformative agenda of Gorbachev. Hence, while consulting with the British and Soviet leadership over the issue of the imminent reunification of Germany, it could only adopt a policy of buying time and that too, not for long. As according to Munske (1994: 8) France was sceptical about the united Germany's future role in Europe.

1.3 The Two-Plus-Four Agreement

The pace of events startled even the leaders of Soviet Union, France, UK and USA who then realized the inevitability of the unification. Then on, whatever stumbling blocks remained were removed outside the Two Plus Four structure wherein Gorbachev conceded the membership of NATO and agreed to the systematic removal of Soviet troops. This embossed not just the formal curtaining of the post-war period, but also the end of the terrible legacy of the World War I and the rounding up of a century of authoritarianism. Whereas, on the official plank, the Two-Plus-Four treaty came into force on September 12, 1990, wherein, under Article 1, the borders of the reunited Germany were acknowledged in a definitive way with special emphasis in keeping the sovereignty of Poland intact. Article 2, ensured that the governments of FRG and GDR remains peaceful and exhibits aggression only in commensuration with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 3, carried the candid intention of both the governments of Germany to inhibit their military strength and capacity to rearm. Article 5 involved the orderly retreat of the Soviet troops. Complementarily, Articles 6 and 7 bestows upon unified Germany the right to be in alliances as a full sovereign nation. This made the project of reunification an object of international acceptance removing the slightest particle of doubt in its fruition.

Meanwhile, in the whirlpool of incidents, it was quickly forgotten that the GDR reformers were not against unification per se, but against the event occurring on terms of the FRG. Subsequently, they were accused of having no inkling of the mood of the people, perfidious and bearing Stalinist loyalties. Their fate was finally sealed by the elections of March 1990 which discredited the SED, slammed them of corruption and enraged the mass. After preliminary cleaning of the inside and shuffling of its leaders, Hans Modrow became the Prime Minister. He steadfastly proposed a contractual agreement between the two German states and pointed to the possibility of a German confederation so as to achieve economic support from the Federal Republic and the

European Community at large. He went on to favour unification as the only way to salvage an imminent collapse of the country's economy. A grand coalition of parties was formed for the purpose which obviously inclined toward an economic and currency union along with the eking out of the federative structure whereby the newly formed Laender was poised to join the Federal Republic. Kohl responded promptly in proffering multiple arrangements ranging from immediate assistance to the establishment of the community on contract as was thought of by Modrow and the buildout of the confederative frameworks between the two German states in order to make a federation.

The continuation of the Two Plus Four negotiations was interspersed with the signing of the treaty between East and West Germany setting July 1, 1990 as the implementation date for the currency, economic and social union conjoined with a sumptuous economic aid and reconstruction package. The agreed union thus, marked the obliteration of the GDR as a sovereign entity as the intra-border controls were also to cease on the same date. The same month, its parliament re-established the Laender of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt to merge them into the new sovereign entity. The sheer rapidity of the events leading up to the unification overlooked the compositional lacunas which in the long run proved to be counter-productive. The shortcut via Article 23 instead of 146 might have come handy yet, later on created serious face-off between the people of the east and the west. The moment of ecstasy blew away all the elements of amorphousness to instil the spirit of celebration into the zone of plenty. Surreptitiously entered the forces of calibration to test the sinews of the multitude in combatting the social, cultural and economic dyspepsia briskly unnerving the nodes of integration. *Wende* was followed by *beitritt* (accession) where uniquely enough an institution passed its own death warrant as well as its nation to conjure up the desire of unity. The gradual development of the events had made accession synonymous with unification which is evocative of the internal and external domain of this phenomenon. A comprehensive study of the componential aspects becomes necessary to construct an inextricable proximity among the citizens cohabiting in an unbreakable space.

Unfortunately, fissiparous tendencies entered from different quarters to rupture the chords of the union and disorient the general ambience of consolidation into prolong fragmentation. A feeling of estrangement crept into the minds of the east Germans

who recently surrendered their home and hearth for the indomitable craving of dwelling in togetherness. Forty years of separation and that too under opposing military blocs reinforced by the sense of second class citizens accompanied by the west German's irritation at what they perceive as east German ungratefulness made the actual occurrence of unification in not only body but in mind a lengthy proposition. Therefore, the wistful looking back to the days before the *Wende* forms an escape way from the grinding reality of economic hardships and social exclusion. The increase in imbalance multiplied the ingredients of fragmentation keeping the people of the two regions at tenterhooks of expectations. In this atmosphere of disruption, normalization is the one thing that the people of the east craves the most. A repressive past, continuous hardships and the pain of reunification became too unbearable for the passing of their days.

Helmut Kohl calculated the situation in the east would move briskly toward collapse mainly because of its anaemic economy. Simultaneously, the efforts to successfully unite the two regions into a homogenous whole would bring out the ghost of German question once again into the centre of international agenda. Therefore, to continue with his plans in an undeterred manner, he floated the idea of binding reunification of a country with that of the continent as two sides of the same coin. This gave him a discourse and permitted him the domestic legitimacy to pursue his pro-European convictions in the fiscal issue area, thereby, defy the German financial elite and justify his actions to the voters. This facilitated the peaceful transition of GDR from a socialist country to being absorbed into its democratic counterpart. It was some sort of an extrication volatilizing the entire governing edifice into the stronger inorganic compound of liberalism thereby, creating a whole new stable substance of governance. It had the elements of thick base sprayed with the clean fluids of transparency, law, egalitarianism and justice. The emerging new Federal Republic was an alchemic entity transmuting the bureaucratic power into property and influence.

In fact, Pulzer (1996: 303) argues that the new Germany is the first true nation-state in German history and in that sense unification has achieved the German quest for normality. It gives an air of certainty that they will stay firmly locked within the EU and NATO structures ending the romanticising with *Sonderweg* (exceptional path). Salewski also saw in the unification the definitive solution of the German question, putting an end to its struggle for place in Europe which lasted at least 300 years (1993; vol. 2: 428). Unified Germany in the eyes of H. A. Winkler is a post-classic nation-state

which had to relinquish certain attributes of a sovereign state due to the mechanics of division and unification. According to Femke Van Esch (2012: 45), it mingled into the cult of the Europatriotism vanquishing the dogma of sound economics. This gave the Federal Republic the leverage to dominate not only the international scenario following the reunification but also consolidate its position in the European continent itself staving off resistances from within as well without. A huge body of multitude mixed themselves into a strange new terrain sacrificing their very own socio-cultural nook indicates a desperate urge to unshackle not so much their way of life as to taste the optimal level of material prosperity. This made the mood to oscillate between euphoria and disillusionment. They were caught up in the eternal dilemma of to do or not to do which overlooked the unavoidable hurdles conjoined with the systemic alterations required in both parts of Germany. There was a time when Chancellor Kohl in an official statement to the Bundestag on 21 June 1990 envisaged an undivided bond in the commercial, economic and social sectors of the two German states. This to him was an opportunity for the provinces of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia to become prosperous zones knowing full well that it was quite an uphill task. However, his doughty confidence not only made the process of reunification an unmixed success, but was all the more commensurate with *zeitgeist* (the spirit of the time). Still, belying the presumptions of clarity, the positivistic assurance faded into the cloud of delayed unfulfillment. The single most vital element of duration required to catch up with the advance zone seemed a distant reality. Hence, a huge gap was created between the words of the Chancellor with that of the ground reality. Gradually, these parts in the east, experienced the spectre of deindustrialisation where booming terrains no longer indicated remodelled villages, throbbing cities and prosperous merchandising fields. Contrarily, it became synonymous with abandoned production outlays and assembling business units steadily recaptured by Mother Earth. On closer observation it was seen that the east Germans, in many cases, found not much of a difficulty in the changed conditions surviving commendably well than was surmised to any fair degree. In fact, there was not much of a disquiet regarding the re-joining of the regions. The people of east Germany was optimistic about the social and political alteration with surveys depicting an overwhelming consensus in favour of reunifying Germany. There was indeed a near absence of secessionist and retarding tendencies, surprisingly enough through the entire cross-section of the society and political parties. Accordingly, the sense of disenchantment, if any, is not borne out of a

feeling of demur to reunify, rather it was primarily an associative occurrence seeded in the dismay of the hard economic infirmities encircling reunification. By mid-90s, the systemic and conventional shift being more or less over, the people started to cope up with the milieu so as to train themselves as indispensable part of the new framework. Resting on the magnitude of triumph or misfortune the changed environment could well be seen as a fortune, an opportunity and a test, or as a load, interdiction, anguish and the termination of any plan of past life. The two further aspects of integration have been the attempt to fuse the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, and the reorganisation of local government within Berlin. However, many from the east were not ready to accept unification with a city that they saw as dominated by west Berliners. Though both parliaments approved the move, by the required majorities, yet the referenda in May 1996 saw 63 percent of Brandenburgers reject the move, as against 53 percent of Berliners (mostly west Berliners) favouring. This has led to the snowballing of the whole project.

According to Jarausch (2010: 500), in contrast to Bismarck's conquest of Germany, the restoration of the national state in 1990 was neither an outcrop of a powerful national movement nor the consequences of three successful wars. Further, Jarausch (2010: 500) argued that it materialised from the confluence of the democratic awakening of the East Germans as also the manoeuvring of the governments in Bonn, Washington and Moscow. Grassroots explanation nullifies both these interpretations and sees the protest of the people as an outburst against the consistent scheme of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation) by the SED alongside Stasi vigilance which nought national unity. In complete disrespect of the popular sentiment, Honecker jettisoned Kohl's idea of an undivided community and interpreted his coming to Bonn in 1987 as revamping the distinctiveness of the two German states. The tearing down of the Wall came as a stolid sign of victory for the agitating mass who took it as their own victory against internal and external pressures. In their enthusiasm they failed to realize that the turn of the events moulded by intentions and accidents were rolling that way. Their role was to fill up the spaces in swarming numbers thinking all the time as to have made the fundamental difference. Aided by *Begreussungsgeld*¹ (welcoming money). They poured into the much fabled land of prosperity and was mesmerized by its glitter.

¹ Especially money awarded once yearly to visitors entering the FRG from the GDR prior to unification.

Consequently, it changed the slogans from we are the people to we are one people, forcing the authorities to frantically alter the plans for a gradual reconciliation of the two Germanies. The developments were so brisk as to make the promises of the West German authorities look like hollow rhetoric having no practical preparations. For it took the Chancellor about twenty-one days three weeks following the fall of the Wall to rise up to the occasion and make reunification a reality in advancing from confederation to federation of both the Germanies. Executed through the extension of the Basic Law to the new states, it catered for not only the protection of human rights but transformed an arbitrary legal system into a functioning *Rechtsstaat*² (constitutional state). This *Zeitenwende* (turn of the eras) altered the political map of the northern hemisphere.

Reunification finally overcame the hiatus in supplying a convenient terminal to a native rendering of regal conceit, Weimar failure, Third Reich misdemeanour, GDR fallacious beginning and ultimate FRG salvation. As Dellenbaugh (2013: 24) quoted Jarausch in his writing that starting from the nadir of inhuman crimes and shattering defeat, it gradually recovered self-esteem through political Westernization and democratization and was eventually rewarded for its recivilization by the overthrow of Communism and reunification with the Eastern states. Further, as Kaiser (1991: 204) has argued that the new united Federal Republic is as much an outcome of an international constellation as the old one of 1949. Neither came as the product of an outside diktat. Rather each emerged in conjunction with legitimizing domestic forces, contested in the days of Adenauer, but endorsed in 1989-90 by a consensus of the major political parties.

1.4 Argumentative Framework of the Study

There is an immense ocean of literature which delves into the plethora of social, cultural and economic issues concerning unification. The uncountable waves of this scholarship continuously wafted against the incidents created by this unique phenomenon to measure its effects in the lives of both the east and west Germans. A great majority of the works concentrated on the immediate impact it had on the society and economy with special emphasis on the distinct culture of the east compared to that of the west.

² It tends to restrict the power of the government through legal bindings which has some connection with the Anglo-American concept of the rule of law. Here, the citizens enjoy civil liberties based on law and are entitled to use the courts. It is actually considered to be a precondition for a liberal democracy in the writings of Immanuel Kant who was, in turn, inspired by the French and American constitutions in the late eighteenth century.

This is not to say that there were not many studies which focused on the long-term repercussions of unification on the lives of the Germans as a whole. While carefully deducing the events conjuring up to reunification, they brought in elements of induction to scrutinize the forces actively working behind a host of occurrences which ultimately went on to make this a historic moment. The indelible impression eked out in the minds of the people is refracted through the prism of identity, consciousness, customs, nuances, behaviours, feelings and visions of the Germans. Therein, the condition of the east Germans demands a greater amount of attention in experiencing the transition which affected in more than one ways their entire paradigm of life.

Argumentatively, the pulling down of the Wall corroborated a deep sensation of unity among the residents of the two regions of Germany. This has been iterated through such utterances from the people of east as we are the people. Here, one can insinuate the burgeoning sense of togetherness rippling through the various avenues of requirements to meet in unison. This flow of unity however, met with some obstacles when the people of west Germany said, so are we. Immediately, it flashed some fractures reflecting a deep social lacuna amongst the Germans. The citizens in the east enthusiastically participated in protests so as to reunite Germany seldom knowing that they are inflicting upon themselves the pain of self-victimization. The ensuing social cleavage and its concomitant differences in perspectives was also reflected in the satirical dramas and the political cabarets of the time. The memories from state socialism to that of the continuing experience under the unification projected the cultural milieu of *Trotzidentität* (identity of contrariness), *Ostalgie*³ (nostalgia for the erstwhile state of East Germany) and *Ossi* (east) pride. This created a self-awaking, an urge to revisit the past and developed a positive mindset toward to the derisive western stereotype. This, to some extent, helped in maintaining a stream of cultural exclusivity amidst the bellowing wave of symbiosis unfurled by the process of unification. Before there was any hope of uniting the country as a *Staatsnation* (a politically unified entity), the notion of being a German, resided almost completely in the kernel of *Kulturnation* (cultural nation). Unification harped considerably on this particular sentiment as a potential tool to overcome the obvious social and economic disunity of the people. However, those did not go on to praise the national categories of the east, undermining their legitimacy

³ It is a strong desire to return in thought and/or in actuality to a former time in one's life. An immense sentimental yearning for the enjoyment of a former place or time.

in disavowing erstwhile sovereignty creating unease about the upsurge in the beginning of 1989 under “springtime of peoples” (Galecki td. by Tymowski 2009: 510). It was a time when as argued by Florczuk et al. (2011: 11) that neither Honecker’s speech nor press publications managed to convince east Germans that their country reaps more benefits than west Germany. Since 1989, east German residents had been deserting on a mass scale to the west via Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the socialist German state which invited Mikhail Gorbachev, simply revealed once more the helplessness of the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Under the very nose of the official celebrations, the crowd went out onto the streets chanting exacting change and incanting slogan as quoted by Florczuk et al. (2011: 11) “*Wir sind das Volk*” (“We are the People”).

After reunification, the east Germans faced a deluge of social problems. In the growing mass of literature, time and again, the issues of identity, satisfaction and/or happiness, researchers have been given particular attention as the plausible determinants and investigative agents enhancing social welfare. The collapse of the socialist regime in east Germany and the concomitant German reunification have given an impetus to economists for indulging in empirical studies to ascertain the profitability of the entire scheme. They prodded into the variables of human life to extract the degree of life satisfaction as an entrenched proxy measure for utility following reunification (Frijters et al. 2004: 22). The conditions created by the Bonn government was one of politically overpowering the East German government. The East German leadership in turning a deaf ear to the Soviet premonitions continued to defend its Westpolitik for accelerating growth particularly in the manufacturing industry (Paquè, 1998: 5). Certainly, a prerequisite of stability in the region was economic development. But Honecker’s forthcoming trip to West Germany was in all cases, inclined as a personal success of his policy and a symbolic political action aiming toward a holistic approach to propel the economy throughout central Europe in a self-sustaining mode (Hoelscher and Hochberg [eds.], 1998: 24). Framing of demand-oriented economic policy meant distributing presents among the mass only in their unknowing recovering through other means. The annulment of this mirage would expose the frailty of the ruling authority which would in turn, stop the flow of fund in healthier times. It would also corrode the distributive capacity in increasing the supply irrespective of the nature of demand. Lingering differences between East and West, originating from two opposing political

systems became prominent in voting behaviour, institutional commitment and voluntary work as well as in the lackadaisical attitude towards the state, economy and society. In these fields there were fewer elements of conformity for the past twenty years. Though attitudes have changed one way or another since 1990 and sometimes have even come closer, the gap in the minds and political opinions still remains (Schroeder, 2010: 2). As Glorious (2010: 2) has rightly pointed out that more than twenty years after German reunification there are still socio-economic disparities between east and west German regions. Large parts of east Germany appear as economically disadvantaged with high unemployment rates and high share of its population living on transfers. As Wagstyl (2014: 2) has argued that while Germany has made huge progress boosting economic output by investing in infrastructure and improving living standards in the former GDR, gross domestic product per head in the East in 2013 is still 66 percent of that in Western Germany.

It could also well be panned-out that post-unification, the scale of migration among the east Germans registered a significant rise. Naturally, movers in those early years of enthusiasm came to enjoy a higher level of life with respect to those who stayed back. Despite that the average magnitude of satisfaction toward life for them after 1990 was characterised by a steady increase. There are few, if any, grounds for animosity or tension based on ethnic and frontier questions between Germany and its neighbours. There was an overwhelming consensus within the new federation about the nature of its state organisation (Marrs, 2007: 103). Amongst all the European countries, Germany has been one of the most favoured destinations of asylum-seekers since its regulations are the most liberal on the continent. The country's reputation as a land of high wages and generous social welfare benefits encouraged an influx of political and economic refugees (Jain, 1993: 20). However, there was quite a hard strain on Germany's social structure because many processes of integration have to be tackled at the same time: Aussiedler (ethnic Germans), Übersiedler (residents of the former East Germany), asylum seekers, labour migrants and their kin, plus refugees. In a total population of almost 80 million there are more than 7 million foreign migrants and if one counts the Aussiedler as well, one touches a figure of 10 million immigrants. Conversely, looking at reunification as a process of migration — not as a migration of people but that of structures and institutions which have separated people from their former environment and made them quite ignorant of their present, it can be seen as creating problems and

challenges of integration similar to other migratory movements (Heckmann, 1995: 2). In the same tune as Canning (1997: 2) quoted Mushaben in her writing that similarly, the increasing mobility forced upon east Germans the syndrome of fast disappearing jobs in their hometowns, thoroughly disrupted the social relations that cumulatively made up a community's social capital.

Arguably, on the economic plane, the *Treuhandanstalt* (the trust agency) regulated the property of the erstwhile East Germany resulting in numerous loss of jobs as most of the regional enterprises became dysfunctional. There was massive unemployment with hundreds of workshops becoming idle in the instant wake of reunification. Moreover, as Silver (2010: 172) quoted Diewald et al. that on a cumulative basis, between 1989 and 1993, jobs in the East fell by one-third, instigating the German champions of banana freedom to launch a counter-offensive aimed at exploiting all possible sources to keep the flow of revenues intact in face of this larger decline. Else, not only would the new tariff have send banana prices skyrocketing reducing imports, trade officials warned, but would have further caused the modest Germans to lose a particularly important source of nourishment. As Rodden (2001: 69) quoted from the *Bild* (literally picture, a german newspaper) that tennis star Boris Becker faithfully eats two bananas per day stressing the preventive medicinal powers of bananas. It argued that the magnesium and Vitamin B6 in bananas made them a lifesaver against everything from heart attacks to mild immunological deficiencies. Moreover, the German Interior Ministry predicted that the EU measure would force Latin American banana farmers to switch to growing coca to survive, ultimately causing a flood of cheap cocaine into Europe. In the findings of Galecki (2009: 510) as is translated by Tymowski, it comes out that the East Germans paid a price for the shortcut. The leap to the kingdom of freedom with its competitive market was an opportunity but, at the same time, a predicament. History, it seemed, wants to punish those who believe that the blooming landscapes promised by the Chancellor of unification, Helmut Kohl, can be established by means of a few political and administrative decisions. The coldly rational scenario for integrating two dissimilar societies failed to take account of the fact that, unlike the factories that were boosting the production statistics of German export, democracy cannot be built on an empty field.

Women can arguably be figured amongst the biggest losers of unification. The right to free day-care as was the right to terminate a pregnancy became things of some hoary

past. Also vanished the twenty-eight weeks of paid maternity leave. These were painful adjustments in a nation where one-third of mothers were single (Marvin in Greisman, 1995: 48). Among the most unpleasant spectres facing the women of the old GDR was chronically unemployed men. These husbands and live-in boyfriends would come home from work one day, pink slip in hand and begin to experience most of the problems unemployed men do anywhere, including becoming increasingly difficult to live with. Germany is not a nation that traditionally accepts idleness among its males neither does it have a culture which rewards men for assisting in homemaker and child-care tasks (Marvin in Greisman, 1995: 48). Many families now have two jobless parents. The effect on east Germany in general can be inferred from a birth rate that has fallen precipitously since reunification. (Meyer and Schulze, 1998: 106). It has already been noted that GDR women were big losers after reunification. One has only to examine the figures of prostitution to realize how far the situation for some women deteriorated. It is chiefly women who have been harmed by cutbacks in subsidies for parenthood, child care facilities, reduced employment opportunities in the trades and professions and repeal of the divorce and abortion statutes. In an authoritarian system where cradle-to-the grave services ministered to social needs, seeking out health care, insurance savings instruments employment housing and education all were taken care of by the state freedom of choice entailed for them a bewildering market with terrifying consequences. Many pensioners suffered forced evacuation from their Berlin apartments as rents skyrocketed and dowdy neighbourhoods became chic residential districts. This created justifiable panic. As far as the marketplace was concerned, the elderly had no future, making way for the young who are flexible, energetic, and productive. But the latter, too, have had obstacles placed in their way since the GDR's demise with guarantees of steady employment on the wane and much of the work that is offered is part time insecure, and underpaid. (Greisman, 2001: 50). Further as Beck et al. (2006: 7) put it from Puhmann that informal social networks could also be established in many active labour market measures, qualification measures and other groups and/or associations. Further education, in particular, was seen to had significant effects in reversing isolation brought on by unemployment. In doing so, there was no competition between the participants but rather encouragement to exchange and pool experience and strategies in the struggle for jobs on the labour market. One woman recalled how, on an accounting course, she learnt how to apply for jobs and about employment practices from other participants and their experience.

The German government invariably speaks of the need to combat extremism of the left and the right in the same breath. To that extent, the comment of the Federal Minister of the Interior Manfred Kanther: ‘We must fight extremism from the right as well as the left with determination’ (The Guardian, 25 February 1995: 13 in Parkes, 1997: 68) is poignant given the banning of the neo-Nazi *Freie Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (Free German Worker’s Party) in 1995. He further said that in the pre-unification Federal Republic the equating of both political extremes had its roots in the anti-communism of the Cold War and an interpretation of German history that held both the Nazis and the communists responsible for the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Although the Weimar KPD was anything but an exemplary democratic party, this interpretation of history overlooks the basic point that it was the Nazis who came to power in 1933 with the active help of traditional conservative forces. Nevertheless, there was left-wing extremism in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of the Baader-Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction⁴ and its various successors (Marrs, 2007: 65). Many juveniles were compelled to move out of their villages to that of the towns to earn more in different sectors. Paradoxically, for many of the east German enterprises this created a dearth of native employees who could have performed in the fresher category compelling them to look toward Czech Republic and Poland.

However, the de-escalation in brutalities failed to reduce the fear of xenophobia among right-wings or the people. Some self-styled neo-Nazis seemed to remain perennially in west and the east with arms and ammunitions who, publicity papers, swastikas and fronts of Hitler in their flats and/or sheds, occasionally seized by police raids. As a comprehensive approach, the *Verfassungsschutz* (the intelligence service) built-up a special unit to tackle such incidents and absolved very many such outfits. Among them were the volatile skinheads functioning in little clusters to direct their fatal enmity mostly at immigrants and refugee hostels which were attacked and/or arson. Motivations generate both from alcoholism and the mental catalyst of juvenile coordination with a general ideological coat of chauvinism. There is however, a dissimilarity between an own outburst in opposition to multitude of colour and a wide

⁴ Actually the Red Army Faction in its early stages was commonly called as the Baader-Meinhof Gang. It was a West German far-left militant group which had the support of the Stasi.

cult rationalizing anti-foreigner hatred as a kind of welfare chauvinism⁵. As Merkl in his foreword in the book by Braunthal (2009: X) argued that there is a mistaken belief that these migrants and refugees receive public benefits above and beyond what the frequently unemployed and down-and-out right-wing skinheads get. In east German urban ghettos and small towns, they also feud with young socialists who like to wear their hair in dreadlocks as a kind of uniform. In some east German locations, extreme right coordination is so dominant it creates a terror regime for leftists and people of colour. Even the DVU and NPD are not sure how they can integrate the unruly skinheads into their political activities. Before considering whether these intermittent successes for far right parties represent any threat to German democracy, it is necessary to consider whether such parties can be classified as neo-Nazi. In their public discourse they generally try to avoid direct adulation of the Nazis, while at the same time using nationalist rhetoric that is reminiscent of Nazi propaganda in its demands that German interests should have top priority. Thus there are claims that Germany is swamped by foreigners, whose main priority is criminal activity that Germany kowtows to foreigners in international organizations, while German soldiers in the Second World War are to be regarded as heroic defenders of the fatherland against communism. Even if it would be wrong to conclude that all those who vote for extreme right-wing parties are unrepentant neo-Nazis, there is enough that is distasteful in their rhetoric to make any protracted success they might enjoy a genuine source of worry (Parkes, 1997: 67). The roots of this violence in east Germany lie in the sudden slicing of the two Germanies, which ushered in momentous turns in the way of life of the east—unemployment, higher rents, financial difficulties, an identity crisis and elimination of cradle-to-grave social security benefits. These symptoms permeate all and sundry. The disappointment and vexation of the young is increased by social rootlessness and impatience with the slow and painful process of reconstructing east Germany. Extremists have been encouraged by a demoralized, incompetent and negligent police force in East Germany which has failed to effectively stop or slow the wave of right-wing violence (Jain, 1993: 22).

The arrival of the groupuscular faction of self-determining advocates of political freedom is related to the particular context of the resurgence of the subculture of neo-

⁵ Mainly a political notion which professes that the welfare benefits should only be enjoyed by the natives of a country and not the immigrants. It supports the concept of sustaining the natives by exhausting the foreigners.

Nazism reunified Germany. The 1990s saw a rise not only of neo-fascist organizations, primarily through the party political platform of the *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland* (The National Democratic Party of Germany). There is also a rising trend of a more militant nationalism leading to ethnocentrism and race snobbery. According to Schlembach (2013: 301) that is where one can witness the (re)emergence of a self-proclaimed national-revolutionary movement. This has helped to put a renewed emphasis on social-revolutionary politics in some neo-Nazi scenes. German militant neo-Nazis are often organised in so called *Freie Kameradschaften* (free fellowship). Further, Schlembach (2013: 304) argued in line with Atkinson, Heitmeyer and Kurthen et al. that since reunification, there has been a wealth of research about racist street violence perpetrated by Germany's extreme right. Here, most research and media attention has focused on anti-foreigner violence triggered by high-profile attacks, riots and murders of asylum seekers and other foreigners such as those in Rostock, Moelln or Hoyerswerda in the 1990s. These were characterized by a passive tolerance, and in some cases participation, by bystanders, and thus a blurring of the boundaries between organized extreme right activists and nationalist locals and youths. Violence here became more generalized than that perpetrated by activists with connections to the resurgent fascist movement belying the projection of *Machtvergessenheit* (obliviousness to power) (Kaiser, 1990: 205).

1.5 Aims and Objectives of the Study

German reunification is an act of uniting the two countries, 'East' and 'West' Germany in breaking down Wall in 1989 and the subsequent evaporation of the East German Regime. On the night of 2nd and 3rd October, 1990, a sea of multitude gathered to rejoice the reunification of the two German states at the Republic Square in Berlin. The unification of east with that of the west is one of the most important historical milestones of the European history post-1945. However, it is not possible to narrow down circumstances preceding this historical event to the time period between two great events. This entire incident not only reunited, but at the same time, led bare the vast differences between the two states in socio-cultural and economic aspects. This unequal merger of two very different societies led to many paradoxes like the financial condition of the pensioners of the east being quite sound threw them into unconducive social conditions. Women became under-represented in decision-making, both in the political and economic arenas. Though they managed to caught up with men in relation to

educational attainment, however, went on to encounter discriminatory behaviour at different moments in the course of their life. Further, the integration of their labour market has mainly occurred through employment, managing to provide only scant working hours and low wages. This study endeavours to focus on the structure of the proportion as to how women tackle the risk of poverty at the age of retirement? Especially, in the hindsight of high unemployment rates in the new federal states of the east which in part, also tended to increase. Moreover, the transferring of conventions from West Germany as regards joint taxation and reduced support in the segment of free childcare had far-reaching consequences. The private sphere of the family life was pulverized in the increasing rate of divorce and accelerating alcoholic abuse of the menfolk. These issues need to be adequately addressed. The factor(s) leading to the dwindling condition of the elderly women despite enjoying a stable pecuniary freedom shall also be accounted for so as to unfold the issues toward a logical destination. This work will further try to discuss the concurrent right-wing radical scenario in Germany after it became one in 1990. After 1945, mainly three vital right-radical parties, neo-Nazi outfits and skinhead clusters threatened the regime in West Germany, while rightist young organizations came up in the east. Reunification created acute economic hiccups in economy and society which adversely affected the young generation there. Consequently, brutalities against non-natives, socialists, transgender, nomads, the vagrant and ruin at Jewish places registered a significant rise. Rightist groups tried to get hold of favour among the youths with a camaraderie of media instruments cashing in on the feeling of threat by the youth of the east. This led to multiple incidents of violence, terrorism and neo-Nazi activities ever since unification. Attention will also be given as regards the solution behind the non-engendering of extreme hate toward the Extremists as also dealing with the debate on whether indeed the hate-crime was on the rise, or whether simply more arrests have been made due to increased law enforcement effort.

This study will try to evaluate by employing the tools of deduction and induction, the social and economic condition of the east German people after the unification. While bringing about the shift of the political apparatus, establishments and administrative rules from the west to the east it entrenched the chasm 'we—they'. It was further strengthened with multiple cliché like good as to 'us' and bad as to 'them'. The common dislike for the socialist regime among the west Germans in general, engendered a

cumulative disaffection towards all the east Germans. Conversely, the idealized picture of the Federal Republic which people of east had adored was changed with a blend of disaffection. The results of the analysis will be treated as proof of a causal connection between the bonds in society and the state of economy in the region. The study seeks to evaluate the policy measures taken by Helmut Kohl to deal with diverse social dimensions after unification. After the unification, the migrations of east Germans led to a tremendous identity crisis over the east. This study will try to highlight the increasing social disparities between the east and the west Germans.

The analytical structure of this research will help to make an in-depth study of the issues involved in the impact of unification on the social life of the east Germans after unification. This would let one understand the beginning of the relationship and its various facets. A critical study of the reunification will provide a vivid picture of the social conditions of the east Germans post-reunification. The Germans from the east are perceived in the west as hesitant, unadaptable, compliant and unenthusiastic. The incongruity between the state of things in politics and society stalls the formation of a Pan-German singularity.

The objective of this study could be said to lie in examining the consequences of one of the major historical events in the socio-political and economic domain that might have shaped out a major outcome among the people of the reunified Germany. As also in the effort to showcase the tussles, turmoil and the triumph of the people in an undivided land making it a determined destination. In the process, it may have that much of potential to become a source of inspiration and a model-study evoking future enquiry from scholars showing interest to work in similar fields.

Chapter 2

Socio-Economic Impact of German Unification

2.1 Introduction

This chapter tries to analyse the various facets of the social life of the east Germans after unification of the Federal Republic in 1990. The plethora of changes experienced by them in the new domain along with the lingering continuities provides the main crust of the challenges confronting them in their daily livelihood. Born and reared up in the cocoon of protection and provision, they were suddenly pulverized into the whirlwind of competition and calculation. The liberal social ambience guided by the unbridled individual prosperity was propelled by the laissez-faire approach which brought in possibilities through rigorous harnessing of oneself in the ever unsecured zone of effort. A slight loathness could fling one into the dark alleys of socio-cultural estrangement and penury.

The state having had to play no role in the framing of the daily businesses made the east Germans even more sceptical about the ethical standards of the Federal Republic. They began to live in panic of losing any moment the bare minimum necessities of life putting their very survival at stake. This constant fear of the present uncertainties put them back into the serenity of the lost past as an escaping avenue to draw some solace out of it. The near-absence of the state in one's life, the social exclusionary treatment meted out to them by the fellow west Germans and the existent cultural incompatibility compelled the majority of the east Germans to withdraw into their own mental spaces of hopes, expectations, dreams and imaginations so as to justify their decision to integrate with the west. This made them morose, hallucinatory, delusive and cynical.

The issue of migration is discussed as a concomitant consequence of reunification. The stream of east Germans pouring into west German territory as one people belonging to a united nation. Reunification, however, altered the situation significantly in automatic channelization of the flow toward the east. Various expectations led to a sizeable number of people pouring in from the east to the west. Among them mainly securing a respectable job and enjoyment of the civic liberties in an unchained figured fundamentally.

The issue of the economic reconstruction also forms an inextricable part of the general impact upon the society from the point of view of the east Germans who spent almost half a century under the paternalistic care of the state. They used to live an all-encompassing social life where financial security mingled into the real existent collectivism. In the new federation, they confronted absolute segregation of the social from the economic. The cult of individualism was girdled in the explorations of the self into an unfriendly world where the strategies of survival is spangled with the predicaments of unknown dangers which could push a man into alleys of unending hardships. Poverty, hunger, penury, insolvency and vagrancy are some of the outcomes offered by the forces of liberal market economy. Economy, as one of the social disciplines, was a major linchpin of the entire project of reunification. The prospects of unbridled prosperity and freedom made the people of the east crave for integration with the west. Their eagerness to unite in overlooking the existing problems whatsoever, was due to the tinkering of the coins as if beckoning them into a magical portal of everlasting comfort and luxury.

2.2 Impact on Social Life

The long and arduous reunification process began in 1989 with the famous ten-point agenda of the then Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Notwithstanding the opposition of France and England, he went onto stress the importance of a united Germany facilitating the burgeoning of the European Union. At around the same time, USSR as a socialist power began to lose much of its weight on account of irreparable institutional weaknesses. Gorbachev tried to salvage the crisis in bringing about domestic and foreign policy reforms. This led to the policy of maximum non-interference in the communist bloc which encouraged the Central and East European States to break free of the socialist shackles into the realm of freedom and democracy. The German Democratic Republic(GDR) was no exception where the people too, went into the streets demanding freedom on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the socialist rule under Honecker which was at that time being graced by Gorbachev.

Kohl was pragmatic enough to take advantage of this situation in forwarding his plan of unification as a viable option of not only pacifying the turbulent weather in Europe but also to calm the international climate. The fall of Honecker not only created a power vacuum, but a dissolution of the politico-administrative machinery of GDR. The

immediate effect of which was a mass exodus of people into west Germany where the federal government provided them prompt assistance along with humanitarian aid and medical provisions. Steps were also taken to merge east into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) making it a single entity. Cooperation was extended in the economic, scientific-technological, communication, environmental and cultural fields. This automatically set into motion an irreversible transformation in the political and economic system with the GDR leadership forging a constitutional and an electoral change. It meant free, equal and secret multi-party elections doing away with party monopoly and subsequent release of all political prisoners with the abolition of such draconian laws. Given the proximity of both states in Germany and the special character of the relationship between them an even tighter network of agreements was framed within the kernel of contractual community. This was thought of as envisaging new forms of institutional cooperation being the harbinger of a confederative structure.

The merging of the two parts was seen as a development of the inter-German relation embedded in the pan-European process. Here, the West is already considered a pacesetter to platter out lasting and just European order of peace. The project of unification could best be interpreted as an assimilative phenomenon once again bringing together historically rooted people thereby, overcoming the Cold War⁶ division of Europe. It was further connected with the expansion of the European community which Kohl is of the opinion could be done in not only preserving the cultural diversity, but promoting basic rights of freedom, democracy, human rights and self-determination. He sought to push forward the CSCE⁷ architecture in further fostering East-West cooperation in multiple fields. Still, in many quarters, the possibility of a united Germany ignited disturbing memories of the two World Wars and Holocaust⁸. Thus, to get rid of this seemingly eternal cross of albatross and assuage the detractors Kohl favoured disarmament and arms control. In the Vienna Conference, he supported the idea of reducing conventional forces in Europe along with efforts

⁶ A state of political and military tension after the Second World War between powers of the Western Bloc (the US, its NATO allies and others) and powers in the Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact).

⁷ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in the backdrop of the Cold War in the Finnish capital Helsinki, in the year 1975 as a mechanism of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation could not become operational due to super-power rivalry.

⁸ It is a Greek word which means “the Catastrophe”, was a genocide in which Adolf Hitler exterminated a massive number of Jews in and around Germany.

toward confidence-building measures, reduction of nuclear capabilities and world-wide ban on chemical weapons. United States of America (USA) played a pivotal role in making the plan of unification a reality. The organic unity sought and explained by Kohl was made acceptable to the powers around the world only by the continuous stolid presence of the American leadership. Eventually, an atmosphere of mutual trust and amicability was created in which the merger occurred.

The genesis of 3 October, 1990 was however, not the one expected by the German leadership along with the teeming millions on both side of the border who were ecstatic about the *Einheit* (unity). Celebrations had hardly died when many east Germans began to witness many discordances among the attitude of the people of the west reflecting internal fissures. Earlier, opinion polls from the second half of the 1980s did exhibit that the feeling of national solidarity with the east Germans developed more among the old (90 percent) than the young (65 percent) considering themselves as members of the 'one' German people. Thirty-four percent of young west Germans began with the assumption that two German people existed. Between 1976 and 1987, an average of 15 percent of those over sixty years of age considered the GDR an alien state; among young west Germans the number was a good 50 percent. An evaluation of the related data in the *Deutschland Archiv* (German archive) in 1989 showed that the GDR was seen by a significant chunk of the younger generation as a foreign nation with a different social order which was no longer a part of Germany. This, in the words of Silke Jansen, led to a breakdown in the consciousness of a national common ground and made room for constant mutual alienation. Generationally transcendental in nature, many from the east, in the newly created Federal Republic thought of the earlier division as a relief and the nation-state, at least the German variety, as the erroneous path. Guenter Grass went to the extent of justifying the segregated existence as the punishment for Auschwitz. If that is taken as an extreme, then also one could read the premonition in the lines of Goethe and Schiller⁹ written in 1796:

Your hope of shaping a nation,
Germans, in vain;

⁹ They were two formidable litterateurs associated with movements of 'Sturm und Drang' (Storm and Stress) and 'Weimar Classicism' who wrote, apart from on other things, profusely on German society and culture.

Instead shape yourselves ably

Into freer people!

It goes without saying that the ‘unity’ came as the fulfilment of the general will of the east Germans. Interestingly though, in the first phase of the November revolution of 1989, no one uttered any word about reunification. Civil rights leaders strove for a radical democratization of the GDR. They demanded internal self-determination by east Germans instead of national self-determination by the German people. Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the people of east Germany said, ‘We are the people’ wherein, the mass rejected the failed system of existent socialism¹⁰, including a possible third way between capitalism and socialism and coveted material equality with privileged Germans in the West. Naturally, under such circumstances, in reply the people of west Germany said, ‘So are We’. This immediately reflect a deep social divide amongst the Germans. Citizens in the east German part of the newly united Germany, even though they have helped bring about the final breakup of the GDR and its political order found themselves victims of overpowering, superior, unsympathetic and presumptuous *Besserwessis* (the all-knowing west german). Clichés of whining *Ossis* and arrogant *Wessis* spread quickly and were echoed in countless jokes. A public opinion poll taken by the Opinion Research Institute in Allensbach in April 1993 showed that only 22 percent of West Germans and 11 percent of East Germans answered that they felt together like Germans. Seventy-one percent of the old citizens and 85 percent of the new citizens of the Federal Republic saw themselves divided by “opposing interests” (Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “*Wirdsichjetzt fremd, was zusammengehört?*” *FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung*, 19 May, 1993). Given such differences, the German nation-state of 1990 is not a national power state, but an equal member of supranational communities. The visionary idea of a community “in which the free development of each is the free development of all”, (Marx and Engels, 1848: 27) became more of a utopia than ever before. Consequently, it led to a massive retreat into the private domain, centring the focus on family. Gardening and the construction of small county houses to spend the weekends away from the mainly dismal blocks of flats, physical activities and the participation in cultural affairs became major activities. It was a calm and fairly comfortable lifestyle, after all the basic needs were met

¹⁰ A fundamental criticism labelled against the unresponsiveness of the existing social relations creating organizational fatigue among the people in general followed inevitably by an authoritarian rule.

pertaining to social security. However, the frailty of this cocooned ambience was revealed later on. It became more perturbing to the mass when government displayed apathy in adopting Gorbachev's reform policies engendering resentment and strong protest. This unremitting reluctance coupled with the beginning exodus of people, brought on the '*Wende*' and eventually the unification.

Actually, a large number of east Germans in the newly formed Federal Republic were in doldrums regarding their national and personal identities. They wondered what voices and influences should be considered as representations of unity. Struggle ensued in negotiating between maintaining a sense of their own cultural heritage and adapting to a western German mentality. This voyage of self-discovery was further complicated by the feeling that the West was colonizing the East. Satirical humour illuminated these divisions and rivalries, caricaturing the participants in their ongoing identity negotiations and thereby depicting an east German identity based on what they should not become, from the point of view of the caricaturists: xenophobic vigilantes, west German impersonators and GDR historical revisionists. Inventing discursive constructions of "eastern Germaness"¹¹, they provided critical commentary on evolving social norms and hierarchies. The people of east, west and *Auslaendern* wrangled amongst themselves to formulate an inclusive culture.

After 1989 the speedy transformations of the *Wende* (Turn) period and the unification process caused great uncertainty for east Germans, unleashing long-simmering resentments, anxieties and rivalries. Humourists used this volatile time to reflect on existential questions and the potential for rectification of uncivil behaviours, prompted, among other causes, by xenophobia, because, although east and west Germans had their difficulties reuniting, they always recognized each other as fellow Germans. Immediately following the opening of the border, the desire to abolish all symbols of the forced separation was overwhelming. Watchtowers and sentry posts were among the first objects to be razed. Soon thereafter, the process that humans had started was taken over by natural forces, and Mother Nature¹² reasserted her dominion over politics,

¹¹ It is a kind of a complex relationship between artists and the state; oppositional and conformist art. Under 'Socialist Realism', it depicted everyday life in a Socialist System as beneficent for living and working. Popular material culture specialities included nudism and a nostalgic feeling toward the east.

¹² It is a common personification of nature concentrating on the life-giving and nurturing aspects impregnating and multiplying into flora and fauna.

replacing the man-made border with wetlands and wildlife. The physical destruction of the Wall did not automatically lead to the disappearance of it in their minds. Forty years of living within a specific system made them apprehensive of the situation of alteration following unification. Differences in ways, modes and existence surrounded them so much as to extricate them from the mainstream social mores of west Germany. The failure of memory to assist with the reorientation demanded in everyday life in post-wall east Germany, the task of commemoration and the controversial expression of *Ostalgie* (nostalgia for the east), or the nostalgia exhibited by the east Germans toward any aspect of life in the GDR is mainly borne out of distraught. The presentations were however, variegated in nature ranging from empathy to mockery where one is free to suppress and/or cherish the individual-collective position. Reunification brought the 'present' into the 'ephemeral' domain given the dynamicity of the events which could very well make a day old parchment obsolete. The persistent heckling of the west Germans toward the east Germans kept the mental divide so alive as to make the real comingling of the two parts an illusion. After 1989 as per Fulbrook "the asymmetry between young East and West Germans in levels of knowledge, interest, and sense of community with each other was very striking."¹³ Over the years, the rift in the attitude had remained and in the following of the daily mores have even increased. The air of superiority by the west Germans in every aspect of social and cultural life has retarded the process of acculturation. The arrogant, snobbish and temperamental behaviour of the west Germans compelled the people of the east to submerge themselves into the thoughts of the past to derive some happiness out of life.

After reunification, the east Germans began to believe more strongly that the inequalities in income is one of the main catalysts preventing the gelling of the two societies. This went on to increase the mental distance and disaffection that left the people of the west often wondering if the burdens of unification were worth the gain leaving a feeling of second class citizens for the east. It made them fall into a strain of selective nostalgia for some of the more comforting aspects of the old regime. In recent times, the magnitude of dejection is on the decline with an increasing trend toward inclusivity. Much of the moroseness is on the wane to emanate a feeling of genuine togetherness among the people of the east as an integral part of the German society given the continued increase in their satisfaction levels throughout the decade (Frijters

¹³Fulbrook, Mary (1999), *German National Identity After the Holocaust*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

et al. 2004: 8). Earlier, the mass opposition to the SED regime in the autumn of 1989 was largely inspired by a critical stance to the ruling elite. It could not realize the values it had publicly claimed to advance. Common aspirations for a better life furnished them with a general understanding of the good society and a sense of collective belonging which to their dismay became untenable in the social environment of integration. The ambiguity of the new surrounding propelled them to reject the reproachable thought of having lived the wrong life in the wrong place. The undercurrent of humiliation associated with the West German paternalism made the confluence of the two societies difficult to the extent of making the east Germans more cynical. Already they faced dogged opposition from the ruling elite who disregarded Soviet warnings and continued the defence of *Westpolitik* (policy toward western nations). The coming of general dissatisfaction also centred round the distributive policies of the reunified nation which based its welfares up on the performance of the people.

The values of modesty, solidarity and equality might have been socially functional under real existent socialism, but it continued to draw its air in the liberal atmosphere of the united nation where the possibilities for consumption and individual advancement was unbridled. The people from the east could adapt quite quickly to the changed situation because socialism and liberalism had a shared value orientation of consumerism. They just cashed in their morals to fill up their pockets and plunged into the highway of the western life. Automobiles became the symbol of emancipation into the unfettered domain of personal satisfaction. It unlocked their long repressed consumer fantasies making them a party to the German status game of outdriving and outshining everyone else on the road. This unadulterated mimicry however, failed to assimilate them into the Western culture with its bogey of imperatives and opportunities seeding out of the liberal market society provoked a cultural backlash in the east. They discovered to their utter dismay the belongingness in the new society and its culture. They found themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous salespeople, exploitative employers, rogue business partners and impatient friends and relatives from the west. Amidst such miseries they quickly coined the term *Besserwessis*¹⁴ (The know-it-all West Germans). The slogan '*Wir sind ein Volk*' (We are one People) with which the revolution of 1989 ended actually expressed the deep desire of the east Germans to get

¹⁴ This is a pun which indicates a *Wessi* (Westerner) who feels superior to that of an east German. Some former east Germans felt that former West Germans do not respect their culture and they were rather assimilated into the latter's culture rather than the two cultures were bonded as equals.

hold of the social parity. They thought that integration would bring them not only the much prized D-Mark but the equal citizenship right denied to them in the not reformative GDR. Instead they received the stigma of ‘half-Russians’ who do not how and care to work.

These bitter realities made them increasingly ambivalent and self-contradictory. They began to find solace in identifying themselves as ‘*DDR Buerger*’ (East German, citizen of the GDR). Though they had not shown any interest in creating a non-partisan ‘Committee for Justice’ to defend their interests, yet they thoroughly blamed Chancellor Helmut Kohl and other Western politicians of making false promises. It seemed that they had rediscovered amidst all such injustices the functional value of modesty along with familyism and security. The widespread retreat into their families and/or private space could be interpreted as a reflex of people accustomed to subordination as well as an in-burst against the daring venture into the public space in the autumn of 1989. They also became nostalgic toward the stability and security once prevailing behind the Wall. Having virtually no contact with the ethnically different or socially distressed people they were suddenly thrown into an ocean of heterogeneity. It acted as a shock therapy in brewing up intolerance toward foreigners and a general antipathy for assimilation. Escalation of racist violence is a by-product of the uncherished desires borne out of society-wide scapegoats. The wave of xenophobia that had swept Germany was a clear indication of crystallization of the cultural crisis. Therein lurks the danger of retreating to ethnic nationalism as the final solution to such cultural schisms and antagonisms.

Life in truth and lies are vital paradoxes affecting in a broader canvas the morale of a society. Inhabitants form the atomic structure building up into the dense network of the various modes operating in a way so as to drive the entire edifice of civilization toward a more vantage position. These atoms in the form of humans are preoccupied more with their daily existence and pursuit of life’s tiny pleasures than with the critical appraisal of their lives’ contradictions. The survival of the *Jugendweihe*¹⁵ (youth consecration generally for the 14-year-old) ceremony is ample proof of the continuation of some of the old cultural form which withstood the demise of the socialist regime. To some extent

¹⁵ It is a secular coming of age ceremony practiced by German 14-year-olds. It originated among the secular societies in the 19th century as an alternative to Confirmation by the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. It was particularly widespread in East Germany, where state atheism was encouraged under the GDR.

communism continues to influence the cultural domain of the *Ossis* (the people from east germany) in a more fluttering manner of a free chosen piece of value. Interests in the present went onto shape the memories of the past leading to a realization of loss and melancholy. Surveying the altered situation in the wake of the reunification, great many from the east felt the absence of comfort whistled away in the turmoil of fusion. Passing the moment of joy, they hurled themselves into the territory of unknown wrapped in the morass of pain and suffering. All through they frantically searched for salvation which became more and more distant. They were sucked into their own mental vacuum of tabula rasa erasing all the uncountable memories. The tendencies of fleeting incidents embossed upon their soul a lingering sense of nonentity where these people were trapped as if for eternity.


The nostalgic feeling for the former GDR is rather a symptom of the West German need for a utopia. A naturalizing fantasy creating a dream sequence, literally a 'no place', wherein the East Germans' neurotic connection with authoritarian past increases the crave for an unchained future. Ironically, the industry of unified Germany precisely provided its owners the opportunity to achieve an unburdened future through the repetitive signalling of the past-obsession of the East Germans. Conjoining the two parts left a hole in the social-symptomatic order having a non-comprehensive effect upon the minds of the East Germans. It led to conflicting cultural constructions mostly of the past which concomitantly manufactured the future. This was a consequence of the de-legitimization of the cultural continuity denuding them of space. Lingering differences between East and West, originating from the two opposing governing systems, revealed themselves in voluntary work as well as in the attitude towards the state, economy and society. In these fields few have been growing together in the past twenty-five years. Though attitudes have changed one way or another since 1990 and sometimes have even grown proximal, the gap in the minds still remains (Schroeder 2010: 2).

The pall of despondency spreads far and wide to encompass the geo-mobile trajectories of the self. There, the inherited cluster of norms transmitted through generations meets and mingles with the time-honoured customs to give birth to a new plethora of values styled as culture. Ever transient and evolutionary by nature, it continuously influences the behavioural patterns of individuals who in turn, contributes to its repertoire of rules. This tussle between the construct and the constructor instils the necessary force to

sustain in different environments. It infuses within an individual the required strength to flourish amidst towering odds. This resilience catapulted them into tropes of stasis and a prior which engendered hopes to transform the social plight. In the process, it would automatically open the door to future prosperity. The east Germans fell in between the doldrums of loss of the past and gain of the future. This punctured their present so deeply so as to make them rub the glue of nostalgia over it. They began to wear ‘people were born in the G.D.R.’ T-shirts, collected Trabants, the rattling two-cylinder cars that they waited years to buy or go online to be contestants on the ‘Ossi-Quiz’, all questions related to East German pop culture.

The comic and unsettling part of it is that Stalinist totalitarianism seemed preferable to West German social democracy. The mix of irony, humour, concern and mimicry points toward a trend of rising admiration and radical fantasy for authoritarianism. The global capitalist superstructure manufactured the cult of multiculturalism thereby, injecting the serum of compulsive tolerance amongst individuals. Consequently, a hallucinatory fellow-feeling shows up among the different ethnic groups only to be ruptured in the face of grinding reality. This constant struggle of the east Germans both within and without makes them all the more *heimweh* (homesick) as the only sweet space of repose.

Figure 1. The Ways, Precisely, in which Residents of East and West Germany are Different (in Per Cent)



Source: www.osw.waw.pl/sits/default/files/prace_35_en_0.pdf

The above graph (Figure 1) analyses the differential quotient of the east Germans in comparison to their counterparts. As has been discussed by Florczuk and Ciechanowicz (2011: 18), the categories reflect the intangible domain of measurement where only the behavioural patterns are observed to record them into points 0 to 70. Here, ‘0’ resembles the absolute absence of affinity and ‘70’ the maximum effort of individuals in achieving

the degree of amicability in the reunified nation. It tries to depict the extent to which the integration sieved into the very thought -processes of the east Germans.

2.3 Economic Reconstruction

Germany, undoubtedly, is one of the major industrial countries. In terms of overall economic performance, it is the third largest and with regard to world trade she holds second place. It is one of the seven leading western industrial countries known as the 'Group of Seven'. In 1994, the GNP came to a record DM 2,978 billion, in the western part of the country alone, a per capita amount of DM 45,200. It doubled in the past twenty-five years and looking in the larger term, in the forty years since the formation of the FRG (West Germany) it had even increased five-fold. This stupendous resurgence from the devastation of the World War II to the present position among the world's leading industrial nations was neither due to natural nor financial resources, but sheer hard work, skilled manpower and a constant improvement in her performance. The crucial factors which accounted for the German economic success are: (1) the training and industry of the labour force; (2) the managerial skills; (3) the permanent adaptation to the economic challenges of the world market and on a more philosophical-analytical level; (4) the wide scope which the social market economy affords to hard working people and which guarantees everybody's free development of his or her personality.

The culmination of the World War II saw the Federal Republic developing a socially responsible market economy. It rejected both the left of the Manchester School and government intervention. Under the motto "as little as government as possible, as much government as necessary", the State played mainly a regulatory role in the market economy, creating general conditions for market processes. But it is the millions households, consumers and companies who decide freely what they want to consume or produce. The government foregoes any direct intervention in price and wage fixing. The social market system runs on the twin axels of 'competition' and 'profit'. Reunification joined a long estranged part to the FRG. It was a country sans competition, sans a social market economy and sans the driving forces of profit. However, in the statistics of economists, the GDR was presented as the tenth strongest industrialized country in the world. In reality, the much hyped highest rate of industrial production and the highest standard of living in the Eastern Bloc, all proved to be a

hollow propaganda with productivity abysmally low and goods unmarketable in nature sold due to artificial shortages. It was completely a seller's market with monopolistic structures. This led to high prices with government paying billions in subsidies, zero technological upgradation with production sites and machineries becoming outdated, no serious R&D with concomitant isolation and backwardness. This, in turn, led to low wages, retainment of unproductive and superfluous jobs, low rents, environmental degradation and infrastructural disrepair. Thus, the conversion of the command economy into well-functioning market economy was a daunting task. Finance apart, it entails a complete change of management, ownership, supplier system, retail outlets, banking system, change or retraining of personnel and foreign markets. It required an inside-out makeover with most of the old values giving way to new ones: private initiative, direct responsibility, a high working ethos and a commitment to a democratic society. Moreover, energy, public transport, food, rents, cost of social net was expected to increase manifold though along with income yet most naturally, nobody would like it. Hence, it became apparent that the mingling of the two economies meant more of disintegration than rebuilding.

Thus, the German government decided to revamp the entire economy to make it competitive. The task was given to a public privatization agency, the *Treuhandanstalt* (The Private Trust Agency) established in 1990 to privatize, reorganize or if necessary, wind up and sell former state assets in the GDR. It went on to become the biggest economic unit in the world. By the end of 1994, it disposed of 13815 companies, wound up 3700 enterprises, secured investment commitments of DM 211 billion job commitments of 1508000 and generated DM 66.6 billion of revenues. 860 companies and part of companies were bought by foreign investors. They paid DM 6.8 billion and agreed to create or retain 155000 jobs and to invest DM 25.8 billion. The accumulated debts of approximately DM 256 billion were converted into a fund which the Federal Government would have to pay back over a period of about thirty years. In the early '90s, the OECD countries went into a recession yet in united Germany there was a distinct boom, fuelled by the money each GDR citizens received from the Federal Government. It was immediately spent on cars and other consumer goods. The pent-up demand was so strong that it swept many hardnosed industrialists off their feet. However, this bonanza lasted only two years after which the wave of recession splashed in with the COMECON countries no longer in a position to order liberally. Overseas

demand plummet partially in those areas where Germany excelled like industrial equipment, machinery, luxury passenger cars and engineering products. The situation became more aggravated with a particular crisis in the European steel market where cheap steel imports from Eastern European countries swamped the market partially at dumping prices. This resulted in high wages, short working hours and longest paid holidays. Thus, in the years 1993 to 1995, the general domestic demand decreased by 1.2 percent and 14 percent for industrial equipment. Unemployment went up to 14 million and public debts shot up with effects on money supply, inflation and interest rates.

Things began to look brighter from 1996 onwards with east emerging as Europe's fastest growing region. The construction of modern production plants in progressing, investment per employee and per resident are higher than in West Germany. In recent past, the east German economy had grown between 6 to 9 percent per annum. The overall economic trend in the Federal Republic up to the year 2000 projects a real GDP growth of 2 percent per annum on an average, a limiting of upward price trends of just under 2 percent and an average rise in employment of just under half a percent per annum. Unemployment still persists as a major problem and an allergen of the German economic scene. Yet, the Federal government had kept the inflation rate below 2 percent. In these many years, national restoration and economic unification has come a long way towards success.

With the arrival of the economic power in the form of EMU (The Economic and Monetary Union) east Germany was flooded with all the desired goods. People indulged in a spending spree and were keen on replacing as many things of GDR origin as possible in a record time. Travelling became a cakewalk where crossing of borders needed only an identity card which again in many cases was optional. In all places the new money was welcomed and along with it the bearer. The Russian Author F. Dostojewsky¹⁶ coined the phrase, "money represents printed freedom". The east Germans felt it for the first time as they experienced that good money increases this freedom as it extends the possibilities to use it. The majority of the pensioners benefited from a substantial upgrading of their pensions which enabled them to travel and live an active life. Decent clothing and access to high-quality food products were then no

¹⁶ Fyodor Dostoevsky as a litterateur explored the human psychology and engaged himself with a variety of philosophical and religious themes.

longer out of reach for the elderly. On a broader scale, the core principles of a liberal and democratic society like pluralism, minimal interference by the state in personal matters as well as in the economy, a spirit of tolerance and the rule of law for all, soon became apparent.

When in late 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Dresden was received by the masses with the cry we are one people, and in return promised flourishing landscapes. However, within a couple of years, the GDR was in a desolate state. There are many critics who blame the Chancellor even as vast changes did occur in a year's time with countryside sporting new roof tiles, windows and doors, the old coal-based heating system substituted by gas or oil, new pavements, safe road-crossings and village churches reconstructed. New industrial areas came up in the vicinity providing shops for small-scale industries or craftsmen. Roads had been broadened and got a new surfacing, crossings were provided with traffic lights, thousands of trees were planted along the roads and many new and huge shopping centres and markets for building materials had been constructed away from the towns and villages. The same mirth of reconstruction and modernization was evident in the towns. Public transportation underwent an immense modernization with shopping complexes studded at every nook and corner. There also came up a vast variety of restaurants and pubs- an achievement indeed, for people were used to make advance bookings or had queue up for a place, when they intended to eat out. It was also a great joy to see that the implementation of the environmental laws, the rapid process of abandoning the coal-based heating system and the utilisation of modern cars with four-stroke engines had improved the environment and the quality of life substantially. Despite all these achievements, there was a taciturn feeling even of disillusionment throughout all sections new federal states. One needs to examine the causes in the nostalgic reminiscences of a once privileged elite, now being neglected and/or by failure to defend a specific lifestyle.

The restructuring and rebuilding of the east German economy, as well as the downfall of the East European markets caused severe problems and increased unemployment leading to the diminution of 75 percent of the jobs in the industries, leaving a mere 592000 jobs compared to 2.2 million in 1990. The overall unemployment statistics (annual average of 1996) shows 9.3 percent and 14.9 percent for the old federal states and the new respectively. This, undoubtedly, led to a loss of self-esteem and decrease in their living standards. People, in large numbers, began to realise that the

reconstruction of the economy was no longer a process bound to be solved in due time, but it was connected with the structural problems in the old federal states and even so with the development of the world economy. Flexibility and the willingness to adjust to the qualifications to the changing market demands were needed more than ever. Errors in management and paucity of capital, combined with a remarkable proclivity of not paying already had led to the insolvency of 3900 enterprises in the first half of 1996, a substantial increase of 44 percent compared with the same period of the last year. The unremitting exodus of well-trained, mobile and highly motivated young people contributes more to this malady. In addition to those approximately three and a half million people who had crossed the border till 1989. The same year, in the month of November alone, more than 225,000 people, 75 percent of them in the age group of under thirty, left in search for job opportunities in the old federal states. This gave birth to some strange situations of having a surplus labour as also a lack of qualified manpower to meet the needs of new factors which then came up. On the other hand, those entrepreneurs and managers who came to support the reconstruction, not always turned out to be an asset. Many workers saw the decline and final failure of the privatization attempt as a result of mismanagement or dreadful industrial policy. It is obvious and understandable that the giants in the West German industry are not interested in fierce competition within their own country. It was only natural that many top position in the new and in the legal system were occupied by specialists from the west. A similar situation prevailed in business and commerce; there the sound capital resources and the profound knowledge of the mechanisms of the free market economy grants success. As a result, houses, shops, restaurants, renovated flats, business and so on were owned by the people of the west. All these facts had an impact on the mind-set of the people in the new federal states.

The east Germans were nurtured in a way which ranged the community or rather the collective in the first place, the defeat of freedom was “the acceptance of the necessary”. The psychiatrist Hans-Joachim Maaz, director of the psycho-therapeutic clinic in Halle, describes the “typical” east German the following words:

“We had been moulded by the permanent hindrance of the development of our self. Inhibitions, set in many different ways, have caused a deep vulnerability of the self, and prevented the development of the inner stability. The more we were denied acceptance as individuals, of our emotions and our thinking, and could not gather experience while trying different prospects of life, the more we became

dependent on external authorities, giving orientation and security” (Michael Moeller and Hans-Joachim Maaz, ‘*Die Einheit beginnt zu Zweit: Ein deutsch-deutsches Zweigesprech*’ (The unit starts to second: A German-German branches opening [Berlin! Rowhold Verlag, 1991]).

This warped personality structure, combined with the struggle to come to terms with the tremendous changes in all spheres of life, the sudden insecurities about the livelihoods, for many the humiliating experience of unemployment and a profound loss of orientation in all probability created nostalgic memories in a section of the population. The majority, however, was already speedily adopting the competitive style of life. The compensation for hard and effective work in a currency which paved all ways to satisfy material wishes, evoked the willingness of retraining and for more mobility. Those, whose idealistic and abstract projections of a future had been shattered, turned to a more realistic point of view in an endeavour to make right the wrongs in respective spheres. Nevertheless, it was highly desirable from the society as a whole to work for a common future by redeveloping the principle of solidarity within the country and in a broader sense and more modestly, accepted by all strata of the society, might prove to be too bad after all. Between 1989 and 1993, jobs in the east fell by one-third. Unemployment, outlawed by the GDR constitution and virtually unknown before 1989 became rampant. At 15 to 20 percent, it was twice that of West Germany, and these official unemployment figures excluded the women and youth who were discouraged from seeking work. Massive but temporary public job creation and subsidized retraining allowed some ten percent of the labour force to remain in their jobs. This raised real incomes, but came at the price of insecurity. Panel survey data show that the people of the east who remained in the labour force after the fall of the Wall, a fifth was unemployed in 1996 and 40 percent had been unemployed at some time between 1989 and 1996. One-third of those in the 1989 labour force switched occupation, and over two-thirds changed firms. Between 1989 and 1996, one-half of working east Germans changed firms, a rate of mobility considerably higher than in West Germany.

Many in the older generation took early retirement, including many of the former GDR elites whose positions quickly were phased out. The *Treuhand* undermined east German managers and public administrators. After East and West German enterprises merged, cultural conflicts over work practices arose between managers. Nor did entrepreneurship create a class of nouveaux riches. In fact, most self-employed east Germans worked in construction and in marginal activities collapsed after subsidies

ended. As unemployment mounted, younger, skilled workers fled from east to West. Indeed, some argue that the unification process was so swift and generous precisely in order to discourage mass migration. However, since 1990, dearth of good jobs and low wages compelled around 2 million people, many young and well-educated, to leave the former east. From 1990 to 2001, a million moved in. From 1990 to 2006, Saxony-Anhalt lost over a fifth of its people (The Economist, 2006: 9). Some of the young men and women who went to the West for work have returned, even at the expense of income declines, because they did not fit in. According to Witte and Wagner (1995: 2) economic uncertainty coupled with lifestyle emulations led east German women to halve their fertility, to a rate even lower than that of West German women. In turn, the weak economy and drooping birth-rate in eastern Germany contributed to its further depopulation. Both policy decisions and competition with West German workers contributed to the region's decline. Larger macro-economic changes created a German "hourglass-shaped economy" rewarding highly educated workers and eroding the demand for, and wages and conditions of low-skill labourers, thereby, contributing to greater earnings inequality. After 1989, inequality of wages and household income rose in the east, although it remained lower than in West Germany where people had more assets. The gap in wealth between East and West persisted inducing class polarization and income inequality. Despite these promising signs, private and public sector layoffs continued and GDP per capita in the east lagged that in the West.

The east German labour market has taken on some of the insider-outsider problems of the West. Since the East has more precarious employment, however, some speak of "secondary integration" or "social exclusion" because many shuffled among unemployment, training, and employment schemes, never to land a stable job. (Diewald et al. 2006: 62). Almost twenty-five years into unification, the unemployment rate in the East is about twice that in the West, adding to downward pressure on wages and impeding movement towards wage equilibrium. Changes in life satisfaction among east and west Germans were more related with relative than absolute income. The extension of the FRG pension system to the former GDR did not strengthen their identification with the state nor promote social integration. Although the demonstrations eventually petered out as they failed to prevent the implementation of the reforms, they came to symbolize the deep disaffection that some in the former GDR were beginning to feel about unification. The task of rebuilding the economy of the east remained as the initial

enthusiasm of reunification began to vanish. To this day, the west Germans balk at the vast cost of reconstructing the east and doubts its completion. The east German economic volte-face engendered cynicism, if not outright hostility. This structural ramification called for an even more active role of the state in sustaining especially the industrial section in increasingly gaining adherents. The availability of west German support provides east with the most favourable fundamentals for a rapid transition. Partly offsetting those advantages was the presence of a rich brother that will underwrote the social security system, thus creating an incentive to hike wages ahead of productivity. The discussion serves as a background for an evaluation of the growth opportunities in unified Germany.

On the whole, the migrants began to impress scant aggregate effect on native wages and employment which varied on different subgroups of natives. A high percentage of them worked in the tertiary, manufacturing and construction sector. Though over the past twenty-five years, there was a shift in sectoral distribution of migrant employees towards the tertiary sector.

In fact, one of the enervating way to deal with the reconstruction is to create more new capacity in the east by attracting migrants and turn them rapidly into high productivity workers and taxpayers. This meant, either real wages will stop growing for a while and create a cushion of profits and investment, or crowding-out will turn into a fight over income shares that will derail an already difficult situation. Herein, comes the critical responsibility of the unions in broadening the costs of adjustment over time with minimal crowding out, this presenting the best prospects for sustainable real wage growth. Continued subsidization on the job is undesirable as it demoralizes workers and slugs the urgent task of modernization and restructuring. A brighter avenue is to pay unemployment compensation, provide education and training premiums and create financing vehicles for small businesses. Needless to say, stabilization of the wage level in the east or at least a wage policy connected to productivity is an all-embracing development. Alongside, the change in the security outlook might also dramatically reduce the military expenditures thus, making unification a gain rather than a burden in income. The economic integration of any two neighbouring regions at an unequal level of development requires a paradigmatic shift spangled with difficulties. Even so, the absorption of the monetary and banking systems along with the institution of industrial relations enabled east to avoid any kind of anarchic equilibrium. Rather, the attainment

of an efficient pattern of production is a major gain of the re-fusion coping up with the rapid pace of privatization under the *Treuhand* and then the *Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben* (German Federal Agency for special tasks related to reunification) whose primary task was to control and enforce the thousands of contracts under which the assets of central planning had been privatized, as well as to sell off the last dregs of east German industry and real estate.

The east German experience was a unique one among transition economies because the country inherited an entire set of institutions appropriate with advanced industrial countries. Amongst those imports are a social system, including unemployment compensation, a pension system with immediate entitlements for qualified recipients, a hard currency, a system of public finance and a banking system with branches that opened virtually immediately after unification. It also had a decentralized government authority, accounting systems and free trade access throughout Europe. Borne out of the concomitant legal union created during the time of unification it dispensed with the issue of sovereignty typically standing in the way of the wholesale importing of institutions. The advantages of having a common institutional history on which to build the new ones was marred by the amount of debts remaining intact. It complicated the restructuring process and privatization negotiations. The more serious difficulty encircled round the treatment of property rights and restitution to previous owners. The existence of multiple claimants to the same asset, foreshadows years and years of sorting out the restitution problem. Priority of the new investing owners too were challenged. The initial conversion and wage increases in many sectors gave the east Germans about 50 percent hike compared to that of the west. Since the fall of 1989, jobs were lost in every branch of economic activity with the industrial sector taking the brunt with some 3 million people becoming jobless. This, in turn, decimated the labour force (including the participation rate of the females) significantly as workers migrated, commuted, or forced early retirement.

Presently, in east Germany, family incomes equal nearly 55 to 60 percent of the west. Nearly 30 percent of the labour force is unemployed, considering short-time work and jobs programs. Thus, migration, or at least commuting, seems to be an obvious solution to unemployment. In fact, the latter is on the rise with nearly one-half million east German residents working in the west. Nearly 70 percent of commuters travel 10 to 50 kilometres. It also strikes the best balance between earnings and the cost of living by

relieving earners the large extra cost of housing in western part. It is cost-beneficial with increased employment opportunities and income prospects. Akerlof and his colleagues make the point that unemployment is the overriding reason for migration decisions. The economy is catching-up following the law of convergence as observed by Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1991: 177). It is further attenuated by high levels of education and geographic proximity facilitating transfer of skills and technology. The consequent rise in productivity, in all probability, would cause a sharp increase in unemployment, thereby making it a mixed blessing. The speedy confluence of the two economies seems a herculean task with no easy solutions to overcome the massive inequalities in the structural edifices. The nitty-gritties of growth, rate of interests, cost of labour and per-capita income makes the gaining of parity a trans-generational affair. Unification has confronted the nation with the challenge of absorbing the triple shock of easing financing of consumption in the East; investment in the East; and an increase in labour supply in the linked labour markets. Income and fiscal policies are the chief tools available whereby a moderate increase in taxes accompanied by predominant use of debt finance would elevate consumption levels creating an agile service sector to smoothen up the cost of merger.

Table 1: Measures of East German Convergence, 1991–2000

Percent of Corresponding Western German Measure

Year	Consumption per Capita(a)	Gross Weekly Nominal Wage(b)	Labour Productivity(c)	GDP per Capita(d)
1991	43	50	44	42
1992	54	65	57	50
1993	65	71	67	59
1994	70	72	70	64
1995	73	74	71	66
1996	72	72	72	67
1997	73	76	72	67
1998	73	76	72	66
1999	n. a	76	72	66
2000	n. a	73	73	65

a. Uses average of successive year-end population values. Berlin is included with western Germany.

b. East Berlin is included with east Germany and West Berlin with west Germany.

c. Total value added at 1995 prices per employed person. Berlin is included with east Germany.

d. Total value added at 1995 prices per person. Berlin is included with east Germany.


Sources: Burda and Hunt (2001:10)

A highly visible consequence of the integration of the labour markets was an unprecedented rise in both nominal and real wages in the east. The second column of table 1 gives details for the period 1991–2000 for gross weekly nominal wages. At the time of monetary union, earnings in east were about a third of those in West Germany, given the one-for-one exchange rate, having already risen by several fold in ostmark (east German currency) terms up to June 1990. (Sinn and Sinn 199: 147 and the references cited therein). This is a complex development given the fact that the east possessed less human capital as also suffered massive joblessness. Hunt notes that the employment fall was largest for low-paid workers who were also incidentally low skilled. A surprising side effect of the transformation of has been the collapse of the collective bargaining system imported from the west. This can explicate the thaw in wage convergence that began in 1995, evident from table 1. The punishment for the rise in unemployment and incomplete wage convergence was a massive decline in union membership in the east, from just under 50 percent of workers in 1991 to about 22 percent in 2000. More decisive is the fall in membership in the employers' associations functioning as bargaining intermediaries for large industrial collective wage agreements. Overall, low and plummeting membership vitiates the credibility of wage agreements and of the collective bargaining system itself. The labour unions were correct in expecting that high wages would keep people in the east. They also explain the discrepancy between the individual-level results showing that laid-off workers emigrate and the aggregate results showing that source unemployment is not a push-factor. The high wages may have caused layoffs among older workers early in the transition but apparently kept young students indoors in the hope of later getting a high-paying job. Thus, on balance, high wages in the east reduced emigration even in the face of sharp rise in wages by keeping up the semblance of people in the east through its effect on mobile youth. Again, the labour market behaviour of eastern female workers is strikingly similar to that of eastern male workers. It is caused by a combination of strong labour force attachment of women of the east, their low birth rate, their high representation in public sector employment, and a selection effect whereby the lowest paid were forced to leave employment.

The Federal Government's social aims defines social mobility as the change of living circumstances and the dynamics of social participation occurring within an individual's lifetime (intra-generational mobility). There, poverty risks are seen as a dynamic

process listing the most important factors in increasing the predicaments to one's place in society and identifying ways for successfully organising opportunities to overcome those. As earlier phases of life situations affect opportunities in the later ones, particular attention is paid to decisive watersheds in the various life phases for playing a successful part in the education system and labour market and in society in general.

Figure 2: Comparative Rate of Unemployment between East and West Germany (in Per Cent)



Source: Burda and Hunt (2001: 6)

The above graph (Figure 2), reflects the significant rise in unemployment following the years of reunification. It is a clear indication of a slump in the labour market as a result of transfer of the economic structures not going the way as was initially expected. After the first decade of unification, experiments apart, the gradual thump in the overall economic situation failed to bring about any improvement in the job market leading to joblessness among the east Germans.

The process of reunification created an absence of wage subsidies or an increase in productivity, forcing the closure of almost all the east German companies. This would have led to the fall of wages in stalled only by the timely intervention of the west German trade unions as they feared apart from the tide of migrants a concomitant effect upon their wages. In fact, migration had been reduced by increased wages in east Germany (Hunt, 2006: 9). But a quick increase of wages in the east worsened the unemployment risk of workers reduced the chances of life satisfaction. High rate of unemployment also led to a deterioration of the power of the trade unions making wages flexible quotient which continued until recently. Studies performed at the household


level revealed that the income of east German households increased markedly in the period 1991-1996 with a decline in the initial negative income gap. The analysis of Goebel and Gorning (2015: 20) reveals disposable income convergence on the household level between east and west Germans which continued to widen. According to OECD (2008: 2) the income distribution of Germany widens from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. On the individual level for the population with an age over 20 for the period 1992 to 2001 recorded a modest increase in market income. Consequently, inequality in income increased more strongly in east relative to the west Germany (Bach et al. 2007: 1).

Empirical analysis of income convergence and heterogeneity revealed deflation of incomes by the consumer price index. The goal of equalising nominal incomes still remains a pipe dream. However, living standards appear to have equalised in accounting the local costs of living as well. The persistence of differences is to some extent an outcrop of policy choices reflecting the attitudes of the residents of both the east and the west germinating in their respective economic ambience. The pall of bleak prospects compelled a significant number of qualified young east Germans to migrate west in search of employment. While such mobility of labour became a welcome gesture of an integrated market, it also showed the continuation of structural imbalances which twenty-five years of policy failed to overcome. This is a stark reminder of the massive challenges, and perhaps limitations, of state intervention in overcoming regional development imbalances at the sub-national level, especially when these are the fallout of decades of alternative development avenues. In face of crises, the German economy has proved remarkably resilient. Backed by a strong manufacturing sector, a robust labour market and an upswing in domestic demand contributed substantially toward growth. While income inequality is low, the share of low-paying jobs has risen considerably. In such circumstances, the government's plans to raise pension entitlements will make the lowering of the relatively high labour tax wedge more difficult. This, in turn, failed to alleviate future poverty risks among the elderly. The frailties of taxation did not affect the accumulation of wealth by the banks during the euro area crisis. On the contrary, with a tinge of vulnerability, it weathered well.

The contribution of the service sectors to value-added growth in Germany had been relatively small which made the overall product market competition sharper. Nonetheless, in some domestically oriented service sectors, regulation protected

incumbents from cut-throat competition. While export oriented manufacturing is exposed to international competition and responds with productivity-increasing innovation and human capital accumulation, service sector productivity kept lagging. However, this did not prevent the economic growth from becoming more socially inclusive reducing disparities in well-being. Inequality and relative poverty in Germany have surged since the mid-1990s, although income inequality has not increased since 2004. But poverty risk had increasingly affected employees with relatively low employment protection or limited access to unemployment insurance, as well as many part-time and self-employed workers. Youth who have not graduated from upper secondary education face poor lifetime employment prospects and education outcomes continue to depend strongly on socio-economic background. Thus, fostering better balanced, socially inclusive and greener long-term growth with fiscal policies is attainable through a more supportive and broad tax bases by updating property tax valuations and extending capital gains taxes on residential real estate, except for owner-occupied housing. Lower social security contributions are also required especially for low-pay workers. This should be accrued from general tax revenue by prioritizing spending on growth-enhancing items like infrastructure and childcare. The improvement of the resilience of the financial sector depends on adequately capitalizing the banks. The authorities should be empowered to include bank debt as comprehensively as possible in the future bail-in instrument.

Figure 3: Unit Labour Cost (Percentage) in the East Compared to the West (Change as Compared to Previous Years)



Source: <https://books.google.co.in/books?id=pZuhfsIGYH8C&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=Unit+Labour+Cost+in+the+East+++germany&source=bl&ots=qJ6OM-6E5p&sig=fpKY6pB9Dv71zgaJarTsI3UsDcA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiUqIyRxebNAhUI4YMKHYMmCrUQ6AEILjAD#v=onepage&q=Unit%20Labour%20Cost%20in%20the%20East%20%20%20germany&f=false>

The objectives of financial stability over creditor rights should receive an upper hand when resolution legislation is applied. Alongside, the Laender should continue restructuring the Landesbanken, including through privatisation. This would strengthen the contribution of the services sector to economic growth. Unintended entry barriers should be reassessed while abandoning price regulation in some professional services. The above graph captures the gradual down-flow in the unit labour cost in the year following the unification. The transfer of the free market mechanism created a temporary slack in the east German economy pulling down the amount of money received in lieu of work. From the 1995 to 2000, it kept falling to touch the level of the west German market wage. From the 90s onward, its competitive position has persistently improved because wages grew at a slower pace than productivity. This contributed toward the favourable evolution of unit labour costs benefitting the tradable manufacturing sector. It indeed relies to an increasing extent on inputs from other domestic sectors.

Slow growth of domestic demand, essentially of private consumption and construction investment, is the key factor behind the weakness of GDP growth in Germany. In spite of this, output growth in the New Laender was higher than in the West. Part of this could be explained by a catching-up effect following the drastic fall in output at the start of re-unification. But even more so it was the result of a composition effect, with the building sector giving a disproportional contribution to growth in the New Laender. This was partly due to reconstruction needs related in particular to the area of infrastructure, but it also resulted from very liberal fiscal incentives for both business and housing construction.

Fiscal expansion financed by distortionary taxation has the potential to generate substantial adverse growth effects after the initial positive demand stimulus subsides. It might crowd out private investment belying the expectations of a direct relation between higher taxes and net profits as also create discrepancies in higher wage and non-wage costs thereby slowing down labour market developments. Re-unification also contributed to the deterioration of Germany's external competitiveness throughout the nineties. The decline was detected prominently in the relative loss of export market shares where particularly, east German firms were virtually absent from world markets and a relatively low attractiveness of Germany as a business location causing the New Laender to run a de facto trade deficit of enormous proportions. But since the beginning

of the twenty-first century, much of these effects began to dissipate. More specifically, wage restraint and the weak euro, restored external competitiveness in the West, but failed to do so for the New Laender which continue to be obfuscated by high unit labour cost. The continued performance of the different economic sectors kept up the momentum of development in the east conjoined with the expert support given by the west. The dichotomous nature of economic prosperity was reflected in the chalking of a restrictive budget trying to compensate the prevarications in output growth. Much of this variation occurred due to a subdued labour market participation with a precipitous equilibrium in the unemployment rate remaining stable.

This happened mainly because of the east-west wage differentiation persisting in spite of the relative freedom exercised by the concerned authorities in stabilizing the labour market, high rates of marginal tax in combination with a long benefit duration coupled with high benefit rates for certain groups evoking significant unemployment traps and a general absence of flexibility and mobility. The government of Merkel implemented regulations triggering further constraints. Although the direct effects of these measures on employment creation were probably puny, it needs to be emphasised, in this context, that in many respects re-unification has made the country more heterogeneous than ever before. The appropriate response would have been to make labour markets more flexible. Contrarily, existing rigidities were made worse by pricing out a significant share of the east German labour force to maintain a balance between wage and production. Frail employment growth, constituting a serious hurdle to a more pronounced rise in economic welfare, needs to be tackled through economic reforms. This entails a deeper look into the macro-economic policy mix, competitiveness tax benefit system, wage formation processes and employment protection regulation. This led to a further tightening of the monetary conditions putting pressure on the general price structure, an outcrop of the decimated resources. Naturally, the policy-makers concentrated more on the domestic needs to maintain the level of life satisfaction unfazed for the multitude already whirling in the pool of reunion. The Bundesbank, too, responded favourably in lowering the rate of discount to safeguard the currency. Yet, the output gap healed on a gradual basis bringing stability in the domestic economy.

The swift and unexpected re-unification, preceded by the introduction of the Deutsche Mark drove unit labour costs to untenable levels, especially in the tradable sectors, which were immediately exposed to international competition. In the face of rising

unemployment, the complete introduction of the west German social security system meant that social security payments soared, putting a huge burden both on the social security systems and on government budgets. It was ultimately the federal budget which had to shoulder most of the bill. Again, the precarious state of infrastructure there meant that huge public investments were necessary to allow the east to catch up with its counterpart. On the revenue side, there has been a clear increase in all components since 1991. The rise in direct taxes was as significant as that of indirect taxes, due not only to the introduction of the solidarity tax, but also to the absence of a major income tax reform. The financial impact of re-unification, weak economic growth and a rise in the number of pensioners was clearly sturdiest on social security contributions.

Table 2: Development of General Government Expenditures (in Percentage of GDP)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Expenditures (in % of GDP) of which:	47.1	48.1	49.3	49.0	49.6	50.3	49.3	48.8	48.9	45.9
-Social Benefit (Total)	26.2	27.3	28.5	28.9	29.5	30.9	30.6	30.2	30.1	29.7
- Compensation of Employees	9.0	9.2	9.3	9.0	9.0	8.9	8.7	8.5	8.4	8.1
-Gross Fixed Capital Formation	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.9

Source: Commission Sources, AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic Database), Cited in European Commission Economic Papers, (2002: 45)

The rise in the overall expenditure masked the strength of the social benefits and interest payments. The latter was due to the huge rise in public debt resulting from the way re-unification was handled economically. It was clearly larger than the rise in social security contributions described above. At first glance of the table 2 above, such a development would appear to contradict the basic principle of the German social security system which stipulated that in case of higher than expected expenditure the contribution rates would have to rise in the short-term. This divergence was however, stalled by increased transfers from the general budget. Consequently, the structure of expenditure changed momentarily over the decade between 1991 and 2000 with outlays for the compensation of employees and investment considerably reverted back

in terms of GDP while social transfers rose rapidly. This put into question the credibility of the consolidation process froth with the possibility of expenditure overrunning income. In combination with moderate wage increases and minor changes to social security benefits, these developments had at least not increased incentives to take up a job (On the negative impact of high taxes and a generous social transfer system on labour supply in Germany see also IMF Art. 4 [Selected issues] 1999: 96 and Ifo, 2001: 31 as cited in European Commission 2002: 55).

Table 3: German Fiscal Shock

	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00
GDP	0.54	0.77	0.39	-0.30	-0.78	-1.34	-1.99	-2.45	-2.87	-3.05
Private consumption	-0.61	-0.44	-0.65	-1.13	-1.44	-1.82	-2.26	-2.60	-2.88	-2.93
Private Investment	2.39	0.95	-1.28	-2.75	-3.95	-4.69	-4.62	-4.11	-3.34	-2.66
Employment	0.03	-0.18	-0.57	-1.06	-1.48	-1.80	-2.15	-2.51	-2.88	-3.21
Rear wage costs	0.54	1.46	1.60	1.39	1.12	0.74	0.42	0.29	0.21	0.23
Real net wages	0.53	0.19	-1.26	-3.04	-4.27	-5.57	-6.93	-8.1	-9.10	-9.58
CPI	0.15	0.55	0.96	1.18	1.39	1.67	1.99	2.26	2.62	3.04
Capital stock	0.09	0.19	0.15	-0.01	-0.24	-0.53	-0.81	-1.05	-1.23	-1.34
Labour productivity	0.55	0.96	0.89	0.60	0.49	0.17	-0.21	-0.38	-0.50	-0.39
Inflation	0.15	0.40	0.40	0.22	0.21	0.27	0.32	0.26	0.36	0.41
Unemployment rate	-0.03	0.17	0.53	0.99	1.39	1.68	2.01	2.34	2.69	2.99
Trade balance (% of GDP)	0.31	-0.64	-0.76	-0.70	-0.63	-0.48	-0.20	0.07	0.35	0.54

Results are % Deviations from Baseline Levels.

Source: European commission (2002: 34)

The results depicted in Table 3 clearly exhibits an unfavourable trade-off between the short-term expansionary effects and the long-term output losses inflicted by a tax financed expenditure of government consumption. While GDP marks an initial

increase, though with a multiplier smaller than one, it falls below the baseline already in the fourth year. Already after the second year, the growth rate is about 0.3% points below baseline growth. The economy continues to grow by about 0.3% less in the following years and eventually reaches a lower level of GDP. Similarly, the unemployment rate rises by about 3% points after 10 years. In QUEST (Quality Underwriting Ethics Standard and Trust), this effect arises from the fact that an increase in labour and indirect taxation lowers the wedge between the take home market wage and the reservation wage. According to these results, fiscal policy may have contributed significantly to the growth slowdown in Germany over the 1990s. (cited in European Commission Report, 2002: 55). These calculations indicate that due to longer-lasting effects of a tax financed increase in expenditure, GDP growth could be subdued for a longer duration. Although the impact of productivity on public investment remains largely inconclusive, there is some inkling of positive contribution (cited in European Commission Report, 2002: 56). The economic weightage earned through reunification stunted its share of the market.

The deterioration in external price and cost competitiveness in the initial years of reunion was quickly overturned in the second half of the 1990s stabilizing the overall economic position. However, the amount by which average German unit labour costs exceeded those in West Germany indicates the extraordinary huge mismatch in the five new Laender and East Berlin. One must also take into account the shortcoming of the observed unit labour costs in the east which belie the full pressure of wage increases as they only partly reflect the genuine productivity progresses. The real effective exchange rate though remained high indicating thereby the importance to take into consideration the impact reunification had on external competitiveness of the country as a whole. Further deterioration of the external balance was offset by a large current account surplus. Any variations therein were taken up in confidence of the large pent-up demand in the New Laender. A post-mortem of the current account into its constituent components shows that reunification affected most severely and immediately the balance of trade. It took about five years for the trade balance to attain a new plane of a surplus as the real exchange rates began to drop. However, this recovery of the net trade balance was jettisoned by developments in the primary income and services balance. In parallel, the services balance declined progressively. The relative under-

performance of German exports can be nearly exclusively attributed to the performance of east Germany.

Table 4: Net External Balance of Goods and Services

Years	Billion DEM			% of GDP		
	Germany	West	East	Germany	West	East
1990	-	141.95	-	-	5.9%	-
1991	-6.88	152.16	-159.04	-0.2%	5.6%	-78.5%
1992	-7.78	187.07	-194.85	-0.2%	6.5%	-74.9%
1993	5.69	210.22	-204.53	0.2%	7.2%	-64.2%
1994	10.78	224.27	-213.49	0.3%	7.4%	-58.0%
1995	22.70	-	-	0.6%	-	-
1996	37.27	-	-	1.0%	-	-
1997	50.13	-	-	1.4%	-	-
1998	57.54	-	-	1.5%	-	-
1999	37.62	-	-	1.0%	-	-
2000	15.33	-	-	0.4%	-	-

Source: European Commission
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication1878_en.pdf

Table 4 shows the net external balance of goods and services for unified Germany. For the latter two cases, the bilateral regional trade deficit was treated like external trade. The table shows very clearly the cause for the very sharp decline in the external balance as a result of re- unification. While in 1990, West Germany alone ran a trade and services surplus of 142 billion DM, the figure for unified Germany a year later shows a deficit of 6.9 billion. The separate figures show that this drop does not find any counterpart in the West figures. Contrarily, its nominal net position actually registered a slight increase.

Over the years, much has changed with direct investment flows affected by mergers and acquisitions, multinational companies doing direct investment disregarding economic conditions, removal of restrictions on goods, capital and persons, and the euro removing exchange rate risks. Without the massive challenge of transforming the east German economy, the corset of structural inflexibility would not have hurt the German labour market as much as it has in the past decade. Moreover, interdependence of labour market structures translates partial malfunctioning into an overall bad performance. It is even hard to determine the wage elasticities of labour supply and

demand in the low wage segment (cf. European Commission Report, 2002: 96). In reaction to a shock wage change the mobility of hiring and firing were seen as substitutes (cf. European Commission Report, 2002: 96). The same argument holds for the cyclical adjustment of individual labour market segments. Instead, even in the upturn their employment perspectives did not climb to the expected levels.

2.4 Migration


In the aftermath of the revolutionary changes of 1989, many predicted that Germany would face the predicament of a *Voelkerivanderung* (flooded by mass migration). It was assumed incentives to migrate to the affluent west would considerably increase given the declining economic situation, social bonhomie, civil war, and growing racial tension or conflict. These predictions have proved false. Most of the minorities in Germany are made up of *Gastarbeitetei* or guest workers, recruited to alleviate a shortage of labour. Later on, when it stopped, the authorities expected them to leave. However, the majority did not leave but they kept on growing in numbers through family reunification and high birth rate. Gradually, the foreigners came to be seen as the cause of the problems, and *Auslaenderfeindlichkeit* (racism or hostility towards foreigners) escalated. The media generally exacerbate the situation inviting restrictive measures and declarations which in turn, enhanced hostility and prejudice against foreigners and refugees. These hostile attitudes appeared to have given some justification when political leaders confirmed them, or failed to condemn them. Thus, the circle continued spinning into greater hatred and prejudice. The mood of enthusiasm and expectations among the east Germans in the immediate aftermath of unification in speeding toward the west was quite unbridled. They thought themselves to be emancipated from the drudgeries of a socialistic pattern of living to that of the beauty of individual prosperity. However, after 1996, the number began to decline mostly due to the humiliating experience at the hands of the west Germans and to some extent regaining the tempo of productivity in their parts following the restructuring of the economy. After 2000, the rate increased, but not to any significant proportions so as to allay their disillusionment regarding the union of the two parts.

Reunification triggered, rapid deindustrialisation, labour market restructuring and subsidised the housing investment causing a tsunami of internal migrants leaving the east German cities for the countryside. However, the fact is that the total volume of

moves to suburban areas was considerably larger than out-movement to western German states. In the 1990s, aggregate intensities of East-West migration between the six states (Laender) in eastern Germany (including Berlin) and the ten states in western Germany cast strong impacts on regional population growth in the years following reunification. Net outflows from the eastern states were highest in the years 1989/90 which again was visible in the temporal trend as peaking in 2001. Out-migration was found to be highest among young adults with above average education, who left non-metropolitan regions in the east and moved to western states with bright job prospects. Thus, to borrow the words of Kontuly et al. (1997: 43): “the overall consequence of unification [...] was a broad spatial distribution of growth to all Western German regions and a wide pattern of loss in the East”. Much less attention has been devoted to the patterns and trends of migration between regions in eastern Germany and their impact on population decline. This is despite the fact that migration propensities fall with distance, so that the volume of short-distance movements is much higher than that of longer distance moves to a different state. Thus, intra- and interregional migration, especially between the larger cities, their hinterlands and non-metropolitan areas can be expected to have a much stronger impact on regional population change than longer distance moves. Although not in the context of East-West migration, yet, the growth of east German cities was primarily driven by changes in the propensities of movement between the larger cities and their non-metropolitan hinterlands. Since the beginning of the century, a new wave of migrants appears to be directed towards the city centres, drawn by the easy availability of the amenities of civic life.

This probably reflects early mistake of rapid wage convergence after reunification, that made east Germany less competitive. Since migration is one way to improve job matching, increased mobility in the labour market was considered an important ingredient to be at par with the west. Indeed, more recently, the mobility rate in east is approaching the West German level. Regional policies are also more strongly directed toward improving local amenities, as differences in location-specific amenities cause migration. In particular, younger people at the beginning of their work life are attracted to regions rich in amenities. Infrastructure investments and the promotion of man-made amenities such as soft location factors like environmental protection could be more effective and spur the endogenous development potential of lagging regions.

Figure 4: The Number of Gross Migrants



Source: Wolff (2009: 2)

The above graph denoted the gradual drop in the number of east Germans moving to west Germany as social discrimination persisted to fade the excitement of unification from the minds of the people of the east. Also, the economic condition from the mid-90s began to register a fair amount of growth, discouraging mobility. After 2000, there is a slight increase given the fact that in certain sectors of manufacturing job creation was much less, compelling the to move.

Generally, however, east Germany (divided into 113 counties) changed the most. Starting from 1989, the bad financial situation, the unavailability of jobs and the uncertainty of what tomorrow would bring made the mass seek ways of improving their and their families' standard of living and move to other areas. Analysing population inflows in all East German counties in 1991, we can see that only 5.3% of them (i.e. Potsdam and Mittelmark and the urban counties of Greifswald, Plauen, Jena, Suhl and Weimar) had inflow rates exceeding 20.0%, because of population outflow to the western Laender. In the other counties, inflow rates were much lower.

From 1991 onward as much as 76.1% of all East German counties had outflow rates between 15.5 and 30.0% and another 23% within 30.0–60.0%. In 2005, however, the 30.0–60.0%. range occurred in as much as 50.4% of the counties, while the first group's share went down to 49.6%. In absolute terms, the group of East German counties losing from 30–60 persons per 1000 inhabitants increased from 26 in 1991 to 57 in 2005. As regards the urban counties, in 1991 there were 15 urban counties with outflow rates

below 30.0‰ in East Germany, but within the next 14 years their number fell to merely three, while the group of urban counties where outflow values ranged from 30.0 to 60.0‰ increased by half. On the other hand, in 1991 14 rural counties in East Germany had outflow values from 30.0 to 60.0‰, but at the end of the analysed period there were as many as 33 of them, i.e. almost 40.0% of their total number.

An analysis of internal migration in Germany demonstrates that objective and subjective factors were behind the out-migration decisions. In the case of the East German population the economic push factors certainly included unemployment, lower wage levels than in West Germany and insufficient infrastructure. The factors that evidently “pulled” population living in the eastern Laender ranged from the possibilities of having higher earnings and improving one’s standard of living, to personal or career development. Even so, some counties in the eastern Laender managed to achieve positive internal migration balances. This proves that some former GDR areas were capable of seizing opportunities that a free market offers and of attracting new residents. Simultaneously, the positive balance of migration in the western Laender counties guaranteed well-paid and interesting jobs, such as South Bavaria, where the balance of migration was positive and soaring.

Over the last two decades, seemingly substantial shifts in the patterns of internal migration ignited an intense scientific and public debate about the possible causes and consequences of regional population change. The timing was impeccable, especially in the context of low birth rates, increasing life expectancy and comparatively low levels of international migration. As very few predominantly urban counties record a natural increase of population, the movement of people between Germany’s regions plays a key role in shaping population growth and age structures. However, the biggest concern regarding east-west-migration was the problem of human capital loss. The migratory movements are highly selective with regards to education and formal qualification with those having a better degree venturing out more confidently to create a new and independent life in the progressive west.

2.5 Representations in Literature and Media

The reasons for the boom can be attributed to many factors that coalesced before and after German unification. The strong economy and high standard of living had allowed Germans from both the FRG and the GDR to indulge in all kinds of comical

entertainment before the fall of the Wall by enabling them to purchase television sets and theatre, cabaret and movie tickets. This affluence, which commenced in the West in the mid-1950s with the success of the post-war *Wirtschaftswunder*¹⁷ (economic miracle) and in the East a decade later- though on a smaller scale due to trade deficits and inefficiencies in the socialist planned economy there- nevertheless was constantly subjected to Cold War political tensions propelled by the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. These tug of war led to the prohibition of the Communist Party¹⁸ (KPD) in the West Germany in 1956 and to the censorship of the mass media and literature in East Germany. After the fall of the Wall in November 1989 and unification in 1990, however, this tension was released and the combination of relief, happiness and freedom was admixed with new worries unleashing a flood of humorous and socially critical and satirical responses in all genres and media. Just six years after unification the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* observed that a new generation of Germans was growing up that is more fun-loving. They seemed to have freed themselves from the heavy weight of Germany's turbulent past by shedding much of the guilt its parents and grandparents felt-and feel about. The evaporation of the Cold War tensions led to a new openness where people could freely talk about its National Socialist and divided past. This coupled with the potent "normalization" efforts of politicians, authors and the mass media since the 1980s has allowed Germany to inculcate a healthy nature of national pride. This, in turn, led to lowered inhibitions, a necessary precondition for the appreciation of humour. The people of Federal Republic mustered enough self-confidence to be able to laugh at just about anything, including themselves and their violent history.

In the post-1989 cabaret texts, the theme which gained popularity among the people was one of identifying oneself or the others either as victims or perpetrators in the GDR regime. It also involved both collective and individual guilt and suffering. Hart's skit "*Gedaechtnis*" (1990) presented one such perspective, related to the victim/perpetrator

¹⁷ Operating as part of the command economy, the government controlled and regulated production, distribution and prices claiming to contribute significantly toward the economic growth as compared to the uncertainties of the free-market economy of the capitalist system.

¹⁸ The Communist Party of Germany was a major political party between 1918 and 1933. In the post-war period it became a minor outfit in West Germany until it was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1956. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism and subsequently merged into *Die Linke* (The Link).

dichotomy to individual memory work. Consisting of a dialogue between a doctor and a patient, a common dynamic in that period writings, his piece linked the inability to place oneself in the GDR landscape of blame and victimhood in terms of a failure of memory. Earlier on, the skit established the patient's condition as common and familiar to the doctor, signalling to the audience that the individual's ailment may be related to contemporary concerns. But in that climate, it could be seen as an approach to "socialist wrongs"¹⁹ involving forgetting and rejection of the recent past. By accounting for the patient's sudden memory loss with a brick that hit him on the head, Hart allows his protagonist to escape any direct agency which accompanied the *Wende*. The brick, it seems, what blocks access to the patient's past—a painful and solid object, hitting beyond the patient's control. Whether or not he was a perpetrator before 1989, the patient then was a victim of that violent blocking of memory. In a further twist, the doctor in an effort to assist the patient in his memory work and uncover the facts about his patient's potentially criminal past, poses a series of questions whose contents describe the specific actions of a typical informant, as if to lead the patient to unfurl his culpable actions. In the process, the doctor too, unwittingly, exposes his own relationship to that phase. Hence, individual memory can be seen as a place where uncomfortable truths may be harboured and suppressed having the unpredictable potential to re-emerge.

Inge Ristock's *Die Akte* (The File, 1990) adopts a critical stance regarding the viability of individual memory work related to one's Stasi past, focusing on the limited credibility of both documentary evidence and investigative methods. It tries to displace the specific content of memory to critique the structures. The skit builds the tension around the character "C" also known as Helmut. In the discussion of past moral behaviour or its dearth thereof, the presence or absence of a Stasi file, regardless of its content is considered enough to determine whether one is a victim or a villain. In the end, as Helmut tries to counter himself, it is seen that no facts about his past could suffice the already formed conviction of his colleagues about his villainy. This thickly ironic denunciation reanimates the insidious weather faithfully chosen to annul. Peter Ensikat endeavours to move beyond such cynicism choosing to expose hypocrisy in

¹⁹ It included an obligation to work as the idea of unemployment was non-existent, the profits created went into the 'social pot' to make life better for everyone, surplus accumulated as 'social wage' robbing individuals from enjoying out of their contributions, private property was minimum with most compelled to live in rented places, tillers only had right to their lands with the compulsion to join agricultural co-operatives and there was virtually an absence of individual enterprise with the state hovering over under the super-structure of command economy.

preserving memory's ability to play a positive ethical role. The challenge of living in the new social ambience of the Federal Republic was taken up in right earnest by majority of the east Germans in facing the demons of the past head on. In order to save themselves from being lost in the tangent of past and present, they salvage their place in the new surroundings by reorienting to the circumstances of everyday life.

Wolfgang Schaller's skit *Alter Mann in neuerZeit* (Old Man in Modern Times, 1992), writes about a confused older man turning to a young police officer for help in finding his brother's house as the city streets were recently renamed making those unrecognisable to him. He has become a kind of an irrelevant silhouette trying to reconcile his 'self' in the bigger realm of the German Republic which is altogether a whole new entity. There, renaming of the former GDR places and objects orchestrated a kind of a detour in the minds of east Germans which called for skirting of familiar and comforting reminiscences. These could well have been accommodated within the collective sphere of the public giving reunification a true connotative justice.

Performed on stages in Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden in the years immediately after the dismantling of the Wall, these cabaret texts showed the way in which a distinctly east German genre adapted its satirical focus to face the pressing alterations of reunification. Correctly remembering things could bear ethical fruit, whether in the capacity of a corrective for past wrongs or as a precedent for future developments. Here, distortions involve the danger of brewing up injustices by making a passive sufferer of the present protest against the extremes of liberty trying to turn a familiar world into a series of disparate and obsolete blocks. Satire becomes a democratizing gesture where remembering as well as forgetting is treated as a privilege of the few though it could be initiated by anyone without duress and as an individual preference.

Unification brought about an immediate flurry of political cartoons in newspapers and satirical magazines like the western German *Titanick* and the eastern German *Eulenspiegel*, as well as of cabaret performances, in which satirists took leave of socialist East Germany and summarized briskly changing events and experiences of the post-wall period. Several new cabaret theatres sprouted up in the following years in the five newly admitted eastern German federal states, and both eastern and western German writers, filmmakers, and performers set to work generating a boom in all genres and modes of comic literature, television and film. In November 1989 the Titanic

ushered in this new era of Nachwendehumor (post-wall humour) by portraying on its cover a photograph of a young woman with an unfashionable, short, curly hair cut, wearing a jeans jacket (for these reasons alone easily identifiable to all Germans as an east German), and holding a large cucumber peeled like a banana in her hand, bearing the caption ‘Zonen-Gaby (17) im Gleuck (BRD): Meineerste Banane’ (Gaby from the Soviet-occupied area {17} in luck {FRG}: My first Banana). Thus started a persistent, new phase of rivalry between two formerly separate and distinct German populations, in which cultural incongruities lent themselves to humorous portrayals. In the above mentioned portrayal, the seventeen-year old (Gaby) represented the naïve, gullible east German who cannot even recognize a banana because she had no access to tropical fruits in the GDR, where restrictive trade agreements and a short supply of western currency limited the number and variety of imported consumer goods. All such rather innocuous, sympathetic, humorous jabs soon developed into a harsh, occasionally grotesque, satirical pricking.

The rapid unification of the two German states should have spawned the film industry. Interestingly, it only came up with reappraisals like Margarete von Trotta’s *Das Versprechen* (The Promise 1995), with its theme of the Berlin Wall going up, seemingly forever for lovers divided by it, in 1961. There had also been scurrilous attempts to confront the problem of Osis and Wesis such as Christoph Schlingensief’s *Das Deutsche Kettensaegenmassaker* (The German Chainsaw Massacre 1990), there the Osis who had vanished were shown to be in fact churned out by a sausage machine near the former border. There had even been a wave of highly successful comedy films like Soenke Wortmann’s *Der bewegte Mann* (The Most Desired Man 1994) and *Stadtgespräch* (Commontalk 1995) representing a genuine new departure being belly laughingly funny, modish, frothy and almost totally bypassed any problems linked with unified Germany within the new Europe. Since the fall of the Wall, German filmmakers made only few momentous approaches to the evolving identity. Thomas Elsaesser in (Sobchack [ed.], 1996: 172), interprets the issue of self-representation in the newly formed state in the spectrum of reassessment.

The existing social cleavage and the differences in perspectives was also reflected in the satirical dramas²⁰ and the cabarets of the time. The memory of life from state

²⁰ It specializes in gaining entertainment from politics. It does not necessarily carry an agenda or seek to influence the political process. However, in the context of reunification, many writers from east Germany

socialism to that of the continuing experience under the united Germany projected the cultural milieu of *Trotzidentität* (identity of contrariness), *Ostalgie* (nostalgia for the East Germany of the past) and *Ossi* (east) pride. This created a self-awaking, a revisiting of the past and a positive mind-set toward to the derisive western stereotype. This, to some extent, maintained a stream of cultural exclusivity amidst the bellowing wave of symbiosis unfurled by the process of unification. Before there was any hope of uniting the country as a *Staatsnation* (a politically unified entity), the notion of being a German, resided almost completely in the kernel of *Kulturnation* (cultural nation). Unification harped considerably on this particular sentiment as a potential tool to overcome the obvious social and economic disunity of the people. Unsurprisingly, national categories were never used to legitimate east Germany as a separate state which makes all the more understandable the huge sense of unease felt by the them from the very beginning of the 1989 “springtime of peoples”²¹ (Tymowski, 2009: 510). Neither Honecker’s speech nor press publications managed to convince them that their country had more benefits than west Germany. Since 1989, east German residents had been fleeing on a mass scale to the west via Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the socialist German state, in which Mikhail Gorbachev participated, simply revealed once more the helplessness of the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. While the official celebrations were underway, people took to the streets demanding reforms and chanting the slogan “*Wir sind das Volk*” (“We are the People”) (Florczuk and Ciechanowicz, 2011: 16).

2.6 Conclusion

The issues of social fragmentation are interpreted through the kaleidoscope of habits, customs and mores which shaped the minds of the east Germans for long forty years. The spatial fusion of the two territories could not at the outset obliterate the attitudinal characteristics of a set of people reared and nurtured under the banner of collectivism. Their entire way of life was inextricably linked with the state which was seen as a perennial paradise providing them with all the vital components necessary not only to

gave vent to their feelings on the socio-economic and cultural occurrences, thereby, adding a literary dimension to a predominantly political event.

²¹It is a part of the revolutionary wave in the late 1980s and early 1990s that resulted in the end of the Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.

sustain but to flourish in full. In their momentary euphoria they never calculated their signing of self-banishment from this cosy nest into the scorching domain of individualism studded with untold miseries and unending troubles. In technical terms, re-unification entailed a thorough overhauling of the paternalistic system of care to that of self-sustenance amidst whatever circumstances. Obviously, accustomed to an unperturbed lifestyle caring and sharing, the people of east Germany, in no time found themselves trapped in the uncongenial environment of isolation where the only escape route was to float in the past fond memories of comfort and plenty. While doing so, they, as is discussed, further alienate themselves from their immediate surroundings making integration a difficult proposition. Along with such psychological discordance comes the general feeling of resigning accompanied by mimicry, protest, dejection and cynicism about the capitalist free society promising unbridled prosperity amidst threatening consequences. Many did take up the daunting challenge of thriving serious risks. This links up with the other issues of wit and humour in the various writings of the time pricking the inherent contradictions of liberalism which to a great extent de-humanizes man in replacing an individual's conscience with calculation, mind with material and manner with measurement. The very identity and culture of the east Germans underwent a sea-change in the newly formed Federal Republic. They were experiencing a homogenous existence under the cult of real existent socialism where gathering and sharing ensured the betterment of the co-habitants. This was dilapidated in the new Republic where the road to prospective plenty went through the alleys of heterogeneity. The establishment of individuality in the circle of competitiveness fetched cumulative flourishing.

The relative peace of living within the community was to a great extent fractured following the discriminatory attitude of the people of west Germany. They were explicit in exhibiting their dislike to have to mix with the people of the east, considered sluggish, incompetent and atavistic in their lifestyle. The situation however, was conducive for travel also gone in the wake of large-scale migration from the east. They moved out in large numbers toward the west in search of greener pastures, but given the ethnic compatibility, the perceptual dissonance largely prevented social integration. Yet, there were compulsions of livelihood which accompanied by an impulsion to throw away all the difficulties and endure the adversities made them a part of the assimilated whole though in an imperfect manner.

Wealth played a pivotal role in unexpectedly expediting the process of re-unification. The prodigal plenty and prosperity of West Germany was the single most point leading to the speedy dissolution of the GDR. The citizens went berserk in their desperation to become an integral part of that land of riches. Desire vanquished reason to cast them into the galling reality of trickery, falsity, felony and hardship. The complete remoulding of the command economy into laissez-faire meant the impossibility of all the east Germans to enjoy outright the material luxuries of the reunited land. On practical grounds of dissimilarities, many of the east Germans stayed back and waited for the change in the overall economic structure. Thus, the promised land of riches remained to many as distant as it was before while the work of bringing about parity in the growth continued. It took quite some years to pull up the east from the debris of stagnation to the destination of productivity. Gradually, the integration of the two terrains began to exhibit the true signs of becoming one through an increasing social acceptance, cultural cosmopolitanism and economic negotiation.

Chapter 3

Impact on Women and Family

3.1 Introduction

This chapter delineates a plethora of issues which affected the life and livelihood of the east German women and the structure of the family in general following reunification. The first two sub-sections explore the variegated fields traversed by a woman in the reunification days. The issue of gender is deliberately avoided to concentrate upon the experiences and feelings of a woman who as an individual underwent sufferings in those days of doldrums. In the struggling sea of humanity, they took up the cudgels to adapt and arise from the bellicose waves to station themselves in a position of stability. All through from education, training and securing a job their supportive and in many cases fundamental roles has been discussed in the backdrop of rapid transition so as to depict not only the material but the mental stamina of the east German females in transmuting the immediate environment of unconduciveness to that of congeniality. The rest of the seven sub-sections discuss the transformative as well as the co-optive experiences of the east German females traversing through the various stages of life. From a responsible female member of a family to that of a wife and mother. It involved the forming and managing of disparate tasks of simultaneously handling the labour-market and functioning as a householder. Especially, in the hindsight that the forms of living together ever since the days of reunification have become quite complex with couples both homo and hetero cohabiting sans married. For many of the east German women, these were shockingly distracting experiences evoking dislike toward their fellow counterparts. It was astonishing for many of them to see groups of people live together, even without being friends or relatives and so on. The institution of marriage there was just one of many options, and no longer a lifelong concept. Male and female singles were respected in society as also children of a non-married couple, or with a mother or father only. Born and reared up in the proper parameters of an obligatory family, these liberalities were unacceptable to them.

3.2 Into the Whirlwind of Change

Under Communist rule in East Germany, social policies ranging from state subsidized child care to extensive maternity leaves were created to ensure women's participation

in the labour force. While women's equal participation rates in the workforce were often publicised as evidence of their emancipation, the state continued to put emphasis on women as mothers. The sheer unwillingness of the state to alleviate women's double burden, that is, their complete responsibility for work within the household jettisons the equal stature of the women in the society. Indeed, some authors have argued that women's disappearance from politics and movement away from full-time work in post-communist countries represent an inherent hypocrisy of representative democracy²². It could be said along with Banaszak (2006: 32) as she quoted from Ferree that the transition from collectivism to individualism persisted the rhetoric of worker-mother as an unchanging phenomenon. The miseries of the women further heightened with the introduction of parental co-payments based on family income, at least charging a basic fee to almost every family. Thus, the cut through German unification has been particularly drastic for mothers with children under the age of three, and it clearly indicates that the policies of the unified Germany encouraged women to care for their own children at home for the first few years. However, German unification did not only affect child care but also led to a diminution in pro-natal policies which used to support mainly those enrolled in education providing them special financial support. This, to a certain extent, made them financially independent from a partner or parents. The abrupt end of these policies led to a massive surge in the conflict between educational participation and motherhood in the east.

Earlier, in the former German Democratic Republic, more than eighty percent of women at working age were involved in the labour market. In particular, it appeared that they were better integrated into the labour market than women of the former German Federal Republic where participation rates were low by international standards. After unification, this share of women gradually declined. This moderate decline could be interpreted as quite remarkable considering that women have been facing high levels of unemployment since the collapse of employment opportunities at the outset of unification. The economic transition was chiefly responsible in significantly plummeting the rate of employment. It consequently led to the endurance of low outflow from unemployment to employment discouraging unemployed women from seeking employment.

²² It was a clever ploy on the part of the ruling authorities to cajole the womenfolk of east Germany to perform more while depriving them of the justifiable return.

According to Geist (2005: 415) housework, as an aspect of inequality affects not only couple relationships, but also individuals' well-being. The functionalities on domestic labour has established that although essentially a private activity, housework is shaped by context. Individual level mechanisms that influence housework can have varying meaning across contexts. In taking from Esping-Anderson, Geist (2005: 415) explains the categorizations by which mechanisms influencing the division of labour is adjusted across liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare state regimes where maximum inequality over housework is seen in conservative welfare states. On many occasions it has been seen that the workings of the division of labour poses unpredictable tangents. Whatever may be the case, the fundamental aim remains the studying of the main determinants of the housework burden of employed women of east Germany affecting their public and private domains. The issue of housework in the Federal Republic pulls out the condition of the women as a workforce in the new social set up. There, the emphasis on the absolute time devoted over the measurement of share surfaces the salience of the paid work fashioning the mechanisms of house work allocation. Domestic production is a site where men and women can live out wifely and husbandly roles. Accordingly, as Geist (2005: 419) quotes from West and Zimmerman that women may do more housework than men in an active effort to affirm their femininity. Geist (2005: 419), further argues in line with Gupta, South and Spitze that seemingly entry into a heterosexual union increases women's time spent on housework while simultaneously reducing men's, thus suggesting that the process of doing gender is more pronounced in traditionally gendered contexts. Geist (2005: 419) went on to argue in taking from Shelton and John that it is not the mere presence of a male partner that increases women's housework, but it is the presence of a husband. Borrowing from Baxter, Geist (2005: 419) suggests that the "incompleteness" of cohabitation as an institution allows for more flexible negotiations of domestic roles among partners in these unions. Incidentally, Geist (2005: 419) opines in following Cunningham that this leaves more room for equal sharing and more flexibility in task assignment, resulting usually in lower levels of housework for cohabiting women. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the reunification, there was a huge exodus of men from the various regions of the east to the west to relish the civic liberties and prosperity. This made the position of the women of the east even more vulnerable without break in living together as well as having to fit into the both domestic and earning roles.

3.3 Re-emergence as Breadwinners

The east German women's *kompatibles Drei-Rollen-Model*²³ (compatible three role model), where women were mothers and homemakers, qualified employees, and political and social activists though projected women as being active in all aspects of social life, did not fully translate into an expanded role for men in the domestic sphere. Since the position of women in society differed more markedly between the two states than was the case for men, the political and economic upheaval following unification was particularly traumatic for women. In addition to the ideological differences and institutional transformation, the transition to a capitalist economy was associated with a deep economic crisis that pushed them out of the labour force. The East German economy suffered a tremendous level of job loss and the labour market position of the women evolved both fundamentally and permanently. The lack of employment opportunities, together with incentives for women to remain at home, reduced East German women's labour market participation which as Geist (2005: 421) in line with Trappe and Rosenfeld, argues was comfortably more compared to the West German levels. The rationale to housework allocation is based on the premise that couples' domestic labour is concomitant on labour force investment and rewards. Possessing the required amount of expertise to engage in any kind of profession as the above picture shows they were still considered to look after the household. Contextualizing it in the typical tradition of liberty shaping men's and women's labour force situation, it seldom affected the housework allocation process directly. Another approach to housework posits that partnerships, especially marriage and motherhood, activate women's perceived need to affirm their femininity²⁴.

Female labour force participation affects the overall economic output of a society, it may influence child well-being, and it determines the development of female wages over the life cycle. According to Hanel and Riphahn (2011: 1) one of the core differences in the German labour markets at the time of unification was female labour force participation with "most of the 91% employed women in the east working full-

²³ It was more of a negotiating mechanism to keep the womenfolk busy in the socio-economic ramifications. Actually, the traditional role of women as a householder remained dominated the psyche of the society in general causing among the east German women, in the initial years following unification difficult to adjust to such anomalous ambience.

²⁴ This particular mind-set kept the east German families together where economically active women also managed to play a key role in within the precincts of the private domain. Thus, synchronising the outer and the inner world.

time, whereas only about three quarters of the 58% in west did so." (Adler and Brayfield 1997: 248). Post-unification the two regions of Germany differed economically, in their heritage, culture and norms. At the same time, they were governed by an identical institutional framework which sets incentives for the employment behaviour of mothers. Hanel and Riphahn (2011: 1), taking from Licht and Steiner states that the overall employment in the east dropped from about 9 million in 1990 to 6 million in 1992 and went on to argue in line with Rosenfeld et al. and Hunt that the participation rates of females declined faster and unemployment rates rose more than those of males in the east. Further, Hanel and Riphahn (2011: 2) agrees with Adler and Brayfield in delving into the norms and attitudes as potential determinants of employment of mothers in the east where it has been seen showed that east German women assigned more importance to employment and that they were more likely to pursue a combination of motherhood and market career. Interestingly enough, Hanel and Riphahn

(2011: 2) borrows from Braun et al. to argue that conditional on a higher valuation of employment, which was imposed by the socialist state, east German females were to a great extent traditionalist in their attitudes. According to Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 110), frequently behavioural adjustment may take some time because societies and individuals "arrange their lives in certain ways, just because that is what was done in the past." According to Hoven (2002: 1) who in taking from Phillips, Watson, Kamenista, Graham and Regulska argues that the exclusion of women from democratic citizenship in the main has often been ascribed to the patriarchal nature of the democratic process in both the Western (capitalist) and Eastern (former socialist) societies. Largely considered as models of existence, the democratic ideas were not much of help to the distressed women of the east. Sandwiched between home and work, they realized the importance of the socialist pattern in providing some relief as opposed to the liberal principles of a free society where the incidence of caring diminishes.

Reunification as a sudden and unexpected socio-political event for many east German women brought them in direct contact with a ready-made democratic, market-oriented system²⁵. Brisk occurrence of events precluded any appropriate evaluation of the situation and the overall assumption that the market would "efficiently co-ordinate

²⁵ Though in the immediate aftermath of the unification there was significant digression in the demand-supply ratio mainly because of the infrastructural transfer of the competitive stricture from the west to the east. It was more operational than systematic.

scarce resources" (Przeworski 1995: 14) did not materialise. Consequently, as transitions took place according to a West German political agenda, the full extent of the underlying problems in the GDR economy was ignored. Lack of policies designed to absorb problems led to the overshadowing of the unification by social and economic crises. The expectation that the shift to a democratic system would produce equality and wealth proved largely a chimera causing widespread disillusionment and social disparities amongst the 'new' German citizens. Instead of greater freedom and participatory democracy for all citizens, a significant feature of the 'democratic' transformation of East Germany was the increasing social differentiation by class and gender. According to Hoven (2002: 4) who in taking from Duncan argues that the disparities between men and women began to increase as their new roles increasingly converged with the West German male breadwinner model. Furthermore, Hoven (2002: 4) in line with Przeworski argues that the political prioritisation of the market alongside the proposal of blanket policies to alleviate immediate social problems neglected the need to empower groups which were socially, economically and politically marginalised, such as women. Thus, they, in particular became detached from public life and the political process. Emerging dichotomies such as employed/unemployed, mobile/immobile, integrated/excluded, public/private or masculine/feminine became significant denominators for who gained democratic citizenship and who did not deeply affect the social status of the women groping about in the turmoil for a secure base.

Moreover, the policies and outcomes of the Federal Government substantially diminished the independence of the women in the east resulting in a scenario of partial convergence²⁶ with the liberal conservative society. Earlier, they used to enjoy high levels of employment and long weekly hours, including the mothers. According to Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 109) who all in taking from Kuenzler et al. and Trappe argues that in posterity mothers' work-family conflicts were alleviated through extensive public provision of child care, reduced working hours for mothers, and a paid birth year, after which women were expected to return to full-time employment. Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 109) in quoting from Einhorn argues that indeed, among the state socialist societies, the GDR went furthest in balancing its policies toward women as producers

²⁶ It was more of an evolutionary exercise where the east Germans constantly engaged themselves in tackling the untasted social and economic consequences of unification. Temporal in nature, it sucked in much of the vitality from the daily struggle to make them more resilient and adaptable.


and reproducers. Almost all the workers were employed by the state or state-owned enterprises where wages commensurate with public pay scales.

Further, Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 109) in line with Kuenzler et al. and Schenk argues that the starkest difference was seen in employment rates and hours with women in possession of higher employment rates and longer hours of work. In the reunified region, they not only lost hugely the scope of work but confronted occupational segregation on account of a strong connection between qualifications and jobs which as Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 109) argues tended to sort workers into occupations along gender lines. This, in turn, increased the wage gaps which were also instigated by pay scales incorporating elements from the pre-socialist period. Gone were the schemes of family policies having generous child care and family leave benefits which minimized employment interruptions in connection with the birth of a child. Scholars have attributed these remarkable alterations in women's (particularly mothers) participation rates fetched by reunification to several interdependent factors. These as Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 111) in line with Schenk shows include labour market factors (e.g., the structure of women's employment opportunities as well as the pressure on them to work for pay), cultural factors (e.g., norms about the care of young children) and policy factors (e.g., public programs for reconciling employment and family obligations). According to Rosenfeld et al. (2004: 111) in line with Adler, Brayfield and Kuenzler et al. argued that these interdependent factors at the individual and family levels led the women in choosing the east as a stronger region for employment and a higher level of economic necessity within families. The drastic decrease in the Federal Republic of the average weekly work hours multiplied the discomfiture of the East German women accustomed to healthy financial existence. Social estrangement accompanied by pecuniary pains drove them to cling into whatever jobs available. This desperateness turned many from part to full-time toilers sans any social benefits as also compelled many to accept part-time work on an involuntary manner.

According to Beck et al. (2005: 1) unemployment is a much talked about theme in Germany given the fact that on a national average of over 11 percent of the potential workforce is idle sparking unending discussions about the rigidity of the German labour market. Yet, joblessness has far-reaching consequences of destabilizing the social equation in perforating classes and creating imbalance in relationships. Incidentally, women of the east as a social group despite being an integral part of the labour market

in the GDR as equally capable breadwinners²⁷, depicted in the above picture, bore the brunt of the fall-out from the unification process, especially given the decline in employment. The decade of the eighties witnessed an overwhelming majority of women engaged in some or the other monetary activities with an ever-increasing trend on the anvil. This burgeoning prosperity was abruptly choked by the process of unification bringing in a pall of gloom. Paradoxically, it provided an added impetus to the east German women to be more resilient in overcoming the turmoil brought about by the social and economic transformation. The fixity of their position was an outcome of the institutional socialisation in the former German Democratic Republic, their reliance on the support of solid social networks and family ties and finally, their reluctance to accept the configuration of the male breadwinner model dominant in the (West) German labour market.

Figure 5: Evolution of Wage Earning Profile



Source: Arntz and Gathman (2013: 33)

However, the rates of unemployment in the new states in light of practised differentiation remains showing signs of slight increase. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, approximately 20 per cent of those available for work in east Germany were unemployed but the real figure, including hidden unemployment, could be nearer 25 per cent (Der Spiegel, 29 2002 p.S.96 ff.). Adoption of labour market fluidity and

²⁷ This speaks more about the continuation of the east German women in significantly contributing toward the financial betterment of the family. They were not much influenced by their west German counterparts who chose to devote more time in domesticities.

sectoral investments has generated employment reducing, in general, the unemployment rates. However, the job prospects of the women in general and that of the east Germans though not bleak, needs to be boosted in order to scale down the incidence of discrimination.

The first important development is that returns to work experience rise substantially during the East German transition. In the socialist economy, age-earnings profiles were relatively flat. Figure 1 shows the evolution of wage-earning profiles using a synthetic cohort approach. The profile for 1995, for example, shows what east German women between the ages of 20 to 60 earned in 1995. If the skills accumulated in the socialist regime shows depreciation (or there is some other unit effect), the synthetic unit approach then underestimates the actual earnings of young women for the coming twenty years. A great majority of east German women were employed or studying, had vocational and technical qualifications and worked in the chemical, electronics and management sectors. Naturally, they had to work for long hours which ate into their maternity leaves exposing them to the uncondusive employment situation. Nevertheless, they feasted upon a wide range of opportunities and enjoyed a level of independence and dignified acceptance in society. They adeptly mixed up the role of a working mother to cast off the disenchantment of isolation, limitation and social degradation.

Loss and/or absence of job thus has considerable but distinct effects for women of all ages. Many find it difficult to maintain their self-respect when there is little hope for any reintegration into the job market. With dejection enters incomprehensibility ceasing them of their household business and robbing them of gainful work. This kept up the pressure of finding a way back into employment to secure their livelihood and future pension entitlements. Even young women who did not experience full socialisation in the GDR have high work motivation, possibly due to secondary socialisation in the aftermath of unification. The enthusiasm over work even prompted them to accept a level of demotion rather than not work. Practicality furrowed into adventurism to preclude the representation and training of women in technical and more advanced areas of education. This resulted in greater polarisation in male and female career opportunities when compared to pre-unification times. Particularly speaking, the re-segregation of the east German labour market injected the western tradition of pushing

women into service sector which is an underdeveloped²⁸ area in the east. Evidently, the determination of the east German women to remain in employment demonstrated relative success in staying engaged. Arguably, even in the face of increasing affluence and the circulating ethos of male breadwinner the spirit of the women to work remained blithe. It registered not only a positive growth but an escalation in the new states. Concomitantly, it lowered the magnitude of reliance maintaining the level of prosperity without on many prevarications. Participation in the labour market thus, became directly proportional toward the maintenance of high living standards in the east.

3.4 Child Rearing and Parenthood

Mostly, reunification regulations were not based on Directive 2003/86/EC, but on the right of free movement for Union citizens. Therein, falls the Residence Act where one of its provisions is that the minor children and the spouses of German and foreign nationals who live in Germany have a right to enter the country. There is however, obvious relaxation for German nationals mostly in order to help the transiting families of the east Germans to relocate smoothly. If the child as one of the integral unit of the family relocates, the central focus of its life is to stay with parents or with such persons possessing the sole right of care and custody to the Federal territory. In case both these types of caring units possess the sole right of care and custody along with a residence permit or settlement permit then minor unmarried children could be granted a residence permit up to the age of 18. A general age limit of 16 applies to all other cases. Children below this age shall be granted a residence permit if either parents or the parent possessing the sole right of care and custody possess a residence permit or settlement permit. The objective was to unify the separated members of the east German family who in large numbers began to live and work in West Germany for a better prospect²⁹. Although given the tough financial and social conditions following unification the decision to have children was becoming a long-term commitment balanced on the twin podiums of direct monetary costs of raising children (such as the expenditures for

²⁸ This does not indicate a lack of participation on the part of the east German women in economic activities rather it reflects a propensity to keep a low profile in the social strata to concentrate more on self and family well-being.

²⁹ Both men and women from the east poured into the west in the expectation of earning and saving more. However, the cut-throat competitiveness of the labour market accompanied by social discrimination made it a tough proposition.

children's clothing, education, housing) and the opportunity costs of childrearing. The latter includes the forgone earnings because of childrearing and the forgone long-term employment chances. Simply, couples would want to make sure that they will be able to bear these long-term consequences before they start family formation. Synchronization between career and childrearing is undoubtedly a crucial factor in the formation of a family.

According to Huinink and Kreyenfeld (2004: 6) this has to take into consideration a woman's career orientations as another chief factor for the postponement of fertility which was expected to enter steeper and more challenging employment tracks, in all probability colliding with the opportunity costs of childrearing corroding on crucial career opportunities. Educational attainment as a chief indicator of women's employment chances becomes instrumental in postponing parenthood. Further, Huinink and Kreyenfeld (2004: 7) argues that highly educated women are therefore, inevitably older at first birth (or first marriage) staying in the educational system for longer periods and childrearing is basically incompatible with education in most societies. The level effect of education refers to the determinant effect of educational attainment on the timing of fertility. Arguably then, couples will postpone parenthood until the male breadwinner has settled into a stable and secure employment situation. This is more so given a woman's bleak employment prospects encouraging an early family life. Such affectations create a societal context projecting males as providers and females as child nurturers. Lack of togetherness in the Federal Republic could not obfuscate the patriarchal ethos³⁰ of the society. The professed liberal attitude of the government in letting people choose their own way of life blurred the lines between anarchy and order. The much trumpeted individual freedom fetched unaccountability and became a breeding ground for promiscuity. Coupled with a near absence of familial cohesion, it led to further deterioration of the situation in alienating man from fellow beings as well as the society at large. In the event of reunification, the people of the east, all on a sudden, found themselves in this infidel environment. A great many felt orphaned in this uncongenial surroundings of rude competitiveness and ruthless individualism. Subsistence and survival became inextricably linked to the market forces disturbing the components of family life with threatening uncertainties of employment. The non-

³⁰ It does not indicate the superiority of the males rather an effort on the part of the authorities to indicate the natural capabilities of the men and women in bringing about a harmonious society.

interventionist policies of the government reduced the chances of individuals settling down to start a family life. This led to offbeat arrangements hampering the security of society and sanity of culture. The establishment of the *Treuhandanstalt* (the trust agency), the Monetary Union and official ratification of the Unification Treaty was according to Huinink and Kreyenfeld (2004: 9) was instrumental in introducing the family policies and the tax and transfer systems of the (former) FRG, prototype of a conservative welfare state model, in the former GDR territories. They went on to drive in the point that the near-completion of privatization failed to bring about a parity over employment and wages in these *alte Laender* (old federal states). In an authoritarian system where cradle-to-the grave services ministered to social needs, seeking out health care, insurance savings instruments employment housing and education. Freedom of choice³¹ in a bewildering market place has a terrifying ring. For pensioners forced out of their Berlin apartment. as rents skyrocket and dowdy neighbourhoods become chic residential districts. There is justifiable panic. As far as the marketplace is concerned, the elderly has no future; they have to make way for the young who are flexible, energetic, and productive.

There was disruption in the labour market which failed to synchronize with the educational pattern snapping the link between work and knowledge. The absence of state support further created joblessness in the cross-section of the population making transition unstable and uncertain. The condition of joblessness for the youth was mainly due to disconnect in the kind of training and the real market employment. According to Huinink and Kreyenfeld (2004: 10) the settled life of the east suffered multiple punctures of vagrancy, mobility and high biographical uncertainties which made the institution of marriage an unviable proposition frothed with risks. These invariably brought about a decline in fertility. The more common it became for women to work, the more important is the compatibility of work and family life for fertility decisions. It was widely expected for public day care places to be drastically cut down and privatized in the course of unification (Adler 2001: 22, Rindfuss and Brewster 1996: 273). However, it functioned as a public sector unit covering a substantial area following the unification of the two parts of Germany. Furthermore, a more competitive labour market impose stronger demands on worker flexibility accompanied by greater career

³¹ A typical feature of a liberal economy where the strain of competition actually limits the options of an individual compelling him/her to do whatever comes in the way.

options inducing career oriented women to postpone parenthood. This, more often, results, in an increased variation in the timing of fertility. Evidence wise, educational participation (of the woman and her partner) reduces first birth risks. In post-unification Germany, this effect has gained strength making individuals to stay longer in the educational system than under the socialist regime. One can therefore, content that the increase in educational participation and the incompatibility of childrearing and education explains part of the postponement of first birth after unification. It had been seen that the new institutional constraints favoured the female home-keeper model, previously neither socially acceptable nor economically feasible. Here, the effects of interactions between partner's and women's labour market situation becomes instrumental in determining the trajectories of bearing a child and forming a family despite the financial conditions. If the possibilities of securing a job and/or gain promotion becomes bleak, many might decide to take a first child and lead a family life. In some ways, the people of the east managed to find some respite though in the Federal State from the stifling socialistic³² atmosphere of the former GDR, precipitating material division and ossifying the society. The exposure to competition for many seemed to be a far better option to use one's merit than to practise compliance and conformity with the concerned authorities in order to flourish in life. The presence of inequality and rigidity proved to be a continuous hindrance in the path of progress with the state going on to create its own winners, functionaries, office holders, executors of state power and its own losers the majority of the population. The regime controlled individuals, their social groups and personal activities where life became state and state became life. The domain of family faded into the background as sheer places to sleep, eat and watch television.

3.5 An Instrument of Socialization

Historically, the GDR society remained dominated by concerns for material well-being and survival, since neither the financial circumstances of households or individuals nor the provision of goods and services improved at any point sufficiently to be taken for granted. Despite state-run institutions to reduce the centrality of the family, the socialization of children and young people through school, after-school activities, youth

³² The domination of the party in the erstwhile GDR made a mockery of the tenets of socialism where mainly in the echelons of advertisement circulated the principles of communitarianism while class antagonism continued unhindered.

organizations and obligatory participation in their activities or for adults through canteen meals and a host of party, trade-union or neighbourhood meetings kept the family firmly entrenched in its centrality. People however, tried hard to avoid the exigencies of the state in having their own washing machines, cooking meal for the family in the evening despite the additional chores, staying at home and watching television and furnishing their apartments lavishly to make the state produced, externally uniform housing units personal by constructing their own private, distinctive world. The primacy of the private world was even more apparent in the retreat of most east Germans to a weekend *Datscha* (Cottage), tended allotment or sought refuge in a beekeeper's association or similar state-free sphere.

According to Kolinsky (1998: 174) who in taking from Oswald and Suess argued that friends and peers gain importance as young people grew older yet never supplant parents. Teachers, youth workers or other public figures who were in daily contact with the young people as carers or educators remained relatively marginal when young people sought advice or needed to confide in someone. After unification, concerns about employment upturned the emphasis on the family but it retained its place among the top priorities for east Germans (Starke, 1995: 165). Family constituted a valued arena in being quarantined from the state and its official discourse of political conformity making it a haven of private retreat. Homes provided the much needed space for letting off of one's steam and express likes and dislikes freely. In the niche society, the family was the most significant of all niches. Until the collapse of its separate state, east Germany was a family-oriented³³ country, despite the relative instability of the family as an institution and the provision of functions by state organizations. Advance industrial societies generally form a more pluralistic family with the frequent occurrences and social acceptance of common-law marriages, divorce and remarriage. Paradoxically, east German family as an institution was among the most popular as well as the most unstable of places recording a high marriage, divorce and remarriage rates. Not only the perpetration of the norms and customs of collective living, but an urge to explore the unknown engendered these ambivalent situations where everything is in a flux of momentariness. In the reunified nation, the people of the east moved along the

³³ This is strange contradiction of practising traditionalism within the overall crust of modernity. Declining rate of population may have been one of the main catalyst propelling state measures toward the increase in the sheer number of families.

overlapping lines of economic stability and emotional experimentation to alter the definition of a family as a space where pragmatically speaking, two consenting adults live together. In referring to a particular critic from the news daily *Der Spiegel*, Kolinsky (1998: 17) was of the opinion that the people in a house or flat who have breakfast together are a family.

Moreover, Kolinsky (1998: 4) argues that the individualization of the family blurring the institutional structures escalated the risk of livelihood in the Federal Republic to a level of uncertainty. The conflicting roles of the state with that of the individuals transpired into the tenuous zone of crisis, especially for the female members connected to the labour market. Single mothers and families with three or more children increasingly faced the risk of penury. This is more so because of the continuous challenge faced by the market economies in generating full and rolling employment due to the forces of unpredictability, intermittent unemployment and retraining. Even for men, the traditional format of choosing a career in their teens and working in their trade or profession until retirement became increasingly unlikely in a working environment recast by economic restructuring outdated skills and qualifications in less than a lifetime. This is further accentuated as Kolinsky (1998: 18) point out by risks with reference to technical education for girls and argues that the gender gap in education has been widening and in agreement with Scharf consents that family networks and support systems for older people have remained remarkably unchanged in the post-communist environment and improved pension rights, in turn, reducing the risks of under provision that had existed in the GDR. By the time unification occurred, the socialist values itself fragmented into a plethora of underpinnings encouraging individualization of life-styles and a social order where the risk of exclusion was never far away and where neither state policies nor personal motivation could produce GDR-style predictability. In the social transformation of post-communist Germany, the family is challenged to adjust to ramified material circumstances, adapt to refashioned values, assume public functions, cope with the newly acute conflicts between work and raising children and manage the patchwork of reskilling and intermittent employment which has in the new Laender as in the old become the hallmark of working lives in the present and future.

3.6 Habitation Structures under Economic Transformation

Considerable attention was paid toward the maintenance of high-quality entitlements³⁴ incurring high non-wage costs. The overhauling of the economic structure increased such expenditures constraining the opportunities for job creation thereby, impinging on German competitiveness. Consequently, part-time work remains a very small sector for men while being a central source of employment for married women. This could be proof enough of a modest effort to reconcile labour market and familial roles which perverted the incentives of the social protection measures reinforcing the traditional wifely role, especially in precipitating exit from full-time work. Post-unification mode of life for the east Germans hovered round economic priorities suppressing the contingent demographic and family-centred necessities. This helped greatly in mitigating the often conflicting goals of family social protection and monetary gains. Such constraints arise from linking benefits derived as social insurance to the amount of levy extracted by digging at the earnings of individuals making formulation of a profitable policy difficult. In real terms, the east Germans found it very hard to engage in high paid works. This, in most cases, compelled the females to restrict their role as homemakers to project an overall image of economic bloom while splitting the pension entitlements along with its derivatives between the spouses, which in the large majority of cases are derived from the husband's record. Close to that is the urgent need to regulate inter- and/or intra-generational distribution of family wealth expected to engender a high degree of cohesion³⁵ while respecting greater plurality of its form.

According to Kolinsky (1998: 60) contemporary changes in family structure has to a great degree shattered the contentious divisions routinely and statutorily made in attributing an inferior value to unpaid work as opposed to paid employment. Integral to this development are the issues of the changing nature of inter-spousal dependency and axiomatic notions of justice and equality attached to the prevalence of superiority in the families to that of the resources. In the German context, they are reassuring evidence of the positive benefits of dependent path determining policymaking. It is quite hard to chalk out a holistic welfare scheme covering the aspects of social security and monetary

³⁴ The state also in conjunction with the private authorities assisted in providing major incentives to working men and women so that they could be in a better position to settle down more quickly in life.

³⁵ Here, the force s of affinity worked in conjunction with the loss and gains in the economic sector. Sometimes it helped in gaining the momentum required to contribute both toward the prosperity of the state and that of personal life.

gain accruing up to a respectable livelihood. Though there is no dearth in attempts to treat the individual as a valued resource of the geo-spatial portion building up the equity issues inherent in the implicit social security contracts between the members, especially between husbands and wives as well as the generations. Orchestration of social protection issues in family policy envelope demographic considerations, striking a balance between initiatives validating traditional family units and those sanctioning new formations, for instance, lone parenthood and non-conventional partnerships, assumptions about the symmetry of marital reciprocities and the lengthening interpretations of dependent childhood. Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that the conjuncture of demographic, economic and marital trends amounts to the most far-reaching change since the Industrial Revolution. The demographic time bomb with historically low birth rates accompanied by rising life expectancy has been measured as incurring especially grave budgetary consequences. Indeed, Eurostat projections of the German pensioner dependency ratio is in a wholesome position. Despite recent innovations achieved through partial renegotiation of conservative social protection regimes, the antediluvian image of husband as the linchpin of financial solidarity still persists in the German psyche³⁶. It had become an incontrovertible phenomenon precipitating instability in spousal relations, but what remains contested is the utilization of social security measures to advance male-female equality within internal family dynamics. In large measure resource-sharing between spouses has been unproblematically assumed, although some benefits have been specifically allocated to mothers in order to guarantee some independent source of income. According to Mangen (in Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 63&78) argues in line with Ostner and Lewis that it is not at all clear how a modernization of social protection would be popularly received if it implies a real incorporation of male heads of households into the equation of care, since such an endeavour would entail forming new solidarities which are substantially alien to current mainstream interpretations of marital partnership. Yet, in the changed conditions of post-unification days, the role reversal of the male and female, in the east German families became frequent. They had to manage between work and family chores where the engagement of the females was found to be more than that of the

³⁶ The coming of the east Germans, especially the women helped much in deflecting the stereotypes of the West German society fetching a semblance of parity in the overall structure of the nation.

males suffering from uncertainty of job and taking to drinking. In such desolate mental state, they to some extent stepped into the shoes of their partners.

In conjunction with the profusion of family formations, the rise of dual-income, female-waged and no waged families, long-held presumptions about internal familial solidarities have become progressively redundant for many households. It went on to affect the subsidized schemes targeted for the needy members. Government policies are made on the assumption of lifelong marriage, interpreted as symmetrical partnership and the social catholic tenet of subsidiarity in scrutinizing family responsibilities. However, given the real life variations, social benefits over the last twenty-five years have become volatile as seen in the revision and reintroduction of child benefits and tax allowances. An adjunct effect of it is seen in the shifting priorities of in-kind services for the care of infants as well as the elderly. Naturalness of marriage is a cornerstone of German social security wherein pensions are largely an outcrop of a husband's labour market activity. According to Mangen in (Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 64) in line with Scheiwe opines thus, it is marriage per se, rather than childbearing that confers advantage and means which makes a divorced childless woman better off than her equivalent who never married. Marriage is a prerequisite for receipt of widow's benefit and remarriage shifts dependency from the former to the new husband. The accumulation of entitlements via marriage can have sombrely adverse impacts in terms of an abrupt interruption of welfare rights on dissolution. It goes on to affect the splitting of pension between spouses ending in a divorce and hampers the continued eligibility for the ex-wife's sickness cover. Fortunately, as Mangen in Kolinsky edited book (1998: 64) brings out that the old (in comparison to the new) Laender have comparatively low rates of divorce, lone parenthood and extra-marital births. However, the number of sole mothers is set to rise substantially with current high rates of divorce where one-fifth of its households are already headed by mothers alone. Even if full-time occupational rates of lone mothers are considerably above those of married women, the uncertainty of their employment status is also more typical with dearth of infant care opportunities and reduces their availability for full-time work, the routine criterion for receipt of unemployment compensation. Further as Mangen in the same book discuss that at least in the interpretation of German social assistance regulations, there is a measure of flexibility which may offer possible avenues for future expansion in the form of lone parent claimants being offered additional discounts on earned income if they have high

work-related expenses or, alternatively, free child care; and they also have access to certain tax and housing allowances. It is the never-married mothers who comprise the most vulnerable group. They are the victims of residualization³⁷ in welfare models stolidly entrenched in marital and labour market status (Mangen in Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 64). The overall linear distribution mechanism gives more to the lone parents with several children compared to couples, although lone parents with only one child are treated more generously. On a closer look, the benefits of existing social entitlements for single parents may appear to be more apparent than real. As Mangen in (Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 65) book argues that the childrearing allowance, for instance, is of little effective value to lonest mothers, since at best it is set at too low a level to provide other than minimum subsistence support, even when combined with the typical remuneration from part-time work. This invariably compels mothers either to do a full-time job or quit altogether to depend on social help. Ultimately, the economic status of lone parents becomes contingent upon their status of employment which corroborates directly with the level of prosperity. The young members of the family while in education also assist in keeping up the earnings in doing some or other jobs. This lessens the degree of dependency and enables the incorporation of means to increase the emoluments for across the generations.

Till date, the extension of rights beyond the conventional heterosexual contractual partnerships remains under-legislated. Whereas proponents of the status quo argue that marriage is a legally binding commitment and is the only form of partnership that should conferred with entitlements, there are others who suggest an extension of those that rights to other variants of couples to help an individual to inch toward equality of rights. More intricate still are homosexual partnerships. In such stream of affairs, it has quite a low birth rate and an increase would still hardly change the relative position of the country which anticipates more of child-free marriages. Yet budgetary policy remained inherently conservative³⁸ with the governing coalition consistently rejecting a full socialization package through general taxation in the form of a universal citizenship benefit. Nevertheless, action on family protection has been more

³⁷ This is not to say that it led to sedimentation of the classes rather it gave mew dimensions to the strait-jacket policies of social security in joining more varieties of relationship criteria into the list of provisions of the state.

³⁸ It supported the minimization of the role of the state to succour maximum freedom of doing business which would in turn enrich the state and its dwellers. However, the government remained sympathetic to the needs of the people and kept an eye on the excesses of the private operators.

expansionary inclining toward a compromising angle to co-opt the traditional social insurance model. Significantly, the restitution principle through monetary reparation has been extended into compensation for limited forms of non-remunerated domestic care. These innovations are attempts to realign the balance between the traditional German trinity of *Versicherung* (insurance), *Versorgung* (solidarity or citizenship payments) and *Fürsorge* (discretionary assistance) in favour of solidarity solutions. In the long term it could be more effectively utilized to support life-course regimes, intervening to alleviate periods of need or risk during the various phases of life.

3.7 Monetization

Monetization³⁹ have routinely distinguished between the value of paid and unpaid work, a direct outcome of state subsidiarity in regulating remuneration of what are regarded as private domestic duties. Further, Kolinsky (1998: 67) argues in line with McLaughlin and Gledinning that for the most part they relate to child and elder care which could be seen as entitlements to de-commodify and de-familialize to prevent any ruptures in the relationship. The innovations are like a childrearing allowance for infants; pension credits for motherhood; and, latterly, care benefits and attendant allowances for the disabled and frail elderly. Interestingly, they combine extensions of universal entitlement with an infusion of means-testing further formalizing familial duty to supply care, a liability which has been extended by the statutory requirement of individuals to make provisions via insurance for the possibility of a later future need for long-term care. These recent policies have led to a significant expansion of formal payment for care of the family long after the state conceded compensation for child care. Kolinsky (1998: 68) in taking from Harker supports the three-tier model of child care which embraced individualized entitlements, a flat-rate child benefit and supplementary childrearing allowance. These, together with active labour market policies and progressive taxation would enhance the redistributive impact of family social protection while offering real choice to mothers as regards seeking employment. However, the issue of whether social protection should totally compensate for the decision to have children is enduringly controversial with new right speculating that

³⁹ Apart from the tendency on the part of the government to keep sufficient foreign exchange reserves, it also circulates currencies to reduce the expenditure and increase the purchasing power of the people. It aims in reducing the scale of subsidy to stock more notes.

enhancing entitlement could merely encourage irresponsible welfare breeding among the poor whilst providing little to stimulate the better-off to have children.

The west and east of Germany had different perceptions of female labour market roles, but since unification it is the western model of encouraging mothers of young children to stay at home that has mostly prevailed. As argued earlier, German family protection has been somnolent in response, evaporative and dubiously selective. At different times it operated a combined tax and benefit system⁴⁰ and a benefit only system with the abolition of tax allowances. Until 1995 the government used to provide benefits up to the fourth child on verification. In order to streamline tax and benefit provisions, reform of 1996 offered parents the ability to choose either the child benefit or a tax allowance on the basis of their incomes. Although low-income households received additional payments in lieu of their failure to benefit from tax allowances, the contributory percentage of social security payments kept the structure of families from falling apart. The state always remained responsive in driving child poverty through sufficient funds enabling the parents to engage in fruitful financial activities. This in turn, increased the resources of the country and made the net equity of the nation equivalent to that of the level of satisfaction. The present lack of transparency suggests a possible value for money policy line in the future, especially as current outcomes impair the increasingly sensitive issue of the generation contract by imposing high opportunity costs on the fructiferous working woman. Mostly engaged in low income professions, the east German women depended much on the social benefits to rear up their children. This pushed the dynamics of the labour market in supplying part-time jobs keeping the semblance of the minimum of earnings. Further, conditions for receipt could be relaxed pragmatically to take account of any significant changes in female and, for that matter, male employment activity might be to ultimately extend the allowance, with varying tax recaptures, to full-time working mothers to reduce the incentive for labour market withdrawal.

The decision by Chancellor Kohl to instigate baby year pension credits though became popular as an added element to the calculation entitlement was initially under serious doubt. There were misgivings that extraneous objectives were being added to income maintenance policy in old age, that the valuing of the credits would be ticklish and most

⁴⁰ Attempt was made to increase the entire volume of revenue to the farthest through the implementation of various tax and cesses as a collateral development to mitigate the huge cost of reunification.

importantly add up to the liabilities at a time when budgetary bridle and flexibility were prime considerations. Nevertheless, they were enacted overwhelmingly benefiting mothers initially tuned at a year's contribution for periods out of the workforce in order to raise children up to the age of ten, but was tripled within the space of a few years for children born after 1992. Official reticence about the credit is evidenced in the value of recognition afforded to parenthood or, better said, motherhood. Entitlement was set at 75 rather than 100 per cent of average earnings. Unambiguously, labour market participation is a disincentive for the derivation of entitlements stunting incomes and reducing the overall production of wealth. In the long run it becomes counter-productive in isolating them from the chances of gaining productivity in the wake of falling magnitude of inclusivity. Compressed between the old age requirements and grown up children, females feel the meagreness of social entitlements. As Mangen in (Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 70) book argues in line with Offe that in part, the credits were conceded as an alternative to a more radical choice of a minimum social pension guarantee (which many in the feminist lobby would have preferred) and represent but another element of conservatism. Nonetheless, the credits do go a little way towards individualizing own right social security entitlements. Their introduction was also employed as a partial justification for the abolition of a differential pension age. This binding of the cost is in accordance with the level of expenditures given to the widowers to cover up every possible social types of individuals.

The growing salience of the issue of the disabled (and especially care of the elderly) on the social security agenda demonstrates a continuing commitment to statutory social insurance within the existing plural system. In part it reflects the anxiety to reinvigorate responsibilities more firmly within federal fiscal control. Ensuring benchmarks for the future of social security it moulded traditional principles combining liabilities in new ways. Reliance on the employer contribution too, was neutralized by the docking of a statutory public holiday. Furthermore, the new scheme allowed alternative insurance by permitting cover which unlike health care is compulsory for all income groups. It is contracted through private underwriters, infusing an element of competition. Care insurance is a limited venture aimed to invigorate voluntary supplementary private cover to fund the residual, with the possibility of future tax concessions. Officially, the main objective is to empower the individual with real effective choice between limited packages of care, including the options of institutional and domiciliary care, and the

ability to select between formal and family care. However, certain guarantees to respite services are offered to carers who, in addition, have access to new benefits and, hence, a supplementary source of family income. Clearly the scheme is oriented to resolving what have been troublesome responsibilities for funding the care of average and low-income elderly populations.

3.8 Social Security Provisions toward Family

In the wake of labour market transformations, amongst others, the mothers in the Federal Republic are gradually getting exposed to employment opportunities, albeit in a precarious manner. Consequently, social security considerations and neo-corporatist⁴¹ social partnership model of decision-making based largely in the interests of working men are becoming redundant. Taking advantage of the social indifference and monetary difficulties of the east German families, many service sectors in west Germany employed under-waged labour and that too, in part-time to accrue maximum profit. They deliberately dodge the health and insurance schemes of the state to keep alive the inherent frailties of unification which greatly failed to assimilate the east Germans into a single nation. Such practices violated the work ethics to deprive the east Germans in every possible way during and after retiring from their respective labour markets. The right considers it to be superfluous, given the availability of social assistance while for the left it is essential in order to break dependency, especially on the primary labour market, to encourage effective social participation and to temper the excesses of social exclusion. There still lurks disparity in the number of claimants and the recipients due to the rising costs of elderly care, claims by lone parent families, refugees and so forth. However, particularly alarming is the number of claimants among the unemployed whose entitlement to insurance benefits has expired. In 1991, Mangel (Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 74) book shows taking from Schuette that fifteen per cent of the unemployed were receiving social assistance: one-third of Western and two-thirds of claimants from east cited this contingency as the principal grounds for the claim. Recent evidence indicates that although there is a considerable annual turnover among recipients, claimant chronicity is predictably high among the elderly, lone mothers and other impoverished families. Critics complain that the benefit no longer fulfils its original

⁴¹ It involved an ethical standardization in doing business wherein, the state plays the role of an observer to maintain the balance between profit and social distribution. It is aimed toward minimizing the exploitative nature of liberal economy.

objective of 'help for self-help' but, rather, institutionalizes subsistence welfare dependency.

In reforming social and unemployment assistance, the Germans include more effective integration with other elements of social protection, tensile connections with labour market participation and other benefit receipt, or adopting a more contractual active policy format. Chancellor Kohl ignored the privatizing penchant and opted for a solution principally within statutory insurance. Unlike the situation within the narrower confines of family benefits, the burden of general welfare effort falls on the insurance⁴² contributor rather than the taxpayer. Income ceilings for contribution levies and non-contributory benefits were instrumental in financing German unification. It seems that modernization of taxation is unavoidable, if the exigencies of family change, among other contingencies, are to be more appropriately incorporated. In general, what will be required is a broader dragnet of liabilities whilst protecting the lower end of the income distribution. According to Mangen in line with Atkinson and Esping- Anderson this endeavour will also require some hard thinking about how married women are treated and especially their position in future labour markets which effectively concludes that mother's employment is acutely sensitive to the combined effects of tax and benefits where the system of dividing the taxes for married couples encouraged wives with low earning potentials to leave jobs to concentrate more on household activities without affecting the circle of taxation.

According to Ostner in (Kolinsky [ed], 1998: 84) book the unified German state devised policies of welfare in thinking about the presentiment of the individual outside the perimeter of the various relationships that one might be involved in. It entailed dimensions both in the field of work and care which speak of routine assumptions about the generational relations as well as the extent to which women, men and families live up to norms of adaptation. Welfare regimes are based on differential quotients of necessities and fulfilments tending to the requirements of the unit concerned. Elaborating on the participatory role of the family members toward socialization the calculations of the provisions are made. This would minimize the chances of wastage of wealth in becoming highly heuristic in catering to the needs of the families to

⁴² The Federal Government came up with a plan to increase the total wealth of the state in channelizing the incomes of the tertiary sector in the votary of savings. The people in general received a pay-back while the fund remained as a liquid asset.

restructure most the governmental efforts either promoted and/or forced upon their citizenry in light of the paucity of information.

German unification has become quite obfuscated for the unfettered transfer of various institutions, among them those of the German *Sozialstaat* (social state). Denigrated by some quite unfairly as colonization of east Germans, the immediate transfer of socio-political institutions has successfully cushioned the radical challenge of economic privatization within an open and highly competitive world market. It has granted entitlements to income maintenance provided by social insurance and social assistance as well as collective bargaining agreements. The latter have led to wages which have not so far matched productivity. Thus, to high rates of unemployment and to continuing financial dependence on West Germany is the most likely outcome for the near future. Both the clash of two institutional cultures and the immense and lasting costs of unification have set off policy feedbacks which are catalysts in the Government's effort to adapt a more egalitarian social system through individual prosperity.

It has often been observed that the materialistic desire on the part of east Germans to constituted as much of a force leading to pressure for unification as was the craving for free democratic expression. They therefore, mixed rapid equalization of living standards in strong moral terms of social justice. The evolution of incomes in the east following unification and their relativity with the old Laender must retain a variety of measures. Gross nominal incomes per employee or per household neither encapsulate the taxation and transfers activity of the state and social security funds, nor do they reflect purchasing power directly. Net wages and salaries considers the tax and social security contributions and when calculated against the consumer price index they give an indication of the average evolution of net purchasing power per employee or per household type. Alternatively, using national accounts data, net disposable income per inhabitant can be measured, incorporating the tax and transfer impacts of the fiscal and para-fiscal (pension and social security, including employer contributions) systems. An evaluation in purchasing power terms conveys most appropriately the evolution in the command over resources. Difficulties were faced in the equalization of wages for two broad reasons: the working week at 39 hours in the east is four hours longer and there are three fewer days of paid holiday. Moreover, as Ostner (1998: 109) in Kolinsky edited book argues that at least one-third of industrial firms pay at less than the tariff wage, and this proportion can be expected to be significantly higher in craft and services

enterprises. Privatization of apartments and houses, including sales to tenants, has proceeded at a snail's speed and on top of that the local authorities along with cooperative housing associations operated unregistered having no deed of title. This has to a great extent dashed the hopes of prosperity for many of the east German families who settled in various parts of west Germany, exposing them to the vagaries of the labour market thereby, making their roles as parents, husbands and wives increasingly difficult.

3.9 The Different Hues of Family Life

Reunification was influential in reducing the tendencies to marry as well as to secure divorce. Both these developments were responses to a climate of social uncertainty and, more specifically, to the introduction of federal German law⁴³. Relationships and/or marriages were considered prototypes of co-habitation. It had no bearing whatsoever, on property rights, tax benefits or other aspects of personal or financial security. Contrastingly, marriage in federal Germany became synonymous with material benefits making the east Germans reluctant to accept the new strictures. Moreover, the incidence of cohabitation and child-bearing transmuted into accepted norms without the prerequisite of marriage rendering primacy to control and minimize social risks. The general tendency among them was to avoid the unknown commitments that came to be connected with marriage.

Existing marriages, however, gained unparalleled stability accompanied by a jaw-dropping de-escalation in divorces. Apart from individual mentalities, the train of social inconvenience for the loners and 'deviators' was a major disincentive to break the bond of family to plunge into the experimentation of variety. Stiff legislation of the federal state kept the string of commitment on the more solvent partner to stall the clean break thereby denying fragmentation at the very basic level. Obviously, amidst the material upheavals after unification, east Germans shied away from taking on these additional commitments. The women reacted to such niggles by combining employment and motherhood. The majority of the women in the new Laender prefer to balance both areas of their lives without choosing between them. This *ipso facto* led to the rejection of a role as full-time housewife and ticked priority of work over family. Some younger

⁴³ The reunification process was completed in drawing up the minimum legal necessities. The speed with which event developed compelled the authorities to take a shortcut, but the constitutional validity was never compromised. The years after unification saw the gradual strengthening of the legalities.

women already relish the new occupational opportunities and the prospect of building a career based on ability and qualifications.


Investigating the causes of divorce one comes across clear evidence of an increase in alcohol related problems among the frustrated males. Failing to secure a free and fair livelihood, many east German males drowned themselves in drinking. Conversely, a dissatisfied family life leading to break-up also induced many to become addicted to alcohol. Abrupt rises in alcohol mortality could also be plausibly linked to the individuals who have been overconsuming prior to the unification and went on to do so after the formal disappearance of their former state. For almost all regions there was a rising incidence of alcohol mortality⁴⁴ for young men but overall, alcoholism appeared to be a more widespread phenomenon among older males. Naturally, one is enticed to conclude that east German alcohol problem was probably a bit higher after unification than before and continued to show an upward trend, in particular, for the case of Dresden and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in the aggregate for east Germany.

According to Kreyenfeld (2001: 4), there is an inextricable relationship between the labour market and the fertility crisis which tracks the developmental path of the individuals in the new place. The panning out of the crisis phenomenon could well be due to a general fall in population. Kreyenfeld (2001: 4) in quoting from Eberstadt argues that fertility rates in east Germany register a profound and broadly felt lack of confidence in the economic future. Low productivity, frequent training, job creation programs and unemployment rates engendered insecurity and stress among east Germans. The overall atmosphere of uncertainty, market volatility and decline in vacancies keep east Germany's birth rates below that of West Germans. Although there is a general consensus that in the short run, east Germans are undergoing a fertility and labour market crisis, the future course of it remained disputable. One of the silver linings in this general condition of gloom is the capacity of the east Germans to adapt quickly to their surroundings. Whatever may be the market situation, they are always eager to get hold of whatever opportunities to keep themselves rolling and look after their near and dear ones. Moreover, the employment sector in the west too is not that

⁴⁴ Not only the dissatisfaction centring round the social and economic transformations following unification, but to some extent the general habits of the east German males should also be taken into consideration while measuring the degree of drunkenness amongst them. It is more of a combination of both that led to a significant rate of mortality.

promising with a strong trend of assimilation which means the willingness of the east Germans toward fertility and child bearing shall not dip in any alarming levels.

Figure 6: Evolution of Total Fertility Rate in East Germany



Source: Arntz and Gathman (2013:29)

The above graph proves beyond doubt that the incidence of pregnancy is steadily on the rise irrespective of the general labour market scenario. In exactly four-year gap, the number has progressive indication. In the immediate aftermath of the unification, the east Germans faced hurdles that reduced the rate of fertility, but ever since they have shown great adaptive skills to register growth. However, similarity would not automatically drive away the emotional quotient of the east Germans who shows no interest in striking a balance in the birth rate with that of the west. The assumption of crisis turning into adaptation is more of a utopia catching the popular imagination of the people. The east Germans behaved in a way convenient for carrying on the daily chores of life. The arrangements made do not fall into any fixed categories as they were dictated by circumstantial prevarications. The decisions reached were reflections of their physio-mental condition as reflected in the above figure where the cumulative fertility rate declined⁴⁵. It was an independent decision on the part of the family members who sought to fulfil aspirations in an unperturbed manner. Hence, there remains some lacuna in advocating the crisis hypothesis which considered the drop in annual birth rates as an unmistakable sign of a fertility crisis. Moreover, period fertility indicators (such as the annual number of births or the Total Fertility Rate, TFR) can be very misleading in the sense that it might interpret a postponement of motherhood as a


⁴⁵ This does not mean a general plummeting in the birth ratio, but only some temporary planning on the part of the east German women to defer the time of fertility. On the whole, the incidence of bearing child was not much affected.

decline in lifetime fertility. The east Germans enter into fertility much earlier than that of their counterpart in the west thus, having a leverage in assembling the requirements for a positive growth in family.

The new abortion law⁴⁶ was mostly about looking for and establishing unborn life-preserving measures that are fighting socio-economic and personal reasons for abortion. As part of these measures the right of each child older than three – that is after the regular parental leave to affordable part-time childcare was established. The idea behind this rule was to offer pregnant women a part-time work perspective. Two other important policies were stipulated which concerned non-married pregnant women: first, the loosening of means-testing for lone mothers on social assistance who have been allowed since then to accumulate benefits (e.g. social assistance which also includes the housing benefit and the parental leave benefit for three years) without having to rely first on their parents' income. The second measure also pertains to avoiding children's and their mothers' poverty risks. Since 1995, fathers who were not married to their child's mother have not only been obliged (like other fathers) to pay child support but also to maintain the mother until their child will have reached the age of three and entitled to childcare. The Red-Green coalition government has started to shift attention and funding to children and towards the employment of their parents. Children are seen as society's assets and future human capital and as an obstacle for their mothers to be gainfully employed. It will continue this shift by putting more money into full-time child care and schooling. Proposals to finance child-care in reducing the tax based on marriage has been overruled by the Constitutional Court. An increase in the number of female judges however, turned the table in favour of full-time work for mother in juxtaposition to full-time child care facilities by the state. This provided some relief to the east German families in balancing their social and financial activities without disrupting the fabric of the family. The decision to have children also became an easy proposition thus, assisting in enhancing the overall fertility of the nation adding to the level of positive demography. More the state takes up the responsibility, greater becomes the degree of satisfaction among the people of east Germany and better becomes the scenario of integration.

⁴⁶ It provided a window to the east German women to balance their economic independence with that of the social ambience.

Figure 7: Growth of a Family (According to the Number of Minor Children, in Per Cent)



Source: Family Report 2012: Benefits, Effects, Trends (2012: 17)

The above figure clearly shows the relevancy of a family in the national life of the country. The various measures adopted by the federal government is aimed at keeping the prototype unit of a three-membered family intact. Such efforts lead only to a quarter of all minor children in Germany have no siblings. Overwhelmingly, almost half of all children (47 per cent) have a sister or a brother and one in five children lives with two siblings in a family. Only very few minor children (eight percent) have three or more siblings. Continuous initiatives are taken on the part of the governmental institutions who provide pregnancy counselling on any and all matters concerning pregnancy and members of family can attend any pregnancy counselling centre regardless of who operates them. It also provides confidentiality preventing the occurrence of secret births without medical supervision as also dissuades adults from abandoning or killing a newborn.

3.10 Economic Wavering on Family Formation

In most of the cases, the impact of economic uncertainty should vary by women's career orientation. Women who can accommodate themselves with the role of housewives might not be particularly affected in their fertility plans by own labour market insecurities. Only women who consider economic independence as a prerequisite for family formation will delay parenthood, if they feel that the personal economic situation is insecure. Women with a higher education can generally expect to receive higher

wages. Here, it also seems justifiable to assume that if female economic independence is a prerequisite for family formation, it is a matter for the highly educated. In order to address how insecurities, vary by women’s career orientation, indicators of economic uncertainty should be given to interact with the woman’s educational level. Table 1 below delineates an interaction between education and employment status from the base year of 1984 to register the degree of shift in the relationship. For this interaction, taken from the year of reunification, a group women employed part-time and full-time is utilized into one category to provide a sufficiently high sample size. There is clear-cut evidence with respect to the effect of educational participation. For all educational categories, educational enrolment lowers first birth risks significantly. Employment also has a similar impact across all educational levels. The great difference lies in the impact of unemployment. For highly educated women, first birth risks are significantly reduced if they are unemployed. Compared to employed women with a high educational level, their unemployed counterparts experience a first birth risks that is reduced by 60 percent. For women with a medium educational level, we do not find much of an impact of unemployment on fertility rates. For women with a low educational level, however, unemployment seems to increase the transition rate to the first child. Compared to employed women with a low educational level, first birth risks are elevated by 25 percent for their unemployed counterparts.

Table 5: Relative First Birth Risks. Model with Interaction Effects between Female Education and Employment status

Employment Status	Low	Medium	High
Highly employed	0.45	0.37	0.33
Employed	1	0.90	0.95
Unemployed	1.25	0.96	0.38

Notes: Other Variables in Model are Age, Period, Nationality, Partnership Status. Source: Kreyenfeld (cf. 2005: 20)

The above table denotes the importance of qualification in the labour market. Though having no such direct relation, the securing of jobs seems to defy the logic of literacy. Given the huge variegations of the job sector, a semblance of education is enough to keep up the sustenance of an individual. Those having a fair amount of qualification are also deprived of a good category of employment while those who are modestly

educated are seen to secure both high and low end jobs. Actually, the restructuring of the labour market following the unification created such an anomalous situation.

Tables 6 and 7 below provide the interaction of the subjective measures of economic uncertainty and educational level from the year 1984 to mark the plausible differences following reunification. It supports the presumption that economic blues particularly impact first birth risks among the highly educated. For women with a low educational level, the effect is rather vice versa. For example, first birth risks of women with an *Abitur*⁴⁷ (High School Degree) are reduced by roughly 40 percent if they are worried about their personal economic situation (compared to being not worried). For women with a low educational level, first birth risks increase by 13 percent if they are very worried. For life satisfaction, the pattern is similar in the sense that a low life satisfaction seems only to prevent more highly educated women from having children. Low scores on life satisfaction strongly discourage highly educated women from having children. Lowly educated women with a low life satisfaction seem to be particularly amenable to the idea of parenthood.

Table 6: Relative First Birth Risks. Model with Interaction Effects between Female Education and Economic Worries

Economic worries	Low	Medium	High
Very worried	1	0.88	0.53
Somewhat worried	0.83	0.78	0.69
Not worried	0.88	0.66	0.87

Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, employment status. Source: Kreyenfeld (cf. 2005: 20)

Table 7: Relative First Birth Risks. Model with Interaction Effects between Female Education and Life Satisfaction

Life satisfaction	Low	Medium	High
Low valued	1.00	0.30	0.31
Medium valued	0.61	0.52	0.50
High valued	0.64	0.58	0.56

Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, employment status. Source: Kreyenfeld (cf. 2005: 21)

⁴⁷ Actually, the degree of qualification was not that much connected to the labour market, but ipso facto the securing of full-time jobs required higher qualification. Hence, a great majority of east German women had an added advantage of having some kind of employment to run a family with the opportunity to get hold of permanent works.

Table 8 below is concerned with the interaction of education and monthly gross income. As in the previous analysis, we only consider the wages of the full-time employed. If the assumption is correct that highly educated women seek a secure economic position to have children, one would expect that low wages will defer their fertility plans. One finds rather modest support for this presumption. Women with an *Abitur* (High School Degree) and an income of more than 5000 Euro encounter elevated first birth risks. Since this category is rather small, it is not surprising that these results are insignificant. The income-fertility nexus is, complicated by the fact that educational level and income are closely intervened. This becomes very obvious when one considers that the combination low educational level and income of more than 5000 Euro. The base year is taken as 1984 for the convenience of estimates only, the analysis is, however, made from 1989 onward to observe the changes in position. Again, providing estimates for this combination is difficult, since there are too few a cases with such characteristics.

Table 8: Relative First Birth Risks. Model with Interaction Effects between Female Education and Monthly Gross Wage (of the Full-time Employed)

Monthly gross wage	Low	Medium	High
0-2000 euro	1.10	0.96	1.00
2000-3000 euro	1.00	0.93	0.94
3000-5000 euro	0.98	1.00	0.93
more than 5000 euro	-	0.89	1.35

Notes: Other variables in model are age, period, nationality, partnership status, educational participation and part-time employment Source: Kreyenfeld (cf. 2005: 21)

3.11 Conclusion

Increasingly women derive their own social security from their own efforts and especially from paid employment. In the past, the cordons of a sound family assisted them in their physical and mental growth. The values of sharing and caring in a collective manner absorbed whatever pressures came in the way of life. Moving from one stable zone to another, the transformative phases of life never posed any serious challenge. Divorces, single-motherhood and leading of a separated life all were executed amicably in a mutual manner. The development of a girl within the secured parameters of the family gave them a sound start in gathering education, various types of professional trainings and to find a suitable engagement in the labour market. Importantly, the gradual transition to womanhood remained unfettered by the norms of the greater society which cherished the equal participation from them in all fields of

life. Hence, they could become the breadwinners of the family in the capacity of a woman and/or a single mother thereby, further making the roots of the private domain stolid.

Yet, marriage may have served to provide security for life, but post-reunification, marriages became less stable and therefore less reliable in economic and in personal terms. In tackling the conflict between productive and reproductive work, women are more than ever thrown back on their own resources. The family group cannot be relied on to cushion the effects of harsh social conditions, although families may play a supportive role in individual circumstances. It is up to the state to devise a social policy that addresses the unresolved conflict between production and reproduction. Without a major reform of social policy regulations, the modernization of German society may become unhinged by its own shortcomings. Overall, the thoughts, attitudes and behaviours of the women as an individual cohort of the society revolves round the assumptions of the interactive roles they play in the formation of a character. The care and nurture involved in the upbringing of a girl child into an educated member of a family going on to take up the responsibility of economically and emotionally nourishing the private domain as a woman, wife and mother is seen through prism of a holistic development of a human being. The tangible variables of success, knowledge, expertise, adaptation and performance output are inextricably linked to the intangibles of involvement, segregation, satisfaction, fear, responsibility and love surpasses the particularities of feminism. The deep interconnections between mind, body and soul unfurls the wholesome unison of the being into the consciousness of her surroundings.

Chapter 4

Impact on Youth

4.1 Introduction

Youth could be defined as a stage in life where an individual experiences maturation, an enhanced ability to think beyond the obvious is set to play new roles in the society. Cumulatively, it tantamount to cultivating sense of values, achieving socially responsive behaviour, preparing for an economic career, attaining mature relationships with peers, achieving emotional independence from parents, forming sex-role identity, developing intimate relationships and preparing for marriage and family life. Here, social change becomes a vital input, putting in variance the adaptable demands to mould the structure forming developmental avenues. This goes a long way in shaping the psychological⁴⁸ climate of the young people having a direct effect on their life course.

One of the facets of their involvement is in the Right-wing extremism, a complex and multifarious phenomena based on a fictional idea of a natural, harmonious order constructed in a patriarchal mould and presented as an alternative to modern industrial society. The contrasting range of desirable structures includes the State strong in home and foreign affairs and a labour market connoted a performance-oriented community. Publicizing the image of one people and one culture, it exculpates and trivializes the superior biological and racial claim of a particular ethnic group. Xenophobia and Semitism are its offshoots which direct dissatisfaction and aggression against paint up images of *Fiendbilder* (the enemy). It caters for attacks against *Suendenboecke* (scapegoats) like minorities, foreign workers, refugees and so on and so forth. According to Westle and Niedermayar (1992: 87-88), this ideology could be explained as:

“Entailing an anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian concept of political regime, which denies the universal right of freedom and equality of people... [It also includes] the idea of a natural order of things, [that] implies an ethnological or racial concept that is not only linked with ethnocentrism, but is also combined with an exaggerated nationalism, often followed by hostile attitudes towards members of other nations as well as other nations and states themselves”.

⁴⁸ The independent variables of practices, attitudes, policies, rules and relationships provides vital succour to the development of ideas thereby, constructing the pillars of one's participation in the community. Here, the dependent variables of inheritance and genetic trends plays a secondary role being amenable to changes.

In an environment of transition witnessing the disappearance of the state, the mental climate of the young adults was thoroughly disturbed in suddenly meeting with an unfelt emptiness both in the public and private domain. Those breaking times made them go more toward the radical cults, one of which is neo-Nazism, primarily a legal connotation which endeavours to propagate, in direct defiance of *Verbotsgesetz*⁴⁹ (the law), Nazi ideology or measures such as the refusal, playing down, approval or justification of Nazi mass murder, especially the Holocaust is a subculture of hate. It also refers to the ideology of the social and political movements which borrowed elements from the doctrine of ultra-nationalism, racism, ableism, homophobia and antiziganism. Having a gory past, right-wing extremism, presently, is very weak in Germany with NPD's (National Democratic Party) weak representation and subsequent ban. Interestingly, the youth for various reasons, have co-opted to Far-Right attitudes which till date has not died down. Generational presentiments of superiority mixed with the pitiful surrendering of the self at the altar of despair evoked helpless anger. Having no proper solace in the family and/or the society, they subsumed themselves in the futile flames of chagrin expressed in the forms of senseless savagery.

In general, Germany's turbulent has past made her an object of suspicion with each act scrutinized and the efforts of its leaders viewed for possible revival of its unquiet prior. Unification helped in deepening it in some quarters- with the addition of 17 million from the east, comprising a larger territory (357,000 Square Km) and population larger than "regional superpower"⁵⁰- France. A continuous streak of youth violence heightened this alarm. Though prominent journals carried explanatory views on the "authoritarian past" of east Germany as the main reason for this phenomenon, few were able to explain why attacks were equally frequent where unemployment had not yet caused social discontent, or so many of the neo-Nazi groups were organized in the west. Obviously, there is something more than just economic conditions or the oppressive regime that had existed for more than forty years in the east. At about the same time, one could also see the rise of "New Right" as a by-product of the tussles of the post-industrial society where material interests lost its centrality and the bourgeoisie and the working class neither defined neatly nor aggressively confronted (Ignazi, Piero 1996:

⁴⁹ The segment of strict adherence to the principles of maintaining the sanctity of the state where the equitable distribution of the resources is targeted toward the original inhabitants of a sovereign domain.

⁵⁰ In the context of the economic and political domination which it achieved during and after the phase of the cold war period.

560). This also requires an objective reconstruction along with the anti-Americanism and growing radicalization of subcultures in West Germany (especially segments of youth) grown out of the difficulties in coping with the challenges of a multicultural society impregnating Far Right. A new fear of unemployment, considerable increase in migration and refugee influx, terrible and often underestimated costs of absorbing the east, and overshadowing all this, the remembrance of the Weimar Republic and its consequences acted as catalysts in their steady growth.

4.2 The Mode of Transition

Twenty-five years into the pulling down of the Wall, the condition of the young people of the east then integrated into the Federal Republic, underwent radical alterations. Now, there are no longer fundamental schisms separating them as of the east or the west. The two groups are presently to a considerable degree similar in their vision of themselves and of the world. Bonhomie is reached in their preferred leisure time activities, in the central role in their lives of mobility, in the construction of their identities and in the problematic relationship they have with an unknown future. The transition toward adulthood seem uncomplicated, more of de-standardised as much in the east and the west. The tripartite division of the life path in the manner of preparation for work, work and retirement seems long evaporated. Nevertheless, there exist important differences in terms of the disposable economic resources where the east is disadvantaged by the west.

The young people in the east has also distinguished themselves from that of the west in defining the compositions of youth derived from the prolong and to some extent obligatory cohabitation in the family of origin. This creates a conflict between an immanent interior autonomy and an objective absence of independence. Living in such ambivalence is both a boon in averting the chances of abject poverty and a curse in denudation of liberty. Spending a chunk of their time with parents sensitizes them to the memory of the past tying up their imminent adulthood to their respective families with the string of emotion. The trove of memory surpasses the aura of the reunified state to settle down in the real non-existent GDR, collecting the traces of events from the avenues of family, religious groups and social classes. Once filled up with these sensations, it triggers in the mind of the youth impulses which record the degree of feeling for each of the segments. There, the elevated image of the family over others speaks of the deep bond they had with its members. It is an unbreakable relation which

remained considerably unaffected by the spatial-mental changes brought about by the reunification.

It provided the youth facing post-unification turmoil, the sufficient amount of courage and resilience to overcome those trying times. Social fragmentation⁵¹ leading into alienation was a psychological torture for the young people floating in the void of integration. Only the persistence of familial memories in conjunction with the stolid bonds with the relatives saved them from falling into the dark bottomless pit of emotional shock. Keeping a tap on their identity, it kept lighted the mental chamber of memory enabling the youth to carry the cudgels of collectivism as a heritage material through the vibrations of the radical social transformations in the reunified Germany. The new levels of autonomy of actions and individual liberty highly regulated the path of socialisation for the youth as against the uncertainties in the previous set-up of neo-liberalism. The emergent confusion from the clash of values enhanced their ability to filter their judgements in the litmus of policies and pursue the assimilative way to prosperity.

Young individuals are one of the most vulnerable groups in the labour market. Their unemployment rate as argued by Dunsch (2015: 3) in line with O'Higgins that it typically exceeds the adult generation. This is related to the fact that all young people face the critical barrier of entering the labour market for the first time. In the manufacturing of biographical time, individually, each young person has to endeavour to convolute this dichotomy and to define forms of relating to the future capable of containing his/her anxiety about the future (Leccardi in Leccardi et al. 2005: 6). This continues to give them the position of centrality both in the family and in the state through the framing of schemes by the government to assuage the pains of transition. Freed from the syndrome of nostalgia⁵², the youth only felt the tenuous presence of this sensation through the eyes of their elders, thereby, connecting themselves with the upheavals of unification experienced through the transmission of the ideas. Expressed in the mode of perturbation, they went on to mould the mentalities of the young in the

⁵¹ This has more to do with the degree of dissociation involved in the disappearance of an entire nation (GDR), in the process of reunification. The physical metamorphosis though tolerable made a deep impact in the minds of the young adults who found it extremely hard to manage being separated for various reasons from their parents, relatives and friends.

⁵² It was very difficult to break free the thoughts which invariably turned toward the days of the erstwhile state of GDR where amidst thousands of difficulties, one could still be at home with oneself. This self-satisfaction evaporated in the new Federal Republic where whatever material gains accrued, came at the cost of mental repose.

new united domain. While fulfilling their expectations and conjuring up the aspirations, they tend to carry the past customs infusing those into the present to sketch a point of convenience. Here, the element of trust plays a key role in building an important community with the ingredients of shared social responsibility and solidarity. The presentation of an unbroken sequence of life to the estranged people of the east was one of the primary desires of the reunification plan. However, the fulfilment of this wish was overshadowed by the ‘strength of duration’ altering the very similarity of the Germans as an ethnic group into ‘dissimilar products of ideologies’. Herein, the youth as one of the measurable variables forms a condensed prototype for economic, social and cultural changes in the entire society. Their image thus constructed becomes as Leccardi and Feixa (2005: 10) refers from Hall and Jefferson, the metaphor for social change. Through their eyes was painted the visible and the invisible walls that fell and in which manner those bricks were became the life-veins of the new avatar.

Scrutiny is made of the relationships between collective and individual transitions where economy provides the scenario wherein, youth as actors adapt to their serio-comic role⁵³. The move over from real socialism to democratic capitalism altered their standardised period into diverse and deregulated adulthood. A plethora of choices, entrenched autonomy, professed openness and immense possibilities attracts all young people who puts in their best to become contributory adults toward the state and society. The streak of responsibility attached to with these facilities makes dent into their domain of ideologies pushing them into contradictions so as to question the systemic nature of the agencies. Already disturbed in the wake of the unification process, the east German youth torn between past and present, set to determine their own values on the basis of congeniality. This also gave them the opportunity to thrive in a way uncontaminated by the social. The increasing search for safety and security, invariably brings into question the degree of social viscosity achieved by each young individual in the changed circumstances and how far it is inimical in assuring their vitality fabric of the nation. Today’s post-communist⁵⁴ youth of the federal state is valued as the

⁵³ A strange dilemma of sufferings amidst plenty. The youth enjoyed individual freedom yet pined for recluse among their near and dear ones. The abrupt change in the environment flung many east German juveniles toward crime admixed with yearnings.

⁵⁴ It remains a matter of question though to what extent individual liberty replaced the collectivist practices because the Federal entity adopted many social policies which adhered to the rules of providing for the people in a collective way. Hence, the east German youths found some taste of socialist living within the boundary of representative democracy.

custodian of precious cultural resources transmitting each moment through their activities the burgeoning sense of unity in diversity.

The suddenness of the reunification nullified the participation of the youth who like every other east Germans were caught unawares. The swift shifts in the movement left them completely clueless about the possible outcomes of the events. More so due to the internal frictions among the groups spearheading the protest who initially demanded reforms which then transpired into the unification slogan. This made the young section nonchalant, unbothered and casual in approach taking the demonstration a routine exercise aimed at obliterating the excesses of the socialist regime. However, when the overhauling came and dissolved their very state into oblivion, they fidgeted in vain to receive a get a feel of the erstwhile environment. They seem to be at a loss with the no ground beneath their feet, no structure to rely upon and no place to express their dilapidated mental state. Yet, they had their futures before them and could cash in on time. In the overall surroundings of temporality, was seen the rise of possibilities from the side of education, higher training and vocational apprenticeship which could fetch proper jobs in the transformative economic situation. Moreover, business and/or self-employment became a lucrative destination with thousands of youth taking to trade and moving east in search of better ventures (Roberts in Leccardi et al. [eds.], 2012: 21). The ease of travel across the land introduced the phenomenon of the young pendulum worker-migrants which continues to this day. Coupled with this, the culture of consumerism inundated their land engendering more hope of a bright future amongst many who secured decently paid jobs working as an effective ointment to assuage the mental pains and the emotional jerks inflicted by the rapid socio-cultural changes. Unlike much of the counterparts in the west, the young people of the east remained optimistic about their future in light of the strong family bonds which prevailed the testing of turbulent times to supply the vital physio-mental nourishments needed to fight the unhappy tidings. It helped to cling on to their visions to fulfil the cherished dreams. However, in the overarching atmosphere of individualism⁵⁵ in the reunited Germany, many of the youth from the east were so mesmerized by the glitters of individual freedom as to remain oblivious of the toxic by-product of loneliness. The spread of

⁵⁵ It should not be taken at the face value because individualization invariably comes with becoming more responsible to oneself and the immediate surroundings. This was not fully realized by the east German youths who thought of it as unbridled freedom to do whatever they thought of. It became more so due to the restrictions posed by the erstwhile regime of GDR.

which resulted, in many occasions to a loss of identity, self-delusion and a mental void turning many to commit senseless violence on other communities falsely taking them as one of the chief catalyst causing misery. One of the fallout of such delusions was surge in xenophobic tendencies leading to concomitant rise of the far-right. The government responded through the ‘shock therapy’ package which was not prompt enough to stall the rapid spread of gloom and frustration over the non-creation of jobs. A minority (Roberts in Leccardi et al. [eds.], 2012: 21) became so depressed as to nurture the possibilities of neo-Nazi activities to clear up the pall of darkness. While the private sector continued to offer some or the other kind of jobs to keep oneself into earnings. Many had the opportunity to invest into micro-businesses from casual and part-time works. Again, many young women seized the moment to choose a life of housewife. Others claimed their right to sell their bodies. In fact, sex workers became a status symbol in some quarters. Importantly, all young people driven by the constant government propaganda continued to harbour hope of a bright future given the phase of transition talked about as carrying immense possibilities. Throughout their twenties, young adults continued to regard themselves as still life-stage passage more so as under communism the Komsomol⁵⁶ had defined youth as lasting until the age of twenty-eight. The condition of the labour market⁵⁷ became more uncondusive with curtailment of full-time jobs and comprehensive privatization creating frozen housing markets, hence, many young people continued to live with their parents until the time of their parenthood. Earning-wise, the new economic liberalism instilled the presentiments of a bourgeois culture within the young people who began to cherish recognition in providing services absent in the manufacturing and agricultural units. They wanted to be a part of the burgeoning middle-class in engaging themselves in continuous employment in public and/or private sectors. Migration, as a viable option, remained a constant topic of conversation among young people in most places. All these dreams and aspirations were mostly channelized through the inside s of a family whose members gave continuous support in these transient times to see off their wards gaining

⁵⁶ The youth division of the communist party which originated in Soviet Union was considered as the nucleus around which developed the global revolutionary agenda of the socialist parties. They were regarded as the spearhead to bring about the demise of capitalism in founding the pillars of a classless society.

⁵⁷ It includes primarily the secondary and tertiary sectors as the main votaries of employment generation. The progressive measurement of these sectors are directly related to the creation of jobs more so because the role of the primary sector began to diminish.

a decent livelihood. The young adults of the east if not by choice, had the good fortune of enjoying prolonged familial assistance where the creed of individualization enabled them to focus on private goals with resources earned by themselves or supplied by their families and additional support from relatives and friends. Nevertheless, the refabricating of the economy has made the east to converge in a major way with that of the west, narrowing the income-expenditure hiatus so as to incorporate the chunk of unemployed young adults in the dragnet of productivity. There is a marked improvement in the lifestyle of the east German youths who have left the traditional dependencies on the primary sectors to promote themselves as part of the rising middle-class bringing about a balance in the social and economic parameters which sulked following reunification.

4.3 Changing Vicissitudes

The reunification of both the German states presented in appearance as though the social reorganisation of the east has been unique and privileged. Weaved through the strings of common history and culture despite the Iron Curtain, led to the almost complete transfer of institutions and resources. Many expected a quick convergence with the standards in the west igniting the robust possibilities of modernization sweeping away the drudgeries of the oppressive state system. Credibility has come up with an altogether different scenario of never-ending wobble over the effects of the unification let alone focusing on the conditions it created. In this strand of dichotomy oscillating between prosperity and penury, the youth of the east found themselves circling in the quagmire of transformation. They had no inkling about their immediate future and goes through the cruel credulities of daily life. The values of sharing, caring and building is undermined by the new ideals of freedom, liberty and individualism. This corroded their beliefs in the institutions promoting order and justice to navigate them toward the inhibitory path of volatility. The waves of neo-liberal global capitalism kept tossing them in the currents of flexibility and mobility. This pulverized their former smooth transition from being a cared child, a student and an earner to that of a loner having no fixed education and an eternal seeker of job. Hence, the adaptation to the West German norms proves to be an illusion as the reality continuously shifts. Ever since the days of reunification, the youth is facing the consequences of transformation that has snatched away the much of their peace in uprooting them from the convenience

of the family and friends. Many have found some kind of stability yet there are many more who always lives in the reluctance of uncertainties.

It was believed that the restrictive regime of the east had kept the potential of the youth at bay which would be unleashed once the market economy is given the place to operate freely. Likewise, they came to nurture the hopes of a prosperous life full of opportunities and prospects. It was thought of that the wheels of modernization would more plausibly integrate the section of the youth into a vigorous generative mode than any other social groups eliciting maximum profits. A change certainly occurred in the youth making them more inclined toward the western values of individual pursuit of wealth, cultural diversity and freedom of thought. But, at the same time, the expected construction of these mores did not bring in the adequate perspectival changes necessary to reap maximum benefits. The process of conversion robbed them of practical experiences, knowledge and understanding of how to operate things in the new situation. Still, it would have been better had the older people assisted them in the building up of skill, but it did not happen and the youth sort of usurped the opportunities to advance creating a generation gap. Moreover, generational exchange⁵⁸ would have needed an embedded close-knit and secure institutional setting which was definitely lacking. One of the traditional things to have survived the turmoil of reunification is the foreseeable integration of young people into the workforce. Those of all who are not going to college or university, but have finished school are provided job training, almost always within the companies. Though the west German companies were overwhelmingly private initiatives, still it gave some semblance of security. Moreover, a tough selection process is often a positive mark of gaining permanent employment within the company. The youth from the east therefore, has a great deal more of the market with regard to training and employment. Much of the remaining problem of social segregation and economic destabilization is an outcome of the structural change, an integral component of unification. It led to the disappearance of training opportunities and jobs. This, particularly, hit the young people hard in snatching away jobs as they were considered to have the best chance of finding a new one quickly. To calm down the tension, the state came up with numerous training positions so as to keep

⁵⁸ The interactive capacity of the east German youths with their west German counterparts lacked suavity given the type of mental frame which was more inclined toward togetherness. The adventure of living on one's own did not produce much attraction among them save the opportunity to become prosperous in becoming a part of the youth labour market.

the young people engaged which till date provides quite a few jobs in whichever sector found suitable. Thus, the incidence of unemployment is restricted to as minimum level as possible. Along with it the authorities try to link the apprenticeship patterns to the relevant sectors so that the young people automatically receives an added incentive of joining them in completing the course. Deflecting the attention of the young section away from the volatile incidents requires a stolid cultural nuance which can act as a cushion in times of crisis. Unfortunately, the practice of disengagement as a symbol of unchained life is increasing the plight of the young in isolating them from the relational position. This tends to give vent to extreme emotional outbursts in the form of incendiarism threatening to churn every aspect of social stability. More they grope about in the darkness of despair more they tend to become inflammatory in their attitudes and behaviour. Carrying the childhood memories of parental unemployment, they, in most cases, became susceptible to far right-wing attitudes and xenophobia.

The biographical factor determined the degree of endurance among the youth of east Germany. Faced with multiple problems of poverty, desolation, unemployment and vagrancy they demonstrated remarkable flexibility in tackling the incompatibilities through familial ties. Their inherent proclivity toward dynamism enabled them to look upon distress as a deviation from the daily routine. Since they already were accustomed to a certain amount of shuffling and disorder under the previous regime, this made them more exploratory, innovative, dogged and creative⁵⁹. The more the situation became tough, the more they took it as a challenge to outshine the pressures of the circumstance. Social dislocation was met with increased affinity amongst their kith and kin; cultural differences invoked outspokenness showcasing their own ethos and economic predicament registered a higher degree of regional and professional mobility. All through the comfort derived from the private domain gave them the nourishment to confront the hardships of life inflicted by the dissipation of the one into the other.

It further bolsters the development of values and ideologies of the youth to make them integral chips of the socio-cultural super-structure. Wherein, the element of self-efficacy, that is, capability to organize and execute the courses of action for prospective situation seems to develop in such a manner so as to make one master different types

⁵⁹ These attitudes also assisted the east German youths in receiving a fair degree of stability in life as they were not the only ones involved in social mischief, the west German youths too had a handsome contribution in it. The difference is that the former transited while the latter committed violence from their own place of dwelling, the newly formed Federal Republic.

of environmental challenges. In the wake of unification, it is one of the thing that gave them the resilience to see through the transition without much hiccups. Efficacious individuals were then the need of the hour who came and met satisfactorily in mastering and shaping the changing technical, social and cultural demands. In this milieu, the phenomenon of extremism influences the life of a young adult in many ways to make a definite attitudinal prototype responding to the circumstantial variations. The topography of the mind, mapping the sensations of pain and pleasure creates sentiments dictating actions which may or may not conform to the social environment. At a cognitive and emotional level, the accruing of knowledge through perceptions becomes a problematic in mixing up realities with utopia. This creation of a point of confusion goes on to instil some ingredients of force which manifests in the mind as a stimulus of rage guiding one to resort to ferocity. This could also be interpreted as an embedded emotional enhancement channelized through the different expressions of wishes and feelings signifying a personal strategy to psychologically defeat the unconducive environment. Inflicting pain upon others is actually a punishment on the self in failing to overcome the difficulties of the new ambience. All these suffering individuals join up in exhibiting violence as a part of the various extremist organizations to throw up their pent up frustration and helplessness in winning over the environment. The interplay of cultural and aesthetic values also adds up to their worries to coagulate into a hard ball of radicalism⁶⁰. Ideologies are influenced by the emotions coming out of real life experiences to alter the transmitted bogey of values into constant impulses of actions. Juveniles and young adults are constantly exposed to such institutional propagandas shifting the burden of uneasiness on the shoulders of the 'others' as one of the major factors preventing the son of the soils from attaining prosperity. Self-condemnation is never tried at the cost of introspection to survey the overall condition which may be responsible in bringing unpleasant things. On the contrary, some elements of the society took to excessive self-flagellation about the country's past in involving the much of the world in a tussle. This apologetic behaviour increased the tendency of vengeance among the youths who saw in it an unnecessary way of carrying the criticism of guilt. Hence, they tried to justify their acts of savagery in light of the

⁶⁰ Here, it is more indicative of an apprehensive mentality on the part of the east and to some extent west German youths trying to prevent the bad occurrences through some hate incidents. The acts of violence can be interpreted as some admonitions directed toward the foreign communities about their presence in an alien land.

untruthful accusation of being violent when it was never there. The Far-Right⁶¹ and extremist organizations capitalized on such thoughts to construct an image of sustaining pain both upon the weak institutions of the state and the pressure of population eating into the vitals of the resources while depriving the natives from enjoying the fruits of success. The entailing threat perception invokes ferocity as the best way to stall the recurrence of such stimulus while relieving them from the future repress. The multiple layers of interdependency influence the participatory thrust of an individual thereby, determining the position in the overall layout of the retributory design. To what extent one will response toward the felt discomfort becomes directly related to the degree of violence committed. At the macro, exo, meso and micro level, the type of society, culture, structural network and relational feelings conjoins to form the emotional superstructure. This becomes the kernel regulating the shifts in one's actions on a random mode. Exercising control over this particular arena which is mostly an abstract patch provides leverage to make an individual act in a definite fashion. Quite a segment of the young population in reunified Germany was successfully engaged by the different hues of neo-Nazi outfits in the dissemination of violence.

4.4 The Transformation into an Elastic Cohort

The east German youth as an individual and a member of a family, mustered enough stamina to absorb the discomfort of time. Still, this collective effort failed to dissipate the all-round conundrum of regress eating up their vital resources. This propelled many to become desperate seekers of capital in surrendering their centrifugal tendencies⁶², unfurling the phenomenon of an exodus from the east to the west. Started by the adult population soon the young ones (including lasses), especially of 18-25 years of age, overtook them in numbers and notions. A certain degree of deliberateness on the part of the government through the implementation of policies is also responsible in making the people (including the youth) mobile. The plan was to train the young people and place them in distant employment thereby, rolling the capital as well as creating a regional cross-section of human resources. This was expected to alleviate the outcomes

⁶¹ Here, it indicates the presence of such political groups who preferred to continue with the heritage of the land carving the modern way of statehood as a progressive version of the rite and mores which led the foundation of the Federal Republic.

⁶² The general tendency among the youths leaving their homeland to disperse in different directions within west Germany in search of a better life and livelihood. At some point they meet to experience the real changes and forms strong connections which on many occasions helped in bridging the gap between individual and collective existence.


of the structural changes attempted in the economy. Simultaneously, it was also thought of offering the young people some perspective for keeping them where they already are. This should be the main aim for public investment which remained rare in the offering. The newest welfare reforms in Germany clearly spelt out the demands for mobility and flexibility. This rotational way of supplying provisions targeted the harnessing of the regional resources to its optimal bringing an equanimity in the availability and extraction of the materials. This was then thought to invigorate capital generation (with already sufficient infusion of public funds) leading to widespread prosperity.

Regional mobility brought about a noticeable change in the perception of work and the outlook for life in the region. Work plays a significant role along with performance which attaches value to social integration in addition to the material security, especially for the parent generation. Work is seen as a moral duty and source of community rather than an exercise in self-fulfilment. This is transmitted among the youth migrating in large numbers to different parts of the federal land carrying with them the ingredients of internal social relations of east German enterprises carried with morality. Over the years they became more ambivalent regarding their attitude towards work and performance. They began to stress the classical virtues of willingness to work and perform well along with flexibility thus, converting the lack of opportunities into gain of training and subsequent job. Self-actualization comes into fruition in these circumstances inspiring migration both to avoid unemployment and/or precarious employment as well as promote social advancement. Parental care⁶³ has already taken care of self-development and afterwards state care addressed the possibilities of plenty away from the home. Thus, migratory feelings could also be seen as an establishment of the process of social differentiation where age and choice of place is a crucial factor. The youth of east Germany already views their society as in transition increasingly becoming structurally fragile. This large-scale migration has been interpreted by the media as the east becoming a German Mezzogiorno, occasionally conjuring up the spectre of social death of entire regions. This, in turn, bolsters both a fear of marginalization and the predicament of being stigmatised. Strangely enough, staying of the youth in one's own region is interpreted as a sign of dullness making migration a

⁶³ It is inextricably linked to the state policies as the financial requirements plays a major role in it though the social bond gives some relief to the otherwise strangling situation of anomaly. Better the provisions, better the level of care where the only constant is the mental satisfaction.

necessary component arresting the threat of downward mobility. Departure or escape whichever way the movability is described adds up to a kind of protest against the socialist regime as also a way out of a life of disillusion. In connection to the economic politics and the labour market, relocation promises above all distinct job market relief. The politics of regionalization interprets migration as a derogatory phenomenon destroying the social bonhomie of a particular region along with declining its natural population in flushing out the young and/or adult population out of hometown. In call-back attempts, packages with product specific to the region are sent to strengthen their link with their birthplace (Steiner in Leccardi et al. [eds.], 2012: 181). The dilemma is that with young women departs the future families and the absence of schools prevents the coming of families. It neither provides throttle to the intra-regional migration nor assists in the formation of relationships through continuity and trust. Leading to a widespread shrinkage, most of the new Laender in the east presents a desolate look with fewer businesses, sports fields, schools, offices and so on and so forth. Over the years much of this sultry state of things has improved with increased investment toward infrastructure building. Such developmental initiatives have made the landscapes quite palatable in comparison to the west. The young adults now more or less settle in their birthplaces fostering social cohesion in finding work there and extending their families. This assimilation of the economic and cultural factors gives impetus to the continuation of the general bond between the people in a particular region acting as morale booster for future progress. More so, given the fact that the much hyped all problem-free expansion of West Germany across the east German regions getting moulded in the situational logic of action. Based on it, the youth discarded the long tradition of a typical safe passage to start depending on the vagaries of the market which went on to scuttle the investments in education and training.

Figure 8: Right-Wing Extremists in Germany (including Youth)



Source: Siedler (2006: 28)

The above figure though registers a skimpy number of young and juveniles attached to neo-Nazi⁶⁴, yet the main issue of concern is that of the continuity of the phenomenon. Even more alarming is the number of right-wingers in the society. Overall, it depicts the volatile ambience of the society having the capacity to erupt into pervasive acts of violence which continued throughout the decade following unification. To the new circumstances of contemporary society youngest people respond with increased effort and a continued search for opportunities and investigation of risks; and not with protests or by showing rejection of existing society. The extensive resistance of young people to the intrusions of society into their individual lives is manifested in their negative or passive attitude towards politics.

Even so, the youth of the east has recovered remarkably in the arenas of employment, cost parity, mobility, and flexibility, contributing well toward regional development and bridging the socio-cultural schism. Consequently, there is a stark fall in unemployment, increase in productivity and contingent prosperity leading to an unprecedented psychological boost in earning a socio-cultural mainstreaming with the federal ideology. The biographies of the youth are the expressions of modern global capitalism which drove away regional deficiencies, structural shortcomings and co-opting diverse welfare reform strategies. Hence, they could bring into fruition personal goals with that of the collective well-being of the family. This propped up the coordinates of the traditional mores into a tangential linkage with the post-modern ethos making the youth of the east an elastic cohort. This is not to say that they have escaped some of the fallouts of merger eroding into their familial bond creating some sort of a void in the intimate relationship coupled with poor education and bleak job prospects engendering the syndrome of disconnectedness. A state of haze inducing mental promiscuity and physical separation mostly due to the macro-economic and social disjuncture. According to Pfeiffer (2010: 1) specifically, it goes on to curtail investment in human capital slapping youth with failure in not adhering to the set rules as ways to integrate into the society. Mostly, it arises from ignorance toward the prescribed social customs and cultural ethos amongst the elders due to poor parental qualification as well as broken home which goes on to affect the entire being of a youth contributing to a

⁶⁴ Mainly a cult of socialization which has an ideology of clinging to the traditional customs and practices. It embraces modernization as reformed initiative of maintaining the superiority of the original inhabitants.

vicious downward spiral. Proper emotional and material support in times of developmental and economic alteration by the state and the family considerably reduces such developments.

On many occasions, disappointments over the policies of education, joblessness, lack of parental care, social discrimination and cultural gap⁶⁵ induces many a youth to join extreme groups providing an easy outlet to their pent up grievances. Participation in campaigns and events organized by the various Far-Right groups entices them in through their propaganda of hate and vengeance. Often neglected, frustrated and disoriented youths gets attracted these messages and moves out to bring about justice in the quickest possible way of perpetrating violence thereby, creating terror in the hearts of the foreigners and other unwanted elements. According to the United Conference Report (2009: 6) the state tries to control such damaging activities through the avenue of civil society in making the youths to participate in building up a political consciousness away from the much publicised slogan of the rightists drawing up image of an enemy. Moreover, there is the further danger of positing a wrong image of a leftist venture out to strangle the right. Misinterpretations, misgivings and confusion apart, there is also the possibility of developing contradictory viewpoints of a society torn between ideology and patriarchy. Hence, the segregation of the youths from the path of violence increasingly proved to be a tenuous affair contingent upon a host of factors which include proper assimilation strategies⁶⁶. It requires minimum politicization and maximum institutionalization to support the emotional needs of the young adults. The various right-wing outfits, in real and the virtual world caters to this mental vacuum of the young adults to channelize their vigour and stamina to flush out the aliens from the soil as one of the major way to achieve salvation from the daily anxieties of life.

In the wake of the reunification, the youth of east Germany underwent some of the most dramatic changes affecting their social positions. The communist regime was much more successful in keeping them involved in the social networks through a number of activities organised by *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (Free German Youth) operated by the

⁶⁵ This is more indicative of the changes a certain time brings to a certain place where the prevalence of mutual differences among the same community reflects the fixity of clinging on to things thought of as good. Here, the relativity of things was not taken into consideration, hindering the progression of the society. However, the east German youths did adapt and modify to keep pace with time.

⁶⁶ This more refers to the attitude of the west Germans who was in general, critical about the east Germans. At least, the section of the youth could overcome to a large extent, such inhibitory feelings toward their east German counterparts easing the process of free mixing considerably.

*Sozialistische Einheits Partei*⁶⁷ (Communist Union Party). The disappearance of these structures de-contextualised the juvenile social mode of life making them float in nothingness. In the west, right-wing extremism transformed into a more violent category eliciting spontaneous outbursts in a state of heightened alcoholism. Most of the offenders are juveniles filled with right-wing ideas espousing militant presentiments. The only possible loophole in this entire body of vehemence is disorganization which made such incidents abrupt, haphazard, fractured and wayward. Psychological crisis is manifested through the prism of ferocity assuaging the trauma of transformation from a shady comfort to the discomfort of scorching uncertainty.

4.5 Tenuous Survival of Extremism

Humourists Volker Schulz and Paul Pribbernow addressed the public in general to corroborate the spread of fear and prejudice which was trying to spoil the optimistic image of reunited Germany through *Eulenspiegel* (Owl mirror) issue 22/1990 (18). Schulz depicted an oafish German character and Pribbernow linked it with the xenophobic violence, particularly of the youths as neo-Nazi activities. Schulz gives the bold title, “*Ost Repts! Mal Herhoern*” (East Repts! Time Listen!), remotely referring to the Republican party members of east Germany.

Nevertheless, in the 1994 elections, the extreme Right, in general, experienced a complete side-lining with the most organized among them, the *Republikaners*⁶⁸ (the Republicans), mustering a meagre number of seats in the European Parliament and ceased to be a factor in the October elections. Yet, their passing had made its mark with new incarnations emerging from within the ranks of established parties and/or institutions, contaminated mostly by an unruly youth minority whose actions cannot always be linked to the refugee issue as was seen in the case of Hoyersweda or to the plethora of data on economic performance and/or unemployment. Justifiably, a combination of material and psychological factors contributed towards it, drastically changing the ideologies in the rejection of multiculturalism. It criticised the continuous referencing of “German past” thereby, diluting the German identity in aping of Americanism. Compounding upon the socio-economic hardships, the carrying of guilt

⁶⁷ From the end of the Second World War till the Peaceful Revolution, it remained as one of the many Marxist-Leninist Political Parties of GDR. Centring round the doctrines of the classless society, it professed the significance of the electoral rule as a preliminary way toward statelessness.

⁶⁸ One of the major democratic parties, it had more of a conservative agenda of keeping the national solidarity intact wherein, it was much opposed to the phenomenon of immigration.

instigated the youth to indoctrinate into many right-wing groups like the *Deutsche Volksunion*⁶⁹ (German People's Union), skinheads, basically a protest group which aligns itself with the right in violence when it suits its mood and many others. The political orientation of the skinheads is blurred, but has the potential to mobilize on a large scale and respond speedily to neighbouring violence. By 1989, the *Republikaner* Party (REP) also came into force and had significant success in CSU strongholds.

Earlier, the east German regime itself tended to be anti-Semitic and refused diplomatic relations with Israel. Foreign workers were separately housed in near "ghettos"⁷⁰, with not even the Soviets encouraged to mingle with the locals. The *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) were required there no less than the west and the Vietnamese that were brought in have been the focus of attacks in the east. The Russians too were frequently set up and assaulted in a dangerous replay of the "we-they"⁷¹ division. More importantly, large number of youths were trained in the use of small arms as part of the "defence of the fatherland", especially in the Society for Sport and Technology which was an official paramilitary organization. After the collapse of the GDR, it was found that these and other organizations (like the Germany Gymnastics and Sports League) had an overwhelming number of right-wingers within their ranks. The possibility that these trained young men and women would train their skills on helpless foreigners was strong in 1991. In fact, the worst of the violence was when locals cheered on by citizens attacked apartment complexes that housed mainly the Vietnamese and Romanians. After a series of smaller attacks, the violence in Hoyersweda on November 1991 and Rostock on August 1992 caught international glare. Broadly speaking, these elements coagulated around the essential idea of "Germanness"⁷² and dilution of its unique identity. All, in a varying degree sought a revision of history with completely denying the Nazi past or transferring the initiation of the War to the Russians rather than the Hitler Regime. The more moderate (the so-

⁶⁹ It came up as an unofficial outfit in the year 1971 to become one of the parties in 1987 under the guidance of Gerhard Frey. Finally, in 2011, it merged with the National Democratic Party.

⁷⁰ It first came into use in the city of Venice where the Jews were kept in strict segregation. Later on, it came to encompass in general, the point of habitation of the social, legal, economic minority section(s).

⁷¹ Generally used in the binaries of the self as distinguished from the others. The superiority of an individual compared to another is mostly indicative of the internal segregation a community faces within a sovereign boundary.

⁷² It effuses with the racial characteristics of a particular ethnic community which is poignantly distinguishable from the other such communities carrying the vital biological elements over generations.

called intellectual Right) simply viewed Nazism in a milder light arguing that the creation of Westernized Germany completely wiped out any remnants of national identity even while the European Right alleges that the “*Ossies*” retains the “true” Germaness which was at least allowed to prosper and continue by the USSR. Right-wingers allege that an overemphasis by Germans have contributed to the violence of the extreme right-wing groups. A “normal” nature is what is needed to stave-off such occurrences. These sentiments have been given acceptability by authors like Karlheiz Weissman who opined that with the fall of communism, it is important to get the Nazi era into perspective as a page of history, rather than a continuous albatross dangling round the neck of the German people. There were demands from various quarters for the inculcation of normalcy and self-pride. This continues over the years which was aptly reflected in an advertisement in April 1995 in *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (Frankfurt General) where a hundred promising Germans on the fiftieth anniversary of the World War II questioned the need to celebrate the “victory” which had in essence divided the German nation.

Table 9: Criteria of Exclusion in Right-wing Radical Discourse

Criteria of Exclusion	Core Argument
Racism	Inferiority of the “other” on the grounds of biological difference (“natural” hierarchy)
Antisemitism	Special case of racism
Ethnocentrism	Superiority of own collectivity on the grounds of cultural and economic achievements (developmental differentiation)
Religiocentrism (Fundamentalist)	Superiority of own collectivity on the grounds of a particular faith and exclusionary access to “truth”
Xenophobia	Defensive reaction against ethnic and cultural “others” (fight for resources, fear of “cultural mixing”)
Nativism	Special case of xenophobia (in countries with a history of mass immigration, the rejection of foreign influences regardless of ethnicity)
Heterophobia	Intolerance of deviation from mainstream norms (unacceptability of those who are morally “other,” also within their own ethnicity)

Source: Melzer and Serafin (2013: 12)

It led right-wingers to condemn European integration as well as NATO even while calling for recognition of the country’s strength and prime position within Europe. A

few also questioned the legitimacy of Polish leaders and called for an expansion of borders to “German lands”⁷³. The criteria of exclusion in far-right discourse can be based on ethnicity, culture, religion, and/or gender (see Table 1 for elaboration). Analytically, of course, these criteria are distinct, and each has its own peculiar logic. In the real world, however, they are often intermingled, and it is the task of the researcher to disentangle them and reveal their respective rationales in right-wing thinking. One constant is that in all versions, we are dealing with a radical distinction between in-groups and out-groups.

4.6 The Subculture of Violence

The curious fact as was unfolded by the *Verfassungsschutz*⁷⁴ (The Intelligence Agency) is that the membership of the Right is dominated by male overwhelmingly below twenty-one and one in four is an apprentice while many come from rural and structurally underdeveloped regions. However, this has been challenged by events which have shown that the typical neo-Nazi is neither unemployed nor undereducated. Meanwhile, targets have broadened including not only “foreigners”⁷⁵, but all other “weak” classes as well. The connotation “foreigner” itself is an elastic one – for example, the attack on a “Turkish” woman and her granddaughter and her niece (23 September, 1992- Moelln) ignored the fact that she had been born and raised in Germany. Attacks have been made on homosexuals, German leftists, Romanian and Ukrainian, refugees, Russian students and soldiers including elderly Germans. Since 1994, attacks on Turkish establishments had increased. It is an admixture of frustration and culture shock among the youths, especially among those of east Germany resulted in such sinister incidents. As one starts to travel from east to the west, sees the change in motivation behind such attacks from being a diffused and uncertain one to that of a more politically organized and funded events. After the first incidents in the east, violence in the west far exceeded them. A poll of thousand east and west Germans revealed that prior to the *Landtag* (State Assembly) elections, east was less concerned with the foreigner issues, while it was a major one in the west. The press (fully

⁷³ It speaks about receiving back all those Polish the territories over which for many years, following the two World Wars, the Germans kept up their control

⁷⁴ It is an agency of the Federal Republic in charge of maintaining the domestic peace and stability of the land.

⁷⁵ It includes all the non-German communities who came over to the land mainly in search of a better life. In many cases, it was the German authorities who called in such people from around the neighbouring countries to fill in their labour market.

dominated by the west) overlooked the fact that Right's attacks were at least as frequent (if not more) than the east.

Political aims broadly went along those of the Third Reich with the neo-Nazis viewing democracy as effete and out rightly rejected ethnic pluralism. Some even spoke of an extension of the German borders. Rightist groups appeared to have consulted the carving up of Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany with the ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. However, all assembled mainly around the foreigner issue which is the most published cause for violence and enrolment of new members. Their parochialism went to the extent of even becoming chagrined towards the Americans which especially caught imagination of the youth in the east. Ewald Althaus even considered that Germany is being colonised by America (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 59). This also contributed toward the "historical revisionists" and the theories of the great hoax of the Holocaust. Funds and arms, in all probability comes from sympathizers, though extreme groups have been known to resort to crime and perhaps since recent times are resorting to smuggling of weapons. A report notes that around 180 coaches left German cities with arms and armaments for the war in former Yugoslavia (Focus, 1995: 60-62). This fostered new and unlikely alliances to acquire military training and funding. The Croatian Culture Clubs and the Muslim "Merhamet" had also taken advantage of such activities. The Muslim "Handzar"⁷⁶ division also had close connections with right-wing groups in Ingolstadt where, in many cases, seized arms went back into Germany in the hands of rightists fighting for the various groups in the FRY. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution counted 50 right-wing organizations in the crisis area (Focus, 1995: 60-62) while an "insider" alleges that from East Germany army personnel were also involved in both the fighting and in organizing right-wing violence. Arms caches were discovered regularly in Bavaria-Hesse. In an operation in 1995 (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 60) of over 80 suspected hide-outs led to the confiscation of rifles, revolvers, ammunition and so on. Another raid after the arrest of Peter Naumann revealed over 150 kg of arms and explosives.

There was considerable among the neo-Nazis of various hues to coalesce into a concerted effort in both the east and west of Germany, overcoming their fractured

⁷⁶ It was a branch of the SS Bosnian Muslim soldiers who made countless war crimes against the Serbs. They were also involved in genocidal activities under the influence of the Nazi propaganda.

existence. This is further accentuated by the dismal failure in the European and *Landtag*⁷⁷ (State Assembly) elections. The decision by Franz Schonhuber, Heinz Neubauer (Chairman of the German League for People and Household) and Markies Beiricht (Landtag Chairman) to cooperate seems to have been unusual enough to cause public comment. International links also existed with literature being printed in the US by Gary Lauck (arrested on 20 March, 1996)- an American from Nebraska and propaganda leader for the National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP-AO). Connections were also reported with trust groups from Spain, Austria, Denmark, Russia, Finland, South Africa and the US. The neo-Nazis were also barred from entering Kaliningrad, where a programme for the resettlement of Germans (in support of territorial claims) was the objective of the Rightist groups⁷⁸ (DDP/ADN 1995). However, most of these links were superficial and limited to the exchanges of information and literature. Police, however, suspected neo-Nazi hands in the mail bombings which swept through Austria, operating as mercenaries in Iraq and as extremist forces in South Africa against the ANC government (Anderson, n-11). A number of Far Right groups are suspected of operating in Russia (with probable connections to organized crime). With ease of communication through electronic mail, internet and a computer network (Thulenet), attempts are made to make extremist views more politically acceptable. These groups are not as prone to violence as the skinheads and still mobilises in great number on important occasions (for example on Rudolph Hess Day). More politically motivated and overt neo-Nazi groups like the *Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland* (Northern Germany Action Bureau) have taken the strategy of distancing themselves by appealing to its admirers by organizing virtual campaigns. A strategy of indirect influence in contrast to the likes of the violent Deutsche Alternative (German Alternative) makes their ban difficult and controversial.

4.7 Immigrants under the Shadow of Violence

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed renewed xenophobia and racist incendiarism in east Germany primarily as an outcrop of the major changes in lifestyle

⁷⁷ It is the provincial legislative assembly of the German State who influences the workings of the Federal Assembly.

⁷⁸ A cluster of politically conservative outfits who believed in the sanctity of inequality and social segregation as the natural outcome of the disparities in individual talents.

which permeated all ages and classes. The government, however, speaks of the need to combat extremism on the left and the right in the same breath when the Federal Minister of Interior Manfred Kanther said, 'We must fight extremism from the right as well as the left with determination' (Parkes 2002: 68), in the wake of the banning of the neo-Nazi *Frei Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*⁷⁹ (Free German Worker's Party) in 1995. Most probably prompted by acts like the arson attacks on the Luebeck synagogue in 1994. A report on the violence in 1991 showed that two-thirds of the perpetrators were under twenty years of age while only 3 percent were over thirty (P. Panayi in Larres, 1996: 139). It is also the case that whole areas in the suburbs of East Berlin and provincial East German towns are dominated by neo-Nazi skinheads. The disillusionment and frustration of the youth, especially was accentuated by a demoralized, insensate and negligent police force which had been unsuccessful to effectively stop or slow the wave of right-wing violence. The incidence of left-wing extremism too comes into perspective with the presence of Baader-Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction and its various successors (Marrs, 2008: 65). Consequently, attacks were hurled on Soviet youths from Chernobyl which might also be seen as an outburst for the people of that very place associated with the horrifying nuclear disaster. In the same week a hostel for asylum seekers in Saar-Louis on the French border was burned down, killing one Ghanaian and injuring two Nigerians. Incidents of lynching also occurred on the Mozambicans which again may be rooted in the abysmal state of their country engendering anger from among the Germans who saw in them the demons of devastation. A Jewish barracks in the Sachsenhausen⁸⁰ concentration camp north of Berlin too, was burned down in September 1992. However, the attacks on Hoyerswerda⁸¹ surpassed all in violence and ferocity even as Rostock followed in in an almost totally similar incident. There was an amazing degree of apathy from the authorities who in spite of being aware of the impending attacks (with the time reportedly even announced in the local paper) did absolutely nothing. Violence here became more generalized than that perpetrated by 'activists' with connections to the resurgent fascist movement (Kaiser 1990: 187). Residents even

⁷⁹ It was a party which adhered to the neo-Nazi ideologies of racial purity and social segregation and was eventually banned in 1995.

⁸⁰ One of the many Nazi concentration camps located in the province of Oranienberg where the political prisoners were kept until the end of the Second World War.

⁸¹ A district town of Saxony, became infamous for the riots against immigrants.

positioned themselves around to watch while adequate news coverage was ensured. The attackers (after the first day) were far from being typically neo-Nazi members or skinheads- most were well-dressed. Importantly, no fresh foreigner was brought into either of the two cities- both however, had seen a rise in unemployment as two prominent employers had closed down their factories (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 61). The solution of the authorities when they decided to act was to remove the foreigners rather than to discipline the perpetrators. In Saxony-Anhalt, where the number of attacks have been the highest, the number of foreigners actually dropped from 9200 in May 1990 to a mere 2294 in 1991 (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 61) and unemployment opportunities had actually improved. The Fact that there had been quite a few racist attacks in the west too, drives home the point that the Right throughout the land is often provoked not only by the presence of migrants, but also of the disorderly, unclean and sometimes begging east European refugees as many see in it an abuse of the generous social security system. This, rather detonates the theory that economic frustration was the root cause of these attacks. Along with this sour attitude has come the linking, rightly or wrongly, of acts of terrorism, drug-trafficking and violent crimes with those refugee claimants (Gebresellassie, 1992: 7). This had led to series of attacks coupled with indifference and passivity of the people in general regarding migrants as an economic and cultural threat. Far Right demagogues had made use of such sentiments in making the foreigners scapegoats for the nation's real and fantasized ills (Footnote- The inflow of immigrants as a whole has had positive effects on the economic growth, labour market and public budget in the Federal Republic. Far from being a liability, foreigners living in Germany have brought considerable economic benefit to the Federal Republic. They have contributed around DM 200 billion to the Gross National Product. They are also estimated to have paid taxes and social insurance contributions amounting to about DM 90 billion in 1992. It was, therefore, "non-sense to say that our foreigner fellow citizens are a burden on us", asserted Chancellor Kohl in the Bundestag. "The current state of German-Turkish Relations: Combatting Violence and Extremism Measures to improve the Integration of Foreigners in Germany", Policy Statement by Chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl in the Bundestag, 16 June 1993, in Federal Republic of Germany, Press and Information Office, Informationsfunk-Weekly Service (Informationsfunk (Bonn), 1993: 10-11). Neo-Nazi youths call for the expulsion of undesirable foreigners and the creation of a pure Germany. Herein, one could also sense the growing fear of unemployment; rise

in rents and debts and of falling to the bottom pile in the new society. Hence, an easily defined foe comes as a welcome diversion. In the immediate aftermath of the reunification, the massive social dislocation faced by the people of the erstwhile GDR snowballed into multiple crises where the sheer thought of experiencing a sea-change in the ingratiated livelihood engendered a plethora of discomfiture. These could not simply be interpreted as causal occurrences, but as projections of disturbed psycho-physical emanations.

German politicians were not able to find an easy language of multiculturalism⁸² and acceptance of diversity, while policies on integration were patchy at best. Concomitantly, attacks and fire-bombings mounted with one in November 1992 that killed a “Turkish” woman and her two grandchildren in Moelln and injuring nine others. This led to an outrage with several thousand strong “silent” procession against the killings. Since 1994, the racist killings are said to have gone down even as “terrorist” attacks by a banned PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)⁸³ have increased substantially. In all these, there has been little evidence fewer indictments. In a strange gelling of objectives, Turkish extremists are said to have increased anti-Jewish propaganda and distributing copies of *Mein Kampf*⁸⁴ (My Struggle) in Turkish. Germany seems to have been a hotbed landing terrorist groups like the Tamil Tigers, Sikh, Irish and other groups. There also exists a thriving underground market for light arms and weapons for the terrorist trade. Whether the linkages between Rightist groups extend to purely terrorist “Liberation” groups are unknown. The initial government response was typified by a comment in the *Der Tagesspiegel* (The Daily Mirror [Berlin]) which wrote:

“They engage in endless discussions, but the problem they agonized over was not the offenders but the potential victims...They talk about dishonest motives...and unreasonable demands...they mean the refugees who are trying to escape persecution became the persecuted again in Germany...” (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 62).

⁸² As a popular doctrine it showers respect on the cultural nuances of a plethora of communities cohabiting within a sovereign domain. It elicits the ideology of humaneness in recognising, accepting as well as advertising the uniqueness inherent in evolution of the human civilization.

⁸³ It is one of the many left-wing terrorist organizations constantly in tussle with Turkey. Only recently, under US monitoring they are presently declared ceasefire.

⁸⁴ The autobiography of Adolf Hitler having an elaborate exposition the ideologies and the future course of action as he envisaged for himself and Germany.

Such perceptions led to the tightening of the asylum laws and removal of the refugees from the scene of violence rather than punish the perpetrators. In both Rostock and Hoyerswerda, the “foreigners” were removed amidst a frenzy of publicity. In general, the punishments were light with 18-month jail and 120 hours of community service by local courts. Only after the Moelln incident, the first life-sentence was handed-out to a neo-Nazi. Though tough laws were used against the Left [like Section 129(a) of the Federal Penal Court] and all types of terrorist activities was not applied against right-wing violent elements. On the contrary, had the possibility of making “hard core” criminals as also the element to encourage others to indulge more in such acts. Moreover, the unavailability of evidence (with locals unwilling to testify) is one restricting factor, while in the east, the police forces lacked sufficient training and organization to take care of such sensitive issues. More serious is the allegation by the Rights Watch that police force themselves engage in xenophobic violence (particularly in Hamburg and Berlin) leading to refugees often afraid to report attacks (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 1995 in FBIS-WEU-95-D67, 1995: 7). The incident of Moelln⁸⁵ led to the government adopting a controversial step in light of the public outrage in banning the *Deutsche Alternative*⁸⁶ (the German Alternative) when over ten such organizations were nailed. However, they simply went underground and later aligned themselves with established right-wing outfits. These ruffled much talk about the resurgence of a German nationalism which had allegedly lain dormant, frozen under the ice of national division, for forty years. But on closer inspection these incidents of racial violence appeared to have more to do with social dislocation in the new circumstances of the 1990s, accompanied by a general rise in violent crime in the east. Although the increased memberships of organized right-wing parties, and the escalation of racist extremism, were worrying, and although both policing and political responses appeared on occasions to be unduly clumsy and delayed, there was no question of any return to an earlier state-ordained German nationalism. Arguably, of greater significance was a less immediately visible or headline-grabbing phenomenon, the question of the acceptance, or otherwise, of what was in fact an ethnically diverse modern society.

⁸⁵ A beautiful small town in the east part of Germany.

⁸⁶ A small neo-Nazi group founded by Michael Kuehnen in 1989 which was against immigration, keeping of the war-time territories under German jurisdiction and also to re-establish the German Reich. It finally faced ban in 1992.

4.8 The Cordon Sanitaire of Law

The various issues that were debated in post-unification Germany (including the controversial abortion laws) revealed that the prospects of the 1994 elections would compel the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to encompass some of the performance of the Far-Right while the left of the centre parties, Social Democratic Party (SPD) moved further to cut into the performance of the Greens (who gained at their expense back in 1983 and 1987). The rise of the Right particularly threatened the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria and in turn, endangered prospects of the continued coalition.

On July 1993, the asylum laws were amended and received approval in May 1996 from the Council Court where firstly, it was enshrined that the refugees coming from safe third country would not be given asylum; secondly, refugees disembarking (or transiting) through a safe country (second country) could also be denied the right of asylum and thirdly, a refugee's right to challenge rejection in a court of law was also restricted since it would tantamount to a complaint against the constitution and lastly, airport cleaning laws were accelerated the provision (which Federal Ministry rightly calls minor points) that the inability of a refugee to communicate be taken into account. The laws were met with heavy criticisms by the Greens and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Green spokesperson was vociferous about the legal caveats while other party members said that the right of asylum has been made ineffective. The UNHCR regretted that the Karlsruhe decision was seen as denying asylum-seekers all opportunities to refute the presumed security of their country (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 1996 in FBIS-WEU-96-096, 1996). Human rights organizations also welcomed the decision with deep disillusionment. Yet, the asylum law was considered inviolate and is seen as crucial in preventing the recurrence of Far Right attacks. As the then Finance Minister, Theo Weigel put it bluntly: "Hands-off the asylum compromise". (Bild Am Sonntag, 1994: 4-5). The Bavarian Interior Minister clearly links right-wing violence to the number of asylum-seekers and sees a rise or fall depending on their presence (Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998, 65). On the other side of the prism, the passing of the asylum law was received with considerable applause from CDU/CSU circles as a peace-creating effect while Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that Germany could push for a harmonization of the law into the European framework.

(Menon in Jain [ed.], 1998: 65). Clearly, this would not be a difficult task given the resurgence of the Right all over Europe.

Such strict laws made a cordon sanitaire around the country where the former Warsaw Pact countries became the first line of defence against unwanted immigrants with each having readmission agreements with source countries so as to allow them to return such elements promptly. Thus, a domino effect has been created and on top of that Germany resorts to “cheque-book diplomacy” even while trying to create a Volga Republic that would house Russia’s ethnic Germans. Poland received DM 120 million in 1994 (apart from a movement of the German medium industry into the country) while the movement to create safe zones gained momentum.

4.9 Negotiating the Mentality of Supremacy

Despite the existence of a prominent intuitive appeal pointing unemployment as a major cause for the occurrence of neo-Nazi activities, especially among the young population, no rigorous evidence could be elicited to that effect. Loss of printed freedom do create a sense of deprivation, rage toward the foreigners and/or violent predispositions, but the burden of individual sensation precludes an agency to react in an outrageous manner against other clusters of agencies. Deep within though it nurtures the idea of an authoritarian solution yet in practice, one becomes too occupied in searching ways of wining back the financial stability. In such doldrums of agony and ecstasy, various sections of the youth both in the east and the west overtly commits violence bringing back the spectres of arson and genocide into the fabric of the professed multicultural society. Arguably, the number of incidents are puny compared to Nazi past, yet it should not condone the perpetrators on socio-economic grounds. The problem is one of psyche where for generations the Germans came to believe in the relative purity of their race. This shaping of the mentality gets tickled from time to time resulting in such incendiarism. The esoteric formation of the ethnic community determines the exoteric components in the form political nomenclatures like the Far Right, the Right-wing, Autonomous nationalism and so on so forth while in the social and economic domain it represents through fragmentation, recession, culture shock and the like.

Contemporary Germany has managed to douse the flames of neo-Nazism⁸⁷ through the sprinkles of social security, multiculturalism and an exponential economic growth. But one can still argue that in the numerous nook and corner of the nation, uncountable lanes and by-lanes of the state on or the other type of violent activities goes on upon the foreigners, unreported, uncared and unheard to give a touch of shimmering heat of nationalism. Inclusive policies, strict laws, performance enhancement, constitutional amendments have all been tried right from the days of Kohl to Merkel to uproot the malice of racial hatred from the heart of the people at large meeting with considerable success. The remaining poses a problem in tarnishing the image of toleration in committing shameful acts. Dissatisfaction at the practical level of education, job, family along with generational transmission of the notions of superiority induces many youth and young adults to indulge in violence. Merkel, in unison with other party leaders decided not to ban the NPD ahead of the 2013 federal elections. The reasons which prompted such an outcome included a fear that the attempt could backfire giving the party unnecessary limelight and would also tend to undermine the legal strength of the nation. In fact, the influential centre-Right believed in doing away with authoritarianism through electoral democracy. The verdict of the people stands as the final parameter in forming the social dimension of a nation.


Clearly, the tide of events does speak of a continuous undercurrent of adverse feeling flowing in a section of people that keeps the agenda of violence alive. Combined to that the skinheads, white supremacists and autonomous nationalists banking upon the sizable number of the youth population continues to ruffle the minds of the populace in highlighting that much of the miseries are caused by the outsiders eating up the prosperity of the land. Having practically no institutional success they thrive on the despondency of the youth to publicise their issue of hate based on the fictitious supremacy theory of the race. Interestingly enough, the surge in racial violence in the unified nation is orchestrated on society through individual militant right-wing extremist splinter organizations like the *Freie Kameradschaften*⁸⁸ (Free Fellowship) and groupuscular movement of autonomous nationalists emphasised 'national and

⁸⁷ A popular political ideology which denies the happenings of the holocaust as one of the many conspiracies of Russia and hopes to revive the Fourth Reich. It is quite fanatic about maintaining the racial purity and decries any attempt of assimilation.

⁸⁸ It is one of the many neo-Nazi groups which operated in Germany which in the post-reunification days registered a significant number of east German youth taking advantage of their frustrations and drudgeries.

social revolutionary movements’ (Schlembach 2013: 301) though some elements of exhibited incoherence lurked. Apart from correlating it with the numerical and/or ideological attachment, much of it reflects the sentiments of an entire generation of youths bred in subculture of the socialist oppression in the erstwhile GDR began to open themselves up in a vengeance against such prolong psychological torture. Coupled with this, the dispute over the perception of the ethnic disparateness between the east and the west Germans amongst themselves hampered much of the smooth integration of the people keeping the mental Wall it led to the false and mistaken comprehension of the persistent inequalities of the opportunity magnifying racist feelings among the aggrieved, dispossessed and discriminated east Germans against immigrant minorities. Thus, the innate roots of upsurges of racism could possibly be found in the contextual and methodological approach of comparing fundamental economic and socio-demographic information under the aspects of identifying patterns of congruence.

Figure 9: Extreme Right-Wing, Xenophobic and Anti-Semitic Criminal Acts (1993-2001)



Source: Ruhl (2002: 20)

The above figure traces the degree of criminal activities following the reunification of Germany. Most of these were related to the deep-seated anxiety against the non-ethnic communities living in the country. Had it not been for the unification, the youth along with the young adults especially, from the east would not have faced social and economic dislocation. Such a disoriented situation was utilized by the various ultra-right outfits to drive in the hate agenda. Still, as the years denote, the incidence of violence remained though in a restricted manner. But it was enough to keep the social atmosphere tense and apprehensive. The years 1993 and 2000, registered a bit higher

magnitude of brutalities mainly due to the doldrums of social relocation and economic restructuring. However, throughout the years since unification, the number of criminal acts remained quite high indicating a persistent dislike toward all categories of foreign elements in the society.

Superficially, it is difficult to accept in the case of Germany, a federal entity trying to merge its enlarged self into a larger Europe. Chancellor Kohl has however, effectively deprived the right of one of its planks- that of national self-confidence and coming to terms with the past. Yet, the war next door has fed Germany weapons allowing otherwise fringe elements like the Military Sports Group to arm themselves with munitions that are not part of the standard equipment of police forces. This gives various trans-national terrorist groups the chance to use them to organize crime thereby, accelerating the menace of terrorism. Given the terrifying history of the Left in the country (who manage to their business with little or no military training) the possibility of these blooded elements surging their pace of activities in cooperation with organized political groups or leadership seems to be high. Convoluted interplay of several factors like migrants, parental negligence, divorce, unemployment, loss of income and alcoholism, to a great extent, brewed up right-wing violence. Moreover, the reaction of the Federal Government in removing these causes for have sent wrong signals to many such groups leading to indiscriminate attacks on all kinds of targets. Administrative strictness is required although there is no corollary between reducing the number of foreigners and de-escalating violence. Apart from moral issues, the fact remains that Germany continue to need foreign investment and cheap labour to prevent a flight of medium industries to locals outside the country. Germany will continue to draw the centre of attention among all other European countries as she reduces subsidies, welfare expenditures and lowers employment especially, in light of its unification. The reports of Stephen Roth Institute, one of the leading centres for the study of contemporary anti-Semitism and racism, noted, on the whole, at least six acts of racial and anti-Semitic violence on a daily basis in 2009. The next year it observed:

“The prospect of a second generation of eastern neo-Nazis has dashed any lingering hopes that the upsurge in far right support following German unification in 1990 might have been a temporary phenomenon caused by the collapse of the East German economy and the resulting social upheaval and mass unemployment” (Stephen Roth Institute 2010: 22).

While, 2012 saw the prominence of the National Socialist Underground, an underground neo-Nazi terrorist group, associated with at least ten murders, nine of which were immigrants spelling out racially aggravated killings. They arranged for funds by selling an anti-Semitic game 'Monopoly' where train stations were replaced by concentration camps, depicting evil-looking Jews, Hitler, gasworks and burning Israeli flags (Herrick, 2014: 6). The European Network against Racism, ENAR shows an escalation in migration to the neighbouring countries of Germany in light of the increased racial discrimination on the foreigners. They faced problems regarding housing, medical services and education making it hard to lead a normal life. Though not at all rampant, the seeds of neo-Nazi ideals can still be found sprouted across the country growing into trees of disturbance. Networking has reached the cyber level too with neo-Nazi websites more than tripling in just a year, 2010. The NGO *Jugendschutz.net*⁸⁹ (Youth Protection) formed in the year 1997 to safeguard the youth from the influence of right-wing extremists, registered numerous websites dealing with the ideas of Nazism. There are thousands who read daily go through the blogs and according to German Counter Intelligence service a good many use the Internet to gain attention beyond local areas (Stevkovski, 2015: 47).

Eluded success at the federal level, these outfits are locally quite operative, in apart from being chagrined at the foreigners to organizing anti-Islamic programmes, picking them as troublesome elements of the society. Such protests organized by the *Pro NRW* (Pro North Rhine Westphalia) on May 5, 2010 in Bonn followed by provoking the Muslims who at the same time scheduled a peaceful protest ended in the intervention of the police keeping calm on both sides. Again, the far-right party *Pro- Deutschland* (Pro-Germany) on August 16, 2012 won a case at the Administrative Court in Berlin which allowed them to use publicly provocative cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. The appeal was rejected by the court on grounds of freedom of art and by that law it cannot be considered an abuse by a certain religious group. Still, the ambience remains positive in that the nationalist platforms with neo-Nazi or right-wing extremist platforms are yet to come to the fore on account of deepening social problems. However, the initiative of the government in launching imaginative school projects to reduce the students' violence against foreigners and other enemies did not succeed

⁸⁹ The Youth Protection Act of 2003 as supported by this NGO, tried to censor volatile things from reaching the hands of the juveniles which might instigate ethnic hatred in an already difficult following the days of reunification.

much in weaning away the rightists from their derogatory behaviour. Alongside, the purge of professional positions in the east further kept the social situation tense wherein the life of the neo-Nazis and the skinheads became monotonous to make them drunkards. Crisis compounded in a division among social workers with the conservative lot feeling that the professional should not make any concessions to rightist youth's demands unless the latter vouch to make fundamental behavioural changes. They went on to blame the youth's violence on anti-authoritarian education and absence of order, discipline as well as Prussian virtues among youth, their parents and society. They indicated the rightist youth takeover of local youth clubs without the liberal social workers taking any counter-measures whatsoever and considered them as national social workers. The latter defended their position by saying that the youth are in a malleable stage where strictness would only harden their outlook. They should be given the confidence to deal with the problems in a positive manner from settling down with their parents to finding job and training. Regulations, penalties and prohibitions would only provoke violence and lead to tragedy. Such constructive efforts failed to stem the violence that swept the country at the hands of fanatic neo-Nazis and skinheads leading to an abrupt annulment of many projects. They targeted not only the foreigners but leftists, punks, the homeless and the gays. In 2001, the Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (SPD) suggested that the government should start a counselling and referral programme to encourage right-wing extremists to change their political convictions and sever all ties to their former comrades. It was in fact, a modified copy of the ongoing 'exit Germany' (An anti-Nazi organisation which aim to provide support a rehabilitation for neo-Nazis desirous to leave that subculture as well as support for parents and those whose works brings them into contact with usually young people involved in Nazism) programme by the Berlin-based *Zentrum Demokratische Kultur*⁹⁰ (Centre for Democratic Culture). It works not only to help rightists find housing and job, but also reintegrates them into a democratic society. Schiller wanted an involvement of the government to stall retaliation for those staying in the movement, education or employment guidance, housing support as well as witness protection programme thus, giving new perspective for the future. The

⁹⁰ It was an extremist outlet founded in 1997 promoting values that talks about the preservation of the cultural purity of a particular race.

‘Info-Telefon’ was set up which led to numerous calls from the parents of rightists seeking advice as to how they could wean away their children from the movement.

4.10 Conclusion

The government must spend more amounts on preventive programs, social workers and leisure activities for young people, especially for unemployed juveniles. Funds should also be allocated for rehabilitation and re-socialisation⁹¹, otherwise it would instigate marginalisation of the offenders inviting more barbarity. The sanity of the legality should be expressed through the multiplicity of political goodwill, constitutional measures, institutional strength, improvement in social milieu and establishing a cultural bonhomie.

In a manner of speaking, the growth of the Far Right groups and ideologies is not a phenomenon to be underestimated for its potential to create yet another debilitating nationalistic strife and conflict. Though it might not be the state of Germany splintering into a bout of “ethnic violence”⁹² yet what needs to be underlined is that these wars are essentially about an exacerbation of the “we-they” syndrome carried out to a higher degree of violence. Nearly all states facing such tussles are multi-ethnic leading to the dangerous conclusion so easily arrived at among Europeans that only a “nation-state”⁹³ can achieve stability. Exactly on such sentiments the Far Right constructs its platform. International media steadfastly circulated the popular demeanour that the ideology of Fascism has become an inextricable ingredient of general European politics. Likewise, the wellsprings of fascism are among other factors, a dislike for foreigners and a feeling that liberal democracy is detrimental to national identity.

Public and private responses to right-wing extremist violence are seen to have a cyclical pattern with violence evoking a momentary outcry which abates with the ebbing of incendiarism. Even the DVU and NPD as leading protagonists of stemming violence are not sure how they can integrate the unruly skinheads into their political activities. (Braunthal 2009: 141). This apart, thousands of projects were undertaken to wean away

⁹¹ It is a way in which the values, ideas, attitudes, behaviours and mores are reframed to adjust according to the necessities of the time and place.

⁹² Chiefly motivated by political gains of establishing supremacy over a particular ethnic community and/or communities, it perpetrates brutal acts to keep them in under control so as also to maintain the superiority in the coteries of values and culture.

⁹³ Having its base in the constitutional framework, the territory under the sovereign status of politico-cultural sanctity gains the supremacy of being a strong repose of a particular race.

youth from a trajectory of a social behaviour and rightist commitment. Being quite successful, they are yet to reach enough rightist youth who flunk in schools, are jobless and lack family support at home. Again, in many cases, there has been a paucity of qualified social workers or a dearth of continuous financing and in addition given the rate stream of violence, it may well be argued that the hard core right extremist has remained violent and could not be persuaded to change course. The deliberate purpose of the multifaceted efforts to de-escalate violence and provide neo-Nazi and skinheads⁹⁴ youths with jobs and expectation has been to strengthen the civil society. Therein, lies a set of democratic values which propels individuals to assist those who have become the victims of right-extremist brutality. In such a society the police and the courts play a part in preserving the system, but the main thrust remains with citizens and foreigners alike who need to maintain a democratic culture. Difficult this task is, it is further compounded by the fact that some of the right-extremist ideology engenders from the heart of the society, the mainstream citizens, having numerous views that are not quite different from the right-wing extremists. Thus, this cultural construct lives on to draw nourishment from the very soul of geo-polity- the populace, genetically bound to traverse through *Sonderweg* (exceptionalism).

⁹⁴ Originally a cultural group in England it went on to change its ideologies adopting a more ultra-rightist stance. This politicization also relocated its base in the central parts of Europe and ultimately gaining infamy in Germany mainly through its hatred for the immigrants.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This dissertation is an endeavour to measure the impact of reunification on the east Germans from the various tangents of social life. The scrutiny of things that goes on to construct the super-structure of ‘impact’⁹⁵ leads one to the discovery of unknown parameters and opens up new dimensions. On surface, the current of events has been measured in concrete terms and the abstract analysed which includes the conglomeration of elements leading to conformity, building up an identity and assisting one to internalize the immediate vibrations of the environment. Transition from a particular frame, for the east Germans, involved incredulous alterations affecting a paradigmatic shift in their life and livelihood. The coming down of the Wall unfurled a haze of events making an indelible impression upon their minds. The ensuing stimulus is mostly channelized through the physical discomforts experienced in the doldrums of time. There were uncertainties in the effective sustainability of the people which would orchestrate welfare policies in bringing about cohesion among the two societies, cater to economic prosperity, generate wealth thereby, regenerating the entire community.

There is an inherent human need to belong to social groups. The evolutionary DNA has taught the homo sapiens the significance of togetherness as the key to survive and prosper. Reunification was one such time which brought into the fore the crucial issues of escape and flourish from the long drudgery of an inward-looking regime. The people of east Germany bred in an environment of collectiveness realized, in practice, the insubstantiality of the doctrine forcing them to live under restrictions of frugality. They were deprived from the basic physio-mental necessities of life in continuing with dearth of material and mental amenities. The existence of redundant institutions and outmoded values frosted the prosperity and arrested development. The cult of real socialism proved to be a mirage traversing through the projections of equality and justice. For forty years, the regime⁹⁶ kept up the hollow image of social equanimity hoaxing the mass into legitimate distribution of available resources while in reality, the

⁹⁵ Mainly the interventionist and developmental trajectories involved in fashioning the environment of society, culture and economy.

⁹⁶ The socialist rule under the SPD in the erstwhile state of GDR.

misappropriation of wealth continued undeterred. This brought in general impoverishment of the lot at the expense of the ruling elites who became all the more steeped in wealth. The ruthless expropriation of the material and the slimy rinsing of the immaterial, for years, continued to propel the mass into the make-belief of plenty and prosperity. The corrosive structure of the regime remained latent in the glittering propaganda of palpably forming a collective identity, social solidarity precipitating on the formation of group culture.

The normative influence⁹⁷ of such measures prevented the occurrence of disruptive incidents by thrusting upon the values of conformity. It surreptitiously, emanated authoritarian sentiments in stressing the importance of the public institutions over that of the private in shaping and carrying the united psyche of the people manifested in the functionality of the state. It tended to metamorphosed itself into the all-encompassing Leviathan⁹⁸ in nationalization each and every aspect of life and living. The constant engagement of the state agencies in publicizing their morals and ideologies inculcated faith of the system among the people at large. This, in turn, bred obedience setting a routine path habituating the people to conform to the dictums of the state. It enslaved the body into action and the mind into blindly appreciating the mechanisms of the agencies set into motion by the ruling authorities in a repetitive mode. In time, the state, through its various agencies and institutions starts to manage, motivate, manipulate and run the subjects in such a way so as to make them completely dependent upon its care. It elicits the mannerisms of a parent-child relationship laced with rewards and punishments as an inextricable part of the entire edifice. Mass is cajoled into acquiescence in the continuing promulgation of the general well-being projecting an ever-increasing level of opulence. The availability of the basic commodities further clouds the understanding in creating confidence over the system, thus, making it very difficult to think and look beyond the apparent.

⁹⁷ The characteristics of friendliness and associative proclivity which promotes conformity and expands the horizon of acceptance among fellow human beings.

⁹⁸ The all-time classic written by Thomas Hobbes where the state is compared to a gigantic sea-monster dominating every aspect of an individual's life. The latter out of his/her will gives over the right of freedom to a superior authority for personal safety in a kind of an inviolable contract.

The resultant illusion agonizes the psychological plane of the mass in producing conflicting cognitive and incognitive responses⁹⁹. In the tangible fields of education, training, employment, social security provisions, familial and old age care, the policies of the state were quite commendable. It sufficiently covered up the immeasurable stimuluses of stagnancy, deprivation, class hegemony, corruption, moral bankruptcy and the general decadence. This made quite difficult for the people to gauge the level of deprivation, impoverishment, felony and exploitation. The idiosyncratic tendencies among the mass in general, began to increase affecting the cooperative spirit of the mechanism making them indifferent toward the dictums of real existent socialism. Increasing class differentiation, inequitable distribution of wealth, party rule, social repression and cultural exclusivity invited the general angst bending it toward an agitation syndrome. In assessing the social impact of such actions and attitudes one should always take into consideration the greater factors of change sweeping the larger part of the Eastern Europe. Years of suppression blew-off the lid of patience making millions to hit the streets for comprehensive reforms. This air flowed into the east part of Germany to ruffle the minds of many who took to the streets in demanding a complete overhauling of the system in replacing the rule of the state to that of the rule of the law. Demanding a termination to the shameless surveillance and evaluation policies so far followed by the ruling authorities, in glaring violation of the private rights of individuals in the name of protection and care, the people finally broke the jinx to initiate reforms on a wide scale. The non-interventionist role of the USSR made things all the easier in introducing the democratic principles of governance guaranteeing social, economic and cultural freedom in expressing one's views and opinions in an unfettered environment. Still, the ruling elites tried their best to cling on to power by applying various methods of compromise, disregard as well as confrontation. In the process, they finally beckoned their fall in the springtime of mass demonstration bringing about the complete dissolution of their state into the Federal Republic.

This initiated a paradigmatic shift in the lives of the people of the east part of Germany in making them to abdicate years of traits developed under a particular environment in order to adopt at the cognitive level the best of the opportunities, openings and

⁹⁹ It involves both the processes of self-persuasion and disambiguation needed for the sustenance of an individual in a society.

possibilities to improve their overall conditions. Simultaneously, at the incognitive level they were required, at moment to combat the shifting dunes of values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. The discussion on the impact on social life endeavoured to scrutinize the changeover of the prevalent norms confronted by the people of east Germany following reunification. At the stage of injunction, their behaviour deviated significantly in between aggression and suspension. Majority of them tended to form a descriptive path of norms in observing the characteristics of the West Germans. It, in most cases, winded up in an admixture to transgress and/or criticize in a satirical manner the entire operational mode. All through they expected respect from their counterparts in understanding functional capabilities in adopting to the standards emerging from actions. Realistically speaking, the demolition of the Wall did not quite result in the prompt integration of the two societies into a wholesome one. For forty years, the people of the east were habituated to a state care of system which at the concrete level provided education to the children, offered various vocational and intermediate trainings to young adults of both sexes, had all avenues open also to the pursuance of higher education both for men and women. Under the scheme of collective living, it had a well-functioning labour market, offered quite a sum in social security looking after the women, single and/or divorced mothers in delivering child care and provided well in the form of pensions to the aged.

Reunification brought in a massive transformation, for no matter how rusty the superstructure of the GDR was, the multitude, at least had the comfort of receiving education and work on the basis of which the men and women went on to subsist, run their families, rear up children together and/or individually and also look after the elders and/or the aged. However, as the Wall came down, the teeming millions of the east, oblivious of the consequences, drowned themselves completely in the euphoria of re-unity, all through celebrating the resilience of the German race in rediscovering the *Sonderweg*¹⁰⁰. Hearts throbbing, eyes sparkling and mind swooning with joy and excitement of finally breaking free the shackles of state intervention plaguing every point of life, they embraced the moment of integration as one of salvation. Seldom then they thought about the inherent distinctiveness of their social, ideational and cultural

¹⁰⁰ It is more a belief than a reality that the development of the German nation followed a different trajectory from the rest of the European nations. The evolution from a monarchical to a democratic entity now moving toward post-modernity is unique in the sense that it embraced the hard-core elements of nationalism in discarding more of the liberal ingredients prevalent in the major parts of the Continent.

ethos, condensed over the years into a separate tradition, could actually dither the smooth transition toward the nuances of modernity. The ideologies of collective proximity, group solidarity, integrative spirit and voluntary zeal essentially meeting the universalist attributes of each of the subjects within a particular system was always determined by the sacrificial tendencies. In this spectrum of things, the existence of all is considered to be the sufficient living conditions for every other. Individuals, groups and institutions coordinated in an interconnected fashion so as to extract the maximum benefits for all and sundry.

Agonizingly, for the people of the east, growing up in the atmosphere of togetherness, the sudden bump into the zone of individuality, competitiveness, isolationism and self-centrism was like hurling themselves into a treacherous terrain of slipshod. It was an antithetical arena of contesting ideologies positing paradoxes in assessing the true texture of the society. The holistic view of living was placed against the discrete scheme of surviving in the winding ways of the modern west. Freedom came at the cost of comfort, privacy at the cost of competitiveness and realization of the self at the surrendering of compassion. Years into unification, these differences persisted as fundamental traits of the people belonging to two distinct regions. As has been discussed, the concomitant formation of identities maintained the attitudinal marks of the 'East' as opposed to the 'West' thereby, preventing the internalization of the phenomenon of unification. The social mores and customs shaping the definite patterns of behaviours affects the interactive level of an individual vis-à-vis his/her immediate surroundings. The entire representations of unity underwent a sea-change in the sense that while in the former GDR, the subjects were under the all-encompassing state, the birth of the Federal Republic reversed the equation in making them one of the many independent cohorts functioning in tandem with other such units.

Thus, the people of the east as single operational units submerged themselves in large numbers into the stream of reminiscences which came to be known as *ostalgie* providing some ready relief in their otherwise drudgery of reality. This was not all, for many adopted the confrontational strategies of pun and caricaturing in stultifying the image of the *Besserwessis* while many others trudged along the path of satire to criticise the inherent contradictions of the so-called liberal society of the west. Dichotomous to the extent of being hypocritical, the east Germans were not always averse to the conditions in which they were placed. There were many who genuinely adjusted to reap

maximum benefits. Individually, they went on to enjoy the environment of complete freedom (where nobody seems to bother about anybody) to rediscover their strengths and weaknesses so as to make a mark of distinction in the specific layout of minimum intimate interaction. Likewise, attempt has been made to quantify and qualify the physiological as well as the subjective feelings to analyse the motives and sentiments of the people (acting as singular agencies) in the wider panorama of impulses. Operating in a spatial and temporal force, it devises methods of communication with fellow beings in multiple ways of seeking information, casual talks, passive observation and providing avenues through policies for the betterment of a particular person. The social disjunction as it has been discussed does not indicate a prolong rupture between the east and west. Over a period of time more and more of east Germans came to acclimatize with the social conditions keeping a streak of their lingering past. The cleavage, on analysis seems to become more shallow to the extent of being insignificant, yet those fading elements kept up the super-structure of knowledge, belief, art, morals, law and customs of the erstwhile GDR to a constant level of comparison. It went on to affect the capabilities and habits of the east Germans which determined the cultural morass¹⁰¹ of the community. Discussion has been made to the tune of surmising the magnitude of affectation in the domain of practices, discourses, material expressions and attitudinal diversions posing difficulties for the east Germans to fuse into the cultural arrangement of the west. In the initial years of unification, it appeared to the east Germans as a kind of blind imitation of the American Broadway life, but on a closer scrutiny the elements of nativity were found in plenty decorating the spheres of political cabarets, satires, cartoons, literatures and musical genres. Pluralism¹⁰² is the key feature of the unified Federal Republic which gave the east Germans an even greater feeling of loss given the years of habitation under the monolithic communal culture bred by socialism. This strengthened the common bond further entrenched with similarities in the language, kinship, myths, cuisine, clothing, housing and so on.

¹⁰¹ It tries to encapsulate the definitive features a particular community vis-à-vis the other communities to extract the strengths and weaknesses inherent in an ethnic group. Such assessments help in overcoming the infirmities thereby, increasing the overall resilience.

¹⁰² It refers to the adoption of policies by the Federal Republic to protect and safeguard the cultural uniqueness of the minor groups within the state.

These factors of continuity coupled with homogeneity were virulent to the degree of creating inhibitions toward the foreigners in general. In fact, GDR had seldom had an incidence of immigration with in the forty years of its regime, practically none venturing into the country. However, the event of unification facilitated economic restructuring which in turn created openings in the labour market with plausible chances of prosperity attracting people of all sorts in and around the neighbourhood. This proved to be doubly disturbing for the east Germans already struggling to adjust to the altered situations. Unfamiliar with the phenomenon of multiculturalism, they saw in the 'others' a potential threat which could further destabilize their already vulnerable economic position. This came in as an added bonus along with the social and cultural ambiguity tormenting their daily lives. The policies of social security and various laws pertaining to the containment of the immigrants had a minimal effect in stabilizing the socio-economic conditions of the east Germans. Discussion has been made as to how they coped with the situation in going for whatever jobs available to keep themselves ticking. Criticism and control went in juxtaposition to increase the overall potential of the market force. In spite of many dithering, the *Treuhand* did a commendable job in boosting the productivity of the east in making it work along the lines of liberal market forces. Miscalculations, unaccounted misappropriations and false projections about the strength of the east German economy were factors primarily responsible in arresting the desired amount of growth in the immediate aftermath of unification. However, at present as has been argued, the east registers an appreciable progress in reducing the gap in growth with enhanced productivity carried into reduced expenditures.

The segment on the impact on women and family life discussed the pitiable condition of the east Germans women caught in the whirlwind of transition. The entire supportive edifice of the erstwhile socialist state abruptly vanished to expose them to the uncertainties of life in taking away the advantages of state-sponsored education, training and employment facilities with concomitant damage in the incognitive level producing dissatisfaction and anxiety. This was transmitted in the patterns of livelihood which became more insecure at a personal level constraining choices, weakening familial ties in forcing them to take vocational trainings and jobs in distant places. Ironically enough, while it helped in keeping up the earnings it dissociating them from the members of the family. This sustenance in forced isolation increased the level of stress and strain which in many occasions, invited restrained fertility, depression and

solitude. Many found it difficult to enter the familial phase of life unnerved in witnessing the breakage of their own families tattered between the forces of change demanding relocation and continuity urging solidarity under pressing conditions. With the passing of the years, the females of the east gradually adjusted in forming families with the combined roles of wife, earner and mother. They went in and out of the labour market as and when necessary to carry on their multiple identities. Favoured and lived with selective fertility with most preferring a single child in light of the scant provisions of the Federal state along with the uncertainties of job prospect for their male counterparts. As daughters they kept link with their families, as individuals they were breadwinners and single mothers. The memories of obligatory family life haunted many a women of east Germany making it difficult for them to engage in any kind of transitory relationships. For many of them never expected that independence would actually come to affect the configuration of the private domain in making people cohabit in whatever fashion suitable. The over-imposing nature of the state engulfing privacy is what annoyed them the most but to their utter dismay they found that liberty of the west, in actuality, has deformed the meaning of 'privacy'¹⁰³ into a sort of 'promiscuity'¹⁰⁴. Though relative in term, it was the initial impression of the east German females tasting the social surrounding of the new state.

The decision to enter into relationship dithered on these ground of personal prevarications of separation from parents and relatives, discrimination which many families faced while migrating to the west, the decline in the relative proportion of income and the vagaries of the job sector. It has been argued out that the prevalence of such differentiation was handled through the policies of state care providing, to whatever extent possible, assistance to the women to build up their life and livelihood. Provisions for single mother, elasticity of work, child care, social security endowments to women with more than one child, old age pensions helped a lot in maintaining not only the structures of families, but to enervate the available residual energies in further building up the resources of the cohorts transmuting it to the accruing of the social capital. The typical features of a family in West Germany had in it the overriding

¹⁰³ It refers to the practices of the east German women in preserving the cultural poignancy and the social ideologies transmitted through generations.

¹⁰⁴ It refers to the enjoyment of freedom in an irresponsible manner bringing in misery and pain not only to oneself, but to the society in general.

concern of providing space to the members to express their opinions and wishes. This did not tantamount to the loosening up of the values of support, care and unity and the culture of meeting up of the members even if they are staying apart. Many of the migratory east German families found it hard to mix parental care and nurture with that of children separating in their teens and/or for economic reasons and social influence young adults witnessing the separation of their parents. Both ways it has been seen to be a depressive condition. It changed the values of attachment to isolation, the sacred bond of the marriage into a plain choice of an individual and the culture of upbringing into the freedom of negligence. One of the interesting paradoxes as has been discussed is the dependence of the such families of the east upon the state to devise policies which would cater to their sufferings as one of the many consequences of the social integration. Yet, at one time, they protested against such care as was provided by the socialist regime. Family was then one of the fundamental unit of society which post-unification became one of the options for the consenting adults to live under a roof. Such wide dimensions of liberty overlooked the real difficulties of child-rearing, continuation of long-distance relationship and vagrancy and on the psychological level the lack of motivation, enthusiasm and the frequent change in moods. All these incremented to fetch unhappiness, monotony and misery in such a conjoint manner so as to preclude the reaping of internal dividends between the people of the east with that of the west.

It is said that time is the best healer, such axiomatic propositions however, does not always sanctify the gruesome experiences one goes through in real life. For thousands of east German families settling in different parts of west Germany encountered complete ramifications in values, morals and customs which in many instances led to the break-up of the family. Under different circumstances, they tried to cope up with the mentalities of the west in challenging the veracity of the individual existence in the society which is taken to be the conglomerate of the people residing within a particular sovereign zone. The discussion traced both the cognitive and the incognitive terrains of locomotion from the various aspects of sentiments, feelings, sensations and emotions analysing simultaneously the role of memories in providing a passage to escape into a familiar make-belief world suspending the vibrations of reality. Again, from a plausible perspective the puns, caricatures and cartoons made by the people of the east showcased their protective spirit in advertising what they felt were superior modes of social

customs which keeps the humane qualities of mutual help, fellow-feeling and communicability intact while working hard to subsist in an affluent manner. Over the years, however, this gap closed in to make not much of a difference in the attitudes and behaviours of the people from the east with that of the west. The bond of the family incorporated the nuances of individual prosperity in giving ample space to the members while the people of the west too learned to continue with the basic components of the family. It was some sort of a confluence of tradition and modernity which took place within the parameters of the Federal state.

The segment on the impact on youth discussed the general condition of the juveniles and/or young adults in those slippery times of sudden changes and massive transformations. The event of unification along with its train of consequences catapulted the youth of east Germany into a seamless void. As it is the adolescent time demands special care from the near and dear ones so as to build up the character of an individual in a stolid manner. It is a point of brisk transformation which requires an affectionate surveillance and the absence of which might lead to one's physical and moral degradation. Unfortunately, for thousands of such standing on the crossroads of progress or decline, the incident of unification came as a mixed blessing of joy in gaining individual liberty and the gloom in the loss of familial base. Freedom did not come as a complement to discipline, the acquisition of space did not come as an extension of comfort and the right of choice did not come as an ancillary to check. They lost the ground beneath their feet at the most critical juncture of their ascent in life. Bereft of parental care, familial bonds, the separation from the near ones and their routine of life in complete disarray frustration got the better of reason making them temperamental, vainglorious, haughty and choleric. Swift changes in mood, anti-establishment tendencies, persistence of a smouldering anger indicates deep gorges in their mental topography orchestrated by the changes in the socio-economic scenario. This in conjunction with their physical strain disrupted the proceedings of their life in making incomprehensible alterations. True, they desired individual liberty, freedom of choice and prosperity. But unification extracted a heavy price for those in segregating them from their family and friends, on many occasions compelling to drop out of education, providing no fixed training for the young by which they could secure work in the labour market. Again, in many instances, even if the new Federal state had come up with programmes to engage the youth was in most cases not complemented by any

guarantee of job whatsoever. The initial years of the unification witnessed such haranguing situations where hordes of youth stomped about the various cities and towns of Germany irrespective of their regional origin) spreading disturbance and violence in utter despondency over the prevalent conditions. The ambience was also un conducive for the adoption of state policies given the paucity of funds in the wake of economic decline. The huge transfer of funds to the east made the new state financially weak to handle the multiple social indiscipline.

The care and nurture that the youth continued to receive in the former GDR was phenomenal in maintaining their physio-mental balance. Particular programmes for the youth aimed at providing job-oriented education so as to integrate them into the employment sector. Together with the endowments bestowed upon the parents to take care of their offspring converted the energies of the young population toward a constructive goal. Their enthusiasm, positivity and brightness turned them into productive assets of the state. One could very well say an investment well made! Whatever the case may be, pragmatically looking at the organization of the things one could easily surmise the amount of time and energy invested by the authorities on the juveniles and the young adults to bring the best out of them. Those generational reminiscences prevailed during the time of unification creating conflict in the minds of not only the youth but also of their parents who not much back had a completely different experience as adolescents. On many occasions of family talks they shared those with their children thus ingratiating on their minds a picture of an ideal youth which was mangled by the unification. The ensuing physical hardship in the struggle to gain a foothold in those shifting grounds and the mental agony of realizing the crumbling down of the avenues which could have paved the way to success in a much easier way engendered an unaccounted frenzy. In most cases, curried with a host of grievances, this entire bandwagon of despair was targeted toward the foreign population who suffered brutalities in their hands. The state promptly charted policies and laws to safeguard them from such untoward violence but in reality, could do very little in staving off the recurrence of such incidents.

In this context, the doctrines of the right-wing, far-right and neo-Nazism has been discussed which had a history of intolerance toward the foreign population. The protagonists had the stated objective of creating a pure German state in flushing out the mal elements from the terrain. Every individual other than a German was seen as an

enemy of the nation having the potential to spoil the sanctity of the race thereby, profaning the sacredness of the state. Hence, they took extreme measures to obliterate all those non-Germans to uphold the supremacy of the race and the uniqueness of the state. Floating in the vacuum of aimless despair, the juveniles and the young adults of east Germany were easily brainwashed by the rightists into funnelling their grief and anger toward the foreigners. It served for those groups the dual purpose of gaining the confidence of the Germans in protecting the ecology of the race from any possible contamination and the opportunity to oversee the entrenchment of the nation's superiority in the neighbourhood. While for the rudderless ship of the youth, floating aimlessly in the huge ocean of life suddenly a land of purpose was discovered which gave them both a focus and an agenda to live on with. This led to the genesis of a subculture of hatred and violence which raised its ugly head through a number of groups, operating on both the regions of the country. Though not rampant, it was dangerous enough to cause a concern to the authority and apprehension in the hearts of the immigrant population. Derided of any acceptable logic, these events of intermittent violence spliced through the much trumpeted cult of multiculturalism to publicize unrepentantly the dictums of nationalism. Intermittent in nature, such acts of violence until recently, kept occurring despite the attempts of the state to dissuade the young population in trudging along the path of ferocity. The various policies of involving the young adults in workshops on ethnic tolerance and cultural amity, providing education and early vocational training to engage them in the labour market, encouraging parents to guide their wards in professing the values of co-existence in disbursing definite financial packages to that end proved to be insufficient in casting-off the recurrence of such events. As has been discussed, there is more than what meet the eyes in a sense that one needs to question the innate tendencies of a particular ethnic community. The unapologetic behaviour of a segment of the people cutting across age, in holding Russia to be responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War, protesting openly in the streets of Berlin against the commemoration of the World War II which in their opinion led to the brutal division of the country could not be boiled down to the inadequacy of some of the social and economic conditions in the wake of the unification. Not only in the east of Germany, but also in various parts of the west, the steady occurrence of such violence indicates the incorrigibly inherent tendencies of the young population (as also of the populace in general) to purge the country of non-Germans who were considered

as the images of evil roaming about the land to engulf the *Zeitgeist*¹⁰⁵ (Spirit of the Age/Time). The role of publicity apart, it seems to persist in the general psyche of the people manifesting through a plethora of savage incidents emitting signals of caution to such others as the self-proclaimed vanguards of the nation. They were, as if, out on a constant vigil to keep their nation unadulterated from a host of possible contaminations daily moving all over their land. It is a kind of a paranoid, an angst, a disease which to some extent might have been ingratiated in the DNA finding conducive expression through the activities of the youth.

However, every noumenon¹⁰⁶ is manifested in a duality enveloping the attributes of the causality. Here, violence should be seen in conjunction with the intensity, hatred in the company of purpose, propaganda in the interest of power and torture as the promulgation of the rule. The discussion has been made in taking into consideration a number of social, economic and psychological factors linked inextricably, in determining the behaviour of the juveniles and the young adults. There still remains a streak of impatience and anger amongst employed youth also not deprived of parental care and/or has not faced the hardships of unification. Herein comes the factor of generational proclivities employed to enlighten the inexplicable, to comprehend the discrete and to surmise the immeasurable. Alongside, the initiatives taken by the government and various other organizations in stemming the prevalence of racial violence also speaks volumes in favour of the variegated nature of the social ambience emitting a fragrance of ethnic harmony and the music of tolerance. In juxtaposition with the multiculturalism the cult of post-modern existence also prevails in making the people transcend the parochial frontiers of ethnicity and territory to an unhinged domain of vastness. A significant decline in acts of hatred is proof enough of the constructive efforts of governmental and non-governmental institutions striving relentlessly to keep things under check. Dissection of the activities registers a gradual decline, but not a complete disappearance of such acts. Undercurrents and the discrete workings of the mind is beyond the realm of the institutional regimen which fails to nip in the bud the birth of such thoughts translating itself into incidence of brutalities. The discussion on

¹⁰⁵ It denotes a definite set of practices and ideals which goes on to motivate a particular segment of people at a particular time. Mostly, it becomes the dominant feature of the community who then follows its dictums.

¹⁰⁶ The overall accumulation of experience through perception which entails observation and analysis to deduce the loopholes of a particular practice.

the participation of the youth takes into account all these negotiating factors creating an impression on their attitudes, behaviours and mentalities making them commit unacceptable acts of remorse.

This dissertation conglomerates the social and cultural aspects of the east Germans in the wake of unification (and/or reunification, used synonymously in the text), in an endeavour to assess the impact when the two parts geo-spatially became an integral whole. Hence, it negotiated the general issues of identity, culture, demography and economy and went onto engage the particular segments of the condition of the women, family structure and the youth. It deconstructed a plethora of variables to bring out the underlying unity of the theme. In the process, it vivisected the constituent elements deliberating an overview of the entire environment. For a quarter of a century, reunited Germany had and is still, adroitly guarding its unity in the sufficient belief of answering the German question which tormented their minds across generations. Apart from feeling a magnetic pull for the *Volk*¹⁰⁷, they employed the tools of post-modernity and multiculturalism to institutionally surrender the narrow tendencies of remaining anchored to the terrain. Magnifying its spirit of unity with that of the Continent of Europe as well as the West, they have maintained their image of a reformed nation sincerely apologetic and diligently committed toward the prevention of any kind of violence with whatever measures possible. Peeping into the internal arteries of the nation, one comes across some sections of inflammation which though definitely under treatment shows dogged signs of persistence. Women of the east too, have found a foothold living and working under minimum stress with families becoming the kernel of social amicability mixing the values of togetherness into the juice of individualization. Foreigners still regard it as the most favoured destination and more so in face of the increasing parity in productivity, wage and elasticity of job between the east and the west. This has led to an overall exponential economic growth making it one of the richest countries in the world. The participation of youth in violent activities has also considerably plummeted with they becoming more goal-oriented and responsible in navigating liberty. All these said, a thorough survey reveals the assiduity of complications plaguing the convalescence of reunited Germany.

¹⁰⁷ It is a German word which means an ethnic group. In this context, it speaks about the degree of affinity present among them in comparison to other such groups residing in their land.

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