

**THE KASHMIR FACTOR IN US-INDIA RELATION: A
STUDY OF BUSH AND OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONS**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
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VIJAY KUMAR



United States Studies Programme
Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi 110067

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**The Kashmir factor in US-India relation: A Study of Bush and Obama Administrations**" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

Vijay Kumar

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Abdul Nafey

Chairperson, CCUS&LAS

Prof. Christopher S. Raj

Supervisor

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JNU, New Delhi

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Abbreviations

AfPak	Afghanistan Pakistan
CCS	Cabinet Committee on Security
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
FMCT	Fissile Material Control Treaty
G-8	Group of Eight
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LOC	Line of Control
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSG	Nuclear Supplier Group
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
9/11	September 11, 2011 attacks
26/11	November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks

Chapter-1

Introduction

The proposed dissertation is focussing on America's policy towards Kashmir during Bush and Obama administration. The topic significant is primarily because Kashmir is constantly under terrorism subversion supported by Pakistan. The Junior Bush administration comes out openly on war against terrorism. Whether this policy has a bearing US policy on Kashmir. Otherwise Kashmir has been a major bone of contention between India and Pakistan, later challenging India on matters of Kashmir accession to India ever since partition of Pakistan has taken place in 1947 of erstwhile British India.

After the end of cold war in 1945 decolonisation process started rapidly. India got freedom from the bondage of Britain after a very long struggle for independence on 15th of August 1947. But independence came on the condition of partition of India. India got divided into two separate States on the basis of "Two Nation Theory". At the time of independence there were more than 500 princely states in India; according to Lord Mountbatten last viceroy of India they could merge either with India or Pakistan. Kashmir was one among the few states who wanted to remain independent by not joining any state. Soon after independence tribal and Pakistani regular Army in the outfit of tribal invaded the state of Jammu & Kashmir then Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India on 26th of October 1947. As a result of which Indian Army took charge and stopped insurgents and India approached UN in January 1948 against Pakistan's invasion. By then one third of territory was occupied by Pakistan

United Nation Security Council in its resolution 47 called for (a) Removal of all forces including Pakistan occupied Kashmir(POK) from state except for some Indian force to maintain law and order and (b) A plebiscite to be conducted to decide the fate of the state. Both the states did not put resolution into practice and as days passed by dispute deepened. Since then both the countries have fought three wars against each other and two directly over Kashmir issue i.e. 1965 and 1999, which caused huge loss of life and

property from both the sides. During 1971 war, though it was not fought directly on Kashmir issue but ceasefire agreement and Shimla Pact clearly defines that Kashmir issue is to be solve bilaterally. Both the sides are accusing each other; India affirmed that Kashmir lawfully acceded to India while Pakistan alleging fraudulently.

For United States Kashmir is very important issue in South Asia, earlier it was because of cold war politics and now because of nuclear proliferation and Islamic terrorism. United States policy towards Kashmir has not been static. It has been changing US Stance since 1947 according to the time and situation. Often US presents Kashmir problem as Human Rights issue, threat to international security and more explicitly explaining ever since India and Pakistan became nuclear power in 1998. All these US perception on Kashmir problem had a major review ever since 9/11 terrorist attack on US.

As US assumes itself leader of the free world, protector and promoter of Democracy, it has shown great interest in Kashmir issue, US is considered most important third party in the dispute. India got independence and cold war started at the same time so during cold war time US has seen Kashmir dispute through the lens of cold war, India being the leader of non-align movement and its tilt towards former USSR made Pakistan closer to US and became major Non-NATO ally that shaped US policies towards Kashmir unfavourable to India and somehow anti-India. During 1971 war US threatened India and sent its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into Bay of Bengal and even asked Iran and Jordan to send its fighter aircraft to help Pakistan. Cold war ended in 1991, post-cold war India adopted liberal economy and free trade started, which improved US-India economic relation. Before 9/11 it was not even ready to accept terrorism in Kashmir, now they accept Pakistan sponsored terrorism in J&K.

Today relation between US and India is cordial, now things have changed, there is no cold war rivalry, India has opened its market, it is one of the fastest growing economies with huge market potential and its maturity as a responsible nuclear powered nation has brought US and India more close than ever before. Today, US-India bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectorial, covering trade and investment, defence and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health.

Vibrant people to people interaction and support across the political spectrum in both countries nurture our bilateral relationship.

US has tried hard to solve Kashmir issue seriously using all the possible measures like unilateral initiatives, bilateral initiatives with Britain and even multilateral initiatives with the help of United Nations.

Instead of having so close ties and partner in many fields US has not been able to come forward and speak clearly on Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir which their intelligence agencies reports frequently and the whole world agree on it. No serious pressure has been put on Pakistan from US side to stop sponsoring of terrorism in Kashmir.

Thematic literature review

While the proposed research with background provide a narrative on the US pattern of shift from anti-India to neutral position on the most difficult problem of South Asia the focus would be to understand why and how American postponing resolving the Kashmir problem at a time when the Indo-US relation are so-called natural partner and defining partnership for Bush and Obama. Despite US involvement over more than six decades of Kashmir problem is still unresolved; what are the reasons for its failure and what challenges it holds for United States?

Howard B Schaffer in “The limits of influence: America’s role in Kashmir”, argues that US is the most important outside party to the Kashmir dispute and has been involved since the beginning of issue. US diplomacy has fluctuated between engagements and keeping itself away. Since the outbreak of extreme violence and insurgency in 1989, has soured Indo-Pak relation and has brought both the state on the verge of nuclear conflict. The conflict has resulted in direct confrontation many times

How dangerous is the dispute?

Kashmir is one of the most difficult disputes of world to solve; it has consumed thousands of lives and property. The conflict has resulted in arms race in South Asia and has brought South Asia on nuclear flashpoint. The conflict has resulted in confrontation three times directly except numbers of skirmish leaving hundred's dead. Both the states are nuclear powered leaving the dispute most dangerous for the peace and security of world and South Asia in particular. After attack on Indian parliament in December 2001 and Kashmir assembly both the states maneuverer their huge Army along the border resulting high tension and fear of nuclear conflict. According to Indian authorities the attack was planned by ISI inside of Pakistan and attack was accomplished by terrorists based in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities has always been denying and saying they were freedom fighters.

Robert Wirsing in 'Kashmir In The Shadow Of War' examines the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir as this long-standing confrontation between regional rivals became inflamed. It focuses on the period from the effective nuclearisation of the dispute in 1998 to the introduction of U.S. troops into the region in connection with the war in Afghanistan. He takes on key problems illustrated by this case: Regional rivalry, Intervention, Religious conflicts, Conflict resolution. The author is an advocate of international intervention in regional conflicts and does not think that leaving the contesting parties to settle their dispute (a sort of benign neglect) is a responsible U.S. policy.

Why conflict has been continuing despite several attempts?

Sumit Ganguly in his book, "The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and prospect" has rightly pointed out few bilateral conflicts has proven as resistant to resolution to Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The basic structure of States of South Asia is reason behind it. India, which had been created as a civic polity, initially sought to hold on to this Muslim-majority state to demonstrate its secular credentials. Pakistan, in turn, had laid claim to Kashmir because it had been created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. After the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 the Pakistani irredentist claim to Kashmir lost substantial ground. If Pakistan could not cohere on the basis of religion alone it had few moral claims on its co-religionists in Kashmir. Similarly, in the 1980s, as the practice

of Indian secularism was eroded, India's claim PDF to Kashmir on the grounds of secularism largely came apart. Today their respective claims to Kashmir are mostly on the basis of statecraft. This title provides a comprehensive assessment of a number of different facets of the on-going dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Among other matters, it examines the respective endgames of both states, the evolution of American policy toward the dispute, the dangers of nuclear escalation in the region and the state of the insurgency in the Kashmir.

Joseph Korbel in his book "Danger in Kashmir" argues that the roots of the long-term Kashmir "problem," including details of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan that emerged with the 1947 partition of British India. Before 1947 Kashmir was a Muslim-majority "Princely State" ruled by a non-Muslim dynasty. The "two-nation theory" of Pakistan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah claimed separate sovereignty for Muslim majority areas and the inherent justice of Kashmir becoming part of an independent Pakistan. The "theory of secularism", advanced by India and Jawaharlal Nehru asserted that all subjects of South Asia, Hindu and Muslim, had equal constitutional protections in an independent India. To Nehru the "accession" of princely Kashmir to India after partition was valid to the point of being emblematic of India's modernist identity.

Kanishkan Sathasivam in his book 'Uneasy Neighbours' analyse the characteristics a demographic, social-cultural, political, economic and military are primary actors that are party to the conflict: the sovereign states of India and Pakistan and the territory of Kashmir. It explains the history of US policy toward India and Pakistan as individual countries as well as US policy toward the conflict between them, particularly in light of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 and events since September 11, 2001. It also describes and analyzes the involvement of three other major extra-regional actors.

Amit Gupta in his book "Kashmir: Recent Developments and US Concerns", points out that for the United States, the issue with Kashmir is how to prevent an all-out war between India and Pakistan while concurrently maintaining Indian and Pakistani cooperation in the anti-terror campaign and keeping bilateral relations with the two nations on an improving trend. The United States also is interested in preventing the conflict from escalating into a nuclear exchange and ensuring that nuclear weapon related

material in South Asia not be obtained by terrorists or other organizations that would be contrary to non-proliferation efforts. For the long-term, the United States seeks a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem while at the same time attempting to avoid creating a sanctuary for extremist Islamic militants.

Selig S Harrison in “India’s Bottom Line” says that the policy action for US should be to reduce tension between India and Pakistan to encourage peace and dialogue, promote confidence building measures and help to reduce terrorism in region.

Subhash Kapila in “United States Obsession with the Kashmir issue: An Analysis”, argues that US stand on Kashmir has been influenced by Cold war politics in the past and Pakistan being major Non-NATO ally and its dependent on Pakistan to achieve its goal. In the last fifty years, the United States has applied different labels to the Kashmir issue from ‘self- determination’ to ‘aspiration of the Kashmiri people’ to being ‘a nuclear flash-point’ endangering international security’. The constantly changing stand of the United States is reflective of the fact that the United States stand on the Kashmir issue is flexible and can be said to be dependent on two factors at a given point in time: (1) Tenor of India-United States relations and; (2) The strategic utility of Pakistan for any intended United States strategic moves in South West Asia.

The US approach today is to deal both countries separately.

US is not in condition to let attention diverted from war against terrorism, so to appease India president Junior Bush himself announced a ban on Lashkar-e Taiba on 21st December 2001 and after on praised Pakistan’s president steps against militancy. In an attempt to reduce tension, US Foreign Secretary Colin Powell visited the two countries in January 2002. The US urged both the sides to reduce tension and said it will continue to play no role in resolution of Kashmir dispute. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also visited India and Pakistan in 2002 and said that US had had discussion with India “about the need to be balanced and measured” while US-Pakistan discussion focused on “additionally on the need to stop cross border terrorism and on the need for far-reaching reforms to purge Pakistan of extremism and terrorism”.

No longer the US leaders echo President Clinton's assertion at the United Nations General Assembly annual session in September 1993: 'As we marvel at this era's promise of new peace, we must also recognize the serious threats that remain. Bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars rage from Angola, Caucasus to Kashmir'. Ershad Mahmud in 'Post Cold War US Kashmir Policy' points out that the mood in Islamabad was upbeat after the speech while India was annoyed by Clinton's reference to Kashmir as a 'major trouble spot'. Referring to the Indian criticism, the then US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael not only defended her President's comments but also went a step ahead, saying, 'It was meant to say, we see Kashmir on radar screen along with Yugoslavia and Somalia and lots of other places in the former Soviet Union, Georgia, where there is civil conflict going on. We cannot easily overlook it, and there is a message in that'.

Clinton himself had changed his tune in the following year and omitted mention of Kashmir in his speech at the same venue but President Bush and President Obama, as Amit Gupta has said in 'Kashmir: Recent Developments and US Concerns', are saddled with new and dangerous realities confronting their own country and people.

Dilemma of US, Active involvement or staying away

Daniel Markey in 'How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia', argues, 'There is little doubt that normalized relations between India and Pakistan, including a regionally acceptable settlement on Kashmir, would offer tremendous benefits to the United States. Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states toe-to-toe; they distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil; and they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India's activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for Washington's ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by terrorist groups in South Asia'.

Daniel Markey in 'No Exit From Pakistan' book tells the story of the tragic and often tormented relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan's internal troubles have already threatened U.S. security and international peace, and Pakistan's

rapidly growing population, nuclear arsenal, and relationships with China and India will continue to force it upon America's geostrategic map in new and important ways over the coming decades. It concludes with three options for future U.S. strategy, described as defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation. The book explains how Washington can prepare for the worst, aim for the best, and avoid past mistakes.

Howard B. Schaffer in 'The limits of influence: America's role in Kashmir', contends, 'The unsettled Kashmir dispute poses a potentially serious threat to the expanding interests the United States now has in South Asia. Any conflict between India and Pakistan sparked by the dispute could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. Pakistan's critical role since September 11, 2001, in shaping the future of Afghanistan has given the issue a further major dimension. The traditional focus of the Pakistan armed forces on combating a perceived threat from India and the continuing patronage that Pakistani intelligence agencies provide to Islamic extremists in Kashmir make it more difficult, both politically and militarily, for Islamabad to help the United States and its coalition partners combat the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These factors also heighten Pakistan's own problems in contending with domestic extremists. Pakistani support for armed insurgents in Kashmir contributes significantly to tension with India and heightens Indian suspicion that Islamabad is responsible for perpetrating violence within India proper. And until a settlement is reached, there will be no dearth of 'spoilers' eager for opportunities to inflame India-Pakistan relations'.

Should the US stay away?

C. Raja Mohan says yes. In 'Barack Obama's Kashmir thesis', Raja Mohan is of the opinion that the many direct US interventions in Kashmir over the last six decades were not only unsuccessful but also prevented the construction of sustainable ties with India. New Delhi saw Washington's Kashmir interest as part of a broader tilt toward Pakistan that began in the early years of the Cold War. He says, 'If Kashmir has been at the heart of India's accumulated distrust of the United States, the Bush administration chose to ignore the issue as it tried to build a strategic partnership with India. Paradoxically, it was

precisely during this period of American neglect that India and Pakistan made the biggest progress on resolving their conflict over Kashmir’.

From 2003-2007, Delhi and Islamabad unveiled many confidence-building measures in Kashmir for the first time since the partition of the subcontinent. Leaders on both sides of the LoC negotiated, through an official back channel, the framework of a political settlement on Kashmir. The talks, however, were stalled due to internal instability in Pakistan and the renewal of terror attacks on India like 26/11.

Joshua Gross considers US ‘non-involvement’ in the Kashmir dispute as a serious American foreign policy disaster. In ‘The forgotten front’ Joshua argues that ‘hands off’ approach ensures the prolongation of a perilous status quo. A perpetually unstable South Asia flooded with jihadi groups, with two combustible nuclear powers, undermines US national security. Joshua points out, ‘In his attempt to defuse the 1999 Kargil crisis -- the last time Pakistan and India were eyeball-to-eyeball with their fingers on the nuclear button -- President Clinton talked down then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by promising to take a personal interest in the Kashmir dispute. Now is the time for another visionary US leader to live up to that oft-broken promise’, Joshua hopes.

Daniel Markey in ‘How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia’ has another view. He opines, ‘Yet in spite of its central strategic importance, the United States is not well positioned to tackle the Kashmir issue. Washington should not seek to insert itself in the diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi or to press publicly for concessions from either side. These moves would backfire, since Indian and Pakistani leaders can ill-afford to appear to their domestic audiences as if they are caving to US pressure over an issue as sensitive as Kashmir. Moreover, the recent history of back-channel dealings between Islamabad and New Delhi suggests that the basic contours of a Kashmir settlement are already well-known to both sides; no need for Washington to reinvent the wheel’.

Howard B. Schaffer taking middle-of-road approach initially goes on to offer a solution. He points out, ‘If Washington does find a propitious opportunity to play a more active role, the settlement it promotes should call for making the Line of Control a permanent

border that is porous; autonomy for Kashmiris on both sides; and joint institutions on an all-Kashmir basis'. But he cautions that, 'Washington should look for opportunities to play a more active role in helping resolve the dispute while recognizing that this won't be easy. These opportunities will arise only when there are strong governments in both countries willing and able to make the difficult concessions necessary for a settlement. And before the United States becomes more involved, India-Pakistan relations must improve from their present dismal state'. Any eventual US diplomatic involvement should be unobtrusive and avoid fanfare.

Sumit Ganguly in 'Avoiding war in Kashmir' foresees a wider conflict. He argues, 'The United States also needs to consider the possibility that an Indo-Pakistani conflict may not remain confined to the subcontinent. Though the possibility of direct Arab intervention is remote, small but significant support may come from the more conservative members of the Arab world. Their support could prolong and spread the conflict to the Middle East, leading to the prospect of a much wider war. Given the easing of East-West tensions, it is imperative that the United States devote comparable attention to the avoidance of a potential Indo-Pakistani conflict and that both India and Pakistan work toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict'.

Arvind Acharya in 'Kargil and New Power Equations in South Asia' points out that it was the Kargil conflict that threw open a number of issues for both India and Pakistan to ponder. From total opposition to external involvement, India veered towards soliciting active international support for its stand on Kashmir. It also gave the subcontinent rivals an opportunity to abhor fixed ideas about the immutability of US Pakistan, US-China and China Pakistan relationships. It was a bitter travesty for those who rationalised Indian nuclear tests citing Chinese threat. The expectation post Kargil, had been in identifying New Delhi's interests with improvements in and normalisation of relations with Washington and Beijing respectively. Kargil also put Kashmir on the world map. As long as India and Pakistan retain nuclear weapons, they can no longer cite bilateralism to resist international attention on Kashmir.

Moreover, as C. Raja Mohan argues manoeuvring Indo-Pak relations will be an inevitable and important component of American plans. Whether India likes it or not,

Washington will devote substantive diplomatic energies towards the subcontinent, and New Delhi can be drawn into this dynamic. The US may find Kashmir handy for the purpose given its turbulent past and a section of its people's pronounced anti-India sentiment.

Definition, Rationale, Objectives and Scope of Study

The proposed study seeks to examine history of US involvement in Kashmir issue particularly after 9/11 attack on America and December 13, 2001 attack on Indian parliament. Since the beginning of Kashmir conflict US is most important outside party to the conflict. Despite of US involvement for more than six decades Kashmir problem is still unresolved, what are the reasons for its failure and what challenges it holds for United States is to be discussed.

The US stand on Kashmir is static now but it was not so earlier, it was somehow tilted towards Pakistan during cold war times and even till the 9/11. So factors responsible for change in US stand would be examined.

Another important aspect of study will focus on US failure to pressurise Pakistan on ground of terrorism. It is well accepted in American administration that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and even their intelligence report confirms it but US has not been able to pressure Pakistan. During Bush (junior) tenure relationship between India and US was most cordial in the history but even junior Bush failed to pressure Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in India.

The study will also examine that how much Kashmir matters for the US in securing its desired foreign policy goals in Asia. How Kashmir dispute is affecting the US on war against terrorism will also be examined.

The time frame of the research will be 2001 to 2015 which includes two presidencies, Bush (junior) administration and Obama Administration.

Research Methodology

Even though the research paper seeks to examine the American approach towards Kashmir problem from 2001 to 2015, it will be historically placed. The history of American intervention in the Kashmir conflict from 1947 until present and its nuances would form the context in which the dissertation would be sited.

It would seek to explain the changing contours of American foreign policy towards the Kashmir imbroglio and overall India-Pakistan relations and study its determinants, objectives, successes and failures, thus the thesis would not just be factual but also explanatory.

Thesis would be descriptive and analytical. It would try to analyse how the longstanding Kashmir dispute has put a major foreign policy challenge to the world's super power. Kargil conflict would be the benchmark, when the American approach towards Kashmir changed.

The sources used would be both primary such as speeches of the heads of states and governments and secondary literature like relevant books and articles from journals and newspapers will be consulted.

All sources would be perused through a neutral lens. Effort will be made to ensure that the sources referred would be from as many diverse political and ideological perspectives as possible so that the thesis could be empirical and scientific to the largest extent possible. It would be both quantitatively and qualitatively analysed. Libraries such as the American Library, the British Council Library, Institute of Defence and Strategic Analyses Library and the Jawaharlal Nehru University Central Library would be searched to collect all the relevant sources and information.

My research work would be focussed towards answering the research questions raised in the thesis and negating or upholding the stated hypotheses related to the research problem.

Research Objectives

- To understand the policy shift on Kashmir.
- To understand difference between Bush and Obama Administration.
- To find out the reason of US failure in putting pressure on Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir.
- To examine US seriousness in solving dispute.

Research Questions

- What are the reasons for shift in US foreign policy towards Kashmir?
- Why has the US failed to pressurise Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir?
- What are the basic differences between Bush and Obama policy on Kashmir?
- How US is serious to resolve Kashmir issue?

Research Hypothesis

- US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan shaped its approach towards Kashmir issue.
- The Obama Administration focussed more on enhancing bilateral relations with India than on old remaining the Kashmir Question.

This dissertation will be answering these questions and will examine the hypothesis

Chapter-2

An overview of US approach to Kashmir issue

The second chapter illustrates the nature of US involvement on the Kashmir issue. It is a historical narrative that traces the roots of America's involvement and also focuses upon the rationale for such involvement. International politics has had its profound impact on how Kashmir has been perceived by the United States. The United States has been changing perception of Kashmir issue depending on the power politics being played by armed chaired leaders around the world.

Kashmir has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan since the two nations got independence from the British rule. It can also be said that similar to the case to Israel and Palestine. The British government divided the once united Hindustan in a manner that made the problem a persistent issue that has not been solved till date and remains a cause for not only political tension between the India and Pakistan but also is a cause of social and psychological alienation between these two countries which were once a part of a single United Nation.

The role of United States on the Kashmir issue has evolved and changed over the years depending on the overall power politics of the world. In other words, the international politics has had its ramification on Kashmir where the power blocs have used it to garner support for themselves and strengthen their own blocs. Here, it should be remembered that both India and Pakistan achieved independence during the early phase of the cold war and henceforth the fight for the legitimate claim over the Kashmir valley was not limited to the two countries, that is, India and Pakistan but became a part of cold war politics where both the USSR and America placed it through the lens of cold war politics.

The Kashmir issue has been perceived by India and the United States of America differently. To the newly independent nation of the Republic of India, the state of Kashmir symbolized the nation's unity and integrity. It was a question of India's sovereignty. To the United States of America, it was nothing more than a power play. In a bid to have more allies and increase its power and influence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union,

siding with Pakistan in its claim over Kashmir was a political calculation whereby America won another Asian country by its side, gaining another ally in the far off continent of Asia.

Kashmir –its location and geo-political significance

The Kashmir valley represents one of the most magnificent creations of Mother Nature. its beauty in aptly penned by poet Waseem A Malla, 'Far away in an unknown corner,/ God has carved with His own hand,/Valleys that sink and mountains that do tower, /Kashmir: a holy, spiritual and a sacred land'.¹ Emperor Jahangir while expressing the beauty of Kashmir said, 'If there is any heaven on earth, it's here, it's here, it's here'.²

The state lies in the north-western Himalayan range and is rich in temperate flora and fauna. The Kashmir valley situated between the mighty Pir Panjal range and the Zaskar range has the beautiful Jhelum rives flowing by the beautiful snow-capped mountains.³ The valley has attracted travelers since hundreds of years and its natural and scenic beauty is beyond comparison. The snow-clad mountains, green valleys, beautiful lakes and its grandeur attracts people from all over the world. Also known as the 'paradise on earth' its beauty and aura seem to be cursed by bullets and blood. In order to analyze the strategic importance of the Kashmir valley it is important to understand its geo-political location. For this purpose the study Kashmir by taking into account the map of India is essential.

¹ Mallah, Waseem (2012), *A Piper Of The Holy Land: Kashmir*,
<http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/piper-of-the-holy-land-kashmir/>

² <http://www.comradeinn.com/kashmir.html>

³ <http://koausa.org/geography/doc/geography.pdf>



From the map of India, it can easily be understood that the state of Jammu and Kashmir forms the crown of India. The Kashmir valley is the biggest valley in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and is spread over an area of 105 square kilometer. It is approximately 1730 m above sea level.⁴ Geographically, the exact location of Jammu and Kashmir is between 32.17" and 36.58" North altitude and East to West, the State lies between 73.26" and 80.30" longitude (Raina 2002). The state of Jammu and Kashmir shares international border with Tibet, Pakistan, China, and Russia. Then it is quite evident that such a strategic location makes the security of Kashmir valley an important part of India's strategic, political and diplomatic calculations. Again, a number of passes are situated in between the mighty mountains that have facilitated the migration of thousands of people since centuries. Some of the passes that have geo-strategic important are Zojilla pass, Bawalocha pass, Burzil pass, Mahagunas pass, Karakorum pass, Banihal pass, Nubra pass, Kharudangala pass and Changla pass among others. Some of these passes connect India with its neighboring countries and hence are of immense significance.

Therefore, it can be contended that Kashmir is significant to both India and Pakistan due to its strategic geographical location and water resources. The Kashmir valley provides direct access to the People's Republic of China on the north eastern side, Afghanistan and Turkestan on the north western side, and both India and Pakistan on the south. Not only this, the Valley is the lifeline to Pakistan since all the major rivers of Islamabad have their headwaters in Kashmir, mostly the region which is known as Azad (Pakistani occupied) Kashmir is significant since its control means the control over the major rivers (Pan 1998).

⁴ <http://www.bharatonline.com/kashmir/travel-tips/location.html>

Kashmir- The Historical Root

Kashmir had been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan since independence. However, the problem has its source in the bitter history of how the two countries gained independence and the hasty and unplanned way in which international borders were drawn between them. Here it should be remembered that the partition of the India and Pakistan and the drawing of the international boundaries between these two countries, is in itself one of the vital causes of the rising tension and political turmoil in Kashmir. The history of partition was written in the blood and cry of the thousands of innocent lives that were sacrificed in the name of partition. That psychological trauma of which is haunts the lives of the inhabitants of both these nations still now, was the creation of the political game of partition played by the British Crown making not only the two newly independent nation states bitter enemies but also sowing the seeds of hatred in the minds of the people for decades to come.

The Indian subcontinent during the time of British rule was divided into two broad segments, namely, those who were under the direct rule of the British Crown, that is, those states which directly formed a part of British India and the second those who were under the tutelage of the Her Majesty, the Queen. These states, better known as the 'princely states' were ruled by Maharaja, who in turn was under the British Crown and officially recognized Her Majesty, the Queen as the supreme and paramount power in the Indian subcontinent (Blank et al. 2003).

The British crown had 565 princely states, the total area comprising the two-fifth of India and a population of about 99 million people under her tutelage the fate of who were left to be decided during the partition of Indian subcontinent⁵. The Maharajas of these princely states has two options before them, either to join India or Pakistan.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one such princely state. The situation in Kashmir was quite precarious and different than other princely states. The states was

⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm

predominantly and Muslim majority state whereas the ruler of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh was a Hindu ruler. Hence there was a dilemma regarding which side to join especially when the whole division was a part of 'two nation theory' that is, on religious grounds. The Maharaja of Kashmir, faced with such crucial circumstances and dilemma decided to join neither India nor Pakistan and remain independent. He signed an agreement with Pakistan where by normal trade, travel, communication and other such activities would remain uninterrupted.

However, circumstances by late October made the situation difficult for Maharaja Hari Singh to continue to remain neutral. In the October of 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province invaded Kashmir. Within few weeks the situation became tensed and there were increased insurgency backed by the Pakistani government. Maharaja Hari Singh unable to control the situation pledged an urgent need of military help from India and subsequently signed the instrument of accession on October 26, 1947. The next day the Indian army became airlifting troops and finally succeeded in controlling the insurgency.⁶

What followed thereafter made the relationship between the two nations worse with international actors getting involved in a local conflict. The Kashmir dispute was referred to the United Nations. India charged that Pakistan had invaded its territory illegally given that Kashmir had already acceded to India whereas Pakistan alleged that India had gained Kashmir's accession by fraudulent means. In 1948, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 47 calling for the removal of all outside military forces from Kashmir and for a subsequent plebiscite to decide the state's political prospect. United Nation Security Council in its resolution 47 called for (a) Removal of all forces including Pakistan occupied Kashmir(POK) from state except for some Indian force to maintain law and order and (b) A plebiscite to be conducted to decide the fate of the state. Both the states did not put resolution into practice and as days passed by dispute deepened.⁷ The UN Commission for India and Pakistan confirmed the direct involvement of Pakistani army in the continued political turmoil in the region and called for immediate ceasefire

⁶ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm

⁷ http://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war_peace/confrontation/hkashmir.html

and pressed for the need of a plebiscite to decide the future of Kashmir. The ceasefire finally took place on January 1, 1949 with 65 percent of the territory under the control of the Republic of India and rest went to Pakistan. Since then both the countries have fought three wars against each other and two directly over Kashmir issue i.e. 1965 and 1999, which caused huge loss of life and property from both the sides.

American involvement in the Kashmir issue- the early years

Hence, in the early phase of America's involvement in the Kashmir issue, it can be said that the United States was fraught with miscalculations and often sided with Pakistan, the resultant of which was the rising militancy and terrorist activities in the region. During the early years, America perceived Kashmir through the lens of cold war politics.

The cold war which began between the two victors bloc of the second world was formalized during President Truman's administration. The Truman administration perceived international relations through cold war dynamics. The Truman administration feared that continued conflict in the South Asian region would hamper US interest and strengthen the position of its ideological rival, the Soviet Union, in the region. The rift between India and the United States of America began as America decided to hold a plebiscite irrespective of the fact that Pakistan had captured a part of India's territory. Again, in the signing of the US Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and later Pakistan joining the US-led military alliances South East Asia Treaty Organization and Central Treaty Organization in the early phase of the cold war, that is, 1953-54 was peevish by New Delhi with skepticism. Convinced with the notion that the very idea of the Defense agreement and Treaty with Pakistan was nothing but a part of the overall plan to 'check India's power within the region', India's first prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to one of his ministers: "the United States imagine that by this policy they have completely outflanked India's so-called neutralism and will thus bring

India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen. The first result of all this will be an extreme dislike of the United States in India” (Kux 2002). The new equation between Washington and Islamabad reduced the interest of Pakistan in the plebiscite as a solution to Kashmir crisis. The discussion over the possible solution to the Kashmir issue continued even as Prime Minister Nehru visited Washington in October 1949. While discussing the possible options to end the crisis in the region with President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Prime Minister Nehru maintained his strong stance that United Nations should not engage in debating the merits of the dispute until Pakistan forces withdrew from Kashmir (Indurthy 2005).

The situation became more complex with India declining to cooperate in the plebiscite and despite such the United Nations Security Council still pressing for it. Nothing could be solved since the proposal that UN President General McNaughton of Canada submitted on the recommendation of the UNSC in December 1949 on demilitarization and the plebiscite, was found biased by India calling them as favourable to Pakistan and blaming western pressure. The biased stance of the United States towards Pakistan continued as Dean Acheson continued to urge Nehru’s sister, Vijaylakshmi Pandit (India’s ambassador to the US) to accept the UN proposals on Kashmir issue.

Further in the summer of 1950, talks between Nehru and Liquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, failed, as Nehru rejected the idea of UN control of the valley during the plebiscite. Dixon left the region disappointed and advised the UN to give up on its mediation efforts and let the two countries seek a political solution on their own (Kux 2002). Despite such recommendations, the UNSC did not give up. However, talks also failed during 1951-53 as Nehru did not accept a state-wide plebiscite. Hence the Truman Administration was unable for offer a solution to the Kashmir crisis. To India, the Truman administration was ‘unsympathetic and hostile’ toward India’s position, the Kashmir dispute reached a deadlock.

Dwight D Eisenhower took over as the 34th President of the United States in 1953 and served in office as US president till 1961. The proximity and friendship between Pakistan and the United States of America strengthened during this period as Pakistan in 1954 joined the US-created Baghdad pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). In September of 1954, the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. The purpose of the organization was to prevent communism from gaining ground in the region. Although called the “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,” only two Southeast Asian countries became members.⁸

During this time, some of the decisions undertaken by India was perceived by Washington wrongly which increased tension and mistrust between these two democracies.

India perceived these pacts as threats to its security. In addition, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took a hostile view of the Nehru-led Non-aligned movement, stating that it was an immoral and short-sighted policy. The final blow to talks of peace came when the US decided to provide arms to Pakistan, which India vehemently opposed. India was clearly not in America’s good books because of its non-aligned stand with a tilt towards the Soviet Union.

The cold war intensified during the Kennedy administration who entered White House as the 35th President of the United States of America in 1961. During this time Prime Minister Nehru visited Washington where one of the vital issues of discussion was finding the measures for the peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue.

During the fall of 1962 a chain of events compelled India to compromise its stand on Non-Alignment. On October 20, 1962, the People’s Republic of China launched a shocking and intense attack against India in Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) region. The Indian army faced a devastating assault in the hands of the Chinese soldiers.

⁸ <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato>

In the face of such crisis, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was forced to reverse his Non-alignment policy and sought help from the United States. The Kennedy administration which long wanted to garner the friendship of India for countering Soviet influence in the region grabbed this opportunity and helped India with not only arms and ammunitions but also provided diplomatic and moral support despite Pakistan strong reaction against this.

In the letter to the US counterpart, Pandit Nehru asked for 12 squadrons of US air forces. According to sources, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said, “A minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained,” In to his addition, Nehru also requested “two squadron of B-47 Bombers” to strike in Tibet.⁹

Finally with the declaration of ceasefire by China, the war ended on November 22. The United States used this opportunity to strengthen its non-communist capitalist liberal democratic alliance in the region. The whole motive to US in this game plan was the containment of China and USSR and blocking the way of further expansion of communism. The solution of the Kashmir problem was one of the greatest task in the hands of the big brother that they thought would help Pakistan and India solve their mutual hatred against each other and unite against communist blocs.

To attain this objective a delegation was sent by the United States and Great Britain. The US delegation was led by Ambassador Averell Harriman and the British delegation was headed by Duncan Sanders. The delegations from these two nations that represented the liberal democratic blocs visited India and Pakistan in December 1962 and persuaded Nehru and Ayub Khan to consent to open fresh negotiations on the Kashmir dispute. Their efforts led to six rounds of bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan led by India’s External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfikar

⁹ <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jawaharlal-nehru-sought-us-assistance-during-1962-indo-china-war/>

Ali Bhutto, between December 1962 and May 1963. In the sixth round of talks, India finally refused to shift from its position even as an Anglo-American proposal to divide the Kashmir Valley along the ceasefire line, which Pakistan supported (Ganguly 2001). India's refusal to agree to this proposal was a disappointment to the Kennedy administration.

The Johnson administration, which succeeded Kennedy, nearly withdrew from playing any role in the Kashmir dispute because of America's misadventures in Vietnam. One of the most significant developments during Johnson administration was the renewed escalation of conflicts in the Indo-Pakistan border and resultant of which was the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 of what is better known as Operation Gibraltar.

In the August of 1965 Pakistan sent trained guerrillas into the Kashmir region with hopes of initiating an internal revolt in Kashmir against the Indian government. Tensions increased along the ceasefire line and the resultant was the war between the two nations. In the following months India was able to seize strategic mountain passes and launched massive attacks across the state of Punjab towards the city of Lahore. Witnessing the serious escalation of conflict in the South Asia region, the United Nations Security Council backed by US, Britain and the Soviet Union, called for an immediate ceasefire, which was subsequently acknowledged by India and Pakistan on September 6 (Indurthy 2003).

Later on, in the year's months of 1966, under the initiative of the Soviet Union the Tashkent Declaration was signed by Prime Minister Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. On January 10, hostilities ended after the formalization of the agreement between the two parties and were followed by the withdrawal of the Indo-Pakistani forces to the pre-war ceasefire line. The declaration obligated both parties under the UN charter 'not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means' (Ganguly 2001).

The agreement was brokered by the Soviet Union since the Johnson administration during these years was consumed by radical and unexpected turn of events in Vietnam. America's stance during this time was more or less neutral which pleased neither of the

parties. Further when India protested on the use of American weapons by Pakistan, the United States imposed arms embargo on both nation, thereby equating the victim with the aggressor which angered India.

President Richard Nixon succeeded Johnson in the year 1969 as the 37th president of the United States of America. During his administration which continued from 1969 to 1972, the bone of contention between India and Pakistan was not Kashmir, instead it was East Pakistan which is known an independent country known as Bangladesh. America during this time was clear in its motive of siding and aiding Pakistan which created a rift between Indo- US relations. The United States not only did nothing to stop the ongoing genocide in erstwhile East Pakistan but instead kept blind to all sorts of Pakistani misadventures in the region. The United States declared India as the aggressor and went further to illegally supply arms to Pakistan. However, Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi effective calculations and judicious decisions culminated into the establishment of a separate state of Bangladesh, independent and sovereign in December 1971. This was the greatest win to India since it eliminated an aggressor state along the eastern border of the region and also demonstrated India's power and capability, making it an important power in the region.

While these important developments took place, India and Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement on July 2, 1972 transforming the ceasefire line in Kashmir as the line of control and stipulating the any dispute arising between India and Pakistan whatsoever would be resolved through peaceful means. The Shimla agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan forms an essential landmark in the relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. It was regarded as more than peace treaty and was a 'comprehensive blue print' for maintaining good neighborly relations. Under the Shimla Agreement both the countries undertook to renounce conflict and confrontation between them which had strained good relations in the past, and to work towards the establishment of long-lasting peace, friendship and mutual support. Some of significant principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy:

- 'A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches.

- To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people to people contacts.
- To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, which is a most important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace.¹⁰

Relations between India and the United States improved after President George H. W. Bush took office in the year. It should be remembered that during the years of President George H. W. Bush the cold war was drawing to an end. The withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan reduced the strategic importance of Pakistan but nevertheless the United States continued to maintain strategic relations with Pakistan. In 1989, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto met President George H. W. Bush, the event which was described by many as "golden opportunities"¹¹. In the meeting that followed the Pakistani counterpart urged the United States to provide economic and military aid to Pakistan to containing Soviet influence in the region. However, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1990 to curb Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons. The US State Department also urges Pakistan to maintain and uphold the sanctity of the Shimla Accord and tried to generate good neighborly relations between India and Pakistan. The Washington also warned Pakistan regarding the militancy in the region.

Hence it can be said that during the presidency of George H. W. Bush relations between india and the United States of America took a positive turn. Even as no significant or concrete measures were laid, the groundwork had been built after years of mistrust and miscalculations hammered during the cold war years between these two powerful democracies.

¹⁰ <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972>

¹¹ http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-04/news/mn-2495_1_bhutto-s-visit-soviet-troops-white-house

The relations between the two democracies were finally strengthened during the Presidency of Bill Clinton, though few clash of opinions occurred in the early years.

The Clinton government appointed Rabin Raphel as Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs. Rabin Raphel was pro-Pakistani Diplomat whose comments in the Kashmir issue made New Delhi skeptical of Washington's stance regarding the status of Kashmir. In July, appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Raphel expressed the view that the 'whole of Kashmir was a disputed territory and therefore its final status has yet to be resolved'¹². She further said that the instrument of accession was not acceptable. In light of India's immense criticism to such an 'inappropriate' statement, Rabin Raphel was forced to change her stance and accept the Shimla Agreement as legitimate.

Relations between India and America thereafter took the front seat with the visit of Prime Minister Narashimha Rao to the United States on May 14, 1994, the first Indian Prime minister to do after Rajiv Gandhi.¹³ The visit was crucial since it paved the way for strengthening economic, diplomatic and people to people contact in the post-cold war period where the United States emerged as the super power.

Relations were furthered when in 1995 defense minister William Perry visited South Asia. Washington and New Delhi for the first time signed a defense agreement known as the 'Defense Policy Forum'. This was the major breakthrough between them since the two nations have put behind the grey memories of the cold war and entered into a security agreement which is vital for both the countries. Subsequently, secretary of commerce Ron Brown visited India which opened the doors for American and Indian business to flourish. An agreement was signed by Washington and New Delhi to establish the 'Commerce Forum' which was joint initiative by the entrepreneurs and government departments to further commercial ties between them. this brought about an environment of successful bilateral commercial and economic relations for the years to come.

¹² <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/10/world/us-remarks-over-kashmir-anger-indians.html>

¹³ <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50204>

The new millennium was the dawn of the future of strong friendship between the two democracies. In the march of 2000, the historic event of president bill Clinton mesmerized the whole nation and his six days visit along with wife Hillary, daughter Chelsea, mother-in-law and a huge entourage won the hearts of the people of India who whole heatedly welcomed them to the ancient land of India. It was the proof of strengthening diplomatic ties between India and America. The Clintons, during their stay in India, visited Delhi, Jaipur, Agra & the new cyber capital of India, Hyderabad and then left via Mumbai.¹⁴

President Clinton addressed the Joint Session of Parliament and talked about the dangers of nuclear mishandling and the need to preserve the peace and security of the region.

Clinton's speech had the observation that the United States and India face four challenges. He said that the first challenge was to set the economic relationship right. Secondly, he noted that governments have to deal with the problems of poverty and find ways to encourage global economic growth. In order for this to happen, Clinton said, "we know we must also stand with those struggling for human rights and freedom around the world and in the region." Thirdly, Clinton said that both countries need to deal with managing economic growth to protect the environment and reverse climate change. "Our fourth challenge," said Clinton, "is to protect the gains of democracy and development from the forces which threaten to undermine them."¹⁵

On the question of Kashmir in Clinton's noted that it was a bilateral problem and "Only India and Pakistan can work out the problems"¹⁶

Clinton's visit undoubtedly solidified India's relation with the United States of America. Such a positive turn of relations was due to many factors. Firstly, International politics had changed and the cold war calculations are now significant only in the pages of history and no longer formed a part of strategic calculations. America had emerged as the

¹⁴ http://zeenews.india.com/blog/how-bill-clinton-charmed-india-and-got-charmed-too_752.html

¹⁵ <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/indous/indouspr8.html>

¹⁶ <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/indous/indouspr8.html>

super power and now its prerogative was to maintain its supremacy in the world. International relations had changed and so did the strategic and diplomatic calculations. India and United States has a lot in common. India's power could no longer be denied. Its successful testing of nuclear weapons demonstrated made India's nuclear capability. Again, both these countries have shared values regarding liberal democratic principles and respect for individual rights. Both have a written constitution that upholds the rule of law and democratic rights of the people. Again, the opening up of the Indian economy meant that India now requires effective partnership from the United States to strengthen its economic power both domestic self-sufficiency and in dealings with the outside world. America and India's strong partnership is also required to contain terrorist activities in the South Asian region. All these factors and diplomatic calculations changed the relationship between US and India and made them friends, partners and allies in the 21st century.

Analysis of the Kashmir issue and Indo-US relations in the early years

Kashmir is one of the most difficult disputes of world to solve; it has consumed thousands of lives and property. The conflict has resulted in arms race in South Asia and has brought South Asia on nuclear flashpoint. The conflict has resulted in confrontation three times directly except numbers of skirmish leaving hundreds dead. Both the states are nuclear powered leaving the dispute most dangerous for the peace and security of world and South Asia in particular.

Scholars analyzed the armed conflict between India and Pakistan that emerged with the 1947 partition of British India. Before 1947 Kashmir was a Muslim-majority "Princely State" ruled by a non-Muslim dynasty. The "two-nation theory" of Pakistan and Muhammad Ali Jinnah claimed separate sovereignty for Muslim majority areas and the inherent justice of Kashmir becoming part of an independent Pakistan. The "theory of secularism", advanced by India and Jawaharlal Nehru asserted that all subjects of South Asia, Hindu and Muslim, had equal constitutional protections in an independent India. To

Nehru the "accession" of princely Kashmir to India after partition was valid to the point of being emblematic of India's modernist identity (Korbel 1966).

It has been rightly pointed out that bilateral conflicts have proven as resistant to the resolution of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The basic structure of States of South Asia is reason behind it. India, which had been created as a civic polity, initially sought to hold on to this Muslim-majority state to demonstrate its secular credentials. Pakistan, in turn, had laid claim to Kashmir because it had been created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. After the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 the Pakistani irredentist claim to Kashmir lost substantial ground. If Pakistan could not cohere on the basis of religion alone it had few moral claims on its co-religionists in Kashmir. Similarly, in the 1980s, as the practice of Indian secularism was eroded, India's claim PDF to Kashmir on the grounds of secularism largely came apart. Today their respective claims to Kashmir are mostly on the basis of statecraft. This title provides a comprehensive assessment of a number of different facets of the on-going dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Among other matters, it examines the respective endgames of both states, the evolution of American policy toward the dispute, the dangers of nuclear escalation in the region and the state of the insurgency in the Kashmir (Ganguly 1997).

For United States Kashmir is very important issue in South Asia, earlier it was because of cold war politics and now because of nuclear proliferation and Islamic terrorism. United States policy towards Kashmir has not been static. It has been changing US Stance since 1947 according to the time and situation. Often US presents Kashmir problem as Human Rights issue, threat to international security and more explicitly explaining ever since India and Pakistan became nuclear power in 1998.

As US assumes itself leader of the free world, protector and promoter of Democracy, it has shown great interest in Kashmir issue, US is considered most important third party in the dispute. For United States Kashmir is very important issue in South Asia, earlier it was because of cold war politics and now because of nuclear proliferation and Islamic terrorism. United States policy towards Kashmir has not been static. It has been changing US Stance since 1947 according to the time and situation. Often US presents Kashmir

problem as Human Rights issue, threat to international security and more explicitly explaining ever since India and Pakistan became nuclear power in 1998.

India got independence and cold war started at the same time so during cold war time US has seen Kashmir dispute through the lens of cold war, India being the leader of non-align movement and its tilt towards former USSR made Pakistan closer to US and became major Non-NATO ally that shaped US policies towards Kashmir unfavorable to India and somehow anti-India. During 1971 war US threatened India and sent its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into Bay of Bengal and even asked Iran and Jordan to send its fighter aircraft to help Pakistan. Cold war ended in 1991, post-cold war India adopted liberal economy and free trade started, with on strict measures which resulted in improved US-India economic relation. Before 9/11 it was not even ready to accept terrorism in Kashmir, now they accept Pakistan sponsored terrorism in J&K.

It can be pointed out that for the United States; the issue with Kashmir is how to prevent an all-out war between India and Pakistan while concurrently maintaining Indian and Pakistani cooperation in the anti-terror campaign and keeping bilateral relations with the two nations on an improving trend. The United States also is interested in preventing the conflict from escalating into a nuclear exchange and ensuring that nuclear weapon related material in South Asia not be obtained by terrorists or other organizations that would be contrary to non-proliferation efforts. For the long-term, the United States seeks a permanent solution to the Kashmir problem while at the same time attempting to avoid creating a sanctuary for extremist Islamic militants (Gupta 1966).

Selig S Harrison in “India’s Bottom Line” says that the policy action for US should be to reduce tension between India and Pakistan to encourage peace and dialogue, promote confidence building measures and help to reduce terrorism in region.

It can be argued that US stand on Kashmir has been influenced by Cold war politics in the past and Pakistan being major Non-NATO ally and its dependent on Pakistan to achieve its goal. In the last fifty years, the United States has applied different labels to the Kashmir issue from ‘self- determination’ to ‘aspiration of the Kashmiri people’ to being ‘a nuclear flash-point’ endangering international security’. The constantly changing stand

of the United States is reflective of the fact that the United States stand on the Kashmir issue is flexible and can be said to be dependent on two factors at a given point in time: (1) Tenor of India-United States relations and; (2) The strategic utility of Pakistan for any intended United States strategic moves in South West Asia (Kapila 2002).

However, things have changed over the years and so has the diplomatic, political and strategic calculations in international relations. The two nations no longer look at each other through the lens of mistrust, skepticism and falsehood. They are partners is eliminating terrorist activities in the region who are the 21st century's enemy of humankind. International relations change due to change in international events. These events have wide ranging ramifications upon bilateral equations. The American criteria for international politics are guided by realism and therefore American stance in the early years cannot be totally negated. Washington was unable to comprehend India due to its balancing act between maintaining a democratic setup politically and allowing certain principles of socialism to act in the market arena, which is in case of the economic activities. Again, the non-aligned movement furthered the suspicion in the minds of the strategists in America who could not understand India's stand. However, with the end of the cold war relations improved with both sides proclaimed them be Strategic partner, Natural partner and defining relations.

Chapter-3

Bush Administration approach towards Kashmir issue

The third chapter illustrates the nature the Bush Administration (Junior) approach on Kashmir issue. It is a recent historical narrative that have seen major shift in US policy towards India and on Kashmir.

US-India relation is one of the defining bilateral relations of 21st century. One is the largest democracy and other is the oldest. India-U.S. bilateral relations have developed into a "global strategic partnership", based on shared democratic values and increasing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional and global issues. US-India relation has not always been smooth, it has many ups and down specially during cold war era due to cold war politics, Indo-Soviet friendship and US-Pak alliance. Now things have changed, there is no cold war rivalry, India has opened its market, it is one of the fastest growing economies with huge market potential and its maturity as a responsible nuclear powered nation has brought India and US more close than ever before.

The progress between US-India relation started after end of cold war but Pokhran nuclear test (1998) slowed the pace and US slapped many sanctions on India. The real progress started after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became prime minister of India. Mr Vajpayee visited the United States of America four times. He travelled to US twice in 2001 and once each in 2002 and 2003. During his visit in 2001, President Bush promised to Mr Vajpayee to give a new look to the technology front of India. After his trips, the government clinched a deal with the United States on the liberalisation of high-technology transfers to India and easing of restrictions made after nuclear test. It was President George W. Bush who removed all the remaining restrictions. During his tenure framework for Indo-US civil nuclear deal were signed in July 2005 and Civil Nuclear Deal in March 2006 which paved the way for further deepening of relationship. Today long standing hurdle in US-India relation like Kashmir issue has been changed in favour of India specially after 9/11 attack on US trade centre and pentagon.

Today, the US-India bilateral cooperation is broad-based and multi-sectorial, covering trade and investment, defence and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health. Vibrant people-to-people interaction and support across the political spectrum in both countries nurture our bilateral relationship.

The US policy towards Indo-Pak had following aspects before Bush administration.

1. Maintaining Strategic relations with Pakistan

In late 1980s, there was renewed strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan, which was pledged to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Soon after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, US President Jimmy Carter ordered a covert CIA operation to supply American assistance to the anti-Soviet mujahedeen and Pakistan became a vital ground for that assistance, since it is the next door neighbour of Afghanistan. 'Literally days after the Soviet invasion, Carter was on the phone with Zia (the Dictator of Pakistan) offering him hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid in exchange for cooperation in helping the rebels in Afghanistan'. (Harvey 2003).

During Reagan Presidency Pakistan become one of the highest aid receivers like Egypt, Israel and Turkey.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country of paramount geostrategic importance. This is how the US operation was to work - the CIA would take a supervisory backseat role, letting Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) do most of the 'donkey work'. All of the arms supplies finance and training of the anti-Soviet fighters was provided through Pakistan and not directly from the CIA. Pakistan's tribal Northwest Frontier was to provide sanctuary for refugees and become the base where fighters were to be raised, trained and sent into battle. The ISI, with the help of CIA, played responsible role in the selection and distribution of weapons to mercenary armies. (Cooley 1999). So while Pakistan provided equipment, intelligence and money to

the mujahedeen, Washington maintained its armchair supervisory role in the war and left Pakistan to handle direct contact, operations with and training of the mujahedeen. (Coll1992).

Pakistan re-emerged as a 'frontline state' to its fight against communism and until late 1980s, US was providing economic and military aid to Pakistan. In June 1989, when Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited America, President George H.W. Bush reiterated US 'pledges' for the security and development of Pakistan and agreed to sell Pakistan 28 F-16 fighter planes. He also pleaded the US Congress to provide Pakistan with \$380 million economic aid and \$240 million military aid in the year 1990, official rationale being that the Afghan communist regime installed by Moscow still existed and had to be overthrown. (Chou 2003).

Even after imposing sanctions on Pakistan to discourage it from developing nuclear weapons. 10 US military officials tried to maintain normal military links with their counterparts in Pakistan, because Pakistan "a close ally of Washington throughout the Cold War" was considered very important for US military operations in the Gulf War.

Also America did not want Pakistan to get away and alien with radical Islamic states for help, in case of a possible conflict with India. While the US and Pakistan became very close during this time, but this had limited impact on the Indo-US relations, which were going upward after end of Cold War.

2. Improve relations with India

During cold war period India was tilted towards former USSR and Pakistan a close ally of US, these were the two major cause of malign relation between US and India. However President Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were in opinion of good relationship with India and a recently declassified paper shows that Kennedy was least interested in Pakistan than India.

The 1962 war between China and India resulted in improved bilateral cooperation between US and India. When former USSR turned blind eye during the war, US helped India. But soon after, 1965 war with Pakistan changed the momentum in other direction. And after the outbreak of Afghan war US tilted towards Pakistan to contain Red Army. (Kux2002).

Instead of all these factors, US and India tactfully managed their relations and as India sought to grow its economy in electronics, computers and telecommunications, areas where the Soviet Union was of limited utility. A May 1985 Memorandum of Understanding in science and technology removed India from the US list of 'diversion-risk' countries, paving the way for increased investment and technology transfer. In 1987, India purchased a Cray supercomputer from the US for agricultural research and weather forecasting. (Pandey 2009)

3. Preventing proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction

On 11th and 13th May India conducted five underground nuclear tests. Soon after Pakistan too conducted nuclear test and US put economic and military sanctions on both the states, as mandated by section 102 (b) of the Arms Export Control Act.

President Clinton was not happy and said that the Indian nuclear tests "were unjustified" and it has created instability in the region. And, as a result, "in accordance with United States law, I have decided to impose economic sanctions against India". (CNN News, May 13, 1998). National Security Advisor Samuel Berger said that the United States was "deeply disappointed" by the Indian decision to test nuclear weapons. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said that India's decision to conduct nuclear tests "runs counter to the effort the international community is making to promulgate a comprehensive ban on such testing". (USIA Washington File, May 11, 1998).

The US approach in South Asia had worked to encourage India and Pakistan to:

- (1) Halt further nuclear testing and sign the CTBT;
- (2) Halt fissile material production and cooperate in the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) negotiations;

- (3) Refrain from deploying or testing missiles;
- (4) Maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies with other countries and
- (5) Reduce bilateral tensions, including over Kashmir. (CRS Report, June 21, 2002.)

Since the enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1971 and Indian peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 and 1998 Indo-Pak nuclear test, South Asia was on watch list of nuclear proliferation in US. Ant this May event turned the region in the most hostile region in the world. This nuclearisation on Indian sub-Continent became a reason of grave concern for US.

4. Facilitating resolve Kashmir dispute

In 1980s a crucial development took place in Kashmir, the emergence of Muslim separatism in Indian Kashmir, they complained that 1987s election was not fair and formed militant organisation and by 1989 these militant organisation openly acted against Indian state. Some demanded independence and some union with Pakistan.

Pakistan called it a freedom movement and supported it morally and diplomatically and asked for UN referendum while India argued that Pakistan was supporting these terrorists to destabilise Kashmir by giving training to these terrorists and supplying weapons too. During the 1990s, several new militant groups emerged in Kashmir, most of which held radical Islamic views. The ideological emphasis of the insurgency shifted from a nationalistic and secularist one to an Islamic one. 'There has been trans nationalization of the Islamic insurgency. The rebels with clout have been cut from the same cloth: based in Pakistan, trained in Afghanistan and motivated by pan Islamic fundamentalism rather than Kashmiri nationalism. Their ranks filled with Punjabis and Pashtuns, Afghans and Arabs, many of the fighters wage war on behalf of a people whose language they do not even speak'. (Blank1999).

This, to a great extent, was driven by the arrival in the valley of Kashmir of large numbers of Islamic 'Jihadi' fighters who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 'With the Afghanistan war winding down, a reinvigorated Pakistan

army rechanneled its energies and newly supplied military muscle toward the so-called “freedom fighters” struggling against Indian rule in Kashmir’. (Ganguly2011).

The ‘Gates intervention’ helped to calm tempers on both sides of the border. Robert Gates led a group of US officials including Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Martin Kelly and senior National Security Council official in charge of South Asia and the Middle East Affairs Richard N. Haass. From May 19 to 21, 1990, Gates and his associates mediated between the two countries and finally succeeded in preventing them from falling into a war. The United States believed that since India and Pakistan, both possessed nuclear weapons, the outbreak of a conventional war between them might lead to a nuclear war. The Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Kerr later revealed that the explosive situation in South Asia was more serious than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and that only US intervention had prevented a nuclear war. (Bhaskar1998:730). Soon after the Gates mission, India and Pakistan began de-escalating and the crisis passed.

The Kargil War

In the spring of 1999, around 500 to 800 terrorists along with Pakistan regular soldier infiltrated some 10 to 15 KM inside Indian Territory. They positioned themselves at the high mountains and stationed in the bunkers vacated by Indian Army during winters. They positioned themselves in such a manner that NH-1 was within their reach, which was the only road between Srinagar and Leh and thus the only ground supply route to Indian military forces manning the border between Ladakh and China.

The Pakistani army supported the invaders, who were armed with machine guns, mortars and surface-to-air missiles. At the political level, Islamabad probably wanted to refocus the international community’s attention on an insurgency that had seemed to be petering out. At the military level, the Pakistani army may have hoped to spread the Indian armed forces out across the entire border, so as to give themselves more space to foment violence in the valley, where the massive Indian presence had constrained the militant operations of the guerrillas. (Ganguly2003).

On May 9, the infiltrators destroyed the main Indian army ammunition dump near the Kargil. It was found that hundreds of heavily armed infiltrators had occupied at least 35 well-fortified positions top of the ridges facing Dras, Kargil, Batalik and the Mushko valley. They were being supported by the cover fire of Pakistani artillery, which had begun a systematic bombardment of National Highway 1A.

In the beginning India sends around 30,000 troops to evict the intruders. Special Forces were dropped on the high ridges by helicopter. Army soldiers equipped with howitzers, rocket launchers and heavy mortars launched attacks supported by helicopter gunships. The aim was to surround the infiltrators and choke off their supplies even while building up Indian strength to launch assaults. Then Indian Air Force aircrafts and attack helicopters started bombing the intruders.

US Intervention to stop the War

In the beginning of June 1999 the United States and G8 countries expressed concerns over the dangerous situation along the LOC and urged both India and Pakistan to resolve the tense situation bilaterally

Diplomatic negotiations started between the New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif spoke over phone several times in the early weeks of the crisis, with Vajpayee telling Sharif that India would do whatever necessary to drive the intruders out across the LOC. Sharif was not willing to accept Pakistani responsibility for the insurgents' operations.

In last week of May, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh met with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. During their discussion, the United States reportedly agreed to deal firmly with Pakistan; in return, India pledged not to cross the LOC or otherwise escalate the fighting. President Clinton called Vajpayee and Sharif on June 14-15, requesting both sides to avoid widening the conflict. (Chou 2003).

But as the Kargil casualties increased, India's patience began to decrease. On June 17-18, PMs Aide Brajesh Mishra informed US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger that

India might be compelled to escalate its operations. Deeply concerned about this prospect, President Clinton dispatched the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, to Islamabad from June 23 to 27. Zinni prevailed upon Pakistani leader's to call an end to the Kargil operation; in response, he received 'fairly clear' assurances from Pakistan that the insurgents would be withdrawn from the Indian side of the LOC soon. (Chengappa 1999).

Immediately following Zinni's visit to Pakistan, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Gordon Lanpher travelled to New Delhi to brief Indian officials on Zinni's trip and urged India to refrain taking offensive strikes and de-escalate the tension along the LOC. Most important and remarkable from the Indian perspective was that Washington had firmly rebuffed Islamabad's efforts to link the Kargil question to the broader Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. (Ganguly 2009).

Sharif called Clinton on July 2nd, pleaded for American intervention to stop the fighting and resolve the Kashmir dispute; in reply, "the President was crystal clear – he could help only if Pakistan first withdrew to the LOC". In what was widely viewed as a major diplomatic victory for India, the Clinton Administration and most international opinion refused to accept that such a large scale, well-supplied offensive could have been planned or executed without Pakistan's support. India further presented evidence that many of the fighters actually were Pakistan regular army enlisted men and officers. (Ganguly 2003).

On 4th July Sharif flew to Washington to consult with President Clinton. In a joint statement, the two heads of government expressed the view that the "current fighting in the Kargil region of Kashmir is dangerous and contains the seeds of a wider conflict". They agreed that respect of Line of Control in Kashmir by both the parties was vital, 'for the peace and security of South Asia, in accordance with their 1972 Simla Accord'. It was also agreed to take concrete steps for the restoration of the LOC. President Clinton urged an immediate cessation of the hostilities once these steps are taken. Clinton also pointed out that the bilateral dialogue must begin in Lahore in February provides the best forum for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan, including Kashmir.

On 17th July Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez announced that “the war in Kargil has come to an end. The last of the Pakistani intruders have vacated our territory”. (Ganguly 2003).

Nevertheless Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did succeed in getting a promise of ‘personal attention’ by President Clinton to the Kashmir issue. But to India’s advantage, it was made crystal clear by the US that it would not intervene nor even mediate, in the dispute.

9/11 Incident and Change in US Approach

On the morning of 11th September, 2001, terrorists struck at the heart of America, the symbol of economic power and symbol of military might. 19 hijackers took control of four commercial passenger jets flying out of airports on the East Coast of the US and two of the aircrafts were deliberately flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, widely considered to be symbols of America’s power and influence, with a third plane hitting the headquarters of the US Department of Defence Pentagon in Virginia. The total loss of life on 9/11 was around 3,000, including the 19 hijackers. It was the worst loss of life due to a terrorist incident on the soil of United States.

President George W. Bush in his address to the nation described the events of the day as ‘evil, despicable acts of terror’ and said the US was ‘at war with a new and different kind of enemy’. (read Al Qaeda BBC 2001). Subsequently in his address to the US Congress, he declared the Global War on Terror. In October 2001, attacks were launched on Afghanistan by western coalition forces led by the US in conjunction with the anti-Taliban Afghan Northern Alliance.

Bush approach towards Kashmir before 9/11

When junior Bush took charge of office of the US President, the predominant emphasis of the new Republican administration’s policy towards South Asia was to improve and ‘transforming’ its ties with India. President Bush’s April 2001 decision to ‘drop by’ the visiting Indian Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh’s meeting with National

Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and a cordial forty-minute talk in the Oval Office was the beginning of a series of steps changing the nature of US-India relations. (Guihong 2003).

The security field was the first beneficiary of transforming US-Indian relations. The Bush administration de-emphasized non-proliferation as the sole determinant of US policy towards India. Before Bush, Clinton administration demanded India to cease production of fissile materials, stop weaponisation of its nuclear devices or avoid missile testing, production and deployment, President Bush embarked on a course of action that would permit India more access to controlled technologies, even though New Delhi refused to surrender its nuclear weapons program and even refused to sign the CTBT, much against America's wishes. Bush gave clear notice of his judgment that India was part of the solution to nuclear proliferation instead part of the problem. 'Even more importantly, however, this offer of such cooperation was made to India only not to Pakistan, despite the traditional bonding between US and Islamabad, Bush underscored his desire to deal with New Delhi in such exceptional ways that would convey his recognition of India as a friendly rising Asian power'. (Tellis 2008).

The second element of the transformation was the resuming of US defence cooperation with India. Increased exchanges of high-level defence officials as well as meetings on peacekeeping operations, search and rescue operations, disaster relief, environmental security and even joint exercises. While India was seen increasingly as an ocean of opportunity, Pakistan came to be viewed as a real difficulty. Pakistan was economically vulnerable, politically unstable and internationally isolated and it was widely viewed as a decaying and increasingly Islamic state. (Tellis et al. 2001: 9-12).

Following the Kargil conflict and the military coup of 1999, the US gradually considered Pakistan as a problematic and troublesome state, if not a failed state. On the non-proliferation front, Pakistan refused to suspend its missile programme or sign the NPT and the CTBT unless India does so first. (Even worse, it was later discovered that Pakistan had a nuclear and missile exchange with North Korea before September 11).

Moreover, Islamabad had evident close links with Islamic terrorists groups and provided with active support for the Kashmir insurgency, which was based and even trained in Pakistan. Pakistan also backed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and was one of only three countries formally recognized the evil-regime. And lastly, Musharraf's military rule posed further problems; the US asked Islamabad to restore civil government and return to democracy, but there was no progress made. As a result, before September 11, a marginalized Pakistan had a low priority on Bush's agenda. (Guihong 2003: 154).

Rajamohan (2002) argues that as the Bush administration sought to add a new strategic component to the US-Indian relationship as it saw India has potential to counter China, which until September 11 ranked high on the list of newly designated possible enemies of the United States. US-Indian relations were marked by expectations of a new journey about to begin. Pakistan, on the other hand, was increasingly isolated internationally and virtually off the radar screen for the United States. India appeared close to achieving its long-term objective of weakening Pakistani relations with the US. In Islamabad, fears grew that the Bush administration was continuing to tilt towards India, away from Pakistan.

Bush and his advisers sensed the necessity for a transformed and cordial relationship with the largest democratic state India from the very beginning. With its huge population, growing economic strength and the military capacity, a friendly India would not only be an important partner for the United States in its own right but would also serve as a critical source of geopolitical balance vis-à-vis a rising China, an issue that concerned both New Delhi and Washington. Not surprisingly, then, Bush signalled his personal intention to improve this new relationship on several occasions, including prior to his election.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan emerged as a staunch US ally due to its own compulsion and a frontline state in fighting terrorism. The Bush administration sought Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf's aid and cooperation to fight Al Qaeda and

the Taliban in Afghanistan, which he readily accepted by divorcing his former allies. Pakistan was uniquely positioned as a geostrategic link to Afghanistan and gave permission to the United States to use its airspace, granted land access to Afghanistan and employed its defence forces to capture Al Qaeda activists”. (Fair et al. 2010).

Musharraf’s cooperation with Washington to fight terrorism brought Pakistan important gains. It shaped Pakistan’s image and ended the country’s international diplomatic isolation, the result of past sanctions. It also brought much needed millions of dollars aid from the United States, Japan, Europe and international financial institutions. In appreciation of Musharraf’s cooperation, the US administration also declared Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally in March 2004. This rare status that allows Pakistan to purchase military offensive systems from the US offended India, underscored by the fact that Secretary of State Powell did not reveal this decision to Indian officials when he visited New Delhi on March 15-17, 2004. (Indurthy 2005: 53).

Nevertheless, post 9/11, there was a improvement in US-India relations too which due greater cooperation between the two democracies and being victims of terror. George Bush in his first State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 had said: “In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity”. (The Washington Post, January 29, 2002).

But the US, despite growing relations between the two democracies, did not acknowledge the Indian demands comprehensively in its national interest. In India, media, politicians and the public also talked about the ‘double-standards in American war on terror’, as on one hand US wished to ‘smoke out’ terrorism from the world and on the other hand, US was supporting Pakistan, a country well known for sponsoring and supporting terrorism in Kashmir since the very beginning.

Instead India came out strongly in support of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The growing cooperation between US and India resulted in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement on January 20, 2004. This was called the Path finder agreement,

which predicted the transfer of sensitive American dual technology that can be used by India in civilian, nuclear, space, missile and high-tech programs. But US officials assured Islamabad that the United States would not allow this technology to be used against Pakistan, even though US had put a number of terrorist groups based in Pakistan in the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.

Tellis (2008) his book "The Merits of De-hyphenation: Explaining US Success in India and Pakistan", points out that US in the post 9/11 world followed a DE-hyphenated policy in South Asia having three distinct features: First, US calculations was to systemically separate India and Pakistan in terms of his policy; that is US relations with each state was to be governed by an objective assessment of the individual value of each country to US interests rather than by fears about how US relations with one would affect relations with the other. Second, the United States recognized that India is on its way to becoming a major Asian power and, hence, that it wanted an improved level of cooperation than their predecessors and appreciated its potential for both collaboration and resistance across a much larger arena than simply South Asia. Third, the United States recognized that Pakistan is a country having ample problems that must be assisted to achieve a "soft landing" that dampens the currently disturbing social and economic trends by, among other things, reaching out to Pakistani society rather than simply the Pakistani state. (Tellis 2008: 22-23).

After September 11, Bush considered Pakistan to be an important partner in the 'war against terrorism' and the Republican government was reluctant to turn after up the heat on Islamabad, especially on the Kashmir dispute. At the same time, Pakistan-scepticism also inducted in the Bush administration. Pakistan is considered a fragile and dangerous state due to its nuclear instability. Hence, there was an emphasis on its "good behaviour" and aid was being given with conditions attached. On the other hand, India was viewed as a potential strategic partner and a balancer in South Asia. (Wirsing 2003).

Bush approach towards South Asia after 9/11 incident

Terrorists attack on WTC made South Asia the initial theatre for the “war on terrorism” and hence, restructured US relations with the region. As Stephen Cohen has said, “no part of the world was more affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than South Asia”. (Cohen 2002: 13).

India and Pakistan both emerged as allies of the United States in the war against terror aftermath of the terrorist attack. But the wars and rivalry between the two neighbours that had already lasted half a century were showing no signs of declining tension. US was on war against terror and continued to follow the time-tested approach of conflict-management as President Bush had his hands full in Afghanistan and Iraq and could not afford a war or a war-like situation in the Indian sub-continent.

The two successive incident of terrorist attack one on J&K assembly on 1st of October and another on Indian parliament on 13th of December again escalated tension between India and Pakistan.

On 1st of October, 2001, suicide bombers affiliated to Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Muhammad(JeM) blasted their way into the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly complex in the summer capital of Indian state J&K and killed forty people and injured many more. This action by the terrorists angered the Indian government. (Baxter 2004) Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter of “anguish” to President Bush warning Pakistan “there is a limit to patience to the people of India”. Bush took this warning seriously and called Vajpayee to express his shared sorrow and anger for the attack. The terrorist attack prompted Vajpayee to talk about striking back at the terrorist training camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir. (Rajghatta2001).

On 16th of October, Colin Powell Secretary of State United States visited Pakistan. After meetings with Musharraf and his cabinet along with ISI Chief and Director General Ehsanul Haq, in a joint press conference with Musharraf, Powell was full of praise for Pakistan when he spoke of the United States’ “enduring commitment to a great

Muslim nation and that it was the beginning of a strengthened relationship that will grow and flourish”. He called Musharraf a “bold and courageous” man with a rider that “Kashmir is a central point between India and Pakistan”. (Nayak and Krepon 2006).

However, this renewed US-Pakistan alliance and Powell’s statement on Kashmir pained India. So, to allay India’s concerns, Powell visited New Delhi on October 17 and assured Vajpayee that the “United States and India stand united against terrorism, including terrorism directed against India”. He further clarified his statement by saying, “I said ‘central’ in the sense that it is important and to suggest that it isn’t, and would not be accurate”. (Indurthy 2005)

Powell asked India to exercise restraint and resume talks with Pakistan on Kashmir. India was definitely disturbed by the American unfair approach as on one hand, it initiated a war on terror when faced with a terror attack their own and on the other hand US urges India to exercise restraint, when faced with similar violent attacks. As a result, when Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld travelled to New Delhi, he sought to alleviate India’s concerns and offered to resume military sales to India.

It was quite clear that America wanted to maintain healthy relations with both the countries and ensure peace in the South-Asia as Washington could not afford to let international attention divert towards other issues except war against terrorism. So President Bush himself got deeply involved to calm down the increasing tensions between the two neighbours, but he opposed any kind of US ‘mediation’ on Kashmir as requested by Musharraf when he had ‘hour-long discussions with President Bush at the Waldorf Astoria in November 2001, at the UN General Assembly in New York’. Vajpayee also met the President on 9th November in the White House, but Kashmir was not the focus of their discussion - they discussed terrorism and other bilateral issues. (Ganguly 2001).

On 13th of December, 2001, five Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taibaterrorists attacked the Indian Parliament during session. Indian Security forces reacted quickly and

averted the devastation by killing the terrorists in the encounter in which six Indians lost their lives. The particular strike at the heart of India, planned far in Kashmir's peaks and valleys, dealt a blow to Indian society and dangerously severed Indo-Pak ties. After discovering the Pakistan's ISI links to the terrorists through telephonic intercepts, the Vajpayee government withdrew its ambassador from Islamabad, suspended India's road and air links with Pakistan and demanded that Pakistan handover twenty wanted terrorists living in Pakistan for acts of terrorism. General Musharraf quickly condemned the attack but his unwillingness to act on India's demands infuriated politicians in New Delhi. (The Press Trust of India, January 6, 2002.)

Indian Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met on 15th December, 2001 and decided to take military action. In an interview with The New Yorker's Steve Coll, Brajesh Mishra, then India's National Security Adviser, described the CCS meeting following the attack, "we debated, we talked, and we came to the conclusion that the threat of military action should be held up". (Hagerty 2005).

As a result, orders were issued to mobilize and deploy Indian troops along the Line of control to launch an attack against the terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. India moved roughly half a million soldiers - including three armoured strike corps - to the parts of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat bordering Pakistan. In response, Pakistan mobilized its own armour and 300,000 Pakistan army troops to the adjacent border areas of Punjab and Sindh. The 2001-2002 standoff have been described as the largest military mobilization in the world since the Second World War. (Stolar 2008).

The crisis pushed the Bush administration into full-swing diplomatic action. Bush called General Musharraf and urged him to crack down on the terrorists operating from Pakistan. In a quick follow-up, he called Vajpayee and advised restraint. (Nayak and Krepon 2002).

India's strategy was directed towards inducing Washington to urge Islamabad to stop

supporting violent jihadi in Kashmir and India proper. Pakistan, on the other hand it would internationalise Kashmir issue and hoped that the latest crisis would cause the United States to take a more active role in resolving the Kashmir conflict. (Ganguly 2003).

Islamabad argued in its interest that the necessity of mobilizing troops along their Eastern border with India would require Pakistan to deploy limited soldiers in the hunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in western Pakistan, limiting the US war on terror. The US was interested in averting any crisis situation that would affect adversely its global war on terror.

India's diplomatic strategy however was more successful; while Washington urged both sides to show some patience, it purposely put Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations.

This act of the US also pressured Musharraf to proclaim in an important address to the nation on 12th January, 2002, in which he condemned the October and December terrorist attacks in India and said that "no organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir" and that "Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity anywhere in the world".(The New York Times, January 13, 2002)

But President Musharraf completely failed to act against jihadi group in Pakistan. In the aftermath of his speech, Islamabad did arrest around 2,000 militants and shuttered down more than 300 of their offices, but only few militants were prosecuted. Moreover, the leaders of LeT and JeM were released soon in March and they purposely resumed insurgency in Kashmir.

'The Kashmir dispute is at the core of Pakistan's very existence and unlike Afghanistan, Kashmir has traditionally been a major influence on Pakistan's domestic as well as foreign policy. While Pakistan launches a crackdown on terrorist groups, it continued to

insist that this shift did not mean abandoning its support for “freedom fighters” in Kashmir. In his landmark January 12, 2002 speech, Musharraf had warned India that “Kashmir runs in our blood” and restated Pakistan’s intention to provide “moral and diplomatic support” to the Kashmiris’.

Pakistan kept on demanding repeatedly that India should engage in talks on Kashmir was not considered by the Bush administration, they backed India’s broad negotiating position that the creation of an appropriate environment free of violence must precede negotiations. The US decision to counter Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri terrorism marked a big win for India, despite Indian doubts about Pakistan’s ability and willingness to honour his commitments to end cross-border terrorism.

On 14th of May 2002, heavily armed terrorists attacked the Indian military base at Kaluchakin Jammu, igniting a new crisis. As described by one Western reporter the situation in late May, ‘preparations for cataclysm advance daily along the Indo-Pakistani frontier. Around 1 million soldiers have crowded to the long border, equipped with missiles, tanks and fighter jets. War-fevered politicians in both capitals organize appeals for national unity and in the secret military warehouses of both countries; engineers presumably are turning screws on doomsday’s reserve force – two crude but functional nuclear arsenals’. (Baxter 2004).

This frightening possibility could have been true as prime minister Vajpayee warned the Indian army to “prepare for a decisive battle”, and Musharraf strongly reacted that “if India insists on launching all-out war to attack Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri militants, Pakistan is prepared to go nuclear”. (Kux 2002).

Then again, Washington quickly responded through a frenzy of high-level diplomatic activity to prevent war in South Asia. In the beginning of June, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Islamabad, where they evoked a commitment from Musharraf to “end cross-border infiltration permanently”. President Bush also called both leaders urged for restraint. He was soon

joined by the other leaders from the international community, like United Kingdom, Russia and Japan.

These rigorous efforts and visits from international leaders helped relax tensions and put Musharraf in such circumstances to pledge that he would stop cross-border terrorism into Kashmir. As a result of Musharraf's partial fulfilment of his promise by reduction in militant's cross-border infiltration, India reciprocated with its goodwill gestures. It recalled the naval ships back to their Mumbai base and reopened its airspace for Pakistani commercial air travel. In addition, India withdrew most of its troops from the front line.

As the tensions defused, the Bush administration took the initiative to rekindle a dialogue between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. General Musharraf and Prime Minister

Vajpayee met at Agra on July 14, 2001, at the behest of Bush, but the Agra summit failed after two days and no formal agreement could be made. The two sides remained rigid on the core issue of Kashmir.

Thus, at the heart of the US crisis-management strategy was the acquisition of a commitment from Pakistan to end cross-border infiltration permanently and a promise from India that it would engage in substantive dialogue on all bilateral issues, particularly the Kashmir dispute, when violence ceased. But Rajamohan (2003) argues that although these reciprocal promises appeared to have staved off the immediate threat of war, but in actual this threat has not completely vanished. Washington learned that it cannot intervene every few years to defuse nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan; instead, it must find a way to reduce the continuing hostility between the two states.

Soon after crisis in 2002, the Bush administration prepared a framework of three priority requirements to achieve a genuine peace in the region. These were:

- a) Pakistan's sponsorship of cross-border terrorism has become such nagging practice that can no longer be ignored or condoned.
- b) Concrete efforts to resolve conflicts are essential to end recurring tensions between India and Pakistan.
- c) Conducting fair democratic elections to the state assembly on the Indian side of Kashmir could pave a beginning to a peace process on the subcontinent.

For implementing this framework, it was needed for the Bush Administration to take an active role to promote the peace process between India and Pakistan. The traditional US stand that India and Pakistan should bilaterally resolve the Kashmir issue while taking the wishes of the Kashmiri people into account is no longer sufficient. (Ibid 2003). Yet this could not be openly advocated by the US.

On 24th of June 2003, Musharraf met President Bush for around ninety minutes at Camp David. Musharraf once again committed to end cross-border terrorism. Although he could not get F-16 fighter planes for which Pakistan had paid before 1990, Pakistan got an economic aid package of \$3 billion spread across three years. But what he was not able to convince Bush to play a mediatory role in the Kashmir dispute. "Our role will be to aid the process forward. But the decision makers will be the governments of India and Pakistan", Bush said, adding pointedly that terrorists who would like to prevent a peaceful solution should be fought. (Chidanand Rajghatta, The Times of India, June 24, 2003). Thus, it became crystal clear that the US policy after 9/11 was to take both the countries separately, according to American national interests. And from there de-hyphenation started.

India agreed to discuss Kashmir as part of "composite dialogue" in 2004, and Pakistan promised to end cross-border terrorism. US Secretary of State Colin Powell termed this

step on part of both the neighbours 'historic'. Indo-Pak talks were held in 2005 to 2008 and many more other measures were taken to improve ties. While talking to a news reporter in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that he continued to trust President Musharraf and believed that he could do 'businesses with him. (Gaur 2008).

Diplomatic relations continued improving between India and Pakistan and frequent visits between the diplomats, journalists and scholars started taking place. Indian and Pakistani cricket teams played cricket for the first time since 1990. All these changes showed a positive sign that India and Pakistan shared a common goal to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully.

The Bush administration viewed these positive changes in South Asia from the lens of their goal of securing the uncontested military and economic dominance of the United States in the twenty first century. Jones (2004) points out that US is 'anxious' to partner with India because of its economic potential - Wall Street increasingly refers to it as the future 'office of the world' – and because it can serve as a geo-political and military counterweight to China. Soon after the breakthrough of dialogue process on the side-line of SAARC Summit 2004, Bush announced the "next steps in strategic partnership" between India and US. These include greater cooperation in civil nuclear deal and space exploration, an invitation to India for collaboration in missile defence and a resuming the high technology trade.

At the same time, the US viewed Pakistan as balancer to its war in Afghanistan and its war against Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. During the Cold War, the US fuelled the Indo-Pakistani conflict to secure Pakistan support and to make Pakistan anti-Soviet ally. Now, however, Washington wants to bring about a settlement between its traditional ally (Pakistan) and its new Indian ally, so as to secure its predatory interests and ambitions across Asia. (Ibid 2004).

In 2006, Musharraf took a bold initiative to settle the Kashmir dispute. He publicly offered a 'four-point out of the box solution' to Kashmir, including a gradual withdrawal of troops by both the sides, self-governance, no changes to the region's borders and a joint supervision mechanism (Guardian, December 5, 2006.), where he expected US President to use his influence to help settle the Kashmir dispute because "now is the ideal time and ideal environment to resolve it". "All that I expect is Bush's weight, his voice, pressurizing all three groups: me, the Indians, and Kashmiris, to resolve the dispute". He also added that Pakistan was taking all possible measures to prevent cross-border infiltration and there was total intelligence cooperation and operational co-ordination between Pakistan and the US in the war on terror. (BBC 2006).

In spite of US being completely dependent on Pakistan for support of its war on terror, the Pakistan demands of mediation were completely rejected by the US, which specifically stated that only India and Pakistan can actually resolve the dispute and US could act as a facilitator only.

In March 2007, Musharraf fired the Chief Justice of Pakistan unlawfully, that led to political turmoil in Pakistan that effectively made to stop any further progress on Kashmir issue. (Schaffer 2009).

In the next year in February, Musharraf's political party lost the parliamentary elections and a new coalition government formed by the Pakistan People's Party. Then in August, Musharraf was forced to step-down and Asif Ali Zardari became the elected president of Pakistan. The fall of Musharraf adversely affected the on-going peace process between India and Pakistan which finally ended the negotiations process to resolve the Kashmir dispute. At the same time terrorism continued to raise its ugly head in India, with the 2008 attacks in Mumbai which was carried out with ISI's support. Bush led worldwide condemnation of the attacks in Mumbai and offered his sympathy and full assistance to India. In January 2009, Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush as US President.

Chapter-4

Obama Administration and the Kashmir issue

The India US ties are the balancer over which now the 21st century and a post Asian pivotal international system rests upon. Both India and the United States have a common destiny. This is not a value laden assessment but a metaphor of the times for the present international system, where-in, both the historical, strategic, political and cultural factors bring both the nations together though in a much divided international system which suffers with the global divisions in the World Trade organization and the United Nations in the context of the Asian rise and progression. Since the advent of the post-economic recession age, the new pivot and the fulcrum of World Politics, strategy and trade has turned out to be the Asian continent.

The fourth chapter illustrates the nature of Obama Administration approaches on Kashmir issue and Obama Administration focus on improving bilateral relations leaving behind the Kashmir question in cold bag. President Obama assumed office on 20th of January 2009 and is in office till date. Before him Bush Administration had taken a more conservative approach to the Kashmir dispute, taking the position that the dispute needed to be solved bilaterally between India and Pakistan. However, after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US and with the war on terror emerging as a major US foreign and security policy pre-occupation, there was a general sense that this position would change as Pakistan, which became a frontline state along with the US, could put pressure on the US to take on a more active role in the resolution of the dispute. (Roy-Chaudhury 2004). Much to the disappointment of Pakistan, the US maintained its balanced approach in not dragging Kashmir as part of the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem.

President Obama calls the bilateral relationship as the Defining relationship of the 21st century where-in trade; technology and defence form the three fulcrums of the relationship. In the context of President Obama's 2nd visit on India's Republic day one of the agreements signed upon the maritime security issues and the freedom of navigation

themes in Asia Pacific where India is a cooperative partner in regional maritime challenges such as piracy. The neo policy of American engagement with the Asiatic Space too needs to be firmed up in the context of India. One argument goes that United States is involved in a perpetual and single minded promotion of its national interest. Still, the chapter would leverage the contention that the bilateral relationship needs to be a transactional one with the Indian policy emphasis being on the question that how much India will be able to gain out of its cooperative engagement with United States in the Asiatic Space. The question of a cold war preference for defence and larger trade with Russia is passé now but do the Indian equations with Palestine and Iran shadow the relationship with the super power? Thus, how does India veer away from the moral standpoint of being a third world leader, where-in, the Asian choice process between China and US has to be studied by Indian policy makers?

In the same context, President Obama's stance towards the conflicted province of Jammu and Kashmir can be read with the American security and diplomatic Pivot in South Asia. Since the cold war times, the American establishment has been scolded in India because of the cold war tinted policy of Washington in the context of the province of Jammu and Kashmir. The Americans indirectly supported various Pakistani standpoints with the idea that India had to be contained and the all-weather relationship between Islamabad and Washington would serve the South Asian and the Afghani objectives of US Foreign policy in the region.

The Kashmir question during Obama Administration

The province of Jammu and Kashmir could be a new staging point for the larger Asian pivot of the American foreign policy within the much talked of a de-hyphenated relationship between India and Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been a perennial sore point in the general manuscript of a relationship between India and Pakistan which has its own global and regional ramifications with the American grand role in the South Asian region. The State of Jammu and Kashmir now holds true as a new negotiating idiom between India and United States as a value neutral and a pro India

standpoint is very much in the offing. As an instance, with the Jihadi intrusion in the “badlands” of the “Af-Pak” region, the free riding spirit and practice of the terrorists in the unstable region mars the security landscape of J & K. The state is already bleeding by the thorny regional and global issue of Pakistani supported cross border terrorism which adds more bitterness to the India-Pakistan relationship.

The province lies in the twilight zone debate on self-determination which needs to be remedied and corrected by the President Obama’s denomination after the few but long lasting negotiations between the Obama administration and PM Narendra Modi’s efforts at re-negotiating a novae relationship between India and United States. President Obama needs to improve upon the utterances of American establishment personages such as Richard Armitage and Robin Raphael with a realistic and an India-friendly standpoint to be introduced for the Jammu and Kashmir Fracas between India and Pakistan. The persistence of Rawalpindi in getting ahead with the machination of cross border terrorism through the incidents in Pathankot and Dinanagar have to be re calibrated by India and the fissiparous and destabilising role played by the “Deep State” in Pakistan has to be brought to the fore in the world of global Diplomacy which will further the cause of third party intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. United States of America is a nation which believes in its speciality of the American dream and the hyper puissance of its nation, policy and people as a Regulator nation state in the peace challenged regions of the world in a just manner

It is here in these troubled waters of clandestine terror and Jihadi deals along with the idea of the international law profligacy of cross border terrorism can the theme of a larger and responsible role for the American nation can be brought out. The post September 11 and the post-Orlando massacre world create new role and responsibilities for the Regulator great power nations such as United States of America. They have to move away especially in the context of the isolationist and the withdrawing streak of the larger American foreign policy. President Obama in the context of the American withdrawals

from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria has created undocumented but palpable problems for India. India needs a pro India standpoint by the American foreign policy thought in order to re-ignite the India America relationship. President Obama's policy towards the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be deliberated upon in the self-same context.

What needs to be delved inside is that whether President Obama followed the parochial stance of letting Islamabad enjoy the purposes of the "Frontline status" or did the state of affairs were slightly tilted towards India when it came to the resolution of the J & k conflict.

Not following a well-defined chronology, if we delve inside the developments and statements of President Obama in the context of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, than, it can be largely deciphered that President Obama and the official white House speak contends that India and Pakistan need to solve the Kashmir conflict without an American intrusion. In a report aired through the Media source of NDTV based in India, it can be quoted that, "President Obama today agreed with PM Modi that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and to be resolved bilaterally by both India and Pakistan as they held talk in New York during which Pakistan sponsored terrorism issue also came up. There was a broad acknowledgement that this is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and people were happy for India and Pakistan to resolve it among then."(NDTV September 22, 2015)

Thus, India always has had reservation about the American Diplomatic tinkering with the status and conflict resolution issues in the context of the province of Jammu and Kashmir. Some years back during 90s, Pakistan supported a US brokered solution to the quagmire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which India hotly militated against but President Clinton's upping the ante against Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef in the light of the Pakistani intrusion in Kargil opened pathways for a better understanding of the J & k issue between India, Pakistan and the larger interests and the role of United States.

A Times of India news report too pinpoints in the same direction of the dis-interedness and the nonchalance on the part of Washington between India and Pakistan. President Obama was reported as saying in September during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit

to US that, “There was a discussion on Pakistan in one of the meetings in the context of terrorism; broadly the idea was if terrorism has to be fought then all countries have to be on the same page. You can't have some countries talking of good and bad terrorists.”(Times of India, September 29, 2015). Thus, the issue of the Presidential take on the J & K issue has to be understood within the larger idiom of Pakistani supported cross border terrorism.

The American publication, Huffington Post too has a story to narrate concerning the American pinpointing of the Jammu and Kashmir issue. Terrista Scahffer writes, “In the summer of 1965, India and Pakistan returned to the battlefields of Kashmir in a renewed attempt to establish their respective claims over the disputed, fertile region. On August 5th, more than 25,000 Pakistani soldiers, disguised as Kashmiris, infiltrated the area, mingling with their Muslim coreligionists and encouraging insurgency. Indian forces responded violently, launching Kashmir into a bloody, but ultimately indecisive, summer of invasions, tanks and aerial bombardment. The United States and Soviet Union eventually facilitated a ceasefire which restored pre-war boundaries, and the conflict ended on September 22. To this day, Kashmir remains a disputed territory, and its populace continues to pursue a uniquely Kashmiri identity, independent from Indian or Pakistani influences. Howard B. Schaffer, who served as a political and economic officer in New Delhi, relates his impressions of Kashmir, the tragedy of the war, and the ramifications for U.S.-India relations. (Huffington post, August 6, 2015)

The ramifications have always been large for the larger and long term implications between the partnership between India and Kashmir in the light of the State of Jammu and Kashmir being a point of conflict and conflagration between India and Pakistan. Thus, President Obama has to take in consideration the intertwined and indelible imprint of the larger Grand strategy of Washington in the context of the India –US ties and the larger partnership in the 21st century.

President Obama has went on to contend that in a meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef, the American President has reflected the concern that he does not want to be an interlocutor in the conflict issue in South Asia. In a report in the national daily, The Hindu, it has been reported that, “Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised action

against all terrorist networks, including the Haqqani Network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, in a joint statement with U.S. President Barack Obama, which also called for sustained India-Pakistan dialogue on all outstanding “disputes, including Kashmir”. LeT targets India, and it mounted the most gruesome terror attacks in India in Mumbai in 2008. Prime Minister Sharif reaffirmed that Pakistan’s territory will not be used against any other country and noted that this is an obligation of all countries in the region. (The Hindu, October 23, 2015)

Verghese K George further writes that, “According to the statement said, President Obama commended Pakistan for hosting and facilitating the first public talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in July 2015 and highlighted the opportunity presented by Pakistan’s willingness to facilitate a reconciliation process that would help end insurgent violence in Afghanistan. “Prime Minister Sharif reaffirmed that Pakistan’s territory will not be used against any other country and noted that this is an obligation of all countries in the region. Both leaders affirmed that regional peace and stability required the prevention of attacks across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. ”. “President Obama underscored the importance of Pakistan’s role, as one of the largest Muslim democracies, in using its influence in support of peace, security, development, and human rights around the world.”(George The Hindu, October 23, 2015)

Thus, in relation to the importance and the criticality of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the South Asian region, the larger idea of the crucial Pakistan’s role in the context of the Afghan Government’s talks with the Taliban also assumes significance with the white House. It is here that the twist in the tale occurs; where-in, running regional quagmire of Kashmir attains significance. US needs to realize that Kashmir needs to be internalized as an internal matter of the nation which has been brought to the fore as an internal security sore for India by the aid and abatement by the Pakistani establishment.

President Barrack Obama largely has stood for a disentangled foreign Policy of the United States in the larger question of the Province of Jammu and Kashmir. President Obama has ideally sought the argument that both India and Pakistan can bilaterally solve

the intricacies relating to the state of Jammu and Kashmir which also has a well pronounced, religious and cross border terrorism oriented perspective attached to the idiom of the larger India-Pakistan partnership. President Obama has largely stood for change which can be equated with a fresh and revitalized approach for the quandary of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. President Obama has toed a foreign policy line of remaining largely uninvolved from the idea of Kashmir conflict and playing a strategically clever and disinterested move from the conflict in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

A piece in the Foreign Policy Journal contends that India is losing out on Kashmir according to one perception of the quintessential American breed. Ikram Ullah writes in the Foreign Policy magazine, “Kashmir has been simmering since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The violence reached its peak in the 1980s and ‘90s, when the Pakistan-backed Kashmiri insurgency was at its strongest. By the early 2000s, however, the violence seemed to have abated, and there was hope for a peaceful settlement of the issue. But now, optimism for such a peaceful settlement is dwindling. As Kashmir has seen resurgence in violence, public support for the insurgency also seems to be increasing. India is losing whatever support it had among the general Kashmiri public, and this trend will continue unless it brings about a radical change in its Kashmir policy. (Ullah Foreign Policy, May 5, 2016)

In an NDTV release in the month of March in 2014, the Media report sheds pertinent light upon the idea of Kashmir and the India-US-Kashmir quandary. The report goes on to contend that Prime Minister Nawaz Shareef came out with a new request in 2014 that India and the new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi can be asked to have a re-look at their Kashmir Policy with an eye to render asunder the Indian vitriolic and repetitive attacks on the Pakistani policy of aiding and abating terrorism in Kashmir.

Sharif made the request when Obama telephoned him, informing about his forthcoming India visit and discussing bilateral ties and the regional situation. The Pakistani PM

requested President Obama to go ahead with the idiom of castigating India on its repeated insistence on the cross border terrorism issue. The Indian Express Report can be cited here, “The Prime Minister also urged President Obama to take up the cause of Kashmir with the Indian leadership, as its early resolution would bring enduring peace, stability and economic cooperation to Asia,” said a Pakistan Prime Minister’s Office statement on the discussions between the two leaders. It said that Barack Obama informed Sharif of his forthcoming visit to India in January to attend India’s republic Day Parade as the Chief Guest. During the call, Sharif recalled an invitation he extended to Obama last year in Washington and conveyed the expectation of the people of Pakistan to welcome the US President to the country sometime in the future.”(Indian Express November 22, 2014). Thus, the Pakistani Premier has been too steadfast in upping the ante on the Prime Minister Narendra Modi as far as the theme of pigeonholing India on the issue of Kashmir is concerned.

President Obama had raised questions and a great deal of concerns in India in the year 2008 during his election campaign that a UN resolution is required in the global context in order to solve the Kashmir question amicably and peacefully which amounted to an effort to globalize and internationalize the issue in the context of the immediate South Asian context and the larger global equations. The Reuters report contends that, “Obama has moved quite some distance since his 2008 election campaign, when he raised the issue by saying that resolution of Kashmir dispute could help in the war in Afghanistan by convincing Pakistan to focus on tackling militants holed up on its border rather than its traditional enemy.” (Reuters, October 2008) The report further informs that Obama said “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants. (ibid)

Obama focused more on bilateral relation than Kashmir question

United States and India both believes in Democracy and rule of law, there are many convergence of interests between US and India like For US, India is a successful and stable democracy with huge potential for providing peace in security in Indian Ocean region and south Asia at large. Indian Ocean region is the largest oil transport rout of the world and major trading route. More than 70% of Chinese oil supply passed through the region.

US has physiological fear from the rise of China and considers China as a threat to its hegemony particularly in Asia and world at large therefore US is trying to engage and manage Chinas rise rather than openly contain china by shifting its focus from Europe and middle East to Asia-Pacific, even US is strengthening its military bases of Asia-Pacific and working on pivot to Asia policy or policy of rebalancing in Asia. US policy makers knew that India-China has long standing border dispute and even both have fought a war in 1962 wherein India lost badly. Even today India relationship with China is fluctuating with ups and down. Every now and then Chinese Army intrudes at Chumar sector in ladakh, staple visa to Indian citizens and Chinese claim of Arunachal Pradesh. Keeping in mind these factors US considers India a fulcrum for US hegemony in South Asia. Chinese has acquired Gawdar port of Pakistan and Humbantota of Sri Lanka, and trying same at chhitgoan Bangladesh and Myanmar which India see encirclement of itself. Chinese and Pakistan's growing strategic partnership and Chinese help to militarise Pakistan are very much evident. These are the reason of Sino-Indian rivalry which US is aware. Kautaliya way back in third century BC said one should make friendship with enemy's enemy to counter enemy. What Obama Administration has been following seems to be of improving strategic and economic relation with India and leaving the Kashmir question behind. The recent visits of US president Obama clearly demonstrate the importance of India in US policy makers. Before Clinton only 3 other US presidents visited India while Obama has visited twice.

Where India fits in US Pivot to Asia policy?

The United States pivot to Asia strategy has been one of the hallmarks of President Obama's foreign policy agenda and a part of Obama Doctrine of shifting attention from war torn Middle-East to Asia-Pacific. It originated when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State. As the world's economic hub is shifting eastwards to Asia from an erstwhile position on the trans-Atlantic axis, the United States is paying more attention to Asia than any part of world. Hillary Clinton in an article of Foreign Policy Magazine 'America's Pacific Century', writes that today lays emphasis on urging new and old partners/allies to help shape and participate in a rules-based order. Their main concern is about the repetitive Chinese violation of the freedom of navigation in South China Sea. Similarly, the Chinese are increasing their maritime presence the Indian Ocean region like Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea and by building ports and funding big infrastructure projects in surrounding countries. These Chinese activities produced strategic concern in India as well as in the United States, given the freedom of navigation the two countries' shipping vessels enjoy in India's peninsular waters. (Clinton in Foreign Policy Magazine, October 11th, 2011, 'America's Pacific Century').

The Indian Navy's move to strengthen its force-projection capacity in the Indian Ocean by acquiring Aircraft Carriers and modernizing the Indian Navy can be seen as reciprocate of similar Chinese action which are in turn a reaction to secure their oil imports from the Middle East as well as freight movement in the Indian Ocean. While the United States' present focus is on the South China Sea dispute, the shipping routes of the Indian Ocean Region are also fundamental to US interests. Having taken a strategic relevance of India, and engaging more deeply with the country over the last 10-15 years US see India as a country with similar interests to its own in the Indian Ocean region. Within this same context they aim to further cultivate this relationship to further their own agenda of maintaining freedom of navigation and maintenance of a rules based order in the Indian Ocean region.

In the same context, we need to look at Defence Secretary Ashton Carter visit to India in April 2016. While there was wide covering of the defence agreements between Defence Secretary Ashton Carter and Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar but there was very little

written or spoken about the bigger strategic significance of his visit. He is the first high-ranking US politician to visit an Indian operational military command, as he started his visit from the Eastern Naval Command at Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. Indian naval strategies for Indian Ocean region and for Bay of Bengal are mostly implemented from this base. The US defence secretary visit this Naval Command shows how serious the United States is about not only heightening defence cooperation with India but also about evaluating and highly considering India to defend a rules based order and possible management of Chinese in the Indian Ocean region. This development is strategically very important to the Indian strategic community to take note of, yet there was minimum attention was for this perspective on Secretary Carter's visit. Indian media personal during an exclusive interview with the defence secretary were more pre-occupied with asking questions on well-known American positions about Pakistan and deeply insignificant questions as far as the Indian viewer is concerned, such as one about an academic paper on a possible Terrorist Catastrophe in the US that the Defence Secretary had written prior to 9/11. Not a word was raised about why Ashton Carter was really present in India, on why he chose to visit Vishakhapatnam before the capital or about the role he saw India playing in the United States pivot to Asia. (The Hindu, 18th April, 2016)

Regardless of the less media coverage, this cooperation between the two governments and militaries are further testaments to America giving more weight to its strategic relevance of India. Given that a partnership with India is very crucial to the United States, the Americans have recognized that having India: A country of diverse strategic interests it is impossible to have 100% policy convergence on any issues. According to Ashley Tellis (Former Special Assistant to the US President on South Asia) The United States have accepted that with India they will not seek cold-war type binding alliance. However, Tellis has gone more further and said that India's emerging capabilities and rivalry with China have made it a obvious object of U.S. engagement, and that the transformation of U.S.-Indian relations in recent years has been driven by a unique, calculating detachment on the part of United States. This understanding on the part of the United States will go a great way in realising the potential of the US-India relationship. C Raja Mohan in the lead up to Modi's recent China visit characterised a more independent Indian foreign

policy that has become easy to practice as a result of the United States' 'calculated detachment' in the following manner:

“Modi’s sense of India as a “leading power” helps it break out of the non-alignment trap that it had long set for itself in dealing with China and America. Instead of viewing the two relationships as a zero-sum game, Modi is prepared to advance, wherever he can, with both China and America. Nor does he see the relationship with China and America as symmetric. India can cooperate more with the US, for example, in areas like security, while looking for strong Chinese support on infrastructure development.” (Rajamohan, The Indian Express, 14th May 2015)

Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) in an interview with FPI Director Robert Kagan on the Obama administration’s strategic “pivot” from the Middle East to East Asia stated in the interview that “the countries of the Asia-Pacific recognize that while the dominant issues of the 21st century will be decided in that region, the United States was still in the initial stages its engagement there. They recognize that the United States still had pressing situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a premature withdrawal from America’s commitments in those countries would not be positively indicative of Washington’s commitment to the Asia-Pacific”.

Campbell further said that the United States has spent a huge amount on defence following the September 11, 2001 attack; Campbell remarked that most of that spending was done on post-conflict reconstruction. While many countries in the region were spending heavily on power-projection capacities but the United States had not increased. Moreover, while the United States had generally focused its attention in Northeast Asia, it had typically lagged in its engagement with countries in Southeast Asia. The pivot to Asia, Campbell said, will not be completed in a near future, but will require a strategic allocation of diplomatic and military resources.

Campbell further says the United States must recognize that every state in the region wants very good relationship with both China and the United States. This is not primarily due to geo-strategic concerns, he noted, but simple geography. Not like the cold war politics the country’s prominence and position in the area requires that smaller states

maintain strong ties with both Beijing and Washington. The United States relationship with China will be the most complex relationship that we have ever had, and continued engagement with Beijing will be critical to managing the security and economic issues of the 21st century.

Campbell argues that United States approach towards China on human rights issue is indivisible from US economic and security policy. He believes that previous remarks from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that human rights would not impact the other elements of America's China policy were taken out of context. He emphasized that the United States has repeatedly broached human rights with Beijing as well as other authoritarian countries in the region. He admitted that while those conversations were not easy ones to have, they were critical to democracy promotion.

Since the global power has shifted to Asia, the US' Pivot to Asia policy aims to maintain its hegemony in Asia-Pacific and to maintain a dominant strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific theatre by reinforcing its long held supremacy in the region. The strategy comes at a time when China's military assertiveness in Asia is raising, America's economic and political power is relatively stagnant, and the US desperately looking forward to extricating itself from various conflicts in the greater Middle East – Iraq and Afghanistan. India is considered as a falcon of this pivot strategy which is quite clear from the US department of defence guideline and also from various official statements.

This pivot strategy comes with both opportunities as well as challenges for India. It will help enhancing its strategic relationship with the US as well as with the Asia-Pacific countries on a many issues. But the main differences between the two countries may emerge regarding the political endgame in Afghanistan, and any US attempt to push India into making a choice of “with us or against us” on important strategic issues in Asia. India might prefer its own rebalancing strategy and may not ally with any country where its friendly relationship with all the major powers (including China and Russia) holds key to its rise in the coming years. Besides, its own foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region has been evolving over the last two decades. It will thus adopt a very cautious approach towards this pivot strategy.

Meanwhile, India may like to develop a multilateral security system wherein all the Asian giants can work together and cooperate on important economic and political issues for achieving their common interests. The US economic condition also demands a cooperative approach towards the Asian powers, including China. The United States also recognises that India and the US may not agree on every issue but would continue to enhance their strategic partnership. It also respects for India’s strategic autonomy.

US India Military Exercise and Arms Trade during Obama Administration.

US India defence cooperation is one of the most successful aspect of US India relation. The United States is the manufacturer of military equipment’s and India is one of the biggest markets. Both the states have done fabulous improvement in this sector. It has gone the level of one of the biggest arms buyer of America from nowhere; India has done more military exercise with the United States than any other country in recent years. Last year (2015) US surpassed Russia and became India biggest arms supplier to India for the

US DEFENCE SALES TO INDIA UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) PROGRAMME

(Direct Commercial Sales figures not available) (In \$ millions)

	1950-2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
FMS agreements	354	92	1,004	10	143	4,506	168	46	1,040
FMS deliveries	260	85	40	15	31	57	167	194	370

(Source: US Defence Security Cooperation Agency)

first time. See the table:

The US now is the largest supplier of arms to India, leaving behind Russia and Israel, thanks mostly to its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programme, under which the Ministry of Defence buys military equipment following the criteria laid down by the US. There is clearly great comfort for Ministry of Defence officials in procuring military equipment through the FMS route as the procedural propriety is underwritten by US agencies.

DTTI- The game changer

Defence cooperation between the United States and India comes very high in priority for both nations, but the speed and scope of cooperation regarding defence technology and trade has been hindered by differing bureaucratic hurdles and legal requirements. In 2012, Secretary of Defence Mr. Leon Panetta commanded Deputy Secretary of Defence Dr. Ashton Carter to undertake an initiative to facilitate increased United States senior level oversight and engagement to get rid these obstacles. This undertaking is known to as the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI).

The DTTI is neither a treaty nor a law. It is a flexible mechanism to facilitate senior leaders from United States to constantly focus on the opportunities and challenges connected with growing Americas defence partnership.

The DTTI aims to:

- Transform the bilateral defence relationship into one that is limited only by independent strategic decisions, rather than bureaucratic obstacles or inefficient procedures
- Strengthen India's defence industrial base by moving away from the traditional "buyer-seller" dynamic toward a more collaborative approach
- Explore new areas of technological collaboration from science and technology cooperation through co-development and co-production
- Expand U.S.-Indian business ties (Source- Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics US Department of Defence)

The hopes and value lied in the DTTI are shone in the seniority of its leadership. In the United States, the initiative is captained by the third ranking official in the United States Defence Department (DoD), the Undersecretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Mr. Frank Kendall. In addition, there is a joint United States-India DTTI Interagency Task Force (DIATF) co-chaired by the Director for International Cooperation, Office of the Undersecretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Mr. Keith Webster. The DoD also established The India Rapid Reaction Cell (IRRC) in January 2015 to focus exclusively on advancing the DTTI.

President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Modi expressed their support for the DTTI through a joint statement in January 2015 and directed that the DTTI focus on pursuing six co-development/co-production pathfinder efforts.

The three-day visit in April 2016 of US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter was indication of the strengthening relations between the two countries in the defence sector. It was Carters second visit in less than a year and four months after Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar visited United States. It can also be measured in the personal rapport they have established that he arrived in Defence Minister Parrikar's home state Goa, visited a temple, a basilica and some Indian Naval Port and travelled to capital city for official talks. As India and the US have been calling that they are strategic partners. This strategic partnership was also reflected in their defence relations. (The Hindu 16th April 2016)

The US' Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) and India's Make in India initiative have a lot in common. In reality, it seems to have been made to suit each other's objectives. Why not, the Unites States has commercial interests in it to obtain a major share of India's expected defence requirements worth \$100 billion in coming 10 years. However, India is no more interested in a traditional buyer-seller relationship with the United States or, for the same, with any other country. It desires to be a co-developer and co-producer of military equipment's. Under these initiatives, the two sides identified four main areas wherein they could not only exchange technical knowledge but also jointly

produce. Among them are joint manufacture and production fighter aircraft and aircraft carriers. (The Indian Express 13th of April 2016)

It is quite easy to say than to implement as private defence manufacturers in the United States are not known to part with their technology easily. There are many legislative controls also on sharing of technology. These hurdles can be overcome only if India be elevated to the status of US' defence partners like Israel and Australia. At the same time India never wanted to be identified closely with any country in its quest of strategic interests, it cannot overlook also the growing symmetry between its own "look east policy" and US interest in Asia. (Ibid)

For United States India is their largest partner in joint military exercise and at the same time India is doing more military exercise with the US than any other country. Two of the major joint military exercises are Malabar and Yudh Abhyas. Malabar begun in 1992 as a bilateral naval exercise between the US Navy and its Indian Navy has now become a permanently trilateral forum involving the Japanese also.

After 2007, Malabar exercise has been held alternately off the Indian and western Pacific Ocean. So, while the last (2015) one was held off the city of Chennai in the Bay of Bengal, this one's being held in the Philippine Sea, in close proximity to a site fast evolving as a critical flash point in global affairs - South China Sea.

The USA describes the Malabar as, "Series of complex, high-end war-fighting exercises conducted to advance multi-national maritime relationships and mutual security issues."

Exercise Yudh Abhyas is part of an on-going series of joint military exercises between the United States and Indian Armies since 2005, agreed upon under the New Framework of India-US Defence Relationship. Commencing at the platoon level, the exercise has graduated to a command post (CPX) and field training exercise (FTX).

Obama visits to India

Barak Obama is the first president of United States of America to visit India twice, and the most important thing is that most of US president visited India has visited Pakistan but Obama visited India twice but Pakistan not even a single time. Obama visited India for the first time in 2010(it was his first visit to Asia as well) and second time in January 2015 as the chief guest of Republic day parade (first US president attended Republic Day ceremony in India). When he visited India in 2010 he addressed both the house of Indian Parliament.

In his address to Indian Parliament he said “And it is my firm belief that the relationship between the United States and India — bound by our shared interests and our shared values — will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. This is the partnership I’ve come here to build. This is the vision that our nations can realize together”.

In his speech at Indian Parliament he also backed Indian membership to United Nations Security Council, he said that “Together with our partners, we have made the G20 the premier forum for international economic cooperation, bringing more voices to the table of global economic decision-making, and that has included India. We’ve increased the role of emerging economies like India at international financial institutions. We valued India’s important role at Copenhagen, where, for the first time, all major economies committed to take action to confront climate change — and to stand by those actions. We salute India’s long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions. And we welcome India as it prepares to take its seat on the United Nations Security Council”.

Regarding terrorism and Pakistan Obama mentioned that “And we’ll continue to insist to Pakistan's leaders that terrorist safe havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks must be brought to justice. We must also recognize that all of us have an interest in both an Afghanistan and a Pakistan that is stable and prosperous and democratic — and India has an interest in that, as well. In pursuit of regional security, we will continue to welcome dialogue between India and

Pakistan, even as we recognize that disputes between your two countries can only be resolved by the people of your two countries”.

Counter terrorism programme concluded between US and India whereby the terrorist threat was assumed real by both countries and needing actions. Clear recognition by United States of cross border terrorism funded by Pakistan

In his speech at Indian Parliament he said that India is a responsible nuclear powered nation its duty of responsible states to prevent Nuclear-proliferation. Regarding that he said that “Now, let me suggest that with increased power comes increased responsibility. The United Nations exists to fulfil its founding ideals of preserving peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and advancing human rights. These are the responsibilities of all nations, but especially those that seek to lead in the 21st century. And so we look forward to working with India — and other nations that aspire to Security Council membership — to ensure that the Security Council is effective; that resolutions are implemented, that sanctions are enforced; that we strengthen the international norms which recognize the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all individuals. Together, the United States and India can pursue our goal of securing the world’s vulnerable nuclear materials. We can make it clear that even as every nation has the right to peaceful nuclear energy, every nation must also meet its international obligations — and that includes the Islamic Republic of Iran. And together, we can pursue a vision that Indian leaders have espoused since independence — a world without nuclear weapons”. (Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, 8th November 2010)

During his whole stay in India he focussed on bilateral relationship instead of focusing on Kashmir issue. Even in his second visit to India as a chief guest in Republic Day Parade in January 2015 he focused on bilateral relationships instead of old standing Kashmir Issue. During his visit nuclear logjam was broken and India eased rules for American companies to invest in Indian civil nuclear sector. During this visit Obama announced \$4 billion of new initiatives to boost trade/ investment ties, jobs in India via Exim Bank and OPIC. Opened new source of financing for social development ventures with an Indian Diaspora Investment Initiative. (The Times of India, Jan 28, 2015)

During this visit Defence Technology and Trade Initiative operationalized and renewed for 10 years with focus on co-development and coproduction in India for India and global market should boost 'Make in India'.

So both the visits by president Obama were directed towards increasing bilateral relationships and the issue of Kashmir was excluded.

Chapter-5

Conclusion

The US involvement in Kashmir issue can be traced since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. United States stands has not been static and kept on changing according to time and Situation. In the early phase of Kashmir issue United States considered Kashmir as the main “bone of contention” between India and Pakistan. Later US have seen the Kashmir issue from the “lens of Cold War”. Since then United States has been the most important outside player in Kashmir issue leaving behind the erstwhile colonial power of the Indian subcontinent Britain far behind.

In the Dissertation “The Kashmir factor in US-India relation: A Study of Bush and Obama Administrations”, Chapter 1 has covered the introduction part and basic history of the Kashmir issue. The chapter has also explored continuity, gravity, and dilemma apart from policy option for the United States. Chapter 2 covers the whole history of US involvement in Kashmir Question till the Clinton Administration. The chapter has focused on various presidencies approach towards Kashmir issue. Chapter 3 presents the insight of Bush administration stand and approach on Kashmir issue. The chapter also focused on the Kargil War and 9/11 attack on US and Bush commitment to eradicate terrorism from world. Chapter 3 also focused on US-India nuclear deal and “Bush policy of dehyphenation”. Chapter 4 examines United States focus on bilateral relations leaving behind the Kashmir question in cold bag. The chapter also discuss US pivot to Asia policy and where India fits in the policy a part from increased military engagement and arms trade. Chapter 5 is conclusion.

The two events in recent history has impacted much in US-India relation and has changed US approach towards Kashmir to some extent were (A) the Kargil War of 1999 and (B) the terrorists attack on world trade centre by Al-Qaeda.

The Kargil War shocked the American leadership. It came just after Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s peace mission to Lahore that resulted into his signing the

Lahore Declaration for peace with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. The Prime Ministers were getting global applause for their path-breaking efforts for peace and the United States President Bill Clinton was one of the happiest American leaders cheering them and appreciating their ‘courage and leadership’. Then Kargil happened. The timing of the Kargil War has changed United States perception of Pakistan, which was a close ally of United States for little less than fifty years.

The Pakistani intruders having automatic assault rifle and grenade launchers crossed the Line of Control (LOC) in Kargil, the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir with a view to capture the territory and destroy National Highway 1 with a view to break linkages between valley and rest of Northern Kashmir. It was a serious violation of the 1972 Shimla Agreement: where the two countries had signed a pact to respect sanctity of LOC after their last war over Kashmir in 1965 and later India Pakistan war of 1971 too. Clinton was so upset that he criticised Pakistan, ordering not to support militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from the Indian Territory.

This was a significant change in US approach. Later, Clinton in his autobiography ‘My Life’ described Sharif’s moves as ‘perplexing’ and stated that “by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the bilateral talks”. He appreciated the Indian restraint for not crossing the Line of control and intensifying the conflict into an all-out war. India’s diplomatic and military maturity actually won the global appreciation. Apart from G8, European Union and other organisations like ASEAN, China - -a long-time ally of Pakistan -- also insisted Pakistan to withdraw the Pakistani forces to the pre-conflict positions along the Line of control and settle border dispute peacefully.

Kargil crisis is considered to be the first major incident that had clearly brought a significant change in American stance towards the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir dispute. United States for the first time since 1947 had shifted its ‘tilt’ away from Pakistan and since then United States has been seeking balanced approach towards both India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue. Clinton later stood by his successor George W. Bush while the latter led a traumatized American nation to pay homage to those killed in

the 9/11 terror strike. The deadly attack challenged the United States aura of invincibility on their own soil and contributed to transformation of the US perception of the sub-continental realities. The United States became sympathetic to the Indian dis-comfiture over the threats of terrorists and strongly condemned the brutal attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar and the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and the 26th November attack on Mumbai. It put the armed militant bodies playing havoc in Kashmir on the ban list. Quite a few of these organisations had their base in Pakistan.

A greater strategic partnership between United States and India was formulated with the Bush Administration removing the major thorn in US-India relation, nuclear non-proliferation. The United States India nuclear agreement signed in 2008 facilitated nuclear cooperation and there by lifting a decades old US moratorium on nuclear trade with India. The Bush Administration also enforced the policy of de-hyphenation with regards to India and Pakistan. Its result was successful in carrying conviction with the two states in the extent of avoiding any serious possibility of another war between India and Pakistan after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. It also entered into new comprehensive security partnerships with the India while choosing Pakistani as an important ally in the US war on terror and for countering nuclear proliferation. Because of its geo-strategic location and proximity to Afghanistan, America had no other option to enlist Pakistan a “strategic partner” in the global war against terror.

The Kashmir factor in US-India relation: A Study of Bush and Obama Administrations is based on hypothesis that US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan shaped its approach towards Kashmir issue can be justified because as long as Pakistan is an ally in the war against Al Qaeda, it will use its bargaining chip to garner US support on Kashmir, in return for Pakistan’s help to fight in Afghanistan. Choosing Pakistan as an ally in war against terrorism has been a great strategy for America. The Pakistan’s geographical position as it has a very long border with and Afghanistan which is most essential for American war on terror as well as for facilitating Afghanistan to recover from the debris. United States has a very useful supporter in Pakistan for one more reason as well. Pakistan being an Islamic country and having it as a partner has helped the US maintain its credibility in the Muslim world. Since 9/11, the United States has taken pains

to lure the Islamic world and has shown a better understanding of religion. Very recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has stressed the importance of working with leaders in the Muslim community as an important part of the battle against terrorism and Pentagon has suspended a course for US military officers teaching that America's enemy is Islam in general, not just terrorists. So be it Soviet invasion in Afghanistan or American war on terrorism after 9/11, the Afghanistan-Pakistan angle has great bearing on United States approach towards Kashmir.

The second and last hypothesis of this research is the Obama Administration focussed more on enhancing bilateral relations with India thereby avoiding take a decisive position on the Kashmir issue. This hypothesis can be justify as President Obama has focussed more on bilateral relation than on Kashmir issue by analysing the statistics of improvement in commerce and defence relationship apart from US support to India for permanent support in UNSC and MTCR and seeking a major role for India in the "Pivot to Asia" policy.

Trade and commerce form a crucial component of the rapidly expanding and multi-faceted relations between India and U.S. From a modest \$ 5.6 billion in 1990, the bilateral trade in merchandise goods has increased to \$ 66.9 billion in 2014 representing an impressive 1094.6% growth in a span of 24 years. India's merchandise exports to the U.S. grew by 3.37% from \$ 6.72 billion during the month of February 2014 to \$ 6.94 billion during the month of February 2015. US exports of merchandise to India grew by 8.75% from \$ 2.95 billion during the month of February 2014 to \$ 3.21 billion during the month of February 2015. India - U.S. bilateral merchandise trade during month of February 2015 was \$ 10.15 billion.

The United States and India share very strong and bolstering commercial and economic relationship, driven by the business policy in both countries. In January 2015, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi decided to elevate the bilateral commercial and economic partnership by starting the first-ever United States-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) which was held in Washington, DC later. The S&CD is the signature, annual forum for policy discussions between the United States Government and the Government of India. The United States and Indian Governments are using this

medium to further advance the shared priorities of generating economic growth, creating jobs, and strengthening the middle class of both the countries.

The shift in US foreign policy towards Kashmir has been influenced by the bilateral relations of United States with Pakistan, India and even China. It has been affected by the politics of the Cold War. When India tilted with Soviet Union, United States always supported Pakistan; even when Pakistan initiated war, United States supported Pakistan and levelled the victim with the aggressor. But the collapse of USSR changed international environment, cold war rivalry and grouping ended, India opened its Market, both the 'estranged democracies' swiftly changed their policy and started strengthening their bilateral relations. As a result of that United States also became sensitive to the Indian concerns on the Kashmir issue and change was seen in the US stand on the Kargil crisis, when United States for the first time took a stand against Pakistan based on 'merits of the case'.

The US failed to pressurise Pakistan to stop sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir because United States has its own compulsion in maintaining good relationship with Pakistan to get Pakistan's support on its war against Terrorism in Afghanistan. It may be seen as dual standard on it fight against terrorism. A senior Democrat Lee Hamilton, who was vice-chairman of the 9/11 Commission stated that it is in United States interest to resolve the Kashmir issue, which would require tough diplomacy. But US cannot force resolution or act as a party party to the dispute and can only encourage both the countries to resolve bilaterally. "We certainly need to work with Pakistan and India to resolve the Kashmir problem. The United States can't resolve that, but we can encourage the two parties to address it. If the Pakistanis continue to move troops from the Afghanistan border towards Kashmir, as they recently did after the Mumbai terrorist attack with a portion of their troops, that's going to make the matters more difficult for American interests in Afghanistan, because we reduce the Pakistani effort to control those tribal areas".

The basic differences between Bush and Obama policy on Kashmir is that Bush Administration had been very tough on terrorism and changed United States stand on Kashmir issue and for the first time United States had acknowledged the Indian concern of Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir and had come strongly against Pakistan on

Kargil war and directed Pakistan to vacate Indian territory. Although Obama Administration has not changed the stand taken by the Bush Administration instead Obama Administration has given more priority to bilateral relationship and expanding Trade and Defence relationship.

Is US is serious to resolve Kashmir issue? After 9/11 on United States, a physiological fear has emerged in Americans about the Indian sub-continent that it is becoming a fertile sanctuary of terrorists posing a big threat to America's peace and security. This has also retained United States interest permanent in the Kashmir dispute, although, no direct linkages were found between the Al Qaeda and the terrorist groups in Kashmir exist. But Islamic groups operate on either sides of the Line of Control.

There is another valid reason, why US will retain its interest in Kashmir. With the existence of a very complex global network of terrorism and their possibilities of obtaining the deadly nuclear weapons, America being the sole superpower, it cannot leave the dispute like the long-standing Kashmir dispute exist too long or become grave which might adversely affect American national security and interests. Nevertheless inconsistency has been the only consistent feature of US approach towards Kashmir

As far as Kashmir dispute is concerned United States has developed a consistent refrain that it will not involve directly in resolve dispute but act as facilitator. US maintain that it is to be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan to their satisfaction. In the meantime it keeps on pushing India and Pakistan towards exchanging their views in bilateral dialogues howsoever hostile these may be. This has helped the US in achieving its immediate objective of averting a war between the two South Asian neighbours - at times an armed confrontation has appeared to be a real possibility and fear of developing into nuclear conflict too.

A war between India and Pakistan at this stage can have an unsettling impact on the current US agenda in South Asia. The US, therefore, is being extremely watchful in protecting its own interests while taking care of the sensibilities of both India and Pakistan in the interest of preventing outbreak of war.

The recent trends shows especially, during Obama Administration that US in no more interested in resolving Kashmir issue instead managing peace and averting chances of direct conflict between India and Pakistan. United States is focussing more on bilateral relation between United States and India especially in trade and commerce field leaving behind the Kashmir issue in cold bag. Since war against terrorism is still on in Afghanistan and in Afghanistan United States can do nothing without help of Pakistan and recent Americas pivot to Asia policy and India best fitted in United States pivot policy puts constrains on United Stated taking tough stand on the Kashmir issue, its Americas compulsion to balance between both.

It seems that United States during Bush and Obama Administration evolved a policy of not addressing the Kashmir issue so long as both countries respect the LOC agreement of Shimla Accord. It is only when the LOC is violated then American influence, diplomacy and power are used to restore peace in Kashmir and balance both India and Pakistan. Hence, otherwise Kashmir is non-issue for America.

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