


U.S. - IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE 2009

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of requirements for award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Upma Kashyap



United States Studies Programme

Center for Canadian, United States & Latin American Studies

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi 110067

2016



CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067, INDIA

July 22, 2016

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled " **U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations, Since 2009**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

Upma

UPMA KASHYAP

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Abdul Nafey

Prof. Abdul Nafey
Chairperson, CCUS&LAS

Chintamani Mahapatra

Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra
Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra for his guidance. He has helped me with extreme support while writing my dissertation. I am thankful to him for his patience and revising my work constantly to make this research successful. I am grateful to him for his motivation and advice that helped me while carrying out the research.

I am thankful to other faculty members Prof. Vijayalakshmi, Prof. Raj, Prof. Ray for helping me understand the American Politics and helping me gain knowledge about my subject.

I extend my gratitude to my parents, Sh. Singhi Ram Kashyap and Giani Kashyap, my sisters Anupama and Kamini who were always there by my side. They have helped me in writing this dissertation and fulfilling my needs whenever the need arose. Their emotional support has been one of the greatest support while going through the most important phase of my life. I am thankful to my family and friends for giving me constant support and encouragement.

Upma Kashyap

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Preface **i-iv**

Review of Literature **v-xi**

Chapter.1. Introduction Over view of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy **1- 31**

Chapter.2. Evolution of Iran’s Nuclear Program **32-59**

**Chapter.3. U.S. Response To Iran’s Nuclear Program: Domestic
and Regional Factors** **60-82**

**Chapter.4. U.S. Role in Nuclear Negotiations: Bilateral and
Multilateral Moves (P5+1)** **83-102**

Chapter.5. Conclusion **103-105**

References **106-115**

Bibliography **116-122**

PREFACE

The Iranian nuclear Programme remains the centre of attraction for the international community since its inception. The programme has its implications, both for the regional and the global politics. It has been argued that for several decades, intensive track two dialogues have been under way between the Iranian and the Americans. The debate on Iran's nuclear programme revolved around the nature of Iran's nuclear programme mostly focusing on its civilian or military uses. Threat from Iran's nuclear program has been one of the most vexing foreign policy challenges confronting the Obama administration. The U.S.-Iran relations over the past three decades or more could be summarized as the two sides have developed an acquisitive capacity to 'miss' each other's moments of responses. The track two diplomacy completely failed in its case. Deal was reached as a result of the current track one process.

Those opposing the nuclear talks and indeed any detente between the West and Iran persistently attacked the negotiations and the emerging terms of a final deal in an attempt to derail the process. Spoilers from the U.S., Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia lobbied against the talks with a common goal to kill the diplomatic effort. The most vocal and tangible threats aired in the U.S. Congress particularly through pressure from the Republican Party and the Israeli lobby. In March 2015, the Republican Party made a highly controversial invitation to Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared that deal –in- the making is a existential threat to a Jewish State. Israel's leaders were in the duty to take threat seriously and they have invested a vast fortune, with the considerable assistance of the United states, in ensuring that the ability to deter Iran or if necessary, pre-empt it from acquiring nuclear weapons. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran's nuclear program, placing it at a breakout capability for the next ten to fifteen years has no reason to pre- empt for the time being. If it did could only hope to set back Iran's nuclear program by some two years for less than provided for in the process, free Iran of all its obligations under the agreement and earn Israel the opprobrium of the other powers that support the deal.

Existing literature encompasses the debate over nature of Iranian nuclear program, centrifuges, whether U.S. should use military strike or negotiations to constraint Iran's nuclear program. Efficacy of U.S. sanctions on Iran has also been

dealt with. Writers have highlighted the parameters of the Iran nuclear deal. But analysis of the nuclear agreement is ambiguous. They fail to tell us what was brought on table by the negotiators of the two countries. How was the deal framed? They have over look into the cost and benefits for the U.S. of the negotiations bargain. How did the talks begin? I intend to analyse whether deal is a good deal or a bad deal. If good, then who benefits from it and how?

A clear picture of various stages of negotiations is not brought about. Further research is needed in U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations , and the U.S. role in shaping the final deal between P5+1 nations and Iran. This would connect the contemporary developments like U.S.- Iran detente, U.S. engagement with Iran to the previous in depth research on complicated U.S.-Iran relations. The effort of this research is to discuss the entire cycle of negotiations, including the obstacles that came during negotiations. Analysts have highlighted the very objection of the Israel to U.S-Iran deal. But rarely have discussed the Israel's influence on negotiations, in spite of being out of P5+1 nations. It is not clear as to how Israel rhetoric influenced the negotiations and finally shaped the nuclear deal. Did it go with the U.S. national security interests or against their interests?

The study focuses on the negotiations between U.S. and Iran and the outside influence of Israel. The U.S.- Iran nuclear agreement was signed on July 14, 2015. It is a very recent development and one of the most important diplomatic issues ever in the U.S. foreign Policy. This research has attempted to throw light on areas that hasn't been studied much like demands that were kept on the negotiation table by both sides. What was U.S. role during negotiations between P5+1 nations and Iran? Does this deal achieve one of the critical security objectives? Though many documents of negotiations would be classified, yet this research discusses who all were involved in decision making from Iran's side? Whether track one or track two diplomacy worked in this case of negotiations? Why much of the rhetoric is around Israel's objection to the deal or how they strongly oppose it.

Further, this research has looked into issues which were very recent and where existing literature has been ambiguous. The aim is to answer questions like why Israel has been so vocal about this nuclear agreement. Could Israel influence the U.S. or Iran at all during the negotiations? Did it influence at all? Did secretary of state John Kerry

fail to satisfy Israel? The aim is to analyse how Israel opposition over the U.S –Iran nuclear negotiations affected the final shaping of the deal. Further, how this has implications for U.S.-Israel position in the Middle East. What is the rationality behind Israel rhetoric and propaganda over the Iran nuclear agreement? Will Republicans let Obama get away with abandoning Israel like this? In which direction is the U.S.-Israel bilateral relation going? Was Iran divided or unified over the nuclear agreement? This research has tried to contribute on the debate of historical, ethical and theoretical issue of ethnic identity group influence on American foreign policy. In a nutshell, effort has been to analyse President Obama response to nuclear program and U.S. policy towards Iran between 2009 -2015 under Obama’s administration. Does he had a clear policy at all or he just made a diplomatic effort to resolve the Iran nuclear issue and intended to resolve Palestine-Israel conflict. Emphasis was to be on U.S. perspective on this deal. This study is an effort to expand knowledge to the U.S.-Iran relations, Iran’s nuclear program and to understand one of the most important U.S. foreign policy challenges today.

Research Methodology

The methodology applied in the study is of qualitative in nature, the qualitative analysis is used as an inductive method. It made an attempt to examine the situation without imposing pre-existing notions on the diplomatic negotiations. Inductive analysis helped in understanding the multiple interrelationships and dimensions that emerge from the data. Israeli opposition to the Iran nuclear negotiations was taken, as an independent variable and nuclear negotiations between Iran and P5+1 nations was dependent variable. The information was used from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source included materials like Presidential speeches, Congressional hearings, official records or documents, which were reviewed and analysed. The secondary sources include books, journal articles , newspaper reports and magazines. Internet sources were also used for this research. Based on the study this research intended to test the three hypotheses:

- 1) The Obama Administration’s success in concluding the nuclear deal with Iran contributed to weakening of the Israel lobby in the United States.

2) Israel's opposition to nuclear deal during the negotiations between P5+1 nations and Iran strengthened the U.S. bargaining position.

3) Political upheavals in West Asia and the need to engage Iran accounted for the reduced influence of the Nonproliferation lobby in the U.S.

Chapters

Chapter one is *Overview of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy*, gives an overview of the U.S. non-proliferation policy with emphasis on the recent developments relating to this policy. It begins with the brief history of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. It examines the evolution of the U.S. non proliferation policy, which is centered on NonProliferation Treaty.

Chapter two i.e. *Evolution of Iran's Nuclear Program* discusses the evolution of the Iran's nuclear program,. Further assess the factors which accelerated the program and rationality behind the nuclear program.

The third chapter *U.S. Response to Iran's Nuclear Program: Domestic and Regional Factors* focuses on U.S. policy response to Iran's nuclear program. It tries to explain various domestic and regional factors that have influenced the foreign policy making toward Iran.

The fourth chapter *U.S. Role in Nuclear Negotiations: Bilateral and Multilateral (P5+1)* deals with the P5+1-Iran nuclear negotiations(2009-2015). It examines the role of U.S. and Israel in the process of P5+1-Iran negotiations. Finally the chapter discusses the Iran nuclear deal 2015 in detail.

The fifth and the final chapter is the *Conclusion*, this chapter sums up all the key findings of the research.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Iranian nuclear Programme remains the centre of attraction for the international community since its inception. The programme has its implications, both for the regional and the global politics. Fast changing international politics has Converted this program from a non-negotiable issue to a matter of diplomatic resolution (Khalid and Hashmi 2014) . It has been argued that for several decades, intensive track two dialogues have been under way between the Iranian and the Americans. Some have primarily focused on general discussion trying to enhance mutual political understanding and open channels of communication around the general issue of relations between the two countries. Others have primarily focused on specific problem solving around the nuclear issue (Jones 2014) .

Monika Chansoria provides a detailed history of the Iranian nuclear Policy right from the time of Iran's acquaintance with nuclear science and technology until the post cold war period when the Iranian nuclear crisis came to the post cold war period, when the Iranian nuclear crisis came to the forefront and has continued to grab international limelight since then. She demonstrates how Iran since 1950's has actively soliciting the support of United States of America, France, Germany, Soviet Union (Russia) , and China depending upon the nuclear resources both technical and personnel (Chansoria 2009).

Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich also review the history of Iran's nuclear programme, its technical nuclear capabilities and their potential military applications, comparing developments under the regime of the Shah to those of the Islamic Republic, then the article discusses Iran's intention by counter posing Iran's declaratory policy, including its economic and political rationale for nuclear power and nuclear fuel production and statements against nuclear weapons, against evidence of suspicious actions provided by western intelligence assessments and IAEA reports. The paper further argues that dealing with the ambiguity is the greatest political and policy challenge faced by nations concerned about a potential nuclear threat from Iran. A closer analysis of Iran's nuclear history reveals that the revolutionary regime's current civilian nuclear plans and their public justifications are not unlike those of the proWestern regime of the Shah. There are many reasons to be sceptical of Tehran's nuclear activities. Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions may remain ambiguous for the

indefinite future but even that nuclear twilight creates dangers (Barzashka and Oelrich 2012).

On the other hand minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif says Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons not enhance its security. Iran does not have the means to engage in nuclear deterrence, directly or through proxies against its adversaries. Furthermore, the Iranian government believes that even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the country's security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iran's conventional military advantage (Zarif 2014).

The existing literature on Iran's nuclear programme revolves around the debate over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Whether it is for purely civilian or military purposes? The next segment of literature prior to the negotiations includes the debate in United States as to whether America should attack Iran and attempt to eliminate its nuclear facilities or find a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis? Matthew Kroenig tells us why nuclear armed Iran is very dangerous? He argues that attempting to manage a nuclear armed Iran is not only a terrible option but the worst. What to do about Iran's nuclear program have been one of the most vexing foreign policy challenges confronting the Obama administration (Kroenig 2012). Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Evan Braden Montgomery raises questions like, can diplomatic efforts and sanctions prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons? Even if Iran and Israel managed to avoid a direct confrontation, Iran's nuclear weapons would remain a persistent source of instability in the Middle East. If Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, would a containment strategy preserve stability in the Middle East? Some analysts including Linabay and Takeyh argue that although Iran can be aggressive at times, it also regulates its behaviour to avoid provoking retaliation. Since the regime is sensitive to costs, the logic goes it recognizes the dangers of escalation; hence; containment would work. When it comes to addressing the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program there simply are no good options.

The recent laborious multilateral negotiations between Iran and P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany has vacillated from disappointing to constructive in the ultimate efforts, has also been a process that

both have a deep vested interest in solving peacefully, as war could ignite potential catastrophic consequences such as regional war and further nuclear proliferation, with incalculable costs to the global oil market and transit. It is also worth noting the shift of language concerning Iran in America's strategic community, evolving out of a militaristic approach to one laced with the rhetoric of promoting 'responsible' behaviour (Edelman et al. 2011). At the same time United States under both the Bush and Obama administration did not opt for a military strike is that ' haulers' who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, secretaries of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish 'pullers'. What the nation does is sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over others aptly describes the making of U.S. policy towards Tehran's nuclear programme in recent years. America's absence from attacking Iran's nuclear installations has been an 'intra-national political outcome' of a battle in which bureaucratic organisations opposing a military strike – the Pentagon, Joint Chief of Staff, Department of State and Intelligence community have prevailed over bureaucratic and political actors pressing for greater consideration of military options, (in the Bush administration) the office of Vice President Richard Cheney, members of Congress from both political skills combined to render him an extremely effective player on the chessboard on which Iran policy was shaped.

Additionally there are indications that the strengthened economic sanctions regime orchestrated by the Obama administration took a heavier toll on Iran than most experts had expected (Oren 2011). Similarly it has been argued that the Obama administration came into office with a sweeping call for a reshaping of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, a greater outreach towards the Muslim world, and a transformational strategy of how the U.S. engages with the international community (Sanati 2014).

Another writer points out that during Obama first term, the administration concentrated on putting in place a structure of sanctions before seeking a real engagement with Iran. The objective was to be in a position to put pressure on Tehran when the negotiations began. But the effect of his policy was to put American diplomacy in such a tight straight jacket that it could not engage Iran with flexibility and it missed the opportunity. A debate continues as to whatever this policy was the result of inaptitude out of control bureaucratic politics, or a sinister plot on the part of

some involved missing the moment deliberately. Writers argue that the U.S.-Iran relations over the past three decades or more could be summarized as the two sides have developed an acquisitive capacity to ‘miss’ each other’s moments of responses. The track two diplomacy completely failed in its case. Deal was reached as a result of the current track one process. History of Iran-U.S track two during this period is not encouraging (Jones 2014). Domestic opposition to Iran in the U.S. Congress led to obstruct Obama’s efforts. Republican Congressmen remained sceptical of Iranian intentions stridently opposing the relaxation of U.S. sanctions. In Tehran, Iranian hard-line conservatives were actually reluctant to embrace the United States. According to some then Obama authorised secret back-channel negotiations that opened the door to nuclear diplomacy and the promise of better relations between Tehran and Washington (Vakil 2014). In my view it remains unclear as to what has been Obama’s perspective about Iran’s nuclear program ? In Lausanne the minister of foreign affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini issued an official joint statement on 2 April 2015 outlining the parameters of a final nuclear deal agreed to by Iran and the P5+1. This was immediately followed by clarifications from U.S. President Barack Obama and White House regarding measures under the JPOA that will block Iran’s pathways to a bomb.

In her paper writer Ellie gives an outline of Iran nuclear deal. Further she argues that since the signing of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in November 2013, it has been evident that the biggest challenge to the negotiations is the sanctions package for Iran’s administration, and indeed President Hassan Rouhani’s campaign mandate, has been the immediate removal of sanctions and the reintegration of Iran into the global economy. Yet Europe and the U.S. want to phase out the sanctions relief over a decade and include ‘snap back’ provisions to return rapidly to sanctions if Iran reneges on its obligations.

The official statement on the Lausanne parameters was purposefully ambiguous on how and when sanctions relief would be provided (Geranmayeh 2015). This particularly research does not tell us what the U.S. role was in framing this interim agreement. Nicholas Burns, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School, opines that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a solid and sensible agreement. As the agreement will essentially freeze Iran’s nuclear research program. At the same time there are also

risks in moving ahead. The most significant, is that while Iran's program will be frozen for a decade, the superstructure apparatus will remain intact, much of it in mothballs (Burns 2015). Other analysts opposed the above argument maintains that the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action is fundamentally flawed in its construction. Even if Iran doesn't violate the JCPOA, over time, it will have patient pathways to nuclear weapons, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, access to heavy weaponry, an economy immunized against sanctions pressure, and a more powerful regional position where it can continue its destabilizing and aggressive behaviour. It remains unclear what will happen if the IAEA is not satisfied. What will be its path of recourse (Dubowitz 2015) ? Hence some have called the nuclear deal a sensible agreement while others say it is a flawed construction.

Iranian media coverage of any issue is usually as complex, contentious and varied as Iranian politics itself. For the nuclear deal, things have been surprisingly bland; criticism of the deal has been limited. In most discussions, media have been positive if somewhat tepid (Felci 2015). According to one of the chief negotiators repeatedly compared the agreement to a Rubric's cube, since every part depends on every other part (Sick 2015). Then aim of this research is to do an in depth analysis of this agreement. Previous research does give a hint to parameters of the deal but has rarely analysed the agreement in detail. Those opposing the nuclear talks and indeed any detente between the West and Iran , have persistently attacked the negotiations and the emerging terms of a final deal in an attempt to derail the process. Spoilers from the U.S., Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia have been lobbying against the talks with a common goal to kill the diplomatic effort. The most vocal and tangible threats have been aired in the U.S. Congress particularly through pressure from the Republican Party and the Israeli lobby.

In March 2015, the Republican Party made a highly controversial invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address congress on the Iran deal. A letter followed this from 47 members of the party warning Iran's leadership that the U.S. President would be unable to deliver on the emerging nuclear deal because Congress holds the authority to provide sanctions relief. These tactics aimed at spoiling the talks are motivated in part by a desire to prevent Obama from establish a foreign policy legacy (Gernmayeh 2015). Even before the United States and the other P5+1 member reached an interim deal with Iran in Geneva in November 2013, Israeli

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forcefully opposed the agreement. As Netanyahu put it, “ What was achieved last night in Geneva is not an historic agreement , it is an historic mistake.”

A number of the Israeli defense and foreign ministry officials also publicly argue this was a “bad deal” because it allowed Iran to continue with Uranium enrichment while sanctions began to ease. Indeed given the importance Israeli’s place on maintaining a strong U.S- Israel relationship, Iran’s open defiance of the United States in its public rejection of the deal received significant critique in Israel, although some argued that Netanyahu’s stance simply represented a necessary ‘bad cop’ role to bolster the West’s bargaining position with Iran. Other Israeli expert’s rhetoric might have been strengthened the terms of the interim deal (kaye and Martinin 2014). Literature is ambiguous about whether Israel played a spoiler during the negotiations or helped U.S. strengthened the nuclear deal. Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared that deal –in- the making is a existential threat to a Jewish State. Israel’s leaders have the duty to take threat seriously and they have invested a vast fortune, with the considerable assistance of the United States, in ensuring that the ability to deter Iran or if necessary, pre-empt it from acquiring nuclear weapons. But since this agreement will turn back the clock on Iran’s nuclear program, placing it at a breakout capability for the next ten to fifteen years has no reason to pre- empt for the time being. If it did could only hope to set back Iran’s nuclear program by some two years for less than provided for in the process, free Iran of all its obligations under the agreement and earn Israel the opprobrium of the other powers that support the deal.

Israel’s concern is greatest when it comes to what happens at the end of the fifteen year period when Iran will have a full fledged nuclear program rendered legitimate by its compliance with thus agreement and therefore not subject to sanctions. But will also by then have much greater visibility into Iran’s nuclear program, much greater ability to detect any attempt to switch from a civil to a military nuclear program and an American president will have all the current military capabilities and much more by then to deal with an Iranian breakout should they attempt one (Indyk 2015). Existing literature encompasses the debate over nature of Iranian nuclear program, centrifuges, whether U.S. should use military strike or negotiations to constraint Iran’s nuclear program. Efficacy of U.S. sanctions on Iran has also been dealt with. Writers have highlighted the parameters of the Iran nuclear

deal. But analysis of the nuclear agreement is ambiguous. They fail to tell us what was brought on table by the negotiators of the two countries. How was the deal framed? They have over look into the cost and benefits for the U.S. of the negotiations bargain. How did the talks begin ? I have made an effort analyse whether deal is a good deal or a bad deal. If good, then who benefits from it and how?

A clear picture of various stages of negotiations is not brought about. Further research is needed in U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations , and the U.S. role in shaping the final deal between P5+1 nations and Iran. This would connect the contemporary developments like U.S.- Iran detente, U.S. engagement with Iran to the previous in depth research on complicated U.S.-Iran relations. The effort of this research is to discuss the entire cycle of negotiations, including the obstacles that came during negotiations. The study also answers questions like who had authority to strike a deal from Iran's side. What does hardliners, conservatives, Ayatollah Khamenei and Hassan Rouhani in Iran think about the deal? What was the Tehran debate on U.S.-Iran agreement and their reaction to Israel rhetoric on deal ?

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

Introduction

The stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world and the ability of statesmen to prevent their use have been crucial to global security since the advent of the atomic age in 1945 (Diehl and Moltz 2008). Constraining the acquisition and use of the nuclear weapons has been one of the most ambitious effort ever made by the international community (Perkovich et al. 2007). “ Scott Sagan opines nukes are not just tools of national security, they also serve as normative symbols of modernity and identity” (Sagan 1977). The United States has played a major role in global nonproliferation affairs. In fact, nonproliferation of nukes has been a primary objective of American foreign policy. The end of World War II came with two path breaking inventions; the first was the atomic bomb and the other was the V-2 rocket the preliminary version of today’s inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This could send nuclear warheads across the globe in half an hour. “ Describing the role of bomb, strategist Thomas C. Schelling wrote during the Cold War : Deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on the threat of military defeat (Diehl and Moltz 2008).” “ Waltz (1981) said that nuclear weapons became popular in no time, the new weapons made strategies for preventing war cheaper and much more credible than earlier policies of deterrence with conventional forces. The then two superpowers, namely United States and Soviet Union grew conservative about war rather than opportunistic and aggressive. These weapons in turn, were a positive and stabilizing factor during the Cold War (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

Since 1945 or after U.S. bombings of two cities of Japan; Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many generals, nuclear scientists and politicians have debated the horrors of advancement in weaponry and weapons race in the atomic age. Between the 1950s and the end of the Cold War, U.S. grew started debating the worst-case scenarios, the global wreck that would result from unlimited nuclear warfare between the two rivals, each assisted by their nuclear armed allies. The threat of nuclear proliferation leading too vast build-up of arsenals and arms races prevail even today. A 1983 study for the World Health Organisation revealed that 1.1 billion people would out rightly perish if

a nuclear war involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, china, and Japan breaks out. Studies have indicated that a megaton nuclear explosion fireball would grow too two across and set-off enormous secondary fires. Anyone caught in open with 9 miles of ground zero would receive third – degree burns and would result in mayhem, throwing rescue efforts off the wind and making military defenses ineffective (Margulies 2010). Nuclear explosions create radioactive debris that continues to poison and kill people for decades to come. Such explosions release radioactive isotopes into the atmosphere, whereby they can enter the food chain and cause deadly disease like cancer, contaminated water and wind would carry poisonous radiation to neighbouring countries, causing sterility and birth effects.

In a case of ‘limited’ nuclear war, nuclear explosions would lead to millions of deaths and create condition for mass starvation due to the destruction of affected country’s agriculture. A 1983 study suggested the dust resulting from nuclear explosion, combined with the spread of smoke in the atmosphere from nuclear fire could absorb sunlight, lowering the temperature of the earth by between one degree and five degree Celsius. The resulting nuclear winter would last for months and destroy world in an afternoon (Margulies 2010). Nuclear war jeopardizes the continuation of the society in a real and collective sense. “ Craig (2009) asserts a developed state hit by a nuclear attack will suffer the death of majority of its citizens, leaving survivor in the real “ state of nature” without healthcare, food, housing, law and order. Nuclear war not only endangers modern societies, it also incinerates the power of the state that would engage in it. The risks involved in the world’s stockpiles of nuclear explosive materials (NEM), nuclear explosive components , nuclear weapons include the dangers for the use of existing arsenals , possibilities of accidental or unauthorized use, the possibilities of deliberate use of nuclear weapons by their authorized possessors. The risks that existing stockpiles of weapons components will be the enablers of proliferation, existing arsenals use can provoke further destabilizing nuclear weapons developments (Committee on international security and arms control national research, 2005). The great powers joined hand together to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, as they were aware nuclear weapons posed threat to international peace and security (Kroenig 2014).

Since the advent of the atomic age, checking nuclear proliferation has been one of the fulcrums of the U.S. foreign policy. American nonproliferation policy hinges upon various assumptions about why and how the bomb might spread (Dueck 2012). Earlier, it seemed that any country that could acquire nuclear weapons and other countries not to begin their acquisition in the first place (Diehl and Moltz 2008). Six of the nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons had already acquired them by the time of signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Speculations regarding the future of atomic bombs after the Cold War and after the dispute in the Persian Gulf gave rise to questions like will the stockpile of nuclear weapons shrink or grow ? Will nuclear warheads remain in the hands of the few ‘privileged nations’? Will we ever have a world without nuclear weapons (Muller et al. 1994)? Since the signing of the NPT, only four countries have developed nuclear weapons and one, South Africa dismantled its arsenal unilaterally by 1991 (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

The extant global non-proliferation regime is centered on the 1968-NPT, it is a framework for the peaceful solution of conflicts, a part and parcel of the global order and serves the security objectives of all states desirous of peace (Muller et al. 1994). It enjoins the five recognized nuclear-weapons states (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation) not to transfer nuclear weapons, nuclear devices or technology to any non- nuclear weapons nation. The “nuclear-haves” are also obliged under Article VI of the treaty, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Nuclear- have-nots”, on the other hand, commit not to obtain or produce nuclear explosive devices or nuclear materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy, such as power generation to the individual safeguards agreement, inked between each of them and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under the deal, all nuclear materials in peaceful civilian facilities must be declared to IAEA, whose inspectors have routine access to nuclear plant sites. The IAEA also have the authority to conduct special inspections anywhere outside declared nuclear plant facilities (The nuclear information project 1-3 www. Fas.org). Challenges to the NPT increased in the era of globalization. The NPT was quite successful during the Cold War. It has faced unprecedented crisis of

credibility in dealing with states like India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and North Korea (Diehl and Moltz 2008). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought the fears of nuclear terrorism to the top of the list of international security threats. Sources reveal that terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda made efforts to obtain nuclear weapons (Margulies 2010).

The uproar over the nuclearization of Iran began in August 2002, when an exile group, the National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), disclosed that Iran had built nuclear related facilities at Natanz and Arak that it had not revealed to the IAEA. State-parties to the NPT (of which Iran is one), such agreement allows IAEA to supervise nuclear facilities and materials to make sure they are not converted for military purposes. The IAEA initiated enquiries into Iran's clandestine activities at Arak and Natanz in 2002. This probe and the information Tehran furnished post-2003 made it amply clear that Iran was involved in suspicious nuclear activities, some of which violated the safeguards agreement with the IAEA (Kerr 2012).

In such circumstances, the Board of Governors of the IAEA reports these findings to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The series of sanctions against Iran grew out of such a situation when the IAEA reported this matter to the UNSC in 2006 that eventually helped bring the recalcitrant nation to the negotiating table in 2013 (Kaplow and Gibbons 2015). A combined strategy of crippling sanctions and direct diplomacy was put in place by the Obama administration and result was the comprehensive nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (arms control.org 2015). The Permanent five powers, plus Germany and Iran agreed to a structure of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 2nd April, 2015 and the framework was finalized on July 14, 2015 (Katzman and Kerr 2016).

“ Kaplow and Gibbons (2015) argues that the recently completed deal between the P5+1 states and Iran would strengthen the sinews of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime. A strong deal will reassure worried-nations about the efficacy of the NPT regime and could alter and strengthen the IAEA safeguards in time to come. In the same vein, it would let Tehran to maintain its Uranium-enrichment capability, which may tempt other nations to nuclear infrastructure as a part of nuclear hedging strategy. They further say that a deal with Iran will legitimizes Iran's nuclear facilities

that were built covertly, violating some of the NPT commitments. These drawbacks of an agreement could endanger the overall credibility of the NPT regime and pave the way for nuclear pursuits for other nations.

This chapter intends to give an overview of the U.S. non-proliferation policy with emphasis on the recent developments relating to this policy. I begin with giving the brief history of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. It is essential to understand history of the above two, in order to analyze recent U.S.- Iran negotiations, evolution of Iranian nuclear program and America's Nonproliferation goals. This chapter is divided into various sections. First half would give a brief history of early scientific developments that led to making of an atomic bomb, race to develop the bomb which led to horrific nuclear war experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Further, how the thinking and strategy to control the spread of nuclear weapons evolved. Second part examines the evolution of U.S. non-proliferation policy, which is centered on Non-Proliferation Treaty. I intend to discuss whether existing U.S. Non-proliferation Treaty has been effective in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons? Has Nonproliferation regime been challenged by the threats? The next section is an exhaustive section of various issues and debates related to U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy. Next part critically analyses the various strategies U.S. has used over time to combat nuclear proliferation.

Lastly, I critically look at the U.S. Non-proliferation strategy in the Middle East with Iran in mind. The aim of this research is to answer whether the recent U.S-Iran nuclear deal undermined the Non-Proliferation Treaty? In other words did political upheavals in the West Asia and the need to engage with Iran accounted for the reduced influence of the nonproliferation lobby in the U.S?

Background and History: Early Scientific Developments

The nuclear age began with a rise in which the United States sought to develop nuclear weapons before its enemy did. In the 1930s, breakthroughs in nuclear altered a handful of scientists to the possibility of inventing an atomic bomb (Margulies 2010). Some scientists were excited about the prospect that nuclear energy could be used for purposes like naval propulsion and power generation. Simultaneously, scientists knew

nuclear power possesses a dark side also, the potent to unleash unprecedented explosive power for military uses. A major requirement for a successful nuclear fission, for both civilian and military uses was inventing a device capable of splitting the atom. Experimental physicists, like Ernest Lawrence of the United States first developed such concepts. This led to the construction of the first cyclotron at one of the famous American universities, University of California – Berkeley in the 1930s. The cyclotron sends effusion of protons at high speeds into the nuclei of uranium atoms, with the goal of splitting of neutrons and thereby altering the physical properties of the original material.

Hungarian scientist Leo Szilard elaborated the principles of a “Chain reaction” in 1934, one of the necessary processes required for a nuclear explosion. Western intelligence sources assumed that Germany under Nobel Laureate Werner Heisenberg had made considerable progress in nuclear weapons program by 1942 (Diehl and Moltz 2008). Several scientists like Edward Teller (1908-2003), Leo Szilard (1898-1964) and Eugene Wigner (1902-1995), had come to live in the United States in their flight from fascism in Europe. Their first thought that atomic bomb could be built, came after realizing that Hitler’s Germany had the knowledge to build one. For the Nazis to be in the sole possession of such a powerful weapon would be intolerable. So, in the year 1939, Teller, Wigner and Szilard decided to persuade the American government to develop the bomb first. It is said that they asked Albert Einstein (1879-1955) to assist them in putting forward their case. Einstein signed the letter that Szilard had written, addressed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882- 1945). The letter read out the future peacetime benefits of atomic energy of the potential as a weapon (Margulies 2010).

The threat that Nazi Germany might beat the allies with the use of this dangerous weapon pushed first the UK and then the US to pursue serious efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The two countries eventually combined their programs into the U.S. –led Manhattan Project (Diehl and Moltz 2008). It is considered to be one of the largest funded projects to date. According to one research published by Brookings Institution the cost of Manhattan project through August 1945 estimated \$ 20,000,000,000 (www.Brookings.edu). Under the scientific direction of professor J. Robert Oppenheimer from the University of California-Berkeley and in the

administrative supervision of Army Brigadier General Leslie Groves, the U.S. team successfully overcame the obstacles and produced the first atomic bomb in early 1945. They detonated this device in the predawn hours of 16 July 1945, at the Trinity site in Almagordo, New Mexico, creating a binding on the secret bomb program, those in charge felt pressure to use the bomb quickly.

Nazi Germany, that had threatened to dominate Europe and had motivated the U.S. and European scientists to build the bomb, surrendered on May 21, 1945. The main task left for America and its partners were to defeat Japanese Empire, as their forces had killed hundreds of thousands of Allied forces in Asia. Few scientists involved in the U.S. weapon program expressed reservations about using nuclear weapons against Japan on humanitarian grounds. As an alternative they suggested that a demonstration shot be scheduled to warn the Japanese and give them a chance to surrender first. U.S. President Harry S. Truman, face dilemma whether to drop a bomb, with large U.S. soldiers still fighting in the Pacific, on August 6, 1945 decided to drop two atom bombs nick-named “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” against two Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States eventually dropped “Little Boy” on Hiroshima on August 6 and “Fat Man” atomic bomb on Nagasaki on August 9, incinerating much of the two cities (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

Around 340,000 Japanese eventually succumbed to the dual-effects of the blast and radiation. The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) immediately called a meeting, including the People’s Commissar of Munitions Baris L. Vannikov and one of the country’s leading nuclear physicists ,Ignor Vasilyevich Kurchatov later known as the ‘ father of the Soviet atom bomb’ Stalin said

“A single demand of you comrades, provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provided the bomb it will remove a great danger from us.”

With Stalin’s inevitable decision, the nuclear arms race now had two participants (Margulies 2010:5). With these actions, the entangled politics of nuclear weapon production and non-proliferation efforts began in earnest (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

Francis Gavin (2015) expresses that in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons became the focus of postwar international politics.

Early efforts to control Nuclear Weapons

The early beginnings of the non-proliferation policy can be traced back to the World War II. During the war, it was essential to prevent the enemy from acquiring information, technology and material that would enable it to make nuclear weapons. In the early forties, U.S. Policy was based upon efforts to control rigorously the spread of nuclear information. One can say U.S. had policy of nuclear secrecy (Cowan 1979). After World War II, attempts were being made to bring the spread of nuclear weapons under international authority. In a first effort to make the United Nations the world's collective security system, the victors of the war decided to establish a UN Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The U.S. put forward the Baruch Plan, premised on the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which is till date the most far-reaching non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament proposal ever made (Muller et al. 1994). This report called for an international body to govern nuclear activities and safeguard nuclear developments under international supervision, in order to keep uses of nuclear energy only for civilian purposes (Diehl and Moltz, 2008).

It also called for controlling all sensitive nuclear material and facilities and ownership by an 'International Atomic Development Authority', which would closely observe all less sensitive nuclear research activities. The U.S. desired of maintaining its nuclear monopoly till the global security system was in place. The prospect of what might have become a protracted U.S. monopoly did not appeal to the USSR, which was itself secretly engaged in an intense effort to acquire its own nuclear arsenal. The Cold War was beginning, and Joseph Stalin may have feared that America would use its nuclear advantage as a means of coercive diplomacy. Thus USSR did not agree to the proposed Baruch Plan, faced by this impasse, the UN AEC could make no progress. The United States then adopted a policy of unilateral denial, the Mc. Mahon Act of 1946 put a constructive end to all nuclear partnership, even between U.S. the United Kingdom, chief partners in the Manhattan Project (Muller 1994). The Baruch Plan efforts were to put the United Nations in charge of the bomb. This plan

eventually died because of failure to reach a workable compromise for starting the process of international control (Diehl and Moltz, 2008). By 1949 Soviet Union and by 1952 Great Britain had developed nuclear explosives and other countries had established nuclear programs (Cowan 1979)

A major turn of policy came in 1953 with the announcement of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech. It offered collaboration of U.S. and other states in the field of civilian or peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Atomic Energy Act was revised in 1954, and provision was made in the Act for international cooperation where suitable agreements could be reached for such cooperation. This enabled the United States to reach agreements for cooperation in atomic energy matters with many nations both individually and collectively. President Eisenhower had mooted a proposal to create an international body with an aim toward a system of effective international supervision to observe diversion of nuclear materials or facilities from their peaceful use. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) grew out of this idea, and was established through bilateral agreements and the IAEA charters allow countries to retain fission material needed for their peaceful nuclear programs. All these agreements included provisions designed to assure that nuclear weapons or any other material will be used only as authorized and not transferred to third party nations. And bringing enriched plutonium and Uranium for nuclear weapons or any other military purposes is specifically forbidden. At the same time, Americans were the suppliers of the nuclear equipment's and technology. The U.S. was able to through IAEA, develop the safeguards systems and agreements, which are central to U.S. current policy (Cowan 1979).

A series of seminars were held at MIT Caltech, Harvard and the Rand Corporation among others in the 1950s and 1960s, a doctrine of 'limited use' explored confining nuclear weapons to the battlefield or to military targets. Strategists of both superpowers coalesced, on the concept of a mutual assured destruction as the means to ensure nuclear peace. Based on the assumption that both opponents were capable of surviving an initial attack and retaliate in full-force, the aim was to counter-balance threats effectively terrifying that neither opposite sides would conceive of actually invoking them (Kissinger 2014). The American Policy also encompassed furnishing financial assistance for foreign nuclear power development. Funds to

nuclear program were given in developing countries under The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to promote peaceful uses of the atom. Two important acts, the international security assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, made clear that such funds could not be provided unless the recipient country met various conditions, including acceptance of IAEA safeguards (Cowan 1979).

Evolution of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

In the late 1950s, U.S. Policy was the chief immediate cause of horizontal nuclear proliferation. United States was deploying nuclear weapons in Europe and relaxing its rule for transferring nuclear technology to allies to counter the Warsaw Pact's conventional military superiority over North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both United States and Soviet Union were conducting hundreds of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere causing damage to the environment. Smaller nations now started to worry about a possible war including nuclear one between the two superpowers. Irish foreign minister Frank Aiken put forth an idea to the UN General Assembly in 1959 to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. His proposal was eventually took shape into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which was proceeded at the conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1968 (Margulies 2010). Under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, Washington advocated Multilateral Force (MLF). The United States would have allowed under this plan its NATO allies, including West Germany, to maintain U.S. service personnel, NATO nuclear-armed submarines under the authority of the Supreme Command. Washington viewed MLF as a non-proliferation policy that would encourage Germany to voice in NATO'S nuclear missions, thus reforming requirements in Germany for an independent nuclear weapons capability. France, United Kingdom and Moscow were not in favour of MLF and asked U.S. to choose between the pursuit of the MLF and the smooth negotiations the NPT. Eventually, Washington chose nonproliferation and dropped the idea of MLF (M. Kroenig 2014). After many rounds of strenuous negotiations, the NPT was ready for signatures on 1st July 1968. The accord aimed to prevent the spread of hazardous nuclear weapons to other nation states (Kroenig 2014). This entente came in effect on 5th March 1970 and by 1971 the IAEA safeguards agreement for parties to the new contract i.e. NPT was adopted (Cowan 1979). The treaty recognized the five countries party to the treaty

would join as non-nuclear weapon states sacrificed their right to develop nuclear weapons in return of a NWS pledged for assistance of nuclear technology just strictly for civilian or peaceful purposes.

The five nuclear weapons states asked other nations to promise to further pursue negotiations in good faith towards eventual global nuclear disarmament. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the first five nations to sign and join the NPT in 1968. Despite, being recognized as NWS, China and France held back from inking the contract for over twenty-four years, eventually joined in the year 1992(Kroenig 2014).

The primary purpose of the treaty is addressed in some of its 11 articles, the first three articles address the treaty's basic aim of retarding the spread of nuclear weapons from nuclear weapons states to non nuclear weapons states and acquire technology to make weapons both directly and indirectly. Article II enjoins other nations not to ask for only assistance and manufacture or acquire the atomic bombs. Article III pledged the non-nuclear weapons countries to comply with a system of safeguards to make certain that fissionable materials are not diverted for military uses or to manufacture nuclear weapons. Article IV has a huge incentive for the parties apart from five nuclear weapons states. its first paragraph defend their 'inalienable rights of all the parties to the accord to the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, develop nuclear research without discriminating and in conformity with Article I and II of this accord.

Article V bounds all parties to share any potential benefits of 'peaceful applications of nuclear detonations.' Article VI says, nuclear weapons states are obligated to pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and finally must aim for complete nuclear disarmament. The other five articles are technical, emphasizes that parties are free too sign other regional agreements to limit nuclear weapons spread, describing the rules for signing, ratifying and amending the NPT. And also must mention the conditions for withdrawing from such agreement. The treaty scheduled a review conference to be held after twenty five years (Margulies 2010).

“ Dueck (2012) opines the Nonproliferation Treaty is framed upon the combination of security assurances and economic incentives which aim to prevent spread of the

dangerous weapons (Dueck 2012).” Despite being recognized as one of the nuclear weapon states, France did not sign NPT until 1992; South Africa which was pursuing nuclear weapons program allegedly with the help of Israel did not sign the contract until 1991; Cuba signed in the year 1995 but did not ratify until 2002. Brazil had not signed the treaty until 1998. India, Pakistan and Israel never signed NPT. Meanwhile, few NPT signatories such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and north Korea have said to violate the NPT (Margulies 2010).

In sync with the conditions of the NPT, on May 11, 1995 more than 170 nations attended the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) at New York in 1995(www.fas.org). The NPT at present remains the skeleton of the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime. Most of the countries in the world are party to the treaty and has been called one of the most successful international treaty to date. Despite predictions in the 1960’s that nuclear weapons would spread to many nations, by 2014 only nine states possessed nuclear weapons (Kroenig 2014). Nonproliferation treaty aimed at nuclear disarmament. In this regard, NPT was assumed as the base for an evolving and an important element of an inclusive disarmament effort. Its membership kept increasing over the years. Some countries that were enough scientifically and economically capable to become nuclear weapon state (NWS) chose not to go nuclear.

Nonproliferation Treaty shed light on aim to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Treaty has laid norms and system for nations how to move ahead if they decide to remain non-nuclear. These norms have been described as the NPT’S cpre success stories as they gave birth to other similar nonproliferation measures, namely the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), accord on nuclear safeguards and nuclear supplier group controls. Analysts point out most of the states joined NPT for economic and political reasons. The other reason behind joining NPT might have been related to national security. Nations predicted that only NPT regime would lay foundations for a wider nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament effort (Fahmy 2006).

The early success of the NPT regime could be measured by the number of states that had began nuclear weapons programs, but then dropped them and signed the

NPT as non- nuclear weapon states in 1968, for example Sweden, Yugoslavia, Norway and Switzerland. (Diehl and Moltz, 2008).

Dark Clouds over the Nonproliferation Treaty: 1970s

Few occurrences in the seventies had a profound effect on the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. (Cowan 1979). The smooth progress of the nonproliferation regime was dealt with a painful blow in 1974. India conducted a ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ (PNE). After Chinese bomb acquisition in 1964, India, which had recently had a border conflict with China in 1962, was bound to follow suit. According to realists, India had strategically maintained an ambiguous nuclear posture. India had build modern nuclear materials and components but did not test or deploy it weapons. This was a clever strategy to deter Chinese, at the same time not encourage neighbours for an arms race. After India went nuclear, Pakistan had to follow suit. Pakistan was now was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, being aware of hostile neighbours nuclear weapons and conventional military superiority (Sagan 1957).

This event had many disturbing aspects. India had used plutonium produced in a reactor that Canada had supplied in the 1950s under ‘peaceful uses only’ conditions, but without safeguards, in the backwash of the Atoms for Peace programme. The explosion was also the first demonstration that developing countries were approaching the ‘threshold’ of nuclear weapon capability, and a new term ‘threshold country’ was coined. The explosion also painfully exposed the failure of the NPT to achieve universality (Muller et al 1994). The Indian nuclear test of May 18, 1974 heightened American anxieties that a proliferation chain reaction would follow. Henry Kissinger stated a year later:

“The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the spectre of an era of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust.” (Chari 1978: 57)

“ George Perkovich, tin his meticulously researched book titled India’s Nuclear Bomb, concluded that domestic political factors compelled then Prime Minister Vajpayee to conduct nuclear tests rather than national security concerns. There was no

articulated strategic or doctrinal necessity. The decision was taken to show new government's stability and strength." Until 1974, the NPT Exporters Committee also known as the ZangerrCommittee, was an organization restricting international exports of nuclear technology. This group was a loose affiliation of nuclear supplier states that demanded nuclear technologies recipient states to accept safeguards and allow periodic inspections to prove their peaceful use in accordance with the NPT. But the treaty did not explicitly demand that other national nuclear facilities be accessible to international nuclear facilities be accessible to international inspection. India's test, as well as evidence that Canadian technology had been used to produce materials used in its secret weapon program, galvanized support for stronger mechanism.

In, 1974, a new organization called the Nuclear Suppliers Group brought together states from both inside and outside the NPT to strengthen export controls and safeguards requirements, which now included enrichment and reprocessing technologies. This requirement would help ensure that materials produced at facilities receiving international assistance, as well as other materials from unsafeguarded facilities, could not be made into weapons (Diehl and Moltz, 2008) Early U.S. policies in the post 1974 period focused upon strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards system. The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) was directed to study alternative fuel cycles for satisfying energy needs without recourse to broader technology or reactors recycling plutonium other stratagems were also employed. President Nixon agreed in 1974 to supply nuclear reactor to Israel and Egypt. According to analysts intention could have been initially to obtain ingress and later control over the Israeli and Egyptian nuclear programs. In 1976, Pakistan was offered the sale of 110 A-7 aircraft to dissuade her from buying a plutonium reprocessing plants from France (Chari, 1978) The nuclear technology and associated fuel cycle activities spread to an increasing number of countries in the seventies. One of the major events of the seventies was the Arab oil embargo. The aftermath of that traumatic experience was a reassessment and reexamination by the individual states of their energy needs and potential methods of fulfilling those needs. This event lead nations to think that nuclear power was essential to face acute shortage of energy sources in the seventies and eighties (Cowan, 1979).

President Carter assumed office with a strong personal commitment to nonproliferation (Chari 1978). Mr. Carter called for new lines of international action in three main areas: i) action to limit the spread of nuclear weapons ii) action to meet the energy requirements of all nations while limiting reliance on nuclear energy; iii) action to make proliferation of peaceful nuclear power safe. He called upon all nations to adopt a voluntary moratorium on the reprocessing plants until studies on methods of controlling the spread of nuclear explosive material could be completed. Carter also called for an examination of the question of plutonium recycles and delay of plutonium recycle and delay in startup of facilities for such recycle. Central to these initiatives was the April 7, 1977 Presidential decision to defer reprocessing and plutonium recycle and to delay development of the breeder reactor. (Cowan 1979).

“ According to Carter’s nuclear policy statement on April 7, 1977, the risk that components of the nuclear power process will be turned to providing atomic weapons” (Chari 1978).” Finally, the Carter’s administration successfully steered through the congress the complex nuclear exports, reprocessing approvals and other items. Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 (NPA) imposed statutory conditions to future cooperation in the nuclear field and a series of U.S. policies were designed to provide assurance of non-diversion for explosive or military use. The goal of the NPA was to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation while ensuring peaceful development of nuclear energy. Many nuclear supplier nations and nuclear purchasing countries expressed doubts about the United States as a supplier of nuclear technology (Cowan 1979). “John Walsh (1981) argues that under Carter’s administration U.S. nonproliferation policy paid attention to the fuel cycle for nuclear power reactors. The goal was to deter other countries from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and developing breeding reactors on the grounds that such developments, make weapons grade nuclear material, especially plutonium easily available.” During the 1970’s the main thrust of U.S. nonproliferation policies were to segregate the issues of vertical and horizontal proliferation, and direct herculean efforts against the latter.

President Reagan indicated that his administration will not go for controlling nuclear fuel and technology and shall rely merely on broad political and diplomatic initiatives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In contrast to Carter’s policy, Reagan outlined that “ the administration will not inhibit or set back civil reprocessing

and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk.” The reason behind the shift in policy was the President’s view that many U.S. international partners, interested in nuclear power had lost faith in the ability of U.S. to recognize their needs. The new administration aimed at reestablishing U.S. image of a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under appropriate safeguards.

“ Federation of American Scientists director Jereny J. Stone noted that the Reagan statement was unspecific; it was a rhetoric cover for all the desire to sell reactors abroad (Walsh 1981).” Proliferation pressures increased in South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, where military governments in Brazil and Argentina remained locked in a secret competition to become the first to achieve nuclear weapon status, drawing on technology provided by several western suppliers. Both states refused to sign the NPT, at the same time Pakistan was drawing technology from western suppliers and getting close to nuclear weapon status. Concerns in congress lead to the passage of the 1985 Pressler Amendment, which strengthened existing U.S., export control laws to require the president to provide certification each year that Pakistan did not possess a bomb and that U.S. assistance would reduce the possibility of Pakistan acquiring one. Despite enough evidence after 1985 of a Pakistani nuclear weapon program, however, the Reagan and Bush administrations continued to certify Pakistan’s non- nuclear weapon status under the new law rather than lose the U.S. base of support for aiding anti- Soviet resistance forces in Afghanistan. Finally, after Gorbachev’s decision to withdraw the Soviet military from Afghanistan in 1989, President Bush denied certification to Pakistan and terminated all U.S. aid (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

New threats to the Nonproliferation Regime in the 1990s

Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, collapse of the bipolar world in the early 1990s , America and Russia continues to cooperate Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to transfer the nuclear weapons on their territory to Russia. Now South Africa, Brazil and Argentina also joined the NPT as part of their national strategies to integrate with the global nuclear umbrella. United States unbalanced in power by the fall of the Soviet Union nearly became hegemonic. Analysts predicted that old cold war system

would be now replaced by democratization, globalized, rule-based system founded on market economies , all of which would lead to gradual disarmament.

“According to George Perkovich, in hegemonic systems, rule- making and enforcing tend to depend on the leader. Theoretically, as he puts it, a benevolent leader in a world system, can persuade other nations to follow rules by assuring them that advantage will be mutual and conflicts will be resolved fairly. Yet it depends on the nation states whether to believe hegemon or not. Historically, there has been a natural tendency of other nation states to balance the existing hegemon.”

By the late 1990s big powers such as China and Russia expressed their views for a multipolar system. Third world countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa had also developed desire and capabilities to rise as major powers. Iran, Iraq , North Korea, Libya and Syria started to deter intervention by the United States and defeat the nonproliferation regime and acquire nuclear weapons capability(Perkovich 2010).

The 1991 Iraq war led to the discovery of an advanced Iraqi nuclear weapons program, this altered the U.S. perception of the adequacy of the nonproliferation regime. (Harvey 2007). It adversely affected the international nonproliferation regime by exposing how far state could go toward building a nuclear weapon , despite being a member of the NPT. Inspections only of declared nuclear facilities had proven inadequate in the case of Iraq. As a result of suspicions raised during the Gulf war and the passage of special UN resolutions aimed at eliminating Iraq’s potential to manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) began a regular inspections of Iraq’s military and scientific research facilities aimed at certifying the full demolition of any WMD capabilities.

UNSCOM inspections revealed that Iraq had nearly developed a nuclear weapon and had also developed biological weapons, despite having allowed required IAEA inspections. Documents revealed that the creation of an extensive procurement network of dummy companies operating in Europe and the Middle East had allowed the Iraqi government to operate a secret nuclear weapon program in undeclared facilities inaccessible to the IAEA. These revelations led to tightening of export control mechanisms in many countries in Europe and to decisions under IAEA

Director Hans Blix to assert the IAEA's rights of special inspection in cases where it had reason to believe there might be important undeclared nuclear facilities in a country.

These new mechanisms were soon tested in the case of North Korea. Pyongyang had signed the NPT under Soviet pressure in 1985 but had delayed providing the IAEA with an official declaration of its nuclear facilities until 1992. Irregularities were discovered in North Korea's declarations by IAEA inspectors regarding refueling activities at a 5- megawatt electric research reactor in Yongbyon. After six inspections during 1992-1993, the IAEA took its report to the UN Security Council in early 1993 and demanded special inspections. North Korea responded by announcing that it would withdraw from the NPT, giving the required three months notice.

After exhaustive negotiations with the IAEA and the United States, North Korea suspended its withdrawal but continued to block inspections at several sensitive facilities. In the background of tensed environment where some U.S. observers had begun calling for preemptive attacks to prevent advancement of a North Korean bomb, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang and persuaded President Kim II Sung to accept the deal. The draft accord asked North Korea to halt its existing proliferation prone nuclear facilities in exchange for two proliferation resistant light water reactors and shipments of heavy fuel oil for energy production until the reactors could be completed. The two states codified this arrangement in the " Agreed Framework" of October 1994, after South Korea and Japan agreed to pay for the project by pledging some \$ 4 billion in loans. The deal averted a crisis but raised questions about the NPT's ability to prevent hazardous weapon proliferation within its own structure and processes, in a situation where a member attempts to undermine treaty restrictions, refuse to comply with special inspections or threaten to leave the treaty(Diehl and Moltz 2008).

These violations of the NPT and of IAEA Safeguards Agreements exhibited that regime is strong only if members abide by its obligations, including limiting the transfer of sensitive technologies when their and use is suspected (Harvey 2007). According to the terms of the NPT, more than 170 countries attended the 1995 NPT

Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) on May 1. 1995 in New York. Three key decisions and one resolution emerged out of NPTREC. First, the NPT was extended for an unspecified duration without conditions. Second, concept and purposes of nuclear Nonproliferation and disarmament were worked out to guide parties to the treaty in the next phase of its implementation. Third, an escalated review process was established for future review conferences. Finally, a resolution supported the establishment of a zone of free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (www.fas.org).

Around one hundred and seventy three countries confirmed their abandoning nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the five big powers to eventually eliminate their nuclear programs. All states took his decision with a belief that the treaty might not be perfect, it nonetheless made all of them safer , both individually and collectively. The number of nuclear weapons and the number of states possessing nuclear weapons were decreasing. But soon, the picture turned much darker.

Almost overnight, Nonproliferation regime built around the NPT was in danger. In May 1998, India announced that it exploded five nuclear devices (Perkovich et al, 2007). According to some strategists, the five nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998 were driven by security considerations. Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton after the episode state:

“We have an overt nuclear weapon state on over borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962....[T] hat country has materially helped another neighbour of our to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years. And for the last 10 years we have been the victim of unremitting terrorism and military sponsored by it in several parts of our country...”

India identified the need to deter Pakistan and China by testing its nuclear devices. However a group of another analysts argued that non- security factors also played a role. The Atlantic Council concluded that India's decision were embedded in the domestic political developments. The decision was driven by India's ambition for a great power status.

“ P.R Chari expressed , the ideology of Bhartiya Janata Party government was rooted on belief that the states power is equated in terms of military might and nuclear weapons” (P.R. Chari 2000:123). After two weeks , Pakistan also boosted of five nuclear explosions of its own. Neither country was a member of Nonproliferation Treaty. A nuclear war was now suspected in South Asia that could be devastating. It would pose a threat to the credibility of the NPT or to the broader nonproliferation regime. It would fail to stop two countries from crossing the nuclear threshold (Perkovich et. al 2007).

The U.S. perceived India’s May tests as a complete policy failure. It led then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to launch a series of talks with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh with a goal of bringing two countries more in sync with arms control and nonproliferation goals. Though this agenda did not meet success, both U.S. and India got engaged in a broader outline on the entire scope of their bilateral relations. Officials from both sides met around fourteen times in seven different countries over two year time period. The famous Talbott-Singh talks have been considered the most extensive U.S.-India agreement up to that time (Kronstadt 2007). India’s nuclear tests posed a direct threat to the Clinton’s nuclear nonproliferation policy. The United States imposed economic and military sanctions on India under the Glenn Nuclear Proliferation Act of 1994. At that time aircraft industry of the United States had significant contracts with India, attempts were made to make amendment to an omnibus appropriation bill. It gave the President the authority to waive most sanctions against India, including those under Glenn Amendments (Alam, 2013).

It was under the Clinton’s administration in the early 1990’s that Washington began negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear weapons programme. As American foreign policy evolved through the 2005, the talks moved from a bilateral format to the multilateral six-party talks. The six parties were Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and the United States. Negotiations reached some important agreements that laid out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization. Yet, implementing the deal was still problematic (Avery et. al 2015). Assessing the U.S. Nonproliferation Policy till 2000, President Johnson and

Nixon negotiated and implemented the nonproliferation treaty as a means to prevent the spread of and eliminate nuclear devices. Biological weapons were banned in the President Nixon Biological weapons Convention. Banning of U.S. missiles was a result of President Reagan International Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. President George H.W. Bush succeeded in banning the chemical weapons by negotiating Chemical weapons Convention. President Bill Clinton negotiated comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each agreement codified a new global norm and provided the international legal system for enabling existing nuclear weapons and preventing the institution of the new ones (Perkovich et.al 2007).

Nonproliferation Policy under the Bush Administration

The Bush administration arrived in office with an aim to combat nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation in fundamentally new ways. Few particular states, nuclear weapons and materials and terrorists were identified as the threat in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002). Bush 2002 National Security Strategy was out rightly criticized because, while it did not use the word ‘preventive war’ it redefined what is called ‘preemption’ to include what had previously been called preventive war (Margulies 2010).

“Squassoni (2006) says in the 2002 National Strategy Bush administration emphasized more on an activist approach. It pressed the need for counterproliferation apart from traditional nonproliferation measures such as diplomacy, threat reduction, arms control and exports controls. The interdiction of WMD started gaining more prominence. The U.S. new policy was to intensify their military, technical, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to prevent movement of WMD materials , technology and expertise to rogue states and terrorist groups (Squassoni 2006). “According to Perkovich et al. (2007) the Bush administration shifted the focus from eliminating weapons to eliminating regimes.”

The new administration ended the remaining U.S. sanctions on India and Pakistan post September 11, 2001 attacks stating its preferences for a new policy of

positive engagement (Diehl and Moltz, 2008). In the words of George Perkovich (2010)

“the new U.S. administration explicitly sought to buttress and assert U.S. hegemony, “dissuade” the emergence of a “peer competitor” and remove or neuter undemocratic regimes hostile to the U.S. power unchecked.”

The states aiming to balance the power of United States were inclined to resist treaty. The nonproliferation regime was challenged; U.S. acted aggressively in international system rather than cooperating with international actors. This reflected in the President Bush 2003 State of the Union Address. He called few regimes possessing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as the gravest danger to America and the world. He clearly changed his approach from ‘what’ to ‘who’. He expressed his willingness to overthrow the regimes, which he termed ‘axis of evil’. The three regimes were namely Iraq, North Korea and Iran. The ‘regime change’ was seen as administration’s new strategic innovation. Bush administration invented a new hostile and confrontational policy toward each of them (Difilippo 2006).

President Bush also emphasized on new methods of deterrence to make clear that the U.S. “*reserve the right to respond with overwhelming force*” to use WMD against its foes. The new administration doubled the budget for a national antimissile system in belief that anti missile system would protect against an attack and also would in itself deter aggressors from seeking nuclear equipment’s. Sources revealed that a new research on more usable types of nuclear devices for counterproliferation missions had also begun (Perkovich et.al, 2007). Bush administration selected few countries as America’s worst enemies, which were accused of their objective to develop nuclear weapons capability. The new policy relied on the threat or use of preemptive military strike and sanctions. These strategies were used against Iraq by the U.S. in March 2003 (Difillipo 2006). These new initiatives were perceived as a preference for ‘counter-proliferation’ over ‘nonproliferation’ that is for the use of force over other forms of coercion over negotiation, pre-emption over defense and deterrence, denial of WMD related technologies to would be recipients over the voluntary relinquishing of WMD capabilities for universally agreed rules and measure, and lastly strategic arms control was preferred for the maintenance and enhancement of nuclear capabilities

over nuclear disarmament. U.S. policy makers actively promoted the notion of a paradigm change by declaring that “[m]ethodically , piece-by-piece, the administration is reinventing the nonproliferation regime it inherited” thereby shattering obsolete thinking on arms control and nonproliferation (Fehl 2012).

Next, Bush administration sent signals to North Korea that it did not trust the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership nor did it like the ‘ Agreed Framework’. Washington voiced out that the DPRK has accepted to having a secret ‘yellow cake’ enrichment program designed to produce nuke weapons. U.S. had sensed that enmity would once again characterize U.S.-North Korea relationship. Pyongyang refused such accusations and responded by emphasizing it has not been developing any such weapons. North Korea withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003 (Difillipo 2006). In the same year news emerged that an international network of few scientists , engineers , middlemen from Germany, Pakistan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Dubai, South Africa and Turkey had for years been covertly selling nuclear bomb designs and necessary equipment to produce nuclear weapons. Buyers included the ‘axis of evil’ states, Iran, Libya and North Korea. It was evident that prevailing laws and export control enforcement practices failed in blocking these transfers of equipment’s. but some argue that many of the secret activities of Pakistani network headed by A.Q. Khan didn’t violate any existing laws. As Pakistan was and still is not a signatory to the NPT.

This episode highlighted the challenge of restricting non-signatories to NPT such as India, Israel and Pakistan to accept nonproliferation obligations. Though these countries broke no covenant in acquiring nuclear weapons materials, but did challenge the entire NPT regime (Perkovich et. al 2007).

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell put forward a convincing case for invading Iraq using controversial evidence suggesting that Iraq was pursuing WMD and nuclear weapons. Despite the lack of a specific UN resolution in support of the war, the United States, the United Kingdom and forces of allied states invaded Iraq in March 2003(Diehl and Moltz, 2008). The justification for this new type of “

counterproliferation warfare” had been established in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 2002 (Fehl 2012).

“Michael Glennon argues that shifts in international power, culture, and security interests had made the United Nations Security Council an arcane relic of another era: “lawful” and “unlawful” have ceased to be meaningful terms as applied to the use of force. New institutions reflecting new political realities would eventually replace the UN Security Council. The United States did indeed have all the authority it needed to attack Iraq, not because the Security authorized it, but because there was no international law forbidding it. It was therefore impossible to act ‘unlawfully’ (Malin 2012)”

Before the invasion of Iraq, new evidences had appeared that Iran, a non- nuclear weapon state and member of the NPT, had been less candid about its nuclear program. It was revealed that Iran had possibly two weapons related facilities that had not been disclosed to the IAEA: a heavy water facility at Arak and a pilot facility to produce highly enriched uranium at Nantanz. Later, the U.S. based Institute for Science and International Security published satellite photos of the suspected site at Nantanz, and a series of inspections by the IAEA confirmed that Iran has deliberately concealed several facilities that were active in its nuclear program (Diehl and Moltz 2008).

By mid 2003, Bush administration was pushing hard to internationalize its counterproliferation campaign against Iran. U.S. announced in 2005 NPT Review Conference that Iran has been involved in secret program to acquire nuclear capabilities. Bush was successful in getting the G-8 the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada Japan, France and Italy to issue a declaration in 2003, which stressed that Iran’s nuclear program can’t be overlooked. Tehran must unconditionally accede to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, a comprehensive inspections routine that would provide a high level of transparency to its activities (Difillipo 2006).

Concerned about the possibility that Iran, some terrorist groups or other proliferant states may have acquires nuclear and other WMD- related technologies, the United States announced a cooperative program called the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI) in May 2003 (Diehl and Moltz, 2008). PSI' long – term objective was to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferation will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile related technology. The Bush Administration has emphasized that PSI is an activity, not an organization, which seeks to develop new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on the land. PSI appeared to be a new channel for interdiction cooperation outside of a treaties and multilateral export control regimes. Critics pointed out that PSI framework applies only to commercial, not government transportation. Government vehicles cannot be legally interdicted (Perkovich et al 2007).

In December 2003, Libya an NPT member but long considered a rogue state because of its secret WMD programs announced that it would abandon its WMD efforts and associated delivery systems (Diehl and Moltz, 2008). This was a result of U.S. ‘persuasion’, ‘dissuasion’ and secret diplomacy efforts (Goldschmidt, 2007). On April 28, 2004 the U.N. Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1540, which required all states to “criminalize nonproliferation”, enact strict export controls and serve all sensitive materials within their borders (Squassoni, 2006). Resolution 1540 was widely debated as a new form of hierarchical rule making and potentially overstepping the Council’s competences (Fehl 2012). Yet it was a useful addition to the nonproliferation toolbox (Meier 2012).

In a major policy shift, the July 2005, U.S.-India Joint Statement notably asserted that, “ as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states”, and President Bush worked on achieving ‘ full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India.” As a reversal of three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, such proposal steered controversy and required changes both in U.S. law and in NSG guidelines. Some in congress expressed concerns that civil nuclear cooperation with India might allow that country to advance its military nuclear programs and be harmful to overall nonproliferation efforts (Kronsdat, 2007). This was the most blatant example of Washington’s disregard for International rules. Bush administration’s skepticism towards international law and multilateralism sparked a debate as to alternative approaches, such as coercive tools are better suited to prevent or roll back suited to the spread of weapons of mass destruction (Dasse and Meier, 2012).

The major nonproliferation objective of President Bush was to prevent terrorist groups and rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery (Harvey, 2007). Critics point out that the problem for the Bush administration was that its nuclear weapons charges against Iraq had not been shown to be accurate and its policy towards North Korea was erratic. Difilippo (2006) argues that Bush highly aggressive counterproliferation campaign invited serious challenges to the NPT regime.

Obama's Nonproliferation Policy

George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all made efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with varying degree of success, and with different political interests in mind. Barack Obama was the first post cold war U.S. President who raised the issue of nuclear abolition and aimed at reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Obama took office promising considerable change in U.S. nuclear weapons thinking, the centerpiece of which would be its very public desire to reignite the quest for 'global nuclear zero'. In other words President Obama intended to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy by gradually increasing the role of advanced non-nuclear weaponry to perform functions previously covered by nuclear weapons.

“Andrew Futter argues that the Obama administration's approach to nuclear policy has been framed by the changing nature of U.S. power and threats to U.S. security in the post 9/11 and possibly post unipolar world. This is because for the past two decades have seen a gradual shift away from the centrality of great power politics and nuclear rivalry with China and Russia in U.S. policy, towards a greater focus on terrorist nuclear threats, rogue states and this clearly reflected in Obama's approach to nuclear weapons policy.”

During a speech, in the Czech capital, Prague, in April 2009 President Barack Obama announced his “intention to seek a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons” and argued that new nuclear disarmament would become a defining part of his presidency. His speech acknowledged his quest for 'global zero'. Obama called for ‘ a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank,

so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation (Harvey, 2009).

Under President Obama, the United States has followed a nuclear nonproliferation policy which assumes that if the United States takes the lead by making important concessions on nuclear weapons, the rest of the world will follow (Dueck 2012). The President has demonstrated a strong tendency to utilize advanced conventional weaponry such as missile defense and Prompt Global Strike (PGS) programmes for roles previously performed by nuclear weapons (Adrewfutter). Obama declared in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review that the United States will neither develop new nuclear warheads, nor use nuclear weapons, biological or chemical attacks against any non-nuclear weapons state in compliance with the NPT. He encouraged the safekeeping of nuclear materials and engaged with Iran diplomatically on the issue of its nuclear weapons program (Dueck 2012).

On July 14, 2015, Iran and six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (The United States, France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and Germany) collectively known as the P5+1 finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ensured that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU) , and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran (Katzman and Kerr 2016). All of these policy components were intended to be part of an interlocking approach toward nuclear nonproliferation. The Obama administration aimed to prevent nuclear materials, and technology from falling into the wrong hands (Dueck, 2012). The aim of this research is to analyse the negotiations bargain between P5+1 and Iran. Has the deal weakened nonproliferation lobby in the U.S.? In spite of strong opposition from U.S. ally Israel; U.S. went ahead for the deal. This research in following chapters will deal with questions like how has this deal affected U.S.- Israel bilateral relation and the Israeli lobby in the U.S.

Analysis of the success and failure of the NPT

Whether the NPT has been a success or failure is a glass half-full/half empty dispute. Supporters argue that NPT has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and should be further strengthened (Margulies, 2010). The nonproliferation regime has scored a few significant successes in bringing about the negotiated disarmament of nuclear programs. Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and several post- soviet republics abandoned nuclear weapons programs that had made significant technical progress (Kissinger 2014). North Korea's attempt to cheat under the NPT was partly unsuccessful because of improved analytical capabilities on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran and Syria also failed to conceal illicit activities. The clandestine programs were ultimately detected because of verification tools and due to new interplay between international monitoring national intelligence and independent analysis (Daase and Meier 2012).

There are fewer nuclear weapons in the world and fewer nations with nuclear weapon programs than there were decades ago. The United States and Russia continue to work cooperatively to dismantle and secure nuclear weapons and materials left over from the cold war. Libya is an important success story and a model for other nations to follow as it verifiably dismantled its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities. Iraq is a model of different type, but no longer poses a threat to its neighbours. European Union has intervened to curb program in Libya and Iran and has adopted a unified nonproliferation strategy that includes requirements for full compliance with nonproliferation norms in all future trade and cooperation agreements. International cooperation has grown with more than dozen nations having formally joined the U.S-led Proliferation security Initiative to interdict illegal transfers of weapons and materials (Perkovich et. al, 2007).

On the other side, some critics argue that the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remained the treaty and that very few NNWS parties actually joined the NPT because it responded to their imminent national security concerns. The greatest testimony to the NPT's limited success was its response to the security threats of NNWS. States like India, Pakistan, and Israel, all non-nuclear in 1968, who felt the security need for a ' strategic' security defense, went nuclear. Other countries like, Egypt which joined

the treaty under the assumption that its membership would ensure adherence to the treaty by its neighbours, particularly Israel, remain dissatisfied members (Fahmy 2006).

The treaty proscribed but did not prevent signatories such as Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran from maintaining covert nuclear programs in violation of NPT safeguards or in the case of North Korea, withdrawing from the NPT in 2003 and testing and proliferating nuclear technology without international control (Kissinger, 2014). Nabil Fahmy (2006), the NPT regime became an unambitious static regime, solidifying prevailing inequalities and the discriminating status quo. Consequently, over the years, the treaty's credibility became increasingly eroded, and its usefulness became progressively diminished in light of changing international security paradigms and the global expansion of the scientific and technological knowledge required for the development of a nuclear weapons program, if not weaponization. In the recent years questions have been raised regarding whether the basic trade-off of the NPT –‘ a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons in return for access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology remains credible as a nonproliferation measure. NPT failed in areas such as South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East.

The reasons behind the failure of NPT include i) nuclear proliferation concerns are dealt with only when they mature, and consequently with a sense of urgency leading to ‘problem management’ rather than ‘problem solving’ approaches. ii) Nuclear nonproliferation concerns and efforts have been governed by shifting standards and driven by political and occasional parochial domestic considerations, when in the past the only criteria was ‘ no more nuclear weapon states and the nuclear ones should disarm’. Analysts argue nonproliferation failed in West Asia. Iraq was caught violating its safeguard and NPT obligations. Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities will continue to be a source of serious concern in the West Asia region (Fahmy, 2006).

The IAEA failed to expose Iran's nuclear weapons program until the year 2003. (Landua 2012) Under article X of the NPT, a nation may leave the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. In a letter addressed on March 21, 2006 to Secretary General Kofi Annan, Iran complained about the fact

that senior U.S. officials have publicly threatened to resort to force against Iran “ in total attempt of international law and the fundamental principles of the charter of the United Nations.” The letter conveyed in international forum Iran’s feelings of insecurity that called legitimizes withdrawal from the NPT. Also in a letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan on May 7, 2006, the Iranian Parliament threatened to force Iran’s government to withdraw from the NPT if pressure continued for Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities (Goldschmidt 2007). Iran has been vocal in asserting that Article IV gives it a right to undertake enrichment or any other fuel cycle actively. Article IV however does not refer to any specific technology, but rather more broadly to the use of nuclear energy. The right is not unqualified but it must be exercised in conformity with the treaty and for peaceful purposes. The lack of clear definition of peaceful purposes leave a grey area with respect to nuclear latency and nuclear hedging, problems which were not adequately foreseen or addressed at the time the NPT was negotiated (Carlson, 2014). Since 1974 disarmament under Article VI of the NPT remains the most contested issue. The issue of the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the West Asia (Baklitskiy, 2015).

The Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the most important foreign policy objectives of the United States. It can be said that, overall it has been a successful policy in promoting and sustaining International peace and security. Existing Nonproliferation regime is centered on the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonproliferation regime has not remained virgin, it kept evolving, modifying according to the new threats and challenges and remained credible.

Nonproliferation regime has come a long way. International and domestic forces as independent variables or factors have influenced the framework, functioning of the policy. Nonproliferation regime then as a dependent variable stretched, grew and adjusted itself to the new emerging challenges. It was strengthen during the early 1990s when many countries became signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. After some time India’s Nuclear Explosion was seen a policy failure in Washington. United States sort out new ways to deal with non-signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The use of nonproliferation tools can be seen since then, as United States used sanctions against India to bring it under nonproliferation regime.

U.S. has innovated many policy tools and strategies to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has looked outside the traditional nonproliferation treaty to limit the proliferation. The Nonproliferation policy was stressed in the era of globalization especially after the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the U.S. President Bush made major policy changes to the nonproliferation regime. His proposed U.S-India nuclear deal brought India indirectly under the ambit of the nonproliferation regime. Further Iran's nuclear program has been a major threat to the U.S. foreign policy interest. The North Korea withdrew from the NPT in the year 2003 opened the debate of the nations compliance to the NPT.

The 2015 P5+1-Iran deal can be seen as an effort to control the Iranian nuclear enrichment program. The following chapters of this research will cover the analyses of this nuke deal and help understanding how has P5+1-Iran deal affected nonproliferation lobby in the U.S. Has it withered away the decades old nonproliferation treaty? President Obama used political strategies like engagement and sanctions to deal with Iran's nuclear program. This chapter intended to show the journey from ' Baruch to Barack'

.....

Chapter 2

EVOLUTION OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Introduction

The Iran's nuclear program has been the source of one of the most protracted global crisis for more than a decade (Krause and Mallory 2012). It has been the cause of the resistance between Iran and the West, particularly the United States (Entessar 2009). Iran became a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. It demonstrated every possible complexity that a proliferator could offer: a revolutionary command with a nuclear program that has both civil and military capabilities, could not explain its nuclear program economically. Iran had a past of discreet nuclear activities, along with accusations of carrying out research indicating an interest in owning nuclear weapons. Iran had disputes regarding the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and also the reading of the Non – Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it had major confrontation with the allies of United States in the Middle East (Barzashka and Oelrich, 2012). Iran's nuclear program, the help it got from the West, and the stopping of such assistance, later the widespread concern Tehran's nuclear program generated and finally the recent nuclear deal between the Iran and P5+1 nations (United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, and Germany) has a long complicated history (Tarock 2006).

The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of the Iran's Nuclear Program. This chapter will highlight the evidences that led to Iranian nuclear program reach its contemporary position. The origin of the Iran's nuclear program can be traced back to the 1950's. The United States and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement on March 5, 1957 under which the U.S. assured Iran with several nuclear technologies, which included a nuclear research reactor (Kroenig 2014). In 1968, Iran was one of the first states to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. Tehran completed its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1974 (Vaez and Sajadapour 2013). In 1974 Iran announced for a creation of nuclear free zone in West Asia and it submitted a resolution in U.N. Iran's Nuclear Program had come to

standstill after the revolution of 1979. Tehran “reinstated” its nuclear program in 1982.

The public debate began when an Iranian exiled group with the name National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI) gave information about the nuclear facilities in Arak and Nantaz unsupervised by IAEA in 2002 which were carrying out nuclear activities. Comprehensive safeguard is needed to be concluded by the NPT members with the IAEA. IAEA started to have knowledge about Iran’s exploration nuclear options since 2002, at Natanz and Arak.

Iran had concluded treaty with France, Germany and the UK (E3) to stop its uranium enrichment program and add an additional protocol to IAEA agreement of 1974, and comply fully 2003 agreement, revealed that Tehran was involved in various nuclear related activities covertly, and this dishonored the safeguards agreement signed by Iran. Iran continued with some of the enrichment activities, but it also agreed in 2004 to agree to more comprehensive suspension with E3. President Ahmadinejad announced the research and development of its centrifuges at Natanz in 2006 and restarted the conversion of uranium earlier in 2005. The IAEA referred the matter to UNSC after having the knowledge of Iran’s nuclear activities and adopt a resolution on February 4, 2006. Iran stopped its compliance for implementing its Additional Protocol. Since then the United Nations Security Council adopted six resolutions making Iran to take steps to reduce the tension about international nuclear concerns contributes by its nuclear program.

In June 2006, the Iran was offered a plan by P5+1 of several inducements in return for Iran’s move in complying with international concerns regarding its uranium enrichment programs and heavy water reactors. The proposal was meant to fulfill IAEA’s concerns regarding the pending concerns by making Iranian government fully comprehend with IAEA continuing inquiry of the nuclear program and stop its enrichment activities and fully implement its added protocol (Congressional Research Service 2012). The US and Israel viewed Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons as unacceptable and a massive threat to the world order. On the other hand, Tehran depicted its nuclear program to be nonviolent and an “inalienable right” with the aim of showing a technological progress and modernity (Vaez and Sadjadpour, 2013).

Diplomacy thrived after the election of President Hassan Rouhani due to the achievement of an interim nuclear accord which is known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) on November 24, 2013. The JPA set out a road map for arriving at a long-term solution and a resolution to address the global concerns about Tehran's nuclear program. A plan of action was reached by P5+1 and Iran on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agenda by April 2015, and it was finalized on July 14, 2015 (Congressional Research Service 2012). The JCPOA plan was seen by the P5+1 to be the most effective way to avoid Iran from gaining nuclear weapons by giving U.S. leverage to prevent Iran from indulging into building nuclear weapons even after the expiration of the major provisions of the plan. The states in Middle East were the opponents of the nuclear deal that included some of the traditional allies in the region, they feared that the deal would enhance the power of Iran provided by the accord and give Iran added advantage to pursue its authority in the region. But the supporters of the deal viewed that the deal would allow Iran and U.S. to develop a relation of cooperation which was needed to curtail the increasing threat posed by ISIS (Katzma and Kerr 2015). To comprehend the current dialogues and nuclear deal between the West and Iran, a debate of the genesis of Iran's nuclear program history is necessary.

Chronological facts need to be reexamined to understand the intricacies of the nuclear dispute between the West and Iran. This chapter looks into the factors, which accelerated the Iran's nuclear program. What have been Iran's purposes behind its nuclear program? Why has Iran's nuclear program been considered such a threat by the United States? How Iran's nuclear program is different when compared to other countries? This article aims to shed light on internal dynamics of Iran's nuclear decision making.

Geopolitical Realities

Iran has got one of the significant place in world politics and got focus of great-power politics in modern history. Iran attained full sovereignty over its territory by the year 1947 (Ozcan and Ozdamar, 2009). Iran has a vast landmass which is about a third the size of the United States. Experts argue that Iran faces a security dilemma due its geographical location and that the desire for nuclear deterrence is compelling.

Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan border it to the north; to the West there is Iraq and Turkey; and Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf in the south. Tehran's neighbours, excepting Oman have proven hostile and untrustworthy (Mokhtari 2005). Historically, the USSR/ Russia constantly posed a menace to the territorial integrity and stability of Iran. Iran had successfully stopped the infiltration of communism during the Cold War period, and avoided Soviet Union from entering in West Asia. Although later Russia became an ally with Iran and contributed it in building its conventional and non-conventional weapons (Bahgat, 2005). Instability in the regions of Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkemenistan always posed a risk for Iran due to the flow of refugees (Mokhtari 2005). U.S. saw the geopolitical importance of Iran and it became necessary to contain Soviet Union from making a hold in Iran (Ozcan and Ozdamar, 2009). Iran controlled rich oil and gas resources. United States aim while shaping foreign policy on Iran has been keeping 'friendly' regimes in Iran to supervise the flow of important commodities like oil and gas to western economies and military forces. Iran had remained one of the closest partner for U.S. in the Middle East under the Shah Reza Pahlavi's regime. Iran got the regional power status when it was ruled by the Shah due to its relations with U.S. till the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Ozcan and Ozdamar, 2009).

Iran is bordered by Pakistan, to the east it is one of the largest Sunni populated countries, this acts as a constraint due to the Shia domination in great majority in Iran. Pakistan is considered as a inferior state by Iran and its recognition as a nuclear power in 1998 was not taken positively by Iran (Bahgat 2005). Iran has been faced by several issues of anti Shi 'i zealots, movement of refugees and threat from terrorists groups. With Turkey Iran shares its borders on northwestern side and has good relations with it, but they differ on the major foreign policy goals for national security. The differences between Iran and Turkey can be established due to the following of the ideology of the state one is a secular state the other is a religious theocracy. Iran was intrigued by the presence of the U.S. forces in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf (Mokhtari 2005). Iran is surrounded by the U.S. military forces in the region like in Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf and Central Asia. After the stack of Kuwait in 1991 Iran came closer to the Arab states in the region which was revealed by the signing of various pacts and enhances the cooperation against future attacks. Bahgat (2005) views that the rapprochements achieved by Iran and Arab states

has not been able to solve the persistent problems and the fundamental issues continues to thrive. The problem is the presence of Shia minorities in the Arab states which are in minorities and are segregated. The Arab states in the region have been the ally of U.S. and have established good defense relationships. The Arab states work in close cooperation with the U.S. and it gets protection from the external attacks especially with its military capabilities and armed forces. The Arab states has always supported U.S. in major wars in the region including the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980s which contributed in the creation and use of some sophisticated weapons system. Lastly, Iran faces issues of territorial disputes with UAE and the Arab states have always shown its support for UAE's claim over three islets.

Due to the threat posed by Iraq which remains one of the main security concerns for Iran which led to the development of nuclear activities by Iran to have leverage in the region. The hostility with Iraq was very severe and the war of 1980-88 was one the biggest clash that Iran has faced with any of its rival. The war ended with a ceasefire in 1988 in favour of Iraq due to the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein against Iran. Given such a situation where Iraq came to a dominant power and a major threat to Iran it became the principle reason for Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions in the region after the war ended. Although Saddam Hussein got toppled down the antagonisms remained between the two countries and it increased due to the territorial disputes existing between them over the region of Shatt al- Arab. Another important factor is the role of Israel in the region for Iran to get nuclear capability Israel has been a direct cause of Tehran leaders concern in acquiring nuclear capability. Israel is one of the strongest countries possessing defense power along with several biological, chemical and nuclear arsenal. This has led Iran to develop nuclear power to keep a check on Israel and deter it from carrying out any attacks against it.

Iran has several issues with its neighbours and faces security issues due to the inherent sectarian and ideological problems making it vulnerable in the region. (Bahgat 2005). More than any other country, Iran has always supposed itself as the natural hegemon on its region. In the words of Ray Takeyh, "Iranian across generations are infused with a unique sense of their history, the splendor of their civilization, and the power of their celebrated empires. A perception of superiority over one's neighbours defines the core of the Persian cosmology. The empire shrank

over the centuries, and the embrace of Persian culture faded with the arrival of the alluring western mores, but Iran has mainly remained intact. Due to their power of their civilization and rich history, Iranians believe that their nation should establish its regional predominance”(Takeyh Ray). According to a study by the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations it points out that Iran is not completely at fault in enhancing its power in the region given the history of conflict and hostility among its neighbours and hence its strategic calculations are not fully irrational (Bahgat 2005).

The Nuclear Program Under the Shah: Conception 1957-1979

The socio-eco conditions were not healthy in 1950s due to the prevailing political problems at home in Iran. In March 1951, Mohammad Mossadeq was appointed as the Prime Minister who was the leader of National Front. After coming into the office Mossadeq nationalized Iran’s oil industry and took hold of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Iran’s economic condition kept deteriorating and United States Truman Administration wanted to make sure that given such a condition of Iran communism should not creep into its social fabric. Hence, steps were taken by the Truman administration to avoid such a situation and gave assistance in economic, military and technical aspects.

Subsequently United States continued the policy of economic and technical assistance under the Eisenhower Administration. Soon, Iran enjoyed its strategic significance for the U.S. Administration after the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 (Alam 2009). Iran got its first exposure to nuclear science when U.S. was providing it with economic and military assistance. Kibaroglu argues that it was also the ages when the U.S. was looking to have its presence in the burgeoning nuclear market where completion came from Britain and Canada (Kibaroglu 2007). U.S. was having difficult time in entering the nuclear market until 1956 moreover, the Atomic Energy Act of 1956 came to act a impediment for nuclear cooperation with other states. This Act was first amended in 1956. The famous ‘Atoms for Peace’ address of President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 before the United Nations General Assembly allowed for such a development (Kibaroglu 2007).

In the speech, Eisenhower was willing to give assistance to states for the development of nuclear technology while resisting the efforts to build nuclear weapons. Iran, from the very beginning was interested to develop nuclear technology and have access to it from U.S. (Kroenig 2014). In 1957 Iran and U.S. signed the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms as a part of the improving relations (Kibaroglu 2006). The first nuclear facility was developed in Iran by the American Machine and Foundry Company to Tehran University with 5 megawatt (MW) reactor. Iran was supplied by 5.15 kilogram of weapon grade uranium by another American firm, General Dynamics, for Tehran Research Reactor. The reactor became operational only later in 1967 (Vaez and Sajadpour 2013). Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 and finally ratified by 1970 (Ozcan and Ozdamar 2009).

Iran was viewed by U.S. as an important partner in Eastern world under the leadership of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who was West leaning secular monarch. The alliance with Iran back then was important to balance the increasing influence of Soviet Union on Arab States in the region. Kroenig (2014) argues that civil nuclear technology cooperation was used by the U.S. to get allies to its side during the Cold War period against Soviet Union. Ironically U.S. helped Iran to build the base for its nuclear program. Washington had helped Iran under its Under Atoms for Peace program for exploration in nuclear technology with no intentions of instigating the setting up program for nuclear weapons (Sahimi 2003). Shah was seen as a significant partner for development of nuclear energy. This had advantages which would allow flow of increased trade related with oil production to the Western countries giving U.S. and European companies to invest and construct the nuclear reactors (Tarock 2006). The Atoms for Peace was not seen to be encouraging enough and was very basic to develop nuclear weapons by the recipient.

By 1970, the peaceful purpose of nuclear program went beyond the making of nuclear energy (Kroenig 2014). 1970s beginning became instrumental that led to the rise of further development of Iran's nuclear program (Sahimi 2003). Nixon administration allowed acceleration of Iran-U.S. nuclear cooperation, this became evident with the visit of Nixon to Iran in 1972. The visit came as result of shifts in power relations in the Persian Gulf, due to the 'Nixon Doctrine' of 1969. U.S. resolve

was that to now place greater stress on the regionally influential states to guarantee them security and stability. The Nixon administration wanted to increase Shah's strength to counter the Soviet's designs on the region (Kibaroglu 2006). The war of 1973 between the Arab countries and Israel, and the increase in oil prices, gave the Shah's administration with the need of more funds for Iran's development (Sahimi 2003). For Shah, nuclear energy was not only indispensable for progress, but also sign of modernity, and became symbolical for Iran newly gained power and prestige.

The Stanford Research Institute and an American firm determined that if Iran was to gain a great power status then it had to create energy from nuclear power amounting to 23,000 megawatts electrical (MWe) by 1994 (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). Iran was moving forward with its scientific advancement with hundreds of Iranians going abroad in U.S. and Europe for scientific studies in their universities with numerous technicians mastering their skills in programmes. U.S had already laid technological ground in Iran throughout the 1960s (Kibaroglu 2007). In March 1974, the Shah saw the need for attaining great power status and announced his ambitious program by developing 23,000 MW (e) of nuclear power energy (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). Shah was quoted as saying that Iran would have nuclear weapons “ *without a doubt and sooner than one would think*” (Bahgat 2006). To achieve this goal, the Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) was established and Akbar Etemad, a French and Swiss educated reactor physicist, was appointed its president (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). The Centre for Non –Proliferation Studies at the Monetary Institute of International Studies viewed that intelligence community in the West had doubts about Iran conduct of nuclear research being used for military applications. However, Shah called for creating the entire Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (MENWFZ) (Bahgat 2006).

According to many researchers U.S. President Nixon encouraged Shah to carry out a large-scale nuclear energy programme (Kibaroglu 2007). In order to build its first power reactors in Bushehr in 1974, Iran signed a contract with the German firm Kraftwerk Union (now Siemens). Iran spent millions of dollars to get low enriched uranium and was invested in Eurodif uranium enrichment consortium based in France. Iran also financed a project to develop uranium enrichment by laser. Iran was keen on getting domestic reprocessing and plutonium separation plant to handle

the spent fuel from power reactor (ISIS Report). Tehran signed agreements with the French company Frametome to build pressurised water reactors. The site preparation work started in Darkhovin on the Kharoon River, the southern part of the border with Iraq. (Monika Chansoria, 2009) Declassified National Security Council documents show that from 1975 and 1976 Iran's increasing interest in reprocessing was one of the main points for U.S. – Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement which allowed U.S. to sell several nuclear power reactors to Iran. The United States was vigilant of Iran's concern regarding its reprocessing plant and IAEA's ability to safeguard such a plant (ISIS Report). In 1975, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with the AEOI for facilitating preparation for bringing out the first batch of Iranian nuclear engineers and the Iranian- Indian nuclear cooperation treaty was also signed. On March 3, 1975, Iran and the United States signed In 1977, Mr. Sydney Sober, a representative of the U.S. State Department, stated that Iran wanted to purchase 8 nuclear reactors for electricity generation from U.S. (Sahimi 2003). By now, there was a huge expansion in Atomic Energy Organization of Iran with increase in the employees of around 3,800 experts, engineers, technicians and interns. The Iranian students returned home from training abroad as nuclear experts now (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). The Carter administration followed the policy of cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field. In 1977 and again in 1978, President Carter visited Iran and reached a new agreement which led U.S. to give Iran as 'most favored nation' status for spent fuel reprocessing. The draft of the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement, which allowed to supervise the export and transferring of material and equipment to Iran along with an aim of having cooperation for nuclear energy, which was signed on July 10, 1978 (Monika Chansoria, 2009). The agreement was meant to enhance and assist nuclear energy collaboration and to guide the export of nuclear equipment and material to Iran.

Iran under Shah's rule also acquired uranium from South Africa in the 1970s (Sahimi 2003). South Africa provided Iran with 600 tons of uranium yellowcake which was purchased under a contract of \$ 700 million and it also got a stake of 15 percent in the RTZ uranium mine present in Namibia. Now Iran began to search for opportunities inside and outside the country for uranium exploration (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). According to Dr. Akbar Etemad, the founder of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran from 1974 to 1978, the TNRC carried out trials in which

chemical agents were used for the extraction of plutonium. It is also believed that the Shah assembled at the TNRC nuclear weapon design team. Asadollah Alam Shah's close confidant and the long-time Imperial Court Minister wrote in his memoirs that "the Shah had envisioned Iran having nuclear weapons (Sahimi 2003). It is debatable whether Shah wanted to make Iran a nuclear weapons capable state, but there were signs of his apprehensive motives." Iran's motives for building nuclear power plants were seen with suspicion when Arya Abbas Amirie, who is the executive director of a leading Iranian think tank called the Institute for International Political and Economic Studies (IIPES), visited Australia representing Iran was asked by the Chairman of the Australian Commission on Uranium why Iran wanted to pursue building "risky" nuclear power plants for creation of energy when it had good oil and natural –gas supplies. Similarly, Georgi Arbatov, the famous director of the Soviet Union's Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies and a foreign policy adviser in Moscow, saw with suspicion about the intentions of Shah's nuclear ambitions when he met with Amirie in October 1978. Arbatov expressed that nuclear status would be used by the Shah to 'blackmail' Iran's hostile neighbours and in case of a major war between the West and the Soviet Union, U.S. could easily use nuclearized Iran to pressure down a large sector of the Soviet army on the border of Iran in order to stop the deployment of its army to Europe.

Entessar (2009) points out Iran had a fear of insecurity from Soviet Union and its support from the states in region to destabilize Iran which allowed Shah to make Iran into a nuclear weapons owning state. But, Shah had more fear from Iraq and Afghanistan which could act as a proxy for Soviet Union rather than fearing for direct aggression from Soviet Union. . To address this threat, Iran communicated with U.S. with a need for getting a 'crash program' to gain highly mobile forces with atomic weapons. Soviet intelligence had viewed that the Shah wanted to make Iran as a member of the nuclear club and make atomic bombs because he did not wanted Israel to have supreme power in the region (Entessar 2009).

Since the early years of Iran's acquaintance of nuclear technology is seen with skepticism and questioned frequently by West. Here the word 'nucleraization' means investments in research, building nuclear reactors, , nuclear facilities in home and abroad, educational infrastructure and providing training in nuclear fields to the

Iranians. Scholars argue that Shah provided the motivation for the nuclearization, but scholars are divided on how the issue of production was handled by the U.S. Analysts view that proliferation was not a major issue until after the Iranian Revolution, and the United States in many ways had lodged Iran's desire so that it could deepen its relations with one of the most important partner in the region. Others claim that West wanted to fulfill its NPT compulsions at the same time while working out to stop proliferation in the early years. According to William Burr, many years were spent by the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations to give commitments for guaranteeing the deal with Iran had safeguards against nuclear proliferation. Burr emphasizes that the programs were instigated by the Shah of Iran and the U.S. administrations wanted Iran to gain nuclear technology but were concerned about the proliferation of weapons. But While Henry Kissinger the then Secretary of State viewed that the deal objective was to have commercial significance rather than paying much attention to proliferation. The nuclearization of Iran is not only about addressing the Shah's wishes. Western officials including scientists and diplomats made Iran to invest in a series of costly projects that eventually led for the formation of Iran's nuclear program.

Hamblin (2014) in his study argues that the crisis of petrol in 1970s was the direct result of the nuclearization of Iran. The energy policies of U.S., Europe, Japan was effected by the oil embargo of 1973, leading to a shortage of supply, this was a crucial moment for the policies of these countries. The advocates of nuclear power in U.S. circulated an advertisement showing the Shah, titled "Guess Who's Building Nuclear Power Plants" arguing that Shah wanted nuclear solution because it was cost-effective and safe. But during the oil crisis the nuclear ambitions of Iran changed dramatically. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries had massive power both economically and diplomatically, and several states with no oil reserves of their own started to create bilateral agreements for establishing good relations and have an access to oil. Henry Kissinger chalked out a strategy that proposed to tie up Middle East in ways making oil embargoes as an extremely difficult option for the suppliers in future. In Kissinger's view, the petroleum states in Middle East including Saudi Arabia and Iran could maintain its power due to the presence of their huge amounts of capital which was un invested freed them to reduce the oil production in accordance to their wishes. The healthy solution would be to provide valuable goods and services by absorbing the unspent capital from Middle East

countries absorbing their unspent wealth. This would make the oil producing countries to get their hands tied in the time of oil crisis as the Middle East states would be tensed about paying their bills and would think twice before any of those states act for oil production reduction. Kissinger said “*what we need to do is to preempt the structure of relationships in the area and to develop a flow of benefits which they won’t want to lose*”. In the Middle East economic development was seen to be important but cynical part of the strategy. The oil strategy now encompassed nuclear power generation which became its key part. In early 1970’s, Kissinger wanted U.S. to develop stronger ties with Iran and include ties that had economic and technological assistance along with the main assistance in military and political field.

Tarock (2006) views that Iran got encouragement from U.S. in early 70s to make use of nuclear base other than oil as it needed nuclear reactors to attain electrical energy generation capacity for its industrial growth. U.S. had commercial interests for Iran and the companies in U.S. were keen on building reactors for Iran. In reality Iran had no need for developing its nuclear energy given the its vast reserve of oil and gas, there was no need altogether to fulfill its energy requirement even for civilian purposes, this debate was never arose back then. When the Iranian Revolution began, at Bushehr two nuclear reactors were sanctioned at a price of \$ 3 billion for construction and installation of equipment. In a nutshell the western countries and companies in U.S. and Europe pursued the Shah of Iran in building nuclear energy program since late 1950’s till the Iranian Revolution, and the Western countries went ahead with such a plan for political motives and overlooked the possibilities of making nuclear bomb even though they were aware of such a scenario The U.S. and its allies provided Iran with different aspects and full backing for fulfilling the vision of Shah for Iran of having nuclear capabilities which included nuclear research, installation facilities and reactors (Sahimi 2003).

The Nuclear Program Post Islamic Revolution (1979-1984)

The revolution of 1979 brought a change in the geopolitics landscape of Iran overnight, Iran now became one of the major opponents of U.S. from being one of the significant and strategic allies. The event led Iran to change its foreign policy priorities concerning world at large, now the threat perception by Iranian government

changed dramatically (Hadian 2008). The Islamic revolution gave a brand new foreign policy orientation for Iran to follow after 1979. Iran's new leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini brought out new vision for Iran departing from his predecessor and pursued internationalist vision where the world is divided between the oppressed and the oppressor. This view was the contribution of Shia political traditions where they were subjugated and oppressed by the Sunni Arab rulers for generations. For Iran, conception of suffering and oppression has a powerful symbolic aspect as well as practical importance. According to Ray Takeyh , “the Islamic revolution was a struggle between good and evil, a battle waged for moral redemption and genuine emancipation from the cultural and political tentacles of a profane and iniquitous West. (Takeyh) .” After the taking of hostage in U.S. embassy in Tehran the Islamic Revolution portrayed a very different Iran's nature to the world and gave a negative perception about its foreign policy and security issues. The incident of hostage crisis led to growth of hostility between Iran and U.S. and affected their bilateral relations. The result was that U.S. immediately stopped the nuclear cooperation with Iran and pursued its allies to avoid giving nuclear technology and know-how to Iran. U.S. shut its doors for Iran after 1979 (Kibaroglu 2006).

Iran now moved from being ally to western powers to a hostile nation represented by Iranian Revolution which rejected the foreign influence and domination and became symbolic for standing up against the western influence in Muslim world, the leaders wanted independence of Iran and external influences. But this meant that their nuclear program would be interrupted. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan knowingly stopped the nuclear program whereas U.S. and other western countries cut out the support for nuclear input to AEOI (Hamilton 2010). The guiding principle of Iran's foreign policy became the slogan given by Khomeini after the revolution “*Na Sharaq, Na Gharb, Faqat Jumhuri-ye Islam*” which meant neither East nor West only the Islamic Republic [of Iran] (Kibaroglu 2006). This slogan also denounced the modernization of the nuclear program in Iran (Hamilton 2010).

Iranian students took fifty two hostages in U.S. embassy who were diplomats and personnel working for the embassy on November 4, 1979. The group of protestors took over the embassy which was against the international law and direct

violation of diplomatic relation with U.S. This was a big challenge for U.S. as it happened abruptly and the hostage situation lasted for many days. The hostage crisis became a big problem for President Carter. A mission was planned for the release of hostages known as Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 it was a secret military mission, but the mission failed miserably and failed to get the hostages back instead it resulted in loss of U.S. aircraft and military personnel. After holding up the hostages for 444 days Iran finally released the hostages. The hostage crisis became one of the starting events that indicated transformation of larger political picture in Iran. The Shah was not liked by the hardliners for his support of Western powers and secular orientation, he was losing his popularity and his ideas were not in line with Islamic values. The anti-government protest started in late 1977 due to the widespread corruption and dissatisfaction along with loss of faith in the government due to the economic issues. Finally, Shah abandoned Iran when there was no hope for him to hang on to the power, and he finally left the country on January 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran immediately in February 1979 from his exile in Paris. Khomeini was an Islamic preacher and a long time opponent of the monarch of Iran. After his return a new constitution was approved in November 1979 proclaiming him as the supreme leader of Iran. Khomeini's ascendance changed Iran within a year which changed from secular monarchy to a Muslim Theocracy state with full condemnation of American interest in Iran making it as one of its biggest adversary (Kroenig 2014).

The 1979 revolution had various consequences for Iran's nuclear program. The nuclear program's scale was significantly reduced and there was less cooperation with foreign companies. Barzashka and Oelrich (2012) argue that though it is widely believed that Western nuclear contractors unilaterally pull out from Iran immediately after the fall of the Shah, the actual history is far more complex. According to them, after Khomeini took over the nation, Iran had apprehensions about the economic viability of a large-scale nuclear programme and temporarily postponed its already questioned nuclear efforts. Iran declared the reactor contracts with France invalid and withdrew from Eurodif enrichment consortium. Also, the administration stopped making payments for the almost – completed Bushehr nuclear power plant. Around same time Germany terminated the project; Iran started looking out for alternative vendors and demanded reimbursement from Germany in 1982. The Iraq invasion in Iran 1980 and further the eight-year war that followed had several devastating effects

on its nuclear program. Kraftwerk Union reconsidering its decision to abandon the nuclear project finally refused to work on the plant until a peace deal was made. Germany barred its companies from providing nuclear assistance to Iran, including incomplete work on the Bushehr plant. France declined Iran to supply nuclear fuel and reimburse Iran its Eurodif shares. In nutshell the revolution turned the enthusiasts of Iran's nuclear program to its adversary (Khalid and Hashmi) .Pirsevedi (2013) argues that the new regime condemned the Shah's nuclear ambitions and took steps to free Iran from its contracts with foreign nuclear suppliers. At the same time did not reject the utilization of nuclear science and technology. Iran was convinced that the Islamic republic of Iran's future utilization of nuclear energy would rely on "locally acquired or developed experience" and "the sharing of resources with other interested countries." Many people inside and outside Iran held Shah intentions was to create a nuclear weapons capability for his country. The new government announced that their country was strictly following the principles and doctrines of Islam, which prohibited the employment of science and technology to the harm mankind. They were interested only in peaceful, civilian applications of nuclear energy.

Due to the prevailing turmoil atmosphere in Iran Saddam Hussein of Iraq grabbed an opportunity to take advantage of the political situation in Iran by invading it in 1980. The war continued for long eight years making one of the lengthiest war in the history of twentieth century. During the war Iraq destroyed the Bushehr reactors in Iran whereas Iran also attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactors at Osiraq (Kroenig, 2014). The Bushehr site was completely bombarded and destroyed, resulting in the wiping out of the important areas of the nuclear reactors (Sahimi, 2003). Iran felt vulnerable when it realized that it didn't possess a credible deterrence against its enemy (ISIS Report). At the 1985 NPT review conference, Iran urged the states parties to deliver Iran with technical assistance in order to go ahead with its peaceful nuclear program. Iran also asked IAEA to call for Iraq's expulsion from the agency, to dispatch fact-finding teams with nuclear safety experts to Iran, to verify the Iraqi attacks. However, IAEA declined Iranian officials request on the ground that Iranian reactors at Bushehr were still under construction were not under IAEA safeguards, did not contain any radioactive material, and did not fall under the agency's competence (Pirsevedi 2013).

The invasion from Iraq made Iran realize the importance of nuclear power to deter its enemy and it reconsidered the position of owning nuclear technology for its best interests (Sahimi 2003). Now Iran started reassessing their nuclear program as a viable deterrence option. The war had pushed Iran into a severe energy crisis and nuclear option was seen as a way out of such a problem (Vaez and Sajadpor 2013). The main objective of newly formed Islamic Republic of Iran was security and progression of its nuclear program. Iran repudiated accusations that their country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons at international arms control forum.

Explaining the rationale behind their nuclear activities, Iranian representatives claimed that Iran pursued a peaceful nuclear program in order to satisfy its increasing demand for electricity and to save hydrocarbon resources for export. Iran also put forward an argument, that their country's nuclear programs was part of a national effort to improve Iran's scientific, industrial and technical capabilities. Finally, Iran argued that nuclear power was ecologically friendly and good substitute to fossil fuels. Post Iran –Iraq war, Iran's nuclear diplomacy was intended at addressing to Iran's security needs (Pirseyyedi 2013).

Iran wanted to resurrect its abandoned nuclear power program; the invasion of Iraq gave the motivation to carry forward the nuclear power status. One can express that the renewed policy of nuclear energy program was needed to fulfill the electricity shortage in the country and most importantly to make it as a deterrent against Iran's enemies and invaders. President Ali Khamenei obtained permission to restart the nuclear program and channel the funds for the program in 1984 by Khomeini. Iran could not complete the Bushehr project on its own and was looking out for partners to complete the project. U.S. acted as an impediment in Iran's way for finding partners U.S. was fully opposed to Iran's renewed policy for setting up nuclear projects (Vaez and Sadjadpour, 2013). Although in the late 1980's a consortium of companies from countries like Germany, Argentina and Spain gave a proposal to Tehran to complete its Bushehr-1 reactor project, but U.S. vehemently opposed such assistance from its allies to Iran (Sahimi, 2003). At this juncture Pakistan came as a relief for Iran when Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, - known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program visited Bushehr twice, in 1986 and again in 1987. He came with a plan of helping Iran with its nuclear program.

A.Q. Khan gave assistance to Iran by providing it with enrichment technology. Iran aimed at getting nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities from Pakistan. A deal was reached under the supervision of the Iranian prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, between the officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and A.Q. Khan's nuclear network which was illicit (Vaez and Sadjadpour 2013). Pakistan gave help to Iran by providing uranium enrichment techniques and transferred Chinese nuclear warheads (Kroenig, 2014). A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report titled "Iran's Nuclear Odyssey" argues that the Iranian nuclear setup was creation of A.Q. Khan it was born out of secrecy by gaining technical drawings costs and sample of components for P-1 centrifuges were stolen from 1970's Dutch design. In order to obtain critical parts of building centrifuges by Iran a variety of procurement efforts was carried out. Centrifuge components and vacuum valves were acquired from a German based company called from Leybold in 1988 by Iranian company Kavosh Yar costing \$ 500,000. The designs for P-2 centrifuge were bought in 1995 from A.Q. Khan's network. Iran sought to renovate the Tehran Research Reactor, been pending since the shah's time. The advance nuclear program of Iran would not have been possible if A.Q. Khan didn't gave Iran with needed assistance.

Iran now became a nuclear customer, ready to spend, and had several suppliers for its purchase. Iran aimed at buying plutonium-reprocessing capabilities in 1992 from Argentina, but its request was denied. Iran finally turned to Russia after years of searching for a supplier in the Western countries to build its incomplete nuclear power plant. In 1990 first protocol was signed for Bushehr project between Iran and Russia (Sahimi, 2003). In the same year, Iran and China also signed an agreement on ten year nuclear cooperation. China agreed to construct a small twenty-seven kilowatt research reactor for the production of radioisotopes at the Isfahan Research Center. China also agreed to build two three hundred megawatt light water reactors (LWRs) for Iran by 2002 (Chansoria 2009). Iran got help from China in developing its uranium-conversion capabilities and gave Iran cauldrons, which is an important technology for the separation of laser isotope (Kroenig 2014).In the year 1995, a nuclear cooperation agreement was signed between Tehran and Moscow to finish the construction of incomplete reactors at Bushehr. Question arises why these countries were helping Iran acquire the world's most dangerous weapons? Kroenig 2014 in his book " A Time To Attack, The looming Iranian Nuclear Threat" argue that

“ states export sensitive nuclear technology when it doesn't threaten themselves but does threaten their adversaries.” Since China, Russia and Pakistan lacked the ability to project military power in Iran, they were not directly threatened by a nuclear – armed Iran. Since U.S. had the power to project military forcing Iran, these countries wanted to constrain American military might by providing Iran security guarantee.

Suspected Iranian Nuclear Programme

The Iranian nuclear weapons controversy touched higher levels during the year 2002, after the nuclear program of Iran was revealed that it was working clandestinely over the years (Chansoria 2009). The U.S. representative on the Office of the national Council of Resistance of Iran talked about the nuclear project of Iran shrouded in secrecy operating in a facility in Arak which was a production facility and Natanz which was enrichment facility. This showed that Iran was making progress in its nuclear power plants to route to nuclear weapons throughout the 1990s, despite U.S. sanctions (Kibaroglu, 2006). International community was highly suspicious about Iran's nuclear activities. As Iran is the member of the NPT, it can build nuclear facilities but with the obligation of communicating such actions to the IAEA for any new construction, but Iran attempted to construct these facilities in secret. These facilities were not limited to basic research or energy production. United States and larger international community was highly disturbed by these developments. The Iranian nuclear crisis had begun (Kroenig 2014).

Following the revelations, the IAEA wanted to visit Arak where the heavy water facility was located. Tehran accepted the IAEA request in 2003, which revealed the confirmation about Iran's action of possessing the heavy water nuclear production. After three months, Iran communicated to IAEA confirming that it wanted to build the IR-40, which was a 40 MW heavy water reactor for research in Arak. Tehran gave the information of possessing p5-1 which was an old European designed centrifuge at Natanz, but the IAEA inspectors discovered that P-2 centrifuges were being built having a sophisticated design in secrecy (Chansoria 2009). The IAEA exposed the clandestine activities in the nuclear sites in Iranian program and asked the Iran government to get the Additional Protocol signed by October 31, 2003 when secrecy of nuclear development technologies were discovered in Arak and Natanz.

Mohammed ElBaraedi the IAEA Director and its group of inspectors carried out frequent visits to Iran and in suspected sites. A series of reports were published by IAEA suggesting that “ Iranian practices up to November 2003 resulted in many breaches of Iran’s obligations to comply with its Safeguards Agreement, but good progress has been made since that time in Iran’s correction of those breached and the Agency’s ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran’s declarations.”(Kibaroglu 2006). During the course of 2002-03, Iranian representatives started defending and protecting their country’s nuclear program and intensified diplomatic argumentation on why Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons programme. According to Iranian, they were not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons because the use of such lethal weapons was against the teachings of Islam, Iranians had experienced the disastrous humanitarian impact of WMD use in the 1980-1988 war and lastly nuclear weapons were morally reprehensible (Pirseyyedi 2013).

Did Iran Violate the NPT?

The U.S. voiced out her opinion that such a clandestine activity on Iran’s part for uranium enrichment was a proof of the country’s intention of attaining nuclear weapons. This stood in violation of the law under the signed agreement of Article II of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further U.S. argued that Iran should be barred from exercising its entitled rights under Article IV of the NPT for the development of nuclear technology. On the other hand Iran discarded such allegation and completely denied the secret plans of having nuclear weapons or violation of any obligations under NPT. Iran defended its position by expressing that there was a failure in reporting to the IAEA in time some of the progress in their nuclear program. Iran invoked Article IV of the NPT in defending its different nuclear projects including enrichment and reprocessing. That Iran’s nuclear activities have not affected the inalienable right of the NPT member states to carry out nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes, it further rejected U.S. request to avoid enriching uranium (Kibaroglu 2006).

According to one Congressional Research Service report titled ‘ Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, 2013 ‘it is not

clear if Iran violated the NPT in reality. The treaty does not have any form of mechanism for knowing that a member party did violate its obligations or not. There exists no formal procedure for determining such violations.’ Kerr 2013 argues that though Iran’s violations of its the agreement appear to be considered as violations of Article III which makes the treaty for non- nuclear weapon countries to accept IAEA safeguards, in compliance with the agency’s statute, “*for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*” (Kerr 2013). Iran could have violated the provisions of Article II of NPT which clearly state that the non-nuclear weapon states should not “*manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*” or “*seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*” .

The State Department report of 2005 views that Iran violated Article II of the NPT and it was in line with the nonproliferation agreements. “*The breadth of Iran’s nuclear development efforts, the secrecy and deceptions with which that have been conducted for nearly 20 years, its redundant and suspicious procurement channels, Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations to report to the IAEA and to apply safeguards to such activities, and the lack of a reasonable economic justification for this program leads us to conclude that Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the NPT*” (State Department Report 2005).

The report also expresses that Iran’s “ weapons program had combination of elements” of Iran’s declaration of nuclear activities, as well as suspicious “ undeclared fuel cycle and other related activities that would have existed, including those that could be run mainly be the military” (Kerr 2013). Tarock (2006) argues that Iran did not violate any of the safeguards in NPT agreements. The NPT agreement state that Iran must announce its existence of nuclear facilities before 180 day’s prior to the introduction of any nuclear material. Iran failed at that time to introduced any nuclear materials at the site in Natanz. However western representatives and officials said that Iran lied about plant’s existence. This created a big political storm in the international community. It was not the first time a country had done this, India,

Pakistan and Israel had also kept their nuclear programmes secret from the outside world. Iran's nuclear programme came under so much scrutiny and international spotlight because of mainly two reasons. One, Iran became the part for Bush 'axis of evil' doctrine and became a target for its regime change. Second, U.S. easy and quick victory in Afghanistan and Iraq after toppling Taliban and Saddam's regime, neoconservatives was confident that it was time to remove the Islamic regime.

Against this background, the U.S. got its support from its European partners adding to the neoconservative views, and suggested that that Iran must be barred from getting a nuclear power status. Iran was in fear of unilateral military action possibility by U.S. against it. This insecurity made Iran to have a softer tone with Europe and hence it entered into negotiations to avoid being invaded by U.S. The main purpose of the negotiations for Iran was to give an assurance to the international community that it did not have intentions of producing nuclear weapons and the nuclear technology would be used for peaceful purposes. Secondly, West would give guarantees to Iran that it would give Iran access to the Western nuclear technologies for civilian purposes. On the other hand Tehran would get assurance that U.S. would not involve in harming Iran militarily and it would not be put under sanctions by UNSC till it follows the safeguards given by IAEA. NPT was the main framework for the conduct of such negotiations (Tarock 2006).

Iran signed the Paris agreement with EU+3 (France, Germany and Britain) on 15th November, 2004. According to this agreement Iran reaffirmed that its nuclear activities have been exclusively for the peaceful purposes. Iran will engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to resolve through full transparency all outstanding issues. Iran was in a vulnerable position during this time. Iran had no other good option than to sign the agreement. The energy market, particularly oil market was also not doing well. As mentioned earlier, U.S. and Britain were victors in Iraq by October 2003.

By 2005, Iran became confident and appeared stronger. Iran submitted to the EU+3 a plan of objective guarantees, which included, as follows. Iran will forego plutonium production through a heavy water reactor, spent reactors fuels will not be reprocessed by Iran, only low-enriched uranium will be produced by Iran, though there will be imposition on the level of enrichment, low- enriched uranium would be

converted to fuel rods for its use in reactors, the limit was placed on number of centrifuges in Natanz, the IAEA will have continuous presence at all the nuclear facilities (Sahimi, 2003). But EU+3 did not respond to Iran's offer, also throughout negotiations process no meaningful incentive was offered to Iran other than promise of possible future cooperation with Iran. EU+3 was simply buying time in hope that Iranian elections of 2005 would bring president Hashemi Rafsanjani back to power. The negotiations reached a deadlock by December 2005, with each side blaming each other to have entered negotiations in bad faith. U.S. and EU together pressed Iran for hauling before the United Nations Security Council. Iran announced in 2006 that the processing of nuclear fuel would be restarted which had been abandoned two years ago for the movement of negotiations with EU. But China and Russia gave a hard stance and did not agree to referral of Iran to UNSC at the IAEA board of Governors meeting the same year (Tarock 2006).

In 2006, Iran was to be referred to the Security Council due to its noncompliance of its NPT safeguards obligations the decision was made by IAEA votes. Soon Security Council Resolution 1696 was passed by unanimous vote, asking Tehran to stop its uranium enrichment activities within a period of one month's time. Iran continued to defend its right to carry out its right for development of nuclear technology. Finally on December 23, the UNSC passed Resolution 1737, which imposed international sanctions on Iran. Another resolution was passed by UNSC 1803 to put tough sanctions on Iran.

The nuclear crisis became costly for Iran especially it harmed its economy badly. In 2012 oil revenue declined by a huge margin of about \$ 40 million compared to that of 2011. The oil exports dropped significantly falling from 2.5mb/d in 2011 to 0.9 mb/d in September 2012. But all this did not have a negative impact on its nuclear activities. The construction of the country's nuclear power plant in Bushehr was completed in the year 2011(Vaez and Sajadpour 2013).

Issues and Debates

Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality:

So far the paper discussed the evolution of the Iran's nuclear program. From its conception, concealment, nuclear crisis to a negotiations phase. It is equally important to assess Iran's nuclear rationality. Bahgat (2006) in his study argues that Iran's nuclear policy is driven by mainly domestic, regional and international dynamics. These can be classified as Security, national pride or prestige and internal political and economic developments.

Security- Iran was defeated in the Iran- Iraq war 1980-1988. U.S. invaded Iraq in the year 2003 and Saddam Hussein regime was toppled. Since then, US have managed to establish a long-term military presence in Iraq. Iran faced a threat from on its eastern side, from Taliban that had anti- Shia stand in Afghanistan. Iran has supported Shite North Alliance that controlled part of Afghanistan. Soon the relation between Iran and Afghanistan dipped to its low in late 1990s when there was almost a military confrontation between the two states. Post 9/11 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan the Taliban regime was overthrown. Since then, U.S. had a good number of military presence in Afghanistan. In 1998 India and Pakistan got nuclear power status. The issues faced by the borders of Iran made it very vulnerable to the threat from its geographical nuclear power neighbours. Analysts viewed that Iran was insecure and was looking seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability in curb the threat. Hence, the role of Iran's Islamic regime and its survival to secure its territorial integrity can be said as the main motivation for Iran's nuclear ambitions.

National Pride- Since several years, the religious establishment of Iran has been divided between different factions, mostly between two camps of conservatives and moderates. Iran's nuclear ambition comes from the need of establishing a regional hegemony which is affected by the historical roots. Iran considered itself to be a great nation but due to the interference from the outside world and the Western powers it could not establish its hegemony and authoritative status in the region. The sense of victimization was seen to be unbearable by the Iranian hardliners, they had been facing separation in the entire Shite history. In the modern times, Iran had lost its territory to western countries like Russia and the Monarch of Iran was swayed by the influence of

U.S. and United Kingdom. The Iraqi invasion further deepened the sense of isolation. Hence, the right to develop nuclear power became a matter of national prestige or pride for the Iranians (Bahgat 2006). Iran views the development of its nuclear technology as a victory given the amount of hurdles it had to face which gave it a sense of supremacy in the region. The nuclear power would allow Iran to become ‘unrivalled world power’ as stated by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Meanwhile Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, former head of the AEOI said “*we have been able to promote the status of Iran and Iranians in international level and we have enhanced the self-confidence spirits and national identity*” (Barzashka and Oelrich, 2012).

Economic Justifications- The reason for developing nuclear power in Iran has also been to diversify the oil dependent energy sector with the increase in electricity and petroleum consumption. The growing population and the depletion of oil reserves has also allowed the need for development of nuclear energy sector in Iran. Many analysts have questioned claims for a civilian nuclear industry on the grounds that nuclear power cannot be justified on economic basis in a oil and gas rich state (Barzahka and Oelrich 2013).

Another analyst Kroenig (2014) argues that Iran’s two strategic goals have been to become the most dominant power in the Middle East and to be able to deter foreign attack from its adversaries like United States and Israel. Only nuclear weapons could have helped them achieve these two goals. The rationale of pursuing nuclear weapons program then could be ultimate security guarantee, fulfilling its desire to be the Middle East’s dominant power as it would be one of two states in the Middle East to gain access to the nuclear club. According to one study by Stanford University scientist Scott Sagan there are mainly three important reasons why states decide to build nuclear weapons. These are security, prestige and domestic politics. And all these factors pushed Iran to pursue its nuclear weapons program.

Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran always claimed that its nuclear program is for peaceful enrichment facility purposes and mainly for power generation. By the year 2013 Iran’s nuclear program consisted of three major aspects: those are gas- centrifuge enrichment program,

production of plutonium program and spent fuel reprocessing from the light- water reactor. Clarke (2013) says that the nuclear program of Iran mostly focuses on the facilities with uranium enrichment of gas centrifuge. Iran constructed secretly and carried out two facilities, with a fuel enrichment plant (FEP) and a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) at Natanz. The FEP constitutes Tehran's main enrichment facility for the production of industrial quantities of LEU fuel, which it claims it needs to feed its nuclear reactors. The FEP have been for research and development program and pilot LEU facility for the production of 20% uranium enrichment LEU fuel up to - 235, for the development of medical isotopes at the Tehran Research Reactor.

Iran's nuclear program has always been ambiguous. Tehran has always claimed that its program is for peaceful purposes. But the program's behaviour and activities have raised suspicion among the international community about its military links. It was never clear whether Iran actually needed nuclear energy. As Iran have huge oil and gas reserves. Iran does not need to enrich uranium to high levels. Iran began to enrich to 3.5 percent in the year 2003. In 2010, Tehran claimed it needed 20% enriched uranium to fuel the Tehran Research reactor. If Iran was solely interested in producing nuclear energy it wouldn't need to be so secretive. Iran tried to hide facility at Natanz and secretly build the Qom enrichment facility. The IAEA has evidence that Iran possessed the design for an implosion- type nuclear weapon and Iran has conducted experiments on engineering its own nuclear warhead on the Parchin military base (Kroenig 2013).

Another analyst Fitzpatrick (2006) vehemently argued that many indicators show military involvement in the nuclear program. Iran's centrifuge workshops have been mostly under the Defense Industries Organisation (DIO). The question has been raised by IAEA regarding the complex arrangements about the previous administrations of the Gchine uranium mine and mill. IAEA became skeptical about the involvement of military establishment in Iranian nuclear program, and was suspicious about how a uranium-ore processing plant can be handled by a new company lacking in experience in uranium mill processing in a very short period of time lasting between 2000-2001. The IAEA reports revealed that the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) was attached to the Ministry of Defense, tried to get hold of

dual use materials and equipment, which has military applications. Iran did not have answers to the IAEA for such procurement attempts.

Iran's military application of nuclear material and equipments were revealed by several recovered documents. In 1987, Iran got a document from the A.Q Khan black market network giving the procedures for making and casting of uranium metal into hemispheres, which could be related to the making of components of nuclear weapons. Later in 2004, the defector from an embassy in Middle East provided U.S. with documents having information related to 'Project 111' which was the nuclear research under the Iranian military. These documents had designs of spherical shapes and notes portraying sophisticated detonators used for explosives generally designed for explosion in a ring. Fitzpatrick (2006) further argues that military and administrative related linkages among various aspects of the nuclear programme provided enough evidence of a military connection.

Nuclear Decision in Iran

Iran's nuclear program decision-making process and chain of command has never been transparent. Experts suggest that important nuclear decisions in past have all been taken by the Supreme leader, a group of senior advisors including those in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Iran's nuclear policy has been officially directed by the Atomic Energy Council. It has total of fifteen members and gives approval for all the nuclear programs, it also regulates the directives and issues to ensure that proper such activities are functioned properly.

The Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gives a final input for its nuclear program. His approval is vital for making major decisions ranging from uranium enrichment to the signing of all the important protocols. Iranian constitution has vested the supreme leader with huge amounts of power, he is the commander of the armed forces, can declare war and to even dismiss the President. The Supreme leader also delineates policies of Iran after the consultation with the national exigency and gives supervision to the execution of the general policies of the country. Iran's Supreme National Security Council determines the defense and national security policies coordinate activities related to defense and security policies. Hence the

nuclear policy making is dominated by the handful of elite section of the society. Also the nuclear policy decision-making have been complex in Iran.

Israel Response to Iran's Nuclear Program

Israel's perception of Iran's nuclear program has been underscored by question of survival of its state and by the security concerns in a hostile regional environment. Israel came into being in the wake of horrific experience of the Holocaust in which millions of European Jews were brutally murdered. Israel acquired nuclear weapons as the 'ultimate deterrent' against already existing threats. Even geographically Israel is a vulnerable state. Israel has been surrounded by adversaries on all sides and together with the lack of any formal security guarantee with any other country. For this reason Israel continued to resist the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, particularly to Iran.

Israeli's have been vocal in their opposition to Iran's nuclear program and have indicated to engage in unilateral military strike to destroy Tehran's nuclear program. (Cheema, 2009). Scholars argue that Iran's nuclear program is not same like Israel nuclear program. As Iran's domestic political system is very different from Israel's'. Iran has very openly spoken about its preferences for the bomb despite the intense international scrutiny. Meanwhile Israel has maintained opacity relating to their nuke program (Hymans and Gratias 2013).

Iran nuclear policy has centered on explaining the international community why Iran need to develop peaceful nuclear capability. It has diplomatically dealt with the West and was successful in weakening U.S. unilateralism and demonstrated the benefit of multilateral negotiations. It demonstrated its good intentions by signing the Additional Protocol and allowing the use of voluntary confidence building measures. Iran played out smartly by increasing the European investments in its country and making American sanctions to be weak against the Regime. Iran also laid the blueprint of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. (Entesssar 2009).

U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East before 1979, made Iran are close partner in the region. U.S. can be seen as major driver behind evolution of the Iran's

nuclear program prior 1979. Iran felt extremely vulnerable during war with Iraq in 1984. It compelled Iran to think about its deterrence options. The aim for nuclear weapon capability was driven by deterrence against Iraq and Israel. Iran's nuclear program has always been ambiguous in nature. Many analysts agree that Iran's nuclear program showed military dimensions. National pride and security can be said to be two main reasons behind Iran urge to attain nuclear weapon capability. Iran nuclear program cannot be studied in vacuum. Nuclear policy forms an important part of Iran's foreign policy. For Iran, its nuclear program has helped it achieving its foreign policy and national security objectives. The next chapter analyses the U.S. policy response to Iranian program over the years.

.....

Chapter 3

U.S. RESPONSE TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL FACTORS

Introduction

Whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime succeeds in restraining the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations depends to a considerable extent on the strategic interaction between the international community and ‘ nuclear aspirants’ (Onderco and Wagner, 2012). According to the scholars of the security dilemma, interpreting other actor intentions is a demanding challenge, but even if the ‘ dilemma of interpretation’ is resolved, a ‘dilemma of response’ remains. Usually, states opt for either a confrontational or an accommodationist policy in response to a risk posed by another state. The confrontational strategy infers that threats can and should be deterred. In contrast, an accommodationist strategy starts from the notion that the security dilemma exists for both parties in a confrontation. As a consequence, the ‘ target’ or ‘opponent’ state’s policies are primarily reactions to the other state’s policies under conditions of uncertainty, possibly driven by uncertainties about of its own survival (Onderco and Wagner, 2012). The U.S. response to Iran’s ambition to attain an indigenous nuclear program over the past half-century has been like a pendulum fluctuating from one end to the other (Hamilton 2010). Foreign policy hawks in the United States have argued for pressure rather than negotiation as a strategy to deal with Iran’s nuclear program. Foreign policy doves on the other hand kept arguing for the use of inducements and engagement. United States and its allies have a broad historical experience of managing challenges from hostile Iran both successfully and unsuccessfully (Dueck and Takeyh 2007).

This chapter examines U.S. policy response toward Iran’s nuclear program. The aim is also to highlight the various domestic and regional factors that have influenced or dominated the foreign policy making toward Iran. The aim of the essay is to analyze both U.S. policies towards Iran before the 1979 revolution and U.S. attitude towards post-revolutionary regime. The U.S. has been the most outspoken critic of Iran’s

nuclear ambition, especially after the revelations of secret facilities at Arak and Natanz. The U.S. has consistently emphasized the need for taking outright action against by the international community (Kibaroglu 2006). I intend to discuss and answer questions like Iran nuclear program being a threat to the national security interests of the U.S., then why Washington under both the Bush and Obama administrations refrained from attacking Iran ? Though we did hear a loud chorus in Washington persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran, Secondly why did U.S. policies in over past three decades failed in halting the Iran's Uranium enrichment program ? There was a huge policy shift toward Iran under President's Obama administration. President Obama was successful at striking a deal with Iran in June 2015. Has this deal completely resolved the Iran's nuclear issue?

U.S. Policy Before Iraninan Revolution

The United States was the principal power that sustained the regime of the Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (the Shah), who ruled Iran from 1941 until his overthrow in February 1979. During the Cold War between the then two super powers i.e. United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), U.S. supported the oppressive and corrupt regime of the Shah. The U.S. viewed the Shah government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the geopolitically important area. The U.S. vital objective during the Cold War was to keep oil-rich Iran under the Western control (Yazdani and Hussain 2006). The roots of nuclear cooperation between Washington and Tehran can be traced to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration. President's biggest initiative was his 'atoms for peace' program that loaned uranium to 'have not' states for peaceful purposes. On March 1957, United States and Tehran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement under the auspices of the Atoms for peace program.

President's John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson took a different approach towards nuclear policies than the previous administration. The overall story of the U.S. relations with Iran during the Kennedy administration is one of misunderstandings and missed opportunities. Shah of Iran used American fears of Communism to gain increased military support, financial aid and influence in the United Nations. According to April R. Summitt, Kennedy did fell victim to the exaggerated fears of

instability and communism in the Middle East. In spite of U.S. and Iran not sharing many mutual interests that time, Shah managed to gain flow of dollars. The focus of Kennedy administration on the Middle East rested on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and U.S. hoped to keep Iran as a stable and strong ally in the region. To assist him in policy making, Kennedy appointed National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, Bundy's Deputy Special Assistant, to oversee a special task force on Iran under the National Security Council umbrella. Other members of the task force on Iran included representatives from the CIA, the Treasury, U.S. information agency, Kenneth Hansen, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget and William Bundy of the Defense Department. All debated questions about the stability of the Shah and possible American responses to his requests for aid. In its report of 1961, the Task force on Iran argued, "to prevent Soviet domination of Iran must be our immediate and overriding objective. This requires the continuance in power of a pro-Western regime, for the ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government which could not withstand soviet pressures." The report basically suggested various methods the U.S. could use to preserve the stability of the Shah.

The State and Defense Departments priority was the Containment of Soviet Union and problem areas like Berlin, Cuba and Iran were too down in the priority list (Summitt, 2004). According to Bary Rubin and James Bill analyses of U.S. policy toward Iran, Kennedy officials did sought to curb the Shah's appetite for unnecessary military weapons and to introduce a long term economic planning in Iran, but U.S. policy failed at implementing it, evident in the anti- Americanism of the Islamic Revolution. James Goode has focused on the divisions in the policymaking establishment between the 'traditionalists' and Kennedy's 'New Frontiersmen'. He contends, that due to fears of Iran's turn to the Soviet Union, the Department sought to preserve the status quo in Iran. While others in the Kennedy's administration favoured sweeping changes because of the fear of instability and Soviet domination (Nemchenok, 2010). During a press conference in March 1963, Kennedy remarked that he was 'haunted' by a fear that within the next decade that the U.S. would be in a world where '15 – 25' countries would possess nuclear weapons. He was intent on slowing the spread of nuclear weapons and in August 1963 the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) was signed. Though Kennedy's administration policies concerning nuclear proliferation were not directly aimed at Iran, but policies did amount to reduce

cooperation with Iran (Hamilton 2010). A major part of the U.S. foreign policy for the Middle East was maintaining the stability of traditional regimes in the region while encouraging them toward gradual and moderate reforms. This goal was aimed at Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran. As Summitt says these “pillars of stability’ were to lead the region in democratic reforms and economic self- sufficiency while avoiding revolutionary unrest. It was not an anti-nationalist policy, but certainly opposed radical change and Communism. It was also important to keep a tight control in the region via Israel and access to oil via Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. Kennedy’s policies were successful at preserving the royal regimes for a short –term (Summitt 2004).” It is said President Kennedy administration lacked at understanding the regional or Iran’s need, in the process, officials set in motion a chain of events that ultimately brought the Iranian revolution of 1978 (Nemchenok 2010).

After the assassination of President Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn into office and was immediately met with the challenge of Iran growing closer to Soviet Union as the Shah was disappointed by U.S. focusing more on the international affairs and reforms and ignoring Shah’s wish of purchasing military hardware. Johnson’s policies were not much related to Iran’s nuclear program, as he was overwhelmingly occupied with the Vietnam War. During his initial years in office, he resisted the Shah’s requests for increased military sales. Over the years U.S. - Iran relationship evolved from patron-client oriented to a more equal relationship. U.S. started selling weapons to Iran. These weapons sales by the U.S. to Iran included a squadron of F-4 Phantom aircraft. President Johnson’s policies changed, as Shah was growing more close to the Soviet. Second, Washington needed to retain the pro-Western orientation of one of its major allies in the region. It was during this period when U.S. assisted Iran to set up the Tehran research reactor at the University of Tehran with U.S. Corporation United Nuclear providing Iran 5.58kg of 93 percent enriched uranium (Johns 2007). President Johnson resumed the nuclear cooperation with Iran after a change in policy during the Kennedy administration.

Nixon Years

By the early 1970’s, the Shah had become the U.S. most important client in the region, *regional gendarme*. U.S. was transforming the Shah dictatorship as one

of its main security ‘ pillars’ in the region under the Nixon Doctrine, which emphasized that the U.S. needed a local gendarme to protect its interests in the region. Iran was assigned the responsibility to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, subsequently the Pahlavi’s regime became one of the largest purchasers of U.S. arms in Middle East by the mid 1970’s. Taking full advantage of this policy , Shah instigated the OPEC oil prices hikes of the early 1970s, and also increased Iran’s defense budget from U.S. \$ 9.4 billion in 1977 (Yazdani and Hussain 2006). Tehran’s cooperation with the Washington in the nuclear field gained impetus with the historic visit of President Richard Nixon to Tehran in May 1972. The visit was the result of a fundamental shift in power relations in the Persian Gulf, which began with “ Nixon Doctrine” of 1969. President Nixon doctrine outlined the “ U.S. intent to place greater emphasis on initiatives by regionally influential states to assure stability and security of their respective regions.” The Nixon Administration wanted to enhance the Shah’s strength in order to deter Soviet intentions on the region. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, oil prices quadrupled overnight. This huge influx of dollars enabled Muhammad Reza Pahlavi to expand the scope of the nuclear energy projects. Shah announced his plans for developing 23,000MW(e) of nuclear power capacity as soon as possible in March 1974. Shah established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the same year to achieve this goal. The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission traveled to Iran to talk to Iranian officials about establishing multinational uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities in Iran. On 3rd March, 1975, a \$ 15 billion agreement for the construction of eight nuclear reactors having a total capacity of 8,000 MW(e) was signed between United States and Iran. Tehran proposed to invest \$2.75 billion in a uranium enrichment facility in the U.S. The U.S. was also eager to let Iran invest in establishing a spent fuel reprocessing facility in Iran. At the same time, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with Iran to provide training for Iranian nuclear engineers (Kibaroglu 2006). Nixon represented a complete policy shift from policies of the previous two administrations.

However, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi Shah’s policies had alienated large segments of the Iranian Muslim population including the religious establishments, which led to great socio-economic disparities. The growing gap between a small section of U.S.-supported Westernized political elite and a largely neglected Islamic population became one of the prime factors for the massive upheavals of 1979 that

culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) (Yazdani and Hussain 2006).

Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter Presidencies

The nuclear cooperation between U.S. and Iran continued under the President Gerald Ford Presidency. A U.S. –Iran Joint Commission was formed to strengthen ties in areas like nuclear energy and power generation. Throughout Ford and Carter administration, the two states attempted to come to terms on a major nuclear cooperation deal that would have included the provision of eight nuclear power reactors to Iran (Kroenig 2014). The U.S. secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Iran’s Finance minister Mr. Houshang Ansan signed the agreement. The fuel for the reactors was to be supplied by the U.S. Muhammad Sahimi in his work Iran’s Nuclear Program part V cites various National Security Memorandums where U.S. expressed his desire for the extensive cooperation between the two countries. On March 14, 1975, in National Security Study Memorandum 219 , President Ford directed

“ a study of the issues involved in reaching an acceptable agreement with the Government of Iran which would allow nuclear commerce between the countries--- specifically the sale of the U.S. nuclear reactors and materials, Iranian investment in the U.S. enrichment facilities, and other appropriate nuclear transactions in the future.”

After a month, Ford instructed the U.S. negotiators to offer Iran uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. National Security Decision Memorandum 292, dated April 22, 1975 stated that the U.S. shall

“--- Permit U.S. materials to be fabricated into fuel in Iran or use in its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with whom we have Agreement.”

Around the same time , the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with Iran for providing training for Iranian nuclear engineers. On July 10, 1978 the draft of the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed. The agreement

was supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran's nuclear energy program. On October 18, 1978, The U.S. Energy Secretary, James R. Schlesinger sent the agreement to President Carter for his signature.

However, negotiations did not succeed over Iran's interest in reprocessing plutonium. By then, Islamic Revolution had swept Iran, and the Shah had informed U.S. that his plans for Nuclear Power Plants were on hold (Sahimi 2003) . Now U.S. altered its policy, as it would have give Iran the ability to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. The eight light –water power reactors the Washington was willing to export did not provide great proliferation risk, but the ability to reprocess would have put Iran close to the atomic bomb. By the late 1970's the U.S. has a strict policy or preventing the spread of plutonium-reprocessing technologies and uranium enrichment technologies to new countries, including Iran , due to proliferation risk (Kroenig 2014). Finally, in 1979, the U.S. stopped its supply of highly enriched uranium to Iran. U.S. also pursued a policy of pressurizing other countries not to transfer nuclear technology to Iran. After the hostage crisis, U.S. cut all diplomatic ties with Iran, the U.S. support to Iran's nuclear program came to end. The following essay will discuss how U.S. responded to Iran's nuclear program after the Islamic Revolution 1979.

After the revolutionaries seized power in February 1979, Iran remained chaotic. The security forces had almost disintegrated, fostering lawlessness. The economy was paralysed by absenteeism, capital flight, strikes and the collapse of public services. Anti –Americanism was widespread in Iran. Under such conditions, U.S. began to formulate a new approach toward Iran. U.S. desired for Iran's territorial integrity and political stability re-establishment that moment. U.S. embassy in Tehran was tasked with collecting information about a wide range of topics, such as the identity and strength of key radical Islamist and radical leftist actors, the clergy's growing influence, the status of the Iran's armed forces and other institutions and the nature of the emerging opposition. The main embassy offices charged with gathering intelligence on these were the political section, usually staffed by four Foreign service officers, and the CIA station, staffed by 2-4 covert operations officers serving under diplomatic cover. "According to Gasiorowski (2015) U.S. officials were careful during this period about not to encourage Iranians to work against the Islamic regime. And

they rebuffed the many plotters who opposed them for assistance, both inside Iran and abroad. Gasiorowski in his article examined U.S. covert operations toward Iran from February to November 1979, based largely on documents from the U.S. embassy in Tehran published by radical Islamists students who seized the embassy. According to him, no evidence of United States carrying out covert operations to undermine or overthrow new regime Covert efforts to undermine the Islamic regime might have destabilized Iran, threatened its territorial integrity, that reduced Iran's oil exports and increased Soviet influence in the region. The CIA covert operation were aimed at mainly collecting intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran in this period (Gasiorowski 2015).” The Carter administration announced a series of punitive measures against Iran that included seizure of Iranian assets in the U.S. , economic embargo and cancellation of visa facilities for Iranian visitors. A military operation ‘ Operation Eagle Claw’ was launched by U.S. which was meant to strike Embassy by the U.S. Special Forces and airlift the diplomatic staff to an American Carrier Task Force in the Arabian Sea. Though, the mission failed to achieve its goal (Yazdani and Hussain, 2006).

In October 1980, following almost one year into the negotiations for the release of Tehran embassy hostages, President Carter announced :

“ It is essential that I and those who aid me in the formulation of our Nation’s foreign policy make our decisions on the basis of accurate information about the capabilities and intentions of other countries and of forces that shape world events.”

“ Kinch (2006) argues that U.S. policy – makers failed to understand the complexity of the political crisis in Iran due to inaccurate information about the ‘ capabilities and intentions’ of key players in the Iranian political scene . The U.S. intelligence on Iran was often inaccurate and conflicting. Sourcing was often selective, either unintentionally or otherwise. It resulted into a misinformed policy-making which led to the political impotency of the U.S. in the crisis which unfolded during 1979.” After analysing the content of intelligence reports available to the President, one can say that President Carter and his advisers were receiving a misguided representation of the revolutionary state of Iran. For example, an August 1978 CIA Intelligence Assessment concluded, “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a

prerevolutionary situation.” Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pointed out in September 1978 that the Shah would “remain actively in power over the next ten years.” Question arises why did U.S. Intelligence community fail ? The capabilities of the U.S. intelligence in Tehran were hampered by absence of Muslim staff at the embassy and lack of officials who spoke Farsi. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders explained in one of the Committee hearing. “ *a non- Muslim does not go into a mosque during a service. That is a fundamental problem.*”

G.Sick points out that U.S. policy was already “ hostage to the social and political experiment” being directed by the Shah. There was a lack of policy on contacting the dissident groups in Iran, the Intelligence contacts within Iran were confined to officials surrounding the Shah and to information provided by Iran’s secret force SAVAK. The U.S. House Committee on Intelligence outlined that U.S. failed to adapt to changing political circumstances in Iran. The nuclear cooperation between U.S.-Iran and Iran’s nuclear program had come to a complete halt during the revolution time.

U.S. Response Post Iranian Revolution

After the Islamic Revolution and overthrow of the Shah, there was a huge policy shift toward the Iran’s nuclear program. Before the revolution, U.S. cooperated Iran in the field of nuclear technology and was supportive of Iran’s nuclear program for the peaceful purposes. The Islamic Revolution 1979 and the ‘ hostage crisis’ created a deep rift between the two countries resulting in the complete break –off of the diplomatic ties. United States changed its policies towards the Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear technology. U.S. consistently followed a policy of denial of nuclear technology to Iran. The paper will now discuss U.S. response to the Iran’s nuclear ambitions under the administrations of Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama.

President Reagan Years

Iraq felt threatened by the Iranian revolution as the revolution’s ideology undermined the legitimacy of the secular Iraqi Baath Party. Iraq launched full-scale military invasion on Iran on 22 September 1980. Iraq accused Iran of violating the

1975 Algiers Agreement, which committed both Iran and Iraq to the thawed principle to determine the boundary line between the two countries. (Yazdani and Hussain 2006). President Reagan administration showed a tilt towards the Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan's special envoy to the West Asia, Donald Rumsfeld visited Baghdad on multiple occasions before and after the Iraqi strikes on the Bushehr nuclear reactor from 1984 to 1988. (Joyce et. al 2003). Rumsfeld visits to Iraq were indicative of U.S. support to Iraq , during the Iraq-Iran war.

The Reagan administration initially did not have a clear policy towards Iran. President Reagan said in a national address on November 13, 1986 “ *My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority to send a signal that United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship.*”(The Public Papers of president Ronald W. Reagan 1986). Later on March 4, 1987 he said that, “ *I undertook the original Iran initiative in order to develop relations with those who might assume leadership in a post- Khomeini government.*”(The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, 1987). The signals of cooperation by U.S. were only sent to secure the release of the hostages, but there were no signs of cooperation in nuclear technology.

Bush I and Iran's Nuclear Program

After taking an oath of the 41st President of the United States, President George H.W. Bush made a reference to U.S. hostages being held by Iranian sponsored Lebanese terrorists in his inaugural address. He said, “ *There are today Americans who are being held in foreign lends,*” and that “ *assistance can be shown here and will.*” President did open the door for a potential improvement in relations with Iran. Iran was not amongst the top priority for Bush's administration as other world events took over in the priority list and competed to reduce his administrations attention toward Iran's advancing nuclear program.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, Gulf war, the fall of the Berlin wall, the crumbling of the Soviet Union, and the Madrid Peace process, all took the center stage during Bush's administration. Though President H.W. Bush did formulate the transfer of dual use technology to Iran policy between 1990-1991. President Reagan, had

restricted the report of sensitive technology to Iran in 1982, but the new administration permitted the transfer of high-tech equipment to Iran. In short, U.S. opened the door for the indirect transfer for U.S. technology to Iran. At the same time U.S. made efforts to halt nuclear cooperation between Iran and some of U.S. allies. President Bush did pressurize Spain to halt work on the Bushehr reactor in Iran in 1990. This could not stop Iran's nuclear program progress, as other countries like India agreed to sell a 10-mw-research reactor to Iran in 1992, despite U.S. pressure. One can say that President Bush did not formulate any particular policy toward Iran or toward its nuclear program (Hamilton 2010).

The Clinton Years

President William Jefferson Clinton came to power in the year 1992, and adopted an aggressive policy towards Iran and Iran than did his predecessors. President Clinton called Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Libya 'backlash states' in his state of the union address. He termed them so, as their behaviour was seen aggressive and defiant. 'Backlash states' are often defined as states ruled by cliques that control power through coercion, they are embarked on costly military and ambitious programs, especially weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems- in order to protect their regimes at home and advance their purpose abroad. (Anthony Lake 1994). According to the chief architect of the new U.S. policy Martin Indyk, both the countries posed a threat to U.S. interests, to the stability of its allies and to Israel's security. Indyk proposed a plan called " Dual Containment", which became a major component of the U.S. policy in the Middle East (Tarock 2006). This policy was not seen as a long-term solution to the problems of Gulf stability but as a way of temporarily isolating the chief opponents of the U.S. in the Middle East. (Brezezinski 1997). Indyk emphasized that the word 'dual' did not mean equating Iraq and Iran. (Sick 1998). Dual containment called for changes in Iran's approach in five areas, support of the Arab-Israeli peace talks, prospective acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), supporting international terrorism, acquisition of conventional weapons that would permit Iran to dominate the Persian Gulf and subversion through supporting Islamic movements in Sudan and elsewhere.

The policy was framed keeping in mind that U.S. would attempt to persuade European powers – together with Russia, Japan and China, to reject Iran's requests for WMD and conventional weapons that might constitute a regional threat. U.S. would oppose development loans to Iran by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It would also seek to persuade all its allies to maintain pressure on Iran so it could not pursue normal commercial relations. (Sick 1998). The policy initially involved mobilizing international political opposition against Iran, together with limited unilateral economic sanctions. The effort of the administration was not to change the regime per se, but change its behaviour in quest for nuclear weapons, its support for various terrorist groups in the region and its opposition to the peace process (Brezezinski 1997).

The aim of dual containment regarding Iraq was to sustain the coalition that had defeated Saddam Hussein's army in Operation Desert Storm and to ensure that Iraq complied with all UN resolutions. Policy called for more recognition of the Iraqi National Congress as a democratic alternative (Sick 1998). It involved maintaining the full-scale international economic sanctions and military containment, a no-fly zone in southern Iraq and a protected Kurdish enclave in the north (Brezezinski 1997). With a Democrat in the White House and the Republicans controlling the Congress, a contest developed between the two parties over who could be most vigorous in promoting tougher policies to deal with Iran (Sick 1998). For example, the Clinton administration put great political and economic pressure on Iran, Congress at the same time approved a request by the CIA for \$ 19 million to continue its covert operations against Iran, and in June 1995 in a letter to President, 202 legislators urged the administration to support the Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Kalk with a view of toppling the Islamic regime.

U.S. kept increasing its economic pressure on Iran, it restricted in April 1995, U.S. oil companies to invest no more than \$ 40 million later reduced to \$ 20 million in Iranian oil and gas industries. It led to the cancellation of an agreement, worth \$ 2 billion, between Iran and the U.S. oil company Conoco for the exploration and development of oilfields in the Persian Gulf. Clinton further pressed China, Russia and Group of seven (G7) to follow the U.S. embargo on Iran, to deprive Iran of foreign investments. U.S. even pressured the World Bank to suspend new loans to Iran

(Tarock 2006). Sick (1998) argued that Conoco deal was entirely legal U.S. law at the time. It was a good deal for the company, which could have used its share of the gas for a project in Dubai. It was a friendly gesture from Iran's side. Under immense pressure , DuPont renounced the deal. Republican Senator Alphonse D'Amato worked closely with the American-Israel Public Affairs (AIPAC), to prepare legislation that would cut-off all trade ties with Iran and punish any corporations that would engage investments there. President Clinton preempted D'Amato by issuing two Executive Orders that made it illegal for U.S oil companies to operate in Iran. (Sick 1998). In his second year in office, in the year 1994, President rescinded Bush's Executive Order (E0) 12735 (Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation) and signed Executive Order 12938 (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction). This order was passed to encompass nuclear technology which previous executive order had failed to include, this order prohibited the export of any services that would assist a foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction (Hamilton 2010).

The contestation between Congress and the White House was replayed in the presidential election year of 1996. Senator D'Amato prepared a bill in 1995 that would impose sanctions on any foreign corporation that invested \$ 40 or more in the Iranian gas and oil sector. Later Democratic Senator, Edward Kennedy succeeded in adding Libya to the sanctions regime. The bill was endorsed by the Clinton's administration with few modifications. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) as an opportunity to take a tough stand against terrorism. The bill was passed by 415-0 votes and was signed into law by the President in August 1995 (Sick 1998). The first few years of Clinton administration was hard on Iran. Yet another blow to U.S.-Iran relations in the year 1996 was the terrorist attack against the Khobar Towers residence of U.S. airmen in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. airmen (Lieber 1997).

It has been argued by many scholars that ' Dual Containment' policy failed to produce intended results in Iraq and Iran. Sick (1998) says that the policy was static in nature, it lacked flexibility to deal with the changing circumstances in a region that noted for unexpected and sudden changes. In case of Iran, policy called for a substantial transformation of Iran's policies and behaviour without any established benchmarks which would measure Iran's actions. In both Iran and Iraq policy created

rifts with chief U.S. allies and friends. Iran was too large, wealthy, complex and too politically active to be isolated. It was difficult to ignore Iran's geographical relationship to the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Basin. As Iran's oil and gas reserves were seen an important component of international energy supplies into the twenty-first century. The dual containment policy failed in recognizing the changes that were under way in Iran. The status quo of 1993 could not sustain the Washington efforts to institutionalize it with dual containment policy created a looming crisis with many of its friends and closest allies. Anthony Lake (1994) then assistant to the President for National Security Affairs also said that America's strategy depended heavily on active coordination and consultations with friends and allies. The policy of unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran were ineffectual, and the attempt to coerce others into the same was America's mistake. Extraterritorial bullying generated unwanted tensions between its important allies and threatened the international free trade order that U.S. promoted for so many decades. U.S. government made a huge mistake by cancelling the \$1 billion deal between Iran and Conoco, this served only French firm interests (Brezezinski 1997).

The policy could not be carried out smoothly as the administration was not backed by the international consensus, which reflected in UNSC resolutions in Iraq's case. And U.S. did not have broad sanctions in place to effect Iran's behaviour (Anthony Lake 1994). Hostility between U.S. and Iran continued right up to the election of President Muhammad Khatami in May 1997. His election raised hopes for improvement in the bilateral relations between the two countries (Tarock 2006). The limited rapprochement began in December 1997 when in a news conference Khatami stated “ *I First of all pay my respects to the great people and nation of America.*” After few weeks later, in a CNN interview, he proposed to America the idea of an exchange of “ scholars, journalists, writers, professors, artists and tourists.”(Lieber 1997). His foreign policy moves did encourage some high- ranking officials of the American Foreign policy to encourage President to engage Iran (Tarock 2006). President Clinton reciprocated by calling Iran “ *an important country with a rich and ancient cultural heritage of which Iranians are justifiably proud and asserted that the current differences between Iran and the U.S. were not “ insurmountable.”*”

“Richard Murphy, a policy maker in the State Department argued that the dual containment policy towards Iran had failed.” Richard Hass expressed a similar view about the logic of the containment policy and the utility of economic sanctions. President Clinton remarked around same time that, “ *I think it is important to U.S. recognize that Iran, because of its enormous geopolitical importance over time has been the subject of quiet a lot of abuse from various Western nations.*” President tried engaging with Iran, but Iran did not take the opportunity to normalize ties with the U.S. while President Clinton was still in office (Tarock 2006).

In short, U.S. policy had a more of mixed result under Clinton’s administration. The policy of dual containment was strongly carried out during the Clinton’s first term, seemed to have been jettisoned with the U.S. seeking to improve relations with Iran while keeping Iraq isolated. Washington embarked on a policy of rapprochement with Iran following the election of Mohamed Khatami as Iran’s President in May 1997. Clinton policies toward Iran did not succeed in his second term due to several factors. Firstly, Republican Party in Congress party provided support for the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which challenged President’s policies on Iraq and Iran. Clinton was held responsible for the Monica Lewinsky affair, which led to the Kenn Starr special counsel investigation of his presidency and to the beginning of an impeachment process. This process strengthened the role of Congress in U.S. foreign policy making and helped leaders like Saddam Hussein and Neatanyahu to resist U.S. pressure (Lieber 1997).

The policy of engagement with Iran also did not show much of positive signs. As normalising relations was not easy for either side. Normalising relations with U.S. would have been losing Revolutionary Mission for Iran. Gradually clerical regime was losing its power over technocrats and its control of the state. Thus it was difficult for Khatami to maintain momentum towards normalization. Engagement would have required U.S. to re-integrate Iran into the international community. (Chubin and Green 1998).

In nutshell, throughout the 1990’s despite America’s energetic diplomacy, the international community appeared complacent regarding Iranian nuclear program. The successful efforts by the President Clinton to prevent substantial international

cooperation with Tehran's nascent nuclear industry, coupled with Iran's corruption and mismanagement, led to perceptions that the program had stalled. Issues like, Iran's quest for missile technology and chemical weapons, Iran's opposition to the peace process, terrorism tended to overshadow the issue of Iran's nuclear program. (Dueck and Takeyh 2007).

U.S. Policy under Bush II Presidency

The Bush administration policy priority was to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Bush believed that a nuclear Iran would be too assertive in attempting to undermine America's goals in the Middle East. U.S. undertook multifaceted efforts to limit Iran's strategic capabilities through sanctions and international diplomacy. At the same time, the Washington engaged in bilateral diplomacy with Tehran on specific issues such as, stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan. (Katzman 2009). There was a huge policy shift under the new administration toward Iran. An international counter proliferation campaign was carried out against Iran, alleging that Iran is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran identified this campaign as unilateralist, and an attempt to prevent Iran from legally (as stipulated by NPT's article IV) acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In the president's 2002 State of the Union address, U.S. created an image of Iran trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. By the spring of 2003, it became quite clear that Bush administration was strongly working to internationalize its counterproliferation campaign against Iran. The U.S. assistant secretary for nonproliferation in his statement to the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT review conference stressed that issues relating to Iran's nuclear activities have made it clear that Iran has been covertly maintaining a program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that one can believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program. The administration succeeded in getting the G-8, France, Canada, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, United States, Russia and Germany – to issue a declaration in June 2003, which stated that Iran's nuclear program cannot be overlooked. This declaration further stressed that Iran must unconditionally accede to IAEA's comprehensive inspections regime, an Additional protocol that would provide a high level of transparency to its nuclear activities. Bush emphasized that it was important

for the international community to unite and clearly tell Iran that, “ *we will not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon. Iran would be dangerous if it had a nuclear weapon.*”

In June 2004, IAEA Director General El Baraadei expressed concerns about the origins of the high and low enriched uranium found in Iran and about the P-2 centrifuge design. Towards the end of the year, U.S. administration insisted that the IAEA should adopt a tough resolution that stipulates that Iran was in breach of its NPT obligations. The U.S. draft resolution demanded yet another deadline for Iran’s compliance if it wanted to prevent the issue from being forwarded to the UN Security Council for future possible sanctions. But international community wanted a more conciliatory approach, thus the IAEA’s resolution on Iran, urging its cooperation and compliance with the agency fell short of U.S. ambitions. (Di Filippo 2006).

The U.S. continued to exert pressure to discourage Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, which according to U.S. and its allies aimed at nuclear weapons capability. Following protracted negotiations, the Security Council in 2006 unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, a mandatory resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter , restricting Iran’s trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology and freezing the assets of ten Iranian companies and twelve individuals thought to be involved in Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. In March 2007, the Security Council passed Resolution 1747, again a unanimous resolution imposing additional economic sanctions. The new sanctions froze assets of twenty-eight Iran’s nuclear program and banned all exports of Iranian arms or materials related to the nuclear program. Iran responded to the Security Council’s resolutions by partially suspending cooperation with the IAEA (American society of International law, 2007).

President Bush ‘s second inaugural address and his State of the Union message in 2005 suggested a clear preference for a regime change in Iran by stating that “*..our nation hopes one day to be the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran.*” Promotion of regime change became a major part of Bush policy in 2006. Though Bush said that democracy promotion programs were intended to promote political evolution in Iran and not to overthrow the regime. “Seymour Hersh(2008) said that Bush authorized U.S. covert operations to destabilize the regime. Many questioned the prospects of U.S. – led Iran regime change through democracy

promotion. While Iran kept arresting the civil society activists by alleging they are accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds.”

A Congressional Research Service report Iran : U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (2009), mentions that \$ 67 million was appropriated for Iran democracy promotion (\$ 48.6 million through the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/ USAID and \$19.6 million through DRL). The hardliners in Iran associated civil society activism with America’s regime change policies. They used U.S. policies to blur the distinction between the acts of dissent and subversion, making it difficult for the civil society actors to pursue sociopolitical activism for the expansion of rights (Tezcur 2012).

U.S. under the Bush administration consistently maintained that military action was also an option on table to delay or halt Iran’s nuclear program. Many opposed the military action against Iran, others feared that sanctions and diplomacy might not succeed and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapon capability. (Katzman 2009). Under the Bush administration negotiations were viewed with a deep suspicion. many feared Iran was just buying time to get itself over the nuclear know-how threshold . (Indyk 2006).

Obama Administration’s Policy

President Barack Obama came to office with a promise of policy change. Obama viewed Iran policy as a component of a larger Middle- East policy that included the protracted Palestinian issue, Arab-Israeli tension. Terrorism and pervasive authoritarian practices in the region, lastly the extraction of U.S. combat troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan and deal with Iran in proportion to its significance.

President tried a new approach toward Iran in his message to the people of Iran in 2009, on the day of Iranian New Year. In a message, President paid homage to the great Persian civilization and its contribution to the world. He referred to Iran’s great culture and civilization the new administration suggested that U.S. would not place any preconditions on Iran’s presence at the negotiating table with the IAEA. Bush

administration had made the suspension of uranium enrichment a necessary precondition for any talks. (Akbarzadeh 2009). Obama was aware that it was important to resolve issues with Iran and how Israel lobby has been influencing U.S. policy makers to shape policy toward Iran over the years. The new president took a different approach toward formulating policy toward Iran. Obama separated U.S. policy towards Iran and Israel, and Iran was kept as one of the issue among others in the Middle East. This was evident at the first meeting between President Obama and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 2009, when Obama asked Netanyahu for a two –state solution and emphasized on the urgency of halting settlement expansions. Obama did not allow Israel to advance anti-Iran agenda during the meet (Akbarzadeh 2009).

The new administration shared goals of the previous administration to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, and to resolve U.S. allies' regional disputes with Iran. Obama made it clear that U.S. would be responsive to Iran's "unclenched fist", and that the new policy involves more direct diplomacy with Iran than was the case during the previous administration. Obama gave directions to his national security team to review existing Iran policy, to look into the areas where both could have a constructive dialogue, so that U.S. could directly engage with them. (Katzman 2009).

President agreed to join the EU+3 Iran talks without preconditions, and showed willingness to engage Iran beyond the nuclear issue. Obama managed to persuade anti- Iran Congress, to delay enactment of a much – awaited U.S. law toughening and expanding the 1996 ISA. The White House feared that the new law could derail talks over the new UNSC resolution, since it explicitly targeted foreign companies doing business with Iran. The new administration was successful in safeguarding the president's power to suspend sanctions against companies from countries too cooperate with the U.S. on Iran. By adopting the EU+3 devised dual track approach with more consistency than the previous administration. Obama managed to preserve the diplomatic track for engaging with Iran while building a far greater sanctions coalition unprecedentedly (Alcaro 2011). While promoting the concept of sustain dialogue, Obama continued international pressure on Iran to present it with a clear costs to retain all aspects of its nuke program (Katzman 2009).

The watershed moment in establishing a new U.S. policy toward Iran was on November 24, 2013. The five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany approved an interim agreement with Iran. P5+1 agreed to suspend elements of the sanctions regime, Iran agreed to suspend the 20 % uranium enrichment, and both the sides agreed to strive to reach a comprehensive deal within six months that would ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. Obama paved the way for the Geneva Agreement by conducting secret talks with Iran. These negotiations had begun in March 2013 and gained momentum after the presidential elections in Iran and Hassan Rouhani taking over as a new Iranian President. A lot of effort and strategy had gone behind supporting the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act bill—a bill meant to strengthen U.S. negotiating position vis-à-vis Iran by threatening further sanctions if Iran violates the Geneva Agreement. President Obama worked hard to convince Senate members not to pass any new measures against Iran. He repeatedly threatened to use his veto against this bill. National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan continued to say no to war against Iran, despite senators secretly pushing the country toward war with Iran. (Kuntzel 2014).

President Obama succeeded in finalizing a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a negotiated outcome between Iran and six powers (France, Russia, United Kingdom, China, United States and Germany) on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA was intended to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be purely for peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad lifting of European Union, United States and United Nations sanctions on Iran. The agreement replaced a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim nuclear agreement in operation since January 2014. President Obama and other P5+1 leaders asserted that the JCPOA was the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain nuclear weapons. JCPOA included a clause for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violated its commitments under the JCPOA. The U.S. allies in the Middle East expressed concerns that the sanctions relief to be provided under the deal would give Iran additional resources to extend its influence in the region. Also lifting of a U.N. prohibition on arms sales to Iran in five years , and on Iran's development of nuclear capable ballistic missiles for eight years , will set the foundation for Iran to emerge as a key regional player (Katzman and ker, 2016).

Prevention of military strike on Iran by the U.S.

The U.S. consistently emphasised the need for taking outright military action against Iran. Iran nuclear program was perceived, as a threat to the national security interests of the U.S.. Despite this, no military action was taken against Iran under President Bush and Obama administration. Oren (2011) in his analysis argued that U.S. abstention from attacking Iran was result of “intra-national political outcome”, resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran threat’ interests. The pulling of interests were among Vice President Cheney’s Camp in the Bush White House, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), member of Congress, the ‘military’s top brass, the intelligence community, the Department of State and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon.

President Bush expressed that America ‘will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon’ in Iran. During the Presidential Campaign, Obama similarly stated, “*we cannot allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon. It would be a game –changer in the region*”. Later Obama’s secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that a nuclear – armed Iran was ‘unacceptable’. U.S. government did engage in detailed military planning and both the Bush and Obama administrations indirectly threatened to use force against Iran. Both Bush and Obama repeatedly mentioned that all options were on the table. Many commentators openly spoke about bombing Iran. “Podhoretz (2007) wrote, There is no alternative to the actual use of force against Iran.” U.S. leaders continuously depicted a nuclear-armed Iran as ‘unacceptable’.” Question arises then why U.S. refrained from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. It has been argued that many domestic factors influenced policy making towards Iran. It was a constant push and pull between ‘hauers’ and ‘hawks’ in America. I argue that U.S. policy towards Iran has been shaped significantly by domestic politics. ‘Hauers’ like the bureaucratic political players like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense and top military officer persistently opposed military action.

President Bush was heavily influenced on the advice of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who advocated diplomatic response to the Iranian nuclear program. AIPAC, a pressure group in U.S. always depicted a nuclear-armed Iran as a ‘urgent

threat'. AIPAC has been the only pressure group that persistently lobbies congress for a tough stance towards Iran. It focused its lobbying activities on tough sanctions and kept enabling military action against Iran. AIPAC was successful in depicting nuclear Iran as an 'urgent threat', continuously insisting that not much time was left for Iran to achieve full nuclear capacity. Also AIPAC did not explicitly call for attacking Iran but pressured for tough sanctions, that could influence Iran's leader to deter their course.

Another pressure group, JStreet, a 'pro-peace', 'pro-Israel' lobby strongly opposed to the use of preemptive military force by Israel or the U.S. to attack Iran. JStreet remained quite active during the Obama's administration. The Department of State, the Department of Defense and the intelligence community influenced policy making towards Iran. The member of the U.S. Foreign Service, the office of the Undersecretary of State for political affairs preferred a diplomatic approach to the Iranian threat. R Nicholas Burns was appointed as the Undersecretary of state in the year 2005. He firmly believed that diplomacy would be the best course of action in containing and blocking the Iranian regime and that a military strike on Iran was not inevitable or desirable. He skillfully led the negotiations, begun in the year 2006, with four other permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany to impose economic sanctions on Iran to compel it to suspend its Uranium enrichment activities. He successfully persuaded China and Russia to join the U.S. in pressing sanctions against Iran and weakened the power of the hawks within the Bush administration. It was Bush who proposed for a diplomatic 'dual-track strategy' pf sanctions and engagement to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

Condoleeza Rice became Secretary of State in January 2005 and developed a close working relationship with R.Nicholas Burns and was influenced by Burns ideas of diplomatic approach. Indeed President Bush refuse to authorize a military strike on Iran due to Rice's influence. As President Obama's Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton remained privately skeptical of the value of engaging with Iran. After the collapse of the Geneva deal 2009 with Iran, Clinton preferred for the alternative diplomatic track i.e. tightening up economic sanctions against Iran.

Intelligence Community in U.S. also played a role in influencing President decision-making with regard to Iran. For example, at a meeting held at the Penatgon in

2006, member of the Joint Chief Staff told President Bush that they opposed a military strike against Iran. They warned President that in response to U.S. military strike, Iran could make life way difficult for U.S. troops in Iraq. Iran could shut off the flow of oil through the Strait Of Hormuz Strait, thereby creating a global economic crisis. U.S. policy toward Iran's nuclear program was a result of domestic influences in recent years. It was an outcome of triumph of one group over others. U.S. abstention from attacking Iran has been an 'intra-national political outcome' of a battle in which bureaucratic organisations opposing a military strike prevailed over political actors pressing for greater need of military options (Oren 2011).

Both regional and domestic factors have influenced U.S. policy making toward Iran's nuclear program. The domestic influences such as AIPAC Israel lobby influenced President Bush and Obama to avoid military strike against Iran. Israel lobby has throughout influenced U.S. policy making toward Iran. The inter departments feud again refrained Bush and Obama from taking any coercive action against Iran's nuclear program. The Department of Defense have dominated the decision making, refrained from military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, as it was aware of the prior burden of Afghanistan and Iraq war on U.S. military. The U.S. policy toward Iran nuclear program was also shaped by the changing situation in the Middle East. There was a need for U.S. to engage Iran, as Iran emerged an important regional actor.

President Obama engaged Iran, with an aim to resolve recent Syrian crisis, the ongoing Palestine-Israeli conflict, and energy security concerning the Persian Gulf and Caspian basin oil and gas flows. I argue, U.S. policy couldn't completely halt the Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program is irreversible. U.S. policy was consistent in opposing military dimension of the program and in denying nuclear technology. At the same time the strategies to deal with Iran varied. President Obama succeeded in striking nuclear deal with Iran. The deal helps U.S. managing the Iran's nuclear program. The deal certainly froze and rolled back Iran's nuclear program. The next chapter talks about the twenty months negotiations between P5+1 powers and Iran.

.....

Chapter 4

U.S. ROLE IN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MOVES (P5+1)

Introduction

There was a breakthrough in United States diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the controversy over the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear program in 2013. The controversy had arisen in 2002 when evidence of undeclared Iranian nuclear facilities at Nantanz was first made public. Concern was raised about Iran's compliance of Non-Proliferation treaty of 1968. The United Nations subsequently adopted five resolutions asking for suspension of its uranium –enrichment programme, ratify and bring into force an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and halt its construction of a heavy –water nuclear reactor. The international community used diplomatic means to try and convince Iran to halt its program. Iran agreed for negotiations over the times, but threats of military actions and sanctions could not persuade Iran to abandon their nuke program (Intelligence on Iran 2015).

P5+1 members comprised of the permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany held sporadically negotiations with Iran since 2006, produced an interim agreement in November 2013 that set out a solution for reaching a long-term comprehensive solution to the much talked dispute over Iran's nuclear program (Kile 2013).

In past, U.S. administration's opposing to engage with Iran was often an outcome of complex policy rationales grounded in historical antecedents (Parchami 2014). After becoming the president in 2009, to stop the nuclear ambitions of Iran Barack Obama made use of diplomacy and sanctions (Sebenius and Singh 2012). In 2003 diplomatic solution was tried to reach when Iran was offered incentives by France, Britain and Germany to stop Iran's nuclear program. (Intelligence in Iran 2015). In July 2015 a nuclear agreement was finalized and agreed by P5+1 as well as Iran and endorsed by the UNSC.

This chapter is an effort to analyze the role of U.S. in the P5+1 –Iran negotiations especially between 2009 – 2015. To examine external and domestic influences on the negotiations. Lastly to study the role of U.S. ally Israel in the process of P5+1 –Iran negotiations.

Background

The history of negotiations between U.S-Iran over the nuclear issue goes back to Shah's time. Shah used approaches which included negotiations with many technology providers to have an access to nuclear power. In May 1974, Ms. Dixy Lee Ray the chairperson of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission talked about the possibility of having facilities for enrichment and reprocessing in the region for the Middle East (Pellaud 2012). Iran was a part of 'constructive dialogue' with Europe in 1990s, much before the disclosure of undeclared facilities in Naanz and Arak in 2002. (Delpech 2012). There were active negotiations between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the IAEA to look out for the disconnect between declarations, inspections and information sources. Many discrepancies were found in Iran nuclear program in the 1990s, but no full evidence was found to initiate any action for the existence of the Natanz enrichment facilities by the national intelligence which actually marked the beginning of an active engagement of the international community with Iran. This incident was seen as the beginning of multilateral consultations and negotiations. Intense negotiations started between the IAEA and Iran to gain an access to the clandestine facilities that had been discovered.

The fall of Saddam Hussein of Iraq in 2003 had a strong impact on Iran. In the same year, a Swiss ambassador Tim Guldemann to Iran, gave information to U.S. officials that a plan with U.S. was approved by Ayatollah Khamenei for comprehensive talks, Mohammad Katami the then President and Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi. Switzerland became the main diplomatic channel for communication between Iran and Washington due to the absence of direct diplomatic relations. The U.S.-Iran negotiations aimed at issues like action against terrorist groups on the grounds of Iran, Tehran's support for anti-Israeli militants, accepting Israel to exist and access of nuclear technology by Iran. Unfortunately, Bush administration dismissed the Gldimann-Zarif efforts. On the nuclear issue, U.S. insisted on a

complete suspension of enrichment activities and opposed any compromise in this regard.

Eu+3- Iran Negotiations 2003

Primary effort to reach a diplomatic solution was in 2003, when France, Germany, and United Kingdom took the initiative for carrying out formal discussions which aimed at persuading Iran to stop the enrichment part of its nuclear program and to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol. The foreign ministers of these three countries, Jischka Fischer of Germany, Domiique de Villepin of France and Jack Straw of Britain went to Tehran in October 2003 to show their willingness to negotiate with Iran. (Pellaud 2012). The meeting was held inside Sa'dabad, the Shah's old place in Tehran. Villepin initiated the meeting, while Fischer of Germany looked tense as he opposed the nuclear power due to back home party ideological preferences. Iran aimed to limit the actual action of enrichment, which is obtained by introducing gasified uranium into centrifuges that spin at supersonic speed to concentrate the percentage of the fissile isotope U-235. On the other side, Europeans wanted to limit its gasified uranium feed material. The Iranians did not agree on the zero centrifuge formula. EU+3 then asked for other possibilities that would guarantee nuclear program is not diverted for military purposes. (Patrikarakos 2012). Iran agreed to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol by bringing it into force in October 2003, also to continue to cooperate with the IAEA and to suspend all activities of uranium enrichment and reprocessing outlined by IAEA. This was seen as one of the major diplomatic success. (Pellaud 2012). ElBaraedi ,then Director General of IAEA did not seem to be satisfied with the negotiations. The main concern was still the ambiguous definition of the scope of enrichment during the negotiations. Though Iran agreed themselves to enhance access to the nuclear program for OAEA inspectors and to resolve all the outstanding questions. In return, EU+3 fully agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to discuss methods it could provide assurance to Iran's nuclear program. According to David Patrikarakos, the first phase of the nuclear negotiations showed the EU+3 limitations as a diplomatic force. (Patrikarakos 2012).

Hassan Rowhani, Iran's main negotiator in October 2003 viewed that U.S. was coordinating their efforts with the EU3 behind the scenes. During negotiations, U.S

was continuously everything pressure on three European powers. One reason seen behind the slow pace of the negotiations. From the beginning, Britain told Iran if they want to settle the nuclear issue they had to negotiate directly with U.S. U.S. was not keen to negotiate with Iranians as they had met military success in Afghanistan and Iraq. .Rouhani criticized U.S. for influencing the negotiation process, and saw that every time Iran and EU3 came close to deal, U.S. pressurized their allies to delay the proceedings. U.S. viewed the negotiations mainly from a security point of view and was not ready to compromise their position. (Parchami 2014).

From Tehran to Paris Agreement

On 23 February 2004 , inspectors discovered yet more undisclosed research in Iran. it was mainly experiments with Polonium -210 which is used in the production of nuclear weapons. Iran was asked to acknowledge the charge but made an excuse by saying that polonium would be possibly used for power generation and that the experiment had occurred some time ago. In the same month, John Sawers, Director General for Political Affairs at Britain's Foreign Office, visited the IAEA to meet JavadZarif, Iran's UN Ambassadors, Mohammad Reza Alborzi and Cyrus Nasser, head of Iran's nuclear negotiation team. European position regarding the Iranian suspension of the manufacture of the centrifuge components was discussed. Europe said that suspension should last until all outstanding issues were resolved. Zarif was not satisfied with the European position. However three week later in a meeting at Brussels Europeans were able to convince Iran to widen the definition of 'suspension's and in return Europe promised support in vague terms for Iran's continuing good behavior (Patrikarakos 2012). U.S. was supervising the process in order to make sure that EU3 would not take any concession on the main issue of the suspension of the enrichment activities. (Pellaud 2012).

In September 2004, ElBaradei was requested to present a comprehensive report on all past Iran's breaches for Security Council referral. The aim was now to get Iran to widen the definition of enrichment to halt work on the production of feed materials for the enrichment process. Pressure from all sides, brought Iran on the negotiation table at Paris in November 2004. Iran position was vulnerable this time. Iran was ready to drop 20 sets of centrifuges if the EU3 would agree to drop the suspension to avoid Security Council referral. On 15th November 2004, the resolution was passed

and the Paris Agreement was officially signed in Tehran by Nicoullaud, and Zarif and other EU3 Ambassadors in Vienna.

In the Paris Agreement, Iran reaffirmed it would commit to full co-operation and transparency with IAEA, would not seek nuclear weapons and agreed to prolong its suspension of all its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. (Patrikarakos 2012). It was a major breakthrough as Iran accepted to suspend its uranium enrichment as a confidence building measure. But Iran kept emphasizing that the suspension would be a temporary measure. However, in 2005 the EU3 altered the accord unilaterally by announcing that uranium enrichment had to be suspended permanently or the future negotiations with Iran would stop. Iranian felt cheated and betrayed by the Europeans and held American responsible for what happened. Rowhani alleged that Bush personally called the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and gave directions to the U.S. delegation at the UN to draft a resolution against the Iran, as a way both bullying EU3 and undermining their efforts. (Parchami 2014). Iran was ready to stop the chemical processing indefinitely of spent fuel to get back the unspent plutonium or uranium, to convert all enriched uranium to fuel rods and to cap enrichment to LEU level. Iran's offer was turned down by the EU3, as EU wanted to buy time and wait for the June 2005 presidential election (Pellaud 2012).

U.S. Join the Negotiations

President George W. Bush began his second term in office with sweeping changes. Condoleezza Rice was appointed as the Secretary of the State and Nick Burns as the Under Secretary of the State for Political affairs. Burns was convinced that Iran's nuclear program would be one of the Administration's top national security challenges. Rice and Burns came out with a decision after various discussions that diplomacy over war will be preferred and at the same time military option would still be on the table in dealing with Iran. Burns invented a two path strategy toward Iran. According to him Iranians had two paths, one co-operate with west, negotiate bilaterally with U.S. and in return take nuclear aid or else face strong sanctions and the threat of military force for not co-operating with U.S. and allies. In nutshell, U.S.

formalized the 'carrot and stick' approach toward Iran. (Patrikarakos 2012). Parchami (2012) in his analysis based on Rowhani's memoirs argue that France wanted to resolve the nuclear issue urgently and was not dependent on U.S. to make its decisions. Britain kept delaying the negotiations because of the possibility of not reaching a final settlement without the approval of U.S. and the Germans were somewhere between the two with a more leaning toward France. Iran interpreted EU3 as a 'good cop' and U.S. as a 'bad cop' amidst the nuclear negotiations. He further argues that U.S. obstructed the path of nuclear negotiations rather than facilitating it.

The Paris Agreement marked the end of third phase of the nuclear negotiations. By the end of the negotiations Iran suspended enrichment for two years. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had defeated Hashemi Rafsanjani in the June 2005 presidential elections. Russia and China had begun to show interest in the Iran's nuclear negotiations by now. We see almost an end of EU3-Iran nuclear negotiations by 2005 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad taking over as the President of Iran. The Paris Agreement marked an end of the third phase of nuclear negotiations. By the end of negotiations , Iran suspended enrichment for two years and received nothing in return. China and Russia started to show interests n the Iranian nuclear issue.

The Birth of the P5+1 Process

Iran broke the IAEA seals On 10 January 2006, on the centrifuges at Natanz, handed them to IAEA inspectors and announced that it would continue research and development activity at the site. The initiation to resume nuclear work did not violate Iran's Safeguards Agreement but crossed the EU/US redlines. U.S. wanted to put economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran and decided to get involved internationally. In January 2006 a meeting was held in London. U.S. wanted the Security Council not to allow Tehran to get away with a violation willfully. The meeting finally resulted in an agreement to unite among the six countries. P5+1 coalition aim was to prevent Iran from gaining the status of a nuclear weapon state.

For the first time, in almost thirty years, U.S. offered direct bilateral negotiations to Iran in 2006. Iran then foreign Minister, Mannouchehr Mottaki spoke about Iran's readiness to accept the U.S. offer but did not agree to the condition of

suspending enrichment. The offer of bilateral talk was domestically unfavorable for mullahs. Iran's anti-western posture was critical to its political legitimacy.

Why Negotiations Achieved So Little?

The P5+1 began talks at the U.N. in late 2006; all states agreed that Iran had turned down the negotiations. U.S. was only left with an option to go down on the alternative path of sanctions. Russia and China were not satisfied with U.S. decision. Europeans were seen as playing a game of balancing Russia and China on one side, and U.S. on the other side. Bolton, Washington's Ambassador to the U.N. , pushed for tough sanctions and China and Russia for limited sanctions. On 23 December, Security Council Resolution 1737 delegated all U.N. member states "to stop the supply, sale or transfer of all items, equipment, materials, technology or goods which could contribute to Iran's enrichment related, heavy-water related activities, reprocessing or to the development of a nuclear weapon delivering systems".

The U.N. Resolution called for travel sanctions against certain Iranian government officials, but sanctions could not stop Iran from enrichment activities. By March 2008, P5+1 was acting tough on Iran. Resolution 1803 put restrictions on travel bans to additional Iranians and companies deemed to be involved in the nuclear work. Also, banned the sale of 'dual -use items' called on countries to withdraw financial support from companies trade with Iran and rigorously monitor the activities of two Iranian banks. The sanctions did prove to be effective to some extent in weakening Iran's economy.

Various groups called for a military strike against Iran due to failure of sanctions in halting the Iran enrichment activities. Meanwhile, Israel was getting worried. The new Iranian president called Israel a 'tumour' and Israel described Iran's nuke program as an existential threat for years. Israel supported diplomacy to resolve Iran's nuclear issue but also suggested to ramp up sanctions against Iran. P5+1 and Israel did not view the alternative approach of military strike desirable at that point in time. (Patrikarakos 2012).

The Obama Administration

The Obama administration came into office with transformational strategy of how the U.S. will engage with the international partners, a call for huge policy shift in the West Asia and greater outreach towards the Muslim world. U.S. felt the need to engage with Iran to resolve other overlapping regional issues. (Sanati 2014). After the post ‘ Arab Upheavals’ in the Middle East the U.S. saw the opportunity of the formation of alliances based on Sunni-Shiite rivalry in the region as an opportunity to counterbalance Iran. Obama viewed the Sunni Islamist axis, mainly Saudi Arabia, Qatar Turkey, and Egypt as a viable alliance to counterbalance Syria, Iran and Hezbollah. Yet, Israel perceived the new U.S. strategy as problematic for their security interests.

Eligur (2014) argues that the longstanding U.S.-Israel known strategy of supporting pro-Western, semi-autocracies in the Arab world would cease. The rationality behind the strategy was the need for U.S. to reduce its overseas commitments and passing the burden to other global partners. This strategy was formulated in the backdrop of U.S. engaged in two expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Post ‘Arab Spring’ both Egypt and Iran moved to improve their bilateral relations despite all the sectarian differences that existed between them and having opposing positions on Syrian civil war.

The analyst further argues that the Obama’s exploiting of the sectarian conflict in West Asian region’s to counterbalance failed as a policy. Egypt moved to improve relations with Iran, contrary to Obama’s expectations. The Obama administration could not win Arabs hearts and minds, despite U.S. full support for the Arab upheavals. Anti-Americanism was widespread in Middle East post ‘Arab Spring’. The weakened U.S. position in the Middle East also directly negatively affected Israel’s Security. Towards the end of the Obama’s first term, he defined Iran’s nuclear program as a ‘red line’ that threatened Israel and the U.S. In nutshell, ‘ Arab Spring’ led to divergence in U.S. and Israel Strategic interests. U.S. felt the need to engage with Iran and reshape its Middle East Policy. This was somewhere strained U.S. and its Middle East ally Israel’s bilateral relationship. (Eligur 2014).

Israel and Iran’s relation were based on shared geopolitical interests, leading to decades of cooperation both before and after Iranian revolution. As last as

the 1990's Israel did not perceive Iran as a threat. The rise of Iranian fundamentalists, their hostility toward Israel, especially under the President Ahmadinejad era, the overall Middle East's geopolitical transformation over the last decade intensifies the rivalry between the two. Iran began to see itself as a regional hegemon and further Arab uprisings also led to Israel concerns. Analyst viewed fall of pro- U.S.-Egypt's leader Hosni Mubarak and the widespread protests among Shi'a population in country like Bahrain shall strengthen Iran regional position. Meanwhile, Iran viewed Israel as a geopolitical military rival. As Israel along with its ally Western ally U.S. challenged its Middle East ambitions.

One important agenda on the table of the new administration was also to manage Israel- Iran rivalry. The main objective was to assure Israel that U.S. is making all efforts to prevent Iranian nuclear capability while discourage Israel from launching its own military strike against the nuclear facilities of Iran. At the same time, Iran's rivalry with the U.S. contributed shaping its various national security and military posture toward Israel. (Kaye et al. 2011).

In this background Obama administration formulated a 'dual-track' strategy for resolving Iran's nuclear crisis. They continued to maintain pressure on Iran in the form of economic sanctions and left the option of military threat on the table. Also offered negotiations and benefits for Iran in exchange of curbs on its nuclear program. The 'dual track strategy' consisted of both pressure as well as engagement at the same time. (Kroenig 2014). Obama administration opted for an engagement track to resolve the nuclear issue. In 2009, Ahmadinejad was elected as the President of Iran. Iran's national debate on managing the nuclear program features as a prominent part of the Iranian presidential campaign. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, former Prime Minister, was adamant that Iran would pursue its nuclear program. (Patrikarakos, 2012).

The rise of 'Green Movement' was seen during 2009 Presidential election which was seen as the coming of Iran's Reformists. Its clash with the political right of the Islamic Republic complicated the Iran's move at engaging with U.S., on important issues of convergence and divergence (Sanati 2014). Iran's internal political system had now changed, with a serious consequence for the nuclear impasse (Patrikarakos 2012). At one side were the second generational elite or the 'New Right' represented

by Ahmadinejad, he wanted a new revolutionary policy for the state. At the opposite side was the Islamic Republic's first generation, who had given birth to post-revolutionary Iran. (Sanati 2014).

The Iranian elections had a direct impact on the U.S. strategy on Iran. U.S. believed Iran would come forward for constructive negotiations to reach a deal, but Iran was still committed to the basic approach of engagement. China and Russia seemed to be comfortable with the status quo of neither a crisis nor a deal. U.S. officials believed Iran had no interest in a genuine deal.

Fordow Enrichment Plant Crisis

In a letter to the Director General IAEA, September 2009, the IAEA officials viewed that the Iranian government informed the Agency to the existence of a previously undeclared uranium- enrichment under construction at Fordow near Qam. Which intended to produce five percent enriched uranium. The nuclear facility was a serious concern for the West. Iran revealed that the decision to build the plant was taken in 2007. Also, it was built in response to continuing, military threats against the Iran's threats against the Iran's nuclear program from Bush administration and Israel. France and Britain denounced the site while President Obama demanded that Iran must be ready for inspections within two weeks. France was not giving any further concessions to Iran. Meanwhile, U.S. was gearing up towards bilateral talks with Iran. Despite, Fordow revelation, China was adamant it would not support increased sanctions against Iran.

Geneva Talks 2009

The P5+1 met with Iran in Geneva on 1st October 2009. In an excited atmosphere the talks began with the two hours preliminary discussions among P5+1 political directors and Iranians, chaired by Solana. The P5+1 offered Iran 'freeze for freeze' deal in which Islamic Republic would stop expansion of its enrichment program for six weeks in exchange for a halt in any further sanctions. Side by side economic benefits in exchange of full system of uranium enrichment were also dismissed. U.S. and Iran had come face to face first in thirty years. Jalili, an Iranian official had persuaded Iran to sit on the negotiating table but Rafsanjani's 'Green Movement' in Iran prevented it. EU had been impatient with Iran by now. Iran was

independent and powerful, at the same time willing to negotiate. Both U.S. and EU felt deceived with Fordow's discovery. Their attempts at détente were not meeting success. Ahmadinejad did want a deal to prevent more sanctions. China and Russia kept persuading all players for negotiations. Despite being unhappy with the conditions of the deal, Iran desired for settlement. On 9th June 2010, U.S. in consultation with other P5+1 members finalized a draft Security Council Resolution 1929 that tightened sanctions against Iran. This included tougher financial measures and an increased arms embargo. On 1 July, U.S. also imposed new unilateral sanctions against the Islamic republic, aimed to stop its imports of important refined petroleum products such as gasoline and jet fuel with limit its access to the international banking system.

Diplomacy Achieved Little Between 2009-2012

In late 2009, Russia had become Iran's close nuclear partner. By late 2010, someone attacked Iran's computer system at Natanz with a malware virus called Stuxnet. The goal of the attack was to destroy all the centrifuges at Natanz. Stuxnet can be seen as a sign of immense diplomatic frustration. Iran's nuclear programme ran into technological difficulties in 2011, which could delay a bomb until 2015. A new round of talks between P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul produced no positive results. Fordow construction was going on and Iran was facing isolation from the West. By the end of Obama's first term, U.S. was committed to sanctions, attempting diplomacy and military strikes were still an option. Obama was criticized and attacked domestically for not being able to handle Iranian crisis successfully. Tel Aviv had also started to build pressure on U.S. by heightening its rhetoric against the nuclear deal.

In June 2011, U.S. imposed sanction against Tidewater Middle East Co. and Iran Air, which is responsible for the most of the Iran's trade. The 14th April 2011 talks ended with nothing substantial. P5+1 powers negotiator Ashton expressed that there would be future discussions based on principle of reciprocity and step-by-step approach. Tehran's negotiator SaeedJalili described talks overall successful. Iran and P5+1 kept meeting at Baghdad and Moscow for negotiations. While, continuing enrichment and increasing its stockpile of LEU. In 2011 there was not much progress in the negotiations. P5+1 pressed for Iran cease Fordow nuclear facility and enriching

uranium to 20%, and surrender its existing stockpile of LEU. For Tehran, it was a demand for ending sanctions on its banking and oil sectors.

Iran expressed that U.S. and EU oil export sanctions were derailing the negotiating process, while West remained adamant that there would be no concession on the sanctions. By 2012, Iran continued with enrichment, the IAEA was skeptical about negotiations; EU and U.S. were equally skeptical but still in the process due to Chinese and Russian pressure. Israel seemed to be more aggressive. The Arabs felt terrified. Iran remained unpredictable and domestically divided. The Western efforts like Stuxnet attack, Israeli targeted assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, P5+1 diplomatic pressure derailed Iran's nuclear program but turned out to be insufficient to change Iranian behavior. By the end of 2012, Iran's nuclear progress continued to progress without slow down. Iran played a spoiler in multifaceted negotiations and seeks to hinder and obstruct simultaneously staying within the international picture. U.S. led the P5+1 Iran negotiations till 2012 and played a tough negotiator. (Patrikarakos 2012).

Convergence of Strategic Interests for U.S.-Iran

The victory of Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 Presidential elections brought resurgence of Reformists in Iranian politics. Redistributing the oil wealth amongst the society's economically weak section as one of the populist policies during the Ahmadinejad's tenure was diverted as Iran's long-term development plans. Redistribution policies provided lower income gains for the poor with some short-term fiscal gain. It led to inflation, slowly declined the purchasing power of middle class Iranian. Iran looked out for imports from China and India for cheap consumer goods. This further led to unemployment in Tehran. Iran's economy gradually started weakening due to U.S. sanctions, narrowing the pool of direct investment coupled with inflation and unemployment. U.S. sanctions did affect Iran's economy and compelled Iran to look for a change.

By 2013, even the Iran's Supreme leader had started backing the restarted negotiations. U.S. was willing to engage Iran to resolve overlapping regional issues. U.S. was aware that regional issues namely, energy security, Israeli- Palestinian impasse, non-proliferation, energy security from the Caspian basin and Persian Gulf oil and gas flows, European energy diversification cannot be fully completed without

improved U.S.-Iran dialogue. U.S.-Iran convergence on strategic interests led to a huge shift in their policy approach towards each other. The need to build new U.S. – Iran partnership was a result of the structure of both type of new international and domestic politics. (Sanati 2014).

P5+1-Iran Nuclear Negotiations

Through the fall of 2012, multiple international negotiations via a diplomatic process were unable to conclude a nuclear deal. Amid the preoccupation with variety of diplomatic processes, the issues in front of the negotiators were whether to get a huge bargain or a repressed understanding, whether U.S. should deal directly or through intermediaries. Whether to announce a deadline for talks or not which channel is more promising, ‘front or back’ for negotiations whether bilateral U.S.-Iran format or whether multilateral (P5+1) would be better.

In 2012, overt negotiations between P5+1 and Iran were on hold, which might have continued revealed by reports that the sanctions would have been increased after the Presidential elections in U.S. by taking stringent actions. Negotiations involved a range of players such as the P5+1 powers, Iran, Arab states and Israel. Each with their own interests Sebenius and Singh (2012) argues that Iran nuclear decision making was influenced by a cost-benefit approach, where as U.S. approach was guided by complex U.S.-Israel interactions throughout. The U.S. aim for negotiating with Iran was simply to avoid Iran from getting nuclear weapons capability. U.S. was refraining from any military action against Iran. The Israeli’s themselves were sending mixed message regarding n attack on Iran. President Obama was using sanctions and incentives as tools for negotiations with Iran. (Sebenius and Singh 2012).

The six U.S. Security resolutions –U.N. security resolutions called for a full suspension of nuclear plant enrichment. The deal agreement called for cutting the four pathways to nuclear weapons. In exchange international community would give Iran with slow phased sanctions relief. Now, Iranians were more pragmatic and looked at the future of their country and wanted to get rid of the burden they were under. The negotiations were not about Iran dismantling its nuclear infrastructure. The bargain was for Iran to retain enough enrichment capacity and enough facilities that give U.S.

confidence that their breakout time is not near. (United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 114th Congress, First Session).

The stalled negotiations resumed in February 2013. Talks were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan by Iran with P5+1 to bring the conflict over nuclear program to an end. The negotiation started with signs of progress and Iran's chief negotiator Saeed Jalili described the meet as 'turning point'. Head of U.S. Central Command Gen. James Mattis expresses Skepticism about negotiations. He believed that Iran has a history of deceit and denial and was using negotiations to buy time. (Iran Intelligence Watch, 2015).

Israel's Red Lines Worked

Expensive and unambiguous 'red lines' give clear boundaries that allow for space in selecting the time, intensity and nature of the action to the deterrent effect. Israel announced many 'red lines' for Iran's nuclear program. Increase in uranium enrichment was such a 'red line'. Again in 2006, after Iran started enriching uranium, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert reduced the enrichment of uranium to a few number of centrifuges. After that Ehud Barak the then Defense Minister, talked about Iran's entry into a 'zone of immunity' which meant that the enrichment site at Fordow a underground facility would be resistant from attacks.

In 2012, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the U.N. gave a new definition to the 'red line' by showing a 'cartoonish' picture of a bomb with a red line trying to convey that Iran had accumulated about 20% enriched uranium suitable for making a nuclear bomb. Israeli's Minister of Strategic Affairs, fixed the 'red line' on having 250 kg of enriched uranium to 20%. Israel later stopped the heavy reactor in Arak to the list of red lines, which happened to be adopted in the later negotiations by P5+1.

Meanwhile, U.S. refrained from drawing close 'red lines' on the Iranian nuclear issue. U.S. kept issuing abstract statements defining a 'Nuclear Iran' as a 'red line'. (Guzansky, 2015). Analysts expressed that Netanyahu 'red lines' did yield positive results for Iran because it used 40% of its 20% uranium in the research reactor, allowing it to keep its enriched uranium repertoire below the red line mentioned by Israel. Something, which neither negotiations nor sanctions achieve, Israel's red line

then acted as a temporary and partial check on the Iranian threat. (Intelligence on Iran 2015).

Interim Deal 2013

In May 2013 at Turkey, Iran expressed its right to have enriched uranium and did not give any concessions. The June 2013 Presidential election in Iran did raise hopes that negotiations will finally be resumed. Meanwhile, Congress in U.S. kept persisting on giving Rouhani a chance to negotiate. Obama made John Kerry the Secretary of State to coordinate with the P5+1 power to pursue diplomacy with Iran. on November 23, 2013 the P5+1 and Iran finally reached a understanding that halt in Iran's nuclear program was necessary and had to roll it back in major areas. The agreement was viewed as an interim deal for a time period of six months that would allow P5+1 to have powers extended time to work with Iran leading for establishing of a permanent solution for Iranian nuclear crisis.

The deal made Iran to halt the enrichment above the limit of 5%, halt the work on its enrichment capacity, and stop the 20% uranium stockpile, reduce the progress at Arak facility and allow IAEA to check the sites at Fordow and Natanz sites in return for the steps the P5+1 would not put sanctions on new nuclear activities on Iran for six months. Also other sanctions on previous metals, gold, Iran's petrochemical experts and auto sector would be suspended. Obama administration called the agreement "an important first step toward a Comprehensive Solution" This temporary agreement was called Joint Plan of Action (JPOA).

Despite Obama administration's diplomatic win, Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, " Benjamin Netanyahu said "What was achieved in Geneva is not an historic agreement, it is an historic mistake..... a bad agreement. It gives Iran exactly what it wants: both substantial easing of sanctions and preservation of the most substantial parts of its nuclear program".

The JPOA was finalized by the P5+1 and Iran by January 2014. On July 2, new set of negotiations took place and July 20th was made as the deadline for outcome of a permanent solution. An extension of four-month was agreed by P5+1 and Iran because no productive results were met. Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarif gave a statement on, 2014 August about Iran's decision to deal with ISIS by supporting the efforts led

by U.S. and other countries in Iraq with return of lifting sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. The negotiations took place by September 2014 between P5+1 and Iran in New York. But negotiations were stalled due to 'lack of progress'. Under the JPOA, Iran halted progress on its nuclear program, rolled it back in key aspects, also allowed unprecedented inspections of its enrichment facilities. In exchange, Iran received limited and reversible sanctions relief related to nuclear program. Though JPOA did not lift sanctions related to trade, oil, banking, domestic embargo, terrorism and human rights. The JPOA was vigorously enforced, since signing of the agreement U.S. designated nearly 100 Iran related targets and imposed over \$ 350 million in penalties for sanctions evasion. In 2014, U.S. sanctions of Iran made it lose oil revenues by a huge sum of over \$40 billion. By 2015, Iran's nuclear program and economy was frozen. The negotiating team was under immense pressure to be able to hold together the international sanctions coalition. Sanctions truly projected U.S. power and were used as tool to obtain national security objectives. In the course of the negotiations, the JPOA looked forward for a final resolution that included an extremely constrained and limited enrichment capacity. Senator Kaine argued that JPOA has been a success. There was a speculation that JPOA would unravel sanctions regime and lead to surge in the Iranian economy. But it did not. Skeptics predicted that U.S. and Iran both would not meet obligations under JPOA, but both countries did. (United States Senate Committee on Foreign relations 114th Congress, First Session 2015).

Final Deal

The Geneva negotiations in early January 2015 yielded some progress. Broad ranges of issues were among small group of staff each side. February 2015, U.S. negotiating team expressed that they have allowed Iran with almost 80% of what they wished in return of very little. Benjamin Netanyahu speech to Congress was scheduled on March 3, 2015, which aimed at warning U.S. of the dangers of a bad nuclear deal with Iran (Intelligence on Iran 2015). In a Joint Meeting to hear and address by Binayamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, held on 3rd March, Netanyahu expressed that Iran's regime was a big threat to Israel and had disturbed peace in the entire world. Iran threatens Israel by its goons in Gaza, Revolutionary Guards on the Golden Heights and lackeys in Lebanon.

Israel objected that deal does not call for demolishing of Iran's nuclear infrastructure. International inspectors will suspend Iran's adherence to restrictions but inspectors won't be able to stop them. They failed to catch Iran while they were building nuclear facilities at Natanz and Qom. He called the nuclear deal a bad deal as the deal had two major concessions. Firstly, was to leave Iran with a massive nuclear infrastructure, secondly, lifting the restrictions on that program within a decade. The deal will not prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; rather encourage a nuclear arms race in the region. (Joint Meeting to hear and address by his Excellency Binayamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, March 3, 2015).

Multiple issues were surfacing in the final weeks of the negotiations. Issues like when UN sanctions from Iran would be lifted, the questions of future inspections of the nuclear sites and number of centrifuges allowed by Iran to possess became important to deal with. Senators Bob Corker and Robert Menendez made a bill authorizing the Congress to give its final say for accepting or rejecting the nuclear deal with Iran making the deal to come at its final stages (Intelligence on Iran, 2015).

Iran Nuclear Deal

After around twenty months of strenuous negotiations, the historic deal was finally made with efforts from U.S. and international partners preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran nuclear deal prevents Iran from manufacturing nuclear bomb by cutting off important channels leading to making of a bomb. Iran would now stop the clandestine activities pertaining to making a bomb in return of lifting of economic sanctions. The nuclear deal places that the sanctions can be replaced back into place if in any case Iran made violations of the deal. Finally, the deal allowed for intrusive, strong and unprecedented measures that are needed to verify Iran's intention of pursuing a nuclear weapon.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ensured continuous supervising of Iran's major declared nuclear facilities. This deal gives IAEA right to construct physical and technical pressure in Iran's nuclear sites, uranium mines and mills. The IAEA inspectors can ask access to any location if they have found suspected undeclared activities. Any suspicious location can be accessed by giving 24 hours notice, but 2 hours notice in certain circumstances. Proponents of the Iran nuclear deal argues that JCPOA does not simply delay on Iranian nuclear weapon but prohibits Iran

from pursuing or acquiring nuclear weapons forever. JCPOA defines that by being a member to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has been obligated to not to seek or get nuclear weapons. In case of non-compliance, the JCPOA will give power to U.S. to mobilize its other international members to take swift action against Iran.

Islamic Republic's nuclear program is significantly rolled back in the first decade of the JCPOA. The nuclear program will undergo controlled, measures, incremental consistent growth for peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed not to carry out certain research and development activities which allows the making of nuclear weapon in the country. The prohibitions have been put on activities ranging from multi-point detonation systems, modeling of nuclear explosive and explosive diagnostic systems, and neutron sources which is specialized. Iran is unable to carry out activities with plutonium and uranium metallurgy for another 15 years. The transparency commitments will continue for 20-25 years as stated in the agreement. U.S. argues that if Iran continues with its nuclear weapon program then the JCPOA tools will be utilized against it (Wh.gov/Iran-deal 2015).

Sanctions under JCPOA

The JCPOA gave a relief from nuclear related sanctions. Various other sanctions from U.S. and U.N. stayed even after the implementation of the JCPOA. The financial institutions of Iran would stay blocked and U.S. citizens would not be allowed to conduct dealings and transactions with the financial institutions of Iran and the government itself. Nonproliferation and Terrorism related sanctions will not be lifted. There will be continuation in the statutory sanctions to transfers of technologies for missile development, conventional weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Iran will continue to be listed as a state that sponsors terrorism. Anyone in world who supports or transacts with individuals sanctioned regarding Iran's support for terrorism, and development of WMD remains on U.S. SDN list along with the possibility of facing exclusion from the financial system of U.S.

The restrictions for buying and selling of nuclear weapons and materials needed for ballistic missiles technology was placed by UNSC on Iran and such items would stay in place for another 5 and 8 years. Iran will continuously remain susceptible to sanctions and snapback. Making use of the advantage of sanctions relief, Iran will need to have a healthy engagement with international community and sustain

their leverage. For getting the capital and goods and services Iran will be dependent on global financial systems. The failure of Iran to follow the obligations for its nuclear development will lead to dominant pressure from international community which Iran cannot overcome (Wh.gov/deal 2015).

Iran Nuclear Deal A Win-Win Agreement

Proponents of the P5+1 nuclear deal have called the deal a good deal. It is a good deal as it cut offs all pathways to bomb. Iran is not allowed to develop nuclear weapon, nor can it build it covertly. Under the deal, Iran is forced to reduce 10,000kgs of enriched uranium to 300kgs. The deal also reduced Iran stockpile of enriched uranium and its centrifuges. Iran cannot possess highly enriched uranium for 15 years. Iran nuclear deal will limit its capability to have nuclear weapons for at least the period of 15 years. Finally the nuclear deal meets and exceeds Washington Institute for Near Policy's (WINEP) standards. (White.gov, 2015) it is a win situation for U.S. as Iran has made many concessions, while P5+1 has made few in return.

Iran in return got the benefits of its own money amounting to \$ 100-\$150 billions which had been stranded due to the sanctions in Western countries (Tarock 2016). The opponents of the deal called it a bad deal. Iran is still allowed the uranium enrichment. The deal puts on hold production and enrichment of uranium for the next ten years. Stockpiling of enriched uranium would continue for the limited period of 15 years. The deal can be called a historical breakthrough as it initiates the rapprochement between Iran and the West. After a decade the talks between EU and Iran ended with fruitful results. U.S. and Iran finally talked face –to-face after three decades. The agreement has immensely reduced the dangers and possibility of another war in the Middle East. The nuclear deal was slanted in favor of U.S. and Israel. The deal was passed despite objection of Congress and Israeli lobby in U.S. (Tarock 2016).

Israel ended up playing the 'bad cop' role, which helped to get a better deal with Iran its small' red lines' intended not take coercive action but to mobilize other international partners to take action. Israel strategy arguably met with success. (Guzansky 2015). The P5+1 –Iran deal has improved U.S-Iran relations for now. The

future of U.S.-Iran bilateral relations hinges on how Israel and Saudi Arabia will react to the rapprochement between Iran and U.S.

.....

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the major foreign policy objectives of the United States. It can be said that, overall it has been a successful policy in promoting and sustaining International peace and security. Existing Nonproliferation regime is centered on the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonproliferation regime has not remained virgin, it kept evolving, modifying according to the new threats and challenges and remained credible.

Nonproliferation regime has come a long way. International and domestic forces as independent variables or factors has influenced the framework, functioning of the policy. Nonproliferation regime then as a dependent variable stretched, grew and adjusted itself to the new emerging challenges. It was strengthen during the early 1990s when many countries became signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. After some time India's Nuclear Explosion was seen a policy failure in Washington. United States sort out new ways to deal with non-signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The use of nonproliferation tools can be seen since then, as United States used sanctions against India to bring it under nonproliferation regime.

U.S. has innovated many policy tools and strategies to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It has looked outside the traditional nonproliferation treaty to limit the proliferation. The Nonproliferation policy was stressed in the era of globalization especially after the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the U.S., President Bush made major policy changes to the nonproliferation regime. His proposal of U.S-India nuclear deal brought India indirectly under the purview of nonproliferation regime. Further Iran's nuclear program has been one of the major threat to the interest of U.S. The North Korea after it withdrew from the NPT in the year 2003 led the debate of the nations compliance to the NPT. The 2015 P5+1-Iran deal can be seen as an effort to control the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.

The most contested issues have been U.S. policies on nonproliferation while ensuring peaceful development of nuclear energy. The lack of clear definition of 'peaceful purposes' in the NPT gives way to nuclear latency and nuclear hedging to the states. Article VI of the NPT is still the most contested issue at present. Egypt's

demand for the creation of free zone for the weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was discussed in the NPT Review Conference 2015. Israel has remained opaque about its nuclear programme. It also opposed the P5+1-Iran deal strongly in the year 2015. Different President of the United States has made efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with different policy interest in minds. It is yet to see whether reliance on new technology like Anti-Ballistic Missile over conventional nuclear weapons will increase in the national security. Also can we ever have a world without nuclear weapons?

U.S. strategic interests before 1979 in the Middle East, made Iran are close partner in the region. U.S. can be seen as major driver behind evolution of the Iran's nuclear program prior 1979. Iran felt extremely vulnerable during war with Iraq in 1984. It compelled Iran to think about its deterrence options. The aim for nuclear weapon capability was driven by deterrence against Iraq and Israel. Iran's nuclear program has always been ambiguous in nature. Many analysts agree that Iran's nuclear program revealed a military dimensions. National pride and security can be said to be two main reasons behind Iran urge to attain nuclear weapon capability. Iran nuclear program cannot be studied in vacuum. Nuclear policy forms an important part of Iran's foreign policy. For Iran, its nuclear program has helped it achieving its foreign policy and national security objectives.

Both regional and domestic factors have influenced U.S. policy making toward Iran's nuclear program. The domestic influences such as AIPAC Israel lobby influenced President Bush and Obama to avoid military strike against Iran. Israel lobby has throughout U.S. policy making toward Iran. The inter departments feud again refrained Bush and Obama from taking any coercive action against Iran's nuclear program. The Department of Defense dominated the decision-making, as it was aware of the prior burden of Afghanistan and Iraq war on U.S. military. The U.S. policy toward Iran nuclear program was also shaped by the changing situation in the Middle East. There was a need for U.S. to engage Iran as Iran has been an important regional actor. President Obama engaged with Iran with an aim to resolve, recent Syrian crisis, the ongoing Palestine-Israeli conflict, and the flow of oil gas regarding the energy security in Persian Gulf region and Caspian Basin. I argue, U.S. policies couldn't completely halt the Iran's nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program is irreversible. Though U.S. policy has been consistent in opposing the military part of

the program and in denying nuclear technology. At the same time the strategies to deal with Iran nuclear program varied.

The deal can be called a historical breakthrough as it initiates the rapprochement between Iran and the West. After a decade the talks between EU and Iran ended with fruitful results. U.S. and Iran finally talked face –to-face after three decades. The agreement has immensely reduced the possibility of development of tensions leading to a possible devastating war in the Middle East. The nuclear deal was slanted in favor of U.S. and Israel. The deal was passed despite objection of Congress and Israeli lobby in U.S.

Israel played out as in a ‘bad cop’ role, that helped in chalking out a better deal with Iran its small’ red lines’ intended not take coercive action but to mobilize other international partners to take action. Israel strategy arguably met with success. The P5+1 –Iran deal has improved U.S-Iran relations for now. The future of U.S.-Iran bilateral relations hinges on how Israel and Saudi Arabia will react to the rapprochement between Iran and U.S.

.....

References

Mohammed, A. B. (2013), *Indo- U.S. Relations: Dimensions and Emerging Trends*, New Delhi: Shipra Publications.

David, A. et al. (2013), “ U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East,” [online: web] Accessed 6th December. 2015 URL: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org>

Riccardo, A. (2011), “ Learning From a Troubled Experience-Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran” *The International Spectator*, 46(4) :115-136.

Akbarzadeh, S. (2015), “ Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Ideology and Realpolitik in Iranian Foreign Policy” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69, (1) : 88-103.

Akbarzadeh, S. (2009), “ Obama and the U.S. Policy Change on Iran” *GlobalChange, Peace & Security*, 21(3): 397-401.

Bahgat, G. (2005) “ Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East : Iran and Israel” *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26(1): 25-43.

Bahgat, G. (2006), “ Nuclear Proliferation : The Islamic Republic of Iran.” *Iranian* 39(3).

Brzezinski, Z. et al. (1997), “ Differentiated Containment” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no 3.

Barzashka, I. and Ivan, O. (2012), “ Iran and Nuclear Ambiguity” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25 (1) : 1-26.

Baklitskiy, A. (2015), “ The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime,” [online: web] Accessed 3rd January. 2016 URL: <http://www.armscontrol.org>.

Brzoska, M. (2012), “ The role of sanctions in non-proliferation in Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase, (eds.) *Arms Control in the 21st Century: Between Coercion and Cooperation*, New York: Routledge.

Carlson J. (2014), “ Peaceful” Nuclear Programs and the Problem of Nuclear Latency,” [online: web] Accessed 15th December 2015 URL: <http://www.nti.org>

Chari P.R. (1978), “ An Indian Reaction to U.S.- Nonproliferation Policy,” *International Security*, 3(2) : 57-61.

Chari, P.R. (2000), “ India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambitions,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 7(3) : 123-135.

*Committee on International Security on Arms Control National Research Council (2005), National Research Council (2005),” Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Explosive Materials : An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities,” [online:web] Accessed 15th December. 2015 URL: <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11265.html>.

*Congressional Testimony, (2015), Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 29, 2015. (Washington. D.C.).

*Congressional Hearings I, (2015) U.S. 114th Congress Session 1st, Senate Committee on Foreign Negotiations: Status of talks and the role of Congress, January 21, 2015. (U.S. Government Printing Office : Washington D.C.)

Cowan Z. Barton (1979), “ A look at U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, *American Society of International Law*, 73 (26-28): 159-166.

Craig, C. (2009), “ American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution,” *Review of International Studies*. 35(1): 27-44.

*Congressional record vol161, number 36.(Tuesday, March 3, 2015) Pages H1528-H15313 From the Congressional Record online through the Government Publishing office, Joint meeting to hear on address by his excellency Binayamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel.

Chansoria, M. (2009), “ Iranian Nuclear Policy : A Historical Overview “ in Alam Anwar (eds). *Iran and Post 9/11 World Order : Reflections and Iranian Nuclear Programme*, New Delhi : New Century Publications.

Chubin, S and Green, J. D. (1998), “Engaging Iran : A U.S. Strategy.” *Survival* 40(3).

Clarke, M. (2013), “ Iran as a ‘Pariah’ Nuclear Aspirant,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 67(4) : 491-510.

Delpech, B. (2012), “ Negotiating with Iran : Testing Alternative Approaches” in Krause Jacuchim (eds). *Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Strategic Implications*, New York :Routledge.

Diehl, J. S. and Moltz, C. J. (2008), *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation*, Santa Barbara, California: Library of Congress Cataloging –in- Publication Data.

Difilippo, A. (2006), “ U.S. Policy and the Nuclear Policy and the Nuclear Weapons Ambitions of the “ Axis of Evil” Countries,” *New Political Science*, 28(1): 101-123.

Colin, D. and Ray, T. (2007) “ Iran’s Nuclear Challenge” *Political Science Quarterly* 122 (2): 189-205.

Dueck, C. (2012) “ Review Essay: Nuclear Nonproliferation and Obama, *Orbis*, 56(3) :503-512.

Eligur, B. (2014), “ The ‘Arab Spring’: implications for U.S.-Israeli relations, *Israeli Affairs*, 20(3) : 281-301.

Entessar, N. (2009) “ Iran’s Nuclear Decision-Making Calculus “ *Middle Eastpolicy*”.15(2), 26-38.

FAS , “ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” 7th January , URL: [http:// fas.org /nuke/control/npt](http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt).

Fahmy, N. (2006), “ An Assessment of International Nuclear Nonproliferation efforts after 60 years,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, 13(1): 81-87.

Fehl, C. (2012) “ A non-proliferation (r) evolution’: U.S. arms control and non-proliferation policy under Bush and Obama, in Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase (eds.) *Arms Control in the 21st Century: Between Coercion and Cooperation*, New York: Routledge.

Fitzpatrick, M. (2006), “ Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme ,” *Survival* , 48(3) : 5-26.

Futter, A. (2011), “ Getting the Balance Right: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” *Comparative Strategy*, 30(30) : 254-267.

Gavin J. F. (2015), “ Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” *International Security*, 40(1), 9-46.

Gibbons, D. R and Kaplow, M. J. (2014), “ The Days after a deal with Iran,” [online:web] Accessed 18th December, 2015 URL : [http:// www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org).

Goldschmidt, P. (2007), “ Priority Steps to Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime,” [online:web] Accessed 18th December, 2015 URL : [http:// www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org).

Grape, S. et al. (2014), “ New Perspectives on nuclear power-Generation IV nuclear energy non-proliferation and support nuclear disarmament,” *Energy Policy*, 73: 815-819.

Gratias S. M. and Hymas E.C.J. (2013), “ Iran and the Nuclear Threshold” ,*The Nonproliferation Review*, 20(1) : 13-28.

Guzansky, Y. (2015), “ Lines in the sand: the use and misuse of red lines” *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume 31, Issue 2, pages 90-98.

Gasiorowski, M. (2015), “US Covert Operations toward Iran, February- November 1979 : Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime ? “ *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51(1):115-135.

Harvey, R. J. (2007), “ Document No. 4 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs: Implications for Nonproliferation,” *Comparative Strategy*, 26(1) : 95-102.

Hadian, N. (2008), “ Iran’s Nuclear Program : Background and Clarification” *Contemporary Security Policy*, 29(3), 573-576.

Hamblin D. J. (2014) “ The Nucleraization of Iran in the Seventies” *Diplomatic History* 38(5) : 1114-1135.

Herbach, J. and Kiefer-Pitts, S. “ More Work to Do: A Pathway for Future Progress on Strengthening Nuclear Security,” [online: web] Accessed 16th December. 2015 URL: [http:// www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org).

Hibbs, M. (2013), “ Iran and U.S. Nuclear Policy,” [online: web] Accessed 25th August. 2015 URL: [http:// thehill.com / blogs/congress – blog / foreign –policy](http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy).

Intelligence on Iran (2015) “ Negotiations ,” [online :web] Accessed 15th September 2015 [URL:www. Intelligence.com / negotiations](http://www.Intelligence.com/negotiations)

Joshi, S. (2005), “ Unilateralism and Multilateralism: Analyzing American Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” *World Affairs*, 167(4), 147-161.

Katzman, K. and Kerr K. P. (2016), “ Iran Nuclear Agreement,” [online:web] Accessed 10th February , 2016 URL : [http:// crs.gov](http://crs.gov).

Katzman, K. (2009), “ Iran : U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [online :web] Accessed 14th August 2015 , URL [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Kerr K. P. (2012), Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, [online: web] Accessed 17 December. 2015 URL: [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Kerr K. P. (2013). Iran’s Nuclear Program : Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations [online: web] Accessed 14 August. 2015 URL : [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Klerk de P. (2014), “ The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the Nonproliferation Regime,” *TheNonproliferation Review*, 21: (3-4), 411-424.

Kissinger, H. (2014), *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations andthe course of History*, Penguin Group: London.

Kroenig, M. (2014), “ Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy,” *Security Studies*, 23(1) : 1-32.

Kronstadt, A. K. (2007), India-U.S. Relations, [online: web] Accessed 10th December 2015 URL: [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Kerr, K. P. and Katzman, K. (2015), Iran Nuclear Agreement, [online :web] Accessed 14 August . 2015 URL : [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Kibaroglu, M.(2006). “ Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs : The West and Iran’s quest for Nuclear Power.” *Middle East Journal* 60 no 2.

Kibaroglu ,M. (2007), “ Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no 2.

Kuntzel, M. (2014) “ Obama’s New Iran Policy : Is America Drifting toward Appeasement” ? *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 8(2) : 25-36.

Landau, B. E. (2012), “ Prospects for a New Arms Control Agenda: View From the Middle East,” in Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase, (eds.) *Arms Control in the 21st Century: Between Coercion and Cooperation*, New York: Routledge.

Lake, A. (1994), “ Confronting Backlash States.” *Foreign Affairs* 73, no.2.

Lieber, J.R, (2011), “ U.S. Middle East Policy in the Clinton Second term,” in Barry Rubin (eds.) *The West and The Middle East : Critical Analysis in Political Science*, New York : Routledge.

Malin, B. M. (2012), “ The effectiveness and legitimacy of the use of force to prevent nuclear proliferation, in Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase (eds.) *Arms Control in the 21st Century: Between Coercion and Cooperation*, New York: Routledge.

Margulies, P. (2010), *Nuclear Nonproliferation*, New Delhi: Viva Books.

Meier, O. and Daase, C. (2012), “ The Changing nature of arms control and the role of coercion, in Oliver Meier and Christopher Daase (eds.) *Arms Control in the 21st Century between Coercion and Cooperation*, New York: Routledge

Medalia, J. (2005), “ Nuclear Terrorism: A brief Review of Threats and Responses, “ CRS Report for Congress. [Online: web] Accessed 14th December. 2015 URL: [http :// www. Fas.org](http://www.Fas.org).

Muller, H., et al. (1994), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Mokhtari, F. (2005), “ No One Will Scratch My Back :Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context.” *The Middle East Journal* 59, no2.

Nemchenok V. V. (2010), “ In Search of Stability Amid Chaos : U.S. Policy toward Iran, 1961-63” *Cold War History* , 10(3), 341-369.

Oren ,I. (2011), “ Why has the united States not bombed Iran ? The domestic politics of America’s response to Iran’s nuclear programme” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24 (4) : 659-684.

Ozcan and Ozdamar (2009) “ Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Future of U.S. Iranian Relation” *Middle East Policy Council* 121-133.

Perkovich, G. et al. (2007), *Universal Compliance: A strategy for Nuclear Security*, Washington D.C. : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Perkovich , G. (2010), “ Global implications of the U.S.-India deal ,” *Deadduswinter*, 20-31.

Pellaud, B. “ Negotiating With Iran : testing alternative approaches”, in Krause Joachim, (eds). *Iran’s Nuclear Programmee : Strategic Implications* , New York : Routledge.

Patrikarakos, D. (2012), *Nuclear Iran : The Birth of an atomic State*, London : Touris

Parchami, A. (2014), “ American culpability: the Bush Adminstration and the Iranian nuclear impasse” *Contemporary Politics*, Volume 20, Issue 3, pages 315-330.

Pollack K. and T. R. (2005) “ Taking On Tehran” *Foreign Affairs*84(2) : 20-34.

Pirsevedi, B. (2013), *Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy* , New York : Routledge.

Sagan, D. S. (1977), “ Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security*, 21 (3) : 54-86.

Sagan D. S. and Waltz. N. K. (2002), *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New York: WW.Norton.

Sanati, R. (2014), “ Beyond the domestic picture: the geopolitical factors that have formed contemporary Iran-U.S. relations,” *Global Change, Peace & Security: Formely Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change*, 26(2): 125-140.

Sadjadpour, K. and Vaez, A. (2013). “ Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey”, [online :web] Accessed 15th September 2015 URL : www.carnegieendowment.org.

Sahimi M. “ Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I : Its History .” Payvand’s Iran News. October 3, 2003. [http:// www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html](http://www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html) (accessed August 12, 2015).

Sokolski Henry (2006), “ The U.S. –India Nuclear Deal: The Right Approach?” [online:web] Accessed 9th January. 2016 URL: [http:// www.cfr.org/india/u.s.-india=nuclear-deal-right-approach](http://www.cfr.org/india/u.s.-india=nuclear-deal-right-approach).

Sajadpour, K. and Taleblu, B. B. , “ Iran in the Middle East : Leveraging Chaos,” [online :web] Accessed 16th December, 2015 URL: [http:// www.fride.org](http://www.fride.org).

Singh K. M. and Sebenius K. J., “ Is a nuclear Deal with Iran Possible ? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” *International Security*, 37 (3): 52-91.

Sick, G. (1998) “ Rethinking Dual Containment .” *Survival* 40 (1)

Summitt, A. R. (2004), “ For a White Revolution : John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran” *Middle East Journal* 58, no4.

Squassoni, S. (2006), *India's Nuclear Separation Plan : Issues and Views* ,
[online:web] Accessed 8th January. 2016 URL: [http:// www.crs.gov](http://www.crs.gov).

Takeyh, R. (2003), “ Iran’s Nuclear Calculations.” *World Policy Journal* 20, no.-2

Takeyh, R. and Colin, D. (2007), “ Iran’s Nuclear Challenge.” *Political Science Quarterly* 122, no2 .

Tarock A. (2006) “ Iran’s Nuclear Programme and the West “ *Third World Quarterly* ,
27(4) 645-664.

Tezcur, G. M. (2012), *Democracy Promotion ,Authoritarian Resiliency , and Political Unrest in Iran*”, *Democratization*, Volume 19, Issue 1, pages 120-140.

*Testimony by Takeyh Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations before Committee on Foreign Affairs “ Implications of a Nuclear Agreement With Iran .”

*Testimony by Martin Indyk, Executive Vice President , the Brookings Institution , before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on “ U.S.Policy in the Middle East after and nuclear deal with Iran “ 3rd June, 2015.

Vakil, S. (2014), “ Obama’s Iranian Gamble,” *The International Spectator*, 49(3): 8-13.

Wagner, W. and Onderco, M. (2012) “ Of Hawks and Dover” *The Nonproliferation Review* 19(2) : 177-195.

Walsh, J. (1981), “ Reagan Outlines Nonproliferation Policy”, *Science, New Series*, 213 (4507): 522-523

.....

Bibliography

1. Adamsky Dima (2011), “ The War over Containing Iran, Can a Nuclear Iran be Stopped?” *Foreign Affairs*, vol 90, no.2, pp 155-168.
2. Anwar Alam (2009). *Iran and Post -9/11World order: Reflections on Iranian Nuclear Programme* New Delhi: New Century publications.
3. Albright David. (2013), *Iran Deal: Good Start on Long Road*, [online: web] Accessed 15th August. 2015 URL: <http://www.cfr.org>.
4. Abrams Elliot (2015) *Obama and the Iran Deal: What does ‘Messing with Israel Mean?’* [online: web] Accessed 14th August .2015 URL:<http://www.newsweek.com>.
5. Abrams Elliott (2015) *Obama Tries to Invest Whatever Excuses He can to Break with Israel*,[online: web] Accessed 15th August .2015 URL: <http://www.nationalreview.com>.
6. Alcaro,Riccardo, (2011), “Learning From a Troubled Experience – Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran” *The International Spectator*, Volume 46, Issue 4, pages 115-136.
7. Akbarzadeh, Shahram, (2015), “Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Ideology and Realpolitik in Iranian Foreign Policy” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 69, Issue 1, pages 88-103.
8. Barzegar, Kayhan, (2014), “Iran–US Relations in the Light of the Nuclear Negotiations” *The International Spectator*, Volume 49, Issue 3, pages 1-7.
9. *Congressional record vol 161, number 36. (Tuesday, March3, 2015) Pages H1528-H15313 From the Congressional Record online through the Government Publishing office, Joint meeting to hear on address by his excellency Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel.
10. *Congressional Hearings, I, (2015) U.S. 114TH Congress Session 1st, Senate Committee on Foreign Negotiations: Status of talks and the role of Congress, January 21, 2015. (U.S. Government Printing office: Washington D.C.)

11. Carefanu Jay James, (2015) "If Iran starts cheating, Netanyahu has no Choice but to Strike", [online:web] Accessed 16th August. 2015 URL: <http://www.heritage.org/search/commentary> .
12. Clarke, Michael (2013), "Iran as a 'Pariah' Nuclear Aspirant" Australian Journal of International Affairs. Volume 67, Issue 4, pages 491-510.
13. Davis, Lynn E, (2011), Iran's Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices, RAND Corporation.
14. Davis E. Lynn (2015) The Days After a deal with Iran, U.S. Policies of Hedging and Engaging, Accessed 16th august, 2015 URL: <http://www.rand.org>.
15. Dalton Toby, Acton M. James, Hibbs Mark, Perkovicn George, (2015) Parsing the Iran Deal: An Analysis of the Iran deal from a nonproliferation perspective, Accessed 15th August .2015 URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org>.
16. Einhorn Robert, (2015) debating the Iran Nuclear deal, [online: web] Accessed 15th August. 2015,URL: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports>.
17. Esfondiari Haleh (2015). In Iran, a Range of Reactions to Netanyahu Speech and Nuclear Talks. Accessed 15th August. 2015 URL: <http://blogs.wsj.com>.
18. Eilam, Ehud, (2013), "Israel's Military Options, Challenges and Constraints in an Attack on Iran"Defence Studies, Volume 13, Issue 1, pages 1-13.
19. Ganji Akbar (2013), " Who is Ali Khamenei? The Worldview of Iran's Supreme leader". Foreign Affairs, pp 24-48
20. Geranmayeh Ellie, (2015), " Towards and Beyond a final Nuclear Deal with Iran", The Integration Spectator: Italian journal of International affairs, 50:2 pp 1-7.
21. Jurvis Robert (2013), " Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenge of Coercive Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, pp105-115
22. Hymans,Jacques E.C. & Matthew S. Gratias, (2013), "Iran and the Nuclear Threshold: Where is the Line?" The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 13-38.

23. Hobbs, Christopher & Matthew Moran, (2012), “Looking Beyond a Nuclear Armed Iran: Is Regional Proliferation Inevitable?” *The International Spectator*. Volume 47, Issue 4, pages 127-148.
24. “Iran nuclear talks approach conclusive deadline.” *Strategic Comments*, (2015), vol 21 Issue 1: pp vii-ix.
25. Judis B. John, (2013). Netanyahu said something shockingly bad at the U.N.[online: web] 15th August .2015 URL: <http://www.newrepublic.com>.
26. Joshi, Shashank, (2014), “Iran and the Geneva Agreement” *The RUSI Journal*, Volume 159, Issue 1, pages 58-66.
27. Kroenig Matthew, (2012). “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol 91 no 1: pp76-86.
28. Kuntzel Matthias (2014), “Obama new Iran Policy: Is America Drifting toward Appeasement”, *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol 8, Issue 2: pp 25-36.
29. Kaye, Dassa Dalia, Parisa Roshan, Nader, Alireza, Monica Sanata, (2012) *Israel and Iran : A Dangerous Rivalry*, RAND Corporation.
30. Khlopkov, Anton , (2013), “How the United States helped Iran build a laser enrichment laboratory” *The Nonproliferation Review*, Volume 20, Issue 1, pages 39-62.
31. Levite Eli Arielm (2015), *The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Nuclear agreement*, Accessed 15 August. 2015 URL: <http://carnegieendowment.org>.
32. Lappin Yeakov, (2015) *Iran Nuclear deal maker US- Israeli defense cooperation more vital*, [Online :web] Accessed 16th August .2015 URL:<http://www.jpost.com/middle-east/Iran/analysis>
33. Muntgomery Braden Evan, Krepinevich F. Andrew and Edelman S. Eric (2011) “The Dangers of a nuclear Iran: The limits of Containment,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol90 no1: pp66-81.
34. Matthias Kuntzel (2013), “America’s Sniffing “Red Lines on Iran’s nuclear ambitions: A wedge issue in U.S.-Israel relations,” *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol7, Issue 1: pp 37-44.

35. Mishra Sylvia (2014), *Studies on Iran*, New Delhi: Paragon International publishers
36. Mousavian Hossein seyed (2012). *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A memoir* by Seyed Hossein Mousavian Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
37. Martini Jeffrey and kaye Dassa Dalia (2015) “The Days After A deal with Iran, Regional Responses to a final nuclear agreement”, Accessed 16th August. 2015 URL: [http:// www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org).
38. Mathews T. Jessica, (2015) “The New Deal”, [Online :web]Accessed 15th August. 2015 URL: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives>.
39. Morana,Matthew & Christopher Hobbs, (2012), “The Iranian nuclear dilemma: light at the end of the tunnel?” *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume 28, Issue 3, pages 202-212
40. Nader alirera (2015) “The Days After A deal with Iran Continuity and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy”, [Online :web] Accessed 16th August. 2015 URL: <http://www.rand.org>.
41. Obama Barack, (2015) Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear deal, [Online: web] Accessed 15th August . 2015 URL:<http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation>.
42. Phillips James, (2015). “The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Understanding Key Issues”, [Online: web] Accessed 14 August. 2015 URL: <http://www.heritage.org/research>
43. Philips James, (2015) Obama administration should sanction Iran, not Israel, [online: web] Accessed 16 August. 2015 URL: <http://www.dailysignal.com>
44. Phillips James, (2010), *Iran’s Nuclear Program: What is known and Unknown*, (online: web) Accessed 16 August 2015, URL: <http://www.heritage.org/research>.
45. Rothkopf David (2015). “ Obama’s Pivot to Iran” *Foreign Policy*. January 29 (29-1-2015)

46. Rothkopf David (2013) “ This deal won’t seal itself” , Foreign Policy. November 12 (12-11-2013).
47. Rothkopf David, (2015)“Is a nuclear Iran a threat or a distraction”? [Online web] 15th August. 2015 URL:<http://foreignpolicy.com>.
48. Sheran R. Wendy (2014) “Iran Policy and Negotiations Update”, Accessed 16th August .2015 URL: [http:// www.State.gov](http://www.State.gov).
49. Shannon N. Kile, (2013). “Iran and Nuclear proliferation concerns”, [online: web]. Accessed 16 August. 2015,URL: <http://www.sipri.org>.
50. Sherrill, Clifton W., (2012), “Why Iran wants the bomb and what it means for US Policy” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 19, Issue 1, pages 31-49
51. Seliktar, Ofira, (2011), “Assessing Iran's Nuclear Rationality: The “Eye of the Beholder” Problem” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa , Volume 2, Issue 2, pages 188-206.
52. Takeyh Ray and Pollack M. Kenneth (2014), “ Near Eastern Promises: Why Washington Focus on t he Middle East,” Foreign Affairs pp-92-105.
53. Tepperman Jonathan (2013), “ Barak’s Last Battle: An Israeli Lion in Winter”, Foreign Affairs, pp 91-104.
54. *Testimony by Martin Indyk, Director, the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings Institution, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on “ Response to Iran’s nuclear Ambitions: next step, “ 19th September 2006.
55. *Testimony by Martin Indyk, Executive Vice President, the Brookings Instituion, before the Senate Foreign Relations Commmittee, Hearings on “ U.S. Policy in the Middle East after a nuclear deal with Iran.” 3rd June, 2015
56. *Testimony by Robert Menendez, Ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on “ Senator Menendez’s Remark at AIPAC national convention” 2nd March 2015.

57. *Testimony by Nicholas Burns, Goodman Professor of Diplomacy International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School before the senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 29th July 2015.
58. *Testimony by Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director of Democracies Centre on sanctions and Illicit Finance, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on ‘ The Joint Comprehensive plan of Action’ ,29th July, 2015.
59. *Testimony by Juan C. Zarate, Chairman and Senior Counselor Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ,Chairman and co founder, financial Integrity networks senior adviser, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, Hearing before the senate foreign Relations Committee Washington DC, July 30, 2015.
60. *Testimony by Antony Blinken Deputy Secretary of State U.S. Department of State before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on “ Iran nuclear negotiations: Status of talk and role of congress January 21, 2015.
61. Taleblu Ben Beham and Sajedpur Karim (2015), “Iran in the Middle East: Leveraging chaos”, [online: web] Accessed 16 August. 2015 URL: www.fride.org .
62. *Telhami Shibley, (2015) “Nethanyahu Steered U.S. toward war with Iran – the result is a deal he hates” [online: web] Accessed 15th August. 2015 URL: <http://blogs.reuters.com>
63. Testimony by Pollack M. Kenneth, on U.S. Policy toward the middle East after the Iranian Nuclear argument, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the implications of the JCPOA for Middle East. August 5, 2015 (<http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony>).
64. *Telhami Shibley, (2015) “Netanyahu and the Iran Nuclear deal: A historic Mistake” ? [Online : web] Accessed 15th August. 2015, URL : <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/marker/posts>.
65. Telhami Shibley, (2012) “Americans on Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Program” [online: web] Accessed 15 August .2015 URL :[:http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports](http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports).

66. Takeyh Ray, (2015) “Iran Nuclear negotiations after the second extension: where are they going”? [Online ;web] Accessed 15th August. 2015 URL :<http://www.cfr.org>.

.....