SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN BANGLADESH (2001-2014)

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

ASHWATI C.K

CENTRE FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2015

CENTRE FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067, INDIA

Tel. : 011-26704350
e-mail : batraamita@gmail.com

DATE: 27 JULY, 2015

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION IN BANGLADESH, 2001-2014"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Ashwati C.K

Ashwati C.K

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Amita Batra

(Chairperson, CSAS/SIS)

सभापति/Chairperson
दक्षिण.एशियाई अध्ययन केन्द
Centre for South Asian Studies
अंतराष्ट्रीय अध्ययन संस्थान
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली/New L   110067

Dr. Sanjay K. Bhardwaj

(Supervisor)

दक्षिण.एशियाई अध्ययन केन्द
Centre for South Asian Studies
अंतराष्ट्रीय अध्ययन संस्थान
School of International Studies
जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University
नई दिल्ली/New Delhi-110067

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF TABLE, MAP, & FIGURE

Page No.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AL	Awami League
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BNP	Bangladeshi Nationalist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CTG	Care-taker Government
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
GOI	Government of India
HUJI-B	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Islami
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
JMB	Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
JMJB	Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh
JRB	Jatiya Rakhi Bahini
NGO	Non Governmental Organisations
PBCP	Purba Bangla Communist Party
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RSO	Rohingya Solidarity Organisation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons

PREFACE

In different ages of human history variety of weapons ranging from stones to missiles were employed. Small arms and light weapons are widely known as preferred weapons for guerillas, terrorist outfits, and criminals in the execution of violence targeting non-combatants to state in the relentless aim to disrupt rule of law and achieve control over government machinery. This implies in an ostensible manner that state's monopoly over coercion is slowly fading, where non-state entities are acquiring authority over violence. Annually half a million human lives are lost, leaving many wounded in the violence involving misuse of sophisticated arms which hampers durable peace required for the sustenance of development and protection of human rights. As per various estimates produced by experts, there are approximately 850 million small arms are in circulation across the globe.

This research study comprises four chapters. First chapter comprehend the overview of SALW proliferation in Bangladesh by analysing with the broader global context. It also discusses the scope, rationale, and objectives of the research and methodologies applied. Second chapter attempts to unearth variables responsible for the unbridled circulation of arms in the domestic sphere. In this chapter I focus on the political landscape in a historical manner and analyse confrontational forces impeding its democratic norms. External sources with regional and extra-regional linkages involved in the process of arms availability will be examined in chapter three. This will include exploring the nexus between terrorism, insurgency, transnational organised crime, and arms trafficking. Disarmament and governance mechanisms to prevent uncontrolled circulation, transfer and accumulation of SALW forms the part of chapter four. I have used the institutional approach to find out loopholes creating hurdles in the proper management of arms at global, regional and domestic levels. The concluding chapter would highlight the summaries of each chapter and put forth key findings of the study.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The most significant aspect required to generate knowledge on any country leads us to explore juxtaposing and complementary trends in terms of politics, economics, and society vice versa. Bangladesh is a densely populated country of the South Asian region with its landmass scaling 57,000 square miles (Lewis 2011). In geographical terms, country is defined as a riparian state due to the convergence of cross border linking rivers like Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna, on the flip side country is susceptible to climate change, frequent floods, and cyclones having devastating impact on human lives and economy. Situated in a high agricultural productive deltaic ecosystem, natural disasters have become a hurdle in tapping the potential. Hilly terrain with turbulent rivers adorns its western borders. To the south its coastal areas are open to the Bay of Bengal, Sunderban mangrove forests are located to the borders shared with India. Demographically country is home to various beliefs and cultures; the majority speaks Bengali and professes Islam as religion. Culturally similar but differs in religious expressions comprise Hindus. Other religious denominations belong to Christianity and Buddhism. It also has a cluster of ethnic tribes inhabiting predominantly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

It's over arching population growth and relative control over resources by the majority has been a source of poverty, forcing people to migrate to India. Earlier it was contended that those migrating to India were predominantly ethnic and religious minorities due to exploitation and discrimination in terms of political, social, and economy. Rather demographic pressures leading to migration as the sole variable, the underlying cause has been in search of better employment opportunities. This has been a source of contention in the bilateral relations with that of India. To add more vulnerability, the presence of Rohingya refugees in its south western region has borne conflicts or violence between locals and refugees. The worst scenario is caused by those undocumented refugees, who have accumulated various security issues.

Geopolitical equations in the South Asian region defined by India's hegemonic position and asymmetries in the power balance have come to affect Bangladesh in Cold war and after its demise also. Surrounded by India on three sides of its physical land borders and shares a narrow piece of strip with that of Myanmar. Its geo-political location is in advantageous as well as bane position. Such an argument is placed because on the positive side it forms a link between South Asia to an economically robust South-East Asia, along with this country is crucial for India in the development of its North-Eastern states. Disadvantages are posed due to its terrain providing safe havens and exit routes for traffickers using its porous land and maritime borders (Pattanaik 2013: 30).

Retrospection of society and nation-building in Bangladesh

This part would make a detailed understanding of the factors which influenced society and nation-Building processes in Bangladesh in a historical perspective where the framework is drawn from colonial times to post-colonial Pakistan and finally its formation as an independent nation-state in 1971.

The partition of Bengal in 1905 was among the first attempts by the colonial administration to create fissures against the nationalist movement, though actions were undertaken as a political measure for better administration, beneath such a policy was to demarcate then Bengal on communal lines. In consecutive colonial policies like communal award, were intended to break any possibilities of Hindu-Muslim unity which could prove dangerous for their rule. By 1940s the seeds of divisive politics germinated in the form of demand for a separate political unit for Muslims i.e. Pakistan, an idea furthered by Mohd. Ali Jinnah. Such a demand was preceded and succeeded by violent communal riots till Indian Subcontinent was partitioned to form India and Pakistan (both East and western wings). To cite few examples, the worst affected areas of Direct Action Plan Day in 1946 were witnessed in Bengal where riots between Hindus and Muslims were broken out.

Partition of India into two administrative independent units was an example of the perceived juxtaposing notions of nation building undertaken by then political leaders. East Bengal's decision to form part of erstwhile Pakistan was not merely due to fascination for the two nation theory. Scholars have observed from a political economic perspective that, Bengali speaking Muslims in colonial Bengal were economically, politically, and intellectually deprived by their Hindu counterparts. This eventually led to resentment and idea of a separate Muslim state was imagined as a protection from the exploitation of Hindu Zamindars after the departure of colonial rule (Oldenburg 1985: 723).

Within a short span Bengali Muslims in the Eastern wing found themselves being ruled by a much more hostile non-Bengali elite of the Western wing, who have dispossessed of any equal share in polity, economy or defence. The notion of its creation was clearly defined by religion as a unifying factor or precisely the exclusionary vision of nation-state building. The early cleavages became clear after West Pakistan's proclivity to introduce Urdu as an all encompassing national language which certainly brought East Pakistanis deprived of their linguistic and cultural identity.

Here we see a dramatic shift in the overall imagination and vision of identity. Earlier being part of Pakistan identified them as a Muslim first and Bengali cultural notions to secondary level. The perceived discrimination by its western brethren, and imposition of repressive measures by military backed governments of Pakistan turned Bengali speaking population to unite under the language movement; this was the highest stage of vernacular elite taking full course of action. After the bloodshed of partition related communal violence and displacement, East Bengalis became armed under *Mukti Bahini* to resist Pakistan Army's atrocities.

The civil war of 1971 broke out due to the continuing military assault by the Pakistan army, which has forced millions to cross over to bordering states of India for safety. Such military action was met with *Mukti Bahini* and its coalition with Indian armed forces, which ultimately paved way for liberation. It is to be noted that India's earlier neutral

position in the whole issue was turned by supporting the Awami League and aiding *Mukti Bahini.* The most undeniable fact was India full blown support to guerillas or Mukti Fauj by making them acquire training in sophisticated weapons by Indian military in its soil. Logistical support, supply of weaponry, and training to common guerillas by India has provided them with ample leverage to counter attack much militarily equipped Pakistani force (Benvenisti 2012). After the military victory, those arms provided by India remained in circulation. Government's inaction for weapons destruction and collection have made them to proliferate in the country and most probably such arms were turned to black markets by former rebels once war got over (Saroja 2012: 159). For an independent country, this was the first stance of abundance of uncontrolled arms being turned to non-state actors.

Bangladesh's turbulent history of political processes saw its first setback in the corrosion of democratic values under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, whose policies saw deviation from its stated principles by declaring emergency. As a counter reaction military officers assassinated Mujib and his family, this was followed by a series of coups conspired by those in higher echelons of military. The initial factors which can be attributed for the fading away of civilian influence over politics was strictly shaped by misgovernance of Mujib's rule who turned blind eye to nepotism, corruption and mishandling of core issues of general population in a war torn and famine hit economy. We can say that the early perish and deterioration of political institutions was largely done by the first regime under Mujib. His popularity as a leader of the masses could not transform Bangladesh to nurture civilian values of government.

The second blow to the country in its infancy stage was in the form of politically ambitious military leaderships taking reign over the government and bringing amendments to the constitutions. This was coupled with altering original vision of the Bangladesh's nation-state building processes. By reviewing the history of Bangladesh's experience with military rule, we find many similarities to that of its predecessor Pakistan. Because in Pakistan too democratically elected government could not sustain for longer duration, or remained as puppet regimes of the military, forced to run under the

veil of democracy. Moving back to Bangladesh's case, two prominent military rule were headed first by Ziaur Rehman and later by Ershad.

By this time two sections have emerged in the Bangladesh polity in which one with secular credentials with a legacy of participating in the liberation struggle, the other were collectively known as collaborators often criticized for their alleged role in supporting Pakistan army in human rights violation. Zia's regime took forward policies where initially regime tried to civilianize his position by entering into electoral politics. His methodology was not based on garnering support via popular mobilization, instead power consolidation was made possible first by involving religion into politics. Bangladeshi nationalism based on religious Islamic identity was his brainchild to legitimize his rule. Ershad moved a step ahead by declaring Islam as the state religion (Riaz 2008).

Whether Ziaur or Ershad their political and constitutional related policies had sown seeds for the fragmentation of the society. The secular notions of the polity was left in a moribund state, whereas state led repression, restrained democratic rights glorified their characteristic features of their path to governance. From Mujib's period till end of Ershad's government, Bangladesh experienced shift from Parliamentary form of government to Presidential one. Moreover, religion was established as an instrument to garner popular support. Islamist parties entrenched their preliminary acceptance in the wider polity.

Free and fair elections were held in Bangladesh in 1991 which has brought democratic principles to full swing. Since then elections have held in regular intervals, the darkest stigma has been the use of violence and religion as an instrument for the consolidation of power. Bangladeshi Nationalist Party with its support from religion based radical political parties have taken every step to undermine the plight of minorities especially Hindus who were targeted in pre and post election violence. Like other post-colonial states in South Asia, Bangladesh has experienced corruption and misgovernance in its executive and judiciary coinciding with instabilities in its legislative branch. Holding of regular election does not set the sole parameter of a vibrant democratic state, the politicisation of every

institution of the government and a robust network of patron-client relationships have tarnished its image as a vanguard of democracy as we find in the vision of its nationalist leaders.

The retrospection of society in Bangladesh when viewed through the lens of its nation-state building in a historical manner we find that partition left a huge scar in the maintenance of communal harmony. Instead eschewing such polarising tendencies, nation building processes could not find a viable solution to institutionalise process in the creation of an egalitarian society. Over the years Bangladesh even after liberation has witnessed the establishment of majoritarian based political notions, where minorities have suffered the worst. Euphoria of Bengali nationalism was translated into Bangladeshi nationalism, where as the former proposed secular values latter has identified with Islam. Existence of such ideals has over the years strongly embedded in the vision of the nation, solidified by political parties with exclusivist tendencies.

The spread of Wahabi ideals in the country professed through Islamic radical political parties and huge clusters of madrasas have to a larger extent contaminated the social and political milieu. It should not be forgotten that very creation of the country had strong secular ideals beneath its nationalist struggle. What has brought erosion to its inclusionary vision of nation-state is not to be based solely on the social fragmentations or numerical strengths and weaknesses of minorities, rather state since its inception could not develop strong state structures to delineate religion from politics as a legitimacy factor.

Small arms and light weapons proliferation in Bangladesh

Given the broad perspective of Bangladesh's polity, society, and geo-political realities, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have formed integral component of every type of armed violence being perpetrated in the country. Such a phenomenon is deeply influenced and shaped by its domestic and external factors. Recent stride in the in the large scale use needs to be addressed for which a mere state-centric approach would

not be sufficient, rather requires a much more human security perspective to be taken into consideration. Major arms haul in the years 2003, 2004, 2014 from different regions of Bangladesh and explosion of 450 bombs in 63 districts in a well organized manner in 2005 bears testimony to the collusion between traffickers and terrorists with trans-national linkages.

Initially, securing power and profit are two motivating factors behind arms trafficking. After 1990 Bangladesh revived from the shackles of multiple military coups or military backed regimes ushering to a democratic era. Unfortunately uncompromising nature of two leading political parties Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Awami League (AL) have locked horns in violent manner not only in parliamentary politics but also in educational institutions inciting exchange of bullets in campus politics. Maintaining a regular armed cadre is a common feature of all political parties in the country principally for the purpose of intimidation, suppression of voice of dissent and related rivalries. Often economic deprivation and marginalisation has induced unemployed youth to serve as armed cadre for politicians in higher echelons. Undemocratic characteristics of political parties are further reinforced in their relentless indulgence in the acquisition of arms by party members (Malik and Joseph 2005: 55).

The domestic socio-political environment which boosted the rise of political Islam has led to the mushrooming of various Islamist militant organizations since 1990s through covert and overt political patronage (Pattanaik 2011)**;** (Josukutty 2011). Quiet evident, for sustaining any militant group requires acquisition, and maintenance of a flow of weapons is as important as the ideology in order to challenge the government and create social unrest (Riaz & Bastion 2011). As mentioned earlier about the uncompromising nature of the political parties has been a major hurdle in containing terrorism and militancy in Bangladesh which has its roots in eschewing secular principles and establishment of Islam as state religion is an underlying factor in providing a friendly environment for the growth of fundamentalism targeting minorities in the first stage and later occupying say in the government through its political organisations.

Small arms and light weapons proliferation is not limited to the borders of a nation-state but has an external dimension which transcends regional and extra-regional linkages and contributes to the contraband flows. Geographically, Bangladesh's international borders presents a mixed picturesque because of the hilly dense forests of its South-Eastern part sharing international boundary with India's North-East and a small strip of Arakan state of Myanmar, its western borders are prominently known for char lands or riverine islands. Undemarcated boundaries, porosity, existence of cross cutting ethnic identities as inhabitants in the peripheries, poor border management, and prevailing corruption among law enforcement agencies have shaped it as highly vulnerable to transnational crimes.

Insurgency in the North-eastern states of India has primarily generated the demand for sophisticated weapons, India's covert aid to *Shanti Bahini* in the Chittagong Hill tracts, and the stateless Rohingyas taking refugee in Bangladesh have potentially influenced the flow. The legacy of arming each other's insurgency has resulted in the rise of armed violence within the social matrix of the state, and Bangladesh is not an exception in this case (Kartha 1999)**.** On the supply side, traffickers found it as profitable to act as facilitators in the transshipment of weapons from black markets based in Thailand and Cambodia. Undeniably the region's security dilemma developed out of the strategic triangular equations between India-Pakistan-China has in different phases played the proxy card to subvert each other; Bangladesh was caught in the crossfire. Dangerous mix of transnational organised crime, rise of terrorists and provisions made by Bangladesh as active or passive provider of safe-havens to insurgents of India have had resulted in turning the country to a destination for SALW.

Ideologically heterogeneous non-state actors have developed workable relationship in the nefarious business of providing smooth transit and movement of contraband, this brings to the fore that ideological affinity is not an only reason for cross border cooperation among rebels but had drawn out of the convenience, physical proximity as well as for the arms shipments. But by 1990s it has been widely acknowledged that arms acquired the status of currency as Rohingyas were trading weapons to Islamist militants for political protection and ideological proximity, on other hand Indian rebels were providing

training, so new linkages were developed with the onset of terrorist networks in the region (Riaz & Bastian 2011).

Security experts have argued that Bangladesh being hemmed between drug and narcotics producing sub regions of Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent, along with this easy opportunity of money laundering has facilitated the country as a safe haven for the trafficking and destination state which has propelled criminal activities, extortion, and sectarian violence (Kanwal & Chansoria 2010).

The Arms Act of 1878 which came into force in the colonial period, and was formulated with a penal approach rather than emphasizing on humanitarian aspects is being continued without any major amendments by the government of Bangladesh (Alam 2014). Scholars have contended that the act needs to be modified with provisions to grant, refusal, renewal, duration, and cancellation of arms licenses. Along with this, need is felt to form a national coordinating agency to monitor the illicit flow, transfer of weapons and to frame programs for stockpiling, destruction of seized arms (*Daily Star* 2011).

From its South-Eastern borders, the alleged involvement of law enforcement agencies in the trafficking of arms through Chittagong hill tracts to Myanmar border which is further causing political and social instabilities, paving way for violence prone society and a safer haven for non state actors involved in illicit trade (Mohsin 2002). Bangladesh government under the aim of countering terrorist activities and de-weaponisation conducted two operations (Operation Clean Heart and Spider Web). Such ad-hoc measures could not be effective in the long run; moreover law enforcement agencies were blamed for their human rights violations during operations.

Given the fact, Bangladesh shares territorial and maritime boundary with India and Myanmar makes it implicitly and explicitly important for these countries to cooperate as three are interlinked in various issues of transnational crime and terrorism to which small arms is the most nefarious form of illicit trafficking. In this scenario, insurgency in

India's north eastern states is a making of its own domestic politics of "split and rule" like wise the stateless and identity crisis of Rohingyas of Myanmar.

Features of Small Arms and Light weapons

International security was predominantly obsessed with anxieties resulting from the outbreak of nuclear war or proliferation of the technology, where small arms and light weapons did not account as posing a grave threat in the Cold war period. In fact, it was only in 1990s security analysts and related policy circles took the burden of generating an understanding regarding the gravity of peril underlying the uncontrolled availability of SALW. Presumptively the intensification of violence and associated crimes by small arms has invariably caused fragmentation within developing societies which are still reeling under multitude of disparities embedded in the incomplete nation-state building process. Even in a post conflict situation, reducing human sufferings remain a challenge if arms have not been collected and destroyed. Kofi Annan has termed small arms as likely "weapons of mass destruction" responsible of carnage taking heavy death toll:

> Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime Annan (2000: 52).

SALW lacks an internationally agreed definition, though UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms of 1997 has till date been utilised as a working definition in various literatures concerned with the regulation, eradication and combating the weapons flow. The categories of SALW are as follows:

a) Small Arms:

    i)   Revolvers and self-loading pistols;

    ii)   Rifles and carbines;

    iii)   Sub-machine guns;

    iv)   Assault rifles

    v)   Light machine guns;

b) Light weapons:

    i)   Heavy machine-guns;

    ii)   Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers;

    iii)   Portable anti-aircraft guns;

    iv)   Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles;

    v)   Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;

    vi)   Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems;

    vii)   Mortars of caliber of less than 100mm;

c) Ammunition and explosives:

    i)   Cartridges (rounds) for small arms;

    ii)   Shells and missiles for light weapons;

    iii)   Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems;

    iv)   Anti-personal and anti-tank hand grenades;

    v)   Landmines;

    vi)   Explosives (UN 1997).

The wide gamut of SALW cannot be defined on an individual basis when there is an absence of quintessential features, though small arms comprises those which can be handled by a single person and light weapons by a group or crew to a desired destination. Due to the smaller size it is difficult to be traced unlike other conventional weapons like ballistic missiles or inter-continental missiles and can be hidden or preserved for a longer duration, further to be trafficked to new regions ridden with violent conflict. Even the availability of weapons in itself regulates and determines the scale of damage, for which design, weight, resources available to combatants for purchase and local level production entails massive impact. Organizational setup of armed groups and physical terrain dictates on a larger account in the accumulation and acquisition of arms, where group behaviors and social control affects operational objectives and in target setting (Small Arms Survey 2005: 179-81).

From the technical perspective, weapons are often accurate in precision reflecting its lethality as an automatic assault rifle of Kalashnikov class has the catastrophic capability to fire 600 rounds per minute to render many human deaths (Singh 2013: 113). New technological innovations have bolstered the preferences among fugitives. Though change in the nature of warfare to a more intra-state level has made the demand to rise. The earlier trend of weapons meant for military or defence purposes, nowadays civilians are possessing with great ease.

These portable weapons are found to be cheaper, which makes it a weapon of choice for criminal elements as can be operationalised without any specific training. The actual cost involved in the accumulation are derived from the fact that it requires multiple channels for trans-shipment engaging numerous actors whose motives are economic, ideological or political. Let's put it another way countries which have stringent rules and regulations, prices of weapons presumably becomes costly; on the other hand where laxity exits prices goes down and runs the risk of outbreak of conflict; porosity of borders determines the lowering of prices; swell in defence spending of neighbouring countries which has certain level of pilferage also escalates proliferation of arms in the adjacent country (Small Arms Survey 2007: 257-8).

Channels of Supply

Arms whether legally or illicitly manufactured, if possessed by non-state actors only fuels violence and becomes a source of discontent and militarisation of the society claiming less value to human lives. From a global perspective, deaths caused by small arms are mostly based out of the war zones, with no clearly defined causes yet they can be categorised into homicides, non-intentional or accidental, street violence vice versa. In the long term, continued availability and impacts of firearms violence results in the 'break down of civil order and dramatic increases in lawlessness, banditry, and illicit drug trafficking' (Cukier and Sidel 2006: 5). There are diverse views on the channels of arms supplies. (Bourne 2007) has identified ten channels, Klare with four (1997). In the

following passages, I have converged both views to bring a comprehensive understanding.

1. Government to government transfer was either in the form of sale or aid. As per (Bandarage 1997) third world countries were encouraged to build up their arsenal by the two power blocs in their inherent East-West competition over winning and building alliances. Arms were supplied even to repressive regimes thus fuelling ethnic and armed conflicts of all sorts. This has unquestionably rendered the whole narrative of Cold war being not of durable peace, at least in the third world. The prevalence of intra-state conflicts as observed by (Raghavan 2007: 23-4) is somehow result of the absence of super power rivalry which had leverage over controlling the conflicts through arrangement of collective security assurances. The devastation caused by the cold war stockpiles is being experienced in the weak and fragile states, where excess arms have destroyed the legitimacy of the sovereignty resulting massive political destabilizations.

2. Arms sale for Commercial purpose is purely based on export and import by states for economic profits. Small arms survey (*Research Note 11* 2011) has given an extensive account of small arms exporting countries, in which USA has acquired the first place with an average annual estimate of USD 700 million from 2001-08. The list is followed by Italy, Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Austria etc. Transfers by China and Russian federation are more or less ambiguous. From this it can be comprehended that reporting of arms transfers usually falls between transparency and secretive. The survey found that apart from major exporters, Iran and North Korea are the most opaque and poor in reporting practices which we can trace from the political regime characteristics of the country. The same difficulties are found in assessing the worth of imports. Another facet of importing is that, certain countries which tend to be importers are actually trans-shippers about which exporting countries remain unaware. Cyprus is such a country where imported arms materials and components are again re-exported; such transfers can be dangerous due to obscurity of end-user certification (*Research Note 12* 2011).

3. Covert supply of arms is characterised by arms supplies to insurgents and non-state actors of violent nature by certain countries for strategic and political needs. During cold war, US's covert arms aid to insurgents groups increased after its reluctance to directly involve due to experiences of Vietnam War. Prominently, under Reagan administration arms pipelines were established through CIA for the channeling of weapons to clampdown over Soviet inclined regimes by insurgents of Angola, Afghanistan. In correspondence to this, Soviet proxy war led arms were supplied more to Soviet backed regimes rather insurgents. Technically such covert grey market transfers are defined in the first level by the political objectives of the suppliers; secondly there is an absence of clarity in reference to the laws and procedures of the states involved (Bourne 2007). Waning of super power intervention in conflicts across regions through covert aid found a major decline after the end of Cold war, though many countries in the pursuit of proxy war kept channeling arms to insurgents for e.g. Pakistan's support to militants in Indian part of Kashmir (Klare 1997).

4. Black market transfers are illegally produced and its proliferation is beyond the control of the state, but accounts only for a small fraction from the overall global trade in arms based in regional and local contexts. Moreover, sudden rise in the number of SALW after 1990s is the result of ex-cold war stockpiles being turned to black market sales. It has been asserted that fears of UN arms embargoes places black market as the only source for acquiring portable and light weapons. Using the social network perspective (Kinsella 2006 :104-5), defined 'network ness' as opposite to 'marketness' as an obvious feature of black market transfers. As black market network operates in a lawless environment, where political, religious, ethnic attachments forms a social cohesion which in turn provides great dividends in the form of commitment.

II
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

It is a widely accepted fact that portable arms are not a root cause for the social fragmentations but a major factor for instability and spirals of violence. Bangladesh has

emerged over the years as an end user from a transit state for small arms and light weapons, which have its origin in the changing contours of domestic socio-political environment coupled with the regional and extra-regional linkages. Porous borders, loopholes in the effective border management and geographical location of its south eastern border to insurgency affected states of India and Myanmar has made Bangladesh a desired transit state for the illicit trade through both black and grey channels.

This study explores the relationship between criminalization of politics, rise of Islamist militancy in the post 9/11 scenario and covert or overt patronage to extremist elements with that of small arms trafficking. However, there has been less academic exploration on the demand side for small arms as most of the focus has been to address the problem from the supply side only. There is a substantial amount of literature dealing with the causes of the availability and flow of arms but scholars have limited their study to the consequences. A critical study on the demand side would result in bringing a comprehensive understanding on the issues of governance, problems with state building, developmental issues, and the linkages to other transnational threats like narcotics, human trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism coinciding with supply dimension.

This proposed research work would cover the period 2001-2014, as the developments in the domestic political landscape has fostered a vicious cycle of violence perpetrated by the perpetual confrontations between claimants of state power, followed by the ascendancy of Islamists in the mainstream politics which has eroded the state's capacity to govern and related uncertainties to the lives of common people. It was during this period huge caches of arms were discovered by the law enforcement agencies. With the deterioration of law and order, state was compelled to undertake mechanisms to contain criminal elements and terrorist activities. Instead it could not bring any success for a long term rooted in prevalent corruption and institutional weaknesses. The scope of the study is to assess the role of various actors, diverse motives, and routes of illicit arms trafficking and to evaluate the effectiveness of the initiatives undertaken at the national, regional, and global levels. This work takes a closer look at the changing currents of governance at the domestic level; it also highlights the central issue of the need for

cooperative security mechanism to curb the menace. Overwhelming significance to address the proliferation of SALW in Bangladesh has pragmatic implications from the human security perspective, in the maintenance of its relationship with immediate neighbours like India and Myanmar to thwart security dilemma and hostility. For the purpose of research two hypotheses have been developed:

- *Hypotheses 1*: Lack of political will and misgovernance has facilitated burgeoning of the demands for small arms in Bangladesh.
- *Hypotheses 2*: Politically motivated violence to capture state power has resulted in the militarisation of the society.

As the proposed study seeks to understand and explore various domestic and external factors responsible for small arms availability and flow in Bangladesh and the counter measures adopted at domestic, regional, and global levels. Research would be undertaken in historical and descriptive methods along with analytical in nature. Datas would be analysed through an inductive method often referred to as bottom-up approach. In the process, research would begin with an examination of the concepts like governance, state and human security in the given context and then detailed observations based on various datas concerning various legislations regarding arms and explosives, casualties, security sector reform, reviews of procedures for de-weaponisation, leading to generalizations and ideas in the understanding of the intensity of the threat.

The study will be conducted in empirical method considering primary and secondary sources. The primary source will include all Governmental publication of reports of various ministries and departments such as Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, documents from International institutions- Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, Small Arms Survey, International Action Network on Small Arms. Apart from primary sources, the secondary sources include books, articles published in journals and newspapers, internet sources and academic papers.

III
SUMMARY

Theoretical underpinnings shows that a state centric-approach would be insufficient as major impacts are situated in the local level, complete proclivity on human security's scope would obscure the state's role in terms of governance of arms at various levels. A holistic approach involving local concerns, state controls, participation, and cooperation of regional states and commitment to global regimes on SALW disarmament would suffice. Flow of weapons in post-partition East Pakistan and post-independence Bangladesh was influenced by the appalling regional conflicts along with persistent corruption; zero sum game based domestic politics and newly the rise of radical Islam in the form of extremists, terrorists, and fundamentalists. It took long time for the international community to break the shackles of fascination in its quest to prevent nuclear holocaust and pay attention to proliferation of portable arms as a risk factor to human lives in the realisation of freedom and rights.

CHAPTER II

PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN BANGLADESH: DOMESTIC FACTORS

Production of arms and ammunitions are integral part of any country's defence industrial complex. Bangladesh is also not an exception, to meet its internal and external threat perceptions government has taken measures to build robust ordinance factories with external aid and assistance. As per governmental datas, Bangladesh Ordinance factories commenced its production from 1970 based in Ghazipur with the technical support from China. In its formative stages, the manufacture was concentrated on 7.62 mm semi automatic rifle T-56 which oversaw advancement to 7.62mm automatic assault rifles in the small arms categories to meet its changing contexts of threat perceptions. It takes the pride of its high standard production extending to 10,000 Rifles per annum (BOF 2012). These arms have contributed as the major weaponry possessed by three wings of its defence, Para-military, and police forces. These arms have often been leaked or stolen from the government stockpiles, becomes the foremost sources of arms being flown to clandestine entities.

Relatively slow acknowledgement of the perils caused by SALW has restricted further development of a composite scholarly knowledge on the matter. Bangladesh presents a fascinating case in the whole conundrum of SALW proliferation and circulation within the country. Domestic factors shaping the spread of SALW in Bangladesh poses a serious challenge of where to situate the issue? This is for the reason that country after a short period of insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts did not experience any other forms of armed conflict.

Then riddle becomes more precarious when we are countered by the assessment of Small Arms Survey Yearbook of 2002 which has clearly stipulated that Bangladesh is not just to be counted as a transit state instead an end user. Findings of a research done by Bangladesh Development Partnership Centre in 2005 provides that, there are

approximately 400,000 unlawfully held guns and those registered with the government are comprising only 185,000 (Kafi 2005). To make things worse Government of Bangladesh (GOB) has no accurate statistics regarding the number of illegal arms in circulation and verification of owners seeking possession through legal channels were not conducted in many cases for which corruption can be held responsible.

Who are those actors who deliberately need arms? Who are principle targets? If small arms proliferation is a transnational crime, then why Bangladesh has entangled to be a destination? How it has impacted the internal security through the prism of both human and state centric approaches. To uncover those clusters of variables responsible has inspired me to substantiate my framework by analysing at first the confrontational political environment enmesh with criminalisation right from parliament to educational institutions where role of thugs have acquired deeper meaning for their political masters to remain in power. In the next section, ascend of extremist and terrorist organisations who have in regular intervals demonstrated their presence through bombings and other terror activities. Succeeding section would throw light on the plight of Rohingya refugees of Burma origin and their contribution to insecurities in the country. In the final part of this chapter I will unravel the case of victims of such an armed violence. Presence of abundant weapons in wrong hands only proliferate terror and climate of anxiety, where living standards of common citizens are highly impacted, and of those vulnerable in the society.

Easy availability and distribution of SALW and related insecurities have contaminated the socio-political and economic landscape of Bangladesh since its inception. Though my study has chosen period from 2001-2014 because during this time span country after the restoration of democracy has witnessed spirals of violence in a well orchestrated manner where political activists, common citizens have lost their life or seriously injured. Three democratically elected political regimes and a short period of military backed Caretaker government have remained in power. Such a chaotic environment has questioned the viability of the governance. Insecurity among general populace has decisively questioned the levels of misgovernance resulting from abject poverty, arms in the hands of

unemployed youth easily swayed away by thugs or party loyalists. It has become widely acknowledged that Bangladesh has turned to be a conduit for illicit trafficking for SALW, though significantly such clandestine flows are inward as well as outward coupled with thousands of craft manufacturing under the veil of spare part factories (Datta 2007:157).

In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA, which has literally changed the concept of terrorism to a global crisis. This has subsequently proved that terrorism's principle targets were not selected from developed, developing, or least developed countries rather a global phenomenon in which Bangladesh was also not spared. We can assume that access to weapons actually embellishes the nature, longevity, and sustenance of any form of violence, conflict, or civil war.

II
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF BANGLADESH

Beneath the ideals of democracy is the rule by consent, while representatives are elected though electoral politics. The historical origin of the concept called democracy has developed against the prevailing 'state of nature' defined by chaos and insecurities which we find in the works of political theorists like Hobbes. This appears straightforward that violence has no place in democratic processes. The intermingling of violence and politics takes place where crisis of legitimacy takes root. The book *On Violence* has discussed violence in political realm, in which author concludes that 'violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance' (Arendt 1969: 56). From her work we find the glimpse of how violence can obliterate authority of any government.

In a series of debates we are made to believe that democracy inherently brings perpetual peace in its liberal notion, where usage of coercion by state requires being legitimate enough to ensure the security of citizens. Connecting political violence to democracy or its processes entails that the goal of individuals or a group to ascertain their position in polity drives them to instrumentalise intimidation. Who are these groups then? The

agents involved in such violence can be either pro-state or anti-state with clearly demarcated goals to secure power and political leverage. Thus democracy in its different manifestations can provoke or stimulate violence (Schwarzmantel 2011). Violence and weapons are intimately linked so that its prospects are dangerous for polity and governance.

Violence has become integral and discernible ingredient of the political and electoral milieu of Bangladesh. Here the penchant for weapons assumes relevance for conducting acts of violence to intimidate opponents at the very first level. Regimes at centre have changed under different leaderships and political ideologies since its bloody war and breaking away from erstwhile West Pakistan. However political culture of violence has not made any significant decrease. Notably, it happens in two ways- first disagreements within the party in a hierarchical manner, secondly clash of interests and ideologies between ruling and opposition groups, virtually found in street and physical violence taking a heavy death toll and injuries.

Highly politicised institutions of governance like judiciary, state police inclined to ruling regimes have further tarnished expectations for the flourish of a vibrant democratic values and principles. To make my argument cohesive I will first present the historical overview of the confrontational democratic processes witnessed by the country in last forty three-years, political violence degrading the political environment and educational institutions.

Confrontational politics

Religion became a major element of the confrontational politics since beginning, where parties were found asserting their ideology oscillating between secularism and Islamism. Such a contestation has intensified over the years, eroding the politics to an intolerable level. The foundation of such competition is embedded in the fact that political groups with secular credentials believe that breaking away with Pakistan in itself has affirmed its values of religious tolerance, whereas those who opposed liberation war of 1971 were

termed as 'collaborators'. Juxtaposing to this aspect are those parties in politics, who have emphasised on the need of bringing religion to politics. This has again brought the whole scenario into a principle challenge of whether the identity of the country is based on linguistic cultural or on the religion of the majority i.e. Islam. Moreover Bangladeshi politics majoritarian tendencies have relatively deprived its religious and ethnic minorities. Minorities in general were over the years marginalised in such a manner that they were targeted socially, politically and economically.

Democracy, socialism, nationalism, and secularism were the cardinal values on which the foundation of newly created Bangladesh was laid. The enthusiasm for these four pillars in the nation-state building faded away simultaneously. Sooner it was realised that the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was ill-equipped in the political skills to manage the cluster of competing challenges presented by the war torn economy and the famine in 1974. The political climate was marred with nepotism, widespread corruption, party loyalists were single handedly favoured, and opposition political parties were suppressed. Law and order mechanism was aggravated by his own creation of a paramilitary of freedom fighters known as Jatiya Rakhi Bahini turning to a stiff confrontation to the established military. Surge in legitimacy crisis and political intolerance of the first regime of independent Bangladesh led to distortion of democratic spirit by the proclamation of emergency rule in 1974, in correspondence to this development one party rule was established with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as the President. Continued repressive measures in an authoritarian way met with a coup on 15 August 1975, in which Mujib along with his family members were assassinated.

Major setback to the civilian political control over state machinery by multiple uniform clad coups ushered to the beginning of military regime era in the country. Decisively Bangladesh received diversion from its earlier stated principles of nation-state building. To mention worth internal factionalism and conspiracies within the elite organisation could not bring durable stability. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman country witnessed chaotic situation with a series of coups and counter-coups for eighty four days, change of power from one person to other in short intervals culminating finally

with Ziaur Rahman taking the supreme authority of the military dominated government by the last of 1975 (Riaz 2008). Compelling waves of disagreements from military pushed Zia to secure legitimacy by civilianizing his rule, initially formed a political party- Bangladesh Nationalist Party which ensured victory in Presidential elections of 1978. Despite his initiatives to remain in power through democratic electoral processes and popularising Bangladeshi nationalism by placing Islam in the forefront, various failed coup attempts as many twenty took place to confront his rule. Zia could not survive the twenty first coup attempt of May 1981, ultimately he was assassinated. The leadership vacuum and absence of a successor turned Justice Abdul Sattar to win election as a candidate from BNP. His government was short lived, dismissed by a bloodless coup and establishment of martial law under General Ershad.

General Ershad could not garner much support even after launching of Jatiya Party in his drive to civilianise as a replication to the path of his predecessor Zia. His moves were contested by two major political parties-Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The combined opposition's boycott of presidential and parliamentary elections in 1986, 1988 corresponded with frequent strikes, protests from various wakes of life swinging it to a popular upsurge, thus weakening the prospects for Ershad to rule and forced him to resign as he was snubbed of military backing (Blair 2010). In essence both military backed governments essentially brought the volatile mix of religion and politics to achieve political and constitutional legitimacy where secular ideals of founding fathers were doomed.

The popular movement by combined opposition showed maturity of the political parties in restoring democratic norms. Expectations for a stable parliamentary system could not usher in to a reality; in effect stark contrasting features were established by both major political parties like AL and BNP. In 1991 free and fair elections were held for the first time, BNP under Khaleda Zia (widow of Ziaur Rahman) formed a coalition government which was short of majority made her to take support from Jamaat. In the initial years AL and BNP cooperated with each other in passing various amendments, significant among them was the alteration of Presidential to Parliamentary form of government.

Anticipation of a peaceful democratic system was flawed as in the succeeding years both political parties resorted to extra-parliamentary form of political instruments like protests, demonstrations, and low levels of tolerance accusing and counter-blaming of election rigging, boycotts. Fifth parliament of BNP alliance was compelled to resign in 1995 before completion of the tenure under the guise of opposition's stiff non-cooperation and deterioration of law and order in the country.

Year 1996 scribed history due to two parliamentary elections and creation of Care Taker Government (CTG) with its major function to run an interim government after the dissolution of the Jatiya Songsad. Election held in February was manipulated by BNP to secure victory. Nevertheless it could not survive as Awami League through popular unrest brought the functioning of the government machinery to a halt. Same year fresh elections were conducted under the auspices of CTG, results tilted heavy on Awami League though fell short of majority and had to form its government through support of Jatiya Party. In any case Sheikh Hasina's could complete her term, paving way for Khaleda's return to power in 2001 to 2006. Episodes of sporadic protests became a regular feature. By this time country began witnessing heightened religious extremism and fundamentalism. Notably BNP's alliance with Islamist parties have provided impetus, although history of religion and politics intermingling mushroomed in the military backed regimes' itself.

Curtailment of democracy loomed large when military backed technocratic regime took the reign of the central government in Dhaka on 11 January 2007 (famously known as 1/11). This was in reaction to spirals of violence perpetrated by party members of both political parties throughout the end of 2006. The mandate of 2008 elections resulted in Awami League's victory was the culmination of popular resentment against Khaleda's misgovernance and corruption. BNP boycotted parliamentary election of 2014 altogether as Khaleda Zia expressed possible rigging due to abolish of CTG in 2011 by then incumbent Awami League government.

The historical general overview has thrown light how politics was translated into zero sum game, where victory of either side was criticized, and cooperation in running the government found literally utopian, bringing country on the brink of instability in political and economic terms (Kochanek 2010). Both AL and BNP used political platform as a gateway to exploit and access resources. In this way outcome of confrontational politics based on patronage and violence has provided "pungent democracy" along with encouragement of criminal networks to operate out of governmental control (Blair 2010). The patron-client relationship has turned Bangladesh to neo-patrimonial state where competitive politics has consistently averted the maintenance of capacity to rule (Islam 2013: 165).

Political Violence

Political landscape of Bangladesh under any regime could not escape from instigating violence against voices of criticism. The role of armed gangs, criminals, and non-state actors in politics have relatively remained understudied phenomenon or found least scholarly attention. *Small Arms Survey* of 2010 has extensively covered this aspect, where their activities in connection with government are discussed. Delegation of violent assignments are channeled to them by political groups or regimes because they are comparatively cheaper to maintain, possess knowledge of the local environment and are comparatively easy to be deployed. In many cases political groups are far less in establishing control over such groups rather they are employed when need comes. Such militias all across the globe, especially in the third world have found part of the weak or fragile democratic system, their service being utilised in a systematic covert mode. The same research work has underlined the dubious fact of how such groups' activities become a source of small arms circulation and related human rights violations. Tasks undertaken by non-state armed gangs work with impunity ultimately increase the chances of violence and fatalities (Small Arms Survey 2010: 255-68).

Having defined dysfunctional political and parliamentary system of Bangladesh, has in a nutshell bred criminals who have extensively increased the demand for small arms and

light weapons which can be easily concealed for covert acts. From which we can reach to a point that instigators of such violence are political actors ranging from rural to urban base. Then the question comes what is the agency through which such virulent acts of politically motivated armed violence are carried out? Answer lies with political parties' reliance on private militias, partisan armed groups, or *mastans*[1] who are instrumentally used to silence political rivals or alter behaviour of the larger audience through fear generation. Who are these *mastans* then? To borrow ideas of (Ruud 2014) *Mastan's* role is neither influenced by political ideologies or party strife, somewhat they work within a politically motivated criminal arena with points of contact with party bosses. The purpose is mutual, that is bully get political protection in turn for criminal services.

From a historical perspective on the collusion between political parties and thugs can be traced back to the period of Mujibur Rehman, who first formed a parallel army of ex freedom fighters (Jatiya Rakhi Bahini). This is to be kept in mind that after the Bangladesh Liberation War arms were not recovered back from fighters, rather it simultaneously diffused to the Bangladesh's politics. Jatiya Rakhi Bahini (JRB) was majorly designated to kill dissenting voices rising in the party and among opposition. During this stage those who opposed were directly considered as anti-Mujib or probably non-patriots. JRB possessed prodigious amount of power that they employed arbitrary methods of instilling terror to quell any form of critique to the regime (Siddiqi 2011). JRB's creation was a strategy adopted by the Mujib regime to thwart any military coups because those repatriated army personnel after liberation war were inherently trained and recruited by earlier West Pakistan which has experienced martial law. Army which found itself being deprived of the power and prestige due to JRB's exceeding domain of activities, even ex freedom fighters were favoured in promotions, corresponding to this was defence budget cuts. These reasons were ample for resentment and military coup was staged (Singh 2005). The same regime under the guise of personal safety made provisions for access of Light Machine Guns (LMG) to every member of the parliament. Rather institutionalizing accommodative democratic processes, arms circulation gave impetus for revisionist tendencies. Such trends were followed by future regimes as evident in the

---

[1] Mastan denotes thugs engaged in extortion, using arms and other means to incite violence for their client.

case of Ershad who blatantly supported armed student fronts in the drive to make political base strong (Moniruzzaman 2009: 84). As observed by an expert on SALW proliferation in Bangladesh that by the mid of 1980s, almost all major political parties were involved in a strategic race to accumulate arms, or more precise to say it was the quantum of arms possession which highlighted one's power and strength (Hussain 2000).

The restoration of democracy did not reduce the arms usage as it was after 1990's, violence and low level shadowy conflicts were intensified between two principle rivals- Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Another contributing factor was the end of insurgency waged by indigenous people of Chittagong Hill Tracts through a peace accord of 1997; nevertheless government took no appropriate step to disarm ex- combatants and de-commissioning of weapons. This has supposedly helped many local criminals and smugglers to circulate them in the black market. From 2001 to 2014 political landscape of the country has turned violent with attacks and counter attacks on party members by goons hired by major political parties. It can be assumed that hostilities reached its peak. According to reports by *Odhikar* from 2001-2014, in various political violence 4320 human lives were lost and 175018 were injured. As I have discussed in chapter one that injuries and deaths contribute to severe humanitarian crisis in those countries where health facilities are meager, stagnating country's human, economic and social development as a whole. Political unrest of varying degrees has brought severe fragility to the institutional mechanisms to curb it.

Representation of women in the parliament is minimal despite the fact that two female leaders of the major political parties have formed governments in alternative terms since 1991. From a gendered viewpoint, the linkages between illegal arms and *mastans* have initially barred women participation in electoral competition. Initially Bangladesh is a patriarchal dominated country, whereas women are socially, economically, and politically vulnerable. The fear of sexual harassment, intimidation snatches away a gender equal representation and participation in politics. Moreover, the harsh reality is that honest and competent candidates are found to be suppressed in any form of challenging the established political ideologies. *Mastans* use their network with political organisations for

their vested interests and rent-seeking behaviour, and women are found to be least in maintaining contacts with criminals, thus prevented by public and private notions of social limitations (Chowdhury 2009: 558-59).

Campus Violence

Going through the history of language movement to liberation war and for the restoration of democracy, youth mobilization has played a tremendous role whereas educational institutions became prime points of origin in generating camaraderie for a common cause. All major political parties have their own student wings like Chatra League of Awami League, Islami Chatra Shibir of Jamat-I-Islami, Chatra Dal of BNP that are used as cadre during election rallies and sufficiently arms are supplied to them causing 'uncivil associationalism' (Lewis 2011). Why educational institutions are politicised? This is so because student wings operates as mini- armies for their concerned political party, very often their armed fronts are found to be utilizing violent tactics to dominate particular campuses for contracts, distribution of dormitory rooms (Siddiqi 2011). Students getting access to such resources through student party wings are required to exchange with political loyalty, which keeps rallies crowded. Secondly, campus politics provide environment for young leaders to make their political base strong. Within campuses student armed cadre are encouraged to undertake violent means to quell opponent ideologies. When it comes to counting impact, universities are forced to close their academic calendar affecting education of many. None of the governments so far has taken any measure in curtailing student politics turning to violence, as major parties have used campuses to play proxy war of the national politics.

For an efficient and effective democratic polity, opposition's role is determined by their actions to prevent ruling regime from turning to authoritarian in its policy decisions. The duties of the opposition parties are equally responsible to protect democratic ideals like that of party in power. This section has highlighted the dark corners of Bangladesh's political environment in which criminal nexus with political parties and their associated outfits have contaminated political values due to patron-client, personality cult, and use

of religion by them. Muddling state of affairs is the direct result of misgovernance, corruption in judiciary, bureaucracy turning to serve political leaders rather citizens. Flimsy functioning of law enforcement agencies have certainly contributed in the proliferation of arms and gangs with despicable intensions. Civil disturbances cause political insecurities thus weakening its structures and institutions of the state.

III
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH

Terrorism for varied reasons, geographical configurations, and in diverse connotations have appeared and disappeared in the global history of humankind. In the scholarly circles, most difficult task has been to produce an all encompassing definition for acts of terrorism. The most obscuring element is to understand how particular nation-states perceive terrorism. As in the case of Pakistan whose political leaders have often found making a distinction between good terrorism and bad terrorism, any how violence in any form is a threat to humanity. On the flip side it becomes difficult to differentiate between state led terrorism or the illicit attacks on people by non-state actors. In both cases killing human beings are objective.

The general debate on the concept has focused on key facets like ideology, organizational skills, tactics employed, target audience, inter linkages between arms and terrorism etc. The relevance of the phenomenon gained currency after 9/11 attacks and proliferation of a large number of outfits claiming to alter the order predominant from nation-states to global level. This has indeed brought scholars placed in different spatial settings to reach on a degree of consensus in defining it as a threat to modern societies perpetrated either by individuals or sub-state groups utilizing force or violence against non-combatants or civilians for achieving their goals of ideological nature, but ultimately it has a political undertone to replace the prevailing order (Jackson 2012).

Often we find in many literatures that terrorism is a politically motivated act, corresponding to this for generating fear mobility is required, its man force should be

capable of inculcating and proliferating their ideals among the masses. Here a political economic perspective comes into question, about its funding mechanism. Financial management to procure arms, inseminate terrorist ideologies, training of recruits, logistical support etc. Diabolic relationships are constructed between transnational organised criminals and terrorist organisations, so that it provides ample of strategic, financial, and political goals to be achieved. One glaring example is the mushrooming of narco-terrorism, money laundering rackets, human trafficking which can be calculated as the most lucrative form of trade accumulating excessive capital in such a manner that can easily evade intervention from the state agencies. One clear implications of the end of cold war is the waning borders of transnational organised crime and acts of terrorism.

For a country like Bangladesh which has a history of durable political instability as discussed in the previous section is intrinsically coupled to internal security and economic stagnation. On the other hand, the same security and stability confronted with insurgency, left-wing extremism, and terrorism in different phases since its creation. Primarily mere ideological proselytization is not sufficient for any violent non-state to initiate their stated goals, instead availability of unhindered huge cache of arms and ammunition are required to be employed. Here portable weapons procured by non-state actors have found its pathways through covert sponsoring to the acquisition from black markets where arms are trafficked through its porous borders.

Bangladesh has since 2001 caught international attention for turning to be a hotbed of terrorism or equating its security scenario to that of Afghanistan. In quick successions various bomb blasts took place all across the country. These implications clearly show that home grown terrorism has culpable roots within the domestic sphere. Terrorism is a global menace, we should not ignore the aspect nation-states are either responsible in sponsoring or becoming a victim of it. In a country where fundamentalism remained active with less state counter-action, for such a concept to develop terrorism becomes prime instrument for its ultimate victory. My approach to trace the roots of terrorism and violence employing portable arms and ammunition is not limited to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and extremist tendencies rather I explore various armed groups having

diverse backgrounds (ethnically motivated insurgency in CHT, Anti-state ultra-left ideologically Maoist extremists and clusters of Islamic religion oriented terrorists) active in the different phases of Bangladesh's history.

Low Intensity Guerilla Warfare or Insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Genesis and Reliance on Arms

In the infancy phase after its creation Bangladesh was fraught with the demands of autonomy for indigenous people living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts located in the South-Eastern region of the country bordering North-Eastern states of India. Historical inquiry into the grievances of the CHT tribes shows that their issues were not merely political, rather social, and economical. Politically under the colonial government of British Empire granted limited autonomy status for their ancestral land in 1900 (the CHT Manual) (Dowlah 2013: 773-4). First set of blow to ethnic tribes came with the departure of Colonial rule as on the basis of two nation theory new two countries were formed-India and Pakistan, whereas latter had two administrative units (East and West Pakistan). Chittagong Hill Tracts became part of the Eastern Wing of Pakistan following partition in 1947. Under Pakistan rule which recognized the potential of the region to tap its natural resources, hill people had to face displacement due to the construction of Kaptai Dam. Eventually then Pakistan regime did not pay heed to any compensatory measures for those displaced, in such a gross deprivation those affected were forced to take refugee in India.

The waves of liberation movement unleashed Pakistan ultimately to loose its eastern wing, thus Bangladesh was born in 1971. The plight of indigenous people[2] loomed large in the newly formed country which had Bengali nationalism as its foundation stone, indigenous people's distinctiveness were not recognised. In the initial stages, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) met with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to accord them with their traditional rights enjoyed during the colonial times, formation of their own legislative assembly, maintenance of the position of tribal chiefs or kings.

---

[2] Chakmas, Marmas and Tripuras are numerically larger ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Unfortunately Mujib's response was not up to the expectations imagined by the leadership of PCJSS; former wanted their assimilation to Bengali identity.

Disillusioned by government's deliberate ignorance led the leadership to eschew peaceful means to armed struggle in furthering their demands related to distinct ethnic identity within the country. *Shanti Bahini* became the armed wing of PCJSS in 1973, as a consequence it led to two decades of guerilla warfare with that of government forces. The operational methods and strategy were inspired by Mao Tsetung's Guerilla Warfare, in regular intervals they engaged in creating civil disturbances through killing Bengali settlers, targeting government officials, extorting money from non-hill people. The penetration of this armed struggle was limited to Chittagong only, conditioned by their strategic needs. Among their multi-pronged techniques, prominent were to raid army in a hit and run methodology, avoidance of ambush in unfavourable conditions, and to run parallel administration in occupied parts (Ahmed 1999).

For *Shanti Bahini* adoption of guerilla tactics were due to its numerical and militarily weaker strength as compared to its counterpart. Nevertheless for insurgents geography became an important determinant in imposing its leverage in the whole struggle. When it comes to source of small arms and light weapons, Chittagong was used as a transit point for arming rebels in the North-Eastern states of India by West Pakistan. In this way presence of sophisticated durable arms were not new, rather part of the old route for trafficking. Secondly insurgents of *Shanti Bahini* had the arms compilation from left over of the liberation war, which eventually were possessed by them. Third was the external dimension, India's top intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) provided covert aid through arms supplies, sanctuary, and training to armed groups. India's involvement was a classic case driven by changing contours of Indo-Bangladesh relations. Assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and military coup by Ziaur Rehman gave ample of reasons for India to intervene in camouflage (Chakma 2010: 296). Moreover CHT is geographically sandwiched between two states of India (Manipur and Tripura), and latter became its base in India (Upadhyay 2009).

Government's reaction was not limited to military action, demographic change by settling Bengalis, forced conversion of hill people to adopt Islam, arbitrary arrests, torture, mass killings etc. This has eventually turned militarization of the region since the intensification of the armed struggle and counter measures. In 1983, PCJSS leader Manabendra Narayan Larma was assassinated created factions within the insurgent group. Initiatives for peace-building was commenced in the 1980s itself due to pressures mounted on Bangladesh government from international donors. Secondly India took a softer outlook towards its alleged active support to guerillas when democracy was restored in Bangladesh and formation of Awami League government in 1996, in the following year 1997 peace accord was signed (Yasmin 2014: 124). It has been generally identified that peace accord has abolished *Shanti Bahini* at the first level, despite this a splinter group United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) has questioned the peace settlement called as deceiving the aspirations of hill tribes.

Growth of Islamisation and negative attitude of BNP towards the accord is a contending question for the implementation. BNP did not hesitate in calling the accord as a black pact or a mere plot by then AL government to earn international recognition; subsequently it was disdained as unconstitutional (Panday & Jamil 2009: 1065). Crossfire between UPDF and PCJSS provided a grave excuse for Bangladesh's reluctance for the removal of military camps. Tardy developments in the implementation of the accord impacted by the nature of regime coupled with increasing terrorist activities, proliferation of small arms and radical Islamic ideals propagated by madrassas can prove to be sufficient variables to revitalise insurgency in the region out of resentment (Begovich 2007). Law and order situation will get derailed if accountability on the part goes unchecked, as recent warnings by PCJSS leader Jyotindra Bodipriya's to undertake tougher measures are indications to re-associate their earlier tactics (Ahmmed 2013: 128).

Bangladesh's experience with insurgency has raised concerns over its domestic security, exaggerated by the availability of SALW. Containment of insurgency should be addressed from a human security approach, rather blatantly making use of the coercive apparatus of the state. Chittagong is not merely significant due to the past active

insurgency, indeed this is a strategic location for arms trafficking meant for North-East India's rebels and the presence of Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar contributing to terrorist training and recruitment for Rohingya Solidarity Organisation. Time has become ripe for the country to device inclusive strategies to quell any insurgency or guerilla warfare, because economic costs can be higher probably challenging the sustainable development as a whole. For Bangladesh internal threats have proven to be more dangerous than external ones, placing higher demand on developing synergies in a productive mode.

Left-Wing Extremism in Bangladesh

Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP) is among the left-wing ideology oriented organisations in Bangladesh with an aim to wage armed struggle in altering the existing order drawing inspiration from the Chinese Revolution. Disenchanted with the Awami League's deviation from left oriented ideologies and socialism after the liberation war made many radicals within the party to disassociate themselves and take up arms in opposition to state policies (Datta 2005: 433-4). Their aims are embedded against footprints of feudalism in the country. JMJB was given full freedom to counter roots of left wing extremism in 2004, which has caused mass killings of those inclined to the ideology.

Other parties which have born as splinter groups such as Sarobohara party have indicated their establishment against the state being puppet of India's expansionist and hegemonic tendencies. Though Maoism has lost much acceptance and fascination in the country, but many small radical organisations are still active engaged in perpetrating violence through extortion and other forms of criminality. It was noted that from 2001-05 there was a sharp stride in the extremist activities as causing 177 deaths in 2005, in the consequent years there were variations in the degrees of violence (Islam 2011). Formation of CCOMPOSA (Coordinate and Consolidate the unity among Maoist parties and organisation in South Asia) in 2001 of which PBCP is a member (Ramana 2008). This regional level grouping of mutual assistance can be a threat because South Asian countries like India, Nepal, and

Sri Lanka have borne the brunt of Maoism Inspired extremism causing internal disturbances and deviation of country's economy in strengthening counter-measures.

Religion Based Extremism and Terrorism

Founding fathers of Bangladesh visualized a secular image of the country in a consistent way of juxtaposing its predecessor's exclusionary notion of the nation. Rise of religion based terrorism cannot be completely attributed to the events after 9/11 attacks, because radicalism and fundamentalism as a faith of the frail was marking its presence just after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in 1975. Accession of the religious right in mainstream politics simultaneously has boosted the terrorist organisations based in the international sphere to exploit the socio-political and historical fragilities inherited by the country in its two partitions (from Colonial rule and later from Pakistan). From a more myopic view of possible underlying causes for the proliferation of radical ideas can be traced to the deletion of word 'secularism' among the four principles of state policy during the military regime of Ziaur Rehman. In a similar vein General Ershad losing his ground in politics, led him to declare Islam as the state religion. These developments along with the lifting of ban on Islamist parties collectively known as 'collaborators' bolstered their confidence in spreading the tentacles of exclusionary imagination of nation-state building upon Islamic ideals.

Jamaat-e-Islami was the forerunner among other Islamist parties in bringing solely religion oriented politics. This was inaugurated with its formation of alliance with BNP in 1991, and in 2001 elections Jamaat-e-Islami was coincided with Islamic Oikkyo Jote. They could not materialize well after this in the next two elections. Their pre-supposed ideologies were deeply entrenched in the destruction of the syncretic values and traditions. Moreover, patronage to such divisive parties by BNP has prepared a sympathetic milieu for radical groups to flourish and in circumscribing the secular credentials of Awami League (Olapally 2008). In electoral terms, Islamist parties could not garner many seats as required to achieve their aim of translating Bangladesh into an Islamic state based on *shariat*. One researcher has observed that such radical elements

were not in any perpetual struggle to capture state power through election processes. The intentions were clear to align with a regime, which could be bent at their will, and BNP was found suitable. He goes on to cite an example that Afghanistan was not ruled by Al Qaeda rather Taliban did, and the reductionist notions of Islam were not whole heartedly accepted to the people initially, rather it was imposed on them in a violent approach (Karlekar 2005). Besides Jamaat and its student wing (ICS) alleged linkages with *jihad* mongering armed groups, has gained political legitimacy by its alliance with mainstream party like BNP but principally they have an aversion to democracy (Bhaumik 2009).

We can ascertain that fundamentalism found firm stand along with the revival of religion in political sphere. Establishment of theocracy in Iran and formation of *mujahideen* to fight against Soviet led forces in Afghanistan were two prominent international events, where religion became an important instrument in overthrowing established regimes and ideologies. Bangladesh has witnessed both home grown terrorism and also those with transnational linkages. The *Global Terror Index 2014* in its key findings has elucidated that Bangladesh is among the thirteen countries which are running the risk of possible heightened terrorist activity. Generating an understanding of the terrorist organisations working the country becomes significant, for this purpose in the following paragraphs I will delineate such groups based on religion and their reign over terror.

Harkat-ul- Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B) scored centrality in the 1990s because its members comprised of those veteran fighters of *mujahideen* who fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This outfit is known to have operational linkages with Al Qaeda comprising dual wing, one is engaged in waging armed struggle through *jihad* and other being responsible for spreading the venom of divisiveness to attract a larger audience. The famous slogan "*amar sobai hobo Taliban, Bangla hobe Afghanistan*" simply reflects their intentions to turn Bangladesh to another Afghanistan on the path of Taliban. HUJI-B could cultivate its support base primarily in the coastal belt of the country. Various estimates show that outfit is running six training camps in the Chittagong and similar camps in Cox's Bazaar too. Here two points becomes crucial- first Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar are known for gun running and the presence of documented and undocumented

Rohingya refugees. Overtime HUJI-B joining hand with Rohingya Solidarity Organisation came to lime light which is sufficient to prove my point of the possible collusion (Sharma & Behera 2014). And terrorists serve their operational tactics not only in conspiring or projection of power through violent attacks, on the flip side trafficking of weapons provide them with ample of finances.

Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) deviates from HUJI-B in one respect that it lacks any strong international agenda, for them targets are derived from those propagating or promoting secularism, democracy, communists or left oriented leaders, and non-Muslim practices within Bangladesh. JMB was recognized as the potential threat to internal security when they successfully detonated 450 bombs in sixty three districts (300 locations) out of sixty four in a well coordinated manner on 17 August 2005. Large-scale bombings were considered by certain scholars as not intended for inflicting mass casualties' instead sheer demonstration of their presence and counter-reaction to the BNP's government's crackdown on them (Olapally 2008). Subsequent raids on JMB hideouts led the law enforcement agencies to reveal that cadres have received training and expertise in the manufacture of bombs and arms were procured from other militants in the Indian subcontinent (Prakash 2011). JMB activities severely tarnished the law and order mechanism sustained with poor management and expertise.

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) like JMB is of a recent origin, is more inclined towards domestic affairs, and geographically located more in the North-Western parts of Bangladesh bordering Indian state of West Bengal. Cadres of JMJB first targeted the outlaws known as *Sarboharas* of left wing extremism and in consecutive events they have detonated bombs to attacked entertainment programmes, NGO's which display it as an attempting to replicate Taliban in Afghanistan. (Karlekar 2005) makes a comparative analysis that the savagery committed by JMJB is similar to that of Al Badr, the Razakars, and Al Shams joint operations during Liberation Movement of 1971. To add more, they share a common worldview indistinguishable to that of Jamaat, Shibir, and HUJI-B etc. As evident is the case of 'Bangla Bhai' who was earlier an activist of Shibir (student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami). *South Asia Terrorism Portal* has outlined that the weaponry

possessed by JMJB included firearms used during vigilante acts and had access to crude explosives which are part of domestic craft production of clandestine nature. JMJB's unleash of violence in the name of countering ultra-left extremists and government turning blind eye during BNP regime is best explained in the words of Subir Bhaumik:

> At the peak of JMJB's vigilante actions, the cabinet committee on law and order led by BNP minister, Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan ordered the arrest of Bangla Bhai for taking 'law into his own hands'. But three BNP ministers belonging to Rajshahi- Aminul Haq, Fazlur Rahman Patal, and Ruhul Kuddus Dulu-opposed the police action saying that the JMJB was on a 'pro-people mission' freeing the northern region from the left-wing extremists (Bhaumik 2009: 88).

These events clearly indicate to a common variable that state's orientation in deciphering terrorists and its allied organisations were more or less biased and driven by their vested interests. Under international pressures Bangladesh government has placed ban on activities of HUJI-B, JMB, and JMJB. Over time new splinter groups or existing ones have re-emerged with new names which are indeed a warning siren for the government despite its crackdown on them.

IV

EXODUS OF ROHINGYAS TO BANGLADESH

Being a host to refugees from Arakan (now Rakhine), is caught between the dilemma of its own internal security concerns and humanitarian cause of Rohingyas. An historical overview of the state sponsored eviction and related persecution would throw weight in understanding the problems arising out of Rohingyas in Bangladesh as a contributing factor in matters pertaining to its national interest and security. Myanmar since its inception in 1947 has experienced various conflicts emerging out of ethnicity based militant activities. The condition of Muslim minorities especially in the Arakan province were subjected to state led atrocities along with segregation and neglect.

Rohingyas were excluded from the imagination of nation-state formation which began in the 1960's under the military government of General Ni Wen. 'Burmese way to Socialism' was among the first state institutionalised instrument used for ethnic cleansing and to oppress the Muslim Arakanese, consequently Operation Naga-Min (Dragon King)

in 1978 led to the mass expulsion from their homeland and approximately 200,000 took refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh, within one year most of them returned after the conclusion of an understanding at the bilateral level. Shared identical culture and religion coupled with weak borders availed Rohingyas to choose Bangladesh to escape from the harsh treatment of Myanmar government (Ullah 2011: 140). The promulgation of 1982 Citizenship Law recognized Kachin, Mon, Kayah, Chin, Rakhine, Karen, and Shan state as forming the part of Burmese race, this act rendered Rohingyas as stateless and ethnically discriminated. The military operation Pyi Thaya further drove Rohingyas to Bangladesh in 1991-92. Various scholars have found denial of citizenship, arson, looting, rape, forced labour, religious discrimination and persecution, displacement, racist nature of the military regime, arbitrary confiscation of property etc (D'souza 1992; Lewa 2003; Ahmed 2010).

Threat to liberty and infringement of rights force people to abandon their homeland, hence called as Refugees. Being victims of human rights violations, there is a growing understanding that refugees may pose problems for host countries. According to one assessment:

> Ill-defined, porous borders make it difficult for states to protect themselves from the spill-over of refugees fleeing conflict in neighbouring countries. The long-term presence of large concentrations of refugees exacerbates other security concerns such as arms trafficking, drug smuggling, the recruitment of soldiers, and the trafficking of women and children, over which many host countries have little control. These security concerns are magnified when refugee influxes involve into long-term refugee populations and when major donor governments lose political interest and fail to provide sufficient assistance. Thus, host states perceive protracted refugee situations as posing direct and indirect threats to their security and regime survival (Loescher and James 2005: 30).

Directs threats can be described as when refugee camps set up by the host country becomes hide-outs or base for various militant outfits which can rupture bilateral relation with the country from where refugees have moved. Development of resentment at the domestic level against hosting refugees by the state comprises indirect threat.

Survival issues in an alienated Bangladesh and being victim of long-term state led coercion is believed to have augmented in the formation of various splinter groups out of

Rohingya Patriotic Front, eminent among them are Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF). The principle objective is to achieve autonomy or secure independent state for Arakanese. The growing international linkages between RSO and other transnational Islamist terrorist organisations including the formation of Bangladesh Islamic Manch with nine fundamentalist groups as members in 2002 are indeed alarming for Bangladesh as it could turn the country to a breeding ground for terror (Lintner 2002). The finance required for the activities of RSO are reportedly generated through its clandestine business of arms and drug trafficking across the porous borders of Myanmar and Bangladesh (Selth 2004: 114). Bangladesh is facing a real security dilemma out of the vulnerable condition of Rohingyas on the one hand where the frustration levels inherently developing out of statelessness is motivating towards fascination for engagement in terrorism and associated crimes.

How terrorism becomes attractive for those victims of political change or marginalized sections of the society? People or community who were historically persecuted, made victims of humiliation, faced with recognition and identity crisis then terrorism comes to serve as a means of redemption. This is followed with the promises to annihilate the oppressor and in the end restoring lost dignity (Langman & Morris 2003). Rohingya Solidarity Organisation is supposed to have acquired sophisticated Chinese RPG-2 rocket launchers, firearms, light weapons and assault rifles of AK-47 range from Thai arms dealers of the black market (Lintner 2002: 06). This can in future turn to be catastrophic for a terror hit country which was once called as 'cocoon of terror' by Bertil Lintner.

IV
IMPACT ON HUMAN LIVES

In the last two sections two major factors and related variables have been unearthed responsible for the raising the demand for cheap, portable and easy concealable weapons. It has certainly contributed in the penetration of small arms in the social, economic, and political spheres thus pushing the country to weak governance with least transparency,

accountability, equity, and security. In this section I attempt to underline the impacts on human lives.

Well known economist Abul Barkat in his work *The Political Economy of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh* has at first gives a critical comparative analysis of upward and downward trends caused by religious extremism and economic– political criminalisation from 1975-2012. In the upwards trends there is a surge in the influx of illegal arms, usage of black money and muscle power in politics, expensive medical facilities, erosion of political values, rich-poor divide visibly sharpened in education, mis-appropriation of grants and aids by vested interests etc. Contrary to this, downward trends are in terms of economic development, efficiency of the state institutions to deal with black marketeering, good governance and vice versa (Barkat 2013: 11). In the given time period, black money accumulated by criminals are equivalent to US $ 117 billion. These criminals have channeled illicit money in drug and small arms trafficking and trade (2013:14). A simultaneously economic mode of criminalisation has resulted in the political criminalisation. With the increasing instances of violence conspired by politicians, extremists, and terrorists have affected its foreign investments. Destruction of properties in bombings and loss of life in exchange of firearms creates economic underdevelopment in terms of sustainable growth. And it's a well known fact that unemployed youth are more inclined to criminal and terrorist organisations, which are easy to be recruited for their activities.

Secondly, with respect to social security the worst victims of SALW fatalities are the most vulnerable. In Bangladesh ethnic and religious minorities have been systematically persecuted in regular intervals in the form of vandalism of their properties, looting, and rape etc. Unregulated circulation of firearms in the society increases the probability for victimization. The gender bias is prevalent in a patriarchal dominated society of Bangladesh where women are subjected to human rights violations. *Saferworld* in its key findings of the report titled (*Challenges to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on South Asia in Bangladesh* 2006: 13) presented that women are targeted with portable arms for abduction, rape, human trafficking, and killings as part of domestic violence.

Thirdly, attacks conducted by rival political parties reel the democracy to fragility. In 2004, grenade attacks on AL rally have brought forth certain key elements that they were conducted with great precision and professionalism in a well coordinated manner (*Daily Star* 2004). This raises the question over political freedom to participate in the electoral processes. Intimidation, political assassinations only create fear and anxiety which can relatively lead the country to authoritarianism, it should not be forgotten that in the past whenever political crisis emerged military played the foul game in capturing the power.

V
SUMMARY

In the modern state system, state is the epicenter authority in providing security to its citizens. Bangladesh's insecurities generated by the availability of unregulated arms make her to reorient the approach in curbing the threat. Government on the first basis should trace the roots of the acquisition of weapons by non-state armed groups, rather solely concentrating on the offensive capability. Criminalisation of the politics has facilitated much in the militarisation of the society, which throws open the question on Election Commission to bar those politicians with criminal record or to develop model code of conduct who are found to be engaged in inciting violence. This chapter was an attempt to focus on the possible links between Arms, violent politics, and terrorism of varying characteristics. During the study it was found that the collusion between three has had disastrous impact on human lives. Any threats endangering human lives are indeed ample to destroy humankind and its civilization.

CHAPTER III
EXTERNAL LINKAGES AS SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Preoccupation with traditional security threats borne out of ideological confrontation between two power blocs after Second World War, found transition in the Post Cold War era with more emphasis on non-military aspect which are transnational in nature. The notorious nexus between terrorists, transnational criminal networks and various non state actors came to be recognized as a threat to global security as a whole. Over the years security experts and policy makers have raised concerns over the expanding tentacles of non-traditional security threats with spill over effect as a potential feature, which are not confined to the borders of any modern nation-state where sovereignty is defined by strict demarcation of territorial boundaries. The darker side of globalisation has facilitated in generating advanced communication links and technology for the flow of arms, drugs, ideology, and other contraband to various regions across the globe. In this context, it becomes highly strenuous to preclude and control the menace. This indeed, impacts negatively on development and infringement of human rights especially in the developing world.

South Asia for long has experienced various inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the post colonial period, where small arms and light weapons have played a substantial role in shaping the intensity and sustenance of the violence. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India to a larger extent have been discerned as a destination for the influx of portable arms. On the other hand countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal were distinguished as a transit route for the trafficking of arms meant for various armed militants in the region (Chanda, S & Gupta, A.K 2004). Violent death of non-combatants and possibility of the diversion of arms from a post-conflict region to criminal gangs contributes to major humanitarian fallout. Additionally, in many cases subservient neighbouring countries have armed and harboured each others insurgents in an attempt to gain strategic influence against a superior enemy. For an instance Pakistan's support to the Khalistan movement or militancy in Kashmir, displays intention of the country to germinate internal

destabilisations against India. Apart from immediate neighbouring states, both capitalist and communist blocs fought proxy wars through arming their allies in various regions during Cold War. Moreover, 'geographical proximity and shared ethnic bonds' are two major causes in South Asia through which struggles in one country spill over into other countries (Chandoke 2008: 257).

Bangladesh faces myriad transnational security challenges which have the potential to jeopardize its internal stability and social matrix, emanating beyond its frontiers. Notably, since the end of Cold War Bangladesh has witnessed surge in the arms availability with a transition to being an end-user. Unearthing external factors responsible for the proliferation of small and light weapons in Bangladesh requires a critical analysis of the interplay of various actors, motives, and routes involved in the process. Proliferation of portable and durable arms involves three broad categories of countries which are responsible for the source, transit, and destination (Small Arms Survey 2002: 141). Possession of arms is not the sole reason for violence or conflict and it does not occur in vacuum.

This chapter intends to broadly examine the regional and extra-regional factors and their equations impacting on the proliferation of arms in the country. I would focus on the armed militancy in the North-eastern states of India, and explore the reasons which have involved Bangladesh. This aspect would shed light on the role and influence of state actors like Pakistan and China in a historical context as well as international funding sources of terrorism in Bangladesh. The next section would deal with the nexus between transnational organised crime and dynamics of arms procurement routes through both grey and black channels. Existence of cooperation between non-state actors are inimical not only to insurgency affected states, most probably neighboring states also experience the brunt of violence.

II

REGIONAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL FACTORS

Insurgency in Bangladesh's Neighbourhood

Insurgency can be described as a non-conventional or irregular form of warfare, mostly orchestrated in the rural setting with a purpose to wage low intensity war targeting the established government against perceived socio-economic marginalisation and exclusionary notion of nation and state building projects. According to (Kilcullum 2005: 605-6), insurgency is a government problem and insurgents represent deeper grievances existing in the society, where violence is only instrumental. From the tactical point of view, insurgents use different expressions terror acts in accordance with the accomplishment of their desired goals. Paradoxically, initiation of organized form of violence by internal groups is militarily weaker as compared to government forces which mark its significance from other forms of warfare (Haas 2015). Existence of cross cutting ethnic ties along international borders, geographical contiguity to insurgency affected turbulent areas facilitate in the spill over effect to peripheral states and possibility for armed crimes becomes evident.

Contextualising Bangladesh and its neighbourhood in the above mentioned characteristic features of insurgency brings out certain understanding that how country has emerged as conduit for the flow of portable arms. The country shares 4,096 km long physical border with India on its three sides.

Table 3.1 Borders of Bangladesh with India

States of India bordering Bangladesh	Length of the border
Assam	263 km
Tripura	856 km
Mizoram	318 km
Meghalaya	443 km
West Bengal	2,216.7 km

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, GOI

Genesis of the conflict in North-East of India

North-East region of India can be described as a profusion of different ethnicities, language, culture, and religion. Its connectivity to the mainland India through a narrow stretch known as 'Siliguri Corridor' defines its geographic isolation and the political-economic resentment which has developed in course of time with the state engineering initiated by the government at core[3]. The sociopolitical needs have invariably induced alteration of the political map and the history of past 200 years indicates the prominence of the movement of people (Ghosh 2009). Inability of the Indian state and its bureaucratic machinery to reach out to the remotest North-Eastern frontier in the delivery of welfare policies and services as enshrined in the Directive principles of state policies, have sowed the seeds of marginalisation among the habitants. To add more, the nationalist movement propelled against the British colonialism was not widespread as compared to the activism witnessed in mainland India. These changes have obviously laid the foundation for future conflicts, where unity in diversity as an inclusive notion of the nation was not whole heartedly accepted rather compelled the Indian state to undertake coercion and negotiation as a means to bring the region to its fold. (Ayoob 2002: 44) has described state making in the former colonies as more of a directed one than an autonomous activity, where the task of ruling elites were to mobilize people and material resources within colonially crafted boundaries.

The Weberian notion of the state wielding monopoly over the legitimate use of violence through the coercive apparatus transcends the adoption of violent method by non state entities as a threat to national security and territorial integrity. After independence, newly formed states confronted with the politicisation of cultural communities for external self-determination on the basis of ethnicity because of the failed project of homogenization through the dilution of plural ethnic identities (Sheth 1999). The historical legacy of armed conflict in the region has produced objectives where resistance to the state is based

---

[3] Siliguri corridor is also popularly known as Chicken Neck Corridor, the stretch is 33km on the eastern side and approximately 21 km on the western side. There is a variation in the actual measurement of the western side in the literatures I have studied for my research. More or less 21 and 22 kms are indicated. Here former I have taken into consideration.

on either to secede from India or demand for more autonomy within the state. The finances of militant outfits and the frequency with which they mould themselves to armed liberation groups are two key aspects of political significance in their ethnic assertion, which highlight the weaknesses of the Indian state (Baruah 2002: 4179).

Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Nagaland do not share territorial boundary with Bangladesh, although active guerillas in both states have developed workable relationship with arms dealers and criminal webs across the borders which makes it indispensable in my work to explain the details pertaining to them. In the following paragraphs I would explain contours of violent conflict in each state of the North-East region using the framework of ethnic tribes versus Indian state where demand is made for internal and external self determination, conflict emerging out of fissures between tribes and finally insurgency instigated by the influx of non-tribes causing demographic change.

Against the Indian state

Immediately after India attained independence in 1947, first visible contradictions of the nation-state building were witnessed in Nagaland which as acquired the status of becoming foremost site for the escalation of insurgency related acts in the country. Historically, footprints of nationalist struggle against colonialism was absent in the areas inhabited by Nagas. Moreover their leaderships have from time to time reminded that they constitute among the unconquered people who are principally not sharing any cultural ethos with the rest of India. Naga National Council (NNC) since 1946 has contained both moderate and extreme elements within the organisation that have initially furthered their demands. Hydari Agreement concluded by Government of India (GOI) and the moderates of NNC was rejected by Angami Phizo who took the violent stance of waging guerilla warfare. The sources of weaponry were availed by Pakistan through its Eastern-wing (now Bangladesh) and made use of Japanese and British stockpiles recovered during the Second World War. The liberation of Bangladesh to a greater extent weakened the movement as Pakistan could no longer influence and subsequently Shillong Peace Accord of 1975 was signed. By 1980 a new group Nationalist Socialist Council of

Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980 and its later factions- NSCN (Khalpang) and NSCN (Isak-Muivah) took up armed struggle by revitalizing their past agendas. Through government negotiations and deliberations, both factions agreed for peace talks and ceasefire in 1997 and 2001. Worrisome factor is the low intensity skirmishes between government agencies and militants in regular intervals which affects the livelihood of the people. On the flip side militants if eschewed violence as an instrument, have continued to involve in criminal activities like drugs and arms trafficking, extortion and training other militants in the region.

Assam once known as 'political contractor' for spearheading India's nation-building process in the North-East, outbreak of insurgency tells a different story as contrary to other states (Bhaumik 2009). To begin with, protest movements against economic alienation laid the foundation for future conflicts. Significant migration of people from East Bengal during partition and after liberation of East Pakistan forming Bangladesh in 1971 was considered as a threat to the linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness of the state. GOI took measures to meet the grievances of protesting parties by the culmination of the Assam accord in which All Assam Students Union left the violent path and accepted democratic method via newly formed political party Asom Gana Parishad to further their demands. Discrepancies within the accord proved failure in maintenance of a sustainable tranquility due to deadlock in the identification of foreign settlers combined with inability to check unbridled migration through poorly managed borders and elimination of their names from electoral roll which sufficiently fixed their citizenship. These events gave adequate reasons for United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) an offshoot of preceding agitations to wage an armed struggle to stage resentment and demand for sovereign status. Two operations by Indian army in the 1990s (Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino) have enormously weakened their presence. ULFA has in clandestine manner established operational linkages with other insurgents and actors within and outside the country in return for sophisticated weaponry, finances, and logistical support.

The flares of militant adventurism in the North Eastern states did not leave Tripura. Bangladesh or former East Pakistan conterminous to Tripura on three sides made the

influx of Bengali speaking population to move after partition of India and in the aftermath of 1971 war. These developments brought ramifications due to the dwindling mosaic of the tribal in comparison to non-tribal population by 1960s. Precisely, this makes a clear exposition of delicate and fragile nature of the ethnic balance coupled with the realization of the historical injustices (Chakravarti 2001: 2229). In 1978 formation of Tripura National Volunteer Force brought the prospects for insurgency aimed at liberation. In a quick succession many splinter organisations propped up like All Tripura Tiger Force, National Liberation Front of Tripura etc. Broadly periodic violence between coercive apparatus of the state and militants has occurred. Agitation began against influx of migrants, in successive terms insurgents have deviated from their stated objectives and turned the movement more or less in a chaotic manner by their linkages to trafficking and related crimes.

The gravity of violence perpetrated by Mizo National Front in Mizoram from 1966 onwards was once considered as equal or outshined Naga insurgency in a relative comparison. The underlying factor which ignited insurgency was Indian government's ignorance and incompetence to manage famine situation in Mizo Hills which then constituted Assam. Military was deployed to retain those areas vanquished by MNF, later peace prevailed with the successful carving out of Mizoram state in 1987. Diminutive groups have emerged overtime like Bru National Front, Hmar People's Convention-Democracy are active. Arunachal Pradesh has been a peaceful state in comparison to others. In 1996 Arunachal Dragon force was formed with its objective in the formation of Teola country. With a few spills of violence, its linkages with ULFA, NSCN (IM) is a matter of concern in terms of arms procurement and other strategic needs of insurgency.

Fissures between Tribes

In above all cases discussed, we have seen a common trend that states in the North-East region from time to time have chosen the violent method to display their reluctance to accept themselves as part of the post-colonial nation-building process. Core-Periphery contention was inherently visible in the former Princely state of Manipur. Predominant

three ethnic tribes (Meitei, Naga, and Kuki) have locked horns through the formation of insurgent groups based on their separate identity and uniqueness. Ethnically, Meitei based United National Liberation Front became the forerunner in the mushrooming of insurgency in the state since 1964. Other splinter groups like People's Liberation Army (PLA), People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) etc have emerged. According to *South Asia Terrorism Portal,* 5949 people have died in insurgency related fatalities from 1992-2014, leaving Manipur as the most conflict-ridden and violent in the region. This makes Manipur as the classic case where direct violence is being replaced by divisive structural and cultural violence featured by absence of room for reconciliation (Kumar 2012: 40).

Meghalaya did not remain untouched by the flames of insurgency in its neighbouring states. Like other states in the region, outsiders became the prime target in the first stance by 1980s. Following growing resentment amplified the formation of a number of insurgent groups claiming to represent the popular voices. Hynniewtrep Liberation Council (HALC) commenced the movement which established to embody interests of three major distinguishable tribes- Khasis (predominant in central Meghalaya), Jaintias (East), and the Garos (west). Meanwhile, HALC was short-lived from which emerged two splinter groups on separate ethnic lines- Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council laid its demands for the creation of Meghalaya as a state for Khasi tribe; Achik National Volunteers Council in 1995 identified the organisation with its vision of 'Achik Land' in the Garo hills by including two Assam's districts (Kamrup & Goalpara) (Phukan 2013: 99). These insurgency outfits are believed to have forged alliances with ULFA, NDFB, NSCN (I-M) for providing safe-havens, protected passage of weapons and contraband for meeting finances.

Sanctuary to insurgents by Bangladesh

For a successful outcome, insurgency often requires foreign aid and assistance. Scholars dealing with insurgency related studies have put forth the significance and impact of such support. Such a foreign involvement takes both active and passive mode. Logistical, financial funding, arms supply, provisions made for training and sanctuary are known as

active external support. On the reverse side passive support is defined as inability of the state to evade neighbouring country's insurgent operations from its soil (Reider 2014). The necessity arises out to dodge the state repression of the movement, in effect it can complicate the peace processes and norms for negotiation.

According to (Salehyan 2007: 225-26) existence of institutional weaknesses, hostility among neighbours and refugee communities are three factors responsible for the establishment of external bases of insurgents. He also emphasizes that terming state and its border as the sole unit of analyses would be insufficient as broader regional context needs attention. The homogeneous demography of the insurgent network and inhabitants of the sanctuary invariably determines the objective reality of the friendly environment exploited by fugitives.

Moreover inspiring insurgents, promotion of their agendas, ideological and political motivations are far less significant in the external support to insurgencies than the facilitation of safe havens and arms support (Daniel Byman 2013:984). From this we can build a rationale that in the arms supply to insurgents, sanctuary play an important role bearing in mind the fact that weapons are not an independent variable in any conflict eruption rather a mere tool to intimidate the government's authority and legitimacy.

The legacy of conspiring and abetting each other's insurgencies in the South Asian region dates back to early years after the attainment of independence. The terrain of East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) was utilized to train, recruit, and passage of weapons for an umbrella of insurgents of various states of North-east. Government under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was capable of dismantling its association in sponsoring insurgency but proved to be short lived after his assassination. The successive military regimes and the restoration of democracy in the 90s did not deter Dhaka in providing support and allowing to traffic small arms to militants operating from its soil against India. The immediate cause for Bangladesh's decision to harbour militants could be in retaliation to India's covert aid to Shanti Bahini in 1976 which eventually forced Dhaka to enter into a

peace accord in 1997.[4] Military backed regimes' inclination to support insurgents might have grown out of the disillusionment of being deprived of its role in the independence struggle snatched away by Indian army, where as Mujib's creation of a parallel army known as 'Jatiya Rakhi Bahini' was considered as an Indian-inspired force (Jindal 2004: 210).

In 1989 ULFA established its operational base and following Indian Army's three military operations (Operation Bajrang in 1990, Operation Rhino I in 1991 and Rhino II in 1992) made them to regroup in Bangladesh. After Bhutan's crackdown over insurgent camps in 2003 further forced them to reach out to Bangladesh till 2009 when latter initiated actions to clampdown over hide-outs as a measure to improve bilateral relations.

Pushpita Das has based her arguments from the geographical point of view that porosity of borders, dense population along bordering districts has allowed for the insurgents to cross over to Bangladesh:

> Presently, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) as well several other insurgent outfits from the North-East have bases in the Chittagong, Khagrachari, and Sylhet districts of Bangladesh. According to reports, there are 97 hideouts/ camps of Indian insurgent groups in Bangladesh. It is also reported that as many as 77 Indian insurgents/ criminals figuring in Interpol Red Corner Notice are being harboured by Bangladesh. Porous border, lack of economic opportunities, poverty and underdevelopment, attitude of the people towards petty crimes, laxity in vigilance, nexus between criminals and police guarding forces all contribute to escalating trans-border crimes Das (2010: 5).

From time to Border Security Force (BSF) has handed over the list of insurgent camps to its counterpart Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB). The number of hideouts have increased and decreased over the years, after Bangladesh's crackdown on militant camps in 2009 along bordering areas have reduced activities of insurgents but could not bring a complete full stop (*Assam Tribune* 2014).

---

[4] Shanti Bahini is the armed wing of Parbatiya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti which waged insurgent movement against Bangladesh's forced demographic change in the Chittagong Hill tracts.

The whole conundrum of Bangladesh being an active or passive agent in providing safe-haven to insurgents presents two arguments- militant movements in North-East states explicitly has its roots in protest against the huge migration of Bangla-speaking people from erstwhile East Pakistan after partition in 1947 and formation of Bangladesh in 1971. On the other hand, Bangladesh territory was utilised by same insurgents as a sanctuary and for collection of arms. From an economic dimension, finances for insurgency cannot be completely relied on the host country. To contextualise (Makarenko 2004: 134) views in this aspect, she has observed that after 1990s, and in the 21s century there is a virtual reduction in the state support which ultimately tempt terrorist actors to secure their finances through criminality. As in the case of Bangladesh with its not so robust economy and prevalent poverty has made insurgents of North-East to depend upon non-state sponsored but privatized economy generated through taxation, extortion, kidnapping and the narcotics drug trade. It was uncovered the huge business interests of insurgents in Bangladesh for e.g. Paresh Barua (ULFA leader) as one of the aspect of fascination for the country and reluctance for peace talks (Bhattacharjee 2012: 119). Political ideology was marooned when insurgency was twisted as a criminal enterprise.

Critical reflection over India's portray of Bangladesh as playing covert role in North-East insurgency by providing shelter for different non-state actors places two points that it seems bizarre that Bangladesh's linkages to those insurgents whose core values are to target Bengali speaking migrants in states of North-East like ULFA. In this manner 'the blame thy neighbour syndrome' has received active coinage in India where inter conflict resolution mechanisms has failed to a greater degree (Ahmed 2002). Secondly, he adds state's weakness within Bangladesh has somehow allowed non-state actors to utilize its territory rather any strategic designs imbibed to destabilize India. Even if Ahmed's points are taken into consideration, how can one deny the fact of BNP's leader Khaleda Zia calling insurgents as 'freedom fighters' and called for open support during her election campaign in 2001 (*Asia Times Online* 2002).

China Factor

From a broader view small arms and light weapons of Chinese origin has proliferated in the whole South Asia, where supplies have been purely commercial as well as covert aid driven by geo-politics and its strategic interests. In this scenario, Bangladesh is among the top clients of arms purchases from China. From this it can be accentuated that Bangladesh with its inadequate defence budget allocation has somehow forced to rely on China as latter offers credit and soft loans to payback (*Dhaka Tribune* 2014). An eye opener report has provided relevant datas which shows that from 2006-10 China has exported 7.8 US$ million worth military styled SALW to Bangladesh making it rank number two in the overall trade. In the year 2008, China extended help to Bangladesh to open a factory for the production of Chinese Type-81 rifles (SIPRI 2013: 48). China's engagement with Bangladesh in providing assistance in weaponry dates back much before to its formation. In the initial stages, technical expertise was provided which later on helped in the establishment of Bangladesh Ordinance factories to produce arms of various calibers. By 1980's China extended assistance in the field of production ammunition and arms manufacturer giants like North Industries Corp (NORINCO) began projects to produce assault rifles.

Since the departure of colonialism from Indian sub-continent and establishment of Communist regime in China under Mao Zedong has brought a triangular confrontation of China and Pakistan against common enemy India. Before the breaking away of Bangladesh from West Pakistan, its soil was utilised for gun-running and support to rebel groups of North-East India. It was natural that Bangladesh or more precisely East Pakistan became a conduit for the proper channeling combined with the lack of administrative and security management on the porous borders. Chinese arms have played a crucial role in instigating violence and insurgency.

The most probable reasons for China to provide its support to ultras of North-East is grown out of its retaliation to India's policy of support to Tibet and its guerillas (Bhaumik 2009). Such proxy wars have made Bangladesh to be engulfed and it had to

bear the brunt of uncontrolled arms. On the other hand from a technical and economical viewpoint, Chinese arms are considered to be popular among the insurgents and those engaged in the black market clandestine sales because they are quiet cheaper and availability is easy than weapons manufactured by other countries (Kanwal & Chansoria 2010: 4).

To that extent this is among various factors that Chinese weapons have increasingly found its way in arms black markets like that of in Cox's Bazaar in Chittagong. Arms recovered by Rapid Action Battalion in 2004 from Chittagong has found to be manufactured in China, in many other such seizures it became quiet clear that there is a demand for such weapons. China's support to insurgents of North-East India has reduced substantially after Deng Xiaoping's 'good neighbourhood policy', though there has been no change in the availability of Chinese arms in region (Goswami 2012). This brings to a scenario where state led support have found sea change, despite this traffickers have continued their business.

Pakistan factor

Bangladesh has experienced two forms of liberation, in the first level its liberation from colonialism was based on the two nation theory as imagined by the leaders of the Pakistan. Secondly from Pakistan after its linguistic identity was found to be neglected in the post-colonial state which led to liberation war of 1971. Its war for independence was actively supported by India by aiding *Mukti Bahini* which drove her to extend bilateral friendship closer to India after its formation. Since its early years clash of interests in the political dimension brought two major debates to the forefront- one group asserting the Islamic identity and other being strictly affirmed to its secular traditions.

Pakistan as a variable in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Bangladesh is essentially two fold. At the first level Pakistan in its proxy war with India has led her to abet and aid insurgents in the North-East, whereas arms were supplied and provided training via East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In the second phase, as discussed in

Chapter II about various terrorist organisations which have flourished in the country partially due to the rise of Islamists within the country and of course the aftermath of changing international trends of terrorism. Pakistan and its intelligence agencies have taken the advantage of these developments to facilitate financial and arms assistance to non-state actors based in Bangladesh.

To begin with Naga insurgency as discussed in this chapter has revealed the intensity with which it was mobilized and sustained with the active involvement of foreign aid. Then East Pakistan was used by government in Islamabad to provide comfort camps for Naga Guerillas under the leadership of Angami Phizo to concentrate his military strength first in (two camps) Sylhet and later (five camps) in Chittagong Hill tracts by 1958 (Bhaumik 2009). This was closely followed by the Mizo insurrection under MNF in 1966 where its cadres received training in East Pakistan. UNLF of Manipur with its motive of securing independent socialist Manipur found strong backing from the Pakistan army and maintained good political relationship with East wing of Pakistan, perceptible in its supposed support to Islamabad in the Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971. Fugitive intentions of militancy in North –East met with shock due to the breakaway of East Pakistan and formation of independent Bangladesh. Since 1971 such activities came to a halt after the new government in Dhaka took a stern action against abetting insurgency from its soil.

The second phase can be built around the Cold War dynamics of the formation of *mujahideen* who were trained in Pakistan to fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. From the domestic level, Bangladesh immediately after the assassination of its founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rehman saw spurt in the activities of Islamists and the revival of extremist elements under the successive military regimes. Among those who returned from fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan to Bangladesh proved decisive in charting out the future course of their activities in the country after 1990s.

Given the nature of hostilities nurtured by both India and Pakistan, Bangladesh subsequently became a ground for proxy wars. (Riaz 2008) has observed that Pakistan's

intelligence agency ISI, who's loosing ground in abetting Kashmir militancy, brought them to shift their focus to North-Eastern insurgents, at the same time within Bangladesh under Khaleda Zia found to be sympathetic to insurgents, and cleared all paths for generating greater interest. The author has further emphasised that RAW's engagement with that of militants of Burma, made Bangladesh to move closer to ISI in dismantling such activities. In the whole theatre of proxies, the most beneficial have been the Islamist terrorists who could make use of transnational linkages to build their networking strong enough. It cannot be denied of an important aspect that Bangladesh was carved out of Pakistan, if to say with a full blown support from India. This event has certainly impacted the regional geopolitics where Bangladesh became a common ground to be exploited for contestation.

Among the active terrorist outfits in Bangladesh, HUJI-B has garnered much support in the domestic level from various political parties promoting strict Islamic credentials. Its external linkages are believed to be stronger to that of HUJI operational in Pakistan and certain investigations have revealed the collusion with that of ISI (Sharma and Behera 2014). No terrorist organisation can survive without robust funding required for the purchase of arms, ammunition, cadre maintenance etc.

Finances and Funding of Terrorism

No terrorist organisation can survive without robust funding required for the purchase of arms, ammunition, cadre maintenance etc. Chapter two has vividly described the plethora of terrorist organisations active in Bangladesh, which raises the question of how violent non-state actors are raising finances to operationalise their objectives. Country is known for being host to various domestic and foreign based charities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in various developmental, healthcare, medical, and educational sectors. They have certainly contributed in providing aid and assistance to the country facing many sustainable developmental loopholes. These organisations can be principally recognised into two identifiable categories of either Islamic or non-religious.

The aftermath of 9/11 terrorist activities in USA has raised the banner of 'global war on terror', which brought Bangladesh to the centre stage of experiencing the proliferation of various Islamic radical terrorist organisations within the country. Measures undertaken at the global level to trace the possible linkages of terrorist activities made tracing the financial sources as an important component. Major impetus to development in the investigations took a turn after Bangladesh was rocked with serial bomb blasts in 2005. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies found that many West Asian funded charitable organisations were channeling financial resources[5]. Here two variants were found, one in which such organisations were directly aiding and other whose finances were being diverted for terrorist activities.

Bangladesh is host to large number of foreign aided madrasas or seminaries, whose principle aim is to impart education of Islam. Mosques and madrasas over the years were turned to be breeding ground for fundamentalist activities, indoctrination, and base for training. According to various datasets and estimates, there are close to 9,000 madrasas registered with the government, 15,000 comes under the regulation of Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Education Board (Chaudhury 2013). What is really fascinating is the number of Jamaat run seminaries which are approximately figuring at 6,000. To add more, madrasas run by private or ghost organisations out of governmental reach numbers more than thousand. Without government's proper intervention, certain such schools have turned to host in imparting Islamic Jihad.

Another dimension of the terror financing can be identified from the banking and insurance sector. Scholars dealing with terror financing have pointed the ever increasing number of banks in the country as per the changes taking place in the global trends of terrorism. They have raised suspicion on this aspect, as in a country with a large number of inhabitants in abject poverty and sudden rise in the proliferation of financial institutions present a confusing scenario. Accordingly, it has been found that government usually gives preferences to funding from countries in the Middle East especially Saudi

---

[5] Intelligence agencies found that organisations like Qatar Charitable Society, Rabita Al- Alam Al- Islami , Society of Social Reforms etc were among those whose funds were utilised by extremist and terrorist outfits.

Arabia and cluster of other countries from the Arab world. The reason is obvious unlike other western countries; Islamic funding does not require post- utilization certificates (Kumar 2012).

Apart from charity funding and banking sector involvement in channeling flow of money, there are also donations made by individuals within the country and by the Diasporas based in different parts of the world. It was observed that members of Islamic organisations have made frequent visits to various countries, hosting conferences meant to collect funds in the name of charity programmes. Moreover, they have initially targeted expatriate Bangladeshis; it does not imply that Diasporas were responsible. In many cases they have provided donations, without the knowledge of the use in illicit business. Another aspect of the same trend is the misappropriation of *zakat* funds by militant outfits under the guise of trusts (Riaz 2008). JMB's leader Saidur Rahman's revelations during interrogation found that the terrorist outfit was beneficiary of 50-60 lakh Taka collected during the month of Ramadan. It is quiet obvious that such income generated under the veil of charity would have funneled for managing their cadre as well as in arming them to sustain instability in the country.

III
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME AND ROUTES OF ARMS TRAFFICKING

In international politics word 'transnational' has emerged much before the implosion of Cold war, though its intermingling to that of crime and terrorism have acquired importance in recent decades. In the words of (Mcgrew 1992), transnational relations are those linkages which operate beyond the state control by constructing informal, formal, or institutionalised networks, associations, and interactions between individuals, groups, organisations, and communities belonging to different nation-states.

In this sense criminal activities by professional cartels of transnational nature are in constant transformations, complexity, and flexibility being posed by the new

technological innovations in the field of communication and transportation. In the evolution of growing concern over transnational criminal networks and organised crime was viewed earlier as an economic problem measured at local and regional level. Portrayal of terrorism as a threat to global security, its relation to lucrative trade of TOCs for financing has brought latter being counted as possessing the potential to destabilize economic, political, and social sector. Terrorism, transnational security threats, and insurgency are no longer treated as a dichotomy rather a marriage of convenience when need arises for association and cooperation.

Certainly, illicit trade in arms and drugs with the blurring boundaries of terrorists and transnational criminals has implications on the sovereignty. For agencies and governments relentlessly seeking to contain them often find it difficult to claim whether their territory is being used as a transit or destination for arms and drugs, such phenomenon is called triangulation (Willets 2008)

Meanwhile (Carrapico 2012) has portrayed transnational organised crime to have acquired the power and geographical expansion, stemming from the sudden strides in global trade, growth in mobility, corruption, creation of a single market, advances in communication technology and the end of USSR seems to have contributed much to the acceleration of economic transactions with a vacuum of juxtaposing ideologies. Pragmatism and flexible nature has enabled such criminal entities to make adjustments in any given context.

Scholar's like (Gordon 2009) has equated Barry Buzan's 'Regional Security complex Theory' in the analysis of criminal activity of transnational features in which he has developed the understanding of 'crime regions' and 'crime location'. The underlying raison d'être is Buzan's logic of internal amity-enmity lines as stronger than the external one. In this manner, criminal transactions are more intense in 'crime regions', as with 'crime location' depicts particular countries where crime has originated due to poor governance, weak state structures. His thesis has certainly given a deep insight into distinguishing features:

1. Temporary alliances are formed in smaller groups by criminals criss-crossing borders showing certain ethnic undertones, well connected to political elites and official channels thus working within the realm of 'grey market', where lines of licit and illicit are fuzzy and loose.

2. Transnational criminal networks and related crimes are not organised in 'top-down' hierarchical fashion, makes it intricate to trace and destroy by authorities responsible for maintaining law and order.

3. In the lucrative trade, transnational criminal entities act as facilitators in the transactions.[6]

We can comprehend these features and locate in Bangladesh's condition which is marred with transnational crimes especially currency counterfeiting (hundi), trafficking of human and narcotic substances, which eventually has close liaison with gun-running. Major General (retd.) Syed Muhammad Ibrahim pointed that there are approximately 128 syndicates with six lakh operatives using four lakh guns comprising 40% under the age of 18 years as working in these crimes (*Daily Star* 2006).

Drug Trafficking

Techniques involved in illicit trafficking of drugs and narcotic substances are acknowledged to be synonymous to that of arms. Finance generated is undoubtedly is flooded to conflict zones and violent criminal syndicates for meeting their expenses anti-state disposition. Bangladesh is placed between the three prominent regions known for opium production, addiction, and trafficking i.e. Golden Triangle, Golden Crescent and Golden Wedge[7]. The country has no production of psychotropic drug substances nevertheless has been a traditional user of cannabis and its derivatives. Since 1980's it has become a booming transit route which has left the country with the burgeoning of drug addicts, pervasiveness of drug induced offences and situation called "low prevalence and high risk" for HIV/ AIDS (Rahaman 2014: 178). Being locked with

---

[6] Ibid.

[7] Golden triangle (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) lies on the East, Golden Crescent (Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) to the West and Golden Wedge to its North of Bangladesh. These regions are known for the production of opium and manufacture of other narcotic drugs like heroine, codeine, hashish etc.

borders of India on its three sides, Department of Narcotics Control has identified three routes for the movement of drugs on its western, eastern, and northern districts.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is considered as a grave peril to humanity, where most vulnerable and poor women and children are victimised for a variety of purpose including prostitution, slavery, and extraction of human vital organs and above all they become forced labour in the conduct of illicit movement of contraband. Bangladesh showcases a picture of being a source rather than a transit. Weak governance, lack of employment opportunities often fall prey to traffickers. Women and children held captive are trafficked mostly to Middle Eastern countries, involving India and Pakistan as conduit (Datta 2012).

Financial crime

Slight stress on the financial balance severely affects the whole economic sector of the country. Hawala or hundi as known in South Asia is an informal channel to transfer money by evading the banking and taxation system, as a consequence it brings loses to the state revenue. Money laundering involves primarily three stages- placement, layering, and integration. Black money is deposited in small amounts in various accounts called as placement; layering involves explicating amount details as generated from casinos, future trading etc; in the final round through numerous trails of transactions money is integrated into the economy (Mahalingam 1998). The non-violent nature of money laundering becomes a menace when terrorist outfits make use of it for financing their politically motivated activities. Bangladesh is not untouched by this crime, non-state mercenaries utilised this process for acquiring black money in terms of purchasing weapons , ammunitions and in turn corruption. Combination of these threats has immensely determined the security realm of Bangladesh, whereas confrontational politics in the state has not provided option to deal with it by engaging various stakeholders responsible.

Routes for Arms Trafficking

Construing routes used by traffickers to move weapons from the source country through transit states to destination are actually difficult and there is a scarcity of reliable datas also. Moreover, traffickers keeping in view of the possible crackdown by law enforcement agencies have compelled them to change routes according to prevailing circumstances. There is a strong agreement that routes used for illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs are mutually utilized by the fugitives and their criminal allies. Weapons flows mostly from covert arms black market in Cambodia are shipped to Cox's Bazaar from where different methods are taken into action. Prominent arms trafficking takes place in the tri-junction of India-Bangladesh-Myanmar borders whether territorial or maritime.

Maritime routes

According to (Small Arms Survey 2001: 167) there is an assumption that difficulties would arise by the year 2020 in identifying illicit shipping of arms due to the increase in overall volume of commercial maritime trade which is estimated to get tripled. Bangladesh's maritime boundaries open to Bay of Bengal, whereas straits of Malacca reaching out to South-East Asia are known as troubled waters, preferred by gun-runners in the wake of easy trans-shipment via sea. As observed by (Lintner 2002), 'Guns and religion form a recipe for trouble', this statement is in consistent with the stark reality of south-east Bangladesh, whose port city of Chittagong stretching to Cox bazaar is home to Arakanese Rohingya refugees whereas the same area is becoming stronghold of Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islam and Islami Chatra Shibir. Existence of fundamentalist ideology and proximity to gun running and piracy ridden coastal areas highlights the emerging threats to the regional security as a whole.

Land routes

Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-Myanmar territorial borders are susceptible to arms trafficking are widely known. (Anindita Dasgupta 2001: 62) provided a good insight into the two prevalent routes passing through Sylhet and Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh

to North- Eastern states of India. Once arms procured from South-East Asian black markets reaches Cox's Bazaar situated in the South East of Bangladesh, from here caches of smaller size are moved to Mizoram, Tripura and Karimgunj of Assam through Chittagong Hill tracts. Arms travel further to Nagaland via North Cachar hill districts and Karbi Anglong, delivering arms to Meghalaya is conducted through Sylhet passing Dawki and Baghmara in the Khasi and Jaintiya Hill districts. This route probably again provides entry to Mankachar and Dhubri district in Assam and from Siliguri and Dooars into West Bengal and to Bhutan[8].

The second route mentioned by the same author shows that arms from Cox's Bazaar is trafficked to Arakan, eastern Naga and Patkai Hills in Myanmar where ethnic rebels facilitates in the movement of the contraband to Ukhrul District in Manipur, Tuensang and Mon districts of Nagaland and beyond Khonsa in Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh (Dasgupta 2001: 62).

The distinguishing features in both routes originating from Cox's Bazaar highlights that first route is more probably used to supply weapons to Bangladesh's immediate neighbouring states of India like Tripura, Assam, Mizoram, Meghalaya and West Bengal. The other transit route presumably is for those states which are not neighbouring, due to which traffickers have taken the path of Myanmar. Prabal Saikia an ULFA militant who was arrested in 2006, unveiled that arms from Bangladesh reaches his organisation through a route connecting Shillong-Cherapunji-Pynursla (Goswami 2012). Routes may change in accordance with context and demand, but details made available by numerous sources point towards the significance of Sylhet and Chittagong Hill tracts in the nefarious business. Without dynamic mutual assistance and collaboration between diverse insurgents could not have made good use of the mixed features of the terrain. Apart from the South-east routes for trafficking, intelligence agencies have found areas near to border areas of South-west and west as Kushtia, Meherpur, Chaudanga, Jhenidah, Jessore, Satkira as booming (Alam 2014: 146).

---

[8] Ibid.

MAP 3.1 Bangladesh

Political map of Bangladesh

Source: International Crisis Group

Four prominent arms haul in 2003, 2004, and 2014 is a case in point, revealed the vulnerable condition of Bangladesh's poor governance of its borders and exploitation of the territory by traffickers for their inherent motives. Bogra Arms Haul of 2003 was among country's first largest arms haul after its independence (Riaz 2008). Initially government authorities after seizures claimed that arms and explosives were landed up for creating chaos and destabilisations in the country, where both ruling and opposition parties accused each other. Bogra district is located in the northern Bangladesh's Rajshahi Division. According to (Kumar 2003) this seizure has thrown light on the alteration in the earlier trafficking route of arms being shipped from Cambodia to Thailand and reaching Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar via Andaman Sea in the Bay of Bengal. Three tentative routes have been identified. First is a riverine route, Bogra's contiguity to Karatoya tributary of Jamuna river which links up Brahmaputra in Assam makes the movement of consignment easy. Second route lands up in Assam by first moving the cache to Siliguri Corridor in Indian state of West Bengal, from here consignment is reached to ULFA by its ally Kamatpur Liberation organisation. Finally, arms could have passed via Meghalaya to ULFA through Achik National Volunteer Council (Kumar 2003).

The second significant seizure of arms took place on Dec 1, 2003 in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh after exchange of fire between police and criminals (*Daily Star* 2003). In a short span of time, such recoveries in the same year signifies that country is becoming a melting point for arms syndicates engaged in transnational operations concomitant with non-state actors. As per information provided by authorities, weapons were recovered somewhere near to diplomatic enclaves. Moreover, it could not be estimated to whom arms were destined though police claimed target was country's stability. Nevertheless, this was the period when BNP was in power and their affiliation to Islamist parties has raised the banner of increased extremist and fundamentalist act against ethnic and religious minorities.

'Chittagong Arms Haul' on April 2, 2004 was termed as the South Asia's largest small arms seizure ever as noted by Jane's Intelligence Review estimated value between $ 4.5-7

million. The huge amount of cache of arms belonged to Chinese, Italian and US origin. Route utilised by alleged traffickers showcases a slight difference because arms were not uploaded from Cambodia's black market. Instead arms originated from Hong Kong, reached Singapore from where it is assumed to have received more loads, and finally reaching Chittagong by moving to Arakan Coast in Myanmar through infamous straits of Malacca known for piracy and smuggling of contraband in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile there are variations in the origin of weapons and source, although disturbing facts is about the amount of consignment which is termed to be equal to the quantity capable of usage in classical wars against a regular enemy.

Figure 3.1 Routes of 2004 Arms Trafficking

Showcasing the possible route used by traffickers from source country to destination

Source: Dhaka Tribune

Habiganj Arms haul in 2014 is equated to that of seizures in Chittagong Urea Fertilizer factory with respect to the quantity confiscated[9]. Rapid Action Battalion in its multiple raids in Satchchari forests of the district found many bunkers which primarily belonged

---

[9] Habigang is a district in Sylhet division (North-eastern part of Bangladesh).

to ATTF of Tripura containing huge caches of arms. In total seven bunkers were found, in which 12, 987 bullets, four machine guns, five machine gun barrel, 248 rocket chargers, 222 pieces of 40mm rockets and one rocket launcher were held (*Daily Star* 2014). Fact figures points towards the alarming level of arms being trans-shipped to Bangladesh, apart from these major arms hauls many go unnoticed or corrupt practices among officials keeps the clandestine operations to burgeon.

<div align="center">

IV

SUMMARY

</div>

It would be hyperbole to equate Cox Bazaar underground black markets of weapons to that of robust Darra-Adam khel of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. An insightful analysis of the demand and supply elements has brought forth several mutually inter-related facets of insurgency, presence of refugees, abetting proxy war having direct correlation with that of arms trafficking cutting across boundaries. Demands streaming for weapon flow are inherently of Indian origin though oscillating accounts of safe havens maintained by insurgents of Northeast in Bangladesh has contributed to the flourishing illicit economy of arms in the region. This chapter has endeavoured to present a snapshot of the potential expertise acquired by the blurring distinguishing features of insurgents and criminals, where as Bangladesh is caught between the crossfire as a passive and active agent. In this context, monitoring border areas becomes indispensable for the country to thwart risks of transnational characteristics.

CHAPTER IV

INITIATIVES FOR DISARMAMENT AND GOVERNANCE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Governance provides set of rules, norms, legislation, and principles which are decisive and coordination among emerging policies with various structures and procedures. Evolving governance at each level requires political commitment and intermingling of public and private actors to bring about a harmonious solution when dealing with the issue of small arms proliferation. Correspondingly identifying the content, agency for implementation, approach for collaboration and questions of sharing responsibility becomes relevant. For effective governance, there should be checks and balances between legislative, executive, and judiciary with clear demarcation of responsibility and powers. Secondly it is emphasized that a degree of civilian control over security is deemed necessary, somehow in the case of defence forces in South Asian countries are moulded in the colonial legacy of military bureaucracy which has for long been reluctant about civilian involvement. Thirdly, parliamentary powers to allocate and budgetary control over security related expenses. Fourth, security sector should be accountable to the judicial civil courts whenever service is necessary. To conclude, civilian participation in the policy making through engagement in various think tanks, universities, NGOs are considered to make security sector governance more promising for creating a peaceful environment so as to usher human lives more secure from vulnerabilities (Banerjee 2009: 174).

While laws and conventions governing the arms trade have for long kept the issue of small arms, light weapons and ammunitions in moribund state. Principle obsession with nuclear technology can be calculated as an important component, though with the dramatic changes in the nature of warfare and counts of human suffering made security analysts to drift their observation to bring about measures to check the flow of weapons.

This chapter is divided into three principle parts. First, I would deliberate on the existing global conventions and regulations on the spread of SALW. Secondly, from a regional

perspective aim is to explore various arenas of cooperation and existing lacunae in the effective governance of SALW proliferation, whereas SAARC's role would be highlighted. Thirdly, I would outline the legal provisions, agencies responsible for law and order maintenance, response of the state under various regimes in Bangladesh and its relations to India and Myanmar that would constitute the domestic level analysis. In the final section, response by Bangladesh would be discussed along with concluding remarks.

II
GLOBAL LEVEL GOVERNANCE

Global level analysis of SALW governance has been thrown weight in this chapter because Bangladesh's arms requirements are met principally through exports from manufacturing states placed in different parts of the world. Though, official figures of arms importing and exporting remains ambiguous. Here the interplay of various arms manufactures requires to be scrutinized. I have highlighted in Chapter I about the channels of supply of arms and major states involved in the process that are responsible for the maximum trade even in Cold war and in Post-Cold war period. Furthermore, focusing only on national laws would be flawed as each state is bound to prepare, enact, and implement rules and regulatory mechanism according to their persistent necessity ranging between strategic, security, geographical, institutional, or cultural, which might be found contravening to global peace.

With an absence of sustainable global governance if to ignore the role of United Nations there is a lapse of legally binding institutions and programmes to look into over-arching vibrant aspects of illicit trafficking of SALW. In this section I would throw light on the instruments being prepared by the international community comprising nation-states across the globe. The specific time period from 2001-2014 shows numerous complications which has driven UN to device laws which have been either soft or inconsistent to the extent of eradicating sophisticated arms, though complete disarmament is nearly impossible. In the following paragraphs I would present treaties and conventions adopted in a regular flow manner as per the timeline, plus all critical

70

aspect is deliberately considered to underscore the complex nature of global governance. UN Programme of Action, 2001; UN Firearms Protocol, 2001; Arms Trade Treaty, 2013.

Firearms Protocol

This protocol was adopted through a United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/255 in 2001 that has substantially served as a crucial document falling within the ambit of curbing Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), where wide range of SALW described in the chapter I were not made visible rather 'Firearms' was used as the common jargon which in itself has reduced the scope of being applicable to arms of various calibers and ammunitions. Nevertheless protocol was much concentrated as among the first stepping stone calling for cooperation among states for eradicating and combating illicit trafficking of firearms. Article I has crisply stipulated that protocol is designed in such a way to supplement the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNGA 2001).

By and large criminality in the trafficking and manufacturing of arms in an illicit manner has found attention that has limited to transnational groups involved in crime, wherein deliberately state-to-state transfers were excluded highlighting the national security concerns where arms are purchased for the defence needs as mentioned in the Article IV (2). In the process, it has directed states party to the protocol to devise legal or other relevant measures to take necessary actions so as to keep check on the illicit activities termed as criminal offence (UNGA 2001). Puzzle is whether criminalization of illicit production, facilitation, abetting of such an offence mostly based in the local and regional context solves the broad implications of humanitarian crisis caused by the narrow view of 'firearms'. With all its positive facets associated with marking, record keeping, brokering regulation, cooperation in terms of technical assistance makes it among the successors for creating global awareness. Meanwhile, Article 20 defining 'denunciation', giving authority for the states party to the protocol to withdraw after submission of a written notification to the UN's Secretary General, this aspect severely undermines the legally abiding notions that I consider as a major lacunae left by the experts who have prepared the document (UNGA 2001).

The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA)

UN PoA was adopted by consensus in 2001 is a non-legal instead politically binding whose enforcement is defined in terms of voluntary basis rather prescribing hard regulations, covering all aspects of SALW proliferation which indeed provided a normative framework. As a helpful tool for various NGOs, state governments, regional, and interrelated international organisations. Anyhow UN PoA became a forerunner in the creation of a regime and knowledge for timely recognition of the approaching threats to humanity. To summarize out of relevant points from 83 mentioned in UN PoA has essentially constructed a foundation such as recommendation for effective legislative controls, formulation of national point of contact for coordination, in post-conflict situations emphasis was made on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, public awareness campaigns. Promotion of confidence building measures, cooperation among customs and border security official on a regional basis, encouraging negotiations in the sub-regional level, participation of states with UN by presenting reports on the progress of the implementation of PoA.

UN PoA has initially set parameters of good practice guidelines for states. While going through the whole document we find repetition of word 'voluntary' in many stanzas, indicating the very soft nature of the treaty whereby states party are supposedly encouraged with no commitments whose breach would invite sanctions or embargoes as we have witnessed in various regimes related to the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secondly, scholars have identified that there are errors as arms supply to non-state actors were excluded from the preview of the document, as the UN PoA systematically falls short of banning such supplies to nefarious networks responsible for majority of armed violence. Omission of ammunition in its scope became another area of serious lacunae on the part of experts (Efrat 2010: 99). Thirdly, non- cooperation from arms producing countries like USA from making it into a legally binding agreement presents its inherent weaknesses and absence of cooperative norms. Moreover, in many instances universalisation of common standards for arms transfers were repeatedly

blocked by calling it as not being part of the original mandate of UN PoA. Fourthly, UN PoA has unspecified on the criteria for assessing the export authorizations of arms with reference to the domestic regulations (*SIPRI Research Note 15* 2012: 3). Fifth, the 2006 Review Conference could not bring any fruitful outcome due to disagreements. As countries like USA, Pakistan, Russia, China have argued that rather adding new commitments implementation of old ones to be given priority. Such a view were disputed by armed violence affected countries in Africa, Latin America as they urged for expanding the vistas of the mandate by including aspects of global control over civilian possession of SALW (Anders 2007: 17). Scholars have stressed to address the sources of demand side for SALW as supply centric approach adopted by UN PoA involving legal trade control would reduce arms proliferation has been challenged because interplay of motivations and multitude of actors to be brought to the fold (Poddar 2007: 686).

Arms Trade Treaty

Ethics forms an important part of any trade whether SALW or any other goods. According to a report by (Amnesty International and IANSA 2011: 15-8) a state party to the treaty should not provide licenses or authorization for arms exports to those countries found to have excessive human rights violations through its security forces, guilty of forced displacement, torture and killings in state led violence. The same report in its case studies highlighted substantial risk to human rights perpetrated by Bangladesh's law enforcement agencies like police, RAB, and other organisations (2011: 17-8). In this context of dire consequences developed through extrajudicial killings, the country had received arms equipments without any impediments from China, USA, European countries etc. Within the Asia continent Cambodia, Pakistan, and Myanmar are perceived to be the diversion point of Chinese SALW to neighbouring countries in South Asian region, in many instances Indian authorities have argued that such arms from China's Yunnan province made their way to country's Maoists in the Red corridor states via Myanmar and Bangladesh (SIPRI 2013: 51).

One of the basic objectives behind bringing ATT was to develop certain universal standards for the exports, imports, acquisition, and transfers of weapons which would ultimately seek to control small arms proliferation, along with these national regulatory mechanisms to be created so as to enhance government's capacity to prevent the chances of arms being diverted or transferred to anti-social elements. United Nations undertook deliberations since 2006 to 2013 bringing together exporting, importing and transit states in the all encompassing geographical settings under the one fold known as Arms Trade Treaty.

According to a report of SIPRI which has revealed the crux of ATT in a holistic manner as follows:

> Under the ATT, states are obliged to block arms exports if they contravene their international obligations or would be used in the commission of genocide or other war crimes. States parties are also obliged to assess, among other things, the risk that arms exports would undermine peace and security or could be used to violate international humanitarian law or international human rights law. States parties will also submit initial reports on their implementation of the treaty, detailing their transfer control systems, and annual reports on their arms exports and imports, detailing the nature of their arms transfers. In order for the ATT to fulfill its potential of bringing greater responsibility and transparency to the international arms trade, states parties and other ATT stakeholders will need to give thought to the mechanisms needed to enable effective treaty implementation and to facilitate universalization (*SIPRI Insight on Peace and Security* 2014: 1-2).

By cultivating ATT world is not going to be totally disarmed, yet almost legally binding agreement is supposed to set the stage for a more structured procedures. Nevertheless, like its predecessors Article Twenty-Four of the treaty envisages the 'Duration and Withdrawal', whereas state party possesses the right to withdraw which questions the binding principles as expounded by experts. Unlike the Firearms Protocol, ATT has no mention about criminalisation requirements which brings a gap between the two (Drummond and Cassimatis 2015).

Handful of countries involved in the export of arms, those importing cut across regions. Other than legal trades, black markets of weapons remain untraced whose presence is felt from local to the far extent in the regional level but spread across the globe in small

pockets of countries contributing to ant trade. Individual responsibility of the countries should be undertaken in harmony with regional and global norms. The significant role of NGO's in creating public awareness designed to implement measures concerning SALW like Amnesty International, Saferworld, Biting the Bullet etc whose contribution has indeed exerted pressures on the international community to dwell new arenas of control.

III
REGIONAL LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION

Growing awareness and initiatives to combat SALW proliferation at the regional level have acquired coinage over the years as trafficking is more or less rampant within a particular region. In the preceding chapters we have seen the weapons flows inherently reflect the characteristic features with transnational and cross border linkages. However, the risks emanating from the menace of uncontrolled diffusion of arms cannot be checked merely at the domestic level by enacting legislations and security sector reforms, indeed a robust regional cooperation or a more comprehensive approach becomes a major component to curtail the spread. Before proceeding to the core of regional cooperation, essentially there is a need to dwell through the genesis of region as a level of analyses. Realm of security studies in recent years have largely been shaped by two events having global significance, the disintegration of Soviet Union which ended bipolar competition, secondly the 9/11 terrorist attacks which has translated terrorism from a transnational issue to a global phenomenon.

What comprises a region? It can be defined in number of ways, as such geographically proximate states, or actors; display sub-systemic features through regularity and intensity of interaction among them; existence of shared history, cultural, linguistic and ethnic bonds or congruence in political practices (Thompson 1973: 101). Even conflicts also present certain linkages within a regional context. Regional interaction and interdependence have received substantial attention with the end of polarity based global politics, as emerging threats are more often regionally situated, but has international ramifications. Regional security complex theory developed by (Buzan & Waever 2003)

provides the idea that threats are more likely to travel in shorter distances than the longer one, more precisely within a region. Their importance has grown as a result of the end to twin bloc politics governing at the global level. Here it become more coherent to grasp the two extremes of global and domestic, whereas amity and causes of discord is best exemplified in the region as a unit of analysis.

Within a globalised interconnected world, it becomes difficult to visualize particular security dynamic of any given state by placing it merely at the domestic level, for which understanding deserves security to be located in a broader regional context and investigation of the patterns of conflict and cooperation of the state with other actors in the region (Tavares 2008: 107). However, this marks the relevance of intrinsic connectivity between states which cannot be discrete in generating knowledge about security trends. Regional analysis becomes the mid-point between global and domestic.

Regional institution formation in various regions of the world has provided fascinating arenas of cooperation, integration, and interdependence. Not in divergence to the topic I wish to directly unmask the function of such institutional setting within a region and the relevance in terms of security related matters where the pessimism of realists and optimism of liberals are sufficiently reflected. If membership to a regional organisation is voluntary, explicitly there is a common norm among the member states to build a peaceful and secure region albeit enabled through cooperation. However from a narrow perspective, mechanisms to contain conflict and its repercussions are developed by the active coordination of defence, security, and foreign policy at some level. Transformative nature of threats from traditional to non-military based has conditioned the regional approach also in dealing them.

Broadly speaking Bangladesh forms the part of South Asia and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the sole regional institution. South Asia has captured the world attention for being called as the most dangerous region in the world, not only because of a possibility of nuclear holocaust between warring Pakistan and India instead many transnational security threats have flowed from one country to the other in

passive or active manner such as terrorism, drugs, human and arms trade in an illicit manner, where the role of sovereign states are brought in question by the respective intelligence agencies of affected countries. It has come to be recognized as a region with least regionalism, having its roots in the legacy of partition history of the Indian subcontinent by the departure of colonial rule.

Within SAARC there is a lack of awareness among the states of the institution to incorporate arms trafficking as a principle threat to the region which as the prospect of deterioration of trust and security. Quintessentially SALW concerns could never form a prominent place in the interactions between states of the organisation as per (*Biting the Bullet* 2006). Nevertheless, there are few instruments in SAARC which has made a remarkable consideration of other transnational crimes which in itself is linked to arms proliferation showing sufficient evidence of engagements in the region despite several loopholes at the level of implementation and vigorous security governance. Unquestionably SAARC is a platform for the states to continue their dialogue on issues which need more than bilateral engagements, creating a sense of unified and well coordinated approach.

The broad consensus was generated member states about terrorism's effects of regional instability since the early years of its formation. Culminated in the form of the adoption of SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism of 1987, came into force on 22 August 1988 after the ratification by all member states. The Article I clause (e) of the convention has mentioned offences 'relating to firearms, weapons, explosive and other dangerous substances' as constituting the act of terrorism, whereby for the law concerning extradition such offence would not be termed as a political offence. We can assume that here 'firearms' is a generic term used for a wide range arms which are circulated through both grey and black channels prominently in the region. This convention was in reaction to the ongoing activities of LTTE in Sri Lanka. Skepticism over the successes of convention arises to the effect of who constitutes as terrorists. This is in acquiescence with the prevailing behavior of states harboring each others insurgent organisations, providing aid and arms etc. The most prominent available example is of

India's support to Shanti Bahini in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, in turn Bangladesh's territory has been used as safe-havens by North-East India's insurgents. The national governments in South Asia have recognized internal insurgent movements as constituting acts of terrorism.

Ray of hope amid security dilemma was the formation of SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk in 1995 in Sri Lanka's capital Colombo with its stated purpose to 'collate, analyse, and disseminate information on terrorist offences, tactics, strategies, and methods'. Given the nature of relations maintained by states in the region, STOMD has received blowbacks with the non-regular flow of information exchange, absence of regular interaction between focal points are among the constraints faced by the desk in its smooth functioning (Saez 2011).

An Additional Protocol to SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was drafted in consultation with legal experts as a reaction to the unified voice against terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks among the international community, signed in 2002, and after ratification by all member states came into force in 2006. This protocol was meant to be in tune with the changing dynamics of terrorism and its interrelated aspects such as curbing the funding channels, sharing of information, freezing of assets found to be of nefarious nature. Article IX dealing with the co-operation on immigration and customs control has underlined in its clause (1) about the need for enhanced exchange of information between parties to the protocol to undertake 'measures to detect and prevent the international movement of terrorists and trafficking in arms'.

SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was signed in 2008; principle idea was to boost sharing of intelligence, providing relevant documents, records related to crime to the requested state party. This was considered to allow for active investigation of cases whereby information is required to be extracted from other states within the region. The creation of a central authority in each country was vision of this convention for assistance. One of the major setbacks is keeping extradition out of its purview whereas it is deemed necessary in a region where transnational criminal networks

work in collusion with one another. Police cooperation[10] was envisioned through regular interactions between police chiefs which culminated in the idea of creation of SAARCPOL in the tradition of Interpol in the region. Noteworthy moves has not been initiated so far which reflects the nature of cooperation in the region based on mutual suspicion and zero sum game attitude of members.

For South Asian countries time has become ripe to navigate new policies for removing obstruction in the diplomatic channels and domestic level to bring out a common norm, over the issue of small arms. Antagonisms maintenance has nothing to do more than aggravating the situation. Already being named as the most insecure region, achieving 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' would become an elusive utopia with the grave chances of posing human security corrosion. For this purpose, it would be highly beneficial to learn lessons from ASEAN, Nairobi protocol etc which have in crux achieved great level of understanding about threats posed by the circulation of SALW in wrong hands. Scholars have argued either to make amendments to the SAARC Charter with flexibility and maturity so that wider security issues can be negotiated (Jabeen & Chowdhry 2013: 401).

On the other hand researchers like (Pattanaik & Nayak 2013) have confined the regional security architecture creation to that of non-traditional security threats whereas hardcore issues were envisaged to be made part of future discussions. For South Asia non–interference and protecting sovereignty has been cardinal values when it comes as a stumble blocks to robust regionalism. Various instruments have been enacted in compliance with the international community's substantial movements in creating awareness. Implementation is an arena where the security governance meets the juxtaposing views and policies within the region.

---

[10] From 1996 to 2011 nine SAARC Conferences on Cooperation in Police Matters were held.

Drawbacks of regional efforts

1. South Asia is rampant with armed conflict, violence, and arms trafficking. There is a lack of regional trust deficit, one of the vital components for addressing the issue of SALW. There are scant instances where SALW issues have found mention in various security related dialogs between governments and in their common platform known as SAARC. This can be simply credited to the mutual suspicion, mistrust or more likely the diplomatic statecraft of nation-states and dilemma over discussion on security matters involving SALW (Nepram 2009; Greene & Marsh 2012).

2. When it comes to intelligence sharing, there is common trend among South Asian countries to start the blame game against each others' intelligence agencies like India accusing ISI and DGFI of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In a similar vein, both countries have made responsible RAW of India for many occurrences of internal instability. Undeniably, in a certain time period these intelligence agencies have involved in abetting and financing non-state actors and criminal entities either for strategic balance or diplomatic manoeuvre.

3. In comparison to that of ASEAN, SAARC could not form a common South Asian identity. The concepts and norms of sovereignty, nationalism, and non-interference are deeply entrenched in the policy formulation of individual states and the pre-eminence of the 'national security paradigm' where multilateral solutions to security threats have not received any reception. Moreover, the preservation of hard won sovereignty after prolonged colonial rule and relative sense of democratic values have further left the region to have weak regionalism (Acharya 2002). Given the dynamic complexities of arms trafficking, without synchronisation between countries of the region it would be a difficult task to trace the footprints of the clandestine business. South Asia has to pool its synergies in a deliberate approach so that the suffering of its population can be mitigated, so that individual governments would be capable of translating their present resources for sustainable development.

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. (BIMSTEC)

Bangladesh is a member of the sub-regional grouping called BIMSTEC which has initially recognized for greater collaboration in economic arena by boosting trade and investment in view to tap the potential of rich resources among the member states. Countries that have joined BIMSTEC belong to South Asia and South-East Asia[11]. Pro-activeness expressed by concerned countries has emerged out of the prevailing notions of greater multilateral cooperation necessary in a globalised world. Peculiar feature is that all these states have familiarity in one sense of facing challenges posed by terrorism and transnational organised criminal networks. BIMSTEC members agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWC) in 2004 having mainly four sub-groups with each country being made responsible for particular subject (Intelligence Sharing, Curbing finances for terrorism, illicit trafficking of drugs, issues pertaining to law enforcement agencies). The stated initiatives made advisory for countries in the first meeting of the BIMSTEC JWG on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) to deny safe havens, sever the links between organised crime and terrorism, cooperation encompassing policy and operational levels.

Major breakthrough was expected with the signing of BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Trafficking in 2009, whereby member states vowed to prevent, investigate, suppress, and cooperate in the goal of eradicating terror networks. Article III dealing with 'Cooperation in Combating Terrorism' clause (d) provides that member states to check and contain illicit trafficking and trade of arms. Clause (e) has made provision to make facilities to cooperate in curbing the access of terrorists to arms. Biggest breakdown with this convention is that, only India and Bangladesh has ratified it, non ratification by other

---

[11] Member states are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar. The regional grouping has its origin in BIST-EC primarily formed by Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Membership was increased simultaneously. In 2004 BIST-EC was changed to BIMSTEC in its first summit having headquarters in Dhaka, Bangladesh. It has prioritized various sectors of cooperation namely Trade and Investment, Energy, Technology, Agriculture, Tourism, Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime, Climate Change etc.

members has prevented the treaty to come into force. It is worth to be mentioned that BIMSTEC member states are worst hit by the menace of illicit trafficking of SALW. As we are aware of small arms black markets in Thailand being utilised by insurgents of Myanmar and North-East India, Bangladesh being a conduit and destination, these arms then reach unto Nepal where there is a legacy of Maoist insurgency. BIMSTEC creation in itself has questioned the geographical realism of regionalism and paving way for recognition of accepting global needs and reality. Since lack of resources and proper coordination has stalled such initiatives in essence.

Mutual acknowledgement of insecurities and action oriented execution of conventions and protocols aimed at regional combat of transnational crimes are deemed necessary. Mere signing or ratification works only within the frame work of normative level. What can be done? Crafting national legislations in harmony with regional aspects, regular interactions between state and non-state actors (NGO's) of countries within the region, exchange of information, regime leaderships eschewing power balancing acts etc can contribute for regional security governance. Non-traditional threats may origin in one country spill over to other and impacts with greater propensity.

III
DOMESTIC LEVEL INITIATIVES

Westphalian modern state system has destined independence in the foreign policy formulation and defence related decisions resting with the internal affairs of the state, which restricts external intervention as a threat to sovereignty. In this manner, state becomes the primary unit to deal with the causes and consequences and prevention of organised crimes of transnational origin. Justification lies in the power and authority of the state, because it is responsible for the enacting of legislations, regulating the flow of goods whether licit or illicit. On the other hand, vulnerable chaotic situation in a state is the outcome of weak governance, corrupt officials, low levels of civil society involvement, and legitimacy issues due to autocratic or authoritarian rule where power comes with coerce rather participatory (Williams 2013).

As I have discussed in Chapter I about the contemporary debate between state security versus human security, in which many scholars have emphasized that role of State cannot be strictly ignored, instead more humane approach within its domain was proposed. In this way, state becomes pivot around which numerous machineries work in a centrifugal way where the core is responsible. It would be an utopia to vision for complete disarmament; nevertheless policies can guide to reduce the usage which would be explained in detail in following paragraphs.

Dwelling through global and regional loopholes and discrepancies in the measures to combat portable arms raises questions over the management of arms in the domestic scale. Significant arms seizures in Bangladesh has thrown open the debate of how its soil has become fertile ground for traffickers and anti-national elements to exploit weak security governance at the internal level. Prevalent social and political violence targeting civilians in significant numbers have brought the common jargon for various weapons of different calibers called 'small arms' as a peril for state survival and welfare of its citizens to live without any anxiety or fear.

Legislation, Domestic Measures, and Law enforcement agencies

Arms Act of 1878

Possession of arms by states falls within its sovereignty, nature of its governance vary according to its legislations and regulations which determines the civilian and military use and related penalties if found to be in violation determined by the supreme law of the land. Weaker laws often enable criminal entities to flourish. On the other hand increase insecurities of its citizens and impedes democratic values by instilling fear or probably criminalization of politics where might (having armed groups) is right acquires power.

Among the commendable efforts by Sheikh Hasina government in 2009 to combat terrorism, extremism, and criminal elements in the country was the formation of Counter-Terrorism Bureau within the ambit of Police organisation. One cannot deny the activities

of Rapid Action Battalion who have neutralised many terrorist activities, seized weapons, and ammunitions. In this direction large number of arrests were conducted throughout the country, despite this question arises how effectively those under custody would be penalized for their crime. My puzzle is pointing towards the condition of the Arms Act of 1878 which has not been amended by successive governments of the country after independence.

This act was enacted during British colonial administration with a punitive approach not withstanding sociological aspects, which does not comply with the threats of the current scenario. Cursory look at the Act brings to the fore various inadequacies which were literally ignored by ruling regimes in Dhaka. To begin with, Chapter I interpretation clause (4) of the act arms are defined as comprising 'fire-arms, bayonets, swords, daggers, spears, spearheads, bows and arrows; cannon includes howitzers, mortars, wall pieces, mitrailleuses etc; ammunition rockets, gun cotton, gunflint, gun-wads, fuses etc. The most visible criticism is the non- updating and non-inclusion of the categories of weapons of different calibers developed and modified through technological innovations in the last 136 years.

Secondly with respect to 'licensing' there is no consistency regarding the rules. It clearly stipulates that government through its official gazette may make rules from time to time to decide upon the terms, conditions, officer responsible for granting licenses (Alam 2014: 147-8). Citizens, who have not acquired licenses, are debarred from import, export, manufacture, movement of arms. In a country which has a legacy of corruption, obtaining licenses is not difficult. After thorough analyses of the act, there is no mention or provisions made to control brokering. Unlike its regional counterparts, Bangladesh has not made legislation on 'transit' of arms from its territory. In a nutshell, the act could not breakaway from the shackles of the colonial framework of the legislation.

Bangladesh Police Comparative Crime statistics, 2002-14 depicts the levels of criminality, whereas figures indicate that in the years from 2002-04 saw highest numbers of arrests under Arms Act as in these years' three major arms hauls have taken place, and

then in 2014 significant criminals were caught. Many criminals have succeeded to remain out of the clutches of law enforcement agencies thus breaking rule of law for their political-economic-social benefits, so such datas are misleading at times in making an assessment of the gravity arms related violence and crimes (Appendix I).

Domestic Measures for De-Weaponisation

There is no official estimate on the circulation of small arms and light weapons possessed by civilians and criminal gangs. In its drive to de-weaponisation and elimination of criminal networks, two operations namely *Operation Clean Heart* and *Operation Spider Web* were conducted by the Government of Bangladesh in 2002 and 2003. The main aim of *Operation Clean Heart* was to arrest listed criminals, to seize illegal weapons and above all to restore law and order in the country. Armed forces engaged in this operation were criticized for human rights violations, as it also questioned then government's intention for the involvement of Army (non-civilian institution) in a democratic country. It was contended that such a drive was an attempt to eradicate political opponents (Pathania 2003). This operation was called off in 2003 with limited success, though 6892 including 1651 terrorist were arrested from nation wide raids and approximately 2,028 weapons and 29,754 rounds of ammunition were recovered (Malik and Joseph 2005:82-3). Government's directions for the civilian deposit of licensed arms were met with enthusiasm among citizens. *Operation Spider web* was launched by Bangladesh government in July 2003 largely in the districts like Kushtia, Satkira, Meherpur, Jessore, Khulna etc. The stated aim was to primarily target the proliferation and activities of outlawed Left-Wing Extremists like Biplobi Communist Party (Haq group), Purbo Bangla Communist Party, and New Biplobi Communist Party. By August 14 same year operation came to an end, met with the same fate as of previous one and as a tip of the iceberg few petty criminals were arrested. What has systematically derailed was the poor intelligence sharing, corruption in the police organisation provided inputs for criminals to escape and extra-judicial killings tainted the image of armed personnel involved (Kumar 2003).

Law Enforcement Agencies

In a country governed by democratically elected representatives, police forms an important institution whose primary duty is to maintain law and order by not breaching the limits of civilian administration. Insightful studies by two research conducted by (International Crisis Group 2009: 14-6) and (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives 2008:16-32) have thrown light on the condition of Police in Bangladesh. According to their study, Police has acquired the status of being among the most politicized and corrupt institution where the interferences of political and bureaucratic actors for their vested interest have significantly impacted the efficiency and morale. These impediments have led to misgovernance in the security sector and government's response rather than rectifying incompetence, created an elite organisation Rapid Action Battalion in 2004 which has many successes till date in containing criminal and terrorist activities. Despite these achievements from a human security approach, RAB during its operations have abused power, illegal detention, torture and extra judicial killings could thrive as a civil friendly institution.

Another law enforcement agency dealing with border security i.e. Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) now BGB met with a crisis by mutiny in 2009. Thirty-six hour long revolt in the capital left the security of the country at stake; earlier apprehensions were that for better wages, and working conditions such a drastic step would have taken. Operation Rebel Hunt was launched by the security forces to contain mutineers, large number of weapons, ammunitions was stolen which apparently open the possibility of linkages to terrorists and criminal networks. Nevertheless, such an incident definitely on a temporary basis collapsed border security of the country. We need to bear in mind that any security breach across the borders provides safe passage for traffickers and criminals (Munir 2009: 1-2). For a country ravaged by the rise of extremism and resource constraints of the law enforcement agencies shows the vulnerabilities in tackling proliferation of SALW.

Chittagong arms trial

The trial of 10 truck loads of ammunition and arms of SALW category discovery in 2004 from Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Factory (CUFF) has taken excessive time lag of passing through three political regimes in Bangladesh for bringing perpetrators to limelight. I have derived the information on the trial basically from leading newspapers of Bangladesh that have extensively covered pros and cons of the case. Security expert opinions have underscored major elements of the trial. First, the huge cache is estimated to resemble the size of armaments kept by many brigades of the security forces. Secondly, it has revealed the collaboration of intelligence agencies with that of politicians in the consignment importation through illicit means. Thirdly, for the first time in the history of judiciary of Bangladesh such a case received attention whose verdict can have bilateral, security, strategic and political undertones. Fourth, the mishandling of the investigation under political pressures has severed the international image of Bangladesh along with the revelations of the clandestine nature of the trafficking taking place within its soil. Fifth, Chittagong arms haul has unfolded Chittagong as increasingly becoming arms drop zone for the region's insurgents and militants. Finally the reactions by different political parties after verdict has reflected the nature of politics where party in power was blamed for conspiring the opposition which led them to be found guilty.

Under Arms Act and Special Powers Act, two cases (arms and smuggling) were filed in the Karnaphuli police station whose trial began in 2005. In the initial investigations which had many loopholes as such that no leads were revealed about the source, presumed destination and big names from intelligence and political circles of then BNP led regime under Khaleda Zia, only small scale labourers, truck and trawler operators were made part of those among guilty (*The Pioneer* 2014). The military-backed Caretaker Government of 2007 took interest in opening those facets which were veiled during the BNP led alliance was in power. In line with this dynamism Judge of the Chittagong Metropolitan Tribunal ordered for re-investigation after receiving petition from the prosecution. Victory of Sheikh Hasina's Awami League to power in 2009 was promising enough, heralded with its cooperation in the free and fair investigations. The

international linkages to the haul was confirmed with the arrest of arms dealer Hafizur Rehman who later became the prime witness confessed in the court about the involvement of ULFA leader Paresh Barua, who for providing trucks, trawlers paid him 5 million Bangladesh Taka (Bhaumik 2009).

In 2011, the fifth investigation officer of the case Muniruzzaman Chowdhary of (Crime Investigation Department) submitted two supplementary charge-sheets in which 11 new were found accused. The verdict of the Chittagong arms trial was delivered on 30 January 2014 in which following were given death sentence and life by Judge S M Mojibur Rahman- former BNP state minister of Home Lutfozzaman Babar, Paresh Barua of ULFA (absconding since arms were recovered), Jamaat-e-Islami leader Matiur Rahman Nizami, former industry secretary Nurul Amin, Brigadier General Abdur Rahim (former NSI DG), Wing Commander Shahabuddib (NSI Director), Major General Rezakul Haider Choudhary (former NSI DG) etc (*Asian Tribune* 2014).

The trial investigations of Chittagong arms haul has unfolded Chittagong as increasingly becoming arms drop zone for the region's insurgents and militants, in this scenario zero tolerance attitude of Awami League has exemplified its non-cooperation to insurgents and terrorists operating in Bangladesh soil against its neighbours. Despite such an impartial verdict and activities of Rapid Action Battalion, did not deter arms traffickers in their business as evidenced in 2014 similar arms haul in the Satchari forests. There is a need for speedy trial with no political pressures which can solely impact on the nefarious arms enterprises thriving in the country.

Cooperation and Disagreements with Bordering States

Relevance of sustained border management is vital in containing SALW trafficking and imparting them in bilateral narrative needs to be achieved in a coherent manner. As I have mentioned anywhere in this work that border signifies apparent marker of sovereignty of a state, whose violation becomes a matter of encroachment or intrusion involving crisis in diplomatic ties. Lately international community in the Biennial

meetings of UN PoA has discussed over border management as an important component in their mission of mitigating proliferation of durable arms of portable nature. Efficient border management has two tasks in its casket i.e. monitoring and control. On the other hand factors hampering the task are corruption among agencies concerned for border management, lack of cooperation and coordination between local communities and officials, absence of proper technical expertise and training in monitoring movement of contraband. Cordial relations between political, administrative authorities and local populace contribute for effective management (Seniora & Cedric 2010).

Bangladesh has certainly no specific traditional military form of threats in strict realist terms arising out of expansionist or imperialist tendencies from its immediate neighbours despite the geo-political realities. Border management has indeed been the roots of friction, which from time to time has impacted in moulding the policy formulations. As arms' trafficking is rampant in the international borders, which has lax controls combined with amid corruption among the border guarding forces requires an immediate action plan to be drawn to mitigate the menace to become exaggerated in such a manner that insecurity affects humanitarian norms.

Bangladesh and India relations since 1971 shows that socio-political-economic-religious-security/strategic determinants have shaped the course of engagement. As far as my theme is concerned with SALW proliferation and trafficking I wish to address the security part in the ties. Before turning to the core, it is necessary to bring to the point that land boundary demarcation and sharing river waters became the cardinal agenda of dialogue in which former is a case in point for my research. Bangladesh's reliance on New Delhi is characterised by 'tyranny of geography' being locked on its three sides with states of India to the North, East and West directions and a passage opening to Bay of Bengal to its South (Choudhury 2000). The turbulent nature of politics and insurgency in the North-East States of India has made both Dhaka and New Delhi to develop mutually beneficial relationship so as to prevent the nefarious business across boundaries. It should be kept in mind that domestic environment reflects the setting the foreign policy priorities. Controversies and issues pertaining to border security have sufficiently

dominated the discourse of diplomatic relationship between both. This is significant because arms' trafficking is rampant in the Indo-Bangladesh bordering areas on its three sides. The following points are an attempt to understand the multidimensional facets accountable to the puzzle of trafficking.

1. India and Bangladesh shares approximately 4096.7 kilometer long boundary, which are highly porous due to the changing course of rivers forming char lands which has often translated into conflicts among locals for possession. Malaria prone hilly and mountainous terrain along with heavy rains lashing during monsoon season makes the surveillance of borders as a tricky business and a paradise for traffickers. Border area with lack of good roads strains patrolling by officials. Densely populated flat and fertile lands has similar ethnic composition along both borders as in any case demarcation of political boundaries is the legacy left behind by colonialism. Such human habitation makes law enforcement agencies difficult to identify nationalities and their intention of being economical or crime motivated migration or crossing of borders (Das 2008: 369).

2. Contentious issues like non-exchange of 111 enclaves of India in Bangladesh and 51 of Bangladesh's in India has invited much troubles pertaining to governance, often residents becomes victims of crossfire and confused citizenship. Government of India in 1987 devised fencing as an instrument to tackle trafficking and smuggling. This has been considered as unfriendly and violation of Land Boundary agreement of 1974 as maintained by Bangladesh government. Fencing progress received setbacks due to complicated process of land acquisition, dilemmas over jurisdiction, and inadequate man force for guarding the borders coupled with logistic challenges due to complex terrain as mentioned in point one (Upadhyay 2009).

3. From the Indian point of view, illegal immigration of Bangladeshis and their deportation becomes usually difficult when Bangladesh officials refuse to accept. Another dimension to inter state tension along border erupted in 2001 skirmishes in which 16 BSF jawans were killed and bodies mutilated by BDR which strained

relations. Similar incidents of crossfire have happened in which civilians were found victims. Proposals were made for joint patrolling to combat trans-border crimes, in reality BSF has presence more than BDR (now BGB) which burdens the former to be solely responsible (Pattanaik 2011: 746-51).

4. In both countries media houses and politicians have tried to portray through political lens of action by each other states to secure legitimacy and popularity. It has been anticipated that certain political parties in India like Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have at many times relate immigrants crossing borders as having terrorist links, such a confrontational posture has the capacity to make relations weak (Riaz 2011). He has further added that India's search for a scapegoat after any terrorist attacks and labeling Bangladesh migrants as responsible would escalate anti-India feelings or possibly instill fear among local communities (2011). On the flip side, domestic politics of Bangladesh is based on Pro-India Awami League and Anti-India BNP. During various rallies BNP and its alliance have openly spitted venom against India over its hegemonic designs in the region, where in one instance party leader Khalida Zia called insurgents in the North-East as 'freedom fighters'. In the last arms haul of 2014 near Habiganj has revealed the fact that even after dismantling of many insurgent camps by Hasina government since 2009 could not check the flow of arms as many bunkers were found belonging to ATTF of Tripura.

Resolution of Tinbheega Corridor by access and free movement of people of two enclaves of Bangladesh by India in 2011 indeed opened the gates of robust relations underway, the legacy of low levels of coordination among BSF and BGB brings question over the India-Bangladesh Joint Border Guidelines of 1975 which has strictly stipulated norms for enhanced cooperation in tackling transnational crimes like smuggling.

Bangladesh sharing a small but significant border with Myanmar has been the roots of discord. The country has no traditional threat of any territorial expansionist tendencies, there is a persistent border issues which need to be addressed. For Bangladesh robust relations with Myanmar is necessary for the access to South-East Asia and ASEAN. As

arms trafficking is rampant in the international borders, which has lax controls combined with amid corruption among the border guarding forces. I would directly address the bilateral issues to avoid repetition by presenting historical overview of Rohingya issue in this section, though in my Chapter III has broadly addressed the genesis of the pushing of Arakan Muslims to Bangladesh[12].

There is a scarcity of systematic study and literature on the Rohingya predicament as an important component in the non- traditional security related element of bilateral talks. Small arms proliferation is not an independent variable but rather a depended one in the context of forced migration of Rohingyas to Bangladesh. Intrusion of Rohingyas to Bangladesh is a classic case of country's inability to protect its borders from such influx based in its unequal resource distribution. During the Ziaur Rehman regime, Bangladesh could secure international mobility to pressure Myanmar for repatriation of refugees to their native country after the mass exodus in 1978. After the restoration of democracy in 1990 and intensification of religious extremism in the country during BNP regime from 2001-6 has created various pressure groups maintaining soft corner showing solidarity for Muslim Rohingyas is somehow mounting weight in garnering cooperation for solution to the crisis.

Bangladesh was caught in the dilemma of providing refugee to the stateless people because it has certainly created fissures in its relation to Myanmar. And we know that often camps are translated into sleeper cells for various criminals and armed groups to plan strategy for ambush in the future. (Selth 2004: 120) has warned the readers that phobia against Muslims professed by the Burmese regime should not be interpreted as Bangladesh being solely responsible due to rise of radicals and Islamic extremists. Such threat perceptions might be developed to use the narrative to rejuvenate discrimination against religious minorities in the wake of global action called 'war on terror'. Though

---

[12] Conundrum of Rohingyas' humanitarian crisis is that Myanmar considers the religious minority as of Bangladesh origin due to religion and linguistic similarities; on the other hand Bangladesh has denied such a stand. In any case perils posed by refugees are developing from a mere stateless problem to the exploitation of their socio-economic and political conditions by Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist groups to use them as gun and fodder. If not addressed in a holistic manner, it would take less time span to explode into armed violence or conflict which certainly results into regional crisis through spill over as we have seen in Afghanistan or bordering regions of Pakistan.

Rohingyas even has formed various armed organisation could not develop them to the level of leaving a mark through a proper armed community against the oppression of military regimes based in Rangoon, instead they are responsible for armed crime and as facilitators for financial oriented terrorists which is very much disturbing for the internal security of a vastly populated country with a weak law enforcement.

The methodology pursued by the military junta of Myanmar is in itself a riddle, under the international pressure those repatriated were subjected to insecurity, and mortification, this posture has undeniably made many Rohingyas to show reluctance for their return thus burdening Bangladesh to maintain camps to accommodate them. Appreciable assistance by international aid donors and UNHCR is only one side of the coin, on the flip side poor staffing and weak training processes have created hurdles in the providing basic necessities. The construction of fence by Myanmar in its territory would result likely case as happened with that of India. His idea basically points to the possibility that Myanmar would turn blind eye to trafficking contraband to Bangladesh however thwart the same in reverse (Ahmed 2010). Secondly, there are approximately 28,000-30,000 documented and undocumented vary between 2,50,000-3,00,000 of Rohingya refugees, once fencing work gets completed Myanmar would disown them and argue that they are residents of the other part of the border.

A major breakthrough was witnessed in the fourth secretary level talks concluded between both countries in 2012; such positive trends were expressed by Myanmar Foreign minister showing his willingness to accept 9,000 out of 28,000 living in Cox's Bazaar. Such a forward move was seen in 2005 also, but ended with disillusionment by the take away of 90 refugees only (Parnini 2013: 294-95). In 2012, Bangladesh border law enforcement agencies played a pro-active role by preventing the intrusion of Rohingyas after riots perpetrated by Buddhist clergy forcing them to flee. Bangladesh argued for its non acceptance of refugees as she is not party to the UN refugee convention of its protocol of 1967. Human Rights Watch (2012) response for the denial was that Bangladesh is party to Convention against torture, the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights etc which makes her obliged to provide assistance to refugees and asylum seekers suffering state led torture and persecution.

The National Taskforce on Implementation of the National Strategy Paper on Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals received approval from the Cabinet on 09 September 2013 and progress for the accomplishment is in process. Circumstances which has inspired for the Taskforce is a response to the recognition of Myanmar nationals taken refuge in Bangladesh (here we don't find use of Rohingya word) are found to be acting against the national interest by their engagements in smuggling, trafficking and other transnational crimes. Such an influx of refugees has disturbed the social, economic, cultural matrix. The key elements of the Strategy Paper is to increase Bangladesh-Myanmar Border Management by barbed wire fencing of land borders, 50 km long dam over Naf river to make patrolling easy, commencing the survey of undocumented Myanmar nationals, and resumption of 'security dialogue' with government of Myanmar for the repatriation.

Rohingya crisis is not just to be filtered only through the lens of refugee problem, instead their involvement in crimes and extending support to Islamic terrorists itself blots international image of Bangladesh. Without regime support and acceptance to recognize Rohingyas as inherent natives of Myanmar, peace in the region can not prevail and starkly affect Bangladesh's desires to reach out to South East Asia for economic and trade expansion.

IV
RESPONSE

Bangladesh has submitted three national reports to UN PoA in the years 2002, 2003, and 2008 to showcase the progress made by the country. First report details two major proposals that is adoption of 'destruction' as a measure to dispose illegal SALW seized by law enforcement agencies. And to observe 9th July as small arms destruction day. These initiatives are voluntary in nature whereas action oriented approach is less visible given the condition of arms proliferation in the country. Second report has confirmed its

commitment for the cause and two schemes were mentioned. Among them after receiving expert opinion even illegal weapons taken in custody would be made re-usable for the security related government agencies and informed that source of SALW in the country is solely acquired from the internationally based arms exporters of legal nature and government has taken ample of measures to prevent proliferation by verification mechanism. UN permanent mission of Bangladesh chalked out policy decision which have close resemblance to the other two reports earlier produced, newly added were the assurances like strict monitoring of border areas by BDR, vigil on wielding units working in night hours and over the courier and transport services. Only time will ensure how effective these measures have been in reducing SALW risks.

The immediate measures to be undertaken by the Government of Bangladesh is to bring amendments to its existing Arms act in conformity with that of international standards, authorities concerned with the conduct of elections should introduce model code of conduct or rules for the politicians who keep armed gangs to prevent political rivalry related arms violence, public awareness among common citizens should be generated through active collaboration between NGOs and governmental agencies. There is an urgent need for the government to prevent incidents like BDR mutiny in future, so that public belief on law enforcement agencies would prevail as cooperation between two is essential. Finally, on the diplomatic front Bangladesh need to engage with its two immediate neighbours (India and Myanmar) through various mechanisms as arms trafficking is a transnational crime.

V
SUMMARY

The indispensability of multiple levels of security governance of SALW has pressed over the need for greater efforts from state and non-state actors in strengthening the existing standards. Each level has displayed gaps in cooperation and disagreements are driven in strict realist terms of dilemma posed by states. From a more economic perspective, the exporters and importers of arms need to reach on a consensus to protect weapons to be diffused to violent non-state actors. It would be an idealism to dream about complete

disarmament though measures can be initiated in such a manner that various stakeholders and their concerns are taken into consideration.

CONCLUSION

This research work has essentially investigated various dimensions and determinants influencing the nature of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Bangladesh in a descriptive and historical manner, where relevant datas have been empirically analysed to understand and correlate variables. Being a diverse topic, it was difficult to discuss every issue impacting the phenomenon, through out chapters I have endeavored to discuss factors of misgovernance, human rights violations, and general impediments for a peaceful state order by contextualizing the unbridled spread of arms of sophisticated nature.

As observed in Chapter one, proliferation of SALW becomes a multifaceted and complicated phenomenon due to assortment of weapons of different calibers, dynamic chain of supply, and human suffering at the core of challenging peace building procedures.

Approaching and tracing domestic determinants was the aim of Chapter two. State's authority to use violence as a medium to bring rule of law in Bangladesh was thwarted by non-state actors with their objectives derived from ethnic, religious, and anti-state rebellious ideologies from its formative years. Inherently the characteristic of political realm was shaped by confrontations and lack of tolerance among various groups involved the contestation for power. Gaining legitimacy and authority over large populace required them to make use of abundance of arms in circulation, making difficult for any peaceful mediation in the larger interest of establishing law and order.

External linkages analysed in Chapter three, from which we get a glimpse that country like Bangladesh with relative short period of experience of insurgency, became a victim of arms proliferation due to geo-political realities during Cold war and its continuing impact. This brings us to an another complex element of the menace that unabated insurgency in the neighbourhood and influx of refugees play an intrinsic role in providing easy availability of arms conditioned by the laxity among security related agencies. South

Asia countries have found it engulfed in proxy wars which was considered to be a Cold War feature, though its remnants are still visible in the instigation of militancy and terrorist activities. Using the demand and supply equation was deemed necessary to make my arguments interrelated in the above mentioned aspects.

Chapter four was indeed an attempt to generate critical scholarship on the theme by chalking down from the realm of global regulations to comparatively new regional level analyses and domestic controls by emphasizing the relevance of state as the foremost unit for governance and disarmament. Plethora of literature and scholarly sources has pointed to the inevitability of cooperation among all levels to create an environment for the formulation of a legally binding framework of regimes, norms, and procedures. Realist notions of anarchy in the international system becomes crystal clear whereby countries responsible for origin, transit and destination located in diverse geographical settings have either eagerly stated interests in bringing certain global standards. On the flip side, clusters of nation-states keeping in view of their political, economic, and ideological motivating factors of diplomacy deterred any possibilities for a viable solution. Mismatch of interests in various levels over the years has aggravated any further developments in finalizing a decisive solution. Moreover the theme has remained a debatable issue among the scholarly circles and think tanks.

Proposed research work was initiated by placing two hypotheses which were given due concentration throughout various phases of knowledge construction.

- Lack of political will and misgovernance has facilitated burgeoning of the demands for small arms in Bangladesh.

As the study was focused on the time period from 2001 to 2014, it was discovered that in the history of Bangladesh largest arms seizures were conducted. The most precarious feature was that every recovery was not confined to any single geographical location, to say close to only those areas bordering insurgency affected North-Eastern region of India. Rather it was geographically distributed in such a manner that country was affected as a

whole. Hidden cleavages within a fragmented society over ethnicity and religious sentiments became much more visible. Youth mobilization as a regular feature right from its independence struggle to Shahbaug movement shows the positive aspect of activism, contrary to this attraction towards violence and arms as a principle tool in many criminal acts became the darker notion. During the trial of Chittagong Arms Haul, involvement of few ex ministers, officials in the higher echelons responsible to security management were found guilty. This clearly signifies in a country where collusion of lawmakers and enforcement officials' work in close collusion in essence provides a fertile environment for the flourish of anti-state entities whose motives are not limited to political objectives, instead lucrative trade gives ample of financial resources to stabilize their organizational and logistical tactics. Endemic corruption and impunity enjoyed by elite law enforcement agencies like Rapid Action Battalion has tarnished and deviated from their primary goal of ensuring public safety of citizens rather serving vested interests of those in power. The slower pace of recognition of the dangers posed by proliferation of small arms and light weapons highlights Bangladesh government's persistent lack of interest in formulating measures and mechanisms by taking into consideration of various stakeholders. Hence it proves that lack of political will on the part of government in power despite the change of leaderships and misgovernance perpetuated by officials have rendered obstacles in addressing the demand side dynamics.

- Politically motivated violence to capture state power has resulted in the militarisation of the society.

In chapter two, I have highlighted ever changing contours of the political landscape in Bangladesh. Significant element which has remain unchanged since its inception is the penchant for violence as the first and last resort by political parties has left no space for consensus oriented pathways to good governance. Silencing resenting voices within party and criticisms thrown by other political groups are done by assigning the task to criminal thugs. The relentless struggle to capture political power right from academic institutions to parliamentary contestations has been possible by making violence as the tool. Rent seeking nature or more precisely patronage politics and systematic ignorance by certain

political parties to uproot the mushrooming of radical entities. These anti-social elements from time to time have helped political parties to garner support base. What comes as a challenge by Islamists are that, in the name of promoting Islamic ideals are covertly sponsoring radical entities, thus availing arms in the country through different channels. Thus proliferation and diffusion of weapons are promoting in the militarisation of the society.

Findings of the study

1. Given the nature of measures undertaken by the Government of Bangladesh shows consistent lack of awareness among the security analysts and related policy makers to prevent its circulation.

2. There is an intrinsic relation between criminalisation of politics, violence, and arms circulation. This makes it relevant that availability is not being confined only to insurgency in the neighbouring states rather domestic realm has influenced.

3. Disarmament mechanisms so far initiated had not provided any positive outcome in the long run, partly because of the continuation of arms seizures from various locations across the country from 2001-2014. Pro-active role of RAB in such recoveries stands testimony to its performance in security management, though its extra judicial activities have earned criticism from human rights protection organisation calling for reforms to make it public friendly.

4. Bangladesh which has comparatively higher number of Non-Governmental Organisations working in various sectors clearly indicates the presence of civil society engagements. *Saferworld* has brought various reports stipulating the security scenario deteriorated by the access to arms by criminal and illegal entities.

5. Global awareness on the proliferation of Small arms and Light weapons have developed manifold since the deliberation began for UNPoA, 2001. This was truly visible

also in the negotiations for Arms Trade Treaty. Bearing in mind the need for cooperation, though bringing a legally binding norms and regimes seems an utopian idea. Such a context has existed because of the countries who are engaged in arms exporting are reluctant for generating such mechanisms.

Recommendations

1. For curbing the proliferation of SALW and illicit trafficking Bangladesh needs to focus on the demand side for weapons in the domestic level, for this purpose unified stringent legislation should be enacted and severe penalties to be made in place.

2. Forging security challenges to be dealt with the promotion of sustainable development so that youth are not attracted to criminal activities. Here the role of law enforcement agencies becomes important to the extent that rather adopting authoritarian means, encouragement should be given for partnership between civil society and coercive apparatus of the state. The general understanding is that SALW circulation breeds insensitivity in society which might prove catastrophic for the vulnerable people such as women, children, minorities etc.

3. Proper record keeping, marking of the weapons and stockpile management to be initiated as the part and parcel of the national measures as to reduce the chances of arms being leaked from government warehouses. Domestic micro-disarmament should be encouraged at the community level by fabricating collaboration with community leaders.

4. At the regional level, strengthening SAARC through cooperation is a vision in the moribund state when it comes to security issues. However, certain areas of mutual exchange of intelligence sharing, technical assistance, and joint management of borders need to be given priority in the future interactions as unilateralist approach would be insufficient placate insurgents and terrorist fugitives. SAARCPOL would certainly enhance in the capacity building and regional policing as trafficking and proliferation of arms is not a domestic issue of any country.

5. International Arms exporting countries for long have stalled any processes for bringing any standardization for export and imports, human sufferings to be counted in the arms transfers. More obvious governance on a global scale is met with barriers from the heterogeneous cultures, ideologies, and civilizational differences cultivated by nation-states and regions.

Major Arms Seizures in Bangladesh

Year	Location	Seized Arms
27 June 2003	Bogra	1,00,000 Bullets and 200 kg Explosives.
Various raids from Sep- Oct 2003	Bandarban	5 Bombs, 130 kg Plastic Explosives, 226 Hand Grenades, 310 Grenade Launchers, 50 Time Bomb Detonators, 14 containers of Chemicals.
30 November 2003	Dhaka	4 AK-47 Rifles, 2 Revolvers, 20 Hand Grenades 4 Time Bombs, 1000 AK-47 Bullets, 2kg Plastic Explosives and Sophisticated Walkie-Talkie.
2 April 2004	Chittagong	690 T-56-1 7.62mm Assault Rifles (2,760 magazines), 600 T-56-2 7.62mm Assault Rifles (2,400 magazines), Uzi 9mm Sub-Machine Guns(SMGs) with 800 magazines, 100 T-85 7.62mm SMGs (400 magazines), 150 T-69 40mm Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPGs), 2,000 RPG Tubes for Launchers, 150 Optical Sights for T-69 RPGs, 25, 020 T-82-2 Hand Grenades, 840 RPG Warheads, 1, 139, 680 rounds of Ammunition for (T-56 assault rifles & T-85 SMGs) and 2 Walkie-Talkie communication sets.
Weeklong Raids Conducted in June 2014	Habigang	222 Rocket Shells (40 mm), 5 Machine Guns, 248 Chargers for Rocket Launchers, 1300 Rounds of Machine Gun Ammunitions, 13000 Bullets of Different Calibers, 54 Anti-Tank Shells, 633 Rounds of Ammunition, 1 Machine Gun barrel.

SOURCE: DAILY STAR

APPENDIX II

Bangladesh Police Comparative Crime statistics, 2002-14

YEAR OF ARREST	ARMS ACT	EXPLOSIVES ACT
2002	3060	570
2003	2293	499
2004	2370	477
2005	1836	595
2006	1552	308
2007	1746	232
2008	1529	239
2009	1721	227
2010	1575	253
2011	1269	207
2012	1115	289
2013	1517	1007
2014	2023	520
TOTAL	23606	5423

Source: Bangladesh Police

APPENDIX III

Political violence in Bangladesh 2001-2014

Year(s)	Killed	Injured	Total
2014	190	9429	9619
2013	504	24,176	24, 680
2012	169	17,161	17, 330
2011	135	11,532	11, 667
2010	220	13,999	14, 219
2009	251	15,559	15, 810
2008	50	3,185	3, 235
2007	79	2,688	2,767
2006	374	21,265	21, 639
2005	310	8,997	9, 307
2004	526	6,235	6, 761
2003	436	6,281	6, 717
2002	420	8,741	9, 161
2001	656	25,770	26, 426
Total	4320	1, 75, 018	1,79,338

Source: Odhikar

REFERENCES

Primary Sources marked with (*)

* Berman, E.G (2011), "Small arms transfers: Exporting states", *Small Arms Survey Research Notes*, 11: 1-2.

* Berman, E.G (2011), "Small arms transfers: Importing states", *Small Arms Survey Research Notes*, 12: 1-2.

* Biting the Bullet (2006), "Implementation of PoA in South Asia", United Kingdom: Saferworld.

*Brombley, M. et al. (2013), "China's Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons", *SIPRI Policy Paper No. 38*, Sweden: SIPRI.

*CHRI (2008), "Feudal Forces: Reform Delayed", New Delhi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative.

*GA Res. (2001), 105, UN Doc. A/55/255.

*Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh (2014), Strategy Paper on addressing the issue of Myanmar Refugees and Undocumented Myanmar Nationals in Bangladesh: A summary presentation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UN-HR-5013/14/121), Dhaka.

*IANSA & Amnesty International (2011), *How an Arms Trade Treaty can help prevent Armed Violence*, IANSA & Amnesty International, London.

*ICG (2009), "Bangladesh Getting Police Reform on Track" *International Crisis Group*, 182(0): 1-40.

*Institute for Economics and Peace (2014), *Global Terrorism Index 2014*, University of Maryland.

*National Forum Against Small Arms, South Asia Partnership, Saferworld (2006), *Challenges to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on Small Arms in Bangladesh*, Saferworld, London.

*SAS (2001), *Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*SAS (2002), *Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*SAS (2004), *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*SAS (2005), *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

*SAS (2007), *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*SAS (2010), *Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns*, Cambridge: CUP.

*SAS (2012), *Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*SAS (2013), *Small Arms Survey 2013: Everyday Dangers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*SIPRI (2012), SIPRI Research Notes 15, *An Arms Trade Treaty: Will it Support or Supplant POA*, 2012 (15) March.

*SIPRI (2014), SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, *The Arms Trade Treaty: Challenges for the First Conference of State Parties*, 2014 (2) September.

The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, (2001), UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15.

*UNGA Draft Decision (2013), UN Doc. A/CONF.217/2013/L.3

Books

Ahmed, I. (2010), *The Plight of the Stateless Rohingyas*, Dhaka: University Press Ltd.

Arendt, Hannah (1969), *On Violence*, USA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Bandarage, A. (1997), *Women, Population and Global Crisis a political economic analysis*, London: Zed Books.

Bhaumik, S. (2009), *Troubled Periphery*, New Delhi: Sage.

Benvenisti, E. (2012), *The International Law of Occupation*, Oxford: OUP.

Bourne, M. (2007), *Arming Conflict the Proliferation of Small Arms*: New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Buzan, B & O. Waever (2003), *Regions and Powers The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: CUP.

Chaudhury, D.R (2013), *Bangladesh Tryst with Destiny*, New Delhi: Har-Anand.

Cukier, W & V.W Sidel (2006), *The Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to AK-47s*, USA: Praeger.

Das, Pushpita. (2010), *India's Border Management*, New Delhi: IDSA.

Datta, M.B. (2012), *Understanding Security Practices in South Asia*, Oxon: Routledge.

Greene, O & Marsh, N (2012), *Small Arms, Crime and Conflicts Global Governance and the threat of Armed Violence,* Oxon: Routledge.

Haas, E.H (2015), *Operations at the Border: Efforts to Disrupt Insurgent Safe Havens, Dhofar, Oman, Insurgency, Counter Insurgency*, ebook: Maroon Publishers.

Karlekar, H. (2005), *Bangladesh The Next Afghanistan?* New Delhi: Sage.

Lewis, D. (2011), *Bangladesh Politics, Economy, and Civil Society*, New Delhi: CUP.

Malik, Salma & Joseph, Mallika (2005), "Small Arms and the Security Debate in South Asia", *RCSS Policy Studies 33,* New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.

Mohsin, A (2003), *The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh on the Difficult Road to Peace*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Nepram, Binalakshmi (2009), *India and the Arms Trade Treaty: Making Disarmament Meaningful to People's Lives*, New Delhi: India Research Press.

Olapally, D.M. (2008), *The Politics of Extremism in South Asia*, New York: CUP.

Prakash, Ved (2011), *Encyclopedia of Terrorism in the World, vol.2*, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.

Riaz, A. (2008), *Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web*, Oxon: Routledge.

Riaz, A & Fair, C.C (2011), *Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh,* Oxon: Routledge.

Saez, Lawrence (2011), *The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: An emerging collaboration architecture*, Oxon: Routledge.

Schwarzmantel, J.J. (2011), *Democracy and Political Violence*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Sharma, S.K & A. Behera (2014), *Militant Groups in South Asia*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Singh, R.S.N. (2005), "Bangladesh", *Asian Strategic and Military Perspective*, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers.

Singh, Jasjit (2013), *India's Security in a Turbulent world*, New Delhi: National Book Trust.

Stohl, R., Schroeder, M. and Smith, D. (2007), *The Small Arms Trade,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tadjbakhsh, S & A. Chenoy (2007), *Human Security Concepts and implications*, Oxon: Rotledge.

Upadhyay, A. (2009), *India's Fragile Borderlands*, New York: I.B Tauris.

Articles in Edited Volumes and Journals

Acharya, A. (2001), "Human security: East versus West", *International Journal*, 56 (3): 442-460.

Acharya, A. (2002), "Promoting Human Security in South Asia Through Multilateral cooperation" in Dipanker Banerjee (eds.) *SAARC in Twenty-First Century: Towards a Cooperative Future*, New Delhi: India Research Press.

Ahmmed, H.U et al. (2013), "The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in Bangladesh: An Overview", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 4 (4): 123-30.

Alam, H (2014), "Use of illegal arms in socio legal perspectives of Bangladesh: An Overview", *Banglavision Research Journal*, 14(1): 144-150.

Anders, Holger (2007), "The UN Process on Small Arms: All Is Not Lost", *Arms Control Today*, 37(2): 17-21.

Ayoob, M. (2002), "Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Studies", *International Studies Review*, 4(3): 27-48.

Banerjee, D. (2009), "Security Sector Governance in South Asia: An Introduction", *South Asian Survey*, 16(2): 171-185.

Baruah, S. (2002), "Gulliver's Troubles: State and Militants in North-East India", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 37(41): 4178-4182.

Begovich, Milica (2007), "Bangladesh (1972- 1997)" in Karl R DeRouen & Uk Heo (eds.) *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II, Volume 1*, USA: ABC-CLIO.

Bhattacharjee, J. (2012), "India-Bangladesh Security Cooperation Impacting NE India's Insurgency" in Klaus Lange, Klara Knapp and Jagannath P. Panda (eds.) *Revisiting Contemporary South Asia politics, economics and security*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Bhaumik, S. (2009), "Jihad or Joy Bangla: Bangladesh in Peril" in Jaideep Saikia & Ekaterina Stepanova (eds.) *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization*, New Delhi: Sage.

Blair, H. (2010), "Party Overinstitutionalization, Contestation, and Democratic Degradation in Bangladesh", in Paul R. Brass (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics*, Oxon: Routledge.

Carrapico, H (2012), "Transnational Organised Crime as a Security Concept", in Felia Allum and Stan Gilmour (eds.) *Routledge handbook of Transnational Organised Crime*, Oxon: Routledge.

Chakravarti, M. (2001), "Insurgency in Tripura: some trends", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 36 (25): 2229-2231.

Chanda, S & Gupta, A.K (2004), "Pakistan-Bangladesh Nexus in Abetting Insurgency in India's North-East" in Dipanker Sengupta and Sudhir Kumar Singh (eds.) *Insurgency in North-East India The Role of Bangladesh*, Delhi: Authors Press.

Chandoke, N. (2008), "Exploring the Linkages between Rights and Security in South Asia" in Navnita Chadha Behera (eds.) *International Relations in South Asia*, New Delhi: Sage.

Choudhury, D. (2000), "Security Studies in Bangladesh" in Dipanker Banerjee (eds.) *Security Studies in South Asia: Change and Challenges*, New Delhi: Manohar.

Chowdhury, F.D. (2009), "Problems of Women's Participation in Bangladesh Politics", *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 98 (404): 555-67.

Das, Pushpita (2008) "India-Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government's Response", *Strategic Analysis*, 32(3): 367-388.

Dasgupta, Anindita (2001), "Small Arms Proliferation in India's North-East: A case study of Assam", *Economic & Political Weekly*, 36 (1): 59-65.

Datta, S. (2005), "Political Violence in Bangladesh: Trends and Causes", *Strategic Analysis*, 29 (3): 427-47.

-------------- (2007), "Islamic Militancy in Bangladesh: The Threat from Within" *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 30 (1): 145-70.

Dowlah, C (2013), "Jumma Insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts: How Serious is the Threat to Bangladesh's National Integration and what can be done?" *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 24 (5): 772-93.

Drummond, C.E & A.E Cassimatis (2015), "Weapons Smuggling", in Neil Boister and Robert J. Currie (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law*, Oxon: Routledge.

Efrat, A (2010) "Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons" *International Organization,* 64: 97-131.

Ghosh, Partha (2009), "Politics of Competing Ethnicity and Violence: The Experience of India's North-East" in Lipi Ghosh (eds.) *Political Governance and Minority Rights The South and South-East Asian scenario*: New Delhi: Routledge.

Gordon, S (2009), "Implications of the Growing Prevalence of Inter-regional Crime FOR Cooperation in the Asia- Pacific region", in William T. Tow & Chin Kin Wah (eds.) *ASEAN-India-Australia*: *Towards Closer Engagement in a New Asia*, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.

Goswami, N. (2012), "Making sense of insurgencies in North-East India" in Sagarika Dutt & Alok Bansal (eds.) *South Asian Security*, Oxon: Routledge.

Hussain, Neila (1999), "Proliferation of Small Arms and Politics in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh", *RCSS Policy Studies 7*.

Hussain, N. (2000), "Problems of Proliferation of South Asia in Bangladesh" in Dipanker Banerjee (eds.), *South Asia at Gun Point: Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation*, Colombo: RCSS.

Hussain, W. (2006), "Cross-Border Human Traffic in South Asia: A security Perspective from India's North-east" in Lok Raj Baral (eds.) *Non-traditional Security*, New Delhi: Adroit.

Imtiaz, Ahmed (2002), "Contemporary Terrorism and the State, Non-State, and the Inter-State: Newer Drinks, Newer Bottles", paper presented on 23 November 2002 at International Conference on Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process, Soaltee Crown Plaza: Kathmandu.

Islam, M.S (2011), "Political Violence in Bangladesh" in Ali Riaz & C. Christine Fair (eds.) *Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh*, Oxon: Routledge.

Islam, M.M. (2013), "The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial State", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 21 (2): 148-68.

Jabeen, M. & I.A Choudhry (2013), "Role of SAARC for Countering Terrorism in South Asia", *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, 28(2): 389-403

Jackson, R. (2012), "Critical Accounts of Terrorism", in Marie Breen-Smyth (eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Violence*, England: Ashgate.

Jindal, N (2004), "Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh: Implications on India's Security" in Dipanker Sengupta & Sudhir Kumar Singh (eds.) *Insurgency in North-East India The Role of Bangladesh*, Delhi: Spandan.

Josukutty, R.A (2011), "Religious radicalism in Bangladesh: security challenges to India", in K.Warikoo (eds.) *Religion and Security in South and Central Asia*, Oxon: Routledge.

Kanwal, G & Chansoria, M (2010), Small Arms Proliferation in South Asia: Major Challenges for National Security, *Center for Land and Warfare Studies,* 18: 1-6.

Kartha, Tara (1999), "Controlling the Black and Gray Markets in Small Arms in South Asia" in Klare, M & Boutwell, J (eds.) *Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence,* Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kartha, Tara (2000), "Organised crime and the illegal market in weapons in Southern Asia", *Strategic Analysis*, 24 (2): 403-22.

Kilcullen, David. J (2005), "Countering Global Insurgency" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28(4): 597-617.

Kinsella, D. (2006), "The black market in small arms: Examining a social network", *Contemporary Policy Studies*, 27 (01): 100-17.

Klare, M. (1997), "An avalanche of guns: light weapons trafficking and armed conflict in the post-Cold War era" in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.) *Restructuring the Global Military Sector Volume I: New Wars*, London: Pinter.

Kochanek, S.A. (2010), "Corruption and Criminalization of Politics in South Asia", in Paul R. Brass (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics*, Oxon: Routledge.

Kumar, Narender (2012), "Contours of Conflict in Manipur", *CLAWS Journal*, 34-45.

Langman, L. & D. Morris (2003), "The Roots of Terror" in Michael Thompson (eds.) *Islam and the West: Critical Perspectives on Modernity*, USA: Rowman & Little Field Publishers.

Lintner, B. (2002), "Religious Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh", Lecture Delivered 19 August 2002 at Religion & Security in South Asia – An International Workshop, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies: Hawaii.

Makarenko, T. (2004), "The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism", *Global Crime*, 6 (1): 129-145.

Mcgrew, A.G (1992), "Conceptualizing Global Politics", in A.G Mcgrew & Paul Lewis (eds.) *Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-State,* Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.

Mentschel, B.N (2007), "Is the Crescent Waxing Eastwards? Pakistan's Involvement in India's Northeast and Bangladesh", *Pakistan Security Research Unit*, Brief no. 14.

Moniruzzaman, M (2009), "Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh: Issues, Manifestation and Consequences" *South Asian Survey,* 16 (1): 81-99.

Muni, S.D (2006), "Human Security in South Asia", Lok Raj Baral (eds.) *Non-Traditional Security state, society and Democracy in South Asia*, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.

Munir, S. (2009), "The Bangladesh Rifles Mutiny", *Council for Asian Terrorism Research*, 4(0): 1-2.

Nunthara, C. (2005), "Peace and Conflict in the 'Frontier' areas of North-East India", *Sociological Bulletin*, 54 (3): 585-602.

Oldenburg, P (1985), "A Place Insufficiently Imagined: Language , Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of 1971" *the Journal of Asian Studies*, 44(4): 711-33.

Panday, P.K & I. Jamil (2009), "Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: An Unimplemented Accord and Continued Violence", *Asian Survey*, 49 (6): 1052-70.

Pattanaik, S (2011), "Islamist Extremism and the Terror Network in Bangladesh", in K.Warikoo (eds.) *Religion and Security in South and Central Asia*, Oxon: Routledge.

Pattanaik, S. (2011), "India-Bangladesh Land Border: Flawed Inheritance and a problematic Future", *Strategic Analysis*, 35 (5): 745-51.

Pattanaik, S. & N. Nayak (2013), "Does South Asia Needs Regional Security Architecture" in Nihar Nayak (eds.) *Cooperative Security Framework for South Asia*, New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Pattanaik, S (2013), "Bangladesh Army" in Vishal Chandra (eds.) *India's Neighbourhood: The Armies of South Asia*, New Delhi: Pentagon.

Parnini, S (2013), "The crisis of the Rohingyas as a Muslim Minority in Myanmar and Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh" *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 33(2), 281-297.

Poddar, S. (2007), "The Politics of Gun Control and India's Internal Security", *Strategic Analysis*, 31(4): 683-695.

Phukan, M.D (2013), "Ethnicity, Conflict, and Population Displacement in Northeast India", *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1 (2): 91-101.

Raghavan, V.R. (2007), "Challenges to Global Security" *Pakistan Horizon*, 60(3): 23-39.

Rahaman, M.R. (2014), "Drug Trafficking in South Asia: a Case Study of Bangladesh", *Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*, 2(9): 178-184.

Ramana, P.V. (2008), "The Maoist Web: An Overview" in P.V Ramana (eds.) *The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options*, New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley.

Riaz, Ali (2011), "Bangladesh: A weak state with multiple security challenges" in T.V Paul (eds.) *South Asia's Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament*, New Delhi: OUP.

Ruud, A.E. (2014), "The Political Bully in Bangladesh" in Anastasia Piliavsky (ed.) *Patronage as Politics in South Asia*, New Delhi: CUP.

Saroja, B. (2012), "Proliferation of Small Arms in South Asia: An Arc of Instability", *International Journal of Social Sciences and Interdisciplinary Research*, 1 (12): 152-61.

Seniora, J. & Cédric Poitevan (2010), "Managing Land Borders and the Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons" *Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité*, 3 (0) : 1-22.

Selth, A (2004), "Burma's Muslims and War on Terror", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 27 (0): 107-126.

Sheth, D.L (1999), "The Nation-State and Minority Rights" in D.L Sheth & Gurpreet Mahajan (eds.) *Minority Identities and the Nation-State*, New Delhi: OUP.

Siddiqi, D.M. (2011), "Political Culture in Contemporary Bangladesh: histories, ruptures and contradictions"in Ali Riaz & C. Christine Fair (eds.) *Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh*, Oxon: Routledge.

Thompson, W.R (1973), "The Regional Subsystem: A conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, 17(1): 89-117.

Ullah, A.A (2011), "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization", *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 9 (2): 139-61.

Walt, S.M. (1991), "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2): 211-239.

Willets, P. (2008), "Transnational actors and international organizations in global politics" in John Baylis et.al (eds.) *The Globalisation of World Politics*, USA: OUP.

Williams, Phil (2013), "Transnational Organised Crime" in Paul D. Willians (eds.) *Security Studies: an Introduction*, Oxon: Routledge.

Yasmin, L. (2014), "The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 20 (1): 116-132.

Internet Sources

Ahmed, Zarein (1999), "Shanti Bahini", [Online:web] Accessed on 5 July 2015, URL: http://www.ipcs.org/article/bangladesh/shanti-bahini-293.html .

Arms Act, 1878 (Act No. XI OF 1878), Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Dhaka [Online:web] Accessed on 4 February 2015 URL: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=38 .

Assam Tribune (2014), "45 NE Ultra Camps Still Exist in Bangla Soil" [Online: web] Accessed on 26 July 2015, URL:
http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=jun2114/oth05

Barkat, Abul (2013), "The Political Economy of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh", [Online: web] Accessed 7 July 2015 URL: http://scd.rfi.fr/sites/filesrfi/Political%20Economy%20of%20Fundamentalism%20in%20Bangladesh.pdf.

BIMST-EC (2004), "BIMST-EC Summit Declaration", [Online web] Accessed 17 June 2015 URL: http://www.bimstec.org/downloads/1st-bimstec-summit/declaration-on-1st-bimstec-summit.pdf .

BOF (2012), Bangladesh Ordinance Factories, Ghazipur [Online: web] Accessed on 20 July 2015 URL: http://www.bof.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=217 .

Brig. Gen Shahedul Anam Khan (2014), "Chittagong arms haul and our intelligence agencies", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015, URL: http://www.thedailystar.net/chittagong-arms-haul-and-our-intelligence-agencies-10074.

Convention on MACM (2008), "SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015, URL: http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Various%20Publications,%20Agreements,MOUs,%20%20Conventions.%20Charters/PUBLICATIONS/Pdf/Convention%20on%20MACM%2031%20July%202008.pdf .

Hazarika, S (1989), "Bangladeshi Insurgents Say India is Supporting Them", *The NewYork Times*, Agartala, 11 June 1989

HRW, (2012), "Bangladesh: Stop Boat Push-backs to Burma" [Online: web] Accessed 21 June 2015 URL: http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/19/bangladesh-stop-boat-push-backs-burma.

ITS (2009), "BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015, URL: http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/2009/1.html.

Kabir, Ekram (2011), "Amend Arms Act First" [Online: web] Accessed 26 July 2015 URL: http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=170983

Karlekar, Hiranmay (2014), "The Great Chittagong Arms Haul and India", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015 URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edi/the-great-chittagong-arms-haul-and-india.html.

Kumar, Anand (2003), "Operation Spider Web in Bangladesh", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015, URL: http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism/operation-spider-web-in-bangladesh-1148.html.

Kumar, P. (2003), "New Routes Through Bangladesh", [Online: web] Accessed 1 June 2015 URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/article/new-routes-through-bangladesh/220702

Lintner, B. (2002), "Bangladesh: Growing ground for Muslim Terror" [Online: web] Accesed on May 22, 2015 URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI21Df06.html

Mahalingam, S. (1998), "Dealing with Dirty Money" *Frontline*, New Delhi, 17 April 1998

Odhikar (2015), "Political Violence: 2001-2015", [Online: web] Accessed 1 July 2015, URL: http://1dgy051vgyxh41o8cj16kk7s19f2.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Statistics_Political_2001-2015.pdf .

Pathania, J.M (2003), "Bangladesh: Operation Clean Heart", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015, URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper674.

SAARC (1987), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, "Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism" [Online: web] Accessed 24 June 2015, URL: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8ab3a4.html .

SAARC (2004), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, "Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism", [Online: web] Accessed 24 June 2015 URL: http://www.refworld.org/docid/49f6b7ad2.html.

Shahin, S. (2002), "India's Unquiet Eastern Front Part I: Dark Tunnel of Violence", *Asia Times Online*, [Online: web] Accessed 7 June 2015 URL: http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DB15Df01.html.

Sharif A. Kafi (2005), Illegal Small Arms and Human Insecurity in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Development Partnership Center, 2005) http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-annexe-1-EN.pdf.

Staff Correspondent (2003), "Huge Arms Haul in City", [Online: web] Accessed 1 June 2015 URL: http://archive.thedailystar.net/2003/12/01/d3120101011.htm

Staff Correspondent (2014), "Bangladesh: 14 to death over 10 truck arms smuggling", [Online: web] Accessed 23 June 2015 URL: http://www.asiantribune.com/node/70449. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN ref A/52/298, 27 August 1997, Retrieved from http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/Firstcom/SGreport52/a52298.html on 27 May 2015.

The Daily Star (2004), "Saga of Bomb Blasts and Black Saturday" [Online:web] Accessed 6 July 2015, URL:http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/08/26/d40826020327.htm

The Daily Star (2006), "Bangladesh turned into arms smuggling route" [Online: web] Accessed on 26 July 2015, URL: http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/05/30/d6053001107.htm

The Daily Star (2014), "More Arms", [Online: web] Accessed 6 June 2015, URL: http://www.thedailystar.net/more-arms-ammo-recovered-in-habiganj-forest-27751

Other web links
www.satp.org
www.atimes.com