STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND MARKET IN CHINA, 1989-2014

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

D. SATYABHUSAN

CHINESE DIVISION

CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI – 110067

2015

जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
CENTRE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI- 110 067 (INDIA)

Phone : 91-11-2670 4346
FAX : 91-11-2670 4346

DATE: 27 JULY, 2015

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"State, Civil Society and Market in China, 1989-2014"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

D.Satyabhusan

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Dr. D. Varaprasad Sekhar
(Chairperson, CEAS/SIS)

Chairperson
Centre for East Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Dr. Ritu Agarwal
(Supervisor)

Supervisor
Centre for East Asian Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067

Contents

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

First of all, my heart full indebtedness and deepest sense of gratitude is to my supervisor Dr. Ritu Agarwal. I have been wonderfully fortunate to have an advisor who has given me the freedom to explore on my own and meanwhile the guidance to recoup when my steps have faltered. She has been always there to listen my problems and give advice. She has taught me how to question thoughts and express ideas. Her patience and support helped me overcome many crisis situations and finish this dissertation.

Secondly, I take this opportunity to thank my grandparents, parents, Bhai-Bhauja and Lucky for believing in me. Without their encouragement this research would not have seen the light of the day. I thank my niece "Kuhu" who has been always a source of energy for me. Not forgetting my friends and classmates, I thank them, who inspired me to be steadfast throughout this arduous journey.

Last but not the least, I thank my unique university (JNU), centre (CEAS), school (SIS), library and hostel (Periyar) for providing me necessary environment to carry out my research.

However, if any errors found in this dissertation I am solely responsible for the acts of omission and commission thereof.

List of Abbreviations

CCP   Chinese Communist Party

CSOs   Civil Society Organisations

FDI   Foreign Direct Investment

GDP   Gross Domestic Products

HRS   Household Responsibility System

IMF   International Monetary Fund

OLVC   Organic Law for Village Committee

PPP   Purchasing Power Parity

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations

NPC   National People's Congress

PRC   People's Republic of China

SOEs   State Owned Enterprises

TANs   Transnational Advocacy Networks

TVEs   Township and Village Enterprises

Introduction

The study of the nexus among state, civil society and market is an important gadget of understanding the internal condition of a country and is useful in characterizing a political regime, especially fruitful regarding communist regimes. The usage of the civil society theory during seventies is a milestone in the evolution of research on the authoritarian states of Central and Eastern European. During the late 1980's and early 1990s, the concept of civil society had procured academic recognition through the world. It has obtained many patrons, like John Keane,[1] Michael Walzer,[2] Daniel Bell,[3] etc. in the West and Vaclav Havel, George Konrad and Adam Michnik in the Eastern Europe, who developed very useful theoretical framework. Many Chinese experts have been antipathetic to use the concept which appeared in Eastern Europe in the seventies, to understand China before 1989. The concept of civil society became widespread among China experts as useful for the study of Chinese politics only after the suppression of the 1989 movement. Notable Western sinologists began to explore the situation of civil society in PRC including Heath Chamberlain, Thomas Gold, Elizabeth Perry, Vivienne Shue, Dorothy Solinger, Gordon White, Lucian Pye, Philip Huang, Barrett McCormick, Mary Rankin, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Anita Chan, Michalle Frolic, Timothy Brook and many more.

State, market and society are three complementary yet relatively independent systems, a set of opposites constituting the whole of contemporary society. Agency in the state system is embodied by government institutions at various levels and public organisations; in the market system, by profit oriented enterprises; while in the social system, by non profit, non governmental, civil organisations. Amidst the current transition, China's civil organisations

---

[1] John Keane put forward liberating European socialism by endorsing the contrast between civil society and the state. (John Keane, 1988)

[2] Michael Walzer promoted incorporating socialist, nationalist and capitalist epitomes under the course of civil society. (Michael Walzer, 1991)

[3] Daniel Bell proposed a restoration of civil society in the US as a safeguard against the strengthening state bureaucracies. (Daniel Bell 1989)

have represented a massive, complex, and changing system. On a macro level, this system overlaps with the state system and with the market system; yet it has gradually developed characteristics different from both systems.

Civil Society

Initially the concept of civil society was significantly used by Adam Ferguson, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and has been often used by many political scientists since eighteenth century. Civil society was viewed as a sphere where common citizens live their lives with political authority. Hegel (1837) proposed that the state and the society have separate spheres. However, he left the contradiction between the reign of the ego and the necessity for interdependence to be resolved in the universal state. (Gideon Baker, 1998) He recognized civil society as an intermediate between the private citizen and family as a whole and the authority of state. This intermediating social sphere is comprised of a protean structure of organisations, some grounded on family, like kinship forms and others on non-compulsory membership and vigorous involvement, like common interest organisations, religious associations, and economic groups like associations of businessmen or workers of the same trade for mutual benefit. The Hegelian description was further developed by Marx and Engels, specifically in The German Ideology (1845). Marx (1975) categorised Hegel's contradiction in two sections. Again it was evolved with a Marxist angle by Gramsci through his interpretation of the evolution of supreme power by the intimidating power of the state; where he argues that the individual people arises to enjoy various personal autonomy as well as the chance to practice accord in the economic relations of production and civil society. According to Morgan (1989), civil society acts as a shock absorber with regard to the bullying power of the state. Socialist states try to make the society and the individual disappear by their synchronized command on economic relation of manufacturing and the private sphere of citizens. Authoritarian states view a mature civil society as a threat to their authority. So they pursue in assimilating or even terminating what they find ideologically threatening. In these states, the emergence of civil society can be allowed but its requisite independence and discretionary character will be accepted.

Civil society has multiple meanings and projections, as its meaning depends on how and in what context we look at it. If we take it as something as anti-government phenomenon then its sense is different from taking it as complementary to the actions of the government which fills a gap between the government and the citizens. It is sometimes considered as the 'third sector' of society which includes family and private sphere; sometimes as a combination of individuals, non-governmental organizations, institutions those manifest the interests and wills of citizens such as voluntary social associations of citizens, interest groups, community organisations, and protests voluntarily held by the people. Sometimes even the term is used in a more general sense, such as freedom of speech, individual autonomy, an independent judiciary, etc.

The civil society organisations possess the following four differentiating characters including non-official, non-profit, relatively independent, and voluntary. Along with evolving, civil society organisations play a growingly crucial character in social management. They practice some activity of social management voluntarily or in coordination with government sectors. The procedure of social management practiced by them voluntarily or in coordination with the state is not government, but governance.

Civil Society in China

It wouldn't be precise to say that there was no existence of civil organizations at all before 1978; even before 1949 there were traditional secret societies and the automatically founded village level civil organisations functioned for a considerable period, such as temple fairs, ancestral halls, clansmen's groups, country notable associations and civil units. Though they were autonomous professional associations in the sphere of business and freightage; but they were not like contemporary civil organisations and were very much insignificant in numbers and activities. Approximately all civil associations, which had appeared before 1949, were vanished. With the impacts of western culture, civil organisations in China, comparatively autonomous from the state, started functioning visibly in the 20th century. Notwithstanding

this, lack of specific study on the potential of civil organisations, as well the level of their functions; and whatever related data we have, their estimations differ hugely.[4] Almost entire civil organization which appeared prior to 1949 disappeared and the rise of a comparatively autonomous civil society is an outcome of modern China.

It has been more than three and half decades, China has not been an absolutely authoritarian regime, and the immensity, vehemence, and range of the state power practiced over the society and its different basic units cannot be in any way matched with before 'Reforms and Opening Up'. Although after reform the condition of society in China has changed a lot but the Communist party still has a good hold over the society which is very unique with comparison to other countries. But as the market economy is moderately implemented in China, Globalization and the influence of the outside world continue to help and the political and legal domain experiences changes, different types of civil organisations are encouraged to emerge. Their rise will portray optimistically in improving democratic governance both in cities and villages. To sum up, portraying civil society as caught up in a one-dimensional 'tug-of-war' between state and society misleads us. While the focus should remain on groups and associations, let us think of these entities as operating in a space encompassing three force-fields: state, society and market.

Perry (2014) says that civil society is a puzzled anomaly in Modern China. Social contention and associational activism mushroomed over the years following June Fourth movement which was suppressed by the government ruthlessly that disclosed the level to what the Chinese government continues reluctant and not ready to acknowledge the actuality of embryonic Chinese civil society. The common perception might be that the barbaric repression of the massive Tiananmen uprising to have dissuaded impacts on successive protests, but actually the frequency of protest movements has unwaveringly rocketed during the last two and half decade. Furthermore, China currently has numerous grassroots (as well as government-

---

[4]For example, Wang Ying and Sun Bingyao (1999) argues that based on an account, there were approx 1,000 civil associations in China by 1949; But based on another study, there were more than 80,000 civil associations by the same year.

sponsored) non-governmental organisations (NGOs), a vibrant sphere of online public debate, foundations, and charities She argues that, in contrast to 1989, a nascent civil society can now be said to exist.

Post-1989 China provides better opportunity and space for protest both in rural and urban areas. The wave of protests shifted its focus from city to countryside, as several violent tax riots by Farmers against "unfair burdens" were raised in the early 1990s and this rural unrest consequently had satisfactory riposte from the government with the remarkable decision of China's centuries old agricultural tax abolishment. Afterwards, the accumulation point of protest was switched from the countryside back to the cities, as in the late 1990s, petitions were filed by many laid-off and retired workers resulted from the privatization and bankruptcy of many state owned enterprises, They also staged sit-down strike inside factories and government offices withstanding the plant closures and paltry pensions.

In the 2000s, as the negative impacts of swift economic reform became growingly obvious, environmental degradation triggered "not-in-my backyard" protests amidst a rising middle class eager to safeguard its newly obtained property and its health. State-sponsored infrastructure development and commercial real estate projects ignited angry remonstrations by displaced residents. Labour disputes erupted with calls for higher wages and better working environment. Migrant labourers demanded that their children be allowed to appear for entrance examinations of universities in the cities where their parents stay as part of floating population. And yet, amid the wave of demonstrations activities by seemingly all types of aggrieved citizens, China's university campuses have remained remarkably peaceful.

The growth of civil organisations requires both an economic foundation and a political habitat. Following the 1980s, at one hand on the economic front, China started implementing market-oriented economic reorganising, moderately forsaken the earlier planned economy, implemented a socialist market economy and switched from the earlier single system of collective and state ownership to manifold forms of ownership comprising of sole proprietorship, foreign investment, joint venture, and also the earlier systems. China proved various predictions of different economists and Chinese experts wrong by its remarkable economic development. And more importantly the success was achieved without a suitable

environment while having many barriers comprising of inefficacious state enterprises, vague property rights, unreasonable prices, undeveloped transportation, obsolete banking and outdated security facilities, and incompetent markets. Apart from these barriers China had plenty of socio-political hurdles, comprised of uncertainty and disheartenment produced out of the drawbacks of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, profound political separations, a tradition of poverty in village areas and poor standard of education, created similarly horrible problems. However, China's continued double digit growth and growing per capita income since the early-1980s into till the new millennium - calculated in terms of per capita GDP or PPP, per capita income, exports, investment of foreign capital through FDI, urbanization, and technological advancement – have made the world jealous. And China made this miracle while the economies of former socialist countries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe got collapsed. Moreover, though at a comparatively moderate rate, China is enduring its development in the twenty first century when various other economies of big East Asian economies are staggering or dwindling since 1997. During the early 2000s, China earned recognition as the most dynamic economy world, an Asian superpower and the most suitable destination for investment, because of both, its symbiotic relationship with the East Asian leading economies and its exceptional trade with the US deficit economy. This immensely boomed productive forces and levelled up the living standards of the citizens. This was the bedrock of the rapid growth of civil organisations by which the marvellous economic returns piloted by the market reforms generate requisite economic environment for the founding and functioning of the various civil organizations.

While economists have wondered about China's development success, less academic focus has been assigned to the socio-political impacts and "externalities" of the reform programme, comprising of dramatic increases in spatial and class inequality, environmental degradation, the fierce ballooning of the migrant workers, rising ethnic turmoil, loss of jobs, benefits, security of numerous state sector workers. Market reforms, foreign influences, globalization, internet, information technology altogether has produced many conflicts, and the countless spheres of resistance have always been its by-product at all levels.

And at the other hand on the political front, China's political system has too experienced changes. The government allowed increasing political participation and contestation, and village and local elections, started paying attention to legal system, carried out reform in Nation People's Congress, and delegated many powers to lower levels and changed its various functions. The transformations, described above, in economic and political environment made by reform and opening up promote the development of civil society after the 1980s, straight or obliquely.

Ying-Hong Shi in his article "The Issue of Civil Society in China and Its Complexity" talks about the dualities of civil society in China. He believes that present-day China is not yet a civil society, but at the same time it has shown an increasing inclination towards the germination of a civil society. This is the first of two dualities of today's China. The second duality is more complicated and self-contradictory and is defined especially in terms of the last of the above six characteristics. That is, China's embryonic civil society simultaneously has both "civilized" and "uncivilized" natures, and this is the most prominent characteristic of Chinese society as it stands now.

Civil society in China is developing and will develop in a new manner which is very difficult to guess now. Whatever the prospects for China's civil society, it will bring major political and economic consequences to East Asia and as well as to the rest of the world and, be they positive or negative. The outside world can influence strongly and positively upon the growth of civil society, and it might be a major reason for a developed civil society in China. However, to exert such influences successfully is a complicated and arduous matter, requiring comprehensive observation, sophisticated insights, empathic understanding, and a sense of a grand strategy.

Literature Review

Literature review is discussed by categorising into two thematic divisions on the basis of my hypotheses. The first one is emergence of civil society in China; where views and arguments of many scholars are taken into account to show the evidences those can underpin the first hypothesis about existence of nascent civil society in China. Then the second theme is on legitimisation of authority and negotiation for better governance; where various opinions of different experts on China are analysed to defend the second hypothesis about the legitimisation of authority of the state through instrumentalisation of civil society organisations and negotiation of civil society organisations for better governance.

Emergence of civil society in China

Heath B. Chamberlain in his article "On the Search for Civil Society in China" believes that civil society is rising in Modern China, though not where many scholars convey us: not at the fences, nor in the more contained world of scholar-based undertakings. We need to be cautious not to take any symbol of independence or capable independence against the authority of the state as evidential of its existence. The proof here so far is limited and varied, but it recommends that the possibilities for the civil society in China are not completely deserted.

Shu-Yun Ma (2010) categorizes the promoters of civil society in China into two major groups: domestic scholars and exiled scholars. The domestic scholars have concentrated on the establishment of a modern citizenry, comprising of law-adherents and civil representatives of the society. Survival of this group assumes the vigorous participation of the state. The relation between civil society and the state was thus viewed as an cooperative and cordial one. This differs strikingly from the rudimentary attitude of exiled scholars, whose main focus has been establishment of a private sphere which has autonomy from the state.

Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic in their edited book "Civil Society in China" have written that earlier optimism regarding the forthcoming mushrooming of civil society in China at the end of the 1980s has been largely scattered. Hardly do we now find implications for 'the reemergence of civil society' or 'an embryonic civil society' in China. Their research these days highlights a healthy scepticism, wariness about applying such a thoroughly Western-based concept to such a thoroughly non-Western landscape. Reaction to this dilemma has been generally of three sorts: to alter the concept to fit the landscape; to look for changes in the landscape to fit the concept; or to drop the concept entirely. Timothy Brook expresses concern that we who study China are prone to over-emphasize the role of the state in the process of governance and to undervalue the role of society. More specifically, he says, we tend to overlook the widespread and long-standing practice of 'auto-organization', whereby 'Chinese have recurrently formed communities not under the direction of the state nor bound to such state functions as revenue extraction'.

Ying-Hong Shi in his article "The Issue of Civil Society in China and Its Complexity" has considered the following six general and fundamental characteristics of a typical developed civil society to define the condition of civil society in China. Measured against those characteristics, she believes that present-day China is not yet a civil society, but at the same time it has shown an increasing inclination towards the germination of a civil society. This is the first of two dualities of today's China. The second duality is more complicated and self-contradictory and is defined especially in terms of the last of the above six characteristics. That is, China's embryonic civil society simultaneously has both "civilized" and "uncivilized" natures, and this is the most prominent characteristic of Chinese society as it stands now.

Yan Ming Fu, president of the China Charities Federation - a government organized NGO - when asked whether there were any "real" NGOs in China, responded: "We need to use Chinese standards to measure whether or not NGOs in this period are real. The 'pure' kind of Western NGOs is very difficult to find in China." He in his article "NGOs Are 'an Inevitable Trend of the Times'" believes that as China's reforms advance, NGOs will inevitably become more independent.

Legitimisation of authority and negotiation of power

Heath B. Chamberlain has categorised the arguments as "revolutionary moment", 'counter elite structure', and longer-range historical perspective. He believes that civil society can be interpreted as a community fettered and strengthened by its collective decision to oppose, on the one hand, exorbitant pressure from the society and too much state rules, on the other. However, civil society is a comparatively self-governing body, different from the state as well as society; it still share from the both, and confronts and persistently coordinates with the both.

Ying YU in her article "The Role and Future of Civil Society in a Transitional China" believes that the prospective of China's civil society is under high stress, but packed with decisive likelihood, striving to be grown, refined and reciprocal between the authoritarian state and private sphere, with the coexistence of coordination and competition.

Jenna Nicholas in her article "Does Civil Society Play a Role in Promoting Reform in China?" argues that China will strive to attain global legitimacy without considerable domestic modifications. The CCP talks about the achievement of gradualism and the 'Harmonious Society', and peaceful development but to obtain recognition at the world level, it will have to underpin by creating trust by boosting the rule of law and transparency. Hence China will have no option but to acknowledge the situation of the times.

The Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China, published by China Development Research Services in Hong Kong in late 1999, observed that civil society initiatives appeared "set to become a significant trend among large donor organisations in the coming decade."

Jude Howell in her article "Civil Society, Corporatism and Capitalism in China" argues that whilst the state has promoted the development of civil society organisations linked to capitalist interests, it has also had to make some concessions to those groups concerned with the losers of reform so as to ensure political stability, not only for the sake of regime maintenance but also for the continuation of capitalist development. Civil society, social welfare and capitalism are thus intricately intertwined.

Jean-Philippe Beja argues that the growth of a 'civil society' does not indicate that the regime is democratizing, nor does it indicate that the transformation of China will imitate a model identical to that of Eastern Europe. China will set the terms of its own civil society.

Rebecca R. Moore in his article "China's Fledgling Civil Society A Force for Democratization?" says that civil society is unlikely ever to play the sort of role in China that it did in Poland in 1989. Rather, many China scholars and NGO advocates believe that China will democratize in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary way. Regardless of the pace of change, the evolution of liberal democracy in China will require that reform occur from the bottom up as well as from the top down at the societal as well as the state level. A strengthened and increasingly autonomous civil society will serve not only to encourage reform at the top but also to ensure that re-forms are firmly rooted in Chinese society - in its habits, institutions, and values.

A survey conducted by Tony Saich, reported in the East Asia Forum on July 24, 2011, he said: "Two clear trends are visible. Citizens 'disaggregate' the state and, while they express high levels of satisfaction with the central government, satisfaction declines with each lower level of government. While in 2009, 95.9 % were either relatively or extremely satisfied with the central government, this dropped to 65% at the local level."

Jenna Nicholas in her article "Does Civil Society Play a Role in Promoting Reform in China?" says that in early 2011, various anonymous online calls for a 'jasmine revolution' along the lines of the Arab spring led to a wave of arrests by the security apparatus. To add a further dimension to this, the Great Firewall of China, a filtering system that blocks websites hosted outside the country, began to disrupt a much larger number of sites in the early months of 2011. Whilst the response to a perceived threat seemed somewhat draconian, if one puts it into historical perspective, it was merely a manifestation of an age-old preoccupation of Chinese leaders with 'stability' faced with ruling over a country of such vast proportions. The interesting thing was that there was little popular support for a revolution. In fact in a Pew poll in spring 2010, 87% of Chinese expressed satisfaction with their country's direction. Two thirds believed that their lives were better than five years ago and almost three-quarters of Chinese expressed optimism about the future.

Further she says that China is one of the only one-party states to allow citizens to sue the state in court. The number of law suits of citizens against the government has increased from 10,000 five years ago to 100,000 in 2005 – and the success rate is slowly improving. It seems that the government realizes that developing institutional ways of dealing with grievances can make the state more stable. They are to some extent working out ways in which citizens can be compensated for ills rather than merely punished for dissent. The senior leadership has intervened on several occasions, managing to deflect criticism on to 'corrupt local authorities' thereby allowing themselves to take the side of the 'little guy'. However this is seen as appeasement and may prove more challenging in the long run.

Definition, Rationale and Scope

- This study will try to look at the new shift in the power and role of the government with respect to market reforms, rising middle class, globalization and influence of the outer world with emphasis on how the CSOs are emerging in a communist ruling country which is very much unique in many aspects. It will try to assess the western concept of civil society in context of modern China.
- During the last three decades the world is curiously looking at the changes in socio-political economic system of China and specifically on the emergence of the civil society of China as it can bring major political and economic consequences to East Asia and as well as to the rest of the world.
- Through the research the recent changes in the relation among the state, society, market-enterprises and various organisations will be reflected. Although it will also discuss about the past events and probable future.

Research Questions

- How to understand the new shift in the power and role of the state in the wake of market reforms.
- What are the factors responsible for creating a space for the immergence of civil society in China?
- What was the social background for the emergence of civil society in China?
- Whether western based concept of civil society is applicable to the Chinese condition? If we cannot find Western-style civil society in China, do we need to persist in modifying it so that we can find it?
- Whether the civil society organisations are assisting the state for legitimisation of its authority or acting as a revolutionary agent?
- Are the civil society organisations in the suitable condition to negotiate for better governance?

Hypotheses

- Market forces have been pressurising the state to provide a space for the emergence of civil society in China.

- The state is using the civil society organisations (CSOs) to legitimize its authority and CSOs are negotiating with the state for better governance.

Research Methodology

- The methodology employed will be deductive analysis. The market reforms will be taken as independent variable, the civil society in China as dependent variable and the as the state variable.

- Primary sources will include government rules and regulation regarding reform, NGOs, social and voluntary organisations, new government policies.

- Secondary sources will be drawn from related books, articles, magazines, think-tank documents, newspapers and online sources

Limitation of the study

- Limited access of data on civil society organizations available in China.

- Western data are at many times highly exaggerated.

- High level of censorship on data available in China.

- There is no particular indicator to assess the Chinese civil society.

Chapters

Chapter 1- Introduction

The chapter looks into the subject matter and theme of the proposed research by focusing on concept of civil society, the condition of civil society in China and assessing the western concept with respect to the Chinese condition.

Chapter 2 – Market reforms and the changing role of State

This chapter looks into the impact of market reforms, foreign influence, globalization, internet and information technology. It also specifically looks into the changing role in the authority of states to tackle the new situations. This chapter verify the requisite environment for the emergence of the civil society.

Chapter 3 – Emergence of Civil Society Organisations

This chapter deals with the emergence of civil society organisations. It attempts to analyse the social background for the emergence and development of civil society. It discusses about the different types of NGOs and related other various organisations while also look into their behaviour and categorization.

Chapter 4 – Civil Society vis-a-vis Governance in China

This chapter discusses the role of the emerging civil society in governance. It specifically looks into the new policies, laws formulated by the CCP for better governance. It tests the second hypothesis about the legitimisation of the state's authority and negotiation of civil society organisations for better governance.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

This chapter will be based on the findings of the research after testing the hypotheses formulated.

Second Chapter

Market Reforms and the Changing Role of State

This chapter first looks into the reforms and its impacts briefly, and then the impacts of globalization and other influencing factors to understand what happened after a decade of reforms and opening up that led to the emergence and development of civil society. In the last section it will examine the changing role in the authority of states to tackle the new situations. Basically the purpose of this chapter is to explore the link among reforms and opening up, conflicts and resistance, globalisation and its close affinities and the nascent civil society in China. It analyses the background of the creation space by the market reforms for the emergence and development of civil society.

Gordon White (1993) has given three broad senses to link between the economic reforms and the emergence of these organisations. First, a process of accelerated social differentiation has occurred in both rural and urban areas. This has been based on mounting sectorial variation in the economy through increasing specialization, as well as, through diversification of the ownership system, with the quick proliferation of non-state economic institutions, specifically township and village enterprises. Second, a process of decentralization or dispersion of power over economic resources has occurred as a consequence. Third, with the unfurling of market relations there has been a growing atomization of economic factors and, in reaction, an expansion in horizontal ties between them which cross the traditional vertical state-structured boundaries between sectors and areas.

The first section of this chapter begins by briefly discussing the impacts of market reforms. While discussing the impacts this chapter provides insight into conflicts and resistance in Chinese society. Then it proceeds to explore the impacts of globalization, internet, information technologies and increasing political participation on the nature and structure of Chinese society which helped in the emergence of civil society.

Market Reforms

To keep with as well as to fasten the developmental pace of the world, China has wonderfully done the extraordinary economic development with acute awareness of shifting political alignments, ideological formulations and social reforms. And this age of interdependency made it easier than expected. The economic reform in China is one of the successful milestones and greatest social experiment in contemporary world history which largely developed the productive forces contributing to unprecedented economic and social prosperity and rapidly improved the living standards of common people in China.

The reform in China shows historical inevitability. The post-1978 period is needed to be analysed in respect with the pre-1978 period to create a sound understanding of the situation in China. Since the establishment of PRC till the period of reforms, China was identified as a "total society"[5] where almost all the resources, the market sector and the private sector were altogether controlled by the government. Due to Cultural Revolution the national economy of China was on the verge of collapse making China as an underdeveloped country. During mid-1980s, intense ideological debates precipitated between Mao's dogmatism and Deng Xiaoping's pragmatism resulting in the prevalence of the second one. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress became the watershed in PRC's political agenda, marking the shift from - class struggle, command planning and the construction of socialism - to - economic development and stability, guidance planning, market economy - which reaffirmed the newly emerging liberal ideology of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, resulting in the re-legitimization of the Communist Party rule. At this time, China had a clear desire to multiply productivity and develop living standards by reforming its economic system; however it did not have a clear objective or the configuration of the new system; which means the reform hadn't any well-designed strategy or policy measures. Rather being designed a priori, the option of certain reform measures and the order of transformation mirrored the government's pragmatism toward the issues or crisis that emerged in the economic system and the scopes that can be opted to resolve or alleviate the problems. C Tung (2005) says that the

---

[5] Total society: A world of universal anomie populated by the hybridised subjects of mutual recognition. Bull, Malcolm (2001), "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", *London Review of Books*, 23 (19): 7

government's attitude toward certain reform measures is best mirrored by Deng Xiaoping's famous saying: "No matter it is a white cat or black cat, as long as it can catch mouse, it is a good cat." The order of reform measures is best explained by another Chinese saying: "To cross a river by groping the stones."

The initial phase of reform can be called as "reform without losers" which indicates an economic development of inclusive growth. Deng Xiaoping marked the beginning of a new era quite different from Mao Zedong's anti-free market by introducing the 'second revolution'[6] in the form of economic reforms immediately after his resumption of power. Deng chose two ways hand in hand, economic development and political liberalization, to accomplish the aim. The second generation leaders under Deng successfully sought new source of legitimacy by initiation of economic and political reforms and carried out market economy dominated by manufacturing and service sectors in a new reform era. The new leaders gradually and gingerly renounced the earlier planned economy and implemented a socialist market economy. China's economic reform and social transformation has been a multifaceted three decades process whose core elements include expanded latitude for market, mobility, modernization and internationalization together with the phased dismantling of collective and state sectors of the economy. Market oriented economic restructuring policies, for increasing allocation and distribution of resources according to the market economy, were implemented to liberate the productive forces and make the country rich. These policies include fiscal decentralization, state-owned enterprise reform (diversification of ownership forms - by shifting from the earlier single structure of collective and state ownership to diverse forms of ownership), agricultural reform, economic opening, and township and village enterprise reform. Viewed from the centre, the policies implemented to evolve Chinese socialism in styles that accelerate economic growth, bolster party authority, strengthen China's international position in the world economy, and overcome poverty. Viewed from the perspective of diverse social forces promoting the reforms, they afford opportunities to expand social autonomy and facilitate a

---

[6] Reform is China's Second Revolution. (The selected works of Deng Xiaoping)

range of productive and profitable activities previously circumscribed or banned by the party-state.

China's reforms and opening up officially started with in December of 1978, when the state allowed the beginning stages of the de-collectivization of agriculture and the enlarged area of the market. As Peter Ho (2000) describes, the key of initial reform was agricultural de-collectivization and market opening. Although agricultural land ownership resumes existing majorly in the village, independent households signed contracts for efficacious command over the management, output and marketing of agricultural production in exchange for payments in the form of crops and labour to the village, and taxes in kind to the state.

China's three decades of practice in collective farming was the nub for rejecting it for welcoming small-scale intensive family farming, known as the Household Responsibility System (HRS). As villagers and some officials urged to enlarge the span of market, mobility and household activity, and the government growingly doubted the effectiveness of collective agriculture, it was renounced while promoting different types of household contracting which reinstated the superiority of the family farm. In 1984, these contracts were decided to be implemented for fifteen years; and again in 1993, 1998, it was declared that these contracts would be validated for thirty years more. And in 2008 a new land law tried to legally incorporate the extensive practice of household transfer of contracted land, which was viewed as an action for land concentration in the hands of a few resulted in gridlock. In 2009 a new law outlined directions for the resolution of land dispute which reinstated the land management rights, and it generated some of the major rural controversies.

Since the initial period of post-collective reform, hand in hand with HRS, the government implemented free market economy by promoting rural enterprises' diversification of through small-scale industry and handicrafts, lessened barriers on rural-urban migration, and considerably encouraged agricultural products' state procurement prices. The government sanguinely acknowledged the forces from below for better span of household and market. Apart from agricultural de-collectivization, a big surge took place in agricultural output, growth of rural industry. As farmers retrieved command over their labour power and the state eased barriers on markets and subsidiary production, rural labour and capital promptly

proceeded through new passages, and rural people, especially those in developing Special Economic Zones, found new earning scopes due to export boosting.3

It won't be wrong to state that the biggest vigorous reaction to the new scopes created by reform was the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) which proliferated across the nation. Most of the TVEs had their origin in previous commune and brigade industries, but during the reform period influenced by comparatively free market environment where they got ingress to international markets, and incorporated of migrant labour, they provided unparallel boost to rural industry. And on the other hand, with the replacement of the commune by townships, several village collective industries resumed to flourish and many of these were transformed into private firms or shareholding companies (gufen gongsi) or joint ventures, comprising several with foreign investment, providing new jobs and source of income.

There are two major reasons with regard to market reforms that stimulated the emergence of civil society in Modern China. And in both the cases, a single actor whether neither has the capacity to solve all the diversified problems, nor have all information to tackle the complex and dynamic issues. And a single actor neither has complete overview for necessary effective instruments, nor has sufficient effort likely to subjugate unilaterally in a particular government system. So the government needs another actor, while strictly maintaining its superiority in authority and power over the other one, to handle new, more complex, large scale problems.

First is the beneficial consequences of the market reforms and the second is its detrimental consequences of the market reforms. Both compelled the government to create a space for the rise of civil society organisations. The reforms have triggered divergent consequences. Along with urbanization, commoditisation, rising per capita incomes and remarkable affluence; China's reforms and their attendant economic growth have brought growing social inequalities culminating in conflict and resistance.

Beneficial consequences of 'Reforms and opening up' have triggered the emergence and development of civil organisations in China. The remarkable economic development, piloted by 'Reforms and Opening Up', generated requisite economic environment for the emergence

and development of the various civil organisations. The hugely accelerated productive forces and increased living standards of the citizens are the root causes for the candid emergence of civil organisations. The living standards of the Chinese people rose fast due to market reforms. The increase in productivity also minimized the working time of the citizens which resulted in the implementation of the double-day weekend working structure for the Chinese employees in cities during the 90s, by which urban dwellers got leisure time to involve in diverse activities. Many got spare time and economic resources to engage in interests like literary and art, sports and tourist programmes. Various civil organisations appeared these years mirror this style of interests, such as different fun clubs, sports clubs, private neighbourly associations, excursion organisations, etc.

The marvels of China's economy and its gigantic rise in GDP are well known throughout the world. The 'Reforms and Opening Up' made these possible for China to be, the world's second largest economy by nominal GDP, the largest economy by purchasing power parity according, the fastest growing major economy, the largest manufacturing economy, and the largest trading nation (Based on IMF report, 2015). The aim of mentioning the status of Chinese economy is to reflect the transformation of China from an underdeveloped country to the most successful developing country. So it is obvious that the condition of the society has also got much better than the earlier socialist China, though the per capita income is still much below than many countries. It has lifted hundreds of millions of people from poverty, improving living standards of a vast new urban middle class, creating more billionaires than anywhere in the world except the U.S. and turned China into the largest manufacturing centre in the world. A top down authoritarian state has commanded this huge transformation and, although China faced 2009 economic recession which affected the whole world, and retarded the growth, its economy is still strong. The Chinese Government is acutely aware, however, of the need to boost its domestic economy and develop the poorer inland areas.

Many of the civil organizations must their selves manage their funds. Before market reforms, due to the poor standard economy or absence of the authority to take financial choices independently, it was extremely tough for the civil organisations to manage funds without government funding. Economic growth triggers immense dispensable benefits for enterprises

and enhances individual dispensable income. These funds develop into the main resources of financing for civil organisations.

The rise of middle class is one of the major outcomes of market reforms and also one of the crucial reasons for the rise and growth of civil society in China. Cheng Li (2010) says that the link between the middle class and civil society is not ceremonial, facile or linear; rather, it is complex and dynamic. As the volume of the economy has enlarged so too has the volume of China's middle class. Helen H. Wang says that the Chinese middle class is already larger than the entire population of the United States. In fifteen years, the Chinese middle class will reach 800 million. It has changed, and will continue to change, the dynamics of China, and have huge impact on everything. (http://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2011/12/21/the-biggest-story-of-our-time-the-rise-of-chinas-middle-class/) The future projection even strengthens the optimistic hope about the development of middle class along with the growth of civil society. Business Insider Australia (2015), a magazine, puts forward their projections that show that by 2030, China's middle class through broad definition will share about 93% of the urban population. Taking into account both, income growth and urbanisation, 326m new middle class will rise in China's urban areas from 2014 to 2030. The total middle class population will reach 854m in China's urban areas. In particular, the household income level of the affluent middle class population will likely to reach a significantly better standard. The article 'Mobile, online and angry: the rise of China's middle-class civil society?' published in *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural and Media Studies* (2011, Volume25, Issue 1) concludes that a rising middle class in China, that has been promoted by the economic reforms implemented by Chinese government as a method to establish a more prosperous and stable Chinese society. This study is formulated within the substantial theoretical foundation of social theory and civil society. While the Chinese middle class may not be politically submissive and can attain social change, it does so based on self-interest while being watchful and cautious of how its actions are judged by the state, thus handling protests vigilantly so the middle class can continue to garner the economic benefits of state capitalism.

Nonetheless, the detrimental consequence made the government realise the need of civil society organisations to deal with the ongoing and upcoming problems. China was a country

infamous for escalating social flaws, whether measured with reference to social classes, or rural-urban partitions, or ethnic relations, or environment issues while speeding for development. These issues put forward the uncertainty of the feasibility of relentless swift growth. Selden and Perry (2000) say that economists have wondered about China's economic growth success, but at the same time less academic observation has been dedicated to the socio-political ramification and "externalities" of the reforms agenda, including striking widening of spatial and class inequality, environmental hazards, the uncontrollable growth of a floating population, growing ethnic clashes, loss of occupations, security and other advantages of tens of millions of state sector employees. The conflicts that market reforms have aroused and the multitudinous sphere of resistance resulted have been its by-product at every stage.

The proof is very candid as we have witnessed the urgings of Chinese protests that call for an end to government officials' corruption, incompetence due to biasness, and misuse of power; and desire for transparent, honest and popularly responsive government, liberal democratic procedures. The victims of the Tiananmen massacre shedded their blood while calling for more responsible, transparent and lenient government. Although, the single-party state, no doubt, is very much infamous for its radical exercise of authority; the humanistic and communitarian ideals associated with socialism have by no ways been absolutely denied.

There is much of discontent in modern China, some of it ascribable to outrages generated before reforms, but most of it is attributable straight or obliquely to the impacts of reforms policies. Selden and Perry (2000) argue that the actual economic achievement of these policies have promoted "rising expectations" that could not only trigger protest but might culminate in revolution. Furthermore, a sense of "relative deprivation", the expanding gap among greater beneficiaries, lesser beneficiaries and indirect victims of the reforms, has clearly cultivated among the victims and less fortunate that produces not only individual frustration but , at times may become capable of steering collective violence.

Different types of disputes and protests can be directly accredited to the reforms, yet they are some rooted in other contests like tax riots, environmental related protests, ethnic clashes, religious and gender related protestations, legal disputes, pro-democracy movements, protests against corruption, labour strikes, and local electoral conflicts. Social rights and direct legal

disputes in increasing volume of court cases, continuously stress at the edge of government authority and increase the costs of state command. These challenges use social spaces created out of discord between central and local functionary, or between the state and private capital. They strengthen the reform plan, by calling for freer markets, socio- political rights, legal assurance and geographical mobility, state protection against exploitative bureaucrats and companies. The altogether force of these challenges has led to significant transformations in Modern China's law and social practices. The remarkable transformations have unfurled in economic, social and cultural spheres, but the impacts also have been felt in the political and judicial sphere.

In an enduring but zero-sum competition for the right and the potentiality to control obedience, state power and social power are challenging each other. However, they have a fascinating relationship between the emergence of civil society and the consolidation of social power under the authoritarian state. It can be stated that under specific situations, civil society can go hand in hand with authoritarian state. It means initially after going through tumultuous the state may face comparatively more difficult to organize with regard to relatively matured civil society; but, after consolidation of its authority it is relatively congruous to undergo and transform in the styles that allow for better governance.

Need for labour migration strengthened the forces to ease the household registration (Hukou) system which had separated people through inflexible classifications, such as urban and rural residence, that had pre-empted migration from rural to urban area and formed a legal stratum of urban centres to the prejudice of villagers. Due to reform, a huge population preferred to shift their workplaces as well as residences to opt new scope for source of income. Feiling Wang (2010) puts forward that "outsiders" inside urban areas or in better agricultural areas became locus of rural sector, and migrants confronted tough official and unofficial curtailment in their new places. These migrant people legal urban registration continue to be disqualified for many important rights and benefits provided with legal urban registration; such educational right for their children, health and welfare benefits, pensions, legal right to rent or buy homes, and this made extremely tough for them to survive in the urban areas. They are viewed as second-class citizens and called as "floating population" by the state, and they with a huge

number have the capable source of agitation. In addition to these problems, they have become a source of crime and a growing threat to urban residents' jobs.

Urban industry withstood reform at the time when reform in economic and social sector was deepening in many areas throughout rural areas. The reason was urban industry was the major source of revenue, and most of them were functioned under the state. So the state was afraid of reform in this sector, as it might diminish its strength economically and politically and cripple the base of the national economy or might even give rise to unrest among the urban workers who were benefitted from the earlier revolution the most in terms of permanent employment, health care, pensions, sponsored housing and the advantages of being urban residents. Contrary to this, villagers were enjoying many benefits and were strictly commanded under the collective. So it can be said that reform was regarded as Janus-faced; as at one hand, to enlarge the options of market reforms, ease migration and to limit the collective, compulsion was ascending throughout the rural areas, and at the other hand, urban workers considered reform as a powerful menace to their income, security and overall condition.

The inceptive doubts of Chinese labour manifested prognostic. With some benefits brought by reform for SOE or collective workers in the industrial sector as well in the cities; initially industrial workers, especially villagers lost position, scope, lifetime employment and other combo benefits, to emerging entrepreneurs. Additionally, a large number of workers would also be deprived of such welfare gains like pensions that they had worked a lifetime to annex during of privatization of enterprises. And others who continued their jobs were needed to sign contracts with their employers, in the beginning for five years at max and after then usually for one year. The lifetime employment called as "iron rice bowl" came to an end with the loss of workers. Considerable number of workers got appointed on short-term contracts where they would not have any security or benefits, and it was unprecedented that they had to compete with rural migrant workers with meagre amount of wages. By early 2000s, the state sector had been reduced to core industries, since a horde of SOEs were transformed to shareholding corporations possessed by top-tier ex-officials, usually with private or foreign capital, and workers encounter persistent pressures from capital to repeal the rights secured earlier. Displacement and unemployment became common phenomena among SOE workers,

especially Older and women workers, which compelled many to do inferior low-grade jobs without security and interests.

The rift splitting the rich and the poor, amid and within provinces and also over social division and ethnic group, has broadened rapidly because of the market reforms. Following 1978 Market reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping strongly benefitted coastal over inland provinces by state investment and special approach to foreign markets and capital, which was absolutely different to industrial relocation to poorer and peripheral provinces during the Mao period. Government and individual funds drained into fast industrializing coastal provinces that prompted the roaring export of China. And in contrast to earlier class levelling, Reformers encouraged and magnified the fresh wealthy class under Deng's bolstering slogan "Let some get rich first". Actually, by the late 1990s various scholars decided that China in the process of two decades had shifted from the ranks of the world's most equitable societies to one of the most unevenly distributed incomes, resources and chances. However, the paramount leader Jiang Zemin established a high-profile scheme announced to amend this inequality, some resources emerged to have been designated to it and the coastal provinces resumed to lure the majority of foreign investment and overtook inland provinces. Socio-economic inequalities with regard to geography and class are often magnified by differentiation of ethnicity. (Bulag 2000) In the modern society of China of more mobility and better media approach, comprising of online connections have increased consciousness of income inequalities, obvious splendid expenditure and corrupt official procedures, and these imbalances may trigger popular anger and at times stimulate resistance.

Reform has been followed with an easing of command over economy and society in many, though not all spheres. Following the 1980s the Chinese government, concerning the population outburst, demanded the logical but draconian one-child policy implemented throughout, thus embracing straight into the nuclear family to manage reproduction. The one-child policy implemented strongly to guarantee that couples restrict themselves to a single child, acutely practiced till 1990s, and following the aftermath was made a bit discriminatory, presented harsh problems for a society whose core cultural essences are grounded with

affinities and a stress on the familial responsibility to confirm family progression through forthcoming generations, an action that needs a male child.

The one-child policy has attained substantial achievement in the urban areas, where most household can depend on state or collective allowances to supply them after retirement and where strict housing situations benefitted smaller households. However, in the rural areas, where no such welfare government functioned, and where the one-child policy concurred with the bankruptcy of community welfare plans like joint health care, the one-child policy presented excruciating choices for households. The outcomes have involved violent resistance that took such forms as a wave of urging to give birth to a second or next offspring, girl infanticide and, sometimes killing of cadres or household members of cadres who had charged compulsory expulsion of foetus, sterilizations and high penalty on offenders. As Tyrene White (2010) illustrates, rural-cantered resistance would ultimately stress the state to ease the one-child policy to allow a second offspring if the first is a girl. Alternative forces guided the state to welcome diversified births for minorities. Simultaneously, Sara Friedman too illustrates how the restraint on population growth has triggered unimagined results by creating a space for youth to engage in amorous affairs, even earlier than their constitutional marriage age. Disputes and oppositions regarding the state's draconian population checking rules have been going on.

Recently, analysts have advanced a triad of concepts to account for the emergence of powerful social movements: political opportunity structure, network mobilisation and collective action "framing". This "political process approach" has sensitized scholars to a wider array of relevant factors in generating social movements, ranging from the political climate and social connections to symbolic constructions.

Like earlier theories, it offers scant likelihood of forecasting the outcomes of social protest. It does, however, draw attention, in assessing the salience of social movements, to the need to examine not only the nature and levels of discontent in society or the strength, resources and flexibility of the state, but also the concrete opportunities, organisations and outlook of would-be protesters.

Early 1990's saw price reforms that narrowed the gap between the planned and market prices. The Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992 set the clear goal to construct a "socialist free-market economy" with "Chinese characteristics" for the first time. Qian (2000: 15-17) says that "At the outset of reform, China desired reform in order to increase productivity and improve living standards, but at no time did the leadership think that it was going for a full market system. The Chinese economy had taken a huge step from a centralized to market economy, but still carried some character of a planned economy. The 'Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure', adopted by the Third Plenum of the CCP Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993, was the turning point on China's road to markets. Since 1994, China's transition has moved into a new stage which aimed to replace the planned system with a market system."

Apart from the market reform, there are some other vital factors those influence the environment for the emergence and growth of civil society. Such major factors are foreign influence, globalization, internet, and information technology.

Impacts of "Foreign Influence, Globalisation and Internet"

Now-a-days the influences of foreign countries on China's civil society sphere cannot be ignored; as a huge amount of money is inflowing to China from different countries to aid various causes while building civil society with partnership of domestic NGOs. Rebecca R. Moore (2001) says, "Civil society initiatives are hugely popular among the international organisations working in China today." Between 2002 and 2009, US foundations made grants to China of over US$442 million.[7] In 2005, Germany's Protestant Church Development

---

[7] Data from The Foundation Centre online database, http://foundationcenter.org (accessed on 2nd May 2011 for 2003–09 data, and on 19th November 2006 for 2002 data).

Service (EED) dedicated €4.2 million to China for 32 ongoing projects and two scholarships.[8] In the same year, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), a government supported agency, committed CA$249,350,000 to new and continuing projects in China, including CA$2.1 million for direct support of Chinese NGOs from 2002 to 2006.[9] Hong Kong is also a regular source of funding for numerous programs in mainland China, through organisations such as Greenpeace, Oxfam Hong Kong and Partnerships for Community Development.

Anthony J. Spires (2012) describes that within this broader world of funding priorities, over the past decade, a number of grant makers and international NGOs have funded, initiated and designed training programs that introduce Chinese grantees and NGOs to 'best practices' in 'NGO management'. Their efforts have given birth to a small side industry of Chinese-run organisations that help design or implement "capacity-building" (能力建设nengli jianshe), programs. The usual interpretation that Chinese NGOs are deficient in "capacity" reveals a specific myopia on the part of donors and those with the ability to organise and spread the seminars, workshops and training programs apparently deliberated to reinforce the sector. Many of these organisations function as NGOs, with funding and content ideas coming from foreign donors.

To describe the nature of these foreign influences, as well as the attitude of the Chinese government, Anthony J. Spires (2012) writes, *"The 'non-profit management' agendas promoted in foreign-originated training programs are politically and economically conservative. For funders who want to expand or simply continue their involvement in China, a rhetorical commitment to democracy and community empowerment, coupled with practical emphasis on professionalization and hierarchical management, is well-aligned with the interests and rhetoric of the Chinese Party-state. For Chinese leaders who do not want to lose*

---

[8] Data from EED, http://www.eed.de/en/en.eed/en.eed.eed/en.eed.eed.finanzen.2006/index.html#HL0 (accessed on 19th September 2006). In 2005, EED received 65.7 per cent of its income from the German government.

[9] Data from CIDA, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-31112026-M6U#intro (Accessed 19 September 2006).

control over civil society, the lessons flowing into China about NGO management are also not especially threatening."

Courting the support of foreign governments, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and the international media, the new cybersects of the 1990s have managed to remain a thorn in the side of the current Chinese leadership, aiming to generate what Keck and Sikkink have termed "boomerangs" of transnational support and sympathy for their respective causes,6 and, occasionally, succeeding. (Patricia M. Thornton 2007)

Globalization

China's economic reforms, coupled with global markets and information technology, are increasingly connecting not only its business class but virtually all segments of Chinese society to the outside world, thereby producing new opportunities for engagement. These same trends have also been altering the relationship between the state and Chinese society in ways that have important implications for the status of human rights. Chinese civil organisations stand un-identical with their Western counterparts. Nevertheless, China's civil society is still evolving, and neither its future nor the merits of outside efforts to foster its development should be assessed apart from the forces of globalization at work in China today. Continued economic liberalization, legal reform, and global communications technology have been strengthening Chinese society vis-i-vis the state and connecting it to the outside world in unprecedented ways. Globalization is, in effect, providing outside actors with new opportunities to encourage the development of a civil society that is capable of anchoring political and legal reform deep in Chinese society. (Rebecca R. Moore 2001: 56-66)

The channels, through which outside forces can influence Chinese society while subverting the strict control of the state, are being proliferated by global markets and information technology. Global NGOs are also organizing forums for discussion and cooperation. Such cooperation among NGOs, coupled with and facilitated by information-age technology, will make it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to isolate and constrain civil society.

In the recent years, among the Chinese civil organisations, the awareness of the adequacy of information technology for consolidating information and human resources has been rapidly growing up. The potential of overseas agitators and international NGOs, to bypass the Chinese government and establish straight correspondence with the Chinese society, is highly promoted by new information technologies. The data and ideas to which Chinese citizens have access have been broadened by these technologies and in addition, pro-reform communities those surpass the political borders have also been founded. The Internet, for example, constitutes a sort of forum for free association, but it also expands the community in which one can exercise freedom of association.

Many sites have already started creating public forums for popular topics, independent intellectuals gathering while aiming democratic constitutional reforms. New media like the internet, mobile phones and social networks, especially micro-blogging (*weibo*), have become key source of communication and mobilisation in China. China is the biggest internet nation, with more than 60% of China's population now having access to the internet. In 2014, China has more than 800 million internet users marking 22% of world total internet users. It should be noted that in China, mobile phones are used as the primary means of accessing the internet rather than computers. Around 80 percent China's internet users access the internet through their smart-phones. There are over 1.2 billion mobile phone users in China, of which more than 485 million people were connected to the 3G signal. As Twitter is blocked in China, micro-blogs have been created as the Chinese substitute. Mobile micro-blogging has become highly popular among the young generations as an option for manifesting individual opinions and news, as well spreading current events related information, mainly which are not shown by the official media and might going to be lost due to non-reporting in the official media. Micro-blogs are also used as the private extensions of some journalists' professional work. This is one of the ways to evade the restrictions on the media and to circumvent the state directives that direct what (or what not) to write about. Though micro-blog communities are not organised or slackly organised, due to the immenseness and efficacy can be considered as a part of civil society. Apart from spreading information and personal comments or opinions, mobiles and internet can also be used to mobilise groups of people. There are several examples where

activists were successfully organised by either mobile phones (SMS) or micro-blogs.[10] While the internet and micro-blogs have been censured for a long time, mainly by blocking certain words and names and deleting messages, the Chinese government stepped up its efforts to control micro-blogs by introducing a real name policy for registering at the end of 2011. This new regulation is intended to prevent news being spread anonymously, but whether this will turn out to be an effective way of control remains to be seen. Very recent findings indicate that growing demand for mobile instant messaging apps such as WeChat are taking its toll on microblogs, or Weibos.

Chinese authorities have been striving to censor and block access to websites they find threatening, for example, various overseas Chinese dissident organisations and western sources of news and information. From the state's point of view, howbeit, the Internet poses a critical quandary. Various regulations intended to restrict Internet usage in China indicate that the government perceive as Internet as Janus-faced; as it is at one hand indispensable to the surging economic growth and at other a major menace of losing its control over the society.

Undoubtedly, internet is growingly viewed as decisive equipment by foreign actors to cut across government censorship for empowering Chinese society. The establishment of global nexus of NGOs, in the domain of civil society promotion by international civil society endorsement organisations, is expedited by the growing ease of communication.

---

[10] In 2007, the plan to build a chemical factory in Xiamen was prevented by a mass protest organised by text message, and in 2012 demonstrations broke out in Sichuan province after plans to build a copper plant were spread through micro-blogs.

Changing role of state

China has gone through a process of the transformation from a command economy to a market economy. The transformation was directed at gradually placing the market as the key mechanism of resource allocation. The nexus between the power of government and market forces in the Chinese economy has been evolving. For example, during older leaders(during 80s and 90s) in government reports market played a fundamental role; while in newer government reports under new generation leaders market played a decisive role and had the decisive voice in resource allocation by establishing a unified, open, competitive, and orderly market system. The changing role of the government means the government is pursuing to foster a dynamic economy by empowering more liberated market forces. This means we can see deeper businesses activity, better place for private sectors, open financial market system and developed market apparatus etc. The policies for protecting property rights and developing a healthy non-public sector are in line with China's commitment to continued free market reforms. Despite the determination of the Chinese government in implementing and deepening the market reforms, government will still play a leading role in the economy. Shaoguang Wang (2000) says, "The market is not a panacea for solving all our socioeconomic problems. Nor is it a neutral, natural, apolitical, and a historical institution. Moreover, the market is not an end in itself. Rather, it is just a means to promote social and individual welfare. For this reason, the potential role of non-market means, including state intervention, in improving welfare should be neither dismissed nor underestimated." Even after several decades of market reforms, the government today still has control of the commanding heights of Chinese economy, usually the upstream sectors such as resource and energy sectors.

Increasing Political Participation and Contestation

To meet the demands for political participation and to cope with the various social issues, the Chinese leadership has been undergoing various institutional and political reforms and most of these reforms straight or obliquely encourage the growth of civil society. However, that process has not been easy and smooth. In the 1980s, the leadership under Deng Xiaoping had laid down a grand plan for China's political reform. That reform movement ended with the crack down on the prodemocracy movement in 1989. The leadership has since been very resistant to any Western type of political liberalization. Nevertheless, China has also practiced different types of so-called "democracy with Chinese characteristics", such as intra-party democracy, village and township democracy, and deliberative democracy. However, the communist regime has always been able to accommodate different democratic elements without changing itself into a Western type of democracy. Deng, while rejecting the idea of democratizing China finding democracy, a western political invention, unfit for a country of vast territory, diversity of population and average low levels of education and could be destructive as he was afraid that democracy has the potential to create social disorder and anarchy; chose the authoritarian regime finding it compatible for the implementation reforms to get instant outcome. So the foremost task was to re-construct national trust in the Chinese Communist Party and to legitimize its rule. His famous quote "No matter it is a white cat or a black cat, the cat that catches the mice is the good cat" is a best demonstration of his pragmatism. Deng believed that political reforms were indispensable because the totalitarian political structure in 1978 would render economic reforms ineffective, as he said that "Without political change, economic reform would be impossible to maintain and advance".

In order to ensure successful economic development, the state carried out a series of political reforms that decentralized state political power and created more political freedoms for Chinese citizens, even though he did not mean to democratize. These reforms are village and local elections (Experiments in grassroots self-government), legal institutional reform (That improved the rule of law), and reform of representative organisations (Specifically the National People's Congress).

Village and Local Elections

Kevin J. O'Brien (2009) says that the village elections fostered by the government in China is one of the world's biggest grassroots democratic education operation. Since the early 1980's Elections to the People's Congress have been being held at the country and village levels. The sanction of the Organic Law of Village Committees (OLVC) signified the governmental launch of village elections in 1987 which was amended in 1998. The law vowed to self-governance through self-management, self-service and self-education. The advancement of self-governance in rural areas piloted a quick growth of grassroots organisations in the countryside and competitive village committee elections. The term "grassroots democracy" has since then been adopted to describe the political liberalization in rural areas as a result of the grassroots self-governance experiments. In 1998, the amended *Organic Law of Village Committees* promised democratic election, democratic decision making, democratic management and democratic supervision. Therefore, it set the requirements for village committees to implement democratic administration and subjected them to fiscal accountability. Village elections not only encouraged political participation but also initiated political contestation.

Legal Reforms

Changing rule state of Legal reform was another part of the political reform that ameliorates legal protection of citizens' basic rights and imposed limits on state power.

It is generally assumed that in spite of successful socio-economic reforms, the political system stays unchanged. But, to ease the disputes and resistances that associated with huge modifications in socio-economic sphere, the state has started legal reforms. An amended constitution declared in 1982 illustrated codes those furnish instructions about various matters such as environmental issues, labour matters, business matters intellectual property rights, etc. A huge education campaign has been unleashed to popularise the fresh rules. Intervention and negotiation departments and the judiciary have been strengthened for tackling the mushrooming conflicts and resistances, which refer to the attempts to alleviate the growing disputes which may ultimately trigger fierce resistance. The state fulfilling its promises

regarding legal claims, signalled by the state's agreements on various global conventions on socio-economic and cultural rights and also on civil and political rights, the state has declared assistances for religious autonomy, though solely for officially registered organisations, cultural independence for ethnic minorities.[11] But the nature of the outcomes is in contrast. All organisations have not enjoyed expanded religious or cultural freedom and all organisations have not got economic benefits. Even some minorities are experiencing huge pressures for absorption with the loss of autonomous rights.

Reform of National People's Congress (NPC)

CCP was superior (has completely upper hand) to NPC till the 1990's. Howbeit in the 1990's, NPC was improvised due to generational variations and risen education standards of the its deputies and NPC got more autonomy from the party state. In the course of years past, the local people's congresses and the NPC gradually became a court of appeal for Chinese citizens.[12] NPC gradually started to assert its role as a representative of social interests, some of which the government were disinclined to address.[13] Although the NPC continues to rubber stamp most of the party's policies and recommendations, delegates have got strengthened to abstain from or even challenge some proposals. In 1992, for example, when the NPC passed the "Resolution on the Construction of the Three Gorges Project on the Yangtze River" with 1,767 delegates voting in favour, a high number of 644 delegates abstained and 177 opposed the project. The institutional improvements of the NPC and local people's congresses have therefore established a more independent and effective legislative body that invites increasing political contestation.

---

[11] This is for the officially mentioned 56 nationalities those practice major supporting beneficial activities although are too placed under strict control.

[12] The NPC received increasing number of letters from private individual citizens for assistance in various personal matters, and protected the local people's congresses from the pressure of local government officials.

[13] Notably, in October 1989, the Standing Committee of the NPC for the first time rejected a law regarding urban neighbourhood committees after less than half of the members voted for it.

During the initial stage of party structure reforms, three main goals were pursued to achieve: (1) Segregation of the party and the government, (2) Curtailment bureaucratic incompetency and rent seeking behaviour, and (3) Local governments' power expansion. Substitution of younger college educated technocrats and professionals in place of old party comrades by founding the Central Advisory Commission (CAC) as a transition agency to invite old party comrades to step down was one major step to achieve these above mentioned goals. 'Espousal of pragmatism, emphasis on technical and administrative feasibility in policy-making, establishment of civil service system and the Ministry of Personnel, and more effective and far reaching governance' were the major efforts to institutionalize and regulate the party administrative system.

However, Geremie Barmé (2000) argues that the state has expanded the option for official patience regarding intellectual actions through writings and journalism. But still the situation of scholars with regard to the state is dubious like earlier period. Practically, the state's promise are many times marked off, sometimes brutally, generally due to security matters, but as well as sometimes concerning about cultural pollution (the ferrying of harmful foreign ideas which may cripple state recognised values). Cynicism of superstitious, rebellious, dissidents and factional movements has continuously exemplified oppressive state reactions. The brutal restraining operations to curb the quasi-Buddhist sect, Falun Gong movement, unauthorized Christian movements and other religious movements have shown the other face of the state. However, the mixture of fresh legislation, transforming social relationships, and the impetus and hindrance of "conflict, resistance and oppression" has induced a considerable political influence. The three obvious changes in socio-political changes illustrated by Feiling (2000) are as followed. First, following the 1980s, the state has prohibited the mass mobilization movements majorly which were the trademarks of earlier period. Second, the state has stopped its straight command on huge field of the rural as well as urban economy; though has been continuing with major areas of state command. Third, the state has allowed the growing migration and mobility even while resuming applying socio-political features deep-rooted in the Hukou system of population growth checking. The extensively promoted village elections indicate the rationality as well as ceiling of political reforms. The state promoted democratic elections have clearly been implemented in almost half of China's villages. However, with

regard to the whole country, grassroots practices induce weak influence on the implementation of authority, because independent opposition parties are illegal and the CPC strictly supervise the nomination process. The state sponsored small minority parties around the country created by the CPC are obliged to obedience to the party. Writings of all kinds, on-line and offline are confined by a well organised department of party censorship, where as the state ideology continues to be Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, be it under Deng Xiaoping or next-in-lines Jiang, Hu or Xi.

In spite of considerable transformations like an extended role for the NPC, a clear separation continues between free-wheeling economic growth and the enduring restricted political environment. Although local resistances have been appeared during the reforms, the state has been persistently successful in curbing them through isolation of resistances. Fairly crucial has been the CCP's potential to swallow various strong discontents of its critics without tightening the state authority hard. The state sheltered demands for the market reforms and non-governmental sector and expanded the opportunities of the legal system, promoted village elections, and allowed NGOs to perform. Moreover, apart from curbing social conflicts and resistances, the state's positive accomplishments regarding the market reforms have reasonably triggered the emergence of civil society.

Reform leaders' idea of reform was planned to legitimate party rule by facilitating economic reforms on a practical basis; which means not a change of the system, but a change within the system. During the initial period of reform Deng Xiaoping the then paramount leader reform regarded democracy as a medium to modernization rather than a political aim worth pursuing. And he did not validate democracy, but his declaration for political reforms developed hopes among the general population for democratization. Actually he considered that CCP was the only proper vehicle to achieve modernization. The prosperous and surging economic reforms increased Chinese citizens' standard of living and education level who increasingly urging for political freedoms. Liberal ideas to China were also introduced by the increased global trade and communication with China. The above brief historical account of the economic and political reform has briefly explained the socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to the emergence of civil society.

The Chinese saying 'Cross the river by touching stones' (摸石头过河 mo shitou guohe) or the criticism 'blind men are feeling an elephant', whichever way we take it undoubtedly the reforms in China has been a huge success. Reasons can be many like pragmatic approach of the government, strong ruling party, powerful central government, close relationship between people and CPC, strong support from people for the government, Sinicization of Marxism,[14] correct balance among reform, development and stability, well management of efficiency, fairness, gradual reform instead of radical reform etc. And be it the pros or cons of market reforms, both triggered the immergence of civil society.

---

[14] Sinisization means localization of Marxism while considering the situation of China.

Third Chapter

Emergence of Civil Society Organisations

After going through the brief market reforms and the changing role of state, now it's time to look for the main theme i.e. civil society organisations. This chapter, in the beginning, talks about the emergence of civil society organizations. Then it tries to categorise, in different thematic division, the so far different types of NGOs and related other various organisations while looking into their legal status, variation in autonomy and .

It wouldn't be precise to say that there was no existence of civil organizations at all before 1978; even before 1949 there were traditional secret societies, and the automatically founded rural civil organisations survived for a protracted period. Though they were autonomous skilful associations in the field of business and conveyance; but they were not like contemporary civil organisations and were very much insignificant in numbers and activities. Almost every civil association, which had appeared before 1949, were dissipated. Due to the impacts of western culture, civil organisations in China, autonomous from the state, started functioning strongly in the last century. Nonetheless, there is no particular study about the figure of civil organisations and the level of their active functions; and whatever related data we have, their estimations differ hugely.[15] In the Chinese history, civil society has disappeared by 1949, and the emergence of a relatively independent civil society is a product of modern China. If we trace back to the history of modern China (PRC), we will find that from 1949 to 1966 (the beginning of Cultural Revolution), some social organisations came into existence due to political needs. These social organisations included the Women's Federation, the Federation of youth, the Federation of Industry and Commerce, and many academic and arts groups. But from 1966 to 1978, because of the influence of Cultural Revolution, all of the groups stopped their activities and no new groups were established. But by 1989, there were around 6000 national social groups in China which is more than 50 times that of 1978. So this shows that from 1978 to

---

[15] For example, "According to a record, there were about 1,000 civil organizations in China in the first half of the 20th century. According to another research, it was estimated that there were over 80,000." (Wang Ying and Sun Bingyao, 1999).

1989 something happened unparallel in the history of civil organisations in China. The force behind the unprecedented rise of civil society is the market reforms under 'Reforms and Opening up' that unfolded after 1978.

Creating a space for the emergence of civil society

At one hand, to keep with as well as to fasten the developmental pace of the world, China has wonderfully done the extraordinary economic development with acute awareness of shifting political alignments and ideological formulations. And this age of interdependency made it easier than expected. The economic reform in China is one of the successful milestones in contemporary world history which largely developed the productive forces contributing to unprecedented economic prosperity and rapidly improved the living standards of common people in China.

At the other hand, this generated enormous foundational modification to the society of China. According to Rebecca R. Moore (2001), one of the decisive outcomes of "Reform and Opening Up" was that the economic, cultural, legal, and political, habitat for the survival and growth of civil society experienced structural transformation. Market forces have pressurised the state to provide a space for the emergence of civil society in China. This fostered the development of various modern civil organisations initially in the history of China.

There is widespread acceptance that since 1978 China's gradual adoption of market economic reforms has altered the relationship between the state and society by redistributing economic resources in society's favour. Recent changes in the relationship between state and society in China, including the emergence of new social associations or organizations (社会团体shehui tuanti) are largely a product of economic reform. The state, by pulling back, created a space for the emergence of new social groups with economic resources at their disposal. Rebecca R. Moore (2001) says, a top-down process of economic liberalization has triggered, at the grass roots, the formation of new social groups; many of which provide services in areas such as health and education, environmental advocacy etc. These new social organisations now make up a fledgling civil society.

The mounting social disparity resulted out of growing area wise economical differentiation has appeared across the country. There were multiple factors for the sectorial disparity culminated from the market reforms which are discussed in the previous chapter. In a brief they include, state-owned enterprise reform, diversification of the ownership system, agricultural reform like household responsibility system, economic opening with the swift mushrooming of non-state economic bodies like township and village enterprises, fiscal decentralization, augmentation of specialization etc. Gordon white (1993) says, "*With the spread of market relations more and more economic actors are now outside the old protective shells of the work unit, be it a state enterprise or an agricultural collective. But separation brings isolation, and decreased dependence brings increasing vulnerability. This generates both a greater consciousness of individual interests and greater awareness of the need to protect them in the context of pressures from both the state and the market.*" Since the individual economic agent is powerless against both the market and a still powerful state, there is a trend towards recognition of a group interest (群体认同qunti rentong) and, in turn, pressure for a social organization to act on behalf of this group interest. From the angle of the party-state, also, many reformers acknowledged that in the new context of an increasingly marketized economy the old forms of control and regulation were growingly incompetent and new organizational structure had become indispensable, to connect the state with the economy more conveniently and to play a key role representing the state. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the state has been the dominant force behind the establishment of new organisations. It's not just an issue of vertical control; in an economic perspective where market relations breach the old boundaries between systems, such organisations can play a crucial role, not solely in bridging between the state and the independent economic actors, but also in synchronising among various economic 'components' (e.g., fonns of ownership) and various state departments. Discrete state agencies consider these organisations serviceable as a tool of management and command over 'their' sectors of the economy, as well as in easing communication and coordination with other agencies regarding a semi- reformed - half-planned and half-market politico-economic system.

Now while going through the environment for the creation of space for civil society, let's look at the emergence of civil society organization in two sections with respect to the year 1989;

one is pre-1989 and the other is post 1989. The rise of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) indicates profound changes in China. At one hand, the decade of market reforms has given rise to new forms of social organizations and greater interest in volunteerism; on the other hand, the party-state has cautiously welcomed the social welfare role played by NGOs.

Pre-1989

The social demarcation between a "moral civil sector and a strong bureaucracy" has generated two boisterous forces which resulted in triggering the expansion of non-governmental organisations. The social stratum stemming from wealth redistribution, and the generation and metamorphosis of value systems emerging from the modern ideological receptiveness have been van guarding the multifariousness of society with regard to interests, lifestyles and values. The irrevocable vogues of social diversification, civil society development and personal boundaries expansion, principally outside of government sector, have already started. Consequential dispute between the diversifying social structure and the homogenizing propensity of the rigid single party system are becoming inescapable. And simultaneously growing popular resentment, combined with a scarcity of officially sanctioned outlets, is creating civil movements outside government. Now is the right moment to deal with these issues, as China is facing dramatic and unprecedented socioeconomic and socio-political transformation. Many citizens have started debating the country's future projection by discussing the domestic policy issues like governance, market economy models, government-market relations, state-citizen relations, and party-state relations for the effective delivery of public goods.

During 1980's civil organisations were mainly referred to the post reform social organisations like academic associations, research associations, and general groups and foundations. The members of these social associations basically were intellectuals, farmers, retired party cadres, and individual practitioners. Intellectuals and peasants were the leading members of these organisations during the initial phase of Reform and Opening up. Eventually they got the responsibility of the development of civil organisations. The first sign of the revival of

academic groups sparked after the Reform and Opening since those had undergone the political persecution and social constraints during the Cultural Revolution. In 1978 based on the sketchy data, 78 associations of the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) were re-established which increased to 249 in 1979. Majority of the social organisations were established by CCP and state-owned units and some of them by the combined efforts of CCP, state-owned units and social associations. In the late 1980's, CCP issued laws and regulations to standardize a framework for civil organisations, and the State Council founded a social group registration department within the Ministry of Civil Affairs to boost the registration of organisations. It dispatched the parameters for Foundation Administration (基金会管理办法 jijinhui guanli banfa) and the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration（社会团体登记管理条列 shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaolie）respectively. These above two regulations were the initial standards for civil organisations. By the end of 1980s academic civil organisations, many rapid village and township science promotion associations, professional technological research associations backed by China Association for Science and Technology started mushrooming. According to 1988 data from CAST and from the State Statistical Bureau, by the end of 1987, the number of CAST supported academic associations and branch scientific associations were 146 and 1,555 respectively. But the rapid growing village and township science promotion associations topped 46,500. A national network of urban and rural academic associations and public science promulgation had been established.[16]

Rebecca R. Moore (2001) says that further muddling the scenario, nonetheless, are the efforts by the Chinese government to co-opt and compel the NGO community through a series of administrative policies. Between 1980 and 1989, China's State Council and Ministry of Civil Affairs issued various regulations directed to modulate the rapidly mushrooming number of social organisations. Not until 1989, nonetheless, did the state enact a comprehensive set of regulations for the registration and regulation of social organisations.

---

[16] Tian Liangmu, Shen Xiaodan (1988), "zhongguo ke xie guo jia tong ji ju shou ci fa bu zi liao wo guo xian you ke ji she tuan 146 ge", *ren min ri bao* (3rd edition), November 6.

Post-1989

Rebecca R. MooreSource (2001) says, according to the 1989 rules, which were part of a much larger effort by the government to reassert control in the wake of Tiananmen Square, require that all social organisations register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs after first obtaining a state or party sponsor, often referred to as a "mother-in-law". This provision was designed to prohibit similar associations from forming within the same administrative jurisdiction, and thereby to limit the total number of legally recognized organisations.

During the pre-1989 period, China's civil organisations underwent a highly mutating phase from their initial appearance to huge growth organized from the top down of associations appearing across the society. The development of civil organizations reached a new height after going through a decadal political and systemic transformation. The utter force of unceasing reform and Opening, socioeconomic development along with liberation of thinking, the lack of constraints, resulted in the acute growth of civil organisations; the rocketing number of social organisations from 5000 in 1988[17] to 154,500 in 1992. During 1990's along with reforms and opening up a wave of forming groups was unfurled among several academic-scientific-research associations influencing economic and social life.

The clean-up and reorganization was underway for one year, until June of 1991. Through the process, the number of civil organisations registered in the unified system rose from 1990's 10,855 to 82,814 in 1991 and 154,502 by 1992, increases of 6.63 times and 13.2 times, respectively. By 1992 more than 120,000 agricultural technology research associations having millions of members were established. These associations dealt with various kinds of tasks almost 140 kinds including planting, breeding, building, commercial economy promulgation of technology at the village level, affairs related to village and township enterprises, service industries.

---

[17] As the Ministry of Civil Affairs began keeping registration data in 1988.

After 1992, China's civil organisations underwent some major changes. Wang Ming illustrates this period from 1992 to 2007 in two themes. The first one is a process of systematising management to tackle the backdrop of political variations. The other one is the moderate emergence of civil organisations from development among zigzag to a new height, took place during the period of China's mushrooming market economy, intensifying reforms and opening, and expanding social transformations. To have an understanding of china's civil organisations during the one and half decade lets go through Wang Ming's work.

Systemization of Management

During the first period the related system frameworks was incompatible with the development of civil organisations, actually was lagging far behind. So for a single party government, a standardised management of the system framework was indispensable to match the developing civil organisations. In the absence of a standardised system (a legal-regulatory-framework and unified operating models), the emergence of many civil organisations was getting help from the top-down system and involvement of different sections of society and posed challenges to the old system framework. This condition, a bit chaotic in nature, brought the attention of government to design a management system. Various steps were taken to resolve the problems. The major steps were: (1) legal registration and the clean-up and reorganization of civil organisations, (2) a ban on rural cooperative foundations and (3) the formation of a dual administrative system. These above steps weren't taken at once but in a gradual way, over a period of decade, by political components and administrative accommodation. These policy measures incurred repressing effect on the development of civil organisations, curbing the enthusiasm for social organisations sprouted due to top-down support from the centre. From the figures a striking downfall of the development of civil associations during this period can be seen. During 1999-2000, ban on "Illegal organisations" by the State Council, being a part of the social administration, restrained the growth of civil organisations duties of some party-state institutions. And the dual system, created between a political and administrative system, became a big systemic hurdle on to the developmental way of civil associations.

After China underwent a period of gradual building of market economy, deepening of reforms and opening up, political change and evolving society, civil organisations of China, after going through a long period of twists and turns[18], once again reached a new height and entered a new period of their history. From 1999 till 2007, approximately 30% per year annual growth has been being marked in the number of civil organisations has grown. Separately, according to official website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs' China Civil Organisations Net (中国民间组织网), base on the year-end registration data from multiple levels of registration entities, the total number of civil organisations at year-end 2007 was 386,900, growth of 171% compared with the total in 1999. (http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/)

During this period of development though the growth of academic associations was almost static[19], but the growth of industrial and commercial associations was very fast.[20] And the grassroots organisations germinated for the first time,[21] while many other foundations undergo both glory and transformation. (Wang Ming 2010:30) Steps like incorporation of people-run non-enterprise units (PRNEUs) into a unified registration system[22] and other new types of civil organisations emerged one after the other.[23]

---

[18] The period of twists and turns extended almost ten years from the beginning of the 1990s. This undoubtedly is due to the negative impacts of the "clean-up and reorganization" campaigns described above.42 According to the results of our data search, civil organizations hit a low point in 1998. Our search shows that only one hundred some civil organizations were founded that year, less than one-fifth of the rate from 1985.

[19] Wang Ming says, 'Compared to the prior period, growth among academic associations was sluggish compared to growth of non-academic associations and socialist economic (社会经济类) organizations, which, during this period, quickly became the primary segment among civil organizations. According to our search, starting in the mid 1990s, the number of new socialist economic organizations each year began to surpass new academic associations. Starting in 1999, the number of the former began to grow at 30% a year until, in 2007, they outnumbered academic associations by a ratio of 4:1.'

[20] With China's market reforms and the surging growth of the whole economy, many types of industrial, commercial, and development associations sprouted up. Along with these, a new association-oriented population of enterprises and businesspeople emerged. Figures from registration institutions show that from 2002 to 2006, industrial-type social groups grew from 39,100 to 59,700, a growth of 20,600 organizations. At the same time, this type of organization's share of all social groups grew from 29% to 31%.44. (Wang Ming)

[21] The development of China's grassroots organizations is inextricably linked to the activities of foreign relief organizations in China. Grassroots organizations appeared across many fields related to the underprivileged groups' welfare, such as poverty alleviation, women's and children's rights, ecological and environmental protection, handicapped persons' welfare, benefits for rural workers in cities, and AIDS relief.

[22] In October of 1998, the State Council released the Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration (民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条列). They also set to work surveying and

The government set about established a unified registration system and a dual, standardized administration system framework, and, after some reversals, finally established a complete framework and system structure for government administration of civil organisations in the late 1990s. During this process, and after civil organisations experienced not insignificant twists and turns, amidst a maturing market economy, deepening reforms and social transformations, civil organizations gradually emerged from their serpentine path and proceeded to a new peak, exhibiting a trend with several clear characteristics.

Social Background

This section is a consideration and brief analysis of Wang Ming's tripartite thematic division to understand the social background of the emergence and development of China's civil organisations, from the three given angles of system reforms, the public sphere, and collective action.

System Reform

Wang Ming says that system reforms have acted as a catalyst for the civil organisations in China marking the initial base for the striking emergence and unparalleled development of civil organisations. He explained this under the phrase 'emergence theory' of civil organisations in China which is as follows. Market, government and civil organisations were in a very complex relation to each other where they were neither completely inside nor outside the government system, having the perilous position of resistance yet with countless strings attached. (Wang

registering all kinds of privately-run social service institutions all over the nation. Through over two years of efforts, by year-end 2001, the Ministry of Civil Affairs had registered 82,089 PRNEUs. By year-end 2007, that number had reached 173,915, a growth of 111.86% since 2001.

[23] These have included clubs, friendship associations, salons, motorist clubs, and all manner of associational organizations. This has especially been the case since the birth and spread of the Internet, as all types of Internet groups have formed, becoming an indisputable force influencing social life and even political life.

Ming 2010：37) During the initial phases of the Reform and Opening in China when implementation of market mechanisms and several transformations in the society were going on, the proximity of 'market failures'[24] began to be prognosticated in the economist's circle and CCP felt that markets were still not reliable or effective enough to guarantee interests or justice. The discussion about that prognostication was directed towards the underpinning of civil organisations. Thus since late 80s civil organisations were perceived as beneficiary and enjoyed acceptance and liberality of the system. The reformers felt the need of civil organisations and tried to make it sure that the government would use them their support by limiting and standardising them. Precisely because the need for civil organisations came from within the system itself, as long as the Reform and Opening proceeded, civil organisations were guaranteed system space, political tolerance and policy support.

Public Sphere

He further explains the inner logic of civil organizations' development in China as public sphere. The public sphere which was familiarised by Jürgen Habermas defines it as the space between society and state where citizens freely participate in social, public affairs. It is a social realm marked by public requirement, public arbitrator, public interest, and public participation having influence on public and social affairs by citizens permeated with autonomy, independence and awareness of sovereignty. It is the backbone for the society to undertake social activity. Civil organisations are taken as the apparatus for the institutionalization of a public sphere.[25] Citizens imbued with the character of autonomy, independence, awareness of

---

[24] Market failures, often used to justify government interventions, are also offered as an explanation for the appearance of NGOs. Under ideal market conditions, market mechanisms allocate resources optimally. In reality, however, market mechanisms can result in sub-optimal resource allocations or inefficiencies, known as "market failures". Causes of market failures include: natural monopolies, externalities, exclusion, asymmetric information, transaction costs, and public goods or services. For these reasons, resource allocation through market mechanisms can be less than optimal. Correcting these failures can require government or political interventions. Sometimes, because government or political interventions might result in even worse results, NGO interventions are chosen.

[25] Habermas thusly defines civil society: "the essential mechanisms of 'civil society' are formed voluntarily by non-state and non-economic actors. These organizations include churches, cultural groups and academic associations, as well as independent media, sport and leisure clubs, music associations, debate clubs, citizens forums and citizens associations. Furthermore, it includes professional groups, political parties, unions and other organizations". Habermas (1962), *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*

.

sovereignty and consciousness of public participation are the necessary foundation for civil organisations. In the 1990s, along with the introduction of market economics, the China experienced a sustained surge of economic growth, a quickening of government reforms, and a broad social transformation. Along with the enormous increase in wealth and clear improvements in living standards, society's demand for public goods and services also rapidly increased. Demand also expanded for more diverse forms of spiritual life, cultural life, social life, and even political life. As the sphere of citizens' freedoms grew, citizens, increasingly exhibiting both a free and independent character and a consciousness of sovereignty, displayed an unprecedented enthusiasm for public participation. Under the conditions, and amidst this social transformation, there was a clear expansion of the public sphere at every level of society and in every field. The indicators like more accumulation of resources in the sphere, more participation of citizens, more intermediaries focus on the sphere and more involvement of liberal, interested, socially responsible people provided a continuous and gradual growth of the public sphere, and the appearance of various types of civil associations at every place be that at the margins or within a system or between two systems or among the three i.e. state, society and market. These public spheres provide a various types of social services like public services, welfare services and intermediary services by alluring social resources and convincing large scale involvement creating a gradual developing civil society system apart from state and market systems. Environmental protection is one of the works done by the public sphere. The third important reason of the civil organisations' development is 'collective action'.

Collective Action

Civil organisations of any era cannot but reflect the common interests and values of the social classes of their era. Thus, the process of civil organisations' growth over time can also embody transformations in class divisions and social tensions over different periods. He has borrowed Olsen's concept of "collective action" to explain the class basis of civil organisations' development and the transformation of that development.[26]

---

[26] Mancur Lloyd Olsen is the principal founder of public choice theory. His applied economic theories examined the case of American unions and revealed that in collective action remain problems like the prisoner's dilemma and free riding. His *Logic of Collective Action* has been translated into more than ten languages and is regarded as

Market reforms became a bit mature while as well the society transformed up to some extent after experiencing a certain period of Reform and Opening up. Meanwhile market reforms experienced rapid economic development bestowed the Chinese society with immense wealth, establishing new social classes and social power for civil associations to be dealt with. These new social classes or powers are political elites, intellectual elites and economic elite.

Political Elite

Political elites' participation gradually played a major role in the development of civil organisations. Wang Ming describes these political elites differently on the basis of their backgrounds. These political elites were mainly from the following backgrounds. 1) The reform of party and government institutions, 2) Decisions by officials to leave their positions for the marketplace, and 3) The dependency of civil organisations on their responsible departments for administrative support and personnel.

Six large-scale party and government institutional reforms took place in the years of 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008[27] adjusting the government functions mainly reduced or downsized. The effectiveness of civil organisations was strengthened as many of party-government officials joined these organisations after each round of reforms. The big outcome of these adjustments in government functions and administrative reforms was resulted in many important public resources, functions and government institutions fell under the purvey of civil organisations.[28]

---

the seminal work of public choice theory. Olsen's collective action concept is used mostly used to analyze a fixed group. Here, his concept is used primarily to analyze the collective formation of social strata. /Olsen, Chen Yu, et al. trans.,　　　　/ji ti xing dong de luo ji, Shanghai san lian shu dian, 1995.

[27] Shao Pingying (2005), "中国政府机构改革的历史回顾及基本经验 / zhongguo zheng fu ji gou gai ge de li shi hui gu ji ji ben jing yan", in 池州师专学报/*chi zhou shi zhuan xue bao*, 19(6):89–94; and Chen Jilian (2005: 28–29), "Historical Reflections and Experiences of the Chinese Government's Structural Reforms" in the *Chizhou Junior Normal School College Journal*.

[28] This was the case, for example, after the reforms of 1998, in which the State Council dismantled nine national, economic, administrative departments, instituting in their place ten national, industry federations.

The second major source of political elite participation in civil organizations was the decisions by officials to resign their positions for the market in the years 1984, 1987, 1993, and 2000. A powerful boom in economic activity arose as several thousands of officials left public sector for the private sector to utilize their skills with the help of civil organizations to serve the people.[29]

The system itself is the third source of political elites. In the late 1980s, the foundation of the dual administrative system for civil organizations elucidated the jurisdiction of different administrative departments regarding respected civil organizations. Besides, its foundation brought a systemic confirmation of the administrative and personnel relationships which had been unfolding over time between civil organizations and respected departments. Despite the above, the design also gradually generated an "absence of division between government and society" and concomitant issues of incompetency and cumbersomeness. Civil organizations' responsible departments were not only able to ply them with administrative resources, power, functions, and other advantages, but also had certain powers with regards to hiring and firing cadres, allowing them to sustain "personnel exchanges" between the different departments. On the one hand, this offered government institutions a personnel "reservoir" to help enliven their reform efforts; on the other, it strengthened administration and controls of civil organizations.

Mainly because of these above three channels, civil organizations became capable of engaging members of the political gentry from party-government institutions during the period of the Reform and Opening. With their advent, these members brought political and administrative hoards, triggered and expanded potential social resources, and assign themselves to engagement in and guidance of civil organizations, thereby unfolding as a crucial force behind civil organizations by struggling amidst the political and administrative system.

Intellectual Elite

---

[29] Though we are without clear evidence to prove this process, we discovered in the recently convened "China NGOs Oral History" project that many civil organization leaders were officials courageously sent down. Examples include Shenzhen's Guo Xiaohui, Hainan's Leng Mingquan, and Yilong, Sichuan's Gao Xiangjun.

Secondly, wise intellectual elite was vital to the zest of civil organizations' development. In Wang Ming's language, "these elite refer to intellectuals with fierce senses of social responsibility. Well-suited to independent thinking, publicly-concerned and socially responsible, rich in knowledge and social influence, these intellectuals also contributed in many ways and as leaders to civil organizations, some of them event expressing their ardent support and enthusiasm for the movement." After being rehabilitated during the "setting right" and having gotten back on their feet through civil organizations, over the course of the Reform and Opening's divisions and permutations, China's intellectuals split. Some went overseas; some entered the market economy; and some even became officials. Those with the strongest sense of social responsibility developed into the intellectual elite referred to here. In Chinese society, this group proximately resembles Habermas's "citizens instilled with autonomy, independent character, and a consciousness of sovereignty". (Habermas 1962) They organised civil organizations from ideals and value systems, have intense enthusiasm for civil organizations, sprang with their total capacities into the practice of civil organizations, and audaciously came forward to accept all kinds of social challenges.[30]

Economic Elite

Members of the economic elite emerged as a new social power for civil organizations. The economic elite, as used here, indicates to a class of successful entrepreneurs and rich persons with deep consciousness of social responsibility and the capability to perform for the public interest. With 30 years of endured, outrageous economic development and the accreditation of the national economy, living standards in China rose remarkably, the wealth of the country boomed, and, consequently, the volume of the financial assets of households expanded and the

---

[30] Reflecting on the moving deeds of Liang Congjie of Friends of Nature, Liao Xiaoyi of Global Village, Wang Yongchen of Green Earth, Yang Xin of Green River, Liu Detian of the Black Beak Gull Protection Association, Wang Xingjuan of Red Maple women's' hotlines, Tian Huiping of Stars and Rain and countless other eminent members of the intellectual elite, and the activities of the eminent civil organizations they founded, we are reminded of that generation of the intellectual elite that even now is the spiritual backbone of China's civil organizations. Their spirit of sacrifice also rallied young elite intellectuals to the cause. In recent years, increasing numbers of graduates with master's and Ph.D. degrees and overseas educational experience have been joining civil organizations. They've started new organizations; participated in projects; served as volunteers; taken surveys and interviews and written reports. They've brought with them vigor, dynamism and knowledge; but the most key contributions of these youths to civil organizations have been their innovations, change, and hope.

number of very wealthy people increased at an unprecedented rate. This newly appeared social class promptly showed its deep interest in getting associated with social welfare measures. During the late 2010s, participation in social welfare work as well as donations to foundations by Chinese enterprises, specifically privately-owned enterprises, has risen significantly. Simultaneously, registered non-public-fundraising kind of foundations' number has increased with huge expansion of the total assets held by registered foundations. This was most evident when, after 2008's Wenchuan, Sichuan earthquake a record was set with 57 billion yuan donated in two months. This effort was aided by no small number of entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals donating millions, tens of millions, or even hundreds of millions of yuan. This goes to show that concern and active participation in social welfare activities are expressions of a clearly present sense of social responsibility and character on the part of this, most wealthy class. For China's civil organizations, this is an indispensable new social resource. What's more, this innovative and wealthy class has demonstrated its enthusiasm and willingness to participate in social, public works and even in political life. In recent years, signs of active participation in social, public works on the part of entrepreneurs also can be seen amidst the development and dynamism of industrial and commercial associations, and in changes in these associations' governance structures. According to data from civil organization administrative departments in Shenzhen, over half of the chairs of Shenzhen's industrial and commercial associations have become deputies at various levels of the People's Congress or Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress, Guo Xiaohui has, in just the last year, proposed over 20 policies and legislative proposals, 11 of which have been adopted and become policy measures. The Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment (外商投资企业协会) that she leads already functions, to a certain degree, as a policy advocate and a think tank.

Hence, with regard to intensifying reforms, evolving market system, and growing social transformations, the class basis for civil organizations' development have gone ahead from intellectuals and peasants to include the political elite, the intellectual elite and the economic elite. This refers that with respect to the massive transformation, civil organizations have successfully expanded its support base to the elite classes that is potential, to an extent, of

representing the maximum basic interests of the people, developed cultural direction, advanced productive power of the society. By this shift, civil organizations marked a new level. This represents the real foundation underpinning the new and sustainable height reached by China's civil organizations in recent years.

Over this sustained, twenty five year long period of opportunity, civil organizations of all types surged in numbers amidst the tumult of the Reform and Opening, serving as an indispensable, driving force behind China's social changes.

In the wake of the devastating Sichuan earthquake in 2008, the Chinese state, for the first time in the history of the People's Republic, held a nationwide mourning rite for ordinary disaster victims. Drawing on the state-society relations perspective, it can be argued that the emergence of "mourning for the ordinary" can be explained by some important changes in structural state-society relations in China in the 2000s, such as the rapidly developing civil society with moral consciousness and the more adaptive authoritarian Chinese state with concern about its moral legitimacy. These changes were strengthened in the situational dynamics in 2008, which led to the state's acceptance of a mourning proposal from the public sphere. The mourning did not occur in previous disasters because those structural factors were absent or weak and the situational dynamics were different.

Hu's Era: Harmonious Society

Then, entering the 1990's, as China's economy adopted market mechanisms, government accelerated its reforms, and social transformations swept the nation, civil organizations increasingly began to exhibit 'civil' traits, even gradually, the non profit orientation that would distinguish them from enterprises. After 1998, China's government successively drafted and issued several important regulations, forming a more mature, systemic framework. Following the introduction of the Harmonious Society Strategic Aims (和谐社会的战略目标), civil organizations have enjoyed broader participation in state's and society's public governance of

China's politics, economy, culture, and society. This has allowed civil organizations to realize their systemic, non-governmental advantage over party-government institutions as well as their non profit, public welfare, or common welfare governance advantages over enterprises. This participation has also allowed them to contribute to creating a cooperative framework between party-government and private sectors, and, through this interaction, to the edification of a Harmonious Society.

XI's Era: More of a continuation, less of a change

Even with the unrelenting attack on human rights defenders, 2013 will also be remembered as a year that saw encouraging developments in China's civil society. One unequivocal sign of growing and vibrant activism was precisely authorities' strong reaction to peaceful gatherings and public expressions of dissent. The strident nature of the crackdown testifies to how citizens' organized support for rule-of-law reforms and human rights protections reached a new height, unnerving the country's leaders who fear, above all, an increasingly assertive civil society that poses strong challenges to their legitimacy. Teng Biao, Chinese human rights lawyer says that Chinese citizens inspired by the "New Citizens' Movement" (新公民运动) took to the streets in 2013 to rally for anti-corruption measures, calling on top government officials to disclose their personal wealth.

One of the major concerns of this regime in 2013, for China analysts, has been an established openness to public participation in certain political affairs. Xi has shown the gesture to be open to experimenting with a bigger task for civil society in tackling some social issues. David Cohen (2013) says, "*Both in sending signals and in the actual outcomes of a few high-profile clashes between popular media and local officials, Xi has appeared to be open to experimenting with a greater role for civil society in addressing some social problems. But Xi's 'opening' is hardly the first time we have seen relatively open political debate happen in China between crackdowns, and it is hard to pin down real changes in policy that might last.*"

Xi's attitude towards civil society is kind of ambiguous in nature. As predicted by Cohen and also by others, President Xi Jinping's national security commission, in 2013, began disseminating a harsh toned document, titled as 'Document No. 9', to party cadres that carried warning of "seven pitfalls" facing the party and admonished a staunch campaign regarding regulation of overseas NGOs largely based on ideas of democracy, freedom and human right. Party officials were warned against Western notion of constitutional democracy, civil society, etc. The resolution seems to be mirroring Xi Jinping's decision to restrain and to warn journalists of the consequences of challenging the party's monopoly on power. Overseas NGOs will be supervised under of the public security bureau, rather than under the ministry of civil affairs, which traditionally deals with them. In order to register, they would require finding a government agency to sponsor them, a requirement that could prove extremely tough for some. This was followed by a crackdown on human rights lawyers, media, scholars and others.[31] In the same line Simon Denyer (2015) says that China's state security tool has turned its sights on foreign NGOs and their domestic partners, which are bracing for a crackdown. Maya Wang, a China researcher at Human Rights Watch in Hong Kong, said the law, if adopted in its current form, would deal "a very severe blow" to foreign and domestic NGOs working in China. Jessica C. Teets. (2015) describes that one widespread logic is that of factional politics and Xi Jinping's rapid and seemingly total power consolidation. Perhaps more importantly, the new Xi administration mirrors a broader direction on the part of strengthening the Party and suppressing civil society and other forms of social participation.

But, on the contrary, Karla Simon, an expert on civil society law who has worked with the Chinese government, is optimistic about the proposed law. She says that the new regulations will allow China's charities and NGOs to multiply, as well as make it possible for thousands of currently unregistered NGOs to come within the system.

---

[31]Ms. Gao is known as a forthright and principled journalist. She was held in jail for more than a year after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and then served six years in prison in the 1990s on charges of leaking state secrets. She has written tough and clear-eyed commentary about China's leaders, including Mr. Xi. In a column published in early 2013, she declared that he was not a real reformer but was determined to restore the kind of authority and legitimacy Mao Zedong commanded in the early years of Communist Party rule. She was right: That is precisely what he has done.)

Between the Hu and Xi regime the major difference is the proposed international civil society registration regulations which would require these groups to register under the dual management system that is being phased out for domestic groups and replaced by direct registration. This new regulation needs that international groups to register with both a government agency as a sponsoring or supervisory agency, and that instead of registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the groups would register with the Ministry of Public Security. As Jessica C. Teets (2015) argues, the role for Public Security if this regulation is adopted would be a departure from Hu's policies regarding civil society, but not the concept of registering international groups and tying them more closely to government agencies. However, this is too early to predict Xi's administration, as there is no candid sign of radical change in the regulation of civil society in China; though it is important to see the furtherance of the proposed law which may give a direction to policy under Xi's administration. In spite of Xi Jinping's charisma and active attempts to 'rejuvenate' party supervision, the Xi administration, regarding civil society, is more of a continuation and less of a change from the Hu Jintao era.

Classification of Civil Organizations

After the analysis of different types of environment for the emergence and development of civil organizations in China, this section discusses about the various types of NGOs in their current situation. They can be differentiated on the basis of their legal status, degree of autonomy, and field of activities.

Legal Status

Basically four kinds of NGOs are distinguished according to their legal status in this section. They are: Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs), Registered NGOs, Non-Registered NGOs and International NGOs.

Government Organized NGOs

GONGOs have been established by party and government departments as non-profit organizations since the 1980s. Fundamentally three main reasons backed the establishment and development of GONGOs. First, the Chinese government felt it easier to get financial and technical assistance from international sources bilaterally and multilaterally in carrying out development projects by the participation of non-profit organizations. Second, GONGOs can assuage the social repercussion of the continuing economic reform by furnishing welfare services very much complementing to the government's efforts. Third, many government officials joined these GONGOs after losing their jobs during the 1990s administrative reforms which helped in the development of these organizations[34].

Registered NGOs

In spite of restraining legal requisites for the registration of NGOs with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, at the end of 2014 China had about 600,000 organizations registered as "social organizations" including government established NGOs. But it is a tough task to distinguish

between GONGOs and autonomous NGOs due to the diversity of GONGOs; there are many GONGOs in the process of transition to independent NGOs. Even private founded and funded NGOs which manage to register with the government either have governmental support or some connection with the party. This is the reason of many experts' argument about nonexistence of "real" Chinese NGOs.

According to China's Ministry of Civil Affairs, all NGOs should be registered as one of the following three categories: (1) the social organization (she hui tuan ti or she tuan 社会团体或社团), (2) the private non-enterprise unit (min ban fei qi ye dan wei 民办企业单位),7 and (3) the foundation (ji jin hui 基金会), or the branches of the overseas foundations (jin wai ji jin hui dai biao ji gou 境外基金会代表机构). In the official documents of the government, "civil organizations (minjian zuzhi 民间组织)" as well as 'social associations' (shehui zuzhi 社会组织) are sometimes used to refer to the above three categories of NGOs as a whole.

Non-Registered NGOs

Many NGO founders prefer other ways around of founding their organizations to circumvent the arduous process to register a new NGO. Establish a company and register with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce as business enterprises was one of the most common strategies of circumvention for NGOs till the implementation of the new NGO regulations in 1998. This was simpler than registering as a social organization entailing a least management structure with higher degree of autonomy. The implementation of the new legal status for "popular non-enterprise work units" in 1998 shut down the possibility of registering as business enterprises. (Manion 2008:609)

Other NGOs have been successful to found themselves as subsidiary or secondary organizations bracketed with universities, commercial enterprises or other institutions. They have taken privilege of a prime exception to the requisite of registration concerning groups that can be regarded as 'internal' organizations belonging to an existing institution[47]. In this

situation, the NGO only requires to have the consent from the host agency that is ready to bring it under its superintendence.

There is also a massive number of NGOs that just do not register at all but arrange informal groups; called as 'clubs' or 'salons' in urban areas, and in rural areas, can be seen in the amelioration of traditional philanthropic practices that take place around clans, kinship and local associations. The anomaly is that the new restraining procedures for the registration of NGOs since 1998 have possibly led to a rise in the number of these informal organizations those do not bother to register. However, numerous NGO leaders complain about the ongoing registration regulations; the government do not efficaciously avert citizens from founding voluntary organizations as people have become able to bypass government rules. The condition of non-registered NGOs can be described as one of legal uncertainty. As they are not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there is no such legally guaranteed right for their existence, so they operate in a legal grey area.

International NGOs

Liu Xaiobo syas, "*When dealing with organizations that have a certain amount of international renown, the Party's official policies adjust according to the perceived benefit.*" Likewise Chinese NGOs, the international NGOs in China confront various limitations. Although the state has declared the promotion of legal rules for a long time, today there are still no rules regarding activities of international NGOs in China. The slogan "no recognition, yet no prohibition" can reflect the state's outlook on them. However, activities of international NGOs are up to an extent subjected to the regulations for the registration and administration of Chinese NGOs. Like, international NGOs also need to be sponsored by a government or party department in a respected field. This is a major deterrent to many international NGOs struggling to function in China. Some international NGOs have become successful in negotiating specific areas where they will be allowed to function through so-called 'memoranda of understandings' (MoUs). These MoUs are basically negotiated between

international NGOs and local authorities, for special conditions with regard to international NGOs functions.

Degree of autonomy

While it is fairly easy to determine whether an NGO is registered or not, it is very difficult to judge the degree of autonomy of Chinese NGOs. As a number of careful empirical studies have accumulated in the past two decades, scholars now increasingly focus on concretely specifying the mechanisms and processes through which "variation in autonomy" (Teets 2009: 334) are manifested in specific locations, whether they be in the sphere of business,[32] labour,[33] environmental movement,[34] or cultural organizations[35] or provinces. Assessment of their degree of autonomy can be done by consideration of their autonomy from the state, their influence over the state, and the extent to which they play an intermediary role between the state and their membership in a new system of politico-economic regulation.

On the basis of popular nature we can classify the organizations into three different types different to the above categorization, which is as follows: Official, Semi-official and Purely popular.

Official Organizations

These organizations are unique due to their special relationship with the Party. The main leaders and work personnel of an official organization are appointed by a specific state agency as part of its official establishment of posts, and its finances are either paid directly by. Their cadres are selected and appointed by the organization department of the city Party committee Examples: the state or are subject to strict legal regulation the General Trade Union Federation,

---

[32] Nevitt (1996) and Wank (1999) are useful to understand autonomy in the sphere of business.

[33] Perry (1995) and Yang (1989) have written on autonomy in the sphere of labour organizations.

[34] Yang (2005 and 2009) explains autonomy in the sphere of environmental movements.

[35] Nakajima (2010) and Yang (1994) describe autonomy in the sphere of cultural organizations.

the Communist Youth League, the Women's Federation, the Science and Technology Association, the Culture and Arts Federation and the Overseas Chinese Federation etc.

Semi-official Organizations

According to Chen Jie, "The fear of bottom-up social mobilization as well as practical needs have led the government to create a semi-official NGO sector, a policy practiced with increasing enthusiasm from the 1990s." In case of a semi-official organization, the link with a government is looser. Its main leaders hold concurrent posts in their sponsoring organization, which could in turn be an 'official' social organization, and its finances can come from either the state or its own revenue.

Purely Popular Organizations

Last, the purely popular social organization has no overlapping of personnel with its sponsoring state organization and depends on its own finances. As the table shows, the predominant type is semi-official, a category which includes all of the more important economic and professional associations which have emerged during the reform era.

NGOs in china can be also classified into two types based on the process by which they come into existence. They are 'Bottom-up' NGOs and 'Top-down' NGOs. 'Bottom-up' NGOs are the NGOs those organized by the citizens themselves without financial support from the government. This type of NGOs is influenced by a whole of government policies, the requirements of the citizens, and the source of assistance. The other one, 'Top-down' NGOs are supported by the government but has its own system and employees. This type of NGOs may be required by the government to satisfy certain objectives. Due to the political situation of China, the government is confronting various problems resulting in the necessity of these 'Top-down' NGOs to assist the government in dealing with the social pressures.

Field of Activity

Civil organizations in China can be classified into following different categories: Political organizations, economic organizations, organizations related to science and technology, environmental organizations, cultural association, sports associations, health groups, social

welfare groups (Red Cross), religious organizations (Churches), friendly associations, public affairs organizations, professional management organizations, charity organizations, community organizations, academic organizations, professional interest groups, citizens' self-help organizations, and interest organizations.

On one hand, China has remarkably accomplished the miraculous economic development with acute awareness of shifting political alignments and ideological formulations. And this age of interdependency made it faster and smoother than anticipated. The market reforms in China is one of the most successful landmarks in modern world history which immensely promoted the productive forces contributing to unparalleled economic prosperity and rapidly improved the living standards of common people in China. On the other hand, this generated enormous grassroots transformations in the socio-political environment of China. One of the decisive consequences of "Reforms and Opening Up" was the economic, cultural, legal, and political, habitat for the emergence and growth of civil society while experiencing structural transformations. Market forces have pressurised the state to provide a space for the emergence of civil society in China. This fostered the development of various modern civil organizations initially in the history of China, about which this chapter attempted to illustrate briefly. The social background for the emergence and development of civil society organisations such as system reforms, public sphere, collective action, emergence of political-intellectual- economic elites, has laid down a substantial foundation. Also the natural calamities triggered the developmental process of civil society organisations and connected several civil organisations with each other. The end part of this chapter by classifying different kinds of civil society organisations proves the significant emergence and development of CSOs.

Fourth Chapter

Civil Society vis-a-vis Governance

The term governance was extensively adopted and applied to the study of political development in the 1990s by economists and political scientists, specifically after the World Bank did apply the phrase 'governance in crisis' to report the African condition. Gerry Stoker (1998) has given five major conceptualizations of governance, which include a type of institution and actors within and outside government; fading of frontiers to face the socioeconomic situations; inter-institutional power reliance for collective action; self sufficient independent matrix of actors; the potentiality of resolving issues beyond government power. The emergence of the theory of governance enlarged the logical structure for the research of state society relations.

Kooiman (1993) says that a single actor whether public or private neither have the capacity to solve all diversified problems, nor have all information to tackle complex and dynamic issues. And a single actor neither has complete overview for necessary effective instruments, nor has sufficient effort likely to subjugate unilaterally in a particular government system. All these mean that one actor can't substitute the other.

Apart from government, governance comprises of citizens, social networks, interest groups and sectors. The simple essence of governance means the efforts to utilize the authority to maintain order and meet public requirements. The aim of governance is to utilize the power to instruct command and systemise the different actions of people and magnify public interests in the different systemic relationships. From the angle of political science, governance means the procedure of public management. It comprises of the basis for mechanization of political power, the way of tackling public issues and the regulation of public resources. It devotes special scrutiny on the performance of political power and the performance of administrative authority necessary to sustain social stability in a fixed area. Jiang su and Sujian Gao (2012) say that governance can beat the ceiling of state and society and therefore is resilient to the circumstances of state society cooperation and takes its own liability and thus overcome the limitations of using state centric or society-centric approaches alone. Governance high-lightens

the state-society cooperation and can't be successful without the each others' cooperation; which refers to the effective participation and cooperation without which there will be no governance and it must be underpinned by a sound and developed civil society.

As CSOs develop, they play a growingly crucial role in social management. They perform some functions of social management independently or in cooperation with government departments. The process of social management exercised by CSOs independently or in cooperation with the government is no longer government, but governance.

There is no huge contrast in the apparent understandings of "governance" and "government", but their implicit essences are very contrasting. Many scholars view that the basic difference between governance and government is the requisite for an appropriate interpretation of governance. As a means of public management, governance requires jurisdiction and potential like government, and its supreme aim is to preserve normal social stability. This is the similar character of both. Nonetheless, there also are somewhat two rudimentary contrasts between the two approaches. First, the primary and even necessary contrast between the two is that governance needs power, but power is not certainly the government department; government jurisdiction must be the government. The concern of government needs to be public institutions, but the concern of governance can be public institutions, and private organizations or coordination between both. Governance is the coordination between the state and civil society, between official and non-official, between private and public organizations and between obligation and discretion. Hence, governance is a more substantial theory than government. Contemporary companies, universities and even grassroots organisations can function efficaciously beyond government, but not beyond governance. Second, the direction for the exercise of power in the procedure of administration is different. The authority of the government is always practiced from above. It exercises the political power of the government and employs the one-way superintendence of social public issues through articulating orders and preparing and carrying out policies. Nonetheless, governance is a procedure of supervision and regulation featuring cooperation between the upper and lower levels. It practices supervision of public issues majorly through coordination, discussion, collaboration and identity and common aims. The spirit of governance is coordination rooted in market rules,

public benefits and identity. Its management mechanism does not rely on the authority of the government, but that of cooperation network. Its inclination towards the exercise of power is not solitary and from above, but combined and complimentary.

The explicit logic of putting forward the concept of governance and promoting the substitution of government by governance, by the specialists of political and management sciences, is that they see both market and state failure in the allocation of social resources. Governance can make up for some shortcomings of the state and the market in the process of management, command and cooperation, but governance is not the almighty. It has its own constraints. It cannot substitute the state and enjoy political compulsory power. It cannot substitute the market and allocate most of the resources autonomously and efficaciously. As there is the likelihood of failure of the governance, scholars are naturally faced with the questions as to how to overcome governance failure and how to promote effective governance. Various scholars and international organizations encourage different concepts and uses different terms like, effective governance, meta-governance, good governance and other concepts as solutions to this issue, among which the concept of "good governance" is most popular. Good governance as a procedure of social management planned to expand public good. The meaning of good governance is supervision of public life by coordination between the state and people, a new nexus between political state and civil society and a tip-top relationship between the two. The crucial constituents of good governance are legitimacy, transparency, accountability, rule of law, responsiveness, effectiveness etc.

Good governance is basically the restoration process of power from state to society, or to people. It reflects good coordination bridging the state and the society or between the government and people. As long as the complete society is related, there would not be good governance cannot be possible without both the government and citizens. There will be no government as long as little social associations are related, but public management is a must. Good governance depends on non-compulsive coordination of citizens and their meticulous welcome of authority. There can be solely good government at max without vigorous involvement and coordination of people, but cannot be good governance. So, the foundation for good governance is the people or civil society, rather important than the state. In this

context, civil society is the foundation of good governance. Good governance with its real meaning, without a mature civil society, cannot be attained. Hence, following 1990s, one of the causes of the rediscovery and evolution of the concept and application of good governance is the development of civil society. The growth of civil society is apprenticed to bring about transformations in the fabric and position of governance. And it is notably remarkable in China after 'Reforms and opening up'.

Civil Society and Governance in China

Brook and Frolic (1997: 22, 31, 42) argue that experts on China usually over-emphasize the role of the state regarding governance while undermining the role of society. More specifically, he says, we tend to overlook the widespread and long-standing practice of "auto-organization", whereby Chinese have recurrently formed communities not under the direction of the state nor bound to such state functions as revenue extraction. Tracing the history of auto-organization from the late imperial period, Brook argues that traditional organizations based on such factors as shared place of origin and occupation, fellowship, and common cause became increasingly politicized during the Republican era, 'seeking to influence state policies in their favour'. Their presence 'created a new civic politics that changed the face of political life in the cities' and contributed to 'the process of bringing the Chinese state within an accountability based on a shared set of rules. Since 1949 the Communist Party has successfully stifled such auto-organizations, providing them slight leeway only during 'state-corporatist phases of the 1950s and 1980s'. Nevertheless, Brook argues, the sudden proliferation of 'autonomous' student and worker organizations during the spring of 1989 was a clear sign that auto-organization remains a potent, albeit latent force in China. Strongly reminiscent of auto-organizational activities during the Republic era, they are possible portents of the future.

As Chinese experts promptly espoused governance theory to analyse civil society, the integrated research on governance theory and civil society in China inflated post-haste. The research is mainly focused on the available options for cooperation between state and civil society organizations to accomplish better governance while easing both state and society.

Governance theory furnishes an efficient paradigm to the research on China's civil society. And the growth of self-governance of villager's committee, neighbour's committee and NGOs yielded base for the research on the relationship of commensalism between civil society and governance. Zhou and Yu (2009) have shown participation of organizations in public governance by explaining the situations of their engagement and government's reaction. Wang (2009) explains the compatibility of governance theory in case of China and discusses the possibilities of engagement of Chinese social organizations in public governance under splintered authoritarianism. He argues that the Chinese government has started acknowledging its governance limitations in spite of its command over social resources. Wang and Le (2008) provides a research on coordination between government organizations in terms of government's procurement of services with dependency of social organizations on the government. Wang (2010) has written the growth of civil organizations in cooperative governance. These studies discusses about the participatory governance while indicating the transformations in the state-society mutualism. Some scholars like, Gadseden (2008), Jiang (2009) and Ford (2009) also argue that the government liberality with civil organizations has not fully grown into a real cooperation between government and society. A tough registration model makes the government to have tight control over civil organizations and the role of civil organizations has been limited. (Jianxing Yu and Sujian Gao 2010)

A decade of China's market reforms, political restructuration, impact of globalization, internet and information technology, created the basic political, economic and legal habitat for the emergence of civil society. Simultaneously, the rising of civil society affects the social politics and economic activities to great extent, modifies governance to a significant level to promote better governance. It is also crucially influenced by the citizens' political participation, political transparency, citizens' self-governance and government's cleanness and efficiency and government's democratic and scientific policy-making.

Internal Governance of CSOs

Civil organizations too have the matter of governance, and the capability or incapability of their governance directly influence the governance of the society as a whole. Internal management of civil organizations has huge importance for governance. As well as, it has impacts on the political sphere, comprising of political involvement, democratic policy making, self-management of citizens and the attempts to disclose government matters and establish transparent governance. As these civil organizations have many unique characteristics and advantages with respect to government organizations, the various civil organizations which have appeared since the 1980s change the governance of China's society as a whole to a significant level.

There are various civil organizations specially those are active at the grass-roots level, such as villagers' committees, senior citizens' associations and various community organizations, are more transparent in internal management. For example, villagers' committees active in rural areas and neighbourhood committees active in urban areas, substantially disclose the related affairs (like village heads' and committee members' election process, revenue and expenditure) to the public; which refers to their higher political transparency. Wang Ying (2000) says that neighbourhood committees are responsible for the clear conveyance of the related affairs, documents, procedures, deadline, responsible persons and other items to the residents. For the same kind of work in the village level, subsidies are given to village cadres. Important items like income and expenses of the collective; family planning; contracting of land and enterprises, bidding for projects, requisitioning and distribution of land, are made known to public through two ways: on the enclosing wall of the building of committee, and through blackboard bulletin on time. As well as, the help of wire broadcasting and suggestion box (for seeking the public opinions about their respected affairs) are taken for communication.

A key result of civil organizations' higher internal transparency is that the civil organizations' leaders far away from administrative power are relatively much clean with regard to the major ongoing corruption situation of government officials during the transition phase. The growth of villagers' organizations efficaciously controls the corruption of township and village cadres due to the system of making village affairs known to the public, transparent decision-making

activities; by which villagers are able to carry out effective supervision over village cadres. The responsibility for particularly superintending village's public revenue and expenditure and disclosing the results of examination and related accounts in time to the villagers, are the main tasks of the villagers' organization for handling financial affairs. The right to check the village public finance is possessed by the villagers' the village Party branch, representative assembly and the organization responsible for conveying village issues to the people and practicing democratic management. Villagers have the right to place their queries to the above groups and the right to be replied.

Another distinguishing character of civil organizations' internal governance is its being more democratic. Yu Keping (2003) has given three categories to show their democratic internal governance. First, most of the various community self-governing organizations in urban areas select their heads by election somewhat as an issue of form. Second, civil organizations need to largely seek the views of their members for their key policy determination and obtain the consent of their members. The regulations of civil organizations usually have candid presentations on this. Their key internal issues must be broadly analysed and conferred with their members. The related state rules further spell out that the important issues need to, be explained to the related villagers and be voted or at the meetings of villagers. Third, civil organizations commonly have a model of systems for strict internal superintendence.[36] Various major rural civil associations too have a model of open check mechanisms to check that their heads work transparently and honestly. All expenses of the organizations are subjected to rigorous processes for check and confirmation. Major items of expenditure need be determined by collective consultation.

---

[36] For example, the community civil organizations in Shanghai have a whole set of complete systems for residents' supervision, including 1) the community residents' conference designed to listen to, examine, check and supervise the work of the neighbourhood committee; 2) the system of consultation on community affairs designed to coordinate and comment on the community work; 3) the system of community supervisors; 4) the system of commenting on the work style of the government; and 5) the system of supervision through telephone and the system of letters, calls and reception (Wang Ying, 2000).

It is well known that society of China is in a mercurial phase, civil society of China is too the same. There are huge contrasts among the different civil organizations with respect to governance. If government's official organizations and typical civil organizations are regarded as the two poles of the spectrum, then the civil organizations which are closer to the pole of government organizations usually practice weaker governance. In contrast, those organizations which are nearer to the pole of typical civil organizations practice stronger governance. The comparatively independent civil organizations' level of identity and participation amidst themselves that appeared in the contemporary period, like the senior citizens' organizations, community groups, etc. is higher than that among some long-established civil associations having a strict official character, like Women's Federations, Youth League Organizations, etc.

Members generally take the actions to understand in what ways the contributed funds are utilised and put recommend their personal opinions regarding different activities. Some members get involved in the functioning of China Youth Development Foundation and even in its administrative group. Especially, some members participate in policy formulation. Their recommendations about the Project Hope, a major initiative of China Youth Development Foundation turned to a vigorous motivational force for the persistent growth of the Project. (Sun Liping, 2000)

The small but growing sector of labour NGOs also contributes to promoting a culture of rights. Under the influence of transnational advocacy groups, Chinese labour NGOs adopt standard features resembling NGOs in other countries: legal counselling sessions, hot-line, and labour law classes. International investors and sponsors often require them as a condition of funding. The protocols of internationally funded projects often entail annual quotas of labour lawsuits for which these organizations have to provide legal representation. They usually choose cases with "paradigmatic" significance and wide demonstrative effects either for the court or for workers. Media reports on some of their successful lawsuits can create social impacts disproportionate to the size of this NGO sector. (Ching Kwan Lee, 2000)

CSOs legitimizing the authority of the State

The growth of China's civil organizations has become a major bridge between the government and citizens. The crux of governance is coordination between the government and society, but this coordination is not always direct. On the contrary, it often needs cooperation through an intermediate organization like civil organization. On the one hand, different civil organizations quickly seek the need of the government, desire recommendations and disapproval from their members and communicate them to the government. On the other hand, civil organizations convey the government's policies, concerned objectives and recommendations on handling related matters to their members. Through communicating and coordinating interests between the government and society, civil organizations boost cooperation between them while making better governance.

Various civil organizations while seeking and encouraging their members to participate in state's internal affairs, promote them to take part in the political affairs of the state. Civil organizations more intensely involve in social politics than ordinary individuals. However, this situation of China can't be in any case compared with the matured civil societies in democratic countries. Especially this happens in rural areas and the grassroots level in urban areas. For example, one of the key responsibilities of villagers' committees is to organize their members by several ways to get involved in the election of people's deputies at and below county level and the election of villagers' committees. Even some radical ways are implemented in some localities; such as to give material uplifting and grant subsidies to those people involved in voting, or, to impose fine on those villagers who do not participate. Simultaneously, these civil organizations also give several amenities for the political participation of their members. For example, mobile polling stations or ballot boxes are provided for special voting services to residents who go out during the election of deputies of local people's congresses or members of villagers' committees and neighbourhood committees; by which the percentage of participation of the residents remains high.

Environmental NGOs' assistance for Governance

Environmental NGOs were the pioneers in the Chinese NGO movement, and today they play a vital role in the growth and development of Chinese NGOs. Among the current NGOs in China, environmental NGOs are believed to be the most active and the groups with the greatest social impact. China's first significant environmental NGO was "Friends of Nature", a grassroots NGO similar to modern NGOs.

Environmental NGOs in China can be divided into three general categories: (1) officially endorsed NGOs, (2) international NGOs, and (3) grassroots NGOs. The NGOs in each of these categories perform different functions and face different limitations.

Among NGOs in China the functions of environmental NGOs are remarkable and notably greater than those enjoyed by other kinds of NGOs. Because, according to Chinese government officials, environmental NGOs create less political sensitivity than other NGOs.[37] (Wang Fei 2009) Despite the lack of a grassroots culture for NGOs, it is widely understood that the Chinese government is more tolerant of the existence and development of environmental NGOs than NGOs who focus on other issues. Environmental NGOs enjoy a warmer relationship with executive authorities than other NGOs in China. Guosheng Deng says that in recent years, because of a one-sided emphasis on economic development, China's Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has faced incredible difficulties in fulfilling its increasing administrative functions. Despite the importance of Ministry of Environmental Protection's mission, the agency has faced many barriers to enforcement from other central authorities and local governments. This has increased the need for China's environmental protection departments to rely more heavily on environmental NGOs for support and services. In January 11, 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued "guidance on cultivation and guide the orderly development of Chinese environmental NGOs," to improve their quality.[38]

---

[37] NGOs that focus on human rights, labour, and other issues are viewed as potentially more threatening by Chinese officials.

[38] *See Guidance on Cultivation and Guide the Orderly Development of Environmental Guidance*, MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj /201101/t20110128_200347.htm.

Guosheng Deng among the organizations surveyed, 71% of organizations have received the help and support of the government, and these institutions have great expectations for the role of government in environmental protection. As noted above, international NGOs have made important contributions that have assisted in the development of Chinese environmental NGOs. These include contributions of funds, human resources and assistance with capacity-building for China's NGOs.

Environmental NGOs of China have operated at a much lower level than some international NGOs, aiming at plantation, wild life protection, and assisting the state to spread public awareness of environmental issues. Chinese environmental NGOs have been less dynamic than international NGOs in encouraging environmental legislation, enforcement, and participating in the process of regulatory development. Even the Ministry of Environmental Protection's active encouragement of environmental NGOs would not appear to be sufficient. Political or institutional reform may be required before Chinese NGOs engage in the legislative and judicial processes that shape environmental policy. Many surveys on Chinese environmental NGOs have found that such organizations typically focus on projects like the following: exchanging information, building public awareness, education, sustainable development demonstration projects, capacity building, and policy research and other means for promoting environmental protection.

Public Participation in the Regulatory Process in China

In China regulations are issued with little public input by the State Council, a body that is considered a separate branch of government under the Chinese Constitution. Chinese environmental regulations are not the product of fierce lobbying and compromise between affected interests and regulatory authorities.

Public Participation in Accordance with China's Administrative Regulations

Public participation in the area of administrative regulations means systems and mechanisms through which relevant governmental entities allow and encourage interested parties and ordinary citizens to share their opinions in the process of administrative legislation and

decision. These opinions are sought to further enhance justice and the rationality of administrative actions. In China this is a significant element in efforts to promote the rule of law and adherence to law by administrative agencies.

To ordinary citizens, public participation is a mechanism of interest expression. "Article 58" of the registration law of PRC provides that "In drafting administrative regulations, opinions from relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be widely listened to, and forums, seminars, hearings, etc. may be held for the purpose." Thus, gathering of opinions may be in various forms such as panel discussions, feasibility study meetings, hearings, or other forms.

Public participation is increasingly welcomed by the government and more frequently mentioned in the documents of the State Council. The article of "Guidelines of Comprehensively Promoting Administration by Law," issued by the State Council in 2004, requires improvement in the way the public participates in the development of government legislation and broader public participation. The article of "Opinions on Strengthening the Establishment of Government by Law issued by the State Council" in 2010, emphasizes that government legislation should strictly comply with legal jurisdiction and procedures. It also requires improvements in the systems and mechanisms of public participation to guarantee that public opinions can be fully expressed and that legitimate rights can be fully realized.

Public Participation in Legislative Initiatives in China

Under normal circumstances, almost all the laws that the Communist Party wants to enact meet little resistance. But when new legislation or important development projects are being considered, environmental NGOs can find many avenues for influencing government decisions. But in China, because of the strict legal project procedures, theoretically it is impossible for civil society to have a direct role in initiating legislative proposals. The Efforts of Chinese Environmental NGOs to Initiate Environmental Legislation China's environmental NGOs still have some influence on efforts to initiate environmental legislation. They can do so in the following ways. First, they can appeal for the adoption of necessary environmental legislation through their own NGO publications, by network platform, and by the use of

influential media. Second, academics working with the environmental NGOs often are asked to help draft legislative proposals or specific legislation, which are then are submitted to the NPC through its members and the CPPCC.

NGOs' Non-Litigation Roles in Environmental Enforcement

NGOs can play a role in the implementation and enforcement of Chinese environmental law. The implementation of law by Chinese NGOs can be divided into two parts: litigating on behalf of the public after an environmental incident and efforts to enforce the environmental laws during administrative processes. The latter mainly includes supervision of the implementation of the government's environmental policies and promoting corporate responsibility.

As social organizations, environmental NGOs can develop their own proposals and views to some extent, and express their opinions during the administrative process. Efforts to influence public opinion are the most common strategies employed by Chinese environmental NGOs. For example, in 2003 Chinese NGOs effectively organized public opposition to a proposal by a state-owned corporation to build 13 dams on the Nu River. As a result of widespread protests, the project was suspended by then- Premier Wen Jiabao in 2004. In 2012 Chinese NGOs succeeded in bringing several construction projects to a halt for failure to comply with environmental impact assessment requirements."167

In recent years China's civil society has played an increasingly important role in environmental protection. First, since the 1990s the number of environmental NGOs in China has increased significantly.26 Second, mass citizen activism, often focusing on "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) issues, has been on the rise in China.27 Third, the use of legal processes by individual citizens and lawyers through petitions, lawsuits, and other forms of activism has increased.28 Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in efforts to awaken environmental awareness, strengthen environmental protection legislation, expose illegal business activity and governmental failures, and to promote environmental dispute resolution.

CSOs' Negotiations with the State for better Governance

Many civil organizations which have developed since the 1980s have become an important factor for affecting the government's policy-making and a strong motive force for promoting the government's reform. Many civil organizations and especially those professional organizations for academic research have abundant professional knowledge. More and more professional associations begin to serve as the think tank for the government, provide consultancy and advice for the government's policy-making, exert an important influence on the government's policy-making and promote the government's democratic policy-making. The government's reform needs both internal and external motive forces. The external motive force for promoting the government's reform is from individual citizens and civil organizations. The latter are usually more powerful than the former.

Civil organizations, in a way, are a type of interest organizations, and a key direction of its functions is to advance the public interests of its members. Involvement in the policy-making process of Party and government departments is the major way to influence the policies directed toward the benefit of their organizations and members. So, now-a-days several civil organizations in China adopt various methods to participate in the government's policy-making. These methods are categorised by Yu Keping (2008) which are as followed.

(1) Civil organizations delineate problems and solicit the policy formulating departments to take appropriate measures or formulate corresponding policies. For example, according to Wang (2000), in recent years persistent voluntary action for environmental protection - bringing environmental protection into limelight, denouncing of the environmental pollution factors and recommending environmental protection measures - are taken by environmental protection concerned civil organizations - so called "four big green parties", namely the Friend of Nature, the Global Village, the Green Home and the Shannuo Society. The problem of environmental protection, mainly due to these "four big green parties' impacts", has become one of the most important topics for discussion, every year at the NPC and the CPPCC.

(2) Civil organizations give their opinions about formulating special policies and also their execution, on the behest of policy making departments. Government departments, while formulating or executing some policies, solicit related advice from respected civil organizations, and carry out measures or readjustments concerning policies. For example, according to Liu (2000), the recommendations of some civil organizations, regarding the revision of some articles, were considerably sought before the Constitution was revised in 1998-99. The reason here that propelled the government to seek opinion from civil organizations was that the revised articles were associated with the issue of confirming the nature of non-public sectors of the economy. The government organs of political power attentively listened to the opinions of chambers of commerce that analysed the relevant articles, at all levels, enthusiastically and diligently. The civil organizations conveyed their vehement desires, through several ways, to the related government departments of to increase the level of non-public sectors in the national economy by revising the constitution and related economic policies. The members of the chamber of commerce in Nanjing were assembled to discuss and scrutinise the problems and conveyed to the concerned government departments their hopes for entrepreneurs to promote the sound development of non-public sectors of the economy for non-public sectors of the economy.

(3) Civil organizations negotiate with the respected government organs on behalf of their members, if policies issued by the government diminish the interests of their members. For example, as Wang (2000) writes, some proprietors' committees in Shanghai sometimes seek redress for the losses incurred by their members in the process of housing removal. The residents' group of Zhayin Road No. 1 neighbourhood committee after considering the views and requests of the residents through reports and appeals, finally resolved the three outstanding problems - the repair of the Zhayin road at No. 60 Lane, the removal of LPG station and the location of No. 90 Bus - which drew the significant attention and gratefulness of the residents.

An important measure for political growth of China following the 1980s is the advocacy of grass-root autonomy. Currently, people's autonomy in China is strategized on a exploratory senses majorly in the three areas: self-governance of villagers, urban communities and professional groups. The three distinct types of civil organizations primarily responsible for

managing the three major types of grass-roots autonomy are villagers' committees, neighbourhood committees and the different professional organizations. The rise of civil organizations established an organizational foundational for grass-root level self-governance, specifically social self-governance.

According to the Constitution, the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees ((OLVC))and the Organic Law of Neighbourhood Committees of the People's Republic of China, villagers' committees and neighbourhood committees in urban areas and rural areas, respectively, are not the same level units of political power or agency of the state, but civil and autonomous associations. These are grassroots autonomous mass association to regulate, educate and serve amidst city's community people themselves on their own. Lawfully, the important responsibilities of the neighbourhood committee are to popularise the Constitutional rules and government policies, protect the legal rights and benefits of people, educate them to practice their duties lawfully, vanguard of state assets and perform several functions to encourage socialist theoretical and ethical development; to manage public issues and public welfare works for people staying in the quarters; to negotiate in civil conflicts; to assist in pursuing public security; to help the state or its departments in carrying out tasks regarding health sector, assistance during calamities. (Ying, 2000)

Civil organizations play a major role in social welfare projects, by which the government's image has been being upgraded, the citizens' sense of capable identity has been being refined and relation between the government and society has been being eased. The government's obligation to increase public welfare projects gets intensified with the help of civil organizations, and its outcome is better than government's solely and directly organized projects. The role of civil organizations is requisite for better governance, as they make the government better educator, better organiser and better provider of service like supplying relief, helping the distressed and giving help to old persons, women, children, poor people and differently able person. Various civil organizations, like China Youth Development Foundation, Soong Ching Ling Foundation and All-China Society of Charity significantly participate in the Project Hope and the Anti-poverty Project aimed at supporting those children incapable of attending school and supplying relief to the victims of disaster victims and the

poor. What these civil organizations do improves social image, and increases citizens' identity with national state. The social image of the Youth League is evidently upgraded by carrying out the Project Hope. It is a big-scale public welfare project, sponsored by China Youth Development Foundation, established by the Youth League, aimed at educating those poor children who are unable to go to school. The undertaking was started by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China. With the accumulation of civil funds, millions of the poor children are being supported to get education. In the same line Sun Liping (2000) says that China Youth Development Foundation and the Project Hope become indispensable elements for enhancing the stature of the Youth League when the established reputation of the Youth League face challenges posed by the market economy and social transition.

Civil organizations efficaciously review government behaviours. Government authority and behaviours need to be supervised to some level. Before to 'Reform and Opening Up', the superintendence on government behaviours usually comes from intra- government power supervision. After various civil organizations appear, the state starts to be subjected to external supervision. After various civil organizations find that local or departmental government rules are clearly arbitrary or violating rules of the state, they withstand these rules in a proper way. In various instances, the state often modifies the actual rules after being influenced by civil organizations. The strength of civil organizations is directly proportional to the pressure on the government. A noticeable example is that there are lesser incidences of violation of rules and disharmony by township and town members in villages with stable and efficient villagers' committees than in other villages. (Yu Keping, 2000) Even non-governmental institutions do influence foreign affairs policy-making departments concerning the public opinion about some important international issues.

An outstanding growth of contemporary reform of social governance is that the Chinese state is delivering higher importance to civil society. The CCP's usual rules for social management are social cooperation, public involvement, party guidance, and government liability. A bigger role for civil organisations in governance is an essential constituent of social cooperation and public involvement. By 2014, China has approximately more than 600,000 registered civil organisations and 300,000 community organisations. If we consider unregistered civil

organisations, the total number would crosser four million. The state has shown a vigilant temperament towards civil organisations. However in the recent past, chief leaders have promoted the involvement of civil organisations in innovative social management. Chief CCP leaders even made it clear that social organisations would receive more support and encouragement from the government. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, regarding socio-economic development of China, promotion of the growth of social organisations was given an unparalleled degree of attention. These changes refer that although the state has never used the term 'civil society' in its official documents, it is now acknowledging its relevance.

Along with enduring urbanisation, modernisation, westernisation, and democratisation, the Chinese state will inevitably face growing pressure in maintaining social stability. Social governance reform is a way for the government to ease social pressures and maintain social stability. Success will heavily depend on the growth of self-governance and rule of law, increased civil engagement and social autonomy, and development of civil society. Civil organisations do often faced with a choice between the approaches of assisting the state to legitimise its authority over the society, or supporting society to influence the state. The first approach implies that the state, with assistance of CSOs, is more effective in formulating and practicing policies and measure to fulfil social needs. But the other approach, however, implies that public organizations can be more insightful about their own necessities and that they should have the right to involve in formulating and practicing policy schemes which are intended to affect their living directly. While the state and CSOs groups have contrasted system and functions, the condition of China suggests that these two forms of social organization should not be separated from each other, because each has its own sphere of influence in the daily living of the people. On the contrary, they should be linked together for the achievement of desirable social goals. The important question is: how can they be linked effectively and appropriately?

Conclusion

"Under the Dome", a documentary film about air pollution, was watched 150 million times within a couple of days after being released on the internet on 28th February 2015. Surprisingly the documentary was not banned promptly, even though it depicts the inefficiency and negligence of the state. Moreover, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, The People's Daily, promoted it by interviewing its producer Chai Jing. And the newly deputed environmental protection minister, Chen Jining, admired the documentary by correlating its significance to the demand of time. Above all, the documentary was uploaded on the internet, just a week prior to annual plenary sessions of the two, National People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPCCC) that make national-level political decisions. And, Premier Li Keqiang in his inaugural speech to the NPC mentioned the documentary by expressing, "Environmental pollution is a menace which can threaten the living condition of people's and the state is paying attention at this hazard. And this menace needs to be combated collectively and earnestly." However, after a few days, after being watched over 200 million times, the documentary got deleted from the Chinese internet websites on the dictation of publicity department of the Chinese Communist Party. This issue exemplifies the objectives of this research. First, a space has been created for the emergence of the civil society, so that it can raise its voice up to its limitations. Second, the state is trying to make use of the civil society organisations to legitimise its authority by being a bit liberal (although here is only momentary, but there are also many protracted cases illustrated in the previous chapter). Third, civil society organizations can only exist, officially or actively, as long they are in a symbiotic relationship with the state where the civil society gets opportunity to negotiate, and they must not be posing a threat in the state's view.

China is a single-party dictatorial state with new generation leaders, and the dilemma and traditionalism it is reflecting are mostly in reaction to the political condition, however, the ambiguity of the state's nature will be judged by the time. For now one of the most appropriate means to interpret the relationship between the state and civil society in China is "consultative authoritarianism". It delineates that civil society is promoted to consult with the state on policy

matters and to function in the society, but only under the supervision of an autocratic state. Although the state is superintending the civil organizations without a well planned device of control system, but it is playing every card of the pack it possesses to control them at the optimum level.

The market reforms in China is one of the most successful milestones and greatest social experiment in contemporary world history. To keep with as well as to fasten the developmental pace of the world, China has wonderfully done the extraordinary economic development with acute awareness of shifting political alignments, ideological formulations and social reforms. And this age of interdependency made it easier than expected. The market and political reforms of the reform era have blown up various convoluted and twisted social processes. A resettlement or reconciliation of the twain, state-market and state-society affinity, is ongoing fine in China, moreover is expected to be prolonged. The actual spheres where the market, society and state have been familiarised to cooperate are being altered, as well as the regulations, for contention and negotiation, are being revised. The continuous and cautious endorsement of market economic reforms has revamped the link among the market, society and state, while relocating the economic resources in the welfare of the society. The underway state power decentralisation and development of civil organizations have generated part of environmental requisite for both the strengthening of emerging social forces and the concurrent improvement of the capability of the state to govern. As the economy develops, the state - which has been trying to regulate everything solely and has been remained pessimistic about any other factor influencing the society - has become more liberal and lenient for the emergence and development civil society. And along with market reforms, the state has pulled back a bit while creating a space for the emergence of various civil organizations with the provisions for better economic resources for them. Swift economic growth has reconstructed the framework of the society and strengthened or depleted specific social players. Economic liberalization induced top-down process has generated new civil organizations at the grass roots level, among which many deliver services in areas like health and education, and environmental advocacy. These new civil organizations now shape a nascent civil society.

There are two major reasons with regard to market reforms that stimulated the emergence of civil society in Modern China. And in both the cases, a single actor whether neither has the

capacity to solve all the diversified problems, nor have all information to tackle the complex and dynamic issues. In addition, a single actor neither has complete overview for necessary effective instruments, nor has sufficient effort likely to subjugate unilaterally in a particular government system. So the government needs another actor to handle new, more complex, large scale problems, while strictly maintaining its immense superiority over the other one,.

First is the beneficial consequences of the market reforms and the second is its detrimental consequences of the market reforms. Both compelled the government to create a space for the rise of civil society organizations. The market reforms have triggered divergent consequences: on one hand, urbanization, commoditisation, rising per capita incomes and remarkable affluence, on the other, growing social inequalities culminating in conflict and resistance.

Beneficial consequences of 'Reforms and opening up' have triggered the emergence and development of civil organizations in China. The remarkable economic development, piloted by 'Reforms and Opening up', generated requisite economic environment for the emergence and development of the various civil organizations. It largely developed the productive forces contributing to unprecedented economic and social prosperity and rapidly improved the living standards of common people in China. And these are the root causes for the candid emergence of civil organizations. Economic growth brings enormous disposable profits to enterprises and increases personal disposable income. These funds become the key sources of funding for civil organisations. Moreover, a rising middle class in China that has been promoted by the economic reform is playing crucial role to establish a more prosperous and stable Chinese society.

Nonetheless, the detrimental consequence made the government realise the need for civil society organisations to deal with the ongoing and upcoming problems. China was a country infamous for escalating social flaws, whether measured with reference to social classes, or rural-urban partitions, or ethnic relations, or environment issues while speeding for development. These issues put forward the uncertainty of the feasibility of relentless swift growth. the socio-political ramification and "externalities" of the reform agenda, including

striking widening of spatial and class inequality, environmental hazards, the uncontrollable growth of a floating population, growing ethnic clashes, loss of occupations, security and other advantages of tens of millions of state sector employees. The conflicts that market reforms have aroused and the multitudinous sphere of resistance resulted have been its by-product at every stage.

The impacts of foreign influence, globalization, internet, information technology on the emergence and development of civil society organisations cannot be ignored. Now-a-days a huge amount of money is inflowing to China from different countries to aid various causes while building civil society with partnership of domestic NGOs. China's economic reforms, coupled with global markets and information technology, are increasingly connecting not only its business class but virtually all segments of Chinese society to the outside world, thereby producing new opportunities for engagement in unprecedented ways. These same trends have also been altering the relationship between the state and Chinese society in ways that have important implications for the nature of governance. The channels, through which outside forces can influence Chinese society while subverting the strict control of the state, are being proliferated by global markets and information technology. The establishment of global nexus of NGOs, in the domain of civil society promotion by international civil society endorsement organisations, is expedited by the growing ease of communication which will make it increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to isolate and constrain its civil society

To meet the demands for political participation and to cope with the various social issues, the Chinese leadership has been undergoing various institutional and political reforms and many of these changes directly or indirectly promote the development of civil society. The changing role of the state can be understood through the major initiatives taken by the state, such increasing political participation and contestation, village and local elections, legal reforms, reform of the NPC.

Yet the political environment in China creates a challenging landscape for civil society. An unpredictable legal system, restrictions on protest and limitations on internet access as well as freedoms of speech, assembly and press, mean that is difficult for civil society to thrive. Some groups are navigating successfully around these restrictions. Environmentalists have made the

most progress. Environmental NGOs were the pioneers in the Chinese NGO movement, and today they play a vital role in the growth and development of Chinese NGOs. Among the current NGOs in China, environmental NGOs are believed to be the most active and the groups with the greatest social impact.

A significant number of civil organisations that have emerged following the 1980s have turned to be a crucial element for influencing policy formulation of the state and an active and more visional force for encouraging reform in the government. Various civil organisations, mainly the professional organisations regarding intellectual study have far-sighting expertises. Growing professional organisations have started to work as state sponsored think-tanks, discuss with the relevant state departments and suggest in the policy formulation of the state, influence effectively the state's policy formulation while encouraging democratic policy formulation. The reform of the state requires inner as well as outer motivational effort. The outer motivational efforts to encourage the state's reform are exerted from individual people and various civil organisations. Civil organisations are as well key means for developing political transparency. Presently, the rise of civil organisations productively affects the development of political transparency by the following ways. Civil organisations play a major role in social welfare projects, by which the government's image has been being upgraded, the citizens' sense of capable identity has been being refined and relation between the government and society has been being eased. The government's obligation to increase public welfare projects gets intensified with the help of civil organisations, and its outcome is better than government's solely and directly organized projects. The role of civil organisations is requisite for better governance, as they make the government better educator, better organiser and better provider of service like supplying relief, assisting the afflicted and giving help to old persons, children, women, poor people and differently able person.

Civil organisations considerably review the state's behaviour, though in comparison with other democratic countries China lags far behind. But current situation of China is far better than the earlier China. The state authority and behaviours need to be supervised to some level. Before to 'Reform and Opening Up', the superintendence on the state's behaviour usually comes from intra-government power supervision. After various civil organisations appear, the state starts to be subjected to external supervision. After various civil organisations find that local or

departmental government rules are clearly arbitrary or violating rules of the state, they withstand these rules in a proper way. In various instances, the state often modifies the actual rules after being influenced by civil organisations. The strength of civil organisations is directly proportional to the pressure on the government.

Along with enduring urbanisation, modernisation, westernisation, and democratisation, the Chinese state will inevitably face growing pressure in maintaining social stability. Social governance reform is a way for the government to ease social pressures and maintain social stability. Success will heavily depend on the growth of further liberalised economy, better rule of law, increased civil engagement and social autonomy, and development of civil society.

The growth of China's civil organizations has become a major link between the state and society. The crux of governance is coordination between the state and society, but this coordination is not straight all the times. In contrast, it usually requires cooperation through an bridging option like civil organization. From one point of view, different civil organisations quickly seek the need of the state, desire their representatives' recommendations and disapproval and communicate them with the state. From another point of view, they circulate the state's policies, concerned objectives and recommendations on handling related matters to their members. Through communicating and coordinating interests between the government and society, civil organisations boost cooperation between them while making better governance.

China is going through a demanding transition at home—economically, politically, and socially—at the same time its international sway is rising. Chinese civil society is going through a dynamic and thorny period, marked by unprecedented change but still limited prospects and parochial goal. China's civil organisations have emerged from the nation's market reforms, marketization campaigns, and social transformations as a civil society sector. One that is relatively independent of, interdependent with, intermingled with and yet synergistic with the state and market systems. The rise of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) indicates profound changes in China. On one hand, decades of social and economic development have given rise to new forms of social organisations and greater interest in volunteerism; on the other hand, the party-state has cautiously welcomed the social welfare

role played by NGOs. In response to civil unrest and the wide gap between the rich and poor in China, that the government is becoming more responsive to civil society demands for domestic reform aimed at facilitating, improving and funding social sector services as well as loosening restrictions and supporting grassroots initiatives.

Chinese CSOs—particularly unregistered, grassroots organisations—operate under a mixed set of cross-cutting pressures; indeed, they exist in a limbo of only partial legitimacy and nascent, fragile capacity, rife with both risks and opportunities. Foreign CSOs in China face parallel expectations that will persist into the future and that will demand considerable patience and careful navigation. They will be courted and rebuffed at the same time by official Chinese interlocutors.

The overall direction of Chinese policy since the 1990s has been encouraging the development of NGOs to address social problems. Despite issues with registration, NGOs have already taken on a major role in Chinese society as local governments across the country have moved from providing social services directly toward outsourcing them. China is now transforming to make it easier for NGOs to operate. In the long run, the development of grassroots NGOs may prove to be the best indicator of social progress.

The modern Chinese state does not deem civil society with completely scepticism. In contrast, it apparently envisages the civil society organisations to play an important role in addressing the robust social issues that have come in the package along with the Chinese market reforms. However, be it the banning of cooperative foundations and other organisations like Falungong or the documentary "Under the Dome", recent experience shows that the party is quite reluctant to largely forsake its control of the third sector. The authorities are particularly wary not to let political dissidents try to use these associations either to achieve their agenda or only to establish contacts with ordinary citizens through them. Chinese leaders view that the main aim of western forces is to use China's NGOs to mastermind the collapse of the government. So the government in Beijing is doing whatever it takes to check potential colour revolutions from subvert social stability and forbidding regime longevity. In the same line it can be said

that China's continuing intrinsic interests, entrenched in the authority of the state-party structures and that state's intuitive scepticism about independent or diversified societal influences will continue to prevail. These interests in the future will limit CSOs to comparatively marginal importance and resume to curb constrain legitimacy, legal standing, and sustained access to essential resources. But the growth of unregistered civil organisations despite the state's strict restriction is conspicuous proof of the moderate maturation of civil society. Still, the drive in Chinese civil society to keep fighting under difficult and dangerous conditions is the most important asset for promoting better governance in the country.

The likelihood for the future development of civil society is not in dark, but also not without dilemma. The key deadlock lies in the intimate liaison between the state and civil society. Currently civil society organisations are enjoying intimate ties with the government, which might portray an image that CSOs belong to the state system which will complicate the whole paradigm. This image of the civil society organisations may culminate in a loss of confidence of the citizens, hence will impact on the various actors involved. Viewed from this perspective, civil society organisations should endeavour to be more self-sufficient, more self-regulatory and more autonomous, so that they can genuinely mirror mass opinions and strive for the social welfare undertakings. The intermediary function of civil society will then be reinforced and magnified. While looking at the nature of civil society in China, it can be presumed that China will set the terms of its own civil society.

Appendix 1

GONGOs   NGOs

(Top-down, government-organized)   (Bottom-up, grassroots nonprofits)

Legal nonprofits registered as
- SOs
- CNIs
- Foundations (public and private)

Informal nonprofits
- registered as businesses
- unregistered

Mass Organizations (e.g. Women's Federation, Disabled Person's Federation, Communist Youth League)
Public Institutions (public universities, research institutes)

96

Appendix 2

"Civil Society" in Nanfang Daily and Southern Metropolis Daily

Figure 1: Number of Registered Chinese NGOs (in thousands), 1990-2013

"Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier." The Economist. April 12, 2014. Accessed May 2014.

Pandora's box

Number of registered Chinese NGOs, '000

Source: National statistics   *September 30th

Bibliography

Books

Brook, T. and Frolic, B. M. (1997), "The ambiguous challenge of civil society", in Brook, T. and Frolic, B. M. (eds.), *Civil society in China*, NY: Armonk.

Friedman, E. J. (2005), *Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society: State-Society Relations at UN World Conferences,* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hildebrandt, T. (2013), *Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ho, P. (2001), "Greening without conflict? Environmentalism, green NGOs and civil society in China", *Development and Change.*

Howe, C., Kueh Y. Y. and Ash R. (2003), *China's Economic Reform: A Study with Documents*, London: Routledge.

Howell, J. (2001), *Civil Society & Development: A Critical Exploration*, Boulder, Colo: Rienner Publishers.

Howell, J., White, G. and Shang, X. (1996), *In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hsu, J.YJ. and Hasmath, R. (eds.) (2013), "The Changing Face of State Corporatism, *The Chinese Corporatist State: Adaptation, Survival and Resistance*, New York: Routledge.

Kang, X. and Han, H. (2011), "Graduated Control: Research on State-Society Relationship in Contemporary Mainland China" in Deng, Zhenglai (eds.) *State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective*, Singapore: World Scientific.

Lieberthal, K. G. and Lampton, D. M. (1992), *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Migdal, J. S., Kohli, A., & Shue, V. (1994), *State power and social forces: Domination and transformation in the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Brien, (1990), *Reform Without Liberalization*, London: Cambridge Publications

Rosenbaum, A. L. (1992), *State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Selden, M. and Perry E.J.(2000), *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance,* Abingdon: Routledge.

Ma S.Y. (2010), *Shareholding System Reform in China: Privatizing by Groping for Stones,* Cheltenham: Edwaed Elgar

O'Brien, K.J. et al. (eds. (2005)), Engaging the Law in China: State, Society and Possibilities for Justice, Stanford

Simon, K.W. (2013), *Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the New Reform Era*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Solinger, D. (1999), *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tang, S Y. and Zhan, X. (2011), *Political Opportunities, Resource Constraints and Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China*.

Unger, J. (2008), *Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Spaces*, Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe.

White, G. (1996), *In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China*, New York, Oxford University Press.

Yang, G. (2009), *The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online,* New York: Columbia University Press.

Yu K. (2008), *Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China,* Brookings Institution

Yu K. (2008), *Globalization and Changes in China's Governance*, Brill

Articles

Beja, Jean-Philippe (2006), "The Changing Aspects of Civil Society in China", *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, 73 (1).

Brook, Timothy (1998), "Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics?" *The China Journal*, (39).

C. D. Brief. (2013), *Chinese NGO directory (251 NGO profiles with a special report) China's civil society in the making,* Beijing: China Development Brief.

Chamberlain, Heath B. (1993), "On the Search for Civil Society in China", *Public Sphere /Civil Society in China?*, 19 (2).

Chan, C.K C. (2013), "Community-based Organizations for Migrant Workers' Rights: The Emergence of Labour NGOs in China." *Community Development Journal*, 48(1).

Chen, "Popular Support for Village Self-Government in China: Intensity and Sources," Asian Survey, 45:6 (November/December 2005): 865-85

Cheng, J.Y.S., Ngok, K. and Zhuang, W. (2010), "The Survival and Development Space for China's Labour NGOs: Informal Politics and Its Uncertainty", *Asian Survey*, 50(6).

China Development Brief. (2013), *Chinese NGO Directory (251 NGO Profiles with a Special Report) China's Civil Society in the Making.* Beijing: China Development Brief.

Cooper, C.M. (2006), "This is Our Way In': The Civil Society of Environmental NGOs in South-West China", *Government & Opposition* 41(1): 109-136

Croucher, R. and Miles, L. (2010), "Chinese Migrant Worker Representation and Institutional Change: Social or Centralist Corporatism?" *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 5(1).

Dekker, P. (2011), "Socially Responsible NGOs? A European Perspective", in Li (eds.), NGOs *in China and Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts*, Surrey: Ashgate.

Deng Z. (2000), *Civil Society and Reconstruction of National Knowledge Governance System*, (Research Report).

Deng, G. (2010), "The Hidden Rules Governing China's Unregistered NGOs: Management and Consequences", *China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China* 10(1).

Diamond, L. (1994), "Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation. Journal of Democracy" 5(3).

Fisher, K., Li, J. and Fan, L. (2012), "Barriers to the Supply of Non-Government Disability Services in China", *Journal of Social Policy*, 41(1).

Friedman, E. and Lee, C. K. (2010), "Remaking the world of Chinese labor: a thirty year retrospective" *British Journal of Industrial Relations,* 48(3): 3–17

Froissart, C. (2006), "Escaping from under the Party's thumb: a few examples of migrant workers' strivings for autonomy", *Social Research* 73(1): 197–218.

Froissart, C. (2010), "Is there a NGO model? Comparing NGOs supporting migrant workers in Beijing and the Pearl River Delta". *Sciences Po, Asia Centre Conference Paper*.

Fulda, A., Li, Y. and Song, Q. (2012), "New Strategies of Civil Society in China: A Case Study of the Network Governance Approach", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(76).

Gold, T. B. (1990), "The resurgence of civil society in China", *Journal of Democracy,* 1(1):18–31.

Gold, T.B. (1990), "The Resurgence of Civil Society in China", *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (1): 18-31

Hasmath, R. and Hsu, J. (2013), "Isomorphic Pressures, Epistemic Communities and State-NGO Collaboration in China", Paper presented at Association for Asian Studies, San Diego 21-24 March 2013.

Hasmath, R. and Hsu, J. (eds.) (2009), "A State Creation? Civil Society and Migrant Organizations", *China in an Era of Transition: Understanding Contemporary State and Society Actors*, New York: Palgrave.

Hasmath, Reza and Hsu , Jennifer (2008), "NGOs in China and Issues of Accountability", *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 30 (1).

Heurlin, C. (2010), "Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO-State Relations under Dictatorship", *Voluntas*, 21 (2).

Hildebrandt, T. (2011), "The political economy of social organization in China", *The China Quarterly,* 208: 970–989.

Hildebrandt, Timothy (2011), "The Political Economy of Social Organization in China", The China Quarterly 208 .

Ho, P. (2001), "Greening without Conflict? Environmentalism, Green NGOs and Civil Society in China", *Development and Change*, 32: 893-921.

Howell, J. (2012), "Civil society, Corporatism and Capitalism in China" *Journal of Comparative Asian Development*, 11 (2): 271–294.

Howell, Jude (2003), "New Directions in Civil Society: Organizing Around Marginalized Interests", in Howell, Jude, (eds.) *Governance in China*, Rowman and Littlefield Inc.

Hsu, C. (2010), "Beyond Civil Society: An Organizational Perspective on State-NGO Relations in the People's Republic of China", *Journal of Civil Society*, 6 (3).

Hsu, Carolyn (2009), *Chinese NGOs and the State: Institutional Interdependence rather than Civil Society*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco.

Hsu, J.Y.J. (2012), "Spaces of Civil Society: The Role of Migrant Non-Governmental Organizations in Beijing and Shanghai", *Progress in Development Studies*, 12 (1).

Hsu, J.Y.J. and Hasmath, R. (2014), "The Local Corporatist State and NGO Relations in China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23 (87).

Hsu, Jennifer (2012), "Layers of the Urban State: Migrant Organizations and the Chinese State", *Urban Studies*, 49 (16).

Kaufman, Joan (2011), HIV Sex Work and Civil Society in China", *Journal of Infectious Disease* 204 (suppl 5).

*Kennedy, "*The Face of Grassroots Democracy in Rural China: Real Versus Cosmetic Elections"*, Asian Survey* 42(3): 456-82

Kojima, K. et al.(2012), "The Corporatist System and Social Organizations in China", *Management and Organization Review*, 8 (3).

Lee, C.K. (2008), "Rights Activism in China", *Contexts*, 7 (3).

Li (2003), "The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China," Asian Survey, 43(4): 648-62

Li, H. et al. (2010), "From spectators to implementers: civil society organization involved in AIDS programmes in China", *International Journal of Epidemiology*, 39: 65-71.

Lin, T C. (2007), "Environmental NGOs and the Anti-Dam Movements in China: A Social Movement with Chinese Characteristics", Issues *& Studies*, 43 (4).

Liu J. (2000), *Civil Society and Limited Government - A Case Study of China's Chamber of Commerce*, (Research Report).

Lu Y. (2005) "The Growth of Civil Society in China Key challenges for NGOs", *Asia Programme,* Chatham House.

Lu, Y. (2007), "The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs: A New Perspective", *China: An International Journal*, 5 (2).

Ma, Hu-Yun (1994), "The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society", *The China Quarterly*, (137).

Ma, Qiusha (2002), "The Governance of NGOs in China since 1978: How Much Autonomy?", *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31 (3).

Manion, M. (1994) "Survey Research in the Study of Contemporary China: Learning from Local Samples", *China Quarterly,* 139: 741-65

Manion,M.(1996) "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside," American Political Science Review, 90 (December):736-48

Menefee, T. and Nordtveit, B.H. (2012), "Disaster, Civil Society and Education in China: A Case Study of An Independent Non-Government Organization Working in the Aftermath of the Wenchuan Earthquake", *International Journal of Educational Development*, 32 (4).

Mercer, C. (2002), "NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature", *Progress in Development Studies*, 2 (1).

Mercer, Claire (2002), "Review and critique of the NGO literature that equates and/or associates NGOs with democratisation".

Moore R.R. (2001) "China's Fledgling Civil Society: A Force for Democratization?" *World Policy Journal*, 18(1): 56-66.

Nevitt,(1996) "Private Business Associations in China: Evidence of Civil Society or Local State Power?" *The China Journal*, 36: 25-43.

O'Brien,(1994) "Chinese People's Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early Organizational Development", *Comparative Political Studies*, 80-107.

Ostergaard, C.S. (1989), "Citizens, Groups and Nascent Civil Society in China: Towards an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations", *China Information*, 4 (2): 28-41.

PERRY E.J. (2014) "Citizen Contention and Campus Calm: The Paradox of Chinese Civil Society".

Perry, E. (1994). "Trends in the study of Chinese politics: state-society relations", *China Quarterly*, 139 (704–713)

Qin, H. (2004), "NGO in China: The third sector in the globalization process and social transformation".

Yep,R.(2000), "The Limitations of Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China", *Journal of Contemporary China,* 547-65.

Saich,T. (2000), "Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China", *China Quarterly*, 124-41

Schwartz, J. (2004), "Environmental NGOs in China: Roles and Limits", *Pacific Affairs*, 77 (1).

Simon, K. W. (2009), "Regulation of civil society in China: necessary changes after the Olympic Games and the Sichuan earthquake", *Fordham International Law Journal,*32(3): 943–987

Simon, K. W. (2011), "The regulation of civil society organizations in China", *International Journal of Civil Society Law,* 9(1): 55–84.

Simon, K.W. and Hang, G. (2010), "Opening the Space: New Development for China's Community Organizations", *CUA Columbus School of Law Legal Studies*, 25.

Simon, Karla W. (2010), "Two Steps Forward One Step Back – Developments in the Regulation of Civil Society Organizations in China", *International Law Journal of Civil Society Law*, 7 (4).

Spires, A.J. (2012), "Lessons from Abroad: Foreign Influences on China's Emerging Civil Society", *The China Journal*, 68: 125:146

Sun B. (2000), *Professional Associations and Civil Self-Governance in the Economic Field*, (Research Report).
Sun Liping, "Public Welfare NGOs and Governance - the Case of the Project Hope", 2000 (Research Report).

Teets, J. (2013), "Let Many Civil Societies Bloom: The Rise of Consultative Authoritarianism in China", *The China Quarterly*.

Teets, Jessica C. (2012), "Reforming Service Delivery in China: The Emergence of Social Innovation Model", *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 17 (1): 15-32

The directory of NGOs in Nick Young, 250 Chinese NGOs: Civil Society in the Making (Beijing: China Development Brief, 2001).

The Regulation of Civil Society Organizations in China (2011), *International Journal of Civil Society Law*, 9 (1).

Unger, (1996) "Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations", *China Quarterly*, 147 : 795-81

Vala C. T. (2012), "Protestant Christianity and Civil Society in Authoritarian China", *China Perspectives* .

Wang Y. (2000), *China's Diplomacy Based on Domestic Progress*, (Research Report).

Wang Y. (2000), *Civil Self-Governance and Changes in Method of Community Management*, (Research Report).

Wang Y. and Sun B. (1999*), Introduction to the Development of China's Civil Society Organizations"*, (Research Report).

White, "Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (January 1993): 63-88.

White, Gordon (1993), "Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City", *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, (29).

Wu, F. and Chan, K-M. (2012), "Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving government-NGO Relations", *China Perspectives* 3.

Wu, Fengshi (2009), *Environmental Activism and Civil Society Development in China*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series.

Xia,(1997), "Informational Efficiency, Organizational Development and Institutional Linkages of the Provincial People's Congresses in China*", Journal of Legislative Studies,* 3(3): 10-38

Xin,(1994), "A Civil Society and Public Sphere in Post-Mao China? An Overview of Western Publications," *China Information* , 38-52

Xu B. (2013)"For whom the bell tolls: state-society relations and the Sichuan earthquake mourning in China" Published online: 17 August 2013, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013.

Xu, H., Zeng, Y., and Anderson, A.F. (2005), "Chinese NGOs in Action against HIV/AIDS", *Cell Research* 15: 11-12.

Yep, R.(2000) "The Limitations of Corporatism for Understanding Reforming China," *Journal of Contemporary China,* 547-65.

Yin, D. (2009), "China's attitude toward foreign NGOs", *Washington University Global Studies Law Review*, 8 (3).

Yu K. (2000), *Changes in Civil Organizations and Governance in China's Rural Areas – A Case Study of Dongsheng Village, Changqiao Town, Zhangpu County, Fujian Province*, (Research Report).

Zheng Y.,(2008), "Lessons Modern Chinese Charity Workers Can Take From Society's Response to the Wenchuan Earthquake", *China Nonprofit Review*, 3: 130-41.