

**INDIA-AUSTRALIA RELATIONS: A CONSTRUCTIVE
ENGAGEMENT (2000-2014)**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

KUMARI POONAM SINGH



CENTRE FOR INDO-PACIFIC STUDIES

School Of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi-110067

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CENTRE FOR INDO-PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110 067

Phone : 2670 4350
Fax : +91-11-2674 2592

Date: 24/07/2015

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "India-Australia Relations: A Constructive Engagement (2000-2014)" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree in this university or any other university.

Dedicated to my parents...

Poonam Singh

POONAM SINGH

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Shankari Sundararaman
PROF. SHANKARI SUNDARRAMAN


Chairperson, CIPS

 Chairperson
Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

DR. SHUBHAMITRA DAS

DR. SHUBHAMITRA DAS

Supervisor

 Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The current geo-political developments are making international relations and emerging world order more dynamic than in the cold war period. There has been rise of Asian powers and Indian Ocean is fast emerging as a huge economic and human resource potential. This is the crucial transport lane for the vast oil and gas supplies from across the world. This reliance also creates a sense of vulnerability among the countries in the region. The region is facing challenges like climate change and transnational crime. The emerging Indo-Pacific is the most militarized area in the world with seven of the world's ten largest standing armies, the world's largest and most sophisticated navy and five of the world's declared nuclear nations¹. China's energy insecurity is seen from its aggression in South China Sea and Indian Ocean, through which the vast majority of the nation's oil must pass². On the other hand India's Look East policy and blue-water ambitions are drawing it into the western Pacific³. It was assumed that after the Cold War rivalry international platform will be a safe place with world order. But with the slow and steady rise of different powers both economically and militarily, unipolarity is challenged. In this juncture where US, China, Japan, Russia and India has gained equal emphasis on balancing Asia, India has given a particular focus; especially by the states surrounding Asia like Australia in its foreign policy. The focus of the study is to see the various aspects of constructive engagement among India and Australia; especially with the changed relationship after the signing of the agreement on the civil use of nuclear power on the one hand and the declaration of US 'Pivot' to Pacific, where India-Australia relation also takes a security angle will give a holistic perspective of the relation.

Background

India's rapid growth of economy by its expansion and exposure in the larger region has become obvious. India has been connecting with its Indian Ocean neighbours and major maritime powers of the world. There has been a new reliance on the sea for energy and mineral resources with an emphasis on the Malacca straits and the straits of Hormuz. India has been engaging with regional actors on bilateral as well as multilateral framework. There have been crucial factors for the growing importance of India's role in

the Indo-Pacific vis-a-vis Australia. The increased emphasis of Indo-Australian relations can be seen not only from the perspective of energy with Uranium imports but also with a large Diaspora and cultural and economic relations. Both shared interest in the Indian Ocean region. 'Like India, Australia now views the Indian Ocean as vital both for its security and for commerce. Finally, Australia now invokes the expansion of China's naval presence and of the number of agreements linking China to various countries in the region to justify these new initiatives'⁴. India and Australia have been seeking ways to improve their presence and focus on possible partnerships based on shared perceptions and common interests⁵.

Trade increased between them in the recent years. India is the fourth largest export destination for its goods and fifth largest partner in goods and services in 2010-2011 for Australia⁶. Commercial ties between India and Australia have also witnessed significant growth in recent years⁷, alongside the development of India's economic influence. India even became the largest importer of Australian products in the Indian Ocean Region. The recent decision to authorize the sale of uranium to India, a non-NPT-sanctioned nuclear power, brought the bilateral relationship to new levels of trust. Secondly, the rise of China which concerns both however the reason has been different. For India, it is related to the border dispute as well as 'increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean'⁸. While for Australia, it is related with the fear that might be faced a confrontation in which it has to choose between China and US. Thirdly, both India and Australia do not want to stop the rising of China because of their own economic interdependency. Thus they just want to prevent the emergence of Chinese dominated regional order⁹. Fourthly, no one thinks that other could provide the regional security. Australia just hopes that 'India will play a leading role in building a new regional order by balancing other rising power'¹⁰. Fifthly, while Australia has strong and old relation with US, India has started the relation with the signing of 123 Agreement and also with increased economic ties. Lastly, even if they cooperate with each-other in the multilateral organizations it would be low key. Bilateral partnership is then the only opportunity where they could engage more strongly. The partnership between India and Australia can be seen from these angles that will also help in shaping the Asian equation here after.

Currently, in the international pitch, border issues are also making it difficult for India to play a regional role. So 'there is a need to extend India's Look East policy to encompass the South Pacific. India's relationship with South Pacific can act as a counter-weight to China's 'String of Pearls' strategy, which involves building bases around India's peninsula by balancing other regional power in region. China started this (String of Pearls) by building a deep-sea port on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, in the town of Hambantota. Besides this, China has helped Pakistan to build a deep-sea port in the town of Gadara in Baluchistan¹¹. China has started to court the littoral states in the Indian Ocean such as the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles through 'Yuan diplomacy', offering these states aid in exchange for hosting naval bases'¹². To answer China's encirclement in the Indian Ocean, India's naval diplomacy involves sending naval officers on routine trips to atoll states and having regular exchanges at the naval officers' level. But this is not a sufficient act. India should initiate more bilateral trade pacts and multilateral initiatives in the Indian Ocean region by strengthening the regional multilateral organizations. India, despite not being traditional naval powers like the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia or Japan, has invested considerable effort in increasing the operational capability of its navy¹³. 'As a part of its overall strategic priorities, India has begun to be influenced in its naval thinking by Alfred Thayer Mahan's famous maxim that 'whoever controls the world's oceans controls the world'¹⁴. Naval diplomacy plays a very important role as these 'Indian naval officers use to make regular visits to South-east Asian countries'¹⁵. Both Australia and US desire India to participate a in the regional affairs as it has the ability to do it.

The rise of India and its growing engagement in the region is also supported by other powers. The US is working towards strengthening traditional alliances with Japan and Australia and is aiming new security partnerships with India. And numerous US officials have highlighted the potential for India to play an important role in the region. This change in perspective would enable India's foreign policy to unite its maritime assertion and the Look East Policy (LEP) that continues its eastern push, now extending toward the Pacific. The United States' 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review acknowledged India's rise as a military power in the Asia-Pacific region and the dominant role its navy could play in years to come. India needed US support for its economic regeneration and the Clinton

Administration viewed India as an emerging success story of globalization. The US is also contemplating closer ties with a tripartite relation/alliance with Australia (with which it already has) and India. The changed nomenclature of Indo-Pacific as used by the clearly emphasises.

With the release of the Defence White Paper on May 3rd, 2013 Australia officially announced a new region, the 'Indo-Pacific' a strategic arc 'connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia'¹⁶. The 'Indo-Pacific' is not a new term in Australian debates. 'Indo-Pacific' was used in the 1950s to discuss decolonization in the 1960s at two seminars held by the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Australian National University and again in the 1970s¹⁷. 'Yet for around 30 years the term was not prominent until its re-emergence in 2005 in a paper by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies' Michael Richardson who saw the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit (EAS) as symbolizing a more unified 'Indo-Pacific' region'¹⁸.

Besides these the energy security is also became a vital factor by concerning the Asia's economic growth and environmental degradation. 'The current world economy depends on fossil fuels for 80 percent of its total energy supply. Oil accounts for 34 percent of the world's total primary energy supply, coal accounts for 25 percent, natural gas for 21 percent and nuclear energy for 6.5 percent'¹⁹. 'With the coming decline of fossil fuels, nuclear and renewable energies must play growing roles in meeting the world energy demand. The generation of nuclear electricity uses uranium, which is a finite resource'²⁰. Within the whole panoramic situation lies the study of India and Australia relations that will be an interesting study.

Climate change is an emerging factor concerning to both India and Australia. In India, the 'Monsoon rains have been irregular in recent years, resulting in less than average falls in different parts of the country, while other parts have experienced severe flooding. It is unclear from the evidence what effect climate change will have on the critically important monsoonal weather patterns'²¹. From the Rudd Government in Australia too, climate change is becoming serious debate on its dire effects on the region. This is the most serious challenge faced by both and would be more serious in the coming decades.

It is could not be solved by anyone unilaterally. Australia and India are making their efforts to resolve it by raising it both in the multilateral as well as bilateral levels. These issues are ‘the subject of considerable research by their universities, NGOs, aid and funding agencies, and governments’²².

In the light of above discussions it is important to consider that there are generally, ‘three external developments that may help shape the Australian government’s response towards India in the coming months. *One* is climate change and the so-called nuclear renaissance, the *second* is the Indo–US nuclear deal, and *the third* is India’s growth’²³. While another sides, India needs a secure energy resource and support of Australia for UN Security Council seats and balancing China and emerged as a regional player in the region. India can use Australia because it helped India by including it in the Indo-Pacific Asia which is very crucial for India and its naval power to practice its influence.

Review of literature

There is enormous literature on the India- Australia relation while the debate became more endearing with the changed global scenario along with the changed nomenclature. For the better perceptive of the relationship between India and Australia the themes that would be dealt are as follows:

- **India and Australia: Historical relationship**

Available literature provides the information that the relationship between India and Australia after the India’s independence was not cordial. Auriol Weigold noted that the Prime Minister of Australia ‘Robert Menzies was a conservative, who saw non-alignment; the main ideology of Indian foreign policy as ‘foolish’ while Indian Prime Minister Nehru had committed almost three decades of his life to wresting an independence from Britain which he was not about to surrender. Their different values and imperatives cast a long shadow on the formal bilateral relationship. At that time, Australia was of little significance compared with India's other interests’²⁴. India kept itself dispassionate with international scenario. There was boarder conflict which forced India to choose inward looking policy and was unable to play a regional or global role. Australia’s interest to relate itself with India rose in mid 1980s. ‘It was political,

concerned with diplomacy and investment objectives. This also coincided with the end of the Cold War and the beginnings of economic liberalisation in India, and economic opportunity perceived in both countries'²⁵. 'The growing warmth of Australia–India relations in the 1990s, marked by several published reports recommending further relationship-building'²⁶.

Gray Smith mentioned that 'Australia has rejected the development of nuclear weapons for its own security and has pursued a dual strategy for dealing with the disadvantage this creates in terms of military power imbalance internationally. Australia was a very active proponent of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and of the NPT Review and extension process at the end of the twentieth century. With the emerging trade in uranium, Australia developed bilateral safeguards agreements that sought to create barriers to weapons use. From the late 1990s, stayed true to its approach of the previous decades, urging India to close down its nuclear weapons facilities and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state'²⁷. It was also the same time period, when the south Pacific becomes prominent due to French nuclear tests and climate change issue.

Peter Mayer and Purnendra Jain noted that the 'relation became inhospitable promptly after India's Pokhran tests in May 1998. Australia acts as big brother in the region and gave a very staunch opposition about Indian Nuclear Test'²⁸. Man Mohini Kaul in her article expressed the mind-set of Australia towards India. 'On 14 May 1998 the Australian conservative coalition government decided to take action'²⁹ in response to the outrageous acts perpetuated by India in conducting no less than five nuclear tests. Canberra announced 'immediate suspension of bilateral defence relations with India, withdrawal of its Defence Adviser from New Delhi, suspension of non-humanitarian aid and indefinite postponement of all ministerial and senior official visits'³⁰.

- **Post-Cold War Relation**

The relation between India and Australia was seems to be improve by the visit of Howard government when he made his first prime ministerial visit to India, the first since former Prime Minister Bob Hawke's trip there in 1989. It was primarily an exercise in damage

control following the perceived over-reaction to the nuclear tests. But the political relationship could not become normal by this visit. The main purpose of this visit was business, with trade and commerce dominating the conversations. John Howard made two visits to India. The first, in July 2000, was a short, two-day stopover, aimed at normalising relations after the freezing of bilateral links following Australia's forceful condemnation of India's nuclear tests of 1998. Although in his only speech, the familiar *mantras* of shared interests in cricket, Commonwealth and democracy were delivered. After this some important incidents such as 9/11 and other terrorist attack in Southeast Asia were the main factor which waged attention of Australia towards its security. In addition, the increasing scope of their interaction is particularly evident in naval affairs, as noted by the Australian White Paper in 2003. Both countries aimed to broaden their relationship to new sectors, to become true economic, political and strategic partners.

- **India- Australia Economic Relations**

Vibhanshu Shekhar has highlighted the growing relations between India and Australia. According to him the growing economic relationship is cause of 'an enormous increase in India's demand for industrial resources and because of the two countries being a part of economic integration in East Asia'³¹. There is an increase in Australia's exports of non-renewable items as well as other raw materials to India. Both as a part of East Asia Summit process are engage with each other to being important stakeholders in the formation of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA). Both are also working together at the G-20 platform, designated as a premier forum for international economic cooperation. The two countries have shown their willingness in negotiation of a Comprehensive FTA including goods, services, manufacture and investment. 'In November 2008, during his visit to New Delhi, the Australian Minister of Trade also emphases on the bilateral FTA for growing trade interdependency. India's strategic concerns and diplomatic prologues in South Pacific and its entry into the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) as a post-forum dialogue member have also helped to bring India and Australia closer'³².

Sarabani Roy Choudhury has also mentioned the growing economic relations between them in the terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In the present time, FDI is in the

high concerns for a country's development. Both India and Australia are 'finding avenues to participate in FDI and to engage actively with each other in bilateral trade'³³. And the recent activity in the field of FDI between them is very encouraging. Indian investment in Australia estimated Au\$1 billion. It is making Australia the ninth most important destination for Indian FDI. It has generated significant employment. But it is mainly concentrated in IT and resource sectors. On the other hand, India became a prime market for Australian investment. Indeed, over a short period of time India moved up to the third most important destination for Australian investment'³⁴. But it is mainly concentrated in the large cities like New Delhi and Mumbai. Australia would be able to get comprehensive advantage to invest in India by developing its metallurgical industry, food and food product industry, healthcare, IT-enabled services and education. Currently, the movement of FDI between the two is not very large but has a strong potential to grow³⁵. And this greater economic trade can result in more intensive bilateral relationship.

- **Emergence of Indo-Pacific Term and India as a Regional Player**

From 2002 to 2006, the strategic setting for Australian foreign policy was shaped by the events such as of 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the US and the bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002. In 2005, the East Asia Summit has convened to include the ten countries of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), China, Japan, South Korea, and three non-East Asian states, India, Australia and New Zealand. Given its membership and geographic spread, some Asia specialists had even advanced an idea for a new formulation: an 'Indo-Pacific Community'

The argument by David Scott makes three things clear *first* 'that at the conceptual level there has been a strategic rediscovery of a maritime regional framework, the Indo-Pacific. *Secondly* at the policy level there is a significant regional security convergence, a degree of strategic balancing, between India and the United States in this Indo-Pacific. *Third*, it argues that at the causal level there is a common maritime challenge from China faced by India in the Indian Ocean and by the United States in the Pacific Ocean, a common Indo-Pacific strategic challenge which is generating this significant US-India naval convergence'³⁶. He mainly focused that the improving relation between Indo-US is the important factor in the India's foreign policy and its engagement in the region.

Rory Medcalf express about the growing importance of Indo-Pacific and stated that ‘Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on Southeast Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific sub regions will retain their own dynamics too³⁷. It suits Australia’s two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China’s expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia’³⁸. All these shows the growing new strategic importance of Indian Ocean which war far before considered only as the passing through.

On the other hand A.Vinod Kumar has focused that the threats from China has joined India and Australia with US support. Many motives could be attributed to the manner in which the Indo-Pacific paradigm is gaining primacy in Asian geopolitics. At the core of this paradigm are three overlapping features³⁹. First is the strong American effort to find a strategic justification for its Asia Pivot strategy, and its need to propound a language for its rebalancing campaign. Second, it exemplifies measured efforts to merge the geopolitical dynamics of the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean littorals into a holistic whole. This entails the introduction of key IOR actors like India into the East Asian balance of power while also extending the Western Pacific dynamics to the Southern Asian periphery. The third factor emerges from a combination of the first two, and serves as the foundation of the Indo-Pacific realignment: to formulate an inter-oceanic campaign to contain the ‘rise of China’ across the wide stretches of the continental expanse where China’s occurrence is domineering, by mobilizing a spectrum of actors impinged by the Chinese challenge.

Oliver Stuenkel stated that it seems that the Indo-US civil nuclear deal as India’s big accomplishment and stated that ‘due to its democratic credentials, soft power, and

reputation as a benign international actor, a consensus has emerged in the West that India is the world's best hope to balance a rising China, both in the region and, at a later stage, in global affairs. Reflecting this, the USA's recognition of India as a nuclear power - a move that risked weakening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was unprecedented, and showed how important India has become⁴⁰.

Edmond Roy discussed about the Australian policy of Uranium supply and dealt it with the compared it with France and Taiwan. He has also been talked about 'how long Australia can sustain its stand in the face of climate change, economic growth and growing bilateral relations between two democracies with shared interests'⁴¹. Without a doubt, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean is now taking on a considerable urgency. Influential author Robert Kaplan is being widely quoted from his recent book *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*⁴². Kaplan makes a powerfully persuasive case that the Indian Ocean will be the centre of the new Great Game in geopolitics, referring to the strategic competition between India and China in their 'aspirations for great-power status and their quest for energy security.

Inderfurth and F. Karl have mentioned about how the requirement of time changed the perception towards India by the diplomats of US as well as Australia. 'India's inclusion in the Indo-Pacific has largely been promoted by 'a broader network of Australian and US think tanks. Promoters of the concept talk about how countries in the region 'should take a leading role in shaping the economic and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific' and seek to tie India more closely with the US, Australia and Japan⁴³.

With the similar view Barthelemy Courmont & Colin Geraghty observed that Australia is currently reassessing its involvement in Asian affairs, both at the economic and strategic levels. This new posture, clearly identified in the governmental document *Australia in the Asian century: White paper*, released in October 2012, raises new questions regarding Australia's participation in strategic affairs in the Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. According to Australian experts, the Indian Ocean today has become a "Western Front" for Canberra, requiring a clear strategic posture. Australia's growing involvement in the Indian Ocean also provides an opportunity to assert its power and seek out new

partnerships⁷⁴⁴. This statement is focusing on Australia's search for new partners. It is like a constructive engagement of Australia towards India.

- **India- Australia Uranium deal**

Gary Smith come out with the argument about the Australian intensions and noted, 'Indeed, from the Australian perspective, uranium exports could be key measures for strengthening security ties between India and Australia, particularly in the face of China's expanding military reach. There is a realization in Australia that its current position on uranium sale is a huge road block to a real strategic partnership with India⁷⁴⁵. 'The relationship between India and Australia has gained considerable efforts to develop a comprehensive strategic relationship with India. As other great powers rise, Australia can pursue a hedging strategy to diversify its dependencies⁷⁴⁶. In the commercial realm, too Australia sees India as its next, after China, investment in the resource sectors. Besides this the growing concerns in Australia from the Rudd administration is climate change. Thus all these proposals could be examined for its prospective for enhancing Australia-India relations.

Rahul Mishra mentioned that the reason behind the decision of supply of Uranium to India is that Australia which has the biggest uranium reserves in the world does not want to lose out on benefiting from India's rapidly growing uranium energy market. He expressed that the recent developments in India-Australia bilateral ties is the result of economic incentives and strategic calculations. The negotiations on a bilateral nuclear safeguards treaty 'will help fast-track the free trade agreement negotiations between the two countries. It would also encourage Indian Investors to invest in Australian Uranium mines⁷⁴⁷. And India would fuel its growing demand for energy for its growing economy. This would translate into a win-win situation for both.

Zhao Qinghai mentioned about the ongoing planning of trilateral cooperation between Indian, US and Australia named "*Australia-India Relations: A Strategic Partnership Yet to Mature*", he noted that 'In early November 2011, the Heritage Foundation in the US, the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia, and the Observer Research Foundation in India co-authored a research report titled Shared Goals, Converging

Interests: A Plan for US-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific'⁴⁸. The report has also recommended the need of strategic, economic and security cooperation among the three countries. 'The US has gradually strengthened its bilateral defence cooperation with India and Australia and has played a leading and exemplary role for Australian-Indian defence cooperation. Australia, which has always followed the US' lead on the diplomatic front, actively cooperates with the US in its strategy towards India and has taken the initiative to develop relations with India'⁴⁹.

Research Objectives

- To analyse the changed international equations within the emerging relations between India and Australia
- To analysis the historical relationship between India and Australia and those that impact on the present relations
- To understand whether the new relationship between India and Australia is mostly economic or strategic to build a future alliance and/or partnership against China
- To analyse the debates on the geostrategic and geo-economic perspectives of Indian foreign policy

Research Questions

- How the relation between India and Australia is going to affect the region?
- Is Indo-Australian relation a dependent factor on the Indo-US civil nuclear deal?
- How can India become a regional player with the revived relation with Australia?
- Can India play a strategic role in support to Australia's partnership for *quadrilateral alliance*?
- Can geopolitical rivalry take a back seat for constructive engagement with Australia, US, china and Japan that could be advantageous in both economic and energy security perspective?
- Can the revived relation between India-Australia be a stabilising factor for the region?
- Is Australia searching for an alternate economic partner to depend less on China and hence chose India?

Hypothesis

- The strategic location of India and Australia engulfs the entire region of Indo-Pacific making the partnership pragmatic and timely.
- India and Australia have created an independent relation with each other more on constructive engagement rather than strategic partnership.

Rationale and Scope of the Study

The new global order has made India significant due to its strategic presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The emerging Indo-Pacific 'is the most militarized area in the world with seven of the world's ten largest standing armies, the world's largest and most sophisticated navy and five of the world's declared nuclear nations'⁵⁰. On the other hand 'India's Look East policy and blue-water ambitions are drawing it into the western Pacific'⁵¹. The study of the relationship is important because this engagement would be beneficial for both. And India could use Australia for the fulfilment of its growing demand of food, energy and employment in order to stabilize its growth rate. Although India is still thinking that Australia is not much reliable because of its traditional alliance with US which can be considered as bias of the Indian foreign policy makers. The changing needs of the region forced both to use the opportunity to start a constructive partnership, more so due to physical proximity and commonality of threats in the region. Thus the emphasis on the bilateral relation between India and Australia is considered for the study.

Research Methodology

The study would proceed with a combination of both descriptive and analytical methods. And in this the deductive methods would be used to reach the conclusion. The methods of data collection would be rely on both primary and secondary sources extracting from government reports, bilateral agreements, official statements and declarations, books, newspaper clippings, articles, editorials, photographs etc. The questionnaires methods would be use to reach at the satisfied point. Some important theoretical perspective of balancing, band wagoning and hedging would draw on for better understanding and

would apply on the India-Australia relations during the discussion on their political, economical, and security magnitude.

Organization of Dissertation

The following three chapters have been organized into three themes: Historical Realities between the relationship of India and Australia, Building Blocks of Cooperation between India and Australia and Constructive Engagement between India and Australia. In the first chapter, the focus will be on the role of political leaders on the construction of foreign. With it also deal how Non-alignment Movement has deep impact on the relationship of India and Australia and later NPT as a main factor to make estranged relation between India-Australia.

Second Chapter would look at the changing scenario of the international politics and the response of India and Australia to it. In addition the strategic relationship between India and Australia will be discussed in detail. And also figure out the role of these relationships on the bonding between the two countries. Third Chapter intends to look at the rapid economic growth of India and its demand for energy resources and the right time to sign the civil nuclear deal with Australia. With this the discussion would be on other factors and possibilities to make bilateral relationship deeper. The various issues of economic interdependence will be studied along with the recent Indo-US relation and India's expanded relation as a regional player. Economic and diplomatic relationships will be the focus of the chapter. How the potential of rising economic relations is giving the relationship a different structure. Education, Diaspora and other issues will be dealt that emphasises on the potential of creating strong relation between the two. In the concluding chapter the hypothesis will be tested and analysed and future prospects of India-Australia relation as economic partners, strategic allies or culturally bound friends will be analysed thoroughly.

Chapter 2: India-Australia- Historical Glitches in Foreign Policy

Introduction

The relation between India and Australia could be perceived through its multiple similarities in politics, economy and their historical legacy. Both share British colonial experience and its legacies such as English language, political pluralism, rule of law and freedom of press. The political system of India and Australia are multiparty democratic based system. They are also the member of Commonwealth of Nations. And the most obvious aspect where both come together quite often is 'Cricket'. It is imperative to find out if India-Australia relation has always been only Cricket or has gone beyond it into the political and diplomatic angles, so that the recent friendship could be seen to have a base for better cooperation⁵². In spite of these similarities, the two countries failed to make friendly relations and were uninterested in each other. The other reasons were that they had chosen different kind of domestic and foreign policy which resulted their strategies and interests as being poles apart. There were also complete differences in their political ideologies and geographical concerns. An eminent Australian diplomat Christopher Waters explained their relations in the Cold War aptly as "Alignment verses non-alignment, military alliance verses peaceful co-existence, military strength verses non military confidence building measures and western nations verses Asian nations"⁵³.

Post World War Situation: Dilemma for Australia and India

The foreign policy of Australia has changed dramatically in post World War period primarily due to the withdrawal of colonial powers from Asia and partly because of the emergence of Cold War. At that time Australian domestic and foreign policy was guided by its geo-strategic location which was attractive and vulnerable to regional instability arising from post World War situation⁵⁴. These new emerging situations changed the whole international politics. The European powers in the Asian region were the main providers of security to Australia from external threats. Waging of two costly World Wars and with the rising anti-colonial movement in the Asia and parts of Africa, made it difficult to European power to sustain their empire. Australia which was totally different from their Asian neighbour in their cultures, race and traditions became afraid about its

continental security primarily from Japan and later from Communism⁵⁵. Post war situation forced Britain to withdraw from their colonies after giving them independence. Consequently Britain's role as a security provider to Australia was replaced by the US. The major concern for US was that they were afraid about increasing Soviet influence in the region and began involving in Asian affairs by making allies in this region. Meanwhile they came across Australia as an important and useful ally. In these circumstances Australia also felt itself comfortable with the US presence and decided to join the US led western bloc to contain communism and ensure its security commitment by the US⁵⁶. From that time the foreign policy of Australia was thoroughly inclined towards and is also affected by the US policy in Asia and elsewhere.

On the other hand India whose situation was totally different from Australia did not look into the international situation like Australia? For India, Britain was the main cause of economic exploitation of the country. Colonialism, racialism and western power politics have been the main cause of the miserable condition of India and its people⁵⁷. Therefore India determined not to do the same mistake and planned to follow self-reliance and autonomy in all aspects. As a result the policy of Non-Alignment became the base of Indian foreign relations and pledged resolutely to keep India away from joining any Cold War rivalry. But the following international affairs were not as easy as Indian diplomats thought it would be. And here while we are dealing with the relationship between India and Australia it is to find out where they have taken equal stand. Besides the international issues which had greater impact on their bilateral relationship during the period of Nehru and Menzies, the role of leadership is important to discuss.

Political and government leaders have time and again played an important role in both bettering and worsening of relationship between countries. Indian first Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who had greater control on its political and economic affairs did a lot to present India an important place in the international affairs. His relationship with the Australian leader Robert Menzies was not friendly both in personal ideas as well as on international issues. On the other hand Menzies did not have a positive opinion about his Asian neighbours and has sympathy and attachment with the western powers people, culture and ideas. These two leaders have been in the power for a long time and

subsequently had greater impact on building the future perspective about each other. Besides this Cold War trajectory is another major scenario which has effected India-Australia relations.

Therefore both the leaders Jawaharlal Nehru and Robert Menzies had a crucial role in cold war politics and were giving shape to the foreign policy of their respective nations. The foreign policy adopted by Nehru and Menzies had been the starting point of India-Australia relation to sour. Following these perceptions, the principle focus of this chapter is to understand and analyze the evolution of India-Australia relations and also to examine the influence of political leaders in shaping the foreign policy and their posture to deal with upcoming events in the international affairs which had significant impact in their domestic and foreign policy. And also how does the leadership change the policy and perception about of any issues.

India's Foreign Policy and Non-alignment Movement

In the Cold War period Indian foreign policy was basically reliant and guided by the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The major pillar of Indian foreign policy, NAM was mainly influenced by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. NAM came into existence as an international notion on behalf of his great efforts along with the President of Yugoslavia Josip (Joseph) Broz Tito and premier of Egypt Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. India firstly announced the policy of Non-alignment in September 1946⁵⁸. The guiding visions for the adoption of the policy were international peace, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, support of Afro-Asian solidarity and faith in the United Nations⁵⁹. Other countries also followed India and its perceptions. As a result, NAM became the identity of the Third World countries. Although the first conference of Non-alignment held in Belgrade in 1961, the groundwork started much before with the Asian Relations conference organized by Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in April 1947 and another one in 1949. Significantly, it was the Bandung Conference held in 1955 which made NAM not only an international policy but also a major counter theme during the Cold War rivalry.

Bandung Conference: Implication on India-Australia Relations

Bandung Conference is one of those incidences which have major concern on the India-Australia relation on the international front. The countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma which were the member of an association called Colombo Powers that was founded in 1950 came together in an informal meeting to discuss about the countries, members for the invitation of the forthcoming Conference. But here, the debate concerning the Australia's invitation could not be decided. Australia was also not sure to joining the Conference felt uncomfortable about the possibilities of questions on its traditional immigration policy and being different from them Australia showed that it is not hoping the invitation for the conference⁶⁰. However, in Australia there was ongoing debate on joining the conference but finally they decided not to join. Consequently, Bandung Conference, a momentous international event, where 29 countries from Africa and Asia were presented and successfully discussed all the major issues of regional and international aspects without any help of colonial or superpowers . Thus Bandung Conference was a true sign of Afro-Asian solidarity. There was not a single presence of European or superpower country member. This was symbolized that the newly independent countries were able to discuss their economic and regional affairs and work out their affairs without others involvement. Hence conference itself was an expression of anti-colonialism. This kind of solidarity was found to be counter-productive by both US and Australian.

The consequence of the aforesaid conference was in the views of US Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles that "Bandung conference type of meeting was in line with Soviet tactics of regional grouping which excluded the US and if successful, the communist engulfment of these nations will be comparatively easy"⁶¹. Australia who used to follow the ideology of US also shared similar views. The reasons were that Australia has the islands of Papua New Guinea in the 1950s as colony and its immigration policy was based on race, which was not acceptable to these Afro-Asian nations. Bandung Conference was driven by the anti-colonial and anti-racism spirit. Thus it was contradictory to Australia's interest to join and open the option to raise these issues in an open discussion. Panchasheel was incorporated under NAM which were equality and

mutual benefits, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, mutual non-aggression, mutually respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nations and peaceful co-existence. Adhering to the Principles of Panchsheel, Nehru did not share the fundamental Cold War assumptions such as spreading out of communism as Australia did. Consequently India became apathetic in Australian foreign policy⁶². One of the major objectives of Australia foreign policy could be seen that they have concerns to be important alliance of US.

Australia-US: A Natural Alliance

Nehru's policy of nonalignment was deemed unwise by Menzies who saw it as obstructing attempts of the western democracies to keep communism at bay in Asia. The principle concerns of Australia in the 1950 were to establish closer affinity with the US. 'Australia's geostrategic setting steered its security policy to ensure that the threats from outside would be neutralized or be controlled⁶³. Considering this scenario Australia signed ANZUS treaty of 1951. The treaty was the commitment made by US to defend Australia against resurgent Japan primarily but more than, the wars of the 1950s onwards to which it was a response to contain communism⁶⁴. Menzies Government was feared that Bandung would give an opportunity to China to disseminate communist propaganda⁶⁵ and to disarm the Nations of Southeast Asia. As a result, to contain the communist effect in the Southeast Asian region Australia had joined a military alliance, known as South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed in 1954. Although in the member countries of the alliance only two countries were belonged to Southeast Asia namely Philippines and Thailand while the others like Pakistan, Australia, France, New Zealand from outside the region became members of the treaty. On the formation of SEATO that was absurd concerning its member countries, Nehru had harsh opinion.⁶⁶

Nehru and Menzies: Story of Contradiction

The divergences of opinion between Nehru and Menzies approach could be clearly seen on the international issues which had also diverted India's interest along with Australia on their bilateral relations and during 1950s and 1960s the differences became obvious to all on their varied stands. Primary contradiction in the relation was because the absence

of personal equation particularly with Menzies antipathy towards Asia and Asians⁶⁷ through the immigration policy of Australia still supported by Menzies government.

The White Australia Policy was one of the reasons for setting up different views of Australia unlike their Asian neighbours. The policy was introduced in the 1901 by the Australian Federal government aimed at severely restricting non-European and national identity was based upon the assumption on racial and cultural homogeneity⁶⁸. Post World War when the notion of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism were gaining prominence Australia maintained the policy on the excuse of internal affair of Australia. Menzies himself was a staunch supporter of homogenous population and probably it was also because it could avoid the increasing internal racial problem in the country as he saw in the case of some Asian neighbours⁶⁹. However, disagreement was not only limited to their internal affairs it came out on a wider range when these two leaders faced each other on international stage. The reasons for their divergent interests, and the effect of the leaders and their personal posture about each other kept them away to find any solutions to cooperation on international issues. At first, this divergence in opinion and belief could be seen in the case of the emergence of Peoples Republic of China and their totally different attitude to deal with it.

- **International Recognition of Peoples Republic of China**

In 1949, newly independent communist china led by Mao emerged. For Nehru it was not the spread of Communism but a republican victory and gave his support. Menzies government which believed that threats to the region was mainly from communism and became alarmed with communist China. In consequence Menzies joined the policy to isolate the People's Republic of China, with the communist world. And opposed the admission in the United Nations and supported the United Nations Security Council's seat of China for Taiwan. On the other side, Nehru did not think that China has expansionist plan⁷⁰ and became the first county to recognize it. Consequently, India along with the others Colombo powers pressed for giving the invitation to china for joining the Bandung Conference⁷¹. The contradiction between India-Australia again emerged with the Suez Canal Crisis.

- **Suez Crisis**

Another issue where India played a very important role was Suez Crisis. The crisis has priority in Indian foreign issue because of political concerns and shared common historical experience of colonialism and another side it was economic and strategic location of Canal for Indian Economic interests. There was an agreement between British and Egypt in 1936 which had given the legal foundation to British military presence and control the canal for 20 years. The lease was going to expire in 1956. The new Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser was looking for the unification of Arab world and needed money for the construction of Aswan Dam. He was not in the favor of any agreement for lease and impasse of Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was going to affect position of British in the Middle East.⁷² Subsequently it was also going to affect Australia's interest. Like, Hedley Bull noted that Australia's national interest could not be distinguished from the national interest of United Kingdom. 'Menzies was a good friend of the British Prime Minister, and Sir Anthony Eden summoned Menzies to London for attending the Commonwealth Conference'. The commonwealth conference, also known as London Conference aimed the meeting to deal with the Suez Canal crisis. In this conference held from 16-23 August, the contradiction of view could be seen between Nehru and Menzies. Nehru was insisting that Egypt was entitled to nationalize the Canal while Menzies was the strong supporter of 'Eighteen Proposals'. Although it was the eighteen proposals that adopted by the Conference meeting which include an offer to Nasser of Egyptian representation on the Suez Canal Company board and a share in its profits. It was Menzies who himself went to head up a mission and to offer Nasser the eighteen proposals which he rejected'.⁷³ Australia's position towards United Kingdom, in the Suez Canal crisis could be understood by Menzies's strong believe in the ties of history, blood and shared values which bounded Australia's strategic interests together with those of the UK. In others words, the alliance considerations will (naturally and necessarily) remain important to the shaping of Australian approach to that region or other parts of the world⁷⁴.

- **South Africa in the Commonwealth**

The issue of South Africa is another case to understand the sour relations of India-Australia in 1961. The incident of Sharpeville massacre in South Africa revealed the contradiction in their posture and the relationship between Nehru and Menzies. Nehru with other fellow members opened the floor for the discussion on the Sharpeville massacre in the Commonwealth Prime Ministerial meetings. As in the founding principle of Commonwealth racial prejudice recognized as evil for the society and aimed to combat it for the development of the country. Therefore, the demand of Nehru was that South Africa was not qualified for the membership and should be out of it. On the other hand, Menzies articulated that massacre was the internal affairs of South Africa like the immigration policy of ours.⁷⁵ This kind of soft posture being an Australian statesman was contradictory to Nehru's stance that had concerned with greater equality for India and Third World country.

- **International Disarmament**

Disarmament was another case where the two had contradictory posture. The Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was sponsored by United Nations in 1961. Nehru as a strong supporter of disarmament and was one of the leading members of the committee. The committee aimed at disarmament by confidence building measures and nuclear tests controls. Nehru invited Menzies and Menzies did not responded. Moreover, Menzies provided Australian land for the purpose of British Nuclear tests.

- **Five Power Resolution**

However Menzies and Nehru's most public and renowned contradiction was in the United Nations General Assembly in October 1960. Nehru was extremely angry with Menzies's attempt to abort a resolution known as Five Power Resolution put forward by India and four other non-aligned nations (Ghana, Indonesia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia) calling for a superpower summit⁷⁶. It was aimed 'to renew the contacts of Super powers, after the disastrous breakdown of the attempted Summit meeting in Paris in the preceding May.'⁷⁷

As a result of this contradiction in their bilateral relationship hardly improved even when they were succeeded by others. More or less the policy of the government was same with little modifications. Harold Holt (1966-67) government followed the policy of Menzies by little improvement of the relationship with his Asian counterparts. He was known for the 1966 reform in the immigration policy. This reform paved the way for the non-European immigration in Australia. However like Menzies, he was also the supporter of the US and he had increased the numbers of Australian combat in Vietnam War in support of US. On the other hand in India after the Death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi (1966-77 and again 1982-84) became the Prime minister. She did possess a new outlook about the foreign policy and tried to improve the relationship with Australia and visited Australia in May 1968 which was the first visit of Indian Prime Minister after independence. The outcome of the visit was not much optimistic. It was just an initiative taken by these two leaders to having better understanding and diplomatic relationship.

The political relationship was also affected by some international and national issues. Political leaders do play an important role to decide the foreign policy of their countries but it is national and internal situations that also act as dependent factor to revolutionize or transform the policies of the country. This is very true about India's Security and Defence policy.

Security and Defence: NPT vs. India-Australia Relations

India did not sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 since India found it as discriminatory as being nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon state. Indian foreign policy from 1962 to 1998 could be seen as major reflection of activity of the neighbour's country. In other words, the Sino-India war, Indo-Pak war and nuclear test of China were the driving factor of India's changing security and defence policy. The unstable relations and foreign support to Pakistan by United States and China impacted on India's nuclear perception subsequently. 'NPT not only failed to alleviate India's strategic apprehensions, but also accentuated its insecurity by making China a legal nuclear state'⁷⁸.

Australian: From Nuclear Option to Renounce

The nuclear policy of Australia in 1960s to 70s is a story of contradiction between leaders and politics in the cabinet. The nuclear story of Australia starts from the 1958 when Menzies made great efforts to acquire the Nuclear weapons technology from Britain⁷⁹. 'From the Soviet test in September, 1961 until the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 it appeared that Australian government did not take additional steps to access nuclear weapons'⁸⁰. A year later of the Chinese nuclear test Australian Cabinet passed order to study the nuclear options for Australia. In Harold Holt's government the United States asked Australia to accept the terms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)⁸¹. After much discussion the Cabinet accepted only after the reassurance of Defense Minister that this act would not directly affect the country's nuclear weapon program⁸².

After the unexpected death of Holt, Gorton assumed office. British were withdrawing their troops from Asia and this was the situation when Australia was asked to sign the NPT. Like the earliest test ban treaties it was also negotiated by superpowers and asked the non-nuclear country to give up their nuclear weapon options. A report of a working group committee came in 1968, which was requested by Holt to Department of Defense Joint Planning Committee (JPC) suggested that Australia should prepare to sign the treaty⁸³. The treaty was signed but it was the Labor party led by Gough Whitlam that came in the power with the support of NPT and ratified it. Thus from the Whitlam government well-developed and unequivocal policy of non-proliferation started in Australia⁸⁴.

India's Pokhran I test: An Outcome of India's Nuclear Dilemma

India conducted its first Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) on 18th May 1974. However, reason for the test argued by India was industrial and developmental purposes. According to 'Murphy's law of 'nuclear fatalism' a country which can build nuclear weapon then most certainly it will make it'⁸⁵. This was a kind of US non-proliferation perceptions too. Consequently, the harsh criticism from US, Canada, France operated by means of economic and technological sanction. India claimed that it had conducted Peaceful Nuclear Explosion. The reason for claiming this was that in the international

community India was an original signatory of Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which only 'allowed underground nuclear testing. India also could not charge with violation of NPT⁸⁶ which it did not sign. And under NPT too Article V allowed the nuclear explosion for any peaceful applications and also recognized by IAEA⁸⁷. The reason and possibility of changing India's nuclear posture can be reasonably debated to be peaceful.

The origin of Indian's nuclear program 'started in 1944 with the establishment of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) and subsequently with the creation of Atomic Energy Research Committee (AERC) in 1946⁸⁸. After independence, the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) in August, 1948 paved the way for the creation of India Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). The IAEA placed all the 'Uranium and Thorium reserves under the States control thus facilitated the conduct of all nuclear research and development activity in secret⁸⁹. India in the initial phase, India did develop its the nuclear power when the international environment was for Atomic research and development to build its nuclear program as it could solve many of related to economic and social troubles faced by its people⁹⁰. France, United Kingdom, Canada and US assisted India in nuclear uses. 'Particularly, Canadian assistance in the initial phase contributed immensely to India's nuclear efforts'⁹¹.

The nuclear policy in India started to be in concern after the attack of China on Indian mainland. India and China fought a brief but intense border war in October 1962⁹². However, it did not affect directly India's nuclear policy but it raised the question about India's security policy. After China's nuclear testing of 1964 brought an unprecedented nuclear debate in Indian Parliament⁹³. But the Shastri's stance was equivalent as Nehru's and did not change the policy. But the pressures from the multiple directions came for the adoption of a vigorous nuclear policy. In the mid the Indo-Pak war in 1965 started although India successfully overpowered Pakistan but the assistance both military and financially by United States alarmed the India's decision-makers and diplomats.

Again during the Bangladesh liberation war, when Indira Gandhi visited White House, US President did give his words but the posture did nothing to assure India that was not sufficient for India to trust US and sign NPT. Indira Gandhi resisted growing pressure from the major powers for Non-proliferation and opened the nuclear options. '*The*

Sarabhai Profile manifested India's determination to strengthen the nuclear option by embarking on a vigorous program of technical development⁹⁴. At the Bangladesh liberation struggles in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi turned towards 'Soviet by signing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation on 9 August 1971'⁹⁵. This raised the question on India's non-aligned posture. In terms of India's foreign and defence policy priorities, the US support to Pakistan remained a security threat for India⁹⁶ which turned it toward Soviet Union and induce India to consider its security concerns more seriously.

Moreover, the prospect of strategically trilateral security cooperation between US, Pakistan and China made India to think sincerely about its defence and security strategy. All this circumstances encourage India to have a powerful defence and security system and finally India in May 1974 tested peaceful nuclear explosions also known as *Smiling Buddha*. The relationship between India and Australia till this time was not quite progressive. When Whitlam came in power, the relationship between India and Australia seemed to improve. Indira Gandhi too has taken initiatives in this scenario and tried to revive relations and make new partnership, along with Australia.

Whitlam and Mrs. Gandhi: Inauguration of Bilateral Relation

Whitlam (1972-1975) government re-energized the Australian Foreign Policy. Whitlam tried to create the climate required to review relationship with India and visited India in 1973. Whitlam with the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam War in 1975 and with increased financial aids, tried to establish warm relations with its neighbours. He started to pay attention on to the region by its policy of 'Regional Engagement'⁹⁷. The abolition of White Australia policy in 1973 was his valiant act. Besides this he enacted the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975. All these reforms had a remake of Australia's image at the regional as well as international level accommodation; especially in Asia. But the relation with India could not achieve its fruitful ambitions. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions lose the hope of Australia and ratification of nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Agreement between India-Australia

There were only two agreements between these two nations in the Cold War period which was also not much significant. First one was a Cultural Agreement signed on 21 October 1971⁹⁸ and another one was Agreement on Co-operation in the field of Science and Technology on 26, February 1975⁹⁹ under the Labor Party Government. This was to beginning the relationship based on mutual understanding and co-operation but this strategy of soft power diplomacy had a long way to go.

Economic Relations in Cold War

On the Economic front too, the relation between the two nations was not impressive. 'India was too large, too complex and too demanding of resources to handle while it was relatively easy for Australia to concentrate on its neighbours, smaller nations and traditional trading partners'¹⁰⁰. For India the adoption of self-reliance economic policy also some called 'economic autocracy of India' and engagement with emerging newly independent states was the focal point and Australia was not in its economic list. The disparity in the geographical location, economic policy and repugnance of Menzies towards Asia made it difficult to cooperate. This posture was more or less followed by their successors till the end of Cold War. However, Whitlam government announced Australia to be a middle power in the Asia Pacific region. The growing economy of the region and newly Industrial nations were presenting new market for Australian goods. Australia moved towards India carefully to establish closer relations through Southeast Asian region, Japan, China and Korea were of higher interests in its economic motives.

Indian Ocean: Potentials of Cooperation or Rivalry

Australia's policy moves into the Indian Ocean in the 1960S were faltering. The rim countries, culturally, economically and regionally diverse presented a challenge on that was arguably less obvious¹⁰¹. The Indian Ocean was known as British Lake, surrounded by the British imperial and colonial possession that effectively insulated Australia¹⁰². Another barrier to Australia's engagement remained South Asian country's neutralist and non-alignment position¹⁰³. India and Australia however continued to meet in the Commonwealth but did not work to break the ice in their relationship.

Menzies's successors followed the traditional path of supporting the alliance by providing naval bases initially based at Bahrain and continued use of its facility at Diego Garcia for the presence of US in response to USSR presence in Indian Ocean¹⁰⁴. For Australia, the interest in the open trade routes of the Indian Ocean remained imperative. Before, Australia was primarily relying on British and then US presence in the Indian Ocean to guarantee transit, in the Post Cold War its strategy found the Indian Ocean changed.

The increasing competition between US and Soviet Union became serious from the mid 1960s to mid 1970s¹⁰⁵. The increase presence of Soviet in the North West Coast of Indian Ocean, after the withdrawal of British from Suez was frightening US about the influence of Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean. Under these circumstances US diplomats and strategist come across Diego Garcia as a counter implement¹⁰⁶. There was an Island Known as Diego Garcia that was part of the British Empire. Thus Anglo-American mutual agreement finalized in the 1974 for the installation of naval and communication. Even though 'Daniel P. Moynihan, the US ambassador to India reported that India and other Indian Ocean littoral countries believed that the US military presence in the Indian Ocean was not in their interest'¹⁰⁷. As a result, countries of Indian Ocean rim 'continued to campaign for the recognition of the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone a proposal which was supported by US allies too'¹⁰⁸. Australia too was trying to obtain the middle way and supported the Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ) but did not commit any stand¹⁰⁹. The reason was that it could endanger Australia's alliance relation. Whitlam government attempted to create the image of Australia as adherent of Third World without sacrificing his relationship with his alliance nations¹¹⁰. This sort of diplomacy did not work well to establish relationship with India.

Whitlam government tried to limit superpowers competition in the Indian Ocean. Under his term, Australia faced dramatic changes on national as well as international affairs. In 1973 the dissolution of SEATO began with Pakistan's withdrawal. With the end of Vietnam War in 1975 SEATO officially disbanded in 1977. By shifting the state of affairs Australia was moving towards Asian neighbours and became ASEAN's first dialogue partner in 1974. Whitlam visited India three times during his tenure as Prime

Minister¹¹¹. It showed his eagerness to develop relationship with India. Nevertheless it could not be possible to have strong relations. Indian response towards Australia was insignificant as at that point India was herself busy in its domestic affairs ranging from the emergency period, political instability, communal riots so on and so forth.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Decline of India-Australia Relations

In Prime Minister Jodie Foster's term have major changes in the Australian as well as International affairs. In international front, the Soviet invaded on Afghanistan in February, 1980 which impacted the government in many aspects. 'Fraser approved the presence of American naval ships at Cockburn Sound, near Perth, ignoring warning that their presence would make Australia more attractive nuclear target'¹¹². The action could be seen as to improve the relation with US as worthwhile ally that was weak in Whitlam term.

The invasion of Afghanistan dramatically challenged the South Asian strategic landscape deeply impacted upon India's nuclear perceptions¹¹³. The strategic location of Pakistan was favourable for the US to resist Soviet Union's westward expansion¹¹⁴. Also in the military and strategic context Pakistan was supportive to US interest and could help in the deployment of its military as anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan could play a vital role for the US. As a consequence US prorogued all the previous sanction imposed on Pakistan on behalf of the nuclear tests. In addition, US offered US\$3000 million economic aid package¹¹⁵. This support also continued by Reagan administration and provided US\$3.2 billion economic and military assistance by selling its forty F-16 advanced fighting aircraft¹¹⁶. This variety of large assistance to a neighbour like Pakistan with whom India had sour relation could immensely change the balance of power in the region¹¹⁷. Another fact was that with the returning to power Mrs. Gandhi who reportedly authorized preparation for another nuclear explosion paved the way by the development of missile delivery system in Indian Military. The relationship between India-Australia again became strange because of their policies and perceptions about international and national activities.

Indian Ocean Trajectory and Australia's Turning Interest on Self Reliance

The importance of India Ocean for Australia was changing in a strategic ways. When Bob Hawke (Labor Party) elected in 1983, he appointed western Australian Beazley Minister for Defence in December in 1984. Hawke government committed a 'Two Ocean Navy' in 1987 a kind of strategy to maximize self reliance within the vortex of what was politically and economically possible¹¹⁸. At a diplomatic level, Labor government had taken initial steps to improve the relations with other Indian Ocean rim countries by transferring some aid funding from the Pacific region¹¹⁹. A committee report on Australia's overseas Aid Program, cited by McKinley found that India should be highest recipient of aid which could be one of the reasons of decline in relations¹²⁰. Bill Hayden in 1984 suggested that "the relatively low priority given to India by Australia has not been in its advantages and recognized the bilateral relationship of India for Australian interest¹²¹. Thus Australia's move to self reliance was not just the outcome of 1969 Nixon Doctrine and American interest but also a response to north Western Australia's growing resource-based economy on or close to its Indian Ocean coast¹²². Therefore, in 1986 the Australia-India Business Council set up as a diplomatic initiative¹²³.

End of the Cold War: India-Australia Concerning Nuclear Weapon Program

According to George Perkovich and Raj Chengappa India's decision towards weaponization began with 1988-1989 as a response to the nuclear weapon program of Pakistan that was supported by Chinese aid¹²⁴. However there were other implications too for India's another nuclear test in 1998. 'India after 1974 test pursued the policy of nuclear ambiguity- neither confirming nor denying the pursuance of nuclear weapon program or existence of nuclear weapon before conducting nuclear test in May 1998'¹²⁵. After the first nuclear test India was not much concerned about the nuclear weaponization. The reasons for changing nuclear policy could be defining in the term of activities of neighbours' countries, regional insecurity and moreover the political scenario of India which concluded in its second Pokhran Test. Another issue that impacted India's policy was related with China. 'In 1993 and again in 1995 China conducted a series of nuclear test and deployed nuclear warheads in Tibet targeting India'¹²⁶. An important 'cause was related with Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was moving

towards conclusion in 1995¹²⁷. Once the CTBT was concluded, it would be politically very costly to conduct nuclear test¹²⁸. It was under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who in his election manifesto declared to acquire nuclear weapon and it became possible in 1998. When he came into power 'he appointed a strategic review committee. On the basis of their counsel, India carried out five nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May in 1998'¹²⁹ and the Prime Minister Vajpayee also confirmed it to be successful. But the problem of relationship between India and Australia was high in the reaction of Australia which was unexpected in that way. The harsh reaction of Australia on India's nuclear test deteriorated the relation further.

India-Australia: Post Pokhran II Test

The relationship of India and Australia got worse after the second nuclear test of India. US and other countries started criticizing India's posture towards the NPT and some of them put the economic sanctions. Although in Asian countries except Japan no one country did change its relations with India because the reason was that India was not much dependent on any one country. Australia that did not have any strong economic and strategic relationship expressed very harsh comments towards the Indian counterparts. Australian government recalled its ambassador from India which was the main base of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. In counter reactions, India that was not much interested in Australian economy as it has no such strong economic relations did not care about Australia and never paid any diplomatic government level visit until 2014.

Conclusion

Political leaders always play a vital role in deciding the nature of relationship with other countries. This is aptly explained by Meg Gurry, "Policy makers are people too and carries pictures too in their heads about other people..... [that] somehow get cranked into the process of policy making."¹³⁰ And this is very true in the case of the relationship of India and Australia. In the Cold War politics it was political leader who decided all the policy pursuing by their country which was nothing but the reflections of their own views. The policy of Nehru while pursuing disarmament was changed drastically by his

successor Indira Gandhi who represented very different view on same issues like foreign relations and nuclear use. Indira Gandhi decided to have the option of Nuclear power and opened the way for acquiring it while under the administration of Nehru India was against nuclear weaponization. The relation of India-Australia was insignificant till the 1998 when India did its second nuclear test. Australia's harsh reaction was also because it had little to do with India and by opposing it can show up itself as adherent of International institutions. Contradictory to that situation, in present time both Australia and US wants to have good relationship. The cause of diverse intensions from ignorance to engagement will be the main focus of the following chapter. Thus in the next chapter the discussion would be on why Australia has changed its attitude towards India, how these two countries are finding each other beneficial for future cooperation and to what extent the relationship is going to be strong in the future and how and what kind of role US could play to make their relationship work.

Chapter 3: Building Blocks of Cooperation between India and Australia

Introduction

Earlier chapter showed how India and Australia's relations soured due to their ideological differences in the Cold War politics and India's stand of refusing to sign NPT because of it being partial. India's Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 and the reaction of Australia towards India were some of the points of disconcertion between both the countries. Here, the question arises as to why in spite of the end of Cold War, India's economic liberalization and its fiscal expansion, the difference of opinion did not go away. It was probably because India and Australia found each other to be insignificant to their individual foreign policy concerns. Although India needed new partners for its new globalized economy but did not find Australia profitable.

On the other hand the situation was changing for Australia too when US started withdrawing its military bases from Australia, that were under the security umbrella of US until then. Australia needed to put emphasis on development of self-reliance along with US alliances and regional cooperation. Under this situation Australia was going ahead in its own foreign policy such as the forward defence policy. By this policy Australia started deployment of forces outside the Australian territory with the intention of containing potential enemies or defusing political instability before the risks reach Australia's coastline¹³¹. Through this policy Australia started thinking to engage with the US alliance through the emerging regionalism on regional security affairs. The emergence of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was the outcome of this regionalism as a bid to secure the region. This revolutionized environment, however, did little to engage India and Australia through these forums.

Interestingly the collaboration between India and Australia never happened bilaterally. It was only the emergence of multilateral forum such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) renamed as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2013 under which these two countries met and eventually cooperated. But the relation became worse with the reaction of Australia on India's nuclear test and the behaviour of Australian government to the Indian defence

officials in Australia. Although Australia tried to resolve the problems with India and the Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited India in July 2000 and again in March 2006¹³², but the hospitality given by India's side to Australian visits, was cold shoulder. Howard's visit thus became insignificant to make bilateral relationship warmer.

9/11 Incidence: Blurred Security Concerns

This ignorance of each other could no longer continue due to some significant events of the 21st century which have seen world's apprehension and anxiety. It is also significant in the terms of India and Australia's common security concerns. The first and major one was the incidence of 9/11 terrorist bombing of Pentagon and World Trade Centre in the United States. International terrorism became an important factor for changing their mutual relations. On the international front, this incident was the first major issue on which India-Australia, without any deviations had same reactions. This incidence of 9/11 is one of major reasons to boost up not only Indo-US relations but also India-Australia relations. India and Australia which were poles apart on the ideological front in Cold War period, in the context of 'War on Terror' (WOT) joined together to fight against the common threat of terror.

Attack on US has great impact on Australian foreign and domestic policy, since US was/is the main security provider to Australia while US has been the major victim of the terrorist attacks. So how far was it prudent for Australia to feel safe as being reliant on US? The terrorist attack on World Trade Centre showed that in globalized world the security concerns are not determined by boundaries. The 19 hijackers belonged to the al-Qaida terrorist network with their main centre in Afghanistan, were responsible for this horrifying attack. The terrorist attack was a gesture that in this world no country is safe, even if it is the most superior one.

The incident changed the whole perspective on looking at international security environment. US foreign policy changed drastically when US President George W. Bush in his speech to a joint session of congress argued *"We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the*

destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network”¹³³. Consequently Bush government declared a worldwide war on terror¹³⁴. President’s national security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice at CNN interview on 8 Sep 2002 supported US stance on ‘War on Terror’ by presenting her view and said: “*We are in a new world. We are in a world in which the possibility of terrorism, married up with the technology, could make us very, very sorry that we did not act.*”¹³⁵ The reaction of Indian Government towards US was supportive as India had also been another major victim of terrorist attacks in the past and continues to be so.

Following the 9/11, the December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament was also conducted by Pakistan-based two rebel groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, (Army of the Pure) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Mohammed), which are covertly supported by Pakistan's ISI¹³⁶. In 2005, Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh also shared US views on terrorism and strongly supported United States ‘War on Terror’ when he expressed his view by saying that “*Together with international unity and resolve we can meet the challenge of this global scourge and work to bring about an international law of zero tolerance for terrorism.*”¹³⁷

The terrorist attacks on Indian parliament on 13 December 2001 and another major one of 2008 Mumbai attack also affected India’s national security. As these terrorist activities could not be stopped single-handedly, the Indo-US bilateral cooperation towards counter-terrorism initiated with their others strategic concerns. The United States and India are now working closely and increasingly on counter-terrorism cooperation under their defence and strategic agreements. There was some intelligence cooperation between India and U.S. and the Indian counterparts were using US intelligence information and warnings even before the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks¹³⁸. After Mumbai attack, India and the US have accelerated their cooperation on monitoring dangerous terrorist groups that aim to cause harm to Indian and American citizens¹³⁹. India’s position against terrorism corresponds with that of the United States. India has suffered terribly from terrorism over the last three decades and like United States is determined to prevent, deter, and disrupt the terrorist groups that most threaten it¹⁴⁰. There was no hesitation to India’s offer of assistance to the United States following the attacks of September 11,

2001, because India viewed its national interests as ‘congruent with those of the United States in uprooting transnational terrorist groups’¹⁴¹. Similarly, the United States quickly offered law enforcement and intelligence cooperation after the terrorist attacks on Mumbai that began on November 26, 2008.

This forthcoming relation between India and United States has greatly paved the way for India-Australia relations. The effect of 9/11 was to raise questions on the contemporary security policy in Australia. This incidence raised the debate for the security policy of Australia that had previously been dominated by the Defence of Australian paradigm that was state-centric, geographically-focused, balance of power as interpretation of key strategic trends in the security¹⁴². But the attacks on the US raised the question on the strategic policy issues for Australia. The debate started in Federal Parliament that whether an operation carried out by an international terrorist network that operates outside the realms of the state must be considered important strategic entity, as it gave a major shock to the US security, thus deepening the range of actors Australian strategists were to consider seriously¹⁴³.

This attack has served to widen the security policy debate within Australia. If a terrorist plot that was hatched in Central Asia, trained for Western Europe and North America was also considered an event of strategic importance for Australia, where do Australia’s strategic interests begin and end?¹⁴⁴ Consequently, 9/11 has widened and deepened the range of issues to be considered while defining Australia’s security environment¹⁴⁵. The new emerging non-traditional threats were consistently identified as being central to Australia’s post 9/11 security environment. Thus, the outcome of this incident on Australia was that from that time terrorism, regional instability, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and climate change became the core elements of Australia’s security environment.

Australia’s security perceptions changed from traditional to non-traditional threats. And these kinds of threats demand more cooperation and engagement among the nations who share the same region and concerns. Thus, 9/11 has changed the perception between India-Australia of having divergence in the interest and gave them objectives to cooperate with each other. This has led to several bilateral agreements on security-related matters,

including a 2003 Agreement on Terrorism, Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation in 2006, Defence Information-Sharing Arrangement in 2007 and many agreements on intelligence dialogues, extradition and terrorism in 2008¹⁴⁶. In addition, the emerging Indo-US relationship also makes it obvious and easier for these two countries to cooperate on various defence and security concerns. In summation, for India in many ways the relationship with Australia is an extension of its relationship with the United States and common concern of co-operate against terrorism. Another event which forces them to engage strategically was the rise of China, an important player in the region. This is also another factor important that enhanced the relationship between India and Australia on the regional issues.

China-The Catalyst

China's rise, especially its 'peaceful rise' is an important concern within the countries of the region, which in turn made a visible impact on new partnerships to emerge. Emerging partnership between India and Australia is a very crucial and important example of result of China rise. China has gained significant position in the region by increasing energy investment, trade ties, and military cooperation with its Central and Southeast Asian neighbours. In contrast, India pursued a "Look East" policy by strengthening its relationships with countries in East and Southeast Asia. 'China and India both seek to play a greater role in areas adjacent to their own and beyond, thus manoeuvring in overlapping strategic spaces'¹⁴⁷. The border disputes between India and China are making this situation more critical. This dispute started during the colonial times and is still going on. China is claiming the Indian-controlled 90,000-square-kilometer territory of Arunachal Pradesh¹ while India claims the Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin. According to Indian claims, the Aksai Chin which connects Tibet and China's north-western province of Xinjiang, as the eastern most part of its Jammu and Kashmir state¹⁴⁸. Thus the border dispute is the major bone of contention between the two countries.

¹ The claim is partially based on Tawang which is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. Tawang was once a part of Tibet, but after the 1914 Shimla Accord it became a part of India. 'The Chinese contest that Tawang is a Tibetan territory, and because Tibet is considered part of China, the entire Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory-
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Apart from border dispute India and China are competing for energy resources all across the world. India lost two important pipelines (Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline¹⁴⁹ and India-Bangladesh-Myanmar pipeline¹⁵⁰) to China. The issue of energy security and sustained development in both the countries has become a matter of concern which does have the potential for future conflict. India started extending partnership with a large number of countries like Africa, Europe, and Latin America and now it is trying its hand in South China Sea¹⁵¹. India geographically does not belong to South China Sea but because of its energy needs, it is using the new geopolitical and geo-economics strategy to play a vital role in this energy-riches area¹⁵². Thus India's growing energy demands take it to the Pacific.¹⁵³

India's 'Look East' policy which started with the planning of economic engagement with ASEAN countries has also led it to forge stronger ties with Asian democracies such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and certain other Asian countries that lie in the western Pacific region and have strong relations with the United States¹⁵⁴. The relationship which India has established with US from the last decade through defence cooperation has helped India in a way to engage with the countries in the region on the issue of South China Sea.

India is also restraining itself to directly engage in any conflict with China as India has the interest of economic interdependence with China and also in her (China) prowess in the arena of maritime military. This situation is same for Australia too. As China is Australia's most important partner, Australia does not want to contain China but wants to keep Chinese power balanced. Neither India nor Australia wants to engage in such partnerships that demonstrate of having any intention to counter China. This became apparent when Japan projected a 'quadrilateral' dialogue among India, United States and Australia in 2007. But this proposal could not materialise. In the face of official denials, this was widely viewed as part of a policy to balance China, and was viewed by some as the beginnings of a four-way alliance between the United States, Japan, India and Australia¹⁵⁵. Even though the other regional power would not allow China to dominate the region in any way they were also hesitant to take any such action which create the impression of an alliance to contain China¹⁵⁶.

The Malabar Naval Exercises which was held on 4th September 2007 between US and India and they were joined by Australia, Japan and Singapore. At that time the reaction from China was really harsh claiming that this was a strategy to contain China. Consequently, both Australia and India backed away from participation in the quadrilateral dialogue proposed by Japan, largely in the face of concerns about China's reactions but still both (India and Australia) are engaged indirectly with these countries, considering Chinese hegemony as a threat to the region, particularly by the Chinese strategically increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean. And as we know that Indian Ocean is the major concern for India and Australia as both have shared interest in the region.

Indian Ocean in Australian Foreign Policy

The increasing interest of Australia in the Indian Ocean could be seen from 1980s by the policy of "Two- Ocean Navy" theory. Australia started to engage itself with the western coast of the region by its new approach to Indian Ocean. In August, 1994 a joint statement by the foreign minister, Gareth Evans, and the Minister of Trade, Bob McMullen initiated a new strategy based on co-operation between the federal government and the state government of Australia known as Look West Policy.¹⁵⁷ By this policy Australia became more engaged in the region as a middle player. This incident was one of the greatest importances in Australian strategic history because it was the first time that Australian federal government announced a policy encompassing Indian Ocean in the Australian national policy. In the Australian Defence White Paper 2009 also that strongly supported the increasing strategic importance of Indian Ocean and noted that 'over the period to 2030, the Indian Ocean will join the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and defence planning'¹⁵⁸. Therefore it demonstrated increasing importance of Indian Ocean which now became a core in Australian foreign and security policy and as a result the countries of this region like India could not be ignored any longer by Australian diplomats.

Indian Ocean in Indian Foreign Policy

- **Strategic Importance**

Unlike as for Australia, Indian Ocean has been strategically important in India's foreign policy from the very beginning. K.M. Pannikar, a diplomat-historian rightly explained its significance for India when he argued that *“to other countries the Indian Ocean could only be one of the important oceanic areas, but to India it is a vital sea because its lifelines are concentrated in that area, its freedom is dependent on the freedom of that coastal surface.”*¹⁵⁹

India started focusing on its naval power in the Indian Ocean after overpowering Pakistan in 1971 War in which Indian Navy played a vital role. However in real term the expansion of Indian navy started from 1990s when Indian economy stabilized after the introduction of economic liberalization that provided reasonable budget for India Navy. Further, the development of Blue Water Navy (an ability to carry out operations much farther than their territorial boundaries, across the deep oceans¹⁶⁰) by India paved the way for India to project more significant action in Indian Ocean. Besides this, new emerging international trends also made India Ocean vulnerable but the most important sea-bed route for India.

- **Trade Route**

The significance and vulnerability of Indian Ocean could be understood by the fact that Indian Ocean is now surpassing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans as the world's busiest trade corridor¹⁶¹. Around 100,000 ships transit the expanse of the Indian Ocean annually. Nearly 40 per cent of the entire global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz and 11 million barrels of oil pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits, making the maritime route vulnerable and susceptible to interdiction¹⁶². With the rise of Asian economic powers, the interdependence in commerce and trade expansion made them (maritime route) lifeline of the world's top importer countries. This demands the free flow of goods which is totally dependent on the security of seabed trade routes. This also necessitates the active involvement of the navy to secure the sea routes. The growing

energy demand of Asia (comprising countries like India, China and Japan) view these sea lines of communication (SLOCs) as their lifelines¹⁶³.

The responsibility to secure the growing Asian prosperity extends from India to Japan in the East and Australia to the South, along the maritime periphery of the Indian and Pacific Oceans¹⁶⁴. India has been emphasizing the importance of maritime security in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden which is the crucial shipping lanes of its oil supply. Australia has a vital strategic interest in the security of the Indian Ocean too, particularly its sea lanes. Therefore, Australia started to develop its strategic partnership with India and other powers to counter threats such as piracy and manage potential competition as major powers deploy growing naval capabilities to the region. The Indian Ocean will increasingly feature in Australian defence and national security planning and maritime strategy.¹⁶⁵

- **Maritime Resources and Territorial Security**

The Indian Ocean also represents a significant fisheries and energy resource, and is home to what are arguably the world's most important sea lanes of communication¹⁶⁶. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, every coastal state has special right over their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which should not extend beyond 200 nautical miles.¹⁶⁷ These large marine resources also need security from restraining of maritime territorial rights. Both India and Australia have a huge EEZ as they have large sea coast lines. This necessitates patrolling and ensuring territorial security in the Indian Ocean by the navies of both. This Security is needed not only from the inimical activity of state actors but non-state actors too.

- **Non-traditional threats**

Non-traditional threats in the form of organized crime, piracy, trafficking and transnational terrorist networks also make it imperative for India to exert its control in the region. Non-traditional threats to global security have grown drastically in the 21st century. Various Asian based terrorist organizations from Al Qaeda to Jemmah Islamiyah use these maritime routes for narcotics and arms trafficking through which they finance their operations. These non-traditional threats are not only harmful in India's interest but

other regional countries too. Some incidences of non-traditional threats have made them (countries of the Indian Ocean rim) wary of the situation. Like terrorism, Piracy in various parts of the Indian Ocean, such as the Malacca Straits and the Horn of Africa, also require to be solved. India has a huge potential in Indian Ocean by virtue of its strategic location and a powerful navy to counter these threats.

- **Disaster and relief programmes**

Apart from these challenges, natural disasters also pose a major challenge to the littoral states in the Indian Ocean. India also has some territories as littoral islets which face this problem. India's strategic location gives it the most influential power to act in rescue operation quickly in case of natural disasters. India's strategic location could be estimated when we take into view the fact that approximately 60 per cent of the world's natural disasters occur in this part of the world, with catastrophic consequences given the high human density along the coastal regions¹⁶⁸. India responded to the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean by sending Indian Naval ships, aircraft, helicopters, and personnel promptly. On 26 December 2004, the day Tsunami hit the subcontinent, 'the Indian Navy had deployed 19 ships, four aircraft, and 11 helicopters that rushed to Maldives, Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu and Andaman & Nicobar Islands¹⁶⁹. This demonstrates in volumes the efficiency and the operational readiness of the Indian Navy. But these strong challenges need adequate multilateral coordinated response strategies that are often lacking in the region.

Although multilateral institutions, like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) are basically initiated under these intentions and cover the whole maritime areas of Indian Ocean. Multilaterally, Australia has strengthened its role in Indian Ocean regional bodies such as in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)¹⁷⁰. Another organisation where India and Australia have been moving towards better cooperation is in IORA. Australia chaired IORA in 2013 and 2014 which shows its eagerness to be engaged in the region. This multilateral institution, initiated in 1997 with the help of South Africa, India and Australia, aimed to engage in the overall economic development of all Indian Ocean Rim

countries. But this institution could not achieve the expected result because of lack of passion among major states.

IONS is also a multilateral forum where India and Australia along with other regional players are engaged in securing the maritime routes and cooperating in combating piracy, terrorism, natural disasters and other maritime threats. It also aims to bring the IOR littoral navies together for active discussions on matters of common maritime interest¹⁷¹. The first inaugural meeting of this forum was held in New Delhi on 14th February 2008.¹⁷² Meetings are held every two years and various naval seminars and workshop are held every year. Australia has also invited India to participate in the Australian-hosted multilateral Kakadu and Pitch Black exercises in northern Australia¹⁷³. But in these multilateral forums the problem lies partly because of dissimilarity between their priority areas. Consequently, multilateral forums like IORA (IOR-ARC), BIMST-EC, SAARC, all of which have same economic agenda (though with some variations too), is the main reason to make them less successful¹⁷⁴. While US and Australia eagerly wants India to engage in the regional affairs.

Under this view it is also crucial to note that after US Pivot to Asia both US and Australia have been constantly emphasizing upon India's strategic location and the need for India to play a greater role in India Ocean, its security and stability¹⁷⁵. The cooperation between India-Australia increased when they started to engage in a constructive way after the Indo-US defence cooperation signed in 2005, raised trust among the Australian foreign policy makers for the need to engage in a better manner with India on economic as well as strategic and defence related issues.

India-Australia Defence and Maritime Cooperation

Although India and Australia have been engaged in defence cooperation from the post Cold War period but India's nuclear test in 1998 annoyed Australia which announced an immediate suspension of bilateral relations with India and removal of defence adviser and annulment of other defence related cooperation¹⁷⁶. Nevertheless, the defence relation is restored between the two through the defence cooperation between India and US. But the major initiative to give substance to the relationship came from Australia. It was only in

2008 that Australia first moved to expand high level defence dialogue and after that, to transform it into practical cooperation¹⁷⁷.

In 2009, a Joint Security Declaration was signed that 'identified eight potential areas for cooperation: defence dialogue, information exchange and policy coordination in regional affairs, bilateral cooperation in multilateral forums, counter-terrorism, transnational organized crime, disaster management, maritime and aviation security, and law enforcement cooperation'.¹⁷⁸ Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper had flagged the strong mutual interest of Australia and India in enhancing maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean by commenting that: '*As India extends its reach and influence into areas of shared strategic interest, we will need to strengthen our defence relationship and our understanding of Indian strategic thinking*'¹⁷⁹. It was the first time that Australia recognized India as influencing their area of strategic interest and showed the need to strengthen their defence relations. Although the defence ties were restored in 2009 but these only moved tentatively forward until June 2013 when the Defence Minister A. K. Antony made the first ever visit of an Indian defence chief to Perth, Australia and agreed to establish bilateral maritime exercises¹⁸⁰.

The visit was a sign of closer ties between the two countries. Defence Minister A. K. Antony and his Australian counterpart, Stephen Smith, issued an official statement which was retelling their commitment to 2009 Joint Security Declaration¹⁸¹. Hereafter, US declared its changing policy towards Asia and showed the strategic need to include India in its policy towards the region. India responded positively in order to get closer to US and use this relation in its own interest while concerning China as a regional threat.

US Rebalancing Act and its Implication on India-Australia Relation

U.S. is responding to China's maritime rise by consolidating its position in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In its 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance, the Pentagon expressed concerns about China's military development, referring to the 'lack of clarity and strategic intentions behind it and to the potential for friction in the region. Thus, the Pentagon pointed to the need for the U.S. to ensure "regional access" and identified the long-term strategic relationship with India" and other "Asian allies and key partners' as the main

sources of regional security.¹⁸² In this context of the US rebalance towards Asia Pacific region, strategic calculations between India and Australia may prove significant.

India's Emergences as a Potential Player

The rise of India- economically and militarily (especially its naval build up in the aftermath of the so-called China's '*String of Pearls*') presents India in a stronger position. The U.S. has wanted to portray that 'India has the potential to be the security provider of the Indian Ocean'¹⁸³. In taking up a leadership role in the region, India will find a stage in which it can practice its diplomacy. The then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's November 2011 essay in *Foreign Policy*, the first serious elaboration of the rebalance, primarily referred to the Asia-Pacific, but indicated that India and the rest of South Asia were also seen as part of the region. Indeed, the alliance with Australia was described as being expanded and reoriented towards the Indo-Pacific¹⁸⁴. Following this, in a speech in June 2012 at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, then Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta similarly sketched out a more expansive 'understanding of the region that included India in the reference of US rebalancing act.'¹⁸⁵

Rory Medcalf also claimed that America's commitment to Asia was 'very clearly a pivot into the Indo-Pacific - the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific - rather than more narrowly to East Asia or the Asia-Pacific' thus underpinning its relation with India¹⁸⁶. By this 'United States offers the most efficient means to assemble its finite resources to the task of advancing vital American interests while preserving a stable regional order'¹⁸⁷. Thus, US grand strategy of Pivot to Asia has been with the strong understanding of its allies; especially the ability of Australia to engage in the region as much as US itself is involved. Hence, it becomes clear that the role of Australia and India within the 'rebalancing act' of US is important to a large extent. How India relates to the US agenda is another story dealt with later.

For ensuring India's role, US has taken some important steps to fulfil its own desired goals such as- prioritize the Indo-US Defence Cooperation in maritime collaboration and the strategic partnership which is essential for restraining China's military expansion in the region¹⁸⁸. Additionally, US promoted India's role in East Asian multilateral forums

and engaged India into systematic cooperation on security and economic issues with those of allies (Australia, Japan, Singapore etc). US has also signalled its intension to bring India in the South China Sea by improving its relation with India with itself and through its allies.

Another reason of US Pivot/rebalancing was security and the militarization of the region for its own interest through its ally's interest¹⁸⁹. Strategically, for Australia the major concern is the emerging new relationship between US and China¹⁹⁰ because their strange relationship certainly would not be in the favour of Australia's interest. Additionally the Chinese naval modernization is the main concern of the region particularly in the South China Sea. New military deployments or plans have been made by US for Australia and others allies (for geographic rebalance). Under this calculation US decided to deploy its first 180 of the eventual 2,500 U.S. marines in Darwin, Australia, in April 2012.¹⁹¹ Australia has also agreed to permit greater access to US to its air force facilities.

While for India, US Pivot is a facilitator in both terms- by playing a regional role and co-related India's interest with US and its allies. India's strategic interest which is planned by its Look East Policy now also includes the South China Sea as a matter of geopolitics and geo-economics, and each can be considered in turn. India's interest in the South China Sea has a clear strategic dimension. Indian oil major Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, a public sector company, is involved in exploring oil in Phu Khanh basin in Vietnam. India has also begun to ship oil from Sakhalin joint venture in the Russian Far East since 2007¹⁹². Much of these interactions have to take place through the South China Sea. Strategically, two concepts are used by India to bring the South China Sea within its strategic horizons; one is "extended neighbourhood", that was used in 2000¹⁹³ and another one is the "Indo-Pacific". Again Yashwant Sinha, India's then External Affairs Minister, asserted in 2004; *'we have articulated the concept of an extended neighbourhood for India which stretches . . . to the South China Sea'*¹⁹⁴.

India's Maritime Military Strategy stated South China Sea as a blue water area of strategic interest for India. Under this rubric, India could use its naval power projection if necessary. This stance was also supported by government thinking also reflected in its naval strategic formulations in 2007. Therefore, South China Sea is in the middle of the

maritime stretch running from the Eastern Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific and all major naval powers (US, China, India etc) have vital interest in this South China Sea. As GVC Naidu said about the South China Sea that ‘in the strategic arena, India obviously does not want this crucial region to be dominated by China, its long-time rival and competitor’.¹⁹⁵ In addition India’s growing national capabilities give it ever greater tools to pursue its national interests also to the benefit of the United States. ‘India has the world’s third-largest army, fourth-largest air force, and fifth largest navy. India is an important U.S. partner in international efforts to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. Despite India’s principled refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India has shown itself to be a responsible steward of nuclear technology’.¹⁹⁶

India and Australia both see the United States as an invaluable balancer of China’s overall power, especially in the military domain, and thus pursue closer relations with Washington. In theory, the fact that India and the United States have undergone a rapprochement since the turn of the century should make it easier for India to improve its relations with Australia¹⁹⁷. Both India and Australia enjoy strategic ties with US. As a result, India and Australia may hold convergent interests but they feel no need to deviate from their ‘current parallel trajectories with the United States to pursue them’¹⁹⁸. This does not mean that the India-Australia strategic and security relationship is likely to remain limited in the near future. Australia is also coming in India’s other mode of strategic calculation which is economically, culturally and political related. Australia by introduction of Indo-Pacific as its area of interest included India to get involved in the Pacific affairs as its extended neighbourhood and in balancing China.

“Indo-Pacific– Impact on India-Australia Relation

The Indo-Pacific as a conceptual framework is not new, and has been used in various shapes and sizes to contextualise different thematic narratives. Firstly, it used to define Indo- West Pacific (Indian Ocean and West Pacific) by Karl Haushofer in geopolitical framework, used to describe an interconnected space of geo-strategic salience because of its vibrant economics, transportation networks, maritime connectivity, and hinterland potential¹⁹⁹. But it was use in strategic term while speaking at Honolulu in October 2010,

by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; the term 'Indo-Pacific' was used to describe a newly emerging integrated theatre²⁰⁰. Since 2011, the term has been used repeatedly. This term was again used by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 'Confluence of Two Seas'²⁰¹ address to the Indian Parliament in 2007. In 2012, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh used the term during the Indian-ASEAN Summit. In Western discourse, the term Indo-Pacific has been extensively used by the strategic community, with Australia integrating it in their strategic and defence policy documents since 2009²⁰².

2013 Defence White Paper

It was Australia who first announced the term Indo-Pacific officially regarding its regional interest. Under the Defence White Paper of 2013, Australia adopted the concept of an 'Indo-Pacific' as new strategic focus area which connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia.²⁰³ With the release of the Defence White Paper 2013 on 3 May, Australia officially recognizes a new region, the 'Indo-Pacific' as its area of strategic interest in the coming decades. According to Rory Medcalf, the term 'Indo-Pacific' was used in the 1950s to discuss decolonisation in the 1960s at two seminars held by the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the ANU, and again in the 1970s.²⁰⁴ Yet for around 30 years the term was not prominent until its re-emergence in 2005 in a paper by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies' by Michael Richardson who saw the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit (EAS) as symbolising a more unified 'Indo-Pacific' region²⁰⁵.

In geographic range, the Indo-Pacific ranges from East Africa, across the Indian Ocean, to the western and central Pacific, including Japan and Australia. Within this vast area, it would facilitate cooperation between countries and systems of alliances such as cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia, countering trends such as China's assertive behaviour in the South China Sea and its growing presence in the Indian Ocean. Indian politicians and strategists, as well as American and Australian figures also have started using the term "Indo-Pacific" in the past few years for these adjacent waters. But still there is no overall acceptance and use of this term.

From 1990s onwards India used its 'Look East' policy seeking an enhanced politico-economic engagement, which is now gradually but unavoidably acquiring 'strategic' overtones. 'India's military maritime qua naval doctrinal and strategy documents have identified the 'South China Sea and beyond' among the secondary areas of focused interest'²⁰⁶. Thus, 'Indo-Pacific' is neither a new paradigm, nor a Western concept but a framework of strategic relevance for the world at large, by including India. It has been used but in different terms. For Australian diplomats the new region of interest was important by including India in its region as integral part. Thus, revitalized Australia is looking for an expanded space in the security discourse²⁰⁷. This paradox 'requires redefinition in the current intermesh of the globalised environment where cooperation–competition– contestations form an integral part of international politics'²⁰⁸.

As far as the strategic view of the term Indo-Pacific in Australian and Indian foreign policy is considered, there are multiple reasons for forcing it as a crucial and more dynamic region. 44 per cent of national exports and 40 per cent of imports in 2012 were destined for this region²⁰⁹. Five of India's top ten export destinations and seven top import origins, in value terms, are located on the Indo-Pacific rim²¹⁰. While the Pacific pole of the Indo-Pacific is important, the primacy of the Indian Ocean in the national strategic calculus is much more critical due to energy dependency from the Middle East, increasing economic linkages with Africa, and the security of major sea lines of communication passing through the western Indian Ocean²¹¹. Further, an enhanced involvement of Beijing in the strategic dynamics of the Indian Ocean is considered inevitable due to the long sea lines carrying crucial energy and strategic minerals for sustaining its frenetic pace of industrial production.²¹²

India's Concern about Indo-Pacific

For India the concept is also to provide an opportunity to recast its regional interest by responding positively. According to Priya Chacko, analysts like Bramha Chellaney, who says that 'India should abandon its traditional non-aligned stance' or who see China as a strategic threat, promote a vision of the Indo-Pacific in which India, together with the democracies of the region- the United States, Australia and Japan-taking the lead in shaping the economic and security architecture of the region²¹³, have expectations of

positive results by adopting this terminology in geopolitics of Indian foreign policy. But India seems to prefer ASEAN-centred regional projects and bottom-up, issue-driven regional cooperative arrangements, together with a broad collection of 'strategic partnerships' with individual countries²¹⁴. Although by adopting the terminology of Indo-Pacific, India would essentially share Australian and American preoccupations in the region, and key to achieving a more substantial level of engagement²¹⁵.

Apart from this, because of great importance of India's maritime trade in resources across both the Indian and western Pacific Oceans, there is an increased focus on securing sea-lanes and maritime governance through regional initiatives such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery concluded in 2004²¹⁶. It is also imperative for India to strengthen its relation with Australia in accordance with the new terminology. By taking India's side in the regional institution such as a membership for APEC (the Australian government's issued Asian Century White Paper in December 2011) highlighted India as one of the countries with which Australia should have a broader and deeper engagement²¹⁷. Subsequently it started to appear in Australian foreign policy discourse, including speeches by Minister for Defence Stephen Smith and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Secretary Peter Varghese. Rory Medcalf also views the Indo-Pacific as 'a valid and objective description of the greater regional system in which Australia now finds itself'²¹⁸.

Importance of New Terminology for Australia

There were significant debates on the adoption of this new term. But this situation changed with the Defence White Paper 2013. Australian Defence White Paper of 2013 officially presented the Indo-Pacific as a 'logical extension' of what the 2009 Defence White Paper called the 'wider Asia-Pacific region'. The 2013 White Paper adopts the concept and 'adjusts Australia's priority strategic focus to the arc extending from India through Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, including the sea lines of communication on which the region depends'²¹⁹. Thus, appearing in the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, and used to define Australia's strategic focus in the 2013 Defence White Paper, 'Indo-Pacific' has recently become shorthand for how Australia understands its region.²²⁰ There are also numbers of implications of adopting an Indo-Pacific worldview.

For Australia, adopting the Indo-Pacific concept may be perceived to tie Australia closer to the United States and alienate China. Australia must consider how to build relationships with Indo-Pacific powers as it adopts the Indo-Pacific concept into its foreign policy. Australia will need to engage strongly with many other regional players, for example India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and key African countries, as well as China and the United States. This could include security dialogues and operational cooperation. Australia will also need to invest time and effort in building Indo-Pacific institutions. These institutions include the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). The EAS also includes the major Indo-Pacific powers such as India, providing a space for cooperation and discussion of regional issues. The EAS has been reported to be a key part of Australia's foreign policy as part for setting priorities. This suggests that Australia's multilateral focus is increasingly turning towards Indo-Pacific institutions.

One of Australia's main interests in the Indo-Pacific region is to define a broad region in one common concern and create a rules-based order²²¹. It is here that the interests of India and Australia coincide. The relationship between the United States and China, the region's and the globe's two most powerful states, will more than any other single factor, determine India's as well as Australia's strategic environment over the coming decades. Australia's most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct attack, and the security, stability and cohesion of its immediate neighbourhood. Australia also has a real strategic interest in the broader Indo-Pacific region and in a peaceful, rule-based international order²²².

India is now among Australia's top ten trading partners. This will require close cooperation with Australia for development of peace in the region and as an essential tool for economic development too. Under the Indo-Pacific as a common region, this cooperation would be more concrete. Neither India nor Australia supports paramilitary resolution in their approach. This makes them perfect partners in participating in a leading role in building a stable region²²³.

India-Australia and International Institution

India should engage with Australia not only for the economic and security concerns but also for the international status. In the international institutions, recognition is also important to be an influential and important player. Australia is now supporting India's stance for the permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition, Australia which is known as middle power country in the Pacific region has most influential relation with other Pacific Islands countries. India's relation with Australia in another way would be helpful for constructive engagement with New Zealand and the South Pacific Island countries. These Pacific countries which have been neglected by Indian foreign policy now feature prominently in its foreign policy. The importance of these island countries could be seen also in terms of their natural resources. India which is economically a fast growing country needs these resources to fulfil its thrust of demand. China which is increasingly becoming more engaged in this region by aids and investment is now benefitted by these islands countries²²⁴. Also the notion of one country one vote in the UN General Assembly has increased the importance of these island countries in India's strategic calculation. Australia also supports India's APEC membership while India endorses Australia's observer status at the SAARC.

Conclusion

Multilateral forums were the preparatory level of the relationship of India-Australia. The main concerns of cooperation under these forums were security from the international terrorism and the defence particularly naval exercises. Subsequently the emerging regional rivalry between countries of Indo-Pacific region and South China Sea opened new ways of cooperation between India and Australia. Both countries possess naval military power and are considering it necessary to use them in the resolution of regional affairs of their interest. This bilateral relationship becomes more essential when there is immense prospect of economic collaboration in future. As Australia's economy is based on trade, it gives priority to countries that have strong economic potentials. From these perspectives, India would be significant partner where the demand of food and other product is growing high. Moreover the diplomatic visits and the role of Indian Diaspora are promising cooperation imperative. India and Australia are coming closer by necessity

of their strategic concerns but other areas like economy, culture and diaspora are also significantly playing a role in bringing more maturity and substance in their relations. This aspect on will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Constructive Engagement between India-Australia

Introduction

In the previous chapter the discussion was on how the relationship between India and Australia is emerging due to various factors like Indo-US nuclear deal, China factor, and new defence and security concerns. To study the strategic relationship by the two countries in the changing scenario of international environment is quite interesting. This chapter will deal with how India peruses to constructively engage with Australia and vice versa not only in strategic issues of military bonding but economic, cultural and also the issue of Diaspora that helps in building cooperation between the two countries possible and succeed over the years.

Constructive Engagement: Definition and Implication in International Relations

Before discussing constructive engagement between Indian and Australia, it is important to understand the meaning of Constructive Engagement and the difference between Constructive Engagement and Strategic Engagement. In international relations *Constructive Engagement uses as policy which “advocates the maintenance of an economic and diplomatic (usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment, and human rights) relationship with an authoritarian state as opposed to imposing sanctions and embargoes on it”*²²⁵.

An American diplomat, Chester Crocker defines that why any state uses it in foreign policy by arguing that ‘constructive engagement is based on the premise that it is possible to mediate to apply pressure that will result in constructive change and this requires that contact is maintained’²²⁶. Thus focus of the approach is on the process, the dynamics of internal change, rather than the ultimate objective. So this approach envisions a sequence of orderly and inter-related change. Constructive engagement offers an alternative approach to security dilemmas and a political response to a security issue rather than a military one. The approach is helpful in terms of understanding the contemporary

complexity and multifaceted character of modern security dilemmas²²⁷ in global world. It also emphasises 'that peace and stability in which security is grounded, is affected by the inter-dependence between economic, social, and environmental factors as well as political and military'²²⁸.

Consequently, based on the above discussion a line of distinction can be drawn between Constructive Engagement and the Strategic Engagement. Although strategic and constructive, both kind of relationship are important to establish firm relationship between any two countries. In general, in strategic relationship circumstances compel countries to engage themselves while in constructive engagement countries willingly engage with one another. In fact, constructive engagement is not a theory which explains how the country achieve some specific intentions of foreign relations but a method or process²²⁹ by which two countries could understand better and affect their foreign policies via the establishment of diplomatic and economic relation as the main spotlight. While strategic engagement prioritises defence and security concerns as the major factor in engaging with one another, constructive engagement pursues affirm diplomatic relationship.

Although it is important in international relationship to have strategic engagement but constructive engagement should get precedence over strategic relationship. For instance, the relationship between US and Pakistan in the Cold War could be seen as based on strategic features and after the changing scenario (like the end of Cold War and Pakistan as the hub of international terrorism) it lost its importance while the relationship between US and Japan or Australia (constructed by well-built economic and diplomatic relations) could be seen as constructive engagement. Even after the changing of international milieu the relationship between them is still full flourished because their relations are not only based on the strategic but also have diplomatic relationship.

Difference between Constructive Engagement and Strategic Engagement

Strategic engagement and constructive engagement are quite different to each other. Strategic engagement between Australia and India is based on sharing of same

geographical area (i.e. Indo-Pacific). The new emerging regional circumstance made geography as an important factor for collaboration. But Australia is now using geography as a strategy to show that the cooperation between India and Australia in the coming years is necessary because they share the same region of Indo-Pacific. Australia, Japan, China and India share the region of the Indian Ocean. Australia shares better and deeper economic and trade relations with those countries than India, with India the relation is new and emerging. These countries have stronger economic as well as diplomatic relations with Australia than India has. Thus they could affect Australia's foreign policy more effectively than India. The relation with Australia which is making these countries most important to Australia is the constructive engagement not only the strategic relations. Because of this economic interdependence their bilateral relations are stronger. Besides this, diplomatic ties also have great importance in the bilateral relationship. If we look at the diplomatic relations between India and Australia, India did not pay any high official visits for a long time and gave less attention towards its relationship with Australia while diplomatic visits are the most important apparatus for any nation to have the relationship stronger.

Possibilities of Constructive Engagement

There are still much possibilities of the emergence of this kind of engagement between India and Australia. Because the main issues on which they have different views was the NPT and the decision of Australia to not selling Uranium to India. But after the signing of Civil Nuclear Deal on 5 September 2014, the issue of divergence disappeared. Thus it is obvious and easy for an emerging new friendship in the coming years. Both have much similarity in terms of their guiding principle of foreign policy like belief in democracy and multiculturalism, peaceful co-existence, and over all human development etc. But, they failed to establish the relationship in the previous years because of international political affairs of the Cold War. Although most of their political differences disappeared after the end of the Cold War, but the issues of Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and supply of uranium have been matters of dispute for a very long time.

The main argument from Indian side was that the policy of Australia's uranium export to France, Taiwan, China and Pakistan²³⁰ is not clear and refusing to sell to India for not signing NPT and Australia's harsh reaction towards Pokhran II nuclear test in 1998²³¹ were reasons enough for the inevitable distance. India who was not the signatory of NPT did not think that Australia have any right to blame India when its policy concerning uranium supply and nuclear have not lucid account. Even two years later, when the former Australian Prime Minister John Howard paid visit to India in July 2000, he did not receive warm and friendly welcome from India's side. This sourness in their relationship slowly and steadily withered when Tony Abbott 'decided to sign an agreement with India for selling uranium to India in the visit to India in September 2014',²³².

The changing posture of Australia towards India was the outcome of India's economic rise and US support to India by declaring to have a Civil Nuclear deal with India in 2005. And also other countries those have uranium reserves (India currently has nuclear energy agreements with 11 countries and imports uranium from France, Russia and Kazakhstan²³³) were negotiating to sell their uranium to India since 2008. As according to 123 agreement, Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSGs) have been permitted to conclude contracts to supply uranium to India²³⁴. Conditions for uranium trade are set down in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements in which India has pledged to use all nuclear materials it obtains from outside suppliers for peaceful purposes²³⁵. This changed policy was supported by argument that India did its nuclear test to support its defence policy and like other NPT signatories followed the provision and did not transfer the nuclear technology to other states²³⁶.

123 Agreement and Questioning on Australia's Uranium Policy

The role of 123 Agreement is prominent for the changing relationship between India and Australia. US started showing its trust on India's nuclear policy by signing the agreement of 123. This firstly started by US President George Bush in his second term in 2005. This agreement showed that India has the ability to become a natural member of the nuclear countries. At that time, Australia maintained a neutral stand by saying that it is US decision to sign nuclear deal²³⁷ and there was not any sign in Australian side of following

the US. The argument about not selling Uranium to India was stable in Australian diplomatic circles because India was not the signatory of NPT. Australia according to its uranium export policy was not going to deal with those countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But this stand was doubted when an Australian based Newspaper *The Age* had reported that the Australian government 'has secretly canvassed the possibility of uranium sales to India while publicly asserting that it cannot allow such exports as long as Delhi maintains a nuclear arsenal outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'.²³⁸

Australia as Uranium Trader

Uranium supply policy started gradually turning its way to goodwill when Howard's government supported India-specific waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008. Howard Government had announced in-principle his willingness to sell uranium to China, Russia and India²³⁹. Although Australia did sign the uranium deal with China in 2008 and with Russia in 2010 but failed to sign it with India. Howard's zeal to reinvigorate this relationship was interrupted when a domestic uproar forced him to revert on his plans to sell uranium to India. These things hardly improved as his successor, Kevin Rudd, consolidated a key policy decision of his Australian Labour Party (ALP) to not export uranium to countries which are not members of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).²⁴⁰ But when other major countries were ready to trade uranium with India Australia's continued reluctance was not conducive for better relations between the two countries. Australia has been 'justifying its intentions to sell uranium on grounds of changed political climate (end of Cold War) as it required to renew their policies'²⁴¹ And by the time Australia changed its mind and agrees to sell uranium to India which is also important for the Australian economy as it is a trading nation and Australia could hardly ignore the big market for uranium supply provided by Indian demand while other countries were doing the same thing.

Signing of Indo-Australia Civil Nuclear Deal

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced its changed uranium policy towards India and finalized a deal on 5th September, 2014 that would allow Australia to export uranium to India²⁴². Australia acquires 40 percent of the total world's uranium reserves²⁴³ and it is highly profitable for both countries in terms of demand and supply. The significance of the deal is also important for India in another way because it would help India 'to use its smaller domestic radioactive stockpiles for military purposes while giving it the ability to import Australian uranium for civilian nuclear energy power plants'²⁴⁴. As Justification of changing its policy towards India, Australia argued which was followed for a very long time is that "India has an absolutely impeccable non-proliferation record and India has been a model international citizen."²⁴⁵ Before this former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, was the first person to support the supply of uranium to India. However, Australia's ban on selling uranium to India was again reversed by its subsequent Labour government led by Kevin Rudd in 2012²⁴⁶. After the signing of uranium deal with Australia, India is now expected to purchase significant quantities of Australian uranium in order to meet its growing energy needs. In the analytical view, the uranium deal is a deal which is going to improve trust among each other and to forget and forgive past behaviour. The uranium deal created the trust that was missing earlier while India and Australia were engaged with each other during the War on Terror.

Diplomatic Visits between India-Australia as Political Engagement

Abbott's visit to India is a milestone event about improving their bilateral relations rather than merely inking a nuclear deal. In return, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also visited Australia for attending G20 at Brisbane on 18 November 2014. This was the first visit of Indian Prime Minister to Australia after the end of the Cold War is also a significant step towards engagement. 'No Indian prime minister has visited Australia since Rajiv Gandhi in 1986. Manmohan Singh failed to attend even the Commonwealth Summit in Perth in October 2011, prompting media speculation that the continued ban on the export of uranium was a factor behind his decision to stay away'²⁴⁷. The importance

of this visit mentions by the Australian Newspaper by citing ‘The bilateral relationship became strained in 2009, over attacks on Indian students in Australia but now large number of Indian news outlets carried live coverage of the address – the first to the Australian parliament by an Indian prime minister’²⁴⁸. The changed stance of Australia on its uranium policy is reflected by the statement of Abbott in regards to India’s nuclear industry, “It’s not our job to tell India how to conduct its domestic affairs”²⁴⁹. The Indian Prime Minister visit helped in thawing the relationship between the two countries as diplomatic visits and discussions are regarded as keys of making strong relationship and better understanding between the two countries.

There have been other several visits at the Head of Government and Head of State level but the intention was not much clear that also cause the large time gap of diplomatic visits between these two countries as Prime Minister R.G. Menzies visited India in 1950 while Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Australia in May 1968²⁵⁰ which almost takes eighteen years. After that the next visit was by Australia's Governor General Sir John Kerr to India in February-March 1975. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was Chief Guest at Republic Day in January 1979. Prime Minister Bob Hawke visited India in 1983 for a CHOGM Summit. Prime Minister Bob Hawke visited India in February 1989 for a bilateral visit. ‘Prime Minister John Howard visited India in July 2000 and again in March 2006. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited India in November 2009. Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited Australia for a CHOGM Summit in February 1978. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Australia in October 1981 for the CHOGM Summit. The purpose to build a strong relation with each other was not found by both the countries and hence nothing materialised until now. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to Australia in 1986.

The relations between India and Australia have grown in strength and importance since the adoption of economic reforms in India in 1991²⁵¹ and have made rapid strides in trade, investment, energy, mining, science and technology, information technology, education and defence²⁵². During the visit of PM Rudd to India in 2009 both the countries elevated their ties to the level of a Strategic Partnership. By looking at these visits one thing is very clear that India did not pay much attention on making the relationship with

Australia. There is always a wide gap in the visits of the head of the government which shows lack of interest in the relationship. It is Indian Prime Minister Modi who has paid visit to Australia and signed agreement and also visited its other cities and interacting with Indian Diaspora in Australia signalled the upcoming goodwill and growingly constructive based relationship between the two.

India-Australia Economic Relations

India and Australia can be seen as complementary in both their economic and strategic terms. From Australia's standpoint, India represents a huge and growing export market. For India, Australia represents a politically stable and reliable source of energy and resources to help fuel its economic growth. There are considerable opportunities to further develop two-way trade and a far stronger investment relationship.²⁵³ The bilateral trade and investment between these two have increased rapidly. Although in this calculation, India is far behind from China but the pace of India-Australia trade is rapidly increasing. This economic cooperation has continued to deepen since the turn of the century, with Australians increasingly seeing India as a rising global economic player and a potential export destination.

These increasing economic ties have helped convince Australia to advance its relationship with India. In September 2013, the Australian government released a country strategy for India which demarcated a strategy to develop relations with countries identified as priorities because of their size, economic links with Australia and strategic and political influence in the region and globally²⁵⁴. Accordingly this document, reinforced by official Australian statement has indicated an evolution in India-Australia relations. In 2011 India became fifth largest trading partner of Australia. Negotiation to conclude Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and Australia was launched in May 2011. In this negotiation there are six rounds and the more recent of which was held in December²⁵⁵. This negotiation would reduce the tariff and would increase trade and investment.

- **Import- Export ratio**

Australia's top 12 exports items by value in 2006 were coal, iron ore, tourism, education, gold, crude petroleum, aluminium ores, aluminium, natural gas, beef, professional and business services, copper ores²⁵⁶. Moreover, the major problem is faced by the agricultural sector of Australia as Australia is among the world's most efficient agricultural producers and it is heavily export-oriented, with two-thirds of its agricultural production destined for overseas markets²⁵⁷. Moreover, Australia continues to face a number of significant problems in relation to its trade performance. Australia is among the world's most efficient agricultural producers. Australia is also heavily export-oriented economy, with two-thirds of its agricultural production destined for overseas markets. This could be useful for Australia to divert its export with Indian economy where the demand of food product is high and going to be high in the upcoming years.

India's high population will create demand for the agricultural and dairy products. In India, people are turning from agricultural employment to services oriented employment. There is more competition and the government failed to provide its people full employment. By the contrast, in Australia the demands for the people is high in service sector and it could be beneficial for Australia by turning towards Indian employment and invest in India which easily provide the cheap services to its people. Moreover, the other sectors like tourism and education also could be grown by India's contribution to Australia.

There has been significant growth in trade over the last decade and, by 2012-13, the bilateral merchandise and services trade stood at \$16.6 billion²⁵⁸. Australian exports are concentrated in coal, gold, copper and education services and India is now Australia's fourth-largest export customer after China, Japan and South Korea²⁵⁹. However, Australia's recent economic progress has been heavily reliant on trade with China. In 2009, China became Australia's largest export market, surpassing Japan. Primary exports partners are China (21.81 percent), Japan (19.19 percent), South Korea (7.88 percent), India (7.51 percent), US (4.95 percent)²⁶⁰. And India is comparatively far behind China and Japan in the economic relation with Australia. But the growth pace of import-export

has increased rapidly compared to the trade with China. In 2010-11, India stood as Australia's fifth largest trading partner with two-way merchandise trade valued at more than \$17 billion, with Australia exporting more to India than to the United States²⁶¹. Besides this the Abbott Government is turning towards negotiating the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA) which has huge potential for both countries²⁶².


- **Coal**

The energy dimension in India-Australia relations is multi faceted. India which needed Australian Uranium to fulfil its energy demand has been denied on the basis that India is not the member of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Australia did sign a deal for the uranium supply but in the implementation it would take more than two decades. Apart from this Australia is the main Coal exporter country to India. And in India, coal accounts for over half of India's total energy consumption. More than 50 per cent of India's domestic coal production has already been utilised for power generation while three-quarters of India's electricity is generated from over 80 coal-fired thermal plants.²⁶³ As Australia is among the top six producers of coal and is the largest net exporter to India. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) has projected that Australia's saleable production will grow in coming years²⁶⁴. In this context Australia is very useful for India to fulfil its energy demand which is growing day by day.

In raw materials India needs coal from Australia. However India is turning towards nuclear energy but it would take more than two decades to produce nuclear energy. Currently, Coal is the major energy sources for India. India has 4th largest reserves of coal and holds about '301.56 Billion tonnes of proven reserves Coal estimated in the country

as on 1.4.2014²⁶⁵ and imports almost 23 per cent of external imports coal comes from

Total energy consumption in India, 2012



Australia²⁶⁶.



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Agency, BP Statistical Review.

Coal is the last source of energy in India. Thus India would provide Australia a stable market for its coal export.

Considering this scenario, at the time of Abbott's visit to India 'the leaders also agreed to work towards the long-term, sustainable and reliable supply of Australian resources based on India's energy needs' (including increasing sales of conventional fuels such as coal and natural gas to India)²⁶⁷. 'Prior to a meeting with Abbott hosted by business chambers, one group said India should make use of Abbott's visit to seek more coal imports at a time when Indian thermal power stations are running critically short of the fuel'.²⁶⁸ Apart from coal and uranium, India also imports other natural resources and raw materials. In the term of merchandise trade, India is the largest buyer of Australia's gold that forms nearly 40 per cent of Australian exports to India, copper ore and chickpeas.²⁶⁹ Accordingly this presents a lot of trade and investment opportunity for India-Australia to engage with each other driven by the benefits of economic opportunities.

Economic Institution and Cooperation between India-Australia

Prior to having a bilateral relation India and Australia were able to interact well through multilateral forums. For discussion of a range of 'economic and social issues affecting the

region, as a regional centre for a diverse range of technical assistance to developing countries and as a research facility and development information source ESCAP was established by resolution of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, changing its name in 1974²⁷⁰. Australia plays an active and prominent role in ESCAP, as part of its commitment to promoting development in the region²⁷¹.

Another forum which launched in 2012 is Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP is an import economic forum for India in many terms such as it would assist India 'to organize the rules and regulations of doing trade, which will reduce its trade costs'²⁷². It will be helpful in achieving its goal of greater economic integration with member countries and better access to a vast regional market from Japan to Australia. In another way it would provide a podium by enabling India to strengthen its trade ties with Australia with other members' countries such as China, Japan and South Korea. It would also create opportunities for Indian companies to access new markets in Australia²⁷³. 'This is because 'the structure of manufacturing in many of these countries is becoming more and more sophisticated, resulting in a servicification of manufacturing'²⁷⁴. India is well placed to contribute to other countries in RCEP through its expertise in services, not only consolidating the position of the region as the world's factory but also developing it as the world's hub for services'²⁷⁵.

Indian Diaspora in Australia

In this globalized world Diaspora is a fast emerging agent for development and integration between host and guest countries²⁷⁶. And if we are dealing with India-Australia relations it is necessary to deal with the Diasporas. In Australia, Diaspora can be considered as an integral part of its demography. In Australian demography, the Second largest Diaspora comes from India after China. Australia is one of those countries where people follow different cultural and religious practices and yet they co-exist peacefully. India too shares the same social and political framework and tries to follow the idea of 'unity in diversity' sharing different cultures and religion. It helps Indian people to adjust and assimilate easily in Australia and settle there. This could be seen as one of the major causes for the Indian immigrants to settle their easily.

Migration of Indians to Australia is not a new phenomenon. It started in the colonial period in the form of increasing demand of indentured labour. But it was limited to the unskilled and illiterate people. But this type of migration was restricted after the end of Second World War because at that time Australian government introduced Immigration policy on the basis of White Australia Policy. To make sure that only white people could immigrate to Australia, it became essential to qualify the language test to get the permission to settle there. This policy discouraged the Indian immigration to Australia. But this policy could not continue because of some domestic as well as foreign challenges. It was after the end of white Australia Policy in 1975; the migration increased to Australia from Asia but it takes one more decade to attract Indian immigrants. Now there are 251,000 Non-resident Indians (NRIs), 235,000 People of Indian Origins (PIOs) and 486,000 Overseas Indian in Australia based on the data of on January 2015²⁷⁷.

This migration from India to Australia is mostly the migration of skilled labours like engineers, doctors, academician etc. These people with their high educational qualification and contribution in Australian politics and economy occupied some high post and affect the policy and perceptions towards their homeland country. At the present time, Diaspora is considered to participate in the development of both in their countries of origin and host country more successfully and is well integrated in the countries of settlement in the term of attitude, know-how and financial capacity²⁷⁸. Hence there is a strong chance for the Indian Diaspora to play a significant role in foreign policy making of India.

India's Policy to use Diaspora as a Developmental Tool

Diaspora is one of the main focuses in the foreign policy of the current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After he won the election of 2014 by the majority of votes, he visited Fiji, Australia, Japan, US and many other countries that have huge Indian population and also for new economic and strategic partnership. He has interacted with Indian Diaspora in their host countries and requested to contribute by investing their money in India so that India could stand as a powerful nation in the world. Another kind

of contribution by Indian Diaspora could be seen in the way of remittance send by Indians to their friends, family or in charity.

There's no doubt that the economic heft of the powerful NRI community has always played a pivotal role in boosting India's economy, especially its foreign exchange reserves²⁷⁹. Remittances from NRIs to family, friends or relatives in India are the highest in the world. 'The figure stood at \$70 billion in 2013-14, accounting for over four per cent of the country's GDP, the highest amongst countries receiving remittances from overseas workers'²⁸⁰. In Madison Square Garden, USA over 20,000 NRIs congregated to hear their homeland leader, Narendra Modi speaks. In Australia too, a similar number flocked to Sydney's Olympic Park to cheer him loudly. On the other hand 'Western countries, which are coping with ageing population and a lack of science and engineering professionals, are actively attracting Indian doctors and professionals, and by some measures 10% of the total number of physicians trained in India have already emigrated'²⁸¹. Australia is one of those countries which is getting benefits in the service sector by Indian origins.

Education- A Building Bridge

India has strong relation with Australia when we talk about higher educations. Australia is one of the most popular destinations of Indian students. According to Michael Carter, Trade Commissioner and Consul Commercial of the Australian Trade Commission in Chennai, *Australia continue to be one of the top three destinations of choice for Indian students, with the number of students growing steadily*²⁸². Currently, there are 35,000 Indian students in Australia and the numbers are growing rapidly²⁸³. The Consul General to South India Sean Kelly said that 'there has been an increase of 61 per cent year to year growth till March 2014 in higher education institutions across Australia'²⁸⁴. There are many scholarship schemes provided by Australian Government to international students. It currently invests over \$300 million each year in international scholarships which supports around 5,000 international students, researchers and professionals to study in Australia and for Australians to study, research and undertake professional development overseas²⁸⁵.

Australia is using its international education as a strategy for its own development. ‘The inquiry report of Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in 2007 highlight the important role of international education by mentioning that student and academic mobility and exchange are seen to provide the basis for friendship, mutual respect and understanding. Education is the main key of prosperity, security and peace in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond’²⁸⁶. Thus Australia’s international education sector continues to be most active soft power potential inherent in the volume and depth of interactions, relationships and achievements²⁸⁷ with international students resulting affection from Indian students for study. Educational tours of students provide an important forum for exchange of ideas which could create more awareness about Australia and in return directly or indirectly could affect the government policy towards Australia in positive ways.

Australia is one of those countries that attract foreign youths for higher education, particularly in the Asian region. Australia did enhance itself in terms of its education policy Australia started focus on development of its educational system through technical skills and education exchange scholarships delivered under the Colombo Plan introduced in 1951. And now it became a commercialised full-fee approach²⁸⁸. Today ‘Australia is one of the world’s five leading English language- based exporters of education services (OECD 2010) and aimed to generate public understanding in Australia and overseas of Australia’s foreign and trade policies to project a positive image of Australia internationally’²⁸⁹. India has majority of students in Australian University some of whom had gone there through self finance while others availed of the policy of people to people contact. This is one of the best ways to affect people and make awareness about India amongst Australians. This would be an easier way to establish strong relations.

Climate Change: New Security Threat to All


In the present world, Climate Change has become such an issue that no country has a choice but to come together to find solution and hence requires utmost cooperation, which also frames the reason to strengthen the relations. By cooperation in this area India also could diplomatically engage itself with these resource-rich countries. Climate change

is a global crisis that requires a global solution²⁹⁰. An Australian Economist, Ross Garnaut (2008) described 'climate change as a 'diabolical' issue because it is uncertain in its format and extent, insidious rather than (as yet) confrontational, long-term rather than immediate, international as well as national and, in the absence of effective mitigation, carries a risk of dangerous consequences'²⁹¹. Although actions to reduce it are under way in terms of international cooperation and they have been committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Many policies are used by governments around the world to address climate change, and in most cases a number of policies are used in concrete. Like other countries, Australia has drawn on a wide range of measures to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and climate change policies have been introduced at all levels of government since the late 1980s²⁹².

India-Australia and Climate Change Agenda

There is also some multilateral forum in which both India and Australia participated on the climate issue. *The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)* was launched on March 28, 2009²⁹³. It facilitates a candid dialogue among major economies to help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome in international climate change negotiations and it also advances concrete, practical climate change initiatives²⁹⁴. The 17 major economies participating in the MEF are: Australia, India, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Australia has decided to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by five per cent below 2000 levels by 2020²⁹⁵. But only Australia could not reduce the greenhouse emissions because the major gas emission comes from China, US, E.U., India, Russia as shown in the figure.



Thus the major part of these gas emissions activities should be under control by these countries. Only then the climate change could be effective. In India the growing demands of energy and the chief use of coal in the economy is a vital factor of greenhouse emissions. India who is still on the path of economic development and could not fulfil its high energy demand has to divert to other source of energy to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions.

Australia's Climate Change (CC) Policy

Australia has been actively involved in climate change issues. Principally, the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for leading 'international negotiations on CC through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)'²⁹⁶. Australia has been engaged on both national and international level to keep it in control. In the Kevin Rudd period Australia has done a lot for the climate change. Kevin Rudd has been a strong supporter for a sound policy toward CC since it is the major threat any country could face. In 2007 the Australian Labour Party, led by Kevin Rudd, 'was elected on a pledge to act on CC, in what some referred to as the world's 'first CC election'²⁹⁷. In the Kevin Rudd words: '*Significant CC will bring about unregulated population movements, declining food production, reductions in*

*arable land, violent weather patterns and resulting catastrophic events. This is an area of emerging consequences which will require the formal incorporation of climate change within Australia's national security policy and analysis process*²⁹⁸.

After becoming the Prime Minister of Australia Rudd has immediately 'ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and became one of the most active heads of state of the Parties the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, at which Australia had one of the largest Delegations'²⁹⁹. Rudd believed climate change as a security threat when he said 'Australia's environment and economy will be among the hardest and fastest hit by CC if we do not act now'³⁰⁰. It is important fact that economic growth and the health of the economy have direct consequence by the climate. For the sake of economic aspects, rationale and strong action on CC should be considerable.

Apart from this Australian Government also introduced *The Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (or CPRS)* in Australia in 2010 as part of its CC policy³⁰¹. But it failed to achieve its aim because of the commitment of the Kyoto Protocol (which ends in 2012). Then Prime Minister announced that the CPRS would be introduced only when there is greater clarity on the actions of other major economies including the US, China and India³⁰². Another important agreement related to Climate Change is Cancun Agreement. The Cancun Agreements are 'a set of significant decisions by the international community to address the long-term challenge of climate change collectively and comprehensively over time and to take concrete action now to speed up the global response'³⁰³.

Use of Clean Renewable Energy and Nuclear Energy

At the present day, nuclear energy is used by about 30 countries to generate 11% of the world's electricity, with almost zero greenhouse gas emissions³⁰⁴. Currently there are 437 operating reactors and around 70 under construction³⁰⁵. And the future growth in nuclear energy will be in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam) because of emergence of Asia as new economic powerhouse. This nuclear

power is a key for future energy plans in India, where a quarter of the 1.2 billion populations have little or no access to electricity, a situation which Indian Prime Minister Modi says he will tackle³⁰⁶. Currently, India 'operates 20 mostly small reactors at six sites with a capacity of 4,780 MW or 2 percent of its total power capacity, according to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited'³⁰⁷. The government hopes to increase its nuclear capacity to 63,000 MW by 2032 by adding nearly 30 reactors at an estimated cost of \$85 billion³⁰⁸. Considering these climate changes as important issues Australia changes its policy and decided to supply the uranium as the main source of clean energy. And also will fulfil the India's thrust of energy.

But still for more than one decades carbon based-fuels would be the main source of energy for India's growing demand. In this energy and resource area of the economic revenue Australia will continue to be a major supplier of crucial energy and raw materials to the rest of the world, especially to Asian countries including India. At present, around 80% of the world's primary energy needs are met through carbon-based fuels³⁰⁹. By 2040, 'it is estimated that 74% will still be met by carbon-based sources because of growing demand in emerging economies'³¹⁰. Thus it is hard for Asian countries like India to only depend on renewable energy when it has such high demand. But it is trying to diversify its carbon-based fossil fuel to depend to renewable and clean energy for the sake of global environment.

Tourism and People to People Contact

The increase of tourism is also important for direct engagement. Major portion of Australian revenue also comes from the tourist. India which have majority of middle class and GDP growth rate is 7-8 per cent annually could be beneficial in this area. For Indian too, it is one of the finest places to enjoy their vacations. The policy of people to people contact is another way to pay visits and understand people, their culture and countries. The easy way of this is the relaxations of visa issuing and availability of flights become important when it talk about the direct engagement. Australia also has chosen some of Indian major cities like Mumbai and Chennai to promote its culture and attract the people to change its image because of the students attack incidence that damaged the

reputation of Australia among Indians which might affect Indian youth to study in Australia.

Conclusion

There can be various types of diplomatic engagements as far as two countries are concerned. The previous chapter focused on the strategic relationship between India and Australia. These (strategic relations) did not have much effect in mending relations between these two countries. It was either through US or China that acted as a catalyst in forcing them to cooperate with other countries and this kind of relationship may not be productive and could not live long. However if they engage directly by searching new and strong areas of concern in economic and cultural realms, that would be long lasting. This would help them to overcome their domestic as well as foreign problems and support each other to develop their economy. For any country that has good relationship could easily play international role by cooperation. Because in the coming decades the major threat would be felt from the CC water, food production and energy prospects rather than weapons and hegemony. For avoiding these problems it is necessary for India to understand the benefits of Australia for its overall development. Australia too could not only depend on US for its security and want to play a larger role in international politics.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The main objective of this study is to analyse the international changes which led to several changes in the relationship of India and Australia. The study is also to find out if the emerging relation between India and Australia will have the impact of historical animosity or will actually find solid ground to improve their strategic, economic and diplomatic relations. The diplomatic and economic relationship that features in the recent years to enhance constructive engagement is slowly moving towards a concrete confidence building measure between both. This relationship was not visible in the Cold War period which was more entwined with their geographical concerns and political ideologies and national interests.

By this we could understand the nature of relationship which is not only strategically oriented but also economic, cultural and diplomatic based relationship. These kinds of efforts play larger role to have strong intentions and possibilities for a stable relationship. The first chapter deal with the historical relationship that clarifies it is not only the circumstances but also the leadership which had decided the attitude and policy in their relationship. These political leaders have decided and followed the policy on which they have faith. It was also the personal views of Menzies and Nehru that hindered cooperation or look eye-to-eye on international issues. However things changed in the early 1990s.

The end of the Cold War and the Indian economic liberalization were the major concern in this change. This expanded the opportunity for India to engage itself with the world economy. The economic relationship was the only way to engage with other countries than South Asian countries. India was not included in the multilateral economic forum of Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) which was initiated by Japan and Australia in 1989. The liberalization process resulted high economic growth rate by 1997-1998 and the economic trade increased between India-Australia. It was also because of the Asian Crisis of 1997/98 which had adversely affected trade between ASEAN and Australia.

This improving relationship of India-Australia got affected by the Pokhran II nuclear test by India in May, 1998. The reaction from the outside world was expected. Interestingly

Australian argument was more severe towards India compared to any other western country. Besides the regretted reaction of Australia, the governmental action to withdraw all the diplomatic and defence relationship, seemed from the India perspective to be inhospitable. Although the nuclear testing incidence made this relationship freeze but this could not be longer and after 9/11 attack India and Australia joined US in combating international terrorism through the 'War on Terror'. From the Australian side the action to make the relationship normal was initiated and diplomatic visits done but India's response towards it was not positive. In addition the refusal to sell uranium to India turned these visits unproductive till the recent visit of Tony Abbott.

Australia's refusal to supply uranium to India acted as a drag on the relationship for some years and was seen by Indian diplomats as indicating the lack of commitment to the relationship and a refusal to acknowledge India's great power status. But a change in Australia's uranium policy in 2012 when talks of nuclear deal began³¹¹ and progress in the negotiation of uranium supply arrangements has largely removed this impediment to the relationship with the ultimate signing of the civil use of nuclear energy in 2014³¹². India being a fast growing economy, the demand for energy resources is very high and it is impossible to fulfil it without any substitute of fossil fuel. The concerns of climate change and environmental degradation requires for an emerging economic power to use clean energy as other sources increase the pollution. The relationship turns towards cooperation of India-Australia when US seized initiation to have friendly and strategic partnership with India.

The relationships of India-US started to improve from the beginning of 21st century. Rising of international terrorism, economic globalization, the safety of important sea lanes and powerful Indian Navy make India's importance felt by the world. Here the question arises that is the Indo-US a dependent factor for the emerging/changed relationship between India and Australia. By analysing the above circumstances it could be said that improved relationship of India-US did make it easy for India-Australia having more engaged relationship but it is not the only factor to cause the change in their relationship. There are other important factors like economic interdependent, concern of China's peaceful rise, pressure from Indian Diaspora for improved relations, education

and culture and many more have prepared sound reason to make the relationship friendly and trust worthy.

Testing of Hypothesis

There were two hypotheses which are the base of this dissertation. First is that the strategic location of India and Australia engulfs the entire region of Indo-Pacific making the partnership pragmatic and timely. Second is that India and Australia have created an independent relation with each other more on constructive engagement (economic and diplomatic based) rather than strategic partnership.

Indo-Pacific in the Strategic Relationship of India-Australia

To analyse the strategic relationship within the emerging relations between India and Australia it is necessary to keep in mind three major causes- rise of Asian economy, India's strategic location on the Indian Ocean which is India's backyard and aggressively growing China were of common concern. Given both countries' increasing regional interest and the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean region to their strategic calculations, their spheres of action and influence are beginning to overlap, making an enhanced dialogue necessary. On the perceptions of strategic landscapes especially regarding the role of China is aligning India-Australia more closely than they were ever before.

India and Australia increasingly share a common apprehension about China's rise. For India its border dispute with China remains unresolved and China's growing military and naval capabilities, as well as its increased presence in the Indian Ocean are a source of anxiety for Indian diplomats and strategic thinkers³¹³. India also has deep apprehensions about its economic relationship with China. In the case of Australia, that is economically more dependent on China this could be odd situations for Australia's economic and strategic partnerships. This is because Australia whose long-standing security alliance is with the United States while its economic interests depends in large part on maintaining solid trade relations with China. Thus both countries have desire to prevent the emergence of a China-dominated regional order to avoidance of such situations.

Mutual Economic Opportunities and Constructive Engagement

Relations between India and Australia have long been characterized by mutual indifference, in part because neither country is central to the security of the other. For decades, they operated in separate strategic spheres. However, like US, Australia too wants India to play a role in the regional issues. The intense economic dependence on China could raise some problematic situation for Australian economy in the future. Keeping this in mind it is in the interest of Australia to divert its trade and investment plan to India. India is also one of the fast emerging economies of the region after China.

It has also a large population and majority of them belong to middle class. This provides an extensive market and cheap labour for Australian goods and investments respectively. This is true that the portion of Indian trade with Australia is low compared to China's portion and this is also applicable for India's trade with China. The optimistic and palpable thing is that the pace of trade between India-Australia is increasing very rapidly. Trade grew by 24.6 percent per annum between 2000 and 2009, making India Australia's tenth-largest two-way trading partner and fifth-largest export market³¹⁴. Moreover, India is currently Australia's seventeenth-largest foreign investor, while Australia is the 22nd largest investor in India³¹⁵.

Another important thing is that currently both countries have the intentions to have stronger economic and political relationship which was absent in the previous relationship. Australia is also supporting the membership of India for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC). But it still needs more appreciation in political and diplomatic relations and action to overcome the strategic cause and become engaged more economically.

Strategic Vs Economic relations

It is important to understand whether the new relationship between India and Australia is mostly economic or strategic to build a future alliance and/or partnership against China. In fact during the post Pokhran II test, the relationship is mostly based on strategic issues. Like the involvement of India and Australia in East Asian economic multilateral forums such as East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+6 and Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) was

based on strategic calculations rather than economic. This was aiming to include India to contain China's economic influence in these forums. Under the US Asia rebalancing act, India has been given much importance that is being seriously considered by the Australian diplomats. Cooperating with India, Australia also wants US to be involved in the regional affairs so that China could be in balance in the regional affairs where the issue of land and border disputes is rampant. Together they could play an active role in the balance of power in the region. In the multilateral forums these cooperation is very effective which concerns both economic and security concerns of the region.

India and Australia's relation had got a boost with the Indo-US relation and also by the signing of the civil nuclear deal but it is not the dependent factor for their relationship. After this incidence in Australian federal parliament the debate was going for not selling the uranium to India because of their uranium policy. However the importance of any policy depends upon how effective it is. Has Australia been able to bring any change in India's Nuclear Policy by persisting uranium issues or by other nuclear related stands for the past years? Australia in real did not affect India's nuclear Policy because of not having any deep economic or diplomatic relationships. For affecting the other country one should have deep relationship which was not between India-Australia. Another point is that how the other countries are going to act it also matters for the achievement of the policy, as was the case with India. Other countries that have strong relationship with India in practice did nothing to affect India after its nuclear test and India was considered a de facto nuclear power which has never violated any rule as per the IAEA, and even NPT. And when US signed the Civil Nuclear Deal other countries having uranium reserves started negotiations with India. In the international relations it would be a diplomatic action that if the policy followed by any country is unable to achieve the desired expectations then it is better to change that and pick one that is beneficial for the country. This is now Australia feels so that it started to engage with India in all area of relationship.

Having strong relationship with Australia is also advantageous for India. India could become a regional player with the revived relation with Australia. Australia shares the regional interests and has common threat perception like India. The naval capabilities of

Australia are cooperatively active in the regional issues and international exercise. Besides this, Australia has gained the status by proclaiming itself middle power of the region. It has strong role in the South Pacific regional politics. With having friendly cooperation India could utilize it in reaching its influence in the Pacific region which has both strategic and economic benefits.

On the question of India's capability to play a strategic role in support to Australia's partnership for *quadrilateral alliance* would depend upon how the future relationship between them is going to be. Moreover it also would depend upon the circumstances and goal of this kind of alliance. However India itself uses to prevent to be engaging in any official alliance system to persevere its strategic autonomy as in the past. This could be possible if it pursued specific agenda and participation would be beneficial rather than problematic.

Another important question was that can geopolitical rivalry take a back seat for constructive engagement with Australia, US, China and Japan that could be advantageous in both economic and energy security perspective for India? The possibility for this kind of question is also uncertain. Although no one country wants to be engaged in war or direct confrontation but the issues and relationship in the international politics is unstable and fragile. However the increasing economic interdependence is making these relationships comparatively stable. On the other hand the most powerful and effective one could use this kind of dependence in its own interest. This causes the other countries to engage with each other to contain that situation. Thus there would be less chance of any geopolitical rivalry if other countries wisely support cooperation and deeper diplomatic relationships.

This kind of revived relation between India-Australia will be good for the region. There is much possibility of this revived relationship to be stabilised because after the signing of the uranium deal the trust-deficit is removed and both started looking for similarities among them rather than differences. It will work well if other countries like Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan and others in the region join hands in making the various regional groupings work like IORA, IONS which also shows tremendous potential to make India-Australia relation to be a success in reinforcing regionalism.

Is Australia searching for an alternate economic partner to depend less on China and hence chose India? In the international relations, there is nothing which is stable. And in the case of Australia that is dependent on US for its security and on China for the economic concerns, two different but necessary area of national interest can put Australia in dilemma with its historical alliance and the new but strong economic partnership, has possibly made Australia to find an economic alternative to China. Moreover there is a possibility of any anxiety between these two powerful countries (US and china) of the world that have different political and economic system and ideology. Consequently it would be less risky in Australia's interest by diverting its dependence from them and engage with other countries for this apprehension.

Diplomatic Relationship

Besides these economic linkages the political relationship also has been improved after the coming of power by the Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott. Abbott has very optimistic view about having good relations with India. In addition the current Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi who visited Australia, broke the ice of unreliability. India's growing naval and technological capabilities is recognized by Australia, although it does not fear the emergence of a hegemonic India in the Indian Ocean. In addition Australia is expecting India to participate and have a greater role in the supervision of maritime security in the region.

The opportunities are provided by their growing deeper economic and cultural relationship. When India and Australia have divergence it was only the strategic circumstances which brought them together for cooperation. Mainly on the occasion of multilateral forum meeting and defence exercises were the base of their relationship. After the signing of the Uranium Deal on 5th September 2014, the economic relations become stronger. However there is trade, investment and diplomatic opportunities awaiting their future cooperation for mutual benefit.

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