


CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in
partial fulfilment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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Date: 27.07.2015

DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "Civilian Component of the United Nations Peace Operations: An Analysis of Trends and Challenges" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this university is bonafide work and has not been submitted previously for any degree to this or any other university.

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In Loving Memory of my Baba

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List of Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AU	African Union
CANADEM	Canada's Civilian Reserve
CEO	Chief Electoral Officer
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CLA	Community Liaison Assistance
CLJAS	Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service
CPA	Child Protection Adviser
CPT	Civilian Pre-Deployment Training
CTO	Chief Technical Officer
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DOS	Department of State
DPET	Department of Policy Evaluation and Training
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department for Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic Of Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DFS	Department of Field Support
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
EU	European Union
FCI	France Cooperation International
GPP	Government Provided Personnel
HOM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarter
HRPS	Human Rights and Protection Section
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGOs	International Non-governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration

ITS	Integrated Training Service
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OGA	Office of the Gender Adviser
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OROLSI	Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions
MICT	Ministry of Interior and Local Government
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
MINUSTH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUC	United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
PCRU	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PFM	Public Financial Management
PHP	Personal History Profile
RDR	Rapid Deployment Roster
SAG	Senior Advisory Group
SEP	Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SGTM	Standardized Generic Training Modules

SLIP	Senior Leaders' Induction Programme
SML	Senior Missions Leaders
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEMII	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOMII	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNOVER	United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea
UNPKO	United Nation Peacekeeping Operations

UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNPROFR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisations
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USG	Under Secretary-General
WHO	World Health Organization
ZIF	Centre for International Peace Operations

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history various mechanisms were used to deal with the violent conflict. However these mechanisms were quite limited. Diplomacy was widely used but it was effective in ending war rather than in preventing one (Diehl 2007:1). More often the state used coercive mechanism to deal with peace and security. Deterrence, alliance formation and the direct use of military force were the mechanisms used by individual states to preserve their peace and promote their interest (Diehl 2007:1).

In the 20th century, the rise of international organizations brought in another mechanism to deal with peace and security. That mechanism was collective security system. The first international organization, the League of Nations, was formed with the main purpose to maintain international peace and security. It was expected to maintain international peace and security based on collective security system. However, the League's imperfect conception of the collective security system made it rather dysfunctional (Bellamy et al 2010:79). The decisions were to be made on the basis of unanimity and it failed to reach decision because of differences among the member states. Despite the failure of League to operationalize the collective security system, the leaders of the Great Powers still felt that collective security system should be the basis of the new international organization after the end of Second World War. Once again new international organization in the form of United Nations was established in 1945 based on collective security system. Under Chapter VII, Article 39-42 of the Charter provided devises for collective security system which was to be under centralized control of the UN Security Council rather than a decentralized one as in the League of Nations (Saksena 1974:49).

However, necessary objective and subjective requirements for operationalization of collective security system did not existed. Instead of unity among the peace loving states, polarization of international relations took place and the United Nations started functioning in an environment of Cold War power politics. The Security Council's proceedings were dominated by disagreement among major powers which prevented the United Nations from carrying out its primary responsibility of ensuring "prompt and effective action" in time of crises (Saksena 1974:80). Notwithstanding the failure to operationalize the collective security system, the member states felt the moral responsibility to do something to counter the conflicts. Through trial and error, the UN soon established observer missions such as the UN Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine, Observer Mission in India and Pakistan, to fill

the void left by collective security (Diehl 2007:42). The success of early UN peace observation missions led to the development of peacekeeping operations as alternative mechanism to manage conflicts.

There is no Charter provision for peacekeeping. It lies between the peaceful settlement provisions of Chapter VI and the military enforcement provisions of Chapter VII which is sometimes referred to as “Chapter VI and a half” (Karns and Mingst 2010:306). The traditional peacekeeping is the original conception from which other forms of peace operations have developed. It is also called first-generation peacekeeping operations which were primarily used during the Cold War (Karns and Mingst 2010:306). The traditional peacekeeping operations had contrasting characteristic compared to contemporary peacekeeping operations. The main function of the traditional peacekeeping operations was to monitor cease-fire between warring states and supervising the withdrawal of their forces from the area of conflict and monitor the observance of ceasefire by the parties to the conflict. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first traditional peacekeeping operation where lightly armed international soldiers were send with specific function in an interstate conflict (Diehl 2007:43).

With the end of Cold war, the nature of war that was fought before the United Nations also changed from interstate war to more intrastate wars. The intrastate war is more complex as it is not between two countries but within the state with multiple parties in the conflict where the state institutions have collapsed and complex humanitarian emergencies occurred. Under such situation, a new peace operation was evolved which is called the complex peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping and multifunctional peacekeeping (Karns and Mingst 2010:306). This kind of peacekeeping operation is not only to end violent conflict within a state but also to prevent renewed conflict and rebuild a durable stable state.

The intra-state conflict tends to spillover to neighbour countries in the form of mass refugee flow, spread of contagious diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria and attract terrorist group to build their bases in the failed states (Paris 2007:404). Thus the intra-state conflict became a reason of concern for the international community. Humanitarian crises became a sensitive issue of international importance which was regarded by the UN as effecting the peace and security of the world. The UN’s principle security activity in the post-Cold war era is to help war-torn states to make the transition from civil war to a durable peace. The multidimensional peacekeeping operations are mandated to carry out tasks such as disarming

the former warring parties and the destruction of weapons, rehabilitating refugees, human rights monitoring, monitoring of elections, build sustainable institutions of governance, and promoting political participation. To implement these multidimensional tasks, civilian component in peace operation has become very essential. This research focuses on the critical analysis of the role and functions of the civilian component.

Literature Review

The literatures related to this topic are reviewed under themes such as origin and development of UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), Complexity of peacekeeping operations, Civilian Component, and Challenges of Civilian Component.

Origin and development of UN PKO

The scholars like Bellamy (2010), Saksena (1974) have given a comprehensive understanding of how collective security system came into being and how it became dysfunctional both in the League of Nations and the United Nations. These scholars are of the view that the League of Nations was based on a very imperfect concept of collective security which led to responses to aggression selectively (Bellamy et al 2010:79). In the League there was no central authorization like the United Nations where the Security Council has sole authority to maintain peace and security (Saksena 1974:46). The failure of League to translate the idea of collective security into a working system made the United Nations Charter to provide more elaborate provisions of collective security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter enshrined collective security under Article 39-42 (Saksena 1974:49). In order to avoid the uncertainty that characterised the League's collective security system, the UN Charter (Articles 42 and 43) provided with design for a standing military force contributed by the UN member states and thus the United Nations had devised both the rationale and the mechanisms to take collective action (Bellamy 2010:82; Diehl 2007:37). However, the voting system with veto power with major powers prevented the Security Council from taking meaningful action against any of the major powers or aggressors (Diehl 2007:38). Thus, the UNs attempt to develop a better mechanism to maintain international peace and security was also a failure according to Bellamy and Diehl (Bellamy 2010:83; Diehl 2007:40et al.).

Scholars like Paul Diehl (2007), Ramesh Thakur (2001), Karns and Mingst (2010) have defined peacekeeping operations. They are of the view that terms like peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, peacemaking and host of other terms have been used

interchangeably. Peace operations have changed over time and experience for which different analysts use different typology to classify the many operations. Traditional peacekeeping is regarded as a baseline category from which other forms of peacekeeping operations have developed (Diehl 2007:4). These scholars also termed peacekeeping operations into many generations. Some have divided into three generations like the traditional or first-generation peacekeeping; second-generation or complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations; and third-generation operations involving greater use of force (Karns and Mingst 2010:306). On the other hand, some have divided into six generations like first-generation or traditional peacekeeping; second-generation or non-UN peacekeeping, third-generation or expanded peacekeeping; fourth-generation or peace enforcement; fifth-generation or peace restoration by partnership; and sixth-generation or multinational peace restoration and UN state creation (Thakur and Schnabel 2001:9-14).

Scholars like Saksena (1974), Paul Diehl(2007), Bellamy(2010) have looked at how peacekeeping operations evolved in the cold war after the failure of the collective security system. They said that with the failure of collective security the UN continued the tradition of peace observation that began under the League which would offer guidelines to be adopted under peacekeeping. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East which was charged with observing the truce and on the movements of troops and material has been regarded as the organization's first peacekeeping operation by some scholars (Goulding 1993). On the other hand, there are scholars who said that this is misleading because the observation mission had only a small number of troops which mostly dealt with complaints from the parties (Diehl 2007:41). The UN's first self-styled peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), was deployed in the Suez Crisis with a mandate for monitoring the cease-fire and supervising the withdrawal of these forces from the area (Bellamy 2010: 85; Diehl 2007:42 et al). This mission was an innovation where armed international soldiers were charged with specific functions in the interstate conflict (Diehl 2007:43). In this type of the mission soldiers are sent not for fighting but to maintain peace. The operations during the cold war period were predominantly traditional peacekeeping with a limited mandate (Diehl 2007:44). Some of the authors highlight the significance of the core guiding principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force developed in traditional peacekeeping operations during the Cold War (Bellamy 2010:85; Diehl:57 2007).

Paul Diehl (2007), Bellamy (2010), Karns and Mingst (2010) have explained peacekeeping operations experience in the intrastate war in the Post cold war. These scholars

have said that with the end of cold war the world experienced internal tension within the states which also changed the nature of peacekeeping operations. The peacekeeping mission in the intrastate war was not only to end violent conflicts but also to prevent renewed hostilities and rebuild post conflict societies (Karns and Mingst 2010:312). These scholars describe the peacekeeping operation of this nature as multidimensional or multifunctional or “complex peacekeeping” because the mandate involve both civilian and military activities and multidimensional task (Thakur 2001:10; Karns and Mingst 2010:312 et al). It is also referred to as peace operation which is more comprehensive term as it includes both peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding aspects of the mandate (Diehl 2007:55).

Complexity of peacekeeping operations

Scholars like Bellamy (2010), Diehl (2007), Thakur (2001) have discussed about the problem of sovereignty in the peacekeeping operations. These scholars have discussed that during the Cold War the UN focused only on interstate conflicts. There was need of consent from the host state. In Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter reaffirmed the principle of sovereign inviolability which did not allowed UN involvement in the internal matters of a country (Bellamy, Diehl and Griffin, 2010). However after the Cold War due to increase in intrastate conflicts, the tension between sovereignty and human rights issues increased which blurred the distinction between domestic and international issues (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 1998). International society as a whole has a ‘responsibility to protect’ the people from grave human rights violations when their own state is unable or unwilling to do so. The empirical practice of humanitarian intervention and new norm in the form of ‘responsibility to protect’ led to changes in the concept of sovereignty that entitled responsibility along with sovereign authority (Bellamy et al 2010). The main responsibility to guarantee human rights are the responsibility of state but when the state itself is failed or fragile the human security is put in grave danger (Thakur 2006:257). These situations develop the norm of international intervention to carry out the responsibility to protect.

Scholars like Diehl (2007), Thakur (2006), Bellamy (2010) have discussed about the core principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. They have said that with the development of multidimensional peacekeeping operation, these core guiding principles could no longer be adhered to. Mostly during the cold war, consent of the host state was required without which the peacekeeping operations were not deployed. However, it became inappropriate in matter of arm conflict that occurred within a state, where the civil authority is

challenged or collapsed entirely and factional struggle for dominance was under way (Thakur and Schnabel 2001:27). The guiding principle of impartiality cannot be adhered to complex peacekeeping operation as mandate to use force has to implicitly or explicitly support one side of the conflict (Diehl 2007:57). For instance, the principle of impartiality is an obstacle to peace enforcement based upon the rule of law because the law cannot be impartial between those who abide by the law and those who defy the law when it suits them (Thakur and Schnabel 2001:71). These scholars have said that the biggest change in the holy trinity is the use of force. In traditional peacekeeping, use of force was permitted only in self defence. However, in the post-cold war period peacekeepers are authorized to use force for self defence, to protect the mandate and the civilian (Diehl 2007:58).

The group of scholars such as Thakur (2001), Diehl (2007), Coning (2011) have discussed the change in mandate of the UN peacekeeping operations in the post cold war. These scholars have said that with the shift from traditional to multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding the nature of mandate has changed. In the traditional peacekeeping the mandate was limited to only monitoring of ceasefire. When the civil war spread, peacekeeping operations like the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was a step towards peacebuilding which included in its mandate monitoring elections, repatriating refugees, maintaining law and order and conducting certain governmental functions (Diehl 2007:49). These scholars have highlighted that after the cold war the mandate have become more complex by including many humanitarian and development activities like assisting in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan; providing support to hold elections, rule of law enforcement, human rights and many more. As the mandate has changed from monitoring military ceasefires to implementation of comprehensive peace agreements there has been change in UN peacekeeping from military to civilian focused peacekeeping operations (Coning 2011:579).

Civilian Component

Scholars like Bellamy (2010), Karns and Mingst (2010), Cedric de Coning (2011) have described about the origin of the civilian component in UN peace operations. The first civilian component was deployed in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAC) in Namibia (1989) which exhibited in a limited manner many of the characteristic of the peacebuilding like assisting in drafting a new constitution and creating conditions for free and fair elections (Diehl 2007:48; Karns and Mingst 2010:314). This mission had military and

civilian personnel from 109 countries and this experience led the United Nations to undertake other complex missions (Karns and Mingst 2010:315). Thus, there was a significant development in UN peacekeeping from military to civilian focused peace operations which were because of change in mandate from monitoring military cease-fire to supporting implementation of comprehensive peace agreements (Coning 2011:579). With the UN becoming more peacebuilding oriented, the role of civilian component has become significant in laying the foundation for long term stability (Karns and Mingst 2010:312; Coning 2011:579). The transformation in the post-cold war led to quantitative and qualitative changes in the peacekeeping operations. Quantitative in the sense that there was more demand for complex UN peacekeeping operations and qualitative because of demand for skilled personnel (Bellamy et al 2010:97). These scholars stated that peacekeeping operations were given the task of overseeing elections as part of their mandate. In the traditional peacekeeping operations, military was the only core component that did most of the peacekeeping activities. However, complex peacekeeping operations have increased 'civilianization' of peacekeeping. Several UN peace operations in the post-cold war have large civilian component which have played an integral role in the peacekeeping missions (Findlay 1996:21).

Scholars like Bellamy (2010), Cedric de Coning (2009) and policy report of the UN DPKO/DFS (2008), handbook of the multidimensional PKO (2003) have described the organizational structure of the UN civilian component. Civilian component in the UN context is not one coherent component with one identity and management structure, like that of police or military components, but exist as several UN Departments at the UN Secretariat responsible for different specialized the mandate (Coning 2009:2). The units of the civilian component have their own offices in the field mission whose head like the Director of Political Affairs, Chief of Information, Senior Judicial Affairs Officer, Chief Election Officer are responsible to report to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) or the Head of the mission (United Nations 2003B). It also says that Heads of civilian component oversee the activities of its component in the field and report it to the SRSG or sometimes to other offices also like the human rights component have a dual reporting line to both the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Scholars like Bellamy et al explain the organizational structures which have evolved since the post cold war. They said that the UN Secretariat with the complexity of peace operations was restructured in 1992 and the DPKO was created. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions was reformed in the context

of complex peace operations to include the rule of law which include the task of managing and overseeing the judiciary and running and reform national prisons (Bellamy et al 2010:54). The civilian management systems do not follow a standard command and control model. It varies from mission to mission based on the nature of the mandate task and the size of the mission (United Nations 2008B:14).

Scholars like Cedric de Coning (2011), John Karlsrud (2013), Catriona Gourlay (2006) discusses about the recruitment, roster and training facilities of the civilian component. These scholars have identified that the UN have adopted the direct recruitment process as the normal process of recruitment for civilian component. According to them the main reason for UN taking up direct recruitment process is to avoid biasness in seconding civilian personnel whom made only few states to participate that could afford to invest (Coning 2011:581). Vacant civilian positions are advertised on the UN Galaxy e- Staffing System Website. Accordingly, individuals who are interested apply online and successful candidates are selected. However, these scholars have discussed that when UN cannot recruit specialists through normal recruitment system it adopt the secondment process. According to them, civilian specialists are in high demand in today's peacekeeping operations and some of these are in the rule of law professions such as correction officers, magistrates and judges are mostly found in civil services (Coning 2011:588). These scholars discusses that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has expanded and improved its civilian recruitment mechanism through the development of rosters of civilian experts. To identify and recruit civilian experts, the development of rosters is widely seen to be one of the most important responses to increase the demand for a greater number of civilian component (Gourlay 2006:7). The UN has a pre-deployment training centre in Brindisi for the new staff before deployment (Coning 2011:587). The Integrated Training Service (ITS) has conducted pre-deployment training courses in the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) since 2005 (United Nations 2008A:6).

Literatures like the report of the Secretary-General (2009), the Senior Advisory Group reports (211), handbook of the multidimensional PKO (2003) have described the roles and functions of the civilian component. There are five priority peacebuilding areas which include basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, basic social services, core government functionality and economic revitalization (Secretary-General Report, 2009:3). The international civilian capacities have been located to these five core areas (United Nations 2011C:52). These five areas have been divided into clusters and sub-clusters and also cross-

cutting areas of capacity development, gender and human rights. The core capacities to run a government, to re-establish justice, to reintegrate demobilized combatants to the society, to revitalise economy, to provide basic education, health and sanitation and many more have often faced a critical shortage of civilian capacities (United Nations 2011C:5). This report is of the view that the United Nations has the core capacities needed in the aftermath of conflict but these capacities are uneven and there is duplication of work which leads to unfilled capacity gaps that creates problem for the United Nations ability to support conflict-affected countries (United Nations 2011C:5). The Handbook on multidimensional peacekeeping operations have provided certain guidelines for the units of the civilian component roles and functions such as the political affairs officers task of assisting in the political processes through establishing or restructuring new government institutions; the civil affairs officers task of providing policy recommendation and technical advice and assistance to local level authorities; and the public information officers task of providing unbiased information on the peace process (United Nations 2003B: 23-45).

Scholars like Coning (2009), Paris (2007) and the handbook on multidimensional PKO (2003) have discussed about the partnership of civilian component with internal and external stakeholders. They have argued that the different units in the civilian component such as political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, gender experts, public information should work in coordination. For instance, the Public information officers support the activities of other mission components by providing advice and effective means of information (United Nations 2003B:53). Military and civilian police components are now part of a multidimensional peace operation involving political affairs, electoral, human rights, public information and many other activities which have resulted in growing interaction between military, civilian police and various civilian units in non-security related issues (United Nations 2003B:1). They have also discussed the partnership and coordination with the external stakeholders like international or regional organizations, international NGOs, civil society groups and local NGOs. These have helped in sharing resources, technical and operational assistance.

Challenges

Scholars like Cedric de Coning (2011) and the Senior Advisory Council report (2011) and the DPKO/DFS non-paper (2009) have identified lack of civilian specialists in UN peace operations, especially in security sector reform, the judicial and prison management due to unavailability of these skills, who can be deployed at short notice. These scholars say that

civilian specialist come from the Global North because of availability of training and rostering facilities. Thus, only a few states can afford to invest in civilian capacity development. However, the UN General Assembly to maintain equal participation from all states have passed two resolutions in 1997 and 1998 to restrict the use of gratis personnel (Coning 2011:581). They have argued that most of the specialised experts are in the HQ than in the field level and the managers do not want to let go of their best staff and the staff do not want to deploy in field due to family commitments or because of concerns about retaining their position in the HQ (Coning 2011:580).

Scholars like Coning (2011), Morris and Stedman (2008) and the report of Senior Advisory Council (2011) highlights the problem of budget in the UN civilian component. They have argued about the problem of getting additional funding as one of the major challenges facing the multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Getting new voluntary funding is often slow and unpredictable which delays the start of critical peacebuilding task in the immediate aftermath of conflict (United Nations 2011C:25). One of the main challenges hampering women's participation in peacebuilding is insufficient funding (UN News Centre 2014:1). Funds are immediately available for foreign technical assistance salaries but not for assistance to national or local actors (Morris and Stedman 2008:44). They have also argued that funds come more for the military component than the civilian component in peace operations. The complexity of peace operations have also led to problem of budget as the operations are being implemented more by non-military personnel than the traditional military peacekeeping operations (Ammitzboell 2007:70). Maintaining training and rostering facilities also requires additional resources (Coning 2011). Financial institutions like the World Bank help the peacekeeping missions in identifying and procuring funds for reconstruction in post-conflict countries (United Nations 2003B:186).

Scholars like Coning (2013), Karlsrud (2013) and the Senior Advisory Council report (2011) have analysed that with expanded civilian mandates in number of crisis areas, the United Nations is facing difficulty in rapidly deploying expertise and also to transfer skills and knowledge to national actors by the international civilian which have increased the risk of relapse into conflict. Thus, they say that international civilian staff not only should provide humanitarian aid but also transfer skills and knowledge to national actors to enhance local ownership and capacity development (Coning et al 2013:143). Most of the training and rostering facilities are in developed countries like USA, UK, Germany and Canada because they have resources to fund these facilities (Coning et al 2013:154). There is also lack of

standing civilian capacity in the UN, only the Standing Justice and Corrections Capacity of UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) and the Standby Team of Mediation Experts (SBT) of the Mediation Support Unit are the standing capacities within the UN Secretariat (Karlsrud et al 2013:150). They have also highlighted the problem of retention of the UN civilian component due to lack of security, office space, accommodation and no family duty stations which is being provided by other UN agencies. This is one of the reasons why UN suffers from high civilian vacancy rates (Coning 2011:584).

The group of scholars like Coning (2013), Breidlid (2013) et al in their literature argues that there is a misperception that civilian component from the Global South are under-represented in the UN peace operations. They say that 60% of international civilian staff comes from the Global South and the largest comes from Africa who belongs to the top 20 civilian contributing countries. However, contradicts that most of the highly specialized civilians comes from the Global North because of availability of training and rostering facilities. There are reports which argues that the Global South have no policies or programmes aimed at mobilizing civilian capacity. One of the reason is they lack knowledge and expertise in developing policies (Karlsrud et al 2013:138). They have focused that there should be more transfer of skills and knowledge from the Global South because of their similar experiences and context with the post-conflict society. There is need to develop roaster in the South and also international roaster that serve personnel from all over the world (Coning 2013). The UN Civilian Capacities Initiative “CivCap” has delivered that there should be South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation to bring more civilian capacities from the Global South.

These groups of scholars like Cedric de Coning (2011), Dharmapuri (2013) have highlighted the lack of women civilian component in the UN peace operations. They have argued that there is lack of women civilian component in the leadership and senior position. The uneven balance of gender at the national level reflects in its contribution to the international missions which will have a gender imbalance in the peace operations (Coning 2011:580). The national policies also varies, for instance some countries do not have specific policies to recruit women like Mali, on the other hand countries like Canada have very active recruitment process, while countries like Turkey and Greece have ceilings on the promotion of women (Dharmapuri 2013:16). The Senior Advisory Group Report have highlighted that the Secretary-General has pushed his senior leaders to improve gender balance, but have seen little evidence of senior field leaders being held accountable for activities like inclusion in

political process, deployment of gender experts or gender sensitive budgeting (United Nations 2011C:21).

There is policy oriented and guideline literature on the subject such as policy brief of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, UN handbooks on civilian component, the Senior Advisory Council report, Yearbook of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). There are also books and journal which referred to civilian component of specific case of UN peace operation. However, there is no comprehensive work tracing the evolution and expanding role and functions of the civilian component. This study attempts to bring in value addition by tracing the changing role and functions of the civilian component and challenges confronted.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of Study

The civilian component has been defined in variety of ways by different authors. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defined civilian component “as UN non-military staff members who form part of a peacekeeping operation and perform duties relating to human rights, humanitarian or political situation on the ground and the financial and administrative management of a mission” (United Nations 2003A:8). Cedric de Coning have defined UN civilian component differently from the civilian police component which is usually used in the EU context (Coning 2009:2). Tim Wallis have defined civilian component as non- uniformed civilians who play a critical role in reducing violence and creating a safe environment for peacemaking and peacebuilding activities (Wallis 2010:1). This study adopts the definition provided by UNOCHA.

Another major term that is used in this study is ‘peace operation’. Paul Diehl has defined ‘peace operation’ as a comprehensive term which includes both peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding aspects of the mandate (Diehl 2007:55).

With the end of cold war most of the conflict situations brought before the United Nations is of intrastate conflicts. These wars are different from the interstate wars as they involve various factions within the state and where the state is either weak or a failed state. There is no law and order and the state institutions have totally collapsed. The issue of humanitarian crises and the problem of durable peace in the immediate aftermath of conflict have become the major concern of the international community in the post-Cold War era. The military and police are usually confined to maintain safety and security. However, to address

the issue of providing basic services, rule of law, holding elections, forming governments and state institutions it requires a long term engagement. Thus, in the multidimensional peacekeeping operations the role of civilian component to bring durable peace has become an indispensable part of the UN. This study is significant as civilian component greatly determines the effectiveness of the UN peace operations and there is no comprehensive literature which deals with this subject.

The scope of study is limited to focus on civilian component in the post-Cold War period.

Research Questions

1. What kind of functions does the civilian component in the UN peace operations perform?
2. How does the United Nations tries to improve standard of civilian recruitment and training?
3. Why is there shortage of skilled and specialized personnel in the civilian component of UN peace operations?
4. How did the organizational structures and institutional support for the UN civilian component evolved? How do these structures assist in planning and conduct of civilian component?
5. How does the United Nations improve and facilitate the recruitment and roster system of the civilian component?
6. How does the UN civilian component deal with issue of cooperation and coordination with other actors in Peace operations?
7. What are the major challenges faced by the UN civilian component in UN and how attempts been made to overcome those challenges?

Hypotheses

The working hypotheses of the study are:

1. Familiarity of the post-conflict society by the civilian personnel from Global South makes peace building activities more in tune with the needs of the local population.
2. The over-crowdedness of various actors both internal and external in the UN mission made it imperative for partnership to bring about coherence in peacebuilding activities and avoid duplication.

Research methods

This study is mainly adopting qualitative technique as it is descriptive and analytical. The statistics is used to show composition and growth of civilian component to expanding role and increase in terms of quantity of civilian personnel. The study adopts inductive method which draws from the particulars to draw generalization on expanding role and functions of the civilian component of the UN peacekeeping operations. This research draws from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include UN documents such as reports of the UN Secretary-General, policy brief, documents of the UN Senior Advisory Council, as well as policy documents and debates at the United Nations. The secondary sources include books and articles in academic journals, relevant internet sources and reports.

Chapterization

This research study has been divided into following six chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a chapter entitled ‘Evolution of the UN peacekeeping operation and civilian component’. This chapter discusses the origin and evolution of the UN peacekeeping operations. It traces the early mechanisms to maintain peace and security and how the failure led to the birth of peacekeeping operations. It then focuses on how the end of Cold War led to multidimensional missions with focus on peacebuilding and reconstruction activities. It highlights the role of Civilian component which has evolved from a periphery role to become an indispensable part of the multidimensional peace operations.

The third chapter entitled ‘Civilian Component: Organizational structure, Recruitment and Training’ provides an overview of the various changes that took place quantitatively and qualitatively since 1990s with regard to civilian component. It discusses the evolution of organisational structure and institutional support for the civilian component. It then analyses the recruitment system and training facilities of civilian component and the unique problem and challenges that UN faces in relate to recruitment and training of the civilian component.

The fourth chapter is entitled ‘Civilian Component: Roles and Functions’ which discusses the expanding roles and functions of the UN civilian component and the contribution of the civilian component in the outcome of the peace operations. It discusses the roles and functions of the each of the major civilian experts and critically comment on performance and challenges encountered while carrying out their tasks in the field.

The fifth chapter entitled ‘Civilian Component: Partnership with other actors’ discusses the importance of partnership of UN civilian component in post-conflict reconstruction process. The major focus of this chapter is to discuss critically the partnership of UN civilian component within its various units within the UN civilian component, and then discusses partnership with other components such as military and police of the UN mission. It also highlights the ways the UN civilian component enter into partnership with other international and regional organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction in the same field as well as involvement with the local actors of the post-conflict countries. It highlights the challenges they face while engaging in partnership with these actors outside the UN mission.

The final chapter entitled ‘Conclusion’ summarizes the major findings of this study. It also points out how the research questions have been addressed and how the hypotheses have been substantiated or nullified. It ends with general comments on the subject matter of the study and put forth the suggestions of how and why the UN civilian component needs to be made more investment and reform to make it more effective and efficient.

CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION AND CIVILIAN COMPONENT

Throughout the history, various mechanisms were used to deal with the violent conflict. In the traditional system of international relations, the concept of sovereignty was predominant. States, to maintain their territorial integrity from outside aggression, build up their military for offensive and defensive purposes. The system of self-help, which is a core element identified by the realist, was the dominant feature of state behaviour in those days. In the self-help system each state is responsible for ensuring its own wellbeing and survival. However, in this system there is a deep sense of insecurity among the states which proved to be ineffective in preventing war. This ineffectiveness of the states to maintain its own security through self-help system had made them to supplement by alliance system to collectively maintain and protect security of the members of the alliance group. In alliance system, member states sought to maintain balance of power in which no state or coalition of states can dominate the others (Baylis et al (2013:101). In the nineteenth century, the alliance system was institutionalised in the Concert of Europe. The Concert of Europe tried to maintain peace in Europe through multilateral conferences to conclude wars and agree upon treaties of peace. The Concert did not function actively as it was arrogated with the authority of the great powers rather than upon established legal foundations (Claude, 1964:24). There was no impartial agency above the national states to uphold the moral standards of a larger community. In fact, Concert of Europe was regarded as a Concert of the Great Powers. The alliance system did not transform selfish and arrogant nationalists into like-minded statesmen towards a common purpose of bringing durable peace (Claude, 1964:24). There was a sense of mistrust and tension between states which was partially hidden by the alliance system. Thus, this system was not suitable to maintain lasting peace and security.

In the 20th century with the development of science and technology more sophisticated weapons were innovated and use of these weapons proved to be very destructive. These led to the concern that if wars continue to afflict mankind, there was every possibility of the human race getting extinguished. This devastation was seen in the First World War which killed approximately 20 million people. The destructiveness of the modern war made the leaders to think of a mechanism to replace alliance system. This led to generation of the idea of

collective security system. To save the mankind from the scourge of war, the League of Nations was formed based on the idea of collective security and the first formal attempt was made to institutionalise collective security. Woodrow Wilson, who conceptualised the collective security as the fundamental principle of the League of Nations, made it clear that collective security concept was incompatible and antithetical to the alliance system (Claude, 1964:225).

Collective security system was different from the alliance system in the sense that the main purpose of the states is to take urgent measures to prevent the recurrence of war. The idea was that war anywhere is of universal concern and they are likely to occur and thus need to be prevented (Saksena, 1972:7). The proposition “one for all and all for one” is used in the concept of collective security which means that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation against another nation will be met by the combined forces of all other nations (Claude 1964:224). Collective security is a specialized instrument which intended to prevent the aggressive use of force and take collective action against the aggressor and reassure the potential victim. Impartiality is a basic requirement of collective security. It does not respect particular states whether it may be a powerful one, but is an instrument to be directed against any aggressor on behalf of any violated state (Claude 1964:233). This is a significant difference of collective security from the alliance system, as the alliance system’s collaborative action is against an identified enemy state. Due to the principle of anonymity, collective security does not recognize friendships or foe and permits no alliance with or against (Claude 1964:233). The alliance system is always a balancing and competition of power between the opposing groups. This creates the possibility of ending up into conflict. In the collective security, each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern for all and agrees to join in a collective response against an aggressor. Thus, it kept a check on the aggressor which helped in creating peace.

This chapter traces the provision of collective security in the Covenant of the League of Nations and then discuss why and how the League failed in effective implementation of it. Next, the chapter discusses how the UN Charter tried to provide more effective collective security provision and highlight why and how even the UN failed to operationalize it. Then, it traces the origin of the peacekeeping system and highlights the main features and the guiding principles of the traditional peacekeeping operations. The main focus of this chapter is how and why multidimensional peacekeeping operations differ from that of the traditional

peacekeeping operations. It ends with focussing on the importance of the civilian component in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Collective Security System in the League of Nations

The League of Nations was the first formal attempt to institutionalize collective security. Three main articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations: Articles 10, 11 and 16 incorporated the idea of collective security. The League incorporated in Article 10 of the Covenant the fundamental concept that every state in the League respect and preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of all members against external aggression. Thus, the Article prohibited any aggression by providing the basis for legal action against the aggressor state. It provides the obligation of every state for assistance towards the victims of aggression. Article 11 states the ideological premise of the League of Nations that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not was a matter of concern to the whole League and thus had to take actions as required to maintain international peace and security. The provision of Article 16 prescribed that if any member resorted to war in disregard to the legal obligations contained in the pacific settlement section of the covenant would be regarded as “an act of war” against all other Members. In response to such an act, the League undertook to impose immediately a strict embargo on all personal, commercial and financial relations with the aggressor state. Article 16 also provided for collective military sanctions as a last resort to be initiated upon the recommendations of the League Council which was non-binding to the members.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was not a perfect design for collective security. The idea of collective security was vaguely institutionalized and was not properly implemented (Saksena, 1974:10). The sanction against Italy following the Italian aggression in Ethiopia was the only example of the application of the principle of collective security. However, it did not represent a genuine dedication to the principle of collective security. Another important drawback was that the League never enjoyed universal membership or the membership of all the great powers. It suffered from failure to persuade the great powers to work within it. The refusal of the superpower like the US to join the League was a huge shortfall. In the Covenant the decisions were made on the basis of unanimity of all the member states which was difficult to reach. The primary concern of the member states was continued to be to promote national interest. The Articles in the Covenant was never implemented effectively. There was misgiving interpretation against Article 10 and Article 16

of the Covenant. A series of resolutions were passed by the League Assembly concerning the economic sanctions. The resolution emphasized the right of each state to decide for itself when to apply economic sanctions against an aggressor. Also the principle of immediate and absolute boycott was changed to mean gradual and partial boycott (Claude 1971: 241).

To make international decisions for the management and implementation of a collective security system, the League lacked legal authority and practical competence. League imposed inadequate legal restrictions upon potential aggressors and member states gave insufficient commitments for enforcement action (Claude, 1964:240). The Covenant which was based on the Wilsonian ideal, did not translate into guaranteeing durable peace. Claude has said that the history of the League was a constant effort to both strengthen and weaken the collective security provisions. The Members desired to enjoy the benefits but also avoided paying the price of collective security. Thus, the concept of collective security was a failure for the lack of awareness or willingness to oblige by the member states and also a lack of common purpose. The Covenant simply restricted the right to war but did not totally eliminated it for it admitted that war was a method used by states to enforce their claims (Saksena, 1974:13). The outbreak of World War II is the clear sign of the failure of collective security system under the League.

Collective Security System in the United Nations

The failure of the League of Nations did not destroy the credibility of the idea of collective security. Rather, there was a more vivid awareness for the need of more improved system of collective security during the Second World War. The Charter of the United Nations in many respects provided a better constitutional basis for a collective security system than the Covenant. The deficiency of legal authority that the League faced was addressed by the UN Charter, leaving no gaps. It provided for a more comprehensive prohibition of the threat or use of force and any coercive activity by the states to the control and supervision of the Security Council. The Charter incorporated a more elaborate and ambitious provisions for sanctions. Unlike the League, the Charter provides for an all enforcement activity under the Security Council and the authority to identify the aggressor and to order members to engage in non-military sanctions (Claude 1971:242). The Security Council also had the sole authority to put into action the military forces for maintaining peace (Claude 1971:242).

The UN Charter prescribes two ways of maintaining peace and security. One is through peaceful settlement or adjustment of dispute by the methods enshrined in Chapter VI. If this method fails, then the UN Charter prescribes to deal with threats to peace by enforcement measures which are outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter. Under Chapter VI, the Security Council can only give its recommendation on pacific settlement. In contrast, Article 39 of Chapter VII provides the Security Council with authorization to deal with enforcement measures to maintain peace when and where it's required. The members of the UN are obliged to follow the decision of the Security Council under this Chapter and also provide forces at the disposal of the Security Council. Article 40, 41 and 42 provides a series of measures available to the Security Council in enforcing its collective action. Article 40 deals with 'provisional measures' on which the Council may take measures like ceasefires or troop withdrawals before moving to enforcement action. Article 41 and 42 are enforcement measures when Article 40 fails. Article 41 is a non-enforcement action where economic sanctions, transport and communications are boycotted and the interruption of diplomatic relations are taken up. Article 42 authorises the UN Security Council to take decision on action by air, sea or land forces to maintain international peace and security when non-military sanctions had proved to be inadequate to restore international peace and security. Under Article 43 a more active participation of members on military measures is outlined. The member states are obliged to undertake one or more special agreements with the Security Council to provide armed forces, equipments and other facilities and assistance, and rights of passage, if and when the Security Council decides to use military forces for enforcement purposes (Scheffer, 1995: 649-650 and United Nations 2007). According to the Charter, the member states needed to sign a special agreement with the UN. However, the special agreement was never concluded due to Cold War and bloc politics (Scheffer, 1995:650). To maintain international peace and security, the Military Staff Committee was to direct the enforcement of collective security and was to be composed of the chiefs of staff of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, according to Article 47. It had the responsibility of assisting and advising the Security Council for the use of armed forces. The establishment of the Military Staff Committee was the UNs effort to have a direct say in the conduct of forces on an international mission that was to assume continuity of action and establishing procedures for the use of those forces (Diehl 2007:37). It was a significant step from the ad hoc efforts to use force which was particularly faced in the League of Nations.

The UN attempt to bring effective collective security for durable peace did not differ dramatically from the experience of the League of Nations. The Security Council was prevented from taking any decisions by veto of the permanent members (Goodrich 1947:10). The decision making power of the Security Council is reduced to the extensive decision-blocking competence by the great powers. The great powers possess the greatest capacity to threaten the international security and providing veto to them set a deep concern of misuse of veto power by blocking decisions of the Security Council from taking meaningful actions against any of the major powers (Claude, 1964: 242-243).

The rapid rise of cold war politics after the World War II polarized the international system. The states were grouped into the blocs headed by superpowers. The apparent enmity between the blocs did not allow the Security Council to take decision on matter of peace and security. The Korean War was the most important example, where UN became an arena of ideological struggle between the two blocs. The Korean peninsula was divided between the two blocs, Soviet occupied territory in North Korea and US forces in South Korea (Weiss et al 1994: 43). In 1950, North Korean forces backed by the Soviet Union, China and other Communist states attacked the South Korea. This Communist attack on a non-Communist state was called for action led by the US. At that time Soviet Union was boycotting the meetings of the Security Council which made it possible for the US to immediately bring the Korean situation in the Security Council, as there would be no Communist veto to a resolution on the topic (Weiss et al 1994: 44). The Security Council resolutions on the Korean issue provided international legitimacy to US actions on the Korean peninsula until the return of Soviet Union to the Council that prevented further action. The realisation that world peace was threatened by the great powers led the General Assembly to adopt the 'Uniting for Peace' scheme in the area of security operations which was reserved for the Security Council till then. Its adoption was inspired by the Korean crisis and was used for the first time in relation to this crisis. The Assembly undertook to deal with China with its intrusion in the Korean conflict, characterizing the Chinese intervention as an aggressive act and recommended economic sanctions (Claude, 1964:247). Thus, the Assembly through Unity for Peace plan was interpreted as a move to create a system of collective security applicable (Claude, 1964:246). However, it marked with serious deficiency, as the Assembly has only a recommendatory authority. Moreover, the Unity for Peace was an American initiative which was used to get the moral support of the UN for resorts to force which it felt necessary and desirable in the cold war struggles (Claude, 1964:246).

Another important shortcoming of the collective security system was the lack of standing army which made it inefficient to launch enforcement actions. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) which was called upon to provide the organisation with enforcement mechanism failed to achieve the task under cold war politics. The Military Staff Committee had no operations to supervise due to cold war environment, and no troops readily available for any enforcement action by the UN Security Council. Thus, the disagreement among the major powers, the cold war environment and lack of effective mechanism made the collective security defunct.

Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations

Although the collective security system failed to be operationalized and the UN Security Council was deadlock to take decision, the member countries felt the moral responsibility to do something to deal with the conflicts. Thus, due to moral responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the international community developed alternative ways of managing conflicts between the states. Through various trial and error methods, the United Nations used to pass cease-fire resolutions and send observer missions to the conflict areas or set up commissions to address the conflicts. The civil unrest in Greece after World War II led to the deployment of first peace observer mission by the United Nations. The conflict became part of the emerging cold war politics at the international level. The Greek government complained to the UN Security Council about the interference by its communist neighbour in its internal affairs. The Security Council could not authorise the mission as the Soviet Union exercised veto power. The General Assembly had to take the complaint from the Greek government and the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) was established. The UNSCOB was instructed to monitor on cross-border movements (Bellamy, 2010:83). The four nations (Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) involved in the conflict were required to seek a peaceful resolution to their differences. The UNSCOB commission appointed observer group but its work was hampered because of denial of access by the Greece's neighbour. The observer group did not continue the supervision of the border areas, like a traditional peacekeeping force, but made frequent inspections to discourage cross-border rebel movements (Diehl, 2007:41). This mission was largely a success which exhibited that peace observation could function in an environment of cold war politics.

Indonesian independence from Netherland was the first United Nations attempt at truce supervision (Diehl, 2007:41). In 1945, the nationalist forces proclaimed independence of

Indonesia and a new Provisional Government started working. But the Dutch government did not recognize it and send its forces to ruthlessly suppress the Indonesian nationalist. The UN Committee of Good Offices supervised the developments in Indonesia and provided periodic reports to the Security Council. The Committee provided observers to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of Dutch forces from Indonesia (Diehl, 2007:41). In 1949, the Security Council addressed to stop all military operations and recommended to establish an independent United States of Indonesia. With the agreement for independence of Indonesia was achieved, the observers which were send for monitoring cease-fire also later on monitored the demobilization and withdrawal of Dutch forces.

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East in 1948 was the first such operation where Force Commanders were sent. The Middle East conflict has been the world's most pressing issue which had claimed a great deal of the organization's time and attention. They were charged with supervising the truce and on the movements of troops and material. The UNTSO seemed to resemble later peacekeeping operations (Diehl 2007: 41). The mission had only a small number of personnel and was limited to monitoring cease-fire agreements. The United Nations also sent an United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to investigate complaints, to provide information regarding troop movements and to help local authorities maintain order (Diehl 2007:42).

These ad hoc missions were engaged not by means of the Charter provision on collective security but as symbol of the international community's concerns. The failure to operationalize the collective security was compensated by the UN peace observation missions. Through the trial and error, gradually developed the system of deploying UN military force to create conducive atmosphere under which mediation efforts could be successful. When a cease-fire resolution was passed in the UN, unarmed military observer forces were deployed to monitor the cease-fire and the movement of troops. The observer force investigated complaint of any party violating the cease-fire and reported it to the Security Council. In some cases the mission was extended to include in its role to monitor the demobilization and withdrawal of forces as in the UN mission in Indonesia. The observer mission had only a small number of personnel, not more than 600 to monitor the cease-fire (Diehl 2007:41).

New challenges came during the Suez Crises which led the United Nations to seek new strategy. Peace observation became inadequate to perform the extraordinary task. The General Assembly passed the Resolution 998, which authorised the Secretary-General to dispatch a

UN force in the region. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was different from the previous observer missions as it deployed light armed international soldiers with specific functions in an interstate conflict (Diehl 2007: 43). Its functions included monitoring cease-fire and supervising the withdrawal of forces from the area. The UNEF I is regarded as first formal peacekeeping operation of the United Nations.

Table 2:1 Traditional Peacekeeping operations and its mandate

Peacekeeping Operations	Mandates
The UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Monitored arms and troop movements in Lebanon
The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Troops were sent to civil war. They restored order and assisted the Congolese government
The UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	It administered West New Guinea before transfer to Indonesian sovereignty
The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	Monitored troops movement into Yemen from Saudi Arabia
The UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Monitored cease-fire and maintained order
UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	Monitored cease-fire after India-Pakistan War in 1965
The Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Observed and reported on the cease-fire
The UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II)	Monitored the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai
The Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Monitored and supervised the movement of Israel and Syrian forces
The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Monitored cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml> accessed on 10th April 2015.

From 1948 to 1978, there were 13 UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) were the part of these 13 peacekeeping operations of Cold war era. These peacekeeping operations are labelled as traditional peacekeeping operations.

Traditional Peacekeeping Operation

The peacekeeping operations is not enshrined in the UN Charter but was developed during the Cold War to manage interstate conflicts. In this kind of mechanism, military forces are deployed in between the combatants as buffer forces. Military forces that were lightly armed did not have military objectives and were non-coercive in character as they were required to monitor the observance of cease-fire. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was charged with monitoring the cease-fire between combatants and supervising the withdrawal of these combatants from the conflict area. UNEF I was a dramatic innovation where armed international soldiers were charged with specific functions in an interstate conflict. The traditional peacekeeping operations share a number of characteristics in contrast to contemporary multidimensional peace operations (Diehl, 2007:93). Thakur and Schnabel have identified some distinguishing characteristics of traditional peacekeeping which includes consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict, international support especially from the UN Security Council, UN command and control, multinational composition, no use of force, neutrality of UN military between the rival armies and political impartiality between the rival countries (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001:10).

The main function of traditional peacekeeping operation is to monitor cease-fire. It is deployed following a cease-fire resolution is passed but prior to any peace agreement between the combatants. These operations were mostly successful in conflict control measures rather than conflict resolution or preventive mechanism. Peacekeeping operations are not involved in diplomatic measures to keep inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict (Diehl 2007:5). Thus, the tasks of the peacekeeping forces were very limited. Following a cease-fire, traditional peacekeepers separate combatants in order to deter any kind of military engagement. The peacekeepers monitors at the buffer zone so that cease-fire is maintained among the combatants. The traditional peacekeeping operations are expected to create conducive environment for negotiation instead of getting involved in diplomatic initiatives. The peacekeepers do not provide any kind of political solution between the

competing parties. They minimise the hostilities and try to build trust between the combatants which can facilitate an agreement to be reached (Diehl 2007: 5).

Traditional peacekeeping operations were exclusively deployed in inter-state conflicts. UNEF I is a classic example of armed international soldiers deployed in an interstate conflict. However, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was the most significant exception from the general characteristics of traditional peacekeeping operation. It was different from other peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era. In this mission the UN peacekeeping troops were sent to a civil war within a state of Congo (Diehl 2007:45).

Three guiding principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force are developed to guide the formation of peacekeeping operation as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. These three guiding principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. They guide in the conduct of planning and implementing of functions both at the field level and at the Headquarter.

As it is based on the Westphalian premise, the United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed with the *consent of the host state*. The principle of consent is based on the assumption that the combatants were states who are hierarchically organized and so the consent at the government level meant the consent of the whole chain of command (Bellamy et al 2010:191). As mentioned in the Charter, the United Nations is based on the principle of sovereignty and so to respect the sovereignty of state, the consent of the state is required before deploying UN force in the territory of a state. This provides the peacekeeping operations to freely conduct its actions and implement its mandated task. But if there is no consent of the host state, the UN peacekeepers would be seen as a party to the conflict and would not get the cooperation of the host state (Bellamy 2010:192, Diehl 2007:57). When the host state gives its consent it is required to cooperate with the peacekeepers in their actions and to respect the mission mandate. In the same way, the UN peacekeepers also should ensure that it does not lose the consent of the host. The success of traditional peacekeeping operations depends upon the consent and cooperation of the combatants. Traditional peacekeeping should cultivate confidence-building between the combatants so as to help in establishing a process of negotiation. The absence of trust makes consent uncertain and unreliable. In some cases consent are given due to international pressure, where the party to the conflict are not fully committed to the peace process initiative. In that instance, there will be a lot of restrictions to the actions of UN peacekeeping operations, and may led to the

withdrawal of the mission before the tasks are completed. In the Suez Crises, the peacekeeping forces never able to patrol the Israel side of the border and the Egypt's request for withdrawal from its territory could not be refused (Bellamy et al 2010:183).

The UN peacekeeping operations must implement their mandate by not favouring any party in the conflict. They should be *impartial* in dealing with the combatants, which helps to maintain the consent and cooperation of them. The peacekeepers deployment would not give any advantage or disadvantage to any side in a conflict. They only try to separate the combatants from any kind of military engagement. Their main function is to simply observe and monitoring the cease-fire without getting involved in the conflict (Thakur and Schnabel 2001:10). They should be impartial for both parties and must refrain from taking sides for the interest of a particular party. Peacekeeping operations must implement the mandates without favour to any parties. The aggressor is anonymous and peacekeeping forces behave equally with both parties (Diehl 2007:6-7).The peacekeepers while making cordial and cooperative relationship with the parties to bring a conducive environment should not forget its principle of impartiality. Their activities should be transparent and have proper communication with the combatants (United Nations 2008:33). The absence of impartiality of peacekeepers may affect the credibility and legitimacy of peacekeeping operation and it could affect the parties consent and parties may withdraw their consent from peacekeeping and not cooperate with peacekeepers (United Nations 2015:3).

Third guiding principle is *minimum use of force*. The UN traditional peacekeepers cannot use force in an offensive manner. As UN military forces are expected to be impartial, they are not usually required to use force. They are permitted to use force only for self-defence as a last resort. Moreover, their limited military capability with lightly armed do not allow them to carry coercive force. Traditional peacekeeping operations are not enforcement operations and they do not take any initiative in the use of force. The peacekeepers were deployed to monitor cease-fire and not to involve in fight, which was a unique characteristic of UN military force in traditional peacekeeping operations. As the peacekeepers are authorized to use force only for self-defence, they are not heavily armed and thus are not capable to use coercive force (Diehl 2007:6-7). As the peacekeepers represent the international community, violation of the cease-fire would bring a bad international reputation. This deters violation of cease fire by the parties to the conflict. Accordingly, Peacekeepers are sent only for the observation of situation not to resolve conflict and as such limited use of force is allowed.

These guiding principles are the distinctive characteristics of the traditional peacekeeping operations. As they symbolized the will of international community, they enjoyed high regard and they were not target of attack by the warring states. Thus, there were few casualties in traditional peacekeeping operations

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations

The Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s which experienced triple changes in the peacekeeping operations (Bellamy et al 2010:93). These changes were quantitative transformation of UN peacekeeping operations where large numbers of operations were undertaken, normative transformation towards the conception of durable peace and qualitative transformation to carry out complex operations. These changes became necessary as the kind of conflicts that the United Nations required to handle undergone change. Instead of interstate conflict, most of the conflicts that the United Nations required to handle are intrastate conflicts. The respond required for this kind of conflict differ dramatically from that of the interstate conflicts. The UN peacekeeping operation required to carry out wide variety of task such as facilitate humanitarian assistance, maintain law and order, provide security, rebuilding of social, economic and political institutions, and restoration of state authority. To perform these multitask, the number of civilian and military personnel were increased. Compared to the Cold War, the most of the peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War are larger in size. This increase in size and the qualitative transformation to carry out complex operations was due to normative changes to bring durable peace by extending to reconstruct the post-conflict societies (Bellamy et al 2010:93).

Most of the Peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War are mandated with multidimensional tasks and therefore they are complex in nature. Along with monitoring cease-fire and supervising the withdrawal of combatants, peacekeepers in multidimensional operations required to carry out tasks such as demobilizing and disarming armed forces; design and supervise constitutional, judicial and political reforms; organise and monitor elections, train local police and monitor human rights problem (Oudraat, 1996: 506-507). For example, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia exhibited a diverse and complex characteristic of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The mandate was beyond the task assigned to the peacekeepers, which involved monitoring disarmament and supervising the electoral process (Diehl, 2007: 48). Following UNTAG, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) included even broader

multidimensional characteristics. The mandate included not only monitoring elections but also maintaining law and order, repatriating refugees, conducting governmental functions, registering voters and constructing and conducting elections (Diehl, 2007: 49).

Traditional peacekeeping were mostly military undertakings where light armed observers were send to conflict areas to monitor cease-fire. However, with the qualitative transformation in peacekeeping operations, this traditional feature changed. Along with military, a substantive number of civilian personnel were involved in multidimensional peacekeeping. A separate organisational element is set up with the substantive civilian personnel for electoral administration, human rights, maintenance of law and order and humanitarian issues. In the UN Mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) eight major components were deployed: military, civilian police, electoral, human rights, rehabilitation, repatriation, civil administration and information/education (Ledgerwood, 1994:1-10). For instance, the Information/Education Division produced propaganda to inform the local population about the goals of the mission and specifically about the upcoming elections. Thus, with the qualitative change in the mandate with various tasks in post-conflict reconstruction activities, the number of peacekeepers has increased to exercise these new extended activities in post-conflict countries for avoiding relapse into conflict.

The distinctive characteristics of multidimensional peacekeeping operations are as follows:

The most distinctive characteristic of multidimensional peacekeeping operations is that it has a significant focus on internal conflict since the early 1990s. Since then, almost 90% of new multidimensional peacekeeping operations where send to internal conflicts which was previously very few (Diehl 2007:63). These internal conflicts or civil conflicts increased with the cold war coming to an end which led to the decline of interstate wars. The civil conflicts intensity was more extreme than the interstate conflicts as it had a spillover effects on neighbouring states and thus threatening international peace and security. These intensity of civil conflicts included destabilizing of neighbouring countries, refugee flows, cross-border fighting genocide and even spread of infectious diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS (Paris 2007:404). Thus, to foster stable and lasting peace in the aftermath of large scale conflict became an important objective of multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Earlier, traditional peacekeeping operations basic rule was to settle dispute mostly through peaceful means before using any kind of force. This has changed with the intensity of

conflict in post-Cold War, which made multidimensional peacekeeping operations more intrusive and more robust. These operations have a greater emphasis on the use of necessary force and a variety of different mission tasks (Diehl 2007:14). In these operations the peacekeeping activity is more complex and peacebuilding operations are planned to implement a comprehensive peace agreement for building long term and durable peace.

The size of a deployment area is a very important factor that characterises the multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Traditional peacekeeping operations were deployed in border areas which are small in size. On the contrary, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are deployed in vast geographical areas. Thus, for a large geographical area, a large number of peacekeeping personnel are required (Green et al, 1998:489). For example, election supervision missions, peacekeepers are deployed in the entire country. In civil conflicts several groups are operating in different parts of the country which requires that multidimensional peacekeeping operations cover a broader territory (Diehl, 2007: 133). Groups involved in conflict and being from the same geographical area creates a problem for the peacekeeper to separate them.

In the Cold War the parties to the conflict were limited to only two actors as it is involved between two states. Multidimensional peacekeeping is characterised by multiple numbers of actors involved in civil conflicts. This creates difficulty of consent and cooperation with the multiple numbers of actors. The actors in the dispute increase the likelihood of one or more of them objecting to the cease-fire and provisions for the deployment of the peacekeepers. In the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the peacekeepers not only depended on the cooperation of the Israel and Lebanese governments, but also a host of Palestinian groups, Hezbollah and various other Lebanese militias (Diehl, 2007: 133).

An important characteristic of multidimensional peacekeeping operation is its mandate. Mandates have become more ambitious which requires not only active involvement in ending the conflict but also in assisting the transition to peace. As the increase in civil war has exposed complexities and challenges to the UN peacekeeping operations, the nature of the mandate has also changed. Traditional peacekeeping operation was mostly military mandate which became insufficient for multidimensional peacekeeping that included a comprehensive civilian mandate. The international community became more concerned about humanitarian issues and the post-conflict reconstruction to bring durable peace in post-conflict countries. Thus, the UN had to reform its mandate with the rising demand and complexity (Coning,

2011:579). UNTAC is an important example where a comprehensive mandate of repatriating refugees, maintaining law and order, conducting governmental functions and monitoring elections were included (Diehl, 2007: 49). The main problem of such broad mandates is the budget. Regular budget are not sufficient for such broad mandate and thus require additional resources.

To carry out these multidimensional functions, the composition of peacekeeping operations has become diverse which was earlier dominated by military component. The complex operations arising from civil wars require knowledge and expertise to a much greater extent than did the earlier cease-fire monitoring missions. In the traditional peacekeeping operations, the focus was mostly on security measures of the countries affected by conflict which were carried out by the military and police components. They were deployed to maintain security and law and order. The multidimensional peacekeeping operations which included a more extended task of humanitarian assistance and development activities required a more skilled expertise that can effectively implement the mandate. These substantive civilian expertises thus play critical role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.

The consent of the host state was based on the assumptions that the belligerents were states. Therefore, the consent at the government level is regarded as consent of the state as a whole which went lower down the chain of command (Bellamy et al 2010:191). However, in the civil wars the consent has become variable as there are many combatants which may not have a common consent to peacekeeping even if their political authority do (Bellamy et al 2010:191). Moreover, in the multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the consent of the host state is difficult because in the face of state collapse there is no national government to give its approval (e.g., Somalia). In such kind of situation where there is a breakdown or lack of government structures, it becomes difficult for the United Nations get the consent of the host state (Diehl 2007:57).

There is a greater concern for the individual, human rights and government legitimacy in the post-cold War that has led to a decline the strength of state sovereignty. The international community with a belief in moral obligation is becoming actively engaged in dealing with violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. State sovereignty is no longer considered absolute. The international community have legitimate interest if any kind of violations happening within the domestic jurisdiction of states (Diehl 2007: 64). Thus, there has been transformation in international norms towards state sovereignty. Multidimensional

peacekeeping operations are sent in areas where there is no full cooperation of the sovereign state like in Kosovo or where no functioning government exist like in Somalia. Thus, with the losing in the sanctity of state sovereignty concept, the requirement of consent of the host state declined. There are instances where even after the consent of the host governments, significant restriction of the peace operations has jeopardized the mission success. In the case of Sudan, the government announced that it would not permit any peace operation to have the right to use military force in an offensive manner. This made the peacekeepers unable to restrain armed combatants which ultimately posed a threat to human rights (Diehl 2007:152).

The principle of impartiality means that the peacekeepers must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. It has become difficult to maintain impartiality in dealing with intrastate conflicts. The tendency to treat impartiality as synonymous with neutrality may not be problematic in traditional peacekeeping operations. However, peacekeepers in multidimensional that maintain 'neutrality' cannot accomplish their mandate (Bellamy et al 2010:192). For instance, if a party to the conflict violates the cease-fire agreement, the peacekeepers cannot remain neutral and be inactive in stopping the attack. The inactiveness will keep them away from their main function of keeping peace and there is every possibility of reoccurrence of conflict. Thus, even-handedness towards the parties should not become a reason of conflict. More recently, multidimensional peacekeeping operation has supported government forces over rebel groups or democratic forces against the de facto government (Diehl 2007:57). The peacekeeping operations from just being third parties in a conflict have becoming one of the primary parties. Thus principle of impartiality could not be followed in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

In traditional peacekeeping operations, military actions were only allowed to use force in self-defence. With the change and expansion in mandates, such as the core function of protection of civilian population and protection of the personnel of international organizations in the conflict areas, the rule of engagement has allowed robust use of force in more than self-defence (Diehl 2007: 57). UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in an environment where militias, criminal gangs and other spoilers are present to undermine the peace process or threatened the civilian population (United Nations 2008C:34). In such situations, UN peacekeeping operations used necessary means on such kind of forceful attempts (Diehl 2007: 57). Robust peacekeeping operations are authorized under chapters VII to use force to carry out the mandated functions. Thus, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are frequently authorized to use of force under chapter VII.

With complex situation in intrastate conflicts, it has become difficult to adhere to the guiding principle of peacekeeping operations. In fact, it is required to be much more intrusive and robust to carry out the expanded mandates of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Evolution of the Civilian Component

In the interstate conflicts, countries are faced with collapse of government institutions, breakdown of economy and social system and lack of basic social security. This has led the UN to launch ambitious new missions which aimed to assist in reconstructing the political, economic and social systems of post-conflict countries emerging from civil wars (Paris 2007:405). Accordingly, the UN peacekeeping operations are being mandated with multiple functions to bring about durable stability and peace. The military component and later the police component are not capable of carrying out all the mandated tasks. For this special knowledge and expertise are required to implement the challenging tasks of reconstruction activities. This led to incorporation of large number of civilian component which played an integral role in the peacekeeping missions to carry out peacebuilding functions. The military and police components mainly dealt with security issues. But the civilian component's most important function is to provide humanitarian assistance and carry out reconstruction activities. The task assigned to them is not something with quick results. It requires a long term involvement to make transition from civil war to a stable and durable peace.

The civilian component was not something new in UN peacekeeping operations. Earlier its role was limited to only certain administrative functions of the United Nations. The traditional peacekeeping operations included in limited number civilian personnel. The United Nations operation in Congo (ONUC) included an important civilian component. There were civilian experts in agriculture, communications, education, health, law, natural resources and public administration. They were called 'Consultative groups' who provided technical assistance. They assisted in long-term planning of economic, educational and social services. The Belgium colonial regime had neglected the creation of government institutions. Thus, the civilian experts trained the Congolese administrations to run and manage government functions. In the Congo mission, the civilian experts did not get international political and financial support that it should get which was enjoyed by the military branch of the ONUC (Dobbins et al, 2005:20).

Civilian component has gradually developed and its functions have become more complex and comprehensive in the post-Cold War era. Earlier, the emphasis in many countries and organizations has been on building the capacity of the military dimension. However, with a new trend of peacebuilding assistance in post conflict countries the need to develop or strengthen the civilian dimension has become important (Coning 2009:1). Gradually, the task of civilian component extended and in 1989 a mission was sent to United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia to prepare the country for its democratic elections and in the preparation of a new national constitution (Paris 2007:405). Following this, new missions began in early 1991 with number of civilian task such as organization of elections, human rights monitoring and training. The first civilian component in the UN peacekeeping operations was the electoral experts who were deployed in Namibia (Diehl 2007:48). Earlier election experts were limited in the monitoring of elections but with more active involvement it has extended its task on educating voters, register voters, construct the election system and conduct the election. Moreover, Civilian component task also became more inclusive as in most of the post conflict countries there is lack of governmental institutions or are destroyed due to long duration of war, thus assisting in core government functionality. For example, the roots of civil affairs officers, who are mostly deployed in the local level, can be traced in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as civil administrative component taking over the administration of an entire country. They were responsible for the supervision of governmental structures in Cambodia (United Nations 2012B:149). During 1990s small civil affairs personnel were deployed. But with the deployment in Kosovo and East Timor, major number of civil affairs personnel was present.

The importance and awareness of non-military issues which were not previously focused, even though present in some numbers, became highlighted as an international issue with grave affects in peace and security in the post-Cold War era. Peacebuilding in the post conflict countries became the UNs principle peace and security activity since 1990s. As peacebuiding operations became more involved, the civilian aspects of these operations also multiplied promoting human rights, training judges and lawyers, supporting the development of new political parties, and promoting and establishing governmental institutions, among other things (Paris 2007:409-410). Various resolutions were passed in the Security Council to address these important issues. For example, for the first time Security Council resolution in 1996 used the term 'rule of law' to highlight its concern in post conflict countries (United Nations 2012B :5). Gradually, in 2003 the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service was

created within Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to promote rule of law (United Nations 2012B:5). The UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was the first mission to establish rule of law unit. The mission assisted rule of law activities by supporting the existing instruments and policies of the Congolese authority to bring justice reform. It has also established corrections unit where the corrections experts have assisted the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) system to facilitate the handling of cases of pre-trial detainees (United Nations 2012B:14).

In the post-conflict countries the situation is very fragile where there is no law and order, collapse of government institutions, human rights abuse, economic breakdown and no social security. Peacebuilding operations main function is to resolve the root cause of the conflict. If this fragile situation is not look into there is every possibility of relapsing into conflict. The end of Cold War has made UN more active towards reconstruction activities to bring durable peace. Presently, the UN has become more peacebuilding oriented where the role of the civilian component has become significant in laying the foundation for long term stability through its reconstruction activities. Several reports and studies have also highlighted the increasing need to strengthen civilian capacities as a substantive component in peace operations (Coning 2011:577). The Secretary-General report on “Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict” in 2009 is an important report which have emphasised the need to improve the UNs civilian capacities so that they can effectively implement the task of the comprehensive mandate of complex peace operations.

The extended mandate of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations has increased the kind of civilian experts required. Initially, civilian component were required only on limited areas. Now it comprises of various civilian component such as political affairs, civil affairs, public information, human rights, rule of law, child protection and electoral affairs. Presently, the international civilian component with niche areas of expertise has become a vital part to the effective implementation of the peacebuilding mandate (United Nations 2003B:5). Following chapters discuss in-depth the nature, role and functions of the civilian component of the UN operations in the post-conflict societies.

CHAPTER 3

CIVILIAN COMPONENT: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

The intra-state conflict which preoccupied the world since 1990, required more than the traditional peacekeeping operations to address them. Accordingly, the United Nations has expanded the peacekeepers mandate from monitoring of cease-fire to reconstruction of social, political and economic institutions to bring about stable and durable peace. The United Nations focus not only to end violent conflict but also to prevent any reoccurrence of violence in the post-conflict society. The mandate of the multifunctional peacekeeping operations has become more complex and comprehensive. The United Nations mandated broadest range of activities like demobilizing and reintegrating combatants; assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons; organizing and monitoring elections; supporting justice and correction reform; promoting and protecting human rights issues and rebuilding social, economic and political institutions. The military is an important component but to carry out these multidimensional functions, the UN peacekeeping operations also consist of substantive number of civilian component.

An unprecedented number of civilian personnel are engaged in UN peace operations. The civilian personnel are the key to success of peace operations. The demand for qualified and specialised civilian personnel has increased in recent years. In the same way the challenge to find, deploy and manage suitable civilian personnel has also increased. Civilian experts are now expected to sign up for a challenging job in an environment, frequently under hazardous conditions. However, for a long time the deployment of civilian personnel to UN peace operations has remained a marginal issue in policy-making and research. Recently due to the increasing pressure to deliver has provoked intense discussion about civilian capacities and various national and international conferences been held accordingly (Behrendt 2011:1). Due to the civilian component growing demand in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, its significance has grown both in quantity and quality. These have exacerbated increasing recruitment and training demands for civilian component. On the basis of these demands, international organizations have set up specialized departments and sophisticated systems for civilian recruitment. At the national level also recruitment and deployment mechanisms have been developed. For want of a better option, the UN civilian expert rosters have also been built to match the right expert to a particular post. Due to the strategic importance of post-

conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction that has become a major part of the mandate, the significance of civilian component has also increased.

This chapter starts with analyse of why and how various changes took place quantitatively and qualitatively since 1990s with regard to UN civilian component of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It then lays out the organizational structures of both at headquarters at New York as well as at operational field in the missions. It then discusses the recruitment and training of civilian component, highlighting the unique challenges that UN faces with in preparing civilian personnel for the tasks. It ends with highlighting the challenges of organizational and recruitment of the civilian personnel.

Quantitative increase and Qualitative change

With the end of Cold war, most of the conflicts addressed by the United Nations are mostly intra-state wars that took place in the developing countries, where the states are weak or failed to provide the basic security for their citizens and fail to maintain rule of law in the countries. These kind of wars were not new but were kept in check by the superpowers during the Cold War. The change in international environment with the end of Cold War gave rise to more internal conflicts, which led to new generation of “multidimensional peacekeeping operations” which employed not only military and police but also substantive number of civilian component to implement the various peacebuilding tasks in the mandate.

In the Cold War the civilian component were very limited in number as early peacekeeping operations were mandated more of military task. With the number of mandate with civilian tasks increased, there have been strong demand and need for civilian component in the post-Cold War. They are required to provide assistance where the military lacks capacities or abilities (Lijn 2012:4). In 2009, the UN Secretary General produced a report on “Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict” that highlighted the need for increased civilian component (UN Document 2009). Figure 3:1 reflect the quantitative increase of civilian component since 2004 till 2014 as the data on civilian component is in the archival section of UNDPKO is available from 2004. Quantitative demands on civilian personnel have increased since the 1990s as the number of civilian related mandate of the operations have increased over the years. Earlier only limited peacekeeping operations with civilian mandate had been authorised. After the strategic mission in Namibia, where for the first time large number of civilians especially electoral experts were deployed, a specific trend


has followed to deploy substantive number of civilian component. In 1991, following this mission, four peacekeeping missions were authorised, among which three consist of civilian component. Out of 57 peacekeeping operations in post-cold war almost 32 missions from 1991 to 2014 consisted of civilian component. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAG) mission was the most ambitious UN peacekeeping operations of the early period that started a substantive inclusion of civilian component. In Cambodia, during the electoral period there were more than 50,000 Cambodian serving as electoral staff and also Governments seconded around 900 international polling station officers (UN WebsiteA). In 1999, all the peacekeeping operations authorised consist of civilian component which totalled to around 12065 civilian personnel. In 2005, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed which consist of largest number of civilian component authorised. It consists of 4280 civilian personnel in January 2011 (UN WebsiteB). At present there are 16 UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the field and 11 of them have civilian component of around 17,318 (UN WebsiteC).

The increase in quantity of civilian component in the post-cold war is due to the expansion of tasks, as reflected in Table 3.1. The Table consisted of the UN peacekeeping operations since 1991 till 2014 that have civilian specific tasks mandated such as free and fair elections, monitoring human rights, reform of the judiciary, repatriation of refugees, extension of state authority and many more. With complexity of mandate, civilian component also need to be specialized in various field and therefore more varied quality of civilians are required to carry out the mandates.

The multidimensional peacekeeping operations mandate went beyond the limited traditional role of liaising with political actors and the good offices work that had characterized civilian component (United Nations 2012A:31). There has been a significant trend over the past decade to develop a widening range of civilian capacities to help stabilize post-conflict situations and secure the transition from war to peace (Gourlay 2006:5). The establishment of UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor in 1990s brought new qualitative demands for civilian capabilities in peace operations. For example, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) broke new ground with a unique human rights mandate to monitor and verify human rights violations and make recommendations for their elimination. This mandate with civilian capacities brought political stability and human rights protection in El Salvador (Karns and Mingst 2010:312-313). The

civilian component now has more operational and technical roles to play. Multi-dimensional peacekeeping required a number of civilian experts in political affairs, human rights, civil affairs, gender issues, organizing and supervising democratic elections, repatriating and resettling refugees, organizing interim civil administration, rebuilding judiciary, communication and reporting. Figure 3:3 shows the qualitative and quantitative increase of civilian component and its tasks.

Figure 3:1 Quantitative increase in the number of civilian component



Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml
 accessed on 29th April 2015

Table 3:1 Quantitative and Qualitative increase of civilian personnel and the tasks

Mission	Mandate	No. of Civilian personnel
ONUSAL (1991)	Reform of the judicial and electoral system, monitoring the human rights situations, investigating specific uses of human right violations, promoting human rights in the country and certain economic and social issues	1220
MINURSO (1991)	Identify and register qualified voters. Organise and ensure a free and fair elections and declare results	254
UNAVEM II (1991)	Observation and verification of the presidential and legislative elections	1242
ONUMOZ (1992)	Technical assistance and monitoring the electoral process	900
UNTAC (1992)	Human rights monitoring, organisation and conduct of free and fair elections, repatriation of refugees and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure	57344
UNOVER (1992)	To ensure that referendum was conducted freely and fairly	120
UNMIH (1993)	Assist the constitutional authority to establish conducive environment for free and fair elections	818
UNOMIL (1993)	Observe and verify the election process. To report on any major violations of international humanitarian law to the secretary general	1059
UNOSOM II (1993)	To assist in the reorganization of the judicial system and the political processes	2800
UNMIBH (1995)	Human rights, elections, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction	1569
MIPONUH (1997)	Promoting human rights and reinforcing the judiciary	222
MINURCA (1998)	To provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies for the conduct of elections	238
UNOMSIL (1998)	Reporting on human rights issues	55

UNMIK (1999)	Protecting and promoting human rights	353
UNAMSIL (1999)	Support the operations of UNs civilian officials, including SRSG and his staff of human rights officers and civil affairs officers. To provide support to the elections	668
UNTAET (1999)	To establish an effective administration to assist in the development of civil and social services to support capacity building for self government to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development	2482
MONUC (1999)	To facilitate human rights monitoring with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons. Contribute to free transparent and peaceful elections	4397
UNMISSET (2002)	Support for the public administration and justice system	1094
UNMIL (2003)	Reform of justice, human right promotion and protection	1440
UNOCI (2004)	To provide support in the preparation of elections. Reintegrating former combatants including women and children. Promotion and protection of human rights. To provide public information	1167
MINUSTAH (2004)	To assist with restoration and maintenance of the rule of law. To support the constitutional and political processes. To assist in carrying out free and fair elections. To support Haitian Human Rights institutions in their efforts to promote and protect human rights and monitor and report	1588
ONUB (2004)	To contribute to the electoral process. Reform of the judiciary and correction system. In close liaison with the OHCHR the protection and promotion of human rights and investigate human rights violations. To reintegrate former combatants	855
UNMIS (2005)	Promoting the rule of law. The protection of human rights. To support the preparation for and conduct of elections	4280
UNMIT (2006)	To support presidential and parliamentary electoral process. Monitoring, promotions and protection of human rights. To extend support for municipal elections. To enhance the judiciary system	1253
UNAMID (2007)	To assist the political process. Promotion and protection of human rights. Promotion of the rule of law	4053
MINURCAT (2007)	Promotion and protection of human rights and promotion of rule of law	1089
MONUSCO	Promotion and protection of human rights and promotion of rule of law	3964

(2010)		
UNISFA (2011)	Human rights monitoring	213
UNMISS (2011)	To assist in the establishment of rule of law. Foster state building and economic development. Monitoring and investigating human rights	2608
MINUSMA (2013)	The extension of state authority. Free, inclusive and peaceful election process. Human rights protection and provide specific protection for women and children	1190
MINUSCA (2014)	Extension of state authority. Promotion and protection of human rights. Support for national and international justice and rule of law	437

Source: [http: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml) accessed on 29th April 2015

Organizational Structures

Till late 1980s peacekeeping operations were operated through the UN Office of Special Political Affairs as there was no separate department dealing with peacekeeping operation. To plan and manage the large number of complex operations in the post-cold war, the earlier structure became clearly deficient. The peacekeeping operations such as in Namibia and Cambodia which included a comprehensive mandate with both peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions, the limited staff in the Office for Special Political Affairs faced challenges in handling the complex peacekeeping operations. In 1992 the Secretariat was restructured and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created to handle peacekeeping matters (Bellamy et al, 2010: 52). In 2000, the Brahimi Report identified the need to reform and reorganizes the understaffed UN offices to make them capable of addressing the complex peace operations. To implement the proposal, an independent management review was conducted to enlarge and restructure DPKO, and change its management culture. Thereafter, DPKO has been enlarged which now supported all aspects of peace operations, military and civilian, at both the political and operational levels.

Although there is no well-structured organizational set up to deal with civilian component like that of the military and police, there are various units at the UNDPKO which

deal with civilian units such as civil affairs, rule of law, electoral assistance, gender and human rights. There are also other UN departments playing an important role in civilian matters. For instance, electoral issues in peacekeeping operations are supported by the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and human rights issues are supported by Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Thus, the organizational structure of the UN civilian component is not one coherent management structure like its police or military components. The civilian component do not follow a standard command and control model nor does it have one structure specifically for the civilian component of the UN operations (United Nations 2008B: 14). The various specialized civilian units that play an important role in the field include the political affairs unit, civil affairs unit, human rights unit, public information unit, electoral unit and rule of law unit.

At the Headquarter level, which is also called the strategic level, the Security Council provides the legal authority and political guidance for all UN peacekeeping operations and the Secretary General is given the operational authority for directing these operations. The Secretary General then delegates the responsibility to Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (USG DPKO) and at the field level generally by a civilian Head of Mission called Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Thus, all the civilian units are required to report to the Headquarter through the Head of Mission. In the Headquarter there is a DPKO Military Adviser and Police Adviser to whom the military and police components at the operational level maintain technical reporting and communication link. For the civilian component especially political affairs unit and civil affairs unit have desk officers at DPKO to maintain link (United Nations 2003B:24-36). Thus, the UN civilian personnel in the field maintain line of communication with their respective desk officers at the Headquarter. The civilian component also has to maintain technical reporting and communication link with others entities. For example, the human rights unit in the field has a dual reporting line to both the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and the OHCHR (United Nations 2003B: 102). A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to provide assistance to human rights unit in UN peace operations (United Nations 2003B:102). This technical reporting line is but secondary and subordinate to the management reporting line within the Mission Headquarters. However, the civilian units in the field do the technical reporting to

different departments at the Headquarter at New York and other entities as there is no one unified civilian structure like that of the military and police components.

Structure at the Headquarter level

At the Headquarter level there are some main offices where civilian maintain communication link. In the DPKO, Office of Operations and Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions are the major sections that maintain like with civilian component. Both the political affairs and civil affairs units in the field have desk officers in the respective regional division of the Office of Operations (United Nations 2003B:36). A line of communication is maintained between the political affairs and civil affairs units in the field and their respective political desk officer in the Office of Operations in the DPKO (United Nations 2003B:24-36). The desk officers are DPKO's primary mission managers once an operation is deployed and provide political queries and guidance to the field personnel. The desk officers at the Headquarter also revise the draft report provided by the political affairs and civil affairs units in the field in consultation with the mission before submitting to the Office of the Secretary-General and getting cleared by senior DPKO officials and other relevant department heads (United Nations 2003B:28). Through informal exchange of information between the field and the political desk officer in DPKO, political affairs officers in the field keep themselves informed of developments at UN Headquarters pertaining to the mission (United Nations 2003B:27). The civil affairs officers in an interim or transitional administration perform governmental functions with a political dimension and the focal point is that the unit's desk officers in DPKO provide political guidance to them (United Nations 2003B:36).

Among all the civilian component, rule of law is one of the well structured organizational set up. The Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) was created in 2007 to provide holistic approach to re-establishing systems of justice in post-conflict countries. Apart from the civilian component of judiciary experts and prison managers, this institution also consists of police component. The rule of law was included with the tasks of managing and supervising the judiciary and reforming national prisons in post-conflict countries. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) became part of DPKO's OROLSI in 2007 which was before part of the Police Division of DPKO. It serves as the Headquarter counterpart for the justice and corrections officers. Until 2005, CLJAS with one judicial officer and one corrections officer has now increased to five

corrections officers and five judicial affairs officers (United Nations 2013:50). In field missions with mandates in the justice and corrections areas, CLJAS plans, reviews and assess the justice and correction officers in the UN peacekeeping operations. It also provides advice and technical support to justice and correction officers in the field missions (United Nations 2013:49). Guidance tools and training programmes are developed by the CLJAS to support the support the justice and corrections officers in the field (UN 2013:49). The CLJAS keep the justice and corrections officers in the field apprised of significant developments at the Headquarters. It also assists in the selection of senior judicial affairs officers in missions, including heads and deputy heads of justice personnel (United Nations 2012A:11). Regular reports are produced by justice and corrections personnel to submit to the DPKO which provides an overview of the developments and challenges in the rule of law area. These personnel keep the CLJAS regularly and fully informed of their work so that CLJAS can promote their achievements, draw attention to resource needs and respond to questions in the Headquarter and Member States (United Nations 2012A:11).

The UN Secretariat also provides support and guidance to civilian component by some of its departments including the Department for Public Information (DPI) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The Strategic Communications Division of the DPI has peace and security section which provides strategic communications support and guidance to public information unit of UN peacekeeping missions (UN WebsiteD). The section also assists in the development of communications policies and standard operating procedures for public information unit in UN peace operations. The section works in cooperation with the DPKO which provides a review of current UN peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding and special political missions throughout the world.

DPKO works closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), especially Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) in planning and managing electoral support aspects of peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2003B:3). The Division develops operational strategies for electoral experts of peacekeeping operations. It also provides electoral experts to the mission and oversees the implementation of UN electoral assistance in the field (United Nations 2003B:148). In 1991, the Secretary-General designated the Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) as the focal point for Electoral Assistance Activities (United Nations 2003B:148). The focal point determines electoral standards,

assesses the needs and scope of an electoral operation, formulates and staffs the mission and monitors the implementation of UN electoral operations.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides expertise, guidance and support to human rights units in the field. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to provide assistance to human rights unit in UN peace operations (United Nations 2003B:102). The human rights unit has a dual reporting line to both the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and the OHCHR (United Nations 2003B: 102). For instance the Human Rights section of the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) through an OHCHR-sponsored technical cooperation project has provided legislative, substantive and technical advice in the establishment of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission (United Nations 2003B:107).

The sudden expansion and complexity of new missions, was faced with unprepared challenges by the UN Secretariat. Even after the restructuring and reform of the organizational structure, the scale and complexity of the new missions have increased the challenges (Findlay 1996:18). The main challenges facing civilian component is a lack of standard organizational structure. The structures are still at its nascent stage and not fully implemented which still face structural uncertainty. Despite the commitment to structural reforms, these nascent structures are not appropriately configured and are lacking adequate resources (Wiharta and Blair 2010:91-106). Moreover, the civilian component does not have a unified team of experts for analysis, planning and coordination to support the executive team in the UN (Wiharta and Blair 2010: 93). Thus, the civilian planning capacity is still weak. The peace operations which mostly consist of civilian task required the collaboration with other UN departments and agencies and this need to coordinate has been an increasingly critical task for DPKO (Benner et al 2011:6). Another main problem is that at the Headquarter level the staff are mainly from the Global North, while field staff are generally from low-income developing countries (SIPRI 2011:5). This kind of division created difficulties of understanding between the personnel.

Structure at the operational level

At the operational level, there are various specialized units of the civilian component having different chain of command. However, all the units of the civilian component are

required to report the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who serves as Head of Mission and is responsible for implementing the mission's mandate. A mission with many separate components and experts work effectively if the leadership is strong enough to unite together as a team (United Nations 2003B:18)

Political Affairs officer is a substantive civilian component in most missions with political mandate. The political affairs unit varies mission to mission according to the mandate. Therefore, in some missions very few political affairs officers are part of the Mission and in large missions like UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) there were more than 30 political affairs officers(United Nations 2003B:24). The political affairs unit is headed by a Director of Political Affairs. The SRSG or the Director of Political Affairs assigns responsibilities directly to the political affairs officers. The political affairs officers supports the SRSG in interpreting the mission mandate into objectives in the field and monitors and reports on the status of their implementation through the Director of Political Affairs to the SRSG. Drafting reports is the primary responsibility of Political Affairs, which provide an important link between the global vision at Headquarters and developments in the field (United Nations 2003B:27).As part of its reporting responsibilities, political affairs officer coordinates with all mission components providing inputs for reports to the SRSG and then to the UN Headquarters in New York (United Nations 2003B:29). This coordination helps in avoiding repetitive or conflicting information (United Nations 2003B:29).

The *civil affairs unit* in regional and sub-regional offices are supervised by the civil affairs coordinators and are responsible to pursue common strategic goals and reporting from all field locations (United Nations 2003B:36). They are required to produce daily and weekly reports to the DPKO. At the local level, most of the time civil affairs officers are the only civilian representatives of the UN and thus maintain important networks with local and regional government and other key players in the community (United Nations 2003B:36). They have the first-hand report of the local situation. Often at the local level civil affairs unit maintains a connection between political and security actors on the one hand and humanitarian and development actors on the other hand (United Nations 2012A:39). Civil affairs officers structure is more complex in the missions with governance functions. The head of civil administration holds a position equivalent to a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) and is responsible for leading the administration while

ensuring the conditions of transitional administration (United Nations 2003B:37). In such situation, civil affairs officers are assigned key administrative positions and assist the DSRSG in coordination, political analysis, policy development, reporting, management and oversight (United Nations 2003B:37).

The *public information unit* in the UN peace operations has a diversified organizational structure depending on the mission mandate. In some operations, the chief of information and the mission spokesperson are the same person. However, in mission where there is large and diversified public information officers present in the mission, it is advantageous to separate the two positions (United Nations 2003B:50). The chief of information in close consultation with the SRSG and other senior mission officials is responsible in formulating mission's public information strategy and the overall supervision and management of the public information unit. The public information strategy includes the development and dissemination all public information materials and mission web site (United Nations 2003B:50). The chief advises the mission official and UN Headquarters of trends and developments and potential challenges of the local and international media in the field. The information that the chief disseminates ensure that it reaches the targeted audience, both local and international and also important offices at the Headquarter, the DPKO and Department of Public Information (United Nations 2003B:50). Media relations is the main domain of the mission spokesperson gives press briefings and interviews, issues press releases and provides information from the SRSG to the DPKO and DPI. As the main focal point of media relations, it coordinates with local and international media and all mission components to have latest information on mission activities and thus makes official statements on behalf of the mission (United Nations 2003B:50). The spokesperson facilitates the daily work of journalists covering the mission situation for the targeted audience. He assists the SRSG or the Head of Mission on mission priorities and advises him or her on public relations and dealing with the media.

Depending on the nature of the mission, *electoral unit* have sub-offices established for broader coverage and coordination with the locals. The general structure which has a Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) or Chief Technical Officer (CTO) is supported by one or more area coordinator and is responsible for the conduct of the electoral activities and reports directly to the SRSG and provides technical reports to the assigned officer in Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). The Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the DPA at the HQ provides strategic guidance and electoral support to the electoral experts in the field. There is

continuous consultation with the electoral experts of a peacekeeping mission and the EAD. The EAD provides technical briefs and the assignment of staff from UN Headquarters to the electoral unit in the field to address problematic issues. In the legal framework for an election which is negotiation in a mission, the SRSG is the principal interlocutor on behalf of the UN. In such negotiation, the inputs coming from other components is coordinated by one or more electoral experts attached to the office of the SRSG to bring feasible and acceptable set of electoral rules (United Nations 2003B:152).


In a mission with a rule of law mandate, there are two important civilian experts: *justice* and *correction officers*. The justice officers are headed by a Senior Judicial Affairs Officer or a Chief Judicial Affairs Officer who reports to the SRSG or DSRSG responsible for the rule of law. The Senior Judicial Affairs Officer advises the SRSG or DSRSG and other members of the mission's senior management team on a regular basis about the political condition of justice reform, political strategy of the mission for strengthening justice systems and also providing with an analysis of the rule of law aspects of emerging political issues like arrest of political figures and dismissal of members of the high court (United Nations 2013: 29-30). The Officer also ensures that the issue of justice be discussed by requesting the SRSG who is the chair of the senior mission leadership with national counterparts. The Officer meet the SRSG on a regular basis and is a member of the mission's senior management team or strategic planning group to ensure that he/she has regular interactions with senior mission leadership which is an integral part of the mission's decision-making process. The organizational structure of the rule of law unit varies from mission to mission. Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) issued a management guidance in 2009 which recommended that in missions with four or fewer corrections officers, the corrections officers is merged with the justice unit, whereas in mission with five or more corrections officers, there is a separate corrections unit. However, a separate unit for corrections officers have benefited them with increasing the focus on corrections issues within the mission and host state authorities (Durch et al. 2012:52). Thus, in a way the head of corrections officers have direct access to the DSRSG who manages rule of law is a benefit so that correction issues are raised effectively.

In a mission the *human rights unit* has a dual reporting line to both the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and the OHCHR (United Nations 2003B: 102). OHCHR directly receives human rights reports from the field which is initiated for

further action. Human rights units are supported by the OHCHR, which directly provides technical guidance and advice. Like all components, the human rights unit seeks guidance from the SRSG and offers an overview of the political context of the mission area. Human rights unit usually submit daily, weekly, monthly and other periodic report on human rights issue to the SRSG. The human rights report may be external or internal. Internal reports are submitted to the mission headquarter, where as external reports are addressed to governments or to a wider national and international public which are based on internal reports of the human rights officers in the field (Boehme 2008:22). The human rights officers provide a detailed report to the SRSG who then consult and confront the national leadership with the information and also put the report to the Security Council. For instance, in the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the SRSG played an important role with respect to effective functioning of the human rights unit by putting the issue of civilian casualties on the mission's agenda (Boehme 2008:28). Figure 3:2 and 3:4 are the examples of structures in the field.


Figure 3:2 shows the UNAMSIL organizational structure, the civilian component consisted of the Electoral unit, Civil Affairs Officers, Senior Legal Adviser, Child Protection Adviser, Political Affairs Office, Public Information Office and the Human rights Office. The civilian field offices are headed by the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), who is the head of the mission. Figure 3:3 shows the organizational structure of the UNMIL and the civilian component consisted of the Civil Affairs section, Correction and Prison Adviser Service, Human Rights and Protection section, Legal and Judicial System Support Division and Electoral Division. The heads of the civilian field offices report to the DSRSG or the SRSG. These two organizational charts show that the civilian organizational structures differ from the mission to mission.

Figure 3:2 The UN Mission in UNAMSIL organizational structure



Source: <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/monographs/No80/Chap3.htm> accessed on 29th April 2015.

Figure 3:3 The UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) organizational structure



Source: <http://www.powershow.com/image/176bda-ZDc1Z> accessed on 29th April 2015.

The civilian component has a non-hierarchical nature of organizational structure. It consists of flat leadership structures where there is no ranking order. Thus, the line of communication becomes slightly messy (SIPRI 2010:8). It is difficult to ensure clear command and control structures so that decisions are effectively transmitted from the Head of Mission to the relevant units of the civilian component. With regard to line of reporting, it differs depending on the structure of the missions due to lack of standard organizational structure. For instance, Civil Affairs Officers have two reporting line. The first reporting line is to the regional head of office and the second to the senior Civil Affairs Officers in mission headquarters (United Nations 2012:93). The main challenge in such situation is demands from both the sides which creates problem for the civilian staff to deliver effectively to both supervisors.

Thus, the organizational structure of the civilian component is still at its nascent stage and the non-hierarchical nature makes it difficult to have a standard command and control system. The existing organizational structure hampers the effectiveness of the civilian

component of the UN operations. Restructuring and reforms is being proposed to make the structure more effective.

Recruitment System

As the role of civilian component has become an indispensable part of peace operations, its recruitment process has become very important for the effectiveness. The recruitment process of UN civilian component is quite different from the military and police components, which usually adopt the secondment system. There are two types of recruitment procedure adopted of the civilian component: direct recruitment system and secondment system from member states. Most of the UN civilian personnel are directly recruited for peace operations. The main reason for UN taking up direct recruitment process is to avoid bias in seconding civilian personnel as few states have made investment in civilian capacity development. Moreover, the system that relies on secondment of civilian experts limits the choice of available experts (Behrendt 2011:3). With limited choice, no surplus staffs are available in many countries, this creates reluctance by the national government to release their best staff. To overcome these problems, the General Assembly restricted the use of gratis personnel in two resolutions adopted in 1997 and 1998 (Coning 2011:581). Before these resolutions, gratis personnel were assigned to DPKO and most of these personnel came from the developed nations. Personnel from the developing countries were clearly in the minority. It was geographically bias towards those countries who could afford gratis officers and thus giving developed nations an unfair representation. The General Assembly resolution only accepted gratis personnel to provide expertise not available in normal recruitment system.

Direct recruitment: Under the direct recruitment process, the Department of Field Support (DFS) of UN, which provides support to peacekeeping field missions, arranges human resources for peacekeeping operations. The department advertise vacant civilian positions on the UN Galaxy e-Staffing System Website. Accordingly, individuals who are interested apply online and successful candidates are hired. Once they are selected and called for employment, they make their own arrangement with their national employers. Thus, the UN is not dependent on the civil services of member states but also tap on professionals outside governments. The number of civilian post has increased since 2004 during which the UN received 150,000 applications for its civilian peacekeeping field positions (Coning 2011: 580). The UN mostly has an oversupply of candidates as it receives large number of

applications for civilian posts. However, the pool of qualified candidates is much smaller than the total number of applicants.

UN direct recruitment process is faced with bureaucratic and slow nature of work which takes almost 12 months or more until the entry on duty that leads to discouragement of the interested experts (Behrendt 2011:3). Despite the number of applications received by the UN, its peacekeeping operations suffer from high vacancy rates. The vacancy rate is much higher during the start-up phase. Missions like the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had a 40% vacancy rate in 2005, the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) had a 56% vacancy rate in 2008 and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) had a 42% vacancy rate in 2010 (Coning 2011:581). During the start-up phase there is high demand for civilian personnel deployments and these sudden demands make the recruitment and deployment process difficult to cope up. More often, the mission start-ups are unclear and that creates problem for the UN to implement effectively.

The mission start-up phase is particularly challenging. There are some cases where vacancy rates are caused due to inability to absorb more staff. There is less civilian component turnover due to lack of security and difficult working conditions. Therefore, UN faces poor staff retention due to security reasons especially in field offices. In missions like United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS), UN-African Union mission capital in Darfur (UNAMID) and UN Mission in the Central African republic and Chad (MINURCAT) where civilian component were unable to absorb in the field offices due to lack of required security systems, office space, accommodation and no equipment and transport (Coning 2011:581). It also becomes more difficult to retain women staff due to lack of family duty stations.

The core problem faced by UN peacekeeping operations that cause high vacancy rate is not finding the candidates with required skills. More representation from the Global South is needed as they have cultural, linguistic and applied skills that match with the host country and is beneficial for the UN peacekeeping operations (Coning 2011:590). The increasingly specialized task of UN peace operations require civilian experts with contextual understanding of the host country which is mostly found in the Global South (Karlsrud et al. 2013:136). Thus, civilian capacities from the Global South are expected to play a larger role in international peace and security and special attempts been made to get candidates from the Global South.

The direct recruitment process also faces the difficulty to identify candidates in certain specialised categories. The DPKO/DFS non-paper, “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” have identified the lack of civilian specialists especially in the rule of law section as these skills do not exist or are not available in requisite numbers or areas of specialisation (United Nations 2009A:27). This demand for specialised civilian personnel has led to move from a quantitative focus on civilian numbers to a more qualitative approach for a more standard qualification.

Secondment recruitment: UN uses secondment recruitment only when specialists required cannot be recruited through normal recruitment system. Most of the time highly specialised individuals are in short supply. Some of these specialised functions which include the rule of law professions such as correction officers, magistrates and judges are mostly found in civil services of the governments (Conning 2011:588). Thus the UN approach the member states requesting them to made such personnel available for UN mission. DPKO had drafted a generic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for member states to offer specialist experts whenever the specialists are required. However the response for such request is poor and no agreements have been reached yet as the initiative were only to compliment regular DPKO recruitment mechanism when required rather than making part of the process (Gourlay 2006:2).

The secondment recruitment deploys government provided personnel (GPP) for the civilian component of the UN peacebuilding activities. The deployment of GPP can be divided into government level and the individual. In the governmental level it is the internal procedures and regulations for the secondment of government personnel to host countries. In the individual level it is national policies concerning bilateral agreements and supporting international institutions such as the UN. At the governmental level, within the rule of law area, minister of justice and correction or in some countries, Minister of Foreign Affairs has primary responsibility for the deployment of civilian capacity to the UN. In the individual level, the deployment of GPP is more motivated by individual ambitions and experience gaining. However, the obstacles for GPP deployments are a lack of extra civilian experts available for an extended period of time (Vermeelj et al. 2013:3). The government departments and agencies are reluctant to release their best staff to the UN. The seconding staffs to peace operations require additional resources to train them and get ready for UN deployment. Most of the countries from Global South have limited resources to invest in seconding staff as it

requires advance training and readiness. According to Coning, UN should attract more staff from the Global South as it provides for universal representation in the recruitment process and same goes in the case of gender representation (Coning, 2011:581).

Civilian roster system: The problem that UN faces in identifying appropriate candidate through normal recruitment process is addressed by adopting the civilian roster system. Rosters are mechanism where people are pre-trained, pre-identified and placed on rosters and when the need arises they are deployed. It is often seen that the civilian capacity gap can be addressed by the civilian rosters by pre-identifying civilians and keeping their information on record to facilitate a faster recruitment when they are required (Coning and Breidlid 2010:12). The UN faces difficulty in identifying qualified and experienced personnel in certain specialised categories. According to Cedric de Coning the UN do not have a supply side gap given the number of applicant, and the main challenge lies in the time it takes to recruit and fill up peace operations vacancies (Coning 2009:1). A lot of time is spent with the applications to identify the minimum requirements. Accordingly, the roster system helps in improving the time it takes to fill vacancies.

The civilian roster system is initiated at different levels: the UN level, the national level and the nongovernmental level. At the UN level, the DPKO has developed its Nucleus database as a rostering tool in response to the quantitative and qualitative demand of the civilian component. Through the UNs Galaxy online application system, DPKO is using open ended Generic Vacancy Announcement to populate the Nucleus roster. DPKO had also piloted the development of a Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR) in response to the demand for rapid deployment but it proved to a limited success. To populate its nucleus roster with suitable candidates, DPKO is trying to build better linkages with other UN departments, agencies and external roster managers. However, the principle obstacle to linkage with other external rosters is the DPKOs commitment to direct applications which do not allow gratis or seconded personnel and bring inter-agency fragmentation and competition (Gourlay 2006: 3). Nevertheless, in short to medium term, DPKO develops links with other UN departments or agencies, national roster and international nongovernmental rosters through agreements.

Roster system at the UN level: At the UN level, the DPKO has developed its Nucleus database as a rostering tool in response to the quantitative and qualitative demand of the civilian component. The Nucleus database is a roster of candidates for DPKO positions. DPKO is using open-ended Generic Vacancy Announcements to populate the Nucleus roster.

Generic Vacancy Announcements mainly help Nucleus serve its rostering purpose. The interested candidates register with Galaxy and complete an online Personal History Profile (PHP) form for DPKO positions which are automatically deposited in DPKO's recruitment Nucleus database. These applications can be in response to generic announcements with no fixed deadline and common screening for several post-specific vacancies. The Nucleus database has extended its scope and now includes 24 operational groups. Within these occupational groups, the new areas that were introduced in the DPKO have very limited candidates which include the areas of rule of law, corrections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and human rights (Gourlay 2006:13).

However, the Nucleus has certain challenges and limitation as a rostering tool. The Galaxy application system which generates too many applications to screen in a timely manner is inefficient as the vast majority of these applications are not suitable to the requirements. The electronic screening tools used for screening the candidates are also inadequate. The Nucleus database's search functions remain limited which is not in standard with the recruitment software industry. In a 2006 DPKO-commissioned lessons-learned study entitled 'Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations'. It was recommended that the DPKO/DFS consider making use of more sophisticated search tools to handle the large number of applications and try to search for the best candidates, instead of just meeting the minimum requirements (Coning 2011:586).

The DPKO's main recruitment strategy is to develop the Nucleus database into a standing roster capacity to improve the UN's ability to have a core professional standing civilian staff for a mission start-up or to fill specific gaps. However, the rosters system within the UN have been established to meet more limited short-term recruitment needs in specialised areas. This is because to develop standing roster capacity there is need for strong financial implications which most of the states seemed to have little support (Coning 2011:583). The standby roster capacity which is used for the short-term recruitment needs is not without challenges. The DPKO/DFS faces disadvantage while using short-term contract especially in those categories civilians which are in high demand, such as women and experienced civilians. Moreover, other UN agencies that offer for longer-term contracts and better conditions of service, including family duty stations, are in an advantageous position than the DPKO/DFS.

In response to the need for rapid deployment for short-term in the start-up phase of peace operations, DPKO piloted a project, Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR) in 2003 and 2004. The Roster consisted of pre-cleared DPKO headquarters staff that could be rapidly deployed for a period of up to three months to undertake critical tasks in the start-up phase of a mission. The RDR intensively deployed DPKO headquarters staff to the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2004. The main problem faced by the RDR in this mission was that the managers were reluctant to release their staff due to workload concerns at HQ. Moreover, once deployed, the managers in UNMIL were reluctant to allow the civilian staff to return to HQ after the 90 day period because these posts were still to be filled by the regular recruitment system. There was lack of confidence in the mechanism and finally a suspension as a tool of rapid recruitment (Gourlay 2006:18).

At present there is no civilian standby system in the UN Secretariat. The 2009 Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and the UN human resources policy restricts the UN Secretariat from recruiting staff from rosters. This is because the UN aims to give every candidate an equal opportunity to apply directly to the UN. As most rosters are based in the North, there is a perception that cooperating with rosters will give candidates based in the North an unfair advantage over candidates in the South (Coning 2011:585).

Roster system at national and non-governmental level: External rosters are initiated at the national and international non-governmental levels to facilitate the identification and recruitment of specialist civilian personnel for peace operations. In response to the increasing demand for civilian expertise for international peace operations many countries now maintain rosters of personnel. Catriona Gourlay (2006) have identified national and international non-governmental rosters assisting the DPKO identify and recruit specialized civilian personnel. By the 1990s, a number of national rosters were established and have increased their scope. Some of the rosters operate as independent organisations, even though funded by national governments or operate independently within government departments. This had positive implications as candidates were selected on merit basis rather than the inclinations of providing politically preferred. However, in many countries there is lack of independence and the government-controlled rosters and advance their preferred candidates rather than the most qualified (Gourlay 2006:27).

The national rosters are mostly based in countries like Canada, Germany, France, Norway, UK, US and Switzerland. In Canada, Canada's Civilian Reserve (CANADEM), was

established as a non-profit organization with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to facilitate requests from international peace operations. It maintains the largest national roster with a broad scope of expertise. The broad expertise in civilian category includes human rights, peacebuilding, rule of law, governance, democratization, elections and reconstruction. The CANADEM is currently discussing the development of a Memorandum of Understanding with DPKO. CANADEM is the most effective roster mechanism as relatively high numbers of Canadian civilians are employed in DPKO missions. Its success is due to large and diverse roster population, responding to DPKO needs pro-actively, and its effective screening techniques.

France Cooperation International (FCI) promotes French expertise with support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It identifies and recruits experts. It has put forward number of its candidates in direct requests for individual experts or expert teams by international organizations. Like the CANADEM, the FCI have begun to discuss the agreement of a Memorandum of Understanding with the DPKO.

In Germany, the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) was founded with core support of the Federal Foreign Office. The ZIF includes civilian expertise in various categories: democratization, elections, human rights, rule of law, public administration, media development, public information, political affairs, legal affairs, infrastructure and economic affairs, refugees, and reconciliation. The ZIF encourage members of the roster to apply directly to DPKO because of the UNs no gratis personnel. Like CANADEM and FCI, ZIF also received the draft Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of an international roster of civilian experts from DPKO and have responded with interest.

The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) in Norway is the first national roster established for the identification of civilian experts for international peace operations. It maintains a roster of experts who are deployed through secondment. The civilian expertise consists of the following categories: election observers, election experts, political analysis, local governance, free media, good governance, legal reform, human rights monitors and investigators of gross violations of human rights. Most of the civilian experts were deployed in election observation missions. In the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), four civilian experts were seconded to DPKO (Gourlay 2006:31).

In the United Kingdom, Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) is an interdepartmental which provides post conflict stabilization assistance. The deployable civilian experts are within the following categories: economic; governance; infrastructure; public services; health and justice. These categories of civilian experts are contracted to the UN mission.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) of the US Department of State (DOS) is overseeing the development of the various mechanisms for the identification, recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel for peace operations. These mechanisms are: the Active Response Corps, a Civilian Reserve and Global Skills Network. One advantage for DPKO under this national roster is that these mechanisms are being developed in a single office (S/CRS) to respond to requests from DPKO for candidates with specific expertise, otherwise it is a major challenge where different ministries or NGOs maintain the roster (Gourlay2006:35).

In Switzerland, the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP) was established within the Political Affairs Division of the Department for Foreign Affairs. The SEP includes various civilian experts in the following categories: democratization, rule of law, human rights monitoring, election observation and gender issues. The roster response to direct requests for seconded assistance to DPKO through the Galaxy website rather than communicated directly to member states and their respective roster managers.

The main challenge at the national level is that the government controlled rosters are usually limited to its civil servants and thus limited in their size. It excludes civilian experts that have international non-governmental experience or experience working in international organisations and mostly favour its politically preferred candidates. It is recommended that the DPKO need to draw upon the widest range of potential candidates, not limiting its links with external rosters which is directly operated by member states but also non-governmental sector. Another potential challenge faced by DPKO is that national level civilian rosters are maintained in different ministries or NGOs with number of relevant contact points or roster managers which creates difficulty in managing. This challenge can be reduced by insisting on a single, central contact point for requesting expert assistance (Gourlay 2006:32).

There are also international non-governmental organisations playing an important role in assisting the United Nations in the identification of civilian expertise. One of the

advantages of non-governmental rosters is their independence. Independently run rosters tend to be non-exclusive and open to members from a broad range of backgrounds, including the private and non-governmental sectors. However, till date there has been little contact between DPKO and the non-governmental rosters as no formal links is developed and mainly because DPKO only accepts direct applications. Roster systems at national and non-governmental levels are also maintained mostly among the developed countries, thus leading to non-participation of experts from the developing countries.

Recruitment Challenges

One of the main problems DPKO/DFS faces is the civilian personnel retention in the field mission. DPKO/DFS uses short-term contracts in recruiting civilians. This is a disadvantage, especially in those categories of civilian personnel in high demand, such as women and highly specialized personnel (Coning 2011:584). Other UN agencies offer better longer-term contracts and better conditions of service, including family duty stations which are comparative disadvantage for DPKO/DFS. Thus, the UN suffers high vacancy rates, and one of the reasons is poor staff retention. Addressing the problem of staff retention helps in reducing the stress on filling new vacancies and helps in building experience and continuity in the organization (Coning 2011:588). The Senior Advisory Group (2011) argues that field civilian personnel in mission lacks the minimum basic need of decent sanitary conditions, liveable accommodation, basic recreational facilities, access to electricity, potable water, adequate nutrition and the Internet (United Nations 2011C:36). This is negatively affecting retention rates and more particularly women. Without guaranteeing these basic requirements, DPKO/DFS will struggle to attract new recruits. Various recommendations were given to effectively address the civilian retention problem. The DPKO policy directive (2006) have recommended that retention of female civilian personnel can be pursued through improved Human Resources Management Reforms so as to reduce the high staff turnover and to foster greater gender balance (United Nations 2006:6). The Senior Advisory Council (2011) recommends the creation of a fast-track career programme that enables the United Nations particularly DPKO to retain talented civilian staff who are willing to serve in the field through measures like better rotation and mobility programmes to keep service in difficult duty stations attractive (United Nations 2011C:6).

Another major problem for the UN recruitment is the participation from the Global South. Even though there is 60 percent international civilian staff from the Global South in

UN peacekeeping operations, the main problem lies with lack of identifying specialized civilian as the Global South lack in maintaining roster system (Coning and Karlsrud 2011:3). Only countries that can afford with additional resources are maintaining rostering system which mostly comes from the North. UN peace operations benefit more from civilian personnel from the South because cultural, linguistic and skills match with the societies of the host country.

There is a lack of women civilian component in the UN peace operations, especially in the leadership and senior position. The uneven balance of gender at the national level reflects in its contribution to the international missions which is reflected in the gender imbalance in the UN peace operations (Coning 2011:580). There is also lack of sufficient resources to identify women candidates for senior level positions. Retention of female civilian personnel is another problem as there are no family duty stations and the extreme insecure conditions in the field. As a result, they mostly prefer to stay in the Headquarter. In the report, “Women’s participation in peacebuilding – Report of the Secretary-General” (A/65/354–S/2010/466), the Secretary-General defined a seven-point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding (United Nations 2010:9-10). Among the seven-point commitments, it also highlighted that civilian capacity need to include specialized skills to meet women urgent needs and expertise in rebuilding state institutions to make the more accessible to women and girls and eliminating gender discrimination.

Types of Training

Training of civilian for peace operations have become an essential requirement for addressing the civilian capacity gap. Training in a way is to ensure whether there is capable candidate for deployment or personnel already employed to tackle new challenges. Earlier training for civilians were not given importance as they played a marginal role in peace operations. However, with the end of cold war the civilian role in peace operations have increased which led to the need for training of civilians along with military and police. Peacekeeping training aims to enhance mandate implementation by providing civilian personnel with the knowledge, skills and attitudes to enable them to meet the challenges of peacekeeping operations in accordance with DPKO principles, policies and guidelines and help them perform their functions in an effective, professional and integrated manner maintaining the core values of the UN (United Nations 2010: 4-5)

Civilian training could occur before recruitment, in preparation for deployment, on joining a mission and also in-mission training to sharpen skills or to address new needs not previously covered (Coning 2011:587). Basically there are three types of training provided for civilian component for peace operations: Pre-deployment, Induction training and in-service Training.

Pre-deployment training refers to generic and specialized peacekeeping training that is based on United Nations standards and takes place prior to the deployment. The Civilian Pre-Deployment Training (CPT) is one of the primary tools used by DPKO/DFS to improve preparedness, effectiveness and productivity of civilian peacekeepers to help them capable of serving in dangerous and complex peacekeeping environments. CPT provides general course and conducted by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of Department of Policy Evaluation and Training (DPET) of the DPKO/DFS. They conducted the course at the Global Service Centre in Brindisi since 2005. The percentage of personnel who have participated in the CPT course has increased steadily since its inception in 2005 (United Nations 2008A:6). It trains in understanding the United Nations practices and policies for peacekeeping and to prepare new civilian personnel to undertake assigned duties and responsibilities with confidence and adapt to complex mission life and to enhance effectively the performance and capabilities of the civilian component. Only those civilians that are new to UN peacekeeping or have not been employed in a UN peacekeeping operation for at least three years are required to attend the CPT.

The UN has provided for pre-deployment training through a series of DPKO developed standardized training modules called the Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTM). Pre-deployment training topics encompass a wide variety of issues such as prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, code of conduct, HIV/AIDS and security awareness. However, there were findings that the modules are very generic and vast and does not adequately address mission specific challenges (United Nations 2008A:6). Therefore, there is a demand for reform with mission-specific training to be provided during pre-deployment training for better understanding and preparation of the unique problem of the conflict affected country. The Integrated Training Service (ITS) is updating training materials and developing a “core curriculum” required for civilian staff. ITS has assembled a Core Advisory Group of relevant personnel from DPKO/DFS who are examining whether the SGTM continues to represent the

generic required knowledge for civilian peacekeeping personnel prior to deployment and also updating and prioritizing the content of the SGTM modules.

Induction training is provided to personnel deployed to UN headquarters in New York or in the field mission. All new civilian component needs to undergo generic induction training at the UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. Before assuming duties within the mission area, the civilian personnel along with military and police must receive the mandatory in-mission induction training to attain mission readiness. Induction training compliments pre-deployment training and other information courses provided prior to deployment (United Nations 2008A:11). It is also provided to civilian personnel joining departments at Headquarters. Integrated Mission Training Centres or Training Officers coordinates induction training where there is no integrated training structure (United Nations 2015:142).

This training is important as it introduces civilian component with important mission specific topics and departmental priorities and ensures that civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions understand the security, cultural and operational complexities of their working environment (United Nations 2008A:9). It assists them to perform their tasks safely, responsibly and effectively along with observing culturally-sensitive norms and practices of the host country.

Induction training prescribes civilian personnel the standards and values expected to perform in peacekeeping missions. Topics that are included are mission mandate, mission structure, rules of engagement, culture of the host country and decision-making and command (United Nations 2008A:8). The course is generally conducted by the mission's training cell, but the induction courses have also been provided by civilian training centres. At present there are various civilian training centres at Norway, Germany and Switzerland providing induction training like the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) of Germany, the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP) of Switzerland and the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) of Norway (Gourlay 2006:8). In SEP recruited civilian members participate in a two-week peacebuilding induction training course. On the other hand, in NORDEM civilian members are required to attend the 6-day basic induction training course. It also runs a 3-day course on election observation and members attend a rule of law fieldwork course. The ZIF also provides civilian members receive induction training and they participate in a 2-week induction course which is a pre-requisite

for the selection process. Induction training provides an introduction to mission specific organizational, operational, and administrative topics and also regarding United Nations policies and procedures. Cross cutting issues like capacity development, gender and human rights are also provided to civilian component.

According to the UN Needs Assessment report there was concern that there is duplication in the content of the pre-deployment and induction training. Most of the topics which are provided in the pre-deployment training such as prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, code of conduct and mission mandate are also instructed in the induction training (United Nations 2008A:10). Due to this duplication, ITS have tried to standardise the induction training and harmonize the content of pre-deployment and induction training. This is done through developing a policy to clarify the optimal duration of induction training and for civilians it ranges from 0.5 days to 7 days with an average of 2.3 days and standardise it as to which personnel should be included in induction training at headquarters and in the field, which topics should be covered in this phase, and how these topics should be adapted to the mission context (United Nations 2008A:11). Therefore to ensure harmonization between pre-deployment and induction training, mechanisms are being developed by ITS to avoid duplication or overlap.

In-Service training is provided to peacekeeping personnel already working at the headquarters or in the field after induction training is provided. It provides learning activity for civilian personnel during their duty assignment. A variety of job-specific, technical and mission-specific training courses are intended to provide civilian personnel with substantive knowledge and technical skills necessary for implementing peacekeeping mandates and effectively manage resources related to peacekeeping. Some courses are required; others are optional. These courses may be mandatory or optional. It mainly includes specialized training, career development training and cross cutting training.

The Assessment survey found that in-service training is important to improve the peacekeeping personnel effectiveness in carrying out their peacekeeping duties. This training enhances substantive and technical skills, communication skills or leadership and management skills. Along with civilian personnel and other components such as military and police, it is identified that communication, management, supervisory skills, teamwork, planning and organizing, IT/computer skills and client orientation are the most common needs in ongoing training.

In-service training in its course gives emphasis to leadership and management skills training. Senior leadership personnel in mission must enhance their ability to establish and communicate a shared vision and clearly defined strategic objectives, tackle effectively material and human resources, and prevent or mitigate crisis in peace operations (United Nations 2008A:15). One of the main priorities of ITS is to provide stronger leadership training for peacekeeping personnel including civilian component. Currently, ITS runs several courses for senior management and the main programmes are the Senior Leaders' Induction Programme (SLIP) and the Senior Missions Leaders (SML) course. Both the course are continuously being reviewed and modified to meet the needs of senior leaders. The SML course provides essential knowledge and skills required in complex and multidimensional missions to enhance the task of managers. This includes better knowledge of peacekeeping, the strategic vision required for effective mandate implementation, in-depth information on UN rules and regulations in human resources and code of conduct, resource management and finance information (United Nations 2015:147). The Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) is a mandatory five-day course which provides newly-appointed senior leaders in field missions with an orientation of the main challenges faced by senior leadership and the relationship between field missions and UN Headquarters. The participants from civilian component are field mission senior leaders such as Directors of Political Affairs, senior public information officers, Chief Electoral Officers and Senior Judicial Affairs Officer.

There is a concern that United Nations peacekeeping leadership is facing capacity gap as many lacked the skills to clearly define strategic objectives, establish a shared vision and prevent crisis. According to the Needs Assessment Report (2008), some leaders are also not well equipped to identify key issues in complex situations, effectively utilize material and human resources and propose effective and timely action to any problem. Moreover, both the training courses provided by ITS is not adequately addressing the gaps in peacekeeping leadership skills (United Nations 2008A:15). To address the shortcoming, ITS is working in partnership with the Office of Human Resources Management to provide training courses that meet the needs of peacekeeping leadership and review the SLIP and SML accordingly.

Other than the three training courses provided by the UN, technical and specialized training are also provided by certain departments and offices at the Headquarter. The Strategic Communications Division of the DPI plans and supervises annual training course for senior public information officers serving in UN peace operations. DPKO, through its Criminal Law

and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) is developing guidance tools and training materials to support the justice and corrections units in the field. The OHCHR is developing human rights education and training materials and resource tool such as a Database on Human Rights Education and Training.

Another major challenge is that the Global South, which is an important source of civilian capacity, has few training centres dedicated to developing and mobilizing civilian capacity in the South. Most of the highly specialized civilians seconded for DPKO peacekeeping missions come from the Global North. The training centres are mostly located in the Global North. There are training centres in Africa like African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) which is a non-governmental conflict management organisation with the aim of contributing to the building of African capacities and skills by providing training. Most of the training centres in Africa are non-governmental and take a bottom up approach. There are some countries from the South like Brazil, Turkey and South Africa who are still in its discussion stage (SIPRI, 2012:14)

There are serious gaps in all the phases of training: pre-deployment, induction and ongoing. In pre-deployment training there is lack of mission specific training and overemphasis of generic issues were. In the induction training there is problem of duplication in the topics of training with the pre-deployment training. Management, communication and leadership training are the important gaps of ongoing training. In general, training skills needs to be improved in some priority areas like communication, culture of the host country, supervisory skills, team work, planning and organizing, IT/computer skills, client orientation, conflict resolution and risk management(United Nations 2008A:11). The Needs Assessment report (2008) also highlighted the need to strengthen mainstreaming the policies, procedures and processes of UN peacekeeping and to update the training materials and topics with the challenges posed by today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

The civilian personnel have been playing a central role in peace operations and accordingly there has been growing demand for their expertise. The shift to intra state wars with more engagements in resolving violent conflicts and reconstruction assistance has led to increase both qualitatively and quantitatively of civilian component of UN peace operations. Quantitative and qualitative demands of civilian component have increase since 1990s to

respond to intra state conflicts. Earlier only limited peacekeeping operations with civilian mandate had been authorised. From 1991 onwards to the present, there are 57 peacekeeping operations from which almost 32 missions have the civilian component.

The increase in quantity and quality of civilian component in the post-cold war is due to the expansion of tasks. UN peacekeeping operations since 1991 till present 2014 have expanded mandate with civilian specific task such as free and fair elections, monitoring human rights, reform of the judiciary, repatriation of refugees, extension of state authority and many more. With complexity of mandate, civilian component which was earlier limited to advisory role has at present exercise more operational and technical roles. There are more qualitative demands for civilian capabilities as more challenging mandates are given to the civilian component. Thus over the past decade there have been widening range of civilian tasks and requirement of more skilled and specialized civilian personnel to help stabilize post-conflict situations and secure the transition from war to peace has led to quantitative and qualitative change. With the increase in complex operations in post cold war, earlier structures became inadequate to plan and manage peacekeeping operations. To address these challenges, the Secretariat was restructured and in 1992, DPKO was created to handle peacekeeping missions. Moreover, following the Brahimi Report in 2000, DPKO was enlarged and restructured which supported all aspects of peace operation.

At the Headquarter level the main offices where civilian component is concentrated includes the Office of Operations and Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the DPKO. Both the political affairs and civil affairs units in the field have desk officers in the respective regional division of the Office of Operations and thus maintain a line of communication. The Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) is another structure dealing with civilian personnel of the judicial officer and corrections officers. Justice and corrections officers in the field provide regular reports to the DPKO on the developments and challenges in the rule of law area. The UN Secretariat also provides support and guidance to civilian component through the Department for Public Information (DPI) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the DPA works closely with DPKO in planning and managing electoral support aspects of peacekeeping operations which is the focal point in the UN system and provides technical assistance. Moreover, another important initiative in organizational structure was in the human rights area, where a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was concluded between the Department

of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to provide assistance, guidance and support to human rights unit in UN peace operations. Thus, the human rights unit has a dual reporting line to both the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) and the OHCHR.

However, the organizational structure of civilian component lacks standard which creates difficulty in the command and control. It is still at its nascent stage facing structural uncertainty not appropriately configured, no unified team of experts for analysis; planning and coordination; and also lacking adequate resources. Moreover, due to involvement of many other agencies with civilian task, the need to collaborate has become a critical for DPKO. There is also the problem of division with the Headquarter is mainly staffed by the Global North and field level from the developing countries.

At the operational level, each unit of the civilian component have different chain of command but all are required to report the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who serves as Head of Mission and is responsible for implementing the mission's mandate. SRSG plays an important role by uniting together as a team many separate civilian units in a mission. In the civilian component, like that of the military and police also there is a technical reporting and communication link with the Headquarter at New York. However, unlike the military and police components, the technical reporting line civilian units are complex. In the political affairs unit, some missions only have a few political affairs officers as part of the office of the SRSG or Head of the Mission and in large missions there may be more than 30 political affairs officers Headed by a Director. On the other hand, in the public information section in some operations, the chief of information and the mission spokesperson are the same person. However, it is advantageous to separate the two positions where there is large and diversified public information officers present in the mission. At the field level, the civilian component has a non-hierarchical nature of organizational structure with no adequate rank and standing unlike military and police components. This creates confusion in the line of communication and reporting.

The recruitment process of UN civilian component is unique compared to the military and police components, which usually adopt the secondment system. The normal recruitment process of UN civilian component is direct recruitment for peace operations. However, it adopts secondment recruitment in certain circumstances. The Department of Field Support (DFS) provides support to direct recruitment process by advertising vacant civilian positions

on the UN Galaxy e-Staffing System Website. Accordingly, individuals apply online directly and successful candidates are hired. This is to avoid bias in seconding civilian personnel which only few states that can afford to investment, especially the industrialized nations thus giving developed nations an unfair representation. Mainly due to this reason, the UN is not dependent on the civil services of governments but also professionals from any background. Moreover, the General Assembly also passed two resolutions to restrict the use of gratis personnel. However, the UN direct recruitment process is faced with various challenges such as bureaucratic and slow nature of work, high vacancy rates especially during the start-up phase, less civilian component turnover due to lack of security and difficult working conditions, difficult to retain women staff due to lack of family duty stations, not finding the candidates with required skills, need for more representation from the Global South and difficulty in identifying candidates in certain specialised categories such as rule of law section.

UN uses secondment only when system highly specialised individuals are in short supply which cannot be recruited through normal recruitment. A generic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted between the DPKO and member states so that the need for specialist expert is addressed. But this could not be reached as initiatives were only to compliment regular DPKO recruitment mechanism when required instead of making a normal recruitment process. Moreover, for secondment recruitment, the UN deploys government provided personnel (GPP) mechanism specifically for the rule of law area. Most of the government departments and agencies are reluctant to release their best staff to the UN. As secondment recruitment is only adopted when the need arises, it overcomes the dilemmas experienced by organisations relying on secondment.

Another important way through which UN identifies appropriate candidates when it faces problem through the normal recruitment process is the civilian roster system. This system helps in improving the time it takes to fill vacancies by pre-identifying civilians and keeping their information on record to facilitate a faster recruitment when they are required. The civilian roster system is initiated at different levels: the UN level, the national level and the nongovernmental level. At the UN level, the DPKO has developed its Nucleus database as a rostering tool. However, the Nucleus as a rostering tool has certain limitation such as there are too many applications that are generated which are not suitable to the requirements, the screening tools are also inadequate and the rosters system have been established to meet only

limited short-term recruitment needs in specialised areas, instead of a more developed standing roster capacity due to financial implications or lack of better conditions of work. However, the Secretary General report restricts the UN Secretariat from recruiting staff from rosters because the UN aims to give every candidate an equal opportunity to apply directly to the UN. Most rosters are based in the North and thus relying more on rosters may lead to unfair advantage over candidates in the South.

There are also external rosters initiated at the national and international non-governmental levels to identify and recruit specialist civilian personnel for peace operations. National rosters may operate as independent organisations, even though funded by national governments and on the other hand in many countries there is lack of independence where politically preferred candidates rather than the most qualified are advance. Moreover, at the national level civilian rosters are maintained in different ministries or NGOs instead of a single body.

Along with the specific challenges faced by the various recruitment processes within the UN, there certain general challenges. There is retention problem in the field mission especially women and highly specialized personnel which are in great demand. As other UN agencies offer better longer-term contracts and better conditions of service which creates disadvantage for DPKO/DFS. Another major problem for the UN recruitment is the participation from the Global South due to lack of identifying specialized civilian as the Global South lack in maintaining roster system which require additional resources. Moreover, there is lack of women civilian component in the UN peace operations, especially in the leadership and senior position mostly due to the uneven balance of gender at the national level which reflects in its contribution to the international missions.

Training of civilian for peace operations have become an essential requirement for addressing the civilian capacity gap. It provides civilian personnel with the knowledge, skills and attitudes to enable them to meet the challenges of peacekeeping operations in accordance with DPKO principles, policies and guidelines so that they can perform their functions in an effective way. Civilian training is mainly of three types which includes pre-deployment, induction training and On-going Training. Pre-deployment training is both generic and specialized peacekeeping training which takes place prior to deployment to a DPKO led mission. This type of training helps improve preparedness, effectiveness and productivity to new civilian component so that they can undertake assigned duties and responsibilities with

confidence and effectively and adapt to complex mission life. However, it is found that the course is very generic and vast which does not adequately address mission specific challenges. Following these limitations, readjustment of the training standards were initiated which includes updating training materials and developing a “core curriculum” required for civilian staff.

Induction training is provided to new civilian component personnel before deployment to UN headquarters in New York or in the field mission. Induction training is a compliment to pre-deployment training and other information courses prior to deployment. There has been concern that there is duplication in the content of the pre-deployment and induction training. Thus, the need for standardisation of the induction training and harmonizing with the content of pre-deployment and induction training is being adopted. Ongoing training is a learning activity for civilian personnel during their duty assignment. This training includes job-specific, technical and mission-specific training courses to provide civilian personnel with substantive knowledge and technical skills for implementing peacekeeping mandates and effectively managing resources. However, there is a concern that United Nations peacekeeping leadership are not properly equipped to identify strategic objectives and establish a shared vision and prevent crisis. To address this limitations partnership between the ITS and the Office of Human Resources Management is taking place to provide training courses to meet the needs of peacekeeping leadership.

Other than the three training courses provided by the UN, technical and specialized training are also provided by certain departments and offices at the Headquarter. This includes The Strategic Communications Division of the DPI training course for senior public information officers, Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) training materials to support the justice and corrections units and the OHCHR is developing human rights education and training materials.

However, it has been identified that the Global South, which is an important source of civilian capacity, have few training centres dedicated to developing and mobilizing civilian capacity in the South.

Apart from the specific challenges, civilian component also face other important challenges. The works of non-military personnel are very technical which require enough financial assistance for the training and rostering facilities. Most of the highly specialized

experts come from the Global North and there have been concern that funds are immediately available for the foreign technical assistance salaries but not for local or national actors (Morris and Stedman, 2008:44). Most of the countries from Global South due to insufficiency of resources are unable to provide highly specialized experts that require proper training and rostering facilities. There is also concern that financial assistance in peace operations mostly for military personnel than for the civilian component. There is no UN budget funding for civilian activities.

Civilian consist of 20 percent of UN peacekeepers. Although there has been a sharp rise in the number of civilian tasks mandated in UN resolutions, the critical shortage of civilian personnel in global peace support operations is the major challenge (Zabadi 2012:2). There is demand for more specialized expertise in different field and the main challenge of the UN is the civilian capacity gap. To find this expertise and fill the civilian capacity gaps, the United Nations needs to explore a greater variety of sources of capacity, particularly from the global South, and to build effective partnerships with potential provider (United Nation 2011C and Coning, 2013).

In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, civilian component may include experts in various areas like political affairs, human rights, civil affairs, public information, human rights, gender, civil administration, child protection, rule of law and electoral affairs. A major challenge is the coordination of these various units of civilian component. When there is no proper communication and coordination it leads to duplication of work. The SRSG plays an important role in bringing together the various civilian units to work in a coordinated and cooperative manner and share information to avoid duplication. Thus, the SRSG must ensure that the civilian unit pursue an integrated and coordinated approach to bring durable and lasting peace.

Another important challenge is that peace operations often displays civilian roles that should be performed by local actors. Capacity building of local actors is not effectively mobilized due to undermining of local capacities and also due to time constraints in peace operations. There is a general prejudice that local expert may not match an international expert in level of education and professional experience. However national experts have other important qualities like familiarity with local contacts, language, geography, and culture which is undermined in the present recruitment process (Breidlid et al 2013:144). Thus peace operations take the risk of deploying international civilian experts to

perform tasks that could have been performed by local actors (Conning 2011: 587). This deprives the local actors to address their own problems and take responsibility for their own solutions. Rather than maintaining international peace and security, peace operations contribute to the very fragility and undermining its own mandates. Moreover, there has been concern that more often local expertise ends up serving international actors which creates a weak local institutions (Conning 2011: 588). Peace operations can avoid these challenges in consultations with local actors. While planning for new missions there is need for considerations of how staffing and deployment policies can be managed that builds local capacities and facilitates local ownership (Conning 2011:588). This stressed in the Secretary General's report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict that highlights that international expertise must be balanced with increased use of local capacities to strengthen national legitimacy and long term sustainability (Breidlid et al. 2013:144).

CHAPTER 4

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

The intrastate wars are mostly very destructive. The post-conflict society after such destructive war is fragile where there is no law and order, collapse of government institutions, human rights abuse, economic break down and no social security and rule of law. Such kind of conflict also has spill over effect to neighbouring countries as it produces massive humanitarian crisis, mass refugee flow, spread of contagious diseases and bases for terrorist group which ultimately effect peace and security of the world (Paris 2007:404). Lack of legitimate government institutions has created the massive human rights abuse. The state itself is unable or unwilling to protect its own people from grave human rights violations. Due to insecure environment, there is no normal civilian life. The economy is totally ruined and the production capacities of both public and private sectors are reduced with no capacity to direct the economy. National and local administrative structures are weakened or destroyed in the wake of the war and also the judicial infrastructure is seriously damaged. These large scale crises area serious concern and very sensitive which need international assistance. Moreover, long duration of civil war has created deep mistrust among the people and many countries affected by civil war needed complete reconstruction, politically, economically and socially.

Rebuilding the capacities of the is important to bring about durable peace and stability. The UN peace operations have been mandated with post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building with a view to addressing the root causes of conflict. In most of the peacekeeping operations from early 1990s onwards such as Namibia, Central America, Cambodia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Timor Leste, and DRC and others, the UN was required not only to make peace, but to conduct nationwide processes of reconstruction (United Nations 2012A:13).

The complex operations arising from civil wars required knowledge and expertise to a much greater extent than did the earlier cease-fire monitoring missions. The multidimensional peacekeeping operations which included a more extended task of peacebuilding and reconstruction activities required a more skilled expertise that can effectively implement the mandate. Mandates are more ambitious which requires not only active involvement in ending the conflict but also in assisting the transition to peace. These have incorporate a substantial number of civilian tasks which includes building institutions of governance, providing

electoral assistance, strengthening rule of law, monitoring and promoting human rights, providing basic services, development of free media and civil society. Thus, to bring a long term peace and stability, the UN civilian experts have come to play a key role in providing assistance in political, economic and social reconstructions. Reconstruction process helps in harmonizing deeply divided post-conflict societies ravaged by the long war and build confidence among them which help in creating lasting peace. Managing the reconstruction process in post-conflict countries is an enormous challenge for the civilian component that plays a central role in the transition towards durable peace.

This chapter starts with analysis of how and why the expansion of role and functions of civilian component over the period. It discusses the five core areas of reconstruction and guiding principles of carrying out the reconstruction activities, highlighting the importance of UN civilian personnel in addressing these five areas. The major focus of this chapter is to discuss critically the roles and functions of the each of the major civilian personnel of the UN civilian component in carrying out the post-conflict reconstruction of the societies and challenges they faced with in their field of activities. It ends with focus on common challenges the civilian component face which hampers their effectiveness.

Expansion of Civilian Component

The task of civilian component of the UN multidimensional peacekeeping has undergone gradual change from a periphery to a more significant role in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Earlier civilian component mostly supported the military component. Electoral assistance has been the earliest task assigned to the civilian component in UN peacekeeping operations. When UN peacekeeping operations were mandated with more complex operations, civilian component became more diversified. For instance, in 1989 the United Nations mission in Namibia (UNTAG) was given the task to provide assistance in conducting free and fair elections (Diehl 2007:49). Electoral assistance became an important task for helping the post-conflict countries in transition towards democracy and this assistance was provided by civilian experts on election matters. By 1990s massive human rights violations was considered as a threat to international peace and security. The UN peacekeeping operations incorporated civilian experts on human rights to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights (Boehme 2008:12). For instance, in

1991 monitoring human rights situation became an important task for the United Nations observer mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).

Moreover, it was also felt the need for rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure which became necessary for a durable peace. For instance, ONUSAL was the first operation to be mandated to reform judicial system. This task was implemented under the ONUSAL Human Rights Division responsible for the administration of justice of human rights (United Nations 2015:47). The judicial and correction officers became an important unit of the civilian component in the reestablishment and strengthening of the judicial and legal systems in post conflict societies. In the same way, Civil Affairs Officers whose initial task was monitoring local parties on the ground become more specialized to support and strengthen local institutions, especially extension of state authority in areas where it has never been present or absent for a long period of time (Carvalho 2010:30). In the late 1990s with the UN getting more involved in state-building, the Civil Affairs Officers task for supporting local institutions increased in importance.

By late 1990s and early 2000, various new and more specialized tasks were mandated to UN civilian component. Women suffered more than others in conflict situation and faced peculiar problems. The civilian gender experts are incorporated in the UN peacekeeping operations to address the problem of gender equality and plight of women in conflict affected countries. The UN Security Council formally adopted the Resolution 1325 in 2000 which urged the Secretary-General to include the gender component in peace operations to play an important catalyst in mainstreaming gender aspects (Boehme 2008:15). Children are the worst victims in conflict affected countries. To deal with problem of children, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1261 in 1999 to address child protection concerns (United Nations 2011A:17). Another important inclusion of task is the dissemination of information in UN peacekeeping operations to provide authentic information to address tension and violence in conflict affected countries. Innovative public information was for the first time established in 1999 in MONUC, where information was provided through radio to inform people spread across in a larger geographical area about the peace process (United Nations 2003B:47). Thus, over the years, more and more civilian experts are incorporated in the peace operations and they are expected to lay the foundation for long term stability through its reconstruction activities.

The civilian component play key role in carrying out the five priority peacebuilding areas identified by the Secretary-General, which include basic safety and security, inclusive political processes, basic social services, core government functionality and economic revitalization (United Nations 2009A:6). When large scale violence ends, the needs for the civilian component have been expanded in the UN peacekeeping operations.

Among the five core areas identified by the UN Secretary General, the first core area is basic safety and security and this area is supported through the activities of military peacekeepers, police, mine action, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), strengthening the rule of law for an effective peace and stabilization (United Nations 2009A:23). This area is essential to the population to create security space and to carry out other reconstruction activities and enable the delivery of international assistance. In this area, civilian task are mostly located in the reintegration process and the strengthening of rule of law. In the reintegration process, civilian experts assist ex-combatants in acquiring civilian status and gaining sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process taking place in communities at the local level (United Nations 2010:4). Reintegration process is related to early recovery and development processes which often necessitates long-term external assistance. It creates an environment for enabling political and peace process by supporting ex-combatants to become active participants in the peace process. In the reintegration process the ex-combatants are provided counselling, financial support, skills training and education for stable peace by the UN civilian component in partnership with other actors (United Nations 2010:8). The civilian component included in DDR programmes are usually political affairs officers, civil affairs officers, correction officers and child protection advisers. Political affairs officers develop DDR with military component and humanitarian and development organizations. Civil Affairs Officers key mission objective is social integration. For example, in the Transitional Authority in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sirimium (UNTAES), the civil affairs officers were responsible for reintegration and reconstruction (United Nations 2003B:35). Correction officers assist in developing programmes for reintegration of ex-combatants or offenders into society after the completion of prison sentence (United Nations 2003B:99). Child protection advisers mainly assist former child soldiers through release of children from armed groups and reunite with the family. The DDR experts are provided by various UN departments and entities. In the DPKO, the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions has a DDR Section which provides a dedicated headquarters support capacity(United Nations 2010:25).

The rule of law component assists in the strengthening of rule of law in post conflict countries. This is carried out by civilian experts like judiciary and correction officers. Correction officers advice national authorities on institutional restructuring and train national correction services (United Nations 2011C:68). On the other hand, judicial affairs officers help in re-establishing justice institutions and provide assistance to courts, prosecution services, legal professionals associations, legislative drafting, access to justice, juvenile and gender justice and criminal law (United Nations 2011A:72).

DPKO deploys corrections officers to train national corrections services and advises on legislation and infrastructure development and also has expertise in the headquarters in the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions' Criminal Law and Justice Advisory Service. Judicial affairs officers is provided by DPKO to help reform and re-establish justice institutions for strengthening the rule of law by providing activities which include assistance for courts, prosecution services, legal professionals' associations, legislative drafting, access to justice, juvenile and gender justice and criminal law (United Nations 2011C:72). DPKO and DPA support judicial and legal reform through the rule of law and justice components of field missions.

The second core area is inclusive political processes which include constitution drafting, starting electoral processes, political party development, public information and media. It is significant as it supports in reconstituting a stable and peaceful political order for maintaining sustainable peace. It strengthens national capacities at several levels and helps in the restoration or extension of legitimate state authority. To carry out the tasks relate to political processes, civilian experts such as electoral experts, judicial affairs officers, human rights advisers, child protection advisers and gender advisers, political affairs officers, constitutional experts, media experts are involved. These experts assist in the process of drafting a new constitution or reforming an existing constitution which is important for forming a state based on rule of law (United Nations 2011C:76). The provision of constitutional assistance is closely linked to specific mission mandates. DPA and DPKO lead constitutional assistance in mission settings with UNDP providing policy and technical expertise (United Nations 2011A:76).

Electoral process is another important task in this area which is a vital part towards democratic transition. The UN electoral officers are involved in these processes. DPA's Electoral Assistance Division supports electoral assistance and deploys electoral officers in

UN missions (United Nations 2011C:78). Along with this process, political party development is an important task to strengthen political parties to perform as effective actors of democratization and good governance. Capacities in political party are primarily administered by UNDP (United Nations 2011C:82). Other United Nations capacities exist in DPA in its mediation roster and expertise on political party development and DPKO programmes capacity development and good offices.

In the inclusive political process, Public Information and media is an integral part for maintaining peace and assisting in international aid and development efforts which is exercised by public information officers. The Department of Public Information (DPI) of the UN plays an important role in coordinating communicating strategies for missions and deploys public information experts to assess, draft and implement communications strategy (United Nations 2011C:84).

The third core area is the provision of basic services which is necessary to build core state capacities and also to ensure socio-economic development. This includes water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. The civilian experts may include human rights experts, medical specialists and civil affairs officers. Experts for basic services are mostly provided by UN agencies to field missions. Water and sanitation promote hygiene, develop water supplies, waste management and drainage and exercise by medical specialist or any specialist experts on basic services. Among them UNICEF is taking the lead in supporting national programmes to provide access to water and basic sanitation (United Nations 2011C:102). In the health section civilian experts like medical specialists seeks to improve the effectiveness, predictability and accountability of health action during humanitarian responses (United Nations 2011C:96). WHO is leading in the health section and it has rosters of health experts in speciality areas. UNICEF focuses on child health and provides health education. Providing quality education which is exercised by civil affairs or human rights affairs to children and young people promotes sustainable development in the long term. UNICEF is playing the lead role in providing education to children and UNHCR provides access to basic education for refugees and IDPs (United Nations 2011C:90). UN Volunteers (UNV) also has capacity in education matters.

The fourth core area is restoring core government functions which are essential to strengthen national ownership in post-conflict countries for political and development process

which includes basic public administration and public finance (United Nations 2011C:104). In the basic public administration, UN is providing assistance in supporting the executive branch, the legislative and also local governance which includes civilian experts such as civil affairs officers and judicial affairs officers. For supporting the executive branch, DPKO provides technical assistance for policy development, legal and management reform, decentralization of state authority and support to local governance structures(United Nations 2011A:104). OHCHR also assist in the reformation of executive branch by promoting good governance and human rights across all branches of government.

Restoring of legislative process is exercised by judicial affairs officers, correction officers and human rights officers to create legislative institutions that are representative, effective and accountable to the people (United Nations 2003B:94-107). UNDP is the designated United Nations agency for legislative assistance. UNDP provides technical support in legislative drafting, trains members of parliament and their staffs and in defining legislation priorities (United Nations 2011C:110). If mandated, DPA and DPKO deploy capacity to support the legislative branch.

With a bottom-up approach to involve more participation from the local level, local governance and decentralization initiatives is taken up by civilian component, especially civil affairs officers (United Nations 2003B:35). UNDP provides technical support to governments on local governance and decentralization. DPKO's role in local governance and decentralization depends on the mandate. DPKO deploys civil affairs unit for local governance (United Nations 2011C:112).

Assistance in financial management of public resources and delivery of services to achieve public policy objectives is also provided by the civilian component. UNDP deploys capacities in financial management from its rosters. DPKO, when mandated, advises governments on public financial management (PFM) and also coordinates United Nations PFM activities (United Nations 2011C:116). UNV's roster also has PFM capacity.

The last and Fifth core area is economic revitalization which is an essential part of peacebuilding. It is crucial in the immediate aftermath of conflict for stable peace and is necessary foundation for longer-term development. It includes employment generation and livelihoods for youth and former combatants and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. In this area the civilian experts are mostly provided by the UN entities. Employment generation aims

to generate employment that provides income and economic growth in conflict-affected communities (United Nations 2011C:120). ILO plays the lead role in employment generation and it supports rapid income generation programmes. Rehabilitation of infrastructures like private sector and industrial development and public works and infrastructure programmes help in economic revitalization. Under UN, it is assisted mostly by UNDP (United Nations 2011C:124-127).

These five core areas play a significant role in bringing sustainable development in post-conflict countries. Most of the tasks in these areas have been carried out by the UN civilian component in partnership with other actors. The Senior Advisory Group's (SAG) report, known as the Guehenno Report, has formulated a framework "OPEN" which refers to four key principles to carry out the post-conflict reconstruction. Those four guiding principles are: ownership, partnership, expertise and nimbleness (United Nations 2011C:3). These principles means to strengthen national ownership of peace processes by supporting core government functions, national capacities and improving the economic impact of international interventions; to encourage the United Nations to work in global partnerships with Member States and civil society organizations where civilian capacities are to be found; to draw on outside UN civilian expertise and to establish clarity on the core capacities of the United Nations and also stronger accountability to Member States; and lastly for using available resources more effectively and efficiently to increase UNs nimbleness in the post-conflict countries (United Nations 2011C:i). These four principles are expected to guide the activities of the UN civilian component in carrying out their mandated tasks.

Roles and Functions of Civilian Component

As discussed in the earlier chapter, the civilian component is not one coherent component with one identity or management structure, like that of UN police or military components. The Civilian component has gradually expanded with various kinds of experts are involved and their functions have become more complex and comprehensive. To effectively perform their complex tasks, civilians are mostly specialists or experts in their respective areas. Accordingly, each civilian expert has specialized roles and functions to perform in the mission.

Political Affairs Officers

The UN Political Affairs Officers mainly work at the national level and directly with the host government, assisting the political processes in the conflict affected countries. It originated in the traditional peacekeeping mission with the recognition that political advice needed to be internally available to the Heads of Mission (United Nations 2003B:23). However, political advisers, who were assisted by a political affairs officer, were initially drawn from the military, monitoring the activities of the military observers with political implications. With significant political mandate in most of the UN peace operations in the post-Cold War, political affairs officers are civilians playing important roles and functions as part of the Office of the SRSG or the Head of Mission (United Nations 2003B:24).

The role and functions of Political affairs officers are at the heart of mandate implementation and must carry the objective of the larger national and international political context(United Nations 2011B:16). The political affairs officers reports directly to SRSG regarding the developments in field missions.

In the pre-deployment phase, political affairs officer play an active role in providing *strategic assessment, planning and preparation of mandate* for the mission. In the strategic assessment, the political affairs officers assess the country or territory where the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation is envisaged and based on the findings of the assessment, a concrete recommendations to the Secretary-General is devised on how the UN system might respond to the post-conflict situation (United Nations 2011B:13). If the decision is made to deploy a UN mission, political affairs office is established as soon as possible so that political affairs officers undertake detail political analysis and planning (Oswald et al. 2010:571).The political affairs officers also provide early assessment and awareness of the mission's political environment to the Head of the Mission. The work that a mission does is inherently 'political' which is significant in supporting the peace process. Thus, when a mission plan is prepared the political affairs officers give recommendations of the political context required in the mission (Oswald et al. 2010:571). Moreover, in a transitional administration mandate, political affairs officers conceptualize, plan and establish new political institutions and thus provide support for strengthening of political and governance institutions in post conflict countries.

Political affairs officers play the role of a *negotiator and liaison officer* by maintaining the mission's primary contacts with the parties to the conflict by gathering information and

resolving disputes (United Nations 2003B:25). During the start-up phase of a peacekeeping operation, the role of the Political Affairs component is critical, especially if there is no peace agreement in place or if a long term political transition is under way when the mission is deployed (Oswald et al. 2010:571). In such situations, political affairs officers take additional responsibilities in supporting the SRSG during negotiation processes. Thus, the political affairs officers have an important role to function in the pre-negotiation stage which is very critical as a clear agreement is required for successful negotiations. During the negotiation process, the parties to the conflict and mediators to get to the table may sometimes hastily set up framework within which substantive issues are to be discussed (United Nations 2003B:26). But this is a bad process which most of the time leads to failure. However, the political affairs officers help in maintaining dialogue between the parties in the pre-negotiation stage even when the substantive issues are still too contentious to be discussed.

During the negotiation stage, the agreement process is very complicating with compromises among interested group, the emergence of potential winners and losers and differing interpretations of the agreement by the signatories (United Nations 2003B:25). A clear agreement is necessary for successful negotiations which are very critical but most of the time ignored. The political affairs officers have an important task to make the parties to the conflict commit and compliance with the agreement. Establishing confidence-building and conflict mitigation to deter potential spoilers is provided for smooth functioning of negotiations (United Nations 2011B:14). There is emergence of winners and losers with the shift in power balances which may favour different group in different stages. The Political affairs officers should be aware of these winners and losers, especially in the lead-up to elections and in the immediate aftermath, in order to prevent a breakdown in cooperation.

As a *liaison officer*, the political affairs officers, along with the parties to the conflict, interact and work together with other partners in the peace process, including all the United Nations entities, diplomats, international and regional organizations and civil society groups and leaders (United Nations 2003B:25). All components of the mission have external contacts in their respective functional areas but the political affairs component manages the overview. Regarding this task the political affairs officers advise the SRSG on the appropriate level of contacts between mission personnel and external partners and also when it is necessary for the SRSG to intervene personally at the highest level. The political affairs component is also

responsible for the liaison with the political authorities of the host country including the cabinet, parliament and local authorities (United Nations 2003B:25).

The political affairs officers play the *role of a monitor* of the national, sub-regional, regional and sometimes international political context relevant to the mandate. Under the monitoring role, the political affairs officers review and evaluate political developments as well as security, humanitarian and economic developments. Depending on the mission, the political affairs officers are charged with responsibilities when there are no civil affairs or human rights capacity which includes reporting on reconstruction, reconciliation and human rights issues (United Nations 2003B:26). Thus, political affairs officers assist in the integrated reporting of the Mission by providing the overall account and analysis of developments on the ground. This requires political affairs officers to have a comprehensive knowledge of the overall situation of the mission area. By drafting reports from the mission to DPKO political affairs officers provide a link between the global vision at Headquarters and developments on the ground (United Nations 2003B:27).

The political affairs officers play an important *coordinating role* within the mission. As a coordinating officer, political affairs officer coordinates inputs for reports coming from all mission components and other UN organizations to UN Headquarters in New York. In the field mission too political affairs officer coordinates reporting to the mission headquarters by all the other components deployed in that area. The coordinating function of political affairs is important in a multidimensional operation to avoid repetitive and conflicting information from different components (United Nations 2003B:29). As, Political affairs officers need to have a comprehensive knowledge of the activities and priorities of all components, they provide guidance and advice to other components of the mission on potential political implications of any activity and thus maintain coordination among the components.

For example, in the UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), political affairs officers played important roles and functions by supporting dialogue and reconciliation among the parties to the conflict during the start-up phase which led to the signing of a peace agreement (United Nations 2003B:27). Political affairs officers assisted in developing disarmament plans and restoring local government structures and helped in setting up district and provincial councils. Even in the difficult situation where Somali factions were not coming to terms with each other in an ambition to rebuild the internal structures of a functioning State, political affairs officers put in place 52 district councils and 8 regional councils (UN WebsiteE). They

tried their effort on opening dialogue with the warring party to commit to the peace agreement and with religious and traditional leaders to de-escalate the crisis. However their efforts were in vain as international resolve declined and the UN had to withdraw its mission (United Nations 2003B:27). After the peacekeeping force was withdrawn, few political affairs officers accompanied the special representative to Nairobi where a small office was set up to continue monitoring developments in Somalia. They worked closely with organizations and agencies that still had local staff in Somalia. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) set up in April 1995 which continued to assist in monitoring the Somali conflict from Nairobi. The work of the Political Office came to an end when the new President was sworn to end the Transitional Period.

Civil Affairs Officers

Civil Affairs Officers are mostly deployed at the local level to support social and civic conditions for maintaining peace. Civil Affairs Officers was started being used in the mid-1990s in peacekeeping missions. Initially, Civil Affairs Officers were tasked with providing support to the mission's police component to understand and deal with parties on the ground (Carvalho 2010:30). However, with the evolution of the peacekeeping missions, their tasks were expanded, and included an important role in supporting the strengthening of local structures in post-conflict countries. The name 'civil affairs' was officially used in 1992, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)'s mandate in the former Yugoslavia (United Nations 2012A:30). During 1990s small civil affairs component were deployed. But with the deployment in Kosovo and East Timor, more number of civil affairs officers was present.

The DPKO/DFS approved and promulgated a Policy Directive on Civil Affairs in 2008 which sets out three core roles for civil affairs in UN peacekeeping depending on the mandate: Cross-mission liaison, monitoring and facilitation role at the local level; conflict management, confidence-building and reconciliation; and support to the restoration and extension of state authority (United Nations, 2012A:23). In the early stage of deployment, the initial tasks of Civil Affairs Officers are to gather information, liaison with local partners and understand the environment in which the mission is involved. This stage is crucial as it allows the mission to develop important strategies and understand the requirements of different regions in the host country (Carvalho 2010:32). Latter as the mission develops, Civil Affairs

Officers roles and functions become more specialized and includes additional task like support to local authorities and local level conflict management and confidence building.

The civil affairs officers are the first civilians to be deployed at the local level and as such they play an important *role in liaising* in the UN mission. The main function of the civil affairs officers is to ensure that the local authorities and population are informed about the work of the peacekeeping mission and local concerns (Oswald 2010:571). They also promote public discussion about the issues such as the political process, elections and the content of peace agreements and ensure that all groups including the marginalised ones have a fair participation in the discussion (United Nations 2012A:131). Exercising the roles and functions of Civil Affairs Officers in the local environment is quite challenging as the local interlocutors may not understand the benefit of liaison or sometimes may not properly represent the local population (United Nations 2012A:134-136). To address and avoid any such kind of misperceptions, the Civil Affairs Officers is required to develop and foster good relations between the mission and the local population.

Civil Affairs Officers *monitoring role* with local partners and understanding the local environment are initial tasks which is crucial for the mission to develop strategies and understand the requirements for successful implementation of the mandate. It gathers information, monitor, analyse and report about the priorities, perceptions and concerns of different groups and also the local situation. A Civil Affairs Officer monitors and undertakes analytical assessments of the environment in which the section is deployed. This task is relevant as it provides information to mission headquarters which helps in appropriate responses to the needs on the ground (Carvalho 2010:33). The information on the local situation also helps in effective strategy formulation by providing relevant inputs to reports and provides an early warning on any conflict at the local level particularly in relation to the protection of civilians (United Nations 2012A:144). Information is most commonly shared through reports. The Civil Affairs Officer thus produces a range of situation reports and other thematic reports on local situation first to the SRSG and then to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at UN Headquarters in New York. Two key problems have been identified on civil affairs reporting that it focuses too much on activities rather outcomes and there is not enough analysis (United Nations, 2009A:150).

Civil Affairs Officers *role as coordinator* is important. As a coordinator, Civil Affairs Officers assist for active participation of UN military, UN police and other civilian

component, development and humanitarian actors and also international and national NGOs, as well as local and national authorities which are also beneficial. Coordination is important to avoid duplication and uncoordinated activity and so civil affairs officer familiarise with the work of others in the field. Civil affairs officer also plays the role of a facilitator as it is widely represented at the local level than other civilian mission units and thus facilitates the work of other mission components and UN partners who are not represented at the local level (United Nations 2012A:163). Thus, Civil Affairs assist in information sharing with other actors and also helps in working towards a common objective for the success of the mission.

Civil Affairs Officers have an accurate understanding of the environment which helps them in providing better support and role in *conflict management, confidence building and restoration of state authority*. By liaising with local actors and civil society, Civil Affairs Officers manage conflict and also diffuse tension, prevent conflict and prepare the ground for dialogue between groups. Civil society organisations are important interlocutors and provide information about needs, concerns and priorities of the local people (2012A:170-171). Thus, liaising with civil society actors help civil affairs officers to better understand the local environment and facilitate confidence-building at the local level. Moreover, the role of national/local staff in Civil Affairs section is particularly relevant for having better understanding and targeted approach to the local culture and society, which helps the mission in effectively addressing the concerns of the local environment (Carvalho 2010:33).

The civil affairs *build confidence* with local actors to demonstrate a positive change. This change is the achievement in the implementation of peace agreements and improvement in the socio-political environment (United Nations 2003B:38). By building close relationship with local authorities, civil affairs officers try to translate the mission's objectives into practical measures on the ground and also advise local authorities on their role in implementing the mandate. While having close interactions with local actors, Civil Affairs Officers also provide crucial support in advising local actors and sharing information which may be relevant for tackling issues that arise in certain areas (Carvalho 2010:33). Civil Affairs Officers while building confidence at the local level also ensures that all local partners, including the various ethnic, political and social groups have meaningful engagement in the peace process. Thus, their objective is to create an inclusive political space and promote popular participation which restores local confidence.

With a changed UN perspective on the roles and functions of civilians in the UN missions from their traditional presence, UN shifted its emphasis to a more robust and comprehensive approach on “state building” (Martiskova 2012:346). Thus, *restoration of state authority* which was not a primary role mandated by the Security Council became a critical requirement for stabilizing fragile state to establish durable peace in the post-conflict countries. The Civil Affairs Officers is particularly mandated for this role at the local level and thus work with state institutions and local government authorities as well as the citizens and the society. Under this role, the civil affairs officers facilitate and support the main stakeholders in establishing governance mechanisms that are suitable to the specific environment and thus work for the development of local democratic governance (United Nations 2012A:193). Moreover, in most of the post-conflict countries decision making is located in the national level which excludes the local population from participation. This has led Civil Affairs Officers not only to be involved in the restoration of state authority but also in the extension of state authority so that local institutions can interact better with the local environment and develop political participation (Carvalho 2010:32). Civil Affairs Officers task are thus part of a much larger political process and their role in restoration and extension of state authority have a significant impact on the establishment of legitimate and efficient state institutions which ultimately bring stability of the host country.

In the interim administration such as the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), Civil Affairs played an important role as civil administration, responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life, while simultaneously working to devolve its responsibility to local authorities (United Nations 2003B:35). The Civil Affairs Section at the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) has been particularly active in supporting local authorities to restore their roles at local level through conflict management initiatives and consultations aimed at strengthening their capacity to work in the local environment (Carvalho 2010:35). Thus, since late 1990s Civil Affairs Officers played an active role with more specialized functions in reconstruction activities at the local level in various UN peace operations.

Civil Affairs function have been characterised by a lack of overall clarity of its functions and roles within missions. Its roles frequently overlapped with the roles of other substantive sections of the UN, especially with the Political Affairs Officers as they are frequently represented at the local level alongside Civil Affairs Officers and may have similar

mandates to assess and understand the political environment (Carvalho 2010:30). Moreover, Civil Affairs Officers faces various complexities at the local level. This is characterised by mistrust between the government and its citizens, tensions between communities or groups, and politicization of civil society actors(United Nations 2012A:68). Local actors' priorities may be contradictory to UN principles or international norms and the interest of other actors. This may at times create problem for Civil Affairs Officers whether to support local processes along with adhering to UN principles or international norms. Thus, there is lack of common objective and priorities which is required for the peace process. Such kind of complexities at the local need to be dealt with sensitivity which is part of the Civil Affairs work (United Nations 2012A:68)

Public Information Officer

Public Information in peacekeeping operations was seen as an operational necessity to both UN field and Headquarter level. A mission explain itself and the situations to the local population is done only through Public Information specialist which is the main source of news to which a post-conflict population has access (Durch et al 2003:107). The Public Information specialist priority function is to reach out to the local population, although reaching out to international community remain important (Hunt 2006:27).

The UN mission in Namibia (UNTAG) became the first to accommodate public information in peacekeeping operations, which set up media relations office through which number of radio programmes, a poster campaign and a civil society outreach initiative were pioneered to support elections (Hunt 2006:6-7). In the aftermath of UNTAG which hold greater conceptual importance to public information, the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the first to integrate Public Information specialist in the peace process and a media radio station was also pioneered which broadcasted issues of concerns in the peace process (United Nations 2003B:49). At present Public Information specialist has become increasingly important in peace operations to collect, analyse and disseminate vital information in timely manner for successful mandate implementation.

In the pre-deployment phase, public information specialist plays the role of assessing the mission. Under this role, they assess the quality of the mission environment in the mission area by identifying the important actors, their institutional affiliations and the coverage and output of local media (Hunt 2006:29). These assessments help the formulation of public information strategy and thus gather the relevant information to guide and support the

peacekeeping operation's objectives. The public information strategy is formulated by maintaining good relations between local and international media which is a political and operational necessity (United Nations 2003B:45). Even though Public Information specialist functions are important to a peace operation, most of the time it is neglected. In mission like UNAMSIL, the importance and effectiveness of public information specialists were underestimated which consequently led to inadequate information in the mission.

Public information officers helps in explaining the operation's mandate to the local population, local and international media, the donor community, Member States, agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and keep them update about the progress and obstacles in the peace process (United Nations 2003B:46-47). They act as Spokesperson for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the mission.

Public information officers also play an important role to negate the effects of irresponsible media. They try to establish an environment that promotes the development of free and independent media and standard work ethics for the journalist (United Nations 2003B:48). Any kind of misinformation, and counter propaganda that are harmful to the objectives of the UN and the peace process are dealt with by the public information officers. In a conflict affected country getting credible and accurate information is very rare and many of these areas there may be little or no tradition of an independent, non-partisan media. Under such kind of environment, the public information officers have to develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members and stakeholders informed of developments in the peace process and role and activities of the mission (Coning and Kasumba 2010:42).

The public information officers develop strategy and the overall programme in consultation with the Head of Mission, who will establish mission priorities at each stage (United Nations 2003B:47). The information strategy provided by the Public Information specialist is important during the election process to educate the public on the electoral process as well as the fundamental concepts of a democratic process. Under the information strategy, Public Information specialist also sometimes exercise capacity-building role to train local journalists and assist in rebuilding and reinforcement of national media institutions. These functions are seen as crucial to promote balanced reporting conducive to peaceful

society, especially where media institutions have degraded for a long period of time (Hunt 2006:57).

Public Information specialists have been active in various UN missions to disseminate information for the peace process. For example in the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the public information officers used radio to inform people in one side of the divided country to hear news from the other. Radio Okapias it was named became a successful initiative by the public information unit that helped set standards for the local media and provide capacity building to local journalists or media persons to produce good radio broadcasts (United Nations 2003B:47). After the UN mission withdrew, *Radio Okapi* continued to work for an independent radio network as a long-term objective (United Nations 2003B:47). Again in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Public Information specialist enabled a robust campaign on public information and also live broadcast of UNMIL Radio in the start up phase of the mission. This has helped in improving the sensitization of the mission's presence and activities immeasurably (Hunt 2006:28). Thus the public information specialists have contributed to the transparency and credibility of the peace process and have witnessed widespread success and positive influence.

However, there are important challenges as well. Scholars like Hunt (2006) have raised questions as to whose interests are prioritised by the Public Information specialist (Hunt 2006:52). Media are always influenced whether in an overt or covert way and outcome is influenced according to interest of some actors. Another important challenge is the environment in which the Public Information specialist may be deployed. In most of the post-conflict environment, credible and accurate information can be rare as there is lack of independent media and the local public may perceive the official sources of information as instruments of propaganda (United Nations 2003B:46). Thus, the role and functions of Public Information specialist is crucial in the multidimensional peacekeeping operation.

Human Rights Experts

In conflict affected countries large-scale human rights violation is one of the regular features. The UN attempts to address the human rights issues in the process of reconstruction. The human rights experts are deployed in many of the peacekeeping operations and they are expected to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights. The primary role of human rights experts is to monitor, investigate, document and report on the human rights situation. Human rights monitoring is a sensitive function that involves the collection,

verification, and use of information to address human rights issues and thus requires to gather complete, accurate and unbiased information (Boehme 2008:19). They interview witnesses, victims, government officials and others who may have knowledge about specific cases (United Nations 2003B:103). Human rights experts assess the accuracy of their information so to disseminate correct information about human rights violation. The early deployment of human rights experts greatly increases systematic access to information and builds confidence with the local population. Human rights experts need to gather information without endangering the local population or themselves. The local population is faced with potential dangers when they provide information to human rights experts. The human rights experts also investigate and verify past human rights violations (United Nations 2003B:104-105). For instance, in UN mission in Congo, East Timor and Sierra Leone, human rights experts established records of the past human rights abuses and have also seek non-judicial relief of violations. Officers regularly visit police stations, prisons and courts regarding human rights issues. In Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor human rights experts had a regular schedule for visiting every village and district within their area of responsibility. This visit provides protection to vulnerable people (United Nations 2003B:105).

Reporting is one of the main roles of human rights officers for communicating and distributing information on the human rights situation. Reporting requires to be carried out precisely, accurately, and promptly in order to ensure credibility and effectiveness when raising human rights concerns with the authorities (Boehme 2008:22). Human rights officers submit daily, weekly, monthly and other periodic reporting to the SRSG. They also submit periodic reports, emergency reports, incident reports or reports on the general human rights situation. Human rights experts have also produced reports on specific themes such as torture, pre-trial detention, fair trials, prison conditions and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (United Nations 2003B:106). Human rights officers generally maintain external and internal human rights reports (Boehme 2008:22). Internal reporting are aimed at providing accurate picture of the human rights situation and developing strategies to address human rights issues which are submitted to the headquarters of the mission or implementing organisation. On the other hand, external reports are more likely to bring human rights issues to the attention of governments or to a wider national and international public and are usually based on internal reports. Thus, human rights experts usually produce a multitude of reports directed at a number of different actors.

Apart from reporting, Human rights experts also assist in building human rights capacities and institutions in the host state. They create sustainable local institutions capable of protecting human rights and effectively addressing human rights violations and thus assist in capacity-building initiatives (United Nations 2003B:107). Human rights experts provide technical and substantive assistance in building national institutions, such as national human rights commissions, ombudsman's offices and reconciliation commissions. They also assist in constitutional and legislative reform to ensure in accordance with international human rights norms and standards. Human rights experts help in establishing national human rights plans and the functioning of independent National Human Rights Institutions. For example, Human Rights Section in UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was sponsored by OHCHR, has provided legislative, substantive and technical advice in the establishment of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission (United Nations 2003B:107).

Human rights experts provide training programmes for UN peacekeeping personnel and local and national institutions in human rights issues (United Nations 2003B:107). Human rights experts also train local NGOs and civil society groups and offer specialized courses for local journalists, parliamentarians, medical professionals and community leaders. Human rights teams frequently design and deliver human rights training programmes to local military, police, judicial personnel and prison guards. In UNTAC human rights unit provided substantive and administrative support by providing training courses and materials (Boehme 2008:33). Moreover, human rights experts work with the local educational to provide human rights curriculum in the formal educational system in the host country (United Nations 2003B:108). These creates empowerment within the local population were majority are illiterate and are unaware of their basic human rights. However, these trainings which are crucial for capacity-building sometimes cannot continue at a pace due to lack of funds (Boehme 2008:30).

Human rights experts work in a very insecure environment and so most of the times they are not accessible to the worst violations of human rights and humanitarian law (United Nations 2003B:111). In the case of Rwanda, five members of the Human Rights Field Operation were murdered after being stopped en route to a meeting despite travelling in UN vehicles. There is also lack of resources for carrying out the critical activities. An alternative sources of funding or coordinating with other relevant UN partners, such as OHCHR for

extra-budgetary funds has been recommended by some of the experts (United Nations 2003B:112). Another important challenge of Human rights officers are that they require to gather information without endangering the local population or themselves. Because of the potential dangers the victims may face, human rights officers need to take precaution to ensure that their work does not endanger the very people they are there to assist (UN 2003B:104). As such they have to be sensitive towards the situations and carefully scrutinize the information they collect for an effective peace process.

Gender Advisers

Men and women experience conflict differently and these experiences in armed conflict reflect both gender relations and women's position in the society. The awareness to mainstream gender perspective into peace and security activities led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 in 2000 to encourage women's participation in the peace process. Gender unit serve as a catalyst for mainstreaming gender aspects into peace operations by providing technical advice, guidance and support and implementing, monitoring and evaluating the mission's strategy on mainstreaming gender as well as on the inclusion of gender perspectives into relevant mission policies, programmes and activities (Boehme 2008:34).

Gender advisers play an important role in the assessment and implementation of activities undertaken by all mission components in the gender related aspects. Assessment of the mission helps in the identification of priority initiatives to promote women's rights and gender equality. Gender advisers undertake a cultural analysis of the host country under a gender perspective and adopt this analysis for educating about the society and culture of the host country to the peacekeepers (Boehme 2008:136). This helps and assists the peacekeepers to be gender sensitive while dealing with the peace process. In the pre-deployment phase, gender advisers also participate in the planning process to ensure that gender issues are reflected in the assessment process and promote the recruitment and deployment of female peacekeepers (United Nations 2011B:23).

Deploying of female peacekeepers is crucial as it helps in addressing women's concern more effectively. Most often women are only identified as victims of war and their actual role and potential as agents of international peace and security is marginalised (Solhjell 2013:3). Participation of women in peace operations particularly in the leadership role may act as role models for local women in societies where women have traditionally played a

secondary role. Moreover, strategies and programmes for gender mainstreaming are developed within the mission that enables each component to develop gender specific goals in their mandate and benchmarks for gender mainstreaming (United Nations 2003B:121). The progress of these benchmarks is monitored by the gender advisers.

Gender units support and liaise with national authorities regarding national structures on gender issues. In a way, they support national objectives in improving women's participation in the peace process and also help in building capacities available in national and local governments. Gender mainstreaming strategies needs the active participation of national authorities (United Nations 2003B:122). Gender advisers provide assistance to national authorities to include in their national plans protection of women and girls from sexual violence (United Nations 2011B:24). Gender advisers also give advice to national authorities to implement Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. More importantly they maintain close liaison with the national women's ministry or office of the host country for assisting in active participation of women in the political process (Boehme 2008:39). Thus, they assist in supporting women's participation in the electoral process and making them aware of their political rights.

Gender units provide training to all mission components, including uniformed personnel to respond to specific security concerns of women and girls, advise correction units on the conditions of female detainees and assist justice units to ensure that justice mechanisms are accessible to women and provide protection and promotion of their rights (2011B:23). Gender advisers are specifically mandated to provide guidance and resources in terms of training and training materials for gender mainstreaming in the field. They analyse the cultural of the host country regarding gender perspective and accordingly provide training and education about the society and culture to mission components for more understanding of areas specific sensitive of gender issues (Boehme 2008:16). UN has deployed gender advisers in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and in Liberia (UNMIL).

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is a successful example with respect to the implementation of Resolution 1325 on the ground. The gender unit Office of the Gender Adviser (OGA) of UNMIL has the mandate to mainstream gender throughout the mission and in this regard have supported and facilitated the incorporation of gender perspectives in

policies, procedures and activities within and outside the mission UNMIL's gender unit is headed by a senior gender adviser and consists of two international gender officers, two United Nations volunteers and five national staff members (Boehme 2008:16). Supported by the OGA, various components of UNMIL, including police component, the Legal and Judicial System Support Division, and the Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS), took active part to facilitate the implementation of the rape law and on strengthening the criminal justice system, including the national police, courts and correction system (Boehme 2008:35).

There are certain challenges faced by the gender advisers. Most often gender sensitive laws even after being passed does not stop the crime if the law is not enforced. Implementation requires that the local population must clearly understand the gender sensitive laws. However, negative social attitudes towards violence against women and denial towards it or the application of traditional practices instead of statutory laws are major barriers to actually implementing the law (Boehme 2008:35). Changing the negative social attitudes towards violence against women is a long term effort. Another important challenge is that there has been a tendency of moving away from understanding gender perspectives as inclusive approaches of participation in peace-building and political processes to rather a victimization of women (Solhjell2013:4). This marginalises women in the peace process. Gender advisers need to actively assist the conflict affected women for more participation in the political process and thus contribute to the peace process. Moreover, gender issues are playing marginal role in peace operations and have significantly limited the scope and hampered the functioning of gender units on the ground. The reason for non-integration of gender aspects into mission mandates and failure to address these issues when implementing peace operations is often a lack of political will on the part of implementing organisations (Boehme, 2008:11). This lack of implementation of gender issues is also because of the challenges and difficulty on the ground.

Child Protection Advisers

Apart from women, children face peculiar problems in the conflict areas. Earlier child rights specialists were designated with the Human Rights Section but in UNMASIL a separate child protection adviser post was creating in the Office of the SRSG. Child Protection Advisers (CPAs) are specialist staff sent to missions to help fulfil the child protection mandate and play the role of advocate, facilitator, monitor, adviser and trainer in fostering the protection of children in conflict affected countries. They are deployed in countries where

children face severe protection concerns, including abductions, military recruitment, rape and sexual violence, killing, maiming, displacement, separation, and deprivation of basic social services and education (United Nations 2011B:24).

CPAs do not implement programmes but lay the groundwork for institution-building by assisting inclusion of specific child protection issues in the political agenda. They mainstream child protection issue and advise the SRSG and others of critical child rights concerns to be addressed in peacemaking and peace agreements, ensure that child rights concerns are raised with government authorities and other political interlocutors including armed groups, national authorities of neighbouring countries, regional organizations and bilateral partners, and seek to create an environment for programmatic child protection agencies (United Nations 2011B:24). This support on children's rights is provided to operational partners as they may be unable to engage in overt advocacy on politically sensitive issues such as grave violations of children's rights (Barnett and Jefferys 2008:11). Thus they advise that child protection should be an integral part of the mission including in the planning, strategies and the activities of all the mission components.

Child Protection Adviser as a role of trainer provides training to newly deployed peacekeepers on child protection (United Nations 2011A:17). These trainings on child rights protection are provided to all mission components and must be received prior to his or her deployment. Child Protection Advisers ensure that the training materials meet the needs of the target audience (United Nations 2014:11).

CPAs monitor and report the most serious violations against children. The Security Council established a mechanism to monitor and report on the most serious violations against children in conflict which is referred to as monitoring and reporting mechanism (United Nations 2011A:17-18). They have the political leverage to coordinate the monitoring and reporting mechanisms which includes grave violations, killing or maiming of child soldiers, attack against schools or hospitals, grave sexual violence, abduction and denial of humanitarian access to children and advocate for no leniency of punishment against child rights violation (United Nations 2011B:25). They ensure that relevant components of the peacekeeping operation contribute to effective monitoring and use the information to inform its security analyses and physical protection activities; and also include child rights issues in negotiations with parties to conflict.

Child protection advisers play a key role in establishing dialogue with parties to the conflict. They under the DPKO generally take the lead in establishing and maintaining the dialogue with parties to the conflict which leads to the development of Action Plans to end grave violations committed against children, especially recruitment of child soldiers, killing and maiming, and sexual violence (United Nations 2011A:18). These plans are a means of making parties to conflict accountable, which are then monitored. However, critics have pointed out that Action Plans are sometimes weak which was experienced in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) where illegal recruitment and use of children was directly not acknowledged (Barnett and Jefferys 2008:8).

CPAs was first deployed in UN mission in Sierra Leone UNAMSIL in 2000. Child Protection Advisers have since been deployed in seven other peace operations: MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), ONUB (Burundi), UNMA (Angola), UNOCI (Côte d'Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), and UNMIS (Sudan). MONUC and UNMIS, have the largest number of CPAs being deployed. For example, CPAs in MONUC monitored and reported the condition of children and helped in releasing number of children from armed groups (United Nations 2011A:21). The systematic documentation of violations and abuses against children supported the prosecution of former Congolese militia leader by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the forced recruitment of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan, Child Protection Advisers provided advocacy which included the creation of child protection units in key police stations across the countries. Child Protection Advisers also facilitated training in Sudan, Congo and Sierra Leone which include awareness of child protection issues among trainees, developing training module on child protection, training for both uniform and civilian staff and working together with UNICEF and the local child protection networks to provide training (Olonisakin 2007:7).

Child Protection Advisers faces various problems while implementing their roles and functions. There is lack of clarification of the role of Child Protection Advisers. The work of the Child Protection Advisers is duplicated by other child protection actors, in particular the human rights unit in missions and the UNICEF Country Offices. For instance, the respective roles and functions of the Child Protection Adviser and a child rights specialist in the Human Rights Sections seemed duplicative and confusing (United Nations 2003C: 58). Thus, CPAs activities often overlap with the roles and functions of others (Olonisakin 2007:8). There is

also problem of lack of clarity about the mandate of Child Protection Advisers. There are differences in the understanding of the CPA terms of reference among key actors. For example, the UNAMSIL's CPA was located in the Office of the SRSG, on the other hand the child protection units in MONUC, UNMIS and UNOCI are located under the DSRSG in charge of humanitarian affairs. Thus, this may create confusion regarding the role of Child Protection Advisers as humanitarian, rather than political. The Security Council and some of the review reports suggested clarifying and strengthening the role of CPAs in the UN peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Jefferys 2008:11). There are also disparities in the profile of individuals being selected as Child Protection Advisers for peacekeeping operations (Olonisakin 2007:9). This is because of different ways in which Child Protection Advisers have defined their roles on the ground.

Judicial Affairs Officers

One of the important roles of judicial affairs officers is the mapping and assessment role, particularly at the start-up mission, to provide them with the necessary information of the host countries (United Nations 2013:105). They assess local stakeholders' capacities, the rule of law institutions, the nature of legal dispute and the way these disputes are addressed by the local populations (United Nations 2011B: 16). This role also provides other national and international decision makers with the information required to target resources for reform of the host country rule of law. Most of the time the report of the assessment is distributed only to limited top host government officials and they make decisions regarding the areas of responsibility (Durch et al 2012:53). Thus, the local actors, governmental and non-governmental, working on rule of law issues do not get the benefit to understand the reports and address them. Moreover, national counterparts are reluctant to agree to mapping and assessment functions carried out by international judicial affairs officers as it will draw attention to the weaknesses and problems in the host country's justice system (United Nations 2013:107). It is also not easy for judicial affairs officers to locate and obtain copies of laws in the conflict affected country as most are either destroyed or does not exist.

Judicial affairs officers another important role is to provide *assistance* to the national authorities of the post-conflict countries. They assist national authorities to develop national justice strategies. This strategy is essential to unite disparate groups in post-conflict countries around shared goals of national actors and international community. Lack of national justice strategy hindered the host country from asserting its priority and prevents imposition on

national authorities the donor's agenda (United Nations 2013:118-119). Moreover, providing operational assistance role by judicial affairs officers is done occasionally, especially in transitional administration missions. They temporarily assume the role of judges, prosecutors and public defenders in host state institutions such as in UNMIK, UNTAET and UNMIT. However, there is not much difference between operational supports and becoming as substitutes for national capabilities which may result in the risk of undermining local ownership and undesirable dependency (Durch et al 2012:36). Developing local capacity limits such kind of dependency and ownership issue.

Judicial affairs officers engage in *capacity development* of host state counterparts through training and skills development as its judges, prosecutors and public defenders have little or no formal legal education or training. This is due to the destruction of educational and training institutes or the dearth of legal professionals due to conflict (United Nations 2013:184). Justice training is very sensitive because of variance of legal systems and problem of being seen to interfere with judicial independence (Durch et al 2012:58). Thus, judicial affairs officers provide training in a more ad hoc nature focusing on basic justice and human rights issue. Legal education is also provided through university law schools or technical support to training sessions by ministries of justice which was done in UNMIL and UNOCI. Sometimes the educational level and experience of judges, prosecutors and public defenders is deemed to be so low that they were removed from their positions and replaced by international judicial affairs officers to assume judicial functions so that national staff could receive long term training (Durch et al 2012:59). However, the long term aim of the United Nations is to build strong national capacity instead of substituting it by external actors so that they can manage their own judiciary system effectively. Thus judicial affairs officers are required to strengthen national institutions and actor rather than replace it (United Nations 2013:136).

Judicial affairs officers not only provide technical expertise and train the local capacity but also give *advises* to the Head of the Mission and other mission components on rule of law issues. They advise the political nature of justice reform and the implications of the mission's political strategy for strengthening justice system in post-conflict countries (United Nations 2009B:4). Host state counterparts are also advised for strengthening their justice system. While advising the national counterparts the judicial affairs officers need to have an effective personality to communicate clearly and build relationships with them. Poor relationships and

resistance were observed where national counterparts did not feel they were treated with respect and where the judicial affairs officers have missions failed to share relevant information (Durch et al 2012:60). In a sense, national counterparts may not be interested in receiving advice from judicial affairs officers or may question the expertise of those giving advice.

Judicial affairs officers play a key role in mobilizing resources in support to strengthen the host country's justice system. They help national actors to raise funds and access the resources necessary to strengthen the justice sector (United Nations 2012B:146). There is also effort to facilitate the representation of diverse and marginalized groups in the donor conferences to ensure resource mobilization for range of justice needs (United Nations 2009A:5). Judicial affairs officers support national counterparts to access funding and other resources by assisting them in developing funding proposals which are sustainable for the long term (United Nations 2012B:146). To seek the sources of funding, they work closely with national counterparts. However, mobilizing resources is an intensive task which requires the judicial affairs officers to plan carefully before approaching funding sources.

Judicial Affairs officers were first deployed since 1999 in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Afghanistan. In Kosovo, the Department of Justice remains under international control through UNMIK with minimal involvement of local actors and UN judicial affairs officers played important operational role to perform complex task which includes basic civilian administrative function and monitoring the development of provisional institutions (United Nations 2013:24-25). Again, in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the judicial affairs officers assisted in building a national judiciary and justice framework and in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) they played advisory role to support the new Afghan Government's efforts to establish governance capacity, including for the rule of law and administration of justice (United Nations 2003B:95).

Corrections Officers

Corrections officer is another important component of the rule of law section. Extreme level of overcrowding and human rights abuses in post-conflict prison settings lead to deployment of corrections officers (United Nations 2011B:17). In post-conflict environment prisoners suffer from extreme overcrowding, lack of food, absence of adequate medical care

and poor sanitation, poor management and security. If these problems are addressed properly the adverse impact on the peace process will be limited.

Correction officers mentor their national counterparts and provide on-the-job operational training, which includes the daily treatment of inmates and basic human rights in prisons, and also managing major prison incidents such as riots, disturbances and mass breakouts (United Nations 2012C:5). When UN corrections officers are co-located at prisons of the post conflict countries, their role is generally to provide mentor and advice rather than play substantive operational roles. However, in DRC where numerous corrections facilities are in grave condition, some UN corrections officers have played operational role by stepping in to run correction systems (Durch et al 2012:54). Moreover, corrections officers have also provided assistance to the correction systems to build trust and credibility and improve conditions by providing food, water, sanitation and medical care and essential infrastructure repairs (United Nations 2003B:99).

Correction officers provide training for prison officers and local corrections personnel so that treatment of prisoners is improved. UN corrections officers noted difficulty in advising prison volunteers or the untrained, self-appointed corrections officers, noting that they lack basic ethical understanding of their role and their inconsistent reporting for duty undermines any sustained training plans (Durch et al 2012:58). In UNMIL, the Corrections Advisory Unit (CAU) created reinforcing training plans. Basic training was given to all professional corrections officers and supplemented by advanced training for prison superintendents (Durch et al 2012:58).

They develop reporting procedures to address abuses in prisons and assist in the development assisting in the preparation of laws on prisons, prison policies and regulations. Under the reporting role they also exercise independent inspection of correctional institutions from any kind of bribery, corruption, manipulation and abuse of power (United Nations 2003B:99). Reporting distribution has certain degree of sensitivity. However, this creates problem sometimes, as host state counterparts complains that information has not been properly disseminated (Durch et al 2012:53). To address this, reporting along with advisory assistance can be used for building capacities among host state authorities. For example in MONUSCO Corrections Advisory Unit used an effective technique to encourage their governmental counterparts, who had complained that the UN was not sharing information gathered. They started sending weekly reports to the Ministry, but asked that the Ministry do

the same in response. Thus, the host state officials reports were compared with that of UN correction officers which led to positive outcome of a weekly technical-level meeting, where reports are discussed in detail, synthesized and a list of priority issues for the Ministry is developed (Durch et al 2012:53).

In UN mission in Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda, corrections officers have the mandate to train local authorities in correctional issues (United Nations 2003B:98). Providing direct assistance and support for corrections systems is a recent activity mandated in UN peace operations. This type of direct involvement by corrections officers were in Kosovo and Timor-Leste to establish the complete correctional systems, which included the management and administration of correction facilities, development of human, institutional and legislative capacity. Corrections officers played an advisory role in UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) providing advice and support to the Afghan authorities. Thus, mission to mission it varies where correction officers may limit to advisory role and in some cases a more substantive operational role is played whenever necessary.

The corrections officers in post-conflict countries face various challenges like overcrowding prison houses, lack of legal representation for convicted prisoners, large number of pre-trial prisoners and slow judicial process (United Nations 2012C:14). Most of the time there is no accessibility to remote prisons and lack of visits by judicial authorities. Moreover, the funding for correction sector is not adequate which is required in capacity development of prison houses in host countries (United Nations 2012C:22).

Election Expert

Credible and transparent elections are one of the key first step for post-conflict societies to establish a credible government. In response to the demand for electoral assistance in post conflict countries, the Secretary General in 2003 submitted a report on strengthening the role of the UN in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic elections and the promotion democratization. He identified four categories of electoral assistance provided by the UN, which includes technical assistance, organizational and conduct of elections, observations or monitoring of elections, participation where elections are expected to play a significant role in the peacebuilding phase (United Nations 2005:58-59). Accordingly, UN electoral unit's assistance in peacekeeping operations has increased. The Electoral unit's

mandate is different for every mission and is established directly by the Security Council and developed through Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of DPA.

There has been a shift in the operational role of election experts. The provision for technical assistance has increased and demand for electoral observation has gone down and thus it plays a significant role in peacebuilding operations (Goodwin-Gill 2006:18). There are various types of electoral technical assistance that UN missions have provided which includes election monitors and ballot boxes, advice on electoral laws, regulations and procedures and methods of voter registration and training.

Election experts provide advice to electoral assistance in post-conflict countries. Free, fair and transparent elections are a key to determining democratic governance. There are four important election planning functions of electoral experts (United Nations 2003B:149-151). In the *pre-agreement mission planning* a multidisciplinary task force is established in UN Headquarters in preparation for a peacekeeping mission where the EAD represents the focal point to identify and ensure that the majority of contentious electoral issues are resolved in the initial agreement. After this stage, the next stage is *agreement planning* where if the mandate has electoral matters, EAD becomes involved and despatch one or more electoral experts to assist in this stage. *Mission planning* focuses on achieving key benchmarks within strict timeframes. The EAD deploy an electoral needs assessment (NAM) mission to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the electoral situation in the *post-agreement planning*. This initial survey helps in getting inputs from local, international and other UN actors and evaluates the conflict affected country's condition to provide electoral assistance. An operational plan is thus formulated with cost estimates and outline schedule for the electoral process in the mission. The EAD closely monitors the planning and implementation of electoral activities by electoral experts to ensure compliance with UN electoral standards (United Nations 2003B:150). The Chief electoral officer (CEO) provides regular technical reports to EAD for ongoing consultation and evaluation.

Elections experts provide advice on organizing democratic elections which will guide countries for future polling. Providing free and fair periodic elections helps in confidence building and contributes to the peace and stability of the post conflict country. They assist in expanding the legal framework through strategic negotiation and inputs from all mission components into an acceptable set of electoral rules (United Nations 2003B:152). Electoral experts help in establishing electoral administration in the conflict affected countries. These

includes assisting in the nomination of candidates or political parties, regulations on codes of conduct for political parties and security forces, guidelines on the registration of voters and procedures for polling, counting and tallying (United Nations 2003B:153). Electoral experts conduct registration of voters and also assist in providing civic education and voter information which is critical in the outcome of the ballot. Civic and voter education creates a general awareness of the principle of democratic electoral process. This helps in increasing political participation in diverse areas of governance and also inclusion of the disadvantaged sections of the society in the post-conflict countries (Reilly 2003:23)

Electoral mandate were provided in UN missions such as Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique and Timor-Leste. In the UN mission in Timor-Leste, electoral experts conducted a technical needs assessment, evaluated the capacity of local and regional actors and prepared planning document for the development of Timor-Leste's electoral capacity (United Nations 2003B:149). The mission also held in-depth discussions with Timor-Leste leaders and civil society to ensure that the mission's recommendations would reflect their hopes and expectations. It was crucial to outline realistic expectations based on the relatively short time frame that was proposed for the transition to independence without compromising the integrity and credibility of the constitution-making electoral processes. In Cambodia, election experts took full responsibility for the planning, organization and administration of the election process. Thus, technically successful electoral process was experienced in Cambodia. However, the realities of power politics created problem where the losing parties at the elections returned to power through uncompromising tactics (Reilly 2003:9).

Electoral assistance in multidimensional peacekeeping operations is very challenging which requires a longer time frame to effectively address the election issues. Experience shows that in the short-term, United Nations peacekeeping operation have little choice but to initiate longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts (United Nations 2008C:28). These considerations have a significant impact on the cost, duration and complexity of the process and as a result it is essential that electoral assistance be adequately resourced. Voter registration is another important challenge facing the election experts. Post conflict elections take place in an environment of where there is no basic census or other records. This requires a comprehensive registration of voters which is time consuming, expensive and not very sustainable (Reilly 2003:22). Moreover, there is a frequent intersection of political interest in the registration process which creates doubt in the process (Goodwin-Gill 2006:18). Electoral

assistance is critical in the post-conflict countries and as such support to political parties becomes a politically sensitive topic. The candidates in the political parties are mostly former warring groups and require transformation into non-violent political parties which require additional external assistance such as UNDP to maintain political neutrality and impartiality of the peacekeeping operation (United Nations 2003B:155).

Challenges

The multidimensional peacekeeping operations mandates are increasingly becoming more civilian task oriented that have led to the creation of multiple civilian posts. Thus the proliferation of civilian functions may have led to greater awareness to peacebuilding priorities. However, this has reflected the complexity of the process and as such some of the civilian functions are less clear about the issues needed to be addressed (Wiharta and Stephanie 2010:90). This creates overlapping duties on the ground.

No separate budget allocation for the civilian tasks. The financing process is very slow and cumbersome which hampers the peace process. Getting new voluntary funding is often slow and unpredictable which delays the start of critical peacebuilding task in the immediate aftermath of conflict (United Nations 2011C:25). The UN News Centre also reported that one of the main challenges hampering women's participation in peacebuilding is insufficient funding (UN News Centre 2014:1). For example, United Nations peacekeeping is the largest provider of both justice and corrections personnel for international deployment, but the resources devoted to this area are very limited. Peacekeeping budgets authorized for justice personnel account for only 0.4 percent of the total DPKO budget and corrections personnel for only 0.44 percent (United Nations 2014:1).

The civilian capacity gap in the mission is one of the most important challenge which hampers effective functioning of the civilian component (Coning 2011:153). In areas such as public administration expertise are not readily available in the UN system. Thus a strong partnership is being recommended to address the issue. Initiatives have been taken to standardise the core task and operations but this is focused towards uniformed personnel rather than the most required civilian component (Wiharta and Stephanie 2010:93).

The UN also face problem to transfer skills and knowledge to national actors for capacity building. In some specialized areas the capacities are lacking like in the rule of law area. It is difficult to find international experts who can rebuild a judicial system. Local

capacities are difficult to locate as conflict may have weakened their capacities. In the international market too talented people with right skills, right knowledge and having cultural coherence with the local population is not provided sufficiently (United Nations 2011C:3). Conflict affected countries have capacities which need to be protected and nurtured and the UN need better systems to identify and support them. Even in the international community there is deployable capacity in the core areas which is not fully utilized. Emerging countries from the Global South, whose economy is rising, has created opportunity to deploy civilian capacities with right professional skills and experience as they are familiar with the socio-economic conditions of the conflict affected countries. A long term commitment is required to feel the real gaps in civilian capacity (United Nations 2011C:3).

In the UN peace operations 30 per cent of the civilians are women who are deployed in these core areas. There is more female staff in the UN operations than most states have in their civil services. However, the female staffs are less satisfied than their male counterparts with their opportunities for career development, work experience and conditions of service and most of them leave the Secretariat younger than their male counterparts by an average of five years (United Nations 2011C:35). This problem of retention is because of no family duty stations and insecure environment in the field missions.

Civilian experts deployed for substantive functions are often poorly prepared and not always qualified. They lack understanding of the local institution and local culture even after years of presence (Interpeace 2010:12). Very limited sharing or transfer of knowledge between international civilian experts and local actors take place. There is always the perception among the international civilian experts that the local actors are not efficient to do the task assigned. Rather, local actors are more specialized as they understand the sensitivity of the environment. Such perceptions often lead to displacement of civilian roles that should be performed by local authorities and also disempower and deprive them of opportunities to define their own problems and take responsibility for their own solutions (Coning 2011:587-588).

There has been criticism that civilian officers from the Global North have little understanding of the local condition. Most of the highly specialized come from the Global North. However, it is felt that UN peace operations is too much focused on deploying niche civilian capacities instead of context specific problem of the host country. The Global South has a broad range of capacities but there is difficulty in getting civilian officers. This is

because the Global South has no policies or programmes aimed at mobilizing civilian capacity due to lack of knowledge and expertise in developing policies (Coning et al 2013:138). Moreover, most of the training and rostering facilities are located in the Global North giving them far better representation in civilian task in peace operations than the Global South. This has created concern that there is need for more transfer of skills and knowledge from the Global South because of their similar political and socio-economic experiences and context with the post-conflict society (Coning et al 2013:136).

Conclusion

The change in nature of war from interstate to intrastate has shifted the peacekeeping operations towards reconstruction activities with intention to bring about durable peace in the conflict areas. The core capacities to run a government, to re-establish institutions of justice, to reintegrate demobilizing fighters, to revitalise the economy, to restore basic health and education, and many more are the requirements for bringing durable peace. To carry out these tasks, international civilian experts are deployed by the United Nations as part of the UN peace operations.

The roles and functions of civilian component have changed gradually from a periphery to a more significant role in post-conflict countries. Electoral assistance which was the earliest task assigned to the civilian component in UN peacekeeping operations became important in helping the post-conflict countries in transition towards democracy. By 1990s there was concern towards massive human rights violations lead to incorporation of human rights experts in UN peacekeeping operations. Civilian experts on human rights contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights in conflict affected countries. Moreover, post-conflict countries are affected with weak infrastructure and reconstruction of infrastructure which became necessary for a durable peace. The judicial and correction officers became an important unit of the civilian component in the reestablishment and strengthening of rule of law in post conflict societies. More new and specialized task was mandated by late 1990s and early 2000 to UN civilian component. Children as the worst victims in conflict affected countries became a serious concern and to deal with the problem of children, the child experts became important part of the UN civilian component. Again in 2000, the concern of women in post conflict countries became an important issue which lead to the Security Council resolution to include the gender experts in peace operations to play an important catalyst in

mainstreaming gender aspects. Thus, more and more civilian experts are incorporated into civilian component over the years in the peace operations.

The civilian experts play important roles and functions in the UN peace operations. Most of them are involved in strategic assessment, facilitation, monitoring and reporting, advising and coordination functions in their respective specialized areas. Political Affairs Officers mainly work with the host government. These roles and its various functions of political affairs officers are implemented in a politicised environment. Civil affairs officers on the other hand are deployed at the local level for assisting in the political processes. There is lack of clarity of functions and roles in the civilian component, specifically between the Civil Affairs function and Political Affairs Officers function which frequently overlap as they both at times work at the local level with similar mandate.

Moreover, the civilian component role and functions are becoming more operational in character providing technical assistance along with advisory roles. For example, election experts are not limited to electoral observation anymore and have significant role in the peacebuilding process providing long term assistances. In most of the post conflict countries getting credible and accurate information is very rare as they lack an independent, non-partisan media. However, this function is most of the time neglected in peacekeeping operations which led to misinformation and inadequate resources in the mission. The UN Public Information specialists play an increasingly significant role to overcome this gap. They collect, analyse and disseminate vital and reliable information. Gender experts play significant role in mainstreaming gender issues in the mission. These experts exercise their task in an environment where there is widespread practice of negative social attitudes towards women and application of traditional practices instead of statutory laws. To negate such kind of negative social attitudes towards women require long term effort by the gender experts. Moreover, most of the times women are projected as victims rather than as an active participant in peacebuilding and political processes. Child Protection Advisers are significant addition in recent years. However, they lack clarification of the role as other units, like human rights unit, also have child protection experts, leading to confusion and duplication of functions. The judicial and correction affairs officers restructure judicial and correction systems. In transitional administration missions, judicial affairs officers assume the role of judges or prosecutors. But this has led to undermining of local ownership. Such kind of dependency can be limited by building local capacity.

Apart from the specific challenges of each unit of the civilian experts, there are certain general challenges faced by them. These includes issues like civilian mandates which are complex and not properly defined and thus creates less clarity in the functions of civilian component; lack of additional funding needed for the complex task carried out by civilian component; civilian capacity gap due to lack of expertise and also problem identifying civilian expertise; lack of participation of women in peacebuilding activities and also difficulties in retaining those recruited; and lack of cultural sensitivity of the local environment which is necessary for understanding complex situation in the ground.

Even though they faced with challenges, the civilian component of the UN peace operation played crucial role in re-establishing various state institutions and assisted the host country to develop capacity to provide basic public services. More and more civilian tasks have been mandated by the United Nations and the demand for additional civilian expertise is increasing which shows that civilian component has become indispensable factor in bringing about durable peace and security in the present international system.

CHAPTER 5

CIVILIAN COMPONENT: PARTNERSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS

Civilian component of the United Nation Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) are not the only actors present in the post-conflict societies trying to carry out reconstruction activities. There are many other actors involved in reconstruction activities. The UN military and police are responsible for restoring security, law and order systems in post conflict countries. They work alongside the civilian component in the mission. Outside the UN mission, various organizations such as UN agencies, other international organizations like World Bank, regional organizations, NGOs and local agencies are involved in the same space providing humanitarian and development assistance to build and sustain peace. The UN civilian component of the peacekeeping operations is expected to work in partnership with these other actors. Partnerships offer mutual benefits in the form of information sharing, expertise, experience and also resources. Actors, both internal and external to the mission, through partnership can clearly understand the mission's purpose and tasks, thus enhancing its success (United Nations 2003B:30). Here, the SRSG is responsible to reconcile conflicting viewpoints by identifying priorities, building support with all partners and mediating between divergent interests and objectives (United Nations 2003B:12). The UN agencies, funds and programmes, and other departments of the UN Secretariat have some highly specialized experts for the civilian tasks. The Senior Advisory Council (SAG) has recommended that, for better deliver the civilian capacities, need to respond in the aftermath of conflict through a global partnership with the other sources of capacity within the UN and other external actors (United Nations 2011C:i).

The different actors have distinct interests and strategic objectives in carrying out reconstruction activities. This is requirements that all actors need to take an integrated approach to conflict situations to achieve common objective of peace and stability. However, presence of different actors create problem as there may be conflicting viewpoints of identifying priorities necessary for reconstruction. The motives and interests of different actors and institutions also differ. Lack of partnership or coordination between various actors in the mission creates overlapping of activities. Thus, to reconcile these problems, concerted efforts been made to work in partnership among the various actors for a coherent and effective reconstruction of the post-conflict societies.

This chapter highlights the importance of partnership of UN civilian component in post-conflict reconstruction process. The major focus of this chapter is to discuss critically the partnership of UN civilian component within its various units and with other components such as military and police; with various UN agencies. It also examines the partnership of the UN civilian component with other international and regional organizations engage in reconstruction in the post-conflict states. It also discusses their interaction with the local actors as well.

Importance of Partnership

Multidimensional operations are large and diverse in their composition. Personnel within these operations include military, police, and civilian components. Apart from them, there are other actors in the operational field such as the UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, humanitarian agencies that assist national actors to build and sustain peace after conflict. Apart from these actors, there are number local actors involved in reconstruction activities. As the civilian component of the UNKPOs is not in position to carry out all the reconstruction activities all by itself, it has to enter into partnership with other actors working in the same field. Partnership is important as it is based on a shared understanding among all stakeholders of the objectives of the post-conflict reconstruction of the societies. Each partner has a perspective and a contribution to make and the partners depend on each other for success.

The UN Civil Affairs Officers may not always be the best-placed actor to carry out certain task. So identifying other actors who might have a more effective influence in a given situation and work in partnership with them would enable to carry out effectively capacity-building and advocacy strategies. Developing strong partnership can be a major contributing factor to effective teamwork. It brings different expertise to the table. Partnership is necessary as it creates a shared understanding of common mandated tasks, the required resources for effective functioning and the challenges faces while implementing the task (United Nations 2009A:19). Coordination between various components and other stakeholders lead to more efficient use of mission resources that are most of the time scarce (Wiharta and Blair 2010:105).

Actors both internal and external in the UN mission have different organizational culture, agendas and approaches which need to be systematically integrated through partnerships (Koops 2012:1). This greatly benefits the actors by trying to understand each other distinctive culture and thus working effectively within the parameter of the mandate. Moreover, there are institutional differences between peacekeeping mission and UN partner agencies. Humanitarian actors are oriented towards immediate and temporary assistance, while peacekeepers operate on a political timetable and development actors adopt a long-term assistance (United Nations 2012A:47). Understanding these differences can support to build partnership. Different actors are working under different budgets. There is growing demand and increasingly limited resources which means that the available resources need to be more judiciously, effectively and efficiently utilized (Coning and Holshek 2012:13). Due to the complex environment in post-conflict countries, UN is seeking an 'Integrated Mission' to address the problem of complex task and clear division of responsibility, authority and accountability by including all actors within an overall political-strategic management framework (Eide et al 2005:3). Integrated missions are designed to bring all relevant UN and non-UN actors together.

The Senior Advisory Group, appointed by the UN Secretary General in 2011, analysed how the United Nations and the international community could broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts available to conflict-affected countries and to made important recommendations for improvement. This Group's report known as the Guehenno Report recommended need for coordination and partnership among the various actors engage in reconstruction in the post-conflict societies. The report specifically encouraged the United Nations to work in global partnerships with Member States and civil society organizations where civilian capacities are to be found; to draw on outside UN civilian expertise and to establish clarity on the core capacities of the United Nations and also stronger accountability to Member States (United Nations 2011B:i).The capacities needed in countries emerging from conflict are best found outside the UN either in the affected countries themselves or in the Member states, both in the Government as well as in civil society and private sector.The Group proposes for a partnership to address the challenges of lack of civilian capacities, specialized skills and experience to meet the need of multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

The main advantages of partnership between UN civilian component and other international organizations and relevant NGOs and other actors in the operational field are that it helps to avoid duplication, mixed information and uncoordinated activity. The civilian component of the UNPKO needs to be thoroughly familiar with the work of other actors in the field, especially other UN organizations. There has been a need to organise a weekly or monthly meeting to discuss priorities and share information between all actors about individual activities (United Nations 2003B:39). Global participation underpins legitimacy and strong partnership and offers flexibility to deploy the right combination of actors and capabilities in a particular situation (United Nations 2009A:33). Partnerships in multidimensional peacekeeping operations are important as it offer mutual benefits to every actor involved in the reconstruction and peace process. These can also be a valuable to ensure that players within and outside the mission clearly understand its purpose and tasks to be implemented and thus enhancing mission's success.

The lack of integration at headquarters level also, trickles down to the field. This makes formulation of an overall strategy defective, and consequently makes it difficult to effectively implement peacebuilding policies at conflict affected countries. Effective integration between the UN's peacekeeping, humanitarian, development and political actors at headquarters level is needed to get more coherent and effective peacebuilding policies at the field level (Wiharta and Blair 2010:7). A mission with many separate components and external actors can only work well if the leadership initiates team management. The ability to maintain team spirit and unity is often one of the most challenging tasks faced by the SRSG in managing a multidimensional operation. This task becomes even more complex when partners outside of the United Nations are integrated into the structure of the mission, such as UN agencies and regional organizations, with variety of national and professional backgrounds and different cultures and operational requirements (United Nations 2003B:18). Different each of the external actors operating on the ground have its own approach, timeframe, funding mechanisms and mandates which make effective partnership arrangements challenging. As the environment in the conflict affected countries are highly politicised it affects certain partnerships. Most of the Humanitarian organizations prefer to distance themselves from the peacekeeping operation for fear of being engulfed into political disputes. Thus, it is important for the civilian component to address such concerns because these partners have to continue functioning in the area even after the military component of the UN operations withdraws. A regular and open communication with partners is the best way to avoid manipulation and

maximize common objective and efforts (United Nations 2003B:39). Thus, integrated approach is required so that the different actors are not providing overlapping or conflicting information and wasting scarce resources through duplication of the tasks.

Partnership within the Civilian Component

First and the most important partnership are among the various units of the UN civilian component of the peace operations. There are various units of the UN civilian component which work in partnership with each other to achieve the mandated objective and bring a durable peace in post-conflict countries. Their main task is to reconstruct political, social, judicial and economic systems in post conflict countries. Coordinating the function among the civilian units avoid the duplication of work. Civilian component may be confronted by complex environment in post-conflict area with difficult communications and limited access to up-to-date information about the environment. The only way to overcome this disconnect is for civilian component to work hand in hand together with all civilian units of the UN mission.

Political Affairs officers works on a national level political process in the conflict affected countries. They provide support for strengthening of political and governance institutions. Political Affairs Officers build dynamic partnerships with broad range of stakeholders to be effective in the peace process. Political affairs officers and Civil Affairs Officers work closely together. They share a strategic approach, information and analysis of the political situation (United Nations 2009A:40). Close coordination of civil affairs with the political affairs is crucial to designing a strategy that is supportive of the state institutions. Political affairs officers work on the central level political process and civil affairs officers work on the local level political process. Where political activity is largely focused in the capital city, political reporting and analysis from the local level is provided by Civil Affairs Officers (United Nations 2009A:40). If national-level politics are negotiated at various levels, then political affairs will be represented in the local level, alongside civil affairs. In that case Political Affairs Officers share similar mandates with the Civil Affairs Officers to implement and understand the political environment (Carvalho 2010:30-31). Their interact lead to lack of clarity of roles between the units. Nevertheless, these two units required to work in close coordination with each other to effectively carry out their tasks.

Political Affairs Officers also maintains a close relationship with the spokesperson and public information officers for sharing relevant information about the peace process. Political

Affairs officers provide the public information unit with the latest developments, and public information reciprocates with analyses of media events or interpretations from local journalists (United Nations 2003B:30). The two units jointly advise the SRSG on the messages that need to be sent to the parties to the conflict or other stakeholders. The political process which is an important task of Political Affairs Officers is reliant on the consent of the local population and public information unit play critical role in deriving consent of the population for political process (Hunt 2006:9)

Civil affairs Officers work closely with public information unit to promote better understanding of the mission and its mandate. These help to ensure that the mission is informed of any changes or problems that may impact on acceptance of the mission and consent. Before speaking to the local media, civil affairs unit consult with the public information section of the mission. Civil affairs unit play a direct role in support of activities of the public information unit by providing information about the attitudes and perceptions of different groups at the local level (United Nations 2009A:40). Civil affairs officer partner with the public information unit to ensure the consistency of the messages communicated directly to the public and through the media. In the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for instance, Civil Affairs officers together with public information unit gathered information and analysed public information initiative which helped to guide mission strategy in a number of key areas, and provided key insights into local perceptions for both mission leadership and peacekeepers on the ground (United Nations 2009A:146).

In conflict affected countries large-scale human rights violation takes place. Human rights unit works in close coordination with the Civil Affairs Officers. Civil Affairs Officers seek guidance from Human Rights Officers who analyse human rights threats. Relevant information are shared on allegations or risks of human rights violations to Human Rights Officers for further investigation and action (United Nations 2009A:54). Civil Affairs officers also assist human rights officers by providing access to local officials and record (United Nations 2003B:38). This sharing of information requires technical follow-up, helps human rights officers in addressing human rights violation in the post-conflict countries, especially at the local level. Civil Affairs Officers and Human Rights Officers together make observations on the ground that provides an early warning of crises to the mission (United Nations 2003B:30).

Traditional mechanisms may enjoy greater legitimacy within the community than externally provided solutions. However the problem with traditional mechanisms is that while tackling the problems they may run contrary to the principles of universal human rights (United Nations 2009A:170). Civil Affairs Officers tries to address this tension and coordinate with human rights officers. MONUSCO established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) which included political affairs, human rights, child protection and public information officers and these members are coordinated by the Civil Affairs Officers (United Nations 2009A:162). Civil affairs officers assisted the human rights experts to visit the inaccessible village in Congo where there had been reports of human rights attacks and sexual violence. This coordination approach helped in successfully prosecuting 50 per cent cases of human rights abuses (United Nations 2009A:175).

The human rights officers closely work with the rule of law section with regard to human rights issues. Through the human rights unit in peace missions, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) works closely with DPKO rule of law sections in the field (United Nations 2009A:43). OHCHR perform a range of important technical advisory and institution-building roles to support judicial reform. For example, in the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Sierra Leone (UNIP - SIL) human rights unit have built partnerships in the areas of human rights and the rule of law (United Nations 2012B:26). Human rights unit have engaged with corrections officers on the issues of human rights and the treatment of prisoners.

Multidimensional missions are now mandated to mainstream gender in all policies, programmes and activities, and required to implement Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Missions have gender expert teams which advise the SRSG and the mission on how to mainstream gender and integrate gender perspectives into all areas of activity. The gender experts frequently work alongside civil affairs unit to support the involvement of women in areas such as early warning, protection of civilians, community policing and local peacebuilding (United Nations 2009A:44). As civil affairs officers have close contact with local communities and authorities in the conflict affected country, they support the gender experts with information and analysis about any trends regarding gender issues. Gender experts also provide advice to civil affairs unit on how to mainstream gender and integrate in their work. Civil affairs officers working at local level often experience an environment where local customs or practices may run contrary to principles, such as gender

equality. The customary justice mechanisms in number of countries have failed to protect women and girls from gender-based violence. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the peacekeeping missions gender advisers focused on sensitizing local chiefs about gender issue and promoting harmonization between customary justice and statutory laws, which offer better protection for women and girls (United Nations 2009A:64-65). This ensures that civil affairs officers partner with the gender unit to approach with culturally sensitive way while adhering to UN principles with the local authorities.

The UN electoral experts in the civilian component play important role in implementing mandate for assistance in electoral process. The electoral expert's main function is to ensure free and fair elections in post-conflict countries. Electoral experts are provided with inputs by public information units through live coverage of elections and assist them with civic and voter education for electoral process (United Nations 2003B:152-155). This partnership helps to achieve the mission's objective to provide free and fair elections and bring durable peace. In UNMIL, during the Liberian presidential elections, for instance, public information unit campaigned on civic education and awareness on voter registration and also provided coverage of the election process on the UNMIL Radio which led to the success of the elections (United Nations Hunt:52). The public information officers were able to inform and educate the public about the registration and electoral process and thus encouraged participation which helped the electoral experts to provide electoral assistance in post conflict countries. Thus, a close coordination of work is maintained and information shared between these units.

However partnership among the civilian units faces the problem of balancing the competing priorities of mandated tasks. For instance, at times problem arises between the mediation efforts of political affairs officers and the activities of public information which is seen by political affairs as disruptive to the fragile relations between the mission and the parties to the conflict (United Nations 2003B:30-31). Thus, for a good implementation, planning complementary tasks and arranging the time lines for all units is essential to achieve common purpose of peace and stability in the post-conflict societies.

Partnership with Military and Police

The various components of the multidimensional peacekeeping operations and their sub-units are interdependent when no single component or unit can achieve the mandate of the operation on its own (Coning, 2010:33). Each component in the mission contribute to the

achievement of the overall mission objective. The multidimensional operations include military, police components, and international and national civilian experts on various areas to carry out reconstruction activities. Each of these components and sections within them often has a distinctive subculture that can benefit greatly from trying to understand and working in partnership with other components and units (United Nations 2012A:39). The various mechanisms and modalities is being developed to facilitate coordination and cooperation of the different dimensions of political, security, development and human rights of peace operations to work together as one coherent mission.

The military and civilian police components provide security and maintain law and order which are crucial for civilian component activities in political, electoral, humanitarian, human rights, and other elements. This led to an increasing interaction and work in partnership among the military, police and various civilian personnel to implement the common mandate. The post-conflict environment is made secure by the military and civilian police that are absolutely essential for reconstruction and rehabilitation activities undertaken by civilian component. For example, the electoral unit cannot successfully support the process of election if the police and the military components, do not help to create a safe and secure environment. Within the military component, the civil-military coordination (CIMIC) branch act as the focal point for coordination between the military, police and the civilian components. CIMIC provides the interface between political and security objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding objectives on the other (Coning and Holshek 2012:13).

One of the key civilian members in CIMIC both operational and tactical levels is the UN Civil Affairs Officers, due to their central role in mission coordination and numerous mission initiatives. The civil affairs officers with the CIMIC officers establish ongoing liaison and become familiar with their respective mandates and roles in order to identify and exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies (Coning and Holshek 2012:22). CIMIC Officers facilitate the flow of information and provide advice on how the military may assist the civilian component or local authorities. CIMIC Officers even though report through the military command structure, they usually participate in the coordination mechanisms of the civilian component (United Nations 2009A:41). Occasionally a military observer assumes the CIMIC function at the local level and serves as the primary interface for civil affairs staff (United Nations 2009A:41). Civil affairs at the headquarters level works with the military,

and this interaction is filtered through both the military command structures and to the Civil Affairs Officers in the field. They can help to manage any misunderstanding or conflict between local communities and military units. Civil affairs demilitarize the problem at the social and administrative levels countrywide to help the military through encouraging dialogue or civic interaction in buffer zones (United Nations 2009A:42). For instance, in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syrian Golan, civil affairs were deployed in the mission in 2010 and supported civil-military coordination capability(United Nations 2012A:42).

The civil affairs officers also coordinate with the UN police (UNPOL) to advice on the strategic and policy framework for operations and liaison with local communities (United Nations 2012A:43). They also provide input both for induction processes and for development of police projects or programmes to help police component to understand the political and socio-economic context within which they are operating. In missions that are mandated to protect civilians, civil affairs officers work both with the military and the UN police in joint protection, rapid response and early warning mechanisms. For example, in MONUSCO, civil affairs played a key role in the joint coordination mechanisms for protection of civilians (United Nations 2012A:144).

Community Liaison Assistance (CLAs), who are part of the civil affairs unit, are deployed alongside the UN military in remote strategic localities to identify risks and develop locally protection responses of local civilians. They together with the military component hold monthly briefings at the provincial level. In Joint Protection Teams along with other civilian units, civil affairs coordinated with the UNPOL. In the UN mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) civil affairs officers assisted in the selection, deployment and monitoring of police as part of the mission's work to establish a multi-ethnic police force (United Nations 2003B:37).

Other civilian units which have partnership with UN military and police components are political affairs, public information, human rights, judiciary and correction officers. Political affairs officers provide guidance to both UN military and police components with the latest developments and they reciprocate it by providing invaluable information and support for its task in the peace process. For instance, political affairs officers together with military component develop disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (United Nations 2003B:23).UN military observers and civilian police make observations on the

ground which provides an early warning of threatening crises to the political affairs officers. This helps in preventing conflict and also enhance in reaching inaccessible areas. In MONUSCO, Political affairs unit is part of the Joint Protection Teams which gather and exchange information among the team to achieve better outcome for all actors in the peace process (United Nations 2009A:162).

The public information spokesperson is assisted by military spokesperson for military issues and a civilian police spokesperson for matters pertaining to police and law enforcement. All these spokespersons together try to ensure that the mission always speaks with one voice, for accuracy and to prevent any attempt of division within the ranks (United Nations 2003B:53). Public information officers also help the civilian police develop public information strategies and key messages to raise awareness about human rights issues for the public and address the role of police in society(United Nations 2003B:93). In UNAMSIL, Public Information unit developed a coordination mechanism to ensure exchange of mechanism to ensure a common and universal objective of all the components which is based on exchange of information. This coordination has led to efficient use of scarce public information resources by sharing the workload among the civilian public information officers and military and police public information officer having a collective goal (Hunt 2006:30).

UN promotion of rule of law in post-conflict countries is supported by the primary three actors together: civilian police, judiciary and corrections. Judicial affairs and corrections officers who are deployed in recent years have supported to rebuild these crucial institutions and to complement the role of a transitional authority in the application of the due process of law. In particular, judicial affairs officers coordinate closely with the police component and corrections officers of the mission to ensure the synchronization of all parts of the criminal justice chain (United Nations 2013:44). They are the three pillars of criminal justice system and their close coordination provides substantial strengthening of rule of law. Justice and correction officers along with police and military components ensure a coordinated, coherent and comprehensive mission strategy to strengthen rule of law in post conflict countries which is a core principle of UN rule of law assistance (United Nations 2013:47).

The human rights unit forge a close partnership with UN military and police components with regard to information sharing on human rights violations and developing policies on vulnerable groups. UN military and police understanding of human rights principles are critical to the work of a human rights unit. The military component collects

essential inputs on human rights violations and provides it to human rights expert to address the situation. In the same way, the UN police officers investigate public complaints against any violations of human rights by the police services and ensure compliance with human rights standards. UN military and police personnel have better access to information and remote areas than human rights unit in a peacekeeping mission and thus can provide effective information to the human rights unit (United Nations 2003B:109). Human rights unit on the other hand reciprocate by providing invaluable inputs on human rights principles and standards for police and military training curricula. For example, in Kosovo, the Joint Task Force which included UN police and Human Rights Adviser coordinated to identify groups with human rights abuse and developed strategies to protect them, thus addressing the root causes of the violence (United Nations 2003B:109).

Most of the UN policies and guidelines on civil-military coordination are focussed on the humanitarian-military relationship. There is currently no policy guidance for the non-humanitarian civilian component realm of civil-military relations (Coning 2006:115). Thus, there is policy gap in UN CIMIC action. Scholars like Coning have recommended for the development of UN CIMIC principles and guidelines in peacebuilding operations which can be integrated into the UN mission's overall strategy in support the peace process (Coning 2006:115). Another important challenge facing such kind of partnership is that it works in an environment not only just multicultural but also consist a combination of civilians, police and military with entirely different working cultures, and from a variety of different backgrounds (United Nations 2012B:87). This makes the task of coordination very complex.

Despite such kind of challenges, civilian component's partnership with military and police have addresses the problem of overlapping, duplication and an inefficient use of resources in the UN field mission. Different components may use time and resources to collect the same information and may focus on the same cases while neglecting the others which are less accessible (Coning and Holshek 2012:15). So some extent, this kind of problems have been attempted to address through partnership among the various components of the UN mission. Nevertheless, more conscious efforts in this direction is required in future missions to bring about more efficient and effective outcome.

Partnership with UN Agencies

The civilian component of Multidimensional peacekeeping operations work closely with UN agencies, funds and programmes to carry out reconstruction activities. Civil affairs is

one of the units of peacekeeping operations with the closest operational links to the UN Country Team(UNCT) which brings the different UN agencies, funds and programmes together (United Nations 2009A:45). UNCT partners carry out operational activities for development, emergency, recovery and transition in post conflict countries. The civil affairs officers, due to its strong country wide presence, assist the UNCT by providing access to local level political processes. With these areas of comparative advantage, civil affairs unit and UN agencies closely partner with each other in a number of ways through joint programmes. Civil affairs unit also facilitate the work of UN partners that are not represented at the local level, by providing information for UN agencies, programmes and also assisting in monitoring the implementation of their programmes at the local level (United Nations 2009A:46).Some UN agencies may operate in a country for several years before the arrival of the mission and will continue to operate following departure of peacekeepers. It is therefore important that civil affairs officers take into account the activities that have been undertaken by UNCT partners (United Nations 2009A:46). Moreover, civil affairs unit is frequently faced with lack of funding which create challenge in terms of capacity to run its own activities independently. However, this is addressed through coordination with other partners, especially the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Carvalho 2010:34). In UNMIS, for instance, Civil affairs worked closely with UNCT partners, such as UNDP, to access funds from the Sudan Recovery Fund to address resource-based conflicts in Sudan (United Nations 2012A:176).

UN agencies cooperate closely with the peacekeeping mission by sharing resources and facilities to address a very specific issue of concern. For instance, UNICEF, UNHCR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have made human rights protection a priority in their work. Human rights unit in peacekeeping missions face the problem of a shortage of resources for carrying out its activities. Human rights unit need to identify alternative sources of funding. They work together with other relevant UN partners, such as OHCHR, to raise extra-budgetary funds for research, training and capacity-building activities to address human rights violation in conflict affected countries (United Nations 2003B:112).In the UN mission in Angola (MONUA), the human rights unit in partnership with various UN agencies and international humanitarian organizations conducted joint training on human rights and humanitarian law for their staff and local NGO representatives (United Nations 2003B:110). The UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)have Human Rights Section/ Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cooperating together in the general framework provided by the United Nations Joint Vision for Sierra Leone. The partnership have agreed to bring work plans together, discuss priorities and identify gaps in human rights work, and to join efforts in training and capacity building activities and pool resources to avoid overlapping and to make effective use of the available resources (United Nations 2013:127).

The rule of law unit in peace operations have partnered with various UN agencies to effectively coordinate and work on rule of law issues and their reform in post-conflict countries. The Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance specifically requires the United Nations to develop a joint UN rule of law programme (United Nations 2009B:10). Judicial affairs officers coordinate with OHCHR, UNDP, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UN Women, specifically relate to human rights. For instance, together with OHCHR, DPKO has developed the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators to measure the strengths and effectiveness of judicial, correctional and law enforcement institutions in order to help both the United Nations and national governments to build successful national institutions (United Nations 2012B:2). UN Justice and corrections units in partnership with UNDP provides legal education and Training to support judges, prosecutors and essential clerical staff, with the main focus on improving capacity and processes of the judicial and correction system in post conflict countries (Durch et al 2012:67). The partnership between DPKO and UNDP build on their comparative advantages and complement each other's work in implementing activities in support of the rule of law. This partnership needs to be guided by clarity of purpose in order to achieve long-term goals in rule of law (United Nations 2009B:6). In MONUSCO, consultation and coordination mechanism is established to create coordination for rule of law assistance. This mechanism strengthens the coordination amongst the UN agencies such as UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF involved in justice related activities (United Nations 2009B:15)

The SRSG manages team spirit and unity of effort within the multidimensional peace operations, which is one of the most challenging tasks. This task becomes even more complex when partners outside the mission such as UN agencies are integrated into the structure of the mission (United Nations 2003B:12). The SRSG manage the team, balance a variety of

national and professional backgrounds and different cultures and operational requirements of components which sometimes creates a lot of challenge. There is also a lack of coherence and coordination within the UN's different agencies, who work according to their individual mandates and with their own budgets (Interpiece 2010:14). They sometimes do not work with a common objective.

The emergence of numerous peacebuilding objectives with focus on civilian functions has led to the creation of multiple posts by various UN agencies and departments to address a common issue. This has led to overlapping duties on the ground (Wiharta and Blair 2001:90). The lack of clarity of civilian functions also leads to the lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of different sections. There is no proper division of labour between the civilian component and UN agencies. For instance, UN does not adequately address the division of labour between the peace operation and the UN Country Team (UNCT). In Sudan, the UNCT was already working on issues such as rule of law, demining, DDR and refugee returns when UNMIS was established. This caused considerable confusion to the Sudanese entities, which were already dealing with one UNCT and then had to work with UN civilian component when UNMIS was established (Wiharta and Blair 2001:107). Thus, such kind of overlapping of tasks creates confusion among the actors in the field. Moreover, the problem of integration in the UN HQ impacted at the field level as well. There is competition and mistrust at the HQ level which seriously undercut efforts to bring integration in the field. Thus, civilian component at the field level could not become fully integrated with UN agencies and difference between them created barrier towards a common objective of the UN to bring lasting peace in post conflict countries (Durch et al 2012:22). The main problem of partnership is that it does not create division of responsibility or authority and various UN agencies compete for scarce resources of the donors' funds rather than having central trust-fund mechanism managed by the UN (Kaspersen and Sending 2005:18). The competition over the donors' funding and turf battle over the space of activities are the major stumbling block for effective partnership between UN civilian component and other UN actors engaged in post-conflict societies.

Partnership with Other Organisations

Many non-UN inter-governmental organizations such as World Bank, regional and sub-regional organizations and international NGOs are also involved in reconstruction activities in the post-conflict societies. These actors have their independent agendas, which may not

always be aligned with those of the UN mission. Coordinating and interacting with non-UN actors become essential to achieve common objective of bring about durable peace in the post-conflict societies (United Nations 2012A:47). The Senior Advisory Group (SAG) has also recommended the establishment of a "Civilian Partnership Cell", where external actors match their capacities with UN needs and aims at ensuring to develop partnership between the UN and other organizations working in the same operational field.

Peace operation partnerships between the UN and regional organizations have increased considerably in the last decade. This coordination is important to avoid duplication and inter-organizational rivalry. Recognizing the relationship between the UN and emerging peacekeeping actors such as the European Union and African Union have led to burden sharing and mutual reinforcement for a more effective participation in peace operations (Koops 2012:1). UN and European Union cooperation on peace operations was formally initiated with the 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crises Management. The Secretary General of the UN and Presidency of the Council of the EU has welcomed the cooperation between the UN and EU in the area of civilian crisis management. Following the Joint Declaration, the partnership between the two organizations was cooperated in the field through various activities and frameworks in a mutually reinforcing manner that has shown the ability to adapt to the complex multidimensional crisis (Hummel and Pietz 2015:1).

One important area of partnership between the UN and EU is providing training to civilian component. EU pre-deployment and certification courses are made available to UN civilian personnel (Hummel and Pietz 2015:2). Another important area which has been at the core of both UN and EU missions is rule of law assistance. EU is providing to UN peace operations with niche capabilities in the area of rule of law (Madsen and Pietz 2014:3). In MINURCAT, for instance, the justice planning team of DPKO together with the EU is providing increased UN support for mobile courts, support for prisons and dialogue with the informal justice sector (Durch et al 2012:21). Moreover in the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), judicial affairs officers developed partnership with the EU and the latter supported funds for the rehabilitation of courts and prisons. The development of such cooperation help in sharing both the actors experience in the areas of civilian crisis management and strategies to facilitate the raising of civilian personnel. Thus, against the background of scarce civilian capacity, the EU works to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts.

The relationship between the UN and African Union has received significant attention due to the large scale conflicts in the continent. The UN has collaborated with the African Union (AU) in the area of peacekeeping, and also is making efforts to improve its relationships with them in the area of peacebuilding (Ajayi 2008:2). The AU has embarked on an initiative to develop an African Standby Force (ASF), which also includes civilian component along with other components. The Policy Framework of the ASF aims to achieve coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures, with regard to civilian component, so that the mission and its personnel can transition between the AU and the UN with ease (Coning and Kasumba 2010:34). UN participates in close cooperation with the AU with regard to civilian recruitment in peace operations. In relation to the AU, DPKO support the establishment of an AU civilian deployment capacity and also there is an effort to share personnel data from Nucleus about candidates from AU countries with the AU (Gourlay 2006:48). This type of sharing of data help generate national and regional civilian capacity and keep AU recruitment costs down. The DPKO has held a number of training programmes for AU civilian component (Ajayi 2008:4).

The World Bank is one of the important organizations that work in close coordination with the UN in post-conflict reconstruction process. The World Bank takes the lead in carrying out on core government functionality and the UN supports this initiative (United Nations 2012A:210). The UN civilian work alongside and in coordination with World Bank, which may be engaged in promoting good governance and supporting state institutions (United Nations 2012A:217). In DRC and Liberia, for instance, Civil Affairs unit have developed strategic partnership with the World Bank. In the both the countries, UN and World Bank helped to bring the international community and the national government together with regard to priorities for peace consolidation (United Nations 2012A:217).

NGOs are invaluable sources of information for the UN civilian component, especially with concern to remote areas where they are often based. DPKO actively engages with international and local non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in order to effectively implement its mandate. The UN civilian component explain the operation's mandate to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), keeping them abreast of progress and obstacles in the peace process. This is particularly important in multidimensional missions with complex mandates that may cover a wide range of activities requiring the cooperation (United Nations 2003B:45). The work of international NGOs, often complement

peacekeeping operation. They have played a particularly important role in gender; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); judicial affairs; corrections; elections; and human rights. The successful execution of these thematic programmes dependants largely on close collaboration with a broad spectrum of INGOs working on such kind of activities. For example, the Civil Affairs Section of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) works with various INGOs involved in the national reconciliation process to supports in the promotion of sustainable peace and a just implementation of the peace agreements. The Human rights Section also supported the publication of a comprehensive report “*War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*” which was researched by an international NGO, Physicians for Human Rights, in cooperation with local women’s rights activists (United Nations 2003B:108). Again the first documented cases of atrocities by the rebel forces in Sierra Leone came from the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in partnership with human rights section (United Nations 2003B:110).

The partnership of UN with other organizations is most often ad hoc rather than structured which reflects the limits and challenges of this partnership (Hummel and Peitz 2015:1). Organizations engaged in peace operations always have the problem of differences in mandate and these differences are greater than similarities which give rise to disagreements and create confusion (Morris 2010:31). Moreover, INGOs that work at the local level lack understanding or experience of the specific local context (United Nations 2012A:230). This creates problem for civilian component, especially Civil Affairs Officers to coordinate with INGOs. INGOs also focus more on their organizational benefits such as increasing organization’s visibility and show its relevance rather than concentrating on the targeted issues, which again may negatively impact the peace process.

Partnership with Local Actors

National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. The SAGs vision of “UN-OPEN” strongly reinforced the idea of local and national ownership, which is essential for the consolidation of peace. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core activities, there is promotion of national and local ownership to foster trust and cooperation with national actors. To initiate local and national ownership, the UN civilian component partner with the local actors. The UN not only builds capacity of the local actors but also engage the local communities in reconstruction activities. Partnership with national actors brings legitimacy of the operation and support

mandate implementation and also ensures the sustainability of the peace process. Civilian component in partnerships with national actors give due regard to impartiality, wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender considerations (United Nations 2008C:39). The Capstone Doctrine explains that divergent opinions exist in the host country and thus all opinions and views need to be understood to ensure that participation are not limited to small elite groups. Women's participant is very important for such kind of partnership which is essential for lasting peace as they are a significant part of the community. Close partnership with the local actors help in sharing resources and facilities to address a very specific issue of concern.

When the national government is unable to assume certain responsibilities critical for sustainable peace and stability, it may seek help from the UN. Accordingly, UN through peace agreements assists and partner with the government to develop its capacities to meet the peace process. The various partners involved in implementing the mandate which have substantive civilian task include the parties to the conflict, the host government, opposition groups, local and national administration, civil society, the local population and media. The parties to the conflict may include the host government, local administrative or governmental entities, armed forces, local militia groups and opposition groups. The SRSG may bring together local and international civilian leadership in formal commissions to work on rule of law or civilian matters in a coordinated and cooperative manner (United Nations 2003B:14). Working in partnership with local population and civil society helps the civilian component to better understand local problems in conflict situation. During the transitional period, civilian component come in close contact with the local authorities in creating sustainable political, administrative and legal institutions and conduct local elections and develop local administration.

Public information unit in a mission have a better outreach with the local population. The public information unit with the help of local population can counter any misinformation by the parties to the conflict. They with the local journalists provide the latest developments to political affairs officers. While building local capacity, the UN public information officers provide training or other assistance to local journalists to strengthen independent local media. The success of *Radio Okapi*, an innovative initiative of public information unit in MONUC to broadcast the peace process in great detail, is an important example where standards for accuracy and independence in the local media were built with local capacity to produce good

radio broadcasts (United Nations 2003B:47). The spokesperson of public information unit maintains daily relation with local media to have the latest and accurate information in the operational field. Local staff of the peacekeeping operation plays a crucial role in community outreach by providing well-informed information about any rumours, threats and incidents. Their information is invaluable as they have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the society, culture, languages and history of the mission area which is essential to the success of public information activities. However, local staff may face pressure or intimidation from groups unwilling to cooperate with the UN or seeking to influence the mission that may affect the partnership between local actors and the public information unit.

In the rule of law unit, the legal adviser of a mission in partnership with the local actors can understand and interpret local laws and assess their compliance with international laws and human rights standards and principles but in a culturally acceptable manner. The correction officers work alongside the local police and courts in the criminal justice system and assist in strengthening the rule of law, which is essential for building a sustainable peace. In Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia, DPKO's correction officers engaged with local NGOs who provide a range of assistance, including the delivery of medical assistance, food to prison inmates and improve prison conditions (UN-NGLS Website).

The human rights unit conducts capacity-building initiatives with local governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including national and local human rights institutions. In East Timor and Sierra Leone, human rights officers have worked with local authorities and organizations to establish truth commissions to establish records of the past and seek non-judicial relief for victims of violations (United Nations 2003B:105). Human rights officers to create good working relationships with local NGOs, religious leaders, journalists, grassroots organizations, women's groups and local government officials to protect human rights and effectively addressing human rights violations. By maintaining partnership with the local partners, the human rights unit enhances local capacity to protect and promote human rights. Human rights officers consult local partners to identify training priorities, appropriate pedagogy and local target audiences and participate as trainers with UN officers. Human rights are provided in school curriculum with the help of local teachers and education officials to ensure that the educational system in the host country has a solid human rights curriculum (United Nations 2003B:108). In Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor, local human rights officers were hired to work in human rights unit to increase the

sustainability of peace. Human rights unit in collaboration with a mission's public information office and local journalists and educators have designed and produced radio shows that discuss human rights issues. This is seen in Sierra Leone where the Human Rights Section worked with the Public Information Office to make airtime available on Radio for local human rights activists and women leaders.

Civil affairs officers play an important role at the local level and closely partnership with and assist local authorities and communities in efforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political, legal, economic and social infrastructures that support democratic governance and economic development. The head of civil affairs is expected to maintain high-level contacts with local counterparts. A wide network of contacts is maintained with local and regional government and with other key players in the community, such as community leaders, religious institutions, local committees, women's groups and groups working on children's issues, civil society representatives and the local media implementing the mandate (United Nations 2003B:36). This partnership helps in identifying avenues for immediate action. As a partnership with the local actors, civil affairs officers can assist human rights officers and occasionally electoral officers by providing access to local officials and records. Through this partnership civil affairs officers helps in translating the mission's objectives into practical measures on the ground and advise local authorities on their role in implementing the mandate.

Inclusion of all local actors including the various ethnic, political and social groups in the partnership is the responsibility of the civil affairs officers. Working closing with local women's group advances the issues of women to the central domain. In UNTAES, civil affairs officers engaged with local authorities through specialist joint committees, such as the Joint Implementation Committees. These committees are chaired by Civil affairs officers to conclude agreements on political or socio-economic issues and proceeding on reintegration, restoration of public services, economic reconstruction, education, return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), monitoring human rights and promoting reconciliation (United Nations 2003B:40). They may participate in the negotiation of these agreements with local authorities to ensure adherence to the mandate. In 2007 the Institutional Support Unit of MINUSTAH with the Ministry of Interior and Local Government (MICT) have embed a number of officers within the Ministry to assist with the restructuring of the Local Government (United Nations 2012A:201). There was widespread perception that the UN

mission violated national sovereignty through this task. In an environment of such kind of suspicion and lack of cooperation it was difficult to make any progress. Although with such kind of problems, the work of the Institutional Support Unit with the MICT has had an important impact on local governance. It has revitalized and strengthened some of the key units responsible for local governance and their planning and organizing activities. There has also been significant improvement in the ability of the municipalities to manage their finances in a more transparent and accountable way. Overcoming the suspicion and mistrust between the Institutional Support Unit and the MICT has also paved the way for more extensive and fruitful partnerships between the MICT and other donors, in particular bilateral and international donors which have facilitated the support of local governance as a coherent national strategy (United Nations 2012A:201).

The political affairs unit also plays an important role in liaison with the host government, which includes the office of the president or prime minister, the cabinet, parliament and the relevant local authorities. With the host government, the political affairs officers work in the development of roadmaps for political progress. Gender adviser of a mission may sometimes consult with local experts on gender equality, including academics, local civil society groups and governmental departments or offices for women's affairs. Local women's organizations in collaboration with gender experts often provide local expertise on education and reproductive and general health issues.

Local NGOs and civil society organizations play an important role as influential opinion-formers, important local interlocutors and a channel for information about people's needs, concerns and priorities (United Nations 2012A:170). Forging partnerships with these actors help peacekeeping missions to better understand the local environment and facilitate confidence-building efforts at the local level. For instance, local NGOs active in the mission area is well-placed to advise the human rights unit on the most effective areas to pursue as they know best what the priority human rights issues are and what initiatives are most likely to succeed in strengthening human rights protection (United Nations 2003B:110-111). However, sometimes they may resist sharing information with the UN civilian component, out of concern that their operations may be jeopardised or have a disincentive for information sharing due to competition with each other for resources from the same donors (United Nations 2012A:160). On the other hand the civilian component explain the operation's mandate to local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), keeping them abreast of progress

and obstacles in the peace process. This is particularly important in multidimensional missions with complex mandates that may cover a wide range of activities requiring the cooperation (United Nations 2003B:45). Partnership with local NGOs can enhance popular participation and also the involvement of marginalized groups as they have better understanding of the local context. Thus, they assist in promoting local ownership and local capacity development and this partnership helps in capacity-building initiatives. However, local NGOs most of the times are not formally organized and thus partnership of this kind may have limited project management capacity (United Nations 2012A:229).

Partnership with national/local actors in an environment of local political complexities and sensitivities is very challenging. In some areas, there are local spoilers which create tension between actors in the peacekeeping operations by being cooperative with one while being obstructionist with another. To avoid manipulation and maximise common efforts a need for regular and open communication with partners is the best way to address such kind of challenge (United Nations 2003B:39). Again the partnership between civilian component and local actors is most of the time dominated by the international civilian component rather than an inclusive participation of local actors. In the peace operations, there is a perception that the local capacities are not capable to perform effectively in the peace process, especially in the time of urgency as task is often exercised at a pace that does not allow time to build local capacity (Coning 2011:587). This creates the risk of displacing civilian roles that should be performed by local actors and the very fragility of national capacity which international civilian component is required to address. Moreover, in the partnership process there is the problem of local actors ending up serving external actors which weaken the local authorities and civil society (Coning 2011:587-588). Another problem is due to slow pace of the progress of the peace operations, local actors may appear to be less interested in positive change (United Nations 2012A:80). They may not immediately understand the importance of partnership with civilian component as programmes are not effectively implemented and may not see tangible results. Thus, it is important to be able to explain the benefits of the peacekeeping mission to local actors. In matter of partnership between the judicial adviser and local actors, the legal practices and traditional values and customs in post-conflict countries may sometimes do not meet the international standards and this may create problem between the local actors and the legal advisers (United Nations 2003B:97). The local legal community and the population may resist change if they view their existing laws as legitimate.

A coherent, coordinate and harmonized work of international civilian component with local actors is vital to build local capacity to ensure sustainable peace. There should be local actors' willingness and ability to work together with the UN civilian component.

Conclusion

There are various actors carrying out reconstruction activities alongside the UN civilian component. Outside the UN peacekeeping operation, there are various actors such as UN agencies, other inter-governmental organizations, regional organizations, NGOs and local actors providing humanitarian and development assistance. With various actors within and outside the mission, multidimensional peacekeeping operations function in a very complex environment. The civilian component of the UNKPOs is not in position to carry out all the reconstruction activities all by itself and thus have to enter into partnership with other actors working in the same field. The civilian component needs to work in partnership with these various actors. The partnership offers mutual benefits in the form of information sharing, expertise, experience and also resources and recognizes that all actors need to take an integrated approach to conflict situations to achieve peace. Partnership is important as it is based on a shared understanding and each partner has a contribution to make and the partners depend on each other for success.

Actors both internal and external to the UN mission have different organizational culture, agendas and approaches. This requires a systemic integration through partnership which greatly benefits the actors from each other distinctive approaches and thus leading to effective working within the parameter of the mandate. This has created the emergence of integrated missions to bring all relevant UN and non-UN together for establishing partnership. Here, the SRSG is responsible that missions pursue an integrated approach and activities of various actors are coordinated for effective outcome.

There are various units within the civilian component and the most important partnership should be developed among the various units of the UN civilian component itself. They need to work in partnership with each other to achieve the mandated objective and bring a durable peace in post-conflict countries. Civilian component may be confronted by complex environment in post-conflict area which can only be overcome by working hand in hand together with all civilian units present in the field. Political affairs officers and Civil Affairs

Officers work closely together and share a strategic approach, information and analysis of the political situation. Both focus on the political process of the post conflict country at the national and local level respectively and as such share similar mandates. This has at times created the problem of lack of clarity of roles between the units. Thus, a more clarity in the role of the Political Affairs and Civil Affairs Officers is necessary. Again, Civil affairs Officers also work closely with public information unit to promote better understanding of the mission and its mandate among the local and international communities. Civil affairs unit consult with the public information section of the mission before speaking to the local media. Civil affairs officers reciprocate by supporting the activities of the public information unit, by providing information about the attitudes and perceptions of different groups at the local level.

Civil Affairs Officers and Human Rights Officers share information on human rights threats. They also together make observations on the ground that provides an early warning to the mission. Traditional mechanisms may enjoy greater legitimacy but may run contrary to the principles of universal human rights. To address this tension Civil Affairs Officers coordinate with human rights officers. The human rights officers also work closely with the rule of law section with regard to human rights issues. They address widespread trends of human rights violations and the factors that hinder compliance.

Mainstreaming gender is an important mandate of the UN peace operations. The gender experts frequently work alongside civil affairs unit to support the involvement of women in the peace process. Civil affairs officers support the gender experts with information regarding gender issues. The customary justice mechanisms have failed to protect women and girls from gender-based violence and thus to address this civil affairs officers partner with the gender unit to approach with culturally sensitive way while adhering to UN principles with the local authorities. Public information units provide inputs through live coverage of elections and assist them with civic and voter education for electoral process. They also inform and educate the public about the registration and electoral process and thus encouraged participation which helped the electoral experts to provide electoral assistance in post conflict countries. In multidimensional operation, partnership is difficult to balance due to various competing priorities of mandate implementation. For a good implementation, planning complementary tasks and arranging the time lines for all components can address the challenges faced in partnership.

The multidimensional operations are diverse in their composition and consist of military, police components, and international and national civilian experts carrying out reconstruction activities. Each of these components has a distinctive approach and subculture that can benefit greatly by working in partnership. Therefore, another crucial aspect of partnership has been working together among the various components of the UN peacekeeping mission.

The military and police components need to work in close coordination and partnership with civilian component. Within the military component, the civil-military coordination (CIMIC) branch act as the focal point for coordination between the military, police and the civilian components. UN Civil Affairs Officers is one of the key civilian counterparts to UN-CIMIC officers, due to their central role in mission coordination and numerous mission initiatives. They help to manage any misunderstanding or conflict between local communities and military units. In the same way, civil affairs coordinate with the UN police (UNPOL) to advice on the strategic and policy framework for operations and liaison with local communities. Military and police components provide security to civil affairs officers to carry out the functions effectively. They work together in joint protection, rapid response and early warning mechanisms. Other civilian component which have partnership with UN military and police components are political affairs, public information, human rights, judiciary and correction officers. However, the UN policies and guidelines on civil-military coordination are focussed more on humanitarian-military relationship than the non-humanitarian civilian component realm of civil-military relations. There have been recommendations for the development of UN CIMIC principles and guidelines in peacebuilding operations which can be integrated into the UN mission's overall strategy. Another important challenge is that it works in an environment with a combination of civilians, police and military with entirely different working cultures, and from a variety of different backgrounds which makes coordination very complex. Thus, meaningful coordination among the components in the mission brings a more efficient and effective overall outcome.

UN civilian component work in partnership with other UN actors in the field such as UN specialized agencies, funds and programme to carry out reconstruction activities. With areas of comparative advantage, civilian component and UN agencies closely partner with each other in a number of ways through joint initiatives. Civilian component has facilitated the work of UN partners that are not represented at the local level, by providing important

information. Moreover, civilian component is frequently faced with lack of funding which create challenge in running its own activities independently which is addressed through coordination with other partners, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The SRSG's task of managing team spirit and unity of effort become even more complex when partners outside the UN mission are integrated into the structure of the mission. The UN agencies work according to their individual mandates and with their own budgets thus creating lack of coherence and coordination. Moreover, the emergence of numerous peacebuilding objectives with focus on civilian functions has led to the creation of multiple posts by various UN agencies and departments. This has lead to overlapping duties and duplication of activities in the field. UN also does not address the division of labour between the peace operation and the UN Country Team (UNCT) which creates confusion among the actors in the field. Moreover, the lack of integration in UN HQ with competition and mistrust impacted at the field level as well. The donors funds specific agencies and specific projects rather than donating to a central trust-fund mechanism managed by the UN. This makes various UN actors battle over scarce resources.

Other international organizations such as European Union, African Union, World Bank and also local and international NGOs are also involved in reconstruction activities in the post-conflict societies. These actors have their independent agendas, separate from the UN mission. Coordinating and interacting with non-UN actors is crucial to build relationships and understanding of the different mandates of each actor and supplement each other's efforts. The partnerships between the UN and regional organizations in carrying out peacekeeping operations have increased considerably and most of the time to avoid duplication and inter-organizational rivalry. UN and European Union cooperation on peace operations was initiated in 2003 with Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crises Management, following which the partnership between the two organizations was developed in the field through various activities and frameworks in a mutually reinforcing manner, especially in the area of training and rule of law. The UN has collaborated with the African Union (AU) in the area of peacekeeping, and is improving its relationships in the area of peacebuilding too. Various initiatives like the African Standby Force (ASF) and a ten-year capacity building project to enhance the ability of AU has been developed in collaboration between the two organizations. The World Bank is one of the important international organizations that work in close coordination with the UN in post-conflict reconstruction process. The World Bank takes the lead in carrying out on core government functionality and the UN supports this initiative.

However, organizations engaged in peace operations always have the problem of differences in mandate and this give rise to disagreements and confusion. Thus, a high degree of mutual knowledge and trust and information sharing is required.

International NGOs are also invaluable sources of information for the UN civilian component, especially with concern to remote areas where they are often based. But, sometimes they may resist sharing information with the UN civilian component, out of concern that their operations may be jeopardised or due to competition with each other for resources from the same donors.

The civilian component works in partnership with the local actors to initiate local and national ownership and to build local capacity. This helps in engaging the local communities in their capacity building. Partnership with national actors brings legitimacy of the operation as their consent is most important in supporting mandate implementation and also sustainability of the peace process. Civilian component in partnerships with national actors give due regard to impartiality, inclusiveness and representation of all sections in the society, and gender considerations. Thus, close partnership with the local actors help in sharing resources and facilities to address a very specific issue of concern. However, partnership with national/local actors is very challenging in an environment of local political complexities and sensitivities. The local spoilers present in the area create tension between actors and hamper the cooperation between UN civilian component and the local actors. This requires a need for regular and open communication with the local partners. Other challenges in the partnership with the local actors are lack of inclusive participation of local actors, problem of local actors ending up serving external actors and due to slow pace of the progress local actors may appear to be less interested in positive change. These may weaken the local capacities. It is important therefore to be able to explain the benefits of the peacekeeping mission to local actors and provide opportunity for more participation for them.

Thus, building partnership with multitude of actors in the operational field is crucial for UN civilian component for mutual benefits in the form of information sharing, expertise, experience and even resources. It can also ensure that internal and external players in the mission clearly understand their purpose and tasks, thus enhancing the likelihood of the mission's success. However, the above analysis points out that there are also challenges encountered in the partnership. The conscious attempt needs to be made by all the

stakeholders to address these challenges so that they could achieve common objective of durable peace and stability in the post-conflict societies.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

With the increased destructiveness of the modern warfare, the world leaders experimented with the idea of collective security system with the expectation to bring about lasting peace and security. The first international organization in the form of League of Nations was formed on the basis of collective security system with the primary purpose to prevent the aggressive use of force and take collective action against the aggressor. This was for the first time a formal initiative to institutionalize the collective security system was taken up. However, the Covenant was criticised to be not a perfect design for collective security as it was too vague and no serious attempts been made to implement it. Article 10 and 16 of the Covenant was not properly interpreted. Various resolutions were passed by the League Assembly concerning the economic sanctions under Article 16 which emphasized that each state can decide for itself when to apply economic sanctions against an aggressor. The principle of immediate and absolute boycott was also changed to mean gradual and partial boycott. Moreover, the decisions were to be made on the basis of unanimity which was difficult to reach. Thus, the League lacked legal authority and practical competence to operate on the basis of collective security system. The legal restrictions were inadequate upon potential aggressors and the enforcement action was not effectively committed. Due to these lacunae, the League failed to bring about durable peace.

However, the outbreak of World War II did not destroy the credibility for the idea of collective security as the world leaders were once again devised a more perfect international organization based on the foundation of collective security. UN Charter addressed the legal gap faced by the League. It provided for a more comprehensive prohibition of the threat or use of force by the states under the supervision of the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, Article 39-42 of the Charter provided clearer devices for collective security under the authorisation of the Security Council. However, the UN was not successful in operationalization of the idea of collective security due to the cold war politics that polarized the international relations immediately after the end of Second World War.

Even after the failure to operationalize the collective security system, the moral responsibility to maintain international peace and security made the members to search for an alternative mechanism of managing conflicts in the world. When the processes of dealing

with the conflict through the collective security were blocked due to Cold War politics, the United Nations started the practice of passing neutral ceasefire resolutions, without identifying the aggressor and sending observer missions to the conflict areas to monitor ceasefires and reduce the hostility between parties to the conflict. Through trial and error of these improvised methods became accepted ways of responding to the conflict situations.

However, new challenges came during the Suez Crisis and peace observation became inadequate to perform the extraordinary task. Light armed international soldiers with specific functions in an interstate conflict were sent to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) which was different from the previous observer missions and is regarded as the first formal peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. Since the UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I), the United Nations established ten such operations which are labelled as traditional peacekeeping operations. These traditional peacekeeping operations were based on three guiding principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. However, with the end of the Cold War various changes took place in conducting the peacekeeping operations which have made it impossible to strictly follow the well-established guiding principles.

These changes were quantitative transformation where numbers of operations increased, normative transformation to bring durable peace and qualitative transformation to carry out complex operations, extending to reconstruction of post-conflict societies. During the post-cold war the mandate became complex in nature with multidimensional tasks. The shift in focus from interstate conflicts to intra-state conflicts was faced with a complex environment where the government institutions have collapsed, the economy is fragile and lacks basic social security. The military and the police components were not capable of carrying out all the mandated tasks as they were mostly involved in security issues. Reconstructing the political, economic and social systems and re-establishing basic social services in post-conflict countries require special knowledge and expertise. The civilian component of the UN peacekeeping operations has become indispensable with a new trend of peacebuilding mandate by the UN Security Council.

Initially, among the civilian experts, the electoral experts were a regular feature in peacekeeping operations to assist the host state in developing the political process of conducting the election to establish a democratically elected government. These experts were involved in not just monitoring elections but also extended their task to educating voters, registering voters, constructing the election system and conducting the election. Later civilian tasks of the peacekeeping

operation extended to promoting human rights, training judges and lawyers, reforming rule of law institutions, among other things.

In the post-Cold War, quantitative demands on civilian personnel have increased along with the increase in number of civilian related peacekeeping operations. The study has found that the 32 UN peacekeeping missions from 1990s to 2014 have substantive civilian mandates. At present out of the 16 peacekeeping operations under the DPKO 11 of them have large number of civilian experts to carry out the civilian mandates. The study found that from 1991 till 2014 the mandate consist of civilian task such as free and fair elections, organizing interim civil administration, monitoring human rights, reform of the judiciary, repatriation of refugees, gender issues, extension of state authority, public information, child protection and so on. With this change, civilian component now has more operational and technical roles to play. There is significant trend in peace operations over the past decade to widen the range of building civilian capacities to help the post-conflict countries in transition towards peace.

As the civilian component became the indispensable factor in UN peacekeeping operations, the organizational structure of the civilian component has also been reformed and restructured as the earlier structures became inadequate to plan and manage civilian component. Unlike the military and police components, the organizational structure of civilian component is very complex. The civilian component do not have one well-structured organizational set up like military and police, but there are various desks at the UNDPKO which deal with various units of civilian component. Further, apart from UN DPKO, there are other departments like Department of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs of the UN secretariat playing an important role in carrying out the tasks of civilian component of the UN peacekeeping operations.

In the DPKO some of the main offices where the civilian component is concentrated includes, Office of Operations and Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The political affairs and civil affairs units in the field have their respective desk officers in the Office of Operations and maintain a line of communication. The desk officers at the Head quarter provide political queries and guidance to the political affairs and civil affairs units in the field. These units have obligations to send reports to the desk officers who in turn revised the reports before sending to UN Secretary General through the chain of reporting. The Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) provide holistic approach to re-establishing justice and penal systems in post-conflict countries. Rule of law unit is one of the

well-structured organizational set up in the civilian component. In 2007, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) which was earlier within the police division became part of OROLSI. CLJAS now serves as an important Headquarter counterpart for the justice and corrections officers. This reform in the rule of law unit has increased the number of judicial and correction officers. As a Headquarter counterpart, CLJAS plans, reviews and assess the justice and correction units and also provides advice and technical support to these units in the field missions. In the same way, these units in the field provide regular reports to the DPKO which consist of an overview of the developments and challenges in the rule of law area. According to the reports provided from the field, CLJAS promote the achievements, necessary resource needs and respond to questions in the Headquarter and Member States for the justice and correction units in the field.

Within the UN Secretariat, Department for Public Information (DPI) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provide support and guidance to the civilian component. The Strategic Communications Division of the DPI provides strategic communications support and guidance to public information unit and also standard communication policies for better implementation in UN peacekeeping missions. The Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the DPA work closely with DPKO by planning and managing for electoral assistance in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, at the Headquarter level, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was concluded between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which was an important initiative to provide assistance, guidance and support to human rights unit in UN peace operations.

At the operational field level, the civilian component have specialised units with different chain of command but all are required to report the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and he/she plays an important role uniting together as a team many separate civilian units in a mission. The civilian component technical reporting and communication link with the Headquarter is unlike the military and police components as it is different for the various civilian units. As the civilian component do not have a standard organisational structure, the size and structure varies mission to mission. For instance, in some missions there are only few political affairs officers as part of the office of the SRSG, but in some missions there may be more than 30 political affairs officers headed by a Director. In public information section, the chief of information and the mission spokesperson

are the same person in certain missions. On the other hand, it is found that whenever there is large and diversified public information unit present in the mission, the two positions are separated.

The organisational structure of civilian component is still at its nascent stage and it also lacks adequate resources. It is faced with difficulty in clear command and control structures so that decisions are effectively transmitted from the Headquarter to Mission and then to the relevant units. There is no unified team of experts for analysis, planning and coordination to support the civilian in the field. The structure is non-hierarchical and thus consists of flat leadership where there is limited rank and standing which makes the line of communication confusing. Moreover, it is found that staff at UN Headquarters in New York is mainly from the Global North, while field staff are generally from countries of Global South. This disparity causes tension between the personnel. As civilian task have become a substantive part of peace operations, other UN departments and agencies are also active and this has created the need for coordination which has become an increasingly critical task for DPKO.

As the civilian component gained significance, the recruitment process has become very challenging. The recruitment process of UN civilian component is different from the military and police components. The UN adopted both secondment as well as direct recruitment for the civilian component. There is reduction of secondment recruitment as the UN General Assembly restricted the use of gratis personnel in two resolutions adopted in 1997 and 1998. Before these resolutions, DPKO recruited gratis personnel which mostly came from the developed nations. This became a serious problem when personnel from the developing countries were clearly in the minority. The UN recruits gratis personnel only when the expertise required is not available in direct recruitment system. Department of Field Support (DFS) deals with human resources for peacekeeping operations and advertises vacant civilian positions on the UN Galaxy e-Staffing System Website. However, the direct recruitment process is faced with a bureaucratic and slow nature of work which takes almost a year or more for joining the duty which creates discouragement of the interested experts. Even though large number of applications is received by the UN, it faces with high vacancy rate as it do not get qualified personnel. The vacancy rate is higher in the start up phase. The start-up phase is crucial as there is high demand for civilian personnel deployments which make the recruitment and deployment process difficult to cope up as most of the time it is very unclear what type experts is needed. Moreover, in the field especially during the start-up phase, the

turnover of civilian component is limited due to lack of security and difficult working conditions. In such insecure environment, it becomes more difficult to retain women staff due to lack of family duty stations. Another core problem is finding the most deserving candidate from the large number of applications it receives, especially from the Global South. The civilian experts from the Global South are regarded as more suitable as they have experienced similar environment and thus have better understanding of the problem of the host country. In peacekeeping operations there are certain areas like the rule of law which require specialized experts. However, such skills either do not exist or are not available in requisite numbers or areas.

If the required candidates cannot be recruited through the normal recruitment process, especially in the specialized areas, the UN adopts the secondment system to recruit. For the secondment recruitment, the UN deploys mostly the government provided personnel (GPP). The deployment of GPP is more motivated by individual ambitions and gaining experience. However, the main problem of such kind of arrangements is that the government departments and agencies are reluctant to release their best staff to the UN. Moreover, for investing in secondment it requires additional resources as it requires for advance training which Global South could do in limited way and thus less GPP the Global South

Another important process which UN adopts and which also supplements the normal recruitment process is the civilian roster system. Roster system helps the recruitment process in improving the time it takes to fill vacancies by pre-identifying civilians and keeping the candidates information on record. This system is initiated at different levels such as the UN level, the national level and the nongovernmental level. At the UN level, a Nucleus database is developed by the DPKO as a rostering tool and the interested candidates which are registered is automatically deposited in DPKO's recruitment Nucleus database. There are generic announcements and common screening for several post-specific vacancies which has been extended to include 24 operational groups. Some new areas are introduced within the occupational groups in the DPKO which are facing limited candidates. However, the Nucleus as a rostering tool generates too many applications which are not suitable to the requirements. The screening tools are also not adequate. Moreover, the Nucleus has been established to meet short-term recruitment needs of specialized areas. However this short-term recruitment also faces disadvantage especially in those categories of civilians which are in high demand,

such as women and experienced civilians, as the duration of deployment is short and no family duty stations.

Other external rosters at national and international non-governmental levels have also been initiated and have also increased in scope due to increasing demand for civilian expertise for international peace operations. Some national rosters even though funded by national governments operate independently, but in most of the countries there is not much independence which creates problem as candidates with political reference are promoted than the most qualified one. Moreover, at the national level civilian rosters are managed by different ministries or NGOs instead of a single body which creates difficulty in managing. Along with the national level there are also non-governmental actors playing an important role and the main advantage is their independence with inclusive membership from a broad range of backgrounds. However, the non-governmental rosters still do not have any formal links mainly because DPKO only accepts direct applications.

Earlier training for civilians was not given importance due to marginal role in peace operations. With the increasing demand for civilian in peace operations, training of civilian has become an essential requirement to provide knowledge, skills and attitudes to enable them to meet the challenges of peacekeeping operations. Trainings are based on DPKO principles, policies and guidelines and also lessons learnt from the field, so that functions are performed in an effective way maintaining the core values of the UN. Civilian trainings are basically of three types which includes pre-deployment, induction training and On-going Training. Pre-deployment training takes place prior to deployment in the mission and includes both generic and specialized training. The Civilian Pre-Deployment Training (CPT) is one of the primary tools used by DPKO/DFS that provides general course and does not address specific mandate. A dedicated team of experts of the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of Department of Policy Evaluation and Training (DPET), DPKO/DFS conducts CPTs courses for internationally recruited civilian personnel at the Global Service in Brindisi since 2005. Thus, since 2005 the percentage of personnel who have participated in the CPT course has increased steadily. However, one main problem of this training is that the course provided is very generic and huge which do not adequately address mission specific challenges. Readjustment of the training standards were initiated which focused on updating training materials and developing a “core curriculum” required for civilian staff for better understanding and preparation of the unique problem of the conflict affected country.

The newly recruited civilian component personnel are provided induction training deployment to UN headquarters in New York or in the field missions. Induction training is a compliment to other training and information courses prior to deployment. The training courses are mainly mission specific topics and departmental priorities. It also trains the civilian to perform their tasks with safety and responsibility and sensitizing with the host states cultural norms and practices. However, due to similarity of courses topics in both pre-deployment and induction training there is problem of duplication.

Another important training provided to civilian component in the mission is the ongoing training provided during duty assignment as a learning activity which includes job-specific, technical and mission-specific training courses with substantive knowledge and technical skills for implementing UN civilian mandates and managing resources effectively. Leadership and management skills training courses are also included to train. Senior leadership personnel in mission to enhance their ability to initiate and communicate a shared vision and objective to effectively utilize material and human resources, and prevent crisis in peace operations. There is concern that the senior leaders of the civilian component are not properly equipped to identify strategic objectives and establish a shared vision and prevent crisis. To address this limitations partnership between the ITS and the Office of Human Resources Management is taking place to meet the needs of civilian leadership.

Along with the three training courses provided by the UN, there are certain departments and offices at the Headquarter providing technical and specialized training. This includes the Strategic Communications Division of the DPI providing annual training course for senior public information officers; CLJAS is developing guidance tools and training materials to assist the justice and corrections units in the field and the OHCHR is developing human rights education and training materials and resource tool.

It is found that training centres are mostly located in the Global North. The Global South which is an important source of civilian capacity have few training centres dedicated to developing and mobilizing civilian capacity. The training initiative in the Global South is still in the discussion stage. The Secretary General Report (2011) on “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict” has emphasised the importance of North-South, South-South and Triangular Partnership for addressing civilian capacity. Following this report, some countries have taken the initiative to partner in matter of training. The Senior Advisory Group has also provided various recommendations to improve the quality and scope of training.

Financial lacuna is another main problem facing the training and rostering facilities. The study found that most of the time funds are readily available for technical assistance provided by international actors mostly coming from Global North but not for Global South personnel. Moreover, military personnel are more advantageous in getting financial assistance than the civilian component as they get funding from the UN peacekeeping budget. Secondly, civilian component work in a difficult environment of conflict rooted in the issues of ethnicity and religion. Under such situation international civilian component is required to be well trained to understand the complexity and sensitivity of these societies. Thirdly, there is still critical shortage of civilian personnel in global peace support operations even after the sharp rise in the number of civilian tasks due to the rising demand for more specialized expertise in different fields. There is also lack of training and capacity building of local actors either due to time constrains or due to perception that local expert may not match an international expert in level of education and professional experience, thus ignoring their other important qualities like familiarity with local contacts, language, geography, and culture. Reports like the Secretary General's *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* have proposed to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise to address the civilian capacity gap in the UN. The Senior Advisory Group have highlighted to address the civilian capacity gap through partnership of the UN member states, UN Secretariat and the peace operations training and standby roster community. The UN is taking initiative to address these challenges so that the objective of strengthening civilian component is addressed effectively.

The task of civilian component in peacekeeping missions has over the years become significant and expanded. Civilian component roles and functions have changed gradually from a periphery to a more significant role in post-conflict reconstruction activities. Electoral assistance was the earliest task assigned to the civilian component in UN peacekeeping operations and later on expanded the civilian tasks promotion and protection of human rights, reforming judicial system and correction institutions, reconstruction of local institutions, addressing children and women's concern and dissemination of authentic information to address tension and violence in conflict affected countries.

The Secretary-General (2009) has identified five priority peacebuilding areas where the civilian roles and functions are active. The first core area is basic safety and security which is essential to the population to create security space and carry out reconstruction activities. Under this area, the civilian tasks are mostly located in the reintegration process and the

strengthening of rule of law. In the reintegration process, civilian personnel involved consisted of political affairs officers, civil affairs officers, correction officers and child protection advisers reintegrating the ex-combatants into the society and also assist in gaining employment and income for them. Another task is the strengthening of rule of law in post conflict countries carried out by civilian experts like judiciary and correction officers in re-establishing justice institutions and training national correction services. The second core area is inclusive political processes which include constitutional processes, electoral processes, political party development, public information and media that supports in reconstituting a stable political order. These tasks are carried out by civilian experts such as electoral experts, judicial affairs officers, human rights advisers, child protection advisers and gender advisers, political affairs officers, constitutional experts, media experts to strengthen national capacities and institutions. The third core area is the provision of basic services to build core state capacities and ensure socio-economic development which mainly includes water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees involving the civilian experts such as human rights experts, medical specialists and civil affairs officers. However, basic services are mainly provided by the UN specialized agencies and there is limited participation of UN DPKO in this area. The fourth core area is restoring core government functions which are essential to strengthen national ownership in post-conflict countries which includes public administration and public finance involving civilian experts such as civil affairs officers and judicial affairs officers. The last and fifth core area is economic restoration which is crucial in the immediate aftermath of conflict for long-term development through employment generation and rehabilitation of basic economic infrastructure and the civilian experts are provided both by the UN entities and UN DPKO deployed peacekeeping operations. Thus, these five priority areas are critical for long-term durable peace in post-conflict countries that are mostly exercised by civilian component which are mandated in most of the peace operations in the post-cold War and have become common activities in the peace operations. The Senior Advisory Group (SAG) have also identified these core areas as important and recommended the framework "OPEN" which refers to four key principles: ownership, partnership, expertise and nimbleness that is needed to be followed while exercising the five core areas.

The civilian experts play important roles and functions in the UN peace operations providing strategic assessment, facilitation, monitoring and reporting, advising and

coordination functions in their respective specialized areas. Political Affairs Officers work at the national level with the host government assisting the political processes. Their roles and functions are carried out in a politicised environment and provide assessment and awareness of the mission's political environment to the Head of the Mission. Such kind of environment creates difficulty in bringing into agreement between parties to the conflict with regard to rebuilding the internal structures of a functioning State. This kind of environment may create problem for Political affairs officers in assisting the restoration of national government structures.

In the same way, Civil Affairs Officers also assist in the political processes but at the grassroots level to support social and civic conditions for maintaining peace. They help in informing the local authorities and population about the work of the peacekeeping mission and try to address local concerns. Local environment is quite challenging for exercising peacekeeping operations, especially for Civil Affairs Officers in the negotiation process as the local interlocutors may not understand its benefit. Moreover, sometimes the local interlocutors may not properly represent the local population which lead to problem in addressing the condition at the local level. The Civil Affairs and Political Affairs Officers both function in providing political processes in post conflict countries and at times work at the local level with similar mandate which frequently overlap. Thus, sometimes in some situations there is lack of clarity of functions and roles of both the experts.

Public Information specialist is another important civilian component which plays an increasingly important roles in peace operations to collect, analyse and disseminate vital information to guide and support the peacekeeping operation's objectives. They also help in explaining the mission mandate to the local population, local and international media, the donor community, Member States, agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), keeping them updated about the progress and obstacles in the peace process. In most of the post conflict countries getting credible and accurate information is very rare. The public information officers try to protect and defend the UN's objective and also promote the development of free and independent media and standard working ethics. However, the role of public information officers is most of the time neglected in peacekeeping operations which led to misinformation and misunderstanding in the mission.

Gender experts play an important role in addressing the concern of women and mainstreaming gender issues in post conflict countries. Most of the time women are only projected as victims of war which rather marginalises women in the peace process. Women can also play an important role in peacebuilding and political processes. Thus, gender experts promote the recruitment and deployment of female peacekeepers which is crucial in addressing women's concern more effectively. In the post conflict countries traditional practices are widespread which creates negative social attitudes towards women. Under such environment it is important to negate traditional practices against women which require long term effort by the gender experts.

Child Protection Advisers address the concerns of children as children face specific problems in post conflict countries. They facilitate the inclusion of specific child protection issues in the political agenda. Newly-deployed peacekeepers are provided training on child protection by Child Protection Advisers to ensure that assessment and planning provide the particular needs and rights of children. The monitoring and reporting mechanism of CPAs address the most serious violations against children. They also facilitate child rights issues in negotiations with parties to conflict to end grave violations committed against children. However, Child Protection Advisers role lacks clarification as other components in the mission also have child protection responsibility, in particular the human rights unit which creates confusion and duplication of functions.

The judicial and correction affairs officers play important role and functions in strengthening rule of law in post conflict countries. Judicial affairs officers assist national authorities to develop national justice strategies which are essential to unite different groups in post-conflict countries to shared common goals of both national actors and international community. Judges, prosecutors, public defenders, prison officers and local corrections personnel in post-conflict countries have no formal legal education or training due to the destruction of educational and training institutes during the conflict. To address these problems, capacity development of host state counterparts through training and skills development is provided by judicial affairs and correction officers. However, justice training is very sensitive because of different types of legal systems which may at times create the problem of interfere of judicial independence in host state countries. Correction officers also address the abuses in prisons and assist in the development of laws on prisons, prison policies and regulations. The reporting role the correction officers perform in inspecting the

correctional institutions has certain degree of sensitivity as at times the host state counterparts complains that information of the report has not been properly disseminated. Moreover, in transitional administration missions, judicial affairs officers assume the role of judges or prosecutors which have led to undermining local ownership. Such kind of dependency can be limited by building local capacity.

The civilian component role and functions are becoming more operational in character providing technical assistance along with advisory roles. The provision for technical assistance has increased in election matters. The roles and functions of election experts expanded from just electoral observation function to providing technical assistance of organizing and conducting elections. Registration of voters, civic education and voter information are critical assistance provided by the electoral experts. With increasing complexity, short-term electoral assistance has limited possibility of bringing effective peace process and thus longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts is initiated. Moreover, there is no basic census or other records which requires a comprehensive registration of voters that takes a lot of time and also expensive and non-sustainable. Support to political parties becomes a politically sensitive topic in the post-conflict countries as the candidates are mostly former warring groups. This requires additional external assistance to transform the warring group into non-violent political parties.

With various actors within and outside the UN mission involved in carrying out reconstruction activities in the conflict areas, the partnership among the actors became increasingly important. The UN civilian component of the peacekeeping operation is not in position to carry out all the reconstruction activities by itself and thus have to enter into partnership with other actors working in the same field. UN civilian component carry out its reconstruction activities in multidimensional peacekeeping operations alongside various actors both internal and external to the mission. Partnership is important as it is based on a shared understanding with each partner making a significant contribution and relying on each other for complimentary support.

The civilian component consists of various units that required to work in partnership with each other to achieve the mandated objective. Political affairs officers work closely with the Civil Affairs Officers and share a strategic approach, information and analysis of the political situation. This coordination is crucial to develop strategies to support host state institutions. Political affairs officers that work on the Headquarter level get political report

and analysis about centre-periphery issues and relationships from Civil Affairs Officers. At times national-level politics are negotiated at various levels, where political affairs represent in the local level alongside civil affairs and thus both share similar mandates to implement and understand the political environment. Both Political Affairs Officers and Civil Affairs Officers also maintain a close relationship with the public information officers to consult with them before speaking to the local media. Political Affairs Officers relies on the consent of the local population for the political process and public information unit assist them by deriving the consent of the population.

Civil affairs Officers work with public information unit by consulting with the public information section of the mission before speaking to the local media. They support the activities of the public information unit by providing information about perceptions of different groups at the local level. They together ensure that the messages are consistently communicated directly to the public and through the media. Another component with whom the Civil Affairs work closely is Human Rights Officers on issues of human rights threats. Civil Affairs share relevant information on any kind of risks of human rights violations and also provide access to local officials and record to Human Rights Officers for further investigation and action. They together provide early warning for crises to the mission by making observations on the ground. While addressing human rights issues, traditional mechanisms enjoy greater legitimacy within the community than externally provided solutions. However, traditional mechanisms while tackling the problems may run contrary to the principles of universal human rights. Thus, to address this tension Civil Affairs Officers need to coordinate with human rights officers. Civil Affairs Officers also work alongside gender experts to support the involvement of women in the peace process. Civil Affairs Officers provides information and analysis about any trends regarding gender issues as they have close contact with local communities and authorities of the host country. On the other hand, gender experts advice civil affairs officers to integrate gender mainstreaming in their work. In the post-conflict countries, local customs or practices may run contrary to the principle of gender equality and thus to address this civil affairs officers partner with the gender unit to approach in culturally sensitive way while adhering to UN principles with the local authorities.

Human rights officers work closely with the rule of law section with regard to human rights issues. The rule of law should be based on the International human rights norms and

standards which are the starting point for effective law enforcement and criminal justice in post-conflict assistance. OHCHR through the human rights unit closely work with DPKO rule of law sections in the field provide technical advisory and institution-building roles to support judicial reform. Human rights unit in close cooperation with judicial affairs officers address widespread human rights violations and the factors that hinder its promotion. Human rights unit have together partnered with correction officers on the issues of human rights and the treatment of prisoners.

The electoral expert's main function is to provide free and fair elections in post-conflict countries and inputs on electoral assistance is provided by public information units through live coverage of elections. Public information units also assist the electoral process with civic and voter education by informing and educating the public about the registration and electoral process. This partnership helps to achieve the mission's objective to provide free and fair elections with objective of establishing a stable democratic government in the post-conflict countries.

The partnership among the various units of the UN civilian component is difficult due to various competing priorities. It becomes impossible for each civilian units to please the activities of one another at all times and effectively address the many layers of conflict situation. Thus, there is a need for planning complementary tasks and arranging the time lines for all units to address the challenges faced in partnership. Within the multidimensional operations military and police are other components playing an important role in reconstruction activities. Each of these components has a distinctive approach and subculture that can be beneficial in partnership. The military and police components have recently interacted increasingly with the various civilian experts in the field not directly related to security. The military component has civil-military coordination (CIMIC) branch that act as the focal point for coordination between the military, police and the civilian components. UN Civil Affairs Officers is one of the key civilian counterparts to UN-CIMIC officers, due to their central role in mission coordination. Civil Affairs Officers can help to manage any misunderstanding or conflict between local communities and military component. Civil affairs coordinate with the UN police (UNPOL) to advice on the strategic policy framework for operations and liaison with local communities. Military and police components provide security to civil affairs officers to carry out the functions effectively. They jointly work in rapid response, early warning mechanisms and joint protection.

Other important civilian component which have partnership with UN military and police components are political affairs, public information, human rights, judiciary and correction officers. Political affairs officers provide guidance with the latest developments regarding the political context of the host country to both UN military and police components. On the other hand, the military and police provide invaluable information and support for its task in the peace process and provide an early warning of threatening crises. The Public information spokesperson of the UN mission work in partnership with the military and civilian police spokespersons on matter pertaining to police and military issues and law enforcement. All the spokesperson together tries to ensure that the mission speaks with one voice for better accuracy in the peace process. Promotion of rule of law in post-conflict countries is exercised and supported together by the civilian police, judiciary and corrections to ensure a coordinated, coherent and comprehensive mission strategy to strengthen rule of law in post conflict countries. The human rights unit in close partnership with UN military and civilian police share information on human rights violations and developing policies on vulnerable groups. The military and police components collects essential inputs on human rights violations and provides it to human rights expert to address the situation. On the other hand, human rights unit provide invaluable inputs on human rights principles and standards for police and military training curricula.

However, the civil-military coordination is more focussed on humanitarian-military relationship than the non-humanitarian civilian component realm of civil-military relations. Another important challenge is that it works in an environment with a combination of civilians, police and military with entirely different working cultures, and from a variety of different backgrounds which makes coordination very complex. A meaningful coordination among the various components of the UN peace operations in the mission brings a more efficient and effective results.

UN civilian component also work closely with UN specialized agencies, funds and programme to carry out reconstruction activities which help in sharing resources and facilitate to address specific issue of concern. With areas of comparative advantage, civilian component and UN agencies closely partner with each other in a number of ways through joint initiatives. Civilian component can facilitate the work of UN partners that are not represented at the local level, by providing important information for UN agencies and programmes. Problem of funding which is frequently faced by civilian component in running its own activities

independently is addressed through coordination with other partners, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). SRSG which is the head of the mission required to develop team spirit and unity of effort among the various UN actors in the field. This becomes even more complex when partners outside the UN mission have to be developed. One of the major problems facing the partnership is that the UN agencies work according to their individual mandates and with their own budgets thus creating lack of coherence and coordination. Civilian functions have become a major part of peacebuilding activities in UN missions which have also led to the creation of multiple posts by various UN agencies and departments to address a single issue. This has led to overlapping duties in the field. Thus, along with UN DPKO provided civilian component there exist other experts from UN agencies in the field working on civilian related tasks. There is also no clarity in the division of labour between the civilian component of the UN operation and the UN Country Team (UNCT) which creates confusion among the actors in the peace process. Moreover, at the UN headquarter there is competition and mistrust among the partners which impacted at the field level and thus there is lack of integration. In funding also only specific agencies are provided funds from the donors rather than to a central trust-fund mechanism managed by the UN, which creates continued competition and tussle over scarce resources.

Non-UN actors such as European Union, African Union, World Bank and also international and local NGOs are also involved in reconstruction activities in the post-conflict societies. These actors have their independent agendas, separate from the UN mission and agencies. Coordinating and interacting with non-UN actors can build relationships and understanding of the different mandates of each actor's according to which it is governed. In recent years peace operation partnerships between the UN and regional organizations have increased considerably and most of the time to avoid duplication and inter-organizational rivalry. UN and European Union cooperation on peace operations was initiated with the 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crises Management, which led to the partnership between the two organizations in the field through various activities and frameworks in a mutually reinforcing manner, especially in the area of training and rule of law. The UN has collaborated with the African Union (AU) in the area of peacekeeping, and is improving its relationships in the area of peacebuilding too. Various initiatives like the African Standby Force (ASF) and a ten-year capacity building project to enhance the ability of AU has been developed in collaboration between the two. The World Bank is one of the important financial organizations in close coordination with the UN in post-conflict reconstruction process. The

World Bank takes the lead in carrying out on core government functionality and the UN supports this initiative. World Bank also provides with specialized technical experts in niche areas when UN DPKO doesn't deploys. However, organizations engaged in peace operations always have the problem of differences in mandate and this give rise to disagreements and confusion. Thus, a high degree of mutual knowledge, trust and information sharing is required. In the remote areas International NGOs are often provide invaluable sources of information for the UN civilian component. Sometimes the INGOS may not share such kind of invaluable information with the UN civilian component, due to concern that their operations may be jeopardised or competition with each other for resources from the same donors.

The SAGs framework "UN-OPEN" strongly reinforced the idea of local and national ownership, which is essential for the successful implementation of a peace process. Thus, to initiate local and national ownership, the UN civilian component partner with the local actors. This helps in engaging the local communities in contributing to the reconstruction process in its country. The consent of the host state is very important in supporting mandate implementation and thus partnership with national actors brings legitimacy of the operation and also sustainability of the peace process. Civilian component in partnerships with national actors give due regard to impartiality, inclusiveness and representation of all sections in the society, and gender considerations. The partnership with national actors also helps to better understand local problems in conflict areas. Public information unit in partnership with local journalists provide information on the latest developments in the mission. They also work together to strengthen independent local media to counter any misinformation by the parties to the conflict. To understand and interpret local laws and analyse its compliance with international laws and human rights standards, the legal adviser of a mission work in partnership with the local actors. The human rights unit enhances local capacity to protect and promote human rights by maintaining partnership with the local partners. Local NGOs and civil society organizations play an important role as local interlocutors and a channel for information about people's priorities which help peacekeeping missions to better understand the local environment and facilitate confidence-building efforts at the local level. Thus, close partnership with the local actors help in sharing resources and facilities to address a very specific issue of concern.

Political environment of post conflict countries is very complex and sensitive and thus partnership with national/local actors is very challenging. The local spoilers present in the area create tension between actors in the peacekeeping operations by being cooperative with one while being obstructionist with another. This requires a need for regular and open communication with partners. The partnership between civilian component and local actors is faced with various challenges like lack of inclusive participation of local actors as there is perception that local actors is incapable of performing effectively in the time of urgency, problem ending up external actors doing most of the activities and due to slow pace of the progress, local actors may appear to be less interested in positive change. These may weaken the local capacities. It is important therefore to be able to explain the benefits of the peacekeeping mission to local actors and providing more participation for them.

Thus, Partnership is important as it provides mutual benefits in the form of information sharing, expertise, experience and even resources. It can also ensure that internal and external players in the mission clearly understand its purpose and tasks, thus enhancing the likelihood of the mission's success.

From the above studies it is clear that civilian component has become an indispensable part of peace operations to bring about durable peace, whose importance cannot be ignored. As there is increasing expansion of civilian tasks in peacebuilding mandate, there is increasing need for experts to address the root cause of conflict. With shift of focus from security issues to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities, the task assigned to civilian component have changed from giving short term quick results to a longer term involvement to make transition from civil war to a stable and durable peace. With civilian personnel becoming the key to success for peace operations, the demand for qualified and specialised civilian personnel has increased in recent years. The challenge to identify, deploy and manage suitable civilian personnel has also increased. Civilian experts are now expected to do challenging job in an insecure environment under hazardous conditions.

The more civilian experts with contextual understanding of the host country are required not only to address the short term problems but also build long term capacity among the local personnel. The Civilian personnel from the Global South share a common culture and socio-economic conditions with the host country. Thus, conscious effort needs to be made to recruit civilian capacities from the Global South to play a larger role in post-conflict reconstruction activities. There is a need to develop training and rostering facilities in the

Global South which is limited at present time and because of which there is less number of personnel in UN civilian component from the Global South. The participation of women in peacebuilding activities also need to projected in post-conflict countries to address the concern of women more effectively as they could play important role in reconstructing the devastated societies. At the UN level also the training provided to civilians component need to be improved and restructured in a robust way to reflect various challenges in the operational field and prepare the civilian officers of handling them effectively. The more focus attention is required to strengthen the partnership among both internal and external actors that are directly or indirectly involved in civilian tasks. This creates the need for more systematic integration between civilian component and other non-UN actors. On the whole, solution to the problem of intrastate conflicts lays not in the military action but by building local capacity to manage their own affairs. The importance of civilian component of the UN peacekeeping operation is going to increase as they play crucial role in transition from war to durable peace in the post-conflict societies. It is rationale on the part of the United Nations in particular and international community in general to invest more in making the UN civilian component effective and efficient. The future of conflict management of the United Nations lies in building and assisting local people to build the local capacity to manage their affairs more effectively. The Future research on civilian component needs to be directed towards how to reform the various aspects of UN civilian component so that it could contribute more effectively and efficiently in bring about durable peace and stability in the post-conflict societies.

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(* indicates a primary resource)

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