ISLAM'S ROLE IN INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATISATION, 1998-2014.

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"ISLAM'S ROLE IN INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATISATION, 1998-2014"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated To My Parents

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Abbreviations

ABRI- Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)

ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BPS- Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistics Bureau)

DI- Darul Islam (Abode of Islam)

DDII- Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Proselytisation Board)

DPR- Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Parliament)

FPI- Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)

GAM- Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

GDP- Gross Domestic Product.

PPP- Purchasing Power Parity.

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency.

NEFOS-New Emerging Forces

OLDEFOES- Old Established Forces

GOLKAR- Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)

HANURA- Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party)

ICMI- Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)

MMI-Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin's Association)

MUI- Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Religious Scholars' Association)

NU- Nahdatul Ulama (Rise of the Ulamas)

PAN- Partai Amanat Rakyat (National Mandate Party)

PBB- Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)

PD- Partai Democrat (Democratic Party)

PDI-P- Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)

PKB- Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)

PKS-Partai Keadilan Sejahetra (Prosperous Justice Party/ Justice and Welfare Party)

PPP-Partai Persataun Pembangunan (United Development Party)

PNI- Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)

PKI- Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

KOPASSUS- Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command)

KKN- Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism)

TNI- Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)

HMI- Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students Union)

SBY- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

VOC- Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East Indian Company)

M.I.A.I- Majelis Islam A'La Indonesia (Great Islamic Council of Indonesia)

PMI- Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim's Party)

RPKAD- Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Regiment of the Army Command)

SESKOAD- Sekolah Staf Dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Army Staff and Command School)

PPIM- Program Pascasarjana Ilmu Manajemen (Graduate Program in Management Science)

TAF- The Asia Foundation

IMB- Indonesian Muslim Bloggers

PERPPU- Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (Presidential Executive Order)

MDI – Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Indonesian Mosque Council)

V.I- Vulnerability Index

JI- Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation)

Preface

Most of us are born into the religions of our fathers. Some adopt new religions to embrace a new life or to look for a new truth. Religions teach us to obey rules, to care for others, to be humble in success and composed in grief. Religions have contributed greatly in the formation of society and in the establishment of moral and political authority. Human civilization has been nourished by the religions. Yet, religions have been the greatest tools to incite hatred in people for other people. In many parts of world today, religious divisions continue to be the source of violence and human misery. Actors who profit from political and social instability exist on both sides of these division lines. They perpetuate this instability through creation of a different and unpalatable identity for those on the other side. The 'other' are demonized through the creation of myths and selective interpretations of scriptures and rituals. The purpose of this is to transform the 'other' into beings so far from the goodness and acceptability that any act against them, no matter how barbaric or unfair, can be condoned.

This process of condemnation is most apparent in the case of Islam today. Islam is world's second largest and fastest growing religion. Islam also encompasses a distinct legal system and strict rules for ordering of the personal and social life of its adherents. Observation of these rules entails assuming certain Islamic 'symbols' on one's person and his social life. In this way, Islam is different from contemporary practices of Christianity, Hinduism or Buddhism which emphasize formal membership and observation of public rituals. In other words, these religions are not as penetrative of their adherent's personal life as Islam is today. Such differences in approach and the aforementioned proximity of a Muslim's body with his religious symbols are easily translated by interested brokers as unbridgeable social gaps between two communities. Moreover, the elements of difference are magnified and distorted to create hostility which can then be politically mobilized. At a supra-national level, such differences are used to obliterate shared historical experiences and cultural affinities to create new histories and new identities. Borrowing from Huntington, it can be said that these new historical and cultural identities then form imaginary civilizations, continents of human society which are irredeemably separated.

Islam therefore, presents myriad opportunities for students of international politics who are interested in the effect of religion on politics, both at the national level and beyond. The present study is an attempt to look at the role religion played in the democratization of Indonesia from 1998-2014. Indonesia presents a great opportunity for students and scholars to study the intricate relation between politics and religion. A large country with the distinction of being the most populous Muslim majority country of the world, Indonesia houses great diversity of language, culture and ethnicity. It is also home to significant Christian, Hindu and ethnic Chinese minorities who follow Buddhism or Confucianism. The presence of these different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups has been complemented by the geographical remoteness of Indonesia's numerous islands which form the largest archipelago in the world.

Islam in Indonesia has evolved differently than West Asia or even India. Indonesia's Hindu and Buddhist heritage left an indelible impression on the collective memory of people which expressed in the form of a unique, syncretic Islam that incorporated local rituals and mysticism. However, Indonesia was not immune from the currents of more 'mainstream' Islam that was practised as the 'ideal' Islam by the zealously religious. The friction between an Indonesian and 'Standard' form of Islam is still very much a feature of Indonesian society and politics. After winning full independence in 1949 from the long Dutch rule, Indonesia had undergone great political changes. Its political experiment began with multiparty democracy, which transformed into a socialist dictatorship, only to give way to a right-wing, militaristic regime which lasted till 1998. The second journey of democracy begun from 1998 and still continues. It is important to understand just how significant Indonesian democracy is to the democratic governments of the world. It is a Muslim majority country with a long history of authoritarian rule. It faces serious problems of population, inadequate resources, corruption and intermittent sectarian violence. Despite this, democracy is thriving in Indonesia. The press is free; parties of all hue operate within a democratic set-up. Even the declared Islamic parties refrain from challenging the liberal democratic system. There are regular free and fair elections at every level of government. Considering closely, one will find Indonesia to be unique among all Asian Muslim majority states to have successfully appropriated all these features of a democracy.

Despite the vibrancy of Indonesian democratic experience during 1998-2015, there were worrisome signals in the form of ethnic and religious violence in the islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, Kalimantan etc. Riots, witch hunts and terrorist acts marked Indonesia's democratic

transition during much of the first decade of democracy. How the polity adapted to these challenges and retained its democratic character is the subject of this study. At a broader level, this study is an attempt to understand whether Islam represents a comprehensive social and political 'system' and if it does, whether such a system is compatible with the prevailing notion of democracy.

Violence has been discussed as an important component of unravelling the answer to this central question. Efforts have been made to analyse violence as a social phenomenon and a political tool, rooting it spatially. Statistical methods have been used to discern the underlying causes of violence in their specific locales and to make connections between these causes so that the larger framework of religion and politics' interaction can emerge.

Introduction

Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,508 islands, the largest in the world, situated between the Indian Ocean and Atlantic Ocean covering an area of 1,904,569 square kilometers. Out of these, 6000 islands are habitable (CIA The World Factbook 2015). The principal islands are Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and West Papua. The central island of Java has mainly flat landscape whereas the islands of Sumatra and Borneo are mountainous with many active volcanoes. Indonesia is the largest country in the world where the majority of the population adheres to Islam. According to 2010 Census, There are 207.18 million Muslims in Indonesia, constituting 87.18% of the population, along with 25.54 million Christians and 4.01 million Hindus. Buddhists and Confucians are minor segments of the population (Ibid). Indonesian population is divided into many ethnic groups such as the Malay, Dayak, Madurese, Bugis, Butonese etc who are further divided into many smaller groups based on place of living and traditions. Due to this great diversity of religion, ethnicity, language and culture, Indonesia has adopted the motto 'Vinneka Tunggal Eka' or Unity in Diversity. Bahasa Indonesia is the official language in Indonesia, which is a form of Malay language.

Indonesia declared its independence on August 17, 1945. Indonesia was a colony of the Netherlands from 1800 to 1942. During the Second World War, Indonesia came under Japanese control for three years from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia is a republic, functioning under a presidential system. The president is both the head of state and government. The legislature is bicameral, called Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly. The upper house is less powerful, consisting of directly elected non-partisan candidates while the lower house consists of elected candidates belonging to political parties as well as independent members. The lower house is called Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) or House of Representatives. Since 2001, Indonesia has opted for decentralization and now most of the government's functions are carried out by elected bodies at provincial and district level (Hoffman and Kaiser 2002).

Indonesian economy is the largest in ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the 16th largest in the world according to 2014 estimates. In 2014, its GDP stood at $2.554 trillion (PPP) and per capita GDP stood at $5,447. Indonesia is a leading exporter of Palm

Oil, Tin and Rubber. It is the fourth largest producer of coal. Indonesia's West Papua province has world's largest gold mine and third largest copper mine. From 1970's to early 1990's, Indonesia was a significant producer of petroleum but now it a net importer of the same. Indonesia also has significant timber resources in its outer island such as the Moluccas and Sulawesi (CIA The World Factbook 2015).

Indonesia is a significant military power in South East Asia. Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI or Tentara Nasional Indonesia) comprises 417,268 personnel as of 2012. In 2015, Indonesia's military budget was $ 8.05 billion, amounting to 1% of the country's GDP (Ibid). Indonesian army played a crucial role as liberators from the Dutch during the Indonesian revolution of 1945-49. During the rule of President Suharto, the army played a dual role as the defender of country as well as active participants in the country's politics, economy and culture. Under this principle, army officers served in top bureaucratic posts and ran state-owned and private business concerns during Suharto's presidency. After Suharto's resignation in 1998, military's involvement in politics has become less visible, although not absent.

Indonesia is a secular state, although in a restricted sense. Indonesian Constitution declares faith in 'One and Supreme God' under the over arching philosophy of Pancasila. Indonesian Constitution officially recognizes Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Atheism and Agnosticism are not recognized along with old animistic religions still existing in pockets of the land. Blasphemy is illegal in Indonesia.

Although Indonesia declared independence in 1945, it did not gain full control over her territory till 1949. From 1949 to 1955, Indonesia practiced multi-party democracy under the first president Sukarno. It proved to be a failed experiment due to the great number of political parties vying for power and the resulting political deadlocks in the parliament. Sukarno, who was till then only a figurehead President, took the opportunity to assert his vision of a strong, unified Indonesia based on the tenets of 'Pancasila' and reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution which gave overarching power to the president. He introduced the concept of 'Guided Democracy', whereby he stressed that the parliamentary system is inadequate to deal with Indonesia's problems. In order to gain traction, the new Democracy must be guided by a supreme leader, himself and a traditional system of discussion and decision making through consensus. Therefore, from 1956, the Parliament stood adjourned as Sukarno focused on working group representations and solving political questions and

debates through the traditional Javanese systems of 'Mushwara' and 'Mufakat', meaning deliberation and consensus (McVey 1969: 8).

Sukarno was interested in projecting himself and his country as the leaders of the newly decolonized countries of the world and divided the world between 'NEFOS' or newly emerging forces and 'OLDEFOS' or old and established forces. He was a key figure in the non-alignment movement. He also attempted to achieve a harmony of Indonesia's religions and cultures (Kroef 1973: 271-271). Despite his grand international image, Indonesian economy was struggling and inflation was very high. Sensing that a part of the powerful military was turning against him, Sukarno began to depend on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for support. His turn towards the Communist Party alarmed the nationalist and Islamic sections of the army, who, led by General Suharto, deposed Sukarno after the PKI allegedly tried to organize a coup on 30th September, 1965 (Ibid: 275).

Suharto administration and the army laid the blame of the 30th September coup squarely on the PKI as well as the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, who were perceived to be sympathetic towards PKI's cause. A massacre of communists and minority Chinese followed, in which more than half million people lost their lives (Ibid: 276-277). Under Suharto, elections became a farcical show, held every five years. In 1973, Suharto banned all other parties but his electoral vehicle Golkar and two other newly formed parties, PDI and PPP. He hoarded all the Islamist parties under the banner of PPP and all liberal and Christian parties under PDI. Suharto's regime came to be known as the New Order, as against the Old Order of Sukarno. Under the New Order, Indonesia witnessed steady economic growth and urbanization, mostly due to the profits made from exporting petroleum. Despite the economic performance, the Suharto government became infamous for its pervasive Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (abbreviated to KKN in Indonesia) (Roosa 2008: 142). The bureaucracy became vast, corrupt and inefficient and most of the lucrative businesses were run by Suharto's family members or their cronies. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the Indonesian economy hard and laid bare the gross mismanagement of resources, eventually leading to Suharto's downfall in 1998.

The post-Suharto period has been a period for democratization in Indonesia. Suharto's successor Habibe introduced freedom to form political parties, freedom of speech and press and reintroduced free and fair elections. Habibie also took the first step towards decentralization of power in the country. These freedoms were furthered by the steps taken

by his successor Abdurrahman Wahid to decentralize governance in Indonesia. A further fillip was given to the process of democratization when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was elected as the president through a free and fair direct presidential election. It was the first ever such election in Indonesia. After completing a maximum two terms as president, SBY was replaced through free and fair election in 2014 by Joko Widodo, another first for the country.

The present study focuses on the role of Islam in the post-Suharto period of politics in Indonesia till the end of the second term of President Yudhoyono (1998-2013). This is a study about democratization in Indonesia, with emphasis on the effect of Political Islam on the evolution of various political and social factors that drive politics in Indonesia. Democratization itself is a contested concept, with some scholars stressing the economic aspect of it over all other. The aim of the present study is to show how Islam with its well established social and legal doctrines affect this process of democratization. The study also attempts to understand the evolution of Political Islam and attempts to determine whether it is the only Islamic narrative for conducting politics. The present study will incorporate discussions about concepts of Liberal Democracy, Power Politics and Legitimacy and Violence. Important segments of Indonesian polity and society will be examined to observe the effects of Political parties, Islamic groups, their militias, the secular intelligentsia as well as government institutions such as the civil service and the military.

To study the continuing political relevance of organized religion in the present information society is truly fascinating. In today's context, no religion demonstrates this better than Islam. Islam, as the majority religion for two of Southeast Asia's biggest countries is instrumental in shaping both their politics and their interaction with the world. As the upcoming hub of economic and strategic activities, it is important to understand the role Islam might be playing in this region's politics. Indonesia, the largest country in South East Asia with the largest population and military, is also world's largest Muslim country. Despite a long history of authoritarian rule, the country has begun its journey towards democracy from 1998. It is extremely important in light of its importance in South East Asia that it maintains its democratic credentials and stabilizes its economy. It is also of crucial importance to check certain regressive elements within the state such as certain factions of the military and the hardliner Islamic groups. A truly decentralized democratic polity in Indonesia will provide its government with the required legitimacy to carry out bold economic reforms and will also help in solving conflicts in Aceh, West Papua and other such

regions. However, the same freedom gained from decentralization can also be seen to be leading to corruption, local level contests for power along religious lines and adoption of strict Shari'a based laws. For these reasons; a study of the democratic consolidation process with reference to the role of Islam should be an important and engrossing one.

Islam in Indonesia was spread chiefly by the Indian merchants who adhered to a more tolerant Sufi Islam, blended with the traditional mysticism of Java and produced a unique kind of Islam. According to the study made by the noted anthropologist Clifford Geertz, the Muslim populace of Java adheres to one of the variants of Islam as practiced in Java such as Santri, Priyayi and Abangan . The Santri are considered more puritanical than the other two schools and their variant of Islam closely resembles the Salafi and Wahhabi traditions of Arab. Abangan is a variant of Javanese Islam that is steeped in the old traditions of Mysticism and old Hindu and Buddhist beliefs, interwoven with Islamic ones. It has a strong base in rural agricultural areas. The Priyayi are the landed gentry who consider themselves to be better than the other two schools. The religious practices of the Priyayi resemble those of the Abangan, though. Toleration is the hall mark of both Abangan and Priyayi (Geertz 1963). These divisions among the Javanese Muslims have since been accepted as standard. Eventually, scholars have often analyzed the whole of Indonesian Muslims through the lenses of this threefold division. However, such an outlook often ignores the religious practices of the Indonesians living in the outer islands of the Moluccas or Sulawesi which often cannot be described using this three tier model. Even in Sumatra, Islam was followed rather rigidly than in Java. Later studies have revealed that these divisions are losing relevance in modern Indonesia. A contemporary Indonesian Muslim will identify himself as a 'good Muslim' rather than as a Santri. Due to the ubiquity of Islamic symbolism in Indonesia in contemporary times, it may appear that the Santri elements are gaining in strength in Indonesia but in reality the newfound religious zeal among the populace is not connected to the earlier identities. The new zeal can be explained as the result of the betterment of connectivity with the broader Islamic world, the wealth and zeal of the Arab Islamists and a tendency on part of the Indonesian politicians to resort to edgy Islamic rhetoric when faced with a political challenge, a trend that began with Suharto during the closing days of his presidency. However, it would be a mistake to posit revivalist Islam as a challenge to Indonesian democracy. This is again, an example of conflation between Puritanism and extremism and which brings one back to the primary question of Islam vs. Democracy.

Indonesian society was ruled by the traditional 'Adat' laws and the rulers were thought to be semi-divine entities with mystical powers. There was no concept of a representative government and the traditional Javanese belief system emphasized avoidance of conflict, working through consensus and respect towards elders and people in higher social position. The Javanese concept of power, quite distinct from the European concept, can be understood from the work of Benedict Anderson who has discussed this in detail in his book "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" (Anderson 1972). According to him, the idea of power in Javanese culture was concrete, homogenous and finite. This can be contrasted with the western notion of power which is considered ambiguous and which can stem from a multitude of sources. By considering power as constant, Anderson has introduced a zero sum idea of power whereby for one to gain power, another must lose it. Anderson also considered the Javanese idea of power to be largely free of moral restraints. Charismatic leaders, in his opinion are perceived to 'possess' power in eastern societies including Indonesia in a manner that is not easily understandable from a western viewpoint. This analysis of power is very interesting when applied to the present context of democratization under the influence of Islam as it can explain the cultural background which have led to largely secular political practices in Indonesia. It can also provide an explanation to the near acceptance of the use of violence and corruption by the political elite in Indonesia. However, one needs to remember that Anderson's analysis was largely influenced by the events of mass killings of 1965, an event that affected his academic output throughout his life.

Like many other colonies, the idea of democracy was first brought to the land by the Dutch through their education system, although it was meant for a very small section of the society. Following a pattern of many other colonies, the first expressions of a national consciousness was expressed through social reform movements in early 20th century such as 'Bodi Kaniago' and 'Sarekat Islam'. Sarekat Islam was the first mass organization based on Islamic ideals. It was followed by establishment of other such organizations such as 'Muhammadiah' or the way of Muhammad and Nahdatul Ulama(NU), meaning rise of the Ulamas (Sardesai 1981: 264-265). However, during the turbulent period of Indonesia's freedom struggle, the Islamic organization which had the most impact on Indonesia's politics and history was the Darul Islam movement. By 1927, Sarekat Islam was losing its influence as a rift between the traditionalists and the Pan-Islamists was created. A leader of the Pan-Islamists, Kartosuwiryo became a prominent face around this period. Initially an officeholder at Sarekat, he later formed his own armed militia and started a movement called Darul Islam. Darul Islam

engaged in war with the republicans and only gave in 1962, after Sukarno ended the weak central government at Jakarta. In the face of superior firepower of the army, Kartosuwiryo resorted to rhetoric of Jihad and even ordered a 'Total War' in 1961 which led to terrorist acts (Soebardi 1983: 120). Therefore, the movement should be remembered as an ominous warning about the possibilities of any region of the country succumbing to hard line Islamic political influence if the state is not vigilant enough.

These movements gradually led to the establishment of political parties such as the PNI, who were soon joined by the communist PKI. During the Second World War and Japanese occupation of Indonesia the Japanese attempted to use Islam as a rallying factor to fight the mostly Christian allied forces. They established the organization Masyumi and also built a military wing of that organization. After the Japanese left in 1945, the Dutch wanted to reinstate their colonial system, which was bitterly opposed by the Indonesians. A four year long war of independence followed after which the nationalists were victorious and Indonesia gained independence in 1949. Even among the celebrations of victory, there were demands to declare Indonesia an Islamic country. A compromise was made in the form of 'Jakarta Charter' which ensured adherence to Islam by all Muslim citizens. However, the Charter never gained widespread support and had been voted down by the parliament (Liddle and Mujani 2009: 578).

Sukarno was strongly against Islamic influence in politics and espoused a strong secularism, although there was a fair amount of Javanese mysticism to his brand of secularism (Kroef 1973: 271). He portrayed himself as a successor of the semi-divine kings of old empires. His 'Pancasila' was to be the only guiding principle for the state which had no place for Islamic doctrines. However, the very first principle of Pancasila which acknowledges the existence of One God has led to some interesting transformations in the practice of two important minority religions namely; Balinese Hinduism and Buddhism. Position of certain other religions such as Confucianism and Taoism also became precarious because of this principle as these religions are essentially atheistic in nature.

Suharto regime was oppressive against any expression of political Islam and any overt show of Islamic ideas was thwarted. Along with this, the economic progress made under him which provided jobs and also led to the spread of secular education, has led to greater toleration in Indonesian society. Suharto regime has further opened the democratic space for a benign version of Islam in another way. Orthodox Muslim leaders like Nurcholis Madjid and

Abdurrahman Wahid clearly defined their priorities to be progress and liberalism rather than attainment of Islamic goals. Wahid has brought the toleration of old Javanese society with a dedication for democracy and nationalism. He has played a crucial part in establishing the role of the moderate Ullama in Indonesian politics and society.

The post-Suharto period has also been the most exciting phase for adherents of political Islam in Indonesia. After a long period of repression during both Sukarno and Suharto era, political Islam was finally allowed to surface in the mainstream of politics. This resulted in the establishment of a host of political parties with Islamic agenda ranging from moderate (such as the PKB or PAN) and conservative (such as the PKS or PBB). Even the secular political parties started allowing space for religious discourse in their agenda. A significant event during this phase was the inclusion of the top leaders of the country's two most influential grassroots level organizations, Muhammadiah and NU, in mainstream politics. However, it must be noted that the urge to establish an Islamic society has never overcame the primary goal of establishing a functional democracy. In a country with world's largest population of Muslims and with a history of struggle to establish an Islamic state, this is an interesting fact to observe.

Violence unfortunately became widespread in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The instances of lynching of alleged witches, the ethnic and communal riots in Sulawesi, Moluccas or Kalimantan, the ant-Chinese riots in Jakarta all have taken place shortly after the removal of Suharto from power and continued for years then onwards (Collins 2002). The state itself has been no less violent. The army exacted terrible revenge on the East Timorese for their decision to secede. Also, the provinces of Aceh and West Papua continue to be centers of violence between the state and secessionist groups. Terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta have added to this lethal mix and shown the volatility of Indonesian society. Although it is true that incidents of violence reduced significantly after the election of Megawati and further came down during SBY's premiership; but the conditions which led to violence still remain in the country and if Indonesia ever enters another period of political or economic instability, violence can return again.

However, not everything is right with the Indonesian democratization process. Vestiges of the New Order remain in the form of large scale corruption and nepotism. Decentralization, many argue has actually led to increased corruption. Also, the government has shown a lack of willingness to condemn and curb incidents of minority baiting which are becoming

increasingly common. Decentralization has provided provincial legislatures with law making powers which is used by some of them (like Aceh and West Java) to enact by-laws which enforce Shari'a. Also, negating the pre-poll predictions, the 2014 legislative election has shown significant increase in the votes of Islamic parties; together they received 30% of total votes (Tanuwidjaja 2010: 34). Radical Islam has also gained a foothold in Indonesia with organizations like Jemaah Islamia and Laskar Jihad operating. Pesantren or Islamic schools with boarding facilities have also emerged in large numbers. The present research is an attempt to understand the role of Political Islam in this interesting political milieu, to analyze its future trajectory as a principal component of Indonesian politics.

Research Methods

Choosing proper research methods is one of the most important parts of undertaking a research. This study has been made using both analytical and deductive methods. All data used in this study are secondary, acquired from trusted sources. This is admittedly not a study heavy on statistics. Statistical tools have been used not to help the reader arrive at conclusions. Rather, they set up a premise for deductive reasoning. Although specific locales have been highlighted to analyze the manifestations of a certain problem, this study does not contain a fully fledged 'case study'. When analyzing a subject like the effect of political Islam on Indonesian democracy in the post-Suharto period; one has to work with the many different forms of a single variable such as Islam in Indonesia, Concept of Democracy and Political Islam. Due to such compulsion, the deductive method seems more apt than an inductive one. For example, one cannot conclude from a study of Jakarta based Islamic organizations how such organizations contribute to the society and economy of an outer island town. This study is an effort to identify as many variables related to the question of Islam's influence on Indonesian democracy as possible and to deduce from them the state of Indonesian democracy in contemporary times. It is essential to understand the history of the land to understand how Islam reached its present position here. Therefore, a good part of this study is related to the period before 1998-2013, the declared time frame for this research. However, it is essential to understand that the presentation of history in this case, is analytical rather than descriptive. For example, one cannot understand the zeal for forming Islamic political parties without knowing how expressions of political Islam were repressed during the New Order. Neither can one understand the organization of a recent militant organization like Jemaah Islamiyah without knowing about its predecessor, Darul Islam movement.

Research Questions and Hypothesis

Based on my initial literature review, the following research questions and hypothesis were prepared. During the course of this dissertation, some of them have proved to be less important to ask than other, unasked questions. However, that is all part of research and the mistakes one makes only helps him in learning and exploring further.

The Research questions are:

1. What are the principal characteristics of democratic consolidation in a post-authoritarian country like Indonesia?
2. Is there a universal criterion for judging Islam's relation with democratization and how far it can be applied in case of Indonesia?
3. Does 'Muslim Democracy', as observed in Indonesia, lead to conservatism in a Muslim majority country?
4. What is the future of Indonesian democracy and what will be the role of political Islam in its' shaping?

The Hypothesis that can be advanced based on the research questions and subsequent literatures reviewed are as follows:

1. An authoritarian past and a divided society are making democratic political system in Indonesia susceptible to changes from reactionary forces.
2. Political Islam has democratic as wells as non-democratic values and both are present in Indonesian politics.
3. Acceptance of Muslim values in an open democratic system has provided opportunities for conservatism in Indonesia.

This study is divided into six chapters. These are:

1. Introduction

This introductory chapter will present a brief historical overview of the Indonesian politics and outline the principal social and political factors and their evolution.

2. Democracy and Islam

This chapter attempts to briefly discuss the existing concepts of Democracy and Islam's viability in a democratic environment. It attempts to analyze certain key concepts such as the

difference between political Islam and Muslim democracy and the concept of the ‘ engaged Muslim’.

3. Islam in Indonesian Society and Politics before ‘ Reformasi’

This chapter discusses the role of Islam in the development of the Indonesian nation and the challenges it threw to the Indonesian republic. It also attempts to recognize the importance and role of Islamic social organizations in Indonesian society.

4. Dynamics of Islam in the Indonesian politics in the post-Suharto period

This chapter attempts to analyze the way in which Islam contributed to the political energy that led to new party formations and emergence of new interest groups in Indonesia after the demise of the New Order. It also attempts to show the interesting ‘exchange of values’ between the secular and the Islamic parties whereby the secular parties incorporated a few of the Islamist’s demands and the Islamic parties agreed to function in a liberal democratic system.

5. Violence and democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia: Is Islam to blame?

The penultimate chapter in this dissertation attempts to find whether the spate of deadly violence seen in Indonesia after the fall of the New Order was connected with the resurgence of Political Islam in Indonesian politics. It takes into account the incidents of mob lynching, communal riots and terrorist attacks separately and attempts to see whether any link exists between these.

6. Conclusion

The final chapter very briefly attempts to summarize the key findings of this dissertation and tries to show whether they prove the hypotheses or not. It also attempts to discern the present state of political Islam in Indonesian politics based on the research findings.

Chapter 2

Democracy and Islam

"*Religion is regarded by common people as true, false by the wise and useful by the ruler*."

- *Usually attributed to Seneca the younger*.

As soon as fear, hunger and lust are satiated, the sentient man seeks explanation of his environment and his being. Religions exist to provide the believer with an explanation of the cosmos as well as of his place and purpose in it. From ancient totemic proto-religions to the contemporary organized religions; all serve this basic function. However, the human material condition changes with time as new instruments of resource extraction, mobility, power, gratification and knowledge preservation are invented. Increased wealth and power however came to be possessed and wielded by a few on account of their greater physical power or possession of essential technical knowledge. In order to restrain the majority who did not have any of these qualities but collectively could produce a brute force great enough to unseat the first wielders of power, a system of ensuring obedience without constant use of force was required. Religion emerged as such a system which contained instruments of fear and reward as well as answers for ontological questions. It could not have failed. The success of organized religion in ordering man and society rested on its twin face as a private and public affair. Private religion was devoted to serving the individual's needs for nursing his sense of self vis a vis the larger structures he imagined himself to be a part of; such as society, polity ,the community of believers and the cosmic order (Casanova, 1992 :18). These needs can be termed as spiritual. Private religion also ordered his relation with his family and helped to establish clear hierarchy and division of labor within it. Public religion served as the link between individual and his society. Feasts, group rituals, sacrifices and related festivities helped to develop shared habits which define a culture. The power wielders, usually the monarch; aristocrats controlling slaves, land and soldiers; priests who were also magicians, placed themselves as irremovable parts of such public religious activities. Public religion therefore, consisted of continuously repeated instructions about leading a life outside of one's family, in a way that ensures status quo. Such instructions, necessary for continuation of production, innovation, order and leisure came to be accepted as values and standards, the

transmission of which from one generation to the next needed no coercion. Thus private and public religion; from the inception, are interrelated and quite inseparable. However, as empires grew out of smaller polities, the existing model of religion was stretched to provide order among an ever-increasing heterogeneous population. As the state machinery became considerably wider to govern large tracts of land, increasing number of subjects and a larger army; the number of secondary power-wielders grew. The simple binary of reward and punishment was not sufficient to stop such a group from bottomless self-indulgence and corruption (Nazri et al. 2011 : 250). This could have destroyed the vehicles of wielding power such as army, bureaucracy and priesthood. However, where a single ethnic group was sufficiently large to tackle outside threat and rebellions of minorities (as well as in largely insular polities), this problem was less apparent. The Chinese empire and the South American indigenous empires are testimony to that. However, in case of the Roman Empire, the aforementioned problem was acute. The corruption and idleness of the ruling class who claimed to be divine, in stark contrast to the toils of ordinary men were weakening people's belief in the old polytheistic religious system. This was the reason why a monotheistic religion, based on the Judean concepts of austerity and selflessness was patronized by a Roman emperor and made into the state religion(That the Roman Empire was involved in a long war with Judea hastened the process, portraying the Jews as killers of the Christ) (Keresztes, 1983 : 86). History of early Christianity provides insights about the transmogrification of a simple, essentially Presbyterian religion into a great edifice of power with hierarchically organized and interrelated spiritual and temporal spheres. Christianity achieved this unique centralization in its time with two devices, a central Church - existing as the temporal embodiment of the religion itself and as a vehicle for providing legitimacy to divine rulers; and a single Holy Book which served as a link to the 'original' religion that the Church pretended to preach. Christianity became, therefore, the first *cosmopolitan religion*, one which could be exported to a distant land to provide instant legitimacy to a ruler (Neuman 2011).[1] This was unlike the *organic* religions which have existed before, where religion was a *single-user product* intended for the legitimization of the local God-King.

The above discussion on the evolution of religion as a sophisticated tool for political legitimization and establishment of law and order should serve as an introduction in understanding the nature of Islam as a religion and the socio-political system it proposes as

[1] It should be stated that the author only borrowed from the term 'religious cosmopolitanism' from Neuman's article and have used it to advance an original argument in this chapter.

ideal. Islam emerged in the desolate landscape of Hejaz, in modern-day Saudi Arabia, preached and established by a most remarkable man who came to be regarded by his followers as the ultimate prophet of the one true God. Hazrat Muhammad, a native of the ancient town of Mecca, built around the pre-Islamic holy shrine of Kaba, preached a religion based on the revealed words of Allah. The revelations taught his growing band of followers the values of austerity, brotherhood, philanthropy and strict obedience to Allah and his Messenger (Abdullah 2014 : 101). Tracing its lineage to the Abrahamic religions, Islam appropriated the concept of monotheism, much more strictly than Catholic Christianity could afford in a staunchly pagan Europe (Siddiqi 2009). It also produced its singular Holy Book, the Koran; a collection of the revealed words described by the Prophet. However, Islam was distinct from its predecessors on many counts. Eclecticism of the other religions was replaced with a pragmatic approach towards defining cosmology which centered on the human subject; his deeds and misdeeds and their respective rewards and punishments. It was also very legalistic, with well defined civil and criminal laws. Islam is further removed from the older religions in its non-adherence to any concept of priesthood. Grace of Allah could be achieved through a pious life ordained by the Prophet and the Koran; no mediator was required. However, Koran elaborated little about an ideal polity or the duty of the ruler. For this purpose, during the first three centuries after the Prophet's death, collected volumes were prepared about the life and sayings of the Prophet as well as of his close followers, which included the first four Caliphs of the Muslim world who are considered as ideal rulers following the Prophet's example by heart (Faruqi 1992 : 394-396).

Since the Battle of Badr at 624 AD, Muslim armies have conquered a large part of the world in the name of Allah and his Prophet. Muslim rulers have ruled as the protectors of their religion (Esposito 1999: 10). There exists a central holy book for the Muslims as well as common centers of devotion in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. Despite this, Islam has never developed a centralized, hierarchical structure like the Catholic Church which, by simply establishing a 'brunch' in a foreign land, could provide legitimacy to a newly-converted ruler. The legitimacy of a Muslim ruler depended upon his military strength, his ability to handle the nobility and to some extent, the goodwill of people. How can this puzzle be solved? In order to do this, the history of early Islam must be looked into and see how the religion has evolved vis a vis the state. The fourth Caliph after the Prophet, Ali was succeeded by the Umayyad Dynasty. The succession was not peaceful, coming as a result of long-drawn wars and tribal and inter-tribe rivalries (Ibid : 17). The line of peaceful succession of Caliphs

according to the Koranic concept of 'Shura' or consensus through discussion was broken. Whereas the previous four Caliphs held authority both as political head and religious leader (which in theory was undisputed), the later rulers who formed dynasties and conquered lands spread from the islands of Sumatra to the plains of Andalusia lost their position as religious leaders. This vacuum was filled by a class of religious scholars who soon developed a complex system of laws and doctrines based on their Interpretations of the Koran, their independent reasoning and the social customs of that period. The work of these early scholars resulted in the creation of Hadiths, which are traditions of the Prophet and his followers, as well as in the formalization of Islamic laws or the Shari'a, the Path to rightfulness. Religious scholars for the first three centuries after the death of the prophet were engaged in this work. However, after the canonization of the four Islamic Schools of law (Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i), based on the 'Ijtihad' or independent reasoning of the eponymous founders of these schools and their students, further Ijtihad was not encouraged (Hallaq 1999 : 116). It is crucial to understand that the Shari'a was not a book of law handed down to the Prophet by Allah or a work commissioned by Muhammad himself. It was a later creation by Islamic scholars with the Koran and Muhammad's own life and work as the principal inspiration. This distinction was quite clear in the minds of Muslim commoners in the early centuries of Islam who considered the religious-political system which existed under the rightly-guided Caliphs as ideal. Moreover, since the Islamic societies living under various Kings continued to evolve with time, a need arose for more detailed, 'local' laws which addressed the specific problems of that political and social unit (Coulson 2011 : 137). Therefore a convenient system of dual legislation existed in the Islamic countries of the Middle Ages, of which the Ottoman Empire is a good example. In such polities, the population lived by the Shari 'a laws relating to matters of family and religion. But for civil matters, they obeyed the civil laws enacted by their respective Kings. It is important to bear in mind that the image of the first four ideal Caliphs never faded from the minds of the subjects. However, they accepted, along with the religious scholars the practicality of the new civil laws, always keeping in mind that the rationality of a man, even if he is the emperor can never surpass that of Allah, whose rationality is reflected in the laws and regulations enshrined directly in the Koran (Maududi 1977 : 6). This provided the rulers with a grudgingly accepted legitimacy from the people and the intellectuals. However, they never enjoyed the status of a Holy Roman Emperor in Europe or that of an Emperor of the Middle Kingdom. An important reason for this was that during this entire period, the majority of religious scholars kept no connection with the political system at all. The discourse among the Muslim scholars usually centered upon

esoteric musings about the nature of the world and its creator or they discussed obscure facets of laws mentioned in Shari'a. There were the inevitable Court Theologians who praised the King and urged the populace to read 'Khotba', i.e., the religious prayer in his name (Lammens 1968 : 105). However, such attempts were never accepted unconditionally by the people. Therefore, it is evident that from the early days of the religion, there was an accepted difference between the 'Church and the State' in the Islamic World with a veneer of religiosity in political affairs, a fact which was so engrained in the working of Islamic polities that it became difficult for western Christian scholars to understand this fact since such a phenomenon was not observed in Christendom till the time of Reformation.

Looking at the world today, any observer will notice the drastic change that had taken place within the religion of Islam. Today, the majority of countries with a principally Muslim population have accepted the Shari'a as the foundation of their Constitutions. Many active groups in these countries try to press their respective governments, in ways both non-violent and violent, for a totalistic adoption of Shari'a. Even in countries where the Muslim are a minority, domestic politics often revolves around the question of granting Muslims the right to adhere to Shari'a in civil matters. An influential section of Islamic scholars also support these movements for adoption of Shari'a. An observer might wonder as to how this transformation has come about from the early days of Islam. Olivier Roy, in his edited volume, 'Whatever Happened to the Islamists', argues that a principal reason for this transformation lies in the interaction that took place between the Muslim World and the post-Renaissance West after the 18th century (Roy and Boubekeur 2012). The Arab world maintained close economic as well as academic contact with Europe till the Ninth century. After this period, the Islamic societies stagnated. As Europe entered middle age, foreign trade became limited. Monasteries took over the job of preserving and transferring knowledge, only to a limited clientele, thereby stemming the flow of free exchange and innovation. The lacunae in mutual understanding thus developed were further widened into an unbridgeable chasm during the Crusades. During this phase, the social-historical significance of the Koran and other early religious texts were lost. They started to be venerated not because of the ontological knowledge provided in these texts but simply because they were considered 'sacred'. Borrowing from Benedict Anderson, it might be said that the process was helped by the promotion of Arabic into a high literary language. A language in which the King, his courtiers and top intellectuals could converse and write. Such a language is inaccessible to the common man and therefore it is venerated by him (Anderson: 1983). The result of such

veneration was that lesser clerics often recited the Koran and other Holy Books without knowing the meaning of the words. This practice became widespread and soon it was all but forgotten that the Shari'a was a mere compromise between the King and the pious subjects. According to Roy, renewed contact with the post-Renaissance West must be understood with these preconditions of Muslim Society in mind. The new Europe had already formed stable nation-states. The characteristic Euro centrism of their scholars immediately came into play[2] and they attempted to understand the Muslim countries as 'Nations'. An even greater mistake committed by them however was to perceive the entire Muslim world as a coherent unit, similar to their concept of Christendom. In fact, neither the Muslim Kings nor the subjects had any concept of a nation or a nation-state. Among the populace, their allegiance seldom belonged to anything above their tribe or local religious leader. Although at a broader level they knew and understood the authority of their respective Sultan. The concept of Muslim Umma, or the community of believers, if at all present, was very vague and certainly without any political undertones (Musbahar 2011). For an average Muslim, his only connection to the greater Muslim world was the once in a lifetime Hajj pilgrimage. It can be argued that the Hajj was a great tool for maintaining at least a symbolical unity among the Muslims of world. However, without a modern education system and press, the effect of such symbolism on public imagination must have been very low. One also has to keep in mind that throughout the Middle Ages till the victory of Wahhabism in Saudi Arab, the Hajj pilgrimage itself contained many elements of mysticism such as veneration of the tombs of the Prophet's family and other saints, with different communities venerating different saints (Cook 1992, : 191). Western contact with such societies altered them in two ways: firstly, a minority class of wealthy Muslim merchants, government officials and urban service-providers became mightily impressed by the advances made by the western civilization. However, they failed to realize that the modernization of West have come about as the result of a long process of philosophical and scientific innovation, establishment of an extortive system of colonization, resultant industrialization, movement of labor from rural to urban areas and rise of a new social and religious ethic to support the industrial society. Borrowing from Anderson again, it might be said that they resorted to 'Piracy' of the idea of nationalism and nation-states, which already existed as examples to follow (Anderson 1983 : 207). However, as is almost always the case, Piracy of this idea leads to imitation of the structure of state and society, not its

[2] This is indeed curious since such tendencies are visible as far back as the time of Alexander the Great, the historians in whose army have confidently described the idol of a Hindu deity carried by Indian soldiers as that of Heracles! Contrast this with Al-Biruni, who took great pains to learn Sanskrit and to accurately describe Hindu customs and deities.

processes. Therefore one can see events like the very astonishing transformations of The Ottoman state into modern, secular Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Pasha. However, the very nature of these constructs ensures continuing internal tension between the traditional and the modernistic elements.

The present study focuses on the concepts of democratization and its relations with Islam in the context of Indonesia. Indonesia is an interesting test case for this purpose as it offers an opportunity to study the interactions between Islam and democracy in a colonial as well as in a post-colonial context. At a later period it also offers a view of the interaction between authoritarian forms of government and Islam. Indonesia is even more interesting a subject since the country houses a mix of multiple strands of Islamic practices and doctrines. Therefore, Indonesia can be seen as a microcosm of the different conditions in which Islam exists in the world and interacts with the ideals of Democracy. However, before this study begins in earnest, a few basic ideas about democracy and what the process democratization entails should be covered in brief.

Democracy: evolution of the concept in western thought:

What is Democracy? Generally speaking Democracy has been defined in two ways. Firstly, as "a system of government in which all the people of a country can vote to elect their representatives" and a "fair and equal treatment of everyone in an organization, etc., and their right to take part in making decisions" (Oxford Online Dictionary 2015). The combination of both these definitions leads to the essence of Abraham Lincoln's famous assertion that Democracy is "…government of the people, by the people, for the people." (Lincoln 1863). This definition itself points towards a dichotomy that is always present in the discourse about the nature of democracy. The first definition lists democracy as a process, i.e., of voting to elect representatives. The second definition explains Democracy as a system, where everyone gets fair and equal treatment. In other words, theorists of Democracy are always torn between the acceptance of Democracy as an end in itself or as a means to one or several ends. While analyzing Democracy as a means to end the works of ancient Greek philosophers can be reiterated. Ancient Greek thinker Aristotle certainly thought in this manner. Like many other thinkers in his tradition, not least Plato, his predecessor and teacher, Aristotle was concerned with the question of 'Good Life', what constitutes good life and how to achieve it. Good Life in his understanding was a life of 'virtue', which can be understood as a state of excellence in

every human endeavor. The state was a means to achieve this good life. However, Aristotle's concept of a democratic state was very different from contemporary understanding. He regarded democracy as the least desirable of his classification of political system, the rule of mobs and demagogues. Aristotle also held that all systems of states go through a cyclical process and democracy naturally evolves in the rise of a supreme leader and establishment of monarchy. This negative view regarding democracy is largely the result of the political chaos that existed in democratic Athens, Aristotle's own city-state. What further influenced his ideas regarding the best government was the non-existence of a large educated and relatively wealthy class who are aware of the political events of their time. Such a population exists today, armed with modern information technology, which makes them potentially knowledgeable about a large section of the affairs of the state. Also, the boundaries of states have increased much further than Aristotle could have ever imagined, rendering Athenian style direct democratic participation impossible (Thilly 2007 : 50-79).

After Aristotle, Europe witnessed a long period of philosophical barrenness regarding democratic theory. The first sign of political thinking partially independent of theology is found in the works of Augustine of Hippo- who, in his seminal work 'The City of God', drew a line between the ecclesial authority (which he termed the city of God) and temporal authority, which he termed the 'City of Man'. The City of Man was a weak imitation of the City of God, its political system trying to imitate the virtues of the later but ultimately being immersed in the pursuit of worldly pleasures. However, very crucially, City of Man was not an extension of City of God in Aquinas's imagination. This can be termed as the first expression of the division between the authority of the Church and the State although the author himself might not have thought about his work in the same manner (Jha 2010 : 73-76). The idea of democracy really started to flourish post-renaissance. Thomas Hobbes, although an unabashed apologist for absolute monarchy, provided a crucial idea that ultimately came to define later political thinking. That is, the idea of monarchical authority independent of religious support. His 'Leviathan', the great absolutist Monarch, would not ascend the throne because he has been crowned by the Pope and therefore been imbibed with divine authority. Rather, he would become King because of a contract between the people who selected one as King to avoid all the inherent insecurities of a state of nature. This rational explanation of Kingship was a completely new idea towards explaining authority (Mukherjee and Ramaswamy 2011 :177-182). The ideal of democracy received further clarification in the work of John Locke who emphasized that people have certain rights, namely of life, liberty

and property which cannot be curtailed by a King without due process of law. He also espoused the principle of consent of the people regarding the system of government. The most vociferous supporter of people's right to choose their ruler and their direct involvement in political decision making was Rousseau. He introduced the concept of 'General Will', which was the expression of the will of the people which would lead to effective, good governance focusing upon issues which will prove to be beneficial to everyone. Interestingly, General Will was not the sum total of the will of the people, nor did Rousseau intend it be the expression of the will of the majority. Rather, he envisioned General Will as the embodiment of the goodness in people, as the embodiment of the rational thinking for common good. However, he was rather vague as to how can this General Will be asserted. He proposed elections, where everyone will vote based on their rational understanding of a situation. But what prevents a tyrannical majority from drowning the voice of minority in such voting was a question that was left unanswered (Ibid : 223-228). Montesquieu, in his seminal work 'The Spirit of the Laws' introduced the concept of division of authority into clearly demarcated spheres; executive, legislature and judiciary. However, he did not emphasize that a democratic system is a prerequisite for such a division (Richter 1977).

The Lockean principle that 'Rule of Law' should be the basis of the function of a state found its greatest supporter in Immanuel Kant. Kant employed the idea of 'Rechtsstaat' or a rule based state where the citizenry would be protected from the tyranny of the ruler by codified legal assurances. His formulations are the basis of Constitutional Democracy everywhere although he himself was not a supporter of democracy, which he considered to be detrimental for the right of minorities (Thilly 2007 : 232-234). But perhaps the most original and also the most intellectually stimulating idea regarding democracy has been propounded by Hegel, as a natural extension to his theory of dialectics. Hegel introduced the concept of a 'self' and of 'other'. The self is a complex mental projection of an individual, a compendium of his desires as well as of his rationality. However, the sense of self can only be fully realized through the concept of other, something which is different from the self and makes the individual aware of his peculiar self. According to Hegel, there is always a conflict between the idea of self and the other through which both acquire certain qualities of other and produce a new set of self and others. This process is dialectics, Hegel's most famous contribution to the history of Philosophy. In a brilliant interpretation of Hegel, Sari Roman Langerspetz extends this idea to the field of politics (Langerspetz 2012). It has been argued that Hegelian Dialectics underscores the inherent need for a government and an opposition in any democracy. Without

clashes between the two, where one holds the people's 'trust' and the other embodies those same people's 'distrust', the political system will never reach a solution to any problem and will suffer perpetual entropy, thereby making governance impossible.

John Stuart Mill is another principal figure in the evolution of the idea of democracy. His argument in favor of extending suffrage to the common people greatly affected the political history of his country as well of other states. Mill was continuing the tradition of utilitarianism of James Mill, his father and Bentham. However, he approached the utilitarian theory in a different way. Mill was an advocate of 'liberal democracy' by which he understood a system which will maximize the benefit of everyone in the system. To achieve this, Mill argued, unlike many other thinkers of his time, voting should be extended to the maximum number of people. Only through their continuous participation in the political process can these people be made more aware of the political system and be expected to use rationality in their political thinking. However, Mill also described another virtue of extending suffrage to the masses, i.e. only through participation in the electoral system can their energy be controlled and the possibility of them hindering the work of government be eliminated (Mukherjee and Ramaswamy 2011: 338-339).

Most of the thinkers can be termed as classical liberal thinkers. Although by no means is this a comprehensive list of such thinkers and their ideas. However, collectively, they espoused a system of governance which will incorporate people's right to life, liberty, property and a right to influence the democratic decision making process. These goals can best be realized in a political system which has a representative government, universal suffrage, free and fair regular elections, relative autonomy of the different organs of government, equality of every citizen based on rule of law enshrined in a popularly endorsed Constitution. But today, even if a political system possesses all these qualities, it may yet not be considered to be a truly democratic state. This is because the idea of welfare and social justice has become ingrained in the modern understanding of a democratic state. The role of Marxist ideals is irrefutable in bringing about this change in the perception of democratic state. Karl Marx provided a completely different meaning of democracy which was distinct from all the theories of democracy discussed so far, According to Marx, the liberal democratic state was a façade, along with many other social institutions such as the Religions which merely serve to facilitate the continuing domination of a small class of men over the means of production. Borrowing from Hegel, Marx interpreted history as the history of class struggle between the suppressed classes and the wealthy classes. As modes of production changes with change in

technology and man's ability increases to extract and convert natural resources, the nature of both the ruling and subordinate classes change. However, the nature of their relationship remains the same. Marx interpreted liberal democracy as a part of the 'superstructure' of ideas and institutions which stand over the 'Base' of exploitative economic relations and serve to perpetuate this relation. According to him, the liberal system which only guarantees political and legal equality but no economic equality was not truly democratic. Only a communist polity, free of capitalist exploitation can be termed truly democratic (Jha 2010 : 225-228).

Marxian theory of class struggle and the inability of traditional liberal democratic system to quickly and drastically change the lot of the downtrodden class are apparent. However, the prescription Marx suggested, on the garb of a historical eventuality, was violent revolution of the Proletariat class against the Bourgeoisie class. This was not palatable to many. The failure of the communist experiments in Soviet Union and China to establish a truly communist society was proof that a revolution is no guarantee of a truly democratic system. However, the phenomenon of communism left a deep impact on the minds of supporters of liberal democracy. The need to secure some financial parity among the citizens, some 'safety nets' to prevent the degeneration of society to chaos were adopted by liberal democracies. Especially in the light of the Great Depression, such 'Welfare Policies' became important. F. D. Roosevelt became the foremost figure in the discussion of the Welfare State with his policy of large scale labor-intensive programs funded by government under his 'New Deal' policy and various pro-poor relief programs (Roosevelt Institute 2015). After the Second World War, Britain was quick in introducing various Welfare programs such as the National Insurance Bill and National Health Bill (The National Archives 2015). These were introduced to provide relief to the common people in war-torn economies as well as to prevent the advent of communist thinking.

A most engaging philosophical defense of the welfare state has come from John Rawls who many consider to be the most influential of contemporary times. John Rawls viewed democracy as the system for providing distributive justice. By Justice, he understood 'fairness', i.e. a concept that underlines; only that system of distribution is fare which everyone will want themselves to be a part of. To validate this concept, Rawls took help of a thought experiment called 'the veil of ignorance'. The veil resembled a hypothetical original state of mankind where everyone was capable of rational decision making but nobody knew what the outcome of such decisions would be on oneself. In such a situation, Rawls argued

that everyone would take decisions that will be beneficial for everyone at large. Only such a system can be a true democracy. Rawls also argued that if unequal distribution was indeed unavoidable, then it must be undertaken in a way that helps the least advantageous sections of the society (Hoffman and Graham 2015 : 84-87). Although Rawl's premise is appealing, he has been severely criticized by later thinkers. One obvious criticism is that his ideal society is hard to achieve in reality, it is also a fallacy to think that in a state of original position, everyone will think rationally. Men are often moved by passions such as anger, haste and greed which can cloud their reasoning. Also, employing logic similar to that of a Pascal's Wager, a man might gamble that he will have better chances to live a comfortable life if he makes better provisions for the majority, since he himself would have more possibility of falling into that group. The libertarians like Nozick criticize Rawls from the point of view of Justice itself. According to Nozick, since people are entitled to goods they create; it would be injustice if those goods are taken from them for redistribution (Ibid : 84-87).

However, the concept of Welfare State has received its fare share of criticism from a group of thinkers who believed that that welfare polices result in an overly powerful state bureaucracy which undermines the freedom of the entrepreneurial class. On a more basic level, they argued that the compulsion for the relatively well-off to provide for the poor to create a kind of economic parity in society is a gross violation of personal liberty, and therefore, detrimental to the concept of democracy. Drawing from classic liberal thinkers like Adam Smith, they argued that in the interest of preserving liberty, the state should have a limited function, that of maintaining law and order and to maintain the sanctity of business treaties (Jackson and Sorensen 2010 : 165-167). In this, thinkers like Hayek and Nozick went far ahead of their classical liberal predecessors. Whereas Smith's rationale for a limited government is based on his belief in the ability of people to take rational decision for themselves (especially in their respective field of work or expertise), coupled with his distrust of politicians and bureaucrats and their ability to achieve progressive, better results in different fields which needs different types of expertise- the later crop of liberals, termed as libertarians[3] prescribed a minimal state as that would be the only guarantee of individual liberty. Nozick went so far as to proscribe the state altogether, his idea of 'Open Society', which ran according to the capitalist market system and where all the needs of the people will

[3] The word first began to be used in its contemporary sense since the 1950's. But before that, it was usually associated with people who lived an openly scandalous life. Marquis de Sade, for example, has often been called a libertarian by his contemporaries. This reversal of fortune for the term perhaps also shows the increased acceptance for individuality in the West.

be served by the market, based on the concept of free and fair competition (Hoffman and Graham 2015 : 84-87).

Here the principal theories and ideas associated with the western notion of democracy, especially a liberal democracy has been discussed in very brief. It is apparent that critical contradictions are present within the body of western democratic thinking regarding the true notion of democracy. In light of such contradictions, it becomes very difficult to discuss Islam's relation with democracy. For example, Islam contains the principal of 'Shura' or consultation when choosing a leader; this is unarguably a democratic principle. However, no concept of regularly held elections for removal or re-instatement of that leader exists in the Koran or the Hadiths. Without such a provision, many western thinkers, Robert Dahl for example, would refuse to call such a system democratic. On the other hand, the rights mentioned in Koran and Hadiths as described by Mawdudi, which include right to life, liberty and freedom from slavery can seem to be better foundation stones for a democracy than the early American democracy with its acceptance of slavery and non-existence of rights for women. Muslim thinkers such as Turabi maintained that democratic activities such as elections and parliamentary debates can very well be part of an Islamic Country (Bahlul 2009). A thinker like Gandhi would consider the social justice enshrined in Koran through the system of compulsory Jakat for the rich as a more acceptable system than a western libertarian system. Before delving into the complex claims and counterclaims regarding Islam's compatibility with democracy and the arguments presented by each side, one should first try to understand something more fundamental, i.e. why are Islam and Democracy being always spoken together? The same is not deemed necessary during a discussion of Democracy in a Hindu, Buddhist or Christian social surrounding. What is so inherently political about the religion of Islam that even in today's world the two cannot be thought of separately?

Islam and the Political:

A convenient answer, often resorted to by western scholars of Islam is to point at the distinct social-economic history of Islamic societies. Some of these arguments have already been mentioned earlier. To summarize, these are: Islamic societies have not undergone an industrial revolution and accompanying fundamental changes in spatial demographics, social structure and ethics. Therefore, the religion has not evolved to accommodate ideas of

democracy and secularism. Another familiar line of argument is that since in Islam the concept of popular sovereignty is not present, replaced instead by the supreme sovereignty of God, attempts to implement the idea in Muslim-majority states have often faced resistance. Some like Elie Kedourie and Bernard Lewis explain it through the non-occurrence of democratic institutions in the Islamic history and lament- "[T]he political history of Islam is one of almost unrelieved autocracy . . .There are no parliaments or representative assemblies of any kind, no councils or communes, no chambers of nobility or estates, no municipalities in the history of Islam; nothing but the sovereign power, to which the subject owed complete and unwavering obedience as a religious duty imposed by the Holy Law . . . For the last thousand years, the political thinking of Islam has been dominated by such maxims as 'tyranny is better than anarchy' and 'whose power is established, obedience to him is incumbent." (Voll 2007: 170-178). Scholars like Huntington would claim the near-impossibility of implementing the democratic system in the Islamic 'civilization' which are inherently more authoritarian in nature. However, this is (again) a very euro-centric view that has faced criticism both from in and outside the western world. To summaries an argument presented before, the understanding that Islam is a civilization is a western misinterpretation. Islam, due to the reasons cited above was never synonymous with 'Islamdom', as in Christianity. The entire notion of a unity among the Muslim nations is derived from early western experiences with the Islamic polities. Members of law-bound European societies automatically identified these societies as bound by Shari'a laws and this led to the first misconceptions about an Islamic 'civilization'. In fact, before coming into contact with the west, the Muslims never considered the Shari'a to be the fountainhead of all religious piety and authenticity. It was a way to limit the despotism of autocratic rulers, and therefore was revered. But for the middle age Muslims, Shari'a never represented an ideal system of state or society. The ideal system was always that of the early Rashidun Caliphate. However, it was considered to be an unattainable ideal and therefore, Muslims compromised by accepting despotic rulers who never enjoyed full legitimacy from their subjects. It is only at a later period, post- western contact that Muslims began to consider this system of their forefathers as the ideal system and the Shari'a as the principal tool for establishing that system (Filali-Ansari 2009).

There is a need to distinguish between Islamic Beliefs and 'Muslim beliefs'. Islamic beliefs are common among most of the Umma but Muslim beliefs can be tempered by the social or political, even geographical situation of a particular region and its people. Similarly, 'Muslim

politics' needs to be differentiated from Islamic Politics, also called 'Political Islam'. Political Islam represents, most importantly, a will to impose the rule of Islamic Law in a country and to declare a state as an Islamic one. Muslim politics, on the other hand, is simply the use of Islam to gain political advantage. Islamic Politics, as discussed above, is not antithetical to Democracy but for Muslim politics, the existence of a multi-party electoral democracy is an essential requirement. It is therefore, not at all an oxymoron to call someone a 'Muslim Democrat' (Nasr 2009). The practice of Muslim politics was spearheaded by the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, although Indonesia has provided the best scope for such politics to develop.

Divine Sovereignty v/s Popular Sovereignty:

Debates about the nature of sovereignty in a Muslim country are not at all a new phenomenon. According to Kahled Abou El Fadl, this question was raised by the Khajirites during Caliph Ali's rule, raising slogans such as 'Koran is the Judge' and 'God is sovereign' which will not sound out of place in a contemporary rally of Islamic fundamentalists (Fadl 2009). However, argues Fadl, since Allah himself does not carry out the day to day governance, he must appoint his 'vice-regents' who are mortal men. It is a fallacy and even an insult to Allah to consider that these men, whoever they are, are perfectly capable of interpreting Allah's wish or his reasoning. For, Fadl emphasizes, it is Allah who says in Koran 'I know what you do not'. Therefore one cannot simply rule out the inevitability of human reasoning in human judgment when carrying out Allah's will. The question is merely not one of philosophical speculation. If Allah is the ultimate sovereign than it may follow that acts of humans such as legislations are an insult to his sovereignty. This is the view propounded by conservative thinkers like Sayid Qutb (Khatab 2006, : 75). On the other hand however, this principle can be explained as the ultimate safeguard against autocratic or oligarchic rule since no one person or a group can claim to possess divine rationality and therefore, divine authority. Thinkers like Ghannouchi explain that the believers in God's sovereignty also realize the inability of God to rule over them directly (Bahlul 2009). Therefore, what they mean is 'lawful rule'. However, in the Islamic context of today, 'Lawful Rule' will come to mean rule based on Shari'a. This raises several questions such as the position of minorities and women under such a constitution. These issues will be discussed but first, an even more serious dilemma faces the notion of divine sovereignty described as

rule of law. Under such a system, the common people will hardly have any influence in formulation of the constitution under which they would live. That job will be appropriated by Islamic clerics or the 'Ulama'. This can give the Ulama an undue amount of power in an Islamic Democracy, ultimately defeating the very purpose of it. Bahlul presents the example of the Islamic Republic of Iran where the non-elected Council of Guardians enjoys more power than the popularly elected parliament. An excerpt from the Iranian Constitution: "The determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the majority vote of the fuqaha' of the Guardian Council; and the determination of its compatibility with the Constitution rests with the majority of all the members of the Guardian Council.(Article 96)" (Bahlul 2009). Bahlul argues that in any country, the process of constitution making requires legal experts as well as experts from different fields. It is not the people who directly take part in constitution making; sometimes they may not have any part in it at all. In his support, the example of India's constitutional council, in which more than hundred members were nominated by rulers of princely states can be cited. However, this does not really address the problem since in these countries, India included, once the constitution is formulated, authority no longer rests in the hands of non-elected people. This is a problem that needs serious attention by Islamic democrats and thinkers alike. However, it can be said in defense of Islam that it is not a rule that an Islamic polity will always end up with a non-democratic body of clerical rulers. Indonesia and Turkey, for example, despite their own share of problems, never took that route.

Coming to the sensitive question of the right of minorities and women in an Islamic state governed by the rules of Shari'a, there is nothing in the Shari'a or the Koran that explicitly forbids women's participation in the political process. There are instances from early Islam when the third Caliph, Uthman appointed women in government positions (Muslim Heritage 2008). Although women do face very considerable discrimination and oppression in many Islamic countries, it is by no means a universal feature of Muslim countries. For example, countries like Azerbaijan or Turkey has expanded voting rights to women quite long ago. Even in a country like Saudi Arab, where popular voting is limited to the municipal level, women were recently given the right to vote (Tovrov 2011). The more 'visible' and politically influential Islamic countries of the world happen to be in the middle east, many of which are not democracies and do not allow voting by either men or women. More than their political right, it is the right of women's personal freedom which is often the issue of contention in Islamic countries. This also presents a problem with the 'working of democracy

under basic features of a Shari'a based constitution' argument. If the basic features themselves prove antithetical to the right of a certain section of the people, then how can such a system be called democratic. Many Islamic feminists present the argument that Shari'a provides them with a guarantee of their dignity, that the Hijab is a tool that enables them to be judged on the basis of their work and achievements, not on their beauty. Da'wa or Islamic proselytisation movements also present a similar kind of argument when dealing with this issue.[4] Moreover, such movements often claim that Islam provided the women with right to property much before such rights were given to them in the present western democracies. What one should make of such claims in entirely their individual decision.

Islam, Secularism and Modernization:

It cannot be denied that in the discussion about Islam and Democracy, the western scholars have seldom managed to be objective in their interpretations. The concept of the Christian enlightened 'self' and the primitive 'other' Islam affects their judgment. There is an interesting webpage that compares the essential features of Judaism and Islam and points out the similarities (Christianity in view 2015). Now both these religions are of Abrahamic origin. In fact, the Prophet and his followers did not claim that Islam was a new religion but that it was the reinvigoration of an earlier pure tradition of monotheism. Both Judaism and Islam share many similarities including in the field of divinely ordained laws. But the interesting feature about Judaism, as is claimed by Jewish scholars is that it has a tradition of pluralism embedded in the religion (Elajar 1986). However, they also mention in the past, under the Davidic dynasty, this system had been withdrawn. They are also clear regarding the fact that this pluralism pertains to the rights of different nationalities who might come to live under a Judean state. The basic laws mentioned in the Torah and the Talmud, Jewish books of law cannot be altered and propagation of new constitutions, establishment of parliamentary democracy and elections etc. all have to take place under the aegis of such a system. Even today, the Jewish state of Israel clearly mentions in its declaration of independence, endorsed by an Act of parliament in 1985, that Israel will remain a 'Jewish and Democratic State' (Shetreet 1997: 190-197). Therefore, by the commonly understood meaning of 'Secularism', Israel is not a secular state. However, its credential as a Democracy is seldom questioned by western scholars. Bahlul's article quotes Ghannouchi who maintain that there are certain basic principles of Islam which cannot be discarded in a state with a majority of Muslims.

[4] See, for example, the books distributed by the Bangalore based 'Salaam Center'.

However, once it is accepted that the affairs of the state will not transgress these basic principles, regular acts of democracy such as elections and parliamentary debates can take place.

The contemporary perception among the common people in non-Muslim countries as well as their leaders of Islam as opposed to secularism and modernity is the result of a twofold process. Firstly, Islamic societies became increasingly resistant against changes brought about by contacts with the western civilization. The identification of Secularism with atheism in Muslim societies is a result of post- renaissance western contact with Muslim world. This process begun in the 19th century from the writings of Jamal-Eddin Al-Afghani who equated the European positivists of that era with the 7th century opponents of the Prophet (Sonn, 2005). This changed the struggle with the invading Europeans to a struggle between believers and non-believers. This was the beginning of the rebirth of the concept of Jihad. Secondly, the common western perception must be viewed as a proof of the myopic and selective history of the Islamic World that is perceived by the west. The expeditions of Napoleon in Egypt beginning from 1798 had a profound effect on Islamic societies of the Middle East. The obvious military superiority of a European army backed by an efficient bureaucracy led to a period of awakening in the Ottoman Empire which is called 'Al-Nahda'. This period led to a comprehensive effort by the Ottoman state to emulate the science, technology and military strategies of Europe. Also, a process of 'Ottomanization' began which aimed to consolidate the different ethnic groups under one singular national identity. Although the Ottoman state failed to survive, the reforms initiated by it were responsible for the rise of the modernist Muslim intelligentsia, to which Afghani and Md. Abdou belonged as well as to the formation of a politically active, reformist section. Even the distant lands of Southeast Asia did not remained unaffected from this renaissance. Al-Azhar University of Cairo was established as the hub of modernist Islamic learning and jurisprudence. Throughout the colonial period, a steady stream of students from Indonesia received training there and came back to their country to spread their version of Islam, coupled with a zeal for mass education and political activism, both hallmarks of Islamic Modernism (Machmudi 2008, : 42).

It must also be remembered that secularism is not a guarantee of democracy. In fact, it has been observed that many a times, secularism has served as an excuse for keeping despotic regimes in power. This phenomenon is described as the 'Muslim Free Election Trap' in American foreign and defense policy parlance (Kunkler and Stepan 2013). The idea is simple. If Muslims get to vote freely in a Muslim majority country, they will bring to power a

radical Islamist Party who will turn the country back to the Middle Ages. To avoid such a scenario, and not to mention, gain favorable economic contracts, western powers have many a times, propped up undemocratic but secular regimes in Muslim- majority countries. The regime of the Shah of Iran and that of Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan are good examples. In Indonesia also, Suharto was a secular leader who was much loved by the west and who did not care about real democracy. Koran emphasizes the concept of 'Adl' or justice, which is close to the western understanding of freedom. It means ruling according to Islamic Laws which condemn despotism and tyranny and emphasizes consultation. The spirit of dissent, inherent to democracy is present in the traditions attributed to the Prophet. These traditions mention that the Prophet considered divergence of opinion among scholars as 'Rahmah' or a blessing (Ibrahim 2009). In fact, some of the early Muslim theologians were so intent on keeping the process of rationality alive in the discourse of Islam that they vehemently opposed the canonization of their own religious schools and some have even suffered penalties for that. This speaks volume about the place of importance free discourse enjoyed in Islam. It will therefore be wrong to assume that all traditional Islamic scholars are against democratic norms. In fact, shunning these scholars who have large scale appeal among the masses and engaging only with liberals have often hurt the purpose of western forces intent to bring about democracy in a Muslim country.

In fact, it can be said that modernization is a constant process even in traditional Islamic societies. Positive laws have been enacted in almost all the major Islamic countries barring matters of personal status. These countries have also enacted modern bureaucracies, political parties, labor unions etc. However, even with these progressive moves, secularism is still considered an alien doctrine in these countries. Islam is often viewed by the influential scholars as a sacred, immutable system- encompassing every aspect of social organization and personal mobility. This in fact, creates an artificial debate since changes are plainly visible in the Islamic societies (Filaly-Ansary 2009). A related question also arises here, is the idea of Democracy romanticized too much when introduced in an Islamic society. It often appears as a mystical idea, even one than can 'replace' Islam. This runs the danger of it being identified as another Utopia and may make the Islamic alternative appear more attainable.

Secularism and the Question of Minority Rights:

The right of minorities to live with rights and dignity is considered as an essential feature of a democracy. How does an Islamic state fare with regard to this aspect? The traditional basis

for judging rights of minorities in an Islamic state had been the Suras 3:28, 5:51, 29:46 and 60:8–9 which order the Muslims to treat them with dignity and in an equitable manner as long as they do not act aggressively against them (Kramer et al. 2009). Various Islamic law schools view the, issue of minority rights differently. However, they agreed upon certain basic principles. Firstly, the provision for equitable treatment was extended only to non-idolaters which meant it was reserved for 'the people of the Book'-namely, the Christians and the Jews (Tsadik 2003 : 380). Although at a later period, this included the Zoroastrians and the Buddhists. Recognized minorities in a Muslim society were given the status of 'Dhimmis'-meaning 'the protected people' (Maududi 1977, : 9).On matters of trade, treaty obligations and other civil matters they mostly enjoyed an equal status with non-Muslims. The Hanafi School of law, which was prevalent in the Ottoman Empire, interpreted the issue most liberally. However, even according to their liberal interpretation, they did not enjoy equal rights in matters of criminal law, testimony and inheritance. Regardless of the law schools, Dhimmis were obligated to pay a poll-tax or 'Jizyah'. It has to be kept in mind though that Jizyah was supposed to be taken only from those with means to support themselves and that Dhimmis did not have to pay the 'Jakat' tax that Muslims were obligated to pay (Tsadik 2003 : 399). However, the danger of interpreting Koran literally, as a source of documentary knowledge and set rules which have been discussed before is present when deciding the right of minorities. Modernist interpretation seldom accepts that Koranic verses are written in a nature of poetry and are full of allegories. Therefore, Koranic verses such as Sura 9:29 which say "fight the infidels until they pay the jizyah out of their hands while they are small/humble" create great confusion regarding the true nature of minority's rights under Islamic Law (Kramer et al. 2009). That confusion notwithstanding, it must be understood that a strict Koranic interpretation of Minority's rights was seldom followed in Islamic polities of the past. For example, the Fatimid Egypt was an example of harmonious co-existence of all communities. In the Ottoman Empire, during the period of 'Tanzimat' or reform, equality of all religious communities was accepted. However, like in any other state, mere constitutional guarantee does not often translate to the real life securing of rights by minorities. For example, a democratic state may well pledge such rights in the constitution but do nothing to stop the social prejudices that exist again minority groups. Or it may simply adhere to the wishes of a religiously-based majority party in the lawmaking, thereby practically denying the minorities any rights. Further discrimination can be done by undertaking uneven development in areas populated by the minority community and not

giving them equal opportunities in fields of health and education. This has allegedly been the case of the minority Arabs in Israel.

Consensual Democracy and Islam:

The reader should go back momentarily to Hegel's interpretation by Langerspetz. She explained that it is essential for a democratic system to have an opposition. Without the synthesis of the differing views of the ruling party and opposition, democracy cannot function effectively. However, the Islamic tradition of Shura, which has been mentioned earlier as an example of democratic values in Islam, is closely connected with the concept of consensus (Ijma). However, considerable differences exist between the different schools of Islamic laws regarding the meaning of the term. The Shaf'i school traditionally considered Ijma to be that of the entire Muslim community. Undoubtedly, this line of thought is conductive to the practice of electoral democracy. However, other schools such as Hanbali and Hanafi considered Ijma to involve the opinions of the learned jurists only. Further, certain later variations of Islamic legal interpretations (Usul-Al-Fiq) considered Ijma to have been the sole preserve of the first three generations of Muslim leaders after the Prophet (Dryzek et al. 2008 : 309). Even if Ijma is to be understood as consensus reached by consulting the entire Umma, that is not really conductive to the contemporary idea of electoral democracy where majority votes win over minorities. The idea of consensual democracy, as it has been interpreted by sympathetic Islamic law schools is rarely in practice in the world today. Certain parts of Canada and the small island state of Guernsey do practice a form of consensual democracy but that is limited to the decision making system in the legislature. The election to legislature is dependent on majority votes. Therefore, a deeper introspection of the much touted democratic values of consultation and consensus reveals that they are not sufficient as precedents in order to establish a modern democratic system in an Islamic state. This dilemma points to the limitation of democratic thinking within Islam which refuses to consider any aspects of democratic principles that cannot find some religious backing. To a non-Muslim observer, it may appear strange as to why Muslim scholars refuse to circumvent the religious guidelines, even when they have a fervent desire to establish democratic systems. Part of the answer lies with the colonial experience of the Muslim societies.

Islam and Colonialism:

Many of the world's countries with a largely Muslim population have been under European colonial rule till the middle of the twentieth century. Indonesia, Malaysia, Senegal, Algeria

are some of the many contemporary Muslim states which underwent colonial domination. Colonialism has affected Islamic political thinking significantly. The history of colonial control in Indonesia is old, starting with Dutch takeover of the Moluccas in the mid-16th century. Nature of colonial rule varied widely between colonizing nations, e.g. Dutch controlled East Indies never developed strong democratic institutions like the neighboring British-controlled Malaysia. This is regarded as a principal reason for the virtually unchallenged establishment of democracy in the later post independence whereas in Indonesia, democracy has faced severe challenges. Further, religion often became a rallying point for nationalists in their struggle to overthrow communal rule. Colonialism also created artificial barriers among communities which led to creation of new identities among the colonized (Motadel 2012 : 831-856). There is hardly any linguistic, ethnic or cultural connection between a Javanese and a resident of South Sulawesi. However, due to the administrative system provided by the Dutch, they now consider each other to be part of the same nation whereas the Malays, of similar ethnic and linguistic heritage, would be considered a foreigner by any Javanese. This process was accentuated by the rapid withdrawal of colonialism after the Second World War which led to arbitrarily drawn state boundaries without regard for ethnic or cultural heritage.

The above discussion should serve as a brief introduction to the old but very much relevant debate regarding the compatibility of Islam and democracy. However, one should not fail to notice the strange nature of this debate which presupposes that anywhere in the world either an 'ideal' Islamic polity or a 'perfect' democratic polity exists. Such ideal types do not occur in real life. Somehow, during the discussion of Islam's compatibility with democracy, this basic fact is forgotten. Japan has a deeply entrenched parochial and patriarchal society with a long history of non-democratic rule as well as of very non-humane acts committed during both World Wars throughout the region of South East Asia. Germany has a history of feudal-military rule and of overthrowing a democratic government in favor of a murderous demagogue. The Indian society suffers from acute problems of illiteracy, disenfranchisement among the weaker sections of society and deep division lines across caste and religion. With a Roman Catholic heritage of over five centuries, most South American countries suffered from despotic regimes throughout the last century. These cannot be described as historical or sociological factors conductive to the survival of democracy, yet few are talking of the 'compatibility' between Judaism and Democracy, Roman Catholicism and Democracy and the like. Everywhere in the world, the ideal of Democracy has been

compromised to various degrees to provide the people at least some rights and liberties under partially democratic systems. Despite all its limiting features, there is no reason to assume that an Islamic polity working under the basic tenets of Shari'a would fail to strike such a compromise. In Lebanon, in Azerbaijan, in Indonesia, democracies are thriving. Even in traditionally authoritarian societies such as Bahrain, democratic institutions have been given space to operate. These factors should be kept in mind while weighing a particular Muslim-majority country's democratic potential.

Why Indonesia?

Indonesia is world's largest Islamic country in terms of population. Ethnically, majority of the Indonesians are Malays with the Chinese present as a significant ethnic minority. The territory now called the Indonesian state came under the rule of various Hindu kingdoms, to be replaced by Muslim ones since the emergence of the Majapahit Kingdom (Nawawi 1971 : 159).The present state of Indonesia is a creation of the Dutch colonialists. Dutch domination began in the central island of Java from 17th century with VOC (The United Dutch East India Company) carrying out tread and territorial expansion. Corruption and mismanagement however led the VOC to bankruptcy and in the year 1799, lands under VOC's control went briefly under the control of the French and the British before becoming property of the state of Holland in 1816 (Younce 2001 : 49). Through continuous military expeditions Dutch rule expanded in the East Indies and continued till Japanese invasion during Second World War, barring a short period when the territory came under successive French and British control. The political boundaries of modern Indonesian state were only finalized at the beginning of twentieth century when after a prolonged struggle, the ruler of the rebellious people of Aceh submitted to Dutch rule (Graf et al. 2010 : 186).

Indonesia presents a great opportunity to study the evolution of a Muslim-majority society with a pluralist and syncretic root. Indonesia has a culture which is the result of thousands of years of intermingling of Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and local animist traditions with Islamic traditions and laws. Since Islam in Indonesia came from India, it was easier for the new religion to accustom itself with the syncretic and mystical character of the new land's religions and appropriate the local customs and traditions (Jha 1999:13). A study of Indonesian social and political system is also a study of a post-colonial Muslim majority state with very considerable divisive lines across language and ethnicity. The concept of 'nation-building' so dear to the national leaders of post-colonial countries was also very much present

in Indonesia, providing an opportunity to study the evolution of the concept of nation-state under challenging circumstances. Indonesia of today demands attention from students and practitioners of foreign policy alike. It is world's largest Muslim country, which controls some of the world's busiest sea lines which provide access to half of Asia and the western part of USA. Indonesia is one of the region's largest military powers and a significant economic power as well (Halimi 2014). If the USA and ASEAN's vision of a stable South East Asia and especially a stable South China Sea is to be achieved, Indonesia will have to play a key role. This will not be possible if the country cannot establish a stable political system which can effectively deal with the problems of religion, corruption and ethnic tensions. Therefore, it appears to be very important to study the democratic system of Indonesia and its possibilities to succeed. However, in case one forgets, Indonesia is a country with a majority of Muslims. Of all the challenges Indonesian society and government faces towards the strengthening of democratic institutions and ideals, the religious beliefs of the majority can appear as the greatest. The answer, understandably, cannot be a simple one and needs to be arrived at after studying the other related factors such as the legacy of colonial rule and the following dictatorships, level of maturity reached by the new democratic institutions, the level of religiosity of the people and the nature of their 'public religion', inclination of the various political parties to use religion to garner votes etc. These factors will be taken up and discussed in the subsequent chapters. Here, a brief introduction to the journey of Democratic ideals and movement in the country will follow.

Like many other colonies, the idea of democracy was first brought to the land by the Dutch through their education system, although it was meant for a very small section of the society (Anderson 1983 : 110). Following a pattern of many other colonies, the first expressions of a national consciousness was expressed through social reform movements in early 20th century such as 'Budi Utomo' and 'Sarekat Islam' (Sardesai 1981 : 264). Sarekat Islam was the first mass organization based on Islamic ideals. It was followed by establishment of other such organizations such as 'Muhammadiah' or the way of Muhammad and Nahdatul Ulama (NU), meaning rise of the Ulamas. (Bush 2014, : 3). However, during the turbulent period of Indonesia's freedom struggle, the Islamic organization which had the most impact on Indonesia's politics and history was the Darul Islam movement. By 1927, Sarekat Islam was losing its influence as a rift between the traditionalists and the Pan-Islamists was created. A leader of the Pan-Islamists, Kartosuwiryo became a prominent face around this period. Initially an officeholder at Sarekat, he later formed his own armed militia and started a

movement called Darul Islam (Soebardi 1983 : 120). Darul Islam engaged in war with the republicans and only gave in 1962, after Sukarno ended the weak central government at Jakarta. In the face of superior firepower of the army, Kartosuwiryo resorted to rhetoric of Jihad and even ordered a 'Total War' as early as 1948 which led to terrorist acts (Ibid). Therefore, the movement should be remembered as an ominous warning about the possibilities of any region of the country succumbing to hard line Islamic political influence if the state is not vigilant enough.

The rise of political consciousness in Indonesia, exemplified by the establishment of Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam gradually led to the establishment of political parties such as the PNI, who were soon joined by the communist PKI. During the Second World War and Japanese occupation of Indonesia the Japanese attempted to use Islam as a rallying factor to fight the mostly Christian allied forces. They established the organization Masyumi and also built a military wing of that organization (Lucius 2003 : 44-45). After the Japanese left in 1945, the Dutch wanted to reinstate their colonial system, which was bitterly opposed by the Indonesians. A four year long war of independence followed after which the nationalists were victorious and Indonesia gained independence in 1949 (Sardesai 1981, : 277). Even among the celebrations of victory, there were demands to declare Indonesia an Islamic country. A compromise was made in the form of 'Jakarta Charter' which ensured adherence to Islam by all Muslim citizens. However, the Charter never gained widespread support and had been voted down by the parliament (Lucius 2003 : 48). A period of parliamentary democracy followed independence which proved to be a failed experiment due to the great number of political parties vying for power and the resulting political deadlocks in the parliament. Sukarno, who was till then only a figurehead president, took the opportunity to assert his vision of a strong, unified Indonesia based on the tenets of 'Pancasila' and reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution which gave overarching power to the president.

Sukarno introduced the concept of 'Guided Democracy', whereby he stressed that the parliamentary system is inadequate to deal with Indonesia's problems. In order to gain traction, the new Democracy must be guided by a supreme leader, himself and a traditional system of discussion and decision making through consensus; called 'Mushwara' and 'Mufakat'. Therefore, from 1956, the parliament stood adjourned as Sukarno focused on working group representations and solving political questions and debates through the

traditional Javanese systems of 'Mushwara' and 'Mufakat', meaning deliberation and consensus (Sardesai 1981 : 367-368).

Sukarno was strongly against Islamic influence in politics and espoused a strong secularism, although there was a fair amount of Javanese mysticism to his brand of secularism. He portrayed himself as a successor of the semi-divine kings of old empires. His 'Pancasila' was to be the only guiding principle for the state which had no place for Islamic doctrines except that it accepted the existence of One God. Sukarno went on to solidify his hold on the country's politics although on economic front, Indonesia was tattering. He was eventually replaced by the military general Suharto, following a massacre of communists and minority Chinese, carried on the pretext of safeguarding the state against an alleged coup attempt known as 'October 30 movement' (Sardesai 1981 : 374-375). Under Suharto, elections became a farcical show, held every five years. In 1973, Suharto banned all other parties but his electoral vehicle Golkar and two other newly formed parties, PDI and P (Ibid : 379). He hoarded all the Islamist parties under the banner of P and all liberal parties under PDI. Despite the economic growth witnessed during the long Suharto period, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the Indonesian economy hard and laid bare the gross mismanagement of resources, eventually leading to Suharto's downfall in 1998.

Suharto regime was oppressive against any expression of political Islam and any overt show of Islamic ideas was thwarted (Liddle 1996 : 614-615). Along with this, the economic progress made under him which provided jobs and also led to the spread of secular education, has led to greater toleration in Indonesian society. Suharto regime has further opened the democratic space for a benign version of Islam in another way. Orthodox Muslim leaders like Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid clearly defined their priorities to be progress and liberalism rather than attainment of Islamic goals. Wahid has brought the toleration of old Javanese society with a dedication for democracy and nationalism. He has played a crucial part in establishing the role of the moderate Ullama in Indonesian politics and society.

The focus of the present study is on the post-Suharto period when analyzing the role of Islam in the democratization of Indonesia. Post-Suharto period saw an explosion of new political organizations, parties as well of assertion of Political Islam in the public sphere, hitherto banned by Suharto. It is both interesting and necessary to study the role of Islamic Social organizations and political parties with an Islamic agenda in those tumultuous times because only that can explain the relation of Islam and democratization in Indonesia where after more

than a decade of Suharto's downfall, an observer can see a deeply religious society, competition among political leaders to be more 'religious', continuing operation of Suharto-era instruments of corruption and nepotism and the existence of numerous paramilitary organizations affiliated to political parties which keep traditions of repression of political opposition alive. How much of it has to do with Islam, what is understood by the common citizen by Islamic practices and how leaders use it are questions that will be discussed in the following chapters of this study.

Chapter 3

Islam in Indonesian society and politics before 'Reformasi'

The Colonial Period:

The modern state of Indonesia, known as Dutch East Indies during its colonial period in history, was one of the first Asian territories to fall prey to the advances of European colonialism. Dutch interests in the islands of Java, Sumatra, Bali and other contiguous island territories which form the modern Indonesian state began from the 16th century. In 1595, the first Dutch merchant ship sailed to Java and the lure of staggering profit soon attracted more. For conducting trade in a more organized manner, the Dutch East Indian Company (V.O.C) was formed and given a charter to wage war, build forts and to establish diplomatic relationships with local rulers and trade. However, rampant corruption and mishandling of business led to bankruptcy of the V.O.C in 1800 and the Republican Dutch Government took over the territories controlled by it. However, for the next decade, the Dutch suffered fickle political fortune as they were subjugated to Napoleon's rule in 1806 and had to ask for the favor of the British in 1811 to regain their possessions in East Indies. In 1816, Dutch Control was finally firmly re-established over East Indies (Hall 1968: 541). These changes in government did not result in any observable change in colonial policy. For almost next half a century, the Dutch focused solely on reaping benefits from the highly profitable spices business. Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia remained largely without a cohesive political framework till the middle of the nineteenth century. Up to that point, the Dutch Empire essentially remained a collection of trading outposts. The Dutch company V.O.C and later, the Netherland's government both followed the familiar colonial policy of non-interference in the traditional and religious affairs of the colonies country and focused on reaping financial benefits. Relations with traditional rulers of the land were tactical and there was scant understanding of the nature of their legitimacy among the East Indian natives or their religion and social customs. However, this aloofness was replaced by an eagerness to learn more about the culture, polity and religion of East Indies after the Dutch suffered two consecutive revolts in West Sumatra and Java, namely, the Minangkabau war and the Java war.

Padri Rebellion:

The Padri War or Padri Rebellion was the first expression of Islam's influence in the political arena of East Indies. It affected the region of West Sumatra, the traditional abode of the Minangkabau people, one of the major ethnic groups in East Indies. Minangkabau people were traditionally divided into two groups, based on their functional and ritual space in society. Minangkabau people who had farming land, belonged to the elite landed class whereas the rest traditionally went to learn trade (a ritualized process called Merantau) and became successful entrepreneurs (Graves 1984). These merchants and apprentices were primarily based in the coastal towns which were influenced by the centuries of interactions with the Arab, Indian and European traders. They were much influenced by the modernist developments in Arab's Islam and grew disillusioned of the traditional customary law (Adat) based religious syncretism of their elite. Many of this merchant class made the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and were influenced by Wahhabism, which promulgated strict adherence to Koran and Shari'a (Graves 1984: 23). Many of these Hajis came back to their native land and were distraught by what they perceived as gross violations of the tenets of Islam such as cockfighting and matrilineal traditions. After many attempts by the Padri to forcefully 'convert' their fellow Minangkabau to 'true Islam', a war broke out in 1803 between the traditionalists (followers of Adat) of Minangkabau and the Islamists (Padri). Although the Padris were in a minority, their religious zeal proved to be a winning factor for them. The traditional aristocracy of Minangkabau chose to call upon the Dutch for help in 1821. The Dutch accepted the offer gladly since it gave them an opportunity to gain control over Western Sumatra, where they were in a weak position. Against the militarily superior Dutch, the Padri elements lost ground and finally capitulated with the capture and exile of their leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol; in 1837 (Graves 1984: 24).

Java War

While still dousing the fire of Padri Rebellion in West Sumatra, the Dutch faced more direct challenges to their authority in Java in the form of Diponegero Rebellion, also called the Java War, which continued from 1825 to 1830 (Hall 1968: 544). The rebellion derived its name from Prince Diponegero, a prince of the royal house of Yogyakarta in Java. Diponegero was the eldest son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono III but his mother was not a queen, therefore he had to accept a ministerial post under the Kingship of his half brother. However, the Dutch allegedly made a pact with Diponegero that they would support his candidature for the throne

if he outlives his brother. Therefore, when his brother died, Diponegero was distraught to see that the Dutch supported the infant son of the late King for Kingship. Furious, Diponegero launched a rebellion against the Dutch. Diponegero was a devout Muslim and was well respected by the Javanese peasantry for that. He called for a Jihad or Holy War against the Dutch 'infidels' and those 'non-believers' among the Javanese who did not support him. This was the second time (after the Padri rebellion) in the East Indies that such Islamic rhetoric was employed to incite people to fight wars. The masses supported him for his religious prowess as well as for their hatred against the Dutch who exploited them through the system of forced labor. The Java War was costly for both sides. After the death of nearly 200,000 people, 8000 among them Dutch. Diponegero was captured by trickery in 1830 and deported, thus ending the long war. Expenses of the war drove the Dutch to near-bankruptcy and brought about a change in their economic policy. They started to focus more on cash crops exports from East Indies and introduced the 'Culture System' for increasing cash crops production (Hall 1968: 544-546).

Snouck Hurgronje and Dutch treatment of political Islam:

As has been stated before, the Dutch colonial policy in the first half of the nineteenth century focused solely on economic benefits. However, changing political climate in Europe led to a change in Dutch colonial policy as well. During the middle of nineteenth century, Europe was experiencing relative political stability which was favorable for the emergence of a group of humanist thinkers and philosophers who emphasized the renaissance belief in the unlimited potential of human beings and a scientific, evolutionary outlook to human societies world over. The 19th century European thinker showed a peculiar combination of humanism, idealism as well as ethno centrism. Under their influence and very importantly, the influence of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches, authorities in the Netherlands undertook development of the 'ignorant natives' of the East Indies as their priority. The colonial mission became a 'civilizing mission', although not without a justification which was acceptable to the most pragmatic of the Dutch people and leaders (Jung 2010: 288). If the natives become 'civilized', that is, western-educated, then they would gladly accept colonial rule and there would be no more rebellions. To carry on the civilizing mission, colonial governments needed more information and understanding of the religious and social customs of the natives. This gave rise to a crop of philosophers and researchers whom Edward Said has famously labeled as 'Orientalists'; a class of scholars who interpreted the society, religion and culture of the colonized nations, the 'Orient' with help of received knowledge from

eastern philosophers and their Greek and Roman interpretations. Snouck Hurgronje was the leading orientalist of the Netherlands during the middle of the 19th century. Hurgronje was predominantly a scholar of Islam and he famously spent time in Mecca, disguised as a Muslim student to learn the Philosophy of Islam. He was appointed by the Dutch government to enquire about the Muslim society of Aceh, where the Dutch government was facing steep resistance from 1873. Acehnese were more devoutly Muslim than the regular Javanese and Hurgronje spent almost a year there, again disguised as a local, after which he produced two volumes about their culture and religion. While quiet valuable as a pioneering study of the Acehnese society; his study of the Acehnese culture and society had a dual purpose. Hurgronje was convinced, like many of his time and position, that the only way to secure Dutch rule in the peninsula was to 'elevate' the locals to the standards of Dutch culture. Islam as a religion and especially the Pan-Islamic movement seemed to him as the biggest obstacles towards achieving this objective. However, his 'participant observation' of the Acehnese society convinced Hurgronje that the puritanical Ulama only has limited influence over the common people and that the traditional aristocracy, who derive their legitimacy from mysticism and rule mostly according to traditional or Adat laws, only pay lip service to the resurgent Islamic scholars. In fact, Hurgronje believed that the traditional elite was feeling deeply threatened by the newfound zeal of the puritanical Ulama (Jung 2010: 291-293). Therefore, he concluded that the ideal policy for the Dutch government to achieve their twin objectives; consolidating the Dutch Empire in East Indies and to uplift the natives to the level of Dutch civilization, can only be achieved if the traditional elite is given a western education and therefore assimilated into western culture. He may have also thought that increased westernization would ultimately result in a disregard for traditional religions and lead to scientific secularism. This was a result of the 19th century protestant worldview of Hurgronje and other European scholars belonging to the same milieu. They saw cultural history through evolution and believed adherence to traditional religions as a transitory period, one to be replaced by scientific secularism. A corollary of this belief was that modernization (through western education and imparting of liberal values) was equated with westernization.

Hurgronje was successful in ending the Aceh war but he failed in his project to unify Muslims of Indonesia under the banner of progressive modernism upheld by the Dutch government. What he and many other orientalist scholars wielding comprehensive, generalizing theories did not understand was that modernization may not lead to westernization. In case of Indonesia as well as other countries in a similar situation, western

education and imparting of liberal values in a colonial, illiberal atmosphere only strengthened the resolve of the newly educated class to fight the injustice of colonialism. A newfound grasp of western analytical tools only gave this class a better imperative to reform their religion so that it serves the purpose of fighting colonialists. Infusion of a completely new rationality was only possible in Islam, a religion which values its doctrinal purity and forbids innovation (bida), when this rationality was channelized through a call to purify the religion of all accumulated misunderstandings and baseless practices. This was the rationale behind the modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia.

The success of Hurgronje in ending the Aceh war convinced the Dutch colonial government that his advices regarding the treatment of Islam in Indonesia were worth implementing on a nationwide scale (Jung 2010: 293). This led to, firstly, a preference for the traditional rulers as intermediaries in governance. The younger generation of this upper class was provided with western education and they were given ranks, allowances and other facilities. Sometimes, ancient and long discontinued rituals and rights were invoked to increase their standing among the people. Secondly, the government started using Adat laws in all civil matters. Religion was left almost completely untouched but it was strictly restricted to the personal sphere. Any political expression of religion, i.e. Islam was forbidden (Vandenbush 1952: 181).

This policy, borne out of inadequate understanding of the Indonesian society and its vast diversities, created a result which was the opposite of what the Dutch wanted. As Islam was the only field left untouched by an invasive bureaucracy, it became the sphere of all national and political activities. Islam was the only binding link among the diverse, geographically differentiated ethnic and linguistic groups of the Dutch conquered and administered territories. It was natural therefore, that Islam became a prime moving force for achieving solidarity among the people of East Indies, the basis of an Indonesian nation. The idea of a fledgling nation needs to be insulated from diluting influences from outside; this idea needs to carry within it a sense of adequacy and superiority to a challenger nation. Only Islam could fulfill these requirements in late 19th century and early 20th century Indonesia (Jung 2010: 297). It is no wonder, therefore, that the first large scale Indonesian social and political organizations had Islam as their guiding ideologies.

Priyayi, Abangan and Santri- the three streams of religious-cultural life in Java:

These Islamic organizations which set the course of Islamic politics in Indonesia drew their support almost invariably from one of the socio-cultural groupings that existed among Indonesian Muslims. Division of society along these lines was most clearly visible in Java, but similar divisions existed in outer islands as well, albeit to a limited extent. One of the earliest and most authoritative studies made on these groups is the book 'Religion in Java' by Clifford Geertz, written in 1960. Geertz identified three distinct streams of Javanese society, defined by their religio-cultural beliefs, as well as by their economic activities. These divisions, called 'Aliran', are identified as the traditional nobility or 'Priyayi', the traditional peasantry or the 'Abangan' and the modernist Muslims predominantly engaged in tread and teaching at village level (The 'Santri'), though these divisions between them were often not absolute. Geertz pointed out that the majority of Indonesian in 1960 only adhered in Islam in a very formal manner, without inculcating or understanding its duties (Geertz 1960 : 124). A principal reason for this religious ambivalence was the fact that Islam in Indonesia came from Indian merchants who were influenced by India's own syncretic traditions (Geertz 1960 p: 124-125). The Abangan peasantry adopted a culture which was a synthesis of urban influences and their tribal heritage. They focused on their rituals and its allegorical significance; they also focused on family as the basic unit of society. The Priyayi nobility embodied the refined version of Abangan peasant's culture. They were a 'cultural elite', "whose basis of power is their control over the central symbolic resources of the society" (Geertz 1960: 227). The Priyayi focused on mystical concepts to explain their world view. They had the concept of 'Alus' and 'Kasar' which dictated their every action (Geertz 1960: 232). 'Alus' means everything that is beautiful or pure or graceful and Kasar was everything that was devoid of it. As one can see, both Abangan and Priyayi have very little influence of Islam in their world view. The Santri were, as mentioned before, small time merchants, artisans based in coastal towns who maintained contact with Arab merchants and were influenced by their emphasis on pure doctrinal Islam. Geertz quotes Hurgronje in saying that in 1880, the biggest colony of foreigners in Mecca belonged to the Indonesians (Geertz 1960: 125). Enthused by Koranic teachings, the Santri focused on creating a more favorable space in Indonesia for the propagation of 'true' doctrinaire Islam. The Padri war was the first expression of this internal conflict within Indonesian society. Although Indonesian society has changed much throughout the twentieth century and the traditional Aliran groupings are no longer its defining characteristics, but during the early years of Islamic politics, Islamic

organizations were drawing their legitimacy as the representative of one of these groups. The PNI, for example was almost comprehensively led by Priyayi leaders. Sukarno himself belonged to a family of minor nobility. Sarekat Islam, the most influential of al Islamic organizations, had a Santri base. Muhhamadiyah was a modernist Muslim organization who also had a Santri support base, especially of those who did not want to focus solely on the political aspect of Islam but on fulfilling its social responsibilities. Nahdatul Ulama (The rise of Ulama or religious scholars) was an organization with a support base among the followers of traditional Javanese form of Islam. Although these traditional Aliran groupings may not exist in contemporary times as an acceptable framework of allegiance for the Indonesian people or parties, undercurrents of allegiance to these old groupings can still be felt.

Political Islam develops with nationalist movement; Sarekat Islam:

The first native political organization, Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavor), found in 1908 was not Islamic in nature though. Its membership was almost exclusively limited to indigenous civil servants and its stated aim was betterment of education, not politics (Kahin 1969: 65). Although Budi Utomo later became more political in nature, its carefully moderate nature confined it to a very small section of educated Indonesians. Sarekat Islam, founded in 1911 by H.O.S. Tjakroaminoto was the first nationwide organization of Indonesians that had a clear political Raison d'être. Sarekat Islam (SI, henceforth) was found as a trade union of Batik Entrepreneurs. However, its traditional Santri base (The businesspeople of Indonesia, as mentioned in the context of Minangkabau revolt were devout, modernist Muslims classified as Santris) coupled with the discontent among rural masses against the Dutch rule, soon turned it into a political organization. The Dutch were aware of the potential political force of SI, therefore, they clamped down on the organization. Under pressure, SI declared in 1913 that they would stay away from all anti-governmental activities. However, the government was not assured. On June 30th, 1913, the colonial government in Batavia declared that Sarekat Islam will only be able to establish independent local branches and that there would be no central command structure of the organization (Ibid p: 67-70).

Reduced to a weakened central leadership, SI attempted to attract all elements of Indonesian Muslim society- including the liberals and the socialists. This resulted in tensions within the party over doctrine and methods of agitation. The principal leader, Tjokroaminoto deviated so far from the Santri ideology that he incorporated the traditional Javanese idea of 'Ratu Adil' - a Just Prince who would be the messianic deliverer of the people, in his own figure. First

World War and the Bolshevik revolution further intensified tension between socialist and Islamic groups within Sarekat. At one point, a socialist faction based in Semarang started to enjoy dual membership of Sarekat as well as the communist party. Under the influence of these radical elements, SI started to demand more autonomy from the Dutch from 1916 onwards. When the colonial government introduced 'Volksraad' or people's Council with limited advisory powers, not many from Sarekat joined it (Ibid : 73)

Maintaining unity within Sarekat was proving to be difficult. The original merchant class leaders of the party were feeling increasingly distant from the party's agenda because of the radical influence. Founding of PKI in 1920, which attracted the bulk of socialistically inclined members of SI and that of Muhammadiyah, which attracted the modernist Islamic members arrived as further challenges to the party (Ibid : 87).

Faced with continuing attrition, Sarekat leadership tried to assimilate ideals of socialism into the fold of Islamic ones. Haji Agus Salim, one of the most senior leaders of the party and the de facto head since Tjokroaminoto was incarcerated, declared during the 1921 Congress of the party that dual membership couldn't be enjoyed by party members (Ibid : 75). At the same breath, he also stated that there were no fundamental differences between the tents of Marxism and Islam. He said that the basis of socialist ideas could be found in Islam and one need not look up to Marxism for them. Much in the line of the Leninist worldwide revolution theory, he proposed Pan-Islamism as the guarantor of the success of socialist ideals.

However, this 'socialism on an Islamic basis' didn't really attract the rural masses, especially those in Java since they were followers of the traditional Abangan culture. Moreover, PKI took over the school system and the important school fund that was an important recruiting and organizing ground of Sarekat Islam. Sarekat desperately tried to establish the Ratu Adil concept again to retain the support of Abangan masses but failed. Ultimately, its attempt to work against its own mandate of pan Islamism and doctrinaire Islam and to adopt a universal approach worked against it. Sarekat's members left the party and joined PKI, PNI, Nahdatul Ulama or Muhammadiyah according to their individual political and religious inclinations (Ibid : 72).

Sarekat Islam's failure to provide a platform for the modernist Islamists to take part in the political process resulted in a deep rooted frustration of this community. The domestic political arena was taken over by the communist PKI and the nationalist, Priyayi nobility-led PNI. It was not before the Japanese occupation that the Islamists again got an opportunity to

actively take part in Indonesia's politics. However, the long deprivation during this period has led to a belief among the adherents of Islamic politics that their demands would not be adequately met in a free Indonesia led by any of these two parties. Especially, PKI rule was absolutely unacceptable for the Islamists. Their newfound political prestige during the Japanese occupation period only helped Islamists to consolidate their power for a potential conflict situation in post-independence Indonesia and events after independence proved many of their misgivings about an Indonesian government led by nationalists to be true. The Darul Islam movement, which proved to be the biggest challenge for the nascent Indonesian republic needs to be seen from this historical and political context. However, before discussing more about the Darul Islam movement in detail, one must have an overview of the political situation in Indonesia during Japanese occupation and the role political Islam played during that period.

An opportunity seized- rise of Islamic leadership during Japanese occupation:

Japan, as a rising Asian imperial power wanted to establish a sphere of influence, another name for colonies, throughout the east and Southeast Asian regions. Since a large portion of this region's population adhered to Islam, the Japanese undertook careful studies of the religion from 1930's. In 1938, a World Islamic Conference was organized in Tokyo, where Indonesian delegates were present (Benda 1955 : 354). After Japanese occupation of Indonesia, they quickly realized the need to mobilize Indonesian to their cause for unhindered chain of supplies and also for replenishing auxiliary troops. Japan government believed that only the Islamists had the ability to mobilize people at such a large scale.

Japan's affinity for the Islamic leaders perhaps stemmed from their belief that the Islamists were more staunchly anti-western than the western educated secular nationalist leaders. Led by their belief, the Japanese proceeded to recognize and encourage Islamic leaders and teachers in Indonesian society. Their patronage was not limited to the urban Islamic leaders but also benefitted village level Ulama. This added a new dimension to Indonesian politics. The village Ulama was never really connected with metropolitan politics till this point and they were seen as a part of a distant, old world by the nationalist leaders. However, the Japanese used them successfully to gain allegiance of the Islamist forces in the country. The Japanese wanted to mobilize as mush support as possible. For this purpose, in 1942 they established two organizations. 'Putera' was intended for the nationalists and another organization M.I.A.I was formed to unite all Islamic parties and organizations (Ibid p: 356-

357). Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the two principal Islamic organizations were allowed to function independently as well as inside the framework of M.I.A.I. In 1943, both these organizations were dissolved. However, while the nationalists were not assimilated into any new organizations, an even more powerful new organization was presented to the Islamists in the form of 'Masyumi' in the same year.

Japanese strategies were definitely successful in their immediate goal to win the allegiance of Muslim organizations. Masyumi in fact declared the Japanese cause a Holy War. On the other hand, it was undoubtedly Japanese patronage that made political Islam a serious force in Indonesian politics and consolidated its regional and local structure.

This favorable situation for the Islamists lasted till September 1944, after which continuing military setbacks forced Japan to declare its intent for Indonesia's independence which brought the nationalist leaders to forefront again. This was due to the fact that the Islamist leaders were simply not competent enough to oversee complex matters of power transfer and administering through a vast, westernized bureaucracy. However, this turn in Japanese politics did not dry up support for the Islamists. In fact, as late as 1944, a new militia called Hizbullah was formed and attached to Masyumi as its military wing by the Japanese (Ibid : 360). Japanese toleration and incitement of the radical Islamist elements in Indonesia were to have far reaching effects. Darul Islam movement drew directly from the pool of financial and military resources given to the Masyumi by the Japanese; even its leader received Japanese patronage during the occupation period. Japan's insistence during the power transfer in 1945 led Masyumi to survive the period of transition almost intact and it presented an impressive united Islamic front in the politics of independent Indonesia, in stark contrast to the factionalism among the nationalists post-independence.

Militant Islam challenges nationalism- Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam movement:

This brief description and analysis of the revival of Islamic politics during the Japanese occupation will now provide a backdrop for understanding the force behind Darul Islam movement. It was an armed rebellion against the republican Indonesian government which took place in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. It was led by the charismatic Islamist leader Kartosuwiryo who started his political career in 1927 by joining Sarekat Islam as a protégé of Tjokroaminoto (Soebardi 1983 : 111). Tjokroaminoto died in 1934, when Sarekat was already in a weak position. His death led to a conflict between the younger leaders, which included Kartosuwiryo, and the older ones such as Haji Agus Salim. They differed

especially over the 'Hijrah policy', espoused by the younger leaders, which led to a complete withdrawal from government activities and active non-cooperation. In 1935, Haji Salim requested the national executive of Sarekat to drop the Hijrah policy as he feared state repression. However, he himself was ousted from the party as result, to be replaced by Abikusno, brother of the late Tjokroaminoto (Ibid : 112).

Although a part of the controlling faction in the party, Kartosuwiryo differed from their political outlook significantly. He considered the Hijrah policy to have a positive connotation, one of building self-sufficiency in all field of life rather than the limited negative connotation of non-cooperation attributed to it by the Sarekat leaders. His open criticism of the party's decision to join nationalist factions during the late 1930's finally led to his expulsion from the party in 1940. He founded an Islamic boarding school (Peasntren) in the native village of his wife which was called the Suffah Institute, meaning the institute for those specially blessed by Allah (Dijk 1981 : 39).

During Japanese occupation, Kartosuwiryo took a compromising step in the highly controlled political atmosphere. He joined the umbrella Islamic organization created by the Japanese in 1943 for mass mobilization in their favor, the Masyumi, as a secretary (Soebardi 1983 : 115). After the Japanese surrender in 1945, he was instrumental in the establishment of Masyumi as a political party and a united front for all Muslim parties and organizations in Indonesia. Although a key member of Masyumi, Kartosuwiryo used its organization to further his own ambitions,. In western Java, he transformed Masyumi into Majelis Ulama Islam (MUI) which emphasized on the defense of Islam (Pertahanaan), i.e. defense of the political ideas of Islam (Ibid : 118). He established close contact with other militant Muslim organizations established during the Japanese occupation such as Hizbullah and Sabilillah and launched his concept of an Islamic Indonesian State (Negara Islam Indonesia) (Lucius 2003 : 61). He himself was to be the main religious leader or 'Imam' of the state.

Kartosuwiryo and the newly launched movement found political justification as the Indonesian army made a pact, the Renville Agreement, with the Dutch who were again trying to capture Indonesian territories post Second World War (Nieuwenhuijze 1950 : 176). By this agreement, the army agreed to leave West Java to the Dutch for the establishment of a puppet state. This not only gave Kartosuwiryo a valid reason for launching his rebellion but the Islamist militias under him also benefitted from the weapons the Indonesian army, who previously formed a united front with them against the Dutch, left behind while withdrawing.

Kartosuwiryo adopted strongly articulated rhetoric of a Dar Ul Harb, meaning the abode of war where Islam was struggling for space (which meant all republican territory) and Dar Ul Islam, which he was dreaming to establish through a Holy War, 'Jihad fi Sabilillah' (Holy War in the path of Allah) (Soebardi 1983 : 120). The Islamic state of Indonesia was officially proclaimed on 7th August, 1949. Initially, the reaction of the republican government towards the rebellion was mild. Kartosuwiryo was seen as politician based in West Java who was trying to assert himself in an area just taken over by the Dutch. Some attempts at conciliation were made during 1950-51(Ibid : 127). However, these efforts soon ceased as the Indonesian government and army realized the extent of the Darul Islam threat.

Kartosuwiryo used strict Spartan discipline and a simple personal lifestyle coupled with well disbursed rumors regarding his mystical powers to instill faith and obedience among the ranks of Darul Islam fighters. He even invoked Sufi traditions to make his soldiers take a traditional oath of allegiance (Bai'at) to him (Ibid : 128). These tactics bore fruit. By 1949 itself, Darul Islam became such a threat to the government of Pasundan Java, the newly created state on West Java; that they had to call the Indonesian army for help.

Facing the better armed, more numerous Indonesian army, Darul Islam movement could not continue fighting as a conventional force for long. But Kartosuwiryo and his lieutenants continued fighting a guerilla war till second June, 1962, the day Kartosuwiryo was captured alive by the army (Dijk 1981, : 126). On 6th June, his son and lieutenant issued an order in his name asking all Darul Islam fighters to surrender (Soebardi 1983 : 130). Tired of fighting a losing war and finally disillusioned of the supposed invincibility of their leader, Darul Islam fighters surrendered soon and the rebellion ended. The army and the traditional local rulers (the Buapti) immediately performed traditional rituals such as throwing a Slametan feast to celebrate the returning of peace and normalcy in the region. However, this act also showed at least a temporary victory of syncretic elements in army and politics over the Islamist ones. Kartosuwiryo was interrogated, tried before a special military court and finally executed on 12th September, 1962 (Ibid).

Political Islam during the Sukarno era:

Historical narratives can rarely be presented in a perfectly linear style, even if one is attempting to describe a single aspect of a nation's politics, Political Islam, in this case. This study has previously discussed the role of the Dutch in colonial Indonesia in the propagation of Islamic politics. It has also been seen how Islamic political organizations and movements

such as Sarekat Islam and Darul Islam functioned. This study has consciously stayed away from analyzing the role of Islamic organizations like Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah which are social organizations with an important political role; as such organizations will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. However, a chapter about the history of political Islam in Indonesia must include the Sukarno and Suharto 'eras', the two defining historical periods in the history of modern Indonesia. Many historical events and themes discussed before in context of the Islamic movements and parties coincide with that period when Sukarno was an active force in Indonesian politics. For the sake of continuity and fluidity of text, some repetitions of facts are inevitable when describing the Sukarno era's influence on Islamic Politics.

Islam in Indonesia always had a peculiar character as a public religion. It was never quite defined in its approach towards politics. At one hand, one could observe the political activeness of Sarekat Islam; on the other hand, there were organizations like Budi Utomo which were clearly more eclectically oriented. There was a clear contradiction between those who saw Islam as a means to reform the Indonesian society and those who saw it as a hindrance in the path of Indonesia's emergence as modern and democratic country. This difference in perceptions became more acute since the western educated Indonesian elite were always a minority who were removed from the masses in the villages and outer islands. Propagation of Doctrinaire Islam was the goal of an influential section of Muslim leaders at the beginning of the twentieth century. The western educated nationalist elite, from which Sukarno belonged was generally against such ideas. However, Sukarno realized that the Islamists have a grip over a significant portion of the country's common people's imagination. Sukarno borrowed a lot from Marxist ideas but he was never too keen on the doctrine of class struggle (Mcvey 1969 : 9). He always saw 'the common people' as one group which was divided along lines of religious beliefs and culture. These were differences, which according to him, were not insurmountable (Ibid : 6). Sukarno, as a leader of the Third World in the early twentieth century so often did; believed in the power of national unity. National unity was so much prized by Sukarno that under his regime, it acquired a kind of semi-mythical status (Ibid : 4). In his 1926 pamphlet titled, 'Nasionalism, Islam and Communism', Sukarno made a fervent appeal to his fellow nationalists not to see Islam as something inherently opposed to the idea of nationalism. In his opinion, the forces of modernization in Islam were greatly beneficial in fostering unity among the people of Indonesia and that there was no inherent contradiction between a pious Muslim and a

nationalist. In fact, during the entire 'Guided Democracy' period, Sukarno tried to strike a balance between the three principal shareholders of state power and social mobilization; The Army, The Communist Party and the Islamic groups (Ibid : 6). Sukarno, like many other nationalist leaders of his time, believed that it was the responsibility of a country's leader to assimilate in his person all the different qualities of his nation's different factions and thereby presenting to the nation an ideal. However, his goals were difficult to attain since the three principal currents identified by him were not homogeneous themselves. The army, perhaps the most important source of power for any Indonesian leader, was divided into those who believed that it should be organized on secular lines and those who believed that instilling of Muslim values in the army is essential for solidarity and discipline. The later view received patronage from the powerful General Nasution who was involved in the creation of modernist Islamic organizations such as the DMI and Majelis Ulama (Federspiel 1973 : 416). In the later period of his rule, when a majority of the army leaders became disenchanted with Sukarno, he increasingly relied on the Communists to maintain his position. However, even in a desperate situation like this, he did not attempt to appeal to the Islamic factions which underscore his scant regard for the influence of Islamic Organizations on public imagination.

Sukarno, Indonesia's first president and the undisputed leader till his fall from grace after the October 30, 1965 coup derived his legitimacy and massive popular support from his role as the liberator of the country from Dutch rule and a symbol of its unity. This is natural for leaders of post-colonial countries who make nation-building their primary goal. Sukarno's views on Islam as a religion and as a political force were influenced by his elite background, the consequent elitist-syncretic blend of worldview which is typical of the Javanese traditional elite. Almost on an equal measure, socio-political realities of Indonesian society during his time and his firm belief in the virtue of harmony among social divisions in Indonesia also influenced his treatment of Islam and politics in general.

The best articulation of Sukarno's views of Islam in the scheme of a modernizing Indonesia struggling for her freedom can be found in 'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism'. It is clear from the name itself that he could identify the three main currents of Indonesian politics that was to define it for decades to come. Ruth T. McVey, with help of hindsight, had made a good analysis of this essay and tried to understand the politics of immediate post-Sukarno politics in the light of these understandings.

The first clarification she makes is that the essay was not an attempt by Sukarno to connect with masses, espousing the cause of nationalism. Even if it were, it would not have been successful considering the low literacy rates among Indonesian in the 1920's. He was not even addressing all his fellow nationalists in Indonesia. He was specifically addressing nationalists of his own kind, the young, western educated elite nationalists (Mcvey 1969 : 3). He made a specific appeal to this class to not exclude nationalists of a more Islamic or socialist mindset from their scheme of freedom struggle. It was his belief that both these groups can be made to work together for their common cause. The historical setting of the essay is important to understand the reason for such an appeal. In 1926, Indonesian politics was in disarray with no unity between the three groups of the new western educated elite, the Islamists and the communists, represented by the PKI or Indonesian communist Party.

Sukarno started his political career from Sarekat Islam, Indonesia's first large political grouping which was led by moderate Muslim leaders. The popularity of Sarekat in the past had taught Sukarno the strength of a popular movement sanctioned endorsed by religious authority. The continuous setback suffered by Indonesian freedom struggle due to a lack of cohesion among the political groups strengthened his resolve to achieve unity of purpose and action among these groups.

This inclusive style of Sukarno's politics is undoubtedly a result of his Javanese background. Although he was very much influenced by Marxist ideas, Sukarno never emphasized the importance of classes in Indonesian society. Rather, he saw the society through the traditional division lines based on cultural-religious orientations (Ibid: 5). These traditional divisions were of three types, the traditional elite Priyayi, the traditional peasantry Abangan and the modernist Islamic Santri. For him, the elite had the duty to represent these social groups, which are collectively called 'Aliran'; and also of fostering unity and harmony through embodying these concepts in their public life. Above all, he believed that the leader of the country, he himself, would have to be the direct channel between the 'Rakyat'- people and the government. His concept of Rakyat is a romantic one which does not accept any insurmountable divisions within when the challenge in front is national unity and national preservation (Ibid).

Sukarno's promulgation of 'Guided Democracy' was, in a major way, a confirmation of his ideas about the role of elite and the orientation of the masses. Sukarno created government funded institutions and groups who would represent certain sections of the society, all within

a system valuing harmony and consensus (Penders 1974 : 153). However, the result of his endeavor was that the metropolitan elite became even more disassociated with the social groups they were ostensibly representing (McVey 1969 : 8). In such a situation, they relied on the figure of President Sukarno to provide them legitimacy. This enabled Sukarno to act in the manner of s traditional Javanese ruler (Ibid). He attempted to create a direct connection with the people as the principal receptor of their grievances. Unfortunately, this attempt went little beyond a quasi-revolutionary rhetoric and attempts to rejuvenate symbols of nationalism which were no longer alluring to people. The elite were also very uneasy with his rhetoric, their own precarious position and the advent of army and the PKI as a challenger to their traditional authority.

It can be argued that Sukarno's classification of the Indonesian society was wrong on multiple levels. On one hand, he failed to understand the complexities of the intertwined class and religious divisions in Indonesia. In fact, the traditional Muslims, called 'Kolot' were led by rural moneylenders and small town gentry. Politically, they were represented by the group 'Muhammadiyah'. On the other hand, the modernists Muslims were led by a newly emerging entrepreneurial class who were animated by values somewhat similar to that of Protestantism in Europe. Nahdatul Ulama and the Masyumi party were the political vehicle for the aspirations of this class (Ibid: 13). The commoner, the peasant and small artisan did not fall under any of these categories. According to the idealized notions of Sukarno and other elite like him, they were natural supporter of the cause of freedom. This was a misconception since freedom following the leadership of the Indonesian new elite would have seemed to them simply like replacing a foreign ruler with a native one. This was the class from which the communist PKI derived its support and became the strongest representatives of the common Indonesian people after independence (Hindley 1964 : 115). However, to view PKI as simply a vehicle for political articulation of the rural masses would be oversimplification. PKI had almost unanimous support from the ethnic Chinese business class, a class usually despised by the traditionalists and modernists Muslims alike. Sukarno belonged to a class of elite that existed mentally in between these two classes. He took pride in his noble birth and the traditional ideas of legitimacy that this provided but he also wished to embrace the commoner in the struggle for freedom (McVey 1969 : 16). It can be understood that in post-independence Indonesia, such a balance would be difficult of maintain.

It is important to underscore the role army played in post-independence Indonesia if the treatment of political Islam under Sukarno is to be analyzed. The army is, anywhere in the

world, a relatively closed institution with strong hierarchical structures which discourages voices of dissent from below. Initially after the independence, there was a clash of interests between the army leaders and the ruling elite as the former was not as educated or noble born as the later. However, as the importance of army became clear in the Guided Democracy as the guarantor of status quo, they were included in the elite. Most army leaders were strongly secular and they belonged to Abangan traditions. However, certain key leaders such as General Nasution were Islamists. They insisted that army receive an amount of Islamic education which would be beneficial for maintain discipline and morale. However, the army leaders in general were always hostile to expressions of militant Islam as they had to fight insurgencies in the outer islands which were at least partially based on the claim that the Java based elite was unfit to rule since it was not truly Islamic.

Rise and fall of Masyumi:

Masyumi was the principal political party representing the modernist Muslims of Indonesia in the 1950's. Masyumi, as stated earlier, was an organization that was established in 1943 by the occupying Japanese for mobilizing the Muslims to support the Japanese cause. Its support base was principally in Sumatra, South Sulawesi and Coastal Java. Masyumi received the support of the older Modernist organization, Muhammadiyah which was by far the largest component part of Masyumi's party structure. It was also supported by several like-minded organizations. Masyumi supported individual initiative and rationality as opposed to blindly following the concept of 'takdir' or fate that was espoused by the traditionalist organizations (Samson 1968 : 1002). Mayumi was led by their scholarly leader, Mohammad Natsir. In the pre-independence period, Sukarno had a working relationship with many of Masyumi's leader including the eventual Indonesian Prime Minister Sukiman. However, as Sukarno became increasingly frustrated with the inability of elected parliaments to come anywhere near to his cherished ideals of consensus and harmony, he started to look for ways to increase his own power over the government (Lucious 2003). He found allies in the PKI and the army. The army was somewhat marginalized in Indonesian politics till the PRRI-Permesta rebellions of 17th October, 1955. However, successful thwarting of the rebellion increased army's prestige and established it as a modernizing agent. With army chief Nsaution's help, Sukarno was able to first introduce the concept of a parliament and cabinet based on his principle of Gotong Ryong (Mutual Support and Assistance) (Ibid: 197).

Sukarno took a step further in solidifying his power by establishing a National Council (Dewan Nasional) which comprised of representatives of functional groups: he made himself the chairman (Ibid : 198). Sukarno tried to find political allies in PKI and Nahdatul Ulama. Masjiumi's public appeal had weakened due to their role in the PRRI rebellion.

It should be noted that the differences between Sukarno and Masyumi was not ideological in true sense. Sukarno, as a leader who valued harmony above all; was ideologically flexible. However, the Masyumi leadership was not. They also had an inflated measure of their own strength, even after they failed to perform as expected in the 1955 national elections. Sukarno finally banned Masyumi on August 17th, 1960 for their dual crime of taking side with the rebellious PRRI and of continuously criticizing his 'Guided Democracy'.

Masyumi steadfastly refused to participate in such a cabinet and work with parties like PKI. However, Nahdatul Ulama proved to be more pragmatic and agreed. This kept the NU politically relevant in the coming years of guided democracy when it became the sole Islamic player in the political scene. NU's price for their survival was an increased dependence on Sukarno to validate their position (Samson 1968 : 1003). Since the administration was completely in Sukarno's hands and no other Islamic party was present with which NU could build a joint front, they had to support Sukarno. Masyumi leaders and members faced a tough time after their party was banned. Many chose to stay quiet for the period while some leaders joined lesser Islamic parties or organizations. Some even joined NU.

Masyumi gained a new lease of life after Sukarno's political position became precarious in the aftermath of the October 30th attempted coup. Consequently, Masyumi leaders tried to reorganize their party under the banner of Amal Muslimin Indonesia which was formed as a transitional organization (Ibid). Their effort received support from a section of army officers too. Though on the whole, the army was still not very keen about a modernist Islamic organization. Masyumi leaders, however, were quite certain of a speedy and prestigious rehabilitation since they were the only organization which consistently opposed Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period.

In December 21, 1966 the army command shocked the Masyumi leaders by announcing that they would take 'firm steps' against the perpetrators and supporters of the Madiun and PRRI rebellions (Ibid : 1006). The list included the name of Masyumi. It seemed that the army was not yet ready to forget the 'betrayal' of Masyumi during the rebellions.

To avert the crisis, Masyumi leaders attempted to rechristen the party as Partai Muslimin Indonesia or PMI on April 7th of 1967, thereby shedding the vestiges of their past (Ibid). However, the opinion in army about such a party was still divided and acting President Suharto was not yet prepared to back the new venture which was only of peripheral interest to him. Army's stance was made clear on February 5, 1968 when Suharto declared that PMI could not have Masyumi leaders in its central decision making body if it was to gain government approval. Surprising many political observers, PMI quickly complied and dropped the 'tainted' Masyumi leaders from its body. Perhaps the new party leaders were frustrated after being repeatedly denied a chance to enter the political arena. May be they also hoped that at later date, they would be able to accommodate the ousted leaders once the party has had a foothold in Indonesian politics.

It is important to underscore the role played by Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesian politics during Sukarno era as it remained as the sole Islamic organizations operating in the Guided Democracy. NU was founded in 1926 by a group of rural Javanese religious teachers who were attempting to create an organization to counter the modernizing effects of Muhammadiah and other modernist organizations in Indonesia (Jones 1984 :6). Although NU's mass base was in rural java, it had many urban traditionalist followers as well. NU tried to ensure its survival by carefully cultivating the power holders during both Sukarno and Suharto period. NU was, in a sense a 'natural ally' of Sukarno and the Priyayi-led PNI party as it shared the similar religious views and world outlook as PNI's Javanese elite.

During the first few years of Suharto era, NU and PMI attempted to present a united front to largely secular minded military leadership. They held many conventions and seminars jointly, agreeing on most demands of each other. Together they tried to gain political mileage by making the issue of Jakarta Charter relevant again. They claimed that the proposed Islamic Nature of the state, as espoused in the Jakarta Charter was not incompatible with a modern system of government and the tenets of Panca Sila. They argued that since Panca Sila does not ordain a secular or godless state, Jakarta Charter is not against its grains. It would simply be an acknowledgement of what is public knowledge. They did not have the complication to establish its democratic credentials, which helped them.

Political Islam during the Suharto era:

With the fall of Suharto in 1997, Indonesian politics entered a new and exciting phase of real democratic practices which saw proliferation of all kinds of social and political groups and

organizations along with free and fair elections for the first time since the ill fated national elections of 1955. However, a true democratic system requires that divergent views can be expressed with impunity. However, study of contemporary Indonesian society reveals that this open space is perhaps decreasing in Indonesian society and politics. As a whole, Indonesian people are now more religious and they are following what can be termed as Doctrinaire Islam, a version of Islam which emphasizes the strict observance of Islamic practices as enshrined in Koran and the traditions of the Prophet. Historically, such an interpretation of Islam has been seen by a majority of Indonesian Muslims as alien. Islamic political parties with a distinct Islamic agenda of imposing Shari'a law on the land has emerged on the political scene. Even the mainstream political parties have to appear more sympathetic to the cause of Islam. Without a serious study of Islam's importance in the political life of Indonesia during the previous regimes, it is not possible to understand the present state of the religion in Indonesia. Although this has been briefly discussed in the last chapter, it needs to be taken up with more thoroughness here.

Army and Islam:

Suharto was above all, a military leader and it was during his rule that the army became the most politically powerful force in Indonesia. However, the process of the army becoming involved in politics began from the guided democracy period itself after its role in quashing the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1958 and also ending the menace of the Darul Islam movement. 'Confrontasi' also kept the army politically relevant. Army played an important part in Indonesia's administration when the martial law was in place from 1957-63 (Federspiel 1973 : 407). Even after the repeal of martial law, the army stayed a s a political group on the national scene as they were acknowledged as a 'functional groups' in the Guided Democracy system with 42 seats in 'People's Consultative Assembly' (Ibid). In cabinets and top advisory bodies too, army's presence was significant.

Despite such a position of importance given to the army, its leadership became increasingly critical of Sukarno's pro-communist attitude from 1965 (Hindley 1962 : 918). Sukarno's permission to communist PKI to have its own armed militia and his alleged role in the massacre of 6 army generals during the Gestapu affair proved to be too much to bear for many army officers. The quick erosion of Sukarno's power after the September 30 incident and the rapid rise of Suharto in the political scene is testament to this.

The army did not initially considered to be an important factor in their working. Religion, especially Islam was considered simply a tool to boost the morale of the troops. However, there were significant differences among the army officers regarding the extent to which Islamic teachings should be adopted in the army. General Nasution who was the Chief of Staff as well as the Minister for Defense wanted "Propagation of Doctranaire Muslim religious beliefs and rituals among armed services personnel as a means of ensuring a common ethical or moral guide and standard of behavior." (Federspiel 1973: 407).

However, a group of officers, especially those from central java, did not belong to a doctrinaire Islamic culture and they stood against official propagation of Islamic values in the armed forces. This difference in culture was reflected among the different provincial units of the army as well. For example, a more westernized, rationalistic viewpoint existed among the officers serving in the KOSTRAD (Strategic Army Reserve), RPKAD (Army Para Commando Regiment) or Silawangi Division. Their views differed significantly from the Java based Diponegero Division (Samson 1972 : 547).

Despite their criticism, a chaplain service (Imam Militer) was started in the army from 1957 with Nasution's patronage (Federspeil 1973: 410). The office of the Imam Militer started publishing religious material for the cadre. These publications outlined the duties of the soldier, in line with doctrinaire Islam. However, these teachings carefully avoided any mention of their political duties. Around the same time, works published from the Army Staff College or SESKOAD reveals that despite the Islamization drive in the army, most senior officers still; regarded religion to be divisive issue and that it should be addressed within the Sukarnoist framework of nationalism and Panca Sila (Ibid : 415).

Nasution saw himself as a successor to Sukarno but he did not have a broad support base within the army. Therefore, he attempted to garner support of the Muslim community as well as to consolidate his support among the more Islamic sections of the army. He sponsored the building of Al-Azhar Mosque in Kebajoran, close to the administrative center of Jakarta (Ibid). The mosque's programs were aimed at fostering Muslim unity in Indonesia. The Al-Azhar Mosque also published several journals and books where army officials sympathetic to Nasution's vision contributed. An attempt to establish a council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama) as a co coordinating council between government and the Muslim groups, with army as the mediator was done in 1962 but it was not very successful (Ibid : 416). The Islamic section of the army's dream of achieving Muslim unity in Indonesia under their aegis never

materialized. The largest Islamic groups in the country, such as the NU were not favorably disposed to the army. This convinced many army officials that Islam has to operate within a general framework of a secular, nationalistic state. This view ultimately prevailed in the army when the New Order was established.

However, during the fledgling period of the New Order, immediately after the Gestapu incident, the army attempted to forge a coalition with Islamic organizations to destroy PKI's leadership and its organization (Samson 1972 : 550). During that brief but extremely violent period of bloodshed, Islamic leaders perhaps started to believe that they would be a major force in the Indonesian politics in the coming years. However, the army was always suspicious of them and unwilling to share power. To survive in a suddenly-hostile political environment of the New Order, the Islamic Parties started to claim that Panca Sila, the official doctrine of the New Order was in fact not in contradiction with the Islamic Agenda at all. They claimed that the First tenet of Panca Sila (belief in one God) is in fact an Islamic principle and all other tenets are also found in Islamic laws and texts. With this explanation, they declared that it was secularism which was in fact, opposed to Panca Sila (Ibid : 551). However, their new-found love for Panca Sila did not help them much in the political field. Suharto was a very different kind of a politician than Sukarno and under his rule, Indonesian polity and society underwent some fundamental changes.

Suharto the Father of Development and diminishing status of Islam in politics:

The most palpable of these changes were in the national political discourse itself. Instead of the fiery revolutionary rhetoric of the Sukarno era, Suharto focused on the concept of economic development. Politics became secondary in the national discourse and economics gained primary position (Federspeil 1973 : 418). Panca Sila remained the national philosophy. However, compared to the guided democracy period, Islamic organizations were in a better position. They were allowed to participate in the political sphere, albeit in a highly supervised and limited manner. Inside the army, the Imam Militer continued to function but the zealous activism stopped. Ministry of Religion continued to impart religious training and it was an essential part of the school curriculum. The government and the military did not want to promote Muslim activism and did not want Islamic influence to grow in political organizations.

Suharto took a two-pronged policy for dealing with Islamic influence in politics. He promoted personal piety among Muslims but was opposed to politicization of religion. As

proof of his interest in increasing personal adherence of Islamic beliefs, it can be said that he made atheism illegal. This was so as atheism was seen to be closely linked with communism. Atheism was officially declared to be Anti-Pancasila. The ministry of Religion was strengthened and the students at school were requires taking religious lessons of their parent's choice (Ibid: 419).

In 1973, Suharto fused the existing four Islamic parties into the single party PPP. Even the name of the organization was to be completely non-Islamic. Later, PPP also had to drop their Islamic logo. In 1984, PPP and all other parties had to accept Panca Sila as their foundational principle. Later, PPP was forced to open its membership to non-Muslims. Although very few actually joined (Liddle 1996 : 622).

However, this two-pronged policy of Suharto actually helped the Muslim elements in the Indonesian society and Indonesian became generally more pious than ever. The traditional differences between the Abangan and Santri Muslims started to dissolve from the middle of the 1970's. Later generations of many Abangans became Santri. The conception of Islam as the religion of uneducated villagers was gone. Educated Indonesian Muslims became openly pious. Suharto regime supported the emergence of a 'neoclassical' Muslim intelligentsia, led by Nurcholish Madjid which emphasized the importance of 'Ijtihad' or reasoning in the understanding of Islamic texts, especially Koran. Nurcholish Madjid said that it was the duty of every generation of Muslims to interpret Koran (Ibid : 623). He also encouraged rejection of rituals in favor of theological substance. His views were encouraged in the New Order as he claimed that to form an ideal Islamic society; Muslims do not need a political party, a view that went down well with dictatorial Suharto.

Suharto changes his attitude towards Islam:

As a result of the increasing focus on personal adherence to religion, Indonesian students started to become more pious from the 1970's. Mosques were established in every college campus. These religious students were often oblivious about politics, focusing on personal piety or they were obsessed with the happenings in middle-east while being non-interested in national politics (Ibid : 624). However, a section of these students focused on alleged non-Islamic acts of the government and other agencies. Instances of this attitude can be found in the student protests against the Sports Lottery or alleged anti-Islamic shows on certain television channels (Ibid : 614).

From the mid- 1980's, Suharto started to act favorably towards the various Islamic organizations and started to respect many of their demands. Department of Education and Culture lifted the long-standing ban on wearing of 'Jilbab' or headdress by girl students in school. New laws made interfaith marriages virtually impossible. Another old demand for an Islamic Bank was granted and Islamic Family Laws were codified (Elson 2001 : 269). In June 1991, Suharto and his wife made a well advertised Hajj pilgrimage where they were honored by the Saudi king and henceforth used the suffix 'Haji' before his name (Ibid, : 283). At a later period, near the end of his reign, he also replaced many of the top New Order officials such as Army Chiefs, Golkar Chiefs and important ministers to replace them with Santri staffs. In 1995, the Suharto govt. encouraged attacks on Christians by fanatical Muslims. The genocidal campaign in East Timor in 1992-93 was directed against East Timorese, who were predominantly Christians (Liddle 1996 : 617).

Suharto's Islamic turn arose out of his understanding of the changes that had taken place in Indonesian over a period of years. At the same time, he did not wish to relinquish official control over Muslim organizations which might prove to be too great a political force for him to counter. Therefore, ICMI was formed in 1990 as the representation of political Islam in Indonesia. The establishment of ICMI was not, in fact, a novel turn in Suharto's politics but a continuation of his policy of creating and empowering different social and governmental groups so that they can act as checks against each other and be dependent on the figure of President for deriving legitimacy. This was in fact a classical trait of the consummate Javanese politician which was very much present in Sukarno's handling of politics as well. Even during the earlier phase of New Order, Suharto always attempted to give only that much power to his two principal vehicles of governance, the army and Golkar; so that they could keep a check on each other and carry out Suharto's orders but never become powerful enough to challenge his authority. At this later phase, realizing the growing strength of the Islamists, Suharto simply tried to add one more variable to his power game, the ICMI. From the beginning, it was amply clear that ICMI was not really an expression of political consciousness of the devout Muslims in Indonesia, but another organization within the corporatist framework of the New Order (Ibid). The leaders of ICMI were all high ranking government employees or leaders of parties and organizations closely controlled by the government. It was a typical bureaucratic association which helped its members to advance in their professional carrier while amassing ill-begotten wealth. Some members of the ICMI were clear in stating the middle class nature of the organization. M. Shayfi Anwar, for

example, stressed that the Indonesian Muslim middle class was more culturally confidant than their predecessors in the 1960's who had to deal with the view among the then elite that Islam was antithetical to development and modern age (Ibid : 618). However, just like Nurcholish Madjid, Anwar also asserted that as pious Muslims, members of ICMI do not believe in establishing an Islamic state.

Suharto's Islamic turn and the conscious attempt to include the new generation of Islamist politicians into the corporatist network of New Order did not help Suharto much during the days of his downfall. Despite all claims of a phenomenal and sustained economic growth, Suharto failed to avoid the economic collapse that came in wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. His economic growth was in fact the result of wildly selling of the country's valuable natural resources like timber and oil and not an outcome of a sound economic plan (Roosa 2008 : 84). His family and cronies amassed staggering wealth through corruption and rent-seeking. Many of these cronies used the banking system to borrow billions of dollars never to pay it back, thus destroying the banking system in the country (Ibid : 142). John Roosa, writing an obituary after Suharto's death says that the entire Indonesian economy during Suharto was like a giant Ponzi scheme, designed to lure foreign investors and transfer profits to personal accounts (Ibid). It was his mismanagement of the economy and abatement of the KKN: corruption, collusion and nepotism, which ultimately brought Suharto down. During the massive protests of 1998 against him, Suharto, perhaps surprisingly, did not attempt to cling to power using either an Islamic rhetoric or raw military power. He simply stepped down and lived a quiet life in retirement till his death for ten long years!

In a sense, this is consistent with his personality. Suharto was not one to assert himself openly in public like Sukarno. He was neither a mass leader, nor an orator. He was a skillful, ruthless politician who liked to work from behind and was completely myopic and self-destructive in handling his country's economy; that was his legacy. Political Islam manifested itself freely and fearlessly after the end of Suharto era. The long pent-up force of Political Islam came to surface so strongly that it startled many observers. A host of Islamic parties and organizations, with different political goals and methods started operating. During the sixteen years of the 'Reformasi' period from 1998 to 2014, many of these new players in the political arena did not survive for long and many had undergone significant changes to remain viable. Old Islamic organizations are also very much present and contribute to the vibrancy of Indonesian politics. The next chapter will be an attempt to document this turn in Indonesian politics and also to identify the principal currents of Political Islam in Indonesia.

Chapter 4

Dynamics of Islam in Indonesian Politics in the Post-Suharto Period

End of New Order: Beginning of New Opportunities:

Suharto maintained a semblance of democratic government in Indonesia throughout his presidency. Unlike Sukarno who attempted to justify his undemocratic rule with a uniquely Indonesian understanding of the concept of democracy itself. There was a tone of defiance towards western concepts of democracy discernable in Sukarno's act. Suharto did not view himself as one waging an ideological war against the west. He opened the Indonesian economy to the world and conducted regular, multi-party elections. The elections were, however, heavily controlled affairs and always yielded the same result; Suharto being elected as President for one more term. Only three parties were allowed to compete in these elections from 1973 onwards; Suharto's own party 'Golongan Karya' (Functional Groups) or GOLKAR, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) or PDI and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) or PPP. PDI and PPP both were formed in 1973 on Suharto's orders. PDI was created by fusing the Nationalist and Christian parties together, including the old PNI of Sukarno. PPP was formed by fusing all Islamic Parties, including the successor party to Masyumi. The elections were rigged in a manner which always resulted in approximately 60% votes for the GOLKAR while PDI and PPP shared the rest more or less equally (Lee 2004 : 93).

However, all this changed after Suharto resigned in 1998 and B. J. Habibie, the erstwhile Vice-President became the new president. Habibie had a negative reputation among the Indonesians as an apparatchik of the New Order. He was not liked by the Islamist groups who doubted his Islamic credentials. His well-known fondness for capital-intensive and loss making high technology projects also did not endear him to the business class (AMIR 2007: 90). Pressurised from all quarters, Habibie sought to present himself as a believer in democratic ideals and sympathetic to political expressions of Islam. He enabled the establishment of new political parties (barring communist ones). He also abrogated a law that required all political parties to be based on the ideal of Pancasila. As a result, a host of new political parties and social organizations came to the fore. Many of these parties and

organizations were little more than small cliques around one influential leader and had extremely narrow goals. In the 1999 legislative election, the first free election after 1955, a total of 48 parties fought. Out of the 48, 20 parties professed themselves to be based on Islamic ideals (Ibid: 86). However, most of these parties could not even cross the threshold of 2% of total votes, rendering them ineligible to fight another election. Of the parties which did better, three were New Order era secular nationalist parties (PDI was rechristened PDI-P under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri). Out of the newly constituted Islamic parties, PAN and PKB did well. Despite their relatively poor showing, PK/PKS and PBB has persevered in later elections.

Out of the four new parties in 1999, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsha (National Awakening Party) or PKB was affiliated to the largest Islamic social organization in Indonesia as well as the world (by membership), Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Partai Amanat Rakyat (National Mandate Party) or PAN was similarly affiliated to the second largest Indonesian organization, the modernist Muhammadiyah. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) or PKS was a completely new organization. It was a well organized cadre based Islamist party which drew support mainly from educated urban Javanese Muslims. Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party) or PBB was established as a deeply Islamic party which openly demanded an Islamic state. Its support base was in rural areas.

The New Democracy Begins: Elections of 1999

Below is a table depicting the percentage of votes received by various parties who fought in the 1999 legislative election and the next two elections.

Table No.1

Result of Post-Suharto Indonesian legislative elections (In % of total votes received)

Party Name	Year Of Election		
	1999	2004	2009
PD	-	7.45	20.85
Golkar	22.46	21.58	14.45
PDI-P	33.77	18.53	14.03
PK/PKS	1.36	7.34	7.88

PAN	7.12	6.44	6.01
PPP	10.72	8.15	5.32
PKB	12.62	10.57	4.94
Gerindra	-	-	4.46
Hanura	-	-	3.77
PBB	1.94	2.62	1.79

Source: Tanuwidjaja, Sunny (2010), "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 32 (1): 34.

1999 election was the first truly democratic election in Indonesia after 1955. Naturally, people's interest was very high regarding the election. The newfound atmosphere of political freedom and a newly freed press added further boost to the feverish atmosphere of anticipation and competition. Indonesia was unarguably a much more openly pious society than it had been in 1955. Although repressed for a long period during Suharto's presidency, expressions of political Islam were allowed during the later part of New Order. Very large Islamic organizations existed in the country and they were throwing their support behind their respective political parties. Islamic rhetoric and Islamic symbols dominated the election campaign. Hope, therefore, was running high among the Islamic parties who believed they could very well surpass their 1955 result, when they collectively received more than 43% of the votes (Jha 1999). However, as table 1 suggests, their performance was far from satisfactory. Not only did they not better their 1955 results but the New Order era parties captured the lion's share of the votes.

Despite the positive role played by Habibie during the transition period after Suharto's resignation, he was still not acceptable to either the political parties or the common people who despised everything associated with the New Order at this point of time. Although Golkar was the second largest party in the lower house, they needed support of other parties to see Habibie elected. On the other hand, a complex game of politics was unfolding in Jakarta involving the PDI-P leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, the PAN leader Amein Reis and PKB leader Abdurrahman Wahid. Megawati was the leader of the largest party in the parliament and naturally was the first choice for presidency, but she did not have the numbers in the DPR which would assure a win in this indirect presidential election. Her attempts of gaining PKB's support were not successful. Meanwhile, Amein Reis successfully formed a

coalition of Islamic parties, the so-called 'Central Axis', which projected Abdurrahman Wahid as their presidential candidate. When an 'Accountability Speech' by President Habibie was summarily rejected by all political parties and drew large scale condemnation from the student and youth, Golkar finally withdrew their support from Habibie and supported Wahid instead (AMIR 2007 : 102). The indirect election therefore became a contest between Megawati and Wahid, one Wahid won. However, large scale violence in Jakarta at Megawati's loss convinced Wahid to support Megawati for the post of Vice-President.

Wahid, popularly called 'Gus Dur' was the long time leader of Nahdatul Ulama (Tornquist 2000: 84). He was also the grandson of NU's founder. However, as President, he did not perform well. He was accused of favouring members of NU in government appointments. He developed problems with many powerful members of his coalition cabinet such as Amein Reis and Wiranto and proceeded to dismiss them. He was further accused of corruption in two well publicized cases. All this drew Wahid's presidency to a close by July 2001 when he was impeached by the parliament and Megawati, the sitting Vice-President, became the President.

Megawati was the daughter of Sukarno and she led the struggle against Suharto's policies in the last phase of Suharto's presidency. Though she started her political carrier with PDI, repeated attempts by Suharto to shunt her to political obscurity led her to form a breakaway faction, called PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) or Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle which actively opposed Suharto's policies and played a critical role in organizing the student protests which ultimately caused Suharto's downfall. It is during this period that she was given the title 'Ratu-Adil' or an angel of justice (Lee 2013: 120). Therefore, her appointment as the President was applauded by the people and the media. Despite the high hopes of people, Megawati soon showed herself to be a slow and indecisive leader. However, her presidency saw political stability in the fledgling democracy.

Elections of 2004: SBY Brings Stability

In the legislative elections 0f 2004, the Islamic parties collectively did better than before, winning 41% of total votes. The major Islamic parties won a total 0f 35.12%. However, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that the upsurge was almost entirely due to the performance of the PKS, all other major Islamic parties lost votes. Further, it can be said that

the major Islamic parties, with the exception of PPP presented themselves as moderates and focussed their campaign on development and eradication of corruption.

On the heels of the legislative elections, preparations began for the 2004 Presidential election, which was to be the first free presidential election in Indonesia. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, known as SBY, a former military general and former minister in charge of political affairs in the Wahid cabinet (he earned fame by refusing Wahid's desperate order to declare a national emergency before his impeachment, an act that resulted in his dismissal) had formed a new party called Partai Demokrat (PD) or Democratic Party shortly before the legislative elections and performed surprisingly well, winning 7.45% of votes (Ananta 2005: 80-83). SBY decided to fight the presidential election with the veteran Golkar politician Jusuf Kalla, who fell out with the Golkar leadership, as running mate. They were facing challengers from PAN, Golkar and PDI-P. Megawati was fighting for a second, full term. However, Megawati's popularity was severely diminished from her three year long rule and SBY won the election with good margin. Although Islamic parties PAN and PPP presented their candidates, they were not very serious contenders, as is apparent from Table 2. The Islamic parties could not form a coalition and their performance was affected by infighting (within PAN) and other considerations (Wahid of PKB supported Golkar as the running mate to their candidate Wiranto was Salahuddin Wahid, his brother).

Table No. - 2.

Result of Indonesian Presidential Elections 2004, all figures in percentage:

Party	**Candidate**	**Running Mate**	**First Round**	**Second Round**
PD	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	Jusuf Kalla	33.57	60.62
PDI-P	Megawati Suakrnoputri	Hasyim Muzadi	26.61	39.38
Golkar	Wiranto	Salahuddin Wahid	22.15	
PAN	Amien Reis	Siswono Yudohusodo	14.66	
PPP	Hamzah Haz	Agum Gumelar	13.01	

Source: Ananta, Aris et al. (2005), *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: 80-83.

SBY went on to complete a full term. He did not emerge as a mass leader or great reformer but he provided stability in both Indonesian politics and economy. SBY could not fully deliver on his promises to curb corruption but he could instil some confidence in the business community. Indonesian economy at least partially overcame the depression set in since 1997 financial crisis. This made SBY a popular figure, despite his early decision to cut down on the hugely popular fuel subsidies. The 2009 legislative elections introduced the 'Open List' system to Indonesian voters whereby voters could chose which candidate to vote from a particular party for a particular position, instead of simply selecting a list of candidates presented by a party under the previous 'Closed List' system. The new system made importance of individual leaders more pronounced in the elections. If Figure 1 is consulted, one will see the distinct effect of this new system in the results (Aspinall 2010: 108). The personally popular SBY's party PD, just one election old, went on to win 20.85% of the votes, the highest achieved by any party, while Megawati's PDI-P and the virtually leaderless PKB (Wahid was frequently hospitalised throughout 2009 and finally passed away in December that year).

2009 Presidential elections: Beginning of Coalition Politics

In the 2009 Presidential elections, SBY was clearly the favourite. He received support from the Islamic parties as well. Together, his party PD and the Islamic parties controlled more than half of the seats in the parliament. The elections was contested in only one stage as SBY and his running mate Boediono emerged clear winners with more than 60% votes. As Table 3 shows, SBY did not face any significant competition from his principal challengers, Megawati or Jusuf Kalla. It also becomes clear that the Islamic parties felt safer to be in the SBY camp rather than supporting PDI-P or Golkar. 2009 Presidential election also saw the beginning of official coalition politics in Indonesia. In an increasingly fragmented political scene, securing the minimum stipulated requirement of 120 seats in the legislative assembly for fielding a Presidential candidate was tough for any single party except PD. Therefore, collations were the way.

Table No. 3

Result of Indonesian Presidential Election 2009:

Candidate and Running Mate	Major Constituting Parties of Coalition	Seats Possessed in the DPR	Percentage of Vote won in the Presidential Election
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Boediono	PD, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB	314	60.80
Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto	PDI-P and Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia)	121	26.79
Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto	Golkar and Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat)	125	12.41

Source: Government of the Republic of Indonesia (2009), "Hasil rekapitulasi perolehan suara pasangan calon presiden dan wakil presiden dalam pemilihan umum tahun 2009", Komisi Pemilihan Umum, Jakarta, [Online:Web] Accessed 8 May 2015, URL: htt://mediacenter.kpu.go.id/images/mediacenter/pilpres2009/rekapitulasi_nasional.pdf

Islam and Politics From 1998 Till 2014 Elections

This study so far has shown that since 1999, Islamic parties in Indonesia have never been able to capture majority votes in the legislative elections, even when taken together. Further, between 2005 and 2008, the Islamic parties did not win a single province in the local level elections. In the same period, the PDI-P won on its own in 8 Provinces whereas Golkar won in 2. In the 19 Provinces where no single party could win, Coalitions of Conveniences were made, bereft of any ideological considerations (Buehler 2009 : 52). Surveys conducted between 2008-09 by the Jakarta based Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) or the Indonesian Survey Institute indicate that Indonesian voters were moving towards Pancasila based parties and becoming more ' rational'(Tanuwidjaja 2010 : 34). These surveys also reveal that economic issues top voter's consideration, followed by the individual programs and policies of a party. Coupled with these statistics One might conclude from this observation that Indonesian voters rejected Islamic political parties and instead favoured those with development oriented, secular policies. However, if such a conclusion is stretched to the point of claiming that Political Islam has failed to make a mark in the politics of democratic Indonesia; that would be premature on a number of grounds.

Firstly, Indonesia is definitely a more openly Islamic society than before. The present generation of Indonesians were in fact, encouraged to practice their religion by the Suharto regime, although political expressions of religion was not allowed. There is a 'Ministry of Religion' in Indonesia which looks after the propagation of Islam (although officially it looks after all religions mentioned in the Constitution). Although Muslims in Indonesia are not of a monolithic character, but an element of rigidity in observing their religion has entered Indonesian society. This is exemplified in the high visibility of 'Jilbab' (headdress) clad women and bearded robe wearing men in the streets (especially of the smaller cities), in the increasing number of Mosques and Islamic Tele-evangelists (The Economist 2009). However, a large number of people still have faith in the traditional expressions of Islam in Indonesia. This group goes to visit the shrines of religious leaders and take part in religious debates. They might be called the evolved 'Abangans' who, now disconnected from the communal village, are trying to adjust to their urbanised surrounding.

Secondly, it is not easy to differentiate between an Islamic party and a 'Nationalist, Secular' party in today's Indonesia. It is prudent to remember that in the Indonesian context, any party professing allegiance to Pancasila is called a secular party, notwithstanding that party's way of participating in politics (Tanuwidjaja 2010 : 41). On the other hand, almost all of the declared 'Islamic' parties, who do not take Pancasila to be their core ideology, do not claim an Islamic, Sharia-bound state to be their ultimate goal. They also profess their support for liberal economic policies and freedom of speech etc. Perhaps a more reliable conclusion regarding the secular credentials of any party could be drawn from the voting that took place in 2002 in Indonesian Parliament regarding the inclusion of the infamous Jakarta Charter, i.e., an assertion that Indonesia was an Islamic state and accepts Sharia as the basis of its legal system (Liddle and Mujani 2009 : 578). PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PD, PAN were against, PKS took an ambivalent stand. Among major Islamic parties, only PPP and PBB supported the inclusion. However, PPP's electoral performance in 2004 drove them to take a more pro-development stance.

Thirdly, despite their official ideological stand, declared 'Secular' parties are often not above pursuing Islamic goals for scoring political points. After decentralization of power in Indonesia in 2001, in 42 out of 74 districts where Islamic laws were passed (including harsh 'Hudhud' punishments for criminal acts), nationalist parties won more than 50% of votes. Even at the national level, Golkar supported the controversial Education Bill in 2003, which required all secondary schools to appoint Islamic teachers for religious education of pupils. In

2008, PD and Golkar both supported the Anti-Pornography Bill, which was criticised for being too conservative regarding how women should be portrayed on film and television and insensitive to displays of cultural diversity of Indonesia's minority ethnic groups (Tanuwidjaja 2010 : 42). In the same year, the Nationalist parties stayed silent when the Ahmadiyahs, a sect of Muslims were effectively banned from practicing their religion in public.

Fourthly, the Indonesian people themselves seem to be an enigmatic lot when it comes to endorsing political and public expressions of Islam. Despite their electoral choices, repeated surveys have revealed that Indonesians can be quite conservative on religious grounds. A 2001 survey by PPIM revealed that 57.8% agree that a government based on Islamic teachings is best for Indonesia. In the same survey, 61.4% agreed that Indonesian Muslims should abide by the Sharia. Although it should also be mentioned that only 28.9% agree that Hudhud punishments should be meted out to criminals and 22.6% think that Muslims should always vote for Islamic parties. However, more surprising results emerged in a 2007 survey by PPIM where 55.3% of respondents opposed non-Muslims observing their religious celebrations openly in their locality and 51.6% disapproved of building churches in their locality. Again, in the same survey, 91.6% Indonesians say they support Pancasila and 84.7% support Indonesia as a secular state! (Ibid : 37-38).

The confusing phenomenon of support both for and against a greater role of Islam in politics, as revealed in these surveys has been explained by Sunny Tanuwidjaja as a reflection of a real confusion in Indonesian society regarding the role of Islam in politics. He has shown that whenever surveyors asked their respondents a relatively vague question about the kind of government they preferred, they have answered in the conventional way, i.e. they mentioned a secular state or a Pancasila based state. But whenever faced with a more direct question regarding a particular political action, they have favoured the Islamic option.

Elections of 2014: A New Chapter In Indonesian Politics?

In the legislative election 0f 2014, most of the major parties made electoral gains, barring SBY's PD, which expectedly lost much of its votes as SBY was completing two full terms and hence, could not contest in the upcoming Presidential elections. PDI-P recovered somewhat, buoyed by the last-minute confirmation that the popular Jakarta Mayor, Joko

Widodo and not Megawati, would be their presidential candidate. Gerindra of ex-army general Prabowo Subianto, a close confidant of Suharto and his former son-in-law also did well. Golkar and other major Islamic parties fortune remained more or less the same, PKB recovered from its 2009 election debacle but could not get even 10% of votes (Prabowo 2014).The hardcore Islamist PBB again sunk below the minimum mark. The fragmented picture of the new legislature made sure that coalition would need to be formed again during the Presidential elections.

Table No. 4

Result of the Indonesian legislative election 2014.

Party	Percentage of votes	Number of seats won	Vote swing from previous election (in %)
PDI-P	18.95	109	+4.92
Golkar	14.75	91	+0.30
Gerindra	11.81	73	+7.35
PD	10.19	61	-10.66
PAN	7.59	49	+1.59
PKB	9.04	47	+4.10
PKS	6.79	40	-1.09
PPP	6.53	39	+1.21
NasDem	6.72	35	New
PBB*	1.46	0	-0.33

*PBB could not reach the 2.5% threshold required.

Source: Prabowo, Dani (2014), **"**Disahkan KPU, Ini Perolehan Suara Pemilu Legislatif 2014", *Kompas*, Jakarta, May 11 2015,[Online: Web] Accessed 1 May 2015, URL:htt://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/09/2357075/Disahkan.KPU.Ini.Perolehan.Suara.Pemilu.Legislatif.2014

Indonesian Presidential election of 2014 was a very special one for Indonesians; for many reasons. Firstly, it was to be the first time that executive power would be handed over from one elected president to another through a democratic process in Indonesia. It signified that Indonesian democracy has matured and the electoral system has taken root. Secondly, it was for the first time that a serious contender for the post of President was coming from a non-military, non-elite background. Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, was a small time merchant in Solo before he entered politics and became the Mayor of his city. His successful record as Mayor there won him popularity and he eventually became Mayor of Jakarta. His efficiency, clean image and ability to connect with common people propelled him as the frontrunner in the Presidential election on a PDI-P ticket, compelling even the egotistical Megawati to assume a background role for the moment (McBeth 2013). Jokowi made an understanding with Golkar leader Jusuf Kalla, who decided to be Jokowi's running mate when Golkar declared Aburizal Bakrie to be their Presidential candidate. This way, Golkar's support remained divided between him and Bakrie. At the final phase of the elections, however, Prabowo Subainto emerged as the other Presidential contender. Subianto managed to stitch up a formidable coalition. Together, the coalition of Hanura, Subianto's own party and all major Islamic parties except PKB, controlled almost 60% seats in the parliament.

Jokowi had caught the imagination of international media as a leader of new generation who could change the atmosphere of pervading corruption and inefficiency in Indonesia. He also had considerable support from the younger populace. He faced a much more high-key, costly and slick campaign by the Prabowo camp, Despite this, in the final count, Jokowi emerged as the clear winner (Connelly 2014).

Table No. 5

Result of the Indonesian presidential election 2014

Candidate and Running Mate	Major Constituting Parties of the Coalition	Seats Possessed in the DPR	Percentage of Vote won in the Presidential Election
Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla	PDI-P, Hanura, NasDem, PKB	207	53.15
Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa	Gerindra, Golkar, PPP, PKS, PAN, PBB, PD	353	46.85

Source: Maharani, Dian (2014), "Ini Hasil Resmi Rekapitulasi Suara Pilpres 2014", [Online: Web] Accessed 19 April 2015, URL: htt://indonesiasatu.kompas.com/read/2014/07/22/20574751/ini.hasil.resmi.rekapitulasi.suara.pilpres.2014

However, it will be premature again to translate this win as a final confirmation of the irrelevance of Islam in Indonesian politics (considering that even all Islamic parties together with Golkar could not win the election for Prabowo). Although the Islamic Parties' candidate did not win, the election was not free from expressions of political Islam. Both the candidates were observed to be at pains to establish their credentials as pious Muslims. While Prabowo faced attacks from the rival camp for his billionaire brother, a practicing Christian and his chief financier; Jokowi had to make a Hajj pilgrimage to prove that he was a serious Muslim (The Economist 2014). During the entire election campaign, Islam was a consistent factor for both the candidates.

This again makes the reader face the paradox of political Islam in Indonesia; while on one hand he can observe the Islamic parties never achieving definitive electoral success in the entire post-Suharto period, on the other hand reaffirmations of the relevance of Islam in politics and in popular choice becomes apparent. This paradox can only be explained if one tries to think of 'Political Islam' and 'Islam in politics' as two distinct phenomena. Revisiting the argument presented in the first chapter of this work, it can be said that the urge to establish an Islamic State with Sharia as the basis of all laws has not gained currency in Indonesia. Therefore, what is commonly termed as 'Political Islam' is facing at least a temporary refusal from the Indonesian electorate. However, use of Islamic rhetoric in politics and pursuing Islamic goals such as promoting Sharia-based laws at local level are not shied

away from by any party, notwithstanding their ideological stance. Therefore, the parties can said to be engaging in 'Muslim Politics'; a political situation where parties exploit Islam to gain votes in a democratic setup. These parties may be secular or Islamic, as declared in their respective manifestos but neither openly demands for an Islamic state. No party in this system profess a lack of faith in the democratic system based on elections however, they can led their support to enactment of quite un-democratic laws if that suits their political ambitions. Will such a democracy be stable, where basic democratic values will be protected? Indonesia needs still more time to determine the answer to this. But two things seem clear. One, Islamic parties in Indonesia, as they exist now have never managed to win so many votes which would enable them to start some real experimentation with Islamic laws and principles at national level. See Figure 1 for getting a clearer picture of their electoral performance over the years from 1999-2014.

Figure No. 1

Electoral Performance of the Islamic Parties in Indonesia from 1999-2014



Source: Tanjuwidjaja (2010), p. 34

Secondly, since Indonesian populace and Indonesia's secular parties seem fine with the slow but steady adaptation of Islamic laws in the provinces and oblivious to the instances of religious and sectarian violence which had been occurring in Indonesia on a regular basis since the beginning of its democratic phase; there is nothing to stop either the established Islamic parties or a new, well funded Islamic party with a charismatic leader to take things further and bring an overtly Islamic tone to Indonesian politics. Established parties like PBB had taken that route and failed but PBB is a party with a predominantly rural base and a lack of suave, urban and untainted new generation leadership who could connect with young Indonesians (Buehler 2009 : 59). If an Islamic party finds such a leadership then it would make the political scene in Indonesia very interesting to watch.

The Role of Media in Integrating Islam and Politics in Indonesia

Holding meetings, door to door campaigning, distributing leaflets and printing posters and banners have been the traditional ways of convincing voters for political parties across countries. Newspaper also provides an excellent way for the promotion of political parties and getting their message across to a large audience. A positive press report works as free advertisement for a political party or a pressure group. Therefore, parties and other political organizations attempt to influence the press in numerous ways. These include direct government control, paying for favourable coverage (a phenomenon now called 'embedded news') and control through complete or partial ownership. In Suharto-era Indonesia, the Press was heavily controlled by the government. However, at the beginning of the Reformasi period, this control was withdrawn; first, by liberally distributing licences and then by abolishing the Information Ministry altogether in 1999 (Ariel and Adi 2001 : 333). Since then many new newspapers both at national and regional levels have been established. Currently there are more than 120 newspapers and a large number of magazines being published in the archipelago. Despite the large number of newspapers, published in both Bahasa Indonesia and the regional dialects, readership is limited. Some of the largest newspapers, such as Kompas, which is published from Jakarta, has a readership of 523000.Other large newspapers such as the Suara Merdeka, which serves East Java and Pikiran Rakyat, which serves West Java has circulation of 200000 and 150000, respectively (William and Worden 2011). Contrast this with the daily circulation of 1250000 of Anandabazar Patrika, a regional

language daily in India (Jacob 2012). Although the overall market for Newspapers in Indonesia does not seem to be shrinking, it is not growing at a great pace either.

How Many Read a Newspaper in Indonesia, Anyway?

The reasons for low circulation of Newspapers in Indonesia are twofold. Firstly, the education scene in Indonesia needs to be looked at. Literacy rate is quite high in Indonesia. According to World Bank data of 2011, adult literacy rate (over the age of 15) was 93%, a result of the educational reforms started by Suharto in 1973. However, functional literacy rate is not an adequate indicator of a Country's success in the field of education. World Bank data from the same year suggest that although 81% of Indonesians enrolled in secondary schools, only 27% received tertiary education (World Bank Group, 2014). US Congress's study of Indonesian educational system suggest that at school level, Indonesian students are encouraged to learn by rote and taught in a disaffected manner by their teachers. It figures therefore, that individuals who received education in such a system will not be intellectually endowed enough to comprehend serious news reporting. On the other hand, Television has a very wide reach in Indonesia. According to Jakarta Globe, 91.7% of Indonesians over the age of 10 watch television regularly. In contrast to this, only 18.6% listen to radio and only 17.7% read newspapers and magazines (Gokkon 2014). According to media research website redwing-asia.com, penetration of television among Indonesian adults is close to a 100%. Out of this, local channels capture only 3% of viewers, the rest watch Jakarta-based national channels. Satellite Television is still a new phenomenon in Indonesia, though; with only 4% households enjoying satellite-based channels (Redwing 2013). That means an overwhelming majority still watches the free to air channels telecast from Jakarta.

Owning the News: Political Ownership of Print and Television Media

The reason for going into so much detail about the print and television media in Indonesia is to show their relative usability as tools for political campaigning. Surprisingly, Islamic parties in Indonesia have a very limited presence in both print and television media. It should be noted that media in Indonesia is highly politicised and is considered by Freedom House's study to be a bottom-ranker in terms of media freedom (termed partly-free) (Freedom house 2013). Unlike Suharto era, however, this lack of freedom is not caused by any state agency but the ownership pattern of the media. Since it has already been seen that television is a much stronger carrier of messages in Indonesia than newspapers and magazines, one should start with the major news channels in Indonesia first.

Metro TV, one of Indonesia's premier news channels, is owned by Surya Paloh, the chairman of the NasDem party. Another major channel, TvOne, is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, the Golkar chairman. Indonesians have a tendency to watch the time-limited news on general channels rather than watching dedicated news channels. Therefore, the fact that major general entertainment channels such as RCTI, Global TV and MNC TV are owned by media tycoon Hary Tanoesoedibjo, who was the Vice Presidential candidate of the Hanura party in 2014, becomes significant (Gokkon 2014). In fact, relentless coverage of their respective owner's and his party's campaigns during the 2014 legislative and Presidential elections became a serious cause for concern for international observers as well as the KPI, Indonesian official media watchdog. However, situations have not changed much.

The print media is as much politicised as television. Dahlan Iskan, widely rumoured to succeed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Partai Demokrat, owns the Jawa Pos group, which publishes 140 newspapers in the regional centres. James Riady of Lippo Group, considered to be very close to SBY as well, owns major newspapers such as the English-language daily Jakarta Globe, Investor Daily and Indonesian-language Suara Pembaruan. Suarabaya Post, a major regional newspaper, is owned by Bakrie (Stott 2014). It is clear by now that with the exception of PDI-P, all major secular political parties have their own newspapers and TV channels. However, the Islamic parties are hardly present in the scene. Even the old and established Muslim organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah have only recently attempted to start their own TV channel. But NU's channel, Aswaja TV, has few viewers and is not yet a fully functioning 24 hours channel. Another interesting feature to be noted about the print and television media in Indonesia is that a majority of the owners of Indonesia biggest media houses happen to be Christians in this Muslim majority country.

The owner of Indonesia's largest and most influential magazine Tempo, Jakob Oetma, considered the doyen of Indonesian journalism, is a Catholic. Previously describe media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo is a Christian as well. So is James Riyadi of Lippo Group. The author is not certain about the effect that their owner's religion has on Indonesian news media while covering Islamic parties, organizations and their rhetoric, but it is a fact worth noting.

Social Media in Indonesian Politics: How Islamic Parties are Lagging Behind

With advancement in technology, Internet and social media has become part and parcel of Indonesia's social life. Internet was a new technology in Indonesia in the late 90's and it was not heavily censored by the New Order regime. Therefore, Internet was used to publish news

against the regime that could not have seen daylight with the mainstream media. Indonesians have taken a strong liking to social media such as Facebook, Twitter and blogging sites such as Blogger and Wordpress. According to a report by Asiatimes, 90% of Indonesians in the age group 15-19 regularly go online (Ibid). Also, a large number of Internet users, roughly 80% are below the age of 35 (Indonesians have a median age of 27.6 years) (Frederick et al. 2011 : 150). In June 2013, there were almost 64 million Facebook users in Indonesia, which was the fourth largest population of Facebook users after USA, Brazil and India. Twitter also recorded 30 million users in Indonesia, with Jakarta being called the world's Twitter city (Ibid). Faced with a situation where the neutrality of Newspapers and Television channels are heavily doubted, and quality of news programs on television usually poor, a lot of Indonesians have shifted to Internet for receiving political news. Established media houses have all entered the online news market to catch the trend and there some online-only services which also receive a lot of attention from Indonesians, not least because their neutrality appears to be less doubtful.

Detik.com is one of Indonesia's oldest online news portals and it is operating since the last years of the New Order. Detik.com has a current viewership of 6.1 million every month, followed by 4.2 million for kompas.com, 1.9 million for tempointeraktif.com and 920000 for liputan6.com (Irwansiyah 2011). It should be remembered that the topmost established newspaper; Kompas, has a circulation of only 523000, the striking focus of Indonesian youth on the new medium of Internet will become clear. It has been seen previously that Islamic parties fare poorly in terms of relating their views through traditional media. In the new digital field also, they are not very successful. Among all the major Islamic parties, only PKS seem to have a serious presence in the most important of all social media platforms (with the largest number of users in Indonesia), Facebook. All other parties either do not even have a dedicated Facebook page (PPP) or have one which looks dull and haphazard compared to the slick offerings by Parties like Gerindra (3.4 million followers online) whose page offers HD quality videos, pictures and even a downloadable app! The PDI-P page (1.4 million followers) is less professional looking but much better than the Islamic party's pages. Even at the level of Individual leaders, the Islamic parties are much behind in the race to be social networking-friendly. While Joko Widodo's official page has 2.1 million followers and Wiranto's official page manages 334000 followers; with the exception of Anis Matta, the

PKS leader, other leaders of the three biggest Islamic parties- Muhaimin Iskandar of PKB, Suryadharma Ali of PPP and Zulkifli Hasan of PAN do not even have a Facebook page.[5]

Official websites are an important channel of introducing a party's ideology and agenda. In the context of the highly internet-oriented Indonesia, it is perhaps the most important of such channels. Here also, most of the Islamic parties perform below par. Somewhat predictably, PKS has a well maintained, professional website, complete with YouTube links, RSS feed links and app download options. PKB has a basic but functioning site. PAN has a site that is not fully functional and has no original content. PPP does not even have an official website, at least not one that can be found easily on Google (which means the same thing, anyway). Partai Bulan Bintang, however a surprisingly well maintained site.

Blogging is another very important way to be visible online. Blogs provide a channel for airing personal views of a leader in an informal manner and therefore, it can connect better with the people than a televised speech. Indonesians are active bloggers since at least 2001 and in 2012, there were roughly 5.5 million bloggers in Indonesia (Merlyna 2012 : 131). The pattern of online representation that has been seen among Indonesian Islamic parties so far holds true here also. PKS has the most number of blogs, distantly followed by PKB, with PAN and PBB performing poorly. Now, one might ask what good has it done PKS to have a better online presence when its electoral performance has not been any better over the years than its fellow Islamic parties. It is certainly true that PKS performed poorly in the last legislative election of 2014, losing significant amount of votes from the 2009 election and coming third among the Islamic parties; after PKB and PAN. However one should not forget that PKS's public image as a modern Islamic party was tarnished considerably after their minister in the SBY cabinet was implicated in a scam involving beef exports. Also, it must be remembered that PKS could not match the loud and pervasive television campaigns of the major secular parties. The fact they were appropriating Islamic symbols and demands did not help as well.

This discussion is not intended to start a debate over the efficacy of Internet as a tool for political mobilisation in Indonesia or the continuing supremacy of traditional methods of campaigning and political mobilization. Popularity of internet and social media in Indonesia is proven and the fact that all major secular parties are enthusiastically making use of this new digital medium also points out to the promise that exists in this field. Being active on

[5] Data from personal social media survey, data correct as of 7/05/2015.

popular social media platforms like Facebook is not only about adapting to new technology and exploiting another channel of public outreach for political parties. In the present Indonesian scenario, when a majority of the country's voters have chosen internet and social media as their primary source for news and group activities; it is political suicide not to use this channel. The conspicuous absence of Islamic parties and their leaders from social media bears evidence of their lack of connection with the country's youth, especially the urban, upwardly mobile youth. With their access to traditional print and television media already limited, the Islamic parties are also losing their opportunity to engage the Indonesian voter online. Their shortcomings notwithstanding, Islamic parties refuse to die out. Although they never managed to win enough votes or seats to control politics in Indonesia, they have never been reduced to fringe players either. The last legislative election actually saw them improving their collective performance. If this can be done with lesser fund than the secular parties to conduct campaigns, less visibility in media and almost negligible presence on Internet, then there must be a core support group for moderate Islamic parties in Indonesia. The next section will be an attempt to decipher the identity and internal dimensions of this small but strong social group in Indonesia.

Civil Islam, Political Islam and Muslim Democracy

According to Hefner, when an Islamic society enters a democratic system, Islamic religious authority attempts to reconcile with the democratic political institutions. Hefner termed this process 'Civil Islam'. According to him, civil Islam "..does not involve conflict with the west, but derives democratic ideas from teachings in Islamic history and Quranic verses." (Rudnyckyj 2009 : 185). He also felt that civil Islam values plurality in society and does not view Islam as a monolithic religion. Present Indonesian society seems to be offering a good example of civil Islam, as defined by Hefner. The concept does not assume that democratic values are antagonistic to those of Islam and believes that individuals and groups in society actively strive to achieve a synthesis of both these values. It has already been seen that political parties with a strong Islamic agenda perform poorly in elections (PBB), those with moderate Islamic attitude perform better but not sufficiently good to be controlling politics in the country and secular parties who incorporate some moderate Islamic agenda and pay attention to Islamic symbolism perform the best. What conclusion regarding the role of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesian politics is to be drawn from these observations? Referring to the 2001 PPIM survey cited before, it can be said with some confidence that a majority of Indonesian agree that Islamic principles and Islamic laws should find more articulation in the

Constitution and in the functioning of government (Tanuwidjaja 2010 : 38). Such a wish is inextricably linked with the general idea that abiding by Islamic principles will result in less corruption. But this should not divert the reader from understanding the strong undercurrent of Islamic values in the present Indonesian society. The fact that major Islamic parties of all hues are failing to win big simply show their own organizational deficiency and not a failure of Islam to influence politics as such.

The dual concepts of Political Islam and Muslim Democracy, discussed previously, are crucial in context of Indonesia. In fact, there is no other way to comprehend the popular zeal among Indonesian Muslims regarding their religion. The reason why Indonesian Muslims strongly favour a democracy while placing a lot of value in embracing Islam closely is because they see no conflict between the two. It is this voice of moderation that makes Indonesia unique among the Muslim countries of the world. Below, the author has made an attempt to highlight the key factors which are helping in the propagation of moderate Islamic values compatible with electoral democracy.

Nahdatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and Political Islam in Indonesia

Firstly, one must consider the influences of Indonesia's two largest Muslim organizations- Nahdatul Ulama (claims a membership 30 million) and Muhammadiyah (claims a membership of 25 million) (Bush 2014). Muhhamadiyah was established in 1912 as a part of the larger movement world over to 'rescue' Islam from the impurities of local customs and interpretations. Modernist leaders were influenced by the works of Hasan Al Bannah and Sayid Qutub of the Al Azhar University of Cairo, who preached a return to the roots of Islam, i.e. Koran for all kind of religious and social guidance and rejection of localised interpretations and customs. At the same time, modernist thinkers were fervent supporters of Muslims learning modern sciences and arts to be on an equal footing with the western world. Muhammadiyah, therefore, strongly opposed the traditional Indonesian style of observing Islam and criticised local customs such as Salametan feasts and veneration of the tombs of Sufi saints.

Nahdatul Ulama was established in 1926 as a response by the traditional Indonesian religious teachers (Kiyayi) and leaders to the modernist movement (Jones 1984 : 6).By their very nature, Muhammadiyah attracted a more urban, upper class, educated stratum of Muslims while NU's support base was predominantly rural. Both these organizations built large networks of schools, hospitals and other charitable institutions for propagating their views

and uplifting the masses. Although they provided ideal platforms for political movements, both Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) did not involve in active politics in the Dutch period as well as during the guided democracy; which helped them keep their organization intact in challenging times. Although NU launched a political party during the early years of Suharto's rule, Suharto fused all Islamic parties in 1973 under the banner of PPP. NU left PPP soon and thereafter ceased taking part in active politics (Ibid : 14). After the fall of New Order regime, both these organizations started to actively engage in the political arena. Although neither organization formally launched political parties of their own, Amein Reis, former chairman of Muhammadiyah, launched Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) and former NU chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid launched PKB. Both organizations continue to be the two largest Muslim organizations in the country with a huge network of schools, hospitals and Islamic financial institutions.

An important study was undertaken jointly by the The Asia Foundation (TAF), LSI and PPIM in 2010 to understand the level of influence these organizations have in contemporary Indonesia and how they affect or shape the role of Islam in Indonesian politics, if at all. The study included large scale surveys as well as focus group discussions. The surveys revealed some expected facts such as the relatively high level of post-secondary education among Muhammadiyah members compared to their NU counterparts (24.3% and 6.3%, respectively), relative economic prosperity of Muhammadiyah members compared to NU(48.2% earning over Rp. 1 million/month compared to 31% in case of NU) (Bush 2014). The survey also revealed that a large section of the members actively take part in religious discussion and communal religious observations sponsored by their respective organizations. However, the survey also revealed some less expected, startling facts. Despite both NU and Muhammadiyah having their own large network of Islamic schools, 76% of NU and 77.9% of Muhammadiyah members send their children to public schools. Also, in both organizations, more than 85% do not ask advice about political issues from religious leaders (Ibid : 15-16).

If one remembers that very senior leaders from both NU and Muhammadiyah have established their own political parties, namely, PKB and PAN; then this following table showing the voting preferences of NU and Muhammadiyah members in the 2009 legislative elections will seem surprising.

Table No. 6

Voting Preferences of NU and Muhammadiyah members in the 2009 Indonesian legislative elections. All figures in percentage:

Party	NU members	Muhammadiyah members
Democrat	37	31
PDI-P	12	16
Golkar	9	9
PPP	6	4
PKS	3	10
PKB	8	0
PAN	3	19
Gerindra	1	2
Hanura	1	0
Other Parties	4	2
Confidential/won't answer	15	6

Source: Bush, Robin (2014), "A Snapshot of Muhammadiyah Social Change and Shifting Markers of Identity and Values", Singapore: Asia Research Institute: 16.

Only 8% of NU members voted for PKB and only 19% of Muhammadiyah members voted for PAN! More than 50% members from both organizations voted for secular parties. Does this mean that NU and Muhammadiyah have lost their political significance and now merely exist as social service providers? Leaders from both organizations agree that popular perception of these organizations tend to paint them as bureaucratic and not reflecting the aspirations of young Indonesian people. However, they argue that their influence is more pronounced at the local level elections. They also argue that they do not merely endorse candidates from PKB or PAN but individual candidates from all parties. It is certainly logical for any party to field a NU or Muhammadiyah affiliated candidate, considering the large support network behind such a candidate. It also needs to be considered that the survey by TAF revealed that 76% of NU members and 89% of Muhammadiyah members think that democracy is the ideal system of governance (Ibid). Therefore, it will be unwise to discard these organizations as promoters of moderate Islamic values in Indonesian politics. There is a need to understand their nuanced effect in this regard more thoroughly.

The Moderate Preachers: Friends of Democracy

The second factor that is visibly promoting a sure-footed but moderate expression of Islam in Indonesian society and politics is the phenomenon of charismatic Islamic preachers. Islamic preaching is called Dawa and it can be conducted in many ways. Dawa conducted for large number of people using propaganda techniques has been termed Dawa-bil-Hikmah (Mulkan 2014 : 57). There are numerous 'celebrity preachers' in Indonesia who are practising this type of Dawa. Indonesia is not unfamiliar with preachers with very large following. Hamka, a politician turned preacher was an early example. However, in the new digital age, preachers have increased their reach among prospective audiences tremendously using new technology and new methods.

Abdullah Gymnastiar, known popularly as Aa Gym, is perhaps the most popular of these new generation religious teachers (Ustadj) (Watson 2005 : 775). Aa Gym is a common face on TV, has a host of videos on YouTube and personal website and social networking channels. Aa gym rose to the peak of his fame during 2004-2005 when he regularly courted ministers, presidents and ambassadors. Aa Gym established a well organised business empire in Jakarta which promoted 'Spiritual Tourism', sold DVDs of his speeches and other religious paraphernalia. Aa Gym did not have much standing among the traditional religious teachers who criticised his lack of formal religious education. However, Aa gym overcame these challenges through an informal, contemporary reference-filled and friendly style of teaching. He advocated moderation, pluralism and civil behaviour. Aa Gym exemplified what Doromir Rudnyeckyj has termed 'Market Islam', the synthesis of Islamist ideals and capitalist virtues. Aa Gym is not alone in the field of celebrity preaching. Chinese Muslim preachers such as Koko Liem, famous for his garish costumes and Anton Medan are attracting large number of followers. In a society growing steadily distant from its traditional roots and village level religious teachers, these preachers wield immense influence in Indonesian society (Hookway 2012). Their constant exhortation that to be a good Muslim does not contradict being a democrat in any way can explain how Indonesian Muslims openly favour democracy while rooting for Islamic values.

Selling Islam and selling through Islam: How 'Market Islam' Works

When discussing the role of celebrity preachers in strengthening the idea of Muslim Democracy, the phenomenon of Market Islam also need to be looked at again. Free market economy in Indonesia requires that its workers and executives work hard and don't indulge in

corruption for their respective companies. Unfortunately, Indonesia happens to be one of the world's most corrupt countries- with deep rooted traditions of corruption and inefficiency existing at every level of government and the New Order era companies. To counter this problem, new investors in Indonesia have taken recourse to Islam. Companies such as ESQ Leadership Centre (ESQ being the acronym for Emotional and Spiritual Quotient) are motivating workers to work harder and desist from corruption in the name of duty and honour of a Muslim as enshrined in the holy books of Islam. Such teachings are very popular among employers and work to further reduce the appeal of extremism and overt expressions of Political Islam among the citizens (Rudnyckyj 2009 : 185).

Social Media and Islam

Finally, this study looks again at the sphere of digital media. It has been seen earlier that Islamic parties have limited presence in Internet. Despite this, Islamic issues are strongly represented in Indonesia over Internet. There are more than 13 online communities (which can include related blogs, Facebook pages, YouTube video channels etc.) in Indonesia focussing on issues of Muslims. Blogs happen to be one of the strongest carriers of Indonesian Muslim's thoughts and expressions. As stated before, in 2012, there were approximately 5.5 million bloggers in Indonesia. There also exist large cyber-communities of blogs focussing on issues related to the Muslims such as the IMB (Indonesian Muslim Blogger), ISDN (Islam Dot Net) and Muslimah-IT. These cyber communities also arrange face to face dialogue, such as the one they organized in 2006 under the leadership of famous Indonesian Islamic Internet activist Ahmad Sarwad, who runs the site EraMuslim.net (Merlyna 2012 : 127). This spirit of moderation, openness and dialogue has acted as a bulwark against the recent attempts by the Islamic State (IS) to recruit Indonesian youth through Facebook and YouTube. The reaction from all sections of Indonesia's cyber world has been of disgust and rejection (Stefani and Sugara 2014). This again reinforces the importance of Indonesia's democratic Muslim society in today's world of borderless religious violence.

Local Democracy and Political Islam

Suharto ran a tightly centralized government which controlled the Provincial and District level administrations from Jakarta. Although officials were elected for these two levels, their elections were a heavily managed affair. Legislators at the district level appointed administrators at the level of villages and municipalities. Under this system, the

administrators at village and city level were not accountable to the people at all. Their allegiance was towards their superiors, the district level New Order elite. After the fall of New Order, one of the first acts of the Habibie government was to begin decentralization through acts 22/1999 and 25/1999 which gave districts autonomy from the central government on important areas including finance and natural resources (Hunter 2004 : 116). The local governments also acquired the right to enact laws at their respective level. During the presidency of Megawati, Law 32/2004 was enacted which necessitated direct election for the district head (Bupati). The move appears to be a solid step towards solidification of democracy in Indonesia, a significant step towards curtailing corruption and a result of longstanding demands of the people.

However, the positive effect of decentralization in Indonesia is a contested issue. Scholars like Michael Buehler argue that decentralization has simply altered the nature in which the local elite hold on to their power. Previously, they had to depend on and serve the national elite. But now, they need to make contact with the people and win votes, a task that is pushing them to adopt money politics in a way not seen even during the New Order. Further, the local leaders are attempting to build their own networks of patronage among the locally influential religious teachers, Mosque officials and local thugs. They are also attempting to shape their immediate societies into a smooth, homogeneous one which can be easily controlled. Islam is playing a major role in this attempt and the proliferation of Shari by-laws in many of Indonesia's districts bear testimony to this (Buehler 2008 : 257).

Creating Patronage Networks in the Name of Islam

East Lombok was considered during the late New Order period to be a region of fanatical Islam. What it meant was that there was a great enthusiasm for observing religion, including going on Hajj without having the means to feed one's family. Cynthia Hunter, a researcher who spent a long time in a village of that district state that since decentralization, these attitudes are being encouraged. Every household in that unnamed village of East Lombok paid a compulsory sum for building new mosques in the area. Religious organizations vie for followers and in government schools, pupils are encouraged to wear religious dresses on Fridays when Koran and other Islamic books are compulsorily taught to them.

Buehler has focussed on the effect of decentralization in the districts of South Sulawesi and according to him, the local leaders are using Islamic by-laws to strengthen their patronage networks in a very ingenious manner. He cites the example of the Bulakumba district where

the district head stipulated that to pass their final examination, it would be necessary for school students to know how to read the Koran. Further, the same provision would also apply to anyone aspiring for a position in the local bureaucracy (Ibid). This provides the district head with considerable control over his employees and the youth as he also controls the institutions which provide training for Koran reading, namely the local Mosques and religious teachers.

The patronage network of Mosques and religious teachers is maintained by passing by-laws which make collection of 'Jakat', the giving of alms required by Muslims of means, a subject of the district administration. The people employed for Jakat collection are the local religious teachers who receive a salary directly from the district head, provided out of the Jakat money collected. Further, the local administration has made it mandatory for each Hajj pilgrim to donate 1% of his pilgrimage cost to the Jakat fund of the government. People of Bulukumba are also paying compulsory 'Infaq' and 'Sadaqah' taxes, which are mentioned as voluntary in Islamic religious texts. Bulukumba is the not only district where the local elite is fleecing the pious residents for maintain their hold over the religious structure. Barru district in south Sualwesi has similar schemes running. Apparently, these schemes have paid off as well since the district head (Bupati), Muhammad Rum was re-elected to his position in 2005. District records show that a total of 1311 Islamic teachers were paid by Md. Rum regularly. Moving further to solidify his position a s champion of Islam, Md. Rum had chosen a few villages to be ideal Muslim villages (Desa Islam). In these villages both men and women are forced to wear religiously approved clothing at all times, they are obliged to keep their money in Shari-approved banks, all the street signs and government office boards are written in Arabic and the government offices happily declare that they would not serve a woman who is not wearing a jilbab (headdress) (Ibid : 262-270).

It is easily understandable that enterprises such as this hit at the root of Indonesian constitution and reject the centrality of a home grown Indonesian culture in favour of an imported Arab one. However, one must never forget that all this show of religious stricture is but eyewash for the common, God-fearing people. As has been shown earlier, Islamic enterprises are means for local leaders to patronise key sections of populations such as religious leaders. This is further proved when one notices that a part of the Jakat money is spent to pay militias like Laskar Jundallah, who work as religious police in the districts and also become useful during elections for intimidating opposition and commoners alike. In Barru district, Shari by-law bans Alcohol, but not completely. In the entire district, there is

only one hotel where Alcohol is available and that hotel happens to be owned by the chief campaign financier of the district chief! (Ibid : 274).

Such revelations clearly show that decentralization in Indonesia has not really helped in bringing down corruption or strengthening democracy. In fact, in the light of the data above, it may be said that corruption has become even more widespread. The propagation of Islamic principles has done little to curb the corrupt practices. Some researchers like Henderson and Kuncoro disagree (Henderson, Vernon and Kuncoro 2006). They believe that pious Muslims are inherently opposed to paying bribes. They also believe Islamic parties such as PKB and PKS to be anti-corruption. On the basis of these two observations, they claim that more district level representatives from Islamic parties would make bureaucrats under them to be wary of being involved in corruption as they would fear retribution from the elected executive as well as social sanction from the Muslim citizens. Henderson and Kuncoro attempt to validate their claims on the basis of two surveys they conducted in 2001 and 2004. However, direct elections for the post of district chief began in 2005. Therefore, it is only natural to assessment that the researchers could not include post election observations in their research. From the data presented so far, it seems wise to conclude that assertions of political Islam has not been beneficial for Indonesian democracy at the local level.

Aceh and the Dangers of Unchecked Political Islam

The example of Aceh will perhaps serve as the most potent factor in determining the effect propagation of political Islam can have in Indonesia. Aceh had always been the fountainhead of Islamic pietism in Indonesia, not least because Islam entered the archipelago through former Acehnese kingdoms. Provision for Aceh's autonomy and a dual legal system incorporating Islamic courts for religious and family matters and civil courts for civil and criminal cases has existed in the original 1945 Constitution of Indonesia (Siregar 2009 : 145). With decentralization, the local government in Aceh has taken enactment of Sharia by-laws to an extent that challenges the very legal system of Indonesia. According to Aceh Local Regulation No. 13 of 2003, and regulation No. 14 of 2003, gambling, consuming alcohol and 'lewd acts' have becoming punishable with the 'hudhud' punishments inscribed in the Koran (Ibid). Such punishments include lashing in public from 6 to 12 times for both men and women. This is a clear instance of substituting the civil court with Islamic court and goes against the Indonesian Constitution. If taken further, such provisions can include death by stoning or crucifixion for 'crimes' like extra-marital sex and apostasy. Amputation of limbs

can be ordered for theft. Such provisions not only violate the secular Constitution of Indonesia but also violate human rights. The laws are problematic for other reasons too, non-Acehnese Muslims travelling in Aceh also come under the ambit of these laws, if they happen to commit the crime there. Moreover, it is not clear whether such laws are applicable to the non-Muslims leaving in Aceh. According to a survey, 65% of Acehnese Muslims believe that it is unfair for non-Muslims to be spared (Ibid : 166-167).

The purpose of this entire discussion regarding the effect of decentralization in Indonesia and the role Islam is playing in this experiment with local democracy is not to establish that establishment of local democracy is detrimental to the quality of Indonesia's democracy. Local democracy has worked well in countries like India to enable more involvement of common people in the system of governance. However, Indonesia's example shows that decentralization of authority itself is no panacea for the ills of corruption and underdevelopment. It also shows that unchecked expressions of political Islam in such a milieu can be source of major socio-political challenges to the very ideas of democracy. This, in fact, is another confirmation of the importance of the idea of Muslim Democracy, as the only serious alternative to the advancement of Political Islam in Indonesia. If the political parties appealed to the local level electorate with a development oriented, Islamic symbolism-laden rhetoric, then perhaps it could have become a real challenge to the danger of Political Islam.

Islamic Parties No More Considered Cleaner

The reason why one needs to talk hypothetically about such a situation is firstly, the result of the toleration, nay, abatement of Political Islam by the major secular parties at local level. Secondly, it is also the result of the failure of Indonesia's Islamic political parties to present themselves as the torchbearers of the ideal of Muslim democracy. As has been pointed out before, they could not win a single province between 2005-2008 on their own (Aceh is a special case where local parties are allowed to fight elections). Even in the 19 provinces they became part of coalitions of different hues, they failed to present a workable model of a syncretic Muslim democracy. But the final blow to their credibility as a less corrupt and viable option at the local level came immediately after the presidential elections in 2014.

In 2014, Joko Widodo won the presidential election, facing the formidable opposition of the Red and White (Merah-Putih) coalition of Gerindra, PD and all major Islamic parties except PKB, which joined Jokowi's camp. Immediately after Jokowi's victory, the Red and White

coalition brought a bill proposing the abolition of the system of direct election for the district heads in the parliament, where they enjoyed a majority. The bill was passed successfully on 26th September, 2014, thereby again bringing back the Suharto-era system of district heads being 'selected' by the provincial legislators (Cochrane 2014). All PKS, PAN and PPP affiliated members of parliament voted for the bill, while PKB members voted against (Andiyanto 2014). The new law, termed 'UU Pilkada', caused huge protests among Indonesians, who saw it as a naked power grab by a Jakarta based elite hurt by the prospect of non-elite political leaders like Jokowi or the present Jakarta Governor Basuki (Both emerged in the political scene from district levels) coming up to take their position. Facing unprecedented criticism at home and abroad, the outgoing President SBY soon proposed a Presidential Executive Order, termed 'Perppu', to restore the old system. On 20th January, 2015, it was successfully passed in the parliament and local democracy was restored (Cochrane 2014).

Leaders of Gerindra and other parties who supported the Pilkada bill have stated that they wanted to curb corruption and cut down on the huge expenses of local elections. This attempt to solve a problem by resorting to an older and less acceptable one will only hurt their electoral possibilities further, if the recent pro-local democracy protests are any indicator. However, the most sustained damage has perhaps been done to the image of the Islamic parties who have now all but lost the right to tell to the Indonesian electorate that they are a better alternative in any way than the corrupt and non-Islamic secular parties. At the end of this chapter where all the major aspects of the Political Islam-Muslim Democracy dichotomy in Indonesia has been discussed and factors determining the political fate of Indonesia's Islamic parties studied, the sad but inevitable conclusion seem to be that these parties are a long way from establishing themselves as a credible alternative to the major secular parties at all levels of government. It also seems apt to state that the idea of a successful Muslim Democracy will face considerable challenge in Indonesia despite many factors conductive to it being present in the contemporary Indonesian society.

Chapter 5

Violence and Democracy in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Is Islam to Blame?

"Violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and in action", wrote Frantz Fanon in his famous book 'Wretched of the Earth' (Fanon 2004: 51). Agreed, those words were written in a different context and colonialism and oppression of whites over the black people were so detestable that violence could be prescribed. Would those words, forgetting the context for a moment, sounded out of place if uttered by a Jihadi leader today? And, who defines what is an acceptable context for prescribing violence? For an individual who lost his family in a communal riot in Ambon, it may be perfectly acceptable to want to use violence over the perpetrators. For a religious group in a particular town, it may be justified to use violence against the other group to save themselves as the state cannot guarantee them security. The purpose of this argument is not to find a general, acceptable reason for using violence against another individual or group. Especially not in the name of Islam, Jihad or any other religiously driven concept. In an ideal world, there cannot be any. It is only to assert that under exceptional circumstances, resort to violence is not unnatural and it is not something that is peculiar about Islam or Indonesia. With that understanding, this study of violence in post-Suharto Indonesia can begin. One can also try to see whether or how much such violence is related to Islam and how it affects the future of Indonesian democracy.

Indonesian people have experienced their fare share of violence over the years. The revolutionary violence and the state-sponsored repressive violence of the New Order era aside, the Indonesian people have acted with exceptional violence along religious and ethnic lines on numerous occasions. More surprisingly perhaps, such violence has taken place among Indonesian Muslims themselves almost as many times. This observation therefore begs these questions; is Indonesian society an essentially violent one? Is the majority religion Islam in some way responsible for the preponderance of violence in Indonesia? The answer to these questions will be critical in context of the viability of the democratic experience in the country. The present chapter is an attempt to analyze the social and political context in which these acts of violence took place in post-Suharto Indonesia. Although it need not be emphasized that the past events involving violence against particular groups or communities

leave indelible impressions on the minds of following generations, this chapter will not go into detailed analysis of these events and only mention them as a part of the social construct that created a space for violence in the post-Suharto era.

Violence and Legitimacy

It will be a good exercise to look at a more general understanding of violence, as espoused by some key thinkers; it will help in developing perspective when dealing with problems specific to a country. According to Priestland, violence occurs when "Physical power is deliberately applied with the ultimate sanction of physical pain and little choice but to surrender or physical resistance". Mcfarlane said that "Violence is the capacity to impose or the act of imposing of one's will upon another where the imposition is held to be illegitimate" (Milton-Edwards 2006: 111).

There are problems with both these definitions. Priestland's definition emphasizes physical power, thereby ignoring the tremendous effect psychological violence can create. Mcfarlane's definition, although more sound, leaves the question of legitimacy unresolved. Who decides when imposition of will over others is legitimate, on what grounds? Following this thread, one can see how groups like the HAMAS or Hezbollah can claim legitimacy for their use of violence.

The question of legitimacy is closely linked with the application of violence and one that philosophers have attempted to answer for many years. Thomas Hobbes conceptualized violence as something that existed as a basic ingredient of human nature. The state had to be established to control this violence existing within man and therefore the state and its supreme ruler had the sole right to exercise violence. The concept of 'Danda', i.e. violence exercised by the King as required is at the core of ancient Hindu political thought. The right measure of Danda becomes the source of righteousness, wealth and enjoyment although too much or too less of it can produce the opposite results (Chakrabarty and Pandey 2009: xvi). From these two definitions, two important concepts of violence emerge. First, violence is present in all human beings and secondly; the state has the sole authority to use violence. State's authority to use violence is what Max Weber has identified as its most fundamental feature (Weber and Owen 2004: xlix).

However, state's claim to exclusive use of violence can be contested. People know from their experience that state is not the sole wielder of violence. Now, if a non-state actor is using

violence and the state is not acting to stop it; that can mean two things. One, the state is encouraging that act, which automatically provides the violent actor with legitimacy. Two, the state is unable to prevent that act, which automatically destroys state's authority over the violent actor till the time the state is either able to prevent his acts or to co-opt the actor within the machinery of the state. However, staying unconquered by the state does not necessarily provide that actor with legitimacy in place of the state; his exercise of violence might still be a use of force without legitimacy, going by the weberian model. But then, this understanding only holds true in case one already accepts the legal-rational source of authority as the standard or only source and if the understanding of rationality is shaped by the post-renaissance rationalism in Europe. If a legal system exists that is based on rationality of a different kind, for example, one based on scriptural laws that posits violence as an individual and collective binding responsibility under certain circumstances; then an actor who is practicing violence and is able to justify it on the basis of such scriptures (or selective but publicly appreciated interpretations of the same) might enjoy as much legitimacy as the State itself or even more. This is why religion so often emerges as the most important factor in the exercise of violence by non-state actors.

Religion and Violence

If religion can provoke violence and legitimize violence then it can be understood that it is not a simple system of beliefs or not only a metaphysical explanation of man's questions about his purpose or destiny. How is religion to be understood if not simply as a belief system?

One of the understandings is that religion is a system of cultural belief, as espoused by the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz. But John T. Sidel maintains that religion is neither a system of belief nor a cultural system but , "sociologically it is a field structured by its own institutions, authority relations and instilled dispositions (habitus) and means of production, accumulation and representation of 'symbolic' or 'spiritual' capital.." (Sidel 2007a: 136). Sidel also quotes Talal Asad who defined religion as a "relation between people with regard to texts and intellectual technologies- that is potentially more fluid than other sort of class relations" (Ibid).

Both these definitions attempts to explain religion as a fairly autonomous social system within the society with its own hierarchical structure and own modes and relations of production. Such a definition can help in explaining the impressive authority that religious

leaders enjoy over vast numbers of people. It also outlines the possibility that the religious sphere may overcome or completely assimilate the social and political sphere where social channels of interactions have broken down or the state has become weak and inefficient. But what explains the absolute fanaticism of some adherents of the major world religions where they become willing to even sacrifice their own life for the destruction of the other religion and its adherents?

Mark Jurgensmayer claims that when religious templates are applied to social and political affairs- they take the form of a cosmic war between good and evil. Charles Kimball identifies five key features that turn religions to violence. These are absolute truth claims, blind obedience, the establishment of an 'ideal time', the belief that end justifies the means and a declaration of holy war (Litonjua 2009: 309).

Now, it may be useful to note that these features not so much justify religious violence itself as they justify 'terrorism' in the name of religion. There are significant differences between religiously inspired terrorism and religious violence, which will be discussed later in this chapter. But it is also important to remember that when such features exist in a religion and it is wedded with political power, it becomes easier to mobilize adherents for violence.

Since this work is a study of how democracy has been affected by the post-Suharto developments in all areas of Indonesian politics and society, it must be determined as to how violence affects democracy in general. Democracy, in general is understood as a system of governance based on popular consent, and popular consent is understood to be the consent of the majority. However, a liberal democratic system also entails the principle of safeguarding the interest of the minority. But again, this is an understanding of democracy based on the western model. The present Iranian concept of democracy, for example does not let the elected lawmakers make laws without the approval of a non-elected 'Guardian Council' of Ulama or Islamic legal experts. The rationale behind this is said to be that according to Islamic theology, the only law applicable to all mankind is the law of Allah, the Supreme Being. Any law that is made by the humans which goes against the tenets of Allah's law cannot compete with the rationality of Allah and therefore, such practices should be forbidden. As mentioned before, not all systems of rationality and law are based on the post-renaissance European system and therefore the rationale and legitimacy behind violence varies.

It may come as a surprise to many to learn that Christians were the offenders in the some of the worst cases of violence in Indonesia in the post-Suharto period but actually it should not be. The history of Christianity is just as bloody as Islam, which is often seen as the violent religion that destroys everything good and right. The Crusades caused untold hardships among the Muslims of West Asia and North Africa. When Crusades failed to destroy the Islamic political system then the murderous energy of Christianity turned inwards and took the form of indiscriminate killing of supposed heretics all over Europe (Litonjua 2009 : 113). This barbaric violence even took an organized bureaucratic form under the Catholic Church in Spain and Portugal where inquisition squads spread terror among people and became a tool of political and personal vendetta. Why Christianity is then today is not accused of violence and bigotry and the blame squarely rests on Islam?

It is a complex question that cannot be explained within the confines of a chapter. But very concisely, three reasons behind this attitude can be fathomed. The first reason is simply that very often it is not the Muslims making this accusation but the other religions who have made their peace with the western political system. Secondly, it is a historical fact that Islam has not produced a religious reformer in the present age who is acceptable to the majority of the Umma and at the same time, speaks the language of modernity. Excesses of Catholicism were checked by a Martin Luther, inherent violence in the Hindu caste system was eased to a certain extent by Gandhi (even if only superficially) (Milton-Edwards 2006 : 95). They were reformers and leaders who had the ability to mould the collective memory of people both inside and outside a religion about its past affinities with violence. Why did Islam not produce such a reformer? May be it is because the religion did not develop a reformist attitude in conjunction with broad based social and economic changes, such as the arrival of capitalism or the need to initiate a process of assimilation of Dalits in the Hindu mainstream to prevent a Dalit rebellion of communist nature after the British leave. The parts of the world where Islam reigned did not see such sudden and vast changes. Polity in these areas stayed medieval for a long time and continues to remain so in many areas. Therefore the reform in Islam was largely a need felt by the religious leaders as an ‘answer’ to the onslaught of western modernity that often accompanied western colonialism. It can be seen that the rationale behind reform was very different in case of Christianity and Islam. Christianity underwent reformation to facilitate a capitalist society and production system. Islam underwent reform to become more insulated. It is for this reason that reform in the basic structure of Islam never moved Muslims on to the streets; it remained confined to the

deliberations of the religious scholars at the seminaries of Baghdad, Cairo and Mecca and as such prescribed a return to the 'pure' dogmatic form of Islam in the name of reform.

The link between violence and legitimacy has already been discussed. It has also been discussed how not only state but non-state actors can also claim legitimacy for their violent acts. However, such countering claims on legitimacy are actually a challenge to the state's authority and if the state has not already incorporated the challenger it its fold, then it claims that violence perpetrated by such an actor is 'illegitimate violence'. Such forms of violence may emerge or a reaction against an act of state or as a challenge to state's authority but in either case, it initiates a cycle of violence as state reacts against it and faces further action from the illegitimate actor (Ibid : 102). This point is crucial to this topic as it shows how illegitimate violence can be a challenge to state authority and may not have to do anything with the religious affinities of the actors. In case of Indonesia, this understanding is all the more important since in that country there always remains the possibility of violence being associated or even equated with religion.

This discussion is not intended to be a defense of the acts of violence perpetrated by the Muslims in Indonesia in the post-Suharto period but it is simply an attempt to acquaint a reader with the coming revelations about the strong violence Christians in Indonesia resorted to against Muslims. It was important to make an attempt to show that extraordinary violence along religious lines is not a preserve of Muslims alone. This understanding will also help one grasp the essentially non-religious reasons behind the acts of violence, which will be elaborated in this chapter.

Post-Suharto Violence in Indonesia

It is tempting to conclude that Post-Suharto violence in Indonesia was simply a continuation of the deep-rooted sectarian hatred that became apparent during the post-Gestapu violence of 1965-66 and which was stifled during the New Order regime. Such an assumption will not be entirely false but very much inadequate. The principal factors behind the violent episodes have been economic and political, not religious.

The incidents of violence that took place in Indonesia since independence have been briefly categorized next. There had been the revolutionary violence from 1945-49. Immediately after the independence, the Darul Islam rebellion again threw large parts of Indonesia in throes of

violence, there had been the carnage of 1965-66 which have surpassed all other instances of violence in the country in the sheer number of people killed- roughly quarter of a million, then following a period of relative quiet, there were anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in 1984, rioting by Muslims and Christians in the outer island provinces of Central Sulawesi and Maluku began from 1995 and continued till 2002 while Jakarta again witnessed numerous riots in 1998 till 2001 (Collins 2002 : 584).Meanwhile in the villages of Javanese provinces, lynching of suspected 'witches' and their families by mobs became common. After the riots ceased in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, a new deadly terrorist campaign began in Bali, Ambon, Poso and other Outer Island towns in the form of mysterious shootings, bombings and slaughter by Muslim militias. Suicide bombing by different Muslim terrorist groups became the hallmark of this era. The government forces; both the police and military has also acted with extreme violence in the provinces of East Timor and West Papua. In Aceh, government's struggle with the secessionist forces has again, caused terrible hardship to the local populace. As it can be seen, Indonesia did not have a shortage of violent events! Looked at more closely, these events can be categorized as the following:

a. *Anti-Chinese Violence*: by far the most common trigger for large-scale violence in Indonesia had been the divide between the economically better off entrepreneurial ethnic Chinese people and the Indonesian Malays. This is the most crucial and apparently unbridgeable gulf existing in the Indonesian society. The anti-Chinese feeling led to the massacre of a quarter million people immediately after the coming of new order regime, with full support of the government machinery. In all the large scale riots that happened so far, destroying the life and property of the ethnic Chinese has been a common feature. Some go so far to suggest that the Muslim-Christian divide is not the 'master cleavage' in the Indonesian society, rather, it is the ethnic Malay- ethnic Chinese division- much like the Hindu-Muslim division is the 'master cleavage' in Indian society (Varshney 2008 : 345).
b. *Inter-Ethnic Violence other than Chinese-Malay Violence*: Indonesia is a land of diverse ethnicities, especially in the islands outside Java. Although violence between these ethnicities is not common, still such violence does take place, especially in case the minority ethnic groups are migrants. Such Violence took place in West Kalimantan when the minority migrant Madurese faced persecution from both the Dayak and Malay ethnic groups, indigenous to West Kalimantan.

c. *Directly state-sponsored violence against secessionist groups*: Some of the worst atrocities committed in the land fall under this category. However, in context of this chapter, this particular category of violence is not of relevance to this particular study.
d. *Witch hunts conducted by mobs against perceived black magicians*: This is a locally restricted type of violence that was observed in certain provinces of Java in the transition period from New Order to Reformasi. A surprising number of lives were lost by this type of violence that appears to be the result of largely spontaneous expression of rage by locals not so much against the victim but against their own inability to exorcise the fear of death and hunger in a transition society and polity. This will be discussed in detail later.
e. *Organized large scale violence along religious or ethnic lines*: This was seen in the riots that devastated the islands of Maluku, Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi. Much is to be said about this particular type of violence as this was the most formidable challenge to the nascent Indonesian democracy and one that also the question of Islam's compatibility with democracy into question.
f. The last category of violence in Indonesia is the *terrorist bombing and shooting* that caused hundreds of deaths in Bali and elsewhere. This type of violence had occurred sporadically, carried out by clandestine Islamic militant groups and principally aimed to harm western high value targets. Although in the post 9/11 world, this type of violence turned the world's attention towards Indonesia, especially in the wake of the Bali bombing, it must be said that these instances of Islamic terrorism have stopped since 2005 and an active Indonesian state have by and large been able to break the networks of Islamic militant organizations.

Out of these categories, the violence against Chinese can be understood as the result of both ethnic as well as economic divisions. The presence of a third factor, that is the apparent threat of communism that seemed to pervade the mindset of the Indonesian army and political elite in the first phase of New Order made government a party to the one-sided violence. Reliable accounts of this massive human tragedy have not emerged yet and the Indonesian press and intelligentsia maintain a stiff silence over the matter. In context of the present chapter, this unfortunate even in Indonesian history serves as a reminder to the ability of the Indonesian state to mobilize its common people for serious acts of violence.

Witch Hunts in Java: The socio-political background

Lynching is certainly a type of violence that attracts attention as it sheds light on the effect of sudden political changes on village life and the severe crisis that forceful restriction or regulation of channels of communication such as free associations can have on people amid uncertainty and anxiety. Looking at the largely insular nature of the Javanese village, it is tempting to interpret these lynching as the inability of Javanese villagers to cope with the influx of the 'market' in their life (Sigel 2001 : 44). 'Market' here is used to denote the influence of the economy outside the village that alters social equilibrium in the village. Such as, someone becomes rich quickly after learning a trade in Jakarta or someone not popular in village owning a new television set. But such an approach fails to explain why some desperately poor people were also targets of these witch hunts. A more viable approach will be to see whether the New Order introduced the market or 'development' in the villages without producing any social mechanism to accommodate the new actors who would arise out of the market. This approach explains why someone suddenly gaining wealth is so removed from the self contained world of the village that it seems as nothing but witchcraft for them!

The political and ideological remoteness of the masses in the village from the Jakarta-based politics and development was by no means a co-incidence. It was a deliberate strategy by the Suharto government to keep the masses of people as a politically neutral, unorganized quantity that could easily be exploited. This idea was even given a formal name by one of the key functionaries in the New Order government, Ali Murtopo. He termed it 'Massa Mengambang' or 'Floating Masses' – a rudderless floating mob that was different from the earlier optimistic idea about 'rakyat' or the 'people' (Ibid : 46). The sense of lacking a concrete identity was so acute among the java villagers that they also accepted the pejorative 'massa' title.

The witch hunts were qualitatively different from the earlier practice of punishing a suspected wrongdoer, at times with death, by the people. This practice was called 'Keroyokan', meaning taking law into one's own hand (Ibid : 40). It was almost always practiced against an outsider and thought to be a continuation of the pre-colonial justice system in Indonesia in the face of a failing legal and law enforcement system. However, in case of witch hunts, the witch could be anyone, even someone who has lived in the same village as the offenders for years. All that was needed for the mob to brutally kill the 'witch' was to channelize their own

fear, anxiety and lack of a solid identity was a figure who was in some way 'different' from them, either in fact or in their imagination. The mob is not a thinking, reflecting group of people, they are simply an entity consisted solely of an unbearable aggression; through the process of killing, the individual members of the mob find a new, albeit temporary identity.

Witch hunt as form of collective violence in Indonesia is important to analyze since it has been seen that this particular form of violence is nearly free from any outside influence from the government or any other organization of religious or political nature. It is form of violence emanating from the people, although under circumstances of insecurity and despair. Ashutosh Varsheny has worked on Indonesian witch hunts as a form of collective violence and he asserts that collective violence occurs less frequently in high-income societies as in these societies people as a group are less insecure than in low income societies during periods of political or economic transition. Therefore he recommends that the incidents of lynching in Indonesia should be compared with a similarly low or marginally middle income country to get a clearer picture of how prone Indonesian society is to violence. He goes on to compare the Indonesian incidents of lynching with those of African Americans in the hands of the whites in southern USA from 1882-1930 (Varshney 2008 : 343). According to available reports, during this period, a thousand African Americans were lynched in the American South every year. That is a fairly large number. However, from 1995-2004, just in four of Indonesia's thirty-six provinces, namely West Java, Bali, Bengkulu and South Kalimantan over 5500 people were lynched (also consider that the researcher chose these four provinces because he considered them to be less violent than the other provinces!). He concludes from this observation that Indonesians often take law into their own hands and the local police and political leaders are often a party to that.

However, Varshney agrees that perhaps Southern US in late nineteenth and early twentieth century is not suitable for comparing a vastly different country in time and space as well as cultural background. India seems to be a much better match in terms of general affluence of the people, ethnic and linguistic diversity, village level insular culture and moments of great political and economic upheaval that unleashed serious violence.

As mentioned in this chapter before, the Hindu-Muslim cleavage in Indian society is similar in nature to the Chinese-Malay divide in Indonesia. However, the Christian-Muslim divide is thought to be replacing that divide as the primary one in the last two decades. Therefore if a

comparison is drawn of the number of deaths occurring from violence along these dividing lines, it should be a good indicator of relative levels of violence in these two similar societies.

Is Indonesian society inherently violent?

According to surveys carried out by Varshney, Tadjoeddin and Panggabean, in the period 1950-1995, the number of deaths caused by Hindu-Muslim riots in India is just over 7000 (Varshney et al. 2004). Now, from 1990-2003, approximately 5400 people became victims of Muslim-Christian riots in Indonesia. During that same period, 1259 people died from riots between Pribumi (sons of the Indonesian soil) and the ethnic Chinese. The numbers seem to rival that of India's, result of violence spanning a much larger swath of time. True, the large scale violence immediately before and after the partition has not been taken into account here but in case of Indonesia also, the revolutionary violence during 1945-49 and the anti-Chinese and anti-communist pogrom of 1965-66 has not been taken into account. And in terms of sheer number of victims, the later dwarf any instance of violence seen in India.

Should a conclusion from these comparisons about the 'violent' nature of Indonesian society be reached? Does it prove that under similar circumstances, the Indonesian society and people prove to be more violent than another society and people? Well, such a conclusion is difficult. Varshney quotes a study by King, Keohane and Verba which questions the viability of building a theory of violence based on comparative analysis (King et al. 1994). They argue that if a particular type of violence is considered which, for example, is arising out of inter ethnic economic rivalry in a particular province and find out that it is being caused by:

a. Polarizing politics by political parties.
b. Existence of segregated neighborhoods or ghettos.

Then one may also find that similar factors exist in other provinces too but they are not succumbing to violence. Then, they argue, Violence in the first case is being cause by either a greater intensity of the two factors mentioned or a third, unknown factor. To discern what this factor is, one must study not only the violent provinces but the peaceful provinces as well. And it is true that such studies are almost never a part of research focusing on violence and its causes.

While from a theoretical standpoint, coming to a definite conclusion about the nature of violence in a society seems difficult, the aforementioned study by Varshney, Tadjoeddin and Panggabean show that large scale collective violence in Indonesia is very much locally

centralized. Only fifteen of Indonesia's districts, containing a population of only 6.5% of the total population were the sites of 85.9% of all the deaths caused by violence short of civil war (Varshney et al. 2004).

Varsheny mentions that Barron and Sharpe disagree with this finding. They question the method of this survey undertaken by Varshney et al. They argue that while Varshney et al. depended on new reports of violent deaths from provincial newspapers, their own study was based on district level newspapers, which always provide a much more accurate coverage of local violence. On the basis of their research, they claim that violence short of civil war is much more widespread in Indonesia. However, Varshney retorts by pointing out that while the importance of local level news sources was an important addition to any researcher's repertoire of tools, Baron and Sharpe have studied only two of Indonesia's provinces containing only 3.3% of the population; whereas Varshney et al. have studied fourteen provinces spread across the country, containing 72.4% (Varshney 2008 : 349). It is an old debate about research methods that however, produces even more uncertainty about the violent nature of Indonesian society.

It is worth noting though that whereas large scale violence seems to be concentrated in few areas of the country; small scale local violence such as lynching is much more widespread.

Due to the contradictory outcomes of different studies which focus on quantifying violence spatially and comparing numbers, scholars like Bertrand and Tajima have advocated alternative approaches. Bertrand focuses on the temporal centralization of violence in Indonesia which spikes during major political changes such as the freedom movement, establishment of the New Order and fall of Suharto regime. Bertrand calls these events 'critical junctures'- a time when the 'national model', i.e. the terms of inclusion of various groups and their rent-seeking capacities in a state are re-negotiated (Bertrand 2004, : 22-25).

Tajima prefers the 'weak state' theory to explain the temporal concentrations of violence in Indonesia. He argues that instances of violence spiked in this periods when the capacity of the state to maintain law and order and to provide security were at their weakest. He especially focuses on the role of military as the quintessential peace-keeper in New Order Indonesia and points at the periods of military's weakness as periods of collective violence (Tajima 2014 : 6-7).

Religious organizations and provincial violence

The four provinces in Indonesia which saw exceptional violence in the immediate years before and after Suharto's fall from power had shown clear signs of meticulous organization behind the escalation of violence and mobilization of people for the warring camps. Such organization was undertook sometimes by the local religious organizations but many of the times, and especially in case of the Muslims involved in the riots, the organization was undertook by national level organizations, usually with a strong bureaucratic structure and government backing. It is important to have a brief look at these organizations to understand the development in conflict that the violence-hit regions experienced. Although many such organization are present in Indonesia and they are active and influential in the outer island areas where the formal structure of the state is weak, only three organizations made a significant impact on the conflicts. These are: Nahdatul Ulama and its youth wing 'Ansor', Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Council (ICMI) (Siddle 2007: 56).

MUI was established in 1975 in a climate of suspicion between the state and the Islamic clergy (Porter 2002 : 77). It was an attempt by Suharto to include Islam as one of the components of his corporatist model of state (Ichwan 2006 : 47). New Order state was a prime example of a corporatist state, where every collective endeavor was made part of the regulatory framework of the government under the system of functional representation or made a part of the vast patronage networks of the state. However, MUI was not allowed to carry out political activities. It was supposed to function on an advisory capacity to both the regime and the Muslim community. Eventually, MUI was planned as an umbrella organization to represent all Muslim interests in Indonesia and the Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama and the DMI (Indonesian Mosque Council) were all made members of MUI.

MUI operated through production of 'Fatwa', that is, an Islamic legal opinion and 'Tausiah', which was in the nature of religious and moral advice (Ibid : 46). MUI Fatwa had a quasi-legal authority. MUI mostly worked as a vehicle for legitimizing acts of the New Order regime. It explained govt. programs in a religiously acceptable manner to the common populace. It also had a 'research wing' that helped in singling out the devious elements in Indonesian religion and politics.

Although the MUI did not always agree with the New Order, it never posited in considerable challenge either. As the appointed spokes person of all Muslims in the country, Suharto soon realized the importance of MUI in ensuring the compliance of the outer regions with the

government's development policies, many of which had elements of crony capitalism and could have triggered strong reactions from the local residents of these areas. Despite the reach of television and radio in Indonesian villages, it was understood by the new Order regime that mosque sermons were a more effective way to reach to their audience about the government's programs. MUI affiliated religious teachers were deployed to every village and MUI units were established formally in these. MUI was used extensively not only to educate and control the Muslims but they were also a medium to ensure religious harmony and even to help migrants assimilate to the new cultural and religious environment (Porter 2002 : 82).

MUI was set up in the initial period of the New Order when Indonesian Muslims were principally a village based poor and little-educated people. But with the economic development following the oil-driven windfall in Indonesia, there emerged a significant middle class in Indonesia, mostly arising out of small entrepreneurs and government employees. Principally city based and relatively small in number, the new middle class still became a formidable political voice because of their strong adherence to doctrinal Islam. The rise of the middle class coincided with the establishment of vast networks of government affiliated as well as private Islamic educational institutions which offered religious as well as secular curriculum. Thus, a new Muslim intelligentsia emerged in Indonesia. As was the style of New Order rule, immediately this new class were attempted to be included in the corporatist framework of the state. Therefore, a new institution called Indonesian Council of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) was formed (Ibid).

ICMI was formed in 1990 with Suharto's research and technology minister and late Indonesian president B. J Habibie as the president. ICMI not only attempted to emerge as a forum for the new Indonesian Muslim intellectual but it also attempted to be anew umbrella body for all Muslim organizations, one with more direct government control than MUI. Therefore, on ICMI's governing body, the religious affairs minister and the social welfare minister of Indonesia were routinely present. The overt government control however, became a contentious issue from the beginning. Free minded Muslim leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid, for example, quit ICMI soon after its inception. Despite these problems, ICMI remained throughout a New Order period a powerful body of Islamic leaders and preachers with branches in every major town in the country.

This brief discussion about MUI and ICMI will give the reader an idea about the level of bureaucratization achieved by Indonesian Islamic bodies and their organizational reach in

Indonesia. If it is recalled that it is the goal of this chapter to discern whether violence in Indonesia had to do with the majority's religion in the country and if this violence is a threat to Indonesian democracy and that it has already been claimed in this chapter that much of this violence were organized affairs for political and economic gains then it becomes clear how important a role such organization could have played the affairs.

Violence in Indonesian Provinces: Religion, Politics and Economy

Gerry Van Klinken has produced one of the most authoritative works on the post-Suharto collective violence in the outer islands. Klinken has offered a statistically sound socio-economic explanation of the violence. He asserts that communal diversity does not always lead to communal violence; it is not always politically exploitable and can only be exploited under certain conditions. He presents the examples of North Sumatra and East Kalimantan-regions which are religiously diverse but did not experience riots post-1998 (Klinken 2007 : 37).

Klinken agrees that in-migration by people of different ethnicities on to the outer islands was definitely a trigger for these riots. Often these migrations took place at the behest of the government in Jakarta and the migrants often appropriated the fruits of New Order economic development from the original inhabitants who were often culturally and educationally behind. Migrant Madurese faced violence in Kalimantan; Bugis and Butonese were also made targets, although to a much lesser extent in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. However, in provinces such as Jogjakarta and West Sumatra where migrants constituted as much as 30% and 20% of the population respectively, there was no serious communal violence. In the four provinces which were the worst affected, migrant population averaged around 5% of the total (Ibid : 38).

Therefore, it seems that neither religious diversity nor problems associated with migration can adequately explain the issue of collective violence in the four provinces of West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and North Maluku. Klinken attempts to solve the riddle by drawing attention to the simultaneous processes of decline in the number of agricultural workers and increasing dependence on state for jobs and capital in the outer islands. Once these processes are established as true, he argues that in such provinces, the

competition between local elite will be stiff for getting government jobs and contracts, the only viable source of cash flow there.

The New order state, rich with capital flowing from its oil revenue, gradually increased the reach of state bureaucracy in islands outside Java. Establishment of bureaucratic centers of power led to establishment of towns around them or in other cases, existing towns became larger after the state's outreach. Low income from traditional agricultural practices eventually drove people to non-agricultural blue collar jobs in the towns. However, these towns had no ability to create jobs on their own. Civil Service was a significant but limited option available only for the educated middle class. The rest of the workers had to find jobs as laborers in the building contracts awarded by the government to the local elite.

During the 1990's Indonesian state significantly increased the size of its bureaucracy in the outer islands, thereby increasing the dependence on government even more. The government hoped that private and foreign investments would follow state-controlled investments but that did not happen. Meanwhile, the oil boom ended in early 1990's itself, severely straining the government's coffer (Bertrand 2004 : 175). The shrinking capacity of government to continue the formal and informal channels of patronage was a major cause of anxiousness among the local elite that led to intension in the area as the elites attempted to collaborate according to their religious persuasions. Klinken attempted to quantify the dual effect of shrinking numbers of agricultural labor and increasing dependence on civil service and government contracts to provide jobs with a 'vulnerability index'. To explain vulnerability index, one must consider the following tables depicting the constituting variables which make the vulnerability index.

Table No. 1

Increase in the percentage of non agricultural workers to total workforce in seven Indonesian provinces.

Province	Non-agro workers 1998	Increase from 1970's/80's (%)
Maluku	35.8%	25
West Kalimantan	39.5%	26
Central Sulawesi	45.3%	13
Central Kalimantan	51.5%	29

Indonesia (national average)	55%	30
Central Java	56.9%	30
Bali	64.5%	42
West Java	68.%	36

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia. Jakarta: BPS. Quoted in Klinken (2007): 39.

Klinken cautions that this data by Indonesian government agency is not very reliable in certain cases, fluctuates wildly. However, it can be seen that as a general rule, deagrarianization had come late to the four disturbed provinces and that the outer islands started with a low base for deagrarianization and never managed to catch up with the core provinces of Java. As have already been stated before, lack of industries in the outer provinces meant that this increasing population depended on government jobs. Just how much can be understood from this next table.

Table No. 2

Proportion of civil servants to non-agricultural workers in seven Indonesian provinces, 1998. [B]

Province	Percentage of civil servants to non-agro workers
Maluku	33.1
West Kalimantan	19.1
Central Sulawesi	31.8
Central Kalimantan	20.7
Indonesia (national average)	11.5
Central Java	7.5
Bali	10.0
West Java	8.7

Source: Klinken (2007): 41.

Klinken claims that every political crisis in Indonesia had been followed by a surge in bureaucratic recruitments, either as an attempt to pacify the rebels with government posts or to build a stronger state structure to prevent such violence from happening further (Klinken 2007 : 40). Such recruitment drives have taken place post-independence in 1950, after repeal of Martial law in 1957, defeat of communism in Indonesia in 1966. It is important to note that

the end of New Order and beginning of Reformasi did not produce any major recruitment drives from the government.

Klinken's 'vulnerability index' 'V' is a result of the multiplication of the speed of deagrarianization [D] by the dependency on state as exemplified by the proportion of civil servants in the total non-agrarian work force [B]. Thus V= D×B

Using this indicator, all the four disturbed provinces having a high 'V' indicator can be observed. Consult the table below:

Table No. 3

Vulnerability Index of seven provinces of Indonesia:

Province	Vulnerability Index
Maluku	37
West Kalimantan	30
Central Sulawesi	53
Central Kalimantan	37
Indonesia (national average)	15
Central Java	10
Bali	14
West Java	11

Source: Klinken (2007): 44.

However, there are provinces in Indonesia such as Bengkulu, East Nusa Tenggara, South-East Sulawesi, Jambi and West Sumatra which show a high vulnerability index but have not seen any significant violence. Klinken explains that these are areas with very little urban population. The 'V' depends not on the size of the population under consideration but the percentages. Without a minimum urban population, divisive politics inspiring communal violence is not possible (Ibid : 43).

It has already been mentioned that due to educational requirements, it is only the middle class who can aspire to become civil servants. However, in Indonesia, only in Jakarta and in the towns of East Kalimantan, a sizable middle class exists. A 1994 study by Evers and Gerke

show that 62.8% of the Indonesian middle class fall into the category of civil servants (Evans and Gerke 1994 : 46). The middle class in the four provinces under discussion; is quite small (only about 5% of the population). However, in developing countries like Indonesia, there always exists a third 'intermediate' class of people comprised of small or middle businessmen, village level religious or ethnic organization's leaders and local agricultural or agri-business elite (Ibid : 46). Therefore, the social-administrative structure of an outer island province in the New Order era was like this: A governor at the apex of administration, often a Jakarta-appointed military officer although civilians were being appointed since early 1990's. The governor is followed by district heads and deputy heads who are in charge of a district's administrative and financial affairs, respectively. A large, corrupt and inefficient middle and lower level bureaucracy followed these two deputy heads. At the head of the district society were the business elite who depended on government building contracts and the leaders of local religious organizations like the Protestant Church of Maluku or the local functionaries of national Muslim organizations like MUI or ICMI. The intermediate class was variously exploited by and offered favors from the upper classes. The common, non agrarian population tried to find work with the building contractors (not all succeeded). Central government's patronage flowed through official government channels such as funds made available to religious organizations or contracts awarded to local businessmen. But a large part of it also flowed underground. Corruption was involved in all contracts so that the local businessman can exploit local resources paying less than what official governmental norms demanded. Religious organizations received funds which were channelized in different direction than originally intended. Heavy lobbying from the local religious and business elite was common before the center appointed a new district head or deputy heads (Ibid : 93). The economic dynamics of the outer island regions cannot be understood without understanding the interaction between the local elite, the government-employed middle class and the small elite who all have a share in the shadow area where state interacts with the local economy.

The sudden demise of New Order in 1998 was a blow to this established system of corruption and rent-seeking. In 1999 the Habibie government passed a law that started the process of decentralization. Its immediate impact was that the district head would no more be appointed by Jakarta but will be elected by the people in free elections. The knowledge that the economic resources of the district would now be for the winning elite to control without much central control sent them in a frenzy for maintain and increasing their hold on government (Ibid : 50).[i] In the subsequent study of three provinces, West Kalimantan, Central

Sulawesi and Maluku, one will see that in all three provinces, the apparently religious and/or ethnic violence that flared in the period immediately before and after 1998 were all results of clashes of interest between the elites, where one group tried to assert their dominance over the other by mobilizing the jobless youth and local intermediate classes along religious or ethnic line. Although at a later period, the events went beyond local elite rivalry and national and even international actors became involved and calls of jihad and the irrevocable difference between the Muslims and Christians were touted, they were the cause rather than the reason for the violence.

Next, this study will briefly look at the pattern of violence in three Provinces. These are, West Kalimantan, Poso of Central Sulawesi and Ambon of Maluku.

West Kalimantan

In West Kalimantan, the conflict seemed to be of a distinctly ethnic nature in which the two ethnic majorities, i.e. the Dayaks and the Malays persecuted the minority migrant Madurese people. The province has a population of about 40% Dayaks, 40% Malays and only about 3% were Madurese when the riots began (Ibid : 55). There have been frictions among the Dayaks, a feared people in Indonesia for their ancient practices of headhunting and other primitive ritual practices (some of these were revived deliberately during the riots) (Dove 2006 : 195). In 1983 itself, probably with the first tide of Madurese migrants, the Dayaks clashed with the Madurese and killed at least fifty of them.

Large scale violence took place in West Kalimantan in two phases, once in 1997 and again 1999. In the first phase, it was the Dayaks who were attacking the Madurese and in the second, the Malays were the perpetrators. Dayaks identified their shrinking right over land which the government had declared as forest reserves, despite very little virgin forest actually left in the region due to decades of logging activities (Evans and Gerke : 56). Although this was a grievance that should have been directed against the central government or the Malays; who were their principal competitors in the civil service, their violence was directed to the small minority community of Madurese. Simple hatred towards migrants doesn't explain this. Actually the very targeting of a small and insignificant community gives the impression that the violence was more of an exercise aimed at solidifying one's own ranks and sending a message to the other majority ethnic group. The fact that the Dayak ethnic identity was emphasized by the Dutch and the Protestant missionaries is helpful in understanding the

animosity between the Dayaks and the Malays that was not mitigated despite many Dayaks belonging to Islam (Davidson 2009 : 175).

The first wave of violence of 1997 took place in Sambas district. Approximately 500 people lost their lives and close to 20000 were displaced. It appeared from local news reports that before the violence actually began, ritual practices such as 'Tariu' dance (for bringing the spirits of death to this world so that they can aid the fighters) and passing of the 'red bowl'(a bowl filled with blood and brain of sacrificed animals during war rituals) was being practiced to whip up excitement and readiness among the Dayaks for the upcoming battle. On 31st December, 1997, the Dayaks started burning the house of the Madurese in a small town near the Malaysian Sarawak border named Sanggau Ledo. Small scale retaliation by the Madurese in the district headquarter caused further wave of Dayak attacks; the worst of which left nearly 500 dead (Klinken 2007 : 57).

The attacks, especially those of the second wave, were well organized. Dayaks from large area were gathered and coordinated through coordination posts (Posko) with the help of telephones and walky-talkies. Many of the fighters were using semi-automatic rifles brought from Malaysia and they moved about in trucks financed by the local businessmen and politicians. In a blatant case of Dayak government employees supporting the riots, the deputy district chief of Sanggau, a Dayak, led one of the riots near the Malaysian border (Ibid : 58).

Not much later after the Dayak violence stopped, the Malays launched another round of Madurese bloodletting. The Malay attacks were much more organized affairs than those of the Dayaks. In a clear instance of blaming the victim, the Malay businessmen and local elite formed an association called Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu (FKPM) 'to address the Madurese criminality' as the first signs of Malay violence began to surface, habitually ignored by the local police administration (Ibid : 59). FKPM achieved a semi-government status as many of its members were also influential government officers, religious leaders or part of the local business elite. Large scale atrocities took place in February 1999 and March 1999 and once again erupted in 2000. Although no clear number of deaths are available, it is estimated that close to 50000 people were displaced. During the violence, the officials by and large co-operated with FKPM and even 'helped' the Madurese to ship back to Madura or to stay in refugee camp.

The violence was actually a show of strength by both the Malays and the Dayaks for control of District's politics and economy in an environment of massive political change. In this

regard, it will be useful to remember that Dayaks have already committed rioting once in 1994 for securing the post of district chief for one of them and before that in 1985, which resulted in the ‘ Kasongan Agreement’ between the Madurese and the Dayak (Tajima 2014 : 121). The riots also present an interesting picture of identity formation through violence and the role of historical experience in such formation. Since the Dayaks were closely related with the land for centuries and had shared history and a shared sense of disenfranchisement, they participated in the riots in large number and became successful in asserting their strength and separate identity in the province. So much so that immediately after the 1997 riots, they managed to win the post of two district chiefs in West Kalimantan, despite them not being a majority in of the districts. Malay operations, on the other hand, was a very deliberate affairs that did not serve as much as a tool for political gains.

Poso

The second instance of post-Suharto large scale violence that is being considering in this chapter is the communal riots that broke out between the Muslim and Christian residents of the district of Poso in Central Sulawesi. Poso was considered a traditional Christian stronghold where missionaries started preaching from 1892. Although they were never in a majority, still, their significant numbers coupled with their long history of receiving European education has rendered them as a powerful political group in the area. However, as a result of the in-migration policies of the Suharto government, by the end of New Order, there were a lot of migrants in Poso, roughly comprising 25% of the total population (Klinken 2007 : 73). The migrants were mostly Muslims and the Christians were obviously feeling threatened by the changing demography of Poso. As a direct result of the migrations, the proportion of Christians to the total population of Poso declined from 38% in 1980 to 32% in 2000. However, as in the other areas experiencing violence, it was the sudden change in the entrenched patronage system post 1999 that contributed the most in making the situation truly volatile. In 1999, as has been mentioned before, the central government passed a law empowering the elected district assembly to elect a district chief. Another important issue was the losing of land rights and cash crop cultivation (Siddle 2007 : 158).

Before further elaborating on these issues, it will be helpful to discuss a concept named ‘Dynamics of Contention’ introduced by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in a 2001 book of the same name which had been quoted by Klinken (McAdam 2001). This concept elucidates that a violent episode may escalate in two ways: Passing of information along existing lines of

interaction, i.e. passing such information about a subject that has already been cause for mistrust among different groups to one particular group of people that will confirm their suspicions about the bad intentions of a different group. For example, if two groups are divided regarding their right to graze cattle on a common land that both are claiming as their own; then passing the information, true or false, that one group has managed to bribe a land inspector who would now confirm that group's right over that land will fall into this category. Such a process has been termed as 'escalation by diffusion' by McAdam et al. The second way in which a violent episode may escalate is to pass information to whip up anger and solidarity among previously unconnected 'social sites'. The people who do it has been termed as 'brokers' (Klinken 2007 : 86-87).

Brokers have the ability to present a problem experienced by a particular social class in a particular location to another, spatially separated class of people in a manner that the second group identifies with the first and can be united in their 'common' struggle. This is the process of 'brokerage' (McAdam 2001 : 331).

In Poso, violence rarely escalated through diffusion, although there were opportunities for that given their common problems regarding the cultivation of cash crops such as Cocoa and the issue of land rights. However, one needs to remember that studies of conflicts show that even in those cases where opportunities exist for diffusion, violence does not erupt till a part of elite agrees to take leadership and play the role of broker. Violence in Poso came in four waves, and all these 'waves' coincided with moments of political transition that affects the urban middle class and the elite more than it does the farmer. For example, the first wave of violence came in December 1998, immediately after the announcement that district chief would be elected in a democratic manner from then on. The role of the middle class and elite as brokers of violence should be cleared from this.

A question than can puzzle researchers working on violence in Poso is this; why did religion became the principle tool for mobilization in Poso, when the elite who instigated the violence were life-long Golkar functionaries, not much known for religiosity? The reason was that in Poso, the party's structures was weak and those of the religious organizations were strong. It is important to understand that religious organizations in towns like Poso did not provide a ground for 'civil society', free from State's interference in Poso. Neither did they espouse solidarity of people which could have provided protection against tyranny. In Indonesia, the New Order state had co-opted the religious organizations. In district towns, civil and military

leaders always sought legitimacy from religious leaders of both the major religions. Religion was clearly a main ingredient of politics as the political parties had no organization at the district level and no distinct ideology to offer (Klinken 2007 : 77). Therefore, there was always competition between the Muslim leaders of southern part of Poso, where Muslims were in majority and the Christian leaders of Northern parts like Minhasa.

What rendered the religious organizations even more important in a town like Poso was the fact that they were the only way for the local educated youth to make the correct contacts at political and bureaucratic levels for civil service posts and government building contracts, in the absence of political party structures to provide a platform. The Muhammadiyah affiliated student organization Himpunan Mahasishwa Indonesia (HMI) and the largest student organization for Christians- Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (GMKI) were crucial platforms for lobbying and networking. Later investigations revealed the deep connection between the local religious bodies, businessmen and political aspirants who wanted to control the political and economic power in Poso during Indonesia's transition period.

The first riots of 1998 began from a drunken brawl in a shady Poso neighborhood (Davidson 209 : 178). The resultant violence caused damage to many Chinese businesses, especially liqueur stores. It was a weeklong riot which quickly subsided after the government became active and some of the key leaders from both sides were jailed. The election of district head in June 1999 passed peacefully and much to the chagrin of the local elite, an outsider became the district chief. By April 2000, the groups started mobilizing again. This time, for the coveted posts of the two deputy district chiefs; who controlled the economic affairs. Although the Muslims appeared to be more organized than the Christians, they failed to get their candidates elected, causing another riot in the same month (Klinken 2007 : 81). Both the instances of rioting and violence of 1998 and April 2000 caused much damage to property but they were still limited to particular localities with little brokerage involved.

However, the two instances of communal violence made the religious organizations in Poso to develop better coordinating structures for future riots. The Christians were especially angry for the losses they incurred during the second Poso riots. They soon retaliated in May 2000 with determined, bloody violence which claimed at least 670 lives and caused 425000 people to be displaced (Ibid : 83). An important facet of the so called Poso-III war was that it was not driven by desires for administrative posts or economic favors. That issue was already settled. Poso III in fact, showed how violence on religious lines can escalate and even go out

of control of the very people who started it. The massacre of 80 unarmed Muslims in the Walisongo mosque of Poso became the incident which turned the nation's attention to Poso. Militant Islamic organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin Kompak sensed an opportunity to broaden their base and sent trainers to aid their embattled brethren. Even an Al-Qaida organizer from Spain visited Poso. The Situation worsened steadily as in June-July 2001, the fourth chapter of Poso wars opened. Both sides killed freely. After the massacre of Muslim women and children on 3rd and 4th July, the district government seemed to openly come out in support of the Muslims. When the feared Laskar Jihad group sent hundreds of fighters in Poso, the district chief Muin Pusanden, a Muslim, openly welcomed them and stated, "If 'we' in Poso are attacked, then the defense of Poso will be a holy war (Jihad fi Sabilillah)" (Pontoh 2002).

The Christians on the other hand, were not managing to find much support in Indonesia, but they did manage to organize themselves and send a message to the influential American-Indonesian Christians Association-that made its way to a US Congressional Hearing (Ibid). However, USA was not overtly interested in interfering in far away Poso. 9/11 changed that completely. Assembling of Islamic militants in Poso suddenly became great concern for USA. Meanwhile, Muslim militants and a rapidly dwindling number of Muslim rioters continued attacking and bombing Christian villages till 2005.

Poso Wars were violent but they paled in comparison to the violence witnessed in Ambon of Maluku province. Also, the violence in Poso seldom engulfed the whole district establishment in the way it did in Ambon. In these most violent Muslim-Christian riots, at least 2000 people lost their lives. Klinken maintains that the violence in Ambon was not only different from Poso in scale but also in character. In Ambon, there was clear 'mobilization' of the two communities (Klinken 2007 : 88). Klinken identifies five mechanisms of mobilization:

a. Broad social changes before the conflict.
b. Each side attributing threats to the other.
c. Organizations are created to deal with these threats/opportunities.
d. The organizations involve in collective action against each other.
e. This leads to escalation of great perceived uncertainty.

Ambon

Like Poso, Ambon was also a bureaucrat-heavy province. In 1990, 33% of non-agricultural workers in Ambon were civil servants, although the number came down to 22% in 1998, still it is sufficient to show the heavy reliance on state that is the characteristic of all the disturbed provinces. A 1995 survey showed that a disproportionate number of these civil servants were protestant Christians (56%), although their share in the total population was 43% in 1990 (Ibid : 90). This again, confirms the recurring motif of violence emerging from bureaucratic competition in a scarce-job environment.

Christianity found a place in Maluku from the 16th century and the Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM or the Maluku Protestant Church) was an active tool of the Dutch government to control the local people and create loyal soldiers and clerks for the government. Therefore the GPM acquired a unique bureaucratic character that continued even after independence (Seo 2013 : 28-29). Because of an established central organization already in place, throughout the Ambon violence the Christians looked more organized than the Muslims. Religious organizations like the GPM acquired even more importance in organizing and sustaining violence through a process of 'feedback' (presenting proof of violence to their respective audiences so that their hatred is rekindled each time) as the newly established Islamic political parties were still unorganized in Ambon. As stated before, Muslims lacked organization during the conflicts but at a later stage, they also came together under the leadership of the local Al Fatah mosque.

Ambon conflict was obviously deliberate. There were commonly identified 'brokers' and 'provocateurs'- all from the middle class. As the conflict grew and started to engulf the middle class suburbs- the polemics started to become more and more vicious. Religious hatred was sown using modern technologies like e-mails and CD-ROMs. Even the governor of Maluku province was forced to say that "The local elite had systematically poisoned the ordinary folk's mind over the religion of the office holders." (Klinken 2007 : 101). This was a rare moment of clarity though. From the beginning of the Ambon conflict, wild rumor-mongering seemed to be the order of the day by both the Jakarta based elite as well as the local leaders. The separatist Christian led movement of 1950's- 'RMS', disgruntled Suharto supporters in the army and Ambonese thugs returned from Jakarta- various actors have been blamed for the conflict at various periods (Human Rights Watch 1999).

In Ambon, the violent events occurred in five phases, beginning from January 1999 and continuing till April 2004. During the first two waves of violence, much like Poso, the

conflict remained limited to the local Muslims and Christians and their leaders. Again, like Poso, Muslim militias from outside became involved from the third wave, beginning in April 2000. Although large scale violence ceased after the government brokered peace between the local warring factions through the so called 'Malino Agreement' in 12th February 2002, sporadic shooting and bombing by the militants went on till 2004 (Tajima 2014 : 139).

Laskar Jihad militants first arrived in Ambon in 2000 to help the Muslims in the ongoing conflict (Coppel 2006 : 146). But Christians held out against them. Throughout the period of conflict after their arrival, the police and military either remained totally ineffective or they sided with one camp or the other. It is interesting to note that the involvement of Laskar Jihad here had less to do with Islamic solidarity or embattled Muslims turning to militancy. It was, in fact, a result of political maneuvering from Jakarta. Abdurrahman Wahid became the president in 2001 and asked the military to explain their atrocious conduct in East Timor. The army needed to create a diversion and a group of army officers orchestrated the involvement of Laskar Jihad in Ambon, to create a national and international issue (Klinken 2007 : 103).

Looking at the nature of identity formation, escalation and mobilization in the provinces during the post-Suharto violence, Klinken has darkly commented that the war in Ambon or Poso were neither revolution, nor a separatist movement but simply power contest among local elites in a transitory system. The Protestants were the 'Challenger Elite' in this contest who sensed an opportunity in 'Reformasi' to regain their superior position in Indonesian bureaucracy and economy as PDI-P, the party most sympathetic to Christians, became prominent (Ibid : 104).

Can the conflict be explained using the 'Security Dilemma' theory? Security Dilemma happens when once actor in a possible conflict situation is not sure what the other actor is thinking but both know they have the power to destroy each other. Such uncertainty usually drives one of them to attack preemptively (Ibid : 140). Uncertainty and thereby, the chance of a first strike increases when the traditional communication channels have broken down and the state cannot provide basic security.

Although Security Dilemma theory is useful in explaining how the conflicts started but their escalation and mobilization of non-connected actors cannot be explained without the concept of brokerage, another name of opportunism of local elite. Without their active participation, these conflicts would not have been sustained.

How riots turned into terrorism: The role of Jemaah Islamiyah

From what has been discussed so far, it seems that religious violence in Indonesia in the post-Suharto period followed a certain pattern. It began with the instigation of local leaders busy with local level power struggles and then escalated through brokerage to command attention at a national and even international level. It is usually at the national level that the militant or Jihadi organizations became involved. Initially they were welcomed by the local level government officials but eventually the militants proved ineffective to win a favorable result for Muslims. John T Sidel has written an excellent article describing the real nature of Jihadi involvement in these events and its implications on the future of political Islam in Indonesia. But one delves into that succinct analysis and what will be the final observations of this chapter, one of the most prominent militant Islamic organizations in Indonesia need to be looked at. It played a key role in not only the 1998-2001 riots but carried on a campaign of bombing and terror, including the infamous Bali bombing and Marriot Hotel bombing; that catapulted Indonesia into the terror maps of the world.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was established in 1992-93 by two former Darul Islam (DI) associates, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. Senior Al-Qaida leaders such as Riduan Isamuddin (known as Hambali) helped in the formation of this organization (Abuza 2007 : 38). The idea of establishing a militant Islamic organization grew out of the Persetuan Islam and Al-Irshad (both Islamic religious schools which focus on a 'pure' Arab-style Islam) educational background of the founders and their close supporters (Sidel 2007 : 195). Bashir ran a 'Pesantren' in central Java where a militant version of Islam was allegedly taught. During New Order era, both Sungkar and Bashir had to flee to Malaysia to avoid government persecution and it was there that JI was established. After the end of New Order, Bashir came back to Indonesia alone as Sungkar had died in exile. JI started operating in Indonesia pretty openly at first, although they were officially a clandestine organization, according to their organizational rulebook 'PUPJI'. JI received funds from a section of the military as well as from Saudi charities such as the Islamic Relief Organization (Abuza 2007 : 39).

Jemaah Islamiyah has not been able to become an efficient, hierarchically organized organization. There had been many factions in the association such as an overtly extremist faction led by Noordin Mohammad Top and Dr. Azhari bin Hussein who were advocates of the suicide bombing tactics. They also aimed to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state by 2025 (Ibid). After Sungkar's death, JI also suffered from the lack of a Supreme Leader or

‘Amir’ as Bashir was seen as a weak leader by many. JI has also not been very consistent with their methods; their commitment to international Jihad and their being embroiled in the local conflicts can be seen simply as diversifying or as confusion over goals and tactics.

Despite all their shortcomings, JI proved to be a resilient terrorist organization, despite large number of arrests and deaths of their leaders and cadres. The reasons for this resilience lie in the skill of JI leaders in propagating and justifying their violence in the name of Islam and in their own conviction that only Jihad would uphold Allah’s will and glory. JI was helped the already present hatred among the informed Indonesian Muslims against America for their perceived campaigns of injustice against the Muslims. The fact that JI was not maintaining a hierarchical structure actually helped them as a horizontal structure of self-contained cells guided intermittently by supra-cell leaders ensured that the organization would remain intact even if parts of it fall prey to state’s persecution (Ibid : 45). The JI practice of uniting their core members by encouraging strong kinship ties and intermarriage further helped in managing JI’s unity. JI and its associates successfully carried out the bombings in Bali in 2002, killing at least 200 people. Further bombing at the American owned Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, the Australian and Pilipino embassies and in Bali again killed many more and created an atmosphere of fear and distrust about Indonesia’s politics and its democratic future.

How important is a militant Islamic group like JI in the context of political Islam’s success in Indonesia? It is important to understand the difference between JI and the ‘reactionary Jihadists’ like Laskar Jundullah and Mujahidin Kompak who react violently in response to a particular problem. Such groups do initiate violence and take part in collective violence activities but they are less important to this present concern with future of political Islam in Indonesia. There are groups in Indonesia which take part in mob violence and thuggish behavior with rudimentary knowledge of Islam. Front Pembela Islam is an example. A third actor in the sphere of Islamic politics in Indonesia are the anti-western and pro-Islam student organizations. Salafis constitute a fourth group; Hizbut Tahrir is one of their well known organizations. Salafis self-declaredly focus on Dakwah or propagation of Islam through preaching. They reject violence (Ibid : 67). However Hizbut Tahrir’s name has come up multiple times as an accomplice to the terrorists. ‘Islamic’ political parties are not being mentioned here as they have already made their peace with the present liberal democratic system and do not wish to challenge it in the foreseeable future.

Has JI been a serious challenge to the democratic Indonesian state? Hardly, as one can imagine from their internal problems and inconsistencies. Also, it must be noted that the Indonesia state acted with purpose against JI. In 2005, Dr. Azahri bin Hussein was killed. In the same year, Bashir was also imprisoned. Despite coming out for some time, he has again been put to jail and remains there. In 2009, Noordin Mohammad Top was killed by the special anti-terrorism squad of Indonesian police (Hui 2013 : 2). And on April 21, 2008; a South Jakarta court declared for the first time that JI was a forbidden corporation (Forbes and Nicholson 2008). However, government officials have been silent about this judgment so far. The issue of JI's legality is still, very surprisingly, a murky one. Government officials in the past have given quite ridiculous reasons for not banning JI. For example, one official stated that JI does not even exist and it was all a western ploy to defame Indonesian Muslims. Another stated that JI has never been officially registered as an organization, so, it cannot be banned! JI and other Indonesian militant groups have become much weaker than before in Indonesia. Since 2005, Indonesia has not experienced any terrorist attack. But there are indications that the Indonesian government has not yet been able to fully disassociate its officials from the militant organizations. A striking example of this is that organizations like Hizbut Tahrir and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) still operate as perfectly legal organizations, some have their own websites! Bashir still manages to sneak past his sermons from his high security prison, as was seen recently in 2015 when he pledged allegiance to the ISIS chief, Baghdadi (Witular 2014). Democracy looks in secure in Indonesia but that does not mean that Islamic militancy cannot raise its head again.

Violence and the Project of Political Islam in Indonesia

The end of this study of Post-Suharto violence in Indonesia and its effect on Indonesian democracy has been reached. It certainly involves a lot of actors and a lot of events across a large swath of time. The 2007 article by John T Sidel which was mentioned earlier will be helpful in putting the large number of events of provincial violence in Indonesia across a temporal continuum and to make sense of the core reasons behind them. Sidel calls his approach post-structural, and rightly so-as his article attempts to see beyond the actions of the principal actors and tries to find the overarching socio-political reasons behind their actions. He claims that people's sense of identity is always incomplete as they cannot perceive their identity without contrasting it with the 'other', someone different. Simultaneously, people always rue that the existence of the 'other' with a different identity and the fact that they have to share their leaving environment with them, is not letting them fully exercise their choices

which are parts of their identity. This unavoidable conflict is present in every plural society but in situations of uncertainty, when each side fears that they might lose their identity while the other's become prominent; that they become more acute. René Girard famously said, "It is not the differences but the loss of them that gives rise to violence" (Girard 1979).

In light of this understanding, Sidel explains the violence of 1994/95 to 2005 in several temporal sections, each denoting certain stage of the elite's perception of opportunities and the ordinary people's identification with their goals.

The Muslim intelligentsia (the term not being used to denote a broad group of people who can affect political outcomes using their ability to intelligently scheme) comprised of the middle class, educated and urban Muslims first became hopeful of significantly influencing state power in the 1980's when due to a long process of urbanization and industrialization, millions of rural people devoid of their old kinship ties, arrived at the big cities and towns. The only commonality between these disparate groups was Islam which appeared to be the best way to mobilize this urban underclass or 'Kelas Bawa' (Sidel 2007a : 147). The possibility of mobilization under the banner of Islam seemed even more likely with the proliferation of educational and social service institutions under the auspices of Muhammadiyah, NU, the ministry of religious affairs and the numerous branches of state sponsored Islamic University. As a result of this, a new surge in learning and practicing doctrinal Islam was observed among the university students and common people. A plethora of Islamic literature was being published, the middle and upper classes were discussing Islam in clubs and associations. From the religion of the poor and uneducated, Islam rose to a position of prestige.

The New Order state did not ignore this rise of Islam in the public sphere and attempted to appropriate it within the corporatist fold of the state by establishing umbrella institutions like MUI and ICMI. However, the new Muslim educated class faced a glass ceiling when moving up in the state bureaucracy or the business world. The top echelons were invariably occupied by the Suharto family or their cronies. They also observed that their hope of mobilizing the common people along religious lines to further their political ambitions was proving to be difficult as the people were responding to the corrupt and insensitive 'development' plans of New Order (such as building a dam that needed to displace thousands) with strikes and mass protests, uniting all religions (Ibid : 155). Meanwhile, the urban Muslim intelligentsia were themselves falling prey to the liberal ways of New order elite and becoming comfort-loving

docile followers of state that were alienating them from the very people whom they wanted to lead. In such a condition, it was not surprising that the end of New Order in 1998 and the ascension of B. J. Habibie, the erstwhile ICMI president, would give them new hope of finally capturing the state power. Hobbies' presidency was the closest the Muslim intelligentsia ever came to real power so when he could not remain in his seat and Abdurrahman Wahid, an avowedly traditional Muslim and friend of Christians (his Vice President was Megawati, the PDI-P leader, the majority of whose M.P's were Christians), their hopes were crushed (Ibid : 202). This period of frustration at Jakarta coincided with great uncertainty at the local level due to decentralization. Coupled with the threat from migration, the political situation in provinces became volatile and ready for violence along religious lines.

The riots only subsided when; either religious boundaries were firmly drawn in a place, sometimes through 'ethnic cleansing', or when the state intervened heavily and 'peace accords' were signed to signal end of violence and new arrangements for reestablishment of patronage networks. Finally, Megawati's coming to power in 2001 and her strong position within the parliament and the military ensured security for non-Muslims and settled the question of modernist Muslims capturing state power.

Failure of the Islamic project and rise of terrorism

According to Sidel, it is this 'defeat' of Islam's political ambition in Indonesia that explains its turn to 'Jihad' or militant violence. This new type of violence differed from the earlier ones in three accounts; firstly, they did not have a spontaneous character and were very deliberately committed by trained jihadis. Secondly, the focus of violence shifted from local to national and even international targets. Thirdly, the perpetrators of violence were exclusively Muslim, unlike the 1998-2001 riots when both sides were to blame equally. Sidel claims that that the highly controlled, extra-local and one-sided natures of militant violence in Indonesia are signs of a 'narrowing' of inter-faith violence in Indonesia and evidence of its decline (Ibid: 189).

The 'narrowing' was explained by Sidel primarily as an expression of the growing remoteness of the militant leaders from the common Indonesian Muslims. The two important Jihadi leaders of Indonesia who were very active in the 2001-2005 period, Abu Bakar Bashir, the leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah and Jafar Umar Thalib, the leaders of Laskar Jihad were both hadhrami Arabs (Ibid : 195). Hadhrami Arabs were descendents of Arabic traders who settled

in Indonesia. They are traditionally viewed as the most staunchly scriptural of Indonesia's Muslims. This community has its own schooling system where both leaders studied and later received scholarships to study Islam in Saudi Arab and Pakistan. Therefore, these leaders never learned either the typical nature of Indonesian Islam neither could they identify properly with the Indonesian Muslims. For them, their real calling lay not in the archipelago but in the Middle East. This lack of connection from people showed in the location of the religious schools or 'pesantrens' set up by these leaders; they were in central java! (Ibid). The land of mysticism and syncretic Islam of Indonesia. In light of this, is it surprising that this tiny group of Muslim scholars and their followers resorted to sporadic bombing and other terrorist activities after 2001? 2001 was the year Megawati was elected as the President and all hopes for a modernist Muslim president evaporated. The militant organizations were hurt further by the 'betrayal' of the newly established and old 'Islamic' political parties like PPP, PBB, PAN and PK-all of which accepted cabinet posts in the Megawati government! The banner of Islam which was supposed to represent the whole of Indonesian people never materialized. The state started cracking down on the terrorists. In 2001 itself, Laskar Jihad militias were being decimated by the military, which explains why their bombing campaigns became so few and far between, almost reduced to an annual macabre event. The heightened alacrity and non-tolerance of the state under pressure from the international community after 9/11 ensured that the militants would not be able to organize on a big scale. Sidel concludes that his study shows that rather than proving Al-Qaida outreach in Indonesia or the allegiance of Indonesian Muslims to a Pan-Islamic Jihad, terrorist violence in Indonesia is a logical continuation of Islamic project in the country and shows a failure rather than success of political Islam.

Olivier Roy and Michel Wieviorka's assertion seems apt to describe the situation with terrorism in Indonesia, "Terrorism always betrays the disintegration of some collective action. Wherever the social, national and communal consciousness is strong, and wherever a social or any other kind of movement is capable of being formed, there can be no place for terrorist spin offs" (Wieviorka : 141).

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be asserted with some confidence that Islam has not been the cause of post-Suharto era violence in Indonesia, although much of it was carried out in Islam's name. It has been seen how the greed for power and wealth of local elite in a decentralizing

Indonesia, coupled with the vulnerability of jobless youth had led to the violence in provinces which were overly dependent on the state to provide jobs and capital. It has also been seen that Muslims were not the only or even the chief perpetrators of violence, which dismantles the claim that Muslims or Indonesian Muslims are more prone to violence than Indonesian citizens of other faiths. It can be observed how non-organized forms of violence such as lynching had been common to Indonesia but how they were the expression of extreme insecurity and loss of identity by the poor and uneducated villagers which led them to attack those of their own. Most importantly, it has been seen how terrorist attacks, solely carried out by Muslims indicate not the victory of political Islam in Indonesia but its decline and defeat. 'Islamic' political parties have accommodated themselves with a mainstream liberal democratic system, which itself is now accommodating popular Muslim demands, thereby ensuring the viability of the system in a Muslim majority country. Perhaps it will be overly optimistic to say that democracy has won its final battle in Indonesia but it can be said with confidence that it looks solid enough to win, if further battles do come.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This work's principal aim is to attempt to understand the role Islam played in the democratic experience of Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. Considering Indonesia's composite culture and great diversity in matters of language and ethnicity, it is not surprising that the nature of Islam in the country will be distinct from other Muslim majority countries. At the same time, there will be considerable differences in the way Islam is adopted and practiced by Indonesians of different ethnicity and geographic location. Then again, one has to remember that the concept of democracy is not understood in the same way by all people and in all cultures. In light of these understandings, this study ventured to first present a picture of how Islam has evolved as a spiritual and a political system. Next, the study attempted to present a short description of the concept of democracy and how it developed in the west. Thirdly, it went on to analyze the nature political Islam has taken in Indonesia and what had been its effects on the society and polity of that country. It is plain therefore that the study focussed on two major concepts. The dichotomy between Islam and democracy in general and the effect of Islam on Indonesia's democratic politics in particular. The time period of 1998-2014 was chosen as before this period, expressions of Islam in public life were either suppressed or highly controlled by the state. The pent-up energy that political Islam let through in the aftermath of the Suharto's fall from power is very suitable for the purpose of this study as mentioned.

Below is presented a chapter wise short analysis of the research findings. It will be helpful to first see the outcomes of this work in their fragmented forms and later construct a whole with the research questions and hypothesis as guiding lights.

The introductory chapter serves to present the reader with a brief background of Indonesia's recent history and the premise of this work. The drawbacks associated with the western understanding of Islam's role in politics have been dealt with. In addition to this, how Islam has influenced Indonesia's democratic consolidation is studied, given its historical legacy of religious and cultural assimilation.

The Second chapter provides the crucial theoretical base on which this study progresses further. It attempted to find if there are certain qualities within Islam which are fundamentally against the establishment of a democratic system in a country. In order to arrive at an answer, both the concepts of democracy and Islam as a public religion are explored. Attempt has been made to show the historical development of Islam vis a vis the political systems of the Muslim countries. This study has found that Islam is not incompatible with democracy although it may require modification of certain tenets of democracy. For example, the chapter has shown how secularism, considered an essential part of the liberal democratic experience, is not in fact, indispensible for establishing a democratic polity. If secularism is interpreted as freedom to practice one's own religion then there are numerous instances documented in Islamic scriptures where such freedom had been granted and encouraged. However, if secularism come to mean that the state will declare itself neutral in religious matters, then it might not be possible in an Islamic society. Again, the problem lies in the perceptions about Islam held by the non-Islamic world. In context of Indonesia, this study has found that in order to accommodate democratic as well as Islamic ideals, both the declared Islamic parties and the non-Islamic parties have incorporated certain features from each other. In this context, the crucial difference between Muslim Democracy, i.e. using Islamic symbols and rhetoric to win votes in a democratic set up and Political Islam, which aspires to establish an Islamic state with the Sharia as the basis of constitution. The chapter goes on to declare that Islamic societies can indeed have certain limitations when it comes to establishing a democratic system but in no way is it inevitable that politics in Islamic societies will lead to tyranny or theocracy.

The third chapter describes the major political events that took place in Indonesia before the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 as well as serves as a background for understanding the unique social structure of Indonesia and Islam's place in it. The chapter focuses on the changing status of Islam in Indonesia's public life and its resulting influence in politics. It attempts to show through studies of the Darul Islam rebellion and the Masjumi party that both democratic and militant expressions of Islam are possible in Indonesia. It has also established the socio-political contexts of the emergence of both types of Islamic expressions. The chapter then goes on to assert that the sudden outburst of Islamic sentiments in Indonesia after the demise of New Order was a result of both Sukarno and Suharto suppressing political expressions of Islam. The chapter also identifies the resurgence of Islam in the public sphere

during the last phase of New Order and rightly identifies this as the precursor to the striking socio-political changes that followed the end of New Order.

The fourth chapter attempts to depict the principal political events in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto till 2014. It is an account of the rise of Islamic parties, their initial positions and their compromises which they made to remain viable in a democratic set up. The chapter proves through statistical comparisons between different parties that Islamic parties steadily lost their appeal after the first election in 1999. However, it also showed the increasingly fragmentary nature of Indonesia's voting pattern which ensures that the Islamic parties have not become mere fringe players in Indonesian politics. It outlines instances of compromise by the major secular parties to build coalitions and win votes through inclusion of certain Islamic demands in their agenda. This chapter also presents an analysis of the possibility of reconciling Islamic ideals with democratic ones by a process of mutual acceptance of each other's views and bringing some Islamic demands to the mainstream of politics. This chapter also describes the very important consequences of decentralization in Indonesia that took place after 1999. Decentralization has given provincial and district level governing units considerable autonomy in financial and legal matters. Using this autonomy, some provinces have enacted by-laws inspired by the Sharia, which can prove detrimental to the democratic rights of Indonesian people. These by-laws are not meant to challenge the authority of the liberal democratic state, nevertheless they put numerous restrictions on people, affecting their right to freedom of movement, speech etc. It is a prime example of the practice of 'Muslim Democracy' proving difficult for the upkeep of democracy.

The fifth chapter focuses on the crucial issue of violence in Indonesia in the post-Suharto period and attempts to find out whether the majority's religious affinity is in some way responsible for this violence. Secondly, it attempts to discern whether this violence is detrimental to the democratic polity of Indonesia. This study found that that not all instances of violence in Indonesia during this period is related with religion. For example, the riots in Jakarta in 1998 and 2001, the witch hunts in Java which continued till 2001 are not linked with religious identities. Even in cases where religion seems to be the main reason behind violence, it is found that Christians instigated violence just as much as Muslims. Also, it was seen that in all cases of ' religious' violence, especially those which took place in the islands of South Sulawesi or West Kalimantan were actually the result of insecurity and competition among the local elite who were facing a thorough change in the power and patronage structure after Indonesia decentralized in 1999 and in 2001. Moreover, it was observed that

instances of large scale collective violence seized after 2001, when the polity stabled and Megawati Sukarnoputri, a secular leader became president. Events of terrorist attacks and bombings which continued till 2005 were found to be expressions of frustration and failure to establish an Islamic state rather than an intensification of religious violence. Indonesian democracy was not threatened by this violence. Rather, it grew in stature after the terrorists were persecuted with success.

This brief account of the research findings, presented chapter-wise gives an idea about the research outcome. But to understand this outcome more specifically, one needs to look at the original research questions mentioned in the introduction and try to discern answers from the study of the chapters. The first question posits Indonesia as a post-authoritarian country and attempts to understand the principal characteristics of democratization in a post-authoritarian country. Firstly, it must be said that although Indonesia is certainly a post-authoritarian state, it is not necessarily a post-authoritarian society. Parochial elements which value male dominance, use of brute force over opposing entities such as ethnic and religious minorities are present in Indonesian society. It must also be remembered that two post-authoritarian states may not share much in common with each other. Ethnically, linguistically and culturally diverse Indonesia is a very different society than Bangladesh. Although both present examples of Muslim-majority post authoritarian states, the reasons behind the ascendency of authoritarianism in these states are very different. Therefore, this study does not claim to find any universal characteristics of democratization in post-authoritarian countries. In case of Indonesia, the principal characteristics have been the failure of corporatist state structure and group representation and the presence of large scale vibrant Islamic organizations which acted as accumulators of public opinion as well as incubators of new leadership. The freedom of press and freedom to form parties and groups have been the other central features of Indonesian democratization.

The second research question attempts to find if there are universal criteria for judging Islam's relation with democratization and how far can such observations be applied in case of Indonesia. As depicted in the second chapter, Islamic scriptures leave ambiguity regarding democracy. While the concept of 'Shura' or consultation and rule of law rather than that of the ruler is present in Islam, other central concepts of democracy such as the authority of elected legislature to make laws and amend the Sharia-based constitution is detested. An interesting observation in this regard is just how few Muslim majority countries have actually undergone a democratization process. In contemporary times, Indonesia is one of the very

few such examples and certainly the only one in Asia. Islamic ideals were not really at the forefront of the push for democratization in Indonesia. The demands for Suharto's resignation were the result of New Order's inability to stabilize the country's economy and to check inflation of essential goods prices. However, the protests against Suharto and for democracy came principally from student groups affiliated with the major Islamic organizations of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. It was the Ulama, the religious teachers and leaders who were instrumental in putting pressure on the New Order to change things.

The third research question attempts to see whether Muslim democracy lead to conservatism in a Muslim majority country like Indonesia. This is an interesting and engaging question. A second question which follows from this is whether such conservatism leads to challenges to democracy in that country. It has been observed that Indonesia is increasingly becoming a more pious society. Religious symbols and affiliations are more openly flaunted and identities are divided on the basis of such show. Conservatism among Indonesian Muslims is by no means a novel phenomenon though. What is considered as the 'syncretic' Indonesian Islam is in fact, a variant of Islam practiced among an increasingly shrinking number of Javanese people. In the outer island territories like Sumatra, Maluku or Sulawesi, Islam was practiced rather rigidly. This explains why the secessionist Darul Islam movement was successful for such a long time in these regions. It has also been observed through surveys that Indonesians of the present generation do not have a very clear idea about the role of Islam in their polity. When faced with ambiguous questions such as whether they want secularism and Pancasila to be a part of the state's ideology, most answer positively but when faced with more specific questions such as whether or not they will let a minority place of worship to be built in their area, most of them answer negatively. Muslim Democracy as it is practised today in Indonesia (with an outward reverence for Pancasila while appeasing Islamist groups and leaders as needed) can surely lead to conservatism, considering that the parties are trying to impress these very voters. However, it must be said that there are limitations as to how much certain parties can resort to conservatism. PDI-P, for example, has a significant and wealthy Christian support base. It will be difficult for them to make Christians uncomfortable by aggressively becoming Muslim Democrats. However, other, newer parties with sufficient funding such as Hanura can do it and reap good benefits, eventually making larger secular parties rethink their position.

The fourth research question asked what will the future of Indonesia's democracy and what will possibly be political Islam's role in it. A researcher can analyze the events of past of

present but making prediction about a future event is a different issue altogether. The fifth chapter showed how the project of political Islam ultimately failed in Indonesia and how, as a result, Islamists took to militant violence that continued till 2004-2005. Even these terrorist factions had been largely tamed by government actions by 2008. Apparently it seemed as if democracy is secure from Islamist threats in Indonesia. But present events hint that it may not be so. As revealed in the fourth chapter, Indonesians tend to favour secular democratic politics when the country is stable but whenever the society or politics is in a flux, Islamic choices gain relevance. So, if Indonesia faces another economic meltdown like 1997 or if an international terrorism induced catastrophe affects the country, then such politics may gain a foothold again. However, Indonesian democracy is now more mature than it had been a decade ago. Successful elections have taken place and presidential power haven been handed over peacefully. The election of Joko Widodo as president, a member of Indonesia's middle class rather than of Jakarta elite is a sign that democratic politics has taken root in Indonesia.

In the introduction, this study forwarded the following hypothesis for testing through this research. These were:

1. An authoritarian past and a divided society are making democratic political system in Indonesia susceptible to changes from militant forces.
2. Political Islam has democratic as wells as non-democratic values and both are present in Indonesian politics.
3. Acceptance of Muslim values in an open democratic system has provided opportunities for conservatism in Indonesia.

The first hypothesis stands refuted. Indonesia has established a functional democratic system beyond all doubts. Yes, there are challenges and difficulties in the form of corruption, poverty and bigotry among sections of people but not in a scale that can defeat the democratic system. Change is constant in all democracies and it is only natural that changing needs and wishes of the people will be accommodated in a democracy but such changes never alter the system itself, which is also the case with Indonesia.

The Second hypothesis stands validated. Political Islam does have democratic as well as non-democratic values and both are present in Indonesia. The democratic values of Islam such as

consultation and rule of law is present. At the same time, at provincial level, those provinces which have adopted the Islamic legal system tend to curtail the rights of minorities and to impose strict laws about drinking, gambling and clothing as well as regarding rights and position of women, which contravene democratic norms. While it is not true that violence is an intrinsic characteristic of Islam, but as it is explained in the fifth chapter, violence can become a tool for those who believe that a certain religion has claims to absolute truth. Indonesia has seen a lot of religiously induced violence, especially in the provinces. At national level also there exist militias created on a mixed platform of thuggery and religious zeal (Front Pembela Islam, for example) who endanger the democratic atmosphere.

The third hypothesis also stands validated. If Muslim values such as overt show of religious adherence become a part of democratic exercise then that does open channels for conservatism. Conservatism can mean simply staunch adherence to the daily prayer schedule but it can also mean curtailing of freedom of women and minorities. The problem with a religious basis for democracy is that there are many different ways in which desirable practices can be defined. When a declared secular political party opts to indulge Islamic groups and their demands, it gives these groups leverage over the democratic system.

In light of this discussion so far, the ultimate outcome of this work can be summarised through the following sentences.

A majority of Indonesians are taking interest in doctrinal Islam, shifting from their traditional syncretism. This shift is by no means sudden; this change in religious position coincides with spread of education and rise of a middle class. Pent-up force of political Islam did hope and attempted to win state power through electoral means but failed. In the post-Suharto democratic politics, Islamic parties have increasingly lost ground as secular parties outdo them in manpower, electoral spending and advertisement but the principle reason they failed to attract voters is because the secular parties appropriated some of their agendas and stroke a middle ground. Despite instances of religious violence, electoral democracy faces no serious threat in Indonesia. This does not mean that Indonesian democracy faces no challenge, though. Widespread corruption and collusion persists, as well as attempts to silence the free media and social media. At local level, adoption of Islamic laws helps the local elite perpetuate their power. Lack of independent work opportunities in smaller towns and villages makes state the ultimate provider; giving the local elite further opportunity to exploit the poor. Therefore, the final words that can be said are: Islam is not a threat to Indonesia's

successful democratization in the 1998-2014 period but if democratization is understood as greater than free elections and the right to live freely with dignity then there remains large gaps in implementation of democracy. Islam has been just a tool in the hands of the leaders who used for their benefit and can do so again given the poverty and dependence of people on the state structure of which these leaders, Islamic organizations and secular parties are parts.

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