


**SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT: ROYALTY
AND THE EVERYDAY STATE IN
RAJASTHAN**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in fulfillment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of*
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

25th July, 2015

I declare that the dissertation entitled 'SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT: ROYALTY AND THE EVERYDAY STATE IN RAJASTHAN', submitted by me is in fulfilment of the requirements of the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy of this University.

This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree in this University or any other University and it is my own work.

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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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ABSTRACT

The Indian Constituent Assembly envisaged constituting the constitutional peoplehood for the people of India. Indian state's intention to constitute constitutional peoplehood could not take the intended path in the state of Rajasthan. Ascriptive factors still justify the legitimacy of former *Maharajas* or nobles in the state of Rajasthan (Rudolph, 1966). The scholarly body of literature on Rajasthan explains the continuance of ascriptive factors with the help of variable – *the strength of princely symbols*. This dissertation examines the aspect of the continuance of ascriptive factors with the help of three variables viz., *the strength of princely symbols*; *contradictory approaches of the Indian state* and the *agency of the people*. These three variables explain that continuance of ascriptive factors in Rajasthan is not only because of the strength of princely symbols. The role of the Indian state in allowing these symbols to continue is also very important to understand the reason for the continuance of ascriptive factors. This dissertation examines these two variables in the context of Udaipur. It comes to the conclusion that these two variables have helped in the continuance of ascriptive factors in Udaipur.

The dissertation also examines the interactions of symbols of state and former princely rulers in the modern context. It also examines the impact of this interaction on the people's identity as the citizens. The interactions of symbols of state and princely symbols produce three possibilities. The first, it provides space for princely symbols to get legitimized in the democratic contexts. The second, it creates an opportunity for the Indian state to legitimize its democratic symbols in historically constituted peoplehood. The third, it opens a large window for people to express disobedience to the symbols of state as well as the princely symbols.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Problem

India got its independence from the British Empire on August 15, 1947. The independence brought before the Indian leaders a challenging task to frame a Constitution for India that will be modern yet specific to Indian contexts. An attempt was already under progress, few months before the formal announcement of the Indian independence, to discuss and deliberate how to build independent India on principles of modern democratic values. Nehru introduced the Objective Resolution, henceforth OR, in the Constituent Assembly on December 13, 1946. The Objective Resolution stated its intention of drawing sovereignty of India from its people. Making India a republic was also its stated objective. An intense debate took place, in the Constituent Assembly, over a possibility of successful transition to the Republic of India; and the principle of popular sovereignty about the people and territory of the princely states. However, an agreement was reached to establish India as a sovereign democratic republic that will draw its sovereignty from the will of the people. All these values also got recognition in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution. Nehru strongly defended popular sovereignty for India, while defending OR in the Constituent Assembly, by adding that the princely states and their people will have complete freedom over the form of government in their respective territory if they choose to stay away from India, but if they wish to join India they must abide by the principle of popular sovereignty¹. In brief, India will not have multiple forms of sovereignty in a single territory; principle of popular sovereignty and Divine Rights of Kings cannot coexist together; rather all people of the India would have to be of equal legal status.

While choosing people as the source of popular sovereignty for the independent India, Constitution Makers neglected discussion over how the source of popular sovereignty is differently constituted in their respective peoplehood and how much this would influence actual functioning and realization of the popular sovereignty itself. Let me explain here the concept of peoplehood.

¹ 'Constituent Assembly Debates', Volume 2. Retrieved from, <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol2p3.htm> on 02 April, 2015.

The concept of peoplehood has its root in Edward H. Spicer's work (1962) – *Cycles of Conquest and the Yaquis: A Cultural History* on 'enduring peoples' or 'cultural enclaves'. His work tried to understand people by disassociating them from conventional forms of groupings i.e. religions, ethnicity and class. Spicer's notion of 'enduring people' or 'cultural enclaves' is community of people whose sense of solidarity get drawn from common territory, language and ceremonial cycles that allows the people to endure or persist through time (Holm, Pearson and Chavis, 2003: 11).

The concept of 'cultural enclaves' was used and further explained in George Pierre Castile and Gilbert Kushner's edited volume *Persistent Peoples: Cultural Enclaves in Perspective* (1981). This book revolves around the central question – how do some groups of peoples endure through time even though they are placed in several dominant socio-cultural systems that aim to assimilate, oppress or eradicate them (Stull, 1982: 185). In the introductory chapter of this volume, Castile suggests that it is a continuum of common identity through shared set of symbols that make some community of people a 'persistent peoples'. According to Castile, set of symbols varies from group to group and could even significantly change within the same group over a period of time; so, it is not the set of symbols or culture rather how people retain an unbroken sense of identity that make them 'persistent peoples' (ibid). So, a set of symbols are not important per se rather how the set of symbols are shared that produces a common identity is important for the constitution of 'persistent peoples'. Castile notes that "a people can remain the same "people" in spite of essentially total change in cultural content as long as they retain an unbroken sense of identity" (Castile, 1981: 178). So, two simultaneous mechanisms are important to make 'persistent peoples': first, retaining an unbroken sense of identity and second, maintaining boundaries between the 'people' and the 'others'.

Robert K. Thomas worked on Spicer's original idea of 'cultural enclaves' and modified it to include 'sacred history' as an important constituent of peoplehood. So, his conception of peoplehood has four elements – a distinct language, a particular territory, a specific ceremonial cycle and a sacred history that are interlinked and interwoven in such a way that their separation become impossible (Holm, Pearson and Chavis, 2003: 11-13). According to Thomas, none of these four elements is more important than others and all are interlinked that constitute particular human group's

large sense of identity. So peoplehood essentially explains about the community of people regarding “how they came into existence, how they should behave in relation to their environment, when and how they perform ceremonies, and how they are related to each other within the community” (Holm, 2000: 43).

All these literature (Spicer, 1962; Castile and Kushner, 1981 and Holmer, Pearson and Chavis, 2003) on peoplehood observe that sharing of unique set of symbols among members of a group is necessary to produce, and to a large extent perpetuate, a common and unbroken sense of identity among themselves. The shared aspect of a set of symbols among members of a group makes it unique and also provides space to produce and maintain boundaries between the ‘people’ and the ‘others’. These two collective processes – sharing a set of symbols and creating boundaries between the ‘people’ of the group and the ‘others’ constitute peoplehood.

This particular notion of peoplehood disguises more than it says about peoplehood. It is based on the assumption that group constituting peoplehood shares a unique set of symbols. In other words, all the symbols (which constitute a unique set of symbols) of peoplehood is shared by its constituting members. This definition of peoplehood is premised on the intention of giving a unique and undifferentiated identity to groups of people who are otherwise constitutive of multiple identities i.e. caste, class, gender, religion. No doubt, an undifferentiated identity could be created through the notion of peoplehood but assuming that the undifferentiated identity would make other identities of people redundant is no less than an exaggeration. Going through this framework it would be impossible to understand why people of a particular peoplehood react differentially, very often, to symbols that are not very much constitutive of their own peoplehood. Take for instance the context of Udaipur. The city of Udaipur has very much the Mewari identity (as Udaipur was the capital of erstwhile rulers of Mewar) that constitute the people of Udaipur into Mewari peoplehood. During my fieldwork in Udaipur when I asked the question whether Rajputs should be given reservation in the Indian Army, as many Rajputs has been arguing citing their role in the past as the warrior class, response of the people were very different. Not only responses were different but reasons given in support of the responses were also very different. One objection to this example would be that the city of Udaipur is not the original Mewari peoplehood rather it is in the phase of transition. Fair enough, the objection has valid ground; however even if we try to

speculate the similar instances we can find numerous moments in history where people of a particular peoplehood have responded or reacted differentially to the world outside their own peoplehood. The question: what induce the people of a particular peoplehood to adopt differential lens to interrogate the world outside as well as inside of their own peoplehood, affirms the presence of multiple other symbols that may not be predominant constituents of the peoplehood at all instances.

The literature on peoplehood has tried to explain the nature and characteristics of peoplehood through its constitutive aspect, that is, how peoplehood gets constituted. This framework allowed the theorists of peoplehood to draw a boundary between those symbols that are shared by the people and those that are not shared as far as their role in the constitution of common identity is concerned. The boundary got a new meaning when the prior were termed as functional and the latter as non-functional. This categorization has sidelined various interrelated aspects of peoplehood i.e. how the shared set of symbols get influenced by the symbols that are not so much shared in a peoplehood; how do shared as well as non-shared symbols of peoplehood interact with the external environment; how do external environment bring in its own symbols to dominate the shared set of symbols of peoplehood. All these aspects could be understood if we shift our focus from constitutive aspects of peoplehood to transitory aspects of peoplehood, that is, where one form of peoplehood is slowly moving towards a new form of peoplehood. Constitutive aspect of peoplehood has tried to fixate the form of peoplehood; has projected it as possessor of high inertia that is difficult to change as long as the common identity is shared by people; has necessitated the production of the 'otherness' of those who do not share their commonly shared symbols for continuum of peoplehood.

To understand the interactions of inner and outer world of peoplehood, this dissertation focuses not on the aspect of how peoplehood get constituted rather how peoplehood reacts, resists or accepts to external attempts that intend to transform existing peoplehood into a new one. For the sake of clarity, an attempt has been undertaken to present the transitory aspects of peoplehood into three models.

MODEL – I: Internally Driven Change in Peoplehood

Symbols that do not produce commonly shared identity of peoplehood, but provide identities to the people living in peoplehood has many roles in transiting an existing

peoplehood into some other forms over a period. Let us call the symbols which are shared by people of peoplehood that produces a unbroken sense of identity as 'X' and the symbols that do not constitute the shared set of symbols of peoplehood as 'Y'. Both X and Y stay in a peoplehood, but both have relatively different functions. The X intends to produce a universal sense of identity by shedding particularities that may have come due to Y. The Y, on the other hand, interrogates the universality of X through its particularities. The functional behavior of X and Y differ due to distinct mechanisms through which these symbols are created in a social space. X is constituted through the inner world of peoplehood; however, Y is constituted through the outer world of peoplehood. Y remains in dormant state in peoplehood and tries to see the outer world through the lens of X. Whenever Y sees through its own lens it tries to interrogate and re-interrogate X and the notion of peoplehood coming from the X. It produces several new forms of peoplehood, relatively distinct from the peoplehood projected through X, in the mind of people. It is what I have called 'asymmetrical peoplehoods' within a peoplehood. It is asymmetrical in the sense that there are several notions of peoplehoods within a peoplehood; these are relatively distinct from each other; also, these are slightly distinct from the peoplehood in which they are synced. These asymmetrical peoplehoods within a peoplehood have a tendency to restructure their original peoplehood but mostly at a slower pace.

MODEL – II: Change in Peoplehood Due to its interaction with the External Environment

A change in peoplehood also comes due to the interactions of Y with the symbols outside their peoplehood. Change exhibited in Y due to the interactions with the external world also shapes the way X is shared among people of peoplehood. However, neither X nor Y shapes its configuration on the terms set by the external environment. Both changes, slowly, but on their convenience. So, the process of change takes too much time to be visible in a concrete sense.

MODEL – III: Externally Driven Change in Peoplehood

A change in peoplehood could also take place due to the forces exerted by the external environment in which the external forces set the terms of submission. There could be many external forces, but the role of the state is very important in shaping various peoplehood within its territorial realm. The state has legitimacy in its political

community, and it could label several locally constituted peoplehood illegitimate to bring all of those into its envisaged form of political peoplehood. The Indian state is one of such type. It has intended to constitute constitutional peoplehood in its territory ever since its independence by terming several peoplehood, peoplehood framed on the historical experiences of people's identity as 'subjects' in the former princely states, illegitimate. However, Indian state's attempt to constitute constitutional peoplehood in its whole territory could not succeed. There are several reasons that could actually explain this event. To bring out a substantial change in the existing peoplehood through the external force i.e. state, it is important that symbols of external force treat X as well as Y differently. X needs to be attacked in its all manifestations, and Y needs to be instigated to join their symbols with the symbols of the external force. Indian state attacked X, partially, by delegitimizing titles and political privileges of former rulers of princely states in India. It did not exert sufficient forces on X to make it non-relevant in their respective peoplehood. Rather, Indian state permuted with many aspects of X i.e. cultural to draw Y in its fold. What I mean by the permutation is that mutation of X and symbols of the state were done in an orderly manner, not in any random manner. Orderly mutation of these symbols was necessary to avoid the symbols of state from being termed as the 'other' in princely peoplehood. However, the permutation of symbols brought a new dilemma for people of the princely peoplehood as it placed people in two mutually contradictory categories – 'citizens' and 'citizens-subjects'. What I mean by this contradictory category is that, people's placing under the symbols of the state gives them the identity of 'citizen' but their placing under permuted symbols of X and symbols of the state generate an identity of 'citizen-subjects' in which people retains the identity of citizens as well as subjects in mix proportion. Since the identity of people as 'subjects' of their ruler is a historical aspects in reference to the context of independent India, the placing of people in the permuted symbols of princely peoplehood and symbols of Indian state produces new contradictory categories i.e. 'outside history' and 'inside-outside history' through which Indian state tries to situate people of former princely states in new democratic contexts. Placing in 'outside history' gives the identity of 'citizen' and placing in 'inside-outside history' produces people's identity of a mix of 'citizens-subjects'.

Rogers M. Smith defines stories of peoplehood as stories that are historical in origin but persuasive in narrating, that

... prompt people to embrace the valorized identities, play the stirring roles, and have the fulfilling experiences that political leaders strive to evoke for them, whether through arguments, rhetoric, symbols, or “stories of a more obvious and familiar sort (Smith, 2003: 45).

He mentions three types of stories – economic, political power and ethically constitutive stories to exhibit how these stories constitute identities of people, their ethical and cultural values and also their political community (ibid. 65). Smith, however, sees functions and uses of stories of peoplehood in only one direction – the formation of political community. He neglects probability of bidirectional function of stories of peoplehood. Sometimes several local stories of peoplehood might be coming in conflict with basic assumptions of state’s envisaged political community, and this might have serious consequences for its political people. In other words, sometimes stories of peoplehood become an obstacle in the formation of political community.

For instance, Mewar ruler (1540-1597) Maharana Pratap is commonly seen in Indian popular imagination as a great warrior, ruler and patriot who led his life safeguarding his people. Local people of Udaipur (erstwhile capital of Mewar rulers) district of Rajasthan proudly associate the identity of the city with Maharana Pratap. His birth anniversary is widely celebrated with great splendor all over the city in which local populaces along with the erstwhile ruler’s family participate. This opportunity is used by the erstwhile ruler of Mewar to associate all great symbols, stories and sacrifices of Pratap with a not so good history of rulership of the Mewar dynasty. A sense of legitimacy for the whole history of rulership of Mewar is attempted drawing from a particular instance of sacrifice and bravery of Pratap. It becomes a challenge for the independent India to filter out the great legacy of Maharana Pratap from his dynasty and add it to the political community of India as an important constituent. The process of filtering out would have been quite easier if former rulers were denied tools to manifest and continue their princely symbols in democratic India. Even though the former rulers lost their right to rule once they joined independent India they were granted several personal privileges, financial assistance, and rights over royal regalia by the Indian state. Several festivals, ceremonials, processions and cultural practices which were the everyday part of people in princely states continued, in almost identical form along with active support from the Indian state. These visible manifestations of princely symbols led stories of peoplehood to continue in almost

same form, without much contestation, even 60 years after their assimilation in independent India.

This study, therefore, places a slightly different level of emphasis on peoplehood to understand the nature of the Indian state. It intends to prioritize symbolic manifestations, through which stories of peoplehood seek their reference, over stories of peoplehood in analyzing the evolution of Indian political community since independence. It would help in figuring out reasons behind a relatively lower level of success for the Indian state, in the state of Rajasthan, in its attempt to form a political community for whole India.

The primacy of people over their peoplehood in the discussions, in the Constituent Assembly debates, in India is quite understandable if one imagines the situation at the time of independence where people were constituted distinctly in their relatively different peoplehood. In such a context, Constitution Makers found it pragmatic to push for the construction of a form of peoplehood based on the principles and values of modern democracy which would override several symmetrically or asymmetrically constituted peoplehood in different regions of India. Imagination was that constitutional peoplehood, in due course of time, would sideline or at least would make non-relevant the already existing peoplehood that were based on traditional values i.e. divine rights of Kings.

The next question that arises is had India progressed on its intended path of constitutional peoplehood. If yes, then how far it has progressed? If no, why could not it undertake its intended path? The answer to the above question is a mixed one. Much progress on the path of the formation of constitutional peoplehood has been made in multiple corners of India. However, the same could not be said in the case of the state of Rajasthan, a state in India. Several pieces of literature have pointed out the sustenance of the princely symbols, in unmodified or permuted forms, in the modern democratic polity of the Rajasthan (Rudolph, 1966: 141). Why did the Indian state fail to progress on its intended path of constitutional peoplehood in the state of Rajasthan despite doing fairly well in most of the other states? Why does an attempt to define the people of Rajasthan as citizens get muddled under the dilemma of ‘outside history’ and ‘inside history’? How does the contradictory categories ‘citizens-

subjects' and 'citizen' go hand in hand in this state? What are the possible explanatory variables that could explain this situation?

1.2 Background and Context of the Study

The study has been undertaken in the Udaipur district of the Indian state of Rajasthan. Rajasthan is the largest state in India by area with a total of 33 districts. The history of Rajasthan is very old, almost 5000 years old, associating much with its origin in mythology. The present day Rajasthan, earlier known as erstwhile Rajputana comprising 19 princely states, Lava and Kushalgarh's chief ships and a British administered territory of Ajmer-Merwara, was formed after a long process of integration beginning on March 17, 1948 and ended on November 1, 1956². Rajasthan has a large indigenous populace i.e. the Meo, Minas, Banjaras, Godia Lohars, Bhils, Grasia, Kathodi, Sahariyas, Rabaris and Oswals. Besides this indigenous population, Jats and Gujars are also part of Rajasthan's demography, especially in the north and west. Though the large percentage of Rajasthan's population is Hindu, Muslims (most of them Sunnis) form almost 10% of the population. A very small percentage of Shiaite Muslims (Bhoras) are also present in southeastern Rajasthan. The Rajputs are the most influential section in Rajasthan, even though they represent a small proportion of the populace, due to their historical position of being the rulers of erstwhile Rajputana.

Rajasthan is culturally very rich. Festivals, fairs, arts, forts, palaces, museums, ceremonials, folklore, dance and paintings are integral constituents of Rajasthani culture. Each region has their forms of dance, fairs, dialectics, festivals and folklore. Camel festival of Bikaner, Nagaur fair, Mewar festival of Udaipur, Gangaur festival, Kaila Devi fair, Mahavir Ji fair, Summer festival of Mount Abu, Teej festival of Jaipur, Gogaji fair, Kaliteej, Ramdevra fair, Marwar festival of Jodhpur, Dusshera, Pushkar fair of Ajmer, Chandrabhaga fair and Kolyat fair of Bikaner are some of the widely celebrated fairs and festivals of Rajasthan. Several festivals become occasions to carry out ceremonies and processions. For instance, during the Teej festival in Jaipur an idol of Goddess Parvati is taken out in royal procession from the City Palace

² Government of Rajasthan, 'Rajasthan History', Retrieved from <http://rajasthan.gov.in/AboutRajasthan/RajasthanHistory/Pages/default.aspx>, on 03-01-2015

to the Chaughan stadium. A large number of people take part in this procession. A few kilometers long procession includes bullock carts, decorated horses, elephants and camels; a group of dancers along with brass bands; and a palanquin of Goddess Parvati. Dance, music and art forms have been the conscious self of erstwhile royal courts. The presence of folklore has continuously shaped the prevalent art forms of Rajasthan from time to time. Ghoomar dance, Gair dance, Chari dance, Kachhi Ghodi, Fire dance, Terah Taali, Kathputli, Pabuji Ki Phach and Maand are celebrated folk dance and music of Rajasthan. Folk songs capture the heroic tales of battles, tragedies and even the local legendary heroes. Rajasthan is also the home of several standard paintings i.e. Miniature paintings, Gemstone paintings, Phad paintings, Kajali paintings and Krishangarh Paintings (Bani Thani). It is also famous for international standard handicraft works. Rajasthan's architectural heritage consists of majestic forts, marvelously carved out temples and *havelis*. Some of these are Jantar Mantar (Jaipur), Lake Palace and City Palace (Udaipur), Dilwara Temples, Chittaurgarh Forts and Jaisalmer Havelis. Forts and palaces of former rulers have found a new lease of life in the modern context in the state of Rajasthan. Several large palaces of the former rulers have been converted into Heritage five-star hotels. It would not be an exaggeration to term Rajasthan as a land of heritage hotels. In 1971 when the privy purses and several other privileges of former rulers were abolished, these rulers lost their traditional means of livelihood. To overcome financial constraints, several of them converted their palaces and fortresses into heritage hotels. Each of these heritage hotels depicts their history and traditions. The richness in indigenous culture and traditions has made Rajasthan one of the most popular tourist destinations, for both domestic and international tourists, in India. The tourism industry in Rajasthan is flourishing and contributes a comparatively significant proportion to the state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 'Palace on Wheels' and 'Royal Rajasthan on Wheels' are the two among many modern manifestations of princely symbols in new democratic contexts. The Palace on Wheels started in 1983; it was conceived on the royal background of railway coaches; that were originally the personal coaches of former rulers of the princely states of Rajputana. Named after several Palaces of former rulers of Rajputana, a total of 14 luxury coaches within the train Royal Rajasthan on Wheels were launched in 2009 on the model of The Palace on Wheels.

The Government of Rajasthan has undertaken several initiatives to attract tourists in the state. One of these initiatives is 'Rajasthan Calling'. The motto behind 'Rajasthan Calling' is to attract domestic tourists to Rajasthan and showcase the traditions and cultures of the everyday Rajasthan. To preserve the rich heritage of Rajasthan, Government of Rajasthan has recently launched a scheme, '*Adopt-a-Monument*'. It is basically aimed at conserving the fragile monuments. The scheme is structured on the model of public-private partnership (PPP) where Non-Resident Rajasthanis, corporate houses, and individuals are encouraged to sponsor the conservation work of fragile monuments.

The political system of Rajasthan is not devoid of the cultural components widespread in the state. In the realm of electoral politics, the culture and traditions of Rajasthan play an important role. Though the electoral space of Rajasthan is dominated by the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), neither of these parties takes the risk of neglecting the former rulers. Many of them are deployed by the political parties to draw crowds during the electoral campaign. While many of the former rulers and their descendants have directly participated in the electoral politics, some of them became kingmakers and many others have worked behind the scenes (Narain and Mathur, 1990).

This peculiar aspect of the social, cultural and political life of Rajasthan provided a rich ground to speculate and investigate the research problem that this dissertation is examining. However, time constraint does not allow a thorough investigation of the social, cultural and political everyday life of the people of the Rajasthan. So this study is undertaken in the district of Udaipur (which is further limited to the area around the City Palace in Udaipur and the study does not research the countryside). The selection of Udaipur vis-à-vis other cities (many of which were either former princely states or a part of such), however, has not been done arbitrarily, rather it is based on five reasons.

- A. Udaipur district, where the field works have been undertaken, of the state of the Rajasthan, bears a fine imprint of the form of culture, tradition, economy and polity prevalent in the Rajasthan. Forts, festivals, ceremonials, monuments, lakes, dance, songs, art forms, etc. are also an integral part of the life and culture of the populace of Udaipur. Udaipur is the capital city of the

erstwhile princely state of Mewar. Maharana Udai Singh founded Udaipur in 1559 as a new capital of the Mewar kingdom. A large number of lakes, almost all of that were made during the reign of Mewar dynasty, beautify the city and it is called the 'City of Lakes.' Some of these are Lake Pichola, Jaisamand Lake, Udaisagar Lake and Fatehsagar Lake. Many age old temples, which were built by former rulers, also define the city of Udaipur. People in large numbers visit these temples on a daily basis or during festivals or processions. Some of these temples are Eklingi temple, Keshariaji temple, and Nathdwara temple. Eklingi temple has special importance in the history of Mewar as Lord Eklingi is seen as the *Kul- Devata* by the Maharanas (a ruling clan) of Mewar. In brief, Udaipur has almost all the cultural imprints, though in some cases slight different in form, i.e. forts, palaces, monuments, dances, arts, festivals, ceremonials which define the everyday life of people as it does in other parts of Rajasthan.

- B. The second reason for choosing the city of Udaipur as the site of the field study is related to my first visit to the city in 2013. I had visited Udaipur for three days as part of my research project for post-graduation study. Though my first visit to the city was of very short duration but that instigated me to understand more and more about the city and its way of life.
- C. The other three reasons are mostly based on my limited understanding of the comparative position/situation of the city of Udaipur vis-à-vis other cities of Rajasthan that were earlier erstwhile princely state or the part of it. The third reason was the historical importance associated with the Haldighati where the Maharana Pratap (or Pratap Singh) fought a battle with the Mughal emperor Akbar. Pratap Singh (1540-1597) was the ruler of Mewar belonging to Sisodia clan of Rajputs. The bravery shown in the Haldighati battle by the Pratap Singh made him a local hero and even now he is recognized as a fearless warrior who safeguarded his people until his death. The title 'Maharana' was given to him to pay respect to his bravery. In popular Indian literature he remains an inspirational and patriotic figure. Maharana Pratap Jayanti is celebrated all across the Rajasthan, also in all parts of India, on his birth anniversary on May 9. Recently on his birth anniversary a signature campaign was initiated demanding Indian government to recognize the birth anniversary

of Maharana Pratap as “Rashtriya Swabhiman Diwas” (National Self-Respect Day)³. This campaign started in several states, and almost fifty thousand signatures were obtained in support of this initiative. Though erstwhile Rajputana had several princely states, not any ruler is even nearly as popular, in the popular imagination of the people of Rajasthan as well as India as Maharana Pratap. Pratap has become a well recognized symbolic figure, used presently in both progressive and regressive ways. Many people see him as a symbol of bravery, patriot, strategist and the symbol of unity between Hindu and Muslims; but several other former rulers use it to seek legitimacy for their form of rulership in modern contexts, through quite modern ways. This peculiar history of Mewar separates it from many other erstwhile princely states and provides a very fertile source for my study.

- D. Fourth, although the fight among family members of the former princely states of Rajasthan about the sharing of an ancestral property has been a common phenomenon, the situation of the Mewar dynasty is slight different. Maharana Bhagwat Singh, the last recognized ruler of Mewar, willed his entire property through a trust to his younger son Arvind Singh Mewar and made him the executor of his will in 1984. After the death of the Bhagwat Singh, his elder son Mahendra Singh was recognized as the Head of the Family in a Royal ceremony but his younger brother refused to recognize him as such. The property disputes of the family and the issue of recognition continue to be fought even today in several courts of the India. The reason Bhagwat Singh preferred to recognize his younger son over the elder as the head of the family led to the circulation of numerous stories in the surrounding populace. These rumours built a chain of perception about the former rulers in the minds of the people of Udaipur. Though this event could not have provided legitimacy to these rulers, it kept the symbols of Royals visible in the mind of people. Supporters of both brothers rallied around and kept the princely symbols quite visible.

³ ‘Celebrate May 9 as Swabhiman Diwas’, *The Times of India*, May 9, 2015. Retrieved from <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/patna/Celebrate-May-9-as-Swabhiman-Diwas/articleshow/47217529.cms> on May 15, 2015 and ‘Intellectuals want May 9 as ‘Rashtriya Swabhiman Diwas’, *webindia123*, March 21, 2015. Retrieved from <http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/India/20150321/2558025.html> on April 3, 2015.

E. Fifth, Tourism is a flourishing industry in Rajasthan. The State Government has undertaken a proactive role in the development of tourism sector in the state. However, several heritage sites, monuments, palaces, and forts are still in poor condition. Though the state government took acquisition of several sections of former princely states' heritage sites after 1971 and made it the state property but some of these were left with the former rulers i.e. some Palaces where they used to reside. Several former rulers did not pay much attention to the changing circumstances but the last recognized ruler of Mewar, Bhagwat Singh acted differently. He converted all his property into a trust and converted one of his Palaces into a heritage hotel i.e. Jag Niwas Palace in the Lake Pichola. His son Arvind Singh showed the high skill of entrepreneurship and converted some portions of Palaces into a museum. He further developed the neglected sections of his property and opened them for the tourists. He simultaneously worked towards beautifying the city of Udaipur and conservation of water in the city. All these efforts drew a large number of tourists into the city and the dependence of the local populace on the tourism industry increased. It has brought a new form of legitimacy to the princely symbols in the mind of the people. This form of dedicated entrepreneurship was absent in most of erstwhile Rajputana.

These were the reasons why I choose to survey and study the city of Udaipur. The followings are the objectives of the study:

1. Indian state's attempt to imagine people in two contradictory frameworks: 'outside history' and 'within history'; 'citizen' and 'citizen-subject', is an important tool to understand the notions of citizenship emanating from official as well as unofficial discourses. How do interaction(s) of the symbols of the modern Indian state and the former rulers blur the boundary between 'Citizen' and 'Subject'?
2. What are the compulsions or state's strategies behind such contradictory imaginations? Is it because of the *strength of princely symbols* or, because of the state's strategy to permute its symbols with those of erstwhile royalty' to install legitimacy in the minds of people?

3. What does the state variously means or what is the state for people in an erstwhile princely state, when they are placed under permuted symbols of state and erstwhile royalty?
4. How do people also use the symbols of their peoplehood to counter everyday forms of state power? How does the assimilation into the symbols and using the same symbols to counter state's power go hand in hand?

1.3 Methodology

The study is exploratory in nature and consists of both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The research was conducted in the Udaipur district of the state of Rajasthan. However, the research does not claim to have studied all the corners of the Udaipur. It primarily focused on the urban landscape i.e. few kilometers around the area of the City Palace. It did not study the rural landscape due to lack of time and also due to the assumption that presence of princely symbols might have little presence, in the new and changing contexts, in the far flung villages of the Udaipur.

Quantitative research was undertaken through a questionnaire that had both open-ended as well as close-ended questions. A copy of the questionnaire is enclosed in the Appendix section. As the entire population of the urban landscape of the Udaipur was difficult to study, the analysis generated through the data of the purposive sampling was applied to the rest of the population also. Simple random sampling was undertaken, and the sample size was fixed at 53. However, the aim was to survey all possible different groups and categories of the population on the parameters of gender, religion, caste, age and profession. As questionnaire based research requires one to one interaction, I tried to keep my research high on the ground of ethical framework. Respondents were informed that the research is an independent study strictly for academic purposes and is not linked to any political parties, organizations, government and security agencies. They were assured of the confidentiality of the information they disclosed. At all stages of the interaction, participation of the people in the survey was voluntary.

The problem on which this research intends to throw light requires a deep understanding of the qualitative components of the field. The study undertook

observational method to capture the manifestations of symbols of all kinds in the public sphere. Though a list of things to be observed was prepared in advance, the list is in the Appendix, the overall mode of observation was unstructured, uncontrolled and non-participant.

Even though the basic components required for the field work were well planned, the research certainly encountered several problems in the field. Since I did not get time to carry out a pilot study of the field, I missed some of the more relevant open-ended questions that should have been the part of the questionnaire. Few options of some of the close-ended questions did not correspond to the local dialectic. Another difficulty I faced was to make people comfortable enough to talk to me. Sometimes, respondents tried to know the caste, religion, the place from which I belong. I suspect that in this case some of their responses might have been colored once I disclosed my social identity. Interviewing women was very difficult. In the first place, very few women agreed to respond to my questionnaire in the marketplace. Some of the women were interviewed in their homes, but constant interventions from their husbands and children made it difficult to carry out interviews in a coherent manner. I suspect that some of their responses carried the responses of the family members surrounding them. The one important limitation this research carries is that it might have changed the meaning of several responses of the open-ended questions due to the inherent incongruence between the responses given in a particular language and noting down the responses in another language. Despite all these limitations, the study has tried to capture the various worlds around the people and how they see that. However, at no stages of the research does this study claim to be value-neutral.

Apart from the fieldwork surveys the study has also relied heavily on the print and electronic resources. Primary sources include Official documents, Court Judgments, Constituent Assembly Debates, National and Regional Television Channel, National and Regional Newspapers. Secondary sources include several relevant books, chapters in the book(s), and articles in the research journals.

1.4 Organisation of the Study

This study has several components. It studies the Indian state's imagination of people in two contradictory frameworks – 'citizens-subjects' and 'citizens'; 'inside history' and 'outside history'; compulsions or strategies behind such imaginations. It uses three variables – strength of the princely symbols; contradictory approaches of the Indian state; and agency of the people; to interrogate the research problem outlined in the dissertation.

Chapter Two is divided into three sections. The first section maps out different notions around which concepts of the state have been conceptualized. It discusses strengths and weaknesses of existing notions of state and reasons for its conceptual contestations. It, however, progresses with a contested notion of state to analyze the subject of this study. The reason this study moves with a contested notion of state is that its primary aim is to understand how people see the state through the lens of their peoplehood. The second section analyzes state-society relations in the existing literature. This section categorizes the study of state-society relations into four parts (I, II, III and IV) to understand the distinction among all four parts in simple ways. The fourth part, further, is internally divided into two sections, namely, permeable boundary and blurred boundary. This section argues that it is not enough only to explore how people's identity is constructed in a space in which they reside rather it is important to decipher how people's identity get created due to their presence in multiple dynamic spaces that are constantly engaged in cross-cutting interactions. The third section enquires studies on the cultural construction of the state. This section argues that to understand the cultural construction of state it is very important to explore how people's lens to view state get shaped through interactional aspects of body, space, culture and place.

Chapter Three is also internally divided into three sections. The first section views the relationship between British India and the princely States through the category of paramountcy. The next section extensively analyzes the Constituent Assembly Debates of India to enquire how issues of rulers, subjects and citizens were addressed. What form of peoplehood did the Constitution Makers intend to have for independent India? The third section combines issues raised by several contemporary theorists about the relatively lower level of success of the Indian state in constituting

constitutional peoplehood in the state of Rajasthan. Most of the available literature accepts that it is the strength of princely symbols that resisted the Indian state's attempt at developing constitutional peoplehood in the territory of Rajasthan. This section analyzes two other variables, along with the variable strength of princely symbols, to map out all possible reasons that resisted the Indian state's attempt to constitute constitutional peoplehood in modern-day Rajasthan. It contends the thesis of *strengths of the princely symbols* as far as its explanatory potential to understand the everyday life of the people of Rajasthan is concerned. It also examines the *contradictory approach adopted by the Indian state* with respect to the former rulers to understand why the intended form of constitutional peoplehood could not be formed in the territory of Rajasthan. It ends with an assertion that though culture plays an important role in constituting the nature of the state, the state is not a passive recipient of culture. The state could create its functional diameter in which trajectory of replication, sustenance or even permutation of the cultural elements could take place. For instance, despite the stated intention of the Indian state to constitute constitutional peoplehood in the territory of India, the Indian state provided the privy purses and other benefits to the recognized rulers till 1971. Though these were abolished in 1971, the Indian state remained silent over several important aspects and allowed the continuation of rights of the former rulers over a large section of the royal regalia. Almost all fairs, festivals, processions, which had a dominant impact on the formation of peoplehood in the territory of the erstwhile Rajputana, were allowed to continue in the same form.

Chapter Four tests the hypothesis of the study in the context of Udaipur. It is divided into seven sections. The first section examines modern idioms through which princely symbols try to hold its foot in the local peoplehood. The second section looks into the aspect of how princely symbols; princely symbols along with symbols of state try to situate people in the contradictory category of 'citizens-subjects'. The third section explains how the former ruler of Mewar tries to draw legitimacy of their dynasty as a whole from the great works and personalities of some of the great leaders of their dynasty to legitimize their princely symbols in the mind of people. The fourth section, through the participatory study of fights surrounding Pichola Lake, tries to examine how people use performative aspects of princely symbols to challenge the authority of the state. The fifth section looks into the dual aspects of making citizens 'insurgent'

and 'normalized' through the discourse and experience of corruption in the bodies of the state. The sixth section looks into the aspect of making people straddle between an identity of 'citizens' and 'subjects' by denying information, or creating confusion, about properties of the state and the erstwhile ruler.

Chapter Five concludes the recurring assertions as well as arguments running through the four chapters. It also mentions the lacuna in this study and the scope for further research.

CHAPTER 2

THE STATE AND SOCIETY: THEORETICAL ISSUES

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2.1 Conceptualizing the State

The 'State' has been the object of extensive study in the writings of various theorists and philosophers. Conceptually, however, it has always remained a contested concept.

The concept of state is not much in vogue in the social sciences right now. Yet it retains a skeletal, ghostly existence largely because, for all the changes in emphasis and interest of research, the thing exists and no amount of conceptual restructuring can dissolve it (Nettl, 1968: 559).

The reason for its contestability has been multi-pronged. One among these is related to the level of emphasis placed on the state as an abstract or concrete entity. The state as a concept has always straddled these two ways of gestation. The emphasis on either of the two has led political theorists to compromise on the other. However, a genealogy of the modern state does not claim to have a single notion of the modern state (Skinner, 2009: 326). Observing the evolution of idea of state, Skinner writes that till the 16th Century the idea of state was associated with ruler (person or persons of any individuals) which started changing with the end of this century when people started conceiving political power in terms of abstraction or impersonality (Skinner, 1989: 90). A conceptual transition occurred during this period in which the instance of emphasis shifted from the ruler to the abstract entity of state (ibid.).

Conceptualizing the state in abstract terms could have serious limitations of its own. In non-Western countries, particularly India, if we move away from the lens of abstraction we can observe that people sometimes use their cultural symbols (normative as well as empirical) and widespread practices to disapprove their allegiance to state to assert their right as a citizen. Rather than conceptualizing what the state is, it is more important to understand how people see the state. The latter methodology is important in the sense that people see the state very differently depending upon their location in their respective peoplehood. The question of peoplehood brings out the importance of culture in shaping the popular imagination of state, sometimes quite differently from the abstract conception of state.

On the other hand, the attempt to overemphasize the methodology to conceptualize the state in empirical, concrete, microscopic or observable terms could be susceptible to several other important limitations. It runs the risk of difficulty in the generalization

of a concept as well as an attempt to oversimplify the contested concept. For instance, Weber's attempt to define the state in terms of administrative and legal order and territoriality develops the risk of seeing modern state nothing more than an established apparatus of government and discerning state and government as a virtual synonym (Skinner, 2009: 26).

State as an abstract/normative or observable/empirical entity should not be seen as either the initial or the end point of the course of evolution of the state. The evolutionary aspect of the modern state could itself be the point of contestation in non-western countries but even in Western contexts, at no point in the course of its evolution, could the nature of the state be defined exclusively in abstract or empirical terms. An amalgamation of these two is important to decipher the meaning of the state at a point in its course of evolution.

The contestability of the notion of the state is also due to the fact of linkages between ideas and the context in which they develop. Ideas have contextual dependencies. Also, a conceptual connotation has a distinct contextual perimeter. With the changing nature of society, the nature of the subject of analysis also changes. Once the nature of the subject of analysis changes, the ideas which deal with it also change. In brief, the evolution of a concept is a constant phenomenon. As a concept evolves, its associated sub-concepts also change. It makes a concept contestable if it has evolved over a long period; and the concept of the state is one among these.

The thesis of the evolution of the modern state has also contributed to the contestability of the concept of the state. Skinner maps out the evolution of the modern state in the Western countries (Skinner, 1989:90). He exhibits how the nature of the state by the end of the 16th century, in the Western countries, started shifting from personal to impersonal ones; this is how a new conception of the nature of the modern state came into being. If we start associating the nature of state with its evolution it becomes further important to look into other associated issues i.e. initial conditions/pre-conditions at the time of its evolution, permutation of other concepts or sub-concepts, relations with other concepts or sub-concepts in the skeleton of symmetry or sequence (Kaviraj, 2010). If these issues are taken due consideration, one could easily decipher different conceptions of the state even in the same time-frame but in different contexts. Obviously, the distinct initial conditions, different

ways of functional relationship – symmetrical or sequential, or even the different patterns of sequentiality of a concept with its environment could be the reason for potential contestability of any concept in modern times.

The dilemma of generality vs. particularity is another arena in which contestation over the nature of the state takes place. Political theorists try to present a generalized theory of state by looking at those natures that could fit into coherency of a mega theory of the state. By doing this, they either overemphasize or underemphasize several associated components to fit these into their grand theory. It probably produces risks in which a theory either over-explains or under-explains the relevant components. For instance, non-recognition of culture as an independent variable that shapes the nature of the state is clearly a deliberate move on parts of the political theorists to oversimplify the contested domain. On the other hand too much emphasis on particularities, either by empirical scientists or the anthropologists, reduces the chance to produce a generalized theory of a concept. In absence of a generalized theory of a concept it becomes difficult to map how other concepts or associated sub-concepts are related to a particular concept; how the symmetrical or sequential relations among concepts actually occur in a particular context. Though the level of emphasis on either particularities or generality produces methodological limitations of a unique nature, it also produces a space where contestation over a particular concept could be played out.

Despite the rich arena in which contestation of the concept of the state has been playing out, this study intends to move forward with a contested notion of the state. Moving forward with a contested notion of state does not mean the absence of the existence of the state. The state exists but its role i.e. regulator, facilitator, policy-making actor, dealing with international actors and many more or a mix of all these, could differ in different contexts depending on how the state imagines itself in relation to its constituents. If carefully observed, we can find out the varying forms of the nature of state in relation to its various constituents i.e. if observed with the lens of ‘citizenship’ and ‘peoplehood’, the Indian state could be seen showing its nature quite differently in relation to the state of Rajasthan than other parts of India. Rather than adopting any grand theory of state this study would try to understand Indian state from the relational lens of culture and political citizenship. The search to analyze the nature of the Indian state would be microscopic in methodology (how people see the

state) with the hope of figuring out the nature of the Indian state in specific circumstances under specific roles.

2.2 State-Society Relations

How has the relation between state and society been viewed, historically, is the central question around which this section progresses. Capturing the relation between state and society is a difficult task in the background of their conceptual contestations. However, an attempt has been made in this section to map out the modalities in which these relations have been viewed in the available literature.

Though the scope of this study is to analyze the modern state that evolved since 18th century, if we give a cursory look to the earlier period, we find that the ancient Greek philosophers did not make distinction between state and society. The whole debate around the state, in the Greek philosophy, was expressed in the frame of *state in relation to individuals* and *state as a means or ends for individual*⁴ (Wayper, 1987: ix). The origin of the distinction of the domain of state and society could be seen in the Western European classical liberal tradition which separated both in mutually exclusive category of public and private spheres (Kymlicka, 2002:388); political and social realms (Calhoun, 2002: 454). The public sphere was associated with state and the private sphere with family, market, and economy and later with civil society.

The distinction of the domain of state and society, in the Classical liberal tradition, was for limiting the unnecessary interference of the state in all aspects of human life, and hence, for protecting individual liberty. Thomas Paine famously called the state as ‘a necessary evil’ that is required to protect individual liberty from inhibiting social forces and Adam Smith suggested the state adopt a minimal interventionist role and leave the rest under the ‘invisible hand’ (Heilbroner, 1991: 54). This tradition understood society as, at least potentially, self-governing. The market was seen as one of the best example of the society with a self-governing mechanism, but society was not reduced to market. The distinction between state and society helped them to take

⁴ Greek tradition did not see the state as we see it today. They called it *polis* or City-State. The question what the *polis* means to individuals residing in it provided a framework in which individuals were seen as means to an end that is *polis* itself. The fate and fortune of individual was linked to *polis*. So, this framework did not require distinguishing state and society.

society, quite distinct from state or individual, as a separate unit of analysis (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013).

Arguing against the conception of unlimited sovereignty, Robert MacIver – a twentieth century sociologist and political scientist, proposed distinguishing the domain of social (i.e. society) from the political (i.e. state). According to MacIver, this distinction would possibly help in carving out the specific role and function (especially regulatory role) of state, and it would minimize unnecessary interference of the state in the domain of social. His distinction of the two domains was based on the assumption that state and society represents two different spheres of human actions, the latter representing emotional, cultural and economic interests of groups or organizations, while the state should limit its role to serve economic interests only (Dyson, 2009: 229). He assigned a minimalist role – dealing with *social order*, to the state.

However, historical experience shows that the boundary between the private and public sphere, social and political, state, and society has never remained fixed or static. Strict separation between both these realms was formulated under the assumption that these realms have internal forces of their own that help them to function in neatly drawn non-overlapping perimeter. This assumption seems to be falling on two grounds: First, it is incorrect to claim that both these realms have completely different constituents that produce distinct centripetal or centrifugal forces. Some constituents might be common in both realms, possibly differing in forms, which would be producing similar centripetal forces in their distinct domains. It enhances the possibility of interactions of boundaries between these two strictly drawn realms, as far as their constituents are concerned. Second, centrifugal forces produced by the constituents of two distinct domains have a probability to cross the original perimeters and this would require the original perimeters, to get adjusted with respect to the other. This aspect also supports the assertion that the boundary between social and political, state and society, and public and private spheres are constantly redrawn and sometimes move to overlap. Any change or modification in the realm of the state, either due to internal or external factors, would very much obviously get reflected in the domain of society/social or vice-versa.

The state-society distinction was also based on the presumption that state is a sub-system of society. Conceptualizing state as a sub-system of society helped theorists (ex. MacIver) to filter out the *part* from the *whole* citing the special character of functions of the *part*. Special character of functions of state could be the functional ground of its separation from society, but if we take all assigned or to some extent assumed functions of state the wall of separation between state and society seems to be falling. The monopoly of legitimate violence (Weber: 1947) and territoriality (Mann: 1988) makes state distinct from society. However, state's legitimate power to deal with the international system and other sovereigns makes it quite bigger than society. On the other hand, the state seems lesser than society when its function is shaped by the society in which it is embedded.

It is futile to try and fix the boundary between state and society. Fixing the boundary prohibits us from analyzing causes and intentions that lead to blurred boundaries, the frequency of blurring comes and the depth to which it travels. Analyzing the composite of causes, intentions, frequency and depth is required to understand the cross-functional relationship between state and society at a particular time in a given context.

Timothy Mitchell criticizes pluralist and neo-statist theorists for their unnecessary attempt to provide a conceptual precision to state or society (Mitchell, 1991: 81-88). He pointed that the elusiveness of state-society boundary should be taken seriously, not as a challenge to fix the boundary between both, but as a clue to understanding the nature of the state. Mitchell writes,

The distinction between state and society should nevertheless be taken seriously, as the defining characteristic of the modern political order. The state cannot be dismissed as an abstraction or ideological construct and passed over in favor of more real, material realities. In fact, this distinction between conceptual and material, between abstract and real, needs placing in historical question if we are to grasp how the modern state has appeared. (ibid. 95).

In his view, the goal of theorists should be neither to formulate a precise definition of state nor to deny its existence; rather the goal should understand *political processes* that give meaning to the distinction between state and society. He cautions against making distinctions between state and society as a decisive boundary between both. He thinks that these distinctions should be seen "as a line drawn internally within a network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is

maintained”. Mitchell’s approach suggests seeing the state as a structural effect rather than as an actor or a structure (Ibid. 94). With the denial of the status of *actor* to state, Mitchell’s Foucauldian approach filters out several key components i.e. coherence, agency and policy making roles from the realm of the state. Envisaging the methodology to understand state Mitchell writes,

The state should be addressed an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society. The essence of modern politics is not policies formed on one side of this division being applied to or shaped by the other, but the producing and reproducing of this line of difference (ibid. 95).

Mitchell’s approach to understanding the nature of the state in terms of a structural effect is too abstract to capture. His approach, indirectly, expects to accept all instances that visibly show the nature of the state as a direct product of structural effect. This approach led him to reduce the state to structural effect. It is very difficult to explain if observed more specifically, which effect is a structural effect. It is further difficult to distinguish structural effects from other effects. Viewing nature of the state from the lens of structural effect could also produce inevitable practical limitations. It is very difficult to claim that X structural effect is related to its constituent X1 for the period or context C₁. Theory of Causation does not necessarily claim that an action will have immediate effect; rather effect could be visible distantly, very distantly or even infinitely. It becomes, then, very difficult to claim that X particular structural effect tells us something about the nature of a state of the particular period or contexts or location C₁. Mitchell himself appeals to see the state as “an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, and functional specification”. But he neglects to provide a mechanism that could attribute X particular form of structural effect as related to C₁ particular process of spatial organization, temporal arrangement or functional specification. In brief, it is very difficult to relate specifically a particular set of structural effects with any particular set of processes.

Mitchell’s approach envisages capturing the nature of state through structural effects that is “effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance”. His framework of structural effect rejects accepting the state as an actor having an agency of its own. However, Mitchell’s framework of structural effect, if carefully analyzed, would

exhibit contrary aspects about the agency of the state. Let us frame a slight different question: why do not structural effects - a matrix that is expected to provide a clue to understanding the nature of state, remain same in a specific context for a specific period. The variability of the form of the structural effect is a constant phenomenon in differential contexts for varying time periods, but this could not be altogether sidelined even for a specific context in a specific time. No doubt, a differential structural effect is due to the frequent permutation and combination of constituents of the structure. But, why do the same constituents permute or combine in multiple ways that lead to multiple structural effects? Answering this question is irrelevant for my query but the question itself gives a clue to it. If constituents of a structure permute or combine in multiple ways, then there must be some agency resting with constituents or actors of the structure. Several constituents i.e. culture, practices, institutions, rules and many more get combined in a particular way under specific circumstance to produce a specific form of structural effect. If all these combine in some other sequence, there is a high probability of producing quite a different form of structural effect.

Mitchell's approach also removes another key element 'responsibility' from the realm of the state. Since a state is not an actor, having no agency of its own, but an ensemble of structural effect in Mitchell's approach; it become quite difficult to locate responsibility for state for its actions. Mitchell does not say anything about how responsibility would be fixed in socio-political relations if the actors of these relations are seen merely as a structural effect.

This study is based on the acceptance of the existence of boundary of state and society rather than the existence of a strict boundary between state and society. State and society have a boundary of their own; they are actors in its right, they have demonstrable agency. These specificities make these two realms quite specific. However, the presence of specificity does not mean that both these realms are entirely distinct, and a permanent boundary of separation could be drawn between them. Specificity is the reflexive feature of constituting elements of these realms but distinctiveness is related to the directional level of net force (a balance of centripetal and centrifugal force) exerted by the constituents of these two realms with respect to each other. The net force, here, is referred as the net balance of centripetal and centrifugal force generating internally in these realms. It leads us now to observe

relations between state and society in four probable ways. Let us name state as 'S' and society as 'C'.

1. TYPE - I: cases in which net force of both realms S and C is in favour of centripetal force. The net force is acting inwardly in both these realms, and there are no chances of interactions of these two realms even though they are situated very close. In such cases it is very much possible to draw a strict line of separation between the realm of S and C. Scholarly works of classical liberal theorists separated the realm of state and society and these works fall in the Type – I. However, there has never been any historical instance that could exhibit this model of Type – I, but classical liberal theorists falsely assumed the simultaneous dominance of centripetal force over centrifugal force in both realms and drew a strict boundary between them.
2. TYPE – II: cases in which net force of realm S is in favour of centripetal force, but the net force of realm C is in favour of centrifugal force. In other words, net force is acting inwardly in realm S but outwardly in realm C. So, a clear-cut separation of the realm of S and C is not possible. Interaction of the realm of S and C is very much possible but C will have control over the terms of interaction. Classical Marxist writings (Marx, 1979; Marx and Engels, 1998; Lenin, 2000), neo-Marxist writings (Poluntzas, 1973; Gramsci, 1999; Miliband, 1969) belong to this group.
3. TYPE – III: cases in which net force of realm S is in favour of centrifugal force, but the net force of realm C is in favour of Centripetal force. In other words, the net force is acting outwardly in the realm S but inwardly in the realm C. In this case also a clear cut separation between the realm of S and C is not possible. Interaction of the realm of S and C remains frequent phenomenon, but it is the S that control the terms of interaction. Writings of Max Weber (Weber, 1947), behavioural theorists (Easton, 1957), neo-statist theorists (Skocpol, 1979; Nordlinger, 1981; Krasner, 1984; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985;), work of Gabriel Almond (Almond, 1988) and developmental state theorists (Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995; Leftwich, 2000 and Kohli, 2004) fall in the category of Type – III.

4. TYPE – IV: cases in which net force of both the realms S and C is in favour of centrifugal force. In this case, the frequency of interaction of both the realms is so high that blurriness of these two realms remains the only recognizable aspect. Separating the realm of S and C become impossible. Neither S nor C set the terms of interaction, exclusively, for each other rather both these realms momentarily produce terms of layered interactions. Numerous scholarly works on India (Kothari, 1970; Frankel, 1978; Bardhan, 1984; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Hasan, 1989; Vanaik, 1990; Manor, 1993; Migdal, 2001; Gupta, 1995; Brass, 1994 & 1997; Chatterjee, 1997; Scott, 1998; Fuller and Harris, 2001; Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Vernon, 2005; and Pai, 2010) represents the Type – IV.

While this study compartmentalizes the scholarly writings on state – society relations into four types, this should not be understood as the homogeneity /similarity of argument in any particular type. A wide range of scholarly diversity exists within each type; however, in some cases overlapping of types might also be seen.

TYPE – I

Classical liberal theorists separated the realm of state and society. They argued that state and society have their separate boundary, but they do not overlap or interact with each other. They assumed that net force of both realms of S and C is in favour of centripetal force; net force is acting inwardly in both these realms; and they cannot interact even though both these realms come very close to each other. Both these realms have their distinct logic to function.

TYPE - II

Marxist scholars see, by and large, state as an outgrowth of particular social patterns, reduce politics to society (Migdal, Kohli and Shue, 1994: 2). They saw the state as dependent on society/social forces/class relations. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1998) Karl Marx and Frederic Engels wrote: “The Executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”. In *The State and Revolution* (2000) V. Lenin delineated state ‘as an instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class’. Classical Marxists linked the evolution of the modern state with an emergence of private property serving the interests of the

dominant sections of society. These writings attempted to exhibit how C determines functional behavior of S.

Neo-Marxists like Gramsci and Miliband and Polunzas took a slightly different approach. They did not accept that C always determines the functionality of S rather sometimes S could defy the surrendering terms of interaction presented by C. Despite the deviation in the writings of neo-Marxists from the classical Marxists, the study includes these writings in Type – II because of the fact that even in the neo-Marxist approaches it is not state that sets the terms of interactions between realms of state and society rather state takes only the role of bargainer for the terms of interaction set by C.

Antonio Gramsci included, in the definition of a state, all those institutions and practices through which ruling class construct a consensual hegemony over which they rule (Hay, 1999: 163). Through the framework of *relative autonomy of state*, Gramsci tried to do away with the possibility of drawing a strict boundary between state and society but the primacy of state, as far as the defiance to the terms of interactions set by society is concerned, was always maintained. He viewed the state as relatively autonomous from the interests of the dominant sections of society, a possible arena of change, hope, struggle and revolution in the capitalist society.

Contrary to the charge of Statist theorists i.e. Skocpol and Nordlinger that Marxism provides ‘society-centered explanations’, Gramsci’s approach places the characteristic of relative autonomy with the state. Focusing on the *superstructure* rather than the *base* of the Classical Marxian analysis, Gramsci bi-furcated the realm of *superstructure* into Civil Society – realm of generating consent, hegemony and subtle way of domination, and Political Society – representing state power and the structure of coercion (ibid. 163-164). He showed that realm of *superstructure* in which both coercion and consent produces the domination determines the base and in this sense state is relatively autonomous from the interests of dominant sections of society. Gramsci’s writings asserted that political society shapes the civil society – the institution of family, church, education; and civil society also influences the political society.

Ralph Miliband’s writings also give primacy to state in his analysis of Western societies. Through the analysis of the nature of state in capitalist societies, Miliband

refused to view state as a neutral arbiter of multiple social interests. According to him, seeing the state as relatively autonomous is highly misplaced as the state in Western capitalist countries is hardly able to distance itself from the factions of ruling class. He proved his point by showing direct proportionality between ruling class and their (i) control over means of production, (ii) their close links with political institutions, academic institutions, military institutions and media houses, and (iii) their disproportionate and dominant representation in all layers of state apparatuses. Showing the corresponding functionality between state power and class power Miliband argues that state serves only the interests of capitalist class and leaves no space for any chance of revolution by the dominated sections. He concludes, contrary to Gramsci, that state is not relatively autonomous and its nature could be understood by looking on to the key personnel who control the political and executive institutions and also the effects of the same (Miliband, 1969).

Emphasis on structure *vs.* agency became the core of Miliband- Poluntzas debate (Hay, 1999: 164-168) on the nature of the state. Poulantzas, influenced by the structuralist position of Althusser, suggested seeing the state as a cohesive factor in the social formation (Poulantzas, 1973). According to Poluntzas, the capitalist class is not homogeneous, rather it is internally divided and the possibility of the conflict of interests within this class could not be ruled out. The relative autonomy of state is needed to make system cohesive to serve the long term of interests of the capitalist class as a whole. Poluntzas observed that the state could be showing its dual face; in the short run it could employ several popular reforms, concessions and policies to disorganize the unity of working class but in the long run it might be working to serve the interests of the dominant class as a whole.

TYPE - III

Max Weber, the renowned German Sociologist, defined modern state as a system of administrative and legal order, a compulsory association with a territorial basis (Weber, 1947: 156). Weber defined the state in terms of specific means peculiar to it i.e. legitimate use of physical force, not in terms of ends. He found it impossible to define the state in terms of its ends (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 77).

Seeing the modern state not more than an established apparatus of government excludes *political process* as a unit of serious analysis (Easton, 1953). Overextension

of the framework of established apparatus of government, in the writings of neo-Weberians, has developed a tendency to dismantle the boundary between state and government in the sense that the words state and government have virtually become synonymous (Skinner, 2009: 326).

A group of behavioural political scientists, in the 1950s and 1960s, objected to the frequent invocation of the Weberian lens in understanding the nature and function of the modern state. David Easton (1953) took *political system* as the object of study in place of the *state*. For them, the concept of the state is very indeterminate and, in turn, excludes the political process aspect from the object of study. They convincingly argued in favour of filtering the *political* from its *social* and *cultural* environment (Mitchell, 1991: 78-79). Explaining political life as a distinct system of activity, Easton writes:

The very idea of a system suggest that we can separate political life from the rest of social activity, at least for analytical purposes, and examine it as though for the moment it were a self-contained entity surrounded by, but clearly distinguishably from, the environment or setting in which it operates (Easton, 1957: 384).

Society centered explanations dominated the classical Marxist and Behavioural theorists literature. Individuals or groups remained the primary explanatory variables. Easton's *political system* is quite distinguishable from the rest of the environment, in terms of features and characteristics, but it is shaped by the exterior environment in which it is placed. The status of the state was assigned as a secondary variable in classical Marxist literature and state was almost derecognized in the writings of behaviouralists i.e. Easton (1957). Easton gave primacy to the political system, by terming it a self-contained entity, which sets its terms of interaction with the surrounding environment.

These limitations were sought to be transcended, by the neo-statist theorists, by giving primacy to state in social explanations. These theorists brought back a modified version of the Weberian notion of state that is distinct from society but not identical to the political system. They saw the edges of the state as a certain, a visible but not strict boundary between state and society and, hence, assumed virtual absence of dominating aspects of societal elements (Mitchell, 1991: 86). The following elements formed the core of neo-statist writings: historical perspective to politics, associating politics more with allocation of resources and less with rule and control, state as a

primary actor, primacy of institutional constraints (both formal and informal) in politics and, impact of conflicts over rules and its impact on structures of state as well as on political system (Krasner: 1984: 224-225).

Skocpol argues for the necessity of new theoretical understanding of state where the prime focus should be on state autonomy and its capacity to influence and effectively implement public policies. She rejected the society-centric Marxist approach, economy-based (Keynesian model) and behavioural explanations of social structures as well as individual entities by calling it unsatisfactory. She places state centrally in politics, political and policy formulations. Her work challenged the relative autonomy thesis of neo-Marxists. According to Skocpol, the state does not represent the collective dominant economic interests of the capitalist class; rather state very much maintains its autonomy (Skocpol: 1979, 1985). State's actions impact interest groups, irrespective of their dominance in society and shape their strategy, tactics, bargaining power as well as the nature of interests itself. Seeing state merely as a reference to politics negates the agency of state in shaping society (Krasner: 1984). However, Skocpol's approach reduced the state to the level of an organization whose primary function is to formulate and implement policies independent of the pulls and pressures of the groups and classes of society.

Nordlinger's approach to study state's autonomy is also based on the separate spheres of the existence of the realms of state and society in which the former has a dominant say about the latter. He categorized states into three types: Type I – where state override societal preferences and gains the highest level of autonomy in relation to society; Type II – where state moulds the societal preferences and hence gains only medium level of autonomy; and Type III – where state overcomes societal preferences as non divergence of preferences exist between state and society and hence gains only limited level autonomy (Nordlinger, 1981).

The Weberian notion of state got a new invocation in the literature on the *Developmental state*⁵. Chalmers Johnson was the first theorist who systematically presented the model of developmental state (Leftwich, 2000: 155). His writing on Japan delineated an apt model through which a state could be expected to progress to

⁵ East Asian countries are generally seen as the best examples of developmental state. These countries rapidly reached the height of economy in post second world war period.

the path of being developmental. State, in the literature on the developmental state, got reduced to mere as a policy making actor having unified intentionality of being the impartial arbiter of people's interests. *State capacity* and *effectiveness of state* became the dominant exploratory variables.

The backdrop in which the theory of developmental state developed is interesting to note. The 1970s and 1980s were the periods in which East Asian countries progressed with very high economic growth rate. Neoliberals referred these countries to prove their core theoretical assumption that minimal state intervention in the economy leads to higher economic growth, higher productivity and effective redistribution (Rose and Miller, 1992). These theorists also tried to establish, by citing the miracle of East Asian countries, a negative causality between subsidies given by the state and the level of economic productivity (Craig and Porter, 2006: 2). In these contexts, theory of developmental state came into picture to explain the other side of the story. Developmental state theorists rejected the market-centric explanation of industrialization and economic growth of East Asian countries. According to them, a framework of market-state synergy is important to invoke to understand the directional thrust given by state to market to make latter successful (Johnson, 1982; Deyo, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). They criticized neo-liberals for neglecting the role played by the effective and autonomous state that shaped markets, both domestic and international, in favour of national economic development.

Johnson undertook the case study of Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Japan for the period 1925-75. Analysis of Japanese state led Johnson to note that a country's cultural context does not necessarily explain it being developmental state, rather specific events that shape country's history are necessary explanatory tools to speculate why a particular state is developmental or not. It is not economic policies but rather the collective mobilization of people around a model of economic development that determines state being developmental. This requires if any, presence of weak interest groups so that it does not hinder functioning of meritocratic bureaucracy dedicated for country's economic development (Johnson: 1982).

Wade studied Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and explained the case of East Asian countries, with help of his Governed Market (GM) Theory, in terms of high level of investments along with government's intervention. Moving a step ahead from

Johnson, Wade places importance over the mechanism of formulating and implementing allocation decisions between markets and public administration instead of who is the allocating authority (Wade, 1990). The question of *how* takes priority over *who* to allocations.

Amsden explained the success story of the South Korean economy through the framework of '*replication*' and '*correction*' and '*principle of reciprocity*'. Learning from failures of innovator countries, rather self-innovation, and applying it to own country after adding due corrections in it has been the prime reason for South Korean economic success. Additionally, South Korean industrial strategy modeled on the principle of reciprocity granted subsidies to businesses on the stringent conditionality of corresponding economic performance (Amsden, 1989: 382).

Deyo analyzes the East Asian contexts, though ahistorically, by distinguishing political basis – (necessary for strong, autonomous and effective state) and institutional basis – (necessary for state intervention and effective policy implementation) (Deyo, 1987). His research seeks to explore the form of political and institutional arrangements necessary for the apt formulation and effective implementation of strategic industrial policies in a state. He comes to the conclusion that a state needed both these bases to avoid unnecessary hindrances i.e. corruption, inefficiency to hope for developmental outcomes (ibid. 145). Deyo observes that East Asian countries possessed both these basis i.e. high level of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private partnerships that led these countries to implement effectively the well formulated strategic industrial policies.

Peter Evans (1995) analyses the conditions under which newly industrializing countries would achieve the path of successful industrial development. He poses a relatively different methodological question – *what kind* of state intervention, not *how much* state intervention is necessary for economic development. This methodological move helped him to speculate the direct causal relations between economic development and state-society relations. State structures create differential capacities for an interventionist role of the state. Developmental outcomes are directly related to the manner in which state structures aptly fit with its social contexts as well as the effectiveness with which the interventionist role has been undertaken. He categorizes states into three types – Predatory, Developmental and Intermediate states depending

on the level of autonomy state possesses to its surrounding environments. Predatory states lack the core characteristics of bureaucratic institutions i.e. meritocracy, professionalism, esprit de corps, coherence and these limitations do not allow the state to generate necessary centrifugal force to resist rent seeking behavior of its social constituents to foster nation's economic development. In contrast, developmental states possess mature bureaucracies that allow the state to be more autonomous and undertake serious economic development. Evans notes that it is not merely autonomy that has made states developmental rather the possession of *embedded autonomy*. He observes that developmental states are embedded in a dense network of social ties that generates the possibility for political elites to negotiate constantly with business actors. However, the exclusive presence of neither embeddedness nor autonomy would help a state to become developmental. According to Evans, an appropriate mix of both embeddedness and autonomy that is – *embedded autonomy* (on the one hand, providing subsidies and incentives to business actors for their flourishing and on the other hand, becoming strong enough to compete in global market) is necessary for a state to become developmental. Evans' approach to understand the nature of state gives too much emphasis on the bureaucratic elements of state and underemphasizes several other equally important aspects i.e. historical, cultural and political factors.

Adrain Leftwich (2000) brought political factors as an important explanatory variable in the definition of the developmental state. Though he noted the importance of several other variables i.e. developmentally oriented political elite, a competent bureaucracy, professionals, he accepted 'politics' as the dominant variable. He distinguished regime type and state and concluded that it is not the type of regimes rather the nature of the state and its associated politics that determines the developmental outcomes of a state.

Atul Kohli (2004) predominantly brought the variable - historical factors that were lacking in most of the discourse on developmental state. He enquires the reasons behind a higher level of industrialization and economic growth in some developing countries than other. According to Kohli, the answer lies in the differential patterns or sequences through which historical consolidation of a nation-state has taken place. He notes that colonial legacy is the most important and decisive factor that have determined the patterns of state formation in most of the post-colonial countries. In

such a situation, it is important to have state-directed development to modernize the progressing economy.

All these literatures of Type – III see state-society relations, either empirically or normatively, in such a way in which either state (S) sets the terms of interactions with C or it is expected to do such. State remains the primary explanatory variable, and other variables are either seen as controllable or in supplementary roles.

TYPE – IV

Type – IV approach does not see S as determined by C or C as determined by S. It acknowledges that both S and C have unique net force in terms of centrifugality that allow them to interact frequently on their own terms of interaction. Neither S nor C sets the term of interaction for each other rather they interact on their terms, but they are frequently engaged in the process of bargaining with each other.

Migdal launches a frontal attack on the neo-Weberian theorists by arguing that merely bringing back the state is not enough. The institutions and practices of state could not be understood in isolation. We need to adopt a more balanced state-in-society perspective by situating states in their social settings. It requires disaggregating the state as an object of study, both as an end in itself and as a means towards a better understanding of states and political change (Migdal, 1994: 1). It also requires differentiating both the concepts of the state as well as the society to understand the pulling effects of different elements in different directions which lead to unanticipated patterns of domination and transformation (ibid: 8).

Several studies on Indian politics have also followed Type – IV approach. The literature on the study of Indian politics, however, has not followed a single or monolithic methodological tool. Commenting on the trajectory of the intellectual history of the study of Indian politics, Rudolph, and Rudolph note:

... the intellectual history of the study of Indian politics has followed the shifting methodological scene, from the classicism of the colonial era and the institutionalism of the early Independence era to the behavioural turn and its backlash, to identity politics and postcolonial studies (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2011: 573).

Within Type – IV there are two ways in which the relations between state and society has been understood. One, S and C both interacts with each other, boundary of both is permeable by each other but there are still chances to distinguish the boundary of S

and C. Relation between S and C is understood in functional terms. Two, S and C interact with high frequency and to a deeper depth. The thesis of permeation cannot explain the complete picture. Both S and C penetrate deeply in each other realms and due to the high frequency and width of penetration boundary between state and society seems blurred. This approach does not see S and C only in terms of their functionality rather through the relational aspects (with respect to people) of functional interactions between S and C. In another words, it is people's lens of seeing of frequent interaction between S and C that makes the boundary between them blurred.

A. Permeable Boundary

The early post-independence literature on the Indian state avoided conceptualizing state under irreconcilable or mutually-exclusive binaries of state/society and political/social. Pranab Bardhan explained the political economy of the Indian state in terms of its two oppositional logics - conflicts and compliments – amongst three 'dominant proprietary classes (Bardhan, 1984). The dominant propriety classes were identical as rich farmers, industrial capitalists and a class of bureaucrats and professionals having property in their office. Autonomy gained by the Indian state, according to Bardhan, is due to conflicts within the dominant coalitions. Though there are conflicts within the dominant sections, none of the group of the dominant coalition has been able to establish hegemony over the rest. Influence of the ruling elites, just after independence, to restructure the Indian economy faded away once the groups of the dominant classes got mobilized. Autonomy of state was reduced to the symbolic level as a distributor of permits and licenses. Budgetary subsidies as a demand from the state became the major bone of contention amongst dominant sections.

Achin Vanaik argues that modern Indian state should be seen in organizational terms where the state as an actual organization has its certain interests distinct from the dominant sections (in class terms). So, according to Vanaik, Indian state should be seen in its relational skeleton – relations between the state as an actual organization and the 'dominant coalition' of ruling classes (Vanaik, 1990). Dominant coalition of ruling classes, for Vanaik, is constituted by the agrarian bourgeoisie and the industrial bourgeoisie. Former consists of the rich capitalist farmer class and the latter is led by

big capital. In this sense, for Vanaik, the boundary between state and society is permeable by the dominant classes.

The model of the permeable boundary between state and society, in the writing of Bardhan and Vanaik, is conceptualized through the language of *conflict*, *negotiation*, and *bargaining* in a purely economic domain. A language of *constitution* and *re-constitution* (in social, political, economic as well as cultural domain) that constitutes peoplehood does not find even a cursory mention in these writings.

Rudolph and Rudolph's thesis of the 'strong' and 'weak' state also assumes state as an organization in so far as they see state as a third actor with its self-determining aspect (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987). They saw Indian state as 'strong' in the sense that it possesses a considerable autonomy to make a compromise between dominant classes. 'Strong' characteristics of the Indian state are largely due to its capacity to create, successfully, a large number of industries with the help of expanded bureaucracy. The centrist tendency of the Indian state has helped to minimize political conflict. India state is termed 'weak' as it highly constrains the Indian state's capacity to penetrate the countryside. Due to powerful pressures from countryside, deinstitutionalization of Congress party during the era of Indira Gandhi, caste and class based mobilizations and the role of fundamentalist forces Indian state have been unable to penetrate deeply in the countryside.

Partha Chatterjee (1993 & 1997) uses the Gramscian idea of the 'passive revolution' to analyze the nature of Indian state. Chatterjee argues that the bourgeoisie (progressive and modernizing class, not just the class of capitalists), in the formation of nation-states lacked the conditions, particularly social, to establish hegemony over the new nation-state, so took the trajectory of passive revolution. Passive revolution, though, made old dominant classes a crucial partner in the new nation-state but it was only a partial appropriation of the large chunk of popular masses. Describing political independence of India, Chatterjee writes:

On the one hand, it does not attempt to break up or transform in any radical way the institutional structures of 'rational' authority set up in the period of colonial rule, whether in the domain of administration and law or in the realm of economic institutions or in the structure of education, scientific research or cultural organization. On the other hand, it also does not undertake a full-scale assault on all pre-capitalist dominant classes; rather, it seeks to limit their former power, neutralize them where necessary, attack them only selectively and in general to bring them around to a position of subsidiaries allies within a reformed state-structure. The

dominance of capital does not emanate from its hegemonic sway over 'civil society'. On the contrary, it is its measure of control over the new state apparatus which becomes a precondition for further capitalist development (Chatterjee, 1986: 49).

Chatterjee's essay is important in the sense that it acknowledges the partial, tactical and selective intervention of the independent Indian state in all possible domains, including the cultural domain. He accepts the agency of the state in molding peoplehood without neglecting the explanatory configuration of culture. Such a line of thought, though important to understand the political dilemma of Indian citizenship, remains trapped in the domain of political economy of the Indian state. Chatterjee, however, does not entertain in his work how people see the state or how people frequently get themselves captured, for instance, under the dilemma of citizen vs. subject.

Frankel's work (1978) shows how the relative autonomy of the state-planning elites, in newly Independent India, got restricted under the influence of national (internal) and international (external) pressures (Frankel, 1978). Commenting on the work of Frankel, Akhil Gupta notes:

Frankel's work emerges as an impressive account of the complex interactions among different levels of the state; among different parts of the state system; and among state, regime, and party-that mold the content and direction of state policy. She shows how effective international influence is in changing domestic priorities; how state leaders, who control agrarian "subjects" under the constitution, can exert their own brand of influence by nonconformance; how the other branches of the state system, most notably the judiciary, can overrule and constrain plans made by the executive branch (as in the case of land reform); and how in a parliamentary system politics within the ruling party can play a crucial role in getting necessary support for the leadership's plan priorities (Gupta, 1989: 793).

Sudha Pai's work (2010) on Madhya Pradesh is well-documented research to understand the relationship of the state with the social and economic change in India. She comes to the conclusion that India being a weak state in a strong society it is difficult for the state to overpower social forces, despite its best intentions. She sees hope in the state that works with society, under the precondition that political mobilization of the targeted groups takes precedence over the targeted policy. In India, most of the policies targeting the underprivileged have failed to achieve their target in the absence of lack of political mobilization of the group of people who are targeted by policies. The political mobilization of the group of the targeted people is necessary to assert their right and resist the reverse pressures from the dominant sections of society.

Bureaucracy and bureaucrats' practices become the focal point of study in James Manor's work (1993) on Bangalore's tragedy of 1991 in which hundreds of slum dwellers died due to consumption of poisonous illicit liquor. He shows how the incompetence of bureaucracy, bad government policies, and corruption among politicians and the police, all together, showed the apathy and inadequate attitude of the Indian state towards the so-called undeserving poor.

Paul Brass (1994), in his study of rural Uttar Pradesh, analyzes the aspects of state-failure and the action of state-functionaries on an everyday basis. According to Brass, India is in the midst of multiple crises and one among them is the breakdown of law and order. He argues that violence in U.P is closely linked to politicians, police, and criminals. So, violence is not used spontaneously; rather it is used in these networks of power relations (Brass, 1997). Police, in U.P, is neither simply upholder of law and order, nor it is simply miscreants rather they enter into one or other side of the local conflict. In conclusion, according to Brass, the Indian state is going through the real crisis, and it has lost the legitimacy at least in the sense modern Indian state has been conceptualized in the Indian Constitution.

Ashis Nandy's work marks a sharp departure from the scholarships discussed in this section. According to Nandy, relationship between state and society has always been changing and it is the continuum of the same that has standardized India as a proper Third World country, not her poverty or low urban-industrial growth (Nandy, 1989: 9). It is the same changing features of state and society that has pushed Indian nation-state to the centre-stage *vis-à-vis*, other actors. In his words:

The most prominent feature of the Indian political culture in recent years has been the emergence of the nation-state as the hegemonic actor in the public realm. The nation-state has been an important actor in the Indian political scene during the last four decades, but it has shared the stage with a number of political forces. Now, for the first time, the nation-state has moved center stage and has hardly any competition from the other actors in the public realm (Nandy, 1989: 1).

The approach of permeable boundary underemphasizes the agency of people in everyday challenges to the hegemony of state through the symbols of peoplehood. It seems interested in formulating a theory of the Indian state. This approach does not say much, probably anything, about what people actually think about the state. It does not throw light on to what the state means for people in India. An accurate understanding of state, in fact, requires first hand exploratory research to know what

the Indian state means for the people in India at different places and times. It further requires us to explore the factors i.e. peoplehood which shapes the lens of people through which they see the state.

B. Blurred Boundary

The late 20th century saw the arrival of the anthropological approach that critically interrogated dominant conceptions of the Indian state. This approach interrogated the assumption of taking 'state' as an *a priori* conceptual or empirical object. It argued against taking the state as a given – a distinct, unitary and fixed entity that sets the functional configuration of other institutions to function. Rather, it focused on how state comes into being; what are the ideological and material aspects of state construction; how the state, thus constructed, is different from other institutional forms and the effects of this construction over the operation and diffusion of power throughout society (Sharma and Gupta, 2006: 8).

James Scott (1998), though not a blurred boundary theorist, analyzes large scale authoritarian plans and comes to the conclusion that centrally managed social plans are bound to fail when the schematic visions are imposed which do not correspond to complex social interdependencies. Scott found four common conditions in all centrally managed social plans that derailed or failed: a) The state's attempt to impose administrative order on the nature and society, b) A high-modernist ideology that believes scientific intervention can improve every aspect of human life, c) A willingness to use authoritarian state power to effect large-scale innovations and, d) A prostrate civil society that cannot effectively resist such plans. He notes that local and practical knowledge is as important as formal and epistemic knowledge for the success of designs for social organization. This work of Scott is very important in the domain of public policy but sees the state merely as a policy making actor. Acknowledgement of, and interactions with, local knowledge is important for successful policy formulation and implementation, but equally important is the question of how local knowledge itself gets produced, how it gets distributed throughout the social order and what are the roles of state in the production of local knowledge. Scott's work does not throw light on how the implementation –

irrespective of failure or success - of policies, themselves, help people to see state in a particular way and what are the effects of this on citizenship.

Unlike Scott whose concern is that state sees too much, the concern of Corbridge et al is that the state, sometimes, sees very little. Based on extensive fieldwork in eastern India their book *Seeing the State* enquires into how people see the state and how governmental agencies are seen by the people who advise or work for them (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Vernon, 2005). To understand how people see the state, according to Corbridge, it is important to decipher the construction of people's sightings, specific locations and encounter of sightings (ibid: 45).

Anthropological approaches to understanding politics and the state in India, though few, have not been altogether absent. Commenting on the development of Sociology and Social Anthropology in India, Veena Das writes:

... though society came to be defined as the object of expert knowledge with the rise of social sciences, professional understandings could not completely free themselves of the common sense of their times... it is interesting to see how the project of building social sciences in India, as in other 'new' nations, countered this 'common sense' of western societies presented to them as 'expert knowledge', but it would be a mistake to see the nationalist and other post-colonial projects as producing only reactive knowledge. There were concerns rooted in the processes of social transformation within these countries which also informed the manner in which these subjects developed. Thus one way to understand the development of sociology and social anthropology in India is to understand the different kinds of stakes that various social actors had in defining the processes through which knowledge was to be produced (Das, 2003: 4).

Anthropological writings - in India - could be divided into two, but not strict, trajectories. One trajectory focuses on local political action and the understanding of it but does not say much about the Indian state per se. The other trajectory despite its focus on the local political action also says a lot about the Indian state. In the first trajectory F. G. Bailey, in the early 1970s, analyzed the role of village faction leaders in Orissa and saw them as powerful brokers between the levels of local and state (Bailey, 1963). M. N. Srinivas analyzed factionalism in rural India through the category of caste (Srinivas, 1962). Rajni Kothari, in 1970, also used the frameworks of caste and factionalism to understand Indian state (Kothari, 1970). Robinson, through the ethnographic research in one district of Andhra Pradesh, familiarizes us with the ground level empirical evidence of a major shift in Indian politics with the deinstitutionalization of Indian politics (Robinson, 1988). She also shows the negative causality between the institutionalization of party and electoral politics and the

decline of the traditional authority in rural India. Lerche, in contrast to Robinson, questions the negative causality between the institutionalization of party and electoral politics and the decline of the traditional authority in rural India. Lerche, through the study of Jat landowners in U.P, shows the use and manipulation of state-system by the dominant traditional elites, for their own advantage, even in the strong institutionalization of party politics (Lerche, 1995).

On the other trajectory, several anthropologists (including Corbridge et al work that is previously discussed) have focused on effects of the Indian state on the everyday lives of people and how this impact helps them to conceptualize the state and their own position in relation to the state.

Akhil Gupta (1995) undertakes fieldwork in U.P and comes to the conclusion that boundary between state and society, at the local level, is blurred and hence the state officials at the local level collapse their duty as 'public servants' with their role as 'private citizens'. The blurring role of the state-officials is because of the position of state-officials in their social world, from which they cannot be separated completely. Through his thesis on the discourse of corruption Gupta makes an important point about how people construct the state symbolically to define themselves as citizens. Through the discourse of corruption, citizens assert their rights by virtue of being citizens. They see corruption as an infringement on their basic rights as citizens. Contrary to the earlier arguments of many scholars, Gupta's essay on discourse of corruption shows how the discourse of corruption produces the boundary between state and society (Gupta, 1995: 389) and hence, contrary to Kaviraj, there is not much distinction between the popular and elite imaginations of the Indian state.

Barbara [Harriss-White, in her research on Arni town in north Tamil Nadu, shows how there exists a positive correlation between 'state-failure' and the growth of informal economy at the local level (Fuller and Harris, 2001: 13). The local state has failed to generate sufficient revenues to boost developmental activities and projects and it has created spaces for the private agencies to look into the aspects of security and services thus blurring the boundary between state and society. The new opportunities have been captured by the local dominant forces – rich peasants and the lower middle classes - and are operating as a 'shadow state' or sometimes alongside the 'formal state'. Harriss-White's work, in this sense, reinforces the thesis of the

blurred boundary between state and society. Her work strongly establishes causality between the state's negligent/escapist role in certain domains and the penetration of societal elements in those spaces.

It is, however, equally possible to come to a similar thesis about state and society by accepting the deliberate role of the state in its tacit permission to let the dominant symbols of peoplehood be marketized. Whether it is the strength or legitimacy of symbols of peoplehood which forces the state to recognize or it is the strategy of the state to allow symbols to circulate, is a difficult question and requires further research to arrive at clarity on a case-to-case basis. However, at this point, the *tacit permission* does not mean the reducing culture to the agency of state but to argue the conversion of symbols into the economic capital with the tacit permission of the state. Conversion of certain symbols, not all symbols, into the economic capital could not be possible in the absence of legitimacy of symbols in particular space irrespective of the kind of permission it gets from the state.

The literature representing Type – IV, particularly the approach of the blurred boundary, takes the presence of spaces for granted. They think spaces are always there. They, though, accept the cultural construction of space but falsely assume that spaces are always there. Continuity between space and culture is not recognized. Spaces are constantly reproduced in the process of social interaction. The identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). Though they place the individual in a particular space, they falsely assume that the individual is placed under one particular symbolic frame of reference. A cross-cutting or interaction of symbolic frames of reference and the effect of the same over individuals' sightings are almost absent in these literature.

2.3 State and Culture

Almost all literature on state-society relations, including all types I – IV, do not see culture as an independent variable. Type – II though acknowledges that C is constitutive of culture, but this body of literature does not seem to accept the role of culture in shaping relations between C and S or in the constitution of S itself. The

analysis of the role of symbols or spaces - in which people are situated and their identities are constituted in the constitution of the state is virtually absent in almost the entire spectrum of social and political theorization.

Though culture was discussed by Marx, it could not become an important explanatory variable to be sufficiently invoked to understand the social relations. For Marx and many Marxist writers, culture has remained merely an effect of the state/economic forces, not as major determinants in its right (Steinmetz, 1999: 13). Sociology of knowledge demonstrated an important proposition of Marx that knowledge is grounded in social existence. People's consciousness, according to Marx, does not determine their existence rather it is their social existence that determines their consciousness. As society changes, according to Marx, so do our ideas, ideology and values (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 17-18). Early Marxist scholars though they accepted the role of the state in the construction of peoplehood, could not see culture being a constituent of peoplehood in the modern Western state. Quoting Miliband:

In the politics of Marxism, there is no institution which is nearly as important as the state – so much so that concentration of attention upon it has helped to devalue in Marxist theory other important elements of politics, for instance the cultural elements (Miliband, 2006: 69)

While arguing against Modernization theory, the Dependency School kept traditional and modern sectors of developing societies dependent and integral to the same imperialist system. Keeping traditional and modern sectors dependent and seeing it as integral to the same imperialist system implies neglect of the agency of locals and peoplehood in resisting imperialism in post-independent societies. Frank's writing falls into the same category, but Cardoso and Faletto improve over the limitation of Frank's thesis (Kapoor, 2002: 649-650). Diptendra Banerjee criticizes the theorists of Dependency School and World-System approach for their failure to acknowledge the impact of the pre-colonial history of the peripheral countries on their incorporation into the capitalist world-system (Banerjee, 1987: 8). A similar positional dilemma of state, culture and society continued in the writings of neo-Marxist thinkers (Steinmetz, 1999: 12-15).

Weber's approach sees the legitimacy of the modern state as drawn from either of three factors, namely, traditional, charismatic and legal. So, according to Weber, historically recognized habits could itself bring compliance by the populace (Gerth

and Mills, 1946: 78). Weber acknowledged the central role of cultural factors in understanding the non-Western and pre-modern states but almost no role in understanding the modern western states (Steinmetz, 1999: 13). He thought that the formal legal rationality of the modern Western state had eclipsed the cultural factors substantially (Steinmetz, 1999) and as soon as the non-Western states get installed on the logic of legal rationality they will follow the same suit in appropriation of explanatory potential of cultural factors. In short, it is the modern western state that shapes culture not vice-versa. The Weberian notion of state got a new revival in the literature on Developmental state. The state got reduced to mere as a policy making actor having unified intentionality of being the impartial arbiter of people's interests. *State capacity* and *effectiveness of state* turned important variable to be enquired into, relegating culture into a distant domain of almost negligible influence.

The Behaviouralist approach also did not solve many problems and fell prey to the strict boundary between the social and the political, relegating culture to the level of non-importance to explain the political process. Wherever Culture became the object of research, it primarily enquired how culture affects politics, not the actual construction of the state. Quoting Geertz's response to the Almond and Verba, Migdal writes:

Geertz ... goes beyond common cultural approaches found in political science, such as that in an influential book like *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba, 1963), in which the actual construction of the state plays a negligible role and the focus, instead, is on how broadly held values affect politics. His focus is directly on the "concrete social institution" (Geertz 1980: 19) of the state, and he devises a cultural explanation for its ability to stay together and shape its society (Migdal, 2001: 214).

The blurred boundary approach overemphasizes the strength and agency of culture and space in coloring the way people see the state. Participants are seen merely as passive receptors of culture and peoplehood. Though some accept the cultural construction of space where space gets meaning from the actions performed by an individual inside of it but falsely assumes that individuals/participants belong to one symbolic and socio-economic frame of reference. The aspect of *interaction* or *interconnectedness* as a unit of analysis, of a situation where a participant belongs to more than one symbolic and socio-economic frame of reference, is entirely absent in this thesis. It neglects or underemphasizes, the agency of state not only in becoming a party in the creation of peoplehood but also its sustenance. It also neglects the process of continuous permutation of the symbols of state and the particular peoplehood. It

makes, then, difficult to enquire how people see the state when they are placed under the continuous permuted symbols of state and their peoplehood. How does the dilemma of citizen *vs.* subject get reinforced as an effect of permutation of symbols of state and the peoplehood? How do people, being both passive and active participants in culture and peoplehood, see their positional quadrant *vis-à-vis* state and society? And also, importantly, how does the assimilation into the symbols of peoplehood and, at times, using the same symbols to counter state's power go hand in hand?

While there are numerous bodies of literature, using different theoretical frameworks, to understand the nature of state the contribution of culturalist perspective is least recognized. Very few political theorists have adopted this approach to explore the themes of state-construction, state-building and state capabilities (Migdal, 2001: 212). Dismayed over the place of culture in the sociological theories, Gusfield writes:

In one form or another, sociological research and theory have been dominated by an emphasis on social structure and a relative exclusion of culture in the understanding of human behavior. Both interaction and institutions have typically been understood as consequences of structural factors such as social classes, power distributions, capitalist formations, urbanization, or the dynamics of formal organizations. Forms of thought, such as political ideologies or legal reasoning, and systems of knowledge or expression, such as science, religion or art, have been examined as consequences of the structure of social organization. "Consciousness" has remained a dependent variable, a "superstructure" to the realities of social structure. [Gusfield, 1989: 4-5].

The writings of Clifford Geertz (1973) challenged the social structural theory of ideas for ignoring the meaning of symbols. According to Geertz the sociology of knowledge overemphasizes the role of ideas in explanation and ignores the process of symbol formation to understand how these forms operated to define the world of a social group. Ideas are seen as tools to understand/explain the interests located in the social structure, not as categories that shape consciousness. As Geertz put it:

The link between the causes of ideology and its effects seems adventitious because the connecting element—the autonomous process of symbolic formulation—is passed over in virtual silence (p. 207) ... the question of how symbols symbolize, how they function to mediate meanings has simply been bypassed. "The embarrassing fact" is that there does not exist today – a natural empirical science of symbolic behavior *as such* ... (Geertz, 1973: 208).

In recent years, however, there has been a revival of interest in analyzing culture as an independent unit of analysis. An attempt has also been undertaken to enquire the relationship between culture and space. Dissatisfied with the earlier approaches to the study of community, which treated the subject in largely structural terms, Anthony Cohen developed an interpretive and experiential approach to study community – as a

cultural field having complex of symbols whose meanings vary among its members. Drawing on the work of Geertz's idea of the significance of boundaries, Cohen shows how the boundary of a community is constructed symbolically by the members of the community. He explores how the idea of community is used, how it is defined, classified, spoken of and lived by those who invest the term and its organic reality with symbolic importance (Cohen, 1985).

Douglas's book *How Institutions Think* poses a strong challenge to rational choice theory whose assumption is that individuals act as autonomous rational calculators. Her work establishes the strong proposition that knowledge is essentially social by demonstrating how key activities of thinking such as the conferring of identity, the positing of similarity relationships, the process of remembering, and even the classification of natural kinds can all be shaped by the institutional context in which they occur (Douglas, 1986).

A continuous relationship between culture and space is the theme of Berger and Luckmann's book. To the question of how reality is socially constructed, Berger and Luckman extend Marx's proposition that knowledge is grounded in social existence. Berger and Luckmann though accepts Marx's definition of social construction of knowledge but broadens the horizon of knowledge to mean not mere ideology but rather everything that passes for knowledge in society, whether ideology, false consciousness, propaganda, science or art (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 26-27). They saw knowledge not merely as what learned people accept, and that is projected through the rationality of man but what everyone takes as such. For them, reality is socially constructed where the reality of specific groups is objectified in communicable symbols such as art and language, and distributed throughout the social order. Since reality is objectified in symbols, a social analysis of such reality requires the exploration of performative aspects of symbols.

There has been a great debate about how to understand symbols, etymologically or performatively. Abner Cohen concentrates on deciphering the meaning of symbols and comments that symbols are ambiguous, refer to different meanings and do not bear a precise definition; on the other hand, Forms which are clearly and formally political tend to be signs, lack ambiguity and hence are unidimensional (Cohen, 1979: 87).

Dan Sperber, an anthropologist, criticizes Victor Turner, Freud and Levi-Strauss for giving too much focus on deciphering the meaning of symbols, rather than the performative aspects of symbols⁶. His theory is based on the assumption that human learning abilities are phylogenetically determined and culturally determinant (Sperber, 1975: X).

... the symbolic mechanism is ... not a question of discovering the meaning of symbolic representations but, on the contrary, of inventing relevance and a place in the memory for them despite the failure in this respect of the conceptual categories of meaning. A representation is symbolic precisely to the extent that it is not entirely explicable, that is to say, expressible by semantic means. Semiological views are therefore not merely inadequate; they hide, from the outset, the defining features of symbolism (Sperber, 1975: 113).

Shifting the debate towards deciphering the performative aspects of symbols raises an important question: how do people understand and encounter such symbols in their everyday situations? Answers to this question could be categorized into two strands, one of which sees the participants as mere passive receptors of culture while the other sees them as active participants. A man is the bearer of the reality, according to Berger and Luckmann, of the specific groups of which he is a member. As a man changes his group relation so does his definition of reality. Man, thus, is a possessor of multiple realities depending upon his group membership. Since the course of everyday life varies radically for people, a core of commonality – *paramount reality* – must be shared (though variable from group to group), to maintain “reality” which is implicit in any form of communication (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 35).

The relationship between space and culture is explained though, slightly differently, in the writings of Bourdieu, but he sees only the dominant sections of the people as active participants in the realm of culture and symbols, not the dominated sections. Dominated sections are seen mere as an interactional unit of space through which the dominant sections establish and reassert all kinds of domination. Culture, according to Bourdieu, has the dual capacity to function in diametrically opposite ways: one, as a ground for communication and interaction and the other, as a source of domination. Culture shapes our understanding of reality and also helps to establish and maintain social hierarchies. Culture embodies power relations, whether in the form of

⁶ It is possible that meaning of symbols might be irrational, might have no sound relevance for the social analysis but the important question, according to Sperber, is how symbols function and how do they perform. In other words, symbols might be etymologically insignificant for social explanation but on the functional and performative parameters symbols can never be irrational and irrelevant.

dispositions, objects, systems or institutions (Bourdieu, 1984: 29). Bourdieu claimed that all cultural symbols and practices, from artistic tastes, style in dress, and eating habits to religion, science and philosophy – even language itself – embodied interests and function to enhance social distinctions. Culture, then, is not devoid of political content but rather is an expression of it. Any attempt to write a critical theory of culture will, then, lead naturally to a theory of politics. His theory of symbolic interests re-conceptualizes the relations between the symbolic and material aspects of social life by extending the idea of economic interest to the realm of culture.

Bourdieu distances himself from Marxism by extending the notion of economic interest to ostensibly noneconomic goods and services. In stressing the centrality of economic structures in social life, Marxism, Bourdieu argues, reproduces the classic subjectivism/ objectivism dualism by restricting the notion of interest to the material aspects of social life, whereas the symbolic and political dimensions are considered to lack their own proper interests. This same dualism undergirds the Marxist distinction between infrastructure and superstructure, which Bourdieu rejects by broadening the idea of economic interest to include symbolic or nonmaterial pursuits as well as material ones.

There are symbolic interests, according to Bourdieu, just as there are material interests (Fowler, 1999). Bourdieu thinks of symbolic power as "*worldmaking power*," for it involves the capacity to impose the "legitimate vision of the social world and of its divisions." Because symbolic power legitimizes existing economic and political relations, it contributes to the intergenerational reproduction of inegalitarian social arrangements. Thus, for Bourdieu, symbolic power legitimizes economic and political power but does not reduce to them.

Symbolic capital, thus, represents for Bourdieu a way of talking about the legitimation of power relations through symbolic forms. It is a form of "legitimate accumulation", through which the dominant groups secure a capital of 'credit' which seems to owe nothing to the logic of exploitation. Tied to his stratification analysis of relations between dominant and dominated groups, Bourdieu understands symbolic capital as "a sort of advance", extended by the dominated to the dominant as long as the dominated find it is within their interest to accord recognition and legitimation to the dominant. It is a 'collective belief,' a "capital of trust" that stems from social esteem

as well as material wealth. Symbolic capital, like material capital, can be accumulated, and under certain conditions and at certain rates be exchanged for material capital. Reality in its objectified forms in symbols, for Bourdieu, thus requires the 'value' aspect for its legitimation. For Berger and Luckmann, like Bourdieu, legitimation of reality does not merely require "values," rather; "knowledge" must precede "values". In the words of Berger and Luckmann: "Legitimation not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why things are what they are" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 111).

For Bourdieu and Giddens, space acquires meaning by the actions performed by an individual inside of it. Duranti agrees with such definition between space and culture but extends argument by arguing the possibility of the existence of a rich source of interconnectedness where the participants might belong to more than one symbolic and socioeconomic plane of reference. Recognizing multiplicity of frames and references are important to understand the interactional constitution of the social system (Duranti, 1992: 657-658). Against the cultural determination of social spaces, in the writings of Bourdieu and Berger and Luckmann, theorists of symbolic interactionism emphasized the agency of participants in the interpretation of social spaces. They seek an explanation for social life in the way in which participants define and interpret the situations they confront. Building over the Weberian argument that knowledge of cultural processes is possible only by understanding the meanings that the specific and shared reality holds for those involved, theorists of symbolic interaction began with the premise that the individual and society are interdependent and inseparable—both are constituted through shared meanings (Pascale, 2011: 77-78).

Drawing from John Dewey, Herbert Mead contended that interactions are an ever-evolving series of gestures that can spontaneously change directions. For Mead gestures do not represent ideas nor do they stimulate ideas in response. Only significant gestures/symbols stimulate ideas and become language [Pascale, 2011: 81-82]. Building over the theory of Mead, Herbert Blumer develop a distinction between a personal "I" (how one sees oneself) and a social "me" (how one imagines that one is seen by others). Quoting Blumer, Pascale writes:

For Blumer, the foundation of all social interaction rests in the process of representing ourselves to ourselves—of thinking about ourselves as we think about other objects of consciousness ... Individuals fit lines of action together by first imagining how those with whom we are interacting might perceive us and then adjusting our behavior accordingly. Thus people communicate symbolically and imaginatively with others, and also with ourselves, as we experiment with potential lines of action in our minds. In short, self-indications enable individuals to create meaningful, purposive action; to adjust to circumstances that emerge; and to imagine how others might react. In addition, the process of self-indication involves the concept of multiple selves. Blumer believed that the salience of any identity is context dependent and therefore should be thought of as identity-in-use. Since identities change over time—both in terms of substance and meaning—they are far from being fixed or permanent (Pascale, 2011: 82-83).

Michel de Certeau examined the earlier theories of culture, particularly those written by cultural theorists. Contrary to the many cultural theorists including Bourdieu who pictured people as passive recipients of culture, Certeau examines the ways in which people individualize mass culture in order to make it their own (Certeau, 1984: 52). He appreciates social science for its ability and intention to study the constituents of culture i.e. traditions, arts, music, architecture, language, symbols etc. but criticizes the discipline for not employing any tool to understand how do people reappropriate them in everyday situations. Understanding the appropriation of culture and symbols in everyday situations is important as it discloses how people employ resistance to the power of institutions and symbols of state at almost all the levels and sites of its operation. Elaborating the point Certeau makes a distinction between *strategy* and *tactics*. He links *strategies* with institutions and structures of power who are the “producers”, while individuals are “consumers” acting in environments defined by strategies by using *tactics* (Certeau, 1984: XX-XXI). *Strategies* bear the aspects of formalized knowledge and the *tactics*, though not formalized knowledge, are a willful art – context specific and unrepeatable to counter and resist the *strategies*. Certeau writes:

By contrast with a strategy (whose successive shapes introduce a certain play into this formal schema and whose link with a particular historical configuration of rationality should also be clarified), a tactic is a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus (Certeau, 1984: 36-37).

In other words, actions of individuals, though, are influenced by rules and structures but never wholly determined by those. To claim that people are wholly determined by or integrated into a centralized system of control is completely false. People obviously do not get the escapist route from the dominant culture, but they adapt it to their own ends (Certeau, 1984: 48-49). Unlike Foucault, his belief was that despite repressive

aspects of modern society, there exists an element of creative resistance to these structures employed by ordinary people.

Literature on the relationship between body, space and culture has remained, by and large, agreed on the mutual influence of space and culture to one another. The disagreements are on the points of how the interaction or the mutation of that takes place and what the impacts of the same to social relations are. Stuart Hall's essay tries to join the two exclusive strands of the debate about the relationship between body, space and culture. Problematizing the use of *the popular* and *culture* in the academic literature, Stuart Hall shows how the use of popular is often assumed in the forms of resistance, not consent. It is assumed as a force against the dominant power. But, Hall writes, nowhere at any historical junctures has there been an easy relationship between these. Consent as well as resistance has remained associated aspects of the popular. Beyond culture, there are multiple elements that shape 'the people'. He writes:

We can be certain that other factors also have a stake in defining "the people" as something else: 'the people' who need to be disciplined more, ruled better, more effectively policed, whose way of life needs to be protected from 'alien cultures', and so on. There is some part of both those alternatives inside each of us. Sometimes we can be constituted as a force against the power bloc: that is the historical opening in which it is possible to construct a culture which is genuinely popular. But, in our society, if we are not constituted like that, we will be constituted into its opposite: an effective populist force, saying 'Yes' to power. Popular culture is one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance (Hall, 1998: 453).

It is important, therefore, to enquire how the permutation of body, space and culture takes place at a particular juncture. How does this permutation construct the peoplehood and influence the everyday imaginations and practices of the participants? Formation of peoplehood is not based on the monolithic meaning of symbols that constitute peoplehood. It adopts a new meaning and expressions in the changing contexts to justify its functional legitimacy. And, also, how do people use the symbols of their peoplehood to counter the everyday forms of state power. How does the assimilation into the symbols and using the same symbols to counter the state's power go hand in hand?

CHAPTER 3

ERSTWHILE PRINCELY RULERS AND THE INDIAN STATE

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3.1 Princely Rulers in the British India

Paramountcy was the dominant framework through which several important relations between princely rulers and the British Indian government were established. Paramount relations between princely rulers and British Indian government were first conceptualized by Governor-General Lord Wellesley (1798 – 1805) through the extension of the subsidiary alliance system. However, this work was completed by Governor-General Lord Hastings (1813 – 23) under whose administrative leadership the British Crown acting through the Governor-General in Council became the paramount power with respect to rulers of princely states in India (Davies, 1965: 212).

The important question, now, is to enquire how paramount relations between princely rulers and the British Indian government actually operated on ground level, how structures of paramountcy were actually conceptualized and how this surfaced practically in day to day relations.

Rudolph and Rudolph (1966) note that the British government did not provide a precise definition of the concept of paramountcy, kept this term vaguely, invoked disproportionately in distinct contexts in consonance with its imperial interests. Initially, the realm of foreign affairs, communications, defense and coinage of princely states were kept under the jurisdiction of Governor-General and the rest were left with the princely states. However, in practice this distinction gradually became very blurred. Pointing to this blurred aspect in the context of Rajputana, Rudolph and Rudolph observe,

It left the states internally autonomous while guaranteeing the rulers protection against enemies foreign and domestic. The guarantee against domestic enemies brought with it unsystematic intervention in domestic affairs to insure that there would not be too many of them. An agent or a resident drawn from the special administrative cadre known as the political service represented the governor general in the state and exercised these powers (ibid. 139).

Lord Curzon defended the British Indian government's frequent interventions in internal matters relating to princely states. He observed that it is the duty of every political agent of British Indian government to seek reports from the rulers to satisfy him about the form and manner in which princely rulers were ruling their subjects

(ibid. 94). Interference in the internal matter of princely states, by the British Indian government, was also effected through several other means, for instance, instructions to princely rulers on administrative reforms and modernization and through intervention in determining legitimacy of succession (ibid. 140). Lord Dalhousie extended the scope of paramountcy by adding the tool of British Indian government's right to the annexation of princely states. Annexation was frequently used as a tool to assert British paramountcy to princely states during the term of Dalhousie. Disloyalty to the British government, misrule in the princely territory and non-payment of debts became important pretensions to impose the policy of annexation to princely rulers (Naidis, 1965: 348).

Besides these intervening aspects Indian princely states were not allowed to maintain military troops in their territory, they had to allow British Indian military troops in their own territory, if they failed to maintain British troops at their own cost they had to lose some parts of territory as a penalty, they were disempowered to establish treaty with any other power and they had to take permission from British Indian government before declaring war on any other power (Malleon, 1875).

Lord Reading's letter to the Nizam of Hyderabad on 26th March, 1926 is a classic document to understand unstructured, highly flexible and over-encompassing aspects of the doctrine of paramountcy. It is not limited by the terms and conditions of treaties or agreements rather the paramount could go beyond all these formal spheres. Reading's letter notes,

The sovereignty of British Crown is supreme in India, and therefore no ruler of any Indian state can justifiably claim to negotiate with the British Government on an equal footing. Its supremacy is not based only on treaties and engagements but exists independently of them, and quite apart from its prerogative in matters relating to foreign affairs and policies, it is the right and duty of British government to preserve peace and good order throughout India (Gupta, 1989: 148).

Frustrated and irritated with functioning of Crown's paramountcy through the office of Viceroy, which had cut down several powers of princely rulers, the rulers demanded a thorough examination of Crown's relations with the princely states. The Special Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes observed that princely states had entered into treaties or engagements with the British government as independent and sovereign units; nature of treaties or engagements was contractual; so, those terms

of contract could not be altered without the full consent of both the parties (Chhabra, 2005: 55).

Lord Irwin, successor of Lord Reading, set up a committee headed by Harcourt Butler, in 1927, to enquire into relations between the British Indian government and the princely states. The Butler Committee in its final report observed that the web of relations of princely rulers are with the British Crown, not the British Indian government, so it is the obligation of the paramount – the British Crown, to protect Indian princely states (Riddick, 2006 :107). However, the report defined the concept of paramountcy in more dynamic and flexible form. It rejected the language of ‘contract’ through which princely rulers were defending their case and observed,

... the Crown’s relations with the States were not circumscribed by contract but were a living process moulded by circumstances and policies. Neither a tidy formulation of the principle of paramountcy nor a comprehensive codification of its practice was possible (Chhabra, 2005: 56).

On a request from princely rulers to define the concept of paramountcy in precise terms, the Butler Committee stated, “Paramountcy must remain Paramount” (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1966: 138).

The invocation of paramountcy constantly changed the political relations between British Crown and the princely states; however, the important question for this study is how the invocation of paramountcy in princely states impacted relations of princely rulers with their subjects.

Rudolph and Rudolph observe that paramountcy helped in the entry of the discourses of efficiency and consent in both princely and popular imaginations in the princely states of Rajputana but “the way most Rajasthanis understood the legitimacy of their maharajas or nobles; ascriptive factors justified the exercise of power in 1947 as they had done in 1818” (ibid. 142). Ramusack notes, “Despite British dominance in India, the princes remained significant protagonists in multiple public and private spheres. Relatives, subjects and British officials participated in their personal life cycle ceremonies” (Ramusack, 2008: 167).

Madhu Sethia, arguing on the similar line of Rudolph and Rudolph, notes that even though Rajputs were central and dominant actors in social, cultural and political life of Rajputana but this cannot be taken as a hypothesis to produce a generalized

statement that “every constituent of Rajput political system had changed if the chiefs and their nobles had” (Sethia, 2005: 14). Acceptance of the Crown’s paramountcy by the princely rulers did not continue in their subjects’ social and cultural realms. These rulers continued to enjoy their traditional legitimacy. Sethia traces the range of poetry, particularly Charan poetry, that developed post 1818 and points that even though political ideas and the style of presentation in the Charan poetry were traditional, the rhetoric used in it was full of the feeling of being cheated and degraded by the British (ibid. 15).

With the legislation of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 the British Crown’s paramountcy over princely states ceased to exist. Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided for the lapse of the British Crown’s suzerainty over the Indian States. The word ‘suzerainty’, not paramountcy, finds its place in the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It shows the word paramountcy was never defined legally nor was it required to abolish legally. It was something much more than suzerainty, and it controlled almost all aspects of Indian princely states that were seen important for imperial interests.

The princely states were given the right to either join the Dominion of India or Dominion of Pakistan or remain an independent sovereign territory. Several princely States joined the Dominion of India, and later independent sovereign India, within a span of a decade through separate treaties or agreements with the Government of India. Their merger in sovereign independent India brought a new definitional category of paramountcy. Princely rulers and their subjects both became citizens but political and economic privileges i.e. privy purses and the recognition of their titles as *Rajas*, disassociated the class of rulers from their erstwhile subjects. In more than one sense, these rulers became ‘special citizens’ of India. The suffix ‘special’ in the coming days (1971) became the prime reason for Indian state’s invocation of the concept of paramountcy with respect to princely rulers.

However, the context in which Indian state was invoking paramountcy was very different from the context in which British Crown used this power. India had become independent in 1947, and the Indian Constitution intended to construct a new form of peoplehood, that is, peoplehood based on modern constitutional values. It required the Indian state to invoke paramountcy in very different ways than the British colonial

Empire had done with respect to the princely states in India. The question of constituting the new form of peoplehood cannot be achieved by only altering existing political and economic realms, rather it must continue into the social and cultural realms.

The following sections would analyze extensively the question of rulers, subjects and citizens through the Indian Constituent Assembly Debates. It intends to filter out the form of peoplehood Indian leaders imagined for future India. What kind of invocation of paramountcy was needed in new democratic Indian contexts? Did the Indian state adopt the best possible form of invoking its paramountcy against princely rulers? What was the impact of the invocation of paramountcy by the Indian state, in post-colonial contexts, on the cultural construction of the Indian state?

3.2 Debating Rulers, Subjects and Citizens in the Indian Constituent Assembly

India as a ‘sovereign democratic republic’, based on the notion of popular sovereignty, is the essence of the Constitution of India. This assumption has been derived from the debates in the Constituent Assembly of India where all the emphasis has been on the undifferentiated notion of ‘people’ of the independent India. The notion of people being the source of sovereign independent India hit the stage right from introduction of the Objective Resolution in the Constituent Assembly and followed similar structural trajectory all through the Constituent Assembly debates and lately in most of the subsequent discourses and contestations in independent India.

All powers and authority of the sovereign independent India are derived from the people – there is an indisputable aspect of the Indian Constitution. This aspect was very clear since the introduction of Objectives Resolution, henceforth OR, in the Constituent Assembly on 13th December 1946. On this date, Jawaharlal Nehru placed the Resolution for consideration before the Assembly. Paragraph 4 of the Resolution read as: “... all power and authority of the Sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of government, are derived from the people⁷”. The Objectives Resolution consists of seven Paragraphs aimed at providing the guiding

⁷ A detailed description of OR along with the speech of Jawaharlal Nehru could be seen at the following links: <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol1p5.htm>

principles around which an attempt would be made to frame a constitution for the independent India. It is more in the nature of a pledge. No doubt, intense debate took place in the Assembly on the point of India aspiring to be “Republic” (mentioned in the Paragraph 1 of the OR) and another point of flow of sovereignty from the will of the people (mentioned in the Paragraph 4 of the OR)⁸. Debates around Paragraph 1 and 4 of the OR are of special importance to this paper. The debate was not so much about whether or not the people should be the source of sovereign independent India as about how the mechanism for popular sovereignty could be successfully framed in the absence of representations from Princely States in the Constituent Assembly. Objections raised by Dr. M. R. Jayakar, and several members who supported his move, fall under this category.

Several amendments to the OR were proposed in a time span of almost five weeks. However, after due deliberations and discussions the Objective Resolution was finally passed, in an unmodified form, on 22 January 1947. Several objections to the notion of popular sovereignty were raised during intense debate on OR in the Constituent Assembly. Many members also represented the apprehensions, which were basically articulated through print and electronic media, of the rulers of the Princely States. On all the occasions, whenever Nehru raised to reply the objections of the fellow members, he vehemently rejected the simultaneous existence of two forms of sovereignty, one in which people will be sovereign and the other in which people will be the subject of sovereign, in the independent India. He repeatedly rejected the Divine theory of sovereignty calling it illogical, immature and reprehensible in the modern world. He, however, proposed to accept any form of government in the Princely States if the people of the respective States choose to adhere but rejected, in his personal capacity, continuation of the same if the Princely States want to join the independent India which would be republican in nature. Responding to the queries and questions that were raised against Paragraph 4 of the OR in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru comments,

... some criticisms of it [OR], notably, from some of the Princes ... has been that ... the idea of the sovereignty of the people, which is enshrined in this Resolution, does not commend itself to certain rulers of Indian States ... is a surprising objection ... is enough to condemn the Indian States system of every Ruler or Minister that exists in

⁸All debates, discussions, and the proposed amendments to the OR could be seen in detail at the following links: <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol1p6.htm> and <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol1p7.htm>.

India ... is a scandalous thing for any man to say, however highly placed he may be, that he is here by special divine dispensation to rule over human beings today ... it is a thing which this House will never allow and will repudiate if it is put before it. On this there is going to be no compromise. [(Hear, hear)] ... this Resolution makes it clear that we are not interfering in the internal affairs of the States ... we are not interfering with the system of monarchy in the States, if the people of the States so want it ... That is entirely for them to determine. This Resolution and, presumably, the Constitution that we make ... will be necessary to bring about uniformity in the freedom of the various parts of India, because it is inconceivable to me that certain parts of India should have democratic freedom and certain others should be denied it ... Much more trouble will there be if there is freedom in parts of India and lack of freedom in other parts of India ... So, the objection of the Ruler of an Indian State to this Resolution becomes an objection, in theory, to the theoretical implications and the practical implications of - the doctrine of sovereignty of the people ... We claim in this Resolution to frame a constitution for a Sovereign, Independent, Indian Republic-necessarily Republic- What else can we have in India? Whatever the States may have or may not have, it is impossible and inconceivable and undesirable to think in any other terms- but in terms of the Republic in India⁹.

The unmodified version of popular sovereignty also got reflected in the Preamble of the Indian Constitution on the date of its adoption on 26 January 1950. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution states: “We, the people of India...constitute India into a...Sovereign...Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens... liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship...” (Government of India, 2007: 1). The only major difference, in an etymological sense, between the OR and the Preamble, is the addition of the word ‘Democratic’ in the latter¹⁰. Though the word ‘Democratic’ did not find its place in OR but that does not mean Indian leaders were apprehensive of the institutionalization of the democratic set up in India. J. L. Nehru in his speech, just before introducing OR in the Constituent Assembly, accepted that many words might be missing from the OR, since it was just a pledge or a framework for future model it was not important to get stuck in the legality or etymology. He accepted that the word ‘Republic’ very much incorporates the ‘Democracy’.

Right from the inception of the Constituent Assembly, India was clear on the source of sovereignty for the independent India. Clearly, the ‘people’ of the independent India were accepted as the source of the popular sovereignty. Since heterogeneity is the fundamental truth of any society/nation, no country is made up of people having similarly constituted peoplehood. The concept of peoplehood is important to understand how the people’s identities are constructed through various various ways of belonging in particular socio-political matrix and what does it tell about the underlying transformation of personal self into social ones. Smith writes: "no political

⁹ Retrieved from, <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol2p3.htm>

¹⁰ For details see the given link: <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol1p6.htm>

peoples are natural or primordial" (Smith, 2003:32), and highlighting the importance of belonging in creation of peoplehood he writes, "... the forging of senses of peoplehood never takes place de novo, in a state of nature" (ibid. 34). Highlighting the causality of human actions and their sense of belongingness, Migdal writes,

... emotional ties prompt people to acts of personal sacrifice that cannot simply be explained by their instrumental considerations. Belonging, then, has both a formal, instrumental sense attached to it-that is, one's status-and an informal, affective component-that is, one's sense of identity (Migdal, 2004:15).

Before conferring status on people, it is important to consider how people are constituted in their respective peoplehood. Undertaking this framework, not only to define people but also to build institutions has its limitations but rejecting this could have other serious implications also. The point I want to express, here, is that though an abstract conception of the 'people' was strategically important to adopt in circumstances where people in the Princely States had a long history of being subject to their respective rulers, failing to consider the possible impact of peoplehood on the actual functioning of sovereignty was backfiring.

The Constituent Assembly deliberated, at great length, both the conceptions of 'people' and 'peoplehood' but agreed to move forward with the prior at the expense of the latter. Indian Constitution accepted the people as the only source of sovereignty and provided an equal legal status (or citizenship) to the people of the independent India. 'People' here refers to the people having been devoid of its content of peoplehood at least in the formal sense. An abstract conception of people was formulated.

The Constituent Assembly found it convenient to avoid discussing the impact of the actual construction of the *source of sovereignty* over the functional materialization of the sovereignty itself. The overemphasis on the source of sovereignty was done keeping in mind two factors: i) to safeguard the unity and integrity of the nation and ii) to reject the prevailing model of Divine Rights of Kings in modern democratic context. Nehru was adamant to have a modern democratic system for independent India in which there will be no place for divided sovereignty. According to Nehru, people have to be the ultimate source of sovereignty for India.

As a result, the people got conceptualized as an undifferentiated whole under the framework of universal, but abstract, citizenship. Imagining 'people' as abstract

‘citizens’/an undifferentiated whole, by the Indian state, has been the well-established thought in the academia. (Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan, 2003:1). However, the same has been used, strictly in this dissertation, in the sense that the blurred aspects of ‘subjects’ and ‘citizens’ was given an annihilatory push, at least in its nominal sense, and a non-exhaustive relation between both was made in favor of the latter. In other words, no one was ‘subject’ of any other (as the principle of popular sovereignty also supports) but was ‘citizen’ of equal legal status having equality of participation.

In the previous paragraph, I have mentioned the inherent limitations of the methodology to conceptualize people in abstract ways by shedding their multiple components of peoplehood. This methodology takes a particular trajectory of conceptualization and in turn presupposes several components that might sometimes come in conflict with each other. The point could be well explained through careful examination of the methods and presumptions that were adopted to conceptualize people of independent India in abstract ways. Such an imagined, undifferentiated but abstract, framework demands a clear departure from the definition of ‘the people’ from the actual construction of ‘the people’, despite the fact that people in India have been constructed differentially in their respective peoplehood. Almost all the literature accepts, in one or other ways, India as a heterogeneous country in which culture has an important influence on the constitution of people. If one intends to expand this point further it would not be an exaggeration to generalize this point for all the existing civilizations.

Such abstract conception of people required a complete mismatch between the definitional framework of ‘the people’ and, already, constructed aspect(s) of their peoplehood. It assumed that ‘we’, in the ‘we, the people of India...’, of the Preamble, is similarly constituted ‘the people’/citizens. This framework placed people ‘outside history’ and tried to weaken the hyphenated aspects of ‘citizen-subject’ by replacing it with ‘citizen’ (modeled on the notion of abstract citizenship). The hyphenated remark ‘citizen-subject’ here intends to capture those moments in which ‘people’ get conceptualized more in the historical framework of subjecthood than the modern framework of citizenship. The phrase ‘outside history’ and ‘inside history’ is used, here, in the following sense: ‘Inside history’ intends to capture those moments in which the constructed peoplehood had substantive aspects of pre-independence historical experiences of ‘subjecthood’ in the Princely states or to say cultural

construction of people in their respective spaces. On the other hand, 'Outside history' refers to the intention to create a new and symmetrical peoplehood based on the ethos of the Constitution of Modern Indian state. It was assumed that the modern independent Indian polity will lead a transition from the ascriptive induced peoplehood to the new form of peoplehood based on the common and universal allegiance to the constitutional principalities. There could be many different ways in which Indian constitutional instances might be interpreted. I have used the framework of 'inside history' and 'outside history', intentionally, to mark out the progressive stand of the Indian statesman as far as their genuine attempt to make a new kind of peoplehood is concerned. How far they succeeded in achieving this could be a matter of debate.

Additionally, this framework required a deliberate attempt to neglect the realm of 'culture' which has a "*layered impact or influence*" on the constitution of people in their respective spaces. My intention to use the word 'layered impact' of culture on the people is based on the assumption that both culture and people have the centrifugal capacity to influence each other. Once we become foundational about the argument that it is the culture that constitutes people, and avoid the possibility of its reciprocity, we commit the methodological fallacy of accepting humans as merely a passive element. It is precisely this mistake that our Constitution Makers committed when they remained unconvinced to accept the potential of human agency to shape continuously their respective peoplehood. This fallacy motivated them to conceptualize people in abstract ways. The culture has an influence on the social construction of the human but the possibility of the human continuously reshaping the experience of culture could not be ruled out. So, peoplehood, in the construction of which culture has a significant role, should not be seen as a static phenomenon. It evolves though its pace might be very slow, through the permutation of human agency and several constituting variables.

The neglect of culture did not go unnoticed in the coming years, a body of literature has raised this development. Neglect of 'cultural' at the expense of 'political' has been the recurrent theme in the writing of Bhikhu Parekh. Expressing pessimism over the trajectory of Indian Constitutional development in relation to the place of culture in it, Parekh writes:

The kind of constitutional patriotism on which the Constitution, Nehru and his successors relied, ... was almost entirely political and underplayed its historical and cultural roots ... Preamble of the Constitution lists important political values but makes no reference to India's rich and plural civilization and the way in which its different cultures have interacted and contributed to it ... Directive Principles say nothing about the vital importance of nurturing India's composite culture and the state's role in it (Parekh, 2006: 451-452).

Describing the deliberate attempt on the part of modern Indian State to subordinate all other ascriptive identities to the political identity, Parekh notes:

Above all, the Constitution, in and through which they were constituted as a people, was to be their object of allegiance and loyalty. All Indians were to be united in terms of their common subscription to its structure of authority and values, and their commitment to conduct their public affairs accordingly. They were expected to abstract away or to subordinate their social, religious, regional and other identities to their dominant political identity as citizens (ibid: 450).

No doubt, the Indian Constitution or the process of Constitution making did not place too much importance on the role of cultures in the evolution of new forms of peoplehood premised on the constitutional principalities. It does not mean that this path was adopted in sheer negligence; rather a well thought out approach was adopted, quite knowingly on cost-benefit principles, by the constitution makers in circumstances where several existent cultures, traditions or practices had well entrenched limitations. Constitution makers had three options available at the outset. The first was to accept and recognize existing cultures or ways of life in Indian society and go ahead with that. The second was to formulate modalities to the creation of new forms of peoplehood through modern liberal constitutional principles. Third, was to take both of them together under the assumption that constitutional principles would exert centrifugal tendencies towards the existing Indian cultures, and it would slowly produce the new form of constitutional peoplehood. All these options had their strengths and limitations. The Indian Constitution makers were well aware of all these strengths and limitations. So, the best option before them was to choose those which would have minimum costs but maximum benefits. The first option had higher costs but fewer benefits. It lacked modern social and political values. Since Indian society had several traditions and cultures having their strengths and limitations as well as fixed spaces of configuration, adopting this option would have also posed problems for national integration. The third option was an improved choice over the first but adopting it could have produced apprehension about the uncontrolled and unintentional permutation of both and hence the probability of unintended consequences instantly, distantly as well as infinitely. Therefore, the second option

was the obvious choice that would produce controlled and to some extent predictable consequences with minimum costs.

So, in my view, the larger question is not about what the framers of the Indian Constitution neglected or recognized, rather the question is did they succeed in achieving the goal whatever path they choose to adopt. If yes, to what extent they succeed? If no, why did not they? If no, what went wrong? Was it due to their false approach or due to their short-sightedness about the social contexts in which their approach was supposed to be materialized? Or lastly, was it due to the inconsistencies in resorting over the approach they had chosen?

3.3 Strength of Princely Symbols?

Existing scholarship points out that the Indian state failed to accomplish its imagination of the creation of a new form of peoplehood, based on modern constitutional principles, in several formerly princely states (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1966; Narain and Mathur, 1990). They argue that the Indian state's attempt to imagine 'people' as 'abstract citizens', 'outside history' could not accomplished completely and they present the former princely states, particularly the present day Rajasthan, as strong illustrations of this. When India became independent in 1947, nineteen princely states and three chiefships of Rajputana were amalgamated into a single political unit, Rajasthan, which became a state within the Indian Union (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1966: 138).

Pointing to the presence and continuance of symbols and cultures of past in the political and social structure of Rajasthan write,

Abolition of the privy purses could not erode the charisma of the rulers and princes of Rajasthan. There is overwhelming dominance of the folk culture in the polity of Rajasthan ... that impact of feudal elements of former rulers and nobilities is [not] on the decline. It could be understood if we categorize former rulers and nobilities into various categories, namely, 'those who work behind the scenes', 'king-maker' and those who aspire to be 'king' themselves (Narain and Mathur, 1990) ... In the long run, the abolition of privy purses may certainly have their effect, but at least in Rajasthan the erosion of the political charisma of the princes will take a long time (ibid. 21) ... the rulers of these Princely states of Rajasthan were able to maintain a high degree of political legitimacy over an extremely long period. Despite signs of a slow but stealthy emergence of an over-arching identity of Rajasthan which has tended to transcend earlier territorial loyalties, even today Rajasthan retains a special identity in the context of India – an identity largely based on its historic past of

princes, palaces, pageantry and warfare in which the people participated in full measure (Narain and Mathur, 1990).

Like Narain and Mathure, Rudolph and Rudolph also acknowledge the strength of princely symbols, ascriptive factors, rituals and traditions of the past which not only limited the possibility of the creation of the new form of peoplehood based on the modern constitutional principles in the independent India (referring to the state of Rajasthan) but also simultaneously provided avenues for the sustenance and continuance of the older form of peoplehood till now. They write:

Caste, clan, land, and chivalric reputation had legitimized rulership in the old princely states ruled by Rajputs, members of the warrior-ruler caste (Kshatriyas). After conclusion of the subsidiary alliances in 1818, British recognition and support were required as well. The addition did little, however, to change explicitly the way most Rajasthanis understood the legitimacy of their maharajas or nobles; ascriptive factors justified the exercise of power in 1947 as they had done in 1818 (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1966: 141-42)

Further acknowledgement of the strength of the princely symbols, though indirectly, comes in the writing of Barbara Ramusack. According to Ramusack, an another important reason for the dominance of princely symbols in the public domain of Rajasthan was the fragmentation of the political associations, in the pre-independence period, in unions of princely states along the borders of the erstwhile princely states. This fragmentation made it difficult for the politicians of the princely states to form a coalition to achieve dominance in post-colonial electoral politics (Ramusack, 2008: 242).

This body of literature brilliantly explains the reasons behind the sustenance of the princely symbols, and hence the continuance of the form of peoplehood formed through it, in the post-independence period. However, all of these draw their explanations, directly or indirectly, by acknowledging only the *strengths of the princely symbols*. A glimpse of this could be seen quite clearly in the writings of Narain and Mathur, Rudolph and Rudolph and Barbara Ramusack. For them, it is the strength of the existing princely symbols which remained unresponsive to the change brought by the modern Indian Constitution.

What this dissertation intends to imply by the phrase *strength of princely symbols* is the assumption in scholarly literature that princely symbols i.e. palaces, festivals, ceremonials, etc. still dominantly explain the life style of body-politic of Rajasthan. Though most of this literature accept the gradual change visible in the state of

Rajasthan since independence, it falsely assumes that it is their already constituted peoplehood – in which princely symbols have predominant importance – that has resisted the attempt of Indian state to constitute constitutional peoplehood with the same intensity as in other states.

Though this approach (strength of princely symbols) could throw light on the above stated problems, it neglects several other variables and hence fails to explain numerous related aspects. For instance, by assuming strength of the existing symbols, in present day Rajasthan, as a dominant explanatory variable, it forgets to acknowledge the agency of people which pushes people to be resistant, responsive, receptive or reactive to the already existing form of peoplehood under different contexts and circumstances. Through this approach, they tend to assume people merely as the passive acceptors of the peoplehood in which they are situated. It does not seem to acknowledge the utilization of symbols of peoplehood, by the people, to counter the everyday forms of state power. It also does not explain how the assimilation of people into princely symbols and using the same symbols to counter state's power goes hand in hand. Analyzing this could help us to understand how people oscillate between the mutually exclusive categories i.e. 'citizen' and 'citizen-subject' at different moments in different circumstances. Secondly, this literature fails to accept the contribution of the inconsistent approach of the modern Indian state (i.e. allowing privy purses and other benefits to the former rulers in 1947 and though abolition of privy purses and titles in 1971 but continuing of their rights over some parts of royal regalia, continuing with the festivals and ceremonials in post-independent Indian polity) which generated a space in which the already existing peoplehood, in the parts of Rajasthan, continued in its original or permuted form. Overemphasis on the strength of the princely symbols in the existing forms of peoplehood made other variables i.e. 'agency of people' and 'inconsistent approach of the Indian state' redundant. Acknowledging these variables along with the strength of the princely symbols would help us to understand why the pre-independence form of peoplehood did not continue in the same form in the post-independent India. There could be some instances where earlier forms of peoplehood continued in its unmodified form till now but the approaches of the existing literatures could not explain the phenomenon of the simultaneous existence of the new form of peoplehood which carries contents of both the princely symbols and symbols of modern Indian

constitution. To understand how and why this happened, we need to move beyond popularly accepted the dominant variable i.e. *strength of the princely symbols*.

A follow-up question would be: if we take variables (which are almost equal in application in all other princely states) other than the strengths of the princely symbols then why did not the similar forms of peoplehood continued in other formerly princely states as it did in the former princely states of Rajputana (present day Rajasthan). It is the strength of the princely symbols that could explain the differential pattern of its continuance and of the peoplehood in the state of Rajasthan. On the surface it seems a correct explanation but if we move slightly deeper, we could find several other variables explaining the same effectively. It is true that the 1971 Constitutional Amendment applied to all the former rulers, but it did not produce the same effect in Rajasthan as it did in several other formerly princely states. This could have been possible due to several factors including strength of the princely symbols i.e. how effectively the state governments used the amended Constitutional tool against former rulers, and how ruthlessly people of a particular state used the symbols of the modern Indian state to counter the existing form of peoplehood. A microscopic analysis of this entire phenomenon requires a comparative study of all the variables in the former princely states. Since the scope of this dissertation is limited to the study of Udaipur, this study would not expand this point through the tool of comparative analysis. However, this chapter will enquire into the role of the Indian state in strengthening the princely symbols in new democratic contexts.

The Indian Independence Act, 1947¹¹ brought an end to the British paramountcy over the Indian Princely States, with effect from August 15, 1947, and simultaneously recognized the rights of the Princely States to accede to either Dominion of India or Pakistan or to remain fully independent (Ahmed, 1998: 99). Those that acceded to the Dominion of India lost their right to rule¹², in 1949, but the erstwhile rulers and their families were recognized, by the Indian state, with privy purses and privileges¹³. In a

¹¹ Article 2(4), Indian Independence Act, 1947.

¹² Besides surrendering their right to rule, in the respective princely territories, princes/rulers also surrendered several villages, thousands of acres of scattered *jagir* lands, palaces, museums, buildings, aircraft, cash balances, investment amounting to about Rs. 77 crore and the railway system of about 12,000 miles. See, Arvind P. Datar. "Who betrayed Sardar Patel?". *The Hindu*, November 19, 2013.

¹³ In consideration of their agreeing to integrate with India, the princes were to be paid a Privy Purse, which was approximately 8.5 per cent of the annual revenue of each princely state.

speech to the Constituent Assembly on October 12, 1949 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel defended and justified the privy purses and privileged position of the former rulers:

The capacity for mischief and trouble on the parts of the Rulers if the settlement with them would not have been reached on a negotiated basis was far greater than could be imagined at this stage. Let us do justice to them; let us place ourselves in their position and then assess the value of their sacrifice. The Rulers have now discharged their part of the obligation by transferring all ruling power and by agreeing to the integration of their states. The main part of one obligation under the agreements is to ensure that the guarantees given by us in respect of Privy Purses are fully implemented. Our failure to do so would be a breach of faith and seriously prejudice the stabilization of the new order¹⁴.

It shows, clearly, the Indian state's acknowledgement of the former Rulers as a 'new class of citizens' having more formal privileges and positions vis-à-vis other citizens. An obligation to preserve princely rulers as 'special citizens' was placed on the Indian state. Clearly, this step was a sharp deviation from the model of universal, but abstract, citizenship. Since the people of the former Princely states were subjects, not citizens, in the pre-independence era, continuation of privy purses and the formal political acknowledgment of positions of princely rulers by the Indian state did not allow for smooth construction of a new form of peoplehood in the newly democratic context. People of the former Princely states were now placed under dual symbols of the Indian democratic state and the former Rulers.

The next question that comes to mind is why members of the Constituent Assembly accepted Patel's proposal to grant privy purses and other political privileges to the former rulers if, on the other hand, their primary aim was to construct Constitutional peoplehood for India.

Constitution framers were well aware of the possible consequences of granting political privileges to former rulers on the Indian State's attempt of creating a constitutional peoplehood for the whole of India. Patel himself acknowledged the confusions created by the Indian Independence Act, 1947 that ceased British Crown's paramountcy over princely states and accepted them as independent units apart from the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Indian leaders viewed this as an attempt by the British to balkanize India. In such a context leaders of the Constituent Assembly found it appropriate, practical or strategic to grant political privileges to former rulers for their consent of joining States with independent India. However, they were

¹⁴ <http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol110p5b.htm>

assured that, in the long run, once constitutional peoplehood gets consolidated in India, political privileges to former rulers would be given an outward push by the new peoplehood. This is very simple to assume given the fact that at one end Constitution Makers were attempting to create a new India on the foundation of Constitutional peoplehood and on the other end they were also acknowledging some people as 'special citizens'.

The next heavy blow to the erstwhile royals came in 1970s when the Indian state decided to abolish their privy purses and special privileges. Erstwhile Royals now lost the special treatment that they used to enjoy due to the terms of agreements of accession within the Indian state. The Constitution (Twenty Fourth Amendment) Bill, 1970 was introduced in the Indian Parliament seeking abolition of Articles 291¹⁵, 362¹⁶ and 366 (22)¹⁷ of the Indian Constitution. By article 291, the sum, guaranteed by the Dominion of India to any Ruler as Privy Purse under any covenant or agreement was to be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India and the sums so paid were to be exempt from all taxes on income. By article 362 the Parliament, the State Legislatures and the executive of the Union and the States were enjoined to have due regard to the guarantees and assurances under the covenants and agreements between the Governments of the Dominion of India and the heads of the former Indian States. Also, provisions were made in various statutes conferring on the "Rulers" certain privileges and benefits. By Article 366(22) a "Ruler" was defined to mean the prince, chief or other person by whom covenant and agreements were entered into and who "for the time being" was recognized by the President as the Ruler and included any person who "for the time being" was recognized by the President as the successor of such Ruler.

The motion for consideration of the Bill, though - passed in Lok Sabha - failed to get passed by Rajya Sabha by 1 vote. Soon, the abolition of Article 291, 362 and 366(22), and hence de-recognition of all the former Rulers, was done through Presidential Order. The abolition order was challenged by the former Rulers in the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court judgment (popularly known as Madhav Rao Scindia Case), on December 15, 1970, upheld the petition and declared the Presidential Order

¹⁵ *HH Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur vs. Union of India*, 1971. AIR SC 530, p. 3.

¹⁶ .Ibid.

¹⁷ .Ibid.

as *ultra vires*¹⁸. However, privy purses were finally abolished in 1971 through 26th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971 and this abolition was upheld in the judgment given by the Supreme Court in *Shri Raghunathrao Ganpat Rao vs the Union of India* case of 4th January, 1993.

The important point, to be considered seriously, now is how did the Indian state conceptualize 'people' in its defense of abolition of Privy Purses in the *Madhav Rao Scindia Case*, 1970. The major framework through which the Union of India defended the Case was 'Paramountcy'¹⁹. The petitioner's advocate contended:

An action not authorised by law against the citizens of the Union cannot be supported under the shelter of paramountcy. After the withdrawal of British power and the extinction of paramountcy of the British, the Dominion Government of India. did not and could not exercise any paramountcy over the States. The functions of the President of India stem from the Constitution, not from a "concept of the British Crown" identified or unidentified. What the Constitution does not authorize, the President cannot grant. Rulership is therefore not a privilege which the President may in the exercise of his discretion bestow or withhold²⁰.

On the other hand, the Union of India in its support of the abolition of Privy Purses argued otherwise:

...the source of the right to receive the Privy Purse and to be accorded the privileges claimed was a political agreement and the privy purse was in the nature of a political pension; that in recognizing or derecognizing a ruler the President exercised a political power which was a sovereign power and that the rights and obligations were liable to be varied or repudiated in accordance with "State policy"; that the jurisdiction of the Courts to enforce rights and obligations arising out of the covenant was excluded, because, the rights and obligations arose out of act of state; that the concept of paramountcy of the British Crown was inherited by the Union of India and therefore recognition of Rulership was a "gift of the President"²¹...

¹⁸ See, *Shri Raghunathrao Ganpat Rao vs. Union of India*, 1993, AIR SC 1267.

¹⁹ To understand the significance of re-invocation of the concept 'Paramountcy' in post-colonial India it is important to understand its various modes of manifestations and articulations in the colonial India. The British government studiously avoided precision in defining paramountcy, the exercise of power over princely states. Its meaning derived from a wide variety of treaties concluded with different princes and a system of case law and precedent whose interpretation lay with the paramount power. Butler Commission, in the Chamber of Princes' request to define 'paramountcy', defined it in the following words: 'Paramountcy Must Remain Paramount'. Paramountcy implied that the governor general of India would exercise power in the field of foreign affairs, defense, communications, and coinage in behalf of the princely states. It left the states internally autonomous while guaranteeing the rulers protection against enemies foreign and domestic. The guarantee against domestic enemies brought with it unsystematic intervention in domestic affairs to insure that there would not be too many of them (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1966: 139). Butler Committee's definition of 'paramountcy' could not be read as a set of legal statements rather it was intended to fulfill colonial obligations according to shifting necessities of time. It has nothing much as foundational contents rather it was generating itself new at its every new moment.

²⁰ *HH Maharajahadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur vs. Union of India*, 1971. AIR SC 530, pp. 6-7)

²¹ *Ibid.* p.3.

At this point, the Indian state argued wrongly that the Union of India inherited paramount power from British Crown. Neither the Indian Independence Act, 1947 nor Indian Constitution mentions this at any point. Rather Indian princely states were given independence in their respective territory and were given three options – either to remain independent, or join Dominion of India or Pakistan. In such contexts, if Attorney General of India was defending the Indian State’s act of abolition of political privileges what notion of ‘paramountcy’ he was referring to? It becomes clearer with the next type of defense the Attorney General used to defend the case. Union of India (the respondent) in the Madhav Rao Scindia case took another stand that:

... the people of this country having become conscious of their social and economic rights would not tolerate any longer the concept of Rulership or the privy purse or any of the privileges incorporated in the Covenants and Merger Agreements. Therefore it was the duty of the Government to give effect to the will of the people. It has also taken the stand that the concept of Rulership, privy purse and the privileges guaranteed to, the Rulers without any relatable function and responsibility have become incompatible with democracy, equity and social justice in the context of India of today²².

In his second defense of the case, the Attorney General of India conceptualized paramountcy very differently than in the first defense. In the first defense the Indian State took the stand that it has inherited the paramount power from British Crown after independence. But, in the second defense it argued that Indian State has received power of paramountcy from the will of people (citizen) against the ‘special’ aspects of the ‘special citizens’ (former rulers who were having political privileges). Since Indian State cannot invoke paramountcy against its own citizens but nothing stops the Indian State from invoking this power against ‘special’ recognition of some group of citizens if that creates some sorts of differential citizenship. Even the Article 366(22) defines ‘Ruler’ to mean who "for the time being" was recognized by the President as the Ruler and included any person who "*for the time being*" was recognized by the President as the successor of such Ruler. This political recognition was temporary at the will of President of India – the executive head of the State. Even the Article Similar conceptualization of the paramount power of Indian State took place by the then Attorney General of India in the Case of Shri Raghunathrao Ganpatrao vs Union of India, 1993. He contended,

... the agreements with the princes were pre-constitutional agreements. Admittedly, they were entered into for the purposes of facilitating integration of the nation and

²² Ibid., p. 100.

creating the constitutional documents for all citizens including those of the native States. The history of the development relating to the merger agreements and the framing of the Constitution clearly show that it is really the union of the people of the native States with the people of the erstwhile British India. The instruments of accession are the basic documents and not the individual agreements with the rulers. Therefore, to contend that the agreements were entered into by the rulers as a measure of sacrifice by them is untenable ... The guarantees in Articles 291 and 362 are guarantees for the payment of privy purses. Such a guarantee can always be revoked in public interest; more so, for fulfilling a policy objective or the directive principles of the Constitution. This is precisely what the preamble to the impugned amendment says²³.

The Indian state's attempt to conceptualize people 'outside history' (through 26th Constitutional Amendment, 1971) could not succeed completely in erstwhile princely states of the present day Rajasthan.

... the rulers of these Princely states of Rajasthan were able to maintain a high degree of political legitimacy over an extremely long period. Despite signs of a slow but stealthy emergence of an over-arching identity of Rajasthan which has tended to transcend earlier territorial loyalties, even today Rajasthan retains a special identity in the context of India – an identity largely based on its historic past of princes, palaces, pageantry and warfare in which the people participated in full measure (Narain and Mathur, 1990: 24).

The Indian State's attempt to abolish political privileges to former rulers was completely in consonance with its original intention of creating a constitutional people for the people of India. However, this step did not produce the desired result on the parameter of constitutional peoplehood. Why do people of Rajasthan still draw their identity predominantly on its historic pasts? The reason is very simple. It is related to the intentionality of the Indian state. The Indian state exerted only political aspects of paramountcy and abolished the political privileges of the former rulers. No doubt it was an important step but this step was nothing more than a popular electoral strategy undertaken by then Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi. Indian State did not invoke paramountcy in the cultural domains of the former princely states. Culture is an important domain in which people's identity get shaped and reshaped. To install a new constitutional form of peoplehood it was important to invoke paramountcy in the existing practices, festivals, ceremonials and many other realms.

Even though the Indian state abolished the princely power and privileges, it still provided some avenues for the assertion of princely symbols in democratic Indian polity. For instance, the state did not abolish the right of the princes over the royal regalia. On the other hand, the continuous presence and celebration of festivals and

²³ Ibid.

ceremonies in the princely states provided another ground for the sustenance of princely symbols in the newly arrived (democratic) context.

These are not the only instances where the Indian state and the former Royals could be seen as sharing the platform in the public domain. The picture becomes more fuzzy and complex for the people when the easy permutation of symbols of the Indian state and the former Rulers are seen in the public domain at regular intervals. Sharing the public platforms, by both Indian state and former Royals, has been a regular exercise in the state of Rajasthan. The height of this could be seen during elections. Political parties, deliberately, not only give tickets for contesting elections to these former Royals and their families but also, deployed the former rulers and their extended families in the electoral campaign as a crowd puller. There is overwhelming dominance of the folk culture, a very important mode of identity creation and regeneration, which is used during election campaigns and otherwise for generating consent on important political matters (Narain and Mathur, 1990: 21). It has important consequences for the imagined construction of peoplehood, based on the ethos of the Indian Constitution, in the former princely states.

The failure of the Indian state's attempt to imagine 'people' as 'abstract citizens', 'outside history' could be explained, partially, through the fact that even though the Indian state abolished Princely powers and privileges in 1971, it still provided some avenues for the assertion of princely symbols in the democratic Indian polity. Continuous presence and celebration of the former Princely states' festivals and ceremonies in the new democratic context and the continuance of the right of the Princes over the royal regalia provided a rich alternative ground for the sustenance of Princely symbols in the post-independence democratic India. The Indian state's acknowledgement, in its official as well as unofficial discourses, of the princely symbols contradicted its earlier framework of conceptualizing 'people' as 'abstract citizens'. Such manifestations of the princely symbols in the new democratic setup provided a framework wherein the 'people' got imagined in two simultaneous, but contradictory, dimensions: 'within history' and 'outside history'; 'citizen' and 'citizen-subject'. Sustenance of the Princely symbols affected the Indian state's

intention to create a new form of peoplehood²⁴ in these former Princely states in a new democratic context.

²⁴ The new form of peoplehood, here, refers to the construction of peoplehood on the ethos of the Indian Constitution in which the blur boundary, if any, between 'subjects' and 'citizens' would be given an annihilatory push to establish a non-exhaustive relationship between them in favor of the latter.

CHAPTER 4

THE EVERYDAY STATE AND THE POLITICS OF SYMBOLS IN UDAIPUR

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The chapter would look into four interrelated aspects: the strength of princely symbols; Indian state's role in legitimizing princely symbols in a democratic context; the use of princely symbols by the Indian state to legitimize democratic symbols in historically constituted peoplehood; and the location of people under permuted symbols of former ruler of Mewar and the Indian state. The fourth aspect would also analyze people's resistance to the permuted symbols or identities constructed through these symbols, in one or another ways, to assert their right as citizens. These four interrelated aspects would be enquired and analyzed in the contexts of Udaipur where I undertook my field study.

As noted in the previous chapter, most of the scholarly studies have pointed to the variable - *strength of princely symbols* to explain the socio-political life of Rajasthan. On the other hand, several other studies have focused on the role of the Indian state in modernizing the state of Rajasthan. Scholarly literature is virtually absent of the tool of analysis which takes the role of both the princely symbols and the symbols of the Indian state together to analyze how people think about the state. This framework would be helpful in deciphering how people create their identity when they are situated under two contradictory categories 'citizen-subject' and 'citizens'. To understand these inter-related aspects this study relies on responses given by people on the questions that were asked through the questionnaire. Along with this questionnaire, an observational study of the city of Udaipur also adds to the body of this chapter. Along with the findings of research survey and observational study of the field, this chapter also relies on some electronic and print media reports, and scholarly works to add additional information to make findings more relevant and understandable. To understand the nature and function of shared princely symbols and symbols of the state, this study has also tried to understand the local peoplehood of Udaipur by observing how people exercise their day to day functions; how they interact with symbols and institutions of state; what impression does it create in the mind of people. The basic social, economic background of the respondent is presented in the following table.

TABLE 1
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE RESPONDENTS

(Total Number of Respondents = 53)

S. NO.	SAMPLE VARIABLE	SAMPLE COMPONENTS	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS
1.	AGE-GROUP			
		0 – 20 YEARS	10	18.87
		20 – 40 YEARS	26	49.05
		40 – 60 YEARS	13	24.53
		MOTRE THAN 60 YEARS	04	07.55
		TOTAL	53	100.00
2.	GENDER			
		MALE	42	79.25
		FEMALE	11	20.75
		TOTAL	53	100.00
3.	CASTE			
		UPPER CASTE	27	50.94
		OTHER BACKWARD CLASSES (OBCs)	08	15.10
		SCHEDULED CASTE	11	20.75
		SCHEDULED TRIBE	07	13.21
		TOTAL	53	100.00
4.	MARITAL STATUS			
		MARRIED	31	58.50
		UNMARRIED	22	41.50
		DIVORCED	00	00.00
		WIDOWED	00	00.00

		TOTAL	53	100.00
5.	OCCUPATION			
		GOVERNMENT SECTOR	04	07.55
		PRIVATE SECTOR	05	09.43
		SELF – EMPLOYED	28	52.83
		WAGE LABOURER	06	11.32
		HOUSE WIFE	07	13.21
		ANY OTHER	03	05.66
		TOTAL	53	100.00
6.	EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION			
		POST-GRADUATE	02	03.78
		GRADUATE	13	24.53
		SENIOR- SECONDARY	18	33.96
		SECONDARY	11	20.75
		PRIMARY	05	09.43
		ILLITERATE	04	07.55
		ANY OTHER	00	00.00
		TOTAL	53	100.00
7.	RELIGION			
		HINDU	48	90.57
		MUSLIM	05	09.43
		CHRISTIAN	00	00.00
		SIKH	00	00.00
		ANY OTHER	00	00.00
		TOTAL	53	100.00

Symbols of peoplehood are important manifestations through which identities of people in a particular peoplehood are constituted. Symbol loses their importance as constitutive of peoplehood once their performative aspects become non-relatable with the outside and inside world. If symbols get their support from physical manifestations, the strength of the performative functions of symbols increases,

provided symbols are accepted in their performative perimeter. In such cases, any intention to transform existing peoplehood would require two simultaneous actions, namely, first, pushing relevant new symbols with high intensity so that new symbols would stand tough in competition with the existing symbols of peoplehood and second, attacking physical manifestations through which existing symbols would seek their reference for legitimation. On the pattern of MODEL – III, symbols of external environment i.e. the state must, on the one hand, severely attack X and, on the other hand, the state must try to figure out the best possible ways in which it could relate its own symbols with Y. The simultaneity of both these processes, in a particular frame of reference, is important precondition to change an existing peoplehood into a new one.

The Indian state's aim was to constitute constitutional peoplehood throughout India. Constituent Assembly debates are clearly indicative of this intention. The Indian state, however, took a pragmatic stand at the time of the making of the Constitution and recognized rulers of the former princely states politically. It was necessary, on the model of quid pro quo, for the political integration of British India and princely India. But, the Indian state did not politically recognize these princely rulers for eternity. It was a temporary arrangement. The Covenant clearly states that these arrangements are 'for the time being'²⁵ and each step of succession would require the President of India's assent. When the Indian state invoked paramountcy against princely rulers (or 'special' or 'special citizens'), in 1971, it only derecognized the individual ruler not the 'royal body'. 'Royal body' is not synonymous with 'individual ruler' or 'formal institution of king', rather royal body is an amalgam of history, practices, memory and institutions. The cultural construction of the royal body is as important as its formal institution. If institutions of rulership would have been devoid of its cultural component, the invocation of the British Crown's paramountcy over princely rulers would have had changed the lens through which people of princely states were seeing their rulers. However, the British Crown's paramountcy over princely rulers could not change the legitimacy of princely rulers in the mind of their people (Rudolph, 1966: 141-142).

²⁵ Article 366 (22) of the Constitution of India defined 'Ruler' to mean "who 'for the time being' was recognized by the President of India as the successor of such Ruler" (*HH Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur Vs. Union of India*, 1971, AIR SC 530).

The British Indian government did not find it necessary to invoke the Crown's paramountcy in other ways as long as their imperial interests were being served. But, the Indian state's interests were quite different from the British. The Indian state's aim was to construct constitutional peoplehood in all corners of India. Since the Indian state's aim was broader and different than the British, the Indian state's invocation of paramountcy must have to be based on broader and different imaginative tools than the British. However, Indian state also invoked paramountcy against the former princely rulers only at the political fronts and did not continue in the cultural domains that produce a 'royal body'. Neither in British Indian history was paramountcy defined legally, nor did it function in a predefined structural perimeter. It continuously being defined and redefined in its meaning in changing circumstances. But the Indian state's action, in 1971, shows that it tried to fix the notion of paramountcy only to the political realms. The cultural realm remained untouched.

The Indian Constitution Makers had realized that democratic and other Constitutional principles would slowly change the existing peoplehood in consonance with the ethos of the Constitution. I have already stated in the previous chapter that Constitution makers did not find the path – allowing existing symbols of peoplehood to continue along with the symbols of Constitutional state – that might have been appropriate on cost-benefit analysis. However, the Indian state followed this same particular path in 1971. It either allowed spaces for princely symbols to get renewed and legitimized in new democratic contexts or it became co-partner with existing performative princely symbols. The Indian state, formally or informally, allowed several practices, festivals, ceremonials, processions to continue in the unaltered form in their respective peoplehood. The performative aspects of symbols of the 'royal body' in identical form in new democratic contexts produced a category in which people are continuously imagined through a contradictory framework of 'citizens' and 'citizen-subjects'.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The division of this chapter into six sections is done only for the sake of presenting the ideas in simple and clear forms. An overlap of issues and ideas could be seen quite clearly all through these four sections.

4.1 Modern Idioms of the Princely Symbols

Deployment of princely symbols, in a modern democratic context, is not done only through traditional discourse i.e. cultural, architectural and monumental glory and philanthropy. In a new context, these former rulers have resorted over modern democratic languages to place themselves in comparison with the Indian state. According to Arvind Singh Mewar, the City Palace Museum²⁶ does not charge higher from the foreign tourists, contrary to government rules²⁷. The City Palace Museum charge equally, not differentially, from all visitors irrespective of their nationality. From this episode, the House of Mewar wants to assert that it is based on the principle of equality of treatment to all. Also, equality of treatment is cosmopolitan in nature and do not stop at its own people in some cases. The discourse of equality of treatment is also important to remind the new generation of Udaipur (who is less familiar with the Mewar dynasty) about the glory of House of Mewar that it is based on egalitarian principles since 13 centuries. In projecting the House of Mewar as the upholder of the principle of equal treatment, it tries to project the Indian state, in an opposite image, as an upholder of unequal treatment towards the people. The popularity of the House of Mewar could also be observed by looking at the Facebook page of Eternal Mewar, which has significant followers, surprisingly youth comprises a large percentage.

Another important arena in which modern language has been used by the House of Mewar to legitimize the princely past is the contention over the management of forts and palaces. A divide in the divisive relationship between the royalty and the state agencies can be seen in the light of the debate over the royals' claim over their ancestral properties, now being managed partially by the state. As Rohit Parihar points out, a rare royal unity has emerged as a result of their common grievances of neglect against the state²⁸. Irritated at the neglect and misuse of the forts and palaces taken over from their ancestors by the government after Independence, they want

²⁶ After India's independence and the merger of Mewar with Rajasthan, the City Palace Complex was converted into a museum; other palaces in the vicinity were converted into heritage hotels. Shambhu Niwas Palace remained the private residence of the Maharana. The Mardana Mahal (palace for the royal men) and Zenana Mahal (palace for the royal women) together formed the City Palace Museum. Since 1969, these two palaces had been preserved and developed as the City Palace Museum, which was open to the general public.

²⁷ www.eternalmewar.in

²⁸ See, Rohit Parihar, 'Battle Royal', *India Today*.

them returned again. At the core of the disputes are the covenants signed in 1949 between different princely states of Rajasthan and the Government of India. In most cases, these covenants were not categorical about the future of buildings if the government failed to maintain them. In the present context of gross neglect on the part of the state to fulfill their part of the bargain, the Maharanas of the various princely states like Mewar, Jodhpur, Bikaner and Ajmer were left with no option but to seek a Presidential Reference on the same issue.

Why are former owners not being given the first right to run these buildings with commercial considerations?" asks Arvind Singh Mewar of Udaipur. His brother has questioned the India Tourism Development Corporation's disinvestment of Laxmi Vilas Palace in Udaipur and wants it back²⁹.

The Udaipur City Palace too is a major bone of contention between the two parties. As a part of the covenant signed at the time of independence, the Udaipur city palace was maintained by the state government as a national monument. However, in 1969, it was returned to the royal family, though with the caveat that the government retained a portion of it, including the KhushMahal which was then transformed into a museum cum archives. Arvind Singh insists that no sale deeds were executed. And since the City Palace already houses a huge museum run by the Maharana Mewar Charitable Foundation, he wants the Government to move its belongings to another place. The state turned down his claim, and he took the issue to court. Also, the royal families allege that the government, despite lacking the funds for the upkeep of these historical monuments, is unwilling to return them to their rightful owners. Also, the government seemingly enters into contracts with private players for their maintenance but ignores the royals themselves as a potential partner³⁰. On their part, these blue-blood lineages contend that they have the funds necessary for the maintenance. Further, having already gained much expertise in the arena of heritage management, they believe that these buildings will only add to the lucrative 'Brand Rajasthan Royalty'. The government, though, is unlikely to oblige on this matter. This debate can help through the light of the fact that the erstwhile royalty of Mewar now seeks to partially reclaim their lost legitimacy by invoking the logic of 'managerialism'. By channeling this discourse of the state as a 'bad manager' because of their clear-cut failure in the

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

upkeep of the priceless heritage, the royalty has re-invoked the logic of its glorious past as a 'good manager' or a 'potential good manager'. It is this distinction that has reasserted the traditional symbol of Mewar state as the good manager vis-à-vis the modern Indian state. Management, though, was not the only concern for state when it took control over some parts of regalia, but the erstwhile royalties have selectively used the discourse of 'Good Governance' to highlight the failure of state in sustaining the practices of good governance³¹.

Besides all these, the name of roads, chowks are named in the name of Maharanas. Several statues have been placed at the public places. Some festivals are performed within the City Palace complex but Arvind Singh and his royal family dresses in the Pooja in regal attire. The celebration of festival also goes beyond the City Palace complex in which several people participate before its completion in the Eklinjinath temple, place at the core of the city. Though several functions are performed by the Eternal Mewar as a part of the culture of philanthropy but the presence of the royals are seen, most of the time, in the regal attire at several philanthropic platforms.

4.2 People and Their Contradictory Identities

Humans are social beings; reside in society; get shaped by it and also shape the society in which they are living. No society is homogeneous in its composition, is made of several constituents. These constituents do not function in the pre-defined perimeter; rather they continuously redefine their functional areas. This aspect leads to the production of multi-layered frames of references in which people situate themselves. The multiplicity of frames of references provides differential lens system to people through which they see the world around. Physical or symbolic interactions of people with their external world produce a set of identities for them. Since the production of people's identities depends on their location in frames of references, their position in the contradictory frame of references is bound to generate

³¹ The concept of Good Governance, though have definitional configuration to get imagined in broader way but, got problematised, of course in narrow way, firstly in the World Bank document of 1989 on Sub-Saharan Africa. The document located the reason, for the failure of World Bank's programmes of Adjustment and Investment in the Sub-Saharan Africa, in the 'crisis of governance'. The definition of Good governance, on this account, was equated with the 'sound development management' with four key dimensions: public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for development and, information and transparency (Jayal, 1997: 407).

contradictory identities for them. For instance, if people are placed in two parallel frames, a) a frame having components of divine rights of kings and b) a frame having components of popular sovereignty, there are very high chance that people might be possessing contradictory set of identities i.e. 'subjects' and 'citizens'. Relating identities of people with their frame of reference does not mean that people are merely situated as passive actors in their frames of references. People often interrogate the available frames of references for them and either assimilates into these or try to change it. The process of interrogating frames of references also changes the frame of reference through which they attempt to interrogate the 'other' frames of references. If such is the case, why do not people succeed in annihilating the frame of reference that comes in contradiction with several other frames of references? Let us call the frame of reference that people would be intending to annihilate as P and frames of references through which they try to annihilate P as Q. To annihilate P, it is important that Q are clearly separated from P; and Q attack the physical and symbolic manifestations of P in such a way that it makes P illegitimate as well as irrelevant.

In the context of Udaipur, princely symbols produce frame of reference of type P and symbols of the modern Indian state produce frames of references of type Q. The Constitution of India intended to promote and deploy Q in such a way that, in due course of time, it would reduce P to a level of irrelevance. However, in the context of Udaipur (or Rajasthan in general), Q did not separate themselves from P; attacked P partially and; continued to function in collaboration with P. The collaboration of P and Q produced set of contradictory identity i.e. 'Citizens-Subjects' for the people of Udaipur. The festivals and associated ceremonials and processions become the site where a new definition of citizens gets created. The new definition of citizens get entangled with their earlier identity of 'subjects' and the mutually contradictory set of identity 'citizen-subjects' are created. The celebrations of festivals, ceremonials and processions are not just done for a simple reason that this gives an opportunity to the people of Udaipur to interact with one another, rather the celebrations possess multiple intentions; produces differential categories of everyday life of people; and done in highly institutionalized form. The sound institutional base of celebration has drawn a large number of people under its fold. It has also generated a higher level of legitimacy of princely symbols in the local peoplehood of Udaipur. The sound institutional base of celebrations allows princely symbols to articulate their symbols

in coherent manner. However, to assert that it is the strength of princely symbols and the management skill of erstwhile ruler of Udaipur in skillfully managing the princely symbols that has allowed these symbols to permeate in the everyday life of local people would not be completely true. Role of the Indian state to allow these princely symbols to continue in modern democratic context could not be avoided to be seen as an important variable in explaining the smooth permeation of princely symbols in the everyday life of local people.

The erstwhile ruler of Mewar, Maharana Bhupal Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with the Government of India on April 18 1948, and merged the State of Mewar with the then United States of Rajasthan. Bhupal Singh forwarded a list of the properties that he wanted to keep as his private and personal properties to the Government of India in consonance with the Covenant of Merger. Ministry of States of the Government of India approved this on 29 September 1950. When Bhopal Singh died in 1955 Bhagwat Singh succeeded the throne, and the President of India recognized him as the ruler in August, 1955 as per Article 366 of the Constitution of India. Bhagwat Singh incorporated the Lake Shore Palace Hotel Pvt. Ltd. (LSPH) and the Lake Palace Hotels & Motels Pvt. Ltd. (LPHM) as family companies under Companies Act, 1956. LSPH has 49.5 % shares of LPHM. These Companies own heritage properties of historical importance. Later, Arvind Singh Mewar (younger son of Bhagwat Singh) developed the notions of ‘City within a City’ and ‘Eternal Mewar’ to bring all commercial and non-commercial holdings of House of Mewar under one umbrella. Now, it is called ‘Eternal Mewar’. Writing about the institutionalization of princely symbols in modern democratic context Barbara N. Ramusack notes,

The princes of India offer fantasy for post-modern consumption. Faced with escalating maintenance costs and declining sources of income, princely entrepreneur transformed palaces into hotels where tourists could experience an idealized, pampered lifestyle of royalty during a democratic era ... In 1958 the Rambagh Palace Hotel opened in Jaipur followed by the much photographed Lake Palace Hotel in Udaipur in the early 1960s. In recent decades nobles and merchants in the former princely states have joined princes in opening palaces, *havelis*, forts and hunting lodges, from Mysore city in the south to the foothills of the Himalayas, to tourists. Rajasthan has the largest concentration of such establishments, many of which stage programs of Indian folk dance and music to entertain tourists. Palaces-on-wheels, which originally were renovated railway cars commissioned by the princes and now are replications of such luxurious cars, connect major sites (Ramusack, 2008: 279).

The aim behind conceptualizing ‘Eternal Mewar’ was to create “a unique brand exemplifying hospitality, cultural preservation, philanthropy, education, sports &

spirituality for global audiences”. The institutions of Eternal Mewar have done great work in modernizing the city of Udaipur. Its work in the area of water conservation, energy conservation, education, environment protection and heritage conservation is worth noting. As an attempt to conserve and sustain the cultural heritage of Mewar, Arvind Singh Mewar revived, in 1992, centuries old regal festivals i.e. Ashwa Poojan, Holika Dahan and Kartik Poornima. Along with these festivals, the House of Mewar also celebrates festivals like Mewar Festival, Rajasthan Diwas, Gangaur, Rana Pratap Commemoration and Shriji’s (as Arvind Singh is popularly called) Birthday. In most of these festivals, targeted groups remained residents and the visitors. These festivals are celebrated within the premises of Palaces by Arvind Singh Mewar but almost most of these festivals are also celebrated by the local populace outside the premises of Palaces.

The continuation of festivals, Ceremonials and processions, that were closely related to the ruling period of former rulers does not only produce the category of ‘citizens-subjects’ but also creates many other hierarchies. It is equally important to understand the processes, methods and arrangements through which these celebrations take place. It is not the celebration per se; rather how the process of celebration configures explains much better the aspect of the formation of the category of ‘citizens-subjects’.

Let us focus on the Ashwa Poojan that is celebrated in the City Palace premises. It is organized by the House of Mewar every year on the ninth day (navmi) of Navratra. Historically, Ashwa Poojan was performed by the Maharana of the Royal Mewar Family. Arvind Singh Mewar, a custodian of the House of Mewar (as he now claims his identity in the changed contexts), now performs this pooja. Ashwa pooja is commemorated to emphasize the mutual bond and interdependence of horse and Rajputs for centuries. Five horses are selected for poojan and selection of horses is done according to the guideline described in ‘Salotar’. The highlight of the Ashwa poojan is its regal procession. Arvind Singh arrives in 1905 vintage ‘English Royal Landau Six-in-Hand’ to the venue. The Palace Band salutes Arvind Singh. Arvind Singh, in the next step, conducts prayers, rites and rituals as guided by the priest of the Palace. This is followed by the Royal insignia in which two Chadiwalas carry the long gold staff; two Gotawalas carry the short gold batons (symbolizing the authority of the state). Two men carrying Fly-Whisks are positioned at the back of the horse that draws carriage (Royal Landau Six-in-Hand). Two men wear Chapdas (Coat of

Arms of the House of Mewar) on their sashes, two carry peacock feathers, and one each carries Adani, Chaagir and Meghadumber at the state where Arvind Singh is seated to conduct Ashwa Poojan. At the stage, there are also two men carrying Karaniya with the Sun emblem and one carries the large umbrella. The Ashwa poojan ceremony is followed by Nazraana (involves many nobleman of the city of Udaipur) and Custodian's meeting with guests. In the evening this celebration continues at the Ganesh Chowk where refreshments are organized for general people by the HRH Group of Hotels.



Source: udaipurtimes.com

PICTURE - 01

Several guests come to see the Ashwa Poojan ceremony. They are seated in hierarchical position; those who are powerful and prominent are seated in separate row. Many local people i.e. local elected panchayat representatives, teachers of the Maharana Mewar Public School (MMPS) and Maharana Mewar Vidya Mandir (MMVM), local businessman and locally respected people get chance to visit and consume the princely symbols. The consumption of princely symbols creates the dilemma of self-identity i.e. 'citizens' or 'subjects'. Not all people get a chance to see Ashwa Poojan ceremony as participation is strictly through invitation; however, local electronic media telecast it live, and the local newspapers print it next days. The

response of Abhinav (name changed), a school children of MMCF, is understandable when he says he had never participated ceremonies and festivals celebrated inside the premises of City Palace but many of his teachers do participate. He got to know about his teacher's participation in Ashwa Poojan ceremony through his classmates, who were saying each other about the cancellation of teaching classes as some teachers had gone to Ashwa Poojan ceremony. Teachers have great respect in the Indian society. They are called 'Guru' and are seen in very high reverence. The following words say very much about the reverence shishyas (disciples) hold for their guru (teacher).

“Gurur Brahma Gurur Vishnu
Gurur Devo Mahesh Varah
Guru Shakshat Para Brahma
Tasmai Shri Guruve Namah”

These words are frequently used and practiced in schools of India. Not a single teacher's day celebration in schools is completed without pronunciation of these words. A process of normalization of princely symbols goes through the mind of school children when they see that those symbols are respected by his teachers who are no less than god; institution in itself as far as knowledge is concerned, to him. It gives the impression that knowledge of modern democratic values and the practicing the identity of 'subjects' could sustain together.

The Mewar Festival (PICTURE – 02), three days local festival of Udaipur, is celebrated to welcome the arrival of spring. Udaipur city get decorated, several cultural programmes are organized to entertain the people as well as visitors. Unlike Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner and Nathdwara, Gangaur festival in Udaipur coincides with Mewar festival. This festival is important in two ways. First, it gives local people a chance to celebrate their local culture and traditions. People participate in several cultural performances i.e. folksongs, dances (Kalbelia, Gavri). Several other art forms also draw an attention of the people i.e. snake-charming, chari-dance. Second, Mewar festival has religious importance also as it coincides with Gangaur festival. Gangaur festival signifies worship of Lord Shiva and Parvati together. It is believed that on this day (the first day when Gangaur festival begins) Parvati returned her parental home and blessed her friends with marital happiness. This festival ends

on the third day, and it is believed that on this day Lord Shiva arrived to escort his wife home, and Parvati's friends gave her a grand farewell.



Source: udaipurtimes.com

PICTURE - 02

A grand procession takes place in all over the city of Udaipur and culminates at Gangaur Ghat (of Lake Pichola). People see the waters of this lake as auspicious, women fill water in pots, carries pot for the religious ceremony. The procession, then, reaches to Jagdish Chowk (near Jagdish Mandir) where celebrations continue for the longer period. On the third day, idols of Isar and Gangaur are taken to Lake Pichola, transferred on a specially decorated boat. The last ritual is carried by Maharana of Mewar (now, custodian of the House of Mewar – Arvind Singh Mewar) who carries 'Gangaur Ki Sawari' in a 5ft long boat.

A large proportion of the local populace attends one or other festivals of formerly Mewar. Erstwhile royals celebrate almost all festivals inside the Palace but they also participate in some festivals outside the Palace as a public body whose presence in festivals is necessary to complete rituals. Gangaur and Mewar festival are the important example of it. Sharing of a stage by local politicians and former royals creates a sense of confusion in minds of people about their identity as citizens of India. Physical manifestations of permutations of symbols of state and former royals on one stage create an identity dilemma i.e. 'citizens' and 'citizens-subjects'.

These festivals and processions have helped former royals (who are legally now private citizens) to re-invoke their 'publicness' in democratic contexts. The royal figure remains an important part of festivals and processions. The Indian state actively supports these festivals. Numerous times erstwhile rulers have written to the state government of Rajasthan to preserve the cultural heritage of their dynasties. Arvind Singh himself took responsibility to undertake the project of preserving the cultural heritage of Mewar and he created an institution 'Eternal Mewar'. This form of institutionalization is unique among all other erstwhile ruling dynasties of present day Rajasthan. This institutionalization has helped the House of Mewar to target culturally the local populace very effectively. Celebrations of festivals, Ceremonials, processions or even attracting domestic or international tourists is done in very effective manner. Print and electronic media also play a very important role in articulating princely symbols among the local populace. Almost all events of Palaces are regularly reported in the local newspaper. Pictorial presentation of news and events of formal rulers make princely symbols easily consumable by the local people. So a combination of institutionalization and popular representation in local media has helped the House of Mewar to assert its 'publicness' more effectively. Such practices create contradictory imageries for the local populace i.e. at one instance people see themselves as citizens and at other instance their identities get created through the category of 'subjects'.

The continuance of festivals, and processions in the city of Udaipur has provided a space in which their formerly shared princely symbols could be re-invoked even in new democratic contexts. It has been possible because the Indian state even though intended to treat X and Y differentially (on the model - III I have discussed in Chapter -1), it did not abolish X in all its manifestations. The Indian state also did not try to its level best to instigate Y so that it could diminish the centrifugal aspects of X in local peoplehood. Its impact could be seen in one of the conversations I had outside the Jagdish Temple of Udaipur. It was evening time; people were assembling for *aarti* (prayer) at the Jagdish temple; three local people were chatting among themselves at a Paan shop just opposite the Jagdish temple. When I enquired why people are assembling near Jagdish temple in the relatively large number one of them replied it is aarti time (08:00 PM). People assemble two times a day, morning and evening, for prayer. They started a conversation on random topics related to temples, poojas, faiths

and devotion of people of Udaipur to their revered gods. The person called Nagendra (43 years old) used the phrase 'city of temples' to describe the city of Udaipur. He said it is due to god's grace and blessings Udaipur has survived despite facing several challenges at almost all moments of history. To him, it is the local god who has protected the Udaipur city from severe challenges, and this inclines people to worship god on a daily basis. To prove his point more emphatically, he moves towards me and says it is due to god's grace that Udaipur has attracted so many tourists, a major source of livelihood of local people. The divine attachment to the city of Udaipur has an important relation to princely symbols of their local peoplehood. Even the erstwhile rulers of Mewar have created an impression that they were merely custodians in the name of God Eklinji. God Eklinji was the ruler of Mewar. Through this divine aspect an attempt is made to distinguish the history of Mewar from the history of erstwhile ruling neighbouring states on the parameter that Mewar was never ruled by person rather it was ruled as well as protected by the God Eklinji, however, other princely states were ruled by person with enormous power 'King'. An opposite category of 'Shaashak' (ruler) and 'Sevak' (servant) is created by the locally shared symbols to distinguish their historical identity from historical identities of several erstwhile ruling states. The distinction between 'ruler' and 'custodian' has important implications for invocation of princely symbols in modern democratic context. This distinction is important to make to challenge symbols of the state. Many people see the state as corrupt and inefficient when they feel let down by the officials of the state. Nagendra's friend pointed out that, in modern context, politicians have become shaashak (ruler) than being shevak (serving class). He pointed out that not a single work is done by officials in appropriate and authentic manner. They take money even for legitimate work. Officials do not think that their work is to serve people. For them, ruling attitude of state has made the state indifferent to the basic issues of people; people's problem should be seen and tackled in a shared manner. They seem to argue that 'custodian' form of governance is the necessity of time that successfully functioned in Mewar dynasty since eternity.

The Eternal Mewar developed a forum, namely, 'Mewar Sabha Shiromani', aimed at uniting people and friends of Mewar, who are spread across the globe, to revitalize and strengthen the heritage of Mewar. The forum categorises its potential members into 'people of Mewar' and 'friends of Mewar'. One of the benefits for the members

of Sabha is that people and friends of Mewar will be addressed as ‘Kul Gaurav’. The forum runs on the principle of custodianship under a joint custodianship programme. Though, in democratic contexts, all addresses by the House of Mewar is done in the name of ‘people’. However, the new categorization of people ‘Kul Gaurav’ (Pride of Dynasty) is done through the body of princely symbols. This category seems to exhibit that those who willingly accept the undifferentiated heritage of Mewar is ‘Pride of Mewar’ and those who do not accept the undifferentiated heritage of Mewar is ‘other’ in respect of Mewar. There seems no mid-way; either you accept the glories of all the instances of Mewar dynasty or fit in the ‘other’ category. The category ‘Kul Gaurav’ itself intend to portray people into two contradictory frameworks – ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’.

4.3 Seeking Legitimacy of ‘General’ from the ‘Particular’

Not all princely symbols are of equal strength. There has been hierarchy of symbols based on its strength. The strength of symbols is measured in direct connection of the local peoplehood. Those princely symbols that have greater legitimacy in the adjoining peoplehood gain greater strengths compared to those which have lesser legitimacy. For instance, Maharana Pratap is the most popular leader of the Mewar dynasty. Maharana Pratap as a symbolic figure has been used or structured in such a manner to derive some sorts of legitimacy to all other princely symbols. Maharana Mewar Charitable Foundation (MMCF) which runs the City Palace Museum in the premises of City Palace is structurally arranged on the model of a hierarchy of strength of princely symbols. Maharana Pratap, though, was not the first ruler of the Mewar dynasty. Pratap was 54th Custodian of the House of Mewar. But, once anyone enters the City Palace Museum the exhibition of pictures, glory, weapons, and statues start with the name of Maharana Pratap. All other Custodians/rulers find their place only after the Pratap. Even the tourist guides take too much interest in explaining life and deed of Pratap. Even the official book of the House of Mewar “A Walk Through History: The Official Guidebook of the City Palace Museum, Udaipur” starts with the description of Rana Pratap I (1572-1597). All other rulers who ruled before or after him find a place in the book only after Pratap. It is not surprising, then, to conclude that not all princely symbols of the House of Mewar are of equal strength; so a

derivative legitimacy to several other princely symbols has been attempted to drawn from the symbols which are at the helm of hierarchy in the local peoplehood.



PICTURE - 03

Apart from Pratap, City Palace Tourist guides used to emphasize and speak in detail about two other rulers – Rana Udai Singh II (who built city of Udaipur as his new capital) and Maharana Fateh Singh (who defied the directive of British King George V to attend Darbar (Court) at Delhi because chair for each princely rulers were arranged according to his status). Fateh Singh's image is of a ruler who defied the unjust directive of foreign ruler very much the same as that of Maharana Pratap. Udai Singh's image was presented as the architecture and founder of present day Udaipur. No doubt these leaders were great and the level of differential emphasis is placed on rulers of House of Mewar, by the tourist guides, to derive legitimacy to most of the weak princely symbols of local peoplehood.



PICTURE - 04

PICTURE – 03 shows the Chair that British Indian government returned to Fateh Singh in respect of his bravery shown against unjust behavior of British rulers (as stated by Tourist guide at the City Palace Museum). PICTURE – 04 shows a board symbolizing the importance of chair.

4.4 Lake and the Politics of Shared Symbols

When UIT (Urban Improvement Trust), Udaipur officials reached the Tripoli Gate of Gangaur Ghat to curb washing and bathing activities, which were making Lake Pichola filthy, local people protested the move of government and UIT officials had to leave the spot without any success. UIT officials wanted to install an iron gate at the entrance of Gangaur Ghat. Local people objected by arguing that installation of any gate at the Gangaur Ghat would prevent tourists from reaching the Ghat. They argued

this step would severely impact the health of tourism in Udaipur, and their only source of livelihood would get affected.

During my field study, in December 2014, in Udaipur I got a chance to interact with local people – shopkeeper, hotel owner and people chatting and enjoying near the locality of Gangaur Ghat. They confirmed the above incident and the sudden outbreak after that. It was not violent protest; however, it has much to do with the symbols of their peoplehood. Local people said that the administration of Udaipur was corrupt, non-cooperative and inefficient. The government has not corrected their institutions were supposed to govern the people. It is because of palaces, museums, local heritage culture; handicraft works Udaipur has become a tourism hub in the country. Tourism has brought a source of livelihood for us. We would be unemployed and would probably die if, slowly, administration attacks the sites, symbols that attract tourists. The local people said cleanness of Lake Pichola was very important for all of us but the government must find some middle way to tackle this issue rather than attacking our livelihood. Gangaur Ghat does not have importance only from the perspective of tourism, but it also has divinity and royal elements. Mewar festival and Gangaur festival culminates at Gangaur Ghat where the last ritual is performed by Maharana of Mewar (now Custodian of the House of Mewar).

It is the performative aspects of princely symbols in the economic sense that has developed a sense of preservation of these symbols. Tourism has brought livelihood for the local people. This has also developed the value of keeping their surrounding sphere clean. 'Swachtaa' (Cleanliness) has become an important aspect of local peoplehood. They know that if their surroundings, shops, and hotels are not clean tourists will not come. Cleanliness for them is not only related to health aspects, but rather it has economic functions also.

This incident is illustrative of how people use princely symbols to challenge the Indian state or to assert their right as citizens or to show disapproval of the performative aspects of the symbols of the Indian state. It does not mean people have become hostile to the symbols of state. Rather, people have become hostile to some particular symbols of the state i.e. inefficiency, mismanagement in governance. However, when people realize the performative aspects of symbols of state in their everyday life they willingly acknowledge it. This interchanging relationship could be

seen through following cases. Rahul, a businessman, associated the identity of the city of Udaipur with lakes, temples Palaces, and tourism. He proudly called Udaipur as the 'City of Lakes'. However, his local icons were Maharana Pratap and Mohan Lal Sukhadia. The important point is that he associated the city of Udaipur with lakes, Palaces, Scenic beauty – all of these are directly or indirectly associated with the Royals. But he did not see any of the rulers of Mewar dynasty as their local icon except – Maharana Pratap. A large group of people see Mohan Lal Sukhadia (former chief minister of Rajasthan – also called as the modern architect of Udaipur) and Maharana Pratap (for his bravery, selfless service, patriotism) as their local hero. He chooses late or former politicians whose public statue he would like to be built in his locality for inspiration. These three interrelated aspects provide another story of symbols: people have the agency to decipher even the permuted symbols of their peoplehood provided symbols perform. Despite the contexts of peoplehood that is dominantly constituted by princely symbols, people take pride in their leaders work i.e. Mohan Lal Sukhadia. In the present context, symbols of state have not become weak rather it has to make its symbols more performative in the contexts in which it is going to perform.

4.5 The Discourse of Corruption

People most frequently interact with symbols of state in the form of local and district administration. People's interaction with symbols of state leaves impressions on the mind of people about the nature of the state. This aspect is important to understand the nature of the Indian state in its microscopic manifestations.

The Indian state's symbols i.e. administration, governance, voting rights to citizens have functioned quite differently in the city of Udaipur. Efficiency and excellence of performative aspects of symbols of the Indian state were very important for constituting Constitutional peoplehood in this city. The failure of the local administration, rampant corruption, dictatorial attitudes of personnel and lack of empathy towards poor have transformed state's symbols into 'failed symbols'. Fight against bad attitude of administrators, illegal practices and corruption symbolically create people's identities as 'insurgent citizens' – category of citizens who gradually develops the feeling that Indian state is doing injustice to its own citizens. Inefficiency

of the performative aspects of state's symbols has pushed people of this city into their existing peoplehood. In their peoplehood, they see that princely symbols have been quite swiftly marketized. The tourism industry is rising to its heights. A sense of feelings has developed among most of these people that it is the princely symbols that have opened it for marketization that has become the primary source of their livelihood. Once these feelings have developed among the local populace, the 'insurgent citizens' has turned into 'normalized citizens' within the existing perimeter of peoplehood that is premised on princely symbols.

Manohar, who runs a dhaba, calls state's officials 'chor' (thief). He says *ye sub ke sub chor hain* (all these officials are the thief). One policeman had come to him in the morning to collect money as a bribe for letting him continue to operate his small dhaba on cycle cart near the gate of Saheliyon Ki Bari. He earns a little bit to run his family. His angry response is understandable as his hard earned money is taken away by a police man. People see tourism as their important source of livelihood. They get angry on state's officials as they see the state as a failure on the front of delivery of services. To them, it is tourism that has provided a decent livelihood but unnecessary officials harass them.

4.6 The Denial of Information

There are also some cases where the symbols of the Indian state and princely symbols are not in conflict, rather the Indian state become the facilitator of princely symbols. In *Shri Basanti Lal Singhvi vs Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)*, Central Information Commission (CIC) sidelined the contradictory and confusing stand of MHA. This Case is important to note down the stand taken by MHA, and CIC in its order of 2009. Basanti Lal filed an RTI (Right to Information) application with MHA to know about whether Saheliyon-Ki-Bari is a private or government property. Basanti Lal claimed that he had purchased land (part of Saheliyon-Ki-Bari) from the erstwhile royal in 1963. When a PIL was filed it stated in its response that this property belong to the Indian government, and royals had no right to sell. But, Basanti Lal claimed that Ministry of States recognized Laxmi Vilas Palace and Saheliyon-Ki-Bari as the Royal's private property in 1951. Basanti Lal Singhvi filed an RTI application, on 17th June 2009, with MHA seeking following details,

Details of private property of erstwhile Maharana of Mewar and of public property, as was prepared on 20th April, 1949 at Mount Abu by representative of Maharana of Mewar, Representative of Govt. of India and Govt. of Rajasthan prepared at the time of amalgamation of Mewar State, Photo copy of Details of final inventory prepared in respect of Property of Maharana by Ministry of States and intimated to him vide D.O. No. D-5079-P/49 dated 20 June, 1949³².

Basanti Lal Singhvi received response from MHA on 13th August, 2009. The response of MHA notes,

I am directed to inform you that your request for providing above mentioned information /documents has not been agreed to in view of the policy decision by the Government that the details of the private properties of erstwhile ex-rulers of princely states should not be divulged³³.

An appeal was filed in the office of CIC by Basanti Lal, and CIC order dated 16th June, 2009 notes,

There is no doubt that the properties in respect of which information has been asked for are the private properties of a third party, disclosure of which is permissible only if a larger public interest justifies its disclosure³⁴.

A new appeal was filed by Basanti Lal in 2010 which was heard by CIC on 18th March, 2010 and final order came on 12th May, 2010. The decision notice observes,

Since the issue is already in the public domain, even though the information sought is undoubtedly with regard to private property, this property has been the subject of public activity, in the official demarcation of erstwhile state land as part private and part public. It is only in cases when no such relationship has been established that the plea of privacy can be taken u/s 8(1)(j). Hence Shri K.C. Jain, Jt. Secretary (Judicial), Ministry of Home Affairs is directed to provide the information sought to appellant Shri Basanti Lal Singhvi within ten working days of the date of receipt of this decision notice³⁵.

The stand taken by MHA was very confusing as it complicates the notion of ‘public responsibility’. The treaty between the Indian state and former princely rulers were a state act, not a private act. How the property or land between both was distributed has

³² Retrieved from http://www.rti.india.gov.in/cic_decisions/CIC_SM_C_2009_001190.pdf, on 08th April, 2015.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

been kept outside the realm of public domain. Even though if any property or heritage belong to the government and people are confused about who is its actual owner, people would be unable to fix bodies/institutions responsible in a time bound manner. It was not the question of violation of anybody's privacy rather it was more of a question of whether people have right or not to know what the government owns, on the behalf of people.

Similar sorts of confusion prevails all over the state of Rajasthan. Rajasthan government has lost the necessary documents which has caused delays in the process of litigation. Several former ruler families have captured government properties and these are causing a huge loss to the state economy.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

This study aimed to examine, in the previous chapters, the impact of interactions and permutations of princely symbols and symbols of the state on people's identity as the 'citizen'. It intended to explore how these interactions and permutations blur the boundary between 'citizens' and 'subjects'. To examine this aspect, the research paper has tried to understand the peoplehood of the city of Udaipur through three variables: viz., the strength of princely symbols, contradictory approaches of the state and agency of people. In other words, the attempt has been made to understand how people's identity as the 'citizen' caught into the contradictory category of 'citizens-subjects' under the influence of locally shared princely symbols; through actions of the state; through people's own actions. Additionally, this study also examines the mechanisms through which people come out of these permuted symbols to assert their right as the citizens.

The first chapter surveys notions and forms through which the concept of peoplehood is created. It intends to find out factors that help in constituting a peoplehood. Focusing on constitutive factors is important to understand how a peoplehood could successfully be transited in a newer form. This aspect is important keeping in mind the aim and intention of the Constitution Makers of India to constitute Constitutional peoplehood by replacing peoplehood framed on the notion of shared princely symbols. To understand why Indian state failed to constitute constitutional peoplehood in Rajasthan, it is important to know what the constituents of peoplehood are; how the symbols are placed inside it; and these symbols are shared.

This chapter maps out the constitutive framework in which the concept of peoplehood has been understood in the available scholarly works. There has been a virtual presence of scholarly literature that examines the notion of peoplehood through the aspects of its transition. This study suggests understanding the notion of peoplehood through the aspects of transition. It would probably explain why people of a particular peoplehood react differentially to the symbols of the external world even though they are placed under locally shared symbols. Constitutive aspects of peoplehood try to fix the functional sphere of peoplehood and presumes that the production of the

'otherness' of those who do not share their commonly shared symbols are necessary for the continuation of peoplehood. It does not tell how the inner and outer world of a peoplehood interacts and opens a possibility for externally driven change in peoplehood. The Model – III argues that to make a substantive change in an existing peoplehood through external forces, it is important that these forces adopt two simultaneous approaches: viz., attacking X heavily to reduce it to the level of irrelevance; and instigating Y so as to effectively relate it with the symbols of external world. This paper, on this model, argues that the Indian state failed to attack X in full spirit; though it interacted with Y but mostly the framework of interactions were through the permuted symbols of X and Y. It led to the continuance of princely symbols in almost identical form in the modern democratic contexts.

The role of the Indian state in allowing these princely symbols to continue in a modern context has also been analyzed in the second chapter. The intention of the Indian state regarding the constitution of constitutional peoplehood is examined through the Constituent Assembly Debates in India. The members of the Constituent Assembly agreed on taking people as the source of sovereignty. In doing this, they rejected the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two forms of sovereignty in the Indian Territory. The people of princely states became the citizen of India, but to avoid violent opposition in course of political integration of the Indian Territory the Indian state made certain concessions to the former rulers on the model of quid pro quo. The Constitution Makers assumed that in due course of time modern values and principles of the Indian constitution would make other symmetrically situated peoplehood irrelevant.

The literature on the society and polity of Rajasthan assert that it is the strength of princely symbols that have stopped the penetration of constitutional peoplehood in the territory of Rajasthan (Rudolph, 1966; Narain and Mathur, 1990; Ramusack, 2008). This body of literature argues that former rulers still enjoy the similar form of legitimacy from their former subjects. While arguing this, this body of literature overemphasizes the strength of princely symbols in explaining the peoplehood of Rajasthan. They neglect the role of the state that adopted contradictory approaches in the case of Rajasthan which allowed princely symbols to continue in almost identical forms. Acknowledging multiple variables has helped this study to understand how permutation of symbols of the Indian state and princely symbols in modern

democratic context creates a new form of peoplehood, quite distinct from both, that provides space to princely symbols to get legitimized in the democratic contexts; creates an opportunity for the Indian state to legitimize its democratic symbols in historically constituted peoplehood; and opens a large window for the people to be hostile to both the symbols of state and princely symbols. These princely symbols also use modern democratic languages to maintain their princely symbols as part of locally shared symbols. Indira Gandhi, though, delegitimized the political titles, privileges and privy purses of princely rulers but the Indian state did not exert paramountcy in the cultural realms. Though it attacked the institutions of King, the presence of 'royal body' did not feel this force.

The question of the role of the Indian state in giving spaces to princely symbols to flourish in modern democratic context has been shown in this dissertation through the example of tourism in Udaipur. Even after delegitimizing princely political and economic privileges, the Indian state allowed these rulers to own some of their personal properties i.e. Palaces, forts, temples. In changing context, these physical manifestations of princely symbols have been converted into heritage hotels, museums or for private celebrations. It has drawn a large number of tourists to this places, and a new life has been imparted to the economic life of the capital cities of most of princely states. Economic performance of princely symbols has captured the local space where the state could not reach to help its citizens. Several people of Udaipur's livelihood are relied on the tourism industry. The economic aspect of princely symbols has also brought a new form of legitimacy in its peoplehood. When UIT officials visited Pichola Lake to install an Iron Gate, local people protested against such move as it would affect their livelihood. Pichola Lake, a manmade lake, was built by former rulers of Mewar has now become the center of attraction for local tourists. People's argument against the state was quite expressive. They argued that Indian state has failed to provide a decent livelihood for local people; it is princely symbols of their local peoplehood that is generating a livelihood for them.

This study has also tried to show how interactions and permutations of symbols of the state and princely rulers have produced the contradictory categories for people. Several festivals, ceremonials, processions are held in the city of Udaipur in which local people participates. These festivals i.e. Gangaur, Mewar festival are very old and has been continuously celebrated in this city since the time of Mewar rulers. Some

other festivals i.e. Ashwa poojan, birthday celebration of Arvind Singh Mewar, Kartik Poornima have been started in recent periods also. These new festivals and ceremonials are instituted in the recent period to inform continuously people about the glory of the dynasty of Mewar. Participation of people in these festivals creates their identity as the consumer of princely symbols and the identity of 'subjects'. Many local politicians also frequently participate in these festivals, inside as well as outside the City Palace, and their participation in festivals further creates a dilemma of people's identity as citizens.

This study also shows the process through which erstwhile ruler of Udaipur try to draw legitimacy of their whole dynastic rule through the great works, visions and bravery of few rulers. An attempt at drawing the legitimacy of 'generality' from 'particularity' is being done continuously in the peoplehood of Udaipur. Former ruler and his family actively participate in the birth anniversary of Maharana Pratap. Through the great qualities i.e. bravery, patriotism, brotherhood of Maharana Pratap former rulers of Mewar tries to justify theirs not so great days of rule.

It also shows the appropriation of princely symbols by the modern Indian state to serve their interests. Recently, the Home Minister of India Rajnath Singh called Maharana Pratap greater than Akbar and called for replacing the textbook chapter on Akbar in school by the life and history of Maharana Pratap. The present Governor of Rajasthan, while giving a lecture in college demanded that the state's school textbook must replace Akbar by Maharana Pratap. These are not the only instances where the Indian state has appropriated princely symbols to assert the symbols of religious majoritarianism. Indian state did not hesitate in deploying princely symbols to assert the majoritarianism politics. Evidence of princely symbols in democratic Indian state could be seen through some disparate excerpts:

The last titular Maharaja of Jaipur, Sawai Bhawani Singh died...the Rajasthan government announced a two day state mourning...people offered flowers and wreath...Rajasthan Governor Shivraj Patil, Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot and Pradesh Congress Committee President C.P.Joshi were among those who paid floral tributes³⁶...

The City Place of Jaipur ...hosted a royal wedding...the wedding affair witnessed a host of royal guests of various erstwhile princely states and prominent political personalities including the chief minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi and Vasundhra

³⁶ 'Bhawani Singh, Last Maharaja of Jaipur, dead', *The Hindu*, April 17, 2011

Raje Sindhiya, ex chief minister of Rajasthan...most of the guests were seen in the regal attire, and colorful turbans³⁷.

This study observes that we have to see the relations between state and society through TYPE – IV in which boundaries of state and society are seen blurred. We have to go beyond the simplistic account of blurred boundary and should move to the complicated aspects of blurred boundaries. Since the interactions of body, space and culture produces multiple frame of references for people, it is important that we must shift from simplistic analysis of ‘blurred boundary’ to the aspect of level and depth of blurred boundary. It is important to note, beyond seeing the blurred boundary aspects of state and society, the level of blurred relations. It would give us a wholesome account of a complex picture of people’s lens through which they see their external world differently at different moments of time. Not only it tell us about different lens people are possessing to view the world around themselves, but it also give an important clue about the nature of intervention required to the regressive frame of references.

³⁷ ‘Royal Wedding at City Palace, Jaipur’, *The Sunday Indian*.
<http://www.thesundayindian.com/en/videos/692/>

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APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE



Centre for the Study of Law and Governance (CSLG)

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY, NEW DELHI - 110067

INTERVIEW

FILL BEFORE STARTING INTERVIEW

F1. Name of the Respondent:

F2. Address of the Respondent:

.....

(Give landmark, if respondent's house is difficult to locate)

INVESTIGATOR'S INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT

My name is Mukesh Kumar Jha. I have come from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I am conducting a survey on the opinion of people of Udaipur about their imagination of the city of Udaipur. I will be interviewing many people across the Udaipur district. The findings of this survey, firstly, will be used for writing my M.Phil. Dissertation. It will be finally submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University for my academic assessment. This survey is an independent study and is not linked to any political party, organization, government or security agency. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Participation in this survey is voluntary and it is entirely up to you to answer or not answer any question that I

ask. I hope that you will take part in this survey since your participation is important. It usually takes 30-40 minutes to complete this interview. Please spare some time for the interview and help me in successfully completing the survey.

F3. May I begin with the interview now?

1. Respondent agrees.
2. Respondent does not agree (End the interview here).

Q1. Age:

1. 0 – 20 years
2. 20 – 40 years
3. 40 – 60 years
4. More than 60 years
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

Q2. Sex:

1. Male
2. Female
40. Any Other
50. No Response

Q3. Category:

1. General (Unreserved)
2. Other Backward Classes
3. Scheduled Caste
4. Scheduled Tribe

30. Don't Know

40. Any Other

50. No Response

Q4. Marital Status:

1. Married

2. Unmarried

3. Divorced

4. Widowed

40. Any other

50. No Response

Q5. Occupation:

1. Government Sector

2. Private Sector

3. Self-employed

4. House wife

5. Wage Labourer

40. Any other

50. No Response

Q6. Educational Qualifications:

1. Post-graduate

2. Graduate

3. Senior- secondary

4. Secondary

- 5. Primary
- 6. Illiterate
- 40. Any other
- 50. No Response

Q7. Religion:

- 1. Hindu
- 2. Muslim
- 3. Christian
- 4. Sikh
- 40. Any other
- 50. No Response

Q8. How long have you been living in this town?

- 1. Less than 5 years
- 2. 05 – 10 years
- 3. 10 – 20 years
- 4. Entire Life
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

Q9. A. Have you noticed any changes in the city life of Udaipur?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

B. If yes, what is the significant changes Udaipur city has gone through?

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Q10. What comes to your mind when you think of Udaipur?

1. Maharanas of Udaipur
2. Palaces
3. Lakes
4. Hotels
5. Politicians
6. Administration
7. Attire
8. Handicrafts
9. Scenic beauty
10. Shopping Malls
11. Temples
20. None of the above
25. All of the above
30. Don't Know
40. Any other
50. No Response

Q11. A. Whom do you consider your local icon?

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.....

B. Why?

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.....
.....

Q12. A. Did you attend any festival of Udaipur?

1. Yes
2. No
50. No Response

B. If yes, which festival did you attend?

.....
.....

C. Who inaugurates the festivals usually?

1. Priest
2. Erstwhile Royal figure
3. Politician
4. Government Official
30. Don't Know
40. Any other
50. No Response

D. Do politicians attend festivals?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

E. Do erstwhile royals attend festivals?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

F. Do government officials attend festivals?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

G. Do politicians, erstwhile royals and government officials together attend festivals?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

H. What is the importance of celebrating festivals in your view?

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Q13. How do you see the changing, if any, power, position and image of erstwhile royals of Mewar?

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Q14. A. Did you attend any procession of Udaipur?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 50. No Response

B. If yes, which procession did you attend?

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.....

C. Which route did the procession take?

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.....
.....

D. Who inaugurates the procession usually?

1. Priest
2. Royal Figure
3. Politician
4. Government official
30. Don't Know
40. Any Other
50. No Response

E. Do politicians attend procession?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

F. Do erstwhile royals attend procession?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

G. Do Government officials attend procession?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

H. Do politicians, erstwhile royals or government officials together attend procession?

1. Yes
2. No
30. Don't Know
50. No Response

I. What is the importance of taking out procession in your view?

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Q15. A. Whose public statue would you like to be built in your locality?

1. Erstwhile royal
2. Politician
3. Social Worker
4. Government official
5. Don't Know
6. Any Other
7. No Response

B. Why?

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Q16. A. Did you attend any ceremonial event of Udaipur?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

B. If yes, which ceremonial event did you attend?

.....
.....

C. Who inaugurates the ceremonial events usually?

- 1. Priest
- 2. Royal Figure
- 3. Politician
- 4. Government Official
- 30. Don't Know
- 40. Any Other
- 50. No Response

D. Do politicians attend ceremonial events?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

E. Do erstwhile royals attend ceremonial events?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

F. Do government officials attend ceremonial events?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

G. Do politicians, erstwhile royals or government officials attend ceremonial events?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

H. What is the importance of ceremonial events in your view?

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Q17. A. Have you ever visited the government office i.e. district collectorate, Nagar Parishad office, Block (Prakhand) and so on?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 50. No Response

B. If yes, for what purpose did you visit the office?

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.....
.....
.....

C. Did you find any difficulty in getting things done?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

D. Are you happy with the functioning of these public bodies?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

E. Did government officials demand any sum of illegitimate money for getting your work done?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

30. Don't Know

50. No Response

F. Did you rely on middleman for getting your work done in these offices?

1. Yes

2. No

30. Don't Know

50. No Response

G. How do you see corruption in these offices?

1. Good

2. Bad

3. Good as well as bad

30. Don't Know

50. No Response

H. If good, why do you think corruption is good?

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I. If bad, why do you think corruption is bad?

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J. If good as well as bad, why do you think so?

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K. How do you think corruption could be removed or checked?

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L. What do you think is the most corrupt public institutions in Udaipur district?

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Q18. Whom would you like to see as your MLA?

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Q19. Whom would you like to see as your MP?

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Q20. A. Do you think Kshatriya's demand for 50% reservation in the army, on the basis of their heritage, should be accepted?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

B. If Yes, why?

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.....

C. If No, why?

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.....

Q21. A. Do you think erstwhile royals should join active (electoral) politics?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 1. No Response

B. If no, why?

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C. If yes, why?

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Q22. A. Who popular and known public figures feature in your folklore?

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B. Do you think folk culture is represented in the public functions in your area?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 30. Don't Know
- 50. No Response

Q23. Could you tell us any popular story that must be told to the children?

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Q24. A. Do you vote in elections?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. No Response

B. Do you think voting is important?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Don't Know
- 4. No Response

C. If yes, why?

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D. If no, why?

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ELEMENTS OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDY

1. How do people address to one another, government officials and the local politicians?
2. Statues at public places.
3. Architectural styles of non-heritage sites (i.e. malls, residential localities and so on).
4. Everyday attires of people.
5. Public imageries (i.e. paintings/decorations on walls, name of shops, public hoardings and so on).
6. Representation of erstwhile royals in public media and like.
7. Street culture.
8. Kind of story told to tourists by tourist guides.
9. Location of tourism industry in Udaipur.
10. Architecture of Udaipur city.