

**THE POLITICS OF
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS 1969-79**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY


KSHITISH KUMAR MOHANTY

**CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
1987**

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
ORGANIZATION AND DISARMAMENT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Telegram : JAYENU
Telephones : 652282
661444
661351
New Delhi-110067

28 December, 1987



DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
"THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS 1969-79"
submitted by Mr. Kshitish Kumar Mohanty in fulfilment
of nine credits out of the total requirement of twentyfour
credits for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy
(M.Phil.) of the University is his original work according
to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the
examiners for evaluation.

M. L. Sondhi

Countersigned

(Dr. M.L. SONDHI)
Chairman

M. Zuberi

(Prof. M. ZUBERI)
Supervisor

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Prof. M.Zuberi, my supervisor, for allowing me limitless latitude in doing (particularly pacing) my research and planning. And since some intimate thoughts are usually not said aloud I would not say anything more about him.

I should also like to thank Ashwini, Chandan, Himadri, Sanjay, Satya and Suresh who aided in many necessary chores.

Mr. Jeet Lamba did the typing and imparted a certain "multiplier effect" to the original manuscript. I am indebted to him.

For the errors and nonsense which may still remain in the dissertation, I alone am responsible.

New Delhi

28.12.87

Kshitish Kumar Mohanty
(KSHITISH KUMAR MOHANTY)

CONTENTS

		<u>PAGES</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS		
CHAPTER - I	INTRODUCTORY : OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES	1-4
CHAPTER - II	THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ARMS CONTROL BEFORE SALT : COSMETIC TREATIES WITH/FOR NASCENT DETENTE	5-32
CHAPTER - III	SALT-I : TECHNICAL ARMS CONTROL AND POLITICAL DETENTE IN PERFECT TANDEM	33-85
CHAPTER - IV	SALT-II : CONSUMED BY THE QUICKSAND OF LINKAGE POLITICS	86-123
CHAPTER - V	FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION	124-131
	APPENDIX	132-135
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	136-159

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION : OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

And mutual fear brings peace,
Till the selfish loves increase;
Then Cruelty knits a snare,
And spreads his bait with care.

- Blake, "The Human Abstract".

Benumbed as they were from war and cold war, the two superpowers were shocked to sanity by the Cuban missile crisis. They realized that relations in the nuclear age had to be based on mutual accommodation - or else. Still it took seven years, three American administrations, two Soviet regimes and some imagination on both sides to start, in 1969, the first process to regulate the strategic arms competition - the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.¹

-
1. The "T" in the acronym SALT stands for "Talks", not for "Treaty". The etymology of SALT, as explained by John Newhouse in his history of the first round of the negotiations (Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973) goes back to 1968, when the Central Intelligence Agency was looking for a convenient heading under which to file the sudden flood of material on the subject. The man who coined the acronym was one Robert Martin, an official in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department.

For a time, roughly between 1969 and 1974, the process worked. To borrow from Chairman Mao, a hundred flowers bloomed. The first set of SALT agreements - SALT-I - were signed in 1972, freezing specified types of offensive and defensive nuclear missiles and launchers. Other collateral and confidence-building measures followed. "Mutual fear", it seemed, had brought peace.

Arms control, however, is not, as Lord Byron said of man's love, "a thing apart". It is rather more like woman's love (on the same authority), an inseparable part of life. It is deeply rooted in the "context" of domestic and international life. While SALT-II was being negotiated complications arose in the "context". Though a SALT-II was signed in 1979, the treaty did not become effective, and the process suffered an abrupt end. The demise of SALT underscored the salience of "selfish love".

This dissertation is an account of the role played by "mutual fear", "selfish love", "context" and the like in the process of SALT. In short, this is about the politics of SALT : the role played by politics in the initiation, continuance and termination of SALT. Politics, here, is taken to mean the organizational activities of struggle and disagreement in which men and nations engage to maximize their convictions about differing social values.

How a technical-bureaucratic affair like SALT was set in the context of long-term political-economic-strategic interests of the superpowers? Why did the US and the Soviet Union embark on the path of SALT? What were the gains and losses on both sides? Was it the adoption of "rearm-first-negotiate-later" sequence by the US or the "greedy strategic behaviour and third world assertiveness" of the Soviet Union, which brought about the end of the SALT process? These are some of the questions to which this study proposes to seek answers.

The study, which is based on a historico-analytical and deductive method, seeks to verify the following broad hypotheses:

- i) Although superpower arms control is based on the theoretical insulation from politics, it is, in practice, quintessentially political, enmeshed, as it is, in the greater movement of US-Soviet relations.
- ii) Whether or not a specific arms control agreement that freezes or otherwise limits a particular military-technological sector will contribute toward stability or instability depends more upon the political motives and intentions of the parties than upon neutral or objective scientific facts.
- iii) SALT I was a product of a temporary confluence of priority interests between the two superpowers in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was a product of strategic parity as well as of political detente then existing between the two sides.

- iv) The pace of political detente exceeded the pace of military detente during the early and mid-1970s. Negotiation and conclusion of SALT II were thus made difficult.

- v) The vicissitudes of American domestic politics aided, partly, by the Soviet Union's proneness to play out its revolutionary identity militated against the consistent pursuit of objectives and priorities established at the beginning of the SALT process, and led to the collapse of the process.

After this brief introductory Chapter, Chapter II deals with the background and legacy of SALT. It discusses the meaning and evolution of the concept of arms control, explores the links between arms control and politics, and evaluates the technical and political implications of the rather half-hearted arms control measures before SALT. Chapter III describes the Soviet and American motivations in seeking and concluding SALT-I, analyzes the politico-strategic implications of the Treaty, and shows how both domestic and international politics played a benign role in bringing about the Treaty. Chapter IV describes the difficult path leading to the signing of SALT-II, scrutinizes the reasonableness and tenability of American reservations about the Treaty, and examines the role played by different factors in the collapse of the SALT process. Chapter V is devoted to findings, observations and conclusion.

CHAPTER - II

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ARMS CONTROL BEFORE SALT :
COSMETIC TREATIES WITH/FOR NASCENT DETENTE

Arms Control : Meaning, Origin, and Intellectual Roots

Arms control refers to reciprocally induced measures of strategic stability. Decidedly a modern phenomenon, arms control can be defined as reciprocal engagements between or among "organized societies" for restricting invention, accumulation, or deployment of "specialized instrumentalities"¹ for conducting hostilities. The "specialized instrumentalities" we are concerned with, in this undertaking, are the pan-catastrophic and omnicidal nuclear weapons and the "organized societies" are the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The concept of arms control emerged as a reaction to the lack of progress in the disarmament sphere in dealing with the doomsday vistas of thermonuclear war. Disarmament is a vision arising from the desire for peace, to be implemented by renouncing the use of military force in the settlement of conflicts. This vision has existed as long as war itself. With the development of nuclear weapons and the subsequent fear of an apocalyptic

1. Charles Burton Marshall, Dinner Addresses, in Richard F. Staar, ed., Arms Control : Myth Versus Reality (California : Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p.180.

destruction of entire societies, the drive for disarmament increased. The basic concept was simple : if potential adversaries possess no weapons, war becomes highly improbable. "Create peace without weapons" was the popular slogan.

In contrast, "create peace with fewer weapons"² was the slogan of the arms control theorists. The reduction or abolition of weapon systems advocated by the disarmament approach was acknowledged to be unrealistic and unattainable by the arms control approach. Arms control with its advocacy of more modest measures and step by step approach offered a more realistic solution to the perceived dangers of war.

Arms control originated in the mid-1950s as part of the intellectual development of western, primarily American, strategic thinking that began with the works of systems analysts in the second World War. From this experience, it had become evident that independent analysis of military systems or deployments could reveal unsuspected side effects or deficiencies. In 1947, the Charles River Studies that were conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's (MIT) Lincoln Laboratories, and other similar studies, showed that the most economical allocation of the limited US

2. The slogan was proposed and popularized by the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

resources for strategic deterrence was a mixture of air defence and offensive forces, rather than the United States Air Force's intended concentration on the Strategic Air Command's (SAC) offensive forces.³

In 1954, Albert Wohlstetter's study^{3a} on Strategic Air Command's plans for overseas bases came to both explicit technical conclusions about the high vulnerability of the proposed basing system to surprise attack and the implicit political conclusion that this vulnerability could provide an inherent technological incentive for pre-emption.

Two events in 1957 made the transition from technical systems analyses to arms control theory complete. Firstly, the Gaither Committee of 1957 examined the adequacy of US strategic weapons and their deployment and became alarmed at the vulnerability of the retaliatory force to surprise attack. Bombers were clustered, unprotected, on a few bases. Studies showed that Soviet bombers, too few to be identified by the Distant Early Warning Line, might be sufficient to destroy or disable

3, 3a. Robin Ranger, Arms & Politics, 1958-78 : Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1978), p.202.

American fragile aircraft, eliminating the prospect of the reprisal that was supposed to deter the attack. Secondly, announcement in 1957 of a Soviet flight test of an ICBM precursor further dramatized the vulnerability of the American retaliatory force and the fear of a surprise attack.

Arms control was basically a technical approach to arms interactions. Arms control theory was treated as a relatively unchanging and self-sustained doctrine that deals with the effects of military technology on the stability of deterrence. The theory is based on the following rather modest notions.

- i. Firstly, it accepts conflict among nations as an inevitable part of international politics and views military force as a necessary and legitimate instrument of national policy.
- ii. Secondly, it endorses the verity, in the nuclear arena, of Edmund Burke's epigram that "there are no permanent victories". By recognizing limitations on military power, arms control policy can be an effective component of strategy.

- iii. Thirdly, the theory assumes that decisions to acquire certain types or quantities of weapons can aggravate political conflicts and thereby in themselves contribute to the risk of war.⁴
- iv. Fourthly, the assumption is that both the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in "stable" nuclear arms relationships.
- v. Fifthly, the theory continues, the risk of war can be reduced, or at least contained, both through unilateral decisions to avoid deployments of destabilizing weapons and, more important, through bilateral/international negotiations on agreements to mutually avoid deploying certain types of weapons or to place other types of agreed mutual limitations on weaponry.
- vi. Finally, the assumption goes that since the threat to stability is primarily technical in nature, agreements dealing with them could be isolated or insulated from the general context of superpower relations.⁵

4. B.M. Blechman, "Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., & Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., The Global Agenda : Issues and Perspectives (New York Random House, 1984), p.125.

5. Robin Ranger, op.cit., p.201.

The attractiveness of the arms control notion was demonstrated by the spate of books and articles on arms control in the early 1960s, written or edited by, among others, Donald Brennan, Hedley Bull, Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Ernest Lefever, Louis Henkin, Arthur Hadley and Alexander Dallin. According to Thomas Schelling, one of the prominent arms control theories, the concept would mean :

"all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments".⁶

As Donald Brennan put it, the goal of arms control was to :

"reduce the hazards of present armament policies by a factor greater than the amount of risk introduced by the control measure themselves".⁷

6. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York : The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p.2.

7. Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York : George Braziller, 1961), p.6.

And in the words of Hedley Bull arms control :

"is essentially a restraint on the arms policy of the superpowers in an adversarial relationship, in regard to production, deployment and use of nuclear weapons."⁸

The Rationales for Arms Control

In the Moscow Pugwash Conference of December, 1960, the Soviets, instead of a nuclear attack, held out a rather temperate threat to the Americans: "we shall build twenty Aswan Dams". The Soviets were also concerned about the possible German entry into the nuclear club. The Americans were similarly worried about a Chinese nuclear detonation and they must have similarly thought about starting, say, twenty frontier-science research projects. These provide clues to the rationale of superpower arms control.

The desirability of the restraint of arms races, of measures to reduce the probability of war, of damage limitation and of reduction in defence budgets is, indeed, irrefutable. These objectives, coupled with

8. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p.9.

the need to prevent nuclear proliferation, became the rationale for superpower arms control, and the mainstay of arms control literature in the early 60s. W.W. Rostow, in a memorandum delivered to President-elect Kennedy in December 1960, listed⁹ the rationales for arms control:

- The Nth power problem, centering evidently on China and Germany.
- The danger of accidental war which would rise with the enlargement of the Nuclear Club.
- The arms race is a technologically precarious dead-end game for the Soviet Union and the United States, which neither can win.
- Disarmament would free resources for domestic purposes and for use in underdeveloped areas.

Paraphrasing Thomas Schelling's 1960 definition of arms control, we get a more conventional and technical interpretation of the rationale for arms control. The reasons for arms control, according to him, are to : a) reduce the probability of war ; b) reduce the costs of preparations for war; and c) reduce the death and destruction should war occur.

9. W.W. Rostow, "Introduction : The Politics of Arms Control or How to Make Nuclear Weapons Wither Away", in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., eds., SALT : Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburg : University of Pittsburg Press, 1973), p.xvi.

Several rationales for superpower arms control based on strategic, political, and economic considerations have been postulated.

The first and the most important is the strategic rationale. The goals, direction and execution of arms control policy represent a means by which the strategic goals of stability and deterrence are realized. Simply put, by providing a deterrent at a lower level of armaments arms control enhances the stability of the strategic balance.

Deterrence is an operational term and requires that the survivability and capability of rival states' forces be so counterbalanced as to guarantee that attack would be a losing proposition for either side. 'Stability' is a descriptive term and requires a situation in which neither side fears that the other has gained, or is easily capable of acquiring, a first-strike capability that would destroy the retaliatory force of the other. Arms control by providing each superpower with some control over the other's force size and rate of technological innovation, helps ease the threat of surprise attack or pre-emptive attack. This emphasis on arms control as a means of securing apolitical, technical solutions to the threats to strategic stability is characterized as the "technical-arms-control approach".¹⁰

10. Robin Ranger, op.cit., p.vii.

Secondly, paramount in the consideration of the desirability of arms control agreements is the political rationale. Nations seek arms control to the extent that it accords with their political objectives. Both in official and public discussions and in the literature of arms control, there is the implicit assumption that arms control negotiations and agreements in themselves are desirable because of an alleged causal nexus between arms races and conflict. The political rationale for arms control rests also on the assumption that among the national actors, arms control negotiations and an agreement in one sector 1) are conducive to the initiation and conduct of negotiations and the conclusion of agreements in other sectors of armaments, and 2) create a more favourable political climate for the conduct of negotiations and the conclusion of agreements in still other fields. This emphasis on arms control as a political means to further foreign policy objectives is termed as the "political_arms-control approach".¹¹

Two concepts that are crucial in a discussion of political rationale of arms control are "spillover/ramification" and "linkage". The term "spillover" is widely used in theoretical works in political science on

11. Ibid., p.vii.

the conditions for economic and political integration at the international level. It assumes that among the national actors arms control negotiations and agreements provide a learning process that creates a propensity for further negotiations and agreements. Such exercises furnish a learning experience that contributes to the building of mutual trust and confidence. Linkage, on the other hand, consists in the perception by one power of a link between an arms control accord and the possibility/necessity of resolving/avoiding other divisive political issues. Linkage, thus, is based on the idea of certain trade-offs which may, at times, be deemed as mandatory.

In "spillover" what is contained is a "hope". Linkage, on the other hand, involves an "expectation". We shall discuss more about these terms during the course of this work.

Thirdly, the rationale for superpower arms control rests, to a considerable extent, on economic considerations. It is held that through arms control agreements the superpowers can reduce their budgetary allocations for weapons systems; sizeable funds can be released and be transferred to programmes designed to improve the general welfare of their citizens. For the United States the economic rationale arises from the need to reorder

priorities to provide greater resources for the solution of pressing domestic problems. For the Soviet Union the need to devote additional resources to investment in capital goods, to satisfy consumer needs, and to provide for technological innovation in the non-defence sectors of the economy provides a rationale for strategic agreements.

Arms Control : An "Embedded" Affair

"It is true that armaments can and do constitute a source of tension in themselves. But they are not self-engendering. No one maintains them just for the love of it. They are conditioned at the bottom by political differences and rivalries. To attempt to remove the armaments before removing these substantive conflicts of interest is to put the cart before the horse".¹²

Thus warned George F. Kennan in 1953, long before the formal arrival of the doctrine of arms control. This doctrine, after its inception, was generally treated as a separable subject for analytical purposes, within the finite boundaries of the military game. But it was not entirely divorced from politics. Arms control was rooted in politics and was used as a political instrument. It was, thus, more

12. George F. Kennan, Russia, The Atom and the West, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p.28.

or less, an embedded affair. And considered within the confines of the political dichotomy that obtained between the two superpowers, arms control becomes a far more imposing subject.

Firstly, in the postwar era superpower relationship was dominated by mutual hostility, suspicion and confrontation. The Soviet principles of Marxism-Leninism were clearly incompatible with the American and western values of democracy. Suspicion regarding motives and intentions was deep-rooted on both sides. The cold war was pursued as a zero-sum game in which one superpower lost and the other gained. The American policy of containment was perceived by Moscow as encirclement. The establishment of Soviet buffer zones in Eastern Europe was deemed expansionism by the United States. Confrontation was the order of the day. There is no better explication of this fundamental political difference than that in National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC-68). What that document described was an irreconcilable asymmetry between the political systems of the west and the Soviet Union:

"There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin".¹³

13. Quoted in W.Scott Thompson and Robert E. Kiernan, "Strategy and Arms Control : Political will and Public Diplomacy", in Richard F. Staar, ed., op.cit., p.80.

The Kremlin, on the other hand, having its faith in a revolutionary ideology and beginning from a position of a great psychic and physical insecurity, felt obliged to strike a continuously militant pose against the United States. Identifying "imperialism" with the West, Stalin said in 1952:

"To eliminate the inevitability of war it is necessary to abolish imperialism."¹⁴

Arms control arose in the context of this political dichotomy but had a more confusing political ambience. The beginning of the "Spirit of Geneva" through the Eisenhower-Bulganin meeting of 1955 and the neutralization of Austria(1960), on the one hand, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary(1956), the Khrushchev offensive against Berlin (1958) and the U-2 incident(1960), on the other, formed the political setting for arms control. Arms control, in short, was the product of an era in which the salience of confrontation had not receded but the benefits of a modicum of cooperation were beginning to be realized. The nature and efficacy of arms control would be affected by the strength of the constituency for the latter process.

14. Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in USSR (New York, 1952), p.30.

Secondly, arms control policy was an integral part of the rational foreign policy of the two superpowers one of which was a status quo power and the other, an anti-status quo power. The anti-status quo power, far more than the status quo power, was likely to seek to use arms control negotiations either to promote or to ratify change in the international system. For the status quo power, in contrast, the rationale for arms control was to forestall the emergence of a changed configuration of strategic power that might favour the anti-status quo power.¹⁵

Theoretically, it was natural on the part of the Soviet commentators, given their ideological origins, to stress the interrelationships between negotiated arms limitations and broader accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From a Marxist theoretical perspective, the source of all conflict is economic and by extension political, stemming fundamentally from the existence of historically antagonistic social systems. To a Marxist theorist, the basic premise of arms control - that weapons in themselves contribute to the risk of

15. See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Rationale for Superpower Arms Control", in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, eds., op.cit., p.3.

war - is sophistry. Conflict results from the necessary clash of opposing social forces. The alleviation of conflict, therefore, can only result from broad political accommodation. By making pre-existing settlements specific and legally binding, arms limitation agreements can strengthen political accommodation.

In theoretical terms, on the other hand, the American theory of arms control would isolate such negotiations from politics. The Americans maintained that arms limitation talks should be viewed as technical exercises, directed at constraining the risks which weapons themselves add to existing political conflicts. Indeed, they accepted international tensions as inevitable and saw arms control simply as one way to manage their more dangerous consequences.

In practice, however, the experience has been entirely the opposite. The American insistence upon "linkage" and the Soviet avoidance of it would constitute the greatest irony of the SALT process.


Thirdly, arms control was rooted in politics in yet another important way. The theoretical roots of arms control policy are found in the evolution of nuclear strategy, particularly in the acceptance of the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence requires that, a first-strike nuclear attack based on a rational decision is precluded, since both

sides would possess the capacity to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the other. But the notion of the "credibility" of the deterrent is thought to be measured not by "hardware" alone, but by political will;¹⁶ and indeed the concept of deterrence itself rests upon political perceptions of the intensity of interests, will and determination of the political leaderships at least as much as it does upon the amount of explosive power at their command.

TH-2438

Technical Arms Control Measures and Politics
in the Pre-SALT Era

From the arms-control viewpoint, the two main threats to international stability in the 1960s were the destabilisation of the strategic balance and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These two problems were dealt with by a series of super-powers-sponsored bilateral and multilateral measures.



The first concrete measure of arms control was the Antarctica Treaty of 1959. The treaty's genesis lay in the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (IGY) agreement

16. Marshall D. Shulman, "Arms Control in an International Context", in Daedalus : Arms, Defense Policy and Arms Control, Summer 1975, p.54.

DISS
327.174
M7255 Po



TH2438

that scientific work should be carried out in the Antarctic without prejudice to the existing and often conflicting territorial claims by nine of the twelve eventual signatories: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Great Britain and the United States. The other three-Belgium, Japan and the Soviet Union-established scientific bases there during the IGY.

The Antarctica Treaty demilitarized the area and its inspection provisions allowed for unlimited inspection of non-military activities. On arms control grounds, the following technical reasons for the usefulness of the treaty were listed:

- i. Failure to agree on demilitarization would not only have made possible the use of the area for the testing of atomic weapons, for which suitable areas become increasingly scarce. It could also have conceivably brought about a race for the establishment of missiles and other military installations in Antarctica.
- ii. The treaty represented perhaps the first effective acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of inspection.
- iii. Finally, it represented a practical experiment in inspection and control which provided lessons for later agreements.

However, the Antarctica Treaty "demilitarized" an area which had never been militarized and for which no meaningful military uses could be found. The critics of the treaty maintain that it epitomized the use of arms control as a political instrument, that is the use of nominal arms control measures to achieve detente between the superpowers:

- i. The Soviet Union's political status as an equal had been recognized by the United States, and this created a favourable precedent for the Eisenhower - Krushchev Summit of May 1960.
- ii. The treaty supported the concept of Atom-Free Zones (AFZ) so vigorously advocated by Krushchev in 1959.
- iii. From the Soviet viewpoint the Antarctica Treaty should have established an atmosphere of superpower detente conducive to the western acceptance of the sphere of control in Eastern Europe and a solution of the West Berlin problem.¹⁷

The Hotline Agreement signed in 1963 was the second concrete arms control measure. It established direct communication link between Washington and Moscow.

17. Rob Ranger, op.cit., p.58.

The bomb-proof telex lines established by the agreement are meant to prevent war by misunderstanding. The agreement was a confidence-building measure and a common-sense arrangement that arose out of practical difficulties experienced in the Cuban missile crisis. The establishment of communications between opponents in order to facilitate crisis management had been a major theme of arms control thinking from the beginning, especially in Schelling's works. The Hotline Agreement codified this technical prescription and has, in fact, remained the only measure of arms control whose implementation in any way resembled its theoretical form and performed the functions claimed for it by arms controllers.

The Agreement, however, was not without its political motivations and implications. Detente, in the correct sense of a relaxation of tension, was achieved between the superpowers in the post-Cuba phase through the Hotline Agreement. The actual political restraint on America's technical strategic superiority shown during the Cuban crisis was institutionalized through the hotline. Further with the failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) talks in the spring of 1963, hotline became the last chance of resurrecting the policy of detente and the last catalytic instrument to make the Partial Test Ban (PTB) possible.

The Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited all nuclear tests except those conducted underground. The treaty was signed by the US, USSR and UK and over one hundred other countries. France and China refused to sign the PTBT because it seemed to them to be a device to keep the three leading nuclear powers permanently ahead.

The PTBT has been characterized as almost exclusively an instrument of nominal/political rather than technical arms control. The treaty capitalized on the symbolism that had come to be attached to nuclear testing as representing a barometer of the superpower strategic balance. It did not contain any significant contribution to limiting subsequent advances in strategic arms competition. It permitted continued testing and represented the most marginal inhibition to the development - already in progress - of warheads for the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV). Krushchev and Kennedy were interested in a PTBT to formalize, and therefore advance, the emerging superpower detente. At every stage of the negotiations the arms-control requirement of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty was sacrificed for a partial test ban that could be unilaterally verified.

The PTBT also witnessed the beginning of the preposterous "linkage" concept which was to rock the SALT process later. In the US, a group of Republican leaders including Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, Nelson Rockefeller

and Kenneth Keating attempted unsuccessfully to tie Senate ratification of the PTBT to a reduction of the Soviet troops stationed in Cuba.¹⁸ Krushchev, on the other hand, also attempted, not insistently though, to link a PTB to a NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization Non-aggression Pact.¹⁹

The fourth agreement - the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 - was Latin American effort to "denuclearize" that continent. Initiated by Mexico in 1963, the treaty sought to prevent any introduction of nuclear weapons into Latin America by external powers. It also sought to provide a regional non-proliferation treaty that would commit its signatories to the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. It also embodied for the first time the concept of verification by challenge. After initial attempts to reject the treaty, the superpowers signed the treaty in 1967.

18. Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Prevention in Cuba", in Alexander L. George, ed., Managing US Soviet Rivalry, Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1983), p.298.

19. Robin Ranger, op.cit., p.64.

The treaty, in effect, left Latin America with only slightly greater diplomatic restraints than before on the introduction of nuclear weapons from within or without:

- i. A declaration by Latin American states which lacked the means to manufacture nuclear weapons and which were unlikely either to accept them from, or be offered them by, the US or the USSR could hardly be described as a major advance in arms control.
- ii. The ambiguous position of the three possible Nth powers (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) was that denuclearization did not preclude the development of nuclear weapon options.
- iii. The obvious difficulties, both domestic and international, in invoking the verification-by-challenge procedure, especially outside nuclear installations, made challenge unlikely.
- iv. The treaty imposed no constraints on the existing deployment of nuclear weapons by states that already owned them. The United States retained its transit rights in the Panama Canal and its option of deploying nuclear weapons in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The Soviet Union maintained its bases (Cienfuegos) in Cuba.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 stipulated that outer space, including the Moon, would not be appropriated by any country; and that no nuclear weapons would be put on the Moon or in orbit around the earth. The Sea-bed Arms Control Treaty, on the other hand, prohibited placing of weapons of mass destruction on the Sea-bed. Both these treaties prohibited deployments in areas in which there was in any case not much military interest. They adopted the precedent that had first been set by the Antarctica Treaty - namely, an area of negligible military utility was reserved for peaceful purposes, but any military activity that was desired by the superpowers could continue uninterrupted.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) - the last arms control agreement before SALT - had the invidious purpose of disarming the unarmed. In effect it was a "deal" between nuclear and non-nuclear powers in which non-nuclear powers agreed "not to receive..... manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Article II) provided that the nuclear powers "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control" (Article VI). The

NPT was built on fragile foundations. The nuclear powers appreciated the danger of nuclear proliferation but they were not as concerned about their own nuclear weapons.

The NPT thus had more political significance than technical value. It became the ideal vehicle for emphasizing the bilateral, superpower aspects of detente. Far-reaching change, in the post-Cuba phase, in Soviet-American political understandings demanded a series of interim reassurances that would formalize the evolution of what Marshall D. Shulman has characterized as their "limited adversary relationship"²⁰. Paradoxically, both sides came to attach great importance to an NPT, but for totally different reasons. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw the treaty from the perspective of arms controllers, who had urged the necessity of preventing proliferation, which they saw as rapid and destabilizing. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, faced three distinct problems - in addition to that of its continuing strategic inferiority - in the field of nuclear weapons. The first of these concerned US willingness to disseminate to its European allies both the knowledge of nuclear weapons and the weapons themselves under safeguards that the Soviets regarded as inadequate. The second was the expansion

20. See Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War (New Haven and London : Yale Univ. Press, 1966), p.88.

of this policy to include the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) involving West German access to nuclear weapons. And the third was China's development of nuclear weapons. Whereas the concern regarding China could not be assuaged, the other two fears were dealt with by the NPT.

The NPT had also a brush with the "linkage" concept. In the US, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' report on the NPT recommended in September 1968 - by a vote of seventeen to thirteen - that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification. The minority (a substantial one) view stressed that their objections concerned both the substance of the treaty and its relationship to the tragic events in Czechoslovakia.²¹

To recapitulate, the following points may be made about the theory and practice of arms control in the years before SALT:

1. Firstly, the doctrine of arms control grew out of disillusionment with the disarmament approach; the acceptance of the concept of deterrence; the development of ICBMs and the consequent strategic force vulnerability.

21. Ranger, op.cit., p.119.

- ii. Secondly, at its root, arms control offered a technically oriented approach to arms limitation. It was premised on the assumption that weapons in themselves contribute to the risk of war.
- iii. Thirdly, strategic stability, damage limitation, non-proliferation, greater political accommodation and defence-budget reduction were the major rationales for arms control.
- iv. Fourthly, arms control, despite being a technical approach, was embedded in politics. Arms control was likely to be affected by the ideological - political dichotomy obtaining between the two superpowers, by the divergence in approach of a status quo power and an anti-status quo power.
- v. Fifthly, in retrospect, it was the Nth power problem - the question of non-proliferation - rather than arms control in the more conventional sense which dominated the pre-SALT years.
- vi. Sixthly, as Elizabeth Young has concluded "during the sixties the superpowers have colluded in presenting to the world a series of insignificant treaties"²². The arms-control treaties of that decade placed additional psychological and political barriers in the way of outcomes that were unlikely in any case.

22. Elizabeth Young, A Farewell to Arms Control (Hammonds - Worth, Middlesex : Pelican Books, 1972), p.135.

vii. Lastly, the cosmetic arms control treaties were used to promote the nascent detente between the two superpowers. The agreements can be seen as a part - and perhaps an essential part - of the political process of devolution from the harshest phases of the Cold War. The importance of the arms control issues was enhanced because discussions about them provided a basis for dialogue between the parties. So far as the politics of arms control is concerned, there was, thus, more of "spillover" and less of "linkage".

CHAPTER - III

SALT - I : TECHNICAL ARMS CONTROL AND POLITICAL
DETENTE IN PERFECT TANDEM

SALT : Exegeses on its Origin

There were several proposals for a nuclear rollback before SALT : i) the Bernard Baruch Plan of 1946 for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA); ii) the Soviet proposal of the late 1940s to "ban the bomb"; iii) the Soviet and US proposals of 1959 and 1961, respectively, for general and complete disarmament; and iv) various proposals for "disengagement", "thinning out" etc. on the basis of ideas suggested by Anthony Eden, George F. Kennan, Adam Rapacki etc. Some of these were nobly if naively utopian; some bordered on the absurd; some were cynically propagandistic; some embodied to a greater or lesser degree a moderately realistic vision appropriate to the modus operandi of governments. But all foundered on the same ground : real or imagined disparities in nuclear capability between the two superpowers.

Thus only when the US and Russia stood to gain was some progress possible. During most of the sixties, Moscow's strategic policy was bent upon a large-scale build-up of Soviet intercontinental strategic forces, following the embarrassment suffered during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. By contrast, due to the adoption of MIRV

which could be used to hold down strategic force size, the American policy during the same period was one of strategic constraint. The policy, of which Secretary McNamara was the principal architect, was to contain the momentum which US strategic programmes had attained toward the end of the Eisenhower and the beginning of Kennedy presidencies, largely as a reaction to the Soviet Sputniks and the so-called missile gap of the late fifties.

In a sense, both of these basic strategic policy trends of the sixties were necessary prerequisites for SALT : By 1969, after a long technological bender that had added such terms as ICBM, MIRV and ABM to the lexicon of statecraft, the nuclear giants had attained a rough strategic parity.

The situation of strategic parity was matched , politically by the dissolution of cold war bipolarity and the emergence of a rather fluid, subtle and complex international system: Europe's and Japan's economic rebirth; dislocations in the western alliance system; deflation in America's economic pretensions; the Sino-Soviet rift; signs of breaches in the monolithic communist bloc; and the rise of new nationalism in the developing world. In American politics, the domestic consensus for "containment" had evaporated owing to the traumatic shock of the Vietnam war. The

Soviets, too, had experienced the beginnings of protest against their own political system. SALT, thus, had a solid foundation (strategically) and a congenial ambience (politically).

There are various interpretations of the underlying reasons why the United States and the Soviet Union felt impelled to embark upon strategic arms negotiations with each other after more than two decades of intense postwar political, military and economic rivalry. We shall discuss the three most representative of them by way of three apt analogies.

The first is a bold analogy from animal behaviour. The long period of strategic weapons competition between the two superpowers can be compared to a struggle between two wolves. By 1969, the US and the USSR had arrived

" at that dramatic moment in the contest when one of the wolves, not at all beaten yet feeling that he has had enough, temporarily and tenuously bares his neck while the adversary moves menacingly as if to overpower him. Those who study the behaviour of wolves tell us that in such circumstances the onrusher, instead of moving in for the kill, can

be expected to hesitate in a species-survival response that assures continued life to both".¹

Thus, despite their rivalries, leaders in both countries had come to a general realization by the mid-sixties that some form of mutual accommodation was mandated by the potential destructiveness of the strategic nuclear arsenals that were being created. In essence, SALT came about as a response to that formidable mandate, taking the form of a slow and cautious groping for some means of "stabilizing" the strategic force balance.

Secondly, in a perceptive comparison by John Newhouse,² SALT has been likened to the Congress of Vienna more than 150 years earlier, both being seen as essentially political negotiations inspired by the need to establish an equilibrium in which the great powers might feel secure - the "stability" to be sought through strategic arms negotiations in SALT representing a kind of nuclear age equivalent of the "general security" that Castlereagh thought it was the business of the Congress of Vienna to establish.

1. James E. Dougherty, "SALT and the Future of International Politics," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., eds., SALT : Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1973), p.359.

2. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn : The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 3-5.

The third analogy, as suggested by David Aaron,³ is that of the medieval practice of marrying off one's daughter to a rival prince. In this sense, SALT was a fundamentally political instrument. The interpretation is that the overall political and power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had evolved to a stage in the 1960s that called for some accommodation of both the disparate political interests and the perceived strategic necessities of the two sides. Thus, SALT could be said to have come into being as a major instrumentality for seeking a readjustment of the US-Soviet power relationship and for facilitating the political passage from cold war to detente.

Integrating the various strands of opinion we can say that the SALT process was about two sets of demands : technical arms control and stable political competition. The essential problem of technical arms control was to ensure that the superpowers did not use nuclear weapons against each other, and preferably that nuclear weapons are not used at all; while at the same time ensuring that the possibility of ultimate use helped to stabilize their wider relations. The essential problem of stable political competition was to obtain agreements which met the criteria of interests of state, and thereby represent strategic stability.

3. David Aaron, "SALT : A New Concept", in Foreign Policy, Winter 1974-75, p.57.

American Interests in SALT : Maintaining Status Quo Through 'Other' Means

Unadulterated technical considerations - the so-called "technical-arms-control approach" - are widely⁴ held to be the chief interest of the United States in the strategic arms limitation talks. The American aims in SALT - I are thought to be : i) to freeze the strategic balance at the level of parity; ii) to stabilize mutual deterrence ; iii) to regulate the strategic competition so as to reduce its resource costs, lower the risks of accidental nuclear war outbreak, and discourage the need for new cycles of improved strategic weapons systems.

The United States, however, has persistently sought to limit the impact of international conflicts, and particularly competition with the Soviet Union, upon the status quo in the postwar international order and has employed arms control measures alongside traditional diplomacy, military force and economic influence. The American interests in SALT-I have to be studied in that wider context.

4. See, for example, Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics, 1958-76: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1970); William R. Van Cleave, "Implications of Success or Failure of SALT," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff Jr., op.cit.; and Colin S. Gray, "Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance", in Orbis, Fall 1974.

It is well-nigh impossible, without persuading American decision-makers to undergo narco-hypnosis, to ascertain which factors, in which order of importance, prompted American entry into SALT-I. A rough listing of American interests, however, may be attempted in the following way.

Strategic Considerations

In the years before SALT the United States had maintained strategic nuclear forces superior in size, in delivery capabilities and in flexibility of response to those of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the rapid buildup of land - and sea-based missiles under the Kennedy Administration resulted, by the mid-60s, in long-range strategic strike forces four or five times as large as those of the USSR. The Johnson Administration also remained committed to the maintenance of that superiority. It also began, in 1967, to deploy the Sentinel⁵ ABM system, which could protect both military installations and centres of population against "light" attacks and which could serve as the nucleus of thicker and more extensive ballistic missile defences (BMDs). Thus the United States as late as 1967 not only had a considerable strategic advantage over the Soviet Union but seemed determined to maintain it.

5. The name was later changed to "Safeguard" under the Nixon administration. The number of ABM sites was to be 15 under the Sentinel system. It was reduced to 12 in the Safeguard system.

Three separate developments began, however, to erode that advantage. The first was the initiation by the USSR of programmes for the enlargement and improvement of its strategic nuclear forces as a result of the "never-again" reaction to the Cuba fiasco. The USSR, in consequence, had, by the late 60s, developed strategic strike forces that could destroy an opponent as an organized society, even after absorbing an all-out counterforce attack (respective force sizes of the US and the USSR in 1970 are given in Table-1). Secondly, the discovery that exoatmospheric nuclear explosions could damage incoming reentry vehicles thereby significantly enhancing the effectiveness of BMDs, such as those which the Soviet Union had begun to install around Moscow, raised doubts about the effectiveness of American retaliatory strike forces. The third was the process of perfecting MIRVs which the Russians had started and as a result of which the land-based component of American strategic strike forces.

Under these circumstances, the Nixon administration had essentially three options. One was to expand American strategic strike forces and/or strengthen strategic defences in an effort to retain superiority. But given the technological momentum of the Soviet Union and the economic and political costs involved for America, it was difficult if not impossible. A second option open to the Nixon Administration was that of adopting force postures (a unilateral act) that would preclude the USSR from achieving superiority without necessarily attempting to maintain it

TABLE - 1UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL
STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES, 1970

TYPE	US	USSR
ICBMs		
Small (SS-11, Minuteman)	(1000)	(940)
Medium (SS-8, Titan II)	(54)	(220)
Large (SS-9)	-	(280)
Sub Total	1054	1440
SLBMs	656	350
Bombers	550	145
Total	2260	1935
Number of Warheads Carried (approx)	5300	2225
Deliverable Megatonnage (approx).	5600	9700

Sources :

Laird Statement, 1971;

Washington Post, March 10, 1971.

for the United States. To some extent this was done, under the concept of "strategic sufficiency". The major features of the policy shift from strategic superiority to strategic sufficiency were : building of superhard missile silos, MIRVs, more secure Undersea Longrange Missile System (ULMS, since named Trident) and of missile-sites-defence-system rather than of city-defence system.

The third option was to try to stave off threats and maintain strategic stability through some understanding with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments. This was sought to be done through SALT.

Foreign Policy Considerations

In the late 60s, the US had to come to grips with conspicuous changes in the international system. That was the era of the end of Pax Americana and the beginning of retrenchment of "Containment".⁶ Firstly, the once-compact

6. Originally propounded by George F. Kennan's "Mr. X" article in Foreign Affairs in 1947, "Containment" became American policy, through NSC -68 : "As for the policy of containment, it is one which seeks by all means short of war to 1) block further expansion of Soviet power, 2) expose the falsities of Soviet Pretensions, 3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and 4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behaviour to conform to generally accepted international standards".

NSC-68 was, however, a distortion of Kennan's original views.

communism was no more regarded as a monolithic threat and China had become an independent world actor. Secondly, Western Europe and Japan had attained swift economic recuperation. A revitalized Europe was more assertive politically. The barriers between the countries of Eastern Europe and those in the west seemed to be melting, thus enabling more - and more meaningful - interactions, of which Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik was a good example. Thirdly, there was a diminution of concern about the likelihood of a "hot" war and a growing antipathy to the cold one. Fourthly, there were cracks in the western alliance system due to France's independent path. Fifthly, in the developing world, decolonization and nationalism had become effective counterweights to superpower hegemonism. And, of course, essential nuclear parity with the Soviet Union was an established fact.

American foreign policy displayed a great degree of lucidity and resourcefulness in coming to grips with these changes, thanks to Nixon and Kissinger. Detente - controlled adversarial relationship; balance of confrontation with cooperation - with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was adopted as a more realistic policy of applying containment in a less hierarchical world. Balance of power of the classical European mould based strictly on national interest became the basis of American foreign policy.

Arms control in general, and SALT in particular, was to be the centrepiece of that policy of detente and balance of power.

SALT could help detente, directly or indirectly, in many ways. Firstly, it could preclude programmes (such as the Soviet SS-9 ICBM deployment and American BMDs) which aroused suspicion, increased hostility and heightened the danger of misperceptions. Secondly, it could ameliorate worries about the intentions of the adversary in building up strategic forces. Thirdly, it could assist in promoting an era of negotiation by creating a better climate for the settlement of other issues. Finally, SALT could help reassure allies about actual threats to their security arising from the continued buildup of strategic nuclear forces.

The Domestic Environment

"We face a hostile ideology - global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method (so that) a vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment".⁷

7. "Farewell Address" quoted in J.I. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation of Strategic Armaments", in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff Jr., op. cit., pp. 64-65.

This statement of President Eisenhower, made in his farewell address in 1960, enjoyed strong support among both elites and the public at large, in those times. But by the late 60s American public opinion had shifted in its attitudes toward the Soviet Union, toward the use of force, and with respect of arms control. In fact, the threat to the "containment" policy was less external and more internal: the threat came from the evaporation of the domestic consensus and the diminished commitment of the American public to contain communism.

In the 1930s Gerald Nye talked about the "merchants of death". In the 50s President Eisenhower had warned about "the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial -complex".⁸ In the late 60s an anti-military political climate was abroad in the US. The greatest mistake blamed on the military, of course, was America's involvement in Vietnam. The general American sentiment was typified by the statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson :

"The whole economy is infiltrated. We are a warfare state".⁹

8. Public Papers of the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-61, Washington, D.C., 1961, p.421. Quoted in Gwyn Prins, eds., Defended to Death (Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books, 1983), p.134.

9. Newsweek, 9 June 1969.

Various new groups favourable to arms control entered into the debate on military policy. Different elements among Blacks, Chicanos and other minority groups expressed dissatisfaction with the priority accorded expenditures for armaments.¹⁰ Labour leaders charged that :

"Our Society today is a sick society - and its basic illness can be traced to the war in Vietnam and to our share in the nuclear arms race".¹¹

Prominent businessmen¹² joined in calling for limitations on strategic armaments. Groups of scientists¹³ organized into lobbying, educational, and publicity organizations to oppose new weapons programmes and to support measures for the control of armaments. Virtually everyone concerned with health care, urban development, or any one of the host of other problems confronting the US tended to argue for a reallocation of resources earmarked for various weapon systems.

10. J.I. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation of Strategic Armaments," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff Jr., op. cit., p.66.

11. Ibid., p.66.

12. They included, among others. Sol Linowitz, David Rockefeller and James Roche (then Chairman, GMC).

13. Some of the scientists who testified against the Safeguard system were James R. Killian, George B. Kistiakowski, Herbert F. York and Wolfgang Panofsky.

These sentiments were increasingly manifest in the Congress also. Newer members tended to be most opposed to various military requests. Questions were raised about the rationales for new weapons systems and about the reasons for believing that anti-ballistic missiles (the Safeguard ABM system)¹⁴ were useful bargaining instruments in negotiations. Even such a long-time advocate of military preparedness as Senator John C. Stennis, the then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, refused to go along with the administration's request for an expansion of the Safeguard system pending the outcome of the SALT.¹⁵

This does not mean that all roads led to strategic arms limitations. There were several hurdles as well. Firstly, previous cuts in defence spending and in the armed services had thrown more than a million men onto the labour market and further cuts could add to that number. Secondly, most Congressmen were solicitous of the bases and installations in their districts, and the executive branch, in turn was solicitous of those Congressmen. Thirdly, industry had been hard hit by cutbacks in space programmes and in expenditures for new strategic weapons, resulting in

14. Prominent anti-Safeguard Congressmen included George McGovern, Barry Goldwater, Everett Dirksen, Margaret Chase Smith, Mike Mansfield, Edward Kennedy, Frank Church, Albert Gore and Stuart Symington.

15. J.I. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation of Strategic Armaments", in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff Jr., op.cit., p.66.

sizable pockets of unemployment in California, Texas, New York and Massachusetts - all states with some significance in political life. Industrial leaders in those states were likely to argue for bigger strategic nuclear forces. Fourthly, large elements of the armed services were for powerful strategic nuclear forces. It arose "in part out of their long and active involvement in the cold war, coupled with their lesser immersion in the changing currents of American life".¹⁶ This advocacy also reflected the fact that strategic arms limitations could preclude or reduce their cherished weapon systems programmes.

However, the American decision-makers, caught between the rising costs of defence, pressures for increased domestic expenditures and sentiment for tax cuts and a shrinking support base for the policy of "peace through strategic superiority", welcomed measures that could avert new outlays for strategic nuclear forces and pursued the SALT with the Soviet Union.

In sum, American interest in SALT was a product of the changed contexts of strategic parity with the Soviet Union, the decline of pax-Americana and lessened domestic

16. Ibid., pp.68-69.

approbation for the policy of containment. Technical considerations apart, SALT was to be used as an instrument in the new design for maintaining America's status as the primus inter pares and for "caging the bear".¹⁷

Soviet Interests in SALT : A Case of Equal
Power Spurring Responsibility

The Soviet entry into the strategic arms limitation talks was designed, in the main, by Leonid Brezhnev. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Brezhnev and the SALT process were synonymous and almost synchronous. Initially, Brezhnev seemed to have little of Lenin's vision, Stalin's ruthlessness or Krushchev's exuberance. But he was a man for his own time. Brezhnev personified his country's coming of age. He accomplished something that eluded each of his predecessors: under his aegis, the Soviet Union acquired all the muscle of a full-fledged superpower. As long as Moscow believed itself to be weak, its political manoeuvres were part stone-walling, part dust-stirring, part timidity covered with bluff. With its new-found confidence of a superpower came the willingness to enter SALT.

17. Charles Grati, ed., Caging the Bear (Indianapolis and New York : Bobbs - Merrill, 1974).

The Soviet Union is 'credited with having adopted a "political-arms-control approach"¹⁸ toward SALT :

"The Soviet Union approached SALTfrom an entirely different perspective upon power and order.....Its formal view of the international system was and is revolutionary. Its policies are fundamentally negative in respect of the postwar status quo, which is said to be based upon unresolvable conflicts, following from inevitable contradictions between socialism and capitalism. Its objective in SALT.....(was) to gain substantive equality(or advantage) in strategic nuclear capabilities as a means to wider ends...."¹⁹

Let us now turn to a discussion of the specific considerations that bore on Soviet interests in the SALT to ascertain the validity of the above view.

Strategic Considerations

If in a broad sense the United States was the more reactive party in the Soviet-US strategic competition of the fifties, responding vigorously first to Korea and

18. Robin Ranger, *op.cit.*, p.xvi.

19. Hugh Macdonald, "SALT II : International Politics and Arms Control," in Round Table, Vol. 279, July, 1980, p.309.

then to successive "bomber gap" and "missile gap" alarms, the situation changed notably after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Thereafter, it was the Soviet Union that embarked upon a massive buildup of its strategic forces.

During the early Brezhnev-Kosygin period, a general review of the defence policy took place. This reappraisal apparently generated some controversy, as suggested by the renewal in 1965 of doctrinal criticism by military writers of Krushchev's "one-sided" deterrence philosophy, on the grounds that adherence to such thinking ignored the possibility that deterrence might fail and could lead to questioning the need for large defence outlays. In April 1966, Kosygin indicated that, in the light of a worsening international situation attributed to American aggression in Vietnam and elsewhere, the case for larger defence expenditures carried the day.²⁰

From 1966 on, the strategic forces received priority support. In 1966, the SS-9 and SS-11 systems reached operational stage. By 1972, the total land-based ICBM force was increased to about fifteen hundred operational launchers. The SLBM force also grew, thanks to the Y-class

20. Pravda (April 6, 1966), quoted in Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT", in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff Jr., op.cit., p.39.

nuclear-powered submarine construction programme; the SLBM force size reached about four hundred by October 1971.²¹

On the qualitative side, the significant developments included : installation of IRBM launch complexes in the Southwestern USSR; programmes for orbital and depressed trajectory version of the SS-9; testing of a new and more accurate warhead for the SS-11; programme for the development of an MRV capability; a new prototype medium bomber of advanced variable-wing design; and construction of new large silos.²²

In the post-Cuba climate, all elements of the Soviet leadership appear to have agreed that nothing less than Soviet-American strategic equality would be tolerable any longer. While the military-industrial bureaucracy attended to the business of "catching up", and finally "caught up", the strategic-diplomatic leadership entered the SALT. Firstly, SALT could be used to protect Soviet strategic gains of the recent past and to improve its future competitive position. Secondly, the SALT forum could be usefully employed to explore the American intentions. A third Soviet objective was to try to contain particular US strategic

21. Ibid., p.40.

22. Ibid., pp.40,41.

programmes - Safeguard, Trident etc. - that Moscow found most disturbing. Fourthly, SALT could be used to reach agreements that would block or slow down the adoption of new US strategic programmes.

Foreign Policy Considerations

The late 60s saw an asymmetry develop between the global aspirations of the Soviet Union and the Soviet system's declining appeal as an example of modern societal growth. Although the Soviet military power had expanded substantially, wherever the Russian leaders turned, they perceived threats to their national security - in the awesome might of the United States, in the threatening challenge from Communist China, and in the unsettling wind blowing through East Europe. This asymmetry tended to push the leadership in the outward direction. The result was "peaceful coexistence"; SALT was part of that process.

The Soviet Summit in Moscow in June 1969, demonstrated that the once-monolithic communist bloc was in tatters. The docile bloc of East European satellites was in total disarray. Albania, which had opted out of the Soviet sphere of influence in the early 60s, remained defiantly Maoist. Yugoslavia, excommunicated by Stalin in 1948, continued to toy with economic and political innovations that made the Kremlin bristle. The wily Rumanians ran an

orthodox shop domestically, but went their merry way when it came to foreign and trade policies. Hungary was plunging ahead with economic reforms. And though Czechoslovakia itself was fast reverting to a model communist puppet, it had been forced to do so at a high price : the irreversible alienation of the Chechoslovak people.

Next there was the Sino-Soviet dispute. Stripped of its rhetoric , the conflict was not a hair-splitting debate over communist ideology, but a gut confrontation between two intensely nationalistic states. The very existence of a Maoist alternative to Soviet hegemony gave additional leverages to communist "mavericks" around the world. Even more troublesome, China's increasing belligerence - the Usuri river clash of 1969 - resurrected a spectre that had haunted the Soviets since 1917 - that of encirclement and isolation. The Kremlin was afraid of a Washington - Beijing entente.

The Soviet leaders also tended to take a conspiratorial view of their adversary's role in world affairs. The murder of the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, the fall of Brazil's João Goulart, the political demise of Indonesia's Sukarno, the 1967 Greek coup d'etat and the Israeli defeat of the

Arabs - all these were viewed as part of a worldwide political offensive designed to rollback communism.

At such a juncture, Brezhnev increasingly put his stamp on Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev's diplomacy sought to blend aggressiveness with accommodation. With its tightened grip in the Middle East, its naval forays into the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and its show-the-flag visits around the world, the Soviet Union clearly established itself as a superpower of the first order.

Kremlin's increased self-confidence gave rise to accommodative gestures: Brezhnev devised his "peaceful coexistence" policy. It was generally defined as a form of struggle between states with different social systems without resort to war, but specifically emphasizing the continuing ideological conflict. A broad perspective was represented in an article in Izvestia entitled "The Logic of Coexistence"²³ by Vladimir Osipov. He wrote of "a whole series of new factors in the life of the international community of states which now speak for all-round cooperation". Brezhnev shepherded the crucial decisions on East-West detente through the ruling Politburo (Westpolitik : Brezhnev's visits to France, Yugoslavia; Kosygin's visit to Canada). SALT-participation was an essential part of this policy.

23. Quoted in Marshall D. Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence", in Foreign Affairs, October 1973, p.47.

Firstly, the Kremlin was faced with the threat of a political struggle on two fronts : against the West and against China. A moderate policy toward the West - of which SALT was to be a part - seemed important as a means of eliminating that risk. Secondly, Soviet SALT policy was intended among other things to buttress Soviet military power by helping to limit the military-industrial and political response of the United States to the growth of Soviet strategic power.²⁴ Thirdly, SALT was to be used to resolve the outstanding issues from World War II in a manner legitimizing Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe. Fourthly, SALT was to serve the political function of weakening European confidence in the US commitment to the defence of Europe. Finally, the foremost political function of SALT was to "validate" Soviet claims to be a superpower.²⁵

The Domestic Factors

Foreign policy in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, is not purely an exercise in rational choices, but also involves the interplay of domestic politics. Peaceful coexistence and SALT had their roots in domestic compulsions as well.

24. Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger, 1979), p.248.

25. Ibid., p.248.

First of all there was a general decline of the Soviet revolutionary elan. The Soviet Union's political system rests on the claim that it represents the historically inevitable wave of the future. Yet increasingly it was viewed even in the Soviet Union itself as a conservative bureaucratic mechanism which employed Marxist rhetoric to justify its own vested interests. This condition carried with it the threat of "delegitimizing" the Soviet system among its own adherents. The Sakharovs, Medvedevs and Solzhenitsyns, who probably reflected the sentiments of many scientists, writers, artists and intellectuals, did embarrass the communist leaders with their criticisms.

Secondly, although Soviet military power had grown, growth had been achieved at enormous cost, not only financial but scientific as well. Given the sharp compartmentalization in the Soviet Union between military and non-military production, there was relatively little economic spin-off from the Soviet efforts. The apprehension was that by 1975 the Soviet Union might be confronted by a severe scientific-technological gap in comparison to the US, Japan and Western Europe. Brzezinski wrote in 1971:

"The Soviet system is now in a dialectically hostile relationship to the growth needs of the Soviet system".²⁶

26. Newsweek, 1 November 1971.

Thirdly, in view of the flagging ideological élan and the tottering economy, the Party's future was at stake. Brezhnev was hamstrung by a collective leadership that could turn him out of power. His ambitious Politburo colleague, Alexander Shelepin, the leader of a collection of Young Turks known as the "Komsomol group" was only too willing to step forward in case the prevailing regime faltered.²⁷

Brezhnev experimented with the limited decentralization scheme - the so-called Libermann reforms - in the mid-1960s. It had very little success. Then Brezhnev adroitly took a position somewhere between the "metal eaters" (who favoured concentration on centrally planned heavy industry) and the "goulash faction" (which backed greater production of consumption goods). That did not help improve the situation much either.

SALT promised to stabilize the strategic arms competition, and thus release crucial resources for the Soviet five-year plans. SALT also promised access to western capital and technology which were regarded as the "paramount considerations of the moment".²⁸ It was

27. Newsweek, 16 June 1969.

28. See Marshall D. Shulman, *op.cit.*, p.47.

natural on the part of Soviet leaders that they should welcome SALT.

In short, predominant power or too little power is no a priori spur to responsibility. Equal power can be. So it was for the Soviet Union in the initial SALT years. The success and sustenance of SALT would depend, in part, on how long that perceived equality, and the consequent confidence and willingness, lasted.

International Political Setting : Polycentrism
Prompts More Contact Than Remote Sensing
Between Superpowers

The simplistic assumptions of cold war bipolarity had been in the process of dissolution for several years. In the bipolar days each superpower perceived the other through a stereotyped ethnocentric set of lenses, making it next to impossible to assess foreign policy behaviour outside the hostility paradigm. The transition to polycentrism²⁹ made for a superpower relationship based on a non-zero-sum game model.

The exact moment when the extensive and intensive bipolarity began to change to a state later labelled in the west as "detente" and in the Soviet Union as

29. Since the power of the two nuclear giants remains immensely superior to that of their respective allies, some prefer to call the system "bipolycentric". See John Spanier, Games Nations Play (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 96-98.

"peaceful coexistence" is difficult to pinpoint. Perhaps it could be dated from 1957, when the Soviet Union tested the first ICBM. The transformation was certainly clear after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when both superpowers had a brush with thermonuclear war. Symbolic of their changing attitudes was the signing of the PTBT in 1963.

The transformation of the state system encompassed :

- i) increasing superpower cooperation on military and political issues;
- ii) the loosening of the formerly rival blocs ;
- and iii) the rise of the developing world.

Detente and Peaceful Coexistence

Detente (the Soviet preference is for the term "peaceful coexistence) emerged as a result of policy choices made by the two leaderships. It was shaped by the way in which they concerted efforts in an attempt to define a new relationship that would replace the acute hostility of the cold war, moderate the conflict potential inherent in their competition, and strengthen cooperation in issue areas in which they believed their interests converged.

For one thing, detente created an atmosphere for frequent superpower consultation and negotiation. The polemical tone of their verbal exchanges and the inflexibility of their diplomatic positions were largely eschewed. There

were no summit conferences from 1945 to 1955. By contrast, detente was symbolized by frequent summit meetings, foreign minister consultations, and diplomatic contacts at the ambassadorial and other levels.

For another, there was a German settlement, a substitute for the World War II peace treaty that was never signed. Chancellor Brandt's new government in the Federal Republic of Germany pushed an Ostpolitik which openly recognized the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The German Democratic Republic - East Germany - was finally recognized by Western states after twenty years of isolation.

For a third, there were the economic benefits which detente produced. Whereas American businessmen were interested in access to the Soviet market, for the Soviets trade and technology were perhaps the major reasons for peaceful coexistence. The Soviet economy was lagging particularly in the area of the Second Industrial Revolution - of electronics, computers and petrochemicals. Falling behind in this key sector of a modern economy had grave implications for the Soviet Union as a military power, as a model of modernization for the developing world, and as a nation capable of satisfying its people's enormous consumer needs. Detente allowed Russia to seek modern technology in the west as a quick "technological fix".

For a fourth, there was the resumption of American relations with China. The two countries had been cut off from official contact with one another by twenty years of cold war hostility, which had resulted in hostilities in Korea in 1950 and confrontations in 1954-55 and 1958. Now, given the Sino-Soviet conflict, American - Chinese rapprochement was a key step in producing an American-Soviet reduction of tension and the creation of an atmosphere conducive for fruitful negotiations.

Alliance Disintegration

In the days of American supremacy in nuclear weaponry, America's vows of protection of its NATO allies were highly credible. But the Soviet ICBM test and the first Sputnik eroded the credibility of the American commitment to Europe's defence. No nation can be expected to risk its existence for an ally; therefore, the credibility of America's pledges was at best uncertain, at worst, meaningless.

Again, much of the transatlantic "harmony" and NATO "unity" of the first few years were based on an unequal power relationship. Therefore, opposition to American hegemony constituted one strong motivation that was inherent in the movement to create a United States of Europe

by France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. The six continental states' effort to create a United Europe was at cross-purposes with the American sponsorship of an integrated Europe.³⁰

Nuclear arms, on the other hand, also proved a divisive factor in Sino-Soviet relations. The basic point of their disagreement about the impact of nuclear arms on international politics revolved around the issue of "peaceful coexistence". In the Soviet view, nuclear arms had made coexistence the sole alternative to non-existence. The Chinese accused the Soviets of betraying the communist cause through a cowardice that led them (the Russians) to "kowitz" to the United States.

Further, there were signs of unrest in the Warsaw Treaty Organization bloc. Stalin had left a legacy of popular resentment and hatred for Russia in the "people's democracies". This confronted his successors with a parade of disenchanting events : Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia.

The Sino-Soviet rift; Western Europe's self-confidence and political assertiveness; and signs of protest in the WTO bloc - all these events brought the superpowers into greater contact with each other.

30. See Ronald Steel, The End of the Alliance (New York : Viking Press, 1962), pp. 10-14, 30, 80-82.

Role of New Nations

The polycentrism in the state system and fluidity in the international relations were even further accentuated by the increasing role of the new non-western nations. The decolonization process was in full swing. The non-aligned movement was gathering steam. The Third World countries had formed the Group of 77 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and had started speaking as one group. At the UN General Assembly also they voted en bloc on different issues and refused to be used as pliant pawns by the United States. The new nations became increasingly resistant to attempts to use foreign aid and military force to control them.

As the cohesive alliances, East and West, broke up and the superpowers increasingly recognized the need for cooperation in order to preserve the peace, they also became aware that they could satisfy some of their most important interests through this cooperation. Further, both the Soviet Union and the United States had reason to be distracted from the sort of relationships they had settled down to in the pre-SALT years - the US in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in China, for example. Their competition for the allegiance of the Third World countries declined. Consequently, they gravitated toward each other.

SALT I : Negotiation and the Agreements

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began formally in November 1969. But its origins probably go back at least about six years earlier to President Lyndon B. Johnson's message of January 21, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva when he proposed that Washington and Moscow explore "a verified freeze" on strategic offensive and defensive arms as a follow-on to the limited nuclear test ban treaty. This proved unpalatable to the Soviet Union and was rejected. Nevertheless, because the strategic freeze proposal marked a departure from past comprehensive disarmament approaches, it has been considered by many analysts as an important early milestone on the road to SALT.³¹

Another American initiative that marked a significant precursory step toward SALT when ambassador Llewellyn Thompson began laying the ground for talks with the Russians on curbs on ABM deployment, in 1967. And in a series of private communications between Johnson and Kosygin, some Soviet interest was in fact shown in holding talks on limiting strategic arms. But in Johnson's view, a division of opinion

31. See, for example, Alton Frye, "US Decision Making for SALT", in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelanders, eds., SALT : The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York : The Free Press, 1974), pp. 72-74.

within the Soviet government on whether to enter strategic arms talks may have accounted for Kosygin's eventual negative stance then.³²

A third important phase in the pre-1969 genesis of SALT was in the first half of 1968, after it had become known publicly that the US planned not only to deploy the Sentinel ABM (more advanced than the Soviet Galosh system) but that a new offensive weapon, MIRV, was soon to begin flight tests. In a public pronouncement on June 27, the Soviet Union let it be known that it was ready for "an exchange of opinion" on mutual restrictions of offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

SALT was to be formally launched in October 1968. But the formal opening of negotiations was delayed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This coincided with the presidential campaign in the US. Johnson had become a "lame duck". The talks could not get started.

Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, was initially very circumspect, but eventually found that SALT fitted into his world view. As Strobe Talbott says:

"He circled the idea of SALT cautiously, indeed mistrustfully, before deciding to make it his own. But when he moved it was with dispatch and skill".³³

32. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point : Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-69 (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 480-85.

33. Strobe Talbott, The Endgame : The Inside Story of SALT II (New Delhi : Kalyani, 1979), p.20.

Nixon and Kissinger initiated SALT-I in a series of meetings with Anatoly Dobrynin , the Soviet envoy in Washington. Thus SALT was born in the so-called "back channel". In November 1969, what might be called the "front channel" came into being. Led by Gerard Smith and Vladimir Semyonov respectively, the American and Soviet delegates alternated for talks between Helsinki and Vienna.

The Issues

The two and a half years of SALT-I negotiations proved difficult and agreement was not forthcoming. The differences between the two sides that they had sought to reconcile in the process of reaching the SALT-I agreements fell into two general categories: procedural issues and substantive issues.

The procedural issues involved negotiating style and approach. Illustrative of differences in this category were: i) the Soviet preference for agreements incorporating broad general restraints on strategic arms and oriented toward achieving strong political impact, as contrasted with the US emphasis on functional and highly specific measures intended to produce militarily meaningful results; ii) the Soviet side's tendency to seek "agreement in principle" before disclosing its specific proposals, in contrast to the American approach of offering a fairly complete and

detailed package of proposals; ³⁴ and iii) the traditional Soviet dedication to secrecy.

The substantive issues arose out of the asymmetries between the two negotiating powers: in bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles, all of different ranges; numbers of deliverable warheads of varying yields; total throwweights; hardening and dispersal (which affect vulnerability); offensive and defensive weapons mixes; warning systems, intelligence, command and control systems; and strategic doctrines(See Table-2 for the asymmetries).

In the category of substantive issues the first concerned a common menu of "strategic" items. The Soviet negotiations asserted that a strategic weapon is a weapon that could strike a superpower homeland. Thus they argued that the US forward-based systems(FBS) capable of delivering nuclear weapons to Soviet territory must be included in the definition of "strategic". But the American SALT delegation asserted that "strategic" implies a function transcending the needs of the battlefield. In other words, although nuclear strike air-craft could be flown from the US Sixth Fleet to strike the Soviet Union, their principal

34. Thomas W. Wolfe, op.cit., p.9.

TABLE - 2ASYMMETRIES IN US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES

(ICBMs)

A. USSR

TYPE	SS-7, SS-8	SS-11	SS-13	SS-9	TOTAL
Aggregate Warheads/Missile(no.)	1	1	1	1	
Yield/Warhead(megatons)	5	1	1	18-25	
Throw-weight/Missile(lbs.)	8000	2000	2000	10000	
Deployment (no.)	209	1012	60	288-313	1600
Aggregate Throw-weight (millions of lbs.)	1.7	2.0	0.1	2.9-3.1	6.7-6.9
Warheads(no.)	209	1012	60	288-313	1600

B. UNITED STATES

TYPE	Titan II	Minuteman II	Minuteman III	TOTAL
Warheads/Missile	1	1	3	
Yield/Warheads(megatons)	5-10	1-2	.170	
Throw-weight/Missile(lbs.)	8000	2500	2500	
Deployment(no.)	54	450	550	1,054
Aggregate Throw-weight (millions of lbs.)	0.4	1.1	1.4	2.9
Aggregate Warheads	54	450	1650	2154

TABLE-2(CONTD.)SLBMs

A. USSR

TYPE	SS-N-4	SS-N-5	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	TOTAL
Range (nautical miles)	300	650	1500	4300	
Warheads/Missile(no.)	1	1	1	1	
Yield/Warhead(Megatons)	1+	1+	1+	1+	
Deployment (no.)	-	-	-	-	
Aggregate(Warheads(no.))	27	54	544	220	845
Aggregate(no.)	27	54	544	220	845

B. UNITED STATES

TYPE	Polaris A-3	Poseidon C-3	TOTAL
Range (nautical miles)	2500	2500	
Warheads/Missile(no.)	3	10	
Yield/Warhead(megatons)	.200	.050	
Deployment (no.)	160	496	656
Aggregate Warheads(no.)	480	4960	5440

war mission was to support allied endeavours in a hard battle in Europe. The adjective 'strategic,' according to the Americans was an ascription determined by 'politics.'³⁵ Thus, essentially the US side preferred to consider only "central" strategic forces - ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers, and strategic defences against them. This issue remained one of the unresolved problems of SALT I.

A second set of substantive issues centred on ABM and the interrelationship between curbs on ABM and on strategic offensive systems. Initially the Soviets were interested in an ABM treaty only. But although originally, the US under the Johnson administration had stressed the need for an ABM freeze as a priority objective, the continuing momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup had altered US perspective significantly by the end of 1970; the Nixon administration ruled out any agreement on ABM alone.

It took seven sessions in all (See Table-3 for a chronology of SALT) and a set of parallel "back channel" negotiations carried on chiefly between Kissinger and Dobrynin to break the impasse. Also, as John Newhouse notes, Kissinger's precedent-setting visit to Beijing in July 1971 had introduced triangular-politics into the great

35. Colin S. Gray, "Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance". in Orbis, Fall 1974, pp. 722-23.

TABLE - 3CHRONOLOGY OF SALT MEETINGSSALT I : November 1969-May 1972

SALT Session	Summit	Other Meeting	Chief Participants	Dates
1. Helsinki			Delegations	Nov-Dec 1969
2. Vienna			Delegations	Apr-Aug 1970
3. Helsinki			Delegations	Nov-Dec 1970
		Washington	Kissinger/ Dobrynin	Jan 1971
4. Vienna			Delegations	Mar-May 1971
5. Helsinki			Delegations	Jul-Sep 1971
6. Vienna			Delegations	Nov 71-Feb 72
7. Helsinki			Delegations	Mar-May 1972
		MOSCOW	Kissinger/ Brezhnev	Apr 1972
	MOSCOW		Nixon/Brezhnev	May 1972

SALT II : September 1972-May 1979

SALT Session	Summit	Other Meeting	Chief Participants	Dates
		MOSCOW	Kissinger/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Sep 1972
1. Geneva			Delegations	Nov-Dec 1972
2. Geneva			Delegations	Mar-Apr 1973
3. Geneva			Delegations	May-Jun 1973
		MOSCOW	Kissinger/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	May 1973
	Washington		Nixon/ Brezhnev	Jun 1973

TABLE 3 (CONTD)

SALT Session	Summit	Other Meeting	Chief Participants	Dates
4. Geneva			Delegations	Sep-Nov 1973
5. Geneva			Delegations	Feb-Apr 1974
		Washington	Nixon/ Kissinger/ Gromyko	Feb 1974
		Moscow	Kissinger/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Mar 1974
		Washington	Nixon/ Kissinger/ Gromyko	Apr 1974
		Geneva	Kissinger/ Gromyko	Apr 1974
	Moscow		Nixon/ Brezhnev	Jun-Jul 1974
6. Geneva			Delegations	Sep-Nov 1974
		Washington	Ford/ Kissinger/ Gromyko	Sep 1974
		Moscow	Kissinger/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Oct 1974
	Vladivostok		Ford/ Brezhnev	Nov 1974
7. Geneva			Delegations	Jan-May 1975
		Geneva	Kissinger/ Gromyko	Feb 1975
		Vienna	Kissinger/ Gromyko	May 1975
8. Geneva			Delegations	Jul-Nov 1975
		Geneva	Kissinger/ Gromyko	Jul 1975
	Helsinki		Ford/ Brezhnev	Jul-Aug 1975
		Washington	Ford/ Kissinger/ Gromyko	Sep 1975

TABLE 3 (CONTD)

SALT Session	Summit	Other Meeting	Chief Participants	Dates
9. Geneva			Delegations	Dec 1975
10. Geneva			Delegations	Jan-May 1976
		Moscow	Kissinger/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Jan 1976
11. Geneva			Delegations	Jun-Jul 1976
12. Geneva			Delegations	Sep-Nov 1976
		New York	Kissinger/ Gromyko	Sep 1976
		Washington	Ford/ Gromyko	Oct 1976
		Moscow	Vance/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Mar 1977
13. Geneva			Delegations	May-Dec 1977
		Geneva	Vance/ Gromyko	May 1977
		Washington	Carter/ Vance/ Gromyko	Sep 1977
14. Geneva			Delegations	Jan 1978 - Jan 1979
		Moscow	Vance/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Apr 1978
		Washington	Carter/ Vance/ Gromyko	May 1978
		New York	Vance/ Gromyko	June 1978

TABLE-3 (CONTD)

SALT Session	Summit	Other Meeting	Chief Participants	Dates
		Geneva	Vance/ Gromyko	Jul 1978
		Moscow	Warnke/ Gromyko	Sep 1978
		New York	Vance/ Gromyko	Sep 1978
		Washington	Carter/ Vance/ Gromyko	Sep-Oct 1978
		Moscow	Vance/ Brezhnev/ Gromyko	Oct 1978
	Vienna	Geneva	Vance/ Gromyko Carter/ Brezhnev	Dec 1978 May 1979

power picture giving Moscow new incentives for trying to wrap up a SALT-I accord. Finally, a two-part treaty was signed between Brezhnev and Nixon at the Moscow Summit of May 1972.

The Agreements

The Interim Agreement (see Table-4) on strategic offensive arms set maximum ceilings of 1618 ICBMs for the Soviet Union and 1054 for the United States. Within the ICBM category, heavy missiles of types deployed after 1964 were limited to 313 for the USSR and 54 for the United States. With regard to submarine-launched missiles, the Soviet Union was allowed 62 modern nuclear submarines with 950 SLBMs, compared with 44 submarines and 710 SLBMs for the United States.

The maximum number of SLBMs could be attained only if prescribed numbers of old ICBMs were first turned in - 210 by the Soviets and 54 by the Americans. Otherwise, the baseline figures for SLBMs would be 740 and 656, respectively. The net outcome in combined numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs accruing to each, if all options were exercised, would be 2358 for the Soviet Union and 1710 for the United States.

The ABM Treaty, as signed at the Moscow Summit, limited each country to two ABM deployment areas of 100 launchers each. This ceiling was later reduced by a

TABLE - 4INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITS ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS

CATEGORY	USSR	US
ICBM Silos	1618	1054
Including Modern Large Ballistic Missiles(MLBMs)	313	0
SLBM Launchers	740/950	656/710
Modern Nuclear Powered Submarines(SSBNs)	62	44

July 1974 protocol to the treaty to a single such area, with each party free to choose whether to defend its national capital or an ICBM silo complex. The treaty also included a ban on developing mobile ABM systems, prohibitions to prevent upgrading of air defences into ABM, and constraints upon converting the potential of "futuristic" technology to ABM purposes.

Both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement explicitly provided for the unimpeded use of "national technical means of verification".

Assessing SALT-I : More A Political Event
Than a Technical Accomplishment

One thing is certain : The SALT I was not about disarmament. The superpowers were not attempting dramatically to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals. What they were trying to do was to control the speed and direction in which these arsenals were growing. What the SALT-I agreements achieved was the codification of both sides' planned offensive force deployments from 1972 to 1977 (the duration of the Interim Agreement). The agreements were more an attempt to regulate an evolving strategic balance than to create a static one. From a technical arms-control standpoint, therefore, SALT I was a profoundly nugatory and conservative exercise. For more important were its political implications.

Strategic Implications

The proponents of SALT-I claimed that the chief merit of the treaty was the "establishment of a climate of restraint in superpower strategic weapons procurement"³⁶. The agreements enjoyed general public acceptance on both sides. Kissinger hailed SALT-I as "a technical accomplishment" and as "a political event of some magnitude". Kosygin hoped that they would "go down in history as a major achievement on the road toward curbing the arms race". A balance -sheet of gains and losses for both sides is presented in Table-5. Let us now discuss the real strategic implications of SALT-I.

- i. Firstly, by producing the two agreements - the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement - SALT-I dealt with both the number and character (offensive or defensive) of weapons. From then on, arms control would deal with the number of weapons alone.
- ii. The logic of the ABM Treaty was ruthlessly simple. The second strike was what was important. The Treaty sought to prevent the emergence of a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive arms.

36. Robin Ranger, op.cit., p.157.

TABLE - 5

A NET ASSESSMENT OF THE SALT-I AGREEMENTS

Mutal Gains	Net Soviet Gains	Net American Gains	Mutual Losses
1. Dangers of nuclear war reduced.	1. Land-based ICBM and SLBM launchers frozen in a condition of US inferiority.	1. US left with leads in strategic bombers and MIRV technology.	1. Credibility of Chinese nuclear capability increased (since China would not have to cope with large-scale ABM defences).
2. Mutual confidence between US and Soviet leaders increased.	2. Soviet momentum in MIRV not restricted.	2. Soviet numerical build-up in offensive weapons slowed.	
3. Influence of Soviet hard-liners restricted.	3. US technological lead in ABM effectively frozen.	3. Scope for delegating greater local security responsibilities to the Europeans.	
	4. Soviet option to develop obsolete ICBMs and SLBMs kept open.		
	5. Psychological dynamics of the arms race favouring Russia.		
	6. Resources previously consumed by strategic build-up freed for domestic programmes.		

- iii. The fundamental advantage of the Interim Agreement was that it introduced an element of certainty into medium-term strategic planning.
- iv. The Interim Agreement dealt not only with numbers but with numbers in fixed categories. And the categories related to "things like land, sea and air, not strategic characteristics like susceptibility to preemption or capability for preemption, nor even relevant ingredients like warheads per target point, readiness, speed of delivery, accuracy or recallability after launch."³⁷
- v. The Interim Agreement was characterized by asymmetry of outcome. With its differential numerical ceilings for land-based ICBM launchers and sea-borne SLBM forces; the Interim Agreement froze Soviet numerical advantage in two of the three major categories of strategic delivery forces. The American preponderance in heavy bombers, advantage in ICBM reliability and accuracy; superiority in SLBMs; benefit of support of the forward based systems(FBS) and allied military bases; and lead in the MIRV technology off-set the Soviet advantage. However,

37. Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64(2), Winter 1985-86, p.227.

the SALT-I accords received joint Congressional support only after an amendment³⁸ by Senator Henry M. Jackson, stipulating "equal ceilings" in future agreements with the Soviet Union, was added to it.

- vi. From the "arms-control" viewpoint, those developments which were regarded as mostly destabilizing were left untouched by the SALT-I accords. These included the threat to mutual assured destruction (MAD) that was presented by ABM, MIRV and other qualitative developments.

Political Implications

When put in the context of the Moscow Summit's wideranging superpower accords on the mutuality of their interests, and in the context of the impetus it gave to further agreements in arms control and other fields, SALT-I represented arms control only incidentally. Its political role and implications were more profound.

-
- 38. The Jackson Amendment had three important features:
 - i. that Congress would consider Soviet actions endangering the survivability of the US deterrent to be contrary to the supreme national interest of the US - and therefore grounds for abrogation - whether or not the Soviet actions were consistent with the Interim Agreement;
 - ii. that Congress would urge the President to seek a future treaty that would not limit the US to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits of the Soviet Union; and
 - iii. that a vigorous R&D and modernization programme should be pursued.

The first point to be made is that despite being political, military and ideological adversaries, the US and the USSR had nevertheless managed in the SALT-I agreements to take the first steps forward placing negotiated limitations on some of their most important armaments. The fact of agreement in itself was politically significant.

A second salient point is that the SALT-I accords amounted to a validation of the proposition that the Soviet Union had finally attained strategic equality with the United States. From then on the US had to recognize as legitimate the Soviet "right" as a fellow superpower.

Thirdly, SALT-I could be judged a political success in terms of its spill-over effects, in terms of giving detente a substantial boost. From Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird's reference to the Moscow SALT agreements as "SALT-I" and from the naming of the agreement on limitation on strategic offensive weapon systems as the "Interim Agreement", it was clear that further agreements were forthcoming. Indeed, SALT-II started in November 1972. The Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War was signed at the second summit meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in June 1973. Also the West formally began to admit what the Russians called "the territorial and political realities" that arose from the second World War, and this western attitude was enshrined on a continent-wide basis at the European Security Conference in Helsinki in 1975.

Finally, SALT-I was intertwined with the Basic Principles Agreement (BPA) which, in Kissinger's words, was "a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age"³⁹. The Basic Principles outlined the relationship between the superpowers in political, economic and military terms. It served primarily as an overall statement of declaratory policy which was to guide the conduct of diplomacy.

From the political perspective, relations were to be conducted on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Ideological and socio-political differences were acknowledged but not considered obstacles to mutual accommodation. The principle of non-interference in the affairs of third states was agreed upon. In the economic sphere, trade and commercial relations, alongwith scientific and technological ties, were to be pursued and expended. In the military area, direct confrontation in both the nuclear and conventional spheres would be avoided. Efforts to attain unilateral military advantage were agreed to be inconsistent with the Basic Principles.

By agreeing to the Basic Principles of 1972, both superpowers implicitly accepted the concept of "linkage" : the idea that progress toward arms limitation would lead

39. See Wolfe, op.cit., p.14.

to progress in other aspects of US-Soviet relations and, conversely, that cooperation (or lack of cooperation) in other aspects of US-Soviet relations would facilitate (or hamper) movement in arms negotiations.

The Americans deemed linkage essential in order to reap concrete results across a broad range of issues. This view presupposed the natural inclination of the Soviet Union to try to gain unilateral advantage in one area while reaching accommodation in another. Kissinger argued that any compartmentalization would only encourage the Soviet leadership to feel that they could behave in a competitive manner in one area and cooperatively in another. For the time being, however, Nixon and Kissinger downplayed linkage to keep the process of detente, and its crowning jewel, the SALT process, going.

The Soviets, for the most part, however, consistently objected to linkage. The close interrelationship between arms limitation and movement in broader political relations which seemed to be dictated by Soviet theory⁴⁰ did not get manifested in Soviet policy. Most notably, the Soviets completed SALT I as scheduled, despite the American mining of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports on the eve of the Moscow Summit.

40. See Chapter II, ante.

CHAPTER - IV

SALT - II : CONSUMED BY THE QUICKSAND OF LINKAGE POLITICS

SALT-II began formally in November 1972, six months after the signing of SALT-I. The objective of both sides was to replace the five-year interim agreement on offensive systems with a more comprehensive treaty of indefinite duration. But SALT-II took a long time in coming. What with changes in the American administration, changing strategic force postures of both sides, Russian intransigence with respect to any alteration to the Vladivostok formula and the pressures on U.S. negotiators from Senatorial hawks and the newly formed Committee on the Present Danger,¹ progress was excruciatingly slow. Seven years after the signing of SALT-I, President Carter and President Brezhnev met in Vienna to sign that treaty known as SALT-II.

SALT II : The Ambiguous and Ill-defined Inheritance

To recapitulate, in SALT-I the Soviet Union was permitted a large number of strategic offensive launchers, that is ICBM and SLBM, because its technology was regarded as inferior, because its strategic forces did not have the same flexibility as the American triad

1. Members of this right-wing Committee, established in 1976, were campaigning against detente and SALT.

of ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers, and because it seemed to face more threats.² But as the circumspect heading of the offensive weapon agreement - "Interim Agreement...." - suggested, it was a pact of limited scope and duration important for its symbolic and promotional value. The agreement was to be supported primarily for its promise to lead to a better and more comprehensive follow-on agreement. Thus SALT-II inherited from SALT-I a kind of mandatory obligation to be more thorough in character.

Some of the tougher issues and areas of disagreement - MIRV, FBS, Backfire bomber etc. - had simply been laid aside in SALT-I for later consideration. SALT -II had to come to grips with the unassuaged strategic considerations of both sides.

SALT-I agreements, again, had been essentially a validation of the then existing strategic postures which both sides had already arrived at unilaterally. SALT-II had to face the basic question of what the future strategic relationship between the two superpowers was to be.

The most unfortunate legacy which SALT-I left pertains to the so-called "heavies" - the category of ICBMs

2. In addition to the American strategic forces, the Soviet Union faced the threats of American forward-based systems(FBS) in Europe, the British and French nuclear forces, and the Chinese nuclear arsenal.

in which the Soviets were left with an "especially threatening"³ advantage according to SALT-I ceilings. "Heavies" have a history of their own that is worth recounting.

Back in the early 1960s, the US relied on a heavy missile called the Titan. Robert McNamara decided that Titan made no strategic sense: i) It was too crude; ii) it did not provide a high degree of accuracy; and iii) it was propelled by liquid fuel against which US military planners have nurtured a traditional bias. It was, in short, an objectification of the foreboding word "overkill". McNamara decided that what America needed as the backbone of its deterrent was a smaller, cheaper, more reliable, more versatile, more accurate, and solid-fuelled missile that could threaten the Soviet Union with pinpoint retaliatory strikes. The result was Minuteman: spare, compact, quick and efficient.

The Soviets, on the other hand, in their ICBM programme, seemed to be moving in the opposite direction from the US - toward heavy missiles. On the eve of SALT they deployed a liquid-fuelled behemoth, the SS-9. Later the US observed the Soviets test the SS-9 with a primitive forerunner of MIRVs. The SS-9, they concluded in dismay,

3. Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New Delhi : Kalyani Publishers, 1979), p.25.

was a counterforce rather than a retaliatory weapon; its mission, in other words, may have been to knock out the American land-based ICBM force in a preemptive strike. The American Minuteman felt vulnerable. With the emergence of the SS-9 and the Soviet modern heavy missile programme, the issue of Minuteman vulnerability - so troublesome to the negotiators and defenders of SALT-II - was born.⁴

In its handling of the heavy-ICBM issue, SALT-I did its greatest disservice to SALT-II.⁵ The only unequal numerical limit carried forward from the interim agreement into the SALT-II treaty would be the freeze on modern heavies, which left the Russians with about 300 and the US with zero. Recriminations over the misclassification of the SS-19 as a "light" ICBM and intramural disputes over whether the SS-19 was as big a threat as the SS-18 would haunt the deliberations in Washington until 1977. Well into 1979, Senator Henry Jackson would cite the failure of SALT-I to define "heavy" as proof that all ambiguities in SALT agreements were there for a sinister Soviet purpose, and any loophole would end up being exploited by the USSR and regretted by the US.

4. Ibid., p.29.

5. Ibid., p.30.

SALT-II : The Hesitating Road to the Jinxed Agreement

The most important SALT-II transaction of the Nixon-Ford regime was the Vladivostok Summit agreement reached between President Ford and Soviet Secretary Brezhnev on November 24, 1974. The prelude to the Vladivostok agreement were provided by the Jackson amendment calling for "equal ceilings" in subsequent SALT arrangements and Kissinger's translation of it into "essential equivalence"; the coming of age of MIRV technology; the "Schlesinger doctrine"⁶ in the US stipulating changes in targeting doctrine, force sizing and counterforce; the Watergate crisis, Nixon's ouster and Ford's assumption of Presidency; and incriminations on both the American and Soviet sides of violations of SALT-I provisions.

At Vladivostok the basis of agreement had to be changed to conform with new weapons technology. Both superpowers were adding multiple independently targetable

6. The Schlesinger doctrine, enunciated in 1974 by Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger, had two objectives: i) to reinforce deterrence, and ii) to limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation, if deterrence should fail. It gave added emphasis to preparations for fighting and winning limited nuclear wars. It initiated two major new US defence programmes: i) development and deployment of improved and modernized ICBMs, and ii) a major expansion of the civil defence programme.

reentry vehicles (MIRV) to their land-based and sea-based launchers, or at least were intending to do so. As each strategic launcher could now prospectively carry a number of warheads to a number of different targets, the crucial negotiating issues centred upon numbers of warheads, named strategic nuclear delivery/launch vehicles (SNDV/SNLV); and the crucial strategic issue became the threat to deterrence - Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) - which inheres in the potential of each strategic launcher to account for the destruction of more than one launcher on the enemy's side. Moreover, the heavy weight Soviet launchers previously regarded as completely inferior, now promised, with gradual qualitative improvements, to translate their greater payload potential into a decisive advantage in the MIRV/SNDV balance.

The main aspects of the proposed accord outlined at Vladivostok, parts of which were to undergo some change in the course of subsequent negotiations, were the following:⁷

- 1) An overall ceiling, equally affecting both sides, of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles for each side to include ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers.

7. Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), p.174.

- ii) An equal number of 1320 MIRVed missile launchers for each side, with no limit on throwweight.
- iii) The counting of any missile tested with MIRV against the MIRV ceiling, if the missiles will be deployed.
- iv) Freedom to mix within the agreed aggregate of 2400 delivery vehicles.
- v) A sub-limit of 313 on heavy missiles and no new silo construction (these were provisions to be carried over from the Interim Agreement of 1972).
- vi) Deployment of land-mobile missiles and some type of bomber-launched missiles permitted, but to be included in the overall ceiling of 2400 delivery vehicles.
- vii) Apparent dropping of the long-standing Soviet demand to account for FBS in any agreed aggregate of central strategic delivery systems.
- viii) No constraints on modernization that would preclude such measures as improvements in the accuracy and deployment of new systems still under development, e.g., the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine.

- ix) Duration of new agreement to be from 1975-85 with relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement remaining in force until entry into effect of the new agreement in October 1977.
- x) Following conclusion of the new agreement further negotiations to begin "no latter than 1980-81" on "possible reduction of strategic arms in the period after 1985".

The post-Vladivostok SALT negotiations got underway in Geneva in January 1975. But the going was difficult. The problems of reconciling the draft treaties proposed by the two sides in the early months of 1975 centred around both some familiar issues and some new ones. Among issues in the first category were verification procedures, including an acceptable formula for counting MIRVed missiles and where to draw the borderline between "heavy" missiles and new Soviet ICBMs like the SS-19 and SS-17, which substantially exceeded the volumetric threshold for a heavy missile previously defined by the US side.⁸ The new issues were whether the Soviet Backfire was an intercontinental bomber and should therefore be included in the USSR's aggregate total of 2400 delivery vehicles, and what limitations should be placed on strategic Cruise missiles - a class of weapons that had acquired a new potential, thanks to technological advances, and in which US interest had begun to grow since 1972.

8. Ibid., p.200.

In addition to these various obstacles to the prompt wrapping up of a SALT-II agreement, the Soviet side also had reportedly reintroduced in its draft treaty text language that would have the effect of honouring previous Soviet claims for compensation for FBS and third-country nuclear forces - issues supposedly buried at Vladivostok.

The Cruise missile, however, came to share, with the Backfire bomber the gray area of Vladivostok definitions. By 1975 Kissinger often wished that neither aircraft had been invented.⁹ Kissinger had originally thought of the Cruise missile largely as a bargaining chip. However, the military men who had developed the Cruise missile came to see their brainchild as too valuable to sacrifice. SALT-II got bogged down in the swamp of "the gray area". Kissinger made a last-ditch attempt in January 1976 to conclude a treaty before the end of that year but was unsuccessful. Then to the disenchantment of Kissinger and the Kremlin alike, the politics of an American presidential election year obtruded on SALT.¹⁰ The next moves for a SALT-II were to be made by the new Carter administration.

In March and May 1977 the Carter administration proposed new approaches¹¹ to the Russians. These involved

9. Talbott, op.cit., p.35.

10. Ibid., p.37.

11. Hugh Macdonald, "SALT-II : International Politics and Arms Control," in Round Table, Vol. 279, July, 1980, p.308.

cuts in the overall launcher ceiling and MIRV sub-ceiling outlined at Vladivostok; reductions in the number of Soviet heavy ICBM - a proposal intended to reduce Minuteman vulnerability. American Cruise missile development and Soviet Backfire production were to be constrained. The American strategic bomber replacement, the B-1, was cancelled. Moreover, it was proposed that the SALT Treaty should include severe restrictions in the development and deployment of further generations of ICBM, including mobile missiles, and SLBM. These proposals would have entailed cutbacks in research, development, and testing programmes. They would also have paved the way for stricter limitations on silo and launcher modifications.

The Soviets would have none of them. They were planning to implement the Vladivostok framework and that alone satisfied them as SALT-II. It demonstrated the inflexibility of Soviet weapons technology and strategic development. Unlike the United States which has three separate and sufficient capabilities for assured destruction in its "triad" force structure, the Soviet Union possesses only one force, its ICBM, which can assuredly destroy, and reliably deter, the United States.

The narrowing of differences between the two sides began after the so-called "September breakthrough"¹² in 1977.

12. Talbott, op.cit., p.120.

The central compromise involved US assent to modernization of the Soviet force of some 300 heavy missiles, in effect, allowing the USSR to complete its SS-18 deployment programme. In return, the Russians were said to have relaxed some of their previous demands for Cruise missile restrictions. But still "the final five percent gap" persisted .

As David Aaron once observed:

"When you get down to the end in something like SALT it gets harder and harder to move the negotiations forward because it is harder and harder for either side to move off positions it has staked out as being life-or-death, do-or-die importance. Neither guy wants to be the one who made the last big concession."¹³

In the final phase of SALT II between January 1 and May 7 virtually every issue, major and minor, was under intensive negotiation between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and ambassador Dobrynin and the SALT-II Treaty was signed between President Carter and now President Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979.

But meanwhile there had arisen "complications in the context" : Middle East, Horn of Africa and Cuba. Members of the Committee on the Present Danger in America

13. Ibid., p.226.

raised the spectre of "America-as-No.2" ; powerful domestic interests sought through Congress to promote a more didactic vision of detente and to run down SALT-II. American Senate ratification of the Treaty became a battle - ground. The Carter administration, initially determined to safeguard the "separate development" of arms control from the vicissitudes of international politics, wavered in the face of powerful domestic opposition to SALT, and finally compromised after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. SALT-II remained unratified to be ultimately abandoned by the Reagan administration.

SALT II : The Three Part Agreement

SALT II was divided into three parts, a Treaty limiting strategic offensive forces until 1985; a Protocol restricting certain developments and deployments for three years; and a set of principles for negotiating SALT-III, talks on which were due to begin after Senate ratification was obtained.

In the Treaty (presented in Table-6) each side agreed to limit its strategic launchers to 2,250 MIRV launchers were subject to several different sub-limits. There remained the Vladivostok main subceiling of 1,320 MIRV launchers of all types, ICBM, SLBM and strategic range

TABLE - 6SALT II : LIMITS ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES

TYPE	CEILINGS
1. Total for all ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers	2250
2. Ceiling for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers with LRCMs	1320
3. Ceiling for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs	1200
4. Ceiling for MIRVed ICBMs	820

bombers carrying air-launched Cruise missiles(ALCM). Of these 1320 launchers not more than 820 could be land-based ICBM; and the permitted maximum of ICBM and SLBM - leaving only Cruise missile launchers - was 1200. Within the sub-limit of 820 MIRVed ICBM, not more than 308 "heavy" launchers were permitted, a provision which applied to the Soviet SS-18 only and any replacement for it developed during the treaty period. Other treaty provisions limited silo modifications to prevent higher missiles being replaced by heavier ones, as the Soviet Union had done with its SS-17 and SS-19 replacements of earlier generations, lesser throw-weight, ICBM. New silo construction was forbidden.

The Treaty permitted both sides to deploy new sea-based systems, and one new ICBM each. The United States could proceed with the Trident submarine and its two missile types, the C-4 and D-5. The D-5 MK-500 "Evader" warhead could be terminally guided, thus improving SLBM accuracies to about the same as those of the then existing American ICBM. The Soviet Union could deploy at least one and possibly two new submarine types, and one new SLBM. The United States could develop and probably deploy a new mobile ICBM, the MX, to replace part of the Minuteman force. The Treaty limited the number of MIRV warheads on any launcher, generously, to ten for ICBM and fourteen for SLBM, respectively the design maximum for the MX and D-5 launchers.

The Treaty specified unimpeded verification by monitoring through "national technical means", satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and ground monitoring stations. One provision precluded the encoding of test-missile telemetry, because this had been employed to confound accurate monitoring in the past. Both sides had also committed themselves to periodic, regulated, notification of data on force structures and changes, missile testing ranges and other information. The stockpiling of "refire" missiles in proximity to "cold launch" silos was forbidden. Limitations on the dimensions and volumes of missiles and silos were carried over from SALT-I, amplified, or added anew.

The Treaty contained a non-circumvention provision which would prevent the United States from transferring strategic forces or weapons to allies, but would not, according to American sources, inhibit technological cooperation and technology transfer, such as is provided for in various agreements with NATO countries. Hence the precise effect of this provision was somewhat obscure.

The Protocol to SALT II prohibited the deployment of mobile ICBM for three years, or the testing of any integrated mobile missile-system. This effectively prevented deployment of Soviet SS-16 mobile ICBM, which had been extensively developed already. Moreover, the Soviet Union had reportedly agreed not to manufacture certain components specific to this system. The Protocol did not effectively inhibit deployment of the MX mobile ICBM. On

the other hand , the Soviet Union was not restrained from continuing deployment of the mobile intermediate range (IRBM) SS-20 which could strike targets on Western Europe, China and the Middle East but had insufficient range to strike the continental United States from its bases. Sea-launched Cruise missiles(SLCMs) and ground-launched Cruise missiles(GLCMs) which range over 600 kms could not be deployed while the Protocol was in effect, though testing of such systems could proceed.

Finally, there was a Statement of Principles for SALT-III, intended to set a negotiating context in which the kinds of reductions proposed for SALT-II, but signally absent from it, might become possible.

Assessing SALT II : Stop American Lead in Technology

or

Soaring American Lust for TNT?

The balanced ceilings approach to SALT II, contrasted with the asymmetrical ceilings approach in SALT-I, grew out of the 1972 Jackson Amendment to SALT-I which set forth the principle of equivalence : future treaties would "not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union".¹⁴

14. U.S. Congress, Legislative History of the Jackson Amendment: Proposal by Senator Henry M. Jackson (Washington : GPO, 1972), p.39H. Quoted in Gary L. Guertner, "Carter's SALT : MAD or SAFE?", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October, 1979, p.28.

But symmetrical ceilings and sub-limits did not solve the problem of qualitative variations in Soviet and American systems allowed under the SALT-II agreement.

While there are superficial similarities in the structures of the Soviet and American nuclear triads (ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers), the respective weapons and delivery systems within each triad have evolved with major asymmetries due both to strategic design and levels of technology available. Enforcing equal ceilings with such asymmetries was obviously difficult.

Official US strategic doctrine first dealt with the problem by improvising the Jackson Amendment and devising the concept of essential equivalence. Essential equivalence was added to the US criteria for strategic stability in 1974 and found a place in Secretary of Defence Harold Brown's exposition of "SAFE"¹⁵ requirements for stable deterrence on which the Carter administration based SALT-II :

Survivability
Assured Destruction
Flexibility
Essential Equivalence

SAFE incorporated survivability and assured destruction from the McNamara era. The doctrinal innovations of

15. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown in the Annual Defense Department Report both for fiscal years 1979 and 1980 delineated the SAFE requirements for Stable deterrence.

flexible targeting options and essential equivalence became the major theoretical vehicles for attacking SALT II in the United States.

The theme of the strident domestic criticism of SALT II in the US was the following :

"Strategic trends during the SALT decade have been decidedly adverse to the United States. The trends have been toward Soviet superiority, not essential equivalence; toward reduced, not enhanced strategic stability; toward increased and critical vulnerability of our deterrent forces, not improved survivability; toward the need to spend more on our strategic forces, not less; toward a worsening political relationship with the Soviet Union, not more cooperative Soviet behaviour; and toward poorer, not better, prospects for effective arms limitation agreements in the future".¹⁶

In short critics in the US reformulated the abbreviation SALT to read "Stop American Lead in Technology". However, alternatively it can be said that SALT symbolized "Soaring American Lust for TNT". We shall now discuss the criticisms against SALT II and their rebuttals.

16. William R. Van Cleave, "Challenges to Global Stability", in Adam M. Garfinkle, ed., Global Perspectives on Arms Control (Philadelphia: Praeger, 1984), p.24.

Firstly, it was argued that the existence of a Soviet capability to threaten the US Minuteman force with only a fraction of its ICBM force constituted an asymmetry of forces that could have adverse political and military implications. Combined with the Soviet civil defence programme, this argument was used to raise the threat of a first-strike scenario, of the adoption of "nuclear Trotskyism"¹⁷ by the Soviet Union.

But the discussion of the first-strike scenarios, so common in the US, exhibited a simplistic military/technical perspective remote from the world of political decision-making. A putative aspiration to a war-winning capability was by no means the only explanation for the Russians' giant missiles and civil defence programmes.

- i) The mammoth size of the Soviet heavies could be seen as a function of Soviet technological inferiority.
- ii) The avoidance of nuclear war had been a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy since 1956 when Krushchev, in a sober assessment of nuclear war, reversed the classic Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist states. That it can not be argued that American strategic doctrine is based on a 'war-losing' strategy - given the Schlesinger doctrine, the MX system, the Trident II D-5 system and a second generation ALCMs - is another matter.

17. Guertner, op. cit., p.29.

- iii) The assessment of Soviet passive defences ignored considerations like the vulnerability of key Soviet economic choke points, casualties from fall-out and social disruption and unique political vulnerabilities of the Soviet State.
- iv) Moreover, the high ceilings allowed under SALT II were more than adequate to overwhelm a civil defence system.

Secondly, apart from the fear of a counterforce gap, the criticism of SALT concerned the feverish building up of the strategic nuclear forces after 1972 in violation of the spirit of SALT - I. The Soviets, of course, had introduced several new types of ICBMs and had MIRVED their missiles. But neither was forbidden by SALT.

Moreover, the US itself had pushed ahead with the modernization of its strategic triad. The programme included the Trident system, the MK 12-A warhead, the NS-20 guidance system for the Minuteman system etc. Overall the American stockpile of nuclear warheads doubled between 1972 and 1979. And if President Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber programme, it had "more to do with fiscal frugality than strategic moderation."¹⁸

18. Michael Mandelbaum, "In defence of SALT," in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1979, p.17.

As Gary L. Guertner wrote:

" The SALT II debate is between the 'war-fighters' and the 'strategic stabilizers', over how for counterforce capabilities should be allowed to go".¹⁹

In the noise of the "warfighters", the merits of the SALT-II agreement were lost. Even though the SALT - II agreement was by no means ideal, it was better for both the powers than no agreement at all. In fact, it was beneficial from the US viewpoint as well. The position was well put by Les Aspin in an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

" If SALT II does not end the arms race, it will at least put an end to the numbers race and confine the competition to the qualitative area - the very area which is our strong suit. If we reject the treaty and resume the numbers race, we are entering a race in which we are already behind - surely a very curious route to choose".²⁰

19. Guertner, op.cit., p.32.

20. Les Aspin, "SALT or no SALT", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June, 1978, p.38.

And choose a curious route the Americans did. The reasons for it were surely not technical. It has always been typical of opponents of arms control to find fault with arms control treaties on technical grounds. They know that risk of confrontation and nuclear war with the Soviet Union would not carry much weight in the long run. They find it in their interest to harp on technical points. But by conviction they do not approve of arms control postures, both morally and in terms of security concerns. They believe that the US must seek to change Soviet society and, that to do so, it must remain in a state of tension with the Soviet government. To know how the moveback to the "state of tension" was achieved, we turn first to a discussion on what Talbott calls "complications in the context" and then to a discussion on American domestic politics.

The Gradual Parting of Ways Between SALT and Detente:

The American and Soviet Inputs

During the early and mid-1970s , the pace of political detente exceeded the pace of superpower cooperation in the military-strategic spheres. Political detente reached its high water-mark in mid-1970s in the Helsinki Final Act and, after that, was on the wane. On the other hand, the real SALT battle started only after the mid-1970s. The

decoupling of SALT and political detente led to the emergence of "linkage" which ultimately killed SALT. Let us now discuss the American and Soviet inputs into the process of decline and demise of detente.

The American Inputs

Beginning with the "strategically Neanderthalic"²¹ Jackson Amendment that was tagged along with the SALT-I ratification, the US, in a series of moves, undermined the fabric of superpower detente.

When President Sadat asked the Soviet advisers in Egypt to leave in 1972, the Americans promptly filled the vacuum with military aid. The United States was successful in helping to destabilize the Allende government in Chile which fell to a military coup in 1973. In Southeast Asia, the Americans continued to supply the South Vietnamese with arms despite the "Vietnamization" of the war and the "Peace with Honour"²². In 1975, as Portugal's African

21. See Colin S. Gray, "Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance", in Orbis, Fall, 1974, p.726. Gray, however, lamented that the Jackson amendment was regarded as "strategically Neanderthalic".

22. President Nixon used this beautiful but somewhat inaccurate expression to describe the 1973 Vietnam peace pact signed in Paris.

colonies approached independence after the anti-fascist coup in Lisbon, the United States channelled money and arms to the main pro-western guerrilla groups UNITA and FNLA in Angola. The Americans engaged themselves in political activity in, and provided military assistance to, Ethiopia as well.

The deterioration of detente was, however, formally inaugurated by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. The first amendment formally linked most - favoured nation status for the USSR to emigration policy. Specifically, it demanded formalized, public Soviet commitment to high levels of annual Jewish emigration. The second amendment restricted credit allocation to the Soviets to a four-year total of \$ 300 million - that is, \$ 75 million a year, a mere drop in the bucket relative to Soviet expectations. These amendments had the effect of knocking out the Soviet - American trade agreement already negotiated in 1972 and of denying the Soviet Union the concession of the normal customs treatment the agreement provided. After that there was a long and dreary process of retrogression : rapidly declining trade, neglect or abandonment of cultural - exchange arrangements etc.

By 1976, the complexities and contradictions of detente had become explosive. The fragile American domestic consensus began to fall apart in the election

campaign. The Kissinger strategy came under pressure from right-wing Republicans and from the Democrats. As the Russians saw it, there were three main factions against detente :²³ i) those who refused to concede parity with the Soviet Union and wanted to revert to rearmament; ii) those who wanted to develop a strategic alliance between Washington and China; and iii) those who wanted to press for changes in the Soviet Union by forging links with dissidents and would-be emigres. In addition, as Stephen S. Rosenfeld wrote:

"There is (was) no constituency for 'detente' as such, only for or against particular elements which, one or another group contends, are the crucial ingredients of it".²⁴

Far from resolving the detente debate, Carter's election victory only seemed to sharpen it. The argument over how to deal with Moscow raged publicly within the new administration. Its two wings were personified by Cyrus Vance, the detente-minded Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the hawkish National Security Assistant. The President wavered from side to side.

23. See Jonathon Steele, "The Soviet Union : What Happened to Detente?", in Noam Chomsky, et.al, eds., Superpowers in Collision : The New Cold War (Hammondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books Ltd., 1982), pp. 52-53.

24. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Pluralism and Policy", in Foreign Affairs , January, 1974, p.272.

The Russians anxiously watched the ominous signs mounting almost from the first day of the new administration. Scarcely had Carter moved into the White House when he wrote a personal letter to Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet dissident, and received Vladimir Bukovsky, another dissident who had just been released from a prison. This perplexed the Russians. They saw the whole American human rights campaign as primarily directed against them and their empire in Europe, and as violative of the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972 providing for non-interference in each other's internal affairs. From Moscow's point of view, the Carter policy had to result either from an almost total lack of understanding of Soviet realities or a deliberate attempt to interfere in Soviet internal affairs. Moscow also rejected Carter's contention that he was not singling out Russia : "We will believe that when Carter receives a Chilean dissident at the White House".

At the end of 1977 Moscow suffered a diplomatic slap in the face. The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the United States to sign a joint statement on the MiddleEast, in which both sides pledged to hammer out jointly a comprehensive peace settlement. The statement caused a storm in Israel. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, rushed to the United States and

within four days, the Carter administration had in effect repudiated the joint US-USSR statement. Moscow's hopes of a revived Geneva Conference and joint status with Washington was rudely dashed.²⁵

In 1978, the Carter rhetoric against the Soviet Union began to get tougher. Brzezinski visited China and tried to involve the Chinese in various actions jointly with the United States, not "in alliance" but "in parallels". From the Soviet point of view this was just a semantic difference. One Soviet benefit from detente was that it allayed what Moscow feared might be American-Chinese collusion against the Soviet Union. The renewed Carter-Brzezinski overtures to Beijing in an atmosphere of deteriorating American-Soviet relations resurrected these fears. There was nothing the US could do more likely to cause a harsh and swift reaction in Moscow than play "the China Card". Moscow's fears were confirmed when in December 1978, the Americans decided to normalize their diplomatic relations with China. It looked like a calculated snub to Moscow at best; at worst it was the decisive victory of Brzezinski in the bureaucratic struggle in Washington. The China lobby had finally defeated the arms control and US-Soviet detente lobby.

25. Steele, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

With the tacit encouragement of Japan's and South Korea's arms build-ups, and the phenomenal increase in the NATO budget in 1978, the list of American inputs into the erosion of detente was complete. In short, the erosion of detente resulted from the abrupt shift from the Ford-Kissinger administration to the moralistic-ideological Carter administration. Carter's grand strategy moves were all considered by the Soviets to be unreasonable answers to their support to "national liberation movements".

The Soviet Inputs

The Soviets had their own contribution to make to the decline of detente. It all began with the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Failure of the Soviets to prevent their Arab allies from starting the war and the support Moscow gave the Arabs during the war called into question within the United States the entire detente relationship. Although it would be going too far to say that detente was dealt a mortal blow by the October war, the relationship between the two sides was never the same thereafter.

" The war was an ugly reminder that underlying the mutual desire for enhancing cooperation there remained important conflicting interests and a dynamic of competition that could not easily be restrained or moderated".²⁶

26. Alexander L. George, "The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973: Origins and Impact", in A.L. George, ed., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry : Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1983), p.151.

It would become more difficult from now on to maintain the momentum of detente.

Next there was the crisis in the African terrain, in Angola,²⁷ where in 1975 three local groups - National Liberation Front of Angola(FNLA), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola(MPLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola(UNITA) - fought to fill the political vacuum created by the departure of the Portuguese colonialists. Soviet-Cuban armed support to the MPLA, in the face of the relatively moderate support the Americans gave to the FNLA-UNITA coalition touched off a confrontation over the meaning of detente and its operational relevance for the management of conflicts in the third world. Angola served as a grim reminder that the Basic Principles Agreement had not changed the fundamentally conflictual character of US-Soviet relationships.

28

The Ogaden war of 1977-78 led to a second large - scale Soviet-Cuban intervention in an African conflict

27. For a discussion of the Angolan problem see Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola", in Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record : Annual Survey and Documents 1975-76 (London: Rex Collings, 1976).

28. Two books which give a good account of the Horn of Africa problem are Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976) and Marine Ottaway & David Ottaway, Ethiopia : Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana, 1978).

and a marked increase in US-Soviet tensions. After the Soviet-Cuban intervention on the side of Ethiopia, it became increasingly apparent that the entire structure of the US-Soviet bilateral relationship, even in the arms control area, could not be insulated from the shocks of superpower conflict in the third world. Despite its often-repeated intention not to link Soviet behavior in the third world with other aspects of US-Soviet relations, the Carter administration began to make such "linkages" after the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The Russians' penultimate act was in Cuba. After the Cuban missile crisis, Krushchev boasted: the Soviet Union had forced the "American imperial beast to swallow a hedgehog, quills and all."²⁹ Since then Cuba's quills have periodically pricked the United States. Thus in 1979 events were set in motion to provoke a major US-Soviet confrontation over Cuba. Contemptuously demoted to a "storm-in-a-tea-cup" by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, this crisis concerned a supposed Soviet combat brigade stationed near Havana.

The brigade "mini-crisis" of 1979 had the important consequence of greatly contributing to the political demise of SALT II Treaty. In December 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred. Even had the treaty come up for

29. Quoted in Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Prevention in Cuba," in George, op. cit., p.285.

debate in Senate in October, the brigade crisis would have made its passage doubtful. Linkage of SALT to the much more objectionable Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan in December was nearly inevitable, given the previous linkage of the Cuban brigade. And when Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul to install Babrak Karmal, President Carter termed the invasion:

" the most serious threat to world peace since the second world war" and did not present the SALT II Treaty to the Senate ratification. Linkage proved to be the nemesis of SALT II Treaty.

The Role of American Domestic Politics : An Indignant Congress and the "Peddlers of Crisis"

In 1971, a group of professors in America including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard Holbrooke, and others announced the publication of a new journal, "Foreign Policy". The premise of the new magazine was that "an era in American foreign policy which began in the late 1940s has ended". The contributors stressed "world order", "interdependence" and "global concern". Unfortunately this mood did not last very long.

The mood continued in America roughly till 1974
 30
 which was for the US the high-water mark of detente : the year

30. See Richard J. Barnet, Real Security : Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1981).

of Nixon's visit to Moscow and the Vladivostok accords on nuclear weapons. The moveback to the assumptions and policies of the cold war began almost at the moment Nixon was driven from office. By the fall of 1974, public opinion polls registered a shift in the public mood. And exacerbating the public's disenchantment were an indignant Congress and the hawkish Committee on the Present Danger which in collaboration minimised the constituency for detente and SALT in America.

The Role of Congress

The SALT talks involved several sets of negotiations beyond those at the conference table. Within the US there was at least one constituency with which the President had to struggle to build a policy consensus : the key members of Congress. SALT-I was a secret negotiation, dominated by bureaucratic pressures, high-level executive decision-making and by Kissinger. Once the SALT-I agreements were brought back to the United States, however, Congressional politics began to play a greater role in setting the stage for SALT-II.

When the first SALT accords were completed in what many observers believe was politically-motivated haste at the May 1972 Moscow Summit, hardliners in Congress felt they had been duped. After supporting the Safeguards ABM system, these individual resented the fact that the

system had been bargained away, along with, they claimed, the survivability of the US land-based missile force. This triggered support for the Jackson amendment. Subsequently, the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate Congress became less deferential to the executive branch and more assertive in foreign policy. The Congress endeavoured to assess the effect of decisions concerning key weapons on future arms control efforts. The legislation enacted in 1974 required the executive to prepare arms control impact statements for major military programmes.

Further, President Carter sought to translate his campaign pledges of a new, open diplomacy and close consultation with Congress in the conduct and formulation of foreign policy. But the battle lines were drawn when President Carter nominated Paul Warnke in February 1977 as Chief SALT negotiator. The 58-40 Senate vote confirming Warnke fell short of the margin of support that the administration had sought. Both majority leader Robert Byrd and Republican Chief Howard Baker agreed that the Senate had sent a signal to the White House warning that the administration should take a firm stance with the Soviets for a truly equitable SALT II pact.³¹ Carter's nervous

31. See Stephen J. Flanagan, "Congress, the White House and SALT", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November, 1978, p.36.

system had been bargained away, along with, they claimed, the survivability of the US land-based missile force. This triggered support for the Jackson amendment. Subsequently, the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate Congress became less deferential to the executive branch and more assertive in foreign policy. The Congress endeavoured to assess the effect of decisions concerning key weapons on future arms control efforts. The legislation enacted in 1974 required the executive to prepare arms control impact statements for major military programmes.

Further, President Carter sought to translate his campaign pledges of a new, open diplomacy and close consultation with Congress in the conduct and formulation of foreign policy. But the battle lines were drawn when President Carter nominated Paul Warnke in February 1977 as Chief SALT negotiator. The 58-40 Senate vote confirming Warnke fell short of the margin of support that the administration had sought. Both majority leader Robert Byrd and Republican Chief Howard Baker agreed that the Senate had sent a signal to the White House warning that the administration should take a firm stance with the Soviets for a truly equitable SALT II pact.³¹ Carter's nervous

31. See Stephen J. Flanagan, "Congress, the White House and SALT", in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November, 1978, p.36.

responses were the inclusion of Lt. Gen. Edward Rowley in the March 1977 Vance Mission to Moscow and the courting of Senator Henry Jackson. The President's nervousness meant increasing influence of Congress.

Many influential Congressmen continued to embrace the notion, originally enunciated by Kissinger, that the major aspects of the superpower contacts were interrelated. Indeed, Congress applied this concept to an extreme that Kissinger did not endorse, by predicating the progress of detente and SALT upon favourable developments in Soviet domestic as well as foreign policies. The Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 were the most important examples of Congressional determination to impose this linkage. And after the Cuban mini-brigade crisis a known dove like Frank Church, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, firmly tied the Cuban issue to SALT II :

"There is no likelihood whatever that the Senate would ratify the SALT II Treaty as long as Russian combat troops remain stationed in Cuba".³²

The Role of the Right-Wing

In the summer of 1974, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, a group of Democrats who had broken with


32. Duffy, op. cit., p.304.

George McGovern two years earlier over foreign policy, issued a task force report, "The Quest for Detente", an attack on the very idea that there could be an end to the cold war. Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, James Schlesinger, Charles Walker, David Packard and Henry Fowler continued to meet regularly through the first year of the Ford administration to discuss forming an influential group to attack detente, highlight the Soviet threat and push for significant increases in military spending.

This group was reactivated in May 1977 as many hardliners became disillusioned with Carter's foreign policy. With Senators Henry Jackson and Daniel P. Moynihan as co-Chairman, the coalition was opposed to what they saw as American retrenchment and supported Carter's human rights policy.

In March 1976, the Committee on the Present Danger was organized. In choosing the name, the organizers reached back to 1950 when James B. Conant and other former national security officials had founded an organization with the identical purpose. The Committee was intended as a vast public relations effort for rearmament, universal military service, the stationing of troops in Europe, and the education of the public for a permanent cold war.

In his study, Peddlers of Crisis,³³ comparing the two committees with the identical name separated by a quarter century, Jerry Sanders notes that some of the same people were identified with both efforts e.g. Paul Nitze and Charles Tyroler. The issues, the language and the techniques employed by the two groups were the same.



The "isolationism" and "the culture of appeasement" of post-Vietnam America, Norman Podhoretz said in his book The Present Danger, was a sickness of an elite that had lost the "will" to proclaim the superiority of American values. The objective of these hawks was to help Americans recover that "will".

The efforts of the right wing paid dividends. The Carter administration had lacked a consistent and patient approach to Soviet-American relations from the beginning. Now Carter's domestic support was on the wane and ratification of SALT II was already in trouble. Externally,

33. Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis : The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (London : Pluto Press, 1983).

the North Atlantic Alliance appeared to be in disarray and the US was preoccupied with Iran. After the Afghanistan crisis, the Carter administration, which had steadfastly denied "linkage" initially, applied linkage in every policy area.

On the military side, the Carter doctrine - essentially a restatement of the policy of containment - was applied to the Persian Gulf region. The naval task force in the Arabian Sea was increased in size; the defence budget was augmented by 5 percent in real terms to \$158 billion; greater emphasis was placed on the development of the 100,000 - man Ready Reserve Force; the feasibility of military bases and facilities in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman was pursued; and military aid of some \$400 million was offered to Pakistan. Economic restrictions - in fisheries, trade, credit, technology etc - were applied. And politically, Soviet-American relations were placed in a limbo with the Moscow Olympic boycott and the postponement of the SALT II Treaty.

On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected in a landslide. The worldview of the Committee on the Present Danger - "the peddlers of crisis", as Sanders calls them -

was national policy. Linkage was " a fact of life":

" Linkage is not the creation of US policy. It is a fact of life. A policy of pretending that there is no linkage promotes reverse linkage. It ends up by saying that in order to preserve arms control, we have to tolerate Soviet aggression".³⁴

This was the end of the road for strategic arms limitation talks.

34. Alexander Haig, address to Foreign Policy Association, New York, July 14, 1981. Quoted in Cleave, op.cit., p.26.

CHAPTER - V

FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

During torrid weather it is imprudent to press fraud charges against the only ice merchant in town. Likewise, given the premise of indispensibility of the arms control process, it was probably irrational on the part of the United States to abandon SALT on the question of "linkage". Moreover, if SALT (and detente) could survive a US war against an ally of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, then there is no reason why it should not have been allowed to survive the Soviet war against Afghanistan. Thus prima facie the US and linkage politics seem to be responsible for the end of SALT. But the problem requires a little more elaborate analysis. And the concluding pages are the right place for the review of the politics of SALT, the analysis of the causes of its breakdown, and for testing the hypotheses advanced in the beginning.

Historical Light on SALT

The problems of arms limitation on the scale of the arsenals possessed by the participants, the United States and the Soviet Union, were in many respects unique. But no political problem is unique in all its aspects. The SALT seems to be paralleled by the inter-war naval treaties (Washington-1922, London -1930, London-1936). Firstly, both the interwar treaties and SALT were concerned

with limiting, rather than abolishing, certain kinds of weapons, and establishing numerical limitations in the categories of arms to be retained. A second parallel lies in the partial nature of the arms systems whose limitation was involved.

The grounds of the breakdown of the inter-war treaties were provided by i) the progressive trade war against Japanese goods waged both on the American and British empire markets and ii) the drive for domination on the European continent by Hitlerian Germany. It is interesting to note here that both factors were only indirectly connected with the problem of arms limitation at sea.

The inter-war naval treaties' experience demonstrated two things. Firstly, formal arms limitation agreements can only be concluded under two different sets of circumstances¹ - on a nation defeated in war or as an accompaniment to an informal agreement on common political aims and purposes. Secondly, factors extraneous to arms limitation like complications in the political context can lead to the breakdown of the arms limitation process. Both these truisms were to be repeated in case of SALT.

1. Donald Watt, "Historical Light on SALT", in Round Table, January, 1972.

Politics of SALT

There are, in principle, four ways in which the superpowers could relate to each other in the world system : confrontation, competition, collaboration and avoidance. By the late 1960s, both Soviet and US leaders had concluded that mutual avoidance was not a practical basis for peace. They also came to realize that the periodic confrontations of the 1950s and 1960s were too dangerous in an era of strategic parity between competing global powers. As a result, both the countries moved toward a detente/peaceful co-existence/competitive-collaborative relationship. The rules of the game for such a relationship were set by the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972.

SALT was the centrepiece of this competitive-collaborative relationship. SALT-I was a success owing to many reasons. The domestic situation in both countries was conducive. The external environment was compelling. Europe and arms control were among the highest priorities of the superpowers at the time (in addition to Vietnam for the United States), thus providing what Thomas Comstock calls a "temporary confluence of priority interests"² in reaching agreement through compromise. The leadership

2. Thomas Comstock, "Soviet and American Preference - Orderings During Detente, 1969-1972" (Graduate seminar paper, Univ. of California, March, 1981). Quoted in George W. Breslauer, "Why Detente Failed" in A.L. George, ed., Managing US -Soviet Rivalry : Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1983), p.331.

on both sides (and especially Kissinger) sought possibilities for expanding the mutual interest in restraint and reciprocity. Further, agreement was possible because consideration of knottier issues like MIRV and qualitative strategic modernization was deferred till SALT-II. SALT-I, in brief, was a result of political nimble-footedness.

After SALT-I and the BPA of 1972, detente began to go downhill. The rise of the right-wing in US politics was facilitated by the conservatives' ability to point to Soviet strategic modernization and production of MIRVs, to the presence of SS-20 IRBMs in the European theatre, to "Minuteman Vulnerability" and the "civil defence gap", to Soviet "adventurism" in the Third World, and to Soviet human rights policy at home. Although they were not formal violations of any agreed-upon obligations, and were not real handicaps for the United States, these tendencies helped to legitimize efforts to remilitarize NATO and to encourage a backlash against SALT. That backlash against detente and SALT, in turn, entered into Soviet calculations of the costs of invading Afghanistan. And the Afghanistan intervention, in turn, was ground enough for the United States to cancel the SALT-II ratification process. The fiasco called SALT-II, in brief, was the result of political clay-footedness.

Causes of Breakdown

The explanations for the breakdown of SALT range from Soviet bad faith to American bad faith and from technical inadequacy to linkage politics.

Firstly, the Soviet leaders abused the detente relationship by their pretentious Marxist rhetoric; by the unnecessary scope and intensity of their military preparations; by their childish obsession with secrecy; by the unwise forms of support they gave to minority factions and regimes in the Third World; and by their folly in occupying Afghanistan.

Secondly, the Americans abused the competitive - collaborative framework by their rejection of the trade agreement in 1974; by their many alarmist exaggerations and distortions of the Soviet military posture; by their tilting in favour of Communist China; by the manner in which they pressed the human rights issue; and by the lack of balance in their reaction to what occurred in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, progress during the ten-year SALT process was adversely affected on a number of occasions by technological changes : first MIRVs, then Cruise missiles,

MARVs, mobile MX systems, Eurostrategic systems such as the SS-20, Backfire bomber, and GLCMs, and Pershing IIs. Yet neither the Soviet nor the American leadership seemed to have the political will or the political clout to overcome the impact of technical change. With the rise of the right wing, beginning in 1974, the search for unilateral advantage escalated on the American side. The right wing played up the supposed technical inadequacy of SALT-II and managed in building up a substantial anti-SALT constituency in the US.

The fourth explanation, however, is the most comprehensive. SALT was a part of detente relationship which the superpowers had devised in the early 70s. The success of detente (and of SALT) depended upon adherence to certain essential principles: concreteness, restraint, consistency, patience and linkage.³

- Concreteness in the rules of the game was sought to be established through the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement. The vagueness in the BPA proved counterproductive. Each side tried to define the terms of competition and of collaboration.

3. Kissinger had referred to the need for concreteness, restraint and linkage leaving out consistency and patience for obvious reasons.

- The need for restraint was clearly articulated in the light of the crisis over Afghanistan.
- While the Soviet leadership was both consistent and patient in the pursuit of objectives, unfortunately this was not true of the United States. The vicissitudes of American domestic politics and the nature of the policy-making community within the US militated against the consistent pursuit of objectives once established.
- Linkage is important, but not when faced with the essential and central problems of war and peace. Linkage could be applied to second-order priorities and here the Olympicsboycott and access to western trade, credits and technology were perfectly legitimate instruments to use.

The combination of vagueness; lack of restraint; inconsistency; impatience; and obsessive linkage politics was a sure formula for failure - of detente and of SALT.

Testing the Hypotheses

We had begun with the following five hypotheses :

- that arms control is deeply enmeshed in the overall superpower relationship despite its theoretical insulation from politics;

- that political motives rather than scientific facts determine the interpretation of specific arms control agreements;
- that SALT-I was result of temporary confluence of priority interests between the superpowers;
- that by the mid-70's political detente had run out of steam and left military detente(SALT) in the lurch; and
- that the vicissitudes of American domestic politics aided, partly, by Soviet adventurism led to the collapse of SALT process.

At the end of our discussion, we find that all the five hypotheses stand validated.

Concluding Observation

SALT or START or any other acronym will not succeed unless there is an easing-up in the quarrel of principles which lies at the root of the cold war. This quarrel, however, will continue so long as the difference between the ideals which the two sides represent seems important enough to both of them to justify its continuation.

That may not be forever : after all, most Catholics and most Protestants no longer feel so much urgency about their particular disagreement. But there is no evidence that the ideological war of the 20th century is ready to follow the wars of religion into history just yet.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- ABM : an anti-ballistic missile shoots nuclear warheads at oncoming missiles to prevent them landing on target.
- ALCM : an air-launched cruise missile.
- ASW : anti-submarine warfare involves all measures designed to locate, track and destroy hostile submarines.
- Ballistic Missile : a missile that travels on 'free-fall' trajectory after its initial launch.
- CEP : circular error probability is a measure of the accuracy of a missile. It is the radius of a circle around the target into which half the 'shorts' at the target can be expected to fall.
- Counter-city Strike : retaliation against cities in response to a nuclear attack by the other side.
- Counter-force strike : a pre-emptive attack against military forces to prevent a nuclear attack by the other side.
- Cruise missile : a missile that can change its course either continuously or from time to time during flight.
- Disarming Strike : another term for counter-force strike, employed to make it sound less aggressive.
- First Strike : any attack which takes place without waiting for the other side.

- Force Loading : numbers of nuclear warheads that are loaded on missiles, aircraft etc., and can be delivered to targets in the enemy's territory.
- Hard Target : usually a military target protected (hardened) by walls to withstand the blast overpressure (in pounds per square inch - psi) from explosions.
- ICBM : an intercontinental ballistic missile (e.g. suitable for the USA/USSR range of around 8,000 miles).
- IRBM : an intermediate-range ballistic missile (e.g. suitable for the Europe/USSR range).
- LRCM : a long-range cruise missile is a cruise missile with the range of an ICBM.
- MAD : mutually assured destruction means that each side in a conflict is capable of inflicting a level of damage equivalent to 'minimum deterrence' even when retaliating after a surprise attack.
- MARV : manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles are re-entry vehicles like MIRV, but with the additional facility of being able to change course (manoeuvre) during flight.
- MIRV : multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles are sprayed from a single missile; each has its own guidance system and is programmed to aim at a pre-determined target.

- MRV : multiple re-entry vehicles are sprayed from a single missile but, having no guidance system, scatter randomly.
- Nuclear Warheads : these are carried by missiles or the re-entry vehicles (whether MRV, MIRV or MARV) of a missile and are equivalent to the nuclear bombs dropped from aircraft.
- Overkill : the ability to destroy an enemy more than once.
- Polaris : a nuclear submarine with sixteen SLBMs each of which, in 1975, had three MRV warheads of 200 kilotons and a range of 2,500 miles.
- Poseidon : a nuclear submarine with sixteen SLBMs each of which, in 1975, had ten MIRV warheads of 50 kilotons and a range of 2,500 miles.
- Pre-emptive strike : another term for counter-force strike.
- PTBT : the Partial Test Ban Treaty(1963) bans all nuclear tests above ground.
- Second Strike : retaliatory attack following a first strike.
- SLBM : a submarine-launched ballistic missile - e.g. Polaris, Poseidon and Trident (USA), Sark and Serb (USSR).

- SNDV : strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
- Strategic Superiority : more overkill than the other side.
- Strategic Weapons : weapons for an all-out nuclear war (e.g., ICBMs, SLBMs).
- ULMS : an underwater long-range missile system using Trident.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCESGOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C.), 1967-81.

Congressional Records (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office), 1969-80.

Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), 1969-80.

UN DOCUMENTS

Relationship Between Disarmament and International Security (New York : Department for UN Disarmament Affairs, 1982).

Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Measures (New York : Department for UN Disarmament Affairs, 1985).

REFERENCE WORKS

Annual of Power and Conflict : A Survey of Political Violence (London : Institute for the Study of Conflict), 1971-79.

Facts on File (New York), 1969-80.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), 1969-80.

Military Balance (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1967-80.

Reprints from Soviet Press (New York, N.Y.).

SIPRI Year Book of World Armaments and Disarmaments (Stockholm), 1968-69, 1969-70, 1972-73 to 1977-78.

The Annual Register : A Record of World Events (Harlow : Longman Group Ltd.), 1969-80.

The Statesman's Year Book (London), 1969-82.

The Year Book of World Affairs (London : The London Institute of World Affairs), 1969-80.

SECONDARY SOURCESBOOKS

- Acheson, Dean, Power and Diplomacy(Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1958).
- Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision : Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis(Boston : Little, Brown, 1971).
- Bader, William B., The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons(New York : Pagasus Books, 1968).
- Barnaby, C.F., ed., Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London : Souvenir Press, 1969).
- Barnet, Richard J., Real Security : Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1981).
- Barton, John H., and Lawrence D.Weiler, eds., International Arms Control : Issues and Agreements (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1976).
- Beaton, Leonard, Must the Bomb Spread ? (Harmondsworth, Middlesey : Penguin Books, 1966).
- _____ , The Reform of Power : A Proposal for an International Security System(New York : Viking Press, 1972).
- Bechhoefer, Bernard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution, 1961).

- Biddle, W.F., Weapons Technology and Arms Control (New York : Praeger, 1972).
- Bloomfield, L.P.,
W.C. Clemens, and
F.Griffiths, Kruschev and the Arms Race : Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1966).
- Boskey, Bennett, and
Mason Willrich, eds., Nuclear Proliferation : Prospects for Control (New York : Dunellen,1970).
- Brennan,Donald G.,ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security(New York : Braziller, 1961).
- Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power : Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York : Columbia University Press, 1968).
- Buchan, Alastair, ed., A World of Nuclear Powers (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1966).
- Bull, Hedley, The Control of the Arms Race : Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York : Praeger,1965).
- Chomsky, Noam, Jonathan
Steele, John Gittings, Superpowers in Collision : The New Cold War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books, 1982).
- Clemens, Walter C., Jr., The Superpowers and Arms Control : From Cold War to Interdependence (Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, 1973).
- Coffey, Joseph I.,ed., Nuclear Proliferation : Prospects, Problems and Proposals (Philadelphia : The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 430, March 1977).

- Collins, John M., US - Soviet Military Balance : Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York : McGraw Hill, 1980).
- Cox, Arthur M., The Dynamics of Detente : How to End the Arms Race (New York : W.W. Norton, 1976).
- Dallin, Alexander, et al., The Soviet Union and Disarmament (New York : Frederik A. Praeger, 1964).
- Deutsch, Karl W., Arms Control and Atlantic Alliance : Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions (New York : Wiley, 1967).
- Donaldson, Robert H., ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World : Successes and Failures (Boulder, Colo : Westview Press, 1981).
- Dougherty, J.E., and J.F. Lehman, Jr., eds., Arms Control for the Late Sixties (Toronto : Van Nostrand, 1967).
- Endicott, John E., Japan's Nuclear Option : Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors (New York : Praeger, 1975).
- Epstein, William, The Last Chance : Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York : The Free Press, 1976).
- Feld, B.T., T. Greenwood, G.W. Rathjens, and S. Weinberg, eds., Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1971).
- Frye, Alton, A Responsible Congress : The Politics of National Security (New York : McGraw - Hill, 1975).

- Gallagher, P., and K.F. Speilmann, Jr., Soviet Decision - Making for Defense : A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race (New York : Praeger, 1972).
- Garfinkle, Adam M., ed., Global Perspectives and Arms Control (Philadelphia : Praeger, 1984).
- Garnett, John, ed., Theories of Peace and Security : A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London : Macmillan, 1970).
- Garthoff ,Raymond L., Soviet Strategy in Nuclear Age (New York : Praeger, 1958).
- Gati, Charles, ed., Caging the Bear (Indianapolis and New York : Bobbs - Merrill, 1974).
- George, Alexander L., ed., Managing US - Soviet Rivalry (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1983).
- Gilpin, Robert, and C.Wright, eds., Scientists and National Policy -Making (New York and London : Columbia University Press, 1964).
- Gompert, David C., M.Mandelbaum, R.L. Garwin, and J.H.Barton, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics : Alternatives for the Future (New York : McGraw - Hill, 1977).
- Gray, Colin S., The Soviet-American Arms Race (Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, 1976).
- Green, Philip, Deadly Logic : The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University Press, 1966).

- Halperin, Morton H., Limited War in the Nuclear Age
(New York : Wiley, 1963).
- _____, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control,
(Cambridge, Mass : MIT Press, 1967).
- _____, Defense Strategies for the Seventies
(Boston : Little, Brown, 1971).
- _____, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign
Policy (Washington, D.C. : Brookings
Institution, 1974).
- Henkin, Louis, ed., Arms Control : Issues for the Public
(Engelwood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall,
1961).
- Hoerlick, Arnold L.,
and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign
Policy (Chicago : University of
Chicago Press, 1965).
- Jacobsen, Carl G., Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy
(Glasgow : The University Press, 1974).
- Jessup, Phillip C.,
and H.J.Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space and the
Antarctic Analogy (New York : Columbia
University Press, 1959).
- Kahan, Jerome H., Security in the Nuclear Age :
Developing US Strategic Arms Policy
(Washington, D.C. : Brookings
Institution, 1975).
- kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War (New York : The
Free Press, 1969).
- _____, Thinking About the Unthinkable
(New York : Horizon Press, 1962).

- Kaplan, Morton A., ed., SALT : Problems and Prospects
(Morristown, N.J. : General Learning
Press, 1973).
- Kaufmann, William W., The McNamara Strategy (New York :
Harper and Row, 1964).
- Kegley, Charles W., Jr., The Global Agenda (New York : Random
and E.R. Witkopf, House, 1984).
- Kelleher, Catherine
Mc Ardle, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear
of Nuclear Weapons (New York : Columbia
University Press, 1975).
- Kemp, Geoffrey, R.L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and
Uri Ra'anan, eds., The Superpowers in a Multi-Nuclear
World(Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath,
1974).
- Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen Days : A Memoir of the Cuban
Missile Crisis(New York : W.W. Norton,
1969).
- Kintner, William R.,
and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., SALT : Implications for Arms Control
in the 1970s (Pittsburg , Penn. :
University of Pittsburg Press, 1973).
- Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
(New York : Harper and Brothers, 1957).
- _____, White House Years (Boston : Little,
Brown and Co., 1979).
- _____, Years of Upheaval (Boston : Little,
Brown and Co., 1982).

- Kistiakowsky, George B., A Scientist at the White House : The Private Diary of President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Cambridge, Mass., and London : Harvard University Press, 1976).
- Kalkowitz, Roman et al., eds., The Soviet Union and Arms Control (Baltimore : John Hopkins Press, 1970).
- Lefever, Ernest W., ed., Arms and Arms Control (New York : Praeger, 1962).
- Legum, Colin, ed., Africa Contemporary Record : Annual Survey and Documents 1975-1976 (London : Rex Collings, 1976).
- _____, Southern Africa : The Year of the Whirlwind (London : Rex Collings, 1977).
- Levine, Robert A., The Arms Debate (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1963).
- McNamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security : Reflections in Office (New York : Harper and Row, 1968).
- Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn : The Story of SALT (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).
- Nixon, Richard M., Memoirs (New York : Grosset and Dunlap, 1978).
- _____, The Real War (New York : Warner Books, 1980).

- Payne, Samuel B., Jr., The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1980).
- Polmar, Norman, Strategic Weapons : An Introduction (New York : Crane, Russak, 1975).
- Pranger, Robert J., ed., Detente and Defense : A Reader (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).
- Ranger, Robin, Arms and Politics, Arms Control in a Changing Political Context 1958-1978 (Toronto : Macmillan Co., 1979).
- Rapoport, Anatol, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1961).
- Roberts, Chalmers M., The Nuclear Years : The Arms Race and Arms Control 1945-70 (New York : Praeger, 1971).
- Robles , Garcia, The Denuclearization of Latin America (New York : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967).
- Sanders, Jerry W., Peddlers of Crisis : The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (London : Pluto Press, 1983)
- Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1960).
- _____, Arms and Influence (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1966).

- _____,
and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York :
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).
- Shell, Jonathan, The Fate of the Earth (New York :
Knopf, 1982).
- Shulman, Marshall D., Beyond the Cold War (New Haven
and London : Yale University Press, 1966).
- Staar, Richard F., Arms Control, Myth Vs Reality
(Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution
Press, 1984).
- Stanley, Timothy W., Detente Diplomacy : United States and
and D.M. Whitt, European Security in the 1970s
(New York : Dunellen, 1970).
- Stockholm International Nuclear Proliferation Problems
Peace Research Institute (Stockholm : Almquist and Wicksell,
(SIPRI), 1974).
- Stone, Jeremy J., Containing the Arms Race (Cambridge,
Mass. : MIT Press, 1966).
- Talbott, Strobe, End Game, the Inside Story of SALT II
(New Delhi : Kalyani Publishers, 1979) .
- _____, Deadly Gambits (New York : Knopf, 1984).
- Wiesner, Jarome B., Where Science and Politics Meet
(New York : McGraw - Hill, 1965).
- Willrich, Mason and SALT : The Moscow Agreements and
J.B. Rhineland, Beyond (New York : Free Press, 1974).

- Wolfe, Thomas W., Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970
(Baltimore : John Hopkins Press, 1970).
- _____,
The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Mass. :
Ballinger, 1979).
- York, Horbert, Race to Oblivion : A Participant's
View of the Arms Race (New York :
Simon and Schuster, 1970).
- Young, Elizabeth, A Farewell to Arms Control ?
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin
Books, 1972).

ARTICLES

- Aaron, David, "SALT-II : New Concept", Foreign
Policy (Washington, D.C.), Winter,
1974-1975, pp. 157-165.
- Arbatov, G., "New Stage in Soviet-American
Relations", Social Sciences (Moscow),
Vol. 1, 1974, pp. 8-25.
- Aspin, Les, "SALT or no SALT", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (Vienna),
June 1978, pp. 34-38.
- Badurina, Berislav, "Moscow Summit and Disarmament",
Review of International Affairs
(Belgrade), Vol. 23 (533), June 20, 1972,
pp. 43-46.
- Belayev, I., "Detente and Arms Race are Incompatible",
New Perspectives (Helsinki), Vol.7,
no. 4, 1977, pp. 12-4.

- Bertram, Christoph, ed., "Future of Arms Control (Part I) : Beyond SALT-II", Adelphi Papers (London : IISS), 141, Spring 1978, pp. 1-42.
-
- "SALT-II and the Dynamic of Arms Control," International Affairs (London), Vol. 55, no. 4, October 1979, pp. 565-573.
- Bloomfield, B., "Strategic Arms Limitation", Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 32, no.4, 1977, pp. 184-94.
- Bonosky, P., "Those Who Still Cannot Pronounce "Detente", " New Times(Moscow), Vol. 31, August 1974, pp.19-20.
- Bresler, R.J., and Gray, R.C., "Bargaining Chip and SALT," Political Science Quarterly (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 92, no.1, Spring 1977, pp. 65-88.
- Brown, H., and Davis, L., "Nuclear Arms Control : Where Do We Stand?", Strategic Digest(New Delhi) Vol. 14, no. 8, August 1984, pp. 837-46.
- Brown, Seyom, "A Cooling-Off Period for US-Soviet Relations", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Fall 1977, pp.3-21.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Spring 1974, pp. 35-55.

- _____,
 "What Kind of Detente ?", Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington, D.C.), Fall 1975, pp. 289-295.
- Bundy, McGeorge,
 "High Hopes and Hard Reality : Arms Control in 1978", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 57, no.3, 1979, pp. 492-502.
- Burt, Richard,
 "Scope and Limitation of SALT", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 56, no.4, January 1978, pp.251-70.
- _____,
 "SALT-II and Offensive Force Levels", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 18, no.2, Summer 1974, pp. 465-81.
- Caldwell, L.T.,
 "SALT-II and Strategic Relationship", Current History, (Philadelphia), Vol. 77, no. 450, October 1979, pp. 153-57.
- Carter, Barry,
 "What Next in Arms Control"?", Orbis (Phil.), Spring 1973, pp. 176-96.
- Chernonsov, M.M.,
 "Moscow-Washington : The Beginnings," New Times (Moscow), Vol. 28, July 1974, pp. 8-10.
- Cleave, William R.V., and R.W. Barnett,
 "Strategic Adaptability", Orbis (Philadelphia), Fall 1974, pp. 655-76.
- Clemens, W.C.,
 "Nicholas-II to SALT-II", International Affairs (London), Vol. 49, no.3, July 1973, pp. 466-75.

- Coffey, J.I.,
_____,
"Strategic Superiority, Deterrence,
and Arms Control" Orbis (Philadelphia),
Vol. 13, no.4, Winter 1970, pp.991-1007.
- "The Savour of SALT", Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (Vienna),
Vol. 29, no. 5, May 1973, pp. 9-15.
- Davidow, M.,
"USA : Detente, Crisis and Problems",
International Affairs(Moscow),
April 1974, pp. 25-36.
- Dick, J.C.,
"Strategic Arms Race 1957-61 : Who
Opened a Missile Gap?", Journal of
Politics (Florida), Vol. 34, no.4,
November 1972, pp. 1062-110.
- Drell, Sidney D.,
"Beyond SALT II : A Missile Test
Quota", Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Vienna), May 1977, pp.34-42.
- Dougherty, James E.,
"The Soviet Union and Arms Control",
Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 17,
no.3, Fall 1973, pp. 737-77.
- Feld, Bernard T.,
_____,
" SALT- A Hostage to Politics"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(Vienna), Vol. 34, no. 9,
November 1978, p.8.
- "The Charade of Piecemeal Arms
Limitation", Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Vienna), Vol. 31, no.1,
January 1975, pp. 8-16.

- Flanagan, Stephen J., "Congress, the White House and SALT", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vienna), November 1976, pp. 34-40.
- Foster, William C., "Strategic Weapons : Prospects for Arms Control", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 47, no.3, April 1969, pp.413-21.
- Freedman, L., "SALT II and the Strategic Balance," World Today (London), Vol. 35, no.8, August 1979, pp.315-22.
- Frye, Alton, "Strategic Restraint, Mutual and Assured", Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.), no.27, Summer 1977, pp. 3-26.
- Frye, A., and W.Rogers, "Linkage Begins At Home", Foreign Policy (Washington), Summer 1979, pp. 49-67.
- Frye, Alton, "How to Fix SALT", Foreign Policy (Washington), no. 39, Summer 1980, pp. 58-73.
- Friedberg, Aaron L., "What SALT Can (And Cannot) Do", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Winter 1978 , pp. 92-100.
- Garner, W.V., "SALT II : China's Advice and Dissent", Asian Survey (California), Vol. 19, no.12, December 1979, pp. 1224-40.

- Garson, M.B., "What is the SAL Process All About", International Relations, Vol. 6, no.5, May 1980, pp. 822-42.
- Garthoff, R.L., "SALT-I : An Evaluation", World Politics (Princeton), Vol. 31, no.1, October 1977, pp. 1-25.
- Gelber, Harry G., "Technological Innovation and Arms Control", World Politics (Princeton), July 1974, pp.509-41.
- Gray, Colin S., "The Arms Race Phenomenon", World Politics (Princeton), Vol. 24, no.1, October 1971, pp.39-79.
- _____, "The Arms Race is About Politics", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no.9, Winter 1972-73, pp. 117-29.
- _____, "Urge to Compete : Rationales for Arms Racing", World Politics (Princeton), Vol. 26, no.2, January, 1974, pp.207-33.
- _____, "Rethinking Nuclear Strategy", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), Vol. 4, no. 8, August 1974, pp.45-56.
- _____, "Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 18, no.3, Fall, 1974, pp. 706-27.

-
- "SALT II Debate in Context",
Survival (London), Vol. 21, no.5,
September - October 1979, pp. 202-05.
- Guertner, G.C., "Carter's SALT : MAD or SAFE ?",
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(Vienna), Vol.35, no.8, October 1979,
pp.28-32.
- Hartman, A.A., "US-Soviet Detente : Perceptions
and Purposes", Atlantic Community
Quarterly (Washington, D.C.),
Vol. 12, no.3, Fall 1974, pp. 300-07.
-
- "SALT and the Strategic Future",
Strategic Digest (New Delhi),
Vol. 8, no. 12, December 1978,
pp. 1-11.
- Heurlin, B., "Explaining SALT : Some Observations
on Different Interpretations",
Cooperation and Conflict (Bekkestua,
Norway), no.2, 1977, pp. 109-27.
- Jacobsen, C.G., "Strategic Balance, US-USSR :
An Essay in Skepticism", Coexistence
(Glasgow, Scotland), Vol. 14, no.3,
1977, pp. 196-204.
-
- "Soviet-American Arms Control :
Hope or Hoax ?", Current History
(Philadelphia), Vol.84, no. 504,
October 1985, pp.317-20.

- Jekes, G., "Perspectives of Soviet - American Relations With Special Reference to SALT", India International Centre Quarterly (New Delhi), Vol.5, no. 1,1978, pp.3-13.
- Jensen, L., "Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-79", Journal of Conflict Resolution(Beverly Hills), Vol.28, no.3, September 1984, pp. 535-39.
- Johansen, R.C., "SALT: Illusion and Reality", Alternatives (New York, N.Y.), Vol.5, no.1, January 1979, pp.43-58.
- Kaiser, Karl, "The Great Nuclear Debate", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no.30, Spring 1978, pp.83-110.
- Kanet, Roger E., "Soviet - American Relations : A Year of Detente", Current History (Philadelphia), October 1972, pp. 156-59.
- Kaplan, F.M., "SALT : The End of Arms Control", Progressive (Madison), Vol.42, no. 1, January 1978, pp. 22-27.
- Kaufman, R.F., "Defense Spending : The Dead - weight Of SALT", Nation (New York, N.Y.), Vol.215, no.4, August 21, 1972, pp. 106-09.
- Kennan, George F., "US-Soviet Relations : Turning from Catastrophe", Current (Washington), September 1980, pp.50-55.

- Kennedy, E.M., "Beyond Detente", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no. 16, Fall 1979, pp. 3-29.
- Kintner, William R., "Judging SALT-II", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 23, no.2, Summer 1979, pp.251-61.
- Kisalayek, C., "Round the Prickly Pear : SALT and Survival", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol.22, no. 4, Winter 1979, pp.853-64.
- Kreel, G., "Military Doctrines, New Weapon Systems and Arms Control", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (OSLO : IPRI), Vol.16, no. 1, 1979, pp. 38-46.
- Kruzel, Joseph, "SALT II : The Search for a Follow-On Agreement", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1973, pp.334-63.
- _____, "Arms Control at the Crossroads", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vienna), Vol. 30, no. 6, June 1974, pp. 58-60.
- Lambeth, B., "Soviet Strategic Challenge Under SALT-I," Current History (Philadelphia), Vol.63, no.374, October 1972, pp. 150-55.
- Lanouette, William J., "Arms Control Today : The Public on Arms Control", Current (Washington), October, 1980, pp. 42-45.

- Lee, J.M., "An Opening Window for Arms Control", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol.58, no. 1, Fall 1979, pp.121-140.
- Legvold, R., "Strategic Doctrine and SALT : Soviet and American Views", Military Review, Vol. 59, no. 8, August 1979, pp. 30-38.
- Leonhard, Wolfgang, "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), October 1973, pp.59-74.
- Lodal, Jan M., "Verifying SALT", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no. 24, Fall 1976, pp.40-64.
- Macdonald , Hugh, "SALT-II : International Politics and Arms Control", Round Table (London), July 1980, pp. 305-21.
- Mandelbaum, M., "In Defence of SALT", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vienna), Vol. 35, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 15-21.
- Meittinier, J.K., "Detente in 1979", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vienna), January 1979, pp.29-33.
- Moore, D.W., "The Public is Uncertain", Foreign Policy (Washington ,D.C.), no.35, Summer 1979, pp. 68-73.

- Murphy, C.T.V., "What We Gave Away in the Moscow Arms Agreements?", Fortune(Chicago), September 1972, pp. 61-68.
- Navrozov, L., "SALT : A Maginot Line on Paper", Midstream , Vol. 25, no. 6, June-July 1979, pp. 5-19.
- Neubroch, H., "Controlling Arms Control", Round Table (London), April 1980, pp.210-13.
- Nitze, Paul H., "SALT - I : Strategic Balance Between Hope and Skepticism", Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.), no. 17, Winter 1974-75, pp. 136-56.
- Nitze, Paul H., "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 54, no.2, January 1976, pp.207-32.
-
- "Deterring Our Deterrent", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), no.25, Winter 1976-77, pp. 195-210.
- Nye, Joseph S., "US-Soviet Relations and Nuclear Risk Reduction", Political Science Quarterly (New York, N.Y.), Vol.99, no. 3, Fall 1984, pp. 401-14.
- Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H., "The Mutual Hostage Relationship Between American and Russia", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 52, no. 1, October 1973, pp. 109-18.

- Pierre, Andrew J., "The SALT Agreement and Europe", World Today (London), Vol. 28, no.7, July 1972, pp. 281-88.
- Ranger, Robin, "Arms Control Within a Changing Political Context," International Journal (Toronto), Autumn 1971, pp. 735-52.
- Rose, Francois De, "Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Summer 1979, pp. 1065-74.
- Rosen, Stephen P., "Safeguarding Deterrence", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Summer 1979, pp. 109-23.
- Rosenfeld, Stephen S., "Pluralism and Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), January 1974, pp. 263-72.
- Rostow, Eugene V., "Case Against SALT-II", Commentary (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 67, no.2, February 1979, pp. 23-32.
- Schelling, Thomas C., "What Went Wrong With Arms Control?", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 64, no.3, Winter 1985-86, pp. 1036-49.
- Scoville, H., "Beyond SALT-I", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 50, no.3, April 1972, pp. 488-500.
- _____, "Strategic Forum: The SALT Agreements", Survival (London), Vol. 14, no.5, September-October 1972, pp. 210-12.

- Sengupta, B., "Toils of Sisyphus : The Changing Nature of Arms Limitation Negotiations", IDSJ Journal (New Delhi), Vol.II, no.2, October-December 1978, pp.125-44.
- Shrivastava, B.K., "American Perspectives on Detente", International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 13, no. 4, October-December 1974, pp. 577-607.
- Shulman, Marshall D., "Toward A Western Philosophy, of Coexistence," Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 52, no.1, October 1973, pp. 35-58.
- Steinbruner, J., "Arms Control : Crisis or Compromise", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), Summer 1985, pp. 1036-49.
- Stone, Jeremy J., "When and How to Use SALT", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), January 1970, pp. 262-73.
- _____, "Linking SALT to Ethiopia or Unlinking it from SALT", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(Vienna), June 1978, pp. 38-39.
- Talbott, Strobe, "US-Soviet Relations : From Bad to Worse", Foreign Affairs, (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 58, no.3, Summer 1980, pp. 515-39.
- _____, "Build-up and Breakdown", Foreign Affairs, (New York, N.Y.), Vol. 62, no.3, Summer 1984, pp. 587-615.

- Vukadonovik, R., "Between SALT-I and SALT-II", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), July 1977, pp. 15-18.
- Warnke, Paul C., "Apes on a Treadmill", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Spring 1975, pp. 12-29.
- Watt, Donald, "Historical Light on SALT", Round Table (London), January 1972, pp. 29-35.
- Wohlstetter, Albert, "Rivals But No 'Race'", Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.), Fall 1974, pp. 48-81.
- Zuberi M., "The Global Electronics Battlefield", Year Book of India's Foreign Policy, 1982-83, Satish Kumar, ed., (New Delhi, Sage, 1985), pp. 163-82.
- 