

**MILITARY RULE AND PARTY
POLITICS IN PAKISTAN:
A STUDY OF GENERAL
ZIA-UL-HAQ'S REGIME**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

GAYATRI MISHRA

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EAST
ASIAN AND SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI - 110067**

1987

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST
ASIAN AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Telegram : JAYENU

Telephones : 652282

661444

661351

New Delhi-110 067

21.7.1987

DECLARATION



Certified that this dissertation entitled "Military Rule and Party Politics in Pakistan : A Study of General Zia-ul-Haq's Regime";^{is in} fulfilment of six credits out of a total requirement of twenty-four credits for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of this University. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University, and is her own work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. URMILA PHADNIS
CHAIRPERSON

Dr. KALIM BAHADUR
SUPERVISOR

A_C_K_N_O_W_L_E_D_G_E_M_E_N_T

This dissertation would not have seen the light of the day but for the academic guidance of Dr. Kalim Bahadur, my Supervisor. I am extremely grateful to him for his incisive comments and suggestions at every stage of this work.

I recall with gratitude the timely assistance rendered by my friends, in particular, Indu and Subrat, in the completion of this work.

Special thanks are due to Mr. R.P.Verma who has done an excellent job of typing out this dissertation well in time.

Gayatri Mishra
GAYATRI MISHRA

P_R_E_F_A_C_E

An analytical study of party politics in a developing country under military rule is important since it provides an insight into the actual operation of the political system, within the framework of its declared democratic objectives. Although the subject of party politics in Pakistan has been dealt with earlier, it has been done so as a sub-theme rather than as the main theme. Moreover, study of party politics under General Zia-ul-Haq's regime covering the period from 1977 to 1985 has remained untouched so far.

The present study "Military Rule And Party Politics In Pakistan : A Study of General Zia-ul-Haq's Regime" tries to analyse how the failure of the evolution of a viable party system in Pakistan led to military intervention in politics. Efforts have been made to throw light on how the prolonged military domination inhibited the development of ^a strong party system in the country.

The period covered in this study is 1977 to 1985, both years inclusive. However an attempt has been made to analyse its preceding developments, placing the theme in a historical perspective.

The study has been divided into five chapters.

(ii)

The first chapter consists of two sections, the first of which lays down a framework for analysis of party politics under military leadership. The second section, examines the causes behind the failure of a viable party system to evolve in Pakistan till 1977.

The second chapter deals with the theme of Zia's rise to power, against the backdrop of the failure of party politics in the country.

In the third chapter the various measures and strategies adopted by the General to reduce the significance of political parties and render them ineffective in national politics, are elaborated.

In the fourth chapter the controversial Presidential Referendum and the non-party elections have been discussed at length. In addition the role and status of the political parties in the post-martial law phase, is traced.

The fifth chapter attempts to draw certain conclusions from the preceding discussion and engages itself in some futuristic analysis.

(iii)

The study has historical, descriptive and analytical facets. The need for logical sequence of the study makes the narration chronological. The study is based primarily on extensive secondary sources and has relied on primary sources wherever necessary and accessible.

C_O_N_T_E_N_T_S

		<u>PAGE</u>
	PREFACE ...	i-iii
CHAPTER - I	MILITARY RULE AND PARTY POLITICS : AN OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL SITUATION	I - 46
CHAPTER - II	ZIA'S RISE TO POWER : END OF A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT	47 - 94
CHAPTER - III	TOTAL MARTIAL LAW	95 - 128
CHAPTER - IV	REFERENDUM AND AFTER : ILLUSION OF DEMOCRACY ?	129 - 157
CHAPTER - V	CONCLUSION	158 - 172
	LIST OF TABLES	173 - 174
	SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	175 - 186

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

AL	-	Awami League
AT	-	Awami Tehrik
CML	-	Council Muslim League
COP	-	Combined Opposition Party
CP	-	Communist Party
INC	-	Indian National Congress
JAH	-	Jamiat Ahle Hadith
JI	-	Jamaat-i-Islami
JKMC	-	Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference
JUI	-	Jamiat-Ulama-i-Islam
JUP	-	Jamiat-Ulama-i-Pakistan
KSP	-	Krishak Shramik Party
KT	-	Khaskar Tehrik
ML	-	Muslim League
ML(P)	-	Muslim League (Pagara)
ML(Q)	-	Muslim League (Qayyum)
NAP	-	National Awami Party
NDP	-	National Democratic Party
NI	-	Nizam-i-Islam
PDP	-	Pakistan Democratic Party
PML	-	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	-	Pakistan National Alliance
PNP	-	Pakistan National Party
PNT	-	Pakistan National Tehrik
PPP	-	Pakistan Peoples' Party
RP	-	Republican Party
TI	-	Tehrik Istiqlal

CHAPTER - I

MILITARY RULE AND PARTY POLITICS:
AN OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL
SITUATION

I

Political parties constitute an essential part of modern political process and there is no denying the fact that party politics has almost become an universal phenomenon. Modern politics, secular or otherwise, represents a way of life which calls for discussion and debate, and an agreement to disagree. There is a persistent effort to influence, shape and reshape public opinion by consent, rather than by force or coercion. For the proper exercise of these, organisations are indispensable, and hence political parties become institutions of necessity.

Political theorists have repeatedly emphasized the role of an organised political party in the process of political development, whether it is a Western democratic liberal, a Marxist or a Third World model. The importance of political parties can be perceived by placing ~~them~~ within the broader perspective of the problem of National integration in a plural and transitional society i.e. a society undergoing a complex and skewed socio-economic and political process. They assume significance in developing countries, as "the major instruments for political socialization, specially when they are among the few institutions concerned with affecting political attitude".¹ Moreover these organisations have

1. Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition (Delhi, 1975), p.1.

been found to be "an extremely functional mechanism for reducing the sharpness of traditional cleavages in a plural society and for fostering an outlook consistent with national integration".² More recently, expounding the role of political parties in the process of modernisation, a keen scholar opines, "strong national parties whether in an authoritarian or democratic context, appear to be playing an important role today in providing stable and legitimate government and often in laying the foundations for national integration".³

The significance of political parties as dynamic entities, representing the consensus of a people in a given period of time, is highlighted by both liberal as well as Marxist thinkers. The liberal view appreciates the existence and role of political parties as agencies of organised public opinion by the help of which political system operates, while the Marxian view examines them within the framework of class antagonism. Consistent with the Marxian line of thinking, Lenin regarded party as a "class" that would bring in a new era, culminating in the phase of communism.

2. Muhammed A. Quddus, Pakistan : A Case Study of a Plural Society, (Calcutta, 1981), pp.6-7.

3. Myron Weiner and Joseph Lapalambora, "The Impact of Political Parties on Political Development", in Joseph Lapalambora and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (New Jersey, 1966), p.434.

Modern representative democracy has made party system an indispensable factor in every political society, "whenever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that public must participate or be controlled".⁴ This fact lays stress on the maximisation of political participation, indicating political modernisation in the sense that it calls for the involvement of more and more people into the process of what David Easton calls "the authoritative allocation of values". Another observer⁵ points out, parties are most important agencies for managing participation in a modernising society, and organisation provides the precondition for stability and liberty. Without parties the electorate would be highly diffused and atomised and opinions too variant and dispersive".⁶

The essential features of a party system are as follows :

- 1) a continuity in organisation, that is, an organisation whose expected life span is not dependent on the life span of the current leaders;

4. Gopinath, n.1, p.2.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, 1968), p.461.

6. Karl Lawson, Political Parties and Linkages : A Comparative Perspective (New Haven, 1980), p.3.

- ii) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and other relationships between local and national units;
- iii) self conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and hold decision making power alone or in coalition with others; and
- iv) a concern on the part of the organisation for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner striving for popular support.⁷

While the inevitable necessity of party organization is undeniable, more specifically in a representative democratic political set up, it is pertinent to note that the weak party system in the developing Third World countries, is one of the vital causes for the erosion of democracy and for, paving ^{the} way for military intervention in the sphere of politics. Of late, the rapid spread of decolonisation has witnessed an expanded and extended political role for the military in these newly born countries. Consequently, the rule of dictatorship instead of democracy, and military regimes instead of civilian rule, has become the hallmark of politics.

7. Weiner and LaPalambora, n.3, p.3.

One question needs proper analysis in this context. That is, how far the prevalence of a weak and ineffective party system in a country, is directly related to the ascendance of military in the sphere of politics. This however, does not seek to undermine the relevance of other factors in contributing towards this unfortunate development in national politics.

As a matter of fact, truly described in terms of economic, socio-political and cultural gaps, these New Nations are confronted with problems of serious magnitude and of multi-dimensional nature, at a very early stage of their nation building programmes. These countries suffer from under development, lack of political parties and professional politicians, differences between rural and urban masses, between tradition and modernity etc. In these new states, "society wide institutions, other than the state are scant ... the interaction among the different sectors is tenuous. Parties are often communal, sectional and tribal; there is no mass communication effectively covering the country. The whole infrastructure is meagre and fragile".⁸

8. Geertz Clifford, ed. Old Societies and New States (New Delhi, n.d.), p.22.

Thus, the lack of institutional strength⁹ contributes towards the "institutional decay" in these countries.

When all these conditions prevail simultaneously in a society, it tends to be fragile, unstable and porous; thus providing wide opportunity for the military to intervene. Since the military institution is considered to be an effective source of stability, it has been rightly perceived that "military rule is one of the several practicable and apparently stable alternatives when parliamentary democratic regimes falter".¹⁰

The above approach could also be explained by reference to the legitimacy crisis. Broadly speaking, though military regimes are products of "political, economic and social crisis of social change, and nationalist and revolutionary aspirations"¹¹, more specifically, they tend to thrive in unstable, politically non-cohesive and in most cases non-functioning or poor functioning governments.¹² The strength or weakness of the civilian political institutions include all factors pertaining to civilian political institutions, such as the level of

-
9. These institutions include a national economy, national educational system, national legal order, national party system of one or more, and a national army.
 10. Edward Shil, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States" in John Johnson ed., The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries, (New Jersey, 1962), p.9.
 11. Amos Perlmutter, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formation, Aspirations and Achievements," World Politics, vol.33, no.1, October 1979, p.98.
 12. Ibid.

political institutions, legitimacy, the level of mass political mobilisation and participation, role of political leadership and parties and the functioning of democratic institutions. Deficiency of any one, or of a combination of these factors provide the condition for military intervention in politics.

Political reasons like weak and ineffective political parties are particularly important signs of a praetorian state.¹³ A vacuum in institutional leadership impels the non-political groups to arrogate control for themselves. Here, ^{the} military because of its organisational strength, stand out among the many aspiring and contending parties for power.

The importance of the political parties in providing legitimacy and stability in a modernising political system is tremendous. This line of analysis seems relevant so far ^{as} it points to the effectiveness of strong party organisations in warding off coups. That is to say, under a mass based party system the military is rather underdeveloped for the purpose of performing the political role. Being consistent with the above, theme,

13. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie P. Bennett, eds. The Political Influence of the Military (Yale, 1980) p. 314.

but talking in a different tone, S.E. Finer subscribes to the view point that "where public sentiment to civilian institution is strong, military intervention in politics is rare".¹⁴ Once again, stressing the importance of political parties in a traditional society one author says "where traditional political institutions are weak or non-existent, the prerequisite of stability, is, at least, one highly institutionalised political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party."¹⁵

Problem of Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the common concern of all governments irrespective of the manner in which they come to power. This is particularly true for a military regime, which particularly is anxious in this respect, since coups are essentially regarded illegal and undemocratic. Upon assuming political power, the military government is confronted with a dilemma. Although they typically assert that they have taken over the government only 'temporarily' until conditions can be 'cleaned up' and authority restored to a purified civilian regime, more as a rule than exception, they emerge in power politics once they taste it.

14. Samuel E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London, 1975) pp. 20-21.

15. S.P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", in H. Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (Chicago & New York, 1971), p.201.

The political fall out of this has its impact on the status of political parties, which generally enjoy a respectable place in a democratic set up tending to assume ^α completely different form under a military regime. Handling of political parties (the major vehicle of a participatory government) is not an easy task for the military rulers. Two important reasons could be ascribed for this. First, they lack experience in politics. Second, since they are anti-political in their perception of politics, their natural aversion to democratic politics can-not be ruled out. Thus the most fundamental problem faced by such regimes is how to keep power, once they seize it.

The lack of experience of the military authorities to rule the country all by themselves, their obsession with civilianisation of what in essence is military rule, forces them to seek 'creative' relationship with civilian political groups.¹⁶ They set their eye for 'institutionalisation' which "involves the maintenance of the military leadership in power, coupled with attempts to entrench its position and broaden its support by seeking alliance with civilian political groups which are then subordinated to it".¹⁷ However, in their

16. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Nations (Chicago, 1977), p.39.

17. Christopher Clapham and George Philip, eds., The Political Dilemma of Military Regimes (London, Sydney, 1985), p.2.

effort to do so, a well organised mass-based political party poses serious threat to the survival of the military rule. However, in order to obtain legitimacy through greater popular participation, the military rulers evolve new strategies, like introducing schemes for new form of participation and co-option of civilians into the government, thus making legal and democratic party politics obsolete. Other strategies for sustenance are, intimidation of political opponents, divide et impera, constitutional legitimation and populism.¹⁸

Being backed by the prevailing continued ineptness and divisiveness in society, as as its own hunger for power, the military rulers show a "natural reluctance to return the reign of power to the so-called representative of the people".¹⁹ Hence, the "limited sense" of their takeover tends to acquire a broader sense of destiny and mission, in course of time.

However, the absence of party politics as understood by Western standards, no doubt, keeps the legitimacy of the military in question. One thing that is to be observed is that, how successful the military rulers are in legitimizing their power by taking resort to

18. Jitendra Mishra, "Military Regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan: Strategies and Sustenance and Survival", India Quarterly, vol.34, no.4, October-December 1981, p.522.

19. Khan D.Shah, "Military and Politics in Pakistan", Strategic Digest, vol.9, no.2, February 1979,p.9.

various measures at the behest of party politics, that lies at the crux of a democratic buildup.

Lastly, no military has relinquished power voluntarily. Experience shows that they could be "successful to some extent in nation building activities, but when it tries to reform and civilianise the political system, it faces the greatest danger of being dislodged from power".²⁰

From the foregoing analysis, keeping this general understanding and framework in mind, this work would make an effort to analyse and discuss the following questions/with special reference to Pakistani politics :

- The environmental factors, particularly the failure of party politics to a large extent is responsible for military intervention in politics;
- Corollary to this, the prolonged military domination of the political arena has inhibited the development of political parties, as viable political forces in the country;
- Representing different fields of operation, they are mutually incompatible in their perception and outlook in ruling the country;
- Various policy measures, e.g., civilianization process, non-party elections, constitutional legitimation, Islamisation, are generally adopted at the behest of party politics for sustenance and survival of the military regimes;

20. Nihal H. Rizvi, "Military Intervention in Pakistan", South Asian Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January - June, 1981, p.32.

- Politics, at the exclusion of party system, keeps the legitimacy of this military regime in question.

II

The post War II period witnessed an increasingly effective intervention of military in politics in many of the developing Third World countries. The active participation of military in political affairs has invariably resulted in its seizure of total power. Pakistan, belonging to the category of the developing Third World Nations, offers the most conspicuous example in South Asia, where military intervention in politics is almost complete.

The study of party politics under the military regime in Pakistan provides an interesting dimension, in view of the fact that the absence of a wide spread movement prior to independence prevented experience in intensive political organisations and activities. Highlighting the negative effect of this, one author subscribes to the view point that "the prospect for stable and rigorous modern political system depends upon the success of the country in passing through the phase of nationalist movements and into a time when they

can experience the benefits of organised party system".²¹

The movement for a separate homeland for the Muslims was organised by the All-India Muslim League under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The history of Pakistan Movement is mainly the history of the process of the development of Muslim League as ^a political party, that determined to some extent, the future course of politics that was to take place in Pakistan.

Pre-Partition Legacies (..... till 1947)

The problem of Pakistan is deep rooted in the history of the subcontinent and in the nature of the movement. The movement for Pakistan was purely negative in outlook and character, based on a 'negative force'²² that is the 'fear'²³ of Hindu domination, relying heavily for mass support on the idealism (of Islamic brotherhood) and interest (of promoting economic wellbeing of the people). Though the struggle was launched on the principle of "two nation theory", the Islamic ideology on which it

-
21. L.W. Pye, "Party system and National Development in Asia", in, Weiner and Lapalambora, eds., n.3, p.398.
22. Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan : The vision and the Reality" Asian Affairs, vol.4, no.6, July-August, 1977, p.385.
23. Both Jinnah and Liaquat put forwarded the Islamic ideas of social justice and fairplay to hold the diverse Muslim groups together. See Jinnah's speeches in Quad-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah's Speeches: As The Governor General of Pakistan, 1947-48 (Karachi, n.d.) pp.21, 154.

was based was very vague, and the question of Islam in politics continued to remain ^{an} unresolved issue in Pakistan.²⁴ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the pioneering leader of the movement thought that a debate over the components of ideology and policies would weaken the movement, and, therefore, he exhorted the Muslim community by saying that "we shall have time for programmes, and policies, but first get the government".²⁵

It is remarkable to note that the Muslim League (ML) organisation was also devoid of any concrete socio-economic programme, due to the lack of consensus on issues of fundamental importance among the leaders themselves. Such an approach to this problem however, was not conducive to its solution in the long run. Thus after independence, these centrifugal forces began to assert themselves.

A deep insight into the nature of the movement highlights the fact that it was the elites rather than the masses who were interested in the creation of Pakistan. The Muslim League (ML), drawing its support base

24. For detail analysis of the role of Islam in politics of Pakistan, see K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston 1967), pp.159-184; Keith Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study (London, 1957) pp. 194-231.

25. Quoted in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed., Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol.2 (Lahore, 1964), p.393.

mainly from the land owning, the big business, and the upper middle classes of the society, feared the Hindu domination and competition^{and}, thus wanted to have a free hand in a separate country. Explaining this point, one scholar writes;

"It was an elite based personal movement, not with a broad organised mass base, capable of long-term effective durable struggle against the British colonial operation."²⁶ The phenomenon of "weak indigenous class forces"²⁷ prevented the emergence of a national bourgeois. Thus, the Pakistan movement was spearheaded neither by the Muslim minority areas of India, nor by the Muslim majority inhabitants of the New Pakistan. Thus, it failed to transform itself from^a "National Political movement into a National political party" and "could not build a national organisation with grass root support".²⁸ One scholar pointing out to this character of the Muslim League in contrast^{to} the Indian National Congress (INC) writes ;

26. Robert LaPorte, Power and Privilege; Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1976) p.40.

27. Hamza Alazi, "The Army and Bureaucracy in Pakistan" International Socialist Journal, vol.3, no.14, March-April, 1966, p.152. Tariq Ali also talked about the weakness of the social forces which prevented the emergence of a bourgeoisie class in Pakistan.

28. Mohammad Ayoob, "The Military in Pakistan's Political Development", in S.P.Verma and V.Narayan, Ed. Pakistan: Political System in Crisis, (Jaipur, 1972), p.16.

"In contrast to the development of the congress... when the grassroot organisation and the mass base of the party was built, the Muslim League tended to fossilize at this point. Then all of a sudden during the 1940's it found itself riding the crest of a mass hysteria created partly as a result of religious Jingoism and partly as a reaction to the Congress's lack of accomodation (in fact, or understanding) of the newly emerging MUSlim middle class's economic and political aspirations."²⁹ Whatever support it had, was purely due to its adherence to Islam. Although the Islamic idealism could hold the diverse ethnic groups together for sometimes, the bond faded rapidly after independence was achieved. This was due to the nature of vague ideology, and absence of any concrete socio-economic programme on the part of the Muslim League. As the "endurance of a National party depends on its performance in satisfying the hopes and aspiration of the people",³⁰ the Muslim League fell short of this objective.

29. Op. cit., p.16.

30. Qud dus, n.2, p.28.

Besides this, the nature of political development and leadership of the Muslim majority provinces prior to independence, highlight many things such as, the shifting of loyalties, the formation of fragile coalition government, political opportunism, indiscipline, nepotism, selfish leadership, which ultimately proved ruinous to Pakistan's democracy after independence. An enquiry into the Muslim League politics in the post-independent phase would throw light on this.

Post-Independence Scenario (1947-1958)

The period from independence to 1958 - the year of imposition of ^{the} first military rule, represents the country's first experiment with the Parliamentary form of democracy. Political parties, the most important ingredient of a parliamentary buildup, constituted an integral part of the political system in this period. The party politics during the first decade after independence was conspicuously marked by its instability, weakness and fragility. No doubt, the spillover of the very nature and functioning of the Muslim League as a political organisation in the pre-independence phase had left marked influence on the future working of party system in the country, yet an analysis of the nature and working of political parties of this

period, would throw light on the "identified factor" that stood in the way of proper development of an effective party system in the country in post-independence Pakistan.

The system of healthy party politics calls for a strong opposition to the ruling party. The role of a constructive opposition in Pakistan immediately after independence was circumscribed by the very nature of the Pakistan movement. While the undisputed one party rule of ^{the} Muslim League till 1954 justified the absence of an effective opposition, the multi-party system in the subsequent period, when "politics were made up more of a large number of leading persons with these dependents than a distinct party with visible rival programmes"³¹, prevented the opposition from asserting its place. In the first seven years, till the demise of Muslim League in 1954, the party held unchallenged sway, the opposition being neither "numerous nor strong enough to "influence decision making".³² The domination of one party reduced the opposition to sheer impotence, when the opposition parties lost all hopes of entering

31. K.K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan; 1947-58, (Islamabad, 1976), pp. 180-81.

32. Ibid., pp.185-86.

into office. This was particularly true of what happened to the Communist Party of Pakistan in 1951. An attitude and policy of crushing the opposition could be reflected in the speeches of the First Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, a member of the ruling party (~~the~~ Muslim League), when he remarked "as long as I am alive no other political party will be allowed here".³³ Thus, no party in the opposition and no opposition in the party, was the operating principle of the day.

However, once the Muslim League dissipated after 1954, all hopes of a stable, wellknit, hardhitting and sensible opposition were belied by the configuration of parties. Till 1954, the opposition in the various legislatures was weak, their number being very few. After 1954, though their number increased, they stood disunited and traced their root to divergent political parties.

A shift from one party to a multiparty system after 1954, could not also provide a stable system of opposition. Most of the parties did not have sufficient large mass base and alternative policies, and were heter-

33. Quoted in M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. 10, no.7, July 1970, p.555.


ogenous in character. Though, as an exception to this, the United Front in East Bengal emerged as a viable alternative to the Muslim League by capturing more than two-third of ^{the} seats ⁱⁿ ^{the} 1954 election, it could not rule, as martial law was imposed soon after the election. Other political parties who could not provide alternative leadership *could* best be termed as 'Feudal Clan' or 'Phanton Groups' or 'Religious Associations', rather than political parties.³⁴ Moreover, these groups could not assert their position in National Politics due to the absence of General election.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah's period (1947-48) in Pakistan's political history was characterised by the inauguration of one-man rule, authoritarian tendencies, political and administrative centralization which had serious repercussions in the country's politics in the subsequent years. Jinnah and his Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan initially were in effective control of government. Jinnah's death in 1948, just over a year after independence "deprived the Muslim League of the the only leader who could have held it together".³⁵

34. Aziz, n.31, p.181.

35. Tariq Ali, Pakistan : Military Rule or People's Power (London, 1970), pp.36-37.

After Jinnah's departure, the responsibility fell on the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who was no match either to Jinnah's ability or charisma.³⁶ However, L.A.Khan in his own way tried to sustain the process of shaping up of Parliamentary institution. That he did not move himself to the post of Governor General, but elevated Nizamuddin to the Presidency, speaks highly of him. Unfortunately, another set back for Pakistan stepped in, when Liaquat was assassinated in October 1951. This created a leadership vacuum with Pakistan having no leader of national following and stature.



TH-2437

The one man rule and authoritarian tradition in Pakistan, by assuming extra-ordinary power was started by Jinnah. To start with Jinnah became Governor General rather than Prime Minister, and thus "initiated a tradition of strong, paternalistic executive rule." Personal style was incorporated into the new office of Governor General. Reliance on non-representative in political decision making began with him. By establishing such precedents, he made it easier for his successors to arrogate unlimited powers for themselves.

36. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (London, 1957), p.21.

DISS
355.0213095491
M6875 MI



TH2437

These elites found an ally in the civil-military bureaucracy, whom they often used for political purposes. Thus, in the process, the non-political representative got a foothold in the decision making process. During the first decade, a close working alliance developed between the 'national political elite' and the civil military bureaucracy - an alliance that in later years, specially after 1954, was dominated by the latter. Jinnah's death however, "brought to the surface the conflict between those who held power (the civil servants) and those who wished to do so (the politicians)".³⁷

The manner in which centralization was achieved, was through national party's control over the parties of the provinces. It is surprising to observe that even ^{the} ~~when~~ Muslim League ruled both at ^{the} ~~at~~ centre and ^{the} ~~at~~ province (East Bengal) the latter hardly differed from the former's stand.³⁸ Very often Governor's rule ^{was} ~~imposed~~ to ensure direct central ^{control of} ~~the~~ provinces in order to thwart any challenge to the position of the "national power elite". A glaring example of its blatant ~~imposition~~ ^{imposition} was in East Bengal in 1954, when the newly elected United Front had formed office there.

37. Laporte, n.26, p.46.

38. G.W. Chaudhuri, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (Lahore, 1959), pp.108-109.

Disintegration of Muslim League

The death of Jinnah followed by Liaquat's assassination effectively brought an end to the supremacy once enjoyed by the Muslim League. The organisation suffered a setback as the successors of L.A. Khan did not possess the qualities required of a leader. Likewise, Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman who succeeded Jinnah had neither the gift of leadership nor even the semblance of popular backing. Thus, the party became a hand made of the government. This was clearly demonstrated when the party was forced into accepting Mohammad Ali of Bogra as its President after being nominated by Gulham Mohammad.

Moreover, the administration never consulted the party for any decision taken. The League was a helpless spectator of the frequent cabinet reshuffles. Precisely because it had lost its popular character, that Gulham Mohammad was encouraged in his decision first, to dismiss the Nazimuddin Ministry and latter to dissolve the league-dominated Assembly.

Except in its early years, the Muslim League rapidly became the monopoly of a class which used it for the realisation of its own political ambitions and the advancement of its economic interests. Highlighting on this aspect of the League, one observer points out :

"In the peculiar set up of West Pakistan, the economic power of the landed aristocracy had given it a political ascendancy that neither the introduction of universal suffrage nor the rise of the rise of new political parties could snatch from it."³⁹ Not surprisingly, the League won its electoral victories in West Pakistan in 1951, 1952 and 1953 because of the support of this class. To a large extent, the absence of this support in East Pakistan, could be ascribed to its disastrous defeat in 1954. Hence, the Muslim League, "crippled in the East by a United opposition and captured by the feudal aristocracy in the West, the League ceased to be a mass Party that it used to be before independence."⁴⁰ As an organisation, the League without a programme, leadership, mass following disintegrated and could not effectively revive its past stature.

The rapid decline of the Muslim League and the rise of a host of other parties and factions gave way to the formation of a Coalition Government, which did not augur well for a Parliamentary democracy in a new state. As a result, the dynamics of coalition politics coupled as it was, with the selfish attitude of the political

39. Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi, 1963), p.131.

40. Ibid.

leaders, resulted in early collapse of all the ministries that were formed after 1955.⁴¹ The last two ministries with Chundrigar (October 1957 to December 1957), and Feroz Khan Noon (December 1957 to October 1958) were a conglomeration of four and six political parties respectively.⁴² Mohammad Ali Bogra's government included leaders from the two most stable and influential institutions in Pakistan - the military and bureaucracy.

As a matter of fact, the post-1954 scenario in Pakistan was one of chaos and confusion. The Central and Provincial governments were short lived and ineffective, political parties were constantly declining and breaking up into factions. Further more, political opportunism, corruption, shifting coalition made shambles of parliamentary institution. The result was a breakdown in party discipline and succession of weak government. The inevitable consequence of such a political scenario was the absence of any consensus on issues of national significance, like the question of Islam, East Pakistan's participation, regional autonomy etc.

41. K.L. Kamal, Pakistan : The Garrison State (New Delhi, 1982), p.28.

42. In Chundrigar's government there were four parties, namely the Muslim League, the Republican Party, Krishak Shramik Party and Nizam-i-Islam, where as in Feroz Khan Noon's government there were six parties such as, Republican Party, Awami League, The National Awami Party, The Pakistan National Congress, Scheduled Caste Federation and a section of Krishak Shramik Party.

This in effect gave rise to coalition politics, where a number of political parties were in operation, without any alternative programmes, leadership and mass following both from East and West Pakistan. The unscrupulous party politics following the year 1954 was conveniently exploited by the non-political representatives, to their own advantage. This phase was dominated by the 'viceregal system', ultimately leading to first military takeover in 1958.

The nature of regional politics also to a great extent contributed towards the poor functioning of parties in the country. In the absence of a "national based party, more significantly after 1954, a number of factors like the feudal structure of the country, the geographical peculiarities and bilingual character, came to the fore front and helped in strengthening the obstacles to national integration. This in result gave rise to a number of political parties with strong regional or sectarian base, like the "Pakistan National Congress", the "Jamaat-i-Islam", the "Nizam-i-Islam" etc. While the Awami League had strong foothold in East Pakistan and the "Muslim League" had its sway over the western part. Likewise, the "Republican Party" never extended the scope of its authority to

the Eastern sector. This, no doubt, highly speaks for the absence of any broad based and nationally accepted policies.

Absence of Elections

Truly in a democratic system, Political Parties and elections are very closely related. It is through elections that parties expect to capture power. Thus, regular election is an important manifestation of political process. As an exception to this rule, in Pakistan, during the period 1947-58, no general election was held. The provincial elections in the early 1950s,⁴³ were the only links between the members of Constituent Assembly and the polity, till October, 1954, when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

Thus, clearly electoral politics was not regarded as part of the national political process, in the country. Besides, mostly elite based political parties were the kind of political parties operating during the period having no grass root support and linkage. Although some secular movements (e.g. Bhasani's) had

43. Elections in Punjab, North-Western Frontier Provinces, took place in 1951 and elections in Sind and East Pakistan took place in 1953 and 1954 respectively.

attempted to link provincial or national leadership with masses,⁴⁴ for the most part, these were the exception rather than the rule during the period.

Military Regime Phase : Ayub Era

From the foregoing analysis, it has been observed that the assumption of power by General Mohammad Ayub Khan was to a great extent possible due to the failure of political parties operating within a parliamentary democratic framework. When Ayub took over power, he was not favourably disposed towards political parties and politicians. As is usually the case with all military regimes, General Ayub had a deep aversion for political parties and a low estimate for politicians.

General Ayub's regime (1958-1969) is clearly divided into two distinct phases so far his dealings, relationship with political parties was concerned. While in the first phase his natural aversion compelled him to adopt strict measures against political parties, the second phase witnessed the revival of party politics, although in a strictly limited and undemocratic sense. These two divergent attitudes towards political parties of General Ayub compels one to examine the motivating

44. For a proper understanding of the leftist movement in Pakistan, refer to Ali, n.32, pp.53-61.

factors behind this change of attitude - from politics of no-party to the revival of party politics.

Politics of no-party (1958-1962)

Upon assuming power on 7 October, 1958, General Ayub Khan abrogated the constitution, dissolved the Legislative Assembly, banned political parties and political activities. He publicly expressed his low estimation of politicians and was convinced to do away with political leaders and parties. Giving manifestation to his deep contempt for politicians, he took measures like Election Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in 1959, under which about two hundred politicians including many former ministers were punished. However, the need for nation integration and the search for legitimacy compelled Ayub to envision several other institution and mechanisms. His novel creation - the system of Basic Democracy (BD) - was the most prominent one, to achieve this objective. He devised this "unique mechanism" in order to gain legitimacy for his "Constitutional Autocracy"⁴⁵ along with other mechanisms, like "Civil Bureaucracy", "National Assembly, Provincial

45. Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston, 1967), p.101-26.

Governors"⁴⁶ etc. The idea was that through Basic Democracy (BD) system grass root democracy could be ensured, under which "the voters will be less liable to be exploited and misled than in direct elections where they were driven as cattle to polling booths".⁴⁷

In the atmosphere of continued ban on political activities and political parties, the indirect elections to be National Assembly in 1962 was held on a non-party basis in which 80,000 Basic Democrats elected 75 members to the National Assembly. Here the members of the Muslim League emerged victorious. The important reason was that most of the prominent leaders of the popular parties in East Pakistan like the Awami League (AL), National Awami Party (NAP), were either imprisoned or disqualified under the Election Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) and elections were contested by only what is called as "the second-echelon of political leaders".⁴⁸

However, soon it became apparent that political patronage was not enough to hold the disparate groups

46. For details of these Mechanism, See Quddus, n.2, p.38.

47. Asian Recorder (New Delhi) March 12-18, 1962, p.4471.

48. Raunaq Jahan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration, (London, 1972), p.145.

together in the Assembly. Again, the Basic democrats could not earn for the Ayub regime the required support and the legitimacy which was expected earlier. Moreover, Ayub's supporters (like Z.A. Bhutto and M.A. Bogra) in the Assembly put pressure on the regime for the revival of political parties.

Ayub Khan's change of stand on political parties was not without considerations. First, he had already gained considerable support from the members of the National Assembly, most of whom were old Muslim Leaguers. Second, his revival strategy was based on the policy of dividing the unity of the opposition in the National Assembly.⁴⁹ Lastly, he had the loyalty of a considerable section of the 80,000 basic democrats whom his system "patronized economically, politically and socially".⁵⁰

All these factors worked together in favour of the adoption of the Political Parties Act (PPA) on 14th July 1962. However, it was not without qualifications. The conditions that the parties must not be foreign aided; they must be based on Islamic ideology; and

49. op. cit., p.128.

50. Herbert Feldman, Pakistan: From Crisis to Crisis (London, 1972), pp.3-4, 177-78.

parties must not recruit persons who were convicted of moral turpitude, were emphasised. He laid the condition that parties should follow the Basic Democracy (BD) system and formation of parties should be on a national, pragmatic and grass root level.

Party Politics since 1962

With the adoption of the Political Parties Act (PPA) 1962, leaders of most political parties started the revival of their own organisations. General Ayub Khan after initial reluctance, wanted to form his own party that "would represent the government in the Assemblies",⁵¹ protect his own interest, legitimise his promulgation and proclamations. With a view to operationalize two principles at the same time - that of ensuring some sort of legitimacy in the popular eye and avoiding a mass based new political party - he decided to take over the Muslim League. General Ayub joined the Muslim League and renamed it as Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in December, 1963.

After the revival of political parties, a series of elections, the Presidential election and election to

51. Lawrence Ziring, Ayub Khan Era : Politics in Pakistan (New York, 1971), p.33.

the Provincial Assemblies, were held. In the Presidential election, the contest ensued between the Pakistan Muslim League and the Combined Opposition Parties (COP).⁵² Due to the indirect nature of the election, repressive and restrictive measures adopted by the ruling class, and the loyalty of a considerable section of the 80,000 Basic Democrats, the Pakistan Muslim League emerged victorious. The same practice was repeated in the election to the Provincial Assemblies.

A close observation reveals the fact that although revival of political parties and elections, both at the National and Provincial levels were held, they failed to raise mass support for the regime as well as evolve a national party. Like many other military leaders, Ayub failed to realise the critical role political parties play in National integration. The regime's initial decision neither to revive political parties which were more or less operative at the time of the coup, nor to organise a party of its own had far-reaching consequences on future development. It prevented the emergence of a new cadre of political leadership and to a great extent

52. Combined Opposition Parties was an alliance of the Council Muslim League (CML), the National Awami Party (NAP) The Awami League (AL), the Nizam-i-Islam (NI) and the Jamaat-i-Islam (JI).

"the old style politics was back".⁵³ It made political system less representative by forcing the top leadership (mainly from the Awami League and the National Awami League to abstain from participation under the Election Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) system.

Even after the revival of the party system, Ayub's own party Pakistan Muslim League (PML) did not develop into a national institution. Other parties operating after 1962, were primarily regional in character. Autonomy vs a strong centre, religious vs secular attitudes were the hallmark of the rival party programmes. While the Jamaat-i-Islam, Council Muslim League, and the Pakistan People's Party were largely West Pakistan based, the Awami League was influential mainly the in East Pakistan. Though the two factions of the National Awami Party had inter-regional organisations, the party remained fragmented and weak. The regional character of the parties is well depicted by one scholar who writes "instead of building up their organisational mass support, they generally co-opt locally influential leaders. Party differences are often based on factional rather than pragmatic differences What is more significant, the party schisms are generally on East-west basis".⁵⁴

53. Saleem M. Qureshi, "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan", Middle East Journal, vol.20, 1966, p.457.

54. Jahan, n. 48, p.142.

Yahya Phase : From Conciliation to Confrontation

General Yahya Khan upon assuming power, tactfully adopted a defensive posture and a number of conciliatory policies in dealing with politicians. He had to convince people that the military no longer had a "political role" to play, its objective being a return to "democracy and rule of law". As a matter of fact, the loss of credibility and political legitimacy during Ayub's regime had tarnished the image of the military authorities to a considerable extent.

Spelling the transitory nature of his regime, he declared, "restoration of democracy and smooth transfer of power to the representatives of people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise",⁵⁵ was its objective. Thus appearing to be offering the opportunity for greater civilian participation, he refrained from banning political parties and did not adopt restrictive measures like EBDO. He went a step further by breaking up "one unit" and conceding "one man one vote".

At this juncture, one thing needs to be explained. By allowing political parties to operate smoothly for

55. Bangladesh : Contemporary Events and Documents (People's Republic of Bangladesh, n.d.), p.52, Quoted by Jahan, n.48, p.187.

the election, based on adult franchise, the military ruler seemed to be contradicting the fact, military regimes aversion relating to towards political parties, politicians and democratic way of functioning.

Part of the explanation could be sought in the preceding developments under Ayub's regime, and in the personality make up of Yahya Khan who was not as strong as Ayub. However, complete reliance on these factors alone is misleading. General Yahya Khan had something else in mind. Clearly, Yahya visualised a deadlock in the election where no party would win a workable majority. In case of such an eventuality, the power of the military to manipulate events would remain unimpaired. Secondly, even if a single party would emerge victorious, Yahya still retained the power to refuse validation of the Constitution Bill (if it upsets the basic interests of the ruling class) according to the terms of the Legal Framework Order (LFO).⁵⁶ In both the cases, Yahya seemed to be holding the key.

With this intention in mind, he gave political parties more or less a free hand to operate. In this context, one observer writes, "he was therefore, willing to overlook the extreme stand of the Awami League in the

56. Jahan, no. 48, p.188.

election campaign, although it amounted to the violation of his own Legal Framework Order".⁵⁷

Besides this calculation, another strategy operated. That he allowed nearly a year (from January 1970 to December 1970) for election campaign, had some ulterior motives. This was to ensure that "right-wing parties aided and abetted by the bureaucracy and state control media would gain enough votes to act at least, as a bargain counter".⁵⁸

The first ever direct election based on the principle of adult franchise, was held in December 1970. Interestingly, the results upset Yahya's calculations. First, the election results revealed the total isolation of the Jamaat-i-Islam from the masses. All hopes of installing a "Pakistan Democratic Party - Islam Pasand" alliance the power, were shattered. On the contrary it (the election) saw the Awami League and the PPP sweeping the polls in East and West Pakistan respectively. The Awami League won an absolute majority in the National Assembly (160 seats out of 300) and the PPP emerged as the second largest party (81 out of 300).

57. Mohammad Ashgar Khan, *Generals in Politics*
(New Delhi, 1983), p.22.

58. Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive? The death of a State* (London, 1983), p.83.

With Yahya's first expectation - that no party would win a workable majority in the National Assembly - unfulfilled, he tried to take advantage of the conflicting interests between the Awami League and the PPP. He started negotiations with the clear intention of putting up one against the other.

However, the subsequent developments proved disastrous for Pakistan. First, facing strong opposition from Bhutto, Yahya did not allow Mujib to form the new Government and persuaded the Awami League to share power with the PPP. Mujib-ur-Rehman accused the military junta of attempting to sabotage the popular will and demanded the transfer of powers to the elected representatives. The subsequent developments saw the disintegration of Pakistan into two independent states.

While the objective of General Yahya Khan was clear, he failed to handle the two major regional parties - the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party. On the other hand, the political parties played hardly any role in keeping the country united.. From the election results it became clear that the so-called national parties like Jamaat-i-Islam, Pakistan Democratic Party and the three factions of the Muslim League had little grassroot support either in the East or West Pakistan.

On the contrary, parties like Awami League and Pakistan People's Party with mass support tended to be regional in character. Hence, with no single party commanding support from both the wings of the country, the result led to East-West confrontation, culminating in the disintegration of the country.

Post Military Period (1971-1977)

The post military period gave birth to representative democracy in the country for the first time. The Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ushered in an era of historic significance, for not only was it the first civilian Government but also the longest to remain in power. Z.A. Bhutto, the first directly elected leader of the Pakistan People's Party, became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. With Pakistan People's Party gaining landslide victory in Pakistan, the country seemed to be returning to a parliamentary democratic system. Under such a situation, the political parties (ruling as well as the opposition) were supposed to have their share in the decision making process.

Bhutto, a democratically elected leader did not prove to be any different from his predecessors. His

dealing with his own party - Pakistan People's Party and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League(Q) in Baluchistan and National Awami Party in North-Western Frontier Provinces imposed the fact that, he was authoritarian. This authoritarian nature of Bhutto could be realised from the tactics he adopted to come to power even at the expense of the partition of his country. Moreover, his personalized and authoritarian style of functioning led to confusion within the ranks of the Pakistan People's Party. It was surprising that "the Pakistan People's Party was never organised into cadres, tiers and no election for party office was ever held".⁵⁹

Soon after Bhutto assumed power, other leaders of his party as also those of different parties started suspecting Bhutto as a democrat and socialist. The resignation of so many stalwarts within his own party, specially that of Mian Makmud Ali Kasuri, the Vice-Chairman of Pakistan People's Party, symbolized a failure to reconcile political and other differences within the framework and a broad democratic consensus.

Another factor that Bhutto could never reconcile with was the presence of an opposition inside and outside

59. Quoted in Salmean Taseer, Bhutto, (New Delhi, 1980), p. 123.

the party. From the very beginning, Bhutto launched a major offensive against the opposition parties. Even in the wake of March, 1977 election, Bhutto took special constituent measures such as passing of the Fifth Amendment Bill, "Peoples" Representation Bill, to ensure his party's victory. Bhutto engineered the downfall of the opposition led Governments in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces. Later in 1975, he outlawed the largest opposition party, the National Awami Party, imprisoned its top leadership, including its President Khan Abdul Wali Khan. Bhutto's strategy in creating a "post military state" was however "patrimonial rather than institutional".⁶⁰ He extended his personal control over the bureaucracy, military as well as the party. His strategy of rule, which has been characterised as "patrimonialism, centralization and depoliticization",⁶¹ was devoid of any grassroot political activity. Thus by early 1977, at the time of announcing election, the Pakistan People's Party had already lost the support of the bulk of the society - the middle class. Likewise in the formative phase, the tenure of Bhutto saw the breakdown

60. Gerald A. Heeger, "Political in the post military State; some reflections on the Pakistan experience", World Politics, vol.24, no.2, Jan.1977, p.242.

61. W.L. Richter, "Pakistan under Zia", Current History vol. 78, no. 446, April, 1979, p.169.

of the party structure which proved to be a prelude to the third military regime.

An analysis of the social bases of the political parties operating between 1947 and 1977, would help in identifying, the abstacles in the evolution of a national based party system in the country, inclusive of both the East and West Pakistan.

As it has been clearly demonstrated earlier, the Muslim League was primarily an elite based organisation, drawing support from upper class land owners and urdu speaking families of Dacca.⁶² Thus, while the election victory of the Muslim League in West Pakistan in 1951, 1952, 1953 was due to the support of these classes, its defeat in East Pakistan in 1954 was on account the lack of support of the same class. Hence, in the light of the growing united opposition from the East Pakistan, and lack of support of feudal aristocracy in the West Pakistan the Muslim League was crippled by the year 1954.

The party's revival under 1962, PPA, could have hardly appealed to the masses, given the undemocratic

62. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", International Journal, vol. 23, no.3, 1972, p.382.

and unrepresentative nature of its support base, thus remained extremely limited.

As for the other parties, they were either popular in the East or West Pakistan. The Council Muslim League's support was limited to the East Pakistan. Likewise, the Awami League, which was a East Pakistan based party, could not take off as a national party because of its adherence to six-points.

A few words on the religious parties like the Jamaat-i-Islami and Nizam-i-Islam would be useful for the above discussion. Although the Jamaat-i-Islami stated as a pressure group organisation, later it developed into one of the most well organised party, with having a authoritarian structure and a national ideology of it. However, its social support remained extremely weak and limited. While its rigorous selection process hindered the entry of rural masses, its rigid interpretations of Islam failed to touch a considerable section of modernist in the country.⁶³ All the more important was the fact that its adherence to religion alienated the non-muslim sections in East Pakistan (about 20% of the population). Not surprisingly, therefore,

63. Sayeed, n. 45, p. 163

44

it had to face a humiliating electoral debacle in the General Election of 1970.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), relatively a new party formed in 1967, received support mainly from students, urban intellectuals, small zamindars, etc. However, its social base in East Pakistan was minimal as it could not accommodate the demand for provincial autonomy. Its projection of party ideology as "Islam is our faith; Democracy our Polity; Socialism our economy; All power to the people", influenced all sections of the society and the Pakistan People's Party's success in West Pakistan in the 1970 general election was a clear manifestation of such support.

After the disintegration of East Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the only national based party in the country. However, by 1977, it lost support of a large section of society. Bhutto's Nationalisation Policy, Land Reforms measures, control of the military antagonised all the powerful groups of the country - the bourgeoisie class, landed class civil and military elite.⁶⁴ Besides, he lost the support of the

64. Mishra, n. 18, p.

politically articulate middle class⁶⁵ who were adversely affected, both economically and politically by Bhutto's policies. Hence, Bhutto's weak social base at the time of the 1977 general election proved to be a boon to the Pakistan National Alliance.

The only political party which at one stage should promise of acquiring a National status ultimately succumbed to the population of a party with a weak social base like all other political parties in the country.

From the foregoing analysis it would not be wrong to assume that to a large extent the military's ascension to power in 1958, was a mere recognition of the fact that the nominal parliamentary system which existed till then, had collapsed under the weight of corrupt party politics in the country. An analysis of the party politics during the first two military regimes revealed one major concern - that of how to evolve a national party system broadly inclusive of major geographic and linguistic groups. During Bhutto's rule the PPP failed to capitalise on its political gains, thanks to the adherence to a charismatic leader rather than a clear cut programme of action. On the basis of this analysis, it could be

65. S.J. Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, (London, 1980), p.200.

concluded that it was the tradition of autocracy, in short, which hindered the grafting of democracy in the country.⁶⁶ Consequently this very attitude towards the political parties by the ruling authorities resulted in their own downfall from power.

66. Karl J. Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its causes", Pacific Affairs, vol. 37, no.1, March 1959, p.18.

CHAPTER - II

ZIA'S RISE TO POWER : END OF A
CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

Events in Pakistan ever since the March 1977 Elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies had been showing slow, steady but sure move towards political instability, finally culminating in complete disruption of the country's democratic political process by 5 July, 1977. General Zia-ul-Haq's military takeover, thus put an abrupt end to the longest spell of democratic rule in the country (December 1971 to July 1977). The responsibility for driving the country under another spell of military control, to a large extent, falls on Pakistan's civilian politicians, who once again failed to strengthen the roots of democratic rule, as evident from their scant respect for rule of law and constitutional process.

A search for its immediate cause would focus on the fact that the takeover by military was an outcome of the political instability unleashed in Pakistan since March 1977, when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) showed its determination not to accept the election results, as it was believed to have been rigged on a large scale. More objectively, when we look at the event in a proper historical perspective, other reasons which are deeprooted in Pakistan policies, are not lost sight of.

To turn back to the most immediate cause, the six months, between Bhutto's announcement of the election and his downfall, rank among the most eventful and crucial periods in Pakistan's troubled political history. To start with, on the political front, after Bhutto's announcement of the elections, there was complete polarization in the country, with two major political alliances -- the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance - operating against each other, in a struggle to capture the political seats, in an open, free and democratically contested election.¹

The composition and nature of the Pakistan National Alliance suggested "unity in diversity"; hatred for Bhutto, Bhuttoism and the Pakistan People's Party constituting the basis of such unity. Being composed of nine opposition parties, the Pakistan National Alliance included both the left and right parties. It encompassed within its fold Islamic parties like Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP); parties of centre like Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Pakistan

1. The environment of polarisation in which the 1977 elections were contested is depicted by some electoral statistics. See, Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto - 1971-77 (London, 1980), pp.195-202.

Democratic Party (PDP), Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC); and leftist parties like National Democratic Party (NDP) and Khaksar Tehrik (KT). This diversity in composition obviously reflected their diverse political ideologies. While the Islamic parties represented varying points of view regarding the conduct of the affairs of the state on Islamic lines, the parties of the centre advocated for a return to parliamentary democracy and private enterprises. More differently, the parties of the left believed in some kind of state ownership of capital and decentralised government. The Pakistan National Alliance was, as rightly remarked, a "grand alliance representing almost the entire spectrum of political thinking and ideologies in the country....., and was plagued by divided leadership, speaking different languages and subscribing to different, even divergent ideologies".² But despite these differences the Pakistan National Alliance remained united, "the hand of unity" being "both economic and religious".³ It is true that Bhutto's alleged socialist and secular policies had united these parties under the banner of Pakistan National Alliance.

2. A.T. Chaudhiri, "The Battle of Manifestos - I", Dawn (Karachi), 14 February 1977.

3. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan : The nature and of Direction of Change (New York, 1980), p.157.

Essentially representing the middle-class constituency, these parties stood against Bhutto's strategies of rule, and aimed at dismantling him and the Pakistan People's Party. Inherent in the holding of the election of 1977, therefore, was a great conflict between Bhutto's objectives and the means and processes to achieve them. The very nature of campaign and struggle for power made it obvious that "the March 1977 general election would not be fought on the basis of political programmes, but would effectively be viewed as a referendum on the personality, political style and defects or otherwise of Z.A. Bhutto".⁴ The Pakistan National Alliance incapable of providing a coherent programme (true to its nature and character of composition), raised anti-Bhutto slogans and decided that anything was better than a Pakistan People's Party victory. On the contrary, the Pakistan People's Party headed by Z.A. Bhutto, dismissed the Pakistan National Alliance as a "cat with nine tails",⁵ and was confident of overcoming opposition in the election. Thus, the entire election campaign lasting two months, was marked by mounting violence and estrangement between the ruling Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance.

4. Tariq Ali, "Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a Praetorian State", (London, 1983), p.129.

5. Quoted in Burki, n.1, p.184.

The election results can contrary to all expectations and surprised all parties except the Pakistan People's Party, and others who were involved in this process. The Pakistan People's Party won 155 of the 200 seats only 36 seats to the Pakistan National Alliance. The latter won only 8 out of 116 seats in Punjab and none in the cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi. The Pakistan National Alliance lost in three of the four provinces, winning a majority of seats in one major city - Karachi.⁶

On 11 March, a day after the election to the Provincial Assemblies, which the Pakistan National Alliance boycotted in protest of the election results of National Assembly, the Pakistan National Alliance decided to take resort to massive urban demonstrations and violent confrontations with the government. The resulting explosion blew out of proportion. For a compromising political settlement Bhutto offered some concession, but that was "too little and too late". Even the opposition was not prepared to accept the Prime Minister's offer to hold a

6. A detailed account of the election campaign, results and the subsequent protest movement can be obtained from Lawrence Ziring, "Pakistan : The Campaign Before the Storm", Asian Survey, vol. 17, no.7, July 1977, pp.581-98, and M.G. Weinbaum, "The March 77 Elections in Pakistan : Where Everyone Lost", Asian Survey, vol. 17, no.7, July 1977, pp.599-618.

countrywide referendum in mid-June 1977, to ask the electorate if he should continue in office. Fearing a possible victory for the Prime Minister, the Pakistan National Alliance did not accept the offer, "which could either propel him to new heights of power or put an end to his highly controversial political career".⁷

The impasse continued into the first week of July 1977. Contrary to all speculations that some agreement had been reached between the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance on 4 July, "Operation Fairplay" was launched by General Zia-ul-Haq, on the basis of the failure in reaching a compromise between the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan National Alliance. Thus, evidently it was clear that the failure in reaching a compromise between the two major political groupings, comprising of many political parties, ended Pakistan's experiment with the civilian rule.

Looking at the political developments of the last few months, it could be suggested that the election of 1977 could not have averted the crisis. By the time the

7. Salamat Ali, "Bhutto Wants Another Mandate", Far Eastern Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 27 May 1977, p.24.

election was announced Bhutto had already lost support of the bulk of the "politically articulate electorate - the middle class",⁸ which was then supporting the opposition. More important, "by allowing themselves to become involved in election irregularities ..., the Pakistan People's Party leadership committed the inexcusable mistake of seeming to demonstrate that they were determined to hang on to power at any cost".⁹

The behaviour of the opposition parties was also given the background of bickering among opposition parties, the formation of the Pakistan National Alliance after the announcements of election March 1977, was surprising. But once united, the opposition predictably refused to co-operate with Bhutto even on procedural matters. In this context, it is appropriate to note that even before the elections, Air Marshal Ashgar Khan, the leader of the TI, a constituent party of the Pakistan National Alliance, had said "he and his party might not accept a government victory".¹⁰

8. Burki, n.1, pp.200-201.

9. Shirin Tahir Kheli, "Martial Law Again in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, vol. 5, no.4, March/April 1978, p. 229.

10. Quoted in Salmaan Taseer, "Bhutto", (New Delhi 1980) p. 170.

The Pakistan National Alliance refused to co-operate with the Election Commission in investigating the rigging and began an agitation to oust Bhutto. Significantly, so distrustful was the Pakistan National Alliance of Bhutto that it refused to accept a re-poll unless it was under the supervision of the Judiciary and the army. This whole process, however, highlights the basic discord over the rule of the game. Hence the unbearably violent sheet agitation by the Pakistan National Alliance against the Bhutto regime helped to further undercut the residual legitimacy of Pakistan's only civilian regime.

The lack of a concrete economic programme, proper leadership and the anti-duluvian character of the Pakistan National Alliance contributed to its failure in presenting a credible alternative to Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party. Their basis of unity was hatred for Bhutto and the Pakistan People's Party. This act of the Pakistan National Alliance could be explained by the fact that the fundamental leadership within the Pakistan National Alliance represented by the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had apparently acted on the assumption that anything was better than continued rule by the Pakistan People's Party which posed danger to its status as a political party, by taking

Pakistan politics in an increasing secular tradition.¹¹

In the light of such an assessment, it is not wrong to remark that some components of the PNA, mainly the Jamaat-i-Islami, had consciously adopted the strategy of supplanting the Pakistan Peoples party by taking resort to any measure. The Perhaps knew that "the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) could not really come to power on its own and in case of such an eventuality as Pakistan National Alliance coming to power, it could not hold together for every long because of the given character and composition of the coalition".¹²

In this context, one scholar has rightly commented that "the destabilisation campaign (March-July, 1977) and the subsequent coup was to handover power to political parties of the Ultra-right which could not possibly have come to power through the electoral process."¹³ However, in the process of doing so, what they failed to realise was that, by unleashing violent street demonstrations against Bhutto's regime, they helped to pave the

-
11. The Jamaat-i-Islami, as a constituent of the PNA and being a reactionary and obscurantist organisation resisted effectively the onslaught of the secular forces unleashed by the PPP. See G.Meenai, "Pakistan Peoples Party" in Pandav Naik, ed., Pakistan: Society and Politics, (New Delhi, 1984), p.164.
 12. Mohammad Ayoob, Pakistan comes to full circle, India Quarterly, vol.24, no.1, January-March 1978, pp.17-18.
 13. Aijas Ahmad, "Democracy and Dictatorship" in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, eds., Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, (New Delhi, 1983), p.120.

way for reassumption of power by the military, once the weakness of the civilian regime was exposed.

In such a situation when the legitimacy of the whole electoral exercise collapsed, the only credible alternative to Bhutto and his party proved to be the military juntas. This seemed inevitable, given the tradition of an active political role for the military and weak subjective/civilian control over the military in Pakistan. The perception of these events by the military was that the armed forces "torn between their constitutional duty to the government and their real duty to the nation and the people choose the former in keeping with their role and tradition as a disciplined and loyal organisation".¹⁴

Even after the military stepped in on 5 July, 1977, the political parties were justifying the avert political role of the armed forces. While Ashgar Khan, leader of TI of Pakistan National Alliance justified military takeover when civilians failed.¹⁵ Bhutto seemed to have told Zia, "Come General, why do not you share power with us...

14. A.R. Siddique, "Armed Forces: Tasks and Mission", Defence Journal, vol.4, nos.1&2, 1978, p.5.

15. The Times, 18 August, 1977.

We want to teach them a lesson".¹⁶ This irresponsible act by the civilian leaders, no doubt, helped in increasing the confidence of the military Generals in performing the political role.

Upon assuming political power, General Zia-ul-Haq kept a predictably low profile, claiming no political ambition for himself and assuring elections within 90 days. Thus, propagating his self-image as a neutral, progressive and patriotic guardian of the nation, he justified his action in terms of the failure of the Pakistan National Alliance and the Pakistan People's Party to reach a compromise and stated his limited objective to "organise a full and fair election to be held in October, 1977".¹⁷ Thus, with the declaration of martial law regime, Pakistan came once again under the grip of military rule - third time since its inception. Unlike the first two coups,¹⁸ large scale rigging of the March 1977 election, and the failure of party politics provided the pretext for the takeover.

16. The Times of India, 20 September, 1977.

17. Overseas Weekly, Dawn, 10 July, 1977.

18. Ayub's coup came to prevent election, while Yahya's regime came by negating the choice of the people in the election.

The remaining part of this chapter would deal with the two most crucial years of Zia in power. Starting as a neutral arbiter and an underdog in political matters, General Zia-ul-Haq emerged as a shrewd political operator in the country. He promised to offer an evenhanded deal to all political parties in the conduct of "free and fair" elections, but ended in making party politics and political parties obsolete in Pakistan.

Zia-ul-Haq and the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP)

As stated earlier, General Zia started with a promise of evenhandedness, with the clearly declared objective of holding "free and fair" elections in 90 days. However, the relationship between the General and the Pakistan Peoples' Party - the overthrown government - proved beyond doubt that Zia's practice had in fact been to discriminate against the Pakistan Peoples' Party. He began with a concerted drive against these civilian groups which he had once overthrown. The height of such discrimination saw the liquidation of Z.A. Bhutto and his Party from Pakistan politics.

The drive against Bhutto, Pakistan Peoples' Party etc. started rather early, when he emphasized repeatedly that he would hold elections only when

"positive results" could be obtained. Positive result was identified with the Pakistan National Alliance's victory, as that would suit his rule. Later there was a kind of political resurgence of support for the Pakistan Peoples' Party which really unnerved the General. A strong fear gripped the General and the Pakistan National Alliance, as both the parties - the Pakistan Peoples' Party and the Pakistan National Alliance - got into the business of preparing for the election.

Unable to reconcile his declared objective of holding "fair" elections with a primary need to defeat the Pakistan Peoples' Party, the prospect of which looked bleak under the prevailing conditions, he took resort to various measures to discredit Bhutto and his party.¹⁹ Another factor that pressed General Zia's government to abandon its initial "hand off" and neutral posture was Bhutto's own political actions during the first half of August 1977 - fiery appeals to the masses, criticism of the martial law regime and verbal attacks upon the Pakistan National Alliance leaders. The prospect of Bhutto's return to power became more real and more

19. For detailed measures against Bhutto, Bhuttoism and the Pakistan Peoples' Party, See, ~~Left~~ Right, n. William L. Richter, "Pakistan Under Zia", Current History, vol.76, no.446, April 1979, p.169.

threatening to the military and the Pakistan National Alliance.²⁰

With a clear intention of cultivating political forces opposed to the party overthrown by him, General Zia steadily turned towards the Pakistan National Alliance which was most enthusiastic for an informal alliance with the military. Zia adopted various ways to block Pakistan Peoples' Party return to power. One of which was the postponement of the elections just two weeks before the scheduled date - 18 October, 1977. This was justified by the General in terms of the Pakistan National Alliance's demand for "expeditious accountability before an early poll".²¹ Thus, the process of accountability became the central policy of the government, to which neither General Zia nor the Pakistan National Alliance had set any limits.

It was thus, obvious that the military rulers became aware of Bhutto's "misdeeds" and his "Machiavellian style of rule",²² when they perceive the prospect

20. Patriot, 16 March, 1978.

21. The Tribune, 13 October, 1977.

22. Hasan Askar Rizvi "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 5, May 1984, p.540.

of an outright victory for the Pakistan Peoples' Party in the forthcoming poll. Against this backdrop, the Pakistan National Alliance support to the army against Bhutto could be seen as an "inferiority complex"²³.

It was rightly feared by the Pakistan National Alliance leaders that they could never hope to rule as long as Bhutto was around. Thus, the Zia-- Pakistan National Alliance consensus over the need to eliminate Bhutto was carried out by "placing the full facts of Bhutto's misdeeds before the public". After Bhutto's ^rearrest white papers were issued to prove Bhutto's "destruction of civil institutions, politicisation of the service, use of public funds for personal luxury and party benefit, rigging of election and spreading of the germ of class hatred".²⁴

The height of the accountability process was reached when Bhutto was ^rearrested for the murder of Nawab Mohammad Khan Kasuri, father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, member of National Assembly. This was a golden opportunity for the Pakistan National Alliance leader to

23. Samuel Baid, "Pakistan : Crisis is inherent", IDSJ Journal, vol. 15, n. 1, July-September, 1982, p. 120.

24. William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism : Pakistan Third Military Regime", Strategic Digest, vol. 9, no. 5, May 1979, p. 285.

demand punishment for Bhutto and even "public execution".²⁵

On 1 October, 1977, General Zia announced his decision to postpone General election scheduled to be held on October 18, 1977 and banned all political activities. After nine months of tortuous proceedings, the Supreme Court confirmed the Lahore High Court verdict awarding death sentence to Bhutto.

There is little doubt that Zia's decision was motivated by political considerations and was not the action of an impartial head of the State. Zia virtually dreaded the day, when and if, Bhutto returned to power, the former would himself have to face charges of high treason according to the 1973 constitution. He had no hesitation in ordering the implementation of the Judicial verdict against Bhutto for he was sure that the Pakistan National Alliance Parties, the Judiciary, the army and the bureaucracy would fully uphold his decision. Besides, he visualised a broken Pakistan Peoples' Party after Bhutto's removal. Thus, in the wake of Bhutto's refusal to seek executive clemency, Zia had no problem in ordering the execution. Thus, Bhutto was hanged on 4 April, 1979, which marked the end of the arch rival of General Zia.

25. The Pakistan Times, 29 September, 1977.

In his effort to dismantle the Pakistan Peoples' Party completely, General Zia adopted the strategy of and succeeded in dividing the politicians and members of the PPP into those who were willing to share power and others who were not. This tactic of dividing the unity of the opposition PPP could be exemplified by the fact that he cleverly opposed the anti-Islamic parties in order to wean the moderate Kausar Niaz's PPP faction away from Bhutto's PPP. He made Niaz criticise Bhutto for turning the PPP "into a personal estate of a particular family".²⁶ Moreover, Bhutto's arrest and imprisonment created still greater pressures for division in the Pakistan Peoples' Party. A contest for leadership between Kausar Niaz and Bhutto's wife Nusrat Bhutto, saw the party's unity fast dissipating. With the post for leadership going in favour of the latter, Niaz led his faction out of the PPP to form the "Progressive Pakistan Peoples' Party". After these developments, the PPP found itself disintegrating. General Zia's formation of a "Civilian Government", espousal of Islamic laws, and throwing hints for returning the country to a "Presidential System" in the hope of isolating the PPP and strengthening his politicians.

26. Patriot, 16 March, 1978.

Promising to secure the Pakistan National Alliance, an electoral victory, in an army and judiciary conducted election and institutionalizing military rule under a civilian cover, the General found himself deeply entrenched in politics, with its most formidable opposition - Bhutto and the PPP - out of his path.

In achieving this objective his early association with the Pakistan National Alliance did augur well for his success on this count.

General Zia-ul Haq and the Pakistan National Alliance(PNA)

The PNA which had formed an opposition alliance against the Bhutto's PPP, exhibited a co-operating relationship with the military rulers initially.. As a corollary to this, the General's overtures towards the PNA was quite compromising and sympathetic to an extent that it proved beneficial for the military junta. During the formative phase of military rule, the motives of the PNA and the Military General converged on one point - that was to destroy the influence of Bhutto and his party - although, to perpetuate and fulfill different objectives. This co-operation between Zia and some of the constituents of the PNA could evidently be seen in postponing the election, initiating the process

of accountability against Bhutto and Bhuttoism, raising a non-elected civilian cabinet government and to some extent, initiating the process of Islamisation in the country.

Serving as a junior partner to this collaboration, with the fond of coming to the political forefront after having erased Bhutto and the PPP from the mainstream of national politics, the PNA extended help to General Zia to achieve his implicit objective of destroying the influence of Bhutto. However the General, while giving the impression of systematically preparing for a "free and fair" election and restoring democracy gradually, made a conscious but deliberate effort to consolidate his own rule, first by annihilating the PPP with the PNA's willing support and simultaneously disintegrating the strength and unity of the Pakistan National Alliance.

Dinding the Unity and Strength of the PNA

General Zia's policy of intimidating the PPP with the help of the PNA did not secure him required stability. It was not sufficient enough to secure his authority in tact. He therefore, followed the strategy of dinding his supporters (visibly the PNA) with a clear goal of disrupting its unity.

The first major split within the PNA came about when Tahrik Istiqlal (TI) led by Mohammad Ashgar Khan quit the alliance, protesting against the postponement of the election of October 1978. Subsequently Zia engineered shifts in the PNA unity through allurements of power. In his Federal Government, thirteen members were from four PNA parties - the JI, PML, JUP and PDP. The other parties refused to be a part of it. All the more interesting is the fact that the Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim League (Pagaro's faction) were given privileged positions in the government while the rest were isolated. The refusal of the NDP and TI to join the civilian cabinet, and their subsequent withdrawal from the alliance effectively split the PNA, leaving it an Alliance of only six parties. To keep the defectors guessing, General Zia continued to maintain that he would have handed over power to the Pakistan National Alliance but for its divisions.

Again very cleverly the General disrupted the strength of the PNA, by playing the PNA supporters one against the other. He encouraged M. Ashgar Khan to believe that he was a potential premier by sending him on foreign trip and thereby made the other Pakistan National

Alliance constituents suspicious of Ashgar's motives.²⁷ The NAP recorded a note of dissent on the question of a National Government, while the PNA's Secretary General opined that the National Government would "create a congenial atmosphere for elections".²⁸ Again, while the JUI remained ambiguous, the JI strongly objected to the idea of sharing power with Kausar Niaz's progressive people party. The Muslim League was not averse to the idea at all. More important, the greater tilt of the military towards that, as alleged by the other parties of the PNA, tended to create divisions within the Alliance. The General manipulated the diverse nature of the Alliance to his own advantage, thus bringing about its disintegration systematically, once Z.A. Bhutto ceased to be a power to be reckoned with. Whatever unity the PNA parties had artificially forged on the basis of a strong anti-Bhutto feeling began to loosen with Bhutto's arrest and a crackdown on the Pakistan Peoples' Party.

General Zia-ul-Haq and His Civilian Government

Ever since General Zia-ul-Haq's coup, his quest

Quoted in

27. ¹ Jitendra Mishra, "Military Regime in Bangladesh and Pakistan : Strategies of Sustenance and Survival", India Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, October-December, 1981, p. 534.

28. Nagpur Times, 28 April, 1978.

for a civilian face prompted him to seek "creative relationship with civilian political groups",²⁹ in preference to "election". It is pertinent to note that once Zia called off the elections of October 1977, he needed the "co-option of civilian politicians into the operation of the government",³⁰ to provide a civilian garb for his rule.

First, he was aided by a "Council of Advisors", some military, some civilians functioning as ministers. This arrangement could not however prevent the naked military rule. The "Civilian Cabinet" was a much muted outcome of the original plan of forming a "National Government", with the non-Pakistan Peoples' Party political groups. The idea was to assist the martial law authorities in administration, both at the centre and provincial levels, until democracy was restored in the country. At the outset, the plan misfired, as opposing and contradicting opinions were received from different parties on the subject of a "National Government". While TI rejected the idea of joining a "non-elected" government, parties like NDP, JUP, PDP and a faction of

29. Morris Janowitz, Military, Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago, 1977), p.39.

30. Ritcher, n.19, p.170.

the PML (Malik Qasim's faction) were against the proposal. On the contrary, other constituents of the PNA were not averse to such a proposal, rather were willing to provide an effective bridge between the people and the armed forces. The General, therefore, had to abandon the idea of forming a national coalition "the parties could not consider his proposal by rising above their personal and party interest".³¹

A 22 member ministerial cabinet, installed on 5 July 1978, a full year after Zia's assumption of power, included seven representatives of the PML and none from the PNA. However, this did not serve his purpose. Later, "broad based understanding"³² on "all basic issues" was reached between the military rulers and the PNA, following several rounds of talks. As a result on 23 August 1978, thirteen representatives of four parties from PNA - JI, JUI, PML and PDP - were included into the 21-member cabinet to form a "National Government". Interestingly "all political parties excluding the majority of the PPP loyal to Bhotto"³³ were represented.

31. P.B. Sinha, "Civilian Cabinet of General Zia" Strategic Analysis, vol. 2 , no. , September 1978, p.203.

32. The Times of India, 2 March, 1978.

33. See for detail, "Three Good Reasons Against National Government", Pakistan Economist, vol. 18, no.15 , 15 April 1978, p.506.

As a matter of fact, apart from the unrepresentative and undemocratic character of the "National Government", it is important to note that the civilian cabinet was formed only after the Lahore High Court imposed death penalty on Bhutto in March 1978. In the wake of growing countrywide movement against the persecution of Z.A. Bhutto the need for the PNA cover against the PPP was badly felt to obtain political respectability. It was in this context that General Zia began to woo the PNA leaders by offering them posts in the Federal Cabinet.

A close observation reveals the fact that by resorting to such a step, he intended first, to obtain civilian political support for his otherwise illegitimate government and second, to break the power and unity (by sowing the seeds of disunity) of the PNA, which at that time exhibited some potential to challenge Zia's authority.³⁴ On the other hand the PNA particularly the PML was eager to grab power, which it had lost for a long time. Moreover, the JI wanted to enter office which it could never hope to enter through a fair election.³⁵ In order to appoint a "civilian government"

34. Jameel A. Qureshi, "An Analysis of Contemporary Pakistan Politics : Bhutto Vs the Military", Asian Survey, vol. 19, no. , September 1979, p.925.

35. Kalim Bahadur, "Pakistan : Three years of Martial Law", Link, vol. 22, n.47 , 29 June 1980.

composed of the Jamaat and its allies - the real of ruling junta - Zia not only felt the need to suppress the PPP but to undermine and actually break the PNA as well. Thus, it was only after the TI and NDP refused to join the civilian government, that the Jamaat began to look like a big political party,³⁶ and the military wanted its co-operation for forming the government.

At this juncture, the PNA and the military regime needed each other's support in order to materialise their respective political objectives in their own respective fashion. Neither was it mentioned on what principles the members were selected for the government, nor was it explained explicitly by those Jamaats themselves as to why they joined the martial law government, except for briefing the reasons in a general tone.³⁷ As a condition for the PNA's participation, General Zia promised election by October 1979 and allowed restricted political activities. Although, Zia assured that the new cabinet would enjoy all powers and would have full say in policy making, he continued with the Military

36. Aijaz Ahmad, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 8, no.4, 1978 p. 504.

37. For details of the conditions of PNA Participation, see Salamat Ali, "Early Test for Zia's Cabinet", FEER, vol. 101, no. , 18 August 1978, p.37.

Council regarding it as the supreme body. No doubt, his way of functioning showed a greater tilt towards the later. This he showed by assuming the Presidency without consulting the cabinet, thereby moving Pakistan still further away from the possibility of a return to democracy.³⁸

On the whole, it was a peculiar coalition government, "which does not include the major vote-getters, the PPP, nor the major representatives of the small provinces, the NDP".³⁹ These major exclusions were very crucial as the "Viewpoint" observed :

Particularly the NDP out of the game, the position of Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. becomes similar to that of Punjab and Sind in that the Federal Government will comprise persons only who represent themselves or negligible minority groups in the four provinces.⁴⁰

The initial response from different quarters of political leadership was visibly cold on the issue of a

38. Salamat Ali, "Stepping Back into the Past", FEER, vol. 101, no. , 29 September, 1978, p.28.

39. W. Eric Guffalson, "Pak 1978 : At the Brink Again", Strategic Digest, vol. 9, no. 4 , April 1978, p.245.

40. Viewpoint, 27 August, 1978.

"National Government" of "all parties" based on "broad understanding". Ashgar Khan, Chief of TI which by then had already deserted the PNA, had little interest in joining the non-elected cabinet. So was the PPP. Although the Niaz faction evinced keen interest in the proposal, the 8-Party alliance openly rejected the idea of sitting with members of the PPP in any coalition government.

The PNA too was a house divided on the issue. While the NDP, the JUP, the KT, the PDP and a faction of the PML led by Malik Qasim were against the proposal (although willing to support the regime from outside) other constituents of the PNA showed keenness towards the proposal.

Thus, lack of unanimity of opinion surely resulted in the failure of the talks. The participation of the PML in the "National Government" on 5 July 1978, in defiance of the Alliance, directly precipitated the withdrawal of the JUP from the PNA. The NDP became critical in its attitude towards the PML, branded it as "power hungry" and "the king's party" and demanded its withdrawal.

When the civilian cabinet was formed on 23 August, 1978, even the PNA could not be held together on the

issue of joining the cabinet. The immediate fallout of the cabinet formation was the withdrawal of NDP from the PNA, thus reducing it to a six party affair. The NDP from the very beginning opposed PNA's entry into an "undemocratic and unrepresentative civilian government, under the umbrella of martial law "through the back-door".⁴¹

The formation of the New Cabinet gave rise to divisiveness and unhealthy polarisation in Pakistan. With the PNA fast disintegrating, its position had been reduced to virtual insignificance, leaving it a "minority within a minority"⁴² in Zia's cabinet, with mostly the right-wing Islam oriented parties (JI, JUP, PML etc) joining hands with the martial law regime.

The Zia-PNA co-operation which lasted until two weeks after Bhutto's execution of 4 April 1979, proved useful for the military in dealing with political dissidents and also civilianised the military regime.

Despite being in the National Government, the PNA began to suffer a sense of alienation. It soon came to realize its helplessness before the power of

41. Sinha, n. 37, p.204.

42. Ahmed, n.12, p.124.

a military-bureaucratic oligarchy. To be specific, the PNA soon understood that in Zia's government, the real power rested with "the army, although like before the bureaucracy has again been required to play a role".⁴³ Moreover, the PNA began suffering from public odium for collaborating with the martial law. Some political commentators believe that in the two years since it began agitation against Bhutto, the PNA had shed most of its popular support, while support for Bhutto's PPP had grown considerably.⁴⁴ However, there is no doubt that the principal preoccupation was the electoral disadvantage the PNA would suffer by continued close association with General Zia's government. Thus, at this juncture the PNA was eager to quit the government.

From the point of view of the military regime, the withdrawal of the NDP, JUP and TI from the PNA-fold took away whatever public support the PNA had ever enjoyed. Thus, "their lack of mass support rendered them useless to the junta".⁴⁵ Apart from this, General Zia

43. D.S. Khan, "Military and Politics in Pakistan" Strategic Digest, vol. 9, no. 2, February, 1979, p. 115, Emphasis added.

44. IDSIA, "New Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean", May 1979, p.159.

45. Mutiul H. Abidi, "Pak Military Dictatorship and Democratic Struggle", Marxist Review, vol. 2, no. May 1983, p.415.

was successful in sharing the responsibility of Bhutto's execution with the PNA members. With the PPP in shambles (after Bhutto's execution) and the PNA fast losing its mass support and disintegrating into their own component units, Zia had no problem in stabilizing his rule.

Thus, the early phase of Zia-PNA collaboration after Bhutto's execution and the eight-month old cabinet was dissolved on 21 April 1979, following the PNA's withdrawal of its 13 representatives leaving the cabinet constituting only of bureaucrats and technocrats.

The rationale for withdrawal by the PNA was that, they had achieved the objectives for which they joined the cabinet, namely that of instituting an Islamic order and the announcing^{of} an election date.⁴⁶ At first sight, these objectives of the PNA seem to have been fulfilled. It is important to remember here that Zia started the Islamization policy in February 1979, while the new election date of 17 November 1979, was announced in March 1979. However, as hitherto shown, the truth lay somewhere else.

This marked the end of a civilian face for the military regime. Although, to a certain extent it helped

46. The Hindustan Times, 13 April, 1979.

General Zia to fulfill his short-term objectives, his government apparently had not been able to increase the legitimacy of the regime. Its undemocratic and unrepresentative nature, and the status enjoyed by the political parties which were members of it, no doubt reduced the significance of political parties. Moreover, as it is commented, the cabinet government could "neither produce an alternative leadership the military could trust and ultimately transfer power, nor did it erode the support base of the dissident left and those political parties on the right that were not prepared to join hands with the military rule".⁴⁷ With the withdrawal of political parties from the cabinet, the government lost whatever civilian face it enjoyed. A return to the harsh rule of martial law witnessed the end of a civilian government.

The 90 days "Operation Fairplay" was staged by General Zia with a categorical promise to hold "free and fair" elections. General Zia thus stated, upon assuming power : "My sole aim is to organise free and fair election ... in October this year. Soon after....

47. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 7, May 1984, p.540.

powers will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people".⁴⁸ Later it was seen that he involved himself in the exercise of scheduling and rescheduling the election dates time and again, in order to assure "positive results" to the people. In the process of doing so, he saw to it that no election was held.

It was obvious within a few weeks of the martial law declaration that a peaceful transfer of power to the civilian government was not possible unless "positive results", which implied a victory for the right-wing PNA, was assured. General Zia's insistence on "positive results" clearly had two considerations. First, the elected PNA government could indemnify the rulers for acts done by them during the martial law regime, and second, the new government might amend the constitution which might secure a permanent place for the military to intervene in the political affairs whenever it wanted.⁴⁹

The PNA went all out of its way to obtain an electoral victory. It even absorbed some of the PPP defectors at the cost of the resultant cracks in its unity,

48. Dawn, Overseas Weekly, 10 July 1977.

49. Bahadur, n. 35, p.29.

in order to ensure a victory for them. There was even some discussion late in August, 1978, of merging the Alliance into a single party.⁵⁰ However, no such change was made.

As a set back to all these processes, the idea that "dethroned Bhutto was a destroyed Bhutto" proved a myth and Bhutto's growing popularity came as a sharp warning to Zia, the PNA leaders and also "to some factional element within the PPP".⁵¹ Given the nature of the ascending popularity of Bhutto and the PPP, General Zia sensed rightly that PPP still was the strongest party in the country, regardless of the regime's annihilation campaign against it. Added ^{to} this problem, the JI, the real member of the ruling junta, was not even the largest among the anti-Bhutto parties. Instead the TI and NDP did have some support of the masses. Thus, quite naturally, JI could not have expected to emerge victorious in the election, however, much the elections were rigged. Thus, the need for such a policy of

50. Ritcher, n. 24, p.281.

51. Ibid.

52. Ahmed, n. 12, p.124.

postponing the election was motivated by the strong "fears" on the part of the General and the PNA that PPP would either win the October polls or perform better than its right-wing political adversaries.⁵³ To save themselves from the toll and risks of contesting the PPP, the PNA leaders demanded the trial of Bhutto and other PPP members before the polls were held. Moreover Bhutto's popularity placed the military rulers in a dilemma.

With the interests of the PNA and the military regime converging on this point, the "indefinite postponement" of the election was announced, because of the "potentially dangerous situation" in the country and the need for establishing the principle of "political accountability". Thus the first postponement of "National Election" came in October 1977, with the tacit support of the PNA. This showed Zia and PNA's target of attack to be the PPP.

Later developments, however, gave the impression that, although "accountability took precedence over

53. Salman Taseer, "Bhutto : A Political Biography" (New Delhi, 1980), p.174-75, also see M.A. Khan "Generals in politics", (New Delhi, 1983), p.143.

election", General Zia was sincere in carrying out his objective of holding the election. He announced on 4 December 1977 that the election would be held within 60 days of the completion of accountability,⁵⁴ and justified his action for creating and restoring the condition for fair election, by releasing on bail the NAP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan and his associates in December 1977. Later he could claim to have released many political leaders.

However, he seemed to have diverted his intentions, when on 27 March 1978, he announced that the Presidential form of government was most suited to Pakistan and indicated his favour for reducing the number of political parties.⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, only two days later, on 29 March, the ban on political activities was extended for an indefinite period. Again, on 24 November 1978, the President offered to transfer power to the PNA provided the constituents of the Alliance merged ^{to} form a single united party. This act was however, preceded by the amendment of the Political Parties Act of 1962, prohibiting the formation of political

54. Pakistan Horizon, vol.31, no. 1, 1st Quarter 1978.

55. Morning News, 29 March 1979.

parties opposed to Islam. Finally, on 24 March 1979, Zia announced that he would hand over power to an elected civilian government after the National polls on 17 November 1979.⁵⁶

The first postponement of the election was reportedly hailed by the Muslim League faction (led by Pir of Pagaro), the Jamaat-i-Islami, and other PNA parties who did not dare risk their chances of losing the election, against the backdrop of Bhutto's popularity. On the other hand, the TI withdrew its association from the PNA fold. Obviously, the PPP was as critical as ever towards the military rulers' policies.

It is pertinent to note that, throughout the period of Bhutto's trial, the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) maintained the pretence that he was ultimately going to permit elections to take place. This was done to retain the support of the political parties grouped under the PNA umbrella, and to appease the democratic elements in the Alliance like the PPP, the NDP etc. Another point to be noted here is that, General Zia's final announcement of holding National

56. The Guardian, 24 March, 1979.

elections which came on 24 March, 1979, had some ulterior motives and considerations. Calculatedly, his announcement came a few days before ^{Bhutto} was to be hanged. He tried to sell his honest and sincere intentions and mobilise the support of the political parties other than the PPP and the masses. This "dual strategy" was adopted by General Zia throughout the period of scheduling and rescheduling the election dates. In this context, one observer remarks that Zia,

"while seemingly making preparations for the promised elections to pacify the PNA, at the same time affected long-term, and wide ranging structural changes in the administration with the aim of weeding out pro-Bhutto elements".⁵⁷

Interestingly, he was successful on both counts. After the postponement of the election, while the process of accountability was still going on, the gradual liquidation of Bhutto and the PPP came about and the PNA soon began disintegrating over the issues of postponement of election. Moreover, to some extent, the promise

57. G. Shawney, Zia's, Pakistan : Implication for India's Security (New Delhi, 1985), p.10.

to hold election, provided legitimacy to the government as a few parties flocked around Zia's government at least for some time, and provided popular support.

Politics of Islamisation

Being devoid of popular mandate, General Zia's regime arrogated to itself the task of Islamising the country's institutions. In the process Islam was manipulated by the ruling class in order to do away with popular participation in the affairs of the state, and crush the opposition.

Going back to election politics, a careful observation of the March 1977 election reveals the fact that the PNA demanded "Nizam-i-Mustafa" (the political system of the prophet) along with its most fundamental demand of re-election. Thus, it is not surprising to see General Zia conveniently thinking the anti-Bhutto agitation of March 1977 as "basically a voice of protest against unislamic tenets".⁵⁸ Moreover, the justification provided by him for his takeover was the "divine mission" undertaken by him to Islamise Pakistan before power could be transferred to "Islamic minded people".⁵⁹

58. Afzal Iqbal, Islamization of Pakistan (New Delhi, 1984), p.118.

59. Omar Ashgar Khan, Political and Economic Aspects of Islamization, in M. Ashgar Khan ed. Islam, Politics and the State: A Pakistan Experience, (London, 1985), p. 144.

Although he appeared totally committed to hold elections, a part of his inaugural speech, after takeover, implied that he had other things in his mind. He stated "I must say that the spirit of Islam demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proved that Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That's why I consider the introduction of an Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country".⁶⁰

Given the military character of his regime, General Zia came to realise the difficulty involved in mobilising political support for himself through a political party. Thus, an attempt was made to legitimise his military rule and build mass support through the medium of Islam. In this context one author has communicated thus,

a throwback to Islamic slogans appeared very attractive to the GHQ who found solace in religion, because they provided the generals the main basis of legitimacy for the imposition of military rule.⁶¹

60. Quoted in Shawney, n. 57, pp.9-10.

61. M. Ayoob, "Two Faces of Political Islam : Iran and Pakistan Compared", Asian Survey, vol. 19, no.6, June, 1979, p.38.

This was specifically alarming in view of the PNS's allegations that the PPP was unIslamic and Socialist.

To some others, it looked as a conspiracy between the military and Bhutto's civilian opponents (large number of whom were affiliated to religious parties) to bring down Bhutto and replace his "UnIslamic government with an Islamic regime".⁶² This was quite evident, given the composition and characteristics of the political opposition and its subsequent collaboration with the military, to rule the country in the name of Islam.

From the very beginning, after the takeover Gen. Zia apparently was sympathetic to the Islamic fundamentalistic parties of the PNA. This was evident from the fact that the military was almost promising a victory for the PNA against Bhutto's PPP. The PNA also believed the same and expected Zia's regime to be short lived. As this perception became less tenable, the regime's priorities shifted from elections to accountability and reforms. Thus writes Ayoob Mohammed,

62. Op. cit., p.537.

63. Richter, n..24, p.292.

"to the traditional twin justification of military rule in Pakistan - political instability and threat to the country's survival, General Zia had to add the slogan of enforcement of Islamic Shariat Law in a mammoth effort to sell extended military rule to an increasingly sceptical public".⁶⁴ Hence, it is well noted that his obsession with Islam was borne out of his political motives.

Alignment with the Political Right

Quite distinctively, General Zia's alignment with and overtures towards the political rightist parties like JI, JUI, PML (Pagaro's group), is remarkable. No doubt it served certain major purposes of his. First, this alliance helped him to form a civilian cabinet, which in turn assisted him in consolidating his power. Second, this alliance effectively caused a major split in the PNA group after NDP and JVP deserted it. Lastly, the blame for executing Bhutto was shared between the Junta and the political rightist groups.

64. M. Ayoob, "Pak Comes to Full Circle", India Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1, January - March, 1978, p. 19.

Islamic reforms did serve one political function of the military junta. It encouraged speculation upon alternative governmental forms ⁱⁿ line with Islamic tenets. General Zia, participating in such a speculation commented that a strong Presidential form of government would be more suitable in keeping with the "thinking and psyche of Muslims". He argued that Muslims "believed in one God, one Prophet, and One Book and their mentality is that they should be ruled by one man".⁶⁵

The political parties to the Right praised Zia's effort to give an Islamic tone to the society and virtually proclaimed him as the soldier of Islam. Mohammed Ashraf, Chief of Khaksar Tehrik (KT), another PNA party said, that his party "prefers complete enforcement of the total Islamic system to any other thing, as Western democracy is a total farce in the country".⁶⁶ Political parties outside the PNA had stepped up their demand for early elections showing scant interest in President Zia's steps towards Islamising Pakistan society. The JUI, led by Noorani, alleged that the government had started the reform campaign to divert the peoples' attention from the real issues facing the country, whereas the

65. Dawn, 28 March, 1979.

66. Dawn, 31 March 1979.

PDP led by Bizenjo, accused the government of misleading the people in the name of Islam.⁶⁷ While the PPP became highly critical of Zia's policy, the Pakistan Liberal Party said that the name of Islam was being exploited in Pakistan and described it as "illogical and deceptive".⁶⁸

In spite of these divided opinions and strong opposition, the President^{enacted} a series of measures for the introduction of Islamic system (Nizam-i-Islam) in the country. Towards this end he first reconstituted the Islamic ideology council. Later he appointed individuals noted for their strong commitment to Islam as well as members of religious parties to important government positions. Moreover, in December 1978, he declared Islamisation to^{be} the objective of his government. and announced the creation of shariat courts to determine whether or not specific laws were repugnant to Islam. The process was set in pace by February 1979 with the announcement of "Zakat" and other measures and by setting up a number of institutions in support of his measures. However, his politics of Islamisation

67. National Herald, 18 December, 1978.

68. Ibid.

was to play a significant role in the country's politics in the post-execution phase. However,,to oppose the democratic elements that had taken part in and had supported the PNA movement, the General periodically talked of conducting election in the near future.

Consistent with the theme of Islam, Zia put forth that the PNA was making two inconsistent demands. While the PNA's considerations, to co-operate^{with} the General, by becoming the members of his civilian cabinet, were ~~conducting~~ islam and implementation of Nizam-i-Mustafa, lately Zia discovered these two demands were self contradictory and inconsistent. That, their demands for democracy in the western sense, through elections, was seen as inconsistent with the demand for Nizam-i-Mustafa.⁶⁹ As it is hoped that Nizam-i-Mustafa there were no parties and no democracy unless it is separated from the religion.

Thus, as seen hitherto, Islam was used to crush the demand of the PNA.

69. Muhammad, Munir, "From Jinnah to Zia", (Delhi, 1981), p. 115.

While all the above strategies continued to operate hand in hand, a policy of coercing all other dissidents was followed by the President. This highlights the fact that the ultimate source of authority for a military regime, is force.⁷⁰ Although quite a number of new parties like, "Quaid Azam Muslim League",⁷¹ (led by Malik Iftikhar Ali), "Pakistan National Tehrik" (led by Syed Hashim Raza), "Pakistan Patriotic Front"⁷² (led by Qazi Nazir Ahmed) and "Pakistan Mussawat Party" (led by Mohammed Hanif Ramay), were formed, continuous ban on their political activity made their presence obsolete. In effect, they failed to provide viable alternatives and were non-existent for all practical purposes.

Since election was out of the question, Zia put a ban on regional parties and reduced the number of national parties. Zia's espousal of proportional representation was a tactic to delay election, reduce the number of political parties⁷³ and to ensure that

70. Mishra, n. 27, p. 53

71. Indian Express, 11 October 1978.

72. Morning News, 23 December 1978.

73. Hindustan Times, 21 March, 1979.

no party would secure a majority. Besides, the stipulation of compulsory registration compelled parties to stay away from electoral politics. In October 1978, the President issued an order amending the political parties Act of 1962, prohibiting the formation of political parties opposed to Islam. Finally, under the constitutional order, military courts were set up and 7,000 political dissidents were put behind bars between 1977 and 1979.

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that despite Zia's repeated statements that democracy could not be put off for a long period, its restoration remained to be seen in the formative phase of his rule. Zia held the view that holding elections just for the sake of election carried no meaning. The elections had to yield "positive results". From the General's point of view an atmosphere where such results could be obtained were non-existent throughout this period.

Another factor that contributed to the prevalence of such a bleak prospect for holding national election was that the political parties (mainly the PNA) could not stand together as a viable alternative to the PPP, the dethroned party. On the contrary, Zia's first two years in power saw the glaring display of their weakness.

That the PNA was not alarmed by Zia's step-by-step entrenchment into power speaks of the utter immaturity of the political leadership in the country. The PNA supported all actions of Zia till the hanging of Bhutto in April, 1979. Thus, evidently, the political parties were disintegrating either "because of lack of politics or repression",⁷⁴ to which the PNA and the PPP fell prey to respectively. With the PPP in shambles, and the PNA failing to hold together on common issues, Zia had no problem in stabilizing his rule. He took deep interest in Pakistan politics in the garb of political neutrality. By late 1978, he already had assumed the three important positions of authority - Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), Army Chief, and President of Pakistan. These two years saw Zia systematically rising to the height of power. First, he destroyed the influence of Bhutto and the PPP, with the help of a working alliance with the PNA against the PPP. Later, he created disunity among the PNA by playing one against the other. Through his pro-Islam postures, General Zia tried to legitimize his rule and to a great extent neutralized the threat of the opposition. By forming the civilian

74. Baid, n.23, p.123.

cabinet, he rendered party politics obsolete in Pakistan. And to some extent, he sought legitimacy by promising to hold elections, which had however been several times postponed. No wonder by mid 1979, the significance of all his political opponents were reduced to non-existence.

CHAPTER - III

TOTAL MARTIAL LAW

The death of Bhutto marked the end of any substantial resistance by the opposition, to the military regime. Once Bhutto was ~~alone~~ away with, the PPP dissipated and the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) ran into ~~troubled~~ weather. Later exposing its true character, the PNA split up. Expectedly, it was a matter of time before the Junta could assume unprecedented power and authority. By the end of 1979, after the announcement of the cancellation of ~~General~~ elections for the second time on 16 October 1979, Pakistan entered into the phase of 'real martial law' or 'total martial law', which was more rigorous and stringent than before.

It is remarkable to note that President Zia adopted various policy measures to ensure that the major political parties in Pakistan did not ultimately come to hold the reign of political power. In this context, it would be proper to study the various policy measures, such as the ~~postponement of~~ the General Election, amendment to the Political Parties Act, virtual abrogation of the 1973 Constitution and substitution of it with the 'provisional constitutional Order (PCO), 1981. Besides these, acceleration of the process of Islamization, creation of a nominated Assembly called the Majlis-i-Shoora, holding

of local bodies election on non-party basis, and announcement of the August 1983 plans and subsequent 14 point principles, are relevant.

All these measures in effect, have moved the military far away from its original goals of conducting 'free and fair' elections and preparing conditions for the proper functioning of democracy in Pakistan.

Election Politics - Expansion of
Political Participation

It is through election politics that Zia's regime has acquired a tight control over the political parties. Through various declarations and announcements, the latter's activities have been greatly controlled and restricted.

It has been noted that two weeks before Bhutto's execution, a new date (November 17, 1979) for the National Election was announced. However, soon General Zia on 3 August 1979, amended the Political Parties Act (PPA), 1962, to the effect that all political parties were required to register themselves with the Election Commission (EC), submit their accounts for survey and hold their own party elections. Failure to obey the new laws

would automatically debar a political party from contesting the General election.

The registration clause angered a number of political parties including the PNA and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). However, a number of parties expressed their willingness to register themselves. The political parties like JI, TI, JUI, Musawat party, JUP and all the three factions of the PML belonged^{to} this category. Their argument was that, if political parties refuse to register, the government would get an opportunity to postpone the elections, which in turn would delay the return of a democratically elected civilian rule in the country.¹

On the other hand, the PNA along with the PPP, NDP, PNP and other political parties showed its tenacity in opposing the registration clause. The PNA even went to the extent of calling for a 'joint front' of all parties including the PPP to thwart the government's sinister design to perpetuate the rule.² The response of other parties was lukewarm or even negative. By 30 September 1979, when the period of registration expired, 56 parties had registered out of 80 and 44 had submitted their accounts.

1. Pakistan Economist, 28 September 1979, p.10.

2. Pakistan Economist, 22 September, 1979, p.10.

However, the PNA's attitude proved to be short-lived when on 7 October, 1979 it open handedly welcomed the modified version of the 'registration law' which was aimed at accomodating PNA's viewpoint. Nevertheless, the PPP and the NDP continued to remain as critical as before about this modified version of the registration clause. While the NDP emphatically observed that the modification of the registration clause without any real change was done on the request of the PNA, the PPP reiterated its stand that 'it aimed at preventing the PPP from participating in the election'.³ This law allowed the unregistered parties to contest the elections provided they submitted their accounts and a list of their office holders by 9 October and extended the closing date for nomination of candidates to 13 October 1979.⁴

While the political parties were debating over the electoral changes, the General ~~decided to~~ hold elections ~~to~~ Local Bodies on a non-party basis before the already announced National elections. This attempt to build 'grassroot democracy' was supported by the Progressive Peoples' Party (Niazi) and the JI. However its non-party orientation led to its condemnation by the JUP

3. Pakistan Economist, 13-19 October, 1979, p.9.

4. P. Sharan, Government and Politics of Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1983), p. 182.

and PNA who rightly expressed the fear that it would only lead to Zia's stronghold.⁵ This was obviously a device to create a 'rural constituency' for Zia and build an electoral college which would elect a National Assembly without direct elections, as laid down in the 1973 constitution.

Local Bodies Elections :

The Local Bodies polls were held in four provinces in September 1979, on a 'non-party basis',⁶ primarily to test the strength of the various political parties in the country, mainly that of the PPP. All the major political parties contested the local elections under appropriate disguises.⁷ Results of the local polls only confirmed Zia's apprehension about the continued hold of the PPP. Despite a low poll (below 50 per cent), the PPP nominees besides capturing all Larkana seats, won 58 out of 82 seats in Lahore, 90 per cent of the seats in Nawab Shah, and 26 seats in Peshwar.⁸

The local election which the PPP won by a decisive majority, was thus, 'a clear confirmation of the military

5. Times of India (New Delhi), 21 September 1979.

6. Morning News (Karachi), 20 March 1979.

7. The Local Bodies election in detail has been highlighted in Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? (London, 1983), p.192.

8. Musawaat, 26 September 1979.

Junta's assessment of the political crisis.⁹ This particular test of elections, even to the local bodies on a non-party basis was sufficient for the President to adopt new strategies for cancelling the promised National elections. Contrary to his avowed objectives, General Zia announced on 16 October, his decision to postpone the General election. Preceding to this he declared the forthcoming election under the "proportional representation" system by an announcement of "Presidential Order" called the "National and Provincial Assemblies Order" 1979, on 13 September 1979.¹⁰

This new order came under heavy fire from the PPP which saw it as a "conspiracy" to deprive it of a sure victory in the coming General election. However, JUP made its intention clear that it would participate in the election, because, in their opinion, its boycott would delay the transfer of power to the peoples' representative.¹¹ The NDP chief Mazari expressed his party's opposition to any confrontation with the government, and agreed to participate in the election. Asghar Khan of the T I asserted his party's resolve to participate in the election under any circumstances. He indicated that

9. Ali, n.7 p.136.

10. Pakistan Economist, 22-28 September, 1979, p.9.

11. Ibid., p.10.

his party would win the election and form the government.¹²

While the divided opinion among various political parties was persisting, the military authorities made another controversial move; they decided to postpone the elections scheduled to be held on 17 November 1979, for an indefinite period. The reasons they put forward was that the political parties in the country were hindering the path of Islamic development in Pakistan and that the time was not ripe for any kind of National election. Tehrik Istiqlal (TI) was the most disappointed over the postponement of poll dates. It was expecting a clearcut victory in the polls, where opposition would have come from only a few parties like the JI, PNA and JUP. While the JI was not considered a formidable opponent, a disjointed PNA it was felt, could not have offered a tough opposition. Moreover, with the JUP, it had reached an understanding of some sort on electoral alliance. It blamed the PNA for the conspiracy and said "these people are aware of their weakness and do not wait to expose their unpopularity through electoral contest".¹³

During the period from 1979 to August 1983, the promise to hold elections at an appropriate time in the

12. Ibid.

13. Pakistan Economist, 13-19 October, 1979, p.10.

future was often repeated. On 9 May, 1981, Zia stressed that he would allow elections in the country when two or three major political parties were formed.¹⁴ But while he sometimes called upon the people to work for the "welfare and good" of everybody and sometimes spelt out the need for the establishment of an "Islamic way of democracy", yet at other times he referred to "positive results" and the "dangerous strategic environment as reasons for not holding an early election".¹⁶ He also sometimes felt that the problems which the country was facing were not political but economic.¹⁷ During this time the military ruler was desperately in search of a political formula which would fall short of nation-wide election based on mass franchise.

On 12 August 1983, he announced the new structure of Pakistan's Political system on Islamic lines. Besides other things, he emphasized on future election to local bodies on a non-party basis. It would be evident, that much remained unsaid and ambiguous in these proposals, and many crucial questions were glossed over or

14. Quoted in Sharan, n.4, p.185.

15. Deleted

16. The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December 1979 provided a "Lease of Life" to Zia's martial law rule. In view of the changed global situation, Zia exploited the religious feelings of the entire Muslim World. No doubt, Zia made considerable political capital out of the events in Afghanistan, by ^{diverting} people's attentions from the domestic issues. See N.Mitra "Peasants to Caches", Strategic Analysis, vol.5, nos.1-2, April-May 1981, pp.56-63.

17. Pakistan Economist, 29 September-5 October, 1979, p.11.

evaded, such as,

- i) whether the ban on political parties would be lifted;
- ii) whether elections would be held under a party system, or whether only registered parties or all parties would be permitted to contest; and
- iii) what would be the qualifying standards for the eligibility of candidates. Since the main intentions for eligibility would be character, who and how this would be assessed.¹⁸

Notwithstanding the mounting disenchantment of the political parties, General Zia was firm in his resolve to conduct the future General elections on strict Islamic principles where there was no room for a Western model of party based election. Announcing a 14 point guideline for the proposed March 1985 general elections in March 1984, Zia clearly stated that those who did not possess the required ability to stand up to Islamic Standards would be disqualified.¹⁹ All this shows that Zia had been trying to create a constituency for himself, in the event of his turning into an "elected civilian leader".

18. R.G. Shawney, Zia's Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1985), p.14. For details of the announced new political structure for Pakistan on 12 August 1983, see p.13.

19. Quoted in P.Nayak - Pakistan : Dilemma of a Developing Nation (Jaipur, 1985), p.80.

Military Rule and Popular Legitimacy

As noted earlier, restoration of popular democracy on the basis of a "free and fair" election under the 1973 constitution remained only a stated objective of the military regime. The feasibility of such an eventuality remained an unfulfilled pledge. Expressing his doubts concerning the applicability of western democracy and party politics to Pakistani political situation, General Zia seemingly continued to search for ways of expanding the popular base of his regime in order to sustain and survive in power.

Efforts in this direction could be noticed in the civilian cabinet he formed earlier to which a few political parties were party to, at least in its initial stage of existence. The aftermath of Bhutto's execution marked the end of participation by the PNA. Later, the Federal Cabinet consisted only of military people, bureaucrats, professionals, religious leaders etc.

There was some talk in March 1980 about the expansion of and changes in the Federal Cabinet, introduction of an Advisory Council, first at the provincial level and then at the central level. The idea of introducing an Advisory Council at the provincial and federal level would

be, as stated, a step forward in the fulfillment of President Zia's desire to "hand over power to a political government."²⁰

In a bid to prove himself as an accommodative leader who encouraged divergent political opinions in the country and to judge the mood of the defunct political parties, the General, in mid-1980, initiated a debate on the form of government that was most appropriate for the country. The leaders of the defunct political parties were invited to give their opinions on the merits of the various political systems and more particularly "whether the democratic system adopted in Pakistan was compatible with Islam".²¹ The response obtained was almost unanimously in favour of retaining the basic features of the 1973 constitution. Subsequently, although General Zia did not accommodate this view of the various political party leaders, it was to his credit that he at least initiated such a discussion.

Throughout the year 1980, Zia continued to find as many civilian sources of legitimacy as possible. During this period, he promised governmental changes, an expansion of the central cabinet and envisioned provisions for civilian cabinet in the provinces. However, he

20. Pakistan Economist, 13-19, April 1980, p.9.

21. Sultan Ahmed, Consensus on Constitutional Scheme of 1973, Dawn Overseas Weekly, 9 August 1980, p.1.

fell short of achieving these stated objectives, as adequate steps could not be undertaken in this direction. It was presumed and, rightly so, that the problem might be in not being "able to find a group of politicians who would be acceptable both to the military and the people".²² With strong opposition emanating from the PPP and eminent PNA leaders, Zia found it predictably difficult to prepare an accepted alternative. He unsuccessfully tried to offer the post of Prime Minister to Gulam Mustafa Jatoi (former Governor and Chief Minister of Sind and a member of the PPP Central Executive) and the Chief Ministership of Sind to Abdul Hafeez Pirzada²³ (Bhutto's former Finance Minister and Education Minister).

The unsuccessful attempts at finding ways for popular democracy did not preclude the exploration of other possible alternatives by the General. The idea to build a system of representation upon the "Local Bodies Officials" elected in September 1979, was aimed at building democracy in Pakistan "from ground up". In March 1980, he convened an "All Pakistan Local Bodies Convention" in Islamabad as "the first step towards the establishment of a representative government". As a

22. Gustafson and Richter, Pakistan in 1980 : Weathering Storm, Asian Survey, vol. 21, no. 2, February 1981, p. 166.

23. The Guardian (London), September 1980.

prelude to popular participation, he chaired the discussions on issues of local, national and international interest, with the 300 delegates whom ^{he} called the real representatives of the people, ^{being} "duly elected".²⁴

These discussions were carried out to ensure a sense of wide political participation among the masses and was an effort to uncover the democratic character of the military regime.

Another step in this direction was the establishment of Provincial Advisory councils in the four provinces, with representations from among these local bodies officials, along with others. This representation came under severe criticisms, as "large number of those elected in 1979 were disqualified on *trivial* grounds and replaced by appointments more acceptable to the authorities".²⁵

All these steps were taken with the objective of restraining the opposition parties from gaining any political ground in the country.

In terms of providing popular legitimacy, these steps proved inadequate. The growing mass disenchantment

24. Ibid.

25. *Gustafson*, n.22, p.166.

towards the military rule unnerved the President. Zia's dilemma was enhanced by the launching of the Pakistan Liberation Movement in London by Brigadier Usman Khalid, to "struggle against the military despot and liberate the nation."²⁶ Moreover, the launching of the 9-party movement for the restoration of democracy with massive student support in February 1981 came as a strong resistance to authority. In the light of his troubles, Zia's need to give a civilian face to his regime became all the more pressing.

The effort to humanize his martial law regime was crystallized in the form of an expanded civilian cabinet, in which 23 civilians were included on 9 March 1981. Later, on 24 December 1981, he promulgated his version of the country's Parliament by announcing the composition of the Majlis-i-Shoora. Being a nominated body, mainly drawing support from various sections like the Ulema, Islamic scholars, theologians, doctors, journalists etc., it had to perform only an advisory function in directing the country to the long cherished goals of an Islamic state and way of life and create conditions for economic progress. The Parliament lacked an electoral link with the people and was seen as "a link between the present martial

26. Indian Express, 26 March, 1980.

law and the future democracy". The very nature of the selection of its members was arbitrary and it was being carried out "on the basis of moral character, rather than partisan competition".²⁷ Again, the very fact that the council was an Advisory Body and not a decision making body speaks of its true character. In this context one scholar observers²⁸ that "despite the new line, power remains in the hands of the military". This however, failed to provide the required popular support, rather its unrepresentative nature became more exposed in course of time.

Notwithstanding all these failures in efforts, in early 1983, Zia proposed to "civilianise" the federal cabinet by inducting some politicians with different political affiliations. He ruled out the possibility of a National government or an all party coalition, as demanded by leaders of major parties.

General Zia's long term strategy featured the building up of a constituency of politicians who could sacrifice their party loyalties for the prestige and patronage of local and national positions. It is not

27. Ali, n.7, p.

28. Ibid.

surprising to find^{that} the local government officials elected in non-party elections in September 1979 were members of the Majlis-i-Shoora appointed by Zia. These politicians consisted of members of virtually all the major parties including PPP.²⁹ This in effect not only weakened the original party, but at the same time coloured by the military to have a popular base.

General Zia and the Right-Wing Parties :

While the political-religious parties maintained a good rapport with the military authorities in the early years of Zia's regime, the post-Bhutto period witnessed the crystallization of the like mindedness between the military ruler and the JI - the fundamentalist religious party. A deep observation reveals the fact that the military and the rightist parties continued to gain mutual benefit from this harmonious relationship. For the JI it was the sharing of political power without going through the process of elections. Besides engaging themselves in low-key political activity, it extended its influence in the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media and the educational institutions.

29. W.L.Richter, "Pakistan in 1984: Digging In" Asian Survey, vol. 25, n. 2, February 1985, p.148.

On the other hand, for the military, this alignment with the political right proved more beneficial. First, the threat of political agitation by a political party with a well organized cadre was temporarily removed.³⁰ Second, Jammāt's support to the military was quite crucial in the wake of Bhutto's execution. The leader of the Jamaat, Mian Tufail had assured General Zia that Bhutto's execution could not lead to any deterioration of the political situation in Pakistan, but if that happened, his party would take care of it.³¹

Third, the Jamaat helped the military government to undercut the efforts of other political groups to launch political agitation against the government. At the time of facing opposition from the politicians especially the left of centre groups, it sought the help of a number of rightwing political parties like JI, PML(P), a faction of JUI, as a counterweight to confront the protest movement.

At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that after the formation of the MRD, the rightist parties like the JI, JUP, PML(P) and JUI (Darhkawasti) resolved to

30. H.A. Rizvi - The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan, Asian Survey, vol.24, n.8, May 1984, p.544.

31. Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, 4 April, 1979.

counter the moves of the MRD.³² That they failed in this, was another matter.

Two of the important functions of the right wing ^{were to} forces act as agents of the government and to project the thinking of the JI. The right wing forces succeeded in influencing the thinking and policies of the military government which appeared to be moving systematically towards implementation of the Jammāt's policies and religious philosophy.³³

The military leaders cultivated the extremely orthodox religious leaders who supported the government's decision to assign the highest priority to Islamization. Of late, even the rightist parties started criticising Zia's strong arm methods by which it suppressed the MRD movement. The JUP and JUI (Darkhwasti) refused to accept Zia's proposal of non-party basis election. Though these parties had expressed their agreement with 'Islamic priorities', provided in the 12 August 1983 plan, they continued to insist upon elections under the 1973 constitution.³⁴ In this context, three rightist parties, namely,

32. The Pakistan Times - 3 March 1979.

33. M. A. Khan, Introduction, in A. Khan, ed., Islam, Politics and the State: A Pakistan Experience, ed., (London, 1985), p.8.

34. Times of India, 22 November 1983.

JUI, JUP, (Darkhwasti) and Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH) formed a new alliance to oppose Zia's authoritarianism.

A note of discord could also be perceived in Jamaat's attitude towards the military authorities in early 1984. The Jamaat had been critical of Zia's policies since February 1984, when the military government imposed ban on all the student Unions including the Islami-Jamiat-i-Tulaba (IJT), a Jamaat's front organisation.³⁵ It appeared that President Zia seemed to have ended the special relationship with the right-wing JI as exemplified by the ban on student's union and suppression of the IJT.³⁶ JI found itself in ^a tight spot as it had been pursuing a dual policy during the last seven years. Its sustained effort to cultivate the military regime and at the same time to project an independent political posture, thus seemed to be in danger. It is noteworthy to remark that Jamaat Amir Mian Tufail announced in April 1984, his party's (JI) willingness to cooperate with other parties to end military rule, but stopped short of joining the MRD.³⁷

35. Times of India, 26 February 1984.

36. Times of India, 20 March 1984.

37. Richtr, n.22, p.148.

MRD Agitation :

The Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), drawing its support initially from eight parties.³⁸, was set up in February 1981 with the PPP as its principal component. Unlike the PNA which was an electoral alliance, the PPP's aim was directed towards opposing Zia's constitutional proposal as well as his attempts to hold local election as a prelude to National and Provincial elections. Another point of difference was that while the PNA's basis was the strong aversion for Bhutto's regime, the MRD was an alliance of the Right; centre, and left all together opposing Zia's martial law regime. It is remarkable to note that for the first time two leftist organisations namely the Pakistan Majdoor Kisan Party and Quami Muhaz Azadi, were represented. Other leftist organisations such as the Pakistan Awami Tehrik, Pakistan Socialist Party and the Awami Jamhoori Party also sought to join the MRD.

However, the flames of the MRD agitation^{was} confined to Sind. The response from Punjab was very lukewarm. On the whole, it could not gain a national character,

38. These parties included, PPP, NDP, PDP, TI, QMA, PMKP, JUI, PML. Later in September 1983, PNP joined the alliance and subsequently Awami Tehrik was admitted as the 10th party in the MRD fold.

due to the repressive measures of the government.

In a bid to undercut the efforts of the MRD, political parties like ML(P), JI, JUP endeavoured to set up a parallel alliance. Their purpose, as one observer puts it was, '..... to create confusion and weaken the MRD. This party can not afford to be a part of galvanising the masses and risking a collusion with the regime ... that's why the endeavour to come to power through the back door'.³⁹

Another factor which significantly contributed towards suppressing the political opponents of Zia was the helping hand of the right wing political parties. Zia mobilized a number of orthodox Ulama and their followers as a counter weight, and encouraged a number of political parties like JI, ML(P) and faction of JUP to undercut the protest movement.⁴⁰

Moreover, in a bid to control the MRD from gaining in strength, the government controlled media played up on an hijacking incident and exploited to the full the alleged involvement of the PPP.⁴¹ Later, Zia on 24 March 1981, promulgated the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) which curtailed the powers of the civilian

39. Aziz Ahmed, "Dictatorship and Democratic Struggle," Marxist Review, May 1986, p.416.

40. *Abid.*

41. Dawn, 18 October 1981.

courts to hear any case affecting people under Preventive Detention.

On August 1983, the MRD launched a new mass protest movement against Zia's government. With the exception of the Punjab province, the other three provinces - Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan extended open support to this anti-regime agitation. In order to undermine the PPP, the party at the forefront of the agitation, Zia unleashed a reign of terror in Sind. The repression was reported to be far more brutal than what it had been during the East Pakistan crisis.

During 1984, the military authorities attempted to weaken the MRD with a variety of manoeuvres. Early in 1984, Zia forced Benazir Bhutto to leave the country ostensibly on medical grounds.

Besides being subject to state repression, the movement was also plagued by internal differences. The first blow came from the head of Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference. Its leader Sardar Abdul Qayum, announced that PPP was involved in the plane hijacking of 2 March 1981, and later left the movement. Soon after, JUI threatened to withdraw from the movement. Besides, TI always visualised the danger to its status coming from the MRD itself - its main adversary being the PPP.

Political Parties - A Disjointed Unity :

One major contributing factor for the failure of the operation of stable and strong political parties was their inner squabbles and contradictions. As a direct consequence of these inner contradictions and conflicts, they failed to stand as a united force, ultimately exposing themselves to the searching criticism at the hands of the ruling authorities.

One such issue on which the PPP or the PNA could not adhere to a united stand was the 'registration issue'. Differences of opinions cropped up regarding it within the PPP. While the central hierarchy of the party had expressed its opposition to the issues of registration and proportional representative, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the Sind party chief declared that the PPP would take part in the election. This exposed the party's rank and file to be sharply divided between those who wanted to take part in the elections under all circumstances, and those who advocated boycotting the polls under the conditions imposed by the Martial Law authorities.⁴²

Likewise, on the registration issue, the PNA stood sharply divided. While all the constituent parties except

42. Pakistan Economist, 22-28 September 1979, p.9.

the JI opposed the government's move, the latter decided to apply for registration and in the process got itself expelled from the alliance. When the new ordinance had been issued to accommodate PNA's viewpoint, Mufti Mahmud thought of persuading the JI to come back to the Alliance fold. But the PML(P) exhibited strong opposition to JI's re-entry, thus exposing its dislike towards it. The possibility of PML(P) deserting the PNA fold could not have been ruled out completely, in the eventuality of JI rejoining the fold. Interestingly, others in the PNA feared an unhappy prospect of domination by PML(P) and JUP, JUP was expected to rejoin the fold once the possibility of JI's re-entry was refused.⁴³

The MRD also was a house divided. It proved fragile when exposed to stresses and strains. First, Quyyum's group left the MRD fold by accepting the government's version of the PPP's involvement in the plane hijacking. JUP followed subsequently.

The MRD even today represents a disjointed unity due to serious imbalances among the constituent parties of the alliance. The PPP has more popular support than the rest of the MRD parties taken together. This causes bitterness among the leaders of a number of smaller

43. Pakistan Economist, 13-19 October, 1979, p.9.

parties who are sensitive about the identities of their parties. The TI is the most vocal critic of the PPP and sees its political enemy in PPP rather than in the government.

MRD was also divided over the issue of whether or not to invite moderate and right leaning political parties to join the movement. Moreover, the MRD was divided on the electoral policy based on the principle of August 1983 plan. While the MRD as a whole, condemned that election on a non-party basis would amount to "eroding the very essence of a democratic government",⁴⁴ the JUP, one of its components, expressed its opinion that if political parties were allowed to take part in the election, ~~the~~ party would not boycott it, even if they were held on a non-party basis.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Sher Baz Mazari, the chief of NDP, another constituent of the MRD expressed conditional willingness for starting negotiations with the government, if such negotiations were held under the constitution of 1973. The PPP held it would not take part in any election held according to the programme announced on August 12, 1983.⁴⁶

44. Dawn, 1 September 1983.

45. Pakistan Times, 7 February 1984.

46. Daily News, 16 February 1984.

Again there was no co-ordinated approach by all constituent political parties of the MRD, over the issue of whether or not to contest the polls. Four political parties were planning to form an electoral alliance. The PPP on the contrary, made it clear that such an alliance would be 'meaningless' and would only be exploited by Gen. Zia "who is seeking legitimacy for his rule".⁴⁷

Again, it should be noted here, although some of the constituent parties of the PNA, the PPP and some other parties formed the MRD, the PPP undeniably was the most powerful. Political parties like JUP, TI were against this big brother attitude. There was no co-ordinated approach between PPP and other political parties.

After the execution of Bhutto parted company with the PNA, which had started pestering him to hold election. Subsequently, the PNA continued to express its anger, disappointment and indignation at the government's measures such as amendments in PPA, holding of local bosies polls before the general election, etc.

The PNA's changing attitude towards the military government did not however show any unity within the

47. The Statesman, 6 March 1984.

alliance. The political parties constituting the PNA, split in terms of their character. While JUI and JUP stood for democracy, and were opposed to Zia's regime, the JI and the PML believed in extending full support to Zia.⁴⁸ Thus, the PNA ceased to be a viable force.

Zia and the Opposition :

A factor in the regime's survival was its simultaneous resolve and restraint in controlling the opposition. Politicians and political parties who opposed the military rule, were the worst sufferers of Zia's various policies to bring his opposition under control.

On 3 August 1979, Zia amended the PPA, the violation of which debarred the political parties from participating in the National election. Here the PPP and the NDP were the targets of attack. Mainly with PPP out of the list, the Junta found it convenient to operate.

Again, after announcing the postponement of election for an indefinite period, Zia took some measures on 16 October, 1979. He banned all political parties, forbade political activities of any kind, shut down opposition newspaper and tightened censorship. These

48. M. Ashgar Khan, Generals in Politics, (Delhi, 1983), p.168.

measures were appropriately commented as 'more or less equivalent of a second coup for most of Pakistan's politicians'.⁴⁰

The military regime has pursued a policy of selective suppression of the political leaders engaged in open political activities against the regime. The discouragement of and restrictions on the press, including censorship, restriction on the movement of political leaders are important, means of suppression. House arrest, detention, restrictions on inter-provincial travel are common. Some political leaders including Asghar Khan, Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, N. Nasrellah Khan, General (Retd.) Tikka Khan have been under house arrest.

The PPP has been the main target of attack of the military rule. General Zia, in his most direct indictment to his main opposition party, said that the PPP would not be allowed to rule again and the PPP members would be banned for another ten years from any polls.⁵⁰

One factor which significantly contributed towards suppressing the political opponents of Gen. Zia was

49. Ali, n.6, p.138.

50. The Tribune, 25 December 1983.

the helping hand of the right wing political parties and the religious leaders.

Besides, the military regime initiated a new wave of atrocities and mass arrests to paralyse the MRD movement. Efforts were directed to ensure that the movement its demise before it could gain any momentum. Along with the leaders more than 2,000 political opponents were arrested.

The suppressive measures adopted by Zia bear testimony to the illiteracy of his regime. The more his regime depends on repression, the more its true picture is revealed. This shows that ultimately the last resort of the military regime in crushing the opposition remain farce and coercive methods.

Politics of Islamization :

Religion has been exploited by Zia sustain himself in power and his Islamisation process is without precedent. This has helped him in warding off the opposition, mainly the PPP.

First, Zia used Islam for the postponement of the election. He stated on 30 August 1979;

At present the controversy in the field of politics centres around on forthcoming elections. Several prominent political

leaders, Ulemma, intellectuals and worried citizens advised me that for God's sake do not hold elections in the present circumstances because they might cause harm to the country Some people have termed the present method of election as totally un-Islamic. They feel that it is necessary to complete the induction of Nizam-i-Islam before the election. 51

That no government could reverse Islamization⁵² bears ample testimony to the fact that Islamization has been put at the forefront of his policy. Being quite explicit in his intention, Zia categorically affirmed that 'Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, and in Islam, there is no scope for a western type of election'.⁵³ on party basis. On April 1981 he reiterated that there is no room for political parties in an Islamic system.⁵⁴ This confirms to the viewpoint that there are no parties in Islamic democracy unless democracy is separated from religion.⁵⁵

The major thrust of the Islamization programme has been the Islamization of laws. Towards this end

51. Dawn, 31 August, 1979.

52. Morning News, 9 October 1979.

53. Quoted in Pandav Naik, eds., Pakistan: Dilemmas of Developing State (Jaipur, 1985), p.166.

54. Pakistan Times, 8 April, 1981.

55. Muhammed Munir, 'From Jinnah to Zia' (Delhi, 1981), p.111.

a Council of Islamic Ideology was set up, a referendum was held over the Islamic versus secular question, liquor was banned on PIA flights, Shariat benches were installed in courts, an Islamic Penal Code, was formulated and 500 Government Mosques schools established, Zakat enforced and finally, an Islamic court set up to determine whether the laws are Islamic. These have been, as rightly remarked 'the example of the fossilized version of Islam in its political manifestation'.⁵⁶

During 1979 Gen. Zia made further changes in the electoral laws. In this context, he introduced the proportional Representation system declaring that it was close to Islam.⁵⁷ In August 1979 Zia amended the PPA 1962, to ensure 'registration of political parties with the Election Commission, regulate party funds, obtain political parties' belief in the ideology of Pakistan, and hold party elections annually.⁵⁸ Failure to comply with any of the provisions would serve to disqualify a party from registration, and hence from participation in the election. These measures were taken by Zia to ward off the PPP mainly.

56. Md. Ayoob - Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared, Strategic Digest, vol.9, n.8, August 1979, p.479.

57. Pakistan Times, 11 August 1979.

58. Dawn, (Overseas Weekly), 8 September 1979.

In March 1981, an interim constitution was promulgated by Zia, which declared that democracy and representative institution would be restored as soon as possible "in conformity with Islam". This constitution also empowered the President to dissolve any party 'operating in a manner prejudicial to Islamic ideology or the sovereignty, integrity and security to Pakistan.'⁵⁹

However, Zia went to step further by forming a Federal Advisory Council (Majlis-i-Shoora) in December 1981. The major purpose of the council was to create conditions in which the country attain a democratic, Islamic polity.

In his efforts at Islamization, Gen. Zia has been ungrudgingly supported by the Islamic parties like JI, JUP, JUI etc. Given the nature of the military rule in the country, these religious parties look indispensable at least 'as long as Islamization remains the dominant ideology of the state.'⁶⁰

Legitimacy Through Constitutional Manipulation

Restrospect Constitutional amendment are seen as a device to ensure constitutional legitimation.

59. Riaz Hassan, 'Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan', Middle-Eastern Studies, vol.3, n.26, July 1985, p.269.

60. Ibid., p.274.

Zia got his first constitutional legitimacy by the Supreme Court verdict in his favour, under the plea that 'an extra constitutional' step had been necessiated by the complete break down and erosion of 'constitution and moral authority, and the coup was justified under the "doctrine of necessity."⁶¹ He was reported to have said "as far as the integrity of the country is concerned it would be safeguarded by the armed forces alone".⁶² Therefore, the Army should have the constitutional power and the right to ask a government to resign in the event of what is considered to be a crisis". This "Turkish solution" and such constitutional changes would provide for "the doctrine of necessity."⁶³

Zia's constitutional projections were given a formal sanction by the PCO 1981, which provide for real martial law for an "interim" period. This completely shattered the Parliamentary Democratic frame work provided by the 1973 constitution which was formulated on the basis of consensus among the different political parties. This change provided unfettered power to the

61. The Times, 11 November 1977.

62. K.B.Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (1980), p.183.

63. Ibid.

President, a Federal Council whose membership was to be determined by the President, curtailment of the power of the judiciary and restrictions on political parties.

The immediate fall out of this new constitutional order of March 1981 drastically curtailed the power of the opposition. Instead of Islamic democracy in Pakistan his coup against the constitution heralded era which can be described as Ziacracy where the government is 'of Zia, by Zia and for Zia'.⁶⁴

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that it was a period of harsh martial law. More specifically, all measures - political, economic, religious and constitutional were taken by Zia to annihilate his political opposition, mainly the PPP. This prolonged military domination, no doubt inhibited the growth of democratically elected representative parties.

64. P. B. Sinha, "General Zia's Coup Against the Constitution," Strategic Analysis, vol. 5, nos. 1&2, April-May 1981, p. 3.

CHAPTER - IV

REFERENDUM AND AFTER: ILLUSION OF DEMOCRACY ?

There is no denying the fact, as it has correctly been emphasised by Huntington, that institutional links between the ruler and the ruled are essential for political survival in developing countries. While General Ayub Khan provided for institutional links between the government and the rural sector,¹ through the device of Basic Democratic (BD) system, General Zia with a clear intention to achieve identical objectives, held elections to ~~the~~ Local Councils on a non-party basis. In his relentless search for legitimacy, he inducted more civilians into his cabinet and created a nominated Parliament (Mailis-i-Shoora) to ensure political links between the ruler and the ruled.

It is pertinent to note that, ever since Zia had announced the principles of the August 1983 plan, opposition to it had been mounting at constantly increasing pace from various quarters. Early in October 1983, after the espousal of his plans for a future political set up in the country, the President was vehemently challenged by the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) to hold a referendum, to let the people choose between the General and the nine party MRD. However, more impressive was the fact that

1. Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Bribanti & W. Howard Wriggins, eds., Pakistan : The Long View, (Durham, 1977), p.255.

the Jamaat Amir Mian Tufail announced his party's willingness to co-operate with other parties to end military rule, but stopped short of joining the MRD.² As a clear departure from their adherence to earlier stand, the politico-religious parties like Jamaat-i-Islam(JI) felt the necessity of putting pressure on the military government for an early return to democratic rule in Pakistan. However, in the light of the up-coming troubles, like the fierce MRD agitation, the launching of "Pakistan Liberation Movement" with a government in exile in 1980, Zia's attempts to give a civilian face to his regime, ever since the coup in 1977, must be rated as a failure.

To counter opposition from all quarters, General Election of some form or the other was thought to be the culminating point for the expansion of political participation. It was against this background that general elections on non-party basis, preceded by a Presidential referendum, was conducted. In this process, Zia was trying to procure legitimacy from all possible quarters step by step. Presidential referendum, General election on a non-party basis, installation of a civilian government, constitutional legitimization and

2. William Richter, "Pakistan in 1984 : Digging in," Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 2, February 1985, p.148.

Islamization programmes, were all efforts in this direction. These policy measures, directly and indirectly impinged on the status of political parties in the country and were widely seen as a prelude to party politics. In this chapter, these issues would be discussed at length, placing them in the broader perspective of democracy.

Presidential Referendum

Referendum is an important technique of legitimacy adopted by the Generals in many third world countries where military is in power. The national referendum on the question of 'Islam' was one of the important events in the history of Pakistani military politics.

Explaining the consideration behind the referendum move, Zia declared that "the decision has been taken in the larger interest of the nation because the conditions prevailing around us demand that there should not be any ambiguity about the state of power".³ Zia upheld that the referendum was meant to consolidate and strengthen Pakistan and "to decide the issue of Central leadership".⁴ He also asserted that it was meant to ensure

3. Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, vol.18, n. 1, January 1985, p.24.

4. Dawn (Karachi), 10 December, 1984.

"continuation of the Islamization process as well as its irreversibility".⁵

Assuring the people that the referendum was not for perpetuation of power, rather it was for the transfer of it, he asked the estimated 37 million voters to say 'yes' or 'no' to the question ;

whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Zia, the President of Pakistan, in conformity with the injunction of Islam as laid down ~~by~~ the holy prophet, and for the preservation of ideology of Pakistan; for the "consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people".⁶

The positive vote on this proposition was interpreted as having provided Zia with a mandate to serve as "President for another five years from 1985 to 1990. In case of a negative verdict, the status quo of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) would continue while he would cease to be the President of Pakistan.

The various political parties exhibited divided opinions on the referendum proposal. The opposition

5. Public Opinion Trends (POT), Pakistan Series, vol.XII, no.234, 11 December 1984, p.3786.

6. Dawn, 2 December 1984.

parties rejected outright his formula, designed to secure their support to General Zia's rule for another five years. The Pakistan National Party (PNP of Ninenzo) contended that the non-party election would mean that sovereignty rested with the President and not with the people, which itself was a negation of the basic principle on which Pakistan was based.⁷ On the contrary, the JUI put forth certain conditions⁸ for participating in the referendum of which "free election on a party basis was the most challenging demand before the Zia government". Ashgar Khan's party (TI) exhibited a similar note of dissent towards the referendum proposal. Describing this as "referendum at gun point"⁹ he said, "Zia did not intend to quit nor did he want to transfer power; at most he was thinking of sharing a small bit of power with others".¹⁰ Most of the political parties, the constituents of the MRD, as well as parties outside the MRD such as JUP, reiterated their stand to boycott the referendum.

7. Daily News, 4 October 1984.

8. For detail of the conditions of JUI for participating in the referendum, refer to POT, vol. 12, n. 234, p.3789.

9. Deccan Chronical, 9 January, 1985.

10. DSA, New Review, vol. 17, no.11, November 1984, p.562.

However, Zia had his supporters on this issue too. The Muslim League (P) and the right wing JI accepted the proposal of referendum and extended support to Zia. Mian Tufail of JI blamed the MRD for the government's referendum decision. He said that the seed of a referendum was sown when these political parties triggered a controversy on whether Pakistan had come into being in the name of Islam or for economic reasons.¹¹ Kausar Niazi's 'Progressive Peoples Party' also called for the referendum and declared that referendum was the only effective method by which the country could gradually move from 'Martial Law to Civilian Rule'. It added that the opposition to the referendum proposal would amount to prolonging the military rule.¹²

The referendum ^{that} was conducted was far from free. There was widespread repression and persecution of dissidents. The Presidential referendum was conducted under the continued ban on political parties, political activities and numerous other restrictions. The President on 5 December 1984, promulgated three ordinances to prescribe penalties for instigating boycott of the

11. Dawn, 16 December 1984.

12. Pakistan Times, 15 December 1984.

referendum poll on 10 December 1984. The amendment of Pakistan's Penal Code (PPC), the Representation of Peoples' Act 1976 and the Senate Election Act, 1975, came through in the wake of the referendum. Besides, banning any criticism of the regime, many of the opposition group (such as JUP, NDP, MRD and JUI) leaders were held.¹³

Since the political parties were not allowed to challenge Zia in the referendum by putting up their own parallel candidates and since the press was prevented from printing any thing critical of the referendum, a 'yes' vote was a foregone conclusion.¹⁴

Although the deserted polling stations on referendum day were indication of the lack of popular enthusiasm, the official results showed a turnout of 62.15 per cent with 97.71 per cent voting in favour of the proposition.¹⁵ This, Zia claimed, was a positive proof that the people had outrightly rejected the MRD leadership. It proved beyond doubt as the military authorities claimed that the leaders of the defunct MRD parties had outlived their utility and did not enjoy public confidence

13. Dawn, 19 and 21 December 1984.

14. News Time, 31 December 1984.

15. Pakistan Times, 21 December 1984.

anywhere at all....¹⁶ On the other hand, the MRD contended that only 5 per cent of the registered voters exercised their franchise and thus the masses had evidently responded to the MRD call. Moreover, other allegations like poll rigging, mishandling of the referendum exercise, were thrown at the President.

Having secured a popular verdict, Zia was declared to be the duly elected President of Pakistan for 5 years. The antecedents of this constitutional rule can be traced to Zia's 12 August plan, which envisaged the holding of National election and the transfer of power to the elected representative by 23 March 1985. However, he refrained from spelling out the schedule and mode of elections until very late. Of late, he was toying with the idea of hanging onto power, even after the withdrawal of martial law and more so without risking any electoral set back.

General Zia unfolded his plans in a calculated manner by taking one measured step after another so that his political adversaries did not take the political initiative out of his hand.¹⁷ First, it was in

16. Dawn, 21 December 1984.

17. Hassan Askari Rizvi, "The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol. 26, no.10, October 1986, p.1068.

August 1984 that he made his intention clear to hang on to the post of President. The explicit support from several local bodies elected in 1983 on a non-party basis, made him more confident to stick to his plans. This led him to declare in October 1984 that power would be transferred to the elected representatives only if they gave him an undertaking that "the present process of Islamization would continue".¹⁸ Less than one week later he removed all doubts about his political plans by declaring that he would 'share' power rather than 'transfer' it to the representatives elected in the forth coming elections.¹⁹

Post Referendum Poll - Non-party election

Once General Zia secured his political future, he took steps to bring forward a civilian leadership that would be willing to share power on his terms and serve as a counter weight to his political opponents. The Presidential Referendum was followed by elections to National and Provincial Assemblies. Putting an end to all speculations regarding the operation of political

18. Dawn, 26 October, 1984.

19. The Muslim, 1 November, 1984.

parties, secular or religious, in the General election, he declared the polls to be held on a non-party basis, to the National and Provincial Assemblies on February 25 and 28, 1985, respectively.

An important aspect of the elections was the boycott of polling by the 11 party opposition group, the MRD. This left the field largely to the independents and to partisans of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Jamaat-i-Islam.

There were differences of opinion within the MRD on the question of participating in the elections to be held on a non-party basis. General (Retd.) Tikka Khan (PPP leader) held the view that the government had already conducted the election and only wanted to give it a formal shape. However, on the issue of boycotting the election in toto the MRD could not stick to a unified view or action. Despite this policy decision, numerous politicians abandoned their membership in the various parties of the MRD, including the PPP, in order to contest the election.²⁰ Besides this, the JI, the ML(P) the Progressive Peoples' Party of Kausar Niazi, accepted the offer to contest the election. Some independent

20. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), February 21, 1985, p.30.

candidates like Air Chief Marshall Noon Khan, subscribed to the participation in the polls on the ground that the National Assembly would be a "link between the government and the banned political parties".²¹

To keep its main political opponents away from the centre of power amendments in the pre-1977 coup electoral laws were needed so as to ensure the exclusion of the political parties from the electoral process. In this connection, Zia assumed power to exempt poll disqualification. Moreover, he issued ~~one~~ 'Ordinance amending the PPA 1962, disassociating such persons from being elected as members of the Parliament and the Provincial Assembly, who had not registered with the Election Commissioner (EC) by 11 October 1979, to be eligible to participate in the election. The House of Parliament and Provincial Assembly Election (Third Amendment) Order 1985 was also issued to prescribe the qualification of candidates for the forth coming elections. Besides, 'Double Assembly' membership was banned by ^{the} House of Parliament and Provincial Assembly Election (2nd Amendment) Order.

The election campaign was closely regulated by the military government. No public meetings and

21. The Tribune, 30 January, 1985.

processions were held in a 'deaf and dumb electioneering'. Most important was that no major national, domestic or foreign issues were discussed, but only issues of local importance were highlighted. This in effect brought forth people of local standing who could project the local issues. The "political relevance of parochial identities and particularistic orientation"²² was enhanced, in the wake of absence of nationwide political alignments coupled with lack of national themes. Although these factors had considerably influenced the electoral behaviour in the past, the absence of participation of the political parties at the national level, exposed the limitations of these factors to a great extent.

The turnout for the February election was impressive, irrespective of the fact that political parties did not contest. Secondly, this demonstrated the peoples' support for the polling process and respect for the democratic norms. In this partyless election 52.9 per cent of registered votes were cast in the National Assembly polls and 56.9 per cent in the Provincial election. Participation was highest in Punjab (61.8 per cent), but considerably lower in the minority

22. Rizvi, n.17, p.1070.

provinces - Sind (49.2 per cent), NWFP (47.6 per cent) and Baluchistan (46.6 per cent).²³

Held against the background of the Presidential referendum, the February 1985 election evoked divergent perspectives regarding the prospect of democracy in Pakistan. While the official opinion pertained to the view that partyless election was essential for evolving an appropriate political order, this optimism was not shared by prominent political leaders of the country, such as Benazir Bhutto of the PPP and Ashgar Khan of TI. Again, quite contrary to the view point of opposition politicians, the elected leaders of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly time and again affirmed their belief that elections, whether on a party basis or a non-party basis signified the first concrete step towards implementing democracy. However, the opposition doubted if President Zia was really sincere in his pledge to turn the country over to a democratic civilian government.²⁴

The partyless election of General Zia is to be viewed in his overall political strategy, that is,

23. Pakistan Affairs, vol.38, n.5, 1 March, 1985, p. 1.

24. Dawn, 18 September 1985.

perpetually to keep his opposition away from their legitimate share in political power. Viewed in this context, the occurrence of partyless election raises certain problems of fundamental importance in the functioning of any democratic political system.

First, the question is connected to the prospect of restoration of democracy under this arrangement of partyless elections.

Second, the role of the emerging new ruling class after the non-party election in substituting for the party politics in the country.

Third, how far this new set of politicians are able to cut into the influence of the traditional political parties of the MRD.

Fourthly, what would be the status of such a system in the post martial law phase, when democracy would be fully restored.

An analysis of the February 1985, general election suggests that the elections on a non-party basis were a political setback to the MRD parties whose call for a total boycott failed to prevent people from going to vote.²⁵ However, without taking note of the prevailing political condition at that time, a well balanced

25. New York Times, 27 February 1985.

picture of the event can not be perceived. The whole election exercise was held against the backdrop of continued detention, arrest, and total ban on traditional means of electioneering, which successfully prevented the opposition parties from putting forth their programme before the public. In this context another major happening could be noticed. Coupled with all these above restrictions, the prevention of debate on national and international issues, compelled the candidates to use caste, sect and parochial influence on the electorate.

The craving for power and influence on the part of some individual politicians at the expense of organizations and meaningful political activity was evident. Viewing this in the context of patron-client relationship²⁶ where, the politicians served as clients to the military rulers, it was noticed that these politicians did not fall short of exchanging loyalties for obtaining political rewards. Thus, appeals based on language, ethnicity and religious sectarian differences largely determined the outcome of elections. Moreover, consistent with the whole process of electioneering, the feudal

26. Rasul B. Rais, "Election in Pakistan : Is Democracy Winning," Asian Affairs, vol. 12, no.3, Fall 1985, p.45.

elite, tribal chiefs and religious influentials, businessmen etc. having clan, tribe and feudal social bases emerged triumphant in the polls in rural areas. On the whole, the partyless election marked the resurgence of the landowning class in national politics, with 117 seats out of 200 going to this group and the businessmen forming the second largest social group,²⁷ by winning 42 seats.

about half of the elected members of the National Assembly had party affiliations at one time or another. The ML(P) emerged the largest parliamentary party with over 70 members. The second largest group of 40 was formed by defectors from the Peoples' Party.

Although the voters, thus demonstrated their support for the polling process, they also demonstrated disaffection of the Martial Law regime by defeating four of General Zia's cabinet ministers and one Minister of State. The electoral defeat of Zia's Minister and advisors might be considered a verdict against Martial Law. This view particularly has been reiterated by the MRD leaders.

27. South, April 1985, p.13, See also Dawn, 21 March 1985.

The opposition parties and leaders defended their action of boycotting the polls and reiterated their commitment to the revival of the unanimously accepted constitution of 1973. They referred to the civilian (elected) members as "junior partners in the country's power structure"²⁸ and branded the National and Provincial Assemblies as "puppet assemblies".²⁹ Moreover, the Federal government was dismissed as "an ineffective minority"³⁰ in the fear that instead of resorting to democracy, it would cause the prolongation of martial law. It was contended that the new cabinet was so weak that in order to remain stable, it would constantly require the martial law umbrella. Thus, it was feared in the opposition camp that the lifting of martial law would mean the collapse of the government of that very day.³¹

Notwithstanding the strong criticism against it the civilian government was sworn in and later, in order to mobilize support, the size of the cabinet was expanded to 36 members, the largest cabinet in the entire history of Pakistan. Subsequently, within the Assembly two party

28. Dawn, 12 April 1985.

29. Muslim, 14 April 1985.

30. Dawn, 12 April 1985.

31. POT, vol. 13, n.75, 15 April 1985, p.1415.

like groupings were established. The majority group led by Prime Minister Junejo and the Predominantly Official Parliamentary Group (OPG). A small grouping called the Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG) led by JI and other members played the role of parliamentary opposition.

Thus, from the foregoing analysis it could be perceived that every possible step was taken both by the General and the elected civilian leaders to give some remembrance of a popular civilian government at the exclusion of the major political parties. But in the final analysis, as one commentator noted, "the cause of stability will not be served if the known political parties (defunct though they are) remain out in the cold; nursing their grievances and their sense of alienation".³²

As the day of withdrawal of martial law approached, the military authorities decided to take the necessary steps to regulate political parties in the post-martial law period. In order to achieve this objective,

32. Dawn, 11 November 1985. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, South Asia Series, Quoted in William Richter, n.2, p.211.

the Political Parties (Amendment) Act was passed on 9 December 1985, in the wake of lifting of martial law. This new law provided for an elaborate and cumbersome procedure for registration of the political parties with the Election Commission. The bill also imposes curbs on the free association, movement and activities of the political parties. These restrictions were important in the wake of the continued challenges from the political parties that disputed the legitimacy of the civilianized government.

Politics of Islamisation

The process of Islamization, reached its peak for creating a more Islamic system of government (Nizam-i-Islam). Politically, Islam has functioned throughout Zia's rule as the source of legitimization. The net result of such manipulations of religious factors for sustaining in power, has been the emergence of a chain of controversies over Islamization. However, the 8 year controversy over Islamization reacted its peak in December 1984 referendum which was subsequently followed by non-party elections. The problems and issues that emerge out of this process is vital to our understanding of the emerging scene in the national politics.

The National referendum on the question of 'Islam' heralded a new era in the history of military politics. Zia's cabinet Ministers, right-wing supporters, specially the conservative religious groups supported the President for what he described as the "mission of Islamization of the polity". To this effect, he reiterated his view that, political parties were unislamic and that to restore them would amount to a reversal of Islamization activity during his seven and a half year rule.

True to his style and perhaps because he was unsure of the political climate in the country, Zia manipulated the referendum in such a manner that the outcome was a forgone conclusion. In the December referendum, people could not have said 'no' without incurring the *odium* of voting against Islam. The transforming of a vote on Islam into a mandate to rule the country for another five years, was greeted by the opposition as a cunning piece of work. Giving vent to their resentment on this act, Arshad Chaudhury, a MFD spokesman rightly observed that 99 per cent of the country's population being Muslim, the Islamic system had never been a matter of dispute".³³ The JUI declared

33. The Times of India, 3 December 1984.

the referendum unIslamic.

Moreover, it was declared by the General that the post referendum polls would be held in the framework of 'Islamic Democracy', which did not recognise the operation of political parties. This aspect is crucial. It is to be noted that, under Zia's scheme of polls only the Ministers and members of Cabinet could contest. Government and Opposition Parties appeared to be trading parallel causes and the Islamic democracy and political powers were being initiated by isolating political leaders.³⁴

The election held within the framework of 'Islamic Democracy' is quite intriguing. In the election, the JI won only 9 out of 63 seats. The electoral setback to JI, which had approved and aided the Islamization programme of Zia, might be regarded as a popular verdict against Islamization from the top.³⁵ The people of Pakistan, as indicated, were voicing their disapproval of Zia's politics and his Islamic policies. Unlike their stand in the referendum, people were in a

34. POT, vol. 13, n.14, 18 January 1986, p.258.

35. Fais, n.26, p.48.

position to indicate their disapproval of Islamization.

Moreover, the setbacks for Islamization and Zia's policies were also evident from the way in which JI withdrew from contesting the provincial election.³⁶

Another major controversy was responsible for the emergence of the two factors in the JI over the issue of Islamization. The Karachi wing, led by Ghafoor Ahmed, advocated switching to a militant anti-regime stance to preserve the Jamaat's waning influence. On the contrary, the more influential and powerful Punjabi wing was against the idea of coming out openly against the government. In this context, to quote one observer, largely regime's Islamic protestations no longer cut much ice, Pakistan society is no more or no less Islamic today than it was 8 years ago.³⁷

Post-Martial Law Period

The ending of Martial Law was felt necessary to maintain the credibility of the entire civilianisation

-
36. Sawhney, R.G. "Pakistan Elections : Beginning of the End of the Zia Regime", Strategic Analysis, vol. 8, n.12, March 1985, p.1149.
37. Mohammad Ayub, "Dateline Pakistan : A passage to Anarchy?" Foreign Policy, no.59, Summer 1985, p.162.

process, starting from the February 1985 election to the passing of PPA. The withdrawal of martial law on 30 December 1985 terminated the longest military rule (July 1977 to December 1985) in the country. On the face of it, its lifting signals the return to a democratic system, after the powers have been transferred to the elected representatives. Although General Zia-ul-Haq claims Pakistan to be the most democratic and representative Third World Country on earth, several questions need clarification.

- Is the post-martial law period a departure from the martial law period or a more continuation of the previous regime;
- Would it allow the political representative to operate freely in national policy decision making or would it remain a rubber stamp in the hands of the President;
- What would be the fate of political parties in such a system.

All these questions act partial explanation from one fact. The most far reaching and ominous feature of the Zia brand of non-martial law is that he continues to be the chief of army staff, thus retaining the previous

face. That the post-martial period is a continuation of the old one, for all practical purposes, is revealed in his speech on the floor of Parliament on 30 December;

*The new Democratic order of 1985 is neither a rival nor an adversary of the outgoing regime. It is in fact, an extension of the one in existence for the past several years.*³⁸

As far as his attitude towards political parties are concerned, it is no less than a continuation of the old policy. That he was not favourably disposed towards parties even in the post-martial law phase could be realized from the provisions of PPA. This Act placed humiliating restrictions aimed at making it difficult, if not impossible for the functioning of self respecting political parties.

However, Pakistan Political Parties banned since 1979, resumed their activities after the termination of the Martial Law and the passing of the PPA, after substantial amendments. Prime Minister Junejo revived his PML with support from a majority of MP's elected a year ago on a non-party basis. While some other Political Parties fell under this category, most of the opposition

38. The Muslim, 31 December 1985.

parties still refused to register under a new law requiring them to submit their constitution and accounts to an EC. However, the MFD could not hold on to a united stand over the issue of registration. When most of its constituent units abstained from registering, the TI declared its intention to register. The argument of the supporters of registration goes like this;

"We can not carry on with anti-martial law slogan now that martial law is gone. We should pressurize Junejo to hold fresh elections on a party basis and prepare ourselves for the polls. If we do not do that, he will probably have mid-term elections any way, and the PML will go unchallenged."³⁹

The oppositions condemn the formation of PML as the official party and brands it as a King's party. On the other hand, insisting on their distinctiveness Junejo claims that his party drawn strength from elected representatives of the people and hence it is democratic in character. In a bid to prove it, attempts have been made by elected Political leaders to distance themselves from President Zia and his previous martial law regime. This trend proves that they do not represent a civilian extension of martial law. As most observers agree they can not go too far in asserting their independence until

39. FEER, 6 February 1986, p.32.

Junejo's PML as well as Parliamentary Opposition parties organise themselves to face any political challenge from the 11-party MRD.⁴⁰ Hence they have to depend on the General, to crush any political challenge that the MRD may pose.

The formation of the PML under the leadership of Prime Minister Junejo after the PPA had been passed, may give some pretence of a civilian democratic government. However, the major political elements in the country remained outside this new system. Its total exclusion widely doubted the legitimacy of the official party in the country. This surely does not argue well for the functioning of democracy.

Moreover, the post-martial law period witnessed the emergence of three distinct groups after the revival of PPA. These are the martial law bureaucracy, the elected parliament and the political parties (including both registered and unregistered parties). These groups differ from each other in their perception of ideology as well as political programme and vision of democratic process. Sometimes, two groups align to work against the other. This particularly, holds true in case of military and parliamentary groups working against the

40. FEER, 27 February 1986, p.32.

opposition parties, mainly against the MRD groups. However, it has been observed that the outcome of this 'trilateral politics' would eventually determine the future course of Pakistan politics.⁴¹

From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the Presidential referendum was unique to Zia's style. His contention that "this unusual procedure for the election of the President of the country would not be made a precedent, but would be followed this time as an exception"⁴², provides ample evidence of the fact that this was a clever plan to acquire a constitutional backing by the General. He excluded the political parties from this, and in turn sought the opinion of the innocent masses, in an atmosphere of continued ban on political activity, press, etc. This justifies the opposition's apprehension on the referendum.

One more major thing could be observed from the conduct of the election. Against the backdrop of strict regulation and total restriction, "the Pakistan case" as one observer puts it, "provides a scenario of internal colonialism" that heavily depends on "coercion

41. Rais, n.26, p.52.

42. n.d., President Zia's Election : Referendum in Pakistan (December 1984), Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.8, n.3, Spring 1985.

rather than on consensus measures".⁴³

The very fact that the opposition boycotted the poll was a clear indication of the non-acceptability of the proposition that a positive verdict on Islamization policy of Zia would ensure him the post of President for five years. It was widely believed that "it was Zia's latest ploy to enhance his regime's legitimacy by invoking a divine right to rule".⁴⁴ In the pretext of posing himself as the true follower of Islam, he declared the political parties as unIslamic.

The subsequent partyless election reached the high water mark in the tradition of undemocratic politics. The constitutional and political framework for the functioning of the representative institutions and civilian cabinets at the national and provincial levels were provided in the Revival of the Constitutional Order (RCO) of March 1985, the 8th Amendment, popularly known as the Indemnity law in October 1985, and the political framework determine and distribute the power and function between the three emerging groups.

43. Aftab A. Kazi, "Education, Ethnicity and Political Socialization in Pakistan", Asian Profile, vol. 14, n.4, August 1986, p.358.

44. Ayooob, n.37, pp.161-62.

During this one year the military authorities have been trying, in collaboration with the civilian leaders, to ensure credibility to this entire process of civilianization. However, doubts persist as to its very nature, which has excluded the major political parties in the country. It is not far from truth that this period represents an illusion of democracy. Like the martial law period, in the post-martial phase also the strongest political party (PPP) is not in operation. This has also been the fate of other major political parties in the country. Although legal provisions have changed, it represents a mere continuation of the martial law phase. Moreover whatever number of political parties operating after registration with EC, their freedom of speech and expression are restricted. They are operating in an atmosphere of utter restrictions and limitations. This has serious repercussions on their working. Most regretable is the fact that such an atmosphere, the importance of political parties, that oppose the government policies, have hardly any role to play and their importance is reduced to military.

Thus, in the final analysis, although post-martial law phase gives the impression of a democratically elected government with political parties operating in the country, the truth behind it is hardly any different from that of the martial law period.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

Pakistan now has a political history of four decades behind her. During such a short span, it already has come under the grip of military rule thrice. More disturbing is the fact that, given the nature of political development in the country, it can be safely concluded that the period has yet to arrive, when one can accurately state that decision-making in Pakistan is dominated by the political party apparatus. The failure of democratic process in Pakistan may well be ascribed to the lack of a stable party system.

There is no denying the fact that "the future of political parties depend upon how successful they and their governments are in coping with the crisis of political development."¹ This implies ^{that} the endeavour of a national party depends on its performance in satisfying the hopes and aspirations of the people. Evidently, political parties in Pakistan have failed to achieve the above declared objectives.

The foregoing analysis makes it clear, viewing against this objective, that the emergence of political

1. Weiner and Lapalombora, "The Impact of parties in Political Development", in Weiner and Lapalombora, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, New Jersey, 1967, p.435.

parties, as "dependent phenomenon"² has contributed considerably for the lack of evolution of a strong, national based party system in the country.

Jinnah, Liaquat and Bhutto were handicapped in party and institution building by the weak social base of the Pakistan Movement as well as their own lust for power. A national consensus around the constitution, provincial autonomy, role of Islam, and so on could not be reacted at, resulting in complete breakdown of the existing parliamentary (Nominal) democracy. Evidently, it was the lack of party politics, bad party politics and agitational party politics that resulted in the emergence of Ayub, Yahya and Zia's military takeover respectively.

Politicians were directly responsible for nurturing conditions conducive to their own displacement in the political structure. While Iskander Mirza conspired with Ayub and conducted the army into politics, Bhutto happily rode into martial law power on the back of

2. The timing and manner of their advent, how they organise, and how they perform are aspects largely dependent on wider environmental factors like historical experience, the pre-existing elite setting, the structure of traditional society, the permeation of central institutions etc. See, Philip E. Jones, "changing Party structure in Pakistan" in Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan, (Karachi, 1980), p.114.

General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan.³ The politicians of the Pakistan National Assembly adopted a similar strategy to overthrow Bhutto. It is this legacy which the Armed Forces have now seized upon to consolidate and constitutionalize their power.

As in Pakistan's formative period, so during the tenure of Z.A. Bhutto, the breakdown of the party structure proved to be a prelude to the third military regime of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. In this context, the military intervention in politics in Pakistan, has to be essentially seen in terms of the failure of the civilian countervailing forces, and in reference to the legitimacy crisis. Here, one agrees with what Huntington has to say, that, the reasons for intervention are not military but political.⁴ This however, does not deny the importance of other factors for such military disposition. Hence, the main factors which have brought about military intervention, are the lack of representative political institutions, the absence of consensus, and the coming into power of leaders who depend on personal charisma rather than on constitutional bases of support.

3. Najam Sethi 'Significance of the Zia Regime', Strategic Digest, vol.16, No.3, March 1986, p.305.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society, (New Haven, 1968), pp.195-200.

The study of the role of political parties under the military rule has unveiled an interesting dimension. That, "political parties in Pakistan have been an intermittent and unstable phenomenon, which the political system has neither been able to work well, nor operate for long periods without"⁵, is particularly true, under a military regime. The striking similarities between today's post-martial scenario and the 1962 political situation, prove a point here. The first experiment with 'Guided Democracy' by General Ayub Khan, had paved the way for non-party parliament in 1962. However, notwithstanding his adverse attitude towards political parties and politicians, he was, under the situation, compelled to revive the representative apparatus, within months of lifting of martial law. A parallel comparison could be obtained from the present political scenario, with the revival of political parties, that witnessed the emergence of Muslim League (Pagora) as an official party.

At the time of Zia's military takeover, political observers prescribed limited life for him, at the top. As "proclaimed intentions concerning the succession

5. Ahmed, no.2, p.114.

usually bear little relationship to the outcome,⁶ the military elites, generally are compelled by the post-coup situation to seek to consolidate their rule.

It is well contended that political parties pose a serious threat to military's survival in politics. In such a situation, the military rulers invariably, in a persistent effort, try to undermine their power base, in order to render them ineffective, in the game of power politics. Zia's different policy measures and political strategies, like the civilianisation process, Islamization programme, partyless election, constitutional legitimation, etc. are directed to achieve the above objective. Moreover, Gen. Zia's apparent success, is based on the opposition's inability to formulate an appropriate response, as much on his own strategic genius.

Without exception, all parties contributed in consolidating Zia's power. While Wali Khan gave explicit support to Zia and agreed with the decision to postpone elections; Asghar Khan called for accountability, and the Leftist groups maintained an ominous silence on this issue. More disappointing was the fact that the Muslim League and the Jamaat-i-Islami joined the military government.

6. Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes On the Practice and Theory of Military Withdrawal from the seat of power", Third World Quarterly, Vol.7 No.1, January 1985, p.7.

General Zia's rule has inaugurated 'politics without political parties', in Pakistan. Though contradictory it may appear, with the holding of Presidential referendum, followed by election to National and Provincial Assemblies, on Non-party basis, by changing the electoral and constitutional laws, to the opposition's disadvantages, and by putting greater emphasis on the theme of Islamization, this process seems to be almost complete.

Despite the fact that General Zia's efforts were directed towards procuring legitimacy from all quarters, at the behest of party politics, he has failed to win popular mass support. But, the very fact that he has successfully been able to hang on to the power base, should be sufficient proof of his political wisdom and manoeuvring. Above all, one reason can be attributed to this apparent success of his; that is the role of the unrepresentative forces,⁷ like the JI and some of the

7. It's noteworthy to emphasize here that the electoral strength of the JI is minimal, as clearly evident from the election results in 1971, 1977 and 1985, to the National and Provincial Assemblies. Thus, the necessity to seek the military umbrella, in order to avoid an electoral confrontation, is felt by these unrepresentative groups, in order to perpetuate themselves, at the helm of political power. Hence, they need to harp on the theme of Islamization and would continue to provide the ideological guidelines for the military regime. See; Khan, M.A., Islam, Politics And the State: A Pakistan Experience, (London, 1985), pp.8-9.

defectors of the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP). It has been calculatedly thought by the military rulers that a threat of the prospect of a PPP victory at the polls, would help in perpetually keeping the unrepresentative leaders away from joining, in any movement, for restoring democracy. Thus nothing could be farther from the truth that "the military, bureaucracy and the unrepresentative leaders have one thing in common, the fear of the masses".⁸

This logically brings one's attention to another important point, which has a direct bearing with the above aspect. This is related to the military's persistent desire and effort to undermine the operation of the political parties. Zia is no exception to this. Moreover, far from being identical in his dealing with all the political parties, the attack primarily is directed against his arch rival and the most representative party - the PPP. This explains why General Zia announced a series of measures to ensure political death for the PPP.

Since military rulers' dilemma involves the fact that they neither can withdraw from rulership nor can

8. Gowher Rizvi, "Riding the Tiger" in Clapham and Philip, eds. The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, (Sydney, 1985), p.223.

they fully legitimize it,⁹ they neither can ~~restore~~ the party system fully nor can completely do away with it. While the first step would endanger their political survival, the second would expose them ~~blatantly~~ unrepresentative. However, it is pertinent to note that, if a military ruler outlaws party system, he has to restore the same in different form. In this context, one agrees with the viewpoint that the "best threat the authoritarian leaders can do is to domesticate them, by controlling their number, their personnel, and their programmes".¹⁰

The amendment of the PPA, 1962, the introduction of proportional representation and such other measures, were announced to achieve the above objectives. But, as experience shows, Zia felt the burden unbearable to totally done away with political parties, although they remained under virtual suspension for quite a long period. Before terminating the martial law regime on 30 December, 1984, he gave way for political parties to operate. Zia's policy, thus, has a close resemblance with what Ayub had done.

The efforts of the military rulers to create a

9. S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback, (New York, 1974), p.243.
10. Bloneld, Jean, Political Parties, p.3.

viable political institution, facilitating participation, stability and continuity, suffered during the period of Zia's regime. The attempt at nation building, at the expense of politics, and at the exclusion of representative political parties, in the long run, turn out to be a failure,¹¹ and invariably keeps their legitimacy in question. Notwithstanding the fact that, elections were held, martial law lifted, and democracy restored, Zia could not convert military intervention into participating politics. He was caught between personal preference and objective need of the hour. Besides this, in view of the divergence in the perception of the military rulers and civilian political elites, the legitimacy of the Zia regime would remain widely questioned. In this context, one is more prone to identify his idea with, that 'if democracy and elected representative government is the goal, then martial law sets the progress back.'¹² Thus, inevitably, praetorianism will result in an incomplete regime and polity.

The direct consequences of the prolongation of

11. Huntington, n.4, p.92.

12. Kheli, S.T., "Martial Law Again in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, vol.5, n.4, March-April, 1978, p.240

military domination, has ~~en~~hibited the development of a mass based party system in the country, as has been observed from the preceding chapters. The disintegration came about either because of lack of politics or governmental repression. The PPP also is no exception to this.¹³ Bhutto's political style is no better than that of his predecessors. After Bhutto's execution, it suffered from both ideological disharmony and weak organisation and fell victim to factionalism and intra-party rivalry. Its demographic base is largely restricted to Sind, which in turn, contributes to the party weakness.¹⁴

The MRD is no better. To summarize the MRD's composition, programme, ideology and strategy, "it was composed of warring factions and parties; its leaders were uncharismatic men with huge ambitions, few principles, and a long history of ineffectualness and opportunism, it had no political programme and manifesto, it had no meaningful slogan to fire the imagination of the people; its political tactics were faulty and

13. Although, the biggest, political force, in Pakistan today, is the PPP, its saddled with serious problems. For one thing, Bhutto did not build any organisation nor did he rear up any leadership. The Times of India, 14 January, 1982.
14. The Hindustan Times, 7 September 1980.

it has no unified strategy for struggle against a formidable, determined and ruthless adversary."¹⁵ Moreover, the MRD has been anything other than the PPP in disguise. Hence the failure on the part of the MRD to struggle to dethrown the military from the seat of political power.

On the whole, parties as do exist are neither organically rooted in, nor related to the masses in any co-ordinated fashion. Organisation is haphazard, confused, often at odds with its own imperatives. Democratic values are at low premium, and civil opposition has been divided. In the ultimate analysis, the balance of power between the two protagonists has swung in Zia's favour.

This bleak picture of the existence and operation of political parties~~x~~ would provide an one sided estimation. One thing assuring is visible, on the political horizon of Pakistan. At present, broadly, the various political parties in Pakistan, could be categorized under two rightly disproportionate groupings. Most of the parties, fall under the category of "longer groups", that stand opposed to the Zia's regime, unlike the PPP vs the PNA equationⁱⁿ the earlier stage of Zia's rule. In

15. Sethi, no.3, p.315.

this context, thus, with the changing environment of priorities and expectation, political alignments also have undergone profound changes. All the prominent leaders of the PNA, including JI, which supports Zia's takeover, have withdrawn their support and started criticizing Zia's policy openly. This clearly shows the beginning of evolution of mature political thinking.

As regards the post-martial political scenario in the country, it is too early to suggest whether the recent introduction of civilian ruler had laid the foundation of the political institutions and processes capable of sustaining political and economic pressures. A fairly large political group and a section of country's population have stayed away from the election process and thus dispute the legitimacy of the whole exercise. They are kept completely excluded from the political powers by imposing legal restriction only using the coercive apparatus of the state. This has inevitably led to the confrontation between the civilianized regime and the major political parties, which in turn would make it extremely difficult for the new system to expand its support base and obtain a wide spread acceptability:

Although, the present scene provides the semblance

of a return to democratic rule, with the ban on political parties lifted, and by the creation of a participatory system by setting up parliament etc., the truth suggests a different story. Zia made sure, before lifting martial law, that he continued to exercise the initiative in political process by taking three major steps; by not reviving 1973 constitution, rather introducing amendments in 67 articles, by introducing the 'Indemnity law' and by virtue of retaining the post of Chief of Army Staff (COAS).

Thus, the present scene can not be regarded as a departure from the martial law phase. It represents a mere continuation in the civilian garb. On the other hand, the opposition does not unitedly propose a strong cause. Rightly, in the words of an observer,¹⁶ "it will take quite some time before classes cutting regional lines will crystallise and for classes like the industrial labour and the peasants combining with other groups to seize power". Moreover, "rather than a return to civilian rule, by change in Pakistan in short term is more likely to be in the nature of a military dominated regime, partly due to the elimination

16. Sayeed, K.B., ed . Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of Change (New York , 1980), p.187.

of political activity and partly due to the fragmentation and polarisation of political parties with regional and ideological groups"¹⁷, and the leadership crisis. Moreover, Zia's own disposition is negatively marked. In an interview to "Observer", on the eve of February 1985 election, Zia said that "for a military regime it is damn easy to takeover, but for a military regime to handover, it is next to impossible."¹⁸ With this attitude of the General, it is difficult to predict the immediate future course of politics in the country.

Viewing in a longterm perspective, one can perceive, politics can never be banished or held in a state of sedation for a long time in a country. Modern politics involves participation, both in the electoral as well as decision making at the grassroot level. Democracy, as Finer Observers, "rests in its hope and doubts upon party system; there is the political centre of gravity."¹⁹

Legitimate power within the system flowed from "the people" to their elected representatives. Thus the only solution to the cycles of military rules in

17. Khan, Asghar., Generals in Politics 1958-82, (New Delhi, 1983), p.215.

18. Sunday Observer, 24 February, 1985.

19. Finer, no.9, p.364.

Pakistan, lies in development of civilian institution. This task of civilian institution building and strong civilian countervailing forces can be done only by a return to civilian rule, through a strong, national, grassroot, and mass based political party led by a skilful political leadership. Above all, the importance of the role of the mass support behind this, can't be kept aside.

Last, not the least, the military disposition²⁰ is crucial in shaping the future course of political change or facilitating transfer of power from one power elite to another. It is high time, the military realises that their legitimacy lies in the barracks and not in the center of political power.

20. H.A.Rizvi., Highlights the Importance of this Aspect in his book, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore, 1974.

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE - 1

Final Party Position in the National Assembly
March 1977 General Election

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balu- chistan	Total
Seats	116	43	34	7	200
<u>Parties</u>					
PPP	108	32	8	17	155
PNA	8	32	17	-	36
PML(Q)	-	-	1	-	1
Pakistan Inaquilabi Mahaz	-	-	-	-	-
Pakhtoon Khawa	-	-	-	-	-
NAP	-	-	-	-	-
JUI (Hazar M)	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan Mazdoor Party	-	-	-	-	-
Other Parties	-	-	-	-	-
Independents	-	-	8	-	8

Source: Dawn, March 9, 1977,

Taken from Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan
under Bhutto's leadership, (New Delhi, 1985),
p.270.

TABLE - 2

Final Party Position in the four
Provincial Assemblies
(1977 election)

Seats	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total
Seats	240	100	80	40	460
<u>Parties</u>					
PPP	232	100	71	34	437
PNA ^a	-	-	-	-	-
PML(Q)	-	-	2	-	2
Independents	7	-	5	5	17
JUI (Hazarvi)	-	-	1	-	1

Source : Morning News, 12,13 March 1977

Taken from - S.N.Kaushik, Pakistan under Bhutto's
Leadership (New Delhi, 1984), p.271.

a - The PNA boycotted the Provincial Assembly Election.

BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary SourcesOfficials Speeches, statements, documents

Bhutto, Z.A., From my Death Cell, (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980).

_____, If I am Assassinated, (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970).

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, Speeches : As Governor General of Pakistan, 1947-48, (Karachi, n.d.,).

_____, Speeches & Writings, Vol. 2, (Lahore, 1964).

Secondary Sources(i) Books

Afzal, M. Rafique, Political Parties in Pakistan : 1947-58, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, (Islamabad, 1976).

Ahmed, Manzooruddin, Contemporary Pakistan : Politics, Economy and Society, (Royal Book Company: Karachi, 1980).

Ahmed, Mushtaq., Politics Without Social Change, (Space Publishers: Karachi, 1971).

Ali, Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a Praetorian State, (Penguin Books; London, 1983).

_____, Pakistan : Military Rule or People's Power? (Janathan Cape; London, 1970).

Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S., eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton University Press; New Jersey, 1960).

Aziz, Khursheed Kamal, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-58, (National Commission on Historical, and Cultural Research; Islamabad, 1976).

- Baxter, Graig, (ed.), Zia's Pakistan : Politics and Stability in a Frontline State (Westview Press; London, 1985).
- Bhargava, G.S., Pakistan in Crisis (Vikas Publications; New Delhi, 1969).
- Bhutto, Benazir, Pakistan : The Gathering Storm (Vikas Publishing House; New Delhi, 1983).
- Burki, Shahid Javed, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77 (The MacMillan Press Ltd.; London, 1980).
- Callard, Keith (Pakistan, A Political Study (Oxford University Press; London, 1957).
- Chopra, Pran, ed., Contemporary Pakistan : New Aims and Images (Vikas Publishing House; London, 1983).
- Chaudhary, G.W., Constitutional Development in Pakistan (Longman Group Ltd.; London, 1959).
- Christopher, Clapham and George, Phillip, eds., The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (Croom Helm Ltd.; Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent BR3 1AT, 1985).
- Cohen, Stephen, The Pakistan Army (Himalayan Publishing House; New Delhi, 1984).
- Feldman, Herbert, From Crisis to Crisis : Pakistan 1962-69 (Oxford University Press; London, 1972).
- _____, Revolution in Pakistan : A Study of the Martial Law Administration (Oxford University Press; London, 1967).
- Finer, Samuel, E., The Man on Horseback (Pall Mall Press; London, 1975).
- Gardezi, Hassan and Rashid, Jamil, eds., Pakistan : The Roots of Dictatorship (Oxford University Press; London, 1983).
- Gopinath, Meenakshi, Pakistan in Transition (Manohar Book Service; Delhi, 1975).

- Hayes, Louis D., Politics in Pakistan : The Struggle for Legitimacy, (Westview Press; Boulder, 1984).
- Huntington, Samuel, P., The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Practice of Civil Military Relations, (Howard University Press; Cambridge, 1957).
- _____, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press; New Haven and London, 1968).
- Iqbal, Afzal, Islamization of Pakistan (Idarah Adabiyat-I; Delhi, 1984).
- Jahan, Rounaq, Pakistan : Failure in National Integration, (Columbia University Press; New York, 1972).
- Johnson, John J., ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, (Princeton University Press; New Jersey, 1962).
- Kamal, K.L., Pakistan : The Garrison State (Intellectual Publishing House; New Delhi, 1982).
- Kaushik, Surendranath, Pakistan Under Bhutto's leadership, (Uppal Publishing House; New Delhi, 1985).
- _____, Politics in Pakistan, (Aalekh Publishers; Jaipur, 1985).
- Khan, Mohammad Asghar, Generals in Politics : Pakistan 1958-82; (Vikas Publishing House; New Delhi, 1983).
- _____, Islam, Politics and the State : The Pakistan Experience, (Zed Books Ltd.; London, 1985).
- Kukreja, Veena, Military Intervention in Politics, (NBO Publishers, Distributors; New Delhi, 1985).
- Kumar, Satish, The New Pakistan, (Vikas Publishing House; New Delhi, 1978).
- Lapalambora, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton University Press; New Jersey, 1966).
- LaPorte Jr., Robert - Power and Privilege : Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan, (Vikas Publishing House; New Delhi, 1976).

- Lawson, Karl, Political Parties and Linkages : A Comparative Perspective (New Haven, 1980).
- Munir, Mohammad, From Jinnah to Zia : A Study of Ideological Conversions (Document Press; New Delhi, 1981).
- Nayak, Pandav, ed., Pakistan : Dilemmas of A Developing State (Alek Publishers; Jaipur, 1985).
- _____, Pakistan : Society and Politics (South Asian Publishers, Pvt. Ltd.; New Delhi, 1984).
- Nordlinger, Eric A., Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall; New Jersey, 1977).
- Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers (Yale University Press; Yale, 1977).
- Perlmutter, Amos and Bennett, Valerie P., eds., The Political Influence of the Military (Yale University Press; Yale; 1980).
- Quddus, Muhammed A., Pakistan : A Case of a Plural Society (Minerva Associates; Calcutta, 1981).
- Rizvi, Hassan Askari, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Progressive Publishers; Lahore, 1974).
- Sawhney, R.G., Zia's Pakistan : Implications for India's Security (ABC Publishing House; New Delhi, 1985).
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, Politics in Pakistan, The Nature and Direction of Change (Praeger Publishers; New York, 1980).
- _____, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co.; 1967).
- Schofield, Victoria, Bhutto : Trial and Execution (Cassell Ltd.; London, 1979).
- Sharan, P., Government and Politics of Pakistan (Metropolitan Publishing Co.; New Delhi, 1983).

- Taseer, Salman, Bhutto : A Political Biography, (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1980).
- Verma, S.P. and Narain, Virendra, eds., Pakistan's Political System in Crisis (South Asia Studies, Centre, Jaipur, 1972).
- Ziaullah, Syed & Baid, Samuel, Pakistan : An End Without a Beginning, (Lawar International, New Delhi, 1985).
- Ziring, Lawrence, The Ayub Khan Era : Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969, (Syracuse University Press, New York, 1971).
- Ziring, Lawrence, Bribanti, Ralph and Wriggings, and W. Howarels, eds., Pakistan : The Long View, (Duke University Press, Durham, 1977).

(ii) Articles in Periodicals

- Abidi, Mutiul H. , "Pakistan: Military Dictatorship and Democratic Struggle-I", Marxist Review, vol.16, nos.9&10, April 1983, pp.335-350.
- , Pakistan: Military Dictatorship and Democratic Struggle-II, Marxist Review, vol.16, no.11, May 1983, pp.415-426.
- Ahmed, Aijaz, "Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan", Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol.8, no.4, 1978, pp.477-512.
- Ali, Rao Farman, "The Pakistani Scene", Strategic Digest, vol.8, no.9, September 1978, pp.28-42.
- Ayoob, Mohammad, "Dateline Pakistan: A Passage to Anarchy?", Foreign Policy, vol.59, Summer 1985, pp.154-173.
- , "Pakistan Comes to Full Circle", India Quarterly, vol.34, no.1, January-March 1978, pp.17-25.
- , "Two Faces of the Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan Compared", Asian Survery, vol.19, no.6, June 1979, pp.35-46.

- Badejo, Babafemi A., "Milking Socialism: Bhutto in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, vol.6 no.2, April-June 1984, pp.145-157.
- Baid, Samuel, "Pakistan : Crisis Inherent", IDSA Journal, vol.15, no.1, July-September 1982, pp.87-135.
- Bauzon, Kenneth Espana, "Breakdown of a Military Regime: The Case of Pakistan (1969-71)", Asia Quarterly, 1977/2, pp.116-127.
- Bizenjo, Ghaus Baksh, "Democracy for Pakistan", Mainstream, vol.22, no.29, 17 March 1984, pp.15-24.
- Burki Shahid Javed, "Pakistan's Development: An Overview", Strategic Studies, vol.4 no.1, Autumn 1980, pp.23-46.
- Chari, P.R., "Dynamics of Pakistan Revolts", Strategic Analysis, vol.1 no.3, June 1977, pp.5-9.
- Cohen, S., "Pakistan Army, Society and Security", Asian Affairs, vol.10, no.3, Summer 1983, pp.1-26.
- Cohen, S. and Weinbaum, M.G., "Pakistan in 1981: Staying on", Asian Survey, vol.22, no.2, February 1982, pp.136-146.
- Gustafson, W.E., "Pakistan in 1978: At the Brink Again", Strategic Digest, vol.9, no.4, April 1979, pp.244-250.
- Gustafson, W.E. and Richter, W.L. "Pakistan in 1980: Weathering the Storm", Asian Survey, vol.21, no.2, February 1981, pp.162-171.
- Hafeez, Malik, "Martial Law and Political Development in Pakistan", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.6, no.4, Summer 1983, pp.66-67.

- Hassan, Riaz, "Islamization: An Analysis of Religions, Political And Social Change in Pakistan", Middle Eastern Studies, vol.21, no.3, July 1985, pp.263-284.
- Haque, A.S., "Army and the State: Military Intervention in the Politics of Bangladesh and Pakistan", Indian Political Science Review, vol.16, no.1, January 1982, pp.80-93.
- Heeger, Gerald A. "Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflection on the Pakistani Experience", World Politics, vol.29, no.2, January 1977, pp.242-262.
- Jackman, Robert, W., "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World", The American Political Science Review, vol.70, no.4, December 1970, pp.1078-1097.
- Kaniyalal, John, "Pakistan: Martial Law and After", Strategic Analysis, vol.9, no.12, March 1986, pp.1228-1239.
- Karim, A.S., "Failure of Charisma: A Comparative Analysis of Z.A.Bhutto and M.Rahman", Journal of Social and Economic Studies, vol.11, nos.1& 2, pp.36-53.
- Kaushik, S.N., "General Zia and the Opposition in Pakistan", South Asian Studies, vol.18, no.2, July 1983, pp.47-62.
- Khalid, D.H., "The Phenomenon of Re-Islamization", Aussen Politik, April 1978, as reprinted in Strategic Digest, vol.9, no.6, June 1979, pp.357-376.
- Khan, D.Shah, "Military and Politics in Pakistan", Strategic Digest, vol.9, no.2, February 1979, pp.97-115.

- Kheli, Shirin Tahir, "Martial Law Again in Pakistan", Asian Affairs, vol.5, no.4, March-April 1978, pp.229-224.
- _____, "The Future Course of Politics in Pakistan", Strategic Digest, vol.8, no.5, May 1978, pp.46-50.
- _____, "The Military in Contemporary Pakistan", Armed Forces and Society, vol.6, no.4, Summer 1980, pp.639-653.
- Kukreja, Veena, "Military in Pakistan: A Case of Persistent Praetorianism," IDSA Journal, vol.15, no.3, January-March 1983, pp.423-441.
- _____, "Military Intervention in Politics: Contrasting Cases of Pakistan and India", India Quarterly, vol.38, nos.3&4, July-December 1982, pp.143-164.
- Kumar, Satish, "Presidential Experiments in Pakistan", Radical Humanist, vol.45, no.11, February 1981, pp.9-11.
- Lodhi, Maleeha, "The Bhutto Factor in Pakistan Politics", Contemporary Review, vol.247, no.1439, December 1985, pp.298-294.
- _____, "Pakistan in Crisis", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.18, no.1, March 1978, pp.60-76.
- _____, "The PPP and Pakistan's Democracy", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.6, no.3, Spring 1983, pp.20-31.
- Mehrotra, O.N., "Pakistan: Critical Phase in Turmoil", Strategic Analysis, vol.2, no.1, April 1978, pp.7-11.

- Mishra, Jitendra, "Military Intervention in Bangladesh (1975) and Pakistan (1977): A Comparative Study, IDSA Journal, vol.14, no.2, October-December 1981, pp.167-182.
- _____, "Military Regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan: Strategies of Sustenance and Survival", India Quarterly, vol.34, no.4, October-December 1981, pp.522-546.
- Perlmutter, Amos, "The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations Aspirations and Achievements," World Politics, vol.33, no.1, October 1980, pp.96-120.
- Qureshi, A.S., "An Analysis of Contemporary Pakistani Politics: Bhutto vs Military," Asian Survey, vol.19, no.9, September 1979, pp.910-921.
- Rais, Rasul B. "Elections in Pakistan: Is Democracy Winning?" Asian Affairs, vol.12, no.3, Fall 1985, pp.43-61.
- Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Political Development of Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.10, no.7, July 1970, pp.555-571.
- Richter, William L., "Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order", Asian Survey, vol.26, no.2, February 1986, pp.207-218.
- _____, "Pakistan Under Zia", Current History, vol.78, no.446, April 1979, pp.168-171 & 185-186.
- _____, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regimes", Pacific Affairs, as reprinted in Strategic Digest, vol.9, no.5, May 1979, pp.277-294.
- _____, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.19, no.6, June 1979, pp.547-557,

- Rizvi, Hassan A. "Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan", Asian Survey, vol.26, no.10, October 1986, pp.1067-1081.
- Rizvi, N.H., "Military Intervention in Pakistan", South Asian Studies, vol.16, no.1, January-June 1981, pp.19-27.
- Sayeed, Khalid Bin, "Capabilities of the Martial Law Regime in Coping with Pakistan's Political Problem", Orient, vol.4, December 1978, pp.47-57.
- _____, "Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses More Serious than External Problems", Asian Survey, vol.24, no.2, February 1984, pp.219-228.
- Sawney, R.G., "Post-Election scene in Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, vol.9, nos.2&3, May-June 1985, pp.139-148.
- _____, "Sultan Zia-ul-Haq", Strategic Analysis, vol.8, no.10, January 1985, pp.927-939.
- _____, "Zia's Rise to Power", Strategic Analysis, vol.8, no.6, September 1984, pp.511-524.
- Sethi, Najam, "Significance of the Zia Regime", Strategic Digest, vol.16, no.3, March 1986, pp.304-315.
- Siddique, A.R., "Armed Forces: Tasks and Mission", Defence Journal, vol.4, nos.1&2, January-February 1978, pp.1-17.
- Sinha, P.B., "Civilian Cabinet of Gen. Zia", Strategic Analysis, vol.2, no.9, September 1978, pp.23-28.
- _____, "Fate of Bhutto Hanging in Balance", Strategic Analysis, vol.2, no.8, November 1978, pp.284-290.

Sinha, P.B., "General Zia's Coup Against the Constitution", Strategic Analysis, vol.9, nos.1&2, April-May 1981, pp.1-15.

Syed, Anwar H., "Pakistan in 1977: The Prince in Under Law", Asian Survey, vol.18, no.2, February 1978, pp.117-125.

_____, "The Prince Falls from Grace", Asian Survey, vol.20, no.4, April 1980, pp.118-129.

Weinbaum, M., "The 1977 Election in Pakistan: Where Everybody Lost", Asian Survey, vol.17, no.7, July 1977, pp.599-618.

Weinbaum, M.G. & Cohen, S.P., "Pakistan in 1982: Holding on", Asian Survey, vol.23, no.2, February 1983, pp.123-132.

Ziring, Lawrence, "The Campaign Before the Storm", Asian Survey, vol.17, no.7, July 1977, pp.581-598.

_____, "Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality", Asian Affairs, vol.4, no.6, July-August 1977, pp.385-407.

(iii) Journals and Periodicals

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Weekly, Hongkong, 1977-1985.

IDSANews Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean, Monthly, New Delhi, 1977-1985.

Pakistan Economist, Weekly, London, 1977-1985.

Public Opinion Trend (POT), Analysis and News Service, (Pakistan Series), New Delhi, 1977-1985.

(iv) News-Papers

Bangladesh Observer

Business Recorder

Daily Telegraph

Dawn

Dawn (Overseas Weekly)

Indian Express

Morning News

Nagpur Times

National Herald

Nawai-Waqt

The Hindu

The Hindustan Times

The Muslim

The Pakistan Times

Patriot

The Statesman

The Telegraph

The Times

The Times of India

The Tribune

