

CHINA AND THE NON-ALIGNED : A STUDY IN
FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1957 AND 1976 .

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Preface

The present study is a historical review of the Chinese attitude towards the non-aligned countries between 1957 and 1976. Interest in the topic was first aroused when I studied the Chinese comments over the Fifth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries held at Colombo in 1976. But, until the Chairman of my Centre (Centre for East-Asian Studies) Prof. (Mrs) Gargi Dutt suggested it to me in view of my interest, it never occurred to me that a comprehensive study could be done over it.

The study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter studies the attitude prior to 1957. It is nothing more than a brief description written with the objective of clarifying the background.

The actual study begins in the second chapter which covers the year between 1957 and 1969. 1957 is made the starting year of the study because it witnessed a shift in the general foreign policy posture of China. The shift was from the moderate policy of accommodating with the countries having different social systems to that of a more militant policy of fighting imperialism,

and hardening of policy towards many non-aligned countries. This shift obviously made its bearing on China's relation with the non-aligned countries in alienating most of them from China. The second chapter starts with, and carries through, this aspect and ends up in 1969, another watershed in Chinese foreign policy.

The Third Chapter begins with a description of the change in the general foreign policy trend of China in the aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and relates it to a corresponding change in Chinese attitude towards the non-aligned movement; this time the change being effected in a positive direction. This chapter studies the commonality of purpose, struck by China, between herself and the non-aligned movement as also the exchange of polemics between China and the Soviet Union over each other's attitude towards the movement. Whatever analysis and observation have been made and conclusions arrived at in this chapter are entirely mine.

The Concluding Chapter compares the Chinese stand on non-alignment with that of the stand taken by two other communist countries - the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Prof. (Mrs) Gargi Dutt, Chairman, Centre for East Asian Studies for the suggestion of this topic as also for her valuable guidance in writing this dissertation. However, I am alone responsible for any lapses in the dissertation. I extend my thanks to Dr. N. Das, Assistant Professor, Centre for East-Asian Studies, who is also convener of the seminar for Chinese Studies Division, to have given me the opportunity to initiate a discussion on "China and the Non-aligned World" which gave me valuable feed-back. My thanks also goes to Mr. Radhagopal Pradhan, Research Assistant of East-Asian Studies Centre, for his advice on the technicalities of writing the dissertation. Last, but not the least, I am thankful to a friend of mine who took the pain of typing the dissertation.

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Chapter I

BACKGROUND : CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NON-ALIGNED BETWEEN 1949 AND 1957

The Initial Chinese Stand:

A study of China's attitude towards the non-aligned nations could only begin from the initial Chinese reaction to "non-alignment" traced back to the pre-liberation days of China and the formative period of non-alignment.

Before 1949 Peking was heavily insistent upon a dogmatic asseration of bloc relationship and upon the communist ideology of achieving the broadest possible alignment of all the socialist revolutionary forces in the struggle against Capitalism and Imperialism. These were the days of militant communism (for the Chinese) and any amount of moderation in this policy and objective of total demolition of capitalism and imperialism was wholly out of question and unacceptable. These were the days when the Chinese dogmatically clung to the thesis that war between these two camps was inevitable, and that in this war the victory of the socialist camp was assured. These were the days when the Chinese communists held that all roads led either to the socialist or to the capitalist

camp and, hence, all the nations of the world must rally round either of the two camps.

The world today has been divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: on the one hand, the world imperialist camp, composed of American imperialists and their accomplices, the reactionaries of all countries of the world; on the other hand, the world anti-imperialist camp, composed of the Soviet Union and the New Democracies of Eastern Europe, and the national liberation movements in China, Southeast Asia and Greece, plus the people's democratic forces of all the countries of the world. American imperialism has become the bastion of all reactionary forces in the world; while the Soviet Union has become the bastion of all progressive forces ... These two camps include all the people's of the world - of all countries, classes, sections of the population, parties and groups. 1

In this black-and-white, for-us-or-against-us view joining either camp was a must and remaining neutral was just impossible. Underlining this policy Liu Shao-chi in 1949 stated bluntly that "to remain neutral or sitting on the fence is impossible."²

Thus, a policy of "neutrality" or "non-alignment"³ was just not acceptable to the Chinese communists during

1 Liu Shao-chi, Internationalism and Nationalism (Peking 1949), p.32.

2 Ibid, p.33.

3 "Neutrality" and "Non-alignment" are used interchangeably only to show that to the Chinese both the terms implied a "third road", not to mean that they are one and the same thing.

the pre-liberation days; nor did they give it any importance as a viable international policy.

This stand was reiterated further by Mao Tse-tung in 1949. Mao said:

The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty eight years' experience of the communist party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experience accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries who lean to the side of imperialism, and we also oppose the illusions about a third road. 4

Mao further said:

Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front. 5

Accordingly, China leaned heavily toward the communist camp. In the circumstances there was no alternative for the

4 Mao Tse-tung "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", Speech of 30 June 1949, Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV (Peking, 1969), p.415.

5 Ibid., p.417.

new and as yet unconsolidated Chinese regime, although Mao was careful not to exclude the possibility of loans 'on terms of mutual benefit in the future' from the capitalist powers. Whether or not Mao envisaged an independent road for China in years to come, he remained ideologically committed and may well have supposed that the cold war pressures for unity in the Communist block could be used to forge a durable working agreement between China and the USSR, in which China would not be a mere satellite and which would also further the communist cause throughout the world. There was considerable optimism among the Chinese leaders that the communist movement was soon to triumph in the other developing countries and they may have hoped that the Soviet Union would keep the United States at bay while the forces of socialist liberation in Asia and Africa, inspired by the Chinese example, launched their own struggle for freedom.

The Korean War and Its Impact:

The CPR's estimate of the international situation was still optimistic when the Soviet backed North-Korean army struck across the thirty-eighth parallel on June 25, 1950.

What first appeared to be another triumph for communist revolution soon developed into a strategical reversal, following the defeat of the North-Korean army and the advance of United Nations forces to the Yalu River. To prevent the liquidation of the North Korean regime and the consequent deployment of American military power on their border, Chinese forces intervened and successfully checked General Douglas Mac-Arthur's advance. The resultant military stalemate, as well as the heavy costs inflicted on the CPR to maintain it, was one major factor prompting the Chinese leadership to reappraise the international situation.

As a consequence of the Korean conflict China and the entire Socialist camp found themselves in a defensive military and diplomatic position. For the war spurred the United States to reverse its post-1949 policy of disengagement from the affairs of the Chinese mainland and added fuel to its efforts to organize the rest of the Asian States into a military bloc opposed to CPR. The nations Washington could not persuade to take up arms against China in Korea, she tried to draw into collective security pacts intended to provide the United States with military bases and to develop local anti-communist armed

forces. In an attempt further to isolate and punish China, Washington succeeded in forcing through the United Nations resolutions condemning the CPR as an aggressor and imposing a trade embargo against her. By placing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan straits and undertaking to revitalize the Nationalist Chinese army and Government, the United States precluded any possibility that the Chinese communists would soon be able to settle the Chinese civil war on their terms. Indeed, American revitalization efforts in Taiwan were accompanied by official declarations of support for the KMT's proclaimed goal of eventually retaking the mainland. Far from driving imperialism from East Asia, the Korean war had the undesired effect of producing a vast American political, military, and economic build up in the region.

In the early 1950's there was not much on the revolutionary side of ledger to offset these adverse trends. Asian communist parties that had attempted to generate armed struggles had suffered crushing defeats everywhere except in Vietnam. Partly in response to this situation, from early 1961 onward the communist parties in many Asian States - Japan, India, and Indonesia - began to reject violent struggle; which had resulted in their own weakening

or destruction. These parties shifted to parliamentary strategies in order to build up bases of popular support and political organization which, as the preceding insurrectionary period had shown, the communists did not have. As the major communist powers became more aware of the real conditions prevailing in Asia, their general foreign-policy lines began to reflect their interest in defending rather than advancing the cause of socialism in the Far East. The tactical results of this shift from the Cominform's two-camp doctrine was the gradual adoption by Russia and China of foreign policies enabling them to enlist the support of various international political elements that were willing to remain neutral as to oppose American policy.

The Asian neutrals could, in light of this shift, be regarded as potential candidates for inclusion in an enlarged anti-imperialist United Front, since, contrary to the two-camp doctrine, they did not prove to be camp followers of the United States. India and Burma, in particular, opposed the U.N. resolutions branding China as aggressor and declaring a trade embargo against her.

But if the independence of the neutral countries was to be encouraged and their separation from the American sphere of influence completed, the communist powers needed to overhaul their previous attitude towards the leaders of the developing countries, who were still being depicted, in 1950 and 1951, as mere representatives of the Western powers.

The shift in communist attitudes towards the Afro-Asian nationalist regimes was reflected first not in Soviet but in Chinese policies, since Chinese interests were most adversely affected by the situation growing out of Korean War. As early as June 1951, more than a year before Moscow took similar steps, authoritative CPR spokesmen began to endorse the need for co-existence between socialist and non-socialist states for the purpose of thwarting the alleged plans of the imperialists to start a new world war.⁶ In an important foreign-policy speech in October 1951, Chau En-lai explicitly stated that "countries of diverse socialist systems all over the world can exist peacefully side by side." China, he said, had "never thought of threatening or invading anyone, but

⁶ The first indication by a leading figure in the Peking Govt. that its foreign policy had shifted was the speech by Soong Ching-ling, "On peaceful co-existence", People's China (Shanghai), No.2, 1 June 1951, pp.1-6.

neither would she tolerate "threats or aggressions" directed against her by others".⁷

Shift Towards Accommodation With The Neutral States:

Well before the end of the Korean war, therefore, Peking began to conceptualize the political and class basis of a conciliatory policy towards those Asian Governments, with which, because they had not tied themselves to the United States, she could enter into an entirely different relationship than with those states which chose to remain American clients. In order to explore the possibilities China sponsored the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in May 1952.⁸ By this time her former revolutionary line had given way to a "People's diplomacy" aimed at organizing a broad multiclass "peace" front. At the formal diplomatic level the new policy found expression, beginning in 1951, in the improved relations Peking was able to develop with India, Burma, and Ceylon. This new line was also demonstrated at the Geneva Conference,⁹ where

⁷ Chou En-lai, "Political Report to the Third Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," 23 October 1951, in New China Forges Ahead (Peking, 1952), p.12.

⁸ See collection of documents published in Important Reports and Resolutions of the Peace Conference of the Asian-Pacific Region, (Peking, 1952).

⁹ Convened in 1954 to discuss both Korea and Indo-China.

Chou En-lai made a distinguished debut on the stage of world diplomacy.

The CPR ~~has~~ enormously enhanced its international prestige, especially with the neutrals, by its role in the Geneva Conference which had been more important than that of any other participant except perhaps Britain. This was of course the first international conference that it attended, and the impression that it made was enhanced by the glamour of the unknown.¹⁰

Strictly from ideological point of view, non-alignment by Afro-Asian nations fell short of what Peking would otherwise have wished. But realistic appraisals of the world power configurations ~~has~~ called for a rejection of the dogmatic notion that "those who are not with us are against us". Out of strategic considerations, the communist Chinese ~~have~~ reconciled themselves to a policy based on the premise that "those who are not against them are potentially for them". Their own continued international isolation has

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Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics
(London, 1966), p.254.

led them to perceive the role which a growing third world could play in mitigating the acute tension of the cold war. Non-alignment in the South-East Asia, especially in the Indo-China region, became a central policy which CPR promoted in its effort to liquidate western influence from China's backyard. At the Geneva Conference 1954, convened to settle the Indo-China war, Chou En-lai stressed that Asian countries should settle their own fate and all foreign troops must be withdrawn and foreign bases removed from the surface of the Asian continent. This was stated with the security objective of keeping Indo-china out of American influence. This objective, the CPR of course attained by the exclusion of American bases and alliances system from Indo-china. Although the CPR's promotion of non-alignment in Indochina boiled down to the keeping out of Western influence, its acceptance of the Geneva agreement which forbade the Indo-chinese states to enter into military alliance with any foreign state meant ultimately an endorsement of mutual disengagement.

China's move for accommodation with the non-aligned states of Asia and Africa was confirmed by the joint statement made by Chou En-lai and Nehru in 1954 wherein they

declared the "Five Principles" or "Panch Shila" as the guiding principles of the future relationship between CPR and India. These principles are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.¹¹

Since 1954, the "Five Principles" have been included in virtually every treaty made by the People's Republic of China, an illustration of the enthusiasm of China's leaders for freely negotiated mutually advantageous agreements as the basis of international order.

Bandung Spirit:

Peking's accommodating approach in the mid-fifties to the countries of the Third World was clearly demonstrated

¹¹ Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of India and China issued in New Delhi, 28 June 1954. Text in New China News Agency, 29 April 1954; in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 798, 29 April 1954.

at the Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Asian and African nations in April 1955. In this conference the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, admitted in his speech that "among our Asian and African countries we do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united."¹² "There is every reason to make the five principles the basis for establishing friendly co-operation and good neighbourly relations among us."¹³ He further stated, "On the basis of strict adherence to the five principles, we are prepared now to establish normal relations with all the Asian and African countries, with all the countries in the world, and first of all with our neighbouring countries."¹⁴

The proposals for Afro-Asian co-operation which Chou En-lai announced at Bandung showed the extent of the transformation that had occurred in China's foreign-policy strategy by 1955. What the Chinese leader said and pledged amounted to a replacement of the 1949-to-1950 Mao-Liu call

¹²* Speech by Chou En-Lai before the full conference of Afro-Asian Countries at Bandung, 19 April 1955, in Supplement to People's China, 16 May 1955, pp.11-13.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

for a revolutionary united front from below by a call for a united front from above. Peking's new allies could be the bourgeois governments of newly independent Afro-Asian states which might, for reasons of their own, share China's interest in banding together to prevent the United States from dragging the Third World into the Cold War.

The major foreign policy initiatives China took at the Bandung conference was based on the assumptions: the Sino-Soviet unity would continue and that there would be an increased scope for the application of the peaceful co-existence doctrine. If the Chinese assumptions were correct, the combined effect of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the improvement of relations between Peking and her neighbours would be to expand the basis for a united front strategy of opposition to the American presence in Asia. After Bandung the hoped - for possibility of united front did not materialize and, in fact, China, rather than the imperialists, became increasingly isolated and thrown on the defensive. It is necessary here to analyse briefly the factors that caused the break-down of the Bandung policy.

Estrangement from Moscow:

The Sino-Soviet rift, which the CPC claims to have begun at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956,¹⁵ actually began to take shape before this event.¹⁶ The Soviet Union chose to de-emphasize the significance of the Bandung Conference, especially the implication Peking derived from it; that the Communist bloc should concentrate its strategy on the Afro-Asian states, to the end of exploiting their differences with the imperialist powers. It was already clear from the Soviet's participation in the Big Four talks on Berlin and disarmament at the July 1956 Geneva Conference that Moscow's primary attention would remain focussed on the Atlantic theater and, consequently, she did not welcome pre-emptive Chinese moves to redirect the efforts of the socialist camp elsewhere. That Moscow was in fact interested in the relaxation of tensions with the United States in the Far East, on the basis of accepting the status quo, was revealed in the October 1956 Soviet decision to establish diplomatic relations with Japan.

¹⁵ "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and ourselves: Comment on the Open letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (14 July 1963)", dated 6 September 1963; in The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking, 1963), pp.69-67.

¹⁶ See Donald S. Zogoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, 1962) for a detail account of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The main political effect of the Soviet resumption of ties with Japan was to encourage conservative circles in the Japanese and in other Asian governments on the belief that a "two-Chinas" policy was possible. The Russian action also suggested that the communist powers' militance toward imperialism was weakening and that they might eventually become reconciled to the continuance of military pacts between Asian nations and the United States. This was certainly not the message Peking was trying to convey by its consistent policy of resolute, united opposition to the military pacts of the United States, nor was it the objective China had in proposing the Bandung formula.

Tightened tensions between China and the United States:

Accumulating evidence of divergent Soviet and Chinese policies in Asia necessarily had the effect of undermining China's position in the contest with America in East Asia. The Sino-American talks on relaxing tensions in the Taiwan Straits area, which began in 1955, revealed from the beginning that Washington could not agree to remove her military presence unless Peking was prepared to recognize the American-created status quo, that is the perpetuation

of the Nationalist Chinese Regime. While these talks continued, the United States proceeded with the training and rearmament of the Nationalist armies. Further evidences of the real American intention was the steady rearmament of Japan, and the development of Okinawa into the most powerful air, naval, and nuclear weapons base in the Pacific. Since these efforts proceeded apace, despite the moderate and restrained foreign policy of the CPR at this time, Peking had to conclude that the American camp did not want a relaxation of tensions in Northeast Asia. Any possibility that the Bandung policy might have been the basis for a whole new approach toward the United States - faintly implied by Chou En-lai's offer to talk with the United States,¹⁷ rather than a bid for organizing a broader united front against her, was quickly dashed by the concerted American Far Eastern policy after 1954, which aimed at organizing Asia into a political-military system directed against China.

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Speech by Chou En-lai before the Political Committee of the Bandung Conference, 23 April 1955, extracts in Alan Lawrence, China's Foreign Relations since 1949 (London, 1975), pp. 165-8.

In South-east Asia, the ^{strenuous} ~~serious~~ political-military arrangement that had been worked out at the Geneva Conference was, by 1955, also being rapidly undermined by the United States, which had decided to overturn the 1954 Indo-china settlement. The first consequence of this decision was the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) established by a security treaty (September 1954) dealing with Laos and Cambodia, in which an umbrella clause permitted the signatory powers - but actually the United States - to intervene in these countries in the event of "aggression" - despite the plain language of the Geneva agreement, which explicitly called for the neutralization of these two states. As the French withdrew from South Vietnam, the United States undertook to create a regime in Saigon under Ngo Dinh Diem; the aim was the permanent division of Vietnam into communist and anti-communist zones - similar to the Korean division - again a violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Under the SEATO treaty Thailand and Philippines would serve as the flanks buttressing the main American bastion being created in South Vietnam. By 1956, Washington was already developing a pattern of covert diplomacy and intervention in Laos - which was extended to Cambodia in 1958 and to other Southeast Asian countries designed to strengthen

the remaining weak links in the chain that the United States was forging to contain Communist China.

During the same period the United States made efforts to underwrite the Indian five-year plans, a development that was evidently an attempt by Washington to strengthen New Delhi as a counter-weight to China in Asia. Elsewhere, in 1957 and 1958, rightist military coups were carried out in Burma, Pakistan, Laos, and Thailand and the army became the dominant political influence in Indonesia. To Peking, therefore, it must have seemed that in the period between 1955 and 1958 the United States was engaged in a new drive to dominate Southeast Asia and to sabotage the Bandung formula. The success of this American effort to "roll back" China had a great influence on the subsequent policy shift Peking was to make.

Defection of the Neutrals from the United Front:


The Bandung policy of promoting common unity and support among Asian-African states on the basis of resistance to imperialism notably failed to inspire most of the parties to whom it was directed. Overall, the Afro-Asian states seemed to interpret the Chinese assertion to mean acceptance

of the status quo, not a call to resist American policies. In other words, peaceful co-existence meant only live and let live. This was not an unreasonable inference, since Chao En-lai's statements at Bandung had stressed the point that all the new countries should concentrate on national economic construction and such a decision was not exactly inconsistent with the diversion of energies to confrontations with the colonial and imperialist powers. Had not China also said that peaceful co-existence was possible even with the Asian military allies of the United States - Japan, Thailand and Pakistan? And if Peking could offer to sit down and talk with the imperialists themselves after Bandung, on what basis could China logically object to the Asian neutrals adopting a non-militant posture toward the United States?

The above factors, it would be seen, were mainly responsible for a major change in the Chinese foreign-policy after 1957 calling for a militant anti-imperialist policy, mainly directed against the United States. The change was undertaken as a reaction to the Soviet policy of peaceful co-existence with the United States. The doctrine of peaceful

co-existence between states with different social systems, however, was not contrary to earlier Chinese foreign policy. Peking had advanced peaceful co-existence as a basic, but not the only, principle of her foreign policy several years before Khrushchev reconciled to the concept. Since 1954 it had been the basis of China's relations with friendly Asian states. But she disagreed with Khrushchev's idea that peaceful co-existence should also apply to United States imperialism, which was pursuing roll back, anti-communist policies ⁱⁿ ~~an~~ Asia inimical to Chinese interests. Acceptance of Khrushchev's definition of peaceful co-existence would mean that Peking could not oppose the enlargement and the consolidation of the American sphere in Asia until the balance of power in the West had decisively shifted in favour of Soviet Union. Concern about the possible effects of Khrushchev's proposals led China to call for the socialist camp to take a militant stance towards the United States which in turn, as we will see, would involve China in such activities to erode Chinese credit among the nations which were associated with the loosely - constituted non-aligned bloc.

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Chapter II

CHINA LOOSES CREDIT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED : 1957-1969

Changing Chinese Policy in 1957-58:

The year 1957 is important as it witnessed a change in China's foreign policy in the direction of militant anti-imperialism in marked contrast to the earlier moderate policy of peaceful co-existence with different social systems. The change, however, was not a drastic one; rather, it was gradual. For, in 1957 Chinese policy statements and speeches of Chinese leaders still continued to refer to peaceful co-existence. Thus, Liu Shao-chi in his speech conceded the emergence of an intermediate zone of peace and the important role they were to play in the future international politics. He asserted that the most important trends in the forty years since the October Revolution in Russia included not only the "decline of imperialism", "the rise of socialism", and the "upsurge of proletarian revolutionary movements", but also the development of "national independence and liberation movements" and "the extensive growth of world peace movement". "Mutual friendly relations

in line with the five principles of peaceful co-existence have been established and developed", he said, "between many nationally independent countries and socialist countries which together form a broad zone of peace".¹

Thus, Chinese statements at this time, continued to stress the importance of peaceful co-existence between states having different social systems, and Peking still called for all the peoples of Asia and Africa to rally round the principles of "Panch Shila" and "Bandung". But now "peoples" rather than "states" began to assume a greater importance in these formulations. And to this general approach was added the thought that conditions "were now especially favourable" for resistance to colonialism and imperialism.²

The same attitude was maintained by China in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference convened on 26 December 1957. It was a conference of people attended by unofficial representatives of 45 countries, many

¹ Liu Shao-chi, "The Significance of the October Revolution", speech delivered to the Peking mass rally in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, 6 November 1957, ~~1957~~, ~~6 November 1957~~, in Current Background (Hong Kong), no. 480, 13 November 1957, pp. 6-9.

² Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization 1957-1967 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 11.

independent and some still under colonial rule, where every opportunity was seized by China to discredit the West thoroughly in African and Asian eyes, and establish important contacts with prominent Asian and African public figures, also known for their anti-Western proclivities. The meeting, while strongly anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist as well as generally anti-Western in tone was not strictly speaking, a communist propaganda forum.³ The Soviet delegation played a major role at the Conference, but was unsuccessful in dominating the meeting. The Chinese, however, played a relatively modest role at the conference.⁴ Chu Tu-nan, the major Chinese spokesman, delivered a talk on cultural questions largely apolitical in content.⁵ Kuo Ho-jo, the leader of the Chinese delegation, also spoke briefly, stressing the themes of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.⁶ Neither speech was extreme, and of Chu's remarks the Cairo newspaper Al-massa said: "He has not asked us to break relations with the

³ No more than 30% of the delegates were communists. See Neuhauser, n.2, p.83.

⁴ The Chinese delegation was, however, a larger one consisting of 25 persons. See Neuhauser, *ibid.*

⁵ New China News Agency (hereafter referred to as NCNA), 27 December 1957, in Survey of China Mainland Press (Hong Kong), (hereafter referred to as SCMP), no.1682, 2 January 1958, p.46.

⁶ NCNA, 31 December 1957, in SCMP, no.1684, 6 January 1958, p.40.

West but, on the contrary he asked that the relations be developed and strengthened on the basis of protecting our independence and mutual interest and respect."⁷

A Jen-min Jih-pao editorial hailing the outcome of the Cairo meeting wrote:

The people of these two continents want to take their destiny into their own hands and want to take an active part in determining the destiny of all humanity. They are profoundly aware that in the present peace is indivisible. The establishment of lasting peace is inseparable from the national independence movements. Only when the people of all countries have gained independence and equality can a stable and lasting peace come into being. This is good for which our nations in Asia and Africa should jointly fight. ⁸

It should be noted, however, that although peace was stressed, the Chinese presented it as a distant goal, the light at the end of a long tunnel of "struggle" and revolution. Moreover, in claiming that "peace is indivisible" the Chinese implicitly claimed that a

⁷ NCNA, 28 December 1957, in SCMP, no.1682, 2 January 1958, p.50.

⁸ SCMP, no.1686, 8 January 1958, p.32.

genuine "detente" between the two great powers, the USSR and the USA, was impossible as long as "national revolutionary struggles" went on. Furthermore the Chinese had started giving clear support to these national struggles. In March, at a Peking rally in support of the Algerian war, Kuo Mo-jo remarked:

The Chinese people, who love peace and abhor war, have always sympathised with the struggle of the people of Algeria and all Africa. We regard their struggle and victories as our own.⁹

In identifying with the nationalist struggle in the Middle East and Africa, the Chinese in a sense were legitimizing their growing involvement in these areas. Indeed, the very Chinese presence on the secretariat of Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization helped legitimize their presence in these regions and gave the Chinese contact for the first time with the various nationalist groups at work there.

Another strand in the Chinese argument contended that not only was true peaceful co-existence impossible until the national revolutionary struggles had been won, but the

⁹ NCNA, 30 March 1958, SCMP, no.1744, 5 April 1958, p.49.

struggles were themselves an absolute necessity: true independence could be won in no other way. As such the Chinese were making distinction between two dimensions of national struggle, viz., the national liberation struggle with an objective of gaining political independence, and the national revolutionary struggle with the objective of gaining true independence from the clutches of imperialist forces. Political independence itself required sustained and prolonged struggle for consolidation against the imperialist intervention. Thus a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial commemorating the third anniversary of Bandung conference noted: "The experience of the past three years has proved that hard won war of independence need still greater vigilance because the imperialists never reconcile themselves willingly to defeat."¹⁰ Moreover, the argument ran, the national revolutionary struggles were useful in themselves because they bred greater revolutionary consciousness among the masses. A Hung-chi editorial in late 1958 made this point

¹⁰ SCMP, no.1757, 24 April 1958, p.59.

most clearly:

The history of the October Revolution itself and the period following the October Revolution has proved time and again that in order to achieve victory in the revolution, the people must be imbued with the consciousness that there is to be a revolution, that there is no way other than revolution. In order to instill such consciousness in the people, it is absolutely not enough to rely solely on positive education by the communists. There must also be education by negative example of the revolutionaries ... The reactionaries who resort to brute force in dealing with the people can only educate the people to pay them back in their own coins.¹¹

The appeal of communism, then lay, not in what it proposed, but in what it opposed. Communists need the "negative example" of reactionaries to ferment revolution.

Stress on Militant anti-imperialism:

The Chinese view of the importance of the Third World and of the part they expected it to play in final defeat of imperialism was spelled out most clearly in another Hung-chi article: "The Forces of the New Are Bound to Defeat the Forces of Decay". It was this article that set

11

Hung-chi, 1 November 1958, quoted in Neuhauser, n.2, pp. 15-16.

forth the changing foreign policy line that the socialist camp need not fear nuclear war, for such a war would destroy imperialism, while socialism "would be realized all the more quickly throughout the world". Here the argument that the under-developed regions are the Achilles heel of capitalism and the area where the decisive battles against it would be fought was elaborated in greatest detail:

The United States is separated from the socialist countries by whole oceans; almost the entire capitalist world lies between them. To start a war against the Soviet Union, United States must first bring the capitalist world in its knees. In order to set up military bases in a country, the United States imperialists must first invade that country ... They were naturally everywhere encircled by the people ... Imperialism is like a setting sun in the west; socialism and the national liberation movements are like the rising sun in the East. It is difficult for the imperialists to subvert the nationalist countries which have already won independence, and they are not in a position to hold back the further progress of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America ... If the imperialists insist on war, the people will certainly study politics more closely in a war they are faced to fight and will quickly raise their level of political consciousness; they will never continue to tolerate a system that brings them such endless sufferings and sacrifices; they will rise in their anger and hurl the imperialist aggressive bloc into its grave.¹²

¹² Hung-chi, article, 16 August 1958, quoted in Neuhauser, n.2, p.16.

If in Peking's view China had a special sympathy with and affinity for the national liberation struggles of the under-developed world, it was also implicit in this formulation that the major role of the Soviet Union was to provide a shield behind which these struggles could take place, a shield that the West and the United States in particular could only attempt to pierce at the risk of total destruction. Indeed Hung-chi went on to state that the USSR's "superiority" in rockets made it most unlikely that the West could in fact risk war.

This approach placed a considerable burden upon the Soviet Union. In the Chinese view, Moscow should in effect, risk a nuclear war with the United States, trusting in a military "superiority" it did not believe existed for gains it could not be sure would be either certain or permanent. The Soviets found this approach distasteful. They felt that staking a nuclear war would be a very dangerous affair as it could threaten the existence of mankind itself. Hence, following a rational logic, they resolved to come down on the tempo of resisting the U.S. imperialism and preferred to work with national leaders like Nehru, Subarno and Nasser than to encourage the recalcitrant Chinese leaders' policy of opposing the United

States anywhere and everywhere. Soviet Union also did not support the Chinese stand on the revolutionary movements in Iraq. Mass rallies throughout China offered support to the revolutionaries, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, for the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in July 1958 and warned the Western powers against intervention in Iraq. A series of bellicose government statements condemned the American and British landings in Lebanon and Jordan. No direct threats were made, however; this presumably was left to the Soviet Union, which after briefly blustering, acquiesced in the Western landing. The Chinese were clearly disappointed.¹³ In September China recognized the FLN Provisional Government in Algeria. The Jen-min Jih-pao commented:

The successful Iraqi revolution has brought about a decisive change in the situation in the Middle East. Similarly the birth of the Algerian Republic will exert a tremendous influence on the national independence movement of the African people. 14

¹³ Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, (New York, 1964), p. 195.

¹⁴ SCMP, no. 1861, 20 September 1958, p. 42.

The Soviet Union which unlike China maintained relations with France and did not want to alienate De Gaulle made no move to follow suit at this time.

China's Hardening International Attitude:

The 1958 Middle East crisis moreover, brought into prominence still another side of hardening Chinese international position; renewed opposition to the United Nations, which the Chinese claimed was dominated by the United States. In response to a Japanese attempt to resolve the crisis through U.N. machinery, Jen-min Jih-nao commented, "There is a precedent - and not such an old one - to the stealing of the United Nations banner by the United States to cover up its aggression. The U.N. banner was dirtied in the Korean war which the United States launched. Now the United States is again trying to use the U.N. banner, this time to mask its piratical face in the Middle East".¹⁵

¹⁵ NOVA, 23 July 1958, in SCMP, no. 1821, p. 26, 28 July 1958, p. 26.

If Peking's support for and identification with the struggles of the national liberation movements in the Middle East and Africa tended to accrue credit for the Chinese with the revolutionary movements still attempting to gain independence from colonialist regimes, its hardening international attitudes tended to discredit the Chinese position among national governments in the underdeveloped world already in existence. From the Chinese point of view, of course, these governments were dominated by the national bourgeoisie, and thus at best halfway houses on the road toward a genuine socialist revolution. But these regimes, India and Egypt in particular, had considerable influence of their own among the national liberation organizations.

The Chinese hardening international attitude became overt in 1958 and this, in turn, affected the Chinese reputation among the non-aligned countries. While China's interest in the Afro-Asian Conference and its permanent organization was rising, her faith in the policy of peaceful co-existence was fast diminishing. While on the

one hand she increasingly participated in the activities of the solidarity organization on the other she manifested a belligerent attitude towards practically everyone. By the end of 1958 it seemed as if China had declared a virtual war against the outside world.

First of all a virulent campaign was unleashed against the United States whose presence in Taiwan was denounced in strong terms. A violent campaign, which opened with the shelling of the Quemoy islands, was launched for the liberation of Taiwan. As regards Japan, an ally of the United States, all trades was abruptly stopped after the incident concerning the desecration of the Chinese communist flag in Nagasaki. In Laos, the Pathet Lao in the summer of 1958 was encouraged by Peking and Hanoi to begin an armed insurrection against the government of Vientiane. And in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front, which was formed in the beginning of 1950, immediately sprang armed personnel in that country.

Strained Relationship between China and Egypt:

Peking's attitude towards the non-aligned countries also had begun to harden during the same period. The first such country to feel the hot breath of

Chinese hostility was Egypt. President Nasser had become involved in increasing trouble, with communists. At home he clamped down on the communists and in the Middle East his policies were coming into conflict with communist policies. Khrushchev had mildly criticized Nasser at the Twenty-first Party Congress for the incarceration of Egyptian communists, but much more serious trouble arose as a result of split over the Iraqi developments. The anti-monarchical (and anti-Western) revolution that had broken out in Iraq in August 1958 was hailed both by Nasser and the Communists.¹⁶ Nasser, however, looked upon the event as a step in the direction of forming a super-state structure in which all Arab States would completely merge. Earlier Syria had joined the UAR and now, Nasser hoped that all the other Arab States would also follow suit. But the communists opposed the merger of Iraq with UAR, for, they realised that Iraq's merger with UAR would mean the elimination of communist parties and jail life for them.

¹⁶ V.P. Dutt, China's Foreign Policy 1958-62
(Bombay, 1964), p.157.

While in Iraq a split occurred between the Nasserites and those - including communists - supporting the Iraqi President General Kassem who resisted a union with the UAR, a pro-Nasser coup was suppressed by the supporters of Kassem. This touched off an explosive clash of opinion between Nasser and the communists. The Soviets were also unhappy over Nasser's actions but typically, it was the Chinese communists who adopted a much tougher line and wanted to carry matters much further than the Soviets. The propaganda offensive launched by Peking against Nasser was far more virulent than the Soviet comments, and Peking adopted a line of militant hostility against the UAR leadership. The Jen-min-Jih-pao editorially commented that "since the Shawwaf rebellion, the propaganda organs in Cairo and Damascus have started a frantic campaign against the Iraqi Republic." It claimed that this had caused "concern among all friends of UAR and Iraq," like Sukarno and Nehru, and agitated "press opinion in many countries that uphold peace and neutrality". It charged that the UAR's "campaign against Iraq cannot in any way be regarded as conforming to the principle of non-interference

in each other's internal affairs." It said: "the people all over the world can see that those who were once victims of pressure are today applying pressure on others... No matter what excuse they use, it will be difficult for people not to form a new judgement of them. Egypt regards all other Arab States as annexed".¹⁷

"A new judgement" - that was the key to China's changing attitudes in Asia. Peking was forming "a new judgement" on the neutralist countries. This was apparent from the charges levelled at the UAR. Peking accused the UAR of "ceasing to oppose imperialism in earnest" and claimed that the plans of U.S. imperialism were making headway after the visit of U.S. Under-Secretary Rountree to Cairo.¹⁸ An article by Yu Chao-li in the Hung-chi charged that the anti-communist press of the UAR was currently making much noise over the slogan of "neither West nor East" and that this was an attempt to "confuse the socialist with the imperialist countries." It was tantamount to saying, "neither enemies nor friends," and worried that

¹⁷ Jen-min Jih-pao, editorial, 20 March 1959, Dutt, n.16, p.158.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.159.

"those who want no friends will naturally not be feared by any enemy. On the contrary, according to Peking's new judgement, "this becomes a step towards going over to the enemy".¹⁹

The deteriorating relations between Cairo and Peking reached their lowest point when Peking allowed the Syrian communist leader Khalid Bakdash to utilize the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic to attack Nasser from the Peking pulpit. Bakdash was one of the extreme left-wing and dogmatic communists of the Middle East and Peking's courting of him was significant as indicative of Peking's own inclinations. Bakdash accused Nasser of not only being a reactionary dictator but also of being practically an imperialist agent. Cairo reacted sharply against the Chinese action. The UAR charge d'Affairs in Peking kept away from the Republic Day ceremonies and was recalled. Cairo radio accused the Chinese of seeking communist domination of the Middle East and the UAR Foreign Ministry delivered a strong protest to the Chinese Ambassador against the Peking incident.²⁰ The Cairo paper Al-Ahram said that,

¹⁹ Hung-chi, no. 7, 1 April 1959, -Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy In Africa 1958-71 (London, 1964), p.24.

²⁰ The New York Times, 1 October 1959.

unlike the Soviet Union, communist China was following a stalinist "policy of things" in order to increase international tension.²¹ It was also reported that the UAR Foreign office had sent word to the twenty-five nations of the Bandung Conference suggesting that they reduce their representation at Peking from the ambassadorial level to that of charge d'Affairs as a mark of protest against "recent Chinese aggressions against Tibet, India, Laos, and now the UAR".²²

The Cairo-Peking clash did not subside until Peking had apologized and explained that Bakdash had spoken at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party and not that of the Government of China. Although Nasser accepted China's "sincere regrets",²³ he could not have failed to make a deep note of the real Chinese policy and attitude suddenly revealed as if in a flash.²⁴

Ideological Campaign Against Yugoslavia:

Apart from the strained relationship between China and UAR the vituperative attack of China on Yugoslavia

21. Ibid., 4 October 1959.

22 Ibid., 2 October 1959.

23 Ibid., 26 October 1959.

24 Dutt, n. 16, p.160.

eroded further the Chinese credit among the loosely constituted non-aligned countries. The beginning of the Sino-Yugoslav conflict could be dated back to the time of Polish and Hungarian crisis of 1956 over the question of autonomy of satellite states from Soviet Union. The CPC seemed to have encouraged the Poles beforehand to assert their autonomy from Moscow,²⁵ and to have supported Gomulka's successful assertion of such autonomy. In doing so, they were following the Yugoslav line in some degree although they did not condone Yugoslavia's neutralism or its acceptance of Western aid. They showed no animus against Yugoslavia at this stage once Khrushchev had declared, at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in February, that that country was entitled to find its own road to socialism. The authoritative Jen-min Jih-pao, in a long analysis of the Stalin era based on discussions of China's top leaders, pointed to Stalin's handling of Yugoslavia as one of his major errors.²⁶

After Hungarian revolt of 1956, however, Chinese attitude toward Yugoslavia showed signs of turning sour. At the time when the first version of an important Chinese

²⁵ Zagoria, n.13, pp.55-6.

²⁶ "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 April 1956, ^{See} Zagoria, n.13, p.55.

statement on the East European situation was broadcast on 1 November 1956 the CPC still regarded Nagy's program for Hungary in the same category as that of Poland.²⁷ Three hours later a revised version was broadcast, and then published in the Jen-min Jih-pao, in which the CPC's support for Nagy was implicitly withdrawn.²⁸ In the interval, Budapest radio had announced the dissolution of the communist dictatorship in Hungary, Hungarians withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the adoption of a neutral foreign policy to be guaranteed by the U.N.

Tito reacted rather differently to the Hungarian affair. In his speech at Pula on 11 November 1956, he attributed it to the vestiges of Stalinism and said that

27 "The Government of the People's Republic of China notes that the People of Poland and Hungary in the recent happenings have raised demands that democracy, independence and equality be strengthened... These demands are completely proper." NCNA dispatch, 1 November 1956, in Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (London, 1966), p.91.

28 In the revised version, the words "and Hungary" were deleted from the following sentences of the original (although the passage quoted in the foregoing note was not changed): "As a result of these misunderstandings and estrangement a tense situation has sometimes occurred which otherwise would not have occurred. The handling of the 1948-1949 Yugoslav situation and the recent happenings in Poland and Hungary are enough to illustrate this." Cited in Hinton, *ibid.*, p.91.

such vestiges were present in other communist regimes as well. He added that Stalinism was "the product of a system" rather than the defect of an individual and implied that the best alternative to it was his own system.²⁹ This was too much for the CPC; after pondering his remarks for several weeks, it concluded that for the second time in eight years he needed a public lecture. This appeared in the form of a major editorial, said to be based on discussions at a meeting of the CPC's Politburo. In this document Tito's points were rebutted, and the editorial went on to lecture him on Stalin's merits and the essentials of the "way of the October Revolution". Tito's attack on "Stalinism", on socialist countries, and on many of the communist Parties, said the Chinese, could only lead to a split in the movement. "Clearly, the Yugoslav comrades are going too far."³⁰

Yugoslavia was violently attacked by the CPC in the spring of 1958 and one of the main reasons why the CPC openly attacked Tito "was the hope of bringing Khrushchev

²⁹ Excerpts in The New York Times, 17 November 1956,

³⁰ "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariats", Jen-min Jih-pao, editorial, 29 December 1956, in Communist China 1955-1969: Policy Documents with Analysis (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 256. pp. 257-272.

to break with him also, and a belief that only such break could prevent Yugoslavia from swallowing Albania".³¹

The Chinese campaign against Yugoslavia was launched by an editorial entitled, "Modern Revisionism Must be criticized", in the ~~Peking~~ Jen-min Jih-pao, 5 May 1958.³² This attack of the May 5 editorial of the Jen-min Jih-pao was preceded earlier by the reprint of an article, signed by three Russians, which had appeared in the number 6, 1958 issue of "The Communist", the leading doctrinal magazine of Soviet Russia.³³ The article was received in Peking by cable on April 21 and appeared on the following day in the Jen-min Jih-pao. The article in "The Communist" warned Yugoslavia that the draft, which spoke of the excessive power of the Party and of the State and of the possibility of one communist State exploiting others, was intolerable. It was far from Marxism-Leninism, and would split the international community bloc. "The Communist" demanded that the draft be rewritten.³⁴

31 Hinton, n.27, p.93.

32 SCMP, no.1767, 8 May 1958, pp.4-7.

33 China News Analysis (Hong Kong), no.239, 1 August 1958, p.1.

34 Ibid., pp.1-2.

The draft was not rewritten nor withdrawn, and, therefore, the counter attack from the communist bloc against the Yugoslav comrades was launched and it was no doubt launched first from Peking. It, however, is an old and well-worn Russian tactics, going back to the Tsarist times, to let one's friends launch the first assault.³⁵

The Jen-min Jih-pao published an article refuting Tito's speech.³⁶ Tito blasted back and attacked China and other socialist countries³⁷ and the following day China strongly protested against Tito's slander.³⁸ This was followed by a commentary on the Jen-min Jih-pao on Tito's slander.³⁹ There is reason to think that this assault forced Khrushchev to adopt a less tolerant attitude toward Tito, raised the level of tension in Eastern Europe, and contributed to the execution of Nagy on 16 June 1958. The CPC spoke of Tito as having inspired and sheltered Nagy, and as being no better than Nagy.

35 Ibid.

36 "JMJP Refutes Tito's Speech", SCMP, no. 1803, 26 June 1958, p.15.

37 "Tito attacks China and Other Socialist Countries", SCMP, no. 1977, 17 March 1959, p.34.

38 "China strongly protests Tito's slander", SCMP, no. 1978, 18 March 1959, p.33.

39 SCMP, no. 1979, 19 March 1959, p.33.

Presumably, Tito deserved Nagy's fate.⁴⁰ Nevertheless the CPC maintained minimal correct diplomatic and economic relations with Yugoslavia. Since the trend toward rapprochement between Tito and Khrushchev began in 1961, the CPC continued to maintain that Yugoslavia was not a "socialist" country and therefore could not belong to the "socialist camp".⁴¹ The attack on Yugoslavia, one of the principal exponents of non-alignment, associating it with the imperialist forces⁴² was a blot in the Chinese record among the non-aligned countries who were associated with Belgrade and alienated China further from the "non-aligned".

Sino-Indian Border Dispute:

India, the other chief exponent of non-alignment, was also made a target of Chinese attack. China was invited to Bandung as an Asian rather than a communist state. Nehru, who had urged Chinese inclusion in the Conference,⁴³ felt that China was not inextricably bound to the Soviet Union; he undoubtedly believed that Chinese participation in such events would at once weaken Peking's ties with Moscow while strengthening her ties with her Asian neighbours. Nehru was interpreting the Chinese shift

40 Hinton, n.27, p.92.

41 "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung-chi, editorial, 1 October 1963, in J.P.R.S. Translation from Hung-chi (Washington D.C.), no.19, 22 October 1963, pp.1-29.

42 "JMJP: Why U.S. Imperialism Applauds Tito's Speech", SCMP, no.1804, 29 June 1958, p.33.

43 Colin Legum, Bandung, Cairo, Accra (London, 1958), p.63.

in terms of the strategy of non-alignment but, China although it moved away from Moscow in the subsequent years, did not do anything that would heighten her credit among the Asian neighbours. As late as February 1958 we find Chou En-lai referring publicly and favourably to Nehru and to "our great neighbour India",⁴⁴ This tone rapidly disappeared when Nehru announced on April 8 that he would soon visit Lhasa in order to make good an earlier promise to the Dalai Lama to try to moderate the CPC's Tibetan policy. The CPC evidently took this announcement, which came at a time of growing revolt in Tibet, as a form of interference in the CPR's internal affairs. In July the visit was cancelled at Chinese insistence,⁴⁵ and the CPR published a map restating its version of Sino-Indian frontier and showing a Chinese military highway⁴⁶ recently built across part of the disputed territory shown on Indian maps as being in Ladakh.⁴⁷ By the time that the CPC

44 Chou En-lai, "Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy", speech delivered to the Fifth session of the First National People's Congress, 10 February 1958, NCA, 11 February 1958, in Current Background, no.492, 14 February 1958, p.6.

45 George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (New York, 1963), pp.159-160.

46 In the Aksai-chin region of China joining Sinkiang and Tibet.

47. China Pictorial, no.95, July 1958, pp.20-1.

published a collection of Mao's writings on "Imperialism", entitled "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers", at the end of October,⁴⁸ the CPC evidently meant to include Nehru, and perhaps other Afro-Asian neutrals, among the reactionaries.⁴⁹

The growing unrest in Tibet erupted on March 10, 1959 in fighting in the streets of Lhasa, followed by the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, where he was warmly received. To the CPC both the domestic and the international aspects of this humiliating affair appeared extremely serious.⁵⁰ The Tibetan crisis led to further forward movements by Chinese and Indian troops into the disputed regions along the Sino-Indian frontier. The Chinese were afraid that dissident Tibetans who had escaped to Nepal and India might acquire arms somehow and reenter Tibet unless the frontier were effectively sealed. The result was the skirmishes between Chinese and Indian border patrols.⁵¹

Concerned by these developments, which threatened to put the Indian Army in a position from which it could give aid to Tibetan insurgents if it chose, "the Chinese

⁴⁸ Jen-min Jih-pao, 31 October 1958, NCNA, 31 October 1958, in Current Background, no.534, 12 November 1958, pp.7-14.

⁴⁹ Hinton, n.27, p.34.

⁵⁰ Concerning the Question of Tibet (Peking, 1959).

⁵¹ Hinton, n.27, p.40.

struck first on October 20. After four days of successful fighting, the CPR proposed a ceasefire and a border settlement on a compromise basis similar to that of a proposal it had made in 1959. Only after the new proposal was formally rejected, in mid-November, did the CPR resume offensive operations, again with success. By this time, however, a number of political and military considerations including indications of a sizeable American aid program to India, rendered moderation advisable. On November 21, the CPR announced a unilateral ceasefire, to be followed by a withdrawal to the proposed de facto border indicated in the earlier ceasefire order. The CPR had won a military and to some extent a political victory, but it was not able to bring India to the conference table in a compliant mood.⁵²

The resultant of the Chinese confrontation against Egypt, Yugoslavia and India, the pioneers of non-alignment and responsible for the convening of the Summit Conference

⁵² Ibid., p. 43.

of the Non-aligned nations in 1961 at Belgrade,⁵³ was that by 1963 China stood in danger of getting isolated from the non-aligned nations. So much so that it led President Bourguiba of Tunisia to remark:

"I told him (Chou En-lai) what shocked us in his manner, style and conceptions. I said, "You (Chou En-lai) come to Africa as the enemy of the capitalist states, of the West, of the neutralists and the non-aligned, of India, of Tito, of Khrushchev, of everybody."⁵⁴

China's attitude towards the convening of the First Non-Aligned Conference:

During this period China also was not favourable towards convening a conference of the non-aligned countries.

53 G.H. Jensen in his book Afro-Asia and Non-alignment (London, 1966), p.230⁷ maintained that Nehru was not enthusiastic about convening a non-aligned summit conference in 1961 and he was only compelled by Tito and Nasser to do so. Even if one accepts this it should not undermine the important role Nehru played in popularising the concept of non-alignment as well as in the First Summit Conference of the Non-aligned held at Belgrade in 1961.

54 Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 3 April 1964, cited by W.A.C. Adie, "Chou En-lai on Safari", China quarterly, No.18, April-June 1964, pp.186-7.

In 1961, when Tito, Nasser and Nehru were planning to convene a conference of the non-aligned countries China and Indonesia were attempting to convene a Second Afro-Asian Conference. In March 1961 the Indonesian President had sent out letters suggesting this meeting, and in April when Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, visited Indonesia, their joint communique had said that it was very necessary to convene a Second Afro-Asian Conference in the shortest possible time.⁵⁵ This attitude of China, it can be explained, was developed as a reaction to the attempt of some of the non-aligned statesmen to write off China and other bloc countries, like Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Pakistan; these statesmen were implying that co-operation with the bloc-aligned countries was impossible.⁵⁶ Moreover, China could not agree with the proposals that the non-aligned states were emphasizing. China was interested more in emphasizing the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle in the world; whereas the non-aligned conference was emphasizing in maintenance of peace in the world and peaceful co-existence between the countries of the world,

⁵⁵ Jansen, n.53, p.230.

⁵⁶ Leo Mates, Non-alignment: Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade, 1972), p.246.

including the United States. The non-aligned were interested in avoiding a confrontation between the two superpowers, in averting a Third World War, whereas, China, as was evident from the Sino-Soviet dialogue, was least interested in "Detente". This could be explained in terms of the Chinese national interest. For China during this time was completely encircled by the United States and China was contending for U.S. withdrawal from her near vicinity. China greeted the first conference of the non-aligned countries more out of formality,⁵⁷ and greeted it with the hope that it would strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle.⁵⁸ But the Belgrade Conference emphasized "peace". In a separate declaration the Belgrade Conference resolved:

This Conference of the Heads of State of Government of Non-aligned countries is deeply concerned that ... the grave and critical situation which ... threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict would almost certainly later develop into a world war ... This conference considers that this calamity must be avoided and it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and more particularly the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. should immediately suspend their recent war preparations and approaches ... and resume negotiations for a peaceful settlement.⁵⁹

57 "Premier Chou En-lai Greet the Conference of Non-aligned Countries", SCMP, no.2573, 31 August 1961, p.33.

58 "Further strengthen United Front Against Imperialism and Colonialism", Jen-min Jih-pao, article, SCMP, no.2578, 9 September 1961, p.23.

59 Documents of the Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, see Mates, n.56, p.386.

The Declaration of the Belgrade Conference denounced imperialism and colonialism but said nothing of the sort of struggle against imperialism as desired by China.⁶⁰

The declaration emphasized peaceful co-existence between different social systems saying: "The participating countries feel that ... the principles of peaceful co-existence are the only alternative to the "Cold War" and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe".⁶¹ The declaration also called for "disarmament"⁶² and this was another point on which China was surely not inclined to agree. China was solely interested in fighting U.S. imperialism, an important factor in Sino-Soviet rift. Realising Soviet Union's reluctance to fight imperialism overtly China hoped to continue the anti-imperialist struggle with the help of the Afro-Asian countries. But here, China confronted Yugoslavia and India who, under the leadership of Tito and Nehru respectively, were strongly in favour of peaceful co-existence and detente;

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.387-8.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.388-9.

⁶² Ibid., p.392.

and these two countries had profound influence among the Afro-Asian countries. Therefore, China, in concert with Sukarno rallied for the convening of a Second Asian and African Conference in which, as she could foresee, Yugoslavia would not be represented being an European country and China would be present in the Conference as an Asian to counter-balance India.

China and the convening of the Second Non-aligned Conference:

As the plans for holding a Second "Belgrade" Conference was going on between India and Yugoslavia, China in cooperation with Indonesia was campaigning for a Second "Bandung Conference". This was the particular objective in Chou En-lai's tour of the ten nations in 1963-64.⁶³ That seeking the support of these countries was in the priority list of Chou En-lai is evidenced from the following sentence of the Jen-min Jih-pao's editorial

63. Chou En-lai visited U.A.R., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Originally the plan was for thirteen nations; but because of the revolution in Zanzibar in January (China had recognised the overthrown government in December 1963) and the mutinies in Tanganyika (recognised in December 1961), Uganda (recognised in October 1962) and Kenya (whose independence day celebration had been attended by the Chinese Foreign Minister in December 1963.) Chou had to cross these countries off his visiting list and added Ethiopia in his list. For a detail account of Chou En-lai's tour of Africa see W.A.C. Adie, "Chou En-lai on Safari", China Quarterly, no. 18, April-June 1964, pp. 174-194.

which reviewing Chou's tour wrote, inter alia,

Active preparation should be made for
a Second Asian-African Conference. 64

At the start of his visits, Chou En-lai enunciated five principles that, he said would be the basis of Chinese policy in Africa. ~~and~~ In this program he supported non-alignment. China, he asserted:

(1) Supports African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and colonialism, old and new, and to win and safeguard national independence;

(2) Supports the pursuance of a policy of peace neutrality and non-alignment^{ness} by the governments of the African and Arab countries;

(3) Supports the African peoples in their desire to realise solidarity and unity in the form of their choice;

(4) Supports the African countries in their efforts to settle their differences through peaceful consultations;

64 Jen-min Jih-pao, 6 February 1964. Also see Ogunsanwo, n.19, p.123; Nenhauser, n.2, p.54; Hinton, n.27, p.47.; Adie, n.63, Michael B. Yehuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases", China Quarterly, no.36, October-December 1968, Mates, n.66, p.227. All these writers agree on the point that China was interested in convening a Second "Bandung" Conference and not a second "Belgrade" Conference.

(5) Maintains that the sovereignty of the African countries must be respected by all other countries and that all encroachment and interference from whatever quarter should be opposed. 65

From this it should be clear that China supported the non-aligned policy but put priority on struggle against "imperialism" than "neutrality" and "non-alignment". This was even further reiterated when Chou En-lai said in Cairo:

China was a committed State; however, it did not oppose non-alignment, provided the "non-aligned countries" hold high the banner of combating imperialism and old and new colonialism, support the national independence movements and defend world peace. 66

In Egypt Chou En-lai tried to persuade Nasser for a Second Bandung but got little reward for this purpose; for Nasser was clearly in favour of a Second Belgrade in the first instance. In the joint communique it was only agreed

65 Adis, n.63, p.130.

66 "Premier Chou En-lai's Conference in Cairo", cited by Georg T. Yu, China's African Policy - A Study of Tanzania, (New York, 1971), p.18.

"to preserve the spirit of Bandung".⁶⁸

In Algeria Chou even went so far as to praise the first Belgrade Conference and added that the Bandung and Belgrade conferences were pursuing "the same aim of consolidating peaceful co-existence". In the communique on the test question of a Bandung or Belgrade Conference, Ben Bella, a great admirer of President Tito, was only willing to "develop the spirit of Bandung".⁶⁹

In Tunisia President Bourguiba clearly explained to Chou En-lai that China was regarded as antagonistic to the non-aligned and warned him: "Don't expect to score too much in Africa".⁷⁰

China's Reaction to the Cairo Conference:

Chou En-lai's African tour of 1963-64 was unsuccessful for he could not prevent a Second non-aligned conference before the Second African-Asian. On the eve of the Cairo Conference of the non-aligned countries, 1964, Vice-Premier

68 *Ibid.*, n.63, p.183.

69 *Ibid.*, pp.185, 186.

70 See Note 54 of this Chapter.

Chen Yi, speaking at the reception given by the Guinean ambassador Camara Mamady in celebration of the National Day of Guinea said:

We have repeatedly pointed out that the Second Conference of Non-aligned countries and the Second African-Asian Conference should promote and enhance each other and not exclude or impair each other. We note with satisfaction that this view of ours has become the common view of an increasing number of Afro-Asian countries. 71

Greeting the Conference Chou En-lai said:

The first conference of non-aligned countries of 1961 has played a positive role in the cause of the peoples of the world against imperialism, for national independence and in defence of world peace. We are happy to see that many countries have gained independence in the past few years, and that the majority of the newly independent states have declared that they will pursue a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment in the hope that such a policy will help eradicate colonialism and consolidate their own independence. At present there are still many countries which have not gained independence, whereas many independent countries are still threatened with aggression, intervention and

71

News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin,
no.2165, 3 October 1964, p.47.

control and subversion by imperialism and old and new colonialism. We hope that the Second Conference of the non-aligned countries will on the basis of the positive results of the first conference, make a new contribution to the cause of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples of opposing imperialism and old and new colonialism and winning and safeguarding national independence and that of all peoples of the world of opposing the imperialist policies of aggression and war and defending world peace. 72

Even if China was not successful in holding an Asian-African Conference before the second non-aligned conference China still attempted to influence the non-aligned conference, through her own supporters, to give priority to struggle against imperialism and colonialism over peaceful co-existence. China's views were effectively transmitted at the Conference by the leaders of such States as Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, Burundi, Tanzania, Cambodia, Algeria and Cuba.⁷³ President Sukarno of Indonesia said that peaceful co-existence was not an abstract idea: "There will be peaceful co-existence between us, the developing countries, and the imperialist states only when we can face them with equal strength". He stressed that the developing countries cannot live in peace with the old forces of domination and no country could co-exist

72 News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin,
n.2167, 5 October 1964, p.7.

73 Ogunsanwo, n.19, pp.127-8.

with a foreign power which dominated it and tried to subvert and use military bases to oppose it. He said that the battle cry should be "down with imperialism, down with colonialism" and "ever onward and never retreat". 74

In this context China also denounced India and Yugoslavia who were clearly putting premium on peaceful co-existence. Thus reporting from Cairo the Hsinhua correspondent said that since the conference opened on October first the foreign ministers' conference preceding the second summit conference of non-aligned countries had been confronted with a struggle between two lines for guiding the course of the conference. One was the line stressing the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, which was followed by most of the participating countries and the other was a line of so-called peaceful co-existence propagated by India and Yugoslavia, which aimed at liquidating the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.⁷⁵ The commentator further said that Yugoslav President Tito in his speech deliberately emphasized that "only a few strong holds of

74 News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin, no.2170,
8 October 1964, p.14.

75 Ibid., p.13.

colonialism remain" and that "they often cover a relatively small territory and population". "He advised the peoples now under colonial domination to pin their hopes on an international detente instead of battling with colonialism" ⁷⁶

Commenting on the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's speech the Hsinhua correspondent said that Shastri made no mention in his speech of the struggle against imperialism and "had no courage to deal with U.S. imperialism in particular". His speech, said the correspondent, only showed that the Indian government participated in the conference "with no intention to contribute together with other participating countries, to the Asian, African and Latin American peoples' cause of solidarity to fight imperialism". Instead, it strived "to divert attention of the Conference, whip up an anti-China campaign and poison the atmosphere at the conference". ⁷⁷ The correspondent further described that Shastri's call for full support to the United Nation was tantamount to advis^{ing} the non-aligned countries "to act as

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.16.

⁷⁷ News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin, no.2172, 10 October 1964, p.7.

papers in the U.S. aggression".⁷⁸ Sastri's attitude at the conference only helped the imperialist forces⁷⁹ and unveiled the "double alignment" of India under the cloak of non-alignment.⁸⁰

The Cairo Conference of non-aligned countries, nevertheless, pointed to the continuing and dangerous vitality of imperialism and colonialism. The declaration supported by India, condemned these, noting that together with neo-colonialism, they formed the basic source of international tension and conflict to be combated by force of arms, if necessary.⁸¹ However, the Indian Prime Minister's attempt to have a mission sent to China to stop her making atomic weapons was rejected by the Conference.

The Chinese who had opposed the holding of the Conference, noted with apparent satisfaction its resolutions condemning imperialism, colonialism and neo-

78 Ibid., p.8.

79 News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin,
no.2175, 13 October 1964, p.22.

80 Ibid., p.14.

81 Second Conference of Non-aligned countries, Cairo,
October 5 to 10, 1964, Final Document, See in
Mates, n.56, pp.452-7.

colonialism, and its declaration that peaceful co-existence cannot be fully achieved throughout the world without the abolition of these three evils. Paying tribute to the non-aligned conference the Jen-shin Jih-pao wrote:

The Conference reflected the common will of the peoples of the non-aligned countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to fight against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, support the national liberation movement and defend world peace. It yielded positive results. For this our sincere congratulations. The Chinese Government and people have always respected the independent foreign policy of the non-aligned countries and supported and assisted the just struggle of these countries. The result of the Cairo Conference shows that it is another step forward on the path of unity against imperialism. 82

Hailing the success of the conference the Ta Kung Pao editorially wrote; "The Chinese people will continue to join hands with all non-aligned countries which persist in their policy of peace, neutrality, and with all Asian, African and Latin American peoples in fighting against imperialism and colonialism." 83

The Cairo Conference, of course, adopted a number of propositions opposed by Peking, including a new charter

82 News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin
n.2176, 14 October 1964, p.5.

83 News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin
no.2177, 15 October 1964, p.5.

outlining nine principles of peaceful co-existence and a declaration calling on the nations not to produce, acquire or test nuclear weapons.⁸⁴ Abd al-Nasser, the host of the meeting took a particularly anti-Chinese position.⁸⁵ But the Chinese, despite this expressed a general satisfaction over the conference.

After the Cairo Conference China became active to convene a Second Asian -African Conference. China maintained that the Afro-Asian Solidarity and non-alignment were directed towards the same end. Thus to mute Chinese objections to non-alignment Chou En-lai said in 1965:

Afro-Asian Solidarity is a guarantee for the victory of the Asian and African countries in their common struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism. The solidarity had thoroughly crushed the imperialists' vicious schemes of making Asian fight Asians and Africans fight Africans. The non-alignment policy of peace and neutrality pursued by the Asian and African countries is in fact pointed at U.S. imperialism ... It is very clear that though there are different peculiarities between the endeavour of Afro-Asian Solidarity and the genuine non-alignment policy, however, they have common aims and both of them have

84 Second Conference of Non-aligned Countries, Cairo, October 5 to 10, 1964, Final Document, See in Notes, n.56, pp.439-40, 443-4.

85 Colin Legum, "Africa and China, Symbol and Substances", in A.M. Halperin, ed., Politics Towards China: Views from Six Continents (New York, 1965), p.486.

been developed in the struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism headed by the United States. This can be seen clearly from the main resolutions of the first Asian-African Conference and the two Summit Conferences of the non-aligned states. 86

Thus, throughout this period we see that China had never opposed non-alignment as such. She maintained that the correct and real objective of non-alignment is struggle against imperialism and colonialism (particularly directed against the U.S.) and this struggle should always get top priority. China objected to the non-aligned policies of certain states, like India and Yugoslavia, alleging that they were diverting the non-aligned bloc in a wrong direction, i.e., in the direction of emphasizing on peaceful co-existence and detente. However, it should be remembered that originally non-alignment was formulated to maintain peaceful co-existence with both blocs of the Cold War. And hence, China's interpretation of the real objective of non-alignment should be understood in terms of her own national interest of opposition to U.S. imperialism. And fortunately for China she was supported by many countries of Asia and Africa in such an interpretation. China never gave up this stand and maintained this even during the post-Cultural Revolution phase. But during the intervening time non-aligned movement itself underwent change and by the time the Lusaka Summit Conference was held in 1970, we find that China had identified her interest in the non-aligned movement and hence, came out in open support for non-aligned movement after the Lusaka Conference.

Chapter III

CHINA SWINGS BACK TO SUPPORT THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT : 1969-1976

Features of Chinese Post-Cultural Revolution Foreign Policy:

Discussion of China's relations with the non-aligned countries after 1969, i.e. in the post-Cultural Revolution phase must start with reference to the general theory and pattern of China's post-Cultural Revolution Foreign Policy. The chief characteristics of China's foreign policy during this phase may be summarized as: (a) the placing of the Soviet Union on an equal footing with the United States; (b) the renewal of a flexible united front including the second intermediate zone. Chou En-lai in his speech on Rumanian National Day on August 23, 1968, addressed the Soviet leaders as "social-imperialists" and "social-fascists",¹ and besides emphasizing collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States, the contradiction aspect of Soviet Union and the United States, the "contradiction" aspect of Soviet-American relations was also mentioned. ^{Thus,} The Soviet invasion of

¹ Peking Review, no.34, 23 August 1968, Supplement, P.IV.

Czechoslovakia of 1968 was seen as follows:

It is the result of the sharpening contradictions in the scramble for and division of spheres of influence by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in Eastern Europe, it is moreover the result of the U.S.-Soviet collusion in a vain attempt to redivide the world. 2

These two themes were later adopted as official policy in the communique of the enlarged 12th plenary session of the eighth Central Committee.

While both colluding and struggling with each other, the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists are trying in vain to redivide the world ... Their dirty political deal has been thoroughly exposed before the people of the world. Their nakedly aggressive actions have deepened the internal contradictions within the imperialist and the revisionist blocs and helped promote the political consciousness of the oppressed masses in the U.S. imperialist and Soviet revisionist homelands and, at the same time, they are stirring up a great new upsurge in the struggle of the proletariat and the people throughout the world against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism ... We are not in the least isolated, for the people who want revolution, comprising over 90 per cent of the world's population, are our friends.3

2 Ibid.

3 "Communique of the Enlarged 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (adopted on 31 October 1968)" in Peking Review, no. 44, 1 November 1968, Supplement, P.VIII.

These themes were again more clearly elaborated in the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969. In section VII of Lin Piao's Report to the Ninth Party Congress which presented the framework of China's Foreign policy, it was clearly stated that:

... there are four major contradictions in the world: the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other.⁴

Within the context of these contradictions, China's foreign policy was then outlined as follows:

The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent. It is to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful co-existence with countries having different social

⁴ Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," in Peking Review, 28 April 1969, Special Issue, p.26.

system on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence; and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on expediency; it is a policy in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future. 5

Further, it was mentioned in the report:

All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies. 6

Thus Soviet Union was made a clear target of the United Front. Regarding the United Front, there were to be important changes too, besides the inclusion of the Soviet Union as a target. The broadening of this United Front was an obvious theme. In the October 1968 communique the concept of making friends with "90 per cent of the world's population" was renewed; and in the Ninth Party Congress, the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence were again introduced as the basis of relations with countries having different social

5 Ibid., p.28.

6 Ibid., p.29.

systems. The emphasis on "People" in the Cultural Revolution period was replaced by the broadest united front of "countries and people". Most important of all, in the October 1968 communique, it was stated that the aggressive actions of the superpowers had "deepened the internal contradictions within the imperialist and the revisionist blocs", therefore members of these blocs could also be included into the United Front for they too were subjected to "aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism".

In accordance with the policy . . . enunciated in the 1968 communique and in the Report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 China mended her sour relations with many countries, not to exclude the countries belonging to the non-aligned bloc. Relations with Yugoslavia was improved. On 1 October 1968, Yugoslavian diplomats in Prague were invited to the Chinese National Day reception at the Chinese embassy in Prague. This was soon followed by the visit of a Yugoslavian government delegation to Peking and the signing of a new trade agreement in March 1969.⁷ On the occasion of Yugoslavian National Day, ber 27, 1970, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Chiao

⁷ Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "An Interpretation of China's Foreign Policy - The Post-Cultural Revolution Phase", in Journal of Contemporary Asia (Nottingham), vol.6, no.2, 1976, p.155.

Kuan-hua, in his speech said:

The Chinese government has always held that the relations between states should be guided by the Five Principles ... These principles should apply to all countries, whether they have the same or different social systems. We note with pleasure that it is precisely on the basis of these principles that the relations between China and Yugoslavia have developed in recent years.⁸

This statement offered an explanation for the improvement in relations between China and Yugoslavia, which China had severely attacked as revisionist.

There was of course nothing novel in the Chinese formulation of the United Front, for in the 1950's and 1960's China never refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with countries of different social systems. The militant policies that China exhibited during the late fifties and early sixties was due to the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union and the hostility of the United States.

However there emerged a new trend as regards China's relations vis-a-vis the non-aligned countries. In the early 1970's China swung back to support the policy of non-alignment among the Third World countries.

⁸ Peking Review, no. 49, 4 December 1970, p. 23.

China on the Third Non-aligned Conference:

In congratulating the third conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-aligned countries Premier Chou En-lai said:

Since the second conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-aligned countries held in 1964, numerous changes had taken place in the international situation. The struggle of the people of the world against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, against domination and division of the world by the super powers and against racial discrimination were mounting daily; many Asian, African and Latin American countries are advancing victoriously on the road of struggle to shake off colonial rule, win national independence and develop national economy. This development of events forcefully shows that the Asian, African and Latin American countries will certainly achieve continuous new victories in their struggle to win and safeguard national independence, if only they rely on their own strength, dare to fight and strengthen their unity. The Chinese Government and people firmly stand together with the Asian, African and Latin American countries and people in the world that love national independence and support their just struggle against imperialist aggression, oppression and interference and against racial discrimination. We hope that the Third Conference of the Heads of States and Government of Non-aligned countries will contribute to the Asian, African and Latin American people's struggle for unity against imperialism and against world domination of big powers.⁹

⁹ Peking Review, no.37, 11 September 1970, p.12. Also see Survey of China Mainland Press, no.4740, 18 September 1970, p.127.

China hailed the achievements of the Third Summit Conference of the Non-aligned countries. It said that the speeches made by the delegates at the conference reflected the "common aspirations of the people of the Asian, African and Latin American people for unity against imperialism" and "made positive contribution to the struggle of the people of various countries against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, against racial discrimination and against domination of the world by the super powers." This, according to the Chinese, was a great victory and they regarded it as their own victory.¹⁰

But in saying all this China avoided open support for the non-aligned as a whole; they were only supporting non-alignment in some particular aspects, like anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. However, in less than a year's time, in the joint communique of March 1971 with Cameroon upon establishment of diplomatic relations, it was clearly stated that:

The government of the People's Republic of China supports the policy of non-alignment pursued by the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon.¹¹

¹⁰ Jen-min Jih-pao, editorial, 14 September 1970, in SCMP, no. 4744, 24 September 1970, p.193-5,

¹¹ Peking Review, no.15, 9 April 1971, p.9.

This theme gained greater significance when, commenting on the conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries held in Georgetown in August 1972 the Chinese foreign minister, Chi Peng-fei, stated in a banquet:

The Chinese Government always supports and respects the policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment pursued by countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and is happy to see that the non-aligned countries are playing an important role in international affairs. 12

Again in Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's congratulatory message to the Foreign Ministers' Conference of the Non-aligned countries, it was stated:

The Chinese Government and people firmly stand together with the peoples of the third world and resolutely support the policy of independence, peace and neutrality pursued by the non-aligned countries. 13

The Chinese were particularly happy at the decision of the non-aligned foreign ministers' conference of 1972 to

12 Peking Review, no.34, 25 August 1972, p.16.

13 SCMP, no.5199, 21 August 1972, pp.34-5.

accept the delegation of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia as the sole legal representative of Cambodia to the conference and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam as full member. Hailing the decision the Jen-min Jih-pao article wrote:

This is not only a victory of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese people, but also a common victory of the people of various countries fighting in defence of justice. The Chinese people express warm congratulations to the fraternal Cambodian and South Vietnamese people.¹⁴

Another article by the Jen-min Jih-pao commentator said that the decision was a remarkable victory over the imperialist countries like the United States and "added to the moral strength of the non-aligned countries", and "made a new contribution to the struggles of the peoples of the world".¹⁵

Peking's satisfaction over this decision was, however, completely in line with her earlier policy. Peking had all along supported Prince Samedch Norodom Sihanouk in

¹⁴ JMJP, article, "Just Decision, Common Victory", in SCMP, no.5202, 24 August 1972, pp.168-9.

¹⁵ JMJP, commentator's article, "Struggle In Unity Against Imperialism And Colonialism", in SCMP, no.5203, 25 August 1972, pp.208-9.

Cambodia and denounced the Lon Nol administration as a "traitorous Clique" and lackey of U.S. imperialism. Peking gave refuge to the government of Prince Sihanouk and had been, all along, his strongest supporter. Of course, it should be understood that Peking's support for Sihanouk was for Sihanouk's policy against U.S. imperialism and not for Sihanouk's support for non-alignment as such. In other words Peking supported Sihanouk in as much as the latter's policy of non-alignment was amounting to keep out the U.S. presence in Cambodia. Hence, on this occasion of Cambodia's admission to the non-aligned foreign ministers' conference at Georgetown, Peking also made a common cause. As the Jen-min Jih-pao put it, "The struggle and victory of the Cambodian people are an important contribution to the common cause of the non-aligned countries and to the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of various countries".¹⁶ Peking's support for the inclusion of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam as full member, should also be understood in terms of similar argument.

¹⁶ JMJP, article, "Just Decision Common Victory", n.14.

Expressing an over-all satisfaction over the non-aligned foreign ministers' conference the Jen-min Jih-pao said that the resolutions adopted by the conference on Indo-China, the Middle East, Decolonization and Puerto Rico were "significant achievements" and embodied a strong will among the non-aligned countries to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.¹⁷

China Strikes Common Cause With the Non-Aligned Movement:

China, at this time, also struck a common cause with the non-aligned bloc as a whole. China said that it belonged to the Third World and along with the non-aligned countries was fighting a common battle against the manipulation and monopolizing of international affairs by Superpowers.

China belongs to the Third World. We are firmly opposed to the manipulation and monopolizing of international affairs by superpowers. We do not want and will never want to be a superpower. The Chinese people and other peoples of the Third World have the same historical experiences, and today they are confronted with the common task of struggle.¹⁸

17

JMJP, commentator's article, n.15,

18

Ibid.

The theme was reiterated in 1973 when the JMJP hailing the successful conclusion of the Fourth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries wrote editorially:

"China is a developing socialist country and belongs to the Third World. The Chinese people and the people of various Asian, African and Latin American countries have formed a close bond of friendship in their protracted common struggle."¹⁹

Again in 1976 in Premier Hua Kuo-feng's congratulatory message to the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned countries, it was stated: "Like the numerous non-aligned countries, China belongs to the Third World".²⁰

The JMJP editorial hailing the success of the Colombo Summit of the non-aligned countries maintained: "China is a developing socialist country. She and numerous non-aligned countries belong to the Third World".²¹

¹⁹ JMJP, editorial, 13 September 1973, in News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin no.5670, 13 September 1973, p.23; Also see News From Hsinhua News Agency, Weekly Issue 241, 20 September 1973, p.11; SCMP, no.5462, 13 September 1973, p.90.

²⁰ Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10076, 16 August 1976, p.12.

²¹ JMJP, editorial, 25 August 1976, in Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10085, 25 August 1976, p.28; Also see Summary of World Broadcast, FE/5296, 26 August 1976, pp.9/1/1-2; China Report, vol.xi, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.67-68.

Commonality of Purpose Between Chinese Policy and Non-aligned Movement:

In striking a common cause, China also underlined the identity of aims and objectives of China and the non-aligned countries. China maintained the identity in the field of struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, racism and other forms of alien domination. The Colombo declaration, adopted by the Fifth Non-aligned Summit Conference, maintained that:

The underlying cause of international tensions, which imperilled world peace and security, was attributable mainly to the forces of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, racism and other forms of alien domination which endeavour by pressure or threat or use of force to hinder the political and economic emancipation of nations and maintain the existing pattern of unjust and unequal relationships in the international community, thereby denying peoples their inalienable right to freedom and self-determination.²²

The Conference pledged to fight against all these. The People's Republic of China also supported the non-aligned on all these issues. Earlier, the JMJP editorial hailing the success of 1973 Algiers Conference of the non-

22 Colombo Summit Documents & Selected Speeches of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries (New Delhi, 1976), pp.89-90.

aligned countries wrote: "We firmly support the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and all independence-cherishing and justice upholding countries and people the world over in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism and big-power, hegemony, and we firmly support the non-aligned policy of peace and neutrality pursued by the non-aligned countries".²³ And this position was again reaffirmed in 1976.²⁴ China also supported the non-aligned in their resolutions on Middle East, Palestine, South Africa, South Vietnam, Korea, Latin America, Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal and the economic declaration condemning big-power domination and unequal economic relations.²⁵

But PRC's silence on the two important resolutions of the non-aligned countries - viz. peaceful co-existence and disarmament - deserve some clarification.

²³ JMJP, editorial, 13 September 1973, n.19.

²⁴ JMJP, editorial, 25 August 1976, n.21.

²⁵ Ibid.

Peaceful Co-existence : the Chinese and the Non-aligned Version:

Analysis of the changes that had taken place in the Chinese as well as in the non-aligned countries' attitude over peaceful co-existence, however, showed signs of convergence rather than divergence. During the pre-Cultural Revolution phase China's stand on peaceful co-existence was that - it is possible to co-exist peacefully with countries having different social systems; but peaceful co-existence with the imperialist powers is impossible in any sense. What China actually meant was that co-existence with the United States was impossible. This attitude was formulated when China was facing a grave security threat from the side of United States. And, as has been said earlier, since China could not convince Soviet Union to continue struggle against the U.S. and as the U.S.S.R. was more interested in "detente", China decided to face the U.S. with the help of other third world countries. Thus, China made a distinction between United States (with its imperialist allies) and the other countries of the world, and maintained that it was possible to co-exist peacefully with the latter not with the former.

But the non-aligned countries, for whom the avoidance of a direct clash between the U.S. and Soviet Union was of vital interest were clearly taking a stand

contrary to the Chinese stand. To them peaceful co-existence with the U.S. was possible and desirable. The non-aligned countries felt that if a direct clash between the two superpowers could be avoided other problems could be resolved easily. To put this straight - China was not inclined to co-exist with the U.S. for her own security reasons, the non-aligned were cherishing co-existence for the security of humanity. So we saw that in the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned countries 1961 and Cairo Conference of 1964 peaceful co-existence drew greater emphasis than the struggle against imperialism.

But during the period intervening the Cairo Conference of 1964 and the Lusaka Conference of 1970, attitudes of both China and the non-aligned countries underwent some change. The non-aligned countries felt that the fear of a head-on clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had lessened.

" The immediate danger of a conflict between the superpowers has lessened because their tendency to negotiate in their mutual relations is strengthened..."²⁶

²⁶ "Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Cooperation and Democratization of International Relations", in Review of International Affairs(Belgrade), no.491, 20 September 1970, p.24.

But the non-aligned countries realised that the "detente" was not a cure-all for their own problems and had not contributed to the security of the small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented the problem of local wars.²⁷ The forces of racism, apartheid, colonialism and imperialism continued to bedevil the world peace. At the same time classical colonialism was trying to perpetuate itself in the garb of neo-colonialism. "These phenomena of present-day world tend not only to perpetuate the evils of the past but also to undermine the future; they retard the liberation of many countries, above all, of the non-aligned and developing countries, hampering their advancement, intensifying tension and giving rise to conflicts". Concerned by this state of affairs in the world, the participants of the Lusaka Conference agreed to take joint action and unite their efforts towards that end.²⁸

Thus, during the seventies "the non-aligned" became more active than they were before. They enlarged their area of action and became dynamic. And it was this activism and

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.24-25.

dynamism of theirs, which perhaps prompted a positive response from the PRC, as PRC could identify the serving of her own interest in this activism. China on her own part shed some of its ideological rigidity and became more and more pragmatic. But Peking never gave up its ideological commitment of fighting against U.S. imperialism, and, here, Peking maintained a difference from the non-aligned, in that, the non-aligned did not particularize the fight against imperialism, but China particularized it as U.S. imperialism and Soviet Social-imperialism. The non-aligned were averse to ranging themselves in hostile confrontation against either of the two Great Power military blocs; on the contrary, individual non-aligned countries maintained their freedom to develop bilateral relations with the countries of either bloc.²⁹ But if the non-aligned accept this in principle China also accepted them in practice, as she maintained bilateral relations with U.S.S.R. (despite the ideological rift) and U.S.A. (after 1971, despite ideological opposition). To put it straight the non-aligned aimed at ending imperialism but maintained bilateral relations and peaceful

²⁹ Rikhi Jaipal, "Lusaka Conference in Retrospect", Review of International Affairs, no. 492, 5 October 1970, p. 2.

co-existence with the imperialist countries (by principle), China also aimed at ending imperialism but maintained bilateral relations and peaceful co-existence with the imperialist countries (in practice). Shall we say that the Chinese and the non-aligned stand on "peaceful co-existence" were also the same, despite the fact that China still retained the ideological postulate that true peaceful co-existence was possible only when imperialism ceased to exist; for, even if China believed in this she could not have manipulated the international situation to start a hostile confrontation between the anti-imperialist and imperialist countries. This meant that out of pragmatic consideration China settled down to the adoption of the principle of "gradual elimination" of imperialism. Was this not, also, the non-aligned stand?!

Difference over Disarmament:

The only area in which a genuine difference was marked was over "disarmament". The non-aligned countries have all along maintained their position in favour of general and complete disarmament. Thus the Lusaka Conference of 1970 adopted the following resolution over disarmament:

Conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the ever spiralling arms race, especially in view of the existing large stockpiles of, and impending new qualitative advance in the ever more devastating nature of nuclear armaments, the Heads of State or Government reaffirm their conviction, expressed at the Belgrade and Cairo Summit Conference of Non-aligned countries, that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the most imperative and urgent need of the international community today. 30

The Colombo Summit reiterated this stand of non-aligned countries:

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, having considered the problems of disarmament and in particular the adverse effects of the continuing and intensifying arms race to international peace and security and economic development, convinced that non-aligned countries should reinforce their activities in promoting the urgent solution of disarmament problems, determined to reinforce their activity towards strengthening the role and influence of the United Nations in the negotiation and in reaching the solution of disarmament issues, convinced that the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of agreed measures is an essential prerequisite for the opening of a process of genuine disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and accomplishment of general and complete disarmament under international control. 31

30. Lusaka Declaration, n.26, p.34.

31. Resolution on "Disarmament", Colombo Summit, n.22, p.194.

Accordingly non-aligned movement spear-headed the world disarmament movement and was striving to persuade the superpowers as well as other countries to arrive at a comprehensive agreement. Making this the target, the movement ~~ceased~~^{seized} every opportunity and every platform, mainly the U.N., to achieve something, contributing to that end.

China was never in favour of these programmes. Communist China made it clear that as long as "Imperialist countries" existed in the world, no general disarmament would be acceptable.

"Universal and complete disarmament can be realised only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have been eliminated".³²

Peking rejected all suggestions and invitations to join in talks on disarmament. It attacked the Test-Ban Treaty. It advocated the further spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries. This stand worried every country in the world and as Dean Rusk the U.S. Secretary of State said in 1966, "It is an urgent task of all countries to persuade Peking to change its

32. Peking Review, no.36, 6 September 1963.

stand". 33

Peking, however, never changed its stand. Peking refused to attend any disarmament conference. In the United Nations China never endorsed any proposal on disarmament. During the voting they either walked out, abstained, or came out against. China refused to take part in the work of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament. The People's Republic of China refused to sign the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests. The Peking leadership declared that it would by no means become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A Soviet proposal on the reduction of the military budgets of States - permanent members of Security Council - by ten per cent and utilisation of a part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries, met with Chinese opposition. The Chinese representative declared himself categorically against taking part in the work of a UN Special Committee set up to carry out this proposal. Thus, to date, Peking

33. Dean Rusk, Statement before the House Sub-Committee on Far Eastern Affairs in United States Policy Towards Communist China (the New York Times, 17 April 1966), excerpts in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., Communist China (London, 1968), p.506.

has all along been against all proposals of disarmament and, hence, differs completely from the non-aligned stand on this issue. In fact this stand of Peking contributed a strand to the Soviet Union's allegation that China was not a supporter of the non-aligned nations.

Non-aligned Movement and Sino-Soviet Polemics:

This period also witnessed the exchange of polemics between China and the Soviet Union over each others attitude towards the non-aligned movement. Each maintained itself as a supporter of the movement and attacked the other as the enemy. As has been mentioned before, during this period, Peking treated U.S. imperialism and Soviet Social-imperialism on par. Hence, to her earlier stand - that the non-aligned movement was directed against the U.S. imperialism - she added that the movement was directed against Soviet Social-imperialism as well.

Thus, commenting on the Fourth Conference of the Non-aligned countries in 1973 the official Hsinhua correspondent said that the political declaration on struggle for national liberation, Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea, the Middle East, Palestine and the Law of the Sea adopted by the Conference was an evidence of the

success of the non-aligned countries against "aggression, subversion, control, interference and bullying by imperialism, colonialism and the superpowers", and this success had been achieved in face of untiring struggle against "the imperialism and the Soviet revisionist social imperialism in particular".³⁴ Similarly, in 1976 China maintained that the proceedings of the Fifth Summit Conference of Non-aligned countries of 1976 was "undoubtedly directed against the hegemonic powers, United States and Soviet Union".³⁵

In maintaining this position, China treated Soviet social-imperialism on par with the capitalist imperialism of the United States. China even went to the extent of saying that Soviet Union's social-imperialism "has surpassed old-line imperialism in bullying, plundering and controlling the Asian, African

34. "A Grand Meeting Of Unity And Combat", News From Hsinhua News Agency, Daily Bulletin, no.5671, 14 September 1973, pp.5-6. Also see News from Hsinhua News Agency, Weekly issue, 241, 20 September 1973, pp.7-8.

35. Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent: "Hegemonism Is Dealt Telling Blow", NCNA, 20 August 1976, in Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6168, 30 August 1976, p.43. Also see SWB, FE/5294, 24 August 1976, pp.c1/1-2; China Report, vol.x11, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.65-7.

and Latin American countries, as well as in greed, ferocity and arrogance",³⁶ Soviet Union, on her part, rebuffed the "two Superpower" theory propagated by China and maintained that it was improper to treat imperialism and Soviet socialism on par.

All this is nothing but an attempt to use again the bankrupt device of putting socialism and imperialism on the same level in disregard for the indisputable fact that both the socio-political aims and bases of their policies are in opposition. One can not fail to see that confusing the consistently internationalist policy of the Soviet Union with the actions of the imperialist States allows imperialism to justify its anti-popular dealings. 37

On the contrary, China maintained that non-alignment was incompatible with Soviet Hegemonism.³⁸ This was obvious from the mutual contradictory statements

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36. Jen-min Jih-pao, article, "Hegemonism Is Bound To Be Rejected By World's People", in Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6163, 23 August 1976, p.48.
37. Pavel Demchenko, "Peking Strikes False Notes", Pravda, 19 August 1976, excerpts in China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.70-1.
38. NCNA, comment, "Incompatibility of Non-alignment and Soviet Hegemonism", 19 August 1976, SWB, FE/5298, 21 August 1976, pp.C1/2-3. Also see China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.62-63.

Moscow was giving on the non-aligned movement. For a period of time Moscow told the non-aligned countries that Soviet Union was their "loyal friend", their "natural ally". At the same time Soviet Union said, in an article published in the Soviet paper "Socialist Industry" on 15 August 1976, that without the formation of the socialist community and without consistent implementation of the detente policy by the Soviet Union the birth and development of the non-aligned movement would have been impossible. Thus, Soviet Union maintained two mutually contradictory postulates at one and the same time - that non-aligned movement was an independent political force with powerful political vitality, and Moscow was its source of strength.³⁹ China even went to the extent of saying that "the conception of non-alignment could not harmonize with Moscow's political theory". Because, Moscow's primary preoccupation was to contend for world hegemony with the United States. "Moscow altogether detested such words as 'non-alignment' and 'independent non-bloc factors". That was why Soviet Union asked the

39. NCNA, comment, "Incompatibility of Non-alignment and Soviet Hegemonism", 19 August 1976, SWE, FE/5292, 21 August 1976, pp. C1/2-3. Also see China Report, vol. xii, no. 4, July-August 1976, pp. 62-63.

non-aligned countries "to enter into alliance with them" and declared that whoever did not agree to this was an "out-and-out counter revolutionary" and against the anti-imperialist movement.⁴⁰

China said that Soviet Union always opposed and condemned the non-aligned movement ever since its emergence.⁴¹ According to the basic views of Soviet Union the non-aligned movement was a "trivial matter". Hence they contemptuously described it as a confused "hotch potch".⁴² As against this background and in face of her hegemonistic policies, Peking said, Moscow's recent support for the non-aligned movement was a self-irony.⁴³

40 Ibid.

41 NCNA commentary, "How Does Moscow Regard The Non-aligned Movement", 14 August 1976, Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6163, 23 August 1976, pp.49-51. Also see, SWB, PE/5288, 17 August 1976, pp.C1/1-3; Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10075, 15 August 1976, pp.33-5; China Report, vol.xi, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.60-1.

42 Ibid.

43 JMR, feature story from Colombo, "Self-Irony of Moscow", 18 August 1976, Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10079, 19 August 1976, pp.21-3 Also see, SWB, PE/5291, 20 August 1976, pp.C1/1; China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.61-2.

In reply to the above charge of China, Soviet Union maintained that Peking was propagating a "false thesis" of the hegemonism of superpowers. The thesis was contrived by China alone. In point of fact, said Soviet Union, the non-aligned movement was directed against "imperialism" and not against "hegemonism" as Peking maintained.⁴⁴

China retaliated that "these sayings", (that non-aligned movement should maintain its anti-imperialist orientation, and should not oppose hegemonism, that the struggle against hegemonism was imposed on the movement by China), "by the Soviet revisionists fully reveal their criminal design to change the orientation of, meddle in and disrupt the non-alignment movement". Soviet Union was arbitrarily drawing a line between anti-imperialism, and anti-hegemonism, whereas, in reality the two terms meant the same thing. This fact, said China, had been reflected in a number of declarations and resolutions adopted at the non-aligned conferences. The

44. NCNA commentary, "How Does Moscow Regard The Non-aligned Movement", n.37.

Fourth Summit Conference of 1973 pointed out explicitly that the non-aligned countries firmly 'oppose hegemonism' in order to 'consolidate their independence'. On the eve of the Fifth Summit Conference of 1976, "the leaders and public opinion in many non-aligned countries also took a strong stand against the superpower hegemonism". These should be enough, said China, to rebuff the Soviet Union's fallacy in drawing a distinction between "anti-imperialism" and "anti-hegemonism".⁴⁵

China also alleged that the Soviet Union attempted to sabotage and split the non-aligned movement in an attempt to make profit out of it.⁴⁶ It said that calling itself the "natural ally" of the movement it had taken "more sinister and pernicious steps" to sabotage the same. However, Peking expressed relief that this attempt would not be successful due to the vigilance of the non-aligned countries.⁴⁷

45. JMJP, article "Hegemonism Is Bound To Be Rejected By World's People", 13 August 1976, Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10074, 14 August 1976, pp.25-8; Also see, SWB, FE/5287, 16 August 1976, p.C.1/1; China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.88-9.

46. NCNA, 19 August 1976, Kwang-ming Daily's Report, in SWB, FE/5292, 21 August 1976, pp.C1/3-4, China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.63-65.

47. People's Commune Commentators' Groups on Opening of Fifth Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries, NCNA, 16 August 1976, in Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6165, 25 August 1976, p.138.

The non-aligned countries are watching closely the schemes to split and disintegrate the non-aligned movement engineered by the superpowers, particularly that false friend who pronounces honey words but conceals a dagger in his heart. 48

In her apparent support for the non-aligned movement Soviet Union, maintained China, had the ulterior motive of dominating the non-aligned countries and the rest of the world. Thus, in one of the commentaries by the official Hsinhua correspondent it was maintained that the real aim of the Soviet Union was "to bring the non-aligned movement into the orbit of social imperialism."⁴⁹ To achieve this purpose Soviet Union had adopted an undistinguished policy of divide and rule towards the movement. It arbitrarily divided the movement into a 'healthy force' and 'conservative force' and tried to incite the former to prevail over the other.⁵⁰

48. "Non-aligned Movement Advances Amid Struggle" NCNA, 1 August 1976, in Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6163, 23 August 1976, p.56.

49. NCNA commentary, "How Does Moscow Regard The Non-aligned Movement", 14 August 1976, Survey of People's Republic of China Press, no.6163, 23 August 1976, pp.49-51. Also see SWB, FE/5238, 17 August 1976, pp.C1/1-3; Hsinhua News Agency News Bulletin, no.10076, 15 August 1976, pp.33-5; China Report, vol.xii, no.4, July-August 1976, pp.60-1.

50. Ibid

Conversely Soviet Union alleged that China was never a supporter of the non-aligned movement. It held that the PRC, as a participant in the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian countries held in 1955, had undertaken to observe many of the principles that underlie the non-aligned movement. But later events, showed that Peking had no intention of honouring its commitments. It laid claims on territories of its neighbours, thus violating the principles of peaceful co-existence and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries.⁵¹ Pointing out the Chinese stand on disarmament, Soviet Union said that in the U.N. the PRC delegation did not support any of the twentyfive resolutions on disarmament that were approved by the majority in the General Assembly. On the contrary, the Chinese delegates voted against the resolutions on the non-use of force in international relations, on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, and on the reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent

51. Y. Lugavskoi, "Non-alignment Movement And Peking", Soviet Review (New Delhi), no.39, 26 August 1976, pp.50-52.

members of the Security Council by ten per cent and the utilization of a part of the funds thus saved to assist the developing countries.⁵²

In view of these negative attitudes of China towards the movement its claim of affiliation to the movement revealed the ulterior design that Peking had in its mind. And this could be to divert the movement from its original objective of fighting against imperialism in order to subordinate it for the large hegemonistic goals of Peking.⁵³ Thus, harping on Peking's stand on 'detente' and 'disarmament' Soviet Union maintained that Peking did not share the views of the non-aligned countries, it had nothing common with the non-alignment policy and, hence, could never be an ally of the movement.⁵⁴

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

The exchange of polemics between China and the Soviet Union revealed that the charges they were making against each other were mutual. This was done with a bid to befriend the non-aligned countries. This was important because the non-aligned movement itself, with a membership of 86 countries in 1976, became a formidable force. And as the non-aligned countries belonged to the Third World opposition to the movement would have resulted in estrangement from a majority of these countries. In fact, the policy towards the non-aligned countries formed a part of the Third World policy of both China and Soviet Union and support was given to the movement in an apparent bid to further their prospect among the Third World countries as a whole.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION : SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NON-ALIGNED

So far I have been doing a historical review of the Chinese attitude towards the non-aligned countries. But there still remains some unresolved problems which need explanation.

How do the Chinese communists fit their attitude towards the non-aligned movement in their general ideological framework?

Before I embark on analysing the Chinese ideological rationale, I think it pertinent to take up the rationale given by two other communist countries - Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. My intention, here, is to make a distinction between the Chinese rationale and that of the other two countries. It would, however, be difficult to identify the correct communist rationale in view of the fact that each of the above three countries regarded itself as the true communist. The U.S.S.R. claimed that she was the true follower of Marxism-Leninism, attacked China as a "revisionist" country and decried the non-aligned policy of socialist Yugoslavia. The Chinese on

their part regarded "Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought" as the true gospel of communism, attacked the Soviet Union as "revisionist", "capitalist roader" and "social imperialist" and branded Yugoslavia (until recently) as "revisionist". Yugoslavia under the Presidentship of Tito regarded its "non-aligned" course as the true road to communism.

The attitude of these three communist countries towards non-alignment exhibited considerable difference. The Soviet Union, during the formative periods of non-alignment was quite averse to non-alignment; but later changed her policy and claimed to be the "natural ally" of the non-aligned. She pointed out that the non-aligned movement was directed against imperialism of the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union was a socialist country, and, therefore, was a natural ally of the non-aligned movement. Soviet Union also underlined the identity of purpose between herself and the non-aligned movement. It maintained that non-aligned movement aimed at the end of imperialism, so did the Soviet Union. The non-aligned movement strove to end colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, struggled to maintain peaceful co-existence between countries having different social systems; the policies of the

Soviet Union were also directed to the same end. Soviet Union rejected the Chinese view that non-alignment aimed at fighting the two super-powers - the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.'s dominating and dictatorial role in international relations and at ending their interventionist role. It claimed that it was a true socialist country; and a socialist country could do anything but the role ascribed to it by the Chinese. A socialist country should not be treated on par with a capitalist country like the U.S. A socialist country, by principle, aimed at developing the underdeveloped, liberating the unliberated and giving aid to the poor. This should not be mistaken for intervention or interference. Soviet Union claimed that it was serving the cause of the non-aligned nations from a different platform. In short, Soviet Union claimed that being a socialist country it could not be anything but a supporter of the non-aligned movement.

Yugoslavia, which is both socialist and non-aligned, claimed that true socialism was attainable by pursuing a non-aligned course. Formulating Yugoslavia's stand on non-alignment, Tito said:

We consider it inappropriate to claim that the existing differences in social systems are so antagonistic as to preclude the possibility of co-existence in the sense of active and comprehensive international co-operation. To think

otherwise would mean to accept in advance the alternative leading to war with all its consequences. The future practice will show in full measure which of the two existing systems will prove their value for the further progress of mankind; Yugoslavia is a socialist country and we feel that development in the direction of socialism is not only in line with the aspirations of our peoples but also with the tendencies of historical development of society. It is our conviction that the future will show our conceptions to be historically justified. Others may have a different opinion but this should not present an obstacle to international co-operation... there are states with diverse social systems, at different levels of economic development, with divergent forms of political organization and with opposing ideological attitudes. These differences have resulted from historical development and the different conditions of social development in various countries and how they will shape up in the future is the internal affairs of each country. Interference from the outside in order to impose a specific direction of development - in the illusion that this can erase differences in social systems now existing and bound to exist for quite some time yet owing to uneven development and diverse conditions - could only provoke conflicts and jeopardise world peace.¹

The Central theme of this long quotation was that "non-alignment" was conducive to the internal socialist system of a country and was necessary to maintain the independence of the socialist state, to avert domination

¹ Tito's Address delivered on the occasion of receiving the title of Doctor of Law Honoris Causa at the University in Bandung on 26 December 1958, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), no. 474, 5 January 1970, pp. 2-3.

by any external factor over the internal system.

Our option for the policy of non-alignment stems from the aim of our revolution. Our attitude towards the blocs - in fact, our staying outside the blocs - is not the product of a subjective option, but of the need to protect the chosen path of internal socialist development and defend our country's sovereignty. We believe in the strength of non-aligned policy, in the prospects it offers for the development of international relations on the principles of peaceful co-existence and in the possibilities it affords independent socialist Yugoslavia for making her contribution towards the constructive development of international relations. 2

But Yugoslavia did not assume any responsibility or obligation to further the cause of socialism in other social systems. It should be free for the other social systems to pursue socialist policies if they realize its superiority over any other system. Socialism in any country should be the product of independent internal developments and not the outcome of external enforcements.

Like many others we openly favour a further evolution of international relations and changes ... as will ensure respect for the independence and sovereignty of peoples and states and for

2 Dimec Belovski, "The activities and aims of Yugoslavia as a Non-aligned and Socialist Country", Review of International Affairs, no.420, 5 April 1970, p.3.

their right to pursue their own path of development; on the other hand, we are naturally opposed to interference in the internal matters of states for any reasons, be they economic, military, political or ideological ... Our international activity cannot be motivated by sheer altruism, by a unilateral effort to help others. It is inspired above all by our vital national interests and should be seen as integral part of our unwavering struggle for preserving our won independent position and the place we have won ourselves in the world.³

Thus socialism, according to a non-aligned state like Yugoslavia, became conducive to the non-aligned policy when a socialist state relinquished the stand that it was her "internationalist duty" to espouse the cause of world-wide communism; when socialism was maintained within the national boundary and did not commit itself to foster (actively) a world revolution. And it was on this issue that the Soviet Union decried the non-aligned policy of socialist Yugoslavia (during its formative period) and the Chinese attacked Yugoslavia as "revisionist", because, according to them Yugoslavia was going back on the principles of true "Marxism-Leninism".

The Chinese stand upon this aspect was different from that of Yugoslavia; for they believed in the realisation of world communism and their active support to

³ Ibid, p.5-6.

further that cause. The Chinese Communists have indicated, in their Bulletin of Activities, that co-existence with countries in the 'intermediate zone' was merely a transitional form; socialism would eventually be realised throughout the world.⁴

Communist China further claimed that the only way to transform non-socialist countries into socialist countries was by revolution:

"The Proletariat world, of course, prefer to gain power by peaceful means. But abundant historical evidence indicates that the reactionary classes never give up power voluntarily."⁵

Therefore, Mao pointed out revolutions are inevitable:

Revolution and revolutionary wars are inevitable in class society and... without them, it is impossible to accomplish any leap in social development and to overthrow the reactionary ruling classes, and therefore, impossible for the people to win political power.⁶

4 "Source Material : Several Important Problems concerning the Current International Situation", no.17, (25 April 1961), Bulletin of Activities, in the Politics of Chinese Red Army, ed. J. Chester Cheng, (Stanford, California, 1966), p.481.

5 Jen-min Jih-pao, editorial, 31 March 1964, quoted in Leo Kueh-yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics. (London, 1972), p.19.

6 Ibid., p.20.

The areas in which to carry out revolution immediately, according to the Chinese revolutionary strategy, were countries in the first intermediate zone. These countries, because of the frustration and humiliation they have experienced during the colonial period and the enormous social, economic and political problems they faced were to be, the Chinese believed, "the storm-centre of world revolution".⁷

This revolutionary strategy was put forth in a more straight-forward fashion by Lin Piao:

In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁸

These revolutions were no longer part of the old "bourgeois or capitalist revolution", but were one part of the new world revolution, the proletarian - socialist

⁷ Peking Review, no.10, 15 March 1963, pp.16-17.

⁸ Lin Piao, "The International Significance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of People's War" (Peking, 1965), pp.42-49. in Long Live the Victory of the People's War (Peking, 1965), pp.42-59.

world revolution",⁹ and would lead to socialism". This was the epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism were heading for their doom and "socialism and communism were marching to victory".¹⁰

Lin Biao, however, did not argue that China must make these revolutions, or else they will not occur. On the contrary in good Marxist fashion, he argued they would occur regardless of what China chose to do.¹¹

Nevertheless, an altruistic belief in "world revolution" in favour of "world communism" lessened their credibility among the non-aligned and independent - minded countries. This made them amenable to the same allegation of "interventionist intention" that they lodged against the Superpowers and claimed the non-aligned movement was against. And it was here that the conduciveness of Chinese Communist stance for the non-aligned movement was dealt some negative consideration.

Chinese attitude towards the non-aligned movement was revealed within the Chinese policy towards the Third World, within the United Front strategy to combat

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, ed., Communist China (London, 1968), p.338.

imperialism and colonialism. This point is demonstrable from the Chinese congratulatory messages to the non-aligned conferences in which China maintained that the non-aligned movement sought to uphold the struggle of the Third World against the super powers and claimed that the People's Republic of China was a co-participant in that struggle as she belonged to the Third World.

The greatest claim of China, as a supporter of the "non-aligned" stemmed from the fact that she had never "opposed" the non-aligned movement; not even during the phase when she was in the danger of being alienated from the non-aligned countries. But this was not sufficient to prove her a supporter. China held that she was a supporter of the non-aligned because - she belonged to the Third World, had the same historical experience against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism as the non-aligned countries. But this even was not enough to prove her a supporter, as she claimed; for, we know, that all non-aligned countries were Third World countries but all Third World countries were not non-aligned; in fact, some were opposed to non-alignment. Why should not China be included among these opposers? The Soviet Union's claim that she was a naturally ally

of the movement because she was a "socialist" country also could be countered by the same logic. The commonality of purpose between the policies of the PRC and the "non-aligned" was also cited to prove China a supporter, and this really went a long way to prove that.

In fact, the arguments cited by Peking were all "necessary" to prove her a supporter but were not "sufficient" to do so. The genuine factor that made China a supporter was that she was not a party to any military pact, she did not belong to any bloc. She was factually non-aligned, in relation to blocs and superpowers. The objective natural links between the PRC and the non-aligned countries were many indeed. The vital pretensions of China and the non-aligned countries were very close and even identical in some significant spheres as, for example, on the planes of economic development, decolonization and the struggle against racialism, support for the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people and the Arab peoples, democratization, and asserting the universal character of the UN etc. PRC objectively had more points in common with the non-aligned countries than any other powers. Particularly

as some of the other powers considered the demands of the non-aligned countries to be in contrast to their interests.

If all these - absence of opposition and recurrent support for the non-aligned movement, common historical experience with Third World countries, commonality of purpose, non-membership in military blocs - made China a genuinely non-aligned country, she was not so because she believed in the achievement of "world communism" and thought herself "aligned to that purpose". But, then, that should not deter us from claiming that China was a supporter of the non-aligned movement in so far as the movement fought a common cause. Whether behind this support there was a motive to subordinate the movement and make it an instrument in the direction of world domination is difficult to say. For, neither there is evidence to prove that China was contemplating such a domination nor is it possible to probe the Chinese intention to that effect.

Hence, I conclude that, apart from the period 1958-68, during which China's relation with the non-aligned countries reached its low watermark, China had largely displayed a friendly posture towards the non-aligned nations and the non-aligned movement. This observation particularly holds good for the period 1969-76.

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