

**UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1977-1984 :  
THE ISSUE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
IN WESTERN EUROPE**

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**PREFACE**

## PREFACE

The conflict, co-operation and competition in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union constitute important aspects of the foreign policy environment for the rest of the world. Especially their build-up of nuclear arms threatens the very survival of mankind. Avoiding the outbreak of a nuclear war between the two Super Powers has been a major concern of statesmen, scientists and scholars alike.

Since 1945, no war has broken out in Europe. Nevertheless, between Super Powers the tensions have continued sometimes in relaxed state of detente and at others in the heightened state of cold war. Significantly, both the periods of tension and detente have witnessed stockpiling of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. While at the strategic level some kind of arms control agreement was concluded by the Super Powers (SALT I and SALT II), no agreement on Theatre Nuclear Force has been reached so far.

The present study tries to analyse how the arms race has intensified as a result of the deployment of new theatre nuclear weapons. It also examines the strategic thinking of the Super Powers and the effect it has on their bilateral relations. The deployment of Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles in Europe has been an important issue in the United States relations with the Soviet Union as well as with Western Europe.

The United States views Western Europe as of vital

strategic importance to itself. Consequently, it has regarded the dominance of the region by any hostile power to be detrimental to its vital strategic interests. Ever since the conclusion of the Second World War, the American policy-makers have consciously pursued a policy to contain Soviet influence in Europe. Simultaneously, they work for the promotion of American interests especially in Western Europe. Favourable governments were helped to assume power in France and Italy by clandestinely financing the political parties as a first step to sell the American Version of security to these states. While Marshall Plan (implemented in 1948) was the economic version of the containment policy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the military version. Having successfully sold the American concept of security to the West European states, the deployment of conventional and nuclear arms followed.

This dissertation is a modest attempt to analyse the impact of the US nuclear policy on the relations of the U.S. with the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Soviet relations have been adversely affected by the initiative that America has taken in this regard. As part of its strategy in the last few years the United States decided to deploy 572 Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe. The deployment reinforces its commitments to the security of Western Europe. By threatening to hit the targets in the Soviet Union from the bases in Western Europe, it deters possible Soviet intrusion in Western Europe. It is also part of U.S. strategy to optimise the

China Card of U.S. foreign policy especially (in the context of Super Power relations) not conceding or remaining as mere onlooker to any Soviet attempt to destroy Chinese nuclear installations. Soviet intervention in third world countries like Afghanistan brought about the needed public opinion and Congressional support for conventional and nuclear arms build-up. The U.S. Congress approved the programme of deployment of the new theatre nuclear weapons and the actual deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles began in 1983 despite severe opposition of the Soviet Union.

The methodology adopted here is both empirical and descriptive. On the basis of available empirical data, the issue of U.S. theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe has been analysed. The study tries to point out the interaction among various agencies and organs of government in the formulation and implementation of American policy. An effort is made to show how the U.S. foreign policy elites reacted to this policy. It also examines the response of the United States to the reactions of West European governments to its proposal in this regard.

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**CHAPTER I**

**INTRODUCTION**



## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

The world at present is politically multipolar but militarily bipolar. One group of countries is led by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. Ideologically they are opposed to each other. The ideology of the West led by the United States includes a belief in the government chosen through popular elections under a multi-party system and in universal adult franchise. It believes in the freedom of association and discussion, in the freedom of the press and in the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. The East led by the Soviet Union believes in the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, the enjoyment of dominant political powers by the Communist party as the "Vanguard" of the proletariat and a system in which economic decisions are taken primarily through centralised bodies.

Politically the forces supported by the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other in different parts of the world. For example, in Afghanistan, rebels have arisen against the Soviet troops and Moscow-installed government in Kabul. Scattered border clashes flare between the Soviet supported South Yemen and North Yemen backed by Saudi Arabia and the United States. In East Asia, the Communist and Moslem guerillas campaign against the Marcos government in the Philippines. In El Salvador, the US supported government is opposed by the rebels. In Honduras, Cuban trained Marxist guerillas are fighting against the government. In Guatemala, leftist guerillas are attacking

the right wing government, while in Nicaragua rebels armed by the United States based in Honduras and other insurgents based in Costa Rica harass the Sandinista regime.<sup>1</sup>

The two Super Powers of the world thus have incompatible ideologies and antagonistic perception of various political, economic and international issues. This has led to the stock-piling of dreadful nuclear arms and ammunitions on both sides. The nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union alone can destroy the world several times over. As a result, the fear of nuclear war hangs like a Democles' sword over the entire humanity. But in spite of the various regional conflicts, so far the outbreak of a nuclear war has been avoided. While the United States provides nuclear umbrella to the countries of Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union provides the same to the countries of Eastern Europe. This has resulted in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Despite the great economic strain, the two Super Powers have pursued research and development of nuclear weapons for nearly forty years. For the first time in history, the world is witnessing the two countries equipping themselves with nuclear power. They develop nuclear strategic doctrines to rationalise new technological developments. This state of "competitive co-existence" has been called as "Cold War".

Both the Super Powers are vulnerable to each other's nuclear attack. This has made them realize the limitations of

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1 "Even in Peace Time Forty Wars are Going on", US News and World Report (Washington, DC), 11 July 1983, pp. 44-45.

their power. Hence both of them have arranged their priorities in an ascending order, from peripheral to vital interests. Conflict arises when two nations with equivalent military capacity view their vital interests at stake in the same region. Such a conflict situation has arisen in the past quite often in Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> Peace has been maintained since the end of the Second World War by armed forces and nuclear weapons stationed on either side of the iron curtain.

In order to know the reasons for the sense of insecurity prevailing among the West Europeans, it is important to understand the conflict situation in Europe. An attempt will be made here to emphasise, the competing strategic, geographical, economic, and political interests of the Super Powers in Western Europe. This will be followed by a description of how the strategic doctrines have been evolved by the two Super Powers to counter each other's move in the area. This will help us to understand the reasons for the large stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The geographical location influences the political relations among nations. The presence or absence of natural boundaries, natural resources, the climatic and relief features to a certain extent enhances or diminishes the importance of a country. The strategic geographic location commanding the vital sea routes and the vast natural resources account for the interest of the Super Powers in Western Europe. The Soviet Union

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<sup>2</sup> Edwina Moreton and Segal Gerald, eds., Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 9.

is geographically nearer to Western Europe. Its territory stretches right across the northern part of the Eurasian continent. It is a great global and also the largest European power. Russians feel that Europe is part of their continent and that they have every right to be predominant in this region. Presence of any other Super Power is viewed as a danger to their security. Russia pushed westwards into the European peninsula in pursuit of secure and stable frontiers, and for outlets to ice-free ports for strategic, trade and commercial purposes. The Russian conviction is that Europe should be rightfully part of their political sphere of interest.<sup>3</sup>

#### Economic Interests

As far back as 1891-92, there was diplomatic ties between France and Russia.<sup>4</sup> Lenin foresaw the establishment of peaceful commercial relations with the capitalist countries on the basis of new democratic principles of inter-state relationship. The economic relations between the East and the West developed despite strained political relations. It was widely believed in the Soviet Union that, "if East-West trade suddenly stopped, we would be hit seriously. Trade with the West has become an integral part of our five-year economic plans...."<sup>5</sup>

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3 Malcolm Mackintosh in John C. Garnett, ed., The Defence of Western Europe (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), pp. 39-40.

4 David A. Andelman, "Struggle Over Western Europe", Foreign Policy (Washington, DC), no. 49 (Winter, 1982-83), p. 37.

5 As quoted by Alfred Zanker in "Coming Drought in East-West Trade", US News and World Report, 23 August 1982, p. 35.

In 1958, Khrushchev designed a programme to liberalize the Soviet Union from within and to increase the interaction with the outside world. His effort to increase the agricultural productivity required increased use of chemical fertilizers.

In 1966, Premier Kosygin announced that to speed up economic growth, the Soviet Union would increase the purchases of foreign technology and machinery.<sup>6</sup> The West is technologically more advanced than the Soviet Union. Hence the Soviet Union prefers to import manufactured or semi-manufactured goods. Besides the Soviet Union imports grain even in good harvest years and in years when the harvest is low, the grain import is as much as 25 per cent of total needs. Besides, the modernization of Soviet military forces is dependent to a high degree on the imported western technology.<sup>7</sup>

Soviet trade turnover in millions of roubles  
with the following countries<sup>8</sup>

<u>Countries</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
West Germany	6,629.7	7,022.0	7,601.2
Finland	5,193.5	5,173.3	4,728.5
Italy	4,036.0	4,434.7	4,480.8

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6 Glenda G. Rosenthal and Elliot Zupnick, eds., Contemporary Western Europe: Problems and Responses (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 161.

7 Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Reagan and Russia", Foreign Affairs (London), vol. 61, Winter 1982/83, pp. 251-2.

8 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 31, no. 5, May 1985 (London: Longman, 1985), p. 33631.

France	3,558.7	4,149.9	4,224.3
Japan	3,692.4	3,004.0	2,894.3
United States	5,279.0	1,900.5	3,134.9
United Kingdom	1,565.1	1,816.8	2,212.2
Netherlands	1,926.5	1,713.5	1,888.0
Belgium	1,604.5	1,602.0	1,698.3
Austria	1,209.8	1,352.8	1,652.2
Canada	1,398.8	1,301.9	1,421.7
Australia	523.2	414.0	503.3

From the table above, it can be inferred that the United States had been the greatest trading partner of the Soviet Union in 1982 next only to West Germany. But within the span of two years, the Soviet trade turnover with the West European countries, namely, West Germany, France, England and Italy had increased by about 871.5, 665.6, 647.1 and 394.8 roubles respectively and the same with the United States and Japan had decreased drastically by about 2144.1 roubles and 798.1 roubles respectively.

Besides the trade, large joint projects are underway in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with the help of American and West European assistance. The trans-European gas pipe line, which is five thousand kilometres long was constructed by major firms from France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Austria, the automatic plants in Togliatti, Izhevsk and built with the help of American, West German, Italian and French companies; a fertilizer complex in the Soviet Union was constructed with

American participation, a large iron and steel plant near Kursk was built with the participation of West German firms, Japanese firms are interested in the development of coal mining and timber industry in the Soviet Far East.<sup>9</sup>

While Russia has always viewed trade and economic relations as a means to reinforce foundation of detente, the United States has always tried to use trade as a weapon in its cold war, aimed at "punishment" or to lure political concessions. The Soviet Union too had always been aware of the fact that economic influence could be used as a weapon against them.<sup>10</sup> However, despite their dependence on large quantities of grain imports, Soviet Union's political moves have remained unhampered by the grain embargo imposed by the United States.<sup>11</sup>

The economic relations between the East and the West are thus mutually beneficial. While the Soviet Union relies heavily on the import of grain and technology from the West, Western Europe is becoming more dependent on its trade with the Soviet Union. The rich petroleum reserves and raw materials available

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9 Pavel Shmelyov, Detente: The Soviet Viewpoint; East-West Relations After Helsinki (Moscow: Novosti Press, 1977), p. 52.

10 Georgi Arbatov, William Oltmans, The Soviet Point of View (London Zed Books, 1983), p. 37.

11 President Carter imposed an embargo on export of grain to the Soviet Union after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The embargo hurt the grain producers of Mid-West much more than it did the Soviet Union, thereon assuming office in 1981 President Reagan lifted the embargo.

in the Soviet Union attracts Western Europe. Increase in the economic interaction between the East and the West was viewed by West Europeans as one of the ways to make the relations more normal. Besides the politico-economic leverage may be able to influence the general trends; the trade and technical assistance, can be linked with the good international behaviour of the Soviet Union. But if the Soviet Union opts for aggression, the termination of trade cannot be expected to control its policies. To fight an all out economic warfare in today's interdependent world will affect the political and economic conditions of both the nations.<sup>12</sup>

#### Political Interests

While the Soviet Union is interested in stabilising the strategic relationship with the United States it is also keen on reducing its sphere of influence in other countries. The Soviet Union is politically interested in turning Western Europe against the United States. It is also interested in making use of the differences between the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States in its favour. The West European Social Democrats are committed to Marxism. They are part of the Socialist International, a world-wide organization. They are opposed to both Communism and Capitalism and are dedicated to democracy.<sup>13</sup> Hence the West

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> Stanley Henig and John Pinder, eds., European Political Parties (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp. 34, 52.



European Social Democrats are not unquestionably backing the anti-Soviet policies of their governments. The present attempt of the conservatives in the United States to bury detente has not been supported by most of the parties in the Socialist International (SI).<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union wants to have maximum control and influence over the developments in Western Europe, with West Germany being the main concern. On economic and political issues there are dissensions within the alliance. For example, during sixties and seventies the East-West trade policy of America and Western Europe was relatively harmonious. But when the United States imposed trade sanctions against the Soviet Union after its intervention in Afghanistan, it was no doubt supported but only by a very reluctant Western Europe. Besides, when martial law was declared in Poland, the validity of American sanctions against the Soviet Union, in this case the banning of the sale of gas pipeline technology was again questioned by the West European allies. The Guardian commented: "The trouble with East-West crises, is that they all too rapidly turn into West-West crisis. So it is again."<sup>15</sup>

While to the United States the economic relations with the East develops its military potential against USA, to Western Europe, the economic ties appear to be mutually beneficial. According to John Hobbs, Chairman of the North of England

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14 Y. Konstantinov, "For Peace and Security in Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5, May 1981, p. 52.

15 Guardian (London), 23 December 1981.

Development Council, every five thousand pounds worth of Soviet orders in that part of England assures the employment for at least one person throughout a year.<sup>16</sup> The East-West economic co-operation is found beneficial by constituencies not only within the Alliance but also within the United States.

Besides, the policy of linkage followed by Henry Kissinger, who had tied the liberalisation of restrictions on trade, technology and credits to the Soviet Union's restrained international behaviour and its willingness to solve the problems in the third world countries namely, Vietnam, and the Middle East and its participation in arms control negotiations has been disliked by the liberals in the United States.<sup>17</sup>

At a time when the European members of the Alliance were getting more interested in arms control talks with the Soviet Union, the United States was becoming disenchanted with it. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the question of how to respond to the challenges posed by the Soviet Union in the third world created differences within the alliance.

With the US no longer enjoying supremacy in nuclear weapons and with Soviet superiority in conventional weapons still in tact, the Western Europe questions the credibility of the strategy of flexible response. Europeans had realized that while they pay more for defence they are less secure.<sup>18</sup> Besides, the

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16 Shmelyov, n. 9, p. 60.

17 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p. 247.

18 Rosenthal and Zupnick, n. 6, pp. 387-9.

enormous arms build-up and deployment of new nuclear missiles are disliked by the people of Western Europe who have taken to peace marches and anti-nuclear protests in recent years. Commenting on the role of the United States in arms control negotiations, Los Angeles Times wrote that "without strong participation of the United States, it is possible that first the small West European nations would take the Swedish neutralist approach, with the larger nations (Germany, France and Italy) following suit".<sup>19</sup>

Soviet Strategic Interests in Western Europe

Because of the geographical proximity the presence of nuclear weapons in Western Europe have aroused great concern in the Soviet Union. From 1960s onwards, it has negotiated with the United States not only to balance its strategic nuclear forces but also the Forward Based System (FBS) of the United States in Western Europe. The Forward Based System includes the United States war planes stationed in Great Britain, West Germany and other European countries. The Soviet Union had also been concerned about the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France. In order to balance the "theatre" nuclear forces of the United States in Western Europe and the nuclear forces of Britain and France the Soviet Union had stationed Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on its western side with capacity to hit targets in Western Europe.

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19 Cited in V. Shein, "NATO: The Price of Mature Partnership", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, February 1972, p. 51.

Besides the possibility of waging and winning a limited nuclear war is advocated by the United States. But even a limited tactical/theatre nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and Western Europe would badly affect the population of the Soviet Union. Therefore, to the latter who had already suffered great human loss during the Second World War, the nuclear weapons in Western Europe are of great strategic concern. The nuclear weapons maintained on its western side serve the political purpose of warning the Western Europe to keep off from the Super Power conflict.

In 1975, the Soviet Union began to modernise its SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with mobile three warheaded SS-20 missiles. The NATO consequently took the decision to modernize its theatre nuclear weapons to counter the SS-20 missiles in 1979. New Long Range Theatre Nuclear Missiles like Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) were to be deployed. These long range missiles enable them to hit targets deep inside the Soviet Union. Thus they pose a direct threat to latter's security. An accidental firing of medium range missile from Western Europe would allow only two and a half minutes to four minutes warning time.<sup>20</sup> These nuclear missiles have enhanced the strategic importance of Western Europe to the Soviet Union. Reaching an agreement, on these Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) has therefore become equally important as reaching an understanding with the United States on strategic nuclear weapons.

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20 David Halloway, The Soviet Union and Arms Race (London: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 71.

AMERICAN INTEREST IN WESTERN  
EUROPE

Like the Soviet Union, American interest in Western Europe has rapidly increased. One should not forget that not too long ago the US was viewed as an extension of the Atlantic Community. Even today ethnic groups of European origin (like Italian Americans, Polish Americans, etc.) feel emotionally and culturally linked to countries of their origin. The broad American interest in Western Europe can be discussed under the following categories:

Economic Interest: The economies of Western Europe and America are inter-connected. For instance, of all the United States' investment abroad nearly half is in Western Europe. The European investments in the United States amount to more than 70 per cent of all its overseas investments. The United States is currently running a trade surplus with Western Europe of about \$20 billion. Besides, the United States and Europe have about equal shares of the total Gross National Product (GNP) of the world's market economies. America is interested in maintaining a free trade system and therefore wants to have close collaboration with Western Europe in the management of the world economy. Besides, it wants to encourage free market systems in the third world and joint economic pressure, when feasible and appropriate, against hostile political forces,  
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against the communist world.

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21 Christopher Bertram, ed., America's Security in the 1980s (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), pp. 72-74.

The American foreign policy is essentially formulated with the conviction that no hostile or potentially hostile nation should be permitted to dominate both the Atlantic and Pacific rimlands which are rich in raw materials and industries. Integration of the economy of the independent West European countries by a hostile nation has to be resisted. <sup>22</sup>

Cultural Ties: The United States has rich cultural linkages with Western Europe. Up to 1700, the great majority of immigrants to the United States were English. Later, the largest group of immigrants came from Scotland and Ireland. After 1815, the European immigration into the United States began to gather momentum. Nearly all the immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe, mainly - Ireland, Germany, Britain, Canada and smaller numbers from Switzerland, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. They came mainly because of the economic pressure at home. Between 1815 and 1860 there were nearly five million immigrants, more than the entire population of the United States in 1790. During 1930s, most of the immigrants were refugees mainly German Jews who had fled from Nazi prosecution. Until the end of the nineteenth century, many private enterprises in the United States were nourished by European capital. These early European immigrants introduced a culture which was economically more productive and militarily stronger. Thus the Europeans who had immigrated to better jobs stayed back and

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22 Hagglund Gustav, "United States NATO Strategy", Military Review (Ft Leavenworth), vol. 44, no. 10, January 1974, p. 42.

settled in the United States.<sup>23</sup> These immigrants slowly stopped identifying themselves with their countries of origin and worked unitedly to build up the present America into a powerful Super Power. Thus a very large number of American families are of European origin in some way.

Strategic Interests: The foreign policy of the United States has evolved from isolation to entering into an entangling military alliance with Western Europe.<sup>24</sup> NATO is the result of the realization on the one hand of the Soviet threat to the United States, and on the other the importance of Western Europe in its ideological and military warfare against the Soviet Union.

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee Report of 29 April 1947 analysed that the vulnerable portion of the United States' defence lies on the eastern shore of the Atlantic and suggested the Western Europe as the potential ally in case of war with the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

Hence from 1945 till today, Western Europe has remained an area of vital national interests to the United States. President Richard Nixon in his foreign policy report to the Congress on 18 February 1970, stated that "We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska" and he went on to say that despite the

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23 Benjamin H. Williams, The United States in the Nuclear Age (Meerut: Sadhna Prakashanda, 1973), pp. 39-40.

24 Thomas P. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Foreign Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 162.

25 Ibid., p. 73.

hegemonic position of the United States in the alliance, it has never conceived of its relationship with the Europeans narrowly in terms of absolute power positions. Its aim in Western Europe is to have a viable partner.<sup>26</sup> This has made the Atlantic alliance workable and durable.

...the defence of the United States and Canada in North America and of Great Britain and France in Western Europe is inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a question of what men think now, but is something that has been demonstrated,... in actual warfare in the past. This means that the entire area of Western Europe is in first place an area of strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare.<sup>27</sup>

The five permanent members of the United Nations are the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. With the latter two being communist powers, the United States is interested politically to help the two countries to remain as free, democratic, Western states, enabling them to have more influence in world affairs.

The game between the United States and the Soviet Union is essentially a non-zero sum game. Not every gain for the Soviet Union is a loss for the United States. But America is interested in keeping Western Europe out of Soviet influence. Besides, the ideological division of Europe into East and West, the maintenance of the military balance and retaining peace by balance of terror, in a way serves the interests of both the

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26 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace in Europe: East-West Relations 1966-1968 and the Prospects for a European Settlement (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 18.

27 Etzold and Gaddis, n. 24, p. 73.



Super Powers, to concentrate and to enhance their interests in the Third World.

Thus, though both the Super Powers are interested in controlling the whole of Europe, they have cautiously avoided war in this area which they know would result in an all-out nuclear war. The cost effect calculation has thus prevented the war in Europe all these years.

While the Soviet Union is interested in Western Europe because of strategic, political and economic reasons, United States has in addition cultural roots in Europe. Because of its ethnic population that in itself is important in foreign policy decisions.

#### THE STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

For the United States, the Soviet Union is the main concern in the formulation of its foreign policy and containing the spread of Soviet powers globally and particularly in Western Europe is its prime national interest. The Soviet Union's vital interests lie in catering and balancing the nuclear power of the United States and in reducing the power and influence of the United States over its allies by successfully projecting its image of a peace seeker in Western Europe. Hence, Western Europe has become the stage where the Super Powers compete to gain political, economic and propaganda advantage. It is also the potential theatre for any future dreadful nuclear war which might break out between them.

BASIC AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Categories of National Interest	Elements of Policy	Military Strategy	Strategic Issues
Survival	Deterrence of nuclear war. Non-Proliferation.	Assured Destruction, 'Second Strike Triad Flexible nuclear options withheld reserve; essential equivalence; termination favourable to the United States.	Nuclear trends. Proliferation potential Escalation.
Territorial Integrity	Protect US bases and territory. Defend air and sea approaches to North America. Maintain integrity of NATO countries. Maintain air and sea approaches to Europe.	Forward Defense based on the continent of Europe. Protect lines of communication between US and forward deployment forces/NATO allies.	Datente/ confrontation Maintain general equilibrium between East and West.
Economic well-being	Maintain and expand trade and investments. Continue free passage over international air/sea routes.	US/NATO naval force presence to demonstrate access to lines of communication. Forward Basing to enhance force presence.	Burden sharing. Rationalization, standardization and interrupt-ability.
World Order	Prevent extension of Soviet influence in Europe and around the world. Maintain US credibility and regional influence. Prevent the outbreak of hostilities in region threatening US interests.	Collective security. Maintain credible military-posture in Europe. Promote Soviet concern with two front war security assistance.	Strategic flexibility. Exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. Outside NATO presence/ reinforcement.

Source: William O. Staudenraier, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980s - Part II", Military Review (Leavenworth), vol. 62, no. 4, April 1982, p. 48.

The two Super Powers have formulated various policies and strategies to balance each other's power and influence in Western Europe. To politically contain the spread of Soviet power and Communist ideology, and in order to safeguard its own security interests, the United States formulated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 to militarily contain the spread of Soviet Union's power.

The term "strategy" is derived from the Greek word "strategos" i.e., the art of the general. Policy and strategy are two different terms. While policy outlines the general principles governing a country's relations with the other nations, strategy devices the means or ways to effectively implement the policy.

The strategic doctrine is a sort of justification for the use of the nuclear force. It includes various targets for nuclear attack, detailed plans for the implementation of such an attack and encompasses the goals for which the nation will go to war and the conditions under which wars would be fought. In both its technical and its political aspects, strategic doctrine is constrained by the available technology and "lies at the inter-face of technology and politics".

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28 William O. Staudemaimer, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980s", Part I, Military Review, vol. 62, no. 3, March 1982, p. 42.

29 William H. Baugh, The Politics of Nuclear Balance: Ambiguity and Continuity in Strategic Policies (New York: Longman, 1984), p. 77.

In the Soviet Union, military doctrine has a broader meaning. It has been defined as "an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its armed forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparation of the country and army for war."<sup>30</sup>

American Nuclear Strategy: The American strategic nuclear doctrines and its strategy for ensuring the security of Western Europe has evolved over the past years. The nuclear stockpile of the Soviet Union has increased over the years. Besides the technological advancements has resulted in the production of nuclear weapons with more accuracy and precision. Moreover, the United States is interested in countering the political moves of the Soviet Union in the Third World. Hence the United States in order to ensure its security and that of its allies has changed its nuclear strategy accordingly.<sup>31</sup>

The United States enjoyed nuclear monopoly till 1949, when the Soviet Union first exploded its nuclear device. The year 1950, saw the preparation of the highly secret National Security Council document NSC-68, with its evaluation that a world-wide communist threat existed.

The decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe was taken by President Eisenhower in his policy "New Look" in 1953. The "New Look" policy required the amendment of the United States Atomic Energy Act, so that technical information

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30 As quoted in Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons (Series 1), (New York: UN Publications, 1981), p. 94.

31 Gregory Flynn, The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London: Allanheld Osmun, 1980), pp. 26-27.

about the nuclear weapons might be made available to the allies. The idea that a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe would be countered by American nuclear weapons bolstered the confidence of West Europeans.

During the first world war, the ability to strike the heart of enemy's power was described as a "strategic" capability. Thus there was "strategic bombardment" using "strategic bombers" under a "strategic Air Command" (SAC).<sup>32</sup> But after the availability of atomic weapon, the question was more of how to carry and deliver these atom bombs into the territory of the enemy. It was believed in 1940s that for the next decade the only vehicle for delivering an atomic bomb with adequate accuracy would be the conventionally piloted aircraft.<sup>33</sup> The progress in the technology of guided missile changed the situation radically.

Deterrence: Deterrence is the credible threat of unacceptable counteraction communicated to the enemy by a variety of means: policy statements, statements of one's intentions, diplomatic notes and actions. The deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) in Western Europe was mainly based on this concept of deterrence. The idea of deterrence is based on three expectations, rational behaviour of the enemy, that the enemy

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32 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. xvii.

33 Ibid., p. 27.

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does not have the technical capacity to deter the attack and that it is daunted by the thought of the attack.<sup>34</sup> The Atlantic defence is mainly concerned about the territorial integrity and political independence of the Atlantic states.

Deterrence can be said to be based on offensive capability, meaning the ability to inflict intolerable damage on the adversary. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, stated that unacceptable destruction would require one-fourth to one-third fatalities to a population of a large industrialized nation and destruction of half to two-thirds of the entire industrial capacity.<sup>35</sup> Thus, according to American strategy, the best way to deter the atomic bombardment by one state is to threaten it with counter-attack by nuclear weapons. Mutual vulnerability of both the Super Powers assures security.

In 1946, General Arnold who developed the concept of "retaliation", stated that "our first line of defense is the ability to retaliate even after receiving the hardest blow the enemy can deliver".<sup>36</sup> Thus with the advancements in nuclear technology, both the Super Powers reconciled to the fact that there can be no absolute defence and that the mutual vulnerability

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34 Barrie Paskins, "Proliferation and the Nature of Deterrence", in Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, eds., Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 117-28.

35 Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 52.

36 Freedman, n. 32, p. 41.

to nuclear attack maintained the balance of terror in this nuclear age.

Massive Retaliation: In 1954, the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the "Doctrine of Massive Retaliation". He stated that the United States reserved the option to retaliate, ... by means and at places of our own choosing".<sup>37</sup> It was adopted at a time when the United States was rapidly losing its ability to strike the Soviet Union without the fear of an unacceptable Soviet counter-attack.

Under this doctrine, the retaliatory capacity had to be maintained with high precision and readiness and must be from time to time technologically updated. The situation remains stable till neither power by striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back. This doctrine was applied by America only to places which are of vital importance to its interests like Western Europe. It means that any incursion by Warsaw Pact forces in Western Europe would be met with an overwhelming strategic nuclear onslaught.

In 1955, the talk about the "bomber gap" was started by the United States and it began to spend more on defence. Later between 1957 and 1961, with the Soviet Union successfully placing the first earth satellite in orbit, there was talk about "Missile gap". But in 1961, Secretary of Defence McNamara, claimed that the missile gap was a "myth".<sup>38</sup> But this illusion helped in the

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37 Ibid., p. 85.

38 Edgar M. Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 68-70.

development of advanced nuclear weapon systems and caused shift in the American nuclear strategy.

Thus the fear of Soviet aggression helped in the construction of advanced missile systems. With the Soviet advancements in nuclear technology, the vulnerability of the United States to the attack by the Soviet Union began to increase. The weakness of the American inability to fight a limited nuclear or conventional war with the Soviet Union was realized.

Flexible Response: Thus, in order to respond to the political advancements made by the Soviet Union in nuclear technology and delivery system, the United States opted for the strategy of "Flexible Response". Substantial part of the doctrine was developed by Kennedy and McNamara.

In 1962, Robert McNamara announced the change in the strategic doctrine to that of "flexible response". It meant that the United States would respond according to the degree and kind of challenges covering both limited and major conventional war capabilities. McNamara felt that the nuclear superiority, is to be measured not in terms of the number of missile launchers available but that it should be measured only in terms of the number of warheads that can be delivered on individual targets efficiently so as to destroy them completely.

Flexible response meant that any attack on NATO would be met with appropriate conventional, tactical, theatre or strategic

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39 Robert B. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), p. 56.



nuclear arms. From this point onwards, a number of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons have been deployed, essentially to counter the Soviet superiority in conventional weapon systems. Western Europe is the only area where a large number of the United States nuclear weapon systems have been set up. The doctrine rests on the threat to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of the failure of conventional weapons and the gradual escalation of war.

The United States nuclear forces in Western Europe are capable of conducting both counter force attack, with the aim to knock out enemy's strategic forces and counter-value attack, with the aim to destroy the cities of the enemy.<sup>40</sup>

To implement the policy, McNamara established the United States Strike Command by placing the Strategic Army Command and the Tactical Air Command of the Air Force under joint command. This force was to provide an "...integrated mobile, high combat ready force, available to augment the unified commands overseas or to be employed as the primary force in remote areas."<sup>41</sup>

As Kennedy stated: "Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the Free World must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift and effective".<sup>42</sup> In the sixties, the Soviet Union developed its nuclear weapons and

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40 Nigel Blake and Kay Pole, Objection to Nuclear Defence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 17.

41 McNamara, n. 39, p. 97.

42 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 500.

reached nuclear parity with the United States. This led to the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The American military strategy had always been formulated keeping in view American role in the world and the extent of its commitments to allies. It realized the importance of strengthening the conventional forces so as to avoid recourse to strategic nuclear weapons as far as possible. Thus the doctrine of fighting, "two and a half war" was developed by Kennedy and McNamara. McNamara later stated, "...we had to provide in addition to our NATO requirements, the forces required to meet such an attack in Asia (by China) as well as fulfil our commitments in the Western Hemisphere".<sup>43</sup>

Limited War: The American strategists advocated, "a limited War concept whose intellectual genesis could be traced to Captain Basil Liddell Hart. Later Robert Osgood, an eminent scholar of International Relations stated that if there was to be a strategy of deterrence it had to be credible and that "credibility, in turn, requires that the means of deterrence be proportionate to the objectives at stake."<sup>44</sup> Further, Osgood in his book, Limited War Revisited talks about the nuclear war as a rational instrument of policy which is being facilitated by new technical advancement.<sup>45</sup>

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43 McNamara, n. 39, p. 80.

44 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 26, 242.

45 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder: West View Press, 1983).

The Presidential Directive 59 was signed by Carter on 25 July 1980. It marks an important change in America's nuclear policy. The American ability to fight and win a limited nuclear war was advocated in this document.<sup>46</sup>

While the American strategists call for the following up of limited objectives through limited nuclear war, most of the wars had started with confusion over war aims. Besides, the war resulting in the use of only theatre nuclear weapons may be a limited war for the United States but for the Soviet Union and Western Europe, even a tactical or theatre exchange is strategic because a large part of their population and territory will be affected.

When President Ronald Reagan came to power the political confrontations between the Super Powers had reached its peak. Reagan came to power having promised to ensure the nuclear superiority of the United States. With him in office the attention of the American nuclear strategists turned from building offensive to defensive nuclear weapons. With the American search for more security and superiority, the arms race has escalated into space. Air Force major General Keegan and Army Lieut. General Daniel Graham are the leading advocates of the space weapons. Reagan discussed about missile killing technology based on laser and particle beam technology with his science

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46 For full text of Presidential Directive 59, see Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds., The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present 1939-1984 (Philadelphia: University Press, 1984), pp. 227-34.

adviser George Key Worth II. It is still in the research and development stage. It is known as the "Strategic Defense Initiative"; popularly known as "Star War".<sup>47</sup>

Doubts are being raised whether this defence initiative can strike the Soviet missiles even before they are launched. So far, the present technological development is stated to have the capacity to destroy the Soviet missiles only after they are launched.

It is claimed that when the Soviet missile would be launched it would send warning signals to the sensor satellites orbiting above and one of the satellites would send a powerful beam of light or some sub-atomic particles which would hit the missile and fasten it to the ground. It is stated that when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, it would be reduced to harmless fragments.<sup>48</sup>

The United States under Reagan had started searching for new defensive systems which would make the large stockpiles of nuclear weapons out of use. But any nation cannot possibly get absolute security in this nuclear age. It would result only in the escalation of arms race. However, the basic strategic doctrines of the United States has not changed since the Star War plans are only in the research and development stage.

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47 Walter Issacson, "Reagan for the Defense: His Vision of the Future Turns the Budget Battle into a Star War", Time (Chicago), 4 April 1983, p. 4.

48 Strobe Talbott, "The Risks of Taking Up Shields in the Nuclear Age, It may be Safer when each side has only Spears", Time (Chicago), 4 April 1983, pp. 12-13.

Jonathan Alford of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, stated that "the proposal intends to put a bubble over the US and that would be followed by a bubble over the Soviet Union. If we cannot threaten to strike the Soviet Union, we Europeans are going to be out in the cold".<sup>49</sup> Thus the American commitment to West European security is now doubted because of this Star War initiative. The Europeans feel that once the American territories are protected from the Soviet attack, the United States would not protect the West European territories. If the Star War plans proves to be practicable it will cause revolutionary changes in the nuclear strategy of both the Super Powers.

The Soviet Union vehemently opposes the Star War plans as it views it as a hinderance in negotiating any arms control treaty with the United States. Yuri Andropov, the former Soviet Premier commenting on the American Strategic Defence Initiative stated:

On the face of it, laymen may find it even attractive as the President speaks about what seem to be defensive measures. But this may seem to be so only on the face of it and only to those who are not conversant with these matters. In fact the strategic offensive forces of the United States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line at that namely that of acquiring a first nuclear strike capability. Under these conditions the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying with the help of the ABM defenses

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49 Issacson, n. 47, p. 4.

(of) the corresponding strategic systems of the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat.<sup>50</sup>

Even in his latest arms control proposals the Soviet Premier, Mikhail Gorbachov has asked Reagan to end the Star War programme as a necessary condition for any genuine arms control.<sup>51</sup> While the United States believes in fighting and winning a limited nuclear war and follows a strategy of flexible response with gradual escalation of war the Soviet Union has different strategic concepts and doctrines of its own. While it is essential that two persons playing a game come to an understanding on the basic rules of the game, the two nuclear Super Powers follow opposite strategies and do not believe in the concepts advocated by the other nor try to accommodate their mutual genuine interests.

#### SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Soviet Union views America as the yardstick by which to measure its successes. It has always yearned for acceptance of its equality by the United States. At the same time it has

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50 McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 63, no. 2, Winter 1984/85, pp. 270-71. See also Lubkemeier Eckhard, "Extended Deterrence: Implications for Arms Limitation and Reduction", Bulletin of Peace Proposals (New York), vol. 16, no. 3, 1985, pp. 249-53.

51 George C. Church, "A Farewell to Arms: Gorbachov's Disarming Proposal Combines Bold Visions and Potential Pitfalls", Time (Chicago), 24 January 1986, pp. 6-8.

always adopted a hostile posture and attempted to undermine America's international position thereby enhancing its own Super Power status. Since 1945, from Stalin down to Gorbachov, the United States has been considered as the obstacle to Soviet international ambitions.<sup>52</sup> But at the same time, Soviet Union has needed scientific and technological assistance for its economic growth.<sup>53</sup> Thus while it was competing militarily with the United States, it always maintained its economic ties with the latter. The Soviet nuclear doctrines are not generally as openly expressed as in the case of the United States.

The official Soviet doctrine till Stalin's death was, "Permanently Operating Factors". It was war seen as a massive fight between two societies, in which the final outcome of the war depended on the strength or the weakness of the attacker. The permanently operating factors were: "The stability of the rear; the morale of the army; the quantity and quality of divisions; the armaments of the army; and the organizational ability of the army commanders".<sup>54</sup>

After Stalin's death in 1953, it was realized that with the employment of atomic and hydrogen bombs, surprise was one of the important factors for the attainment of success in war.

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52 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., The Making of America's Soviet Policy (London: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 29-93.

53 Peter J. Potichnys and Jane P. Shapiro, eds., From the Cold War to Detente (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 110.

54 Freedman, n. 32, p. 58.

The ground forces were considered to be very important in the war.<sup>55</sup>

"Vnezapnost" was one of the most important Soviet military doctrine. It envisaged the selection of the military action in such a way that at the proper time it hit the enemy when he was least prepared for the attacks. Then the enemy could be in no position to organize resistance. It was to be achieved by confusing the enemy of one's intentions. The preparations for the war were to be kept secret and new methods to fight the enemy were to be used. The correct place for a strike was to be chosen in such a way that by using methods unfamiliar to the enemy advantages were to be gained.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, the Soviet military doctrine envisaged a traditional strategy, which was aimed at achieving victory in a war by destroying the enemy's war potential and by surviving its attacks. Hence, Victory in a nuclear war had been the basis of Soviet strategic thinking through these years.<sup>57</sup>

Analysing the potential objectives of the Soviet strategic doctrines, John D. Ziak, a renowned political scientist, stated that the aim of the Soviet Union is to continue working

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55 H.S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking", Foreign Affairs (Moscow), vol. 21, no. 2, (January 1958), p. 252.

56 Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, "Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought", Part I, Military Review (Ft Leavenworth), vol. 62, no. 6 (June 1982), p. 5.

57 Keith B. Payne, ed., Nuclear Deterrence in US-Soviet Relations (Colorado: West View Press, 1982), p. 126.



politically, economically and militarily even after the nuclear exchange and that it primarily aims at the complete destruction of the enemy forces and at the same time to occupy Europe. He further stated that the Soviet Union plans to recover from the ravages of the nuclear war as soon as possible.<sup>58</sup>

The Soviet Union has built its nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent to any American attack and at the same time with the capacity to fight a nuclear war. The Soviet nuclear forces have divided into "active" forces which are maintained in order to conduct surprise nuclear attacks on the enemy and the "passive" forces are maintained in order to defend its territories from the enemy attack. Thus the Soviet Union prepares its nuclear forces for both offensive and defensive purposes.<sup>59</sup>

Till 1958, the Soviet Union relied on its ICBMs capacity to carry surprise attacks. But with the missiles of the Soviet Union not possessing the capacity to travel intercontinental distances, Khrushchev in 1962 tried to place Soviet medium and Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles in Cuba with capacity to strike the targets in the United States. But the latter demanded their withdrawal prior to the installation.<sup>60</sup> A vital lacunae

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58 John D. Ziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Doctrine and Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1981), p. 28.

59 Payne, n. 57, p. 156.

60 Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 152.

was revealed in the Soviet strategic plan, when under pressure from the US, the missiles had to be withdrawn.

After this incident, Khrushchev realised that it was much more in the interest of the Soviet Union to follow friendly relations with the United States. He took the option of influencing moderate elements within the decision making process in the United States into adopting policy favourable to the Soviet Union.<sup>61</sup>

But when Khrushchev fell in 1964, once again the voice of the persons favouring the build up of military gained ascendancy. Besides, the political situation in the later 1960s favoured the Soviet arms build up. In 1960s the American resources were diverted towards the Vietnam war and during that time, the Soviets concentrated their resources in the research and development of their nuclear weapons and gained strategic parity with the United States. The SALT I treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union was considered by the Soviets as the American recognition of their equal status.

The Soviet Union had always relied on the policy of minimum deterrence and threatened to use the nuclear weapons only in retaliation against their use by the United States. It had renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. Time and again the Soviet Union had made this clear through public statements made in different world forums. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated

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61 Edward L. Warner, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 81.

in the United Nations General Assembly that his country would not be the first to use the nuclear weapons in any war.<sup>62</sup> Besides, the Soviet Union distinguishes between the use and non-use of nuclear weapons but never the different levels of escalation of nuclear war as envisaged by the United States in its "flexible response" doctrine. It always issues warnings of massive retaliation against the territory of United States even in response to the attack by theatre nuclear forces of the United States stationed in Western Europe.<sup>63</sup>

Besides, the Soviet Union does not believe in the "assured vulnerability" of the targets. While the Soviet Union wants to destroy the strategic forces of the United States, it always prepares for the protection of its vital social assets. It feels that the attainment of strategic parity with the United States help it to support and protect its targets from the attack.<sup>64</sup>

Ironically, despite the enhanced nuclear weapon capabilities, the Super Powers, instead of feeling more secure feel more insecure. While, each nation has been able to develop its nuclear weapons with capacity to strike targets deep inside the territory of the other, it could not effectively produce nuclear weapons or any defensive system which could protect its territories from the nuclear attack of its enemy. Thus, in spite of the Soviet Union attaining nuclear parity with the United States

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62 Payne, n. 57, p. 134.

63 Ibid., p. 135.

64 Ibid., p. 151.

the mutual vulnerability has helped in preventing a nuclear war and in stabilizing the strategic situation. The Soviet Union had also accepted that any future nuclear war would prove to be destructive both for the aggressor and the victim.

But during Khrushchev's leadership the Soviet Union believed that it could fight and win a conventional warfare. This was alleged by the US as the main reason behind the Soviet declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons. Besides the Soviet Union wanted the United States and Western Europe to pledge no first use of nuclear weapons. It was viewed by the United States as its strategy to win an exclusively conventional war since the Soviet Union enjoys parity with the United States in strategic nuclear forces and superiority in conventional nuclear weapons.<sup>65</sup>

Besides, the Soviet Union does not believe in the concept of assured vulnerability and flexible targeting. It was officially stated in the United States Department of Defence publication that:

In developing and deploying their strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have subscribed neither to Western notions of strategic sufficiency nor to the concept of assured destruction. Instead, while they believe that nuclear war and its debilitating results must be avoided, they see the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant post-war position as the only national approach to nuclear forces.<sup>66</sup>

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65 Ray Bonds, ed., The Soviet War Machine: An Encyclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy (New York: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1976), p. 47.

66 Payne, n. 57, p. 205.

The Soviet Union views the various strategic doctrines of the United States like the first strike theory and the limited war concept as not conducive to peaceful co-existence. The Soviet Union does not believe in the gradual escalation of the nuclear war. It has warned over and over again that any nuclear war once started will only be an all-out war and cannot be limited as the United States believes. It views the theatre nuclear forces of the United States in Western Europe as strategic as it is capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union. Besides, the fear of Soviet retaliatory strikes against the United States has forced the latter to seek political rather than military answers to the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

Through its military strategic doctrines the Soviet Union seeks to achieve certain objectives. These doctrines reveal the method by which Soviets would wage war.

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Soviet Principles of Military Art

<u>Principles of Military Art</u>	<u>Primary Objectives</u>
Mobility and high tempo of Combat operations	To achieve and sustain rapid combat force movement for rapid mission accomplishment.
Concentration of Efforts	To achieve superiority by massive fire, to create breaches for breakthrough operations and so forth.
Surprise	To attain rapid and complete victory by surprising the enemy losses and minimizing friendly force attrition.

Combat Activeness	To seize and maintain combat initiative and reduce the likelihood of successful enemy breakthrough operations.
Preservation of combat effectiveness	To reduce the loss of personnel and equipment, enabling pursuit of combat objectives; to allocate and reallocate units effectively within the order of battle.
Conformity of goals	To assure that military objectives conform to the actual battle-field situation based on asset availability, enemy capabilities so forth.
Co-ordination/integration	To assure the success of combined aims operations.

The strategic perceptions of the two Super Powers are different from each other. The perceptions of military balance of the Soviet Union are different from those of the United States.

The United States is much advanced in nuclear technology. Hence its missiles have greater precision and serve its flexible response strategy. But the Soviet nuclear weapons are intended to smash the paths through enemy formations. They do not concentrate on the pinpoint accuracy. This leads to the different ways of fighting a nuclear war. While the United States would like to limit the nuclear war, Soviet missiles do not permit a limitation of nuclear war.

The United States often times is reluctant and hesitant in

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68 Jeffrey Record, "To Nuke or Not to Nuke: A Critique of Rationales for a Tactical Nuclear Defence of Europe", Military Review, vol. 14, no. 10, October 1974, p. 9.

the pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union because of its fear that such a policy would lead to the establishment of a world order with Soviet strategic superiority. Besides, the strategic policies of the United States has always evolved taking into account the security interests of Western Europe. Europe had been artificially divided and had remained so since the end of the Second World War. As had been discussed the security, political and economic interests of the Super Powers are at stake in Western Europe. Both are equally interested in Europe and would not let the unification of the region take place under the aegis of their adversary's control. Hence the peace is maintained in this region by the fear of mutual annihilation which retracts the aggressive intentions of both the Super Powers.

With the increasing strategic capability of the Soviet Union, the strategic policy of the United States has evolved and changed but within the overall perspective of its commitment to European security. But the West European countries have entertained serious doubts about the reliability of the US commitment and this has caused strained relations within the alliance.

Time and again the United States has tried to demonstrate its sincerity to this commitment by stationing American troops in Western Europe and by its strategic policy of flexible response which links the use of tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear weapons in a process of escalation of the nuclear war. Once again, in 1979 in order to prove its commitment to the

security of Western Europe the United States agreed to the European request for the deployment of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile. The political and strategic reasons which aided the implementation of this NATO Theatre Nuclear modernisation programme is to be dealt in the following chapter.



## CHAPTER II

DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED  
CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) IN WESTERN EUROPE

## Chapter II

### DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) IN WESTERN EUROPE

The security of the United States and that of Western Europe are interlinked with each other. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is the symbol of the American commitment to the security of Western Europe. The strategic doctrines of the United States are formulated keeping in view the security interest of its West European allies. Hence various nuclear weapons with varied capability are deployed in both the United States and a number of West European countries to serve the strategic purpose of deterring an attack by the Soviet Union and also with the capacity to fight a possible nuclear war.

To counter the conventional, tactical and theatre nuclear weapons of the United States deployed in Western Europe, the Soviet Union has stationed a number of its own Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles (IRBMs) on the western side of its territory with capacity to strike the targets in Western Europe besides maintaining large conventional forces in Eastern Europe.

In 1970s, both the Super Powers modernised their nuclear forces stationed in Europe. This modernisation had a great impact on their bilateral relations. Here the nuclear doctrines of the Super Powers and the strategic rationality and political reasons behind the large stockpile of nuclear weapons in Western Europe are to be dealt with. The modernisation of the United States' tactical nuclear weapons with the Neutron Bomb and the modernisation of NATO Theatre Nuclear Weapons (TNW) with the

Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) generated great controversy. Political and strategic questions were raised in the Congress and within the executive in the United States that influenced the bilateral relations of the Super Powers to a great extent. An attempt will be made here to analyse the problems which arose between the Soviet Union and the United States on these issues.

After the end of the Second World War, the United States entered into an "entangling military alliance" with Western Europe. The fear of the Soviet invasion of Western Europe was created by the United States. The economies of West European countries lay shattered at the end of the Second World War. They did not have enough resources to support the American troops stationed in Western Europe. Therefore, the policy of countering the Soviet superiority in conventional forces with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe was followed by the United States. In addition to it, nearly 250,000-350,000 American troops were stationed in Western Europe in early 1950s.<sup>1</sup>

Lynn Davis, a former staff member of the United States National Security Council, wrote:

American nuclear policy consists of four different components: employment policy, acquisition policy, declaratory policy, and deployment policy. Employment policy describes the targets and how the United States plans to use the nuclear weapons

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1 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 83.

which it possess today. Acquisition policy establishes criteria for developing and procuring nuclear weapons systems for the future. Declaratory policy gives guidance to American officials on what they say publicly about the employment and acquisition policies. Deployment policy designates where nuclear weapons are to be stationed.<sup>2</sup>

The Department of Defence in 1951, conducted a comprehensive study about the employment of the tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> By 1954, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had built the defence of the Western Europe on the basis of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons acting as a deterrent to potential Soviet attack.<sup>4</sup>

#### Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The tactical nuclear warheads can be made of any weight and length but must be small enough to be delivered by tactical delivery system. Some of the tactical delivery systems are capable of carrying either conventional or tactical nuclear warheads (e.g.) the American Pershing, Sergeant, Honest John rocket launchers, 155 and 203 mm howitzers, Nike-Hercules and surface-to-air missile launchers. Their yield may vary from several thousand tons down to hundreds of tons of explosive.

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- 2 Lynn E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, Deterrence and the New American Doctrine, Adelphi Paper, No. 121 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 1.
- 3 Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 115.
- 4 Michael Maudelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 100-01.

While large yield weapons are usually delivered by aircraft, the low yield nuclear warheads are fired either by artillery<sup>5</sup> or carried by short range missiles or aircraft.

The tactical nuclear weapons were to be used in the battlefield. J. Robert Oppenheimer the head of the Manhattan Project, which produced the first bomb, argued for the need to get "battle back to the battle field". Three models for the use of the tactical nuclear weapons were evolved,

- They were to be used as a warning to show the seriousness of the concern. This use of tactical nuclear weapon could either lead to peace or to an escalation of nuclear war.
- the usage of tactical nuclear weapons were to be confined to only low-yield, sub-kiloton weapons and they were to be used only in the battlefield area. The aim would be to advance further by collapsing the army of the enemies.
- largernuclear weapons with megaton weight range were to be used in theatre operations, and it would automatically lead to an all-out nuclear war.<sup>6</sup>

The United States and its allies have a variety of tactical nuclear weapon systems like surface-to-surface unguided free flight rockets, surface-to-surface guided missiles (SSMs), artillery projectiles, aircraft deliverable bombs and air-to-surface missiles, air, defence missile warheads and atomic demolition munition (ADMs). The five short-range surface-to-

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5 W.F. Biddle, Weapons Technology and Arms Control (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 255-7.

6 M.H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strength (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 28.

surface rocket and missile systems deployed by the West were:<sup>7</sup>  
Honest John - an unguided ballistic rocket with a range of about forty kilometres. It was first deployed by the United States in 1953;

Sergeant - a guided ballistic missile with a range of about one hundred and forty kilometres. It was deployed in 1962;

Pershing - a guided ballistic missile. The range was about seventy kilometres. It was deployed by the United States in 1962;

Lance - a guided ballistic missile with a range of about 110 kilometres, was deployed by the United States in 1974;

Pluton - a guided ballistic missile with a range of about 120 km. It was deployed by the United States in 1975.

The tactical nuclear weapons are mainly to deter the Soviet attack with the threat of the escalation of the nuclear war. In 1966, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was formed within the NATO to formulate the nuclear doctrines governing the use of nuclear weapons. It was decided that the first use of tactical nuclear weapons by NATO would be to demonstrate the determination of the allies to escalate the nuclear war if necessary.<sup>8</sup>

The United States maintains as much as seven thousand

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7 Trevot Cliffe, Military Technology and European Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Adelphi Paper No. 89, August 1972.

8 David Owen, The Politics of Defence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), pp. 160-1.

tactical nuclear warheads in Western Europe.<sup>9</sup> According to Jeffrey Record, a renowned political scientist, the excessive stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and their vulnerability makes them a poor deterrent force, besides they do not serve much defensive purpose, as the command and control of these warheads becomes difficult.<sup>10</sup> But the former Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger (1973-75), defended the utility of the tactical nuclear weapons before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1975. He stated that they must be able to survive the enemy attack, disperse the Warsaw Pact forces and cause collateral damage.<sup>11</sup> Thus the utility and the purpose of the deployment of these tactical nuclear weapons had always been a matter of debate and controversy in the United States.

The nuclear doctrines of the United States was formulated to justify and rationalise the deployment of these tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

The tactical nuclear weapons served the "Forward Defence" doctrine of the United States. It means that the allies should not wait behind the borders for an attack but use their arms, including nuclear weapons beyond their frontier to serve their

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9 "Force Reductions in Europe", A SIPRI monograph (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1974), p. 91.

10 Harold P. Ford, X. Francis and S.J. Winters, eds., Ethics and Nuclear Strategy (New York: Orbis Books, 1977), p. 105.

11 Stewart W.B. Menaul, "The Military Balance and the Implications: A European View", Strategic Review (Washington, DC), vol. 5, Summer 1975, pp. 55-56.

national interests. It is to reduce the loss of boundary and<sup>12</sup>  
to restore the pre-war boundaries as early as possible.

With the advancement in nuclear technology, the Super Powers were mutually assured of destruction in the event of an outbreak of a nuclear war. But in the United States the possibility of fighting and winning a "limited nuclear war" was advocated. The Presidential Directive 59 in 1980 talked about<sup>13</sup> the possibility of a prolonged yet protracted nuclear exchange. Hence, the need for the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons was emphasized more. The need of a tactical nuclear weapon whose use would not escalate the nuclear war was felt.

#### ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON: THE NEUTRON BOMB

The Neutron Bomb is a small warhead that produces twice the direct radiation of a conventional nuclear bomb but less<sup>14</sup> than a tenth of the explosive power heat and fall-out. It is different from the other tactical nuclear weapons as it is produced by fusion and not by fission of uranium isotopes. In an air-burst of any tactical nuclear weapons, 35 per cent of energy appears as thermal effects, 50 per cent appears as blast effects and 5 per cent as instantaneous gamma and neutron radiation and 10 per cent is released over time with the

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12 New York Times, 22 June 1977.

13 Jonathan Alford, ed., Arms Control and European Security, Adelphi Paper No. 11 (Hampshire: Gower, 1984), p. 6.

14 New York Times, 30 January 1978.



radioactive fall-out.<sup>15</sup> But in a Neutron Bomb, 20 per cent of fusion energy would appear as blast and thermal effects, while 80 per cent would appear as instantaneous neutron radiation. The biological effects of the radiation dose levels with their military significance is given in the following table:<sup>16</sup>

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Dose level, Rads (Rads - Radiation dose is measured in rads)	Biological Effects
1      8000	Personnel incapacitated within five minutes and remain so until death in one or two days.
2      3000	Personnel incapacitated within 5 minutes and remain so for 30 to 45 minutes. Partial recovery but functionally impaired until death in 4 to 6 days.
3      650	Personnel becomes functionally impaired within two hours and remain so until death in several weeks.

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The Neutron Bomb kills with instantaneous burst of radiation rather than by destructive explosion. It is capable of producing massive doses of lethal radiation. Its purpose is to deter the Soviet tank attacks against Western Europe. Besides, the limited nature of the blast and fire damage from the neutron warheads is to stop the Soviet thrust into West Germany.<sup>17</sup>

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15 Daniel Gans, "Neutron Weapons: Solution to a Surprise Attack, Part I", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth), vol. 62, no. 11, January 1982, p. 25.

16 Ibid.

17 Congressional Quarterly, 35th Annual (Washington, DC., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1979), pp. 370-1.

The Neutron Bomb can be used in lance surface-to-surface missiles and artillery shells for the American eight-inch howitzers.<sup>18</sup> They fly a few feet above the trees and hence they can avoid radar detection. They have accuracy to strike within sixty feet of their target. Besides, since the neutron bomb does not produce fall-out, it does not hinder the advance of the offensive.<sup>19</sup>

The Enhanced Radiation weapon of the United States has the following characteristic features:<sup>20</sup>

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Characteristic	8 inch howitzer	Lance missile
Model	M110 A2	MGM 52C
Range, maximum kilometres	29 Rocket assisted projectiles	120
Nuclear warhead	W 79	W 70-3
Yield, kilotons	1	1
<u>Nuclear Response</u> (assumed characteristic)		
Time (minutes)	3	10
Rate, minutes per round	10	30

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18 William Gutteridge, ed., European Security, Nuclear Weapons and Public Confidence (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 86.

19 Ibid.

20 Gans, n. 15, p. 32.

Accuracy at 20 kilometres  
(assumed characteristic)

Circular Error Probable	140	100
Probable Error Height	50	30
Circular distribution 90	260	-
<u>Assigned to</u>	<u>Division/Corps</u>	<u>Corps</u>
Deployment, number per division slice	24	4

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Debate over the Neutron Bomb  
in the United States

The theoretical debate over the development of the Enhanced Radiation (ER) weapon was brought to the notice of President John F. Kennedy. John Foster, the head of the Livermore Nuclear Laboratory at California, argued for the development of the neutron bomb, a fission less bomb killing by neutron rays with very limited blast and radiation effect.<sup>21</sup>

Research for developing the neutron bomb had been carried on for the past fourteen years.<sup>22</sup> The New York Times in its editorial wrote that the plan to produce the neutron bomb emerged in summer 1977 as one line item in the budget of the Energy Research and Development Administration for fiscal 1978 and that

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21 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 405. Kennedy's another biographer Theodore C. Sorensen in his book Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 621 also refers to the neutron bomb as an issue during Kennedy's Presidency.

22 Congressional Quarterly, n. 17, p. 381.

by sheer chance, Walter Pincus, a Washington Post reporter who had studied nuclear weapons as an aide to former Senator Stuart Symington, D-Mo., discovered the "Lance Enhanced Radioactive warhead" as an intensive antipersonnel radioactive device.<sup>23</sup>

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Adviser from 1977-81, in his autobiography has written that the Energy Research and Development Administration had neglected to delete the classified term "enhanced radiation", from the publicly released congressional testimony.<sup>24</sup>

#### Discussion on the role of the Neutron Bomb

With The Washington Post publishing on 6 June 1977 about the neutron bomb, the newspapers throughout the United States publicly discussed the role of the neutron bomb in the defence of Western Europe against the Soviet Union.

The writers dubbed it as "Dooms day shell". However, The Knickerbocker News was of the view that though the neutron bomb was scary, since all the weapons were made with the idea to kill people, the opposition only to the neutron bomb was unjustified. Rocky Mountain News, too believed that the neutron bomb served the NATO strategy of deterring the Soviet attack and also in breaking up of the Soviet troops in the event of a war.

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23 New York Times, 9 April 1978. See also Editorial Research Reports, vol. 2 (Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), 15 August 1980, p. 585.

24 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-81 (New York: Farrar, 1983), pp. 301-15.

Tulsa Daily World considered opposition to the neutron bomb as illogical and The Chicago Tribune regarded the neutron bomb to be more humane than the rest of the tactical nuclear weapons. It also felt that it was a credible deterrent against the Soviet Union since it could be used in a smaller area and its blast effects could be confined to a radius of 200-300 yards. Post Tribune answered the critics of neutron bomb by emphasizing the need to keep the western armaments abreast of the new developments. The Arizona Republic listed the advantages of the neutron bomb. It stated that the neutron bomb would enable the nuclear war to be fought only a couple of miles from the city without damaging the city or people and that with the radiation the entire enemy's tank column could be wiped out without damaging 25 the tanks which could be captured and turned against the enemy. The Blade considered the neutron bomb as a credible deterrent as it would destroy the enemy troops completely without damaging the allies territories. Albuquerque Journal viewed the neutron bomb as a preferable substitute for the nuclear weapons already deployed. It was seen as a measure to equalize the Soviet conventional forces. The Dallas Times Herald expressed the opinion that the neutron bomb was an effective deterrent to Soviet invasion. Among the editorials included in the Editorials

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25 The Knickerbocker News (Albany, N.W.), 13 June 1977; Rocky Mountain News (Denver, Colo.), 14 July 1977; Tulsa World (Okla), 9 July 1977; Chicago Tribune (Ill.), 10 July 1977; Post-Tribune (Garry, Ind.), 12 July 1977; The Arizona Republic (Phoenix, Ariz.), 9 July 1977 in the Editorials on File (New York), vol. 8, no. 14, July 16-31, 1977, pp. 884-9.

on File on the subject, only The Lincoln Star in its editorial<sup>26</sup> did not support the neutron bomb. All others supported the new weapon in spite of its terrible destructive capability. The line generally taken by the press was that since all nuclear weapons were destructive there was no logic in opposing only the neutron bomb. While only a few like the Salt Lake Tribune, called for a discussion on this issue. Practically, the entire press supported the research and development of the neutron bomb, in spite of calling it as the "capitalist weapon" as it killed only human beings, and left the buildings and property in tact. The media support for the neutron bomb production to a very great extent influenced the policy decision of President Jimmy Carter.

In the mid March of 1977-78, the United States and West European officials came to an agreement that though the United States would begin the production of the Neutron Bomb, the deployment in Western Europe would be delayed by eighteen to twentyfour months, within which the United States was to conduct arms control talks with the Soviet Union. If no agreements<sup>27</sup> could be reached, the neutron bomb was to be deployed.

The debate over the neutron bomb continued in the media

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26 The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), 12 July 1977; Albuquerque Journal, 12 July 1977; The Dallas Times Herald (Texas), 15 July 1977; The Lincoln Star (Nebraska), 15 July 1977 in the Editorials on File, vol. 8, no. 14, July 16-31, 1977, pp. 889-92.

27 New York Times, 9 April 1978; see also the Editorials Research Reports, 1980, vol. 2, p. 586.

and within the government department. Writing about "the controversy over NATO strategy" Drew Middleton stated in the New York Times that the neutron bomb would be an effective deterrent to the Soviet armoured blitzkrieg advancement. But he also warned about the possibility of the escalation of the war because of the use of the neutron bomb.<sup>28</sup>

#### Debate within the Government

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency prepared a report on the neutron bomb in 1977. It was among the thirty reports prepared by the agency for submission to the Congress. It warned about the possibility of the neutron bomb escalating the nuclear war.<sup>29</sup>

#### Congressional Debate

But because of the large scale peace movements launched in Western Europe, the West European governments could not agree to the deployment of the neutron bomb in their countries. They were indecisive. West Germany could not give its approval for the deployment which was demanded by Carter. Hence, Carter in spite of pressure from the media and his advisers decided not to produce the neutron bomb.<sup>30</sup>

There was a widespread speculation that Carter must have come to a secret agreement with the Soviet Union on either

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28 New York Times, 9 April 1978.

29 New York Times, 2 January 1978.

30 New York Times, 4 April 1978.

limiting the deployment of SS-20 or in reducing the number of Cuban troops and military advisers in Ethiopia.<sup>31</sup> The Associated Press reported that the members of the Armed Services Committee, including the Representative Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman of the Committee and Representative Wilson (R., Cal.), the Armed Services Committee's ranking Republican wrote a letter to Carter arguing against his decision to stop the production of the neutron bomb. Further, the Senate Armed Services Committee member, Sam Nunn (D-Ga) argued that giving up the production of the neutron bomb would create the image of a timid and hesitant America in the minds of the Soviet Union. The Senate majority leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W-Va) warned that the decision to give up the neutron bomb production would have adverse effect on the ratification of SALT II by the Senate.<sup>32</sup> The hardliners in the Congress thus viewed the neutron bomb as a credible deterrent against the attack by the Soviet tanks. Besides, it was also to act as a bargaining chip in the arms control negotiations.

Jimmy Carter was personally committed to the arms control. In his memoirs he has written that he never made up his mind on the deployment of the Enhanced Radiation weapon. He wavered in his decision since he did not get the positive commitment from any of the allies for the deployment of the neutron bomb.<sup>33</sup> He

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31 New York Times, 6 April 1978.

32 Congressional Quarterly, n. 17, p. 372.

33 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Collins, 1982), p. 225.



was supported on this issue by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who favoured the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and considered the new weapon programmes as hinderance to it. But as he too encountered unsurpassed hurdles in arms control he began to favour the production of the neutron bomb though not as strongly as Brzezinski.<sup>34</sup> The National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski pressed hard for the deployment of the neutron bomb. He wanted America to firmly stand by its commitment to produce the neutron bomb and offer to defer the production of neutron bomb only in return for the non-deployment of Soviet SS-20s. Brzezinski was of the opinion that a decision not to produce the neutron bomb would be the worst presidential decision.<sup>35</sup> He speculated in his memoirs that the Vice-President Walter Mondale must have spoken in support of the production of the neutron bomb.

#### Consultation with the Allies

Jimmy Carter postponed the 20 March meeting of the NATO to have further consultations with the allies. He wrote in his memoirs that while the military officials called for the deployment, the political leaders did not. Later Carter sent Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, to England and West Germany. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany sent a message not to cancel the production of the neutron bomb till he

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34 Cyrus Vance, The Hard Choices Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 317.

35 Brzezinski, n. 24, pp. 312-15.

met with the West German Defence Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. While returning to Washington from his four-nation trip to South America and Africa, Carter received the report from Christopher and also Schmidt's message. He then reviewed the situation during the flight with Brzezinski and Vance.<sup>36</sup> Cyrus Vance who advised a softer line towards the Soviet Union faced the opposition from Brzezinski.

The New York Times on 9 April 1978 reported that the White House officials felt that the Congressional support for the weapon and the media support to effectively counter the Soviet Conventional forces helped to a great extent the arguments of Brzezinski who wanted to proceed with the production of the neutron bomb.<sup>37</sup>

On 7 April 1978 Carter announced:

...I have decided to defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects. The ultimate decision regarding the incorporation of enhanced radiation features into our modernised battlefield weapons will be made later, and will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting the security of the United States and Western Europe.<sup>38</sup>

Later, the NATO met on April 18-19, 1978 in Denmark and

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36 The New York Times, 9 April 1978. Carter in his memoirs has written that the West German foreign minister Genscher met with him, Vance and Brzezinski and that he conveyed the willingness of West Germany to accept the neutron bomb if another European nation accepted it.

37 Congressional Quarterly, 36th Annual (Washington, DC., 1980), p. 309.

38 American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977-80 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1983), pp. 11-12.

the defence ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Turkey agreed to modernise the tactical nuclear weapons and to keep the option open for the deployment of the neutron bomb.

The newspapers in the United States strongly reacted to Carter's decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb. The Fort North Star-Telegram supported the neutron bomb as "a potential equaliser of the imbalances between the forces of NATO and Warsaw". It criticized the peace-movements against the neutron bomb as being guided by the Soviet propaganda. It further called upon the NATO countries to increase their conventional forces. The Chicago Defender defended the neutron bomb as an useful weapon to break up the conventional Warsaw Pact forces and stated that its production should not be stopped. The Charlotte Observer supported Carter's decision as an effort to halt the arms race and asked the Soviets to respond in a similar way. Albuquerque Journal expressed the opinion that the neutron bomb was not more destructive than the other nuclear weapons and stated that it did not increase the possibility of a nuclear war. The Honolulu Adviser commented that the decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb as very apt since the western governments were not willing for its deployment. It stated that Carter's move showed the sincerity of American concern over the continuation of the arms control negotiations. Herald Journal thought that the Carter's decision was the best

possible that could be taken at that time. The trend of the comments did not show any uniformity while some supported his decision, others were critical of President's lack of leadership. For example, The Providence Journal while supporting Carter criticized him for following a clumsy way to reach the decision. Los Angeles Times stated that the Carter's handling of the neutron bomb issue would erode the public confidence in the government.<sup>40</sup> The Wall Street Journal assailed the President and said that he must be made more serious about the United States defence and suggested that this could be done either by the resignation of one or two top level military officials or by the rejection of the second treaty on the Panama Canal by the Senate. The Arkansas Gazette assessment was that neither the hardliners nor the arms control advocates were satisfied with Carter's decision. The former because Carter did not proceed with the production of the neutron bomb and the latter because he did not stop its production. The Dispatch opined that the President must base his decisions on the advice of his experts.<sup>41</sup>

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40 Chicago Defender (Illinois), 12 April 1978; The Charlotte Observer (North Carolina), 11 April 1978; Albuquerque Journal (N.M.), 10 April 1978; The Honolulu Adviser (Hawaii), 9 April 1978; Herald Journal (Syracuse, N.Y.), 10 April 1978; The Providence Journal (R.I.), 8 April 1978; Los Angeles Times (Calif.), 10 April 1978, in Editorials on File, vol. 9, no. 7, 1-15 April 1978, pp. 398-403.

41 The Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 April 1978; The Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock, Ark), 12 April 1978; The Dispatch (Ohio), 12 April 1978, in the Editorials on File, vol. 9, no. 7, 1-15 April 1978, pp. 402-5. See also "Why Carter Puzzles Europe", US News and World Report (Washington, DC), 5 June 1978, pp. 17-19.

Carter was forced to defer the production of the neutron bomb because he did not get positive assurance from the allies. The open controversy between the hardliners and the softliners within the government made him take a moderate course. But the media opposed the decision and created the image of a President who had no control over the foreign policy decisions of his administration. This damaged the reputation of President Carter in public. During this time a shift in American foreign policy from detente to cold war was taking place. It is not quite correct to say it was only under President Reagan that the US policy suddenly lurched towards a hardline approach. Even during Carter's presidency, in spite of his personal commitment to arms control, he was forced to assume a tough position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

On 7 June 1978, Carter gave a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis in which he stated that the Soviets could either choose the path of confrontation or that of cooperation and that the United States was adequately prepared for both. He sternly remarked that the United States would not let the Soviet Union run roughshod over some of the American interests and pursue cooperative relations in the other spheres.<sup>42</sup> The Oklahoma City Times regarded the Carter's speech as motivated by the desire to satisfy the American public which wanted him to take a tough stand towards the Soviet Union. But other

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42 The text of Carter's speech is given in New York Times, 8 June 1978.

newspapers were dissatisfied with his stand. The Hart Ford Courant stated that Carter, by not aligning himself with either Cyrus Vance, who supported the arms control or with Andrew Young the US Ambassador to the United Nations who had shown concern over the Cuban presence in Africa or with Brzezinski, a hardliner showed inconsistency in his foreign policy. Chicago Tribune commented that the conflicting views of Brzezinski, Vance and Young accounted for Carter's indecisiveness. The Pittsburgh Press wrote that Carter's speech was made to satisfy both Vance and Brzezinski.<sup>43</sup>

#### Neutron Bomb Production

Later, on 25 October 1978, Carter signed a bill authorizing the production of components of the controversial neutron warhead. Again, this decision was welcomed by the newspapers. The Indiana Polis News called the Carter's decision, to order the production of crucial elements for the neutron bomb, as a realistic response to the growing conventional forces of the Soviet Union. St. Petersburg Times perceived it as a signal of American government running out of patience with the Soviet Union. The Birmingham News stated that the American policy was influenced by the increase in Soviet conventional forces in Europe, and by the poor advancements made, in the conventional

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43 The Oklahoma City Times, 8 June 1978; The Hart Ford Courant, 10 June 1978; Chicago Tribune, 9 June 1978; and The Pittsburgh Press, 10 June 1978, in the Editorials on File, vol. 9, no. 11, 1-15 June 1978, pp. 726-8.

forces reduction talks at Vienna.<sup>44</sup>

### THE LONG RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES MODERNIZATION

The hardline policy towards the Soviet Union began to get the appreciation of the media, foreign policy advisers and the Congress. This slow change in the attitude due to political and strategic reasons greatly influenced and to a certain extent initiated the modernization programme of the NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF).

The question of modernization of the theatre nuclear weapons came up during the last months of the Eisenhower Administration. Later, during Presidency of John F. Kennedy "Multi-lateral Force Plan" was formulated to counter the Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe. But since Great Britain, France and West Germany did not agree to the plan it was dropped.<sup>45</sup>

The Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces were not limited by the SALT treaties. The London Summit of May 1977 initiated the modernization of theatre nuclear forces which formed part of NATO's long term defence programme. Later, this was approved at the Washington Summit in May 1978.<sup>46</sup> In 1977 and 1979

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44 Indiana Polis News, 27 October 1978; St. Petersburg Times, 20 October 1978, and The Birmingham News, 21 October 1978 in the Editorials on File, vol. 9, no. 20, 16-31 October 1978, pp. 1023-25.

45 Karl E. Birnbaum, ed., Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects (Laxenburg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980), p. 27.

46 Ibid.

respectively, two ad hoc groups were formed. "The Nuclear Planning High Level Group (HLG)" was to deal with the modernization of Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) and "the special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters" was to decide on Arms Control proposals.<sup>47</sup>

In 1979, the NATO Council took the decision to modernize the theatre nuclear forces with new Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). It was intended to replace Pershing IA (P-IA) with 400 miles range. It was aimed to have high accuracy and lower yield in order to reduce the collateral damage. The range of Pershing II, ER missile, was to be 1000 miles. The main difference between Pershing IA and Pershing II was the weight. The new missile was approximately 15,500 lbs as opposed to approximately 10,000 lbs of Pershing IA. They were to be deployed at Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) sites during peace-time and to be dispersed to their firing positions during crisis time.<sup>48</sup>

The Pershing II is terminally guided. Its accuracy is ten times greater than that of the SS-20 and achieved by its RADAG (Radar Area Guidance). The maximum range of the missile is usually estimated to be 1800 km. But the exact range is a classified figure. The figure is important since the Pershing II with a range of about 1800 km cannot reach Moscow, but if its

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47 Ibid.

48 Alva Myrdal and others, The Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament (Washington, DC: Spokesman, 1981), pp. 91-92.



range is 2,500 km. it is long enough to strike all targets even around the Soviet Capital Moscow.<sup>49</sup> The Pershing II can penetrate Soviet air defence and are capable of striking time urgent targets.<sup>50</sup>

The targets of US-NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces include:

IRBM/MRBM sites, naval bases, nuclear and chemical storage sites, airbases, command, control and communication (C3) centres, headquarters complexes, SAM sites, communication and POL storage areas, ground force installations, choke points and bridges. Their military significance derives from the potential contribution of those targets to the support of sustained military operations by the Warsaw Pact.<sup>51</sup>

The Soviet Union is more concerned about the Pershing II as it destabilizes the present balance due to its range which can hit targets deep inside the Soviet territory.<sup>52</sup>

The NATO nuclear strategy behind Pershing II was to develop a "credible counter". It wanted to convince the Soviet military planners that a Soviet nuclear strike against Western Europe would run the risk of nuclear retaliation against the Russian homeland.<sup>53</sup>

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49 SIPRI Year Book, 1983 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1984), pp. 7-8.

50 Myrdal, n. 48, p. 95.

51 Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 20.

52 Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal, eds., Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 195.

53 Ottopick, "Atlantic Defence and the Integration of Europe", Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington, DC), vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 1972, pp. 93-97.

Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)

The American Cruise Missile is a winged low flying missile that can carry a large nuclear warhead and is undetectable by the enemy and has pinpoint accuracy. It can carry either nuclear or conventional warhead for nearly 1,600 miles flying close to the earth's surface and guided to its target by a pre-programmed flight plan.<sup>54</sup>

The United States has planned to deploy several hundred sea launched cruise missiles on submarines in 1984 and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in Western Europe in 1983.<sup>55</sup>

The Ground Launched Cruise Missile is a version of the Tomahawk cruise missile to be launched from air transportable, ground mobile platforms. It flies at a speed of around 0.8 mach at an altitude of below 100 metres. During peace-time, it is to be deployed at permanent sites in hardened shelters capable of withstanding blast effects up to 2,000 p.s.i.<sup>56</sup>

Thus the mobile and slow moving cruise missiles are invulnerable to enemy's attack.

Soviet Arms Build-up

During the Vietnam war, when the American resources were diverted to fighting the unending war, the Soviet Union effectively built-up its nuclear arsenal. The modernisation of

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54 New York Times, 9 June 1977.

55 Ibid., 12 December 1981.

56 Myrdel, n. 48, pp. 92-93.

Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles like SS-19 with six warheads each and SS-17 with four warheads each caused concern to the United States.<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, the Soviet Union started replacing its old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with new mobile SS-20s with three warheads each in 1970s. SS-20, uses inertia guidance to hit targets. It has an accuracy or circular Error Probable (CEP) of about 400 m. Technically more than one missile can be launched from the same launcher. But the SS-20 missile releases intense heat during launch so that another missile cannot be fired for several hours.<sup>58</sup> The SS-20 is capable of striking all the cities in Western Europe. Its range is given to be 8,000 km. Since it is a mobile land based missile it is less vulnerable to attack.<sup>59</sup>

The general feeling that the Soviet Union has built-up its strategic nuclear forces during the detente period in 1970s was widely propagated. But an independent source after examining the evidence concluded that the United States and NATO overestimated the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>60</sup> The nuclear weapons of both the Super Powers have different capabilities and to counter each

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57 Ibid.

58 SIPRI Year Book, 1983, p. 7.

59 SIPRI Year Book, 1984, p. 26.

60 For information on how inaccurate figures were used by the United States Government and by the Press, refer to Birnbaum, n. 45, pp. 14-16.

kind of nuclear weapon with a similar kind of weapon is not a feasible option. Hence though the efforts of the United States to match the land based SS-20 missiles with its own version of land based missile in Western Europe helps only in the escalation of arms race, the American scholars urged its need. For example, Walter Pincus in his article, "US considers Long Range Missiles for Europe", wrote that: "Although NATO forces can now reach the Soviet Union with both Polaris submarine missiles and European based bombers, desire for a visible land-based missile system has developed because of Soviet deployment of the SS-20".<sup>61</sup> Thus though the Soviet SS-20 missiles could have been matched by the sea launched submarine missiles, the United States built-up land based missiles to counter the Soviet threat.

Further American writers raised doubts about Soviet intentions in building up the new SS-20 missiles. Richard Pipes of Harvard University, estimating the Soviet strategic objectives wrote that: "the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear doctrine seeks victory, not deterrence, superiority in weapons rather than sufficiency and offensive, perhaps pre-emptive, operations rather than retaliation".<sup>62</sup> This fear of Soviet invasion has always been the psychological game which the United States has played in order to build-up its nuclear arsenals. The Soviet modernization of the Intermediate Range Nuclear missiles was widely considered as creating imbalance in the theatre nuclear forces

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61 Washington Post, 8 November 1977.

62 New York Times, 20 February 1977.

in favour of the Soviet Union. Hence, the need to modernize the European theatre nuclear forces was considered as an important strategic measure to be taken against the Soviet advancement.

Discussion on the Modernization  
of Theatre Nuclear Forces

On 28 October 1977, for the first time in forty years, the Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt talked about the need to fill in the gap in Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) by modernizing the NATO forces. He wanted the principle of equality to be applied to conventional and nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and Western Europe. The withdrawal of the Neutron Bomb proposal and the signing of the SALT II treaty were the main reasons behind the concern. He stated:

SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it in another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons.... Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in moving the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.<sup>64</sup>

Consultation within the Executive

Soon after Schmidt's speech, many interagency meetings to

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63 New York Times, 24 May 1981.

64 As quoted in Brzezinski, n. 24, p. 290.

discuss the modernization issue took place in the situation room in the West wing of the White House. A mini Security Coordinating Committee was formed with David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy at the National Security Council as the Chairman. The other members included Lesli Gelb, David McGiffert of the Pentagon's office of the International Security Affairs, Lieut. Gen. W.Y. Smith of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Spurgeon Keeny of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and their staffs.<sup>65</sup>

While Aaron talked about the missile gap created by the Soviet deployment of SS-20 Gelb called for rational planning. Gelb felt that if modernization is carried out escalation of arms race would result. Since Pershing II was an army project and cruise missile is an air force item, the Joint Chief of Staffs called for including both the weapons in the modernization process.

The NATO High Level Group under the chairmanship of David McGiffert pushed the modernization idea by briefing all European members about strategic rationales. He was helped strongly in this campaign by the Norwegian delegate, John Hoist. This finally led to the Presidential Review Memorandum, PRM-38 to produce Tomahawk, Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and Pershing II. The New York Times commented that Cotter, who had served as Assistant on nuclear matters from 1973 to 1978 under

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65 New York Times, 11 December 1979. Brzezinski in his memoirs had written that he chaired the Security Coordinating Committee, Refer to his memoirs, n. 24, p. 308.

the Defence Secretaries - James R. Schlesinger, Donald H. Rumsfeld and Harold Brown, played a decisive role in the drawing up of the nuclear modernization programme.<sup>66</sup> Brzezinski in his memoirs has written that he was convinced by his staff Aaron and Jim Thomson, about the political necessity to deploy an European-based nuclear counter. Then decision to deploy 572 Ground Launched Cruiser Missiles and Pershing II was taken.<sup>67</sup>

The NATO deployment of Pershing II and GLCM was viewed as a symbol of the unbreakable, inevitable security tie between the United States and the NATO allies. The faith in the leadership of the United States was sought to be restored through this modernization programme. These Long Range Theatre Nuclear forces were supposed to deter the attack by the Soviet Union as they threaten to strike back the Soviet territory. Besides it forms a ring in the ladder of escalation of the nuclear war. With the United States keeping open the option to strike first, these Long Range Theatre Nuclear forces with capacity to hit targets in the Soviet Union posed a real threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

Considering all the above factors, the NATO Defence Council met at Brussels and approved the modernization programme on 12 December 1979. The New York Times viewed the 1979 decision of NATO to modernize their theatre nuclear forces as the most

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66 New York Times, 15 December 1979.

67 Brzezinski, n. 24, p. 308.

democratically arrived policy after exhaustive debate.<sup>68</sup> About the 1979 NATO decision Brzezinski in his memoirs has written:

The intense bargaining, manoeuvring and recalculations involved in this issue demonstrate a problem which many outside the policy process frequently forget. In the modern world, at the pinnacle of power, there is no pure, objective analysis of a strategic problem. All decisions are made in a generalized decision-making process that is colored by domestic politics, economics and allied reactions. The question of an objective 'need' for a credible response in Europe (TNP) had to be balanced against internal NATO politics, various numbers dictated by a variety of actors (both domestic and foreign) and the need for numbers high enough to give the US bargaining leverage with the Soviets.<sup>69</sup>

Brzezinski's account gives a clear picture of the various forces which played a crucial role in the decision of modernizing the NATO theatre nuclear forces.

The NATO decision to modernize the theatre nuclear forces was called as the "dual track decision of 1979". The Allies while committing to the modernization of their theatre nuclear forces with Pershing II and GLCM also asked the United States to open up arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Allies reiterated that if the SS-20s were agreed to be removed by the Soviet Union, NATO would not proceed with the deployment. Thus the stationing of the new theatre nuclear forces was

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68 New York Times, 29 December 1982.

69 Brzezinski, n. 24, p. 308. For the full text of the Communiqué issued at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, 12 December 1979, see the Appendix.



subject to the progress made in the arms reduction talks. <sup>70</sup>

The decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM was taken in 1979 but the actual deployment began only in 1983. Between these years, tension slowly built-up in the political relations of the two Super Powers. Thus, soon after the NATO's approval, the political atmosphere in the world further seemed to help in the rationalization of the modernization plan. The detente which prevailed in 1970s gave way to cold war politics similar to the one which prevailed in the 1950s. When the Carter Administration began its final year, New York Times remarked: <sup>71</sup> "the cold war, about to expire of old age is rejuvenated".

#### AFGHANISTAN

When the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter's soft posture towards the Soviet Union changed within a few weeks. He concluded that the Soviet Union was determined to exploit the Third World conflict to expand its power and influence. Therefore, he proposed measures to curtail the Soviet expansionism. Measures like stopping the export of seventeen million tonnes of grains ordered by Moscow, banning the sale of high technology equipment, curtailing the Soviet fishing privileges in the American waters, delaying the opening of new American and Soviet consular facilities and providing military, food and other aid to Pakistan were

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70 New York Times, 15 December 1979.

71 Ibid., 10 January 1980.

proposed. The Miami Herald observed that the detente was "mortally wounded and dead". The London Free Press called for follow-up action by NATO countries to check the ambitions of Soviet expansion outside Eastern Europe.

When Paul Warnke was chosen as the Arms Control negotiator and Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by Carter, his opinion that the United States need not always match every Soviet weapon because the Super Powers are hostage to each other (the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction) was opposed by the hardliners in the Congress. For example, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. Wash) argued that the Soviet Union was getting numerical superiority in nuclear arms and that this would enable them to get political advantage. He rejected Warnke's view that nuclear superiority which did not ensure nuclear monopoly was of no use.

Former NATO Commander, Gen. Alexander Haig, Jr., said before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1978 that the shift of the military balance toward Moscow and the failure of the United States to challenge the Soviet intervention in Africa and Asia, bred among the allies, "a fear that a post-Vietnam America no longer has the will to stand up to the Soviet Union".

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72 The Miami Herald, 6 January 1980; The London Free Press (London, Ont.), 8 January 1980 in the Editorials on File (New York), vol. 11, no. 2, 16-31 January 1980, p. 64.

73 Congressional Quarterly 1977 (33rd Annual), p. 319.

74 Congressional Quarterly 1978 (32nd Annual), p. 419.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis, changed the political atmosphere in the United States. The post-Vietnam syndrome calling for American non-involvement in world affairs was replaced by American pressure on the government to take up the leadership role and to counter the Soviet political advancements. The SALT II which was signed by Carter with great effort was shelved by the Senate because of the adverse reaction aroused as a result of Soviet advancements in other parts of the world, particularly in Afghanistan.<sup>75</sup>

While the United States accused the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union criticized the American action in Grenada, Lebanon, Nicaragua and its support for Israel's expansionist policies and its support for South Africa's attack on Angola and other African countries.

#### THE REAGAN ERA: CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP

To suit their changed moods the people of the United States elected a conservative leader as their President in November 1980. Ronald Reagan promised to make America stand on its feet and upright among the nations of the world with its superior nuclear force. He blamed the inconsistencies in Soviet behaviour and the revolutionary development of the Soviet military technology for the alarming arms build-up. In

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75 Robert W. Tucker, The Purpose of American Power: An Essay on National Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 14.

addition, he argued that the Soviet Union was posing ideological, political, military and economic challenges to the western ideals, political, economic and security systems.<sup>76</sup>

Through his rhetoric Reagan kept alive the fear of Soviet expansionism in the minds of the American and West European public. In his address before the United Nations Special session on disarmament on 17 June 1982, he stated:

Since World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta Agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin wall.... It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan and ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland. Soviet sponsored guerillas and terrorists are at work in Central and South America, in Africa, the Middle East, in the Caribbean and in Europe, violating human rights and unnerving the world with violence. Communist atrocities in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and elsewhere continue to shock the free world as refugees escape to tell of their horror.

The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet build up of military power in history.<sup>77</sup>

The political movements of the Soviet Union was projected as a danger to the security and freedom of the western countries. Hence the need for strengthening of Western security was emphasized. Western Europe also was anxious to retain the American commitment to the security of Western Europe.

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76 US Government, Department of State Bulletin 1980, vol. 80, no. 2034, January 1980, p. 18.

77 The text of the speech is from Vital Speeches of the Day (New York), 15 July 1982, p. 579.

The Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) modernization was justified as a routine updating of nuclear weapons, which is a must in nuclear technology. It was also projected as a bargaining chip in the arms control talks.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his writings in 1970s emphasized the direct relationship between the theatre and strategic forces. He wrote:

Soviet superiority in the Central sector is further reinforced by about 750 medium range ballistic missiles that have no NATO counterpart. This point more than any other, drives home the lesson that, looked at in general and from the theoretical point of view of a conflict extended over a long period of time, there can only be an overall balance in Europe's central sector if strategic nuclear weapons are drawn into the equation.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, in spite of knowing that the result of an all-out nuclear war would be decided only by the overall strategic balance, the Western strategists and foreign policy advisers emphasized that the Soviet mobile land based SS-20 missile must be countered by a mobile western land based missile.

#### DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GLCM

When the dual track decision was made in 1979, West Germany agreed for the deployment of the new missiles on the condition that they would be deployed in another non-nuclear state. Further, the Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces would not be under the "two-key system" of dual nation control that

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<sup>78</sup> Helmut Schmidt, The Balance of Power as quoted in Myrdal, n. 48, p. 84.

had previously been designed for NATO theatre nuclear weapons.<sup>79</sup>  
They were to be solely under the control of the United States.

The United States decided to deploy the new Pershing II<sup>80</sup>  
and GLCM in West European countries as follows:

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Pershing II Launchers*</u>	<u>Cruise Missiles</u>
West Germany	108	96
Britain	-	160
Italy (Sicilly)	-	112
Belgium	-	48
Netherlands	-	48
Total	<u>108</u>	<u>464</u>

\*Each launcher fires one missile, but could be reloaded with spare missiles.

The Ground Launched Cruise Missiles stationed at Greenham Place in Great Britain on 14 November 1983 became operational on 1 January 1984. Nine Pershing II missiles were deployed at Mutlangen, in West Germany in November 1983. The Cruise Missiles<sup>81</sup> deployed in Sicilly in Italy became operational in April 1984. The Dutch Cabinet on 4 June 1984 voted to delay the decision on deploying Cruise Missiles in the Netherlands and linked it to the advancement in the arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>82</sup> Later sighting the increase in

79 New York Times, 2 November 1979.

80 Ibid., 22 January 1983. For a list of the US theatre nuclear forces, 1985, see the Appendix.

81 New York Times, 4 April 1984.

82 Ibid., 6 June, 1984.

the number of Soviet SS-20s as the reason, the Dutch Parliament voted for the deployment of the cruise missiles on 3 November 1985.<sup>83</sup>

In the next five years, 464 of cruise missiles are to be deployed in Belgium and Woensdrecht in Netherlands.<sup>84</sup>

Factors like the penetrating capacity, the range of the missiles and their ability to survive the enemy attack were taken into account when the allies decided to modernize their Theatre Nuclear Forces with 572 Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.<sup>85</sup>

These theatre nuclear forces aim mainly at counterforce attack. The counterforce attack aims to destroy the command, communication and surveillance centres of the military, missile sites and strategic and submarine bases of the enemy.<sup>86</sup>

The conservative policy makers in the United States denounced the "no second use" policy proposed by Robert S. McNamara. The policy calls for making sure that the nuclear attack was real and then to launch the missiles. It calls for highly qualified communication. The call for "no first use" by McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser (1961-66), George F. Kennan, and Gerard K. Smith was again not considered

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83 New York Times, 4 November 1985.

84 SIPRI Year Book, 1984 (Stockholm, 1984), p. 35.

85 Myrdal, n. 48, p. 94.

86 Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, Study Series 1 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1981), p. 71.

as a viable proposition by the policy-makers in the United States.<sup>87</sup>

### Soviet Reaction

The Pershing II missiles deployed in West Germany would force Moscow to shift to a "launch on warning" strategy that would transfer "the decision to trigger" to the computers. Soviet Union has countered the American move in different ways. It increased the number of SS-20s. It is also deploying New Theatre nuclear missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Marshal Ogarkov is reported to have said that their range is sufficient to hit the bases where the new American missiles are being deployed in Western Europe. The Soviet SS-22, with a maximum range of 900 km. is on the verge of reaching the cruise missile sites in Britain. The SS-23 with a range of about 500 km. can cover almost all the bases in the Federal Republic of Germany from positions in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.<sup>88</sup>

Thus with the advancements in nuclear technology, the balance of nuclear terror is being maintained at a higher level and at greater risks.

The modernization of the theatre nuclear forces had escalated the arms race. The arms control negotiations has been made more difficult. The strategic doctrines, on the

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87 New York Times, 2 February 1983.

88 SIPRI, n. 84, pp. 29-30. For the list of Soviet theatre nuclear forces, 1985, see the Appendix.



basis of which the Super Powers plan to fight a nuclear war, are very different and radically opposite of each other.

The Soviet Union has warned that an attack by the theatre nuclear forces on Soviet territory could be countered by the Soviet nuclear attack on American territory. But American strategists had continued to talk about fighting a limited nuclear war and the production of Neutron Bomb, Pershing II and Ground Launched cruise missiles focussed mainly on increasing their accuracy so as to enable the United States, to fight a limited nuclear war. The nuclear war even if it is limited to Western Europe would prove devastative to the people of Western Europe. This fear of annihilation in the event of a nuclear war has created fear in the minds of the West Europeans and the speeches made by Reagan further aggravated their doubts. For example, Reagan while running for the Presidency in 1980 said: "we may be the generation that sees Armegeddon". Again in the Presidential debate on 1 October 1984, Reagan said: "no one knows whether the Armegeddon is a thousand years away or day after tomorrow".<sup>89</sup>

Reagan's open talk about the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war and the American defence department's programmes of weapon modernization created popular resentment in Western Europe which bursts itself out in the form of peace movements. Thus while unanimity could be achieved at the level of NATO governments, the Europeans severely opposed the modernization

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89 New York Times, 25 October 1984.

of the theatre nuclear forces in Western Europe.

Between 1977 and 1984, the United States formulated and implemented its plans to modernize its tactical and theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Strategically, the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles was shown as the reason for the introduction of the plan. It was helped to a great extent by deteriorating US-Soviet political relations, which itself was the result of the hardline policy pursued by the United States. The Congress fully endorsed the policy and the public opinion extended its support.

The modernization programme led to the escalation of the arms race. It paved the way for the arms build-up by the Soviet Union and brought to fore the latent fear in the minds of the Europeans which in turn led to one of the greatest peace movements.

**CHAPTER III**

**THE ISSUE OF DEPLOYMENT, SOVIET  
RESPONSE AND PEACE MOVEMENTS**

## Chapter III

### THE ISSUE OF DEPLOYMENT, SOVIET RESPONSE AND PEACE MOVEMENTS

The United States and the Soviet Union often try to effectively counter the moves made by the other on the chess-board of international politics. The Super Powers compete with each other to match their nuclear weapons both qualitatively and quantitatively. Neither of them would allow its position to be undermined. This has led to a huge nuclear stockpile on both sides. While the United States builds up its nuclear weapons to "effectively close the window of vulnerability", the Soviet Union justifies its participation in the arms race on the ground that it is being forced to catch up with its rival. Since neither of them wants to be second to the other, they continue their arms race in spite of its high economic cost.

The game of nuclear arms build up is being played in a political environment which contributes to arms race and is in turn influenced by it. The advancements in science and technology also abets the rapid growth of nuclear weapons with more precision, longer range, greater speed and accuracy.

In the last few years, the political relation between the Super Powers has deteriorated to a very great extent. The Soviet Union in 1975 modernized its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) with mobile, three war-headed SS-20s missiles that have the capacity to strike targets in Western Europe. To counter the deployment of SS-20, NATO took

the "dual track decision" in 1979. Accordingly, the decision to simultaneously deploy Pershing II and Tomahawk Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in Western Europe and at the same time to start the arms control talks with the Soviet Union was taken.<sup>1</sup> The decision was motivated by the desire to cool down the popular opposition to the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe.

The members of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are independent, democratic states. Not all the policy decisions of the United States are accepted whole heartedly by the member states. The public in the West European countries have increasingly opposed the American nuclear arms build up in their own countries. The deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe has been vehemently opposed by its people of all classes and creeds. Writing about the participants of the Green Peace Movement, the West German weekly Deizeit commented that they defy any categorization. It stated that in the Green Peace Movement:

there are feminists and ecologists, pastors and pacifists, hard core Leninists and starry-eyed idealists, the old Easter Marchers of the 1960s and the younger radicals of the 1960s, left-wing Social Democrats and Kulkur minded conservatives, neutralists of the right and neutralists of the left, students threatened by proletarianization as status avenues are blocked by economic declines, and peasants threatened by the nuclear power plant next door.<sup>2</sup>

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1 New York Times, 15 December 1979.

2 As quoted in Editorial Research Reports (Washington, DC), vol. 1, 25 February 1983, pp. 154-5.

Though the decision to deploy the Pershing II and GLCM was taken by NATO in 1979, the actual deployment started only in 1983.<sup>3</sup> In the middle, the arms control talks with the Soviet Union was started in 1981 to assuage the feelings of the public against the deployment of missiles. The public opinion in the Soviet Union has little effect on Soviet government policies, whereas the strong opposition expressed by the public opinion in Western Europe has put the governments under great pressure. Between 1979 and 1983, the United States tried hard to justify its new missile deployment on the ground of Soviet threat, the Soviet Union on its part tried to make use of the democratic decision-making process in Western Europe to its advantage. It tried its best to further dissensions within the alliance. In its diplomatic manoeuvres to stop the modernization of NATO weapon programme, the Soviet Union offered various attractive arms control proposals and also threatened Western Europe with dire consequences, if deployment programme was carried out. The United States on the other hand questioned the sincerity of the Soviet arms control proposals.<sup>4</sup>

Besides the Super Powers mudslinging at each other, the people of Western Europe were genuinely scared of the nuclear holocaust. Out of this fear grew one of the most historic peace movements during these years, i.e., between 1979 and 1983,

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3 Alva Myrdel and others, The Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Spokesman, 1981), p. 94.

4 Ibid.

when the "dual track" decision was taken by the NATO and 1983 when the actual deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles started. The validity of the American accusation that these peace movements were manipulated by the Soviet Union needs to be carefully examined. We also intend to examine the Soviet counter actions to the American missile deployment, namely, its efforts to make use of the peace movements in Western Europe to stop the stationing of missiles and also its strategic measures of improving its own theatre nuclear forces in this chapter.

#### SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN COUNTER PROPAGANDA

On 6 October 1979, in East Berlin, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev said that, he would withdraw twenty thousand troops and thousand tanks from East Germany if Western Europe would not deploy new missiles. He also called on the West European countries to come to separate agreements with the Soviet Union. He also promised never to use the nuclear weapons against those countries which did not acquire nuclear weapons or deploy them on their soil. The Brezhnev statement<sup>5</sup> was followed by the notes addressed to the NATO governments.

Brezhnev speech followed an article by the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Dimitri F. Ustinov in Pravda in which he had warned Western Europe of appropriate Soviet counter measures which he did not go on to elaborate. Hence the West

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5 New York Times, 7 October 1979.

questioned the credibility of Brezhnev's proposal. The New York Times characterized the Soviet offer as "Soviet blackmailing the West with detente". It noted that Brezhnev in his proposal had not included the reduction of SS-20 medium range nuclear missiles. And besides, the Soviet decision to withdraw twenty thousand troops when four hundred thousand troops were there was considered to be of little importance.<sup>6</sup>

The United States characterized the Brezhnev's proposal as "propaganda". It reminded its West European allies of the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons and countered the proposal by providing data to prove that though the number of delivery vehicles of the Soviet Union may not have increased, the capabilities of these systems had improved and that the total number of warheads had been rising. It reiterated that only NATO's modernization will bring the Soviet Union to the negotiating table for arms control talks. It questioned the facts in the proposal and pointed out that it was not clear whether the SS-20 missiles were included and the missiles removed from the western part of the Soviet Union would be dismantled or moved to the Asian part of the Soviet Union.<sup>7</sup>

However, the Soviet Union without waiting for the response of Western Europe withdrew the first of the twenty thousand troops and thousand tanks from East Germany reducing their troop level on 5 December 1979. It was the first time,

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6 New York Times, 6 October 1979.

7 Ibid., 15 October 1979.



that the Soviets withdrew from East Germany and the Western reporters were allowed to see the withdrawal.<sup>8</sup> But intentionally or unintentionally, the withdrawal coincided with the convention of the Social Democratic Party in West Germany which met to approve the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. But the proceedings of the party convention indicated that it was not impressed by the Soviet overtures. It went on to support the NATO modernization programme. Furthermore, the NATO Council met on 12 December 1979 and approved the deployment plan. In retaliation, the Soviet Union took back its offer to withdraw its medium range nuclear missiles from its Western region.<sup>9</sup> The Soviets kept up their demand for the dropping of NATO weapon modernization programme as a precondition for the starting of the arms control talks.

Later, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany paid an official visit to the Soviet Union on 30 June 1980. As a result of Brezhnev-Schmidt Summit meeting, the Soviet Union agreed to give up its demand on NATO abandoning the deployment plan as a precondition to start the arms control talks. Besides, they showed their willingness to start the negotiations on limiting Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) even before the SALT II was ratified by the United States' Senate. However, later the arms control negotiators of both the Super Powers could not even agree on the types of weapons to be

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8 New York Times, 6 December 1979.

9 Ibid., 17 December 1979.

included in the talk. What accounted for the impasse was the American belief that the proposal emanated as a concession by the Soviet Union to cover up its political advancements in Afghanistan.

Brezhnev paid a state visit to West Germany in November 1981. After his meeting with Helmut Schmidt in Bonn, he said:

Putting new American missiles in Europe, means making Europe empty of people.... It is as if Europe where hundreds of millions of people live is already sentenced to become a battlefield. It is as if Europe were a cardboard box with tin soldiers who deserve nothing better than to be melted down in a nuclear blast.<sup>10</sup>

In an interview to a West German news magazine, Der Spiegel Brezhnev offered a mutual moratorium on the deployment of theatre nuclear forces to be effective from 30 November 1981, the day the negotiation was to begin, till a treaty to that effect was actually signed. To allay the fears of West Europeans, he went on to state that the Soviet military doctrine was defensive in character and that it did not believe in pre-<sup>11</sup>ventive wars and first strike concept.

The moratorium offer was rejected by the United States. But the above statements indicated that the Soviet Union was moving towards opening serious arms control talks with the United States. But it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union was

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10 New York Times, 25 November 1981.

11 "Thomas A Sancton, "Moscow's Aim: Split NATO, Peace Offensive Against Europe Tries to Block US Missiles", Time (Chicago), 16 November 1981, pp. 8-9.

primarily interested in the arms control talks that would result in stopping the deployment of the new Pershing II and Cruise Missiles. Besides, it attempted to make capital out of the West European concern and fear of a possible nuclear war at their door-steps. The Soviet official news agency Tass accused Western Europe of obediently supporting the decisions that were prepared in advance in Washington and for allowing themselves to become hostages to the Pentagon's nuclear strategy.<sup>12</sup>

In January 1981, Ronald Reagan entered the White House with the promise to make the United States a superior nuclear power. He took up the new NATO deployment plan as a show of American commitment to the security of Western Europe and as a symbol of the unity of alliance.<sup>13</sup> With the hardliner at the helm of affairs in the United States, the Soviet Union wanted to exploit the liberal opinion in NATO in its favour.

The United Nations: In the United Nations General Assembly special session on Disarmament held in June 1982, the Soviet Union pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any war. But instead of matching the offer Reagan in his address accused the Soviet Union of manipulating the peace movement in Western Europe and went on to provide a detailed list of the disarmament efforts of the United States. In various foreign policy statements, the Soviet Union alternately

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12 New York Times, 11 May 1981.

13 Ibid.

dangled the carrot and the stick; sometimes showing the olive branch and at others by issuing the threats of nuclear attack on Western Europe. The United States, on the other hand, aroused fears of Soviet invasion in the minds of West Europeans. <sup>14</sup>

The New York Times in its editorial entitled "the Euro Missile Game" on 27 December 1979, characterized the deployment of Soviet SS-20s and NATO Pershing II and GLCM as part of "the drama of nuclear psychopolitics". It stated that when the Soviet Union tried to split the alliance, the United States reassured its commitment by deploying more powerful and sophisticated nuclear missiles on the European territory.

West European Tour: Brezhnev died and Yuri Andropov succeeded him. When change in the leadership took place in Moscow, elections were due in two important countries in Western Europe, namely Britain and West Germany. Andropov made his first move on the issue of the reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe by offering on 21 December 1982 to reduce the number of SS-20s aimed at Western Europe from the current level of 250 to around 162, equal to the number of British and French Missiles. <sup>15</sup> Later, when he made a visit to the Czechoslovakia capital he took the next move by producing a long declaration that included almost

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14 New York Times, 18 June 1982. See also George J. Church, "No More Mr Nice Guy: In a Speech to the UN the Old Reagan Overtakes the New", Time, 28 June 1982, p. 26.

15 Strobe Talbott, "Playing Nuclear Poker", Time, 31 January 1983, p. 13.

every "peace" proposal that Kremlin had made before, for the consumption of the European people. However, a more important step taken by Kremlin during the early Andropov Administration was the Soviet President's tour of Western Europe, specially to Britain and West Germany, where the election scenes were heating up.<sup>16</sup>

Andropov attempted to convince the Europeans by giving speeches and statements that while Moscow was offering peace, Washington showed aggressiveness by taking a decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in Europe. To counter the effect of the Soviet leader's tour of Western Europe the American Vice-President George Bush undertook a tour of the West European capitals. And he made an effort there to convince the allies of the necessity as well as the validity of the American decision to deploy new missiles in Europe. Another important purpose of Bush's visit was to reassure the allies that America was not unduly inflexible in its arms control proposals.<sup>17</sup>

The news media gave considerable importance to the tour of Bush. The Oregonian felt that the US by sending Bush wanted to influence the West German elections. The Tennessean wrote that the West Europeans were "irritated" by the arms control game played by both the Super Powers. The News and Courier regarded West European charges about American inflexibility in spite of Reagan's zero-option, as a case of bad communications.

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16 Steven Strasser and Robert B. Cullen, "Andropov's Double Game", Newsweek (New York), 17 January 1983, pp. 10-11.

17 Ed Magnerson, "Selling the US by George", Time, 14 February 1983, pp. 26-28.

A substantial number of newspapers viewed the tour as an American effort to reinforce its communications with Western Europe. They also regarded the Soviet proposals as propaganda measures.<sup>18</sup>

### West European Elections

During the national elections in West Germany and Great Britain in the first half of 1983, the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM became an important issue. The Congress of the British Labour Party in October 1980 had strongly opposed the deployment of American missiles in Britain.<sup>19</sup> The Labour Party under the leadership of Michael Foot was committed to complete disarmament and removal of all nuclear weapons from the British soil, quite unlike that of Tories' stand under Margret Thatcher's leadership which gave unflinching support to the deployment of US Missiles in Britain.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, in West Germany also Hans Jochen Vogel and his Social Democratic Party were against the stationing of American missiles in their country. In fact, on the eve of West German elections in March 1983, Gromyko visited Bonn in January in order to boost Vogel's

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18 The Oregonian (Portland, Ore), 7 February 1983; The Tennessean (Nashville, Tenn.), 12 February 1983; The News and Courier (Charleston, SC), 6 February 1983 in the Editorials on File, vol. 14, no. 3, 1-15 February 1983, p. 152.

19 Y. Konstantinov, "For Peace and Security in Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5, March 1981, p. 52.

20 New York Times, 11 January 1983.

image. He offered to negotiate the reduction of SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles on the basis of NATO reduction of Pershing IA and lance missiles. Gromyko further appealed to West German public. He said:

One would like to give expression to the hope that the federal government, the political parties independent of their current role in governing the State and the entire West German public would soberly judge the present situation and do everything to avert the danger of a nuclear arms race in Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Gromyko's effort however ended in smoke. And the pro-American leader Helmut Kohl came out victorious in the 1983 election. The defeat of Vogel was a blow to the Soviet Union as it had openly supported him. And in spite of tremendous popular support for peace movements, people voted for Kohl in the elections.

The propaganda and counter propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States did not end with the West German elections. The Soviet Union was concerned about the deployment of Pershing II missiles in West Germany. It compared it to its own futile effort to deploy IRBMs in Cuba in 1962. Its propaganda was carried on with a view to influence the West German public opinion and pressurise the government against deployment. Besides, it constantly threatened to quit the arms control talks if the new long range theatre nuclear weapons became operational in 1983. To confuse the public

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<sup>21</sup> Talbott, n. 15, pp. 12-15.

opinion, a rumour about an informal proposal was allegedly created by the United States which was denounced by the Soviet Union. The US motive was to weaken the peace movement.

According to the American version, Soviet negotiator Kirtsinsky got in touch with US negotiator Paul Nitze on 13 November 1983 and informally proposed that the nuclear war-heads of both sides would be reduced to 572 and that the Soviet Union would exclude British and French missiles in Western Europe in the arms control talks. But the Tass gave an opposite version of the whole incident. It acknowledged that a "signal" had been given but contended that it was given by Paul Nitze, the United States arms control negotiator.<sup>22</sup> The Tass denounced the announcement as an American move to mislead the people. This confusion was created just one week before the opening of discussion on the NATO LRINF modernization programme in the West German Parliament.

George P. Shultz, United States Secretary of State, immediately met with the West German envoy Peter Hermes and gave him a written assurance that the new proposal was offered by Kvitsinsky and not by Nitze. This was again asserted publicly by the State Department. On the eve of the Parliamentary debate, Andropov wrote a letter to Helmut Kohl, warning about the consequences West Germany would have to face in the event of deployment. In the midst of this great propaganda

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<sup>22</sup> New York Times, 21 November 1983. See also "A Soviet Walkout: Bonn's Vote for Missiles Trigger the Inevitable", Time, 8 December 1983, pp. 10-12.



pressure from both the Super Powers, the West German Parliament approved the plan to deploy Pershing II and GLCM by a vote of 286 to 226.<sup>23</sup>

The Super Powers, while publicly acknowledging that a move had been made, accused each other of misleading propaganda about each other's proposal. The real truth behind the entire episode is hard to make out. Since each of the Super Power announced that the other was willing to give up a position which it had maintained until that time, it could at best be viewed as the worst kind of mudslinging at a crucial time when the West German Parliament was to vote for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. Thus the Super Powers tried to influence both the governments and public of Western Europe.

Peace Movements in Western Europe  
Oppose Deployment

The term "psychological warfare" was formulated during the cold war years. Its aims were to demoralise the enemy, undermine his world view and shake his faith in the integrity of his teaching and foist their own ideas on him.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet Union strongly believed that the public opinion in Western countries could pressurise their governments and influence the foreign policy and arms control issues. Brezhnev in his

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23 Ibid. Helmut Kohl made public the informal Soviet proposal in a television interview in the Middle of November 1983. The American diplomats felt that the Soviets denied the proposal since Kohl had revealed the Soviet move before it was formally made.

24 V. Gurevich, "Psychological Warfare in Imperialist Aggressive Policy", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 7, July 1981, p. 85.

message to the Assembly of Representatives of public opinion for European Security and Co-operation in Brussels in June 1972 said:

Without the consistent and purposeful efforts of the public, residue of the cold war cannot be finally cleared away and the militarist, revanchist and conservative forces opposed to relaxation cannot be isolated. Public opinion is called upon to say its word in favour of strengthening all sided peaceful co-operation among the European states.<sup>25</sup>

As a matter of fact, the Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe do not support unquestionably all the anti-Soviet stand of their governments.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet Union therefore carried on a relentless propaganda drive to win support of people in Western Europe for its objectives. It aimed primarily to reduce the influence of the anti-Communist governments, to reduce the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Western leaders and to keep up the spirit of detente alive. It also aimed to dis-integrate the Western alliance, if possible.<sup>27</sup> Commenting on the Soviet tactics, an American newspaper The News and Courier wrote:

Using a mixture of blandishment and bullying, with offers to reduce the number of nuclear missiles targeted on European cities coming in

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- 25 G.H. Sanakoyev, "Lasting Peace, Effective Security for Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 8, August 1972, p. 9.
- 26 Y. Konstantinov, "For Peace and Security in Europe", International Affairs (Moscow), no. 5, May 1981, p. 51.
- 27 Metzl Lothar, "The Ideological Struggle: A Case of Soviet Linkage", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1973, pp. 369-70.

one breath, only to be followed by threats to blast them to oblivion in the next, the Soviet Union has seized the initiative from the United States.<sup>28</sup>

While the Soviet Union accused the West of trying to undermine the world socialism and subvert socialist countries ideologically through its propaganda, the Soviet Union in turn was accused of trying to cause disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and trying to persuade individual NATO countries, such as Norway, Denmark and Iceland to leave the organization. Although the Soviet Union did not support the communist parties of Western Europe, it did praise the anti-nuclear stand of these parties.<sup>29</sup>

Though the West European governments supported the NATO decision to modernize their LRINF, at the grass root level, there was severe opposition to their decision. The people of Western Europe vehemently opposed the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM and organized peace movements in large numbers.

In Western Europe, the peace movements gained support at different levels. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Netherlands, the proposals of the leading peace movements were adopted by major political parties.

The public concern about the nuclear weapons began in

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<sup>28</sup> The News and Courier (Charleston, S.C.), 6 February 1983 in the Editorials on File, vol. 14, no. 3, 1-16 February 1983, p. 152.

<sup>29</sup> For the arguments listing the reasons which will lead to Soviet "soft" dominance over Western Europe refer to R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe", Adelphi Papers, no. 119, 1975.

1950s. Peace groups like the scientist groups, Pugwash movement in 1953, mass organizations like Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom and the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy in the United States were formed. But during the Vietnam war, as the emphasis shifted to more broader anti-war movements, the importance of the anti-nuclear movements decreased. But in 1979 the peace movement gained momentum again with the aim to stop the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. The Europeans were opposed more to nuclear weapons than to conventional weapons and just like the anti-Vietnam protests, the peace movement also drew support from all the cross sections of the society.<sup>30</sup>

In Great Britain, the Greater London Council had officially launched a policy in 1983 to "Make London Nuclear Free". Besides, many local governments had passed resolutions declaring their areas "nuclear-free". At the Greenham Common airbase, where the GLCM was later stationed, a large number of anti-nuclear protestors assembled in a large area of fourteen miles which included besides the Greenham Common, two other British nuclear facilities. A small group of women, continued their protests at Greenham base for nearly a year.<sup>31</sup>

Since the time when Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of West Germany followed the policy of Ostpolitik (Policy of

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30 Henry Muller, "Disarming Threat to Stability", Time, 30 November 1981, pp. 7-15.

31 "The Deadly Game for Europe", News Week, 11 April 1983, pp. 12-14.

looking to the East) in 1970, West Germany had been influenced by the Soviet Union. Besides, the Communist Party in West Germany which is influenced to a great extent by the policies of East Germany, the anti-nuclear protestors included the ecologists, feminists, academicians and conservatives. More than nearly three hundred peace groups were active in West Germany. The Krefeld Appeal which was prepared by the environmentalists, youth groups and the communist party called for the withdrawal of the support of West German government to the 1979 dual track decision.<sup>32</sup> The peace movements are very vigorous in West Germany as it provides military bases for the stationing of American nuclear weapons. But some people in the country are more interested in the short-term benefits like the increased employment opportunities than in the long-term effects. For example, at Bitburg, the West German base for ninety-six cruise missiles, while the peace activists at the national level were interested in carrying out nuclear protests, the local population of Bitburg, resisted their efforts.<sup>33</sup>

After the 1979 NATO decision, the peace movements in Norway attracted large numbers and the main aim of these peace activists was to make a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. A large number of peace movements or anti-nuclear protests started in Denmark as well. In Italy, most of the

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32 Muller, n. 30, p. 11.

33 "The Missiles of Bitburg", Newsweek, 28 February 1983, p. 20.

anti-nuclear demonstrations were organized by the communist and socialist parties. But in most of the other countries, the peace movement had the support of religious and humanitarian groups like the churches.<sup>34</sup> The peace movements in Western Europe increased in vigour when the people saw the escalation of the arms race as the ultimate result of the NATO's decision to modernize their nuclear weapons.

### SOVIET STRATEGIC MEASURES

When the Pershing II and GLCM missiles were stationed in Western Europe, the Soviet Union walked out of the Arms control negotiations in November 1983. It immediately lifted its moratorium on the deployment of SS-20 missiles and speeded up the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and submarine launched ballistic missiles<sup>35</sup> at a very short distance from the United States.

Besides, the Soviet Union started the forward deployment of SS-21 in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. It was reported that SS-21 was replacing Frog-7 at a rate of four per month. The replacement was said to be complete. The SS-23 was said to be replacing scud B missiles. The deployments of new 162 mm and 240 mm towed and self-propelled gun

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34 Malvern Lumsden, "Nuclear Weapons and the New Peace Movement", SIPRI Year Book 1983 (London: Jaylor and Francis, 1983), pp. 101-14.

35 "Back to Brink Again", US News and World Report (Washington, DC), 5 December 1983, p. 28.

howitzers were considered to be nuclear capable.<sup>36</sup> The following table gives the list of Soviet Theatre Nuclear weapon systems introduced or under development between 1981 and 1985:<sup>37</sup>

~~Theatre~~/Theatre Nuclear Weapons  
SS-X-28 (replacement for SS-20)  
  
SS-21  
SS-22  
SS-23  
  
Replacement for SS-21  
Replacement for SS-22  
Replacement for SS-23  
  
SS-CX-4  
MIG-27 Flogger J  
SS-25 Frog Foot  
152-mm howitzer-M-1987  
SS-N-21  
SS-N-22  
Next generation SLCM/GLCM

The Soviet arms build up greatly contributed to the vigour of the peace movement in Western Europe. The increasing arms build up by both the Super Powers created new fears about catastrophic nuclear war in the minds of the Europeans. Militant statements outlining aggressive tactics by the leaders of the United States raised the level of concern throughout the world but much more in Western Europe.

For instance, Reagan talked about the possibility of using the tactical nuclear weapons against the Soviet troops and limiting the nuclear war without the need for the Super Powers to use the strategic nuclear weapons. Encouraged by

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36 SIPRI Year Book 1985, p. 62.

37 Ibid.

the Soviet Union, West European group vehemently protested against Reagan's statement.

On 11 August 1984, Reagan thinking that microphones were not working, made an off the record joke. He said: "I have just signed legislation which outlaws Russia forever. The bombing begins in five minutes". But his remarks made headlines all over Europe.<sup>38</sup> The Soviet Union officially denounced it on 15 August 1984. Tass wrote that Reagan's comment was "unprecedentedly hostile toward the USSR and dangerous to the cause of peace". A Paris newspaper suggested a group of psychologists to examine the subconscious importance of Reagan's playful remark about bombing Soviet Union.

The President's gaffe drew adverse comments from the American press. The Philadelphia Inquirer remarked that what Reagan did was "not a bad stuff for a B-grade war movie. But Ronald Reagan is in the White House now, grappling with a gunslinger image that is unsettling voters at home, not to mention millions of Europeans and the thinkers of Kremlin". The Albuquerque Journal remarked that "the nation expects much more from the office of President than loose lips". The West German opposition Social Democratic Party called him "incalculable, unstable person". It added:

the lord over life or combustion of all  
Western Europe...is obviously an irres-  
ponsible old man, who gets grinning

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38 The Seattle Times (Washington, DC), 14 August 1984  
in the Editorials on File (New York), vol. 15, no. 15,  
1-15 August 1984, p. 885.



pleasure from the action element of mass destruction and who probably can no longer distinguish whether he is making a horror movie or commanding a Super Power.<sup>39</sup>

While due consideration can be given to the fact that Reagan was only joking when he thought that the microphones were off but his faux pas gave a boost to the peace movements in Western Europe. The hardline statements issued by Washington without due consideration to public opinion also substantially contributed to its strength.

#### American Reaction to the Soviet Peace Proposals

To counter the Soviet peace proposals, which the American government viewed as a propaganda aimed at public opinion in Western Europe, Reagan called Peter H. Dalley, his campaign and advertising adviser in 1980, to help him. National Security Adviser, William P. Clark was asked to head a top level "Public Diplomacy Committee" with the aim to change the officials who favoured a nuclear weapons freeze in the United States government.<sup>40</sup> The American historian Theodore White has characterized the Pentagon's propaganda machine as the most powerful system of brain-washing, man has ever known. But the New York Times, wrote that, "what is surprising about all this is that the United States which invented modern advertising, is not keeping the historical facts straight, even in its own defence".<sup>41</sup>

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39 The Philadelphia Inquirer, 14 August 1984; The Albuquerque Journal, 15 August 1984; The State (Columbia, S.C.), 15 August 1984 in the Editorials on File, *ibid.*, pp. 884-9.

40 New York Times, 23 January 1983.

41 *Ibid.*, 30 January 1983.

While the mass media in the West concentrates more on militarist trend, the Soviet Union through its Moscow radio scares the West Europeans every night with the effects of a nuclear war and at the same time appeals for peace and compromise.<sup>42</sup>

Casper Weinburger, the US Secretary of Defence, stated that though the United States is aware of the Europe's proximity to the Soviet Union, it should not allow that fact to let the Soviet Union promote peace movements in Western Europe. He emphasized that appeasement toward Moscow must be avoided.<sup>43</sup>

In the peace movements of Western Europe, the United States saw the revival of the neutralist and pacifist sentiments of 1930s, which encouraged Hitler to start the Second World War. But the policy pronouncements of the United States created a different picture in the minds of West Europeans. The New York Times reported that the President may be a "great communicator", but that he was communicating mainly a military confrontation with the Russians", it added that only that had brought the opposition to the streets of Europe.<sup>44</sup>

#### American Reaction to the Peace Movements

Due to heavy pressure from the people of Western Europe, Ronald Reagan opened the arms control talks with the Soviet

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42 Konstantinov, n. 19, p. 53.

43 New York Times, 1 November 1981.

44 Ibid., 23 October 1981.

Union in November 1981. He offered the zero-option to counter the Soviet peace-offensive in 1981. But the arms control talks did not make any progress. The hardline taken by United States became another point for the agitation of the peace movements. Hence on 2 April 1983 Reagan came out with an interim proposal. He stated that "when it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many".<sup>45</sup> The speech was directed at the people of America, Europe and Russia. Ambassadors from five NATO countries, namely, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and Netherlands sat in the front row of the audience when Reagan made his pronouncement in the East room of the White House.

The United States realized that the younger generation in West Germany did not seem to have positive image of the former. The new generation did not have the experiences of their parents of the Second World War. Besides, the water-gate scandal, and the Vietnam war seemed to have enhanced the intensity of the negative image of the United States in West Germany. In order to promote more understanding, Charles L. Wick, the Director of the United States Information Service (USIS), raised several million dollars privately to double youth exchanges between the United States and Europe from 15,600 to 30,000 in the next two years.<sup>46</sup>

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45 The text of his interim proposal is given in Vital Speeches of the Day (New York), 15 April 1983, pp. 390-91.

46 New York Times, 4 April 1983.

Peter Dauley, the United States' ambassador to Ireland, had recommended an "Arms Reduction Ombudsman", to help present Reagan's arms policies more effectively. He gave this suggestion in his report submitted about the ways to strengthen European support to Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile.<sup>47</sup>

Stephen F. Szato, has written a book on "Successor Generation", wherein he has stressed the importance of closing what he called the "memory gap" between the older Europeans whose images he said were shaped by CARE packages, Marshall Plan and Berlin airlift and the younger or successor generation responsible for carrying out the peace movements.<sup>48</sup>

The Reagan Administration was able to persuade the Congress to earmark 704 million dollars for the fiscal year ending on 1 October 1983 to carry on counter propaganda offensive by projecting the "truth". It was called "Project Truth". The United States planned to carry out its counter propaganda by combating Soviet misinformation and by educating its foreign service officers how the Soviet Union misrepresented the American policies.<sup>49</sup>

In July 1982, Reagan in his speech delivered at the United Nations listed the US disarmament proposals since the

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47 "Why NATO Allies Worry about West Germany", US News and World Report, 19 December 1983, pp. 31-32.

48 Ibid.

49 "Reagan's Drive to Win Over World Opinion", US News and World Report, 1 August 1983, p. 39.

end of the Second World War. He stated:

Since the end of the World War II, the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. In 1946, in what became known as the Baruch Plan, the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority. The Soviets rejected this plan.

In 1956, President Eisenhower made his open skies proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blue prints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected this plan.

In 1963, the limited test ban treaty came into force. This treaty ended nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space or underwater by participating nations.

In 1970 the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons took effect. The United States played a major role in this key effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives and to provide for international safeguards on civil nuclear activities.

In the early 1970s again at United States urging, agreements were reached between the United States and the USSR providing for ceilings on some categories of weapons....50

Later, the hardliners asked Reagan to publicise Soviet violations of the treaty in a big way as a sort of justification of NATO's modernization programme. The President wrote to the Congress on 23 January 1984, which was submitted along with a report to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance with the arms control agreements. The letter gave a list of Soviet violations of the following arms control agreements:

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50 Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 July 1982, p. 579.

- the 1925 Geneva protocol;
- the 1972 Bacteriological and toxic weapons convention;
- Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki conference on security and cooperation in Europe;
- the two provisions of 1979 SALT II - on telemetry encryption and ICBM modernization;
- the 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. <sup>51</sup>

The Soviet Union responded by sending the United States State Department a memorandum on 30 January. It was delivered by the Soviet embassy in Washington and Pravda published it on 30 January. The memorandum accused the United States of certain violations of the arms control agreements and, indeed, it was Soviet response to the repeated charges of their violations by Reagan. <sup>52</sup>

The Soviet Union asserted in the memorandum:

(i) that the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles itself violated the provisions of SALT II; (ii) that the 1972 ABM Treaty had been violated by the creation of an important radar station on Shemya (an island in the Aleutians), by the installation of roofs over silos for launching anti-missile missiles and by preparations to set up mobile anti-missile radar stations; and (iii) that the USA had also infringed the 1963 treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and below water.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, the two Super Powers justified their arms build up on

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51 New York Times, 30 January 1984.

52 Ibid.

53 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. 30, no. 9, September 1984, p. 33127.

the ground that they were forced into it by the other side.

While encouraging the peace movements in Western Europe, the Soviet Union represses the peace movements in its own state and in Eastern Europe. There are only official peace organizations like the Soviet Peace Committee, the Soviet Peace Foundation and the Soviet Pugwash Committee in the Soviet Union. They are critical about the nuclear weapon systems and policies of the Western countries only and support unanimously the official line of the Soviet government.<sup>54</sup>

#### KGB and the Peace Movements

The United States in its turn very strongly accuses the Soviet Union for manipulating the peace movements in Western Europe. A minor Soviet diplomat in Copenhagen was expelled by the Danish government after reportedly being caught passing money to peace organizations.<sup>55</sup>

The suspicion about the Soviet involvement in the western peace movements has taken deep roots in the minds of some Americans. Anthony T. Bouscaren, Professor of Political Science, Le Moyre College, Syracuse, in speech delivered at the Le Moyre College, Syracuse, New York on 7 December 1982 openly talked about the Soviet involvement in the Western peace movements. He stated:

In its 32 years of existence, the World Peace Council has not deviated from the Kremlin's line of the moment. It did not raise its voice

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54 SIPRI Year Book, 1984, p. 122.

55 Ibid., p. 124.

against Soviet suppression of Polish and East German workers in 1953, Soviet slaughter of Hungarians in 1956, the clandestine emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the projection of Soviet military power in Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen. The World Peace Council has failed to criticise a single Soviet armament program; only those of the West. And it endorsed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

However he conceded that the World Peace Council had no visible means of support from the Soviet Union.

Bous Caren connected the activities of the Western peace movements with the official pronouncements of the Soviet Union. Quoting from a "peace" movement newspaper, he tried to provide evidence of the participation of Soviet delegates in Western peace movement meetings. He said:

Shortly after Leonid Brezhnev called for a "freeze" in nuclear weapons production on February 13, 1981, the first national strategy conference for an American nuclear freeze campaign convened at George Town University. According to a "peace" movement newspaper, the organizers at George Town comprised between 175 and 300 predominantly white middle class people from 33 states, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Records available today identify only two of the invited Soviet guests. One was Oleg Bogdanov, an International Department Specialist in Active Measures, who flew in from Moscow. The other was Yuri S. Kapralov, who represents himself as a counsellor at the Soviet embassy in Washington. Kapralov was not merely an observer. He mingled with disarmament proponents, urging them on their efforts to abort new American weapons. He was an official member of the discussion panel, and, as one listener put it his statements were very impressive.<sup>56</sup>

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56 "Nuclear Freeze: The Moscow Connection", Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 February 1983, pp. 246-8.



Reagan in his speech delivered at the United Nations second special session on Disarmament on 17 June 1982 at New York, accused the Soviet Union:

At the very time, the Soviet Union is trying to manipulate the peace movement in the West, it is stifling a budding peace movement at home. In Moscow, banners are scuttled, buttons are snatched and demonstrators are arrested when even a few people dare to speak about their fears.<sup>57</sup>

But though the Soviet Union can be accused of trying to manipulate and accelerate the growth of peace movements in Western Europe, it cannot possibly create any peace movements in Western Europe. Besides, though the people of Western Europe lend support to the anti-nuclear movements, they have always supported their country's continued membership in NATO. Their concern about the nuclear weapons are genuine. The President's allegations about Soviet KGB infiltrations into the peace movements in Western Europe were not supported by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Further, the British minister for the Armed Forces quoted that £6 million a year was being spent by the Soviet Union in influencing West European peace movements. Though the British government firmly<sup>58</sup> believes in the Soviet involvement, no evidence is forthcoming.

Besides, West German Communist Party has an official membership of only about 50,000. While the Krefeld appeal calling for the annulment of NATO decision on the deployment of

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57 Vital Speeches of the Day, n. 50, p. 579.

58 SIPRI Year Book, 1983, p. 124.

new US missiles was signed by about a million West Germans within just half a year.<sup>59</sup>

While the anti-nuclear movements have gained much popularity and support in Western Europe, within the United States itself, the nuclear freeze movement, which called for the halting of the arms race at the present level, gained much popular support.

### The Nuclear Freeze Movement

The anti-nuclear movement began only in 1981 but gained so much popular support that the nuclear freeze resolution became the largest single issue referendum in the United States history. The newspaper editorials made it a big issue. They urged the electorate either to vote for or against the resolution. Los Angeles Times wrote that the nuclear freeze resolution would at least remind the policy-formulators to be moderate in their approach, but The News and Courier expressed the view that the resolution would hamper the pace of the arms control negotiations at Geneva.<sup>60</sup>

The Saginaw News stated that the nuclear freeze resolution should not be supported if it called for an unilateral freeze. Chicago Tribune found the nuclear freeze to be an unfeasible proposition but warned the American government to

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59 Karen Karagezyan, "The Missiles Threaten Everyone", New Times (Moscow), no. 27, July 1981, p. 22.

60 Los Angeles Times (Calif.), 5 November 1982, The News and Courier (Charleston, S.C.), 11 November 1982 in Editorials on File, vol. 13, no. 21, 1-15 November 1982, pp. 1276, 1278.

act according to the public moods. Arkansas Gazette held the American government's attitude to be solely responsible for the growth in the nuclear freeze movement in the United States.<sup>61</sup> But the resolution was passed by 125 city councils<sup>62</sup> along with one or both Houses of twelve state legislatures.

Addressing the meeting of a Veteran's group in Columbia, Ohio, on 4 October 1982, Reagan assailed the nuclear freeze movement and said that it was led by those individuals who were not interested in the security of the United States and were trying to corrupt the minds of genuine American citizens. He went on to add that "the nuclear freeze movement that has swept across our country that I think was inspired by not the sincere, honest people who want peace, but by some who want the weakening of America and so are manipulating many honest and sincere people".<sup>63</sup>

The newspapers across the country assailed the remarks of Reagan. The Des Moines Register called it loose talk and compared it with the anti-communist movement led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. It challenged the government to provide documentary evidence to prove Reagan's charges. St Louis Post

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61 The Saginaw News (Mich.), 17 September 1982; Chicago Tribune (Ill.), 23 September 1982; Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock, Ark.), 22 September 1982 in the Editorials on File, vol. 13, no. 20, 16-31 October 1982, pp. 1200-03.

62 "What's Next for the Nuclear Freeze Movement", US News and World Report, 21 June 1982, p. 24.

63 Cited in Editorials on File, vol. 13, no. 20, 16-31 October 1982, p. 1204.

Dispatch wrote that just because some Soviet KGB agents attended the freeze movement meetings it could not be argued that they had infiltrated into the movement. Detroit Free Press asserted that the nuclear freeze resolution was not a symbol of playing into the hands of the Soviet Communists but was to be seen as a symbol of the common people's concern about the nuclear war. The Sun quipped that such statements against the nuclear freeze movement must be put in deep freeze. But Birmingham News suggested that the Soviet Union had always infiltrated into the peace movements in the past and may be had done so again. <sup>64</sup>

Majority of the newspapers were critical of the President's remarks. It was reminiscent of the return of the old McCarthy spirit of 1950s when any anti-government person was branded as a pro-communist and as an anti-national.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State during the Reagan's administration (1981-82), has highlighted his own attitude towards the peace movements in his memoirs thus:

Now many Europeans feared that the United States would, after all, be willing to fight a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but would structure US Theatre nuclear forces so as to confine hostilities to Europe. This new paranoia, which proved to have contagious appeal, brought tens of thousands of demonstrators into the streets in the cities of Europe. The Soviets were quick to see in this situation an opportunity for disturbing

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64 The Des Moines Register (Des Moines, Iowa), October 1982; St Louis Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Mo.), 8 October 1982; Detroit Free Press (Detroit, Mich.), 8 October 1982; The Sun (Baltimore, Md.), 6 October 1982; The Birmingham News (Birmingham, Ala), 7 October 1982 in Editorials on File, *ibid.*, pp. 1204-8.

the internal political stability of the countries of Western Europe, and especially West Germany, thereby weakening the Western alliance. In a massive propaganda campaign, the Soviet Union played skilfully upon popular fears. Some of the rhetoric issuing from Washington on questions nuclear unfortunately helped to energize the frenzy.<sup>65</sup>

Haig has further stated that he was opposed to the idea of calling the peace marchers as unpatriotic. He felt that both the United States government and the people had the same view of the nuclear arms reduction but followed different methods. He wanted the hardliners in the government to understand the genuine fear of the peace marchers. He goes on to the extent of stating that the peace movement was more vigorous in the West only because of the people's faith in their ability to change the government's attitude which they lacked in the totalitarian government like the Soviet Union.<sup>66</sup>

Due to the great resentment created by his remarks in June 1982, Reagan adopted a mild attitude towards the freeze movement.

While delivering a speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, in March 1983, Reagan underlined the importance of being patient while negotiating with the Soviet Union. He stated:<sup>67</sup>

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65 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), pp. 226-27.

66 Ibid., pp. 236-7.

67 The text of the speech is given in The Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 April 1983, pp. 393-4.

If we appear divided - the Soviets suspect that domestic, political pressure will undercut our position. They will dig in their heels. And that can only delay an agreement and may destroy all hope for the agreement.

That's why I have been concerned about the nuclear freeze proposals, one of which is being considered at this time by the House of Representatives. Most of those who support the freeze, I'm sure, are well intentioned - concerned about the arms race and the danger of nuclear war. No one shares their concern more than I do. But however, well intentioned they are, these freeze proposals would do more harm than good.

They may seem to offer a simple solution. But there are no simple solutions to complex problems. As H.L. Mencken once wryly remarked, he said for every problem there is one solution which is simple, neat and wrong.

The freeze concept is dangerous for many reasons:

- it would preserve today's high, unequal and unstable levels of nuclear forces, and by so doing reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate for real reductions.
- It would pull the rug out from under our negotiators in Geneva, as they have testified. After all, why should the Soviets negotiate if they have already achieved a freeze in a position of advantage.
- Also, some think a freeze would be easy to agree on, but it raises enormously complicated problems of what is to be frozen, how it is to be achieved and, most of all, verified. Attempting to negotiate these critical details would only divert us from the goal of negotiating reductions, for who knows how long.
- The freeze proposal would also make a lot more sense if a similar movement against nuclear weapons were putting similar pressures on Soviet leaders in Moscow. As former Secretary of Defence Harold Brown has pointed out, the effect of the freeze "is to put pressure on the United States, but not on the Soviet Union".

- Finally, the freeze would reward the Soviets for their 15 years build up while locking us into our existing equipment, which in many cases is obsolete and badly in need of modernization. Three quarters of Soviet strategic warheads are on delivery systems five years old or less; three quarters of the American strategic warheads are on delivery systems 15 years old or older.<sup>68</sup>

Reagan's speech shows the change in his attitude towards the Freeze movement. When the freeze resolution came up for voting in the Congress, he was forced to take a milder attitude towards it. When the President made the speech he had Congressmen in view whom he wanted to placate by underlining the complexity of the problem and by appealing to their patriotism by stating that their support for freeze would put the country at a disadvantage in the bargaining.

The nuclear freeze resolution was passed in the House on 4 May 1983, after adopting an amendment requiring suspension of freeze agreement if it was not followed by mutual arms reduction within a specific period. This amendment was proposed by Elliott H. Levitas (D-Ga). But in the United States Congress, the members were concentrating more on fighting against the MX missile which was of more concern to the people of the United States.<sup>69</sup>

The peace movement in Western Europe and the nuclear freeze movement in the United States has been viewed with

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68 Ibid.

69 Congressional Quarterly, 40th Annual (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 868, 2031.

suspicion by the western governments. In Western Europe it failed to prevent the deployment of the new Pershing II and GLCM. What really mattered was that despite the unprecedented Soviet propaganda the United States had successfully implemented its NATO weapon modernization programme.



**CHAPTER IV**

**ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS**

## Chapter IV

### ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

In less than a decade after the end of the Second World War both the United States as well as the Soviet Union had mastered the knowledge and technology of nuclear weapons. With each passing year the number, precision and accuracy of these weapons increased with a terrifying speed with the result that both the Super Powers have long since acquired an "Overkill" capability. But the trend of stockpiling of nuclear weapons and qualitative improvements in their capacity is showing no signs of abating. The humanity is desperately anxious to avoid a nuclear holocaust but the policy makers in these two countries justify their nuclear policy on the ground of global security. They blame each other for jeopardizing the very survival of mankind by their aggressive policies. Both the powers however would like to reduce the level of their nuclear armaments if it doesnot affect their power position relative to the other.

The arms control negotiations between the two powers have been conducted both within and outside the purview of the United Nations. During seventies, two important arms control treaties were signed by the two countries, SALT I in 1972 by President Richard Nixon and Lenoid Brezhnev and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev.

The era of nuclear predominance enjoyed by the United States passed on to the stage of nuclear parity with its adversary the Soviet Union. Both became vulnerable to each other's attack and each side acquired capability to strike back in retaliation even after receiving the first strike. They were thus mutually assured of destruction. The realization that neither of them can emerge out of a nuclear war victorious made the control of the arms race a necessity. Besides the continuous build up of nuclear weapons had imposed very heavy economic burden on both the Super Powers that could be reduced to a certain extent only through successful arms control negotiations.

The Super Powers possess nuclear weapons with varying capacities. Because the security of Soviet Union is threatened not only by American Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) but also by its Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) stationed in Western Europe, the Soviet Union is keen on balancing not only the strategic arms but also these TNF.

Hence even before the SALT I negotiations began in 1969 Soviet Union raised the question of the inclusion of the Forward Based System of the United States in Western Europe. These nuclear forces have the capacity to strike all important targets within the Soviet Union. Hence during the SALT II negotiations, Vladimir Semyenov, the Soviet delegate defined strategic forces as any Soviet nuclear weapon capable of hitting targets in the United States and any

American nuclear weapon with the capacity to hit the targets in the Soviet Union. Thus while the Soviet Union included the U.S. Forward Based System in Western Europe it excluded its own Intermediate range nuclear forces which threaten the security of Western Europe but lack the capacity to hit targets in the United States<sup>1</sup>. The American delegate Gerard Smith insisted that the American Forward Based System is to counter the Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles. He further argued that the security of Western Europe and the United States are inseparable and that these forces which prove American commitment to the defence of Western Europe could not be removed from Western Europe<sup>2</sup>.

The United States was just not willing to include the Forward Based System within the purview of the bilateral negotiations. Hence the Soviet Union was permitted in SALT I to have a higher number of strategic launchers to balance the advantage the United States enjoyed in the Forward Based System and long range bombers.<sup>3</sup>

In 1974, at the Vladivostok Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached a compromise. The Soviet Union dropped its insistence on limiting Forward Based System and in return the United States gave up its claim to limit the Soviet

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1. Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal, eds., Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 263-6.

2. Ibid., p. 264.

3. Robert Jervis, Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1984), p. 11.



heavy missiles.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the question about Backfire and Cruise Missile were excluded from the talks. But the Soviet Union continued to press for the non-transfer rule in order to restrict the number of cruise missiles. It excluded its own Backfire bombers and medium range missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).<sup>5</sup>

#### Limited Nuclear War

Of recent the United States has propagated the idea of the possibility of fighting and winning a limited nuclear war.<sup>6</sup> This has raised the Soviet concern to come to clear understanding with the United States on its strategic policy towards the use of these theatre nuclear forces so that any outbreak of a nuclear war due to the misunderstanding of the motives of other side could be avoided.

With the signing of SALT II the imbalance in the strategic arms was balanced. But Western Europe was not happy about the treaty as it did nothing to balance the theatre nuclear forces in Western Europe. In 1977, the President of West Germany spoke of the imbalances in theatre nuclear forces in Europe and the need for modernization. In response to the American moves, the Soviet

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4. Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979), pp. 103-5.

5. Strobe Talbott, The End Game: The Inside Story of SALT (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 57.

6. Jonathan Alford, ed., Arms Control and European Security, Adelphi Paper, No. 11 (Hampshire: Cower, 1984), p. 5.

Union started modernizing its own IRBM with new mobile three warheaded SS-20 missiles. There was no land based missile on the NATO side, which could balance the SS-20 missile. Hence the NATO took the "dual track decision" on 12 December 1979 to Modernize its TNF and at the same time to conduct arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. When Reagan came to power, he spoke about the vulnerability of American ICBM to the Soviet attack. This talk about the "window of vulnerability" in 1981 and Reagan's effort to close the window through the modernization of ICBM, namely with MX missile created interests of the allies in the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons. But the decision to deploy new Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in Western Europe met with strong opposition from the people of Western Europe. The peace movements gained much strength and in order to pacify the people of Western Europe and to successfully carry out its modernization plan, Western European Governments pressurized the United States to have arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

Their economic interest in reducing their defence budget, their strategic concern to militarily balance each other's forces and their political policy to pacify the growing antinuclear sentiments of people sustain the Super Powers interest in negotiating arms control treaties. Besides these dialogues help to remove to a certain extent mutual suspicion.

Though mutual interests motivate the superpowers' participation in arms control negotiations, they face certain difficulties which make the negotiating process long and cumbersome. Thus while common basic concern stops at the overall policy of controlling arms race, their specific ways to attain it varies. The difficulties arise due to different strategic perceptions and due to other technical, conceptual and political reasons. The difficulties which the arms control negotiation between the Super Powers had always encountered can be listed as follows :

#### Definition of Strategic Nuclear Weapons

For the United States, strategic weapons means only the nuclear weapons of intercontinental range. Hence the Intermediate range nuclear forces of the United States stationed in Western Europe are not considered as strategic. But the geographical location of Soviet Russia and Western Europe, <sup>in</sup> the same continent gives the capacity to these missiles to strike targets in the Soviet Union. Since these missiles affect the security of the Soviet Union it considers them to be strategic.<sup>7</sup>

Limited Nuclear War : To the United States any war conventional or nuclear confined to the territories of Europe and not escalating to engulf the United States is considered as "Limited Nuclear War". But the Soviet Union disputes this interpretation. It contends that the missiles whether from Western Europe or from the United States threaten the Soviet

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7. Moreton and Segal, n. 1, p. 268

territory and therefore any nuclear war can only be an all out nuclear war. It can never be limited in any way.

Further more, the Soviet Union has made it explicit that it does not believe in the gradual escalation of the war.

Differences in forces : The Soviet Union has superiority in conventional nuclear forces. Instead of countering the Soviet conventional capability with non-nuclear weapons, the United States has followed the policy of deployment of tactical nuclear forces. There are conventional, tactical and theatre nuclear forces in Europe and hence agreement has to be reached at all the three levels.<sup>8</sup>

Besides, some missile delivery systems are called "grey area systems". They can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. Their utility cannot be measured in any way because of their dual use depending on the prevailing situation.<sup>9</sup> While the Soviet Union presses for the inclusion of the mobile aircrafts of the United States which are capable of being transferred to the territories of Europe in a crisis, the United States calls for a global balance of theatre nuclear forces, thus including the mobile SS-20 missiles deployed on the Asian territories of the Soviet Union, since these missiles can also be quickly transferred to the European theatre for use in a war.<sup>10</sup>

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8. Alford, n.6, p.1

9. Ibid., p. 128.

10. Ibid., p. 11.



American Policy of Linkage :

Since 1979, the political environment prevailing in the world to a great extent had started influencing the arms control negotiations. During the Presidency of Nixon, the policy of linking the progress in arms control talks with the political understandings between the Super Powers in the Middle East, Vietnam and Britain was followed.<sup>11</sup> In a briefing to the press reporters in 1969, Kissinger said : "To take the question of the linkage between the political and the strategic environment... (the President)... would like to deal with the problem of peace on the entire front in which peace is challenged and not only on the military one".<sup>12</sup> The New York Times on 18 February 1969 stressed the importance of arms control apart from other political issues. Similar view was expressed by The Washington Post.<sup>13</sup>

Within the American foreign policy establishment, the controversy whether to treat the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on its own merits or to link it with the political actions of the Soviet Union has persisted. It has undoubtedly affected the arms control policy of the United States.

For example, the SALT II treaty was shelved by the Senate primarily because of the Soviet Union's political

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11. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 323.

12. Ibid.

13. New York Times, 18 February 1969; Washington Post, 5 April, 1969.

action of intervention in Afghanistan. When the SALT II hearings opened before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 under the Chairmanship of Frank Church, Senators leaning ideologically to right viewed with suspicion the political moves of the Soviet Union and protested that the treaty favoured the Soviet Union.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, (D. Wash) called for new weapons programmes to increase the strategic capability of the United States. Sen. Sam Nunn, (D.Ga) a military analyst asked President Carter to increase the defence budget. While Richard Stone, (D-Fla) showed concern about the presence of the Russian combat forces in Cuba, the former NATO Commander Gen. Alexander Haig, Jr., stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, "among the allies, fear that a post-Vietnam America no longer has the will to stand up to the Soviet Union"<sup>14</sup> had been created.

The Senate decision on the treaty was delayed and finally the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet Union sealed the future of SALT II approval by the Congress.<sup>15</sup> Alexander Haig, then the Secretary of State also considered the Afghan invasion as a hurdle in the approval of SALT<sup>16</sup>.

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14. Congressional Quarterly, 34th Annual (Washington, DC, 1970), pp. 4 N, 424-25.

15. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 358-65.

16. Alexander M. Haig, Jr, Caveats: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 220.

President Jimmy Carter was forced to take a tough posture towards Soviet Union as it made political advancements in Ethiopia, Cuba and Afghanistan.<sup>17</sup> Kissinger again stressed that the Soviet involvement through proxy military forces in Africa and Cuba would be opposed by the United States.<sup>18</sup>

But the Soviet Union stresses that since arms control negotiations are mutually beneficial, it must be viewed on its own merit, and that it must not be linked with other political relations. But American policy makers think that peace can be maintained only when political atmosphere conducive to it prevails.

NATO Alliance : The United States and the Soviet Union face each other directly in Europe. It is the only place where both had stationed large numbers of their nuclear forces. The European arms control is thus a multilateral venture. It involves an understanding, not only between the two negotiating Super Powers, but also understanding within their alliances.

Besides, Europe has been divided artificially since the end of the Second World War. The political and social systems of the West and the East Europe are radically opposite to each other. This has aggravated the mutual suspicion. Further, each bloc wants to seclude and protect

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17. Congressional Quarterly, n. 14, pp. 378-79.

18. Congressional Quarterly, 35th Annual (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 420.

itself from the influences of the other bloc. Thus the political misunderstandings and suspicion cause stalemate in the arms control talks.

Though West Europe is economically powerful, it is militarily very weak and this disparity had never been levelled since the end of the Second World War. Its security has been inseparably interlinked with that of the United States. Thus in spite of the political and policy differences, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has continued as a military alliance. But the Soviet Union has continued to make the best use of these differences in its favour. These Soviet moves to separate and split the alliance had forced the United States to prove its commitment through the deployment of more accurate nuclear missiles. One important way by which Soviet Union has recently tried to split the alliance is by proposing to negotiate separately with the alliance members. These Soviet moves have made an agreement on arms control treaty much more difficult. Hence, these misunderstandings must give way to mutual understanding of each other's perceptions. This has been stressed by Ralph Earle II, the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Verification of the conformity to the agreed Arms Control principles has posed difficulties in recent years.

The limitation on Multiple Independent Re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) was set aside in SALT I treaty since at that time the Soviet Union wanted to close the gap in MIRV technology. Later, with both the sides having developed MIRV technology, the idea of associating the number of launch sites with the number of warheads have become obsolete. Besides, the multiple warheads, the technology now permits the reloading of missiles with new warheads. These advances in technology have made the task of obtaining an arms control treaty more difficult.<sup>19</sup>

Andrei Gromyko, the former Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister, stated that the American claim to world leadership posed severe problems to the Soviet Union. He criticized the American move of not ratifying the SALT II treaty as an example to show the American claim for nuclear superiority.<sup>20</sup>

#### Theatre Nuclear Arms Control

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and militarily modernised its theatre nuclear forces. This led ultimately to the dual track decision by the NATO Council in 1979. Carter undertook his seven nation West European tour in 1978, to allay the fears that the U.S. would

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19. Maxwell D. Taylor, Precarious Security (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1976), p. 77.

20. Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December, 1981. pp. 130-32.

disengage itself from West European security. He also promised to consult the NATO members before reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup>

Carter opened the negotiations on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in October 1980. The Soviet side was led by Viktor Karpov and the American delegation was headed by S. Purgason Keeny. Both the sides took contradictory stands. While the Soviets insisted on the inclusion of the Forward Based Systems including the war planes stationed in Britain, West Germany and other West European countries, and the American carriers capable of striking Soviet Union, the United States and the allies were ready to open negotiations with the Soviet Union, on the ground that only the nuclear weapons meant for theatre nuclear operations must be limited and that the Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) must be dealt with bilaterally in SALT III by a step by step approach. They argued that the main objective of these negotiations must be to arrive at equality in the land based theatre nuclear systems which must be mutually verifiable.<sup>22</sup> The talks reached a stalemate as both the sides could not agree to begin.

Again, when the linking of arms control issue with other political activities came up it was denounced by

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21. New York Times, 7 January 1978.

22. New York Times, 4 July 1980,  
28 October, 1980.

Cyrus Vance, then Secretary of State in the Carter Administration. He felt that each of the issues like the human rights, trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and the arms talks must be treated on its own merits.<sup>23</sup>

Carter in his memoirs states that he was also against the linking of political moves of the Soviet Union with the arms control talks and shared the view of Vance.<sup>24</sup> But Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, who exercised great influence on him, was against this view. He took a very hardline policy towards the Soviet Union as he felt that since Soviet Union had attained nuclear parity it was making political advancements against the United States and that the latter and its NATO allies must improve their nuclear capability and talk from a position of strength.<sup>25</sup>

While the Soviet Union was concerned about the NATO weapon modernization programme, the United States was concerned about the global political advancements made by the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State said :

The Soviets must be made to understand that the SALT process would come to an end unless Soviet global adventurism were greatly restrained. The Soviet supply or encouragement

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23. Department of State Bulletin Vol. 76 No. 1965,  
21 February 1977, p. 149.

24. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of President  
(London: Collins, 1982), p. 214.

25. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs  
of National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York:  
Farrar & Straus Giroux, 1983), p. 521.

of intervention by proxy, military forces, the use of Soviet forces in the territory of its allies, such as Cuba, the Free Cuban forces to fight in Africa, the support, financing or encouragement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activities seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United States or the exacerbation of regional conflicts must be curtailed.<sup>26</sup>

Reagan and Arms Control Talks with the Soviet Union: At a time when the arms control talks had reached a stalemate due to the political tangle between the Super Powers, Ronald Reagan entered the White House. Throughout his first term he adopted a tough posture toward the Soviet Union. While preparations for the deployment of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) were going on in Western Europe, no initiative was taken by the United States to start the arms control talks with the Soviet Union. However, with the peace movements against Pershing II and GLCM gaining ground in Western Europe, the allies became more concerned about the local opposition. West Germany and Italy started stressing the importance of starting the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to get the public support for the deployment.<sup>27</sup> Hence Reagan under heavy pressure from America's West European allies opened the arms control talks with the Soviet Union in 1981.

Arms Control Initiative: In May 1981, Reagan wrote a letter to Brezhnev conveying American readiness to start

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26. As quoted in the Congressional Quarterly, 38th Annual (Washington, D.O., 1980), p. 420.

27. New York Times, 5 June 1981.



the talks with the Soviet Union. It was agreed that the procedural questions concerning the Arms Control talks were to be dealt with by Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Alexander A. Bessmerthykh, second in Soviet embassy for preliminary arrangements. The major unresolved questions were to be dealt with by Alexander Haig, Jr., the Secretary of State and Gromyko.<sup>28</sup>

Haig and Gromyko met and agreed to open the INF negotiations at Geneva on 30 November 1981. The American side was to be headed by Paul Nitze, seventy four years old well known American negotiator and an anti-Soviet hardliner, who helped to negotiate SALT I in 1972 and the Soviet side was to be headed by U.A. Kvitsinsky who was sixty years old. One State Department official was reported to have said: "The Europeans would have screamed bloody murder if these talks broke up without a date set".<sup>29</sup>

#### ZERO OPTION

In his first major foreign policy speech delivered on 18 November 1981, which was televised alive in Western Europe Reagan offered the "Zero-option" as the

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28. Ibid., 6 June 1981.

29. James Kelly, "Getting to Know You Again", Time (Chicago), 5 October 1981, p. 24.

American arms control proposal to the Soviet Union. The person behind the formulation of the Zero-option was reported to be the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy, Richard Perle.<sup>30</sup>

The proposal offered:

- to cancel the deployment of new US medium range nuclear missiles in Europe if Soviet Union withdrew its medium range missiles aimed at Western Europe;
- to start negotiations on reducing the Long Range Strategic Missiles and the bombers and
- to reduce the risks of surprise attack.

This offer was made just before the summit meeting between Brezhnev and Schmidt.<sup>31</sup>

Casper Weinberger, the American Secretary of Defence in the Reagan Administration, summed up the proposal and said: "You take out yours and we won't put in any and that will leave Europe free". He viewed the zero option as a step toward the opening up of arms control talks.<sup>32</sup>

But Alexander Haig reasoned that the fatal flaw in the zero option was that it was not negotiable. He argued in his memoirs that to expect the Soviets to dismantle the

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30. Walter Isaacson, "Starting from Zero: Reagan Reassures Europe with a Simple Straight Forward Message", Time (Chicago), 30 November 1981, pp. 22-24.

31. New York Times, 19 November 1981.

32. Christian Science Monitor (Boston: Mass), 19 November, 1981 Editorials on File, Vol. 12, 17-30 November, 1981, p. 1296.

already deployed 1100 warheads in exchange for the United States promise of not to deploy a missile was beyond reasonable senses. Besides, this modernisation plan had created such a great controversy within the alliance. Haig even expressed his misgivings that the policy might not intensify doubts about America reneging from its commitment to Western Europe.<sup>33</sup>

The media critically analysed the pros and cons of the Zero-option proposal. The Lincoln Star in its editorials felt that though the proposal was good doubted its practicability. On the contrary the Evening Gazette called it as a sincere offer. The Denver Post expressed the opinion that the speech was more directed to the people of Western Europe than to domestic audience. The Detroit Free Press stated that Reagan wanted to win the propaganda war against the Soviet Union and that he successfully did by proposing the zero-option. The Christian Science Monitor also doubted the practicability of the zero-option and opined that by the modification of positions by both the Super Powers, arms control could be achieved. The Seattle Times wrote that the Reagan's proposal had been offered with the idea to influence the summit meeting between Brezhnev and West German Chancellor Schmidt and that it was also offered as the starting point of the Aras Control Negotiation which later started on

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33. Alexander M. Haig, Jr, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, n. 16, p. 229.

30 November in Geneva. The Birmingham News expressed doubts about the sincerity of the Soviets in conducting arms control talks and called for the building up of arms by the United States even while the arms control negotiations were going on. The Oregonian interpreted the Zero-option as Reagan's proposal to close the communication gap between the United States and the people of Western Europe.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, the zero-option was viewed as a proposal which Reagan was forced to offer because of the pressure from West European peace movements. The media was of the opinion that it was an extreme proposal but also a good point to start the negotiation with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the proposal was mainly aimed to pacify the protests of the people of Western Europe. It was also pointed out by these newspapers that Reagan's claim that Russians had a 6 to 1 advantage over the United States was not true; He had excluded the Forward Based Nuclear equipped aircraft and submarine.<sup>35</sup>

The Soviet Union rejected the zero option proposed by Reagan as impracticable and proposed on its own to reduce the number of its intermediate missiles if NATO gave up its

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34. The Lincoln Star, (Neb.) 19 November 1981; The Evening Gazette (Worcester, Mass.), 20 November 1981. and The Denver Post (Colo.), 19 November 1981, The Detroit Free Press, 19 November 1981, The Christian Science Monitor, 19 November 1981, The Seattle Times (Washington), 19 November 1981, The Birmingham News, Ala., 19 November 1981, The Oregonian (Portland), 19 November 1981, in The Editorials on File, (17-30 November 1981), vol. 12, no. 22, pp. 1292-1301.

35. Ibid.

plan to deploy nuclear missiles. The Soviets included both the British and the French missiles and the American submarines and aircraft based in Europe capable of carrying nuclear weapons.<sup>36</sup>

While the American proposal completely ignored the Forward Based Nuclear Systems, the Soviets went to the other extreme of including both the British and the French nuclear weapons. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations began with these two proposals which were two extremes. Both the Super Powers rejected each other's proposal as extreme and unfeasible. While the Soviet Union went on presenting various alternate proposals even after the negotiations started, the United States did not change its position from its zero-option for a very long time. While these negotiations were going on, some political developments adversely affected the talks.

#### THE CRISIS IN POLAND

The food and the economic situation in Poland was deteriorating towards the end of 1970s. The Solidarity, a labour union called for the rights to go on strikes and conduct economic reforms.<sup>37</sup> This was disliked by the communist party in Poland and Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, imposed the

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36. Isaacson, n. 30, p. 24.

37. Thomas A. Sauction, "Requiem for a Dream: Solidarity August 1980-October 1982", Time, 18 October, 1982 pp. 10-11.

military rule in December 1981.

Thus the military dictatorship was introduced in Poland when the arms control negotiations were going on in Geneva. The United States enthusiastically welcomed Poland's move towards liberatisation. It therefore responded angrily when the communist leadership suppressed the movement led by Solidarity with a heavy hand. The Reagan Administration expressed its strong views without any reservation. However, Reagan decided to continue with the talks, causing displeasure to the hardliners in his administration. When Alexander Haig met Gromyko at Geneva, he stressed that "these INF talks must be dealt with outside the context of normal East-West relationships; because there are fundamental advantages to the U.S. in continuation"<sup>39</sup> Thus there has always been severe contradiction and controversy within the United States government whether or not to continue the policy of linking the arms control talks with the Soviet Union with the other political activities of the Soviet Union.

On 3 February 1982, the Soviet Union called for gradual reductions of medium range missiles and similar weapon systems to limits of about three hundred on each side by 1991. In making this proposal it again counted the missiles of the

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39. William A. Henry III, "Keeping the Lines Open: A Gromyko-Haig Meeting in Geneva, despite tension and criticism", Time, 1 February 1982, pp. 31-32.

French and the British. Brezhnev proposed a two-thirds cut by 1990 in the medium range nuclear weapons of both the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>39</sup>

Immediately on 4 February, the United States rejected the proposal and declared that a draft of its position namely "zero option" had already been given to the Soviet Union. On 16 March 1982, Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union was to adhere to a moratorium unilaterally on the deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union.<sup>40</sup> The moratorium was to be in force until an arms control agreement was reached or until the actual deployment of Pershing II and GLCM began in Western Europe. But in May 1982, while making clear that the Soviet moratorium included the stopping of the construction of the launching sites for new missiles Brezhnev also stated that missiles with capacity to strike West Germany would not be deployed by the Soviet Union.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, while the Soviet Union was putting forward new proposals, they were rejected by the United States either on the ground that they were for the purpose of propaganda or because of the inclusion of the British and French missiles which was incompatible with American interests.

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39. New York Times, 11 February 1982.

40. SIPRI Year Book, 1983 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1983), p. 9.

41. Ibid.

Thus, when the leaders of the two countries were proposing and rejecting each other's proposals, the Soviet and American arms control negotiators worked out a plan quietly in the woods of Geneva.

#### WALK IN THE WOODS PROPOSAL

While uncordial verbal notes were exchanged between the leaders of the two nations, the US negotiator Kvitsinsky explored a new way for achieving arms control. On 16 July, 1982, Nitze and Kvitsinsky took a walk in the woods of Swiss Jura mountains, near the French border. In this private session away from the negotiating table they discussed a compromise. They exchanged a package proposal.<sup>42</sup>

The key features of the proposal were that the Soviets would give up their insistence on cancellation of NATO deployment and their demand for compensation for the British and French forces, and that the number of Soviet SS-20s would be reduced from 243 to 75 in Europe and frozen at 90 in Asia and that the United States would install 75 cruise missile launchers with four missiles each for a total of three hundred warheads and that it would cancel the Pershing II deployment.<sup>43</sup>

The proposal was discussed by National Security Adviser

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42. "Behind Closed Doors: A Story of Intransigence, Infighting - and perhaps missed opportunities", Time, 5 December 1982, pp. 15-23.

43. Ibid., p. 17.



William Clark, Secretary of State George Shultz, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director, Eugene Rostow, Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey and General John W. Vessey, Jr, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A mini group under the chairmanship of Robert McFarlane, objected to the fact that Nitze had crossed his limits. He questioned the rationality behind the idea of giving up Pershing II. Furthermore, he consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether they could do without Pershing-II. Among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey and the Air Force Chief of Staff, Charles Gabriel, leaned in favour of the plan but the Army Chief of Staff, Edward C. Meyer, who had the responsibility for building Pershing II opposed the plan. It was also opposed by the Naval Chief James Watkins. The Chiefs' report was sent to the President.<sup>44</sup>

By that time, Charles Perle, who was one of the principal authors of the zero option, had come back to Washington. He stressed that the United States should stick only to the zero option. The National Security Council meeting took place on 13 September 1982. Later, Shultz met Gromyko at the United Nations on 28 September 1982 and informed him of the negative attitude of the government towards the plan.<sup>45</sup> The following day, Kvitsinsky conveyed that his government was not supporting the proposal.

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44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

The Reagan Administration took a serious view of the entire episode and penalised the initiators of the proposal. Eugene Rostow, the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was accused of giving away American interests by the national security adviser, William P. Clark. Besides, the Secretary of State, Shultz accused him of exceeding his authority. Later Rostow, was forced to resign by Reagan under the garb of streamlining the United States administration.

The newspapers commented extensively on Rostow's dismissal in their editorials. The Minneapolis Star and Tribune stated that it was not only a few senators who were against arms control treaty with the Soviet Union but that it included the President as well. It went on to state that the seriousness of the President's interest in concluding arms control treaty with the Soviet Union must be doubted.<sup>46</sup> The Blade in its editorial, commenting on the fact that Rostow was fired while Nitze had been retained stated that the dismissal was very unfortunate just because Rostow sought an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. But The Atlanta Constitution supported the President on the ground that he had every right to keep in position a person whom he likes. Post Tribune questioned the sincerity of the President's intentions for arms control in this context.

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46. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Minn., 16 January 1983  
 in The Editorials on File, vol. 14, no. 2, 16-31 January 1983, p. 64.

The Washington Post expressed the view that the firing of Rostow was more in order to show that discipline is needed in the bureaucracy and stated that pressure was mounting upon the President to give interim proposal. The Hartford Courant viewed Rostow's resignation as a success to hardliners in the Congress and in the executive who were interested only in the zero option, strict verification procedures rather than in arriving at an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. The Christian Science Monitor stressed the need to impress upon the West Europeans that the United States wanted real arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union and expressed the view that the proposed new Director, Kenneth Adelman, was not impressive as a person interested in arms control and stated that arms control would help Reagan solve his budget problems. St. Petersburg Times saw the resignation of Rostow as a symbol of the increasing influence of the hardliners like Republican Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina over the arms control policy.<sup>47</sup>

In general, majority of the newspapers were of the opinion that Rostow's resignation had created disarray in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They feared that

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47. The Blade, 23 January 1983, The Atlanta Constitution, 17 January 1983, Post-Tribune, Ind., 19 January 1983, The Washington Post, 19 January 1983, The Hartford Courant 15 January 1983, The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1983, St. Petersburg Times, 14 January 1983, in The Editorials on File, vol. 14, no. 2, 16-31 January 1983, pp. 64-68.

it would fuel the anti-nuclear protests in Western Europe and would create doubts in the minds of the allies about the American commitment to arms control. Further it was felt that the firing of Rostow had helped the Soviet Union in its peace offensive against the United States and Western Europe. Many questioned the sincerity of Reagan regarding the arms control negotiation and stressed the need for an interim proposal to restore the confidence of the allies on the United States. It was also felt that Rostow's sudden resignation would affect the arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

The White House had given overall instruction to Nitze about negotiating with the Soviets. Hence Nitze felt that he must have more freedom to search for changes in the other side's position. Nitze stated that he was disillusioned with Rostow's forced resignation.<sup>48</sup> "The Walk in the Woods" proposal and the consecutive actions of the United States drew much attention in Western Europe. A State Department official commented that a mythology had been created in Western Europe that the arms control treaty proposed by Rostow and Nitze had not been accepted by the hardliners in the United States.<sup>49</sup>

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48. Congressional Quarterly, 33rd Annual (Washington, DC: 1977), p. 324.

49. New York Times, 16 January 1983.

Even after the "Walk in the Woods" proposal had been rejected by both the governments in September 1982, the Soviet Union did not give up its efforts either sincere or propaganda to explore the possibilities of coming to terms with the United States in arms control and in finding ways to stop the proposed deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

On 21 December 1982 Andropov who succeeded Brezhnev, proposed again to reduce the number of medium range nuclear weapons to a level of three hundred by 1990. He further stated that the Soviet Union would retain in Europe only as many medium range missiles as Britain and France. He also warned against the deployment of new Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe.<sup>50</sup>

But the United States rejected this proposal once again. It was argued that if British and French forces were threatening the security of the Soviet Union, then the Soviet ICBM could be viewed as threatening the security of Western Europe.<sup>51</sup>

On his visit to Bonn on 17 January 1983, Gromyko again reiterated the Soviet willingness to reduce its medium range nuclear missiles to the combined total of the British and the French nuclear forces and to remove those above this figure to a line in Siberia beyond the range from where they

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50. SIPRI Year Book, 1983, no. 40, p. 13.

51. New York Times, 29 December 1982.

no longer threaten the security of Western Europe. He also offered to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons with a range up to 1000 kilometres to the number deployed by the West.<sup>52</sup>

But along with the proposal to reduce its nuclear forces, the Soviet Union also repeatedly warned the European countries of dire consequences if the plan to deploy Pershing-II and GLCM was carried out.

Guidelines for Negotiations: After Rostow was replaced by Kenneth Adelman, Reagan gave the general outline within which the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiator Nitze was allowed to explore the ways to an agreement with the Soviet Union. He stated that the principle of equality must be the basis of the agreement, that the British and the French forces were to be excluded from the arms control negotiation and that the Soviet Union was not to be allowed to shift the intermediate range nuclear forces from the European theatre to Asian theatre and that the agreement must be mutually verifiable.<sup>53</sup>

The State Department declared in March 1983 that the negotiators were empowered to probe into the new Soviet proposals but were not given power to offer new American proposals. Secretary of State Shultz was given the power to

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52. New York Times, 18 January 1983.

53. Ed. Magnuson, "Uproar over Arms Control", Time, 24 January 1982, pp. 4-6.

coordinate the arms control negotiations.<sup>54</sup>

The United States did not make any changes in its officially declared policy of the Zero option though it was willing to explore other proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. But in fact, the United States not only abstained from offering any other arms control proposal but it rejected invariably all the Soviet arms control proposals as propaganda efforts. The West European leaders and people began to feel that the American proposal was extreme, inflexible and hence not worthy of negotiation. The pressure to modify the American position slowly built up. Further, the "Walk in the Woods" proposal showed that the negotiators without acting on the advice of their respective governments could arrive at an agreement. Doubts began to be raised whether the Soviet Union would have considered the proposal seriously had it not believed that it was being advanced as a negotiating position by the United States. Hence after this, the pressure on Reagan to offer an interim proposal in response to the various Soviet proposals was built by the press, people and the government of the allies alike which felt that the American zero option had succeeded in creating stalemate in the arms control negotiations.

Interim Proposal: In order to satisfy his critics, Reagan in his address to the Eureka College in Illinois called for the reduction of the warheads on the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to an equal number on a global basis.

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54. New York Times, 17 March 1983.

The President stated that, "when it comes to Intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than some. But, if there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many".<sup>55</sup>

But he did not mention the number of the Intermediate Range nuclear missile warheads that would be acceptable as an interim step towards the arms control. Paul Nitze formally presented Reagan's proposal to his Soviet counterpart on 29 March 1983. He asked the Soviet Union to be more flexible. But Gromyko rejected Reagan's offer on the ground that the Soviet Union could not accept the American position that the British and French nuclear forces, and American nuclear delivery aircraft based in Western Europe had to be left out. Nor could it accept the American demand for global reduction of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.<sup>56</sup>

The interim proposal was announced by Reagan because the peace movements in Western Europe were progressively gaining strength. Besides with American plan to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in 1983, the President wanted to reduce the opposition. While continuing to negotiate with the United States, the Soviet Union warned that it would leave

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55. George J. Church, "A Hot Nuclear Exchange: Reagan puts the Ball in the Soviet Court - and Gromyko bangs it back", *Time*, 11 April 1983, pp. 16-18. For the text of the Interim proposal by Reagan see Congressional Quarterly, 39th Annual (Washington, DC, 1983), p. 677.

56. Church, n. 55, p. 17.



the negotiating table once the deployment of new Pershing II and GLCM was carried out.<sup>57</sup>

Whereas a more conducive atmosphere for arms control was created by Reagan's interim proposal indicating American willingness to negotiate flexibly, the atmosphere deteriorated again due to a Soviet Union's seemingly hostile action of downing a South Korean airliner in September 1983 in the Sea of Japan. The conservative groups in the Congress pressurised the President to take a hardline toward the Soviet Union, Richard A. Viguerie, the publisher of *Conservative Digest* went to the extent of asking that "the United States should suspend arms control negotiations. Arms control negotiations are based on trust and this unprovoked attack, along with the Soviet's reported violations of previous agreements, exposed the Soviets as unworthy of that trust."<sup>58</sup>

The U.S. public did not whole-heartedly endorse this view. The newspapers reflected and at the same time influenced the public opinion on the issue of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. Argus-Leader stressed the need for the continuation of talks in spite of the death of Rep. Larry McDonald, D-Ga., and other victims of the crash. Minneapolis Star and Tribune also underlined the importance of continuing

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57. George Russell, "The Moments of Truth: New US Missiles Arrive, and the Soviets prepare to Walk out of Geneva", Time, 28 November 1983, pp 9-10.

58. Congressional Quarterly, 1983, n. 55, p.

the arms control talks with the hostile Soviet Union, though its actions might be antagonistic to American interests. The newspaper did not even support the strong condemnation of Soviet action by Reagan. The Providence Journal criticised the Soviets for caring more about the arms control and less about human lives and human rights. Rockey Mountain News in its editorial advised the allies and the United States not to over react. It did not even advise grain embargo as the difficulty was more likely to be felt by the Americans. The Seattle Times warned that in taking any action against the Soviet Union, all the allies and the United States must join together and must not split on the issue. The Honolulu Adviser wanted the United States government to make use of the opportunity to increase the Soviet fear in the minds of the West Europeans. The Post Tribune in its editorials praised Reagan for not succumbing to the pressure from the hardliners to stop the arms control efforts. The continuation of the arms control talks was viewed by it as the only sane approach to avoid nuclear annihilation. The editorial of the Des Moines Register also shared the views of the Post-Tribune. The Kansas City Times, wrote that the arms control talks which was mutually advantageous to both the super powers must be followed. The Washington Post and Chicago Tribune considered the President's policy to be right. The Dispatch editorial supported the NATO arms

modernization programme.<sup>59</sup> The editorials on File had compiled nearly fifty four editorials on the issue of the shooting down of Korean airliner and the American reaction. All of them, strongly condemned the Soviet action as inhuman. But only The Burlington Press asked for the suspension of talks if the Soviets refused to give a satisfactory explanation. The Union Leader also questioned the use of having dialogues with the people like Hitler.<sup>60</sup> Except for these two all other newspapers either called for the continuation of the dialogue and praised Reagan for not yielding to the hardliners by suspending the arms control talks. They stressed the overwhelming importance of the continuation of the arms control talks. Besides, some of them stressed the need for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. On 5 September 1983, Reagan announced only the suspension of certain cultural, scientific and diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets.<sup>61</sup> He took recourse to arms buildup. His MX

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59. Argus Leader (Siour Falls, S.D.), 3 September 1983, Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 3 September 1983, Rocky Mountain News, 3 September 1983, The Seattle Times, 4 September 1983, The Honolulu Adviser, 2 September 1983, The Post-Tribune, 7 September 1983, The Kansas City Times, 6 September 1983, The Washington Post, 7 September 1983, The Dispatch, 9 September 1983, in the Editorials on File, Vol. 14 No. 17, 1-15 September 1983, p.1014-35.

60. The Burlington Press, (Vt.), 7 September 1983, The Union Leader, 11 September 1983, in The Editorials on File, 1983, Ibid.

61. For the full text of Reagan's address on "the Downed Korean Airliner", on 5 September 1983, see Congressional Quarterly, 39th Annual, 10 September 1983, pp. 1913-14.

(Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) programme easily got the approval of the Congress.

With the announcement of the decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe from November 1983, the Reagan administration was in a position to offer more concessions and show flexibility in the arms control talks.

The Arms Control session on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces started within five days of the shooting down of the Korean plane. As its new proposal at the session, America withdrew its insistence on treating the Soviet SS-20s in Europe and Asia in the same way. The United States further proposed to allow Russia to have more missiles in Asia in return for the United States being allowed to keep extra weapons of its own in reserve for quick transfer to Europe in a crisis.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, on date Reagan announced in the General Assembly of the United Nations, American willingness to accept certain modifications in the arms control proposals. He stated that though the United States still insisted on counting the number of warheads for each side, it would show understanding of the Soviet concern about the British and French forces, and that the United States would reduce its own number of GLCM deployment.<sup>63</sup>

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62. Ed Magnuson, "Moving Back to Square One: Reagan and Andropov Jonst Over Arms Control", Time, 3 October, 1983, pp. 24-26.

63. Congressional Quarterly, 1983, n. 55, p. 1911. See also George C. Church, "Turning on the Heat: The US has Moscow on the Defensive over the Downed Korean Airliner", Time, 19 September 1983, pp. 6-10.

Deployment of Pershing II and GLCM

Yuri Andropov, the former Premier of the Soviet Union, raised doubts about the continuation of the arms control talks when the first GLCMs arrived in Britain in November, 1983. Kvitsinsky, the Soviet negotiator at the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces control table, indicated that Moscow would continue to talk with the United States till the missiles were made operational in late December 1983. The main reason behind this Soviet stand was that it was more concerned about the West German reaction to the deployment of Pershing II on its own territory, which threatened the security of Soviet Union more. The Soviet Union further offered to reduce the number of SS-20s to 140 and move the rest to the West of Urals. But it continued to insist on taking into account the British and French nuclear weapons. Even though Reagan had indicated American willingness to take it into consideration, the proposal was once again rejected by the United States.<sup>64</sup>

The West German Parliament approved the plan to deploy Pershing II and GLCMs by a vote of 286 to 226.<sup>65</sup> On 24 November 1983 the Soviet Union walked out of the arms control talks at Geneva, without setting a date for the resumption of the talks. It was stated that the Soviet delegation

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64. New York Times, 16 November 1983.

65. New York Times, 23 November 1983.

felt compelled "to re-examine all the issues in view of the deployment of new American medium range nuclear missiles in Europe. The deployment had brought about a change in the overall strategic situation."<sup>66</sup>

Breakdown of Arms Control Talks and Arms Buildup

After breakdown of the arms control talks on 24 November 1983, Andropov read a statement on the Soviet television in which he stated the lifting up of the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces on the European side of the Soviet Union. He went on to state that new operational tactical nuclear weapons would be deployed in East Germany and that new Soviet systems would be deployed in the Ocean areas and seas.<sup>67</sup>

On 17 January 1984, the thirty five nation Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe opened, but Gromyko warned against regarding the Stockholm conference as a resumption of the United States - Soviet Union arms control dialogues.<sup>68</sup>

Gromyko on 27 February 1984 stated that the Soviet Union was willing to resume the talks if the United States and NATO were willing to take back their already deployed Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces. But the United States

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66. Ibid.

67. Keesing's Contemporary Archives Vol.30 no.9, September 1984, p. 33127.

68. Ibid.

Department replying to the Soviet suggestion stated that the U.S. was ready to be more flexible once the arms control negotiation began but it was not willing to give any concessions before the talks resumed.<sup>69</sup> Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, the Soviet minister for Defence, spoke of Soviet willingness to resume the talks, if America did not deploy any more new missiles and those already deployed were removed.<sup>70</sup> This was only reiteration of its earlier position.

After the breakdown of the arms control talks, both the Soviet Union and the United States shifted their emphasis to new areas. The United States talked about constructing an anti-ballistic missile defense and in spite of its large costs, started allocating funds for its research and development. The plan was called the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and more popularly known as "The Star War Plan". This search for complete defence by the United States became a matter of serious concern to the Soviet Union. It called for the negotiation to prevent the militarization of outer space, including full mutual renunciation of Anti-Satellite System (AST). The Russians also conveyed their willingness to accept a mutual moratorium on the testing of space arms. In its counter proposal, the United States stated its willing-

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69. New York Times, 4 April 1984.

70. Keessing's Contemporary Archives Vol. 30, no.9, September 1984, p. 33127.

ness to discuss a broad range of issues including the resumption of the arms control negotiations on strategic and medium range nuclear arms. But the American offer was rejected by the Soviet Union as it was more interested in discussing the space weapons.<sup>71</sup>

Chernenkø, who became the Premier of the Soviet Union in October 1984, suggested four areas for opening up the talks. He repeated the Soviet view that the outer space must not be militarised and called for mutual freeze on the nuclear weapons. He asked the United States to ratify the treaties banning underground nuclear testing. He further asked the NATO allies and the United States to pledge not to first use the nuclear weapons. Continuing, he asked for mutual renunciation of the development of the anti-satellite systems and to start conducting talks on the Anti-missile systems immediately.<sup>72</sup>

But Reagan had stated that the Star War Plan was beyond the arms control negotiation. This marred the chances, if they had any at all, of the arms talks.

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces reduction talks faced with great difficulties and even after four years of its inception it could hardly make any headway. The sincerity of the superpowers in conducting a real arms control is questionable. The United States started the

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71. New York Times, 23 May 1984.

72. New York Times, 17 October 1984.



negotiation because of the pressure from its allies. It was more interested in carrying out its planned deployment of nuclear missiles in West Europe and the arms control negotiation was used more as a ploy to lull the opposition to implement its policy. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was interested in the arms control more as a way to halt the modernization plan of the NATO. Moscow's bargaining strategy concentrated less on negotiating at Geneva and more on propagating peace among the people of Western Europe.<sup>73</sup>

Throughout the first three years of negotiations, both the Super Powers offered extreme arms control proposals which were incompatible with the interests of both of them. While Reagan called for the withdrawal of already deployed Soviet SS-20s, the Soviet Union stuck to its position that the British and French nuclear forces be counted as part of Western missiles. The United States did not want to include these missiles because then the arms control negotiation will become a more complicated multilateral venture. Furthermore, the Soviet Union called on Britain and France to negotiate separately with it. This was again viewed as Soviet ploy to split the alliance.

Besides, the political actions of each of the Super Powers adversely affects the arms control proposals. Though

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73. George Russell, "Arms Control: A Soviet Walk Out", Time, 5 December 1983, p.11.

Reagan's policy of continuing with the arms control negotiation in spite of severe pressures on him during the Polish crisis and during the time when the Korean airliner was shot down by the Soviets could be appreciated, at the same time it must also be taken into account that at a time when the peace movements had gained so much strength in Western Europe, Reagan would have faced severe opposition had he decided to walk out of the arms control negotiations. Besides, with Soviet Union constantly threatening to stage a walk out if the nuclear missiles were deployed, the United States could have been more interested in putting the blame for the breakdown of the talks on the Soviet Union instead of taking the blame itself. It would be in American interest to carry out the plan for the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM. Therefore, it did not walk out of the arms control talks in spite of great conservative pressure.

During the negotiation, the United States always rejected the Soviet proposals as mere propaganda. It did not go into the details of the Soviet proposals. Both the super powers were unwilling to see the concern of the other and hardly an agreement could be reached even on the basic points to start the negotiations.

The estimates of the United States and the Soviet Union of each other's nuclear weapons differed greatly. While the United States claimed that the Soviet Union enjoyed superiority in theatre nuclear weapons by excluding its own Forward Based

Nuclear Forces, Soviet Union claimed parity with the United States and NATO by including the British and French nuclear forces. While grossly exaggerating the capabilities of the other, both sides were equally underestimating their own forces.

The United States had excluded its Pershing IA while counting similar missiles of the Soviet Union like the SS-12/22. It also excluded its nuclear tactical aircraft in Western Europe while including all the Soviet frontline Aviation as nuclear capable. The Soviet Union on its part had assumed that all A6s and A7s of the United States as available to NATO and had included the NATO short-range systems also but had excluded its own tactical aircraft.<sup>74</sup>

The following tables gives the US view and Soviet view of their respective and the other side's theatre nuclear forces.<sup>75</sup>

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74. Olive McGraw Marshaw, and Jeffrey D. Forro, eds., Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 62.

75. New York Times, 30 November 1981.

US View

IRBM

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U.S.S.R.

SS-20-250

SS-4+5-350

SS-12/22-100

SS-4+5-30

Bombers

F - 111 - 164

(in Europe)

F - 111 - 63

(in U.S.)

F - 4 - 265

A - 6 - 63

A - 7

Backfire Tu-26-45

Blinder Tu-16-350

Badger Tu-22)

SU-17) - 2700

SU-24)

MIG-27)

560

Total

3825Soviet ViewUS + NATO

French IRBM - 18

French SLBM - 80

UK Polaris - 64

F - 111 - 172

FB - 111 - 65

F - 4 - 246

A - 6) - 240

A - 7)

French Mirage - 46

IV A

U.K. Vulcan - 55

Total986U.S.S.R.

SS - 20 - 243

SS -4+5 - 253

SS-N-5 - 18

Backfire Tu - 26)

Blinder Tu - 22)

Badger Tu - 16)

- 461

Total

975

The United States policy of balancing the land based missile of the Soviet Union with a similar land based missile results only in the escalation of arms race.

The INF negotiations had become more complicated because it involved the interests of not only the Super Powers but also the interests of the allies. Hence, though the formal negotiations were only bilateral, the consultation over the matters of what proposals were to be, took place within the alliance. Hence blame for the stalemate in the arms control talks due to the American position of zero-option must be equally shared by both the allies and the United States.<sup>76</sup> Thus arriving at a consensus within the alliance on the issue of what proposals has to be made is more complicated than the actual process of negotiation itself.

The United States always sought the approval for new arms build up as a bargaining chip which would facilitate the arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The approval for MX-missile programme, neutron bomb and the Pershing II and GLCM had all been sought as necessities to force the Soviet Union into serious arms control negotiations with the United States. But time and again this policy proved to be a failure. The Soviet Union always matched and countered the nuclear missiles of the United States with its own and did not succumb to the American threat. This led only to

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76. Alford, n. 6, p. 24.

an escalation of arms race. In reality, the Soviet Union instead of negotiating more seriously after the American deployment of Pershing II and GLCM staged a walk out and started modernizing its own theatre nuclear forces. The new missiles had caused only the breakdown of the arms control talks. Thus, it can be speculated that the new Strategic Defence Initiative of the United States contributed substantially in further worsening of the already adverse US-Soviet relations.

The arms control negotiation has not achieved the purpose of improving the US-Soviet relations. The mutual suspicion has not been reduced to any extent and its breakdown has indeed resulted in the escalation of the arms race. The INF negotiation for the past three years has not contributed in any way to the improvement of their bilateral relations. It has helped the American theatre modernisation programme.

**CHAPTER V**

**CONCLUSION**

## Chapter V

### CONCLUSION

The Second World War ended the supremacy of the European colonial powers. The end of the war also witnessed the emergence of two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of them identically viewed the importance of Europe to their security. The war shattered Europe was in no position to resist the advancement of the Super Power influence. To advance its economic interests the U.S. desired to harness the capabilities of large number of European scientists, its largest pool of skilled manpower and its tremendous industrial production and raw material resources of the colonies of European states. Politically, the U.S. sought to minimise the influence of competing ideologies in Western Europe. Simultaneously with consolidating their position in Eastern Europe the Soviets sought to increase their influence in Western Europe for similar strategic, economic and political reasons. Thus Europe became the Centre of Super Power rivalry, conflict and confrontation.

Immediately after the Second World War, the American policy-makers viewed the U.S. atomic monopoly as a great strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. They presumed that it would deter any overt or covert Soviet expansionism especially in Europe. But the developments in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Finland which culminated in the establishment of pro-Soviet governments in these states (1947-48) forced American policy-makers to adopt a new policy of containing Soviet expansion advocated by the Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson and the American diplomats like Averell Harriman and George



Kennan.<sup>1</sup> The entire approach had to be reviewed again when the development of far-reaching significance namely, Soviet atomic explosion occurred in August 1949. The attainment of atomic capability by the Soviet Union inevitably had a profound impact on the military calculations of Western allies of the United States.

Thus at the beginning of 1950 the United States faced the presence of huge Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe together with Soviet atomic weapons. The outbreak of Korean war in June 1950 further shattered the assumption that American atomic power would deter communist forces anywhere from risking a military confrontation. Hence the U.S. policy-makers decided to deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe in 1953. The countries of Western Europe welcomed the deployment of nuclear weapons in their territory because this provided them with security with a very low defence expenditure. Besides, it helped in the reconstruction of their war shattered economy. Thus the NATO served the mutual interests of both the U.S. and Western Europe.

The strategic doctrines of "Massive Retaliation" and "Flexible Response" had been the guiding principles behind the American policy towards the Soviet Union in Western Europe. The Soviet attack of Western Europe was to be countered by a flexible American response varying from the use of conventional,

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1 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 41.

tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear weapons. A gradual escalation of the war was anticipated and the situation resulting in the strategic nuclear exchanges was to be averted as far as possible. Moreover, the U.S. had plans to strike massively and effectively at all the vital political, economic and strategic targets in the Soviet Union. The aim was to incapacitate the functioning of the Soviet society and to bring life to a standstill.

The need not only to safeguard the boundaries in the event of war but also the necessity to deter the Soviet attack on Western Europe by threatening a counter-attack on its territory, was felt by the West Europeans. According to the United States, these nuclear weapons which ensure the mutual vulnerability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to each other's attack help in the maintenance of the delicate peace in Western Europe. With the West European allies unwilling to spend more on their conventional defence, more U.S. nuclear weapons like the Atomic demolition mines, nuclear artilleries, land-based missiles like Nike Hercules, Honest John, Lance, Pershing Ia and Sea Launched Cruise Missiles like Tomahawk were deployed in Western Europe, with a range to hit targets in the Soviet Union.

To counter the presence of American troops and nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the Soviet Union deployed conventional and nuclear weapons similar to American atomic demolition mines, artillery and land-based missiles like Frog, Scud B, SS-4 and SS-5 in Eastern Europe and on the Western side of its border. The mutual suspicion and adverse political relations

between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted in the large stockpile of nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

The balance of power slowly changed in the 1960s with the Soviet Union improving the capacity and precision of its nuclear missiles. When the United States was deeply involved in the quagmire of Vietnam war, the Soviet Union concentrated on the research and development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. This enabled the Soviet Union to attain strategic parity with the United States in early 1970s.

The thaw in their political relations in 1970s enabled the signing of SALT I and SALT II. But these treaties did not help in lowering the level of their confrontations. The Soviet Union while coming to an understanding with the U.S. on strategic nuclear weapons, modernized its Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles with mobile, solid-fuelled, three warheaded, land-based SS-20s. The West European allies of the U.S. consequently felt the need for a U.S. land-based missile to effectively counter the threat posed by SS-20s. Besides the credibility of America as a global power was doubted because of its defeat in the Vietnam war. Further, the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the presidency of Jimmy Carter helped in strengthening their suspicion against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet deployment of SS-20s can be viewed as its routine effort to modernize its Intermediate Range Nuclear Missiles. It could also be seen as its effort to strengthen its nuclear armed forces in Europe as these Intermediate Range

Missiles were not controlled by any strategic Arms Control Treaty. But the range of the SS-20s which can hit any targets in Western Europe was perceived by the allies as the Soviet attempt to hold the West Europeans as hostages.

The SALT II treaty was viewed by the West Europeans as an American effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union at the cost of the West European interests. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany in 1977 stressed the need for an American land-based missile to maintain the balance at the theatre nuclear level. This resulted in hectic consultations within the American executive which was followed by heated debates in the U.S. Congress. In 1979, the decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM in the event of the failure of the arms control negotiations was taken to counter the Soviet move by a similar threat to its security from Western Europe. It was to prove the credibility of the American commitment to its Western allies. Besides the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its covert help to the guerilla activities in the third world countries acted as the deciding factor which influenced the decision.

The decisions in the alliance are usually taken after long debate, discussions and a lot of convincing of each of the allies by the United States. In the 1979 decision the two opposite ideas of arms control and arms build-up were linked. Within the alliance the United States faces difficulties at the governmental and the public level.

At the government level, there were growing suspicion

among the allies. The NATO had become an uneasy alliance. The United States and the allies have different perceptions about the Soviet Union. While the European allies are interested in balancing the Soviet power only at the regional level, America is interested in balancing its power globally. The American call to thwart the Soviet expansionist efforts in the third world countries has met with reluctant support from the European allies. Over the years the ideological ground which covered the conflict between the Super Powers had disappeared and the Europeans had realized that while they could economically become more powerful, they were lagging behind in nuclear technology which had brought them under the nuclear dominance of the two giant powers. But the Super Powers are not willing to reduce their dominant role in Europe to any extent.

While America was able to successfully gain the support at the government level for its nuclear modernization programme, it failed to convince the West European public. Moreover, the American strategy of fighting, "limited nuclear war", limited only to the territories of Western Europe and the Soviet Union had successfully projected the nuclear annihilation as a more serious fear than the fear of Soviet expansion or the spread of communism. The American call to fight against communism failed to inspire West Europeans who took to streets to demonstrate against the American deployment of the nuclear weapons in Western Europe. While the West European governments harped on the same old idea of threat from the Soviet Union to sell their

weapons programmes, the people questioned the validity of stockpiling such large quantities of nuclear weapons in their territory. The different attitude of the people and their governments in Western Europe toward the deployment provided the ground for propaganda warfare between the Super Powers who had openly assailed each other in their efforts to influence the people of Western Europe. Psychologically, the West Europeans have been subjected to great pressure.

In their propaganda, they openly accused each other of violating the already signed arms control agreements. The deployment of Pershing II and GLCM became an important issue in the British and West German elections. In West Germany during the national elections, the Super Powers went to the extent of openly supporting the candidates against each other.

The Soviet efforts, to project itself as a peace seeker were successful to a certain extent. Its promise not to use nuclear weapons against those states which do not produce or acquire nuclear weapons or allow them to be deployed in their territory greatly appeal to the West Europeans. It helped to strengthen the voices of the peace protagonists in Western Europe.

The West European peace movements were viewed differently by the Super Powers. The Soviet Union believed that in the West the people can exercise more influence on the policies of their governments. Hence it encouraged these movements which protested only against the American arms build-up. It tried to manipulate these with its various peace proposals, in order to

make the implementation of American Weapons modernisation programme difficult.

The American policy-makers took varied positions toward these peace movements. While the hardliners condemned the movements as a communist ploy to pollute the minds of West Europeans, the moderates saw the need to pacify their sentiments. The latter argued that the genuine concern of people should not be dismissed and that the anti-nuclear call should not be perceived by the United States as a pro-Soviet stand. But, in general, the American policy-makers viewed these anti-nuclear protests as seeking simple solutions to complex problems.

It is evident that the upsurge of the peace movements between 1979 and 1983 was much more due to careless American public policy statements than to a desire to support the Soviet peace proposals. Mainly the American strategic thinking on the nuclear war as a possible, viable and winnable option enhanced the fear of Soviet interventionism in Western Europe to appear as realistic. However, Americans did not consider this fear to be significant.

The United States always found it difficult to carry along with it both the governments and people of Western Europe. The 1979 "dual track decision" by itself showed the extent to which the United States had to compromise in order to pacify the sentiments of the people of Western Europe. The United States was forced to open the arms control negotiations with regard to the theatre nuclear weapons as an essential step to facilitate its weapon modernization programme. While

the United States successfully came to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the strategic arms, it could not similarly sign an agreement controlling its theatre nuclear weapons. The arms control negotiations at this level faces many problems. The problems faced by the United States is both at the intra-alliance level and at the bilateral level with the Soviet Union.

Firstly, the United States and the allies have always jointly bargained with the Soviet Union. The open debates which take place within the alliance reveals divergent policy positions of the various West European nations. The Soviet interest in fishing in troubled waters helps only in complicating the issue further by offering to negotiate separately with the allies. The NATO alliance, consisting of the United States, the small nuclear powers like Britain and France and the non-nuclear states, react differently to the Soviet offers. The allies are always suspicious that the United States would bargain off their interests to serve its own interest and thus act as a pressure group on the United States. The arms control negotiations very sensitive at the bilateral level itself, become all the more difficult. Each time, the Soviet Union offers any modification in its position, the corresponding change in the American stand can be taken only after consultations within its alliance which causes inordinate delay.<sup>2</sup>

The United States opened the Theatre Nuclear Forces negotiations to convince the West European public about the

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<sup>2</sup> Jonathan Alford, ed., Arms Control and European Security (Hampshire: Gower, 1984), p. 24.



necessity of the modernization programme. The Soviet Union while negotiating with the United States, simultaneously carried on its propaganda efforts in the vain hope of influencing the American policy through public opinion. This reduced to a great extent its seriousness and purpose of these negotiations.

Thus for nearly two years from the beginning of the INF talks on 30 November 1981 both sides offered positions which were unacceptable to the other. This resulted in stalemate. Besides certain technical questions like the definition of strategic weapons whether to count the number of warheads or missile launchers, the question of British and French forces had been the stumbling blocks in these negotiations.

Both Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev publicly profess about their genuine interest in making the world free of nuclear weapons. But they differ in their means. While the U.S. President has suggested a defence-oriented strategic system to the world, of which his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) forms the beginning, the Soviet Premier wants to achieve it by limiting the present nuclear stockpile by stages thereby getting rid of them in the years to come. To that effect, in January 1986, on the eve of the new negotiations at Geneva Gorbachev offered a comprehensive disarmament proposal which included all kinds of weapons namely, conventional, theatre, strategic and even space weapons.

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3 George J. Church, "A Farewell to Arms? Gorbachev's disarming proposal combines bold visions and potential pitfalls", Time (Chicago), 27 January 1986, pp. 6-8.

In the first stage, from 1985-90, Gorbachev has called for the reduction of nuclear weapons which are capable of striking each other's territory to 6,000 warheads on each side. While the Soviets include the American intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, they agree to exclude the British and French nuclear weapons during this stage on the condition that they do not upgrade their present systems.<sup>4</sup>

Reagan has welcomed Gorbachev's proposal with caution.<sup>5</sup> The American strategists and policy-makers are studying the proposal. The proposal shows that the Super Powers have still not agreed on a common definition of what constitutes the strategic nuclear weapons. While the United States restricts it to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles alone, the Soviets want to include the American theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe also. It is a positive sign that the Soviets have removed one hurdle by not including the British and French forces, but it has asked them to stop their modernization programme for which the allies might not agree. Besides, Soviets insist that the SDI programme to which Reagan is committed be given up. While these remain as the bone of contention, one positive sign is the Soviets agreeing to allow on-site inspection. It would to a great extent solve the verification problem. The mutual suspicion between the Super Powers had been

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4 Ibid.

5 The Washington Post, 16 January 1986.

built over the years and it can only be brought down by a step by step approach. The political disagreements and the arms race had always been aiding and abetting each other. Hence the attempt to stop one while the other is going on is impracticable.

The Americans who are more advanced in the field of technology had always convinced the people that to make the Soviets negotiate, new nuclear weapons with greater precision are needed. They are described as "bargaining chips". But the arms control negotiations had time and again proved that it has only resulted in further proliferation of nuclear weapons and escalation of arms race. The technological competition between the Super Powers help to stabilize their economy. The Super Powers share the common interest in possessing high level innovative technology which they can sell at high cost to the third world countries. Unless, this technological competition is replaced by co-operation, any genuine arms control cannot be attained.

**APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX

### Communique Issued at a Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, Brussels, Decem- ber 12, 1979.

#### INTRODUCTION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES INTO EUROPE

1. At a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in LRTNF [long-range theater nuclear forces] both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in

age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF [theater nuclear forces] and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive considerations, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace

existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 GLCM [ground-launched cruise missiles], all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program; the missiles will be stationed in selected countries, and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope, and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armor as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980s. They regard arms control as an integral

part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.



C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member states. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the

scale of NATO's TNF modernization requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

Table 1.2. US theatre nuclear forces, 1985

Delivery system	Weapon system		Year deployed	Range (km)	Warheads × yield	Warhead type	Number in stockpile
	Type	No. deployed					
Aircraft	<sup>a</sup>	2 000	—	1 060–2 400	1–3 × bombs	<sup>a</sup>	2 800
Land-based missiles	Pershing II	54	1983	1 790	1 × 0.3–80 kt	W-85	54
	GLCM	80	1983	2 500	1 × 0.2–150 kt	W-84	100
	Pershing Ia	144	1962	740	1 × 60–400 kt	W-50	280
	Lance	100	1972	125	1 × 1–100 kt	W-70	1 282
	Honest John	24	1954	38	1 × 1–20 kt	W-31	200
	Nike Hercules	200	1958	160	1 × 1–20 kt	W-31	500
Artillery <sup>b</sup>	<sup>b</sup>	4 300	1956	30	1 × 0.1–12 kt	<sup>b</sup>	2 422
Atomic demolition mines	Medium/special	610	1964	—	1 × 0.01–15 kt	W-45/54	610
<i>Naval systems</i>							
Carrier aircraft	<sup>c</sup>	900	—	550–1 800	1–2 × bombs	<sup>c</sup>	1 000
Land-attack SLCMs	Tomahawk	50	1984	2 500	1 × 5–150 kt	W-80	50
ASW systems	ASROC	n.a.	1961	10	1 × 5–10 kt	W-44	574
	SUBROC	n.a.	1965	60	1 × 5–10 kt	W-55	285
	P-3/S-3/SH-3	630	1964	2 800	1 × < 20 kt	B-57	897
Ship-to-air missiles	Terrier	n.a.	1956	35	1 × 1 kt	W-45	100

<sup>a</sup> Aircraft include Air Force F-4, F-16 and F-111, and NATO F-16, F-100, F-104 and Tornado. Bombs include four types with yields from sub-kt to 1.45 Mt.

<sup>b</sup> There are two types of nuclear artillery (155-mm and 203-mm) with three different warheads: a 0.1-kt W-48, 155-mm shell; a 1–12-kt W-33, 203-mm shell; and a 1-kt W-79, enhanced-radiation, 203-mm shell.

<sup>c</sup> Aircraft include Navy A-6, A-7, F/A-18 and Marine Corps A-4, A-6 and AV-8B. Bombs include three types with yields from 20 kt to 1 Mt.

Sources: Cochran, T. B., Arkin, W. M. and Hoenig, M. H., *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1: US Forces and Capabilities* (Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1984), updated in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August/September 1984.

*Nuclear weapons*

Florennes, Belgium	48 between March 1985 and December 1987
Hasselbach, FR Germany	96 between June 1986 and June 1988
Woensdrecht, Netherlands	48 between December 1986 and June 1988
Molesworth, UK	64 between September 1987 and December 1988

In the Netherlands the final government decision on deployment was again delayed until November 1985. The nuclear-armed Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile was first deployed in June 1984 (see section V).

A number of other important developments concerning lesser known weapons occurred during 1984 (see table 1.2). The October 1983 NATO Ministers' meeting in Montebello, Canada, called for the withdrawal of

Table 1.3. US European nuclear modernization, 1985-92

Weapon system (warhead)	As of 1985	Withdrawals <sup>a</sup>	As of 1992
<i>Stored in Europe</i>			
Pershing II	54	0	108
Pershing 1a	231	131	100
Ground-launched CM	100	0	464
Bombs	1 730	0	1 730
Lance	690	0	690
Honest John	190	190	0
Nike Hercules	680	680	0
8-inch (W-33)	930	500	430
8-inch (W-79)	0	0	200 <sup>b</sup>
155-mm (W-48)	730	350	380
155-mm (W-82)	0	0	100
Atomic demolition mines	370	370	0
Depth bombs	190	0	190
Total in Europe	5 895	2 221	4 392
<i>Committed to Europe<sup>c</sup></i>			
Poseidon	400	0	400
Carrier bombs	360	0	500
Bombs	600	0	800
Depth bombs	140	0	140
Lance	380	0	380
8-inch (W-79)	200	0	200
Total committed	2 080	0	2 420
<b>Total</b>	<b>7 975</b>	<b>2 221</b>	<b>6 812</b>

<sup>a</sup> Withdrawals in accordance with the modernization decision of 1979 (equal withdrawals for deployments); the Montebello decision of 1983 (1 400 additional withdrawals); and (other) anticipated changes in artillery stockpiles.

<sup>b</sup> Deployment of non-enhanced radiation warheads in Europe.

<sup>c</sup> Warheads committed by Europe or planned for storage in Europe (does not include tactical naval nuclear weapons).

Source: Authors' estimates.

Table 1.6. Soviet theatre nuclear forces, 1985

Delivery systems	Weapon system		Year deployed	Range (km)	Warheads × yield	Number in stockpile <sup>a</sup>
	Type	No. deployed				
Aircraft	Tu-16 Badger	316	1955	4 800	2 × bombs and ASMs	632
	Tu-22 Blinder	139	1962	2 200	1 × bombs or ASMs	139
Land-based missiles	Tactical aircraft <sup>b</sup>	2 545	—	700-1 000	1-2 × bombs	2 545
	SS-20	396 <sup>c</sup>	1977	5 000	3 × 150 kt	2 376
	SS-4	224	1959	2 000	1 × 1 Mt	224
	SS-12	120	1969	800	1 × 200 kt-1 Mt	120
	SS-22	100	1979	900	1 × 1 Mt	100
	Scud B	570	1965	280	1 × 100-500 kt	1 140
	SS-23	48	1982	350	1 × 100 kt	48
	Frog	620	1965	70	1 × 10-200 kt	2 480
	SS-21	120	1978	120	1 × 20-100 kt	480
	SS-C-1B <sup>d</sup>	100	1962	450	1 × 50-200 kt	100
Artillery		n.a.	1956	40-300	1 × low kt	n.a.
		1 080	1974	10-30	1 × low kt	1 080
Atomic demolition mines	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	—	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Naval systems</i>						
Aircraft	Tu-22M Backfire	105	1974	5 500	2 × bombs or ASMs	210
	Tu-16 Badger	240	1961	4 800	1-2 × bombs or ASMs	480
	Tu-22 Blinder	35	1962	2 200	1 × bombs	35
	ASW aircraft <sup>e</sup>	200			1 × depth bombs	200

Anti-ship cruise missiles	SS-N-3	336	1962	450	1 × 350 kt	336
	SS-N-7	96	1968	56	1 × 200 kt	96
	SS-N-9	200	1968	280	1 × 200 kt	200
	SS-N-12	136	1976	500	1 × 350 kt	136
	SS-N-19	88	1980	460	1 × 500 kt	88
	SS-N-22	36	1981	110	1 × ? kt	36
ASW missiles and torpedoes	SS-N-14	310	1968	50	1 × low kt	310
	SS-N-15	76	1972	40	1 × 10 kt	76
	SUW-N-1	10	1967	30	1 × 5 kt	10
	Torpedoes	n.a.	1957	16	1 × low kt	n.a.
Ship-to-air missiles	SA-N-6	264	1977	55	1 × low kt	264

<sup>a</sup> Estimates of total warheads are based on minimal loadings of delivery systems.

<sup>b</sup> Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft models include Su-24 Fencer, Su-17 Fitter, MiG-27 Flogger, MiG-21 Fishbed, Yak-28 Brewer, MiG-25 Foxbat and Su-25 Frogfoot.

<sup>c</sup> The Soviet Union denies that the figure is as high as this.

<sup>d</sup> Land-based anti-ship missile.

<sup>e</sup> Land-based surface-to-air missiles. Nuclear-capable SAMs probably include SA-1, SA-2, SA-5 and SA-10.

<sup>f</sup> Artillery includes 152-mm towed and self-propelled guns and 180-mm, 203-mm and 240-mm calibres.

<sup>g</sup> Includes Bear, Mail and May aircraft.

Sources: Arkin, W. M. and Sands, J. I., 'The Soviet nuclear stockpile', *Arms Control Today*, June 1984, pp. 1-7; Polmar, N., *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, 3rd ed. (US Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1983); Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1st, 2nd, 3rd eds; NATO, *NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons*, 1st, 2nd eds; Defense Intelligence Agency, 'A guide to foreign tactical nuclear weapon systems under the control of ground force commanders', DST-1040S-541-83 (secret, partially declassified), 9 September 1983; Statement of Rear Admiral John L. Butts, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower and Force Projection Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 February 1985.

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