

DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY : A STUDY OF INDIA'S POLICY

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PREFACE

In the immediate aftermath of World War I it was widely held that increased spending on weaponry by the great powers had in its own way been responsible for the outbreak of that conflagration. Thus during the inter-war period the question of disarmament became a matter of concern. That the different efforts aimed at promoting "international peace and security" and curb the stockpiling of arms failed, is another story. What needs to be emphasized is that there was an awareness of this issue, which was naturally reflected in the League of Nations.

While independent India has been an ardent and vocal champion of this cause, it is worth mentioning that its involvement with the problems related to disarmament goes back to the days of the League. Of course, the fact that Indian interests were subordinate to those of the British imperial power meant that the various Indian delegations to the League of Nations could hardly deviate from the British position on the matter. Nevertheless, there was within the country a body that was more representative of Indian opinion and that was the Indian National Congress (INC). The INC, permeated as it was with Gandhian non-violence, consistently advocated the path of peace, at home as well as abroad, And here in lie the roots of India's attitude towards disarmament. It will indeed be a travesty of truth to deny that the views of the INC on disarmament and on peace and security were solely motivated

by Gandhian ideas. To do this would be to ignore the philosophical basis of Indian foreign policy. It is in this context that in Chapter I we propose to deal with the philosophical underpinnings and historical evolution of the quest for peace.

Viewed against this back drop, the Nehruvian opposition to conventional as well as nuclear arms seems but natural. In Chapter II, which deals with India's disarmament policy from 1947 to 1962, we find that the approach was essentially idealistic - based on general, universal concern resulting from the proliferation of conventional weapons and the stockpiling of nuclear arms. It is necessary to bear in mind that the same period was also characterized by the Cold War. This being the global picture there was ample justification for concern. India's response was manifested not merely in its Non-aligned policy and in its efforts to emerge as an "area of peace", but also in its relentless quest for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) at various fora. It would not be out of place to mention that India's meagre defense spendings and its firm decision of not manufacturing nuclear weapons was in part a reflection of its commitment to disarmament.

Efforts directed at arms control continued, aided by proposals from several countries including India with a view to breaking the deadlock between the two super powers. Their efforts yielded partial successes such as PTBT (1963) and the

NPT (1968). Chapter III seeks to explain India's stand on these two major arms control agreements of the 1960s. This chapter also deals with India's concern about nuclear proliferation after China became a nuclear weapon State in 1964. Besides, it also deals briefly with the process of detente which reduced the rigidities of the Cold War and resulted in agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty, the Sea Bed Treaty and SALT I. While not overlooking the fact that detente had served to improve the climate of peace by reducing the level of tension between the super powers and welcoming arms control measures as were concluded, India continued to underscore the utmost necessity of concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for, in the absence of such a treaty there could be no disarmament in the real sense of the word. Events since then have only served to confirm India's point of view.

Chapter IV deals with events after the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 at Pokharan. The reasons why India exploded a peaceful nuclear device, were, among other things, to signal that India was keeping its nuclear option open. As expected, this created a furore in South Asia with Pakistan coming up with the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone proposal, followed by Nepal's proposal to declare Nepal as a Zone of Peace. India did not agree with both the proposals, on the ground that a) the concept of a Zone of Peace should come from all the countries concerned and b) it

should be voluntary in nature.

On the other hand, the concept of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, was given full support by India, since the increased militarization of the Indian Ocean by the super powers proved to be detrimental to her national interests. The increased militarization of the Indian Ocean was heightened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. India viewed all this with alarm. The deteriorating global environment going to the second Cold War and the unsettled conditions along the "arc of crisis" have combined to affect India's security environment. This is reflected in Chapter V with particular emphasis on the South Asian region.

Chapter VI examines the nexus between Non-aligned and Disarmament. For, given these stated objectives on the Non-aligned movement, disarmament is central to the strengthening of international peace and security, and it is no less important for the national security of individual Non-aligned countries. Therefore, the NAM becomes an appropriate forum for countries such as India to press for disarmament.

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Chapter - I

THE QUEST FOR PEACE AND STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT; PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

War is as old as organized human society. So is abhorrence against its devastation. The eternal quest for peace is fuelled by this and the momentum of the struggle for disarmament is sustained by this compelling emotion. One of the most moving expressions of this noble, idealistic sentiment is found in the Old Testament where the Prophet Issiah burst forth poetically:

And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks:
Nations shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war anymore. (1)

Such pacific stirrings did not remain confined to the Judaic-Christian tradition. Many centuries before the birth of Christ, philosophers in East had expatiated on the futility of war and exhorted their followers to give up the contest of arms. Tao Te Ching is considered the principal classic in the thought of Taoism. Traditionally ascribed to Lao Tzu, an older contemporary of Confucius, it is more probably an anthology of wise sayings compiled in about the 4th century B.C. Its tone is more moral than mystical and it advocates the philosophy of meekness as the surest path to survival. In substance and their poetic charm as well as in their anti-

1 Issiah, II.4.

war fervour the relevant extracts from Tao Te Ching are comparable to the passage quoted from the Old Testament:

Arms are instruments of ill omen, not the instruments of gentlemen.... There is no glory in victory, and to glorify it despite this is to exult in the killing of men... When great numbers of people are killed, one should weep over them in sorrow. When victorious in war, one should observe the rites of mourning.(2)

It is not only the poets and philosophers who have lamented the loss of life in warfare. Emperors too in the full flush of their imperialist adventure have been smitten with remorse by bloodshed. The most famous example is of Asoka whose 13th major rock edict seems to echo almost verbatim the precepts of Lao Tzu. The Asokan tradition of pacifism has exercised a powerful sway on the Indian mind since then and this edict merits a closer look:

'When he had been consecrated eight years, the beloved of the Lords, the King Priyadassi, conquered Kalinga. A hundred and fifty thousand people were deported, a hundred thousand were killed and many times that number perished. (Afterwards, now that Kalinga was annexed)... on conquering Kalinga the beloved of Gods felt remorse, for, when an

2 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, translated by D.C.Lou (Middlesex, 1982), pp.89-90.

independent country is extremely grievous ... What is even more deplorable to the Beloved of the Gods, is that all who dwell there ... all suffer violence, murder and separation from their loved ones. Even those who are fortunate to have escaped, and whose love is undiminished (by the brutalizing effect of war), suffer from the misfortunes of their friends, acquaintances, colleagues and relatives".³

Buddhism and Christianity enjoy, not without reason, reputation as 'peace religions'. Asoka's revulsion against war fortified his commitment to Ahimsa (non-violence) and encouraged him in his Dhamma exertions. One of the Ten Commandments is 'Thou Shalt not kill'. However, one must hasten to add that the taboo against killing members of one's own species is almost universal and other religions too have their own version of this prohibition.

It has been argued that aggression - the prime mover of war - is an innate instinct in animals and man is nothing else but a 'naked ape'. What else can be expect^{ed} but that life is going to be a nasty, brutish and short? Struggle for existence, to borrow Darwin's aphoristic phrase, is the survival

³ See Romila Thapar, Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas (Delhi, OUP, 1982), pp.255-56.

of the fittest and if this premise is conceded war is logically legitimized. From Hobbes to Konrad Lorenz the line of scientists, and scholars is a long one but does not necessarily validate their conclusions. It cannot be overlooked that while aggression is innate in animals and ensures the survival of a species to protect an environment it is usually quite harmless. Beasts treat each other in a rather civilized way.

Siddhartha Gautama who attained enlightenment (an apt word in the non-religious context also) in the 6th century before Christ had realized that peace can be attained when the veil of illusion is pierced - distorted perceptions given up - and the essential unity of beings perceived. The cycle of karma was an explanatory device to emphasise that violence can only perpetuate a vicious circle. Non-violence, accordingly was prescribed as the best course of action (right conduct).

Ironically, the pacifist creed in different religions has seldom inhibited the adherents from taking up arms and launching destructive campaigns. Kanishka and Harsha following in the footsteps of Asoka had little difficulty in combining Buddhist piety with victorious marches. Similarly, although 'Christian soldiers' were unheard of till 170 A.D., Christianity was made the official religion of the Roman

empire in 381 A.D. and by the end of that century one had to be Christian to be in the army. Pacifism was wiped out for about 1,000 years in Christendom. This 'lapse' was justified in defence against the invasion of barbarians. Protests against decadent papacy continued to simmer and there was revolt against dogmatism by the start of the 16th century. The most spectacular reassertion of pacifism was made by the opposition to Protestant rebel Zwingli. The Anabaptists accused him of compromising with secular power. This group was persecuted and disintegrated but not without leaving behind a valuable legacy. The most significant descendant of the Anabaptists was Count Leo Tolstoy who became with the passage of years an impassioned anarchist and pacifist, and left a deep imprint on the mind of Gandhi.

Another, non-anarchic tradition of pacifism derives its inspiration from the Christian gospel. This is the sect of Quakers founded by a peasant named George Fox who first appeared in battle radically arrayed with Cromwell. The Quakers turned pacifist in 1650 A.D. after their hopes of establishing a New Jerusalem were belied but have continued to be quite influential. Quakers' view war as wasteful and have exerted considerably in various peace movements since the early 19th century. (Relations of Quaker settlers in America with the original Indian inhabitants were by and large quite peaceful - in 1681. William Penn agreed to an

unarmed unsworn Treaty with them in 1756; all the Quaker members resigned from the Assembly rather than to vote for war subsidies.).

However, the mainsprings of the powerful pacific sentiments are not confined to the domain of religion. In the age of enlightenment, ushered in by the discoveries of Isaac Newton and Rene Descartes, man's conception of universe changed gradually and profoundly. As people lost their faith in heaven they began to pin hopes instead of making peace on earth. This rational-humanist world view has always maintained that detente is preferable to deterrence in the quest of peace.

Due to the polemical complexities a selective historical review is called for.

The Marxists do not concede the claim that it is only the liberals who are the custodians of peace. Trotsky did not mince words:

As for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian priestly and vegetarian Quaker prattle about 'the sacredness of human life! To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him and this problem can only be solved with blood and iron.⁴

4. Cited in Ian Kellas, *Peace For Beginners*, (London, 1984), p.104.

Leo Trotsky was only faithfully following his master Karl Marx who had pronounced, 'force is the mid-wife of every old society' and contended that peace was unattainable till class oppression ends and the State withers away. In more recent years, chairman Mao has held that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' and not all wars are abominable. (Clearly according to revolutionary canons, wars of National Liberation and resistance against imperialists fall in a different category of 'Just' wars - perhaps even necessary, compellingly moral. It is easy enough to demonstrate that the Marxist theory hinges on the importance of material power and that the pursuit of peace is rendered naively idealistic. This would be a grave fallacy.).

In 1899, the major European Socialist parties had formed the Second International and sworn not to fight capitalist wars. Strikes to paralyse the war effort were planned but when war came Lenin found it possible to apply Marxist logic to justify participation in it.

'If the war rouses among the whimpering petty bourgeoisie only horror and fright, then we must say: capitalist society is always an endless horror'.

At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that while liberal peace societies folded up in 1914, it was the socialists who took lead in war resistance. The pacifist tendency of the socialists did not last long. Most socialists decided that revolution had to be defended in Spain against

the attack of the Fascists. Anti-imperialism has proved to be stronger than pacifism. Many politicians and statesmen have, however, persevered to militate against the barbarity of war. Among these, two Indians occupy a prominent place - Gandhi and Nehru. It may be mentioned in passing that both of them recognized the debt owed to another Indian of an earlier generation, Rabindra Nath Tagore for spreading the message of universal brotherhood and creative potential of peace. The names of the institutions fathered by Tagore - Vishwa Bharati, Shanti Niketan testify to the commitment of surrender to peace and international goodwill.

The Legacy of Gandhi

Mohandas Karam Chand Gandhi has become famous the world over as the Mahatma not only because of his outstanding contribution to the liberation of India from colonial yoke but also to world peace. Gandhi propagated the doctrine of non-violence, not as passive submission to evil, but as an active and positive instrument for the peaceful solution of international differences. He emphasised that the human spirit is more powerful than the most devastating armaments. He never ceased to apply moral values to political action and pointed out that ends and means can never be separated. He realized very well that any society based on injustice must necessarily have the seeds of conflict and decay within

itself.⁵

Gandhi was no saint or blurry eyed sentimentalist. His pacifism derived from the twin sources - superficially incongruous - religious pacifism drawn from Hindu and Christian - anarchist traditions and an uncanny utilitarian appreciation of power. This is the secret of his successful use of satyagraha - a technique of non-violent resistance. Nobody before this had tried seriously this personal technique in political arena on a mass scale. (Many of the followers of Bertrand Russell in 'Ban the Bomb' movement adopted Gandhian tactics with great effect). Satyagraha - harmonising ends and means sought to transform apparent feebleness into strength. It was projected as a kind of moral ju-jitsu.

It is only fair to take note of the fact that Gandhi was not the inventor of non-violent mass resistance. Long before Gandhi, non-violent mass resistance had been used (with partial success) against imperialist as well as autocratic governments e.g. The Dutch resistance to the Spanish (1565-1576); Hungarian resistance to the Austrians (1850-1867); Revolt against the Russian Tzar (1905). It needs to be added though in most of the cases this method was tried after violent opposition had failed.

5 For detailed exposition of these ideas refer to Gandhi's Autobiography and for an exhaustive treatment the Collected Works.

The techniques of Gandhian (non-violent) Satyagraha raises some important theoretical and practical issues. It has been used with obvious if not total success for social reform and liberation - particularly against liberal governments. The question remains unanswered: Does non-violence work internationally - against bloody-minded militarist aggressors?

The issue has become topical as since the Vietnam war Marx seems to have been displaced by Gandhi from the radical pedestal. The peace movement which was engendered by the 'counter-culture' during the Vietnam years had drawn a lot of hippies and feminists to Gandhi. This alternative life-style never fulfilled its promise. The pacifist struggle for peace disintegrated as the war drew to its weary end, and has spawned numerous feebler non-violent reform campaigns ranging from gay liberation to ecological conservation.

Are there inherent limitations in Gandhian method or it has not been given a fair trial? Gandhian peace-making did not rule out violence in all circumstances. It was better than cowardice which Gandhi called 'violence double distilled'. Gandhi had himself volunteered for ambulance service in the Boer war and helped recruitment at the start of World War I. The pacific Mahatma thought that the Allies were right in the Second World War but advised the British to abstain from violence as he thought: "At one stroke Hitler

will find that all his tremendous armament has been put out of action".⁶

It is true that Gandhi never worked out a viable system of non-violent national defence but threatened the Japanese with total non-cooperation if they invaded India. When asked how he would cope with the A-bomb he responded:

I will come out in the open and let the pilot see I have not a trace of evil against him. The pilot will not see our faces from his great height, I know. But the longing in our heart that he will not come to harm would reach upto him and his eyes would be opened.(7)

All this may seem fantastic and impractical in the modern world, used as it is to stereotyped, stilted thinking. Failure of other methods (those negating idealism) is equally transparent. Keeping in mind the limitations of human nature and structure of the global system, perhaps war cannot be ruled out absolutely. But, as Nehru had once pointed out:

So long as we do not recognize the supremacy of the moral law in our national and international relations, we shall have no enduring peace. So long as we do not adhere to right means, the ends will not be right and fresh evil will flow from it.(8)

6 Cited in Ian Kellas, n.4, p.128.

7 Ibid., p.129.

8 S.Gopal, (ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru : An Anthology (Delhi, 1983), p.390.

This is the essence of Gandhi's message and mankind cannot afford not to heed to it.

Nehru's Contribution

Jawaharlal Nehru was designated as his political successor by the Mahatma and he loyally carried the message forward.

Jawaharlal Nehru is often described, and not without reason, as a man of two worlds - synthesising in his personality the values of East and West. In the pursuit of peace, indeed he was as much an inheritor of the Buddhist-Asokan tradition/legacy as of the liberal-socialist-humanist of the Fabian stream. His increasingly significant - participation in India's freedom struggle and the advent on international arena can well be used as the trail point with rays of light coming from different directions illuminate something brilliantly. Without much exaggeration it can be asserted that peace for Jawaharlal was a life long passion - he seemed to have assimilated the distilled wisdom of mankind and articulated the anguish against war exceptionally.

As early as 1927, at the time of the Brussels convention of the oppressed people he had cautioned his countrymen (and the world) against the dangers of war:

No man or woman can ignore it, least of all an Indian who desires to achieve freedom for his country.... Today Europe is perhaps a greater powder magazine than it was in 1914. (9)

The resolutions adopted by the AICC at its annual session from then on show the unmistakable imprint of Jawaharlal Nehru. His interest in world affairs was not merely political (related to Indian independence), but was also propelled by love for peace. The lines written shortly after the outbreak of Second World War bear ample testimony to this:

It is an interesting and instructive exercise for the student of history to collect and read the various declarations of war aims which conquerors and governments have made throughout the ages. Always he will find a justification on the highest moral grounds, either religious or political; every aggression is justified, every brutality is condoned for the preservation of some high principle. Often he will discover that it is only the love of ultimate peace that urges the conqueror and aggressor onward.... The desire to hide one's real motives under cover of fine phrases and pious doctrine is a human feeling common to the East and the West.... Is humanity always to go through the self-same round of deceit; must there always be this vast gap between the spoken word and the shady deed? (10)

Soon after Jawaharlal prepared a confidential note for the Congress Working Committee's deliberations at Wardha in which he argued forcefully. Why India should strive for disarmament and exert in the cause of peace. This note is both a testament of belief and declaration of intent. Undoubtedly, Nehru's thinking profoundly influenced independent India's policies. It would be worth our while to cast a

closer look at this document:

Both because of our adherence to the principle of non-violence and from practical considerations arising from our understanding of world events, we believe that complete disarmament of all national States should be aimed at, and is in fact an urgent necessity if the world is not to be reduced to barbarism....

Disarmament ultimately depends on far reaching changes in the political and economic structure of the world, leading to a removal of the basic causes of war....

There is another important aspect of disarmament. What exactly is disarmament? Not to keep an army, or a navy, or military aeroplanes may be the obvious answer, yet this is totally insufficient...(11)

One cannot help admiring the clarity of thought and prescience of the man. The extract cited anticipated the debate relating to the relationship between disarmament-development and recognized the relationship between world peace and an equitable distribution of resources.

Jawaharlal Nehru accorded greater priority to world peace than even the struggle against the neo-colonialist forces and the anti-imperialist confrontations. This led to the ugly clash with Soekarno at Belgrade. The course of history, however, indicates that Nehru is likely to be vindicated. The fate of earth hinges on precarious balance. Fear consumes us all living under the shadow of mushroom cloud and it is useful to remember Nehru's warning broadcast to the USA in April 1948, 'When eyes are bloodshot, vision is limited.'¹²

11 Ibid., pp.388-89.

12 Ibid., p.390.

**More Towards Outlawry of War: Rising Tide against
Brutalities of war, and Institutionalization of
Protests**
(from the Crimean war to the foundation of the UN)

The Crimean war occupies a very interesting position in contemporary history. Fought in a strange semi-twilight to borrow David Thompson's picturesque phrase, it foreshadowed the next century of war fears and acute insecurity. It broke a long spell of peace, "was a fumbling war, probably unnecessary, largely futile, certainly extravagant, yet rich in unintended consequences".¹³

One of these 'unintended consequences' was galvanization of concerted international efforts to reduce, if not to eliminate, the ravages of war in industrial society. It did a lot to debunk the feudal glorification of warfare. The two Disarmament Conferences at Hague (1899, 1907) were direct offshoots. Even afterwards 'Militarism' was viewed with great apprehension and 'pacifist' demands came to be articulated regularly in political programmes. "The issue raised its head whenever national parliament considered expenditure on naval and military establishments".¹⁴

The great war left the nations harrassed and exhausted and prepared the ground for the League of Nations experiment.

13 David Thompson, Europe Since Napoleon (Middlesex, 1976), p.250.

14 Ibid., p.422.

The League was, in fact, the revival and an elaboration of the idea of the concert of Europe, an improved and wider version of the series of congresses which the great powers had held from time to time throughout the past century. At the same time it was something novel, inspired by the idealistic vision of Woodrow Wilson an effort to institutionalize the pacific settlement of international disputes. It sought to forge a system of collective security to preserve peace. Unfortunately, the League was not destined to become anything more than 'an influential debating society'. The failure of the USA to become a member, combined with the exclusion of Germany and Russia sealed its fate. It was constrained to remain in a fragile state of status quo. It proved impotent in coping with challenges posed by militaristic Japan, Germany and Italy. Nonetheless the efforts devoted to the outlawry of war (e.g. the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact) contributed in no small measure towards shaping international public opinion in favour of peace.

There is no need to undertake a detailed analysis of the failure of League here, suffice it to note that the grand failure was not devoid of nobility of purpose and laid the foundation for the UN edifice after two decades. The trauma of the Second World War and the use of atomic weapons against Japan administered a sobering jolt to statesmen. The preamble to the Charter of United Nations explicitly records the resolve

- to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and
- to practice tolerance and live together in peace...
- to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.

Article 1 of the Charter elaborates this undertaking even more explicitly.

British Indian Government's Stand on Peace and Disarmament during the Inter War Years

The Indian delegations participated in the various sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations and although it participated only as subordinate to the British representation, the delegates were keen to protect their separate identity. Issues of disarmament - reduction of armament and military interventions involving Indian troops in colonial ventures greatly exercised their minds. No opportunity was missed to assert independence of mind in these matters.

The Maharaja of Patiala had received implicitly 'instructions' from London to guide the Indian delegations at the League Assembly. This was disputed/contradicted by V.S. Srinivas Shastri, the Indian delegate in 1923 who, while admitting that a 'Memorandum from the Government of India was the basis of India's stand' added that "we should have repudiated with indignation" had the instruction come from the India office. To many it may appear to be sophisticated hair-

splitting to maintain this legalistic difference.¹⁵ Heimsath and Man Singh note, as a matter of record, therefrom "other evidence now available it appears that Shastri was in essential error, although the memorandum he referred to may have indeed come from India".¹⁶ All the same, it must be appreciated that even those Indians collaborating with the colonial masters found it necessary to explain their stand on issues of peace as an Indian - basically in consonance with the aspirations of the Indian people.

Further corroboration for this contention is provided by the following extract from the Report of the Delegates of India to the Eighth session of the Assembly of League of Nations :

As far as the principal questions before the Assembly, namely, that reduction of armaments, security and arbitration, were concerned, the position of India, like that of the dominions, was necessarily one of subordinate operation with the British delegation. Such objections as the delegation thought fit to urge against certain provisions in the draft under consideration, it found more convenient to express in informal meetings of the Empire Delegations than in the open committee or in the Assembly. (17)

15 Cited in Charles H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay, 1971) p.30.

16 Ibid.

17 Cited in Ibid.

At the AICC meeting held in Delhi in 1921, a landmark resolution in the history of foreign relations was adopted. It informed, inter alia, "the neighbouring and other non-Indian States that (1) the present Government of India in no way represent, Indian opinion... (2) India's people have no designs upon any of them."¹⁸ During subsequent years a series of resolutions was adopted, under the inspiration of Nehru reflecting the growing involvement of the national movement led by the Congress Party and expressing the pacifist sentiment. For instance in 1927, Indian reluctance to take part in war preparations was unequivocally stated.¹⁹ By 1936 the hatred of war and an abiding desire for peace in the world had crystallized as a cardinal principle of policy.²⁰ During these years V.K.Krishna Menon played an important role, through Nehru, in drafting these resolutions. In the greetings sent to the World Peace Congress organised by the International League Against Imperialism the Congress echoed the then prevailing (European) socialist rhetoric:

Peace can only be established on an enduring basis when the causes of war are removed and the domination and exploitation of nation by nation is ended.

18 N.V.Rajkumar, The Background of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1952), pp.43-44.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., pp.51-52.

It stressed,

Imperialism is a continuing cause of war and its elimination is essential in the interest of world peace. (21)

The deepening war crisis greatly disturbed Nehru, Gandhi and Jayaprakash Narain. At the Haripura Congress, it was reiterated that "The people of India desire to live in peace and friendship with their neighbours and all other countries". The language was identical with the message to the World Peace Congress extracted above.²² The war policy resolution adopted on the eve of the Second World War embodied the Gandhian approach (essentially the non-violent Satyagraha one) and protested against the 'nightmare of violence'. It declared that while Indian sympathies were entirely on the side of Democracy and Freedom - 'The main issues of war and peace for India must be decided by Indian people.'²³ The several resolutions adopted between 1936-39 had a thread of commonality in that they laid down in unambiguous terms the fundamentals of an independent 'Indian' foreign policy formulated with full realisation of the utter futility of war. To a world suffering from the ravages of war and thirsting

21 Ibid., p.50.

22 Ibid., pp.55-56.

23 Ibid., p.59.

for peace, the Congress said:

It (the war) has demonstrated the inefficiency of organized violence, on however vast a scale, for the defence of national freedom and the liberties of peoples. It has shown beyond doubt that warfare cannot lead to peace and freedom and the choice before the world is uttermost degradation and destruction through warfare or the way of peace and non-violence on a basis of freedom for all peoples. Mahatma Gandhi has presented to the peoples of the world . . . a weapon in the shape of organized non-violence designed to take the place of war for the defence of a people's rights and freedom against armed aggression. (24)


It is this philosophical and historical background that enables us to appreciate independent India's deep and abiding commitment to disarmament. This commitment, however, was not merely a product of India's tradition, but also reflected the awareness of the Indian leadership of the linkages between peace, freedom and economic development.



24 Ibid., p.20.

TH-1920

V. V. 10 (373)



Chapter - II

INDIA'S DISARMAMENT POLICIES PHASE I: 1947-1962

The first phase of the evolution of independent India's disarmament policy could be described as the idealistic stage when her approach was based on general and universal concern about disarmament resulting from the spread of conventional weapons and proliferation of nuclear weapons. This period was also characterized by the Cold War between the two super powers, the formation of military alliances, and the emergence of the Non-aligned movement in opposition to the Cold War and blocism. All these factors led India to be active in the UN and other concerned multilateral agencies, which were engaged in furthering the cause of disarmament, which in turn would lead to a safe world in which human beings could live without fear. The following pages of this chapter will stress on the above mentioned facts keeping in view the security interests of India.

The year 1945 saw the two cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki destroyed by atom bombs. These explosions brought about the fear of the occurrence of World War III. The after effects of these catastrophic events led, "Nehru to believe that there was the need to "develop a temper of peace", in order to avoid such a catastrophe in the future, as in such

a war there would be no victor or vanquished.¹ Therefore, there was the need to work for peace, inch forward towards it, and disarmament was a path leading to this goal. Nehru said: "Disarmament means not having weapons for purposes of war, it is a complicated issue - it should be discussed...."² He further stressed that "if such a small part of these efforts were directed to the search of peace, probably the problem of disarmament would have been solved by this time..."³

One can notice that in India there was a keen desire for world peace through non-violent methods, which were regarded as positive instruments for the peaceful solution of differences arising in the international arena. Disarmament should include the prohibition of manufacturing, storing and using of weapons of mass destruction and should also deal with limiting the growth of conventional weapons.

The world was caught in the grip of a Cold War between the two blocs led by the two super powers. The differences which led to this heightened tension were mainly based on ideological grounds. It was characterized by extreme hostility, between, the two camps, mutual vilification of each other at international fora; it was essentially a psychological warfare. Each

1 Sarvepalli Gopal, ed., Jawaharlal Nehru : An Anthology (Delhi, 1983), p.432.

2 Ibid., p.433.

3 Ibid., p.433.

power was attempting to gain spheres of influences. The advent of nuclear weapons, only intensified the tensions between the two blocs. India, in such a situation, felt that disarmament would help to reduce tensions and create conditions for the two super powers to compete and at the same time exist peacefully.

The UN, meanwhile, was devising methods to help in the reduction of arsenals among the two super powers. India, as a member of the UN, did her utmost to help in reconciling differences between the two main antagonists even though she had no super power status like some other countries. Her attitude had more of a moralistic overture. It was manifested in the role she played in trying to help to work out methods to create a climate for disarmament. It must be noted that "India was not a member of any disarmament negotiating body till 1962, though at that phase her induction along with some other Non-aligned countries into the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was regarded as useful by those Powers with which disarmament was primarily concerned."⁴ India did give her views on the on-going process of the negotiations and judged most of the matters involved on the basis of merit, giving a positive view point on ideas which kept general human welfare in mind, and at the same time subserving the national interest of all countries.

⁴ J.P.Jain, India and Disarmament : Nehru Era, vol. 1, (Delhi, 1974), p.1.

India gave a lot of importance to Article II(1) of the UN Charter which stated that the "General Assembly of the UN had to consider the general principles governing disarmament, the regulations of armaments and to make any recommendations it considers appropriate in that regard to the members or to the Security Council or to both".⁵

The belief prevailed among Indians that disarmament could be effected only by mutual agreement between USA and USSR. However, her national security and national interest was always kept in mind - as Krishna Menon observed:

whenever it was found that our national interests were likely to be adversely affected, we did not hesitate to take a firm and forthright stand... (6)

In 1946 we saw an attempt at curbing the nuclear arms race with the introduction of the Baruch Plan by the U.S.A. The proposals put forward in this plan called for the setting up on an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA), to manage and operate all the facilities dealing with fissionable material, direct control of all atomic energy activities throughout the world, and an inspection and licensing system for activities of a serious character. It was also to encourage only a limited use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The control system according to the

5 Ibid., p.2.

6 Ibid., p.3.

Plan was to be established in stages. The most important feature of this plan was the proposal to establish a veto-free powerful super-national body dominated by western powers.⁷

The USSR reacted vehemently to this proposal as it felt it would be totally Western dominated, and it would interfere with the sovereignty of nation States. The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, called for periodic inspection and special investigation where secret activities were suspected. It also proposed that Atomic Energy would be developed by sovereign States and not as put forward in the Baruch Plan, by an International authority, though if such an authority existed it should come under Security Council jurisdiction of the UN, whereby veto power existed with USSR.⁸

The Gromyko plan was put forward on 19th June 1946, as a counter proposal to the Baruch plan. Mr.A.Gromyko submitted "a draft convention prohibiting the production and the use of Atomic weapons and providing that within three months from its entry into force all atomic weapons should be destroyed. Violations of this convention would be considered as serious crimes against humanity and would have serious penalties by

7 Ibid., p.13.

8 Ibid., p.14.

domestic legislation; an agreement to that effect, of indefinite duration, was to come into force after the approval by the Security Council and ratification by the Council's permanent members. All states, whether or not members of the U.N. would be required to abide by the provisions of the Agreement".⁹

The Soviet proposal laid importance on the prohibition of atomic weapons and destruction of all existing stocks of such weapons.

India's reaction to the plans, at a time when she had not gained her independence, was non-committal. A Sub-Committee was set-up in order to look into the various resolutions being put before the General Assembly. India did express her unhappiness over the deadlock ensuing from the controversial issue. She favoured the Atomic Energy Commission resuming its work but she was not willing to give IAEA the authority to own and distribute resources of atomic raw material, as she was aware of the need for peaceful nuclear energy for stimulating economic development.¹⁰ India supported the concept of cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy and felt that it should be under the General Assembly's supervision. India was keen to protect

9 A.K.Chopra, India's Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi, 1984), p.206.

10 J.P.Jain, n.4, p.18.

the interests of smaller nations in the development of atomic energy as complete dependence on the Agency for fissionable material would affect her vital interests.

In spite of her differing viewpoint with regard to role of the IADA, the First Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (1) (1), adopted on 24 January, 1946 was given full support by India. It proposed the establishment of a Committee to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and to make specific proposals; "(a) for extending between nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends, (b) control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, (c) the need for the elimination from national armaments, of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and (4) the need for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violation and evasions."¹¹

In India, the year 1948, saw the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission with Homi J. Bhabha as the Chairman. The task of the Commission was to (a) survey raw material, develop it, (b) set up atomic reactors for experimental purposes for a period of 5 years and lastly (c) to foster fundamental research in nuclear science in our laboratories, in universities and research institutes of India.

11 Ashwini Kumar, Chopra, n.9, p.204.

This was followed by the seven-point plan for the development of atomic energy (March 13, 1953) put forward by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Minister of National Resources and Scientific Research. The plan propagated the need for the (1) National survey of atomic minerals, (2) construction of atomic reactors, (3) setting up of medical and health division of the Atomic Energy Commission for safeguarding the workers engaged in atomic energy work, (4) setting up various divisions for fundamental research in biology using techniques arising out of development of atomic energy, (5) the establishment of a pilot plant for uranium extraction from copper tailing and low grade uranium ore, (6) establishment of plant for processing of thorium and uranium, (7) and setting up of a plant for processing uranium. The above mentioned plan demonstrates the desire of India to utilize atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 1957 saw the setting up of a Department for Atomic Energy as a separate Ministry to look into matters dealing exclusively with atomic energy. This was followed by the inauguration of the Atomic Research Centre at Bombay by Nehru on 20 January 1957. Today it is the national centre for Research and Development in nuclear energy. In the 1950's, therefore, the main approach towards atomic energy, was to develop it in order to modernize India, but neither Nehru nor Bhabha ignored the "potential military uses of atomic power..."¹² Nehru was not prepared to accept

12 Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option : Atomic Develp
Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York, 1976), p.164.

disarmament proposals that affected India's security. Therefore, he stressed on global disarmament which would benefit mankind as a whole. India's national security, depended on our internal stability which in turn depends on what constitutes the threat to our stability. National security is a decision, "which should be firm in nature, run by a strong, independent minded, unpressurized government...."¹³ In this respect, disarmament, general and complete was a path to secure such an end.

The main concern bothering the minds of Indians was the lack of progress made in the control and eventual destruction of chemical, biological and atomic weapons. Thus, to desire a world without wars could only be achieved through disarmament. To give emphasis to this major necessity, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha, in April, 1954, India's policy as follows:

We have maintained that nuclear, chemical and biological knowledge and power should not be used to forge these weapons of mass destruction. We have advocated the prohibition of such weapons, by common consent, and immediately by agreement amongst those concerned, which is at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment. (14)

13 J.N. Chaudhari, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 37-38.

14 Jawaharlal Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946-61" (New Delhi, 1961), p. 187.

As Nehru put it:

the question of disarmament is most important than any other problem, internal and external, national or international, because it is a national problem, apart from being an international one. The whole future survival of India and every Indian depended upon it. (15)

Bandung Conference (1955)

India was keen to extend the principle of non-violence to international relations. Peaceful co-existence was possible only by attempting to remove fears and suspicions leading to mutual trust and confidence. At the global level, attempts at peaceful co-existence were witnessed with the emergence of a new leadership in the Soviet Union and the assumption to power by President Eisenhower. It could be regarded as a period in which realities of the contemporary situation were appreciated. Just as the Korean crisis was the climax of the Cold War, with the death of Stalin in 1953, began a process of reduction in international tension culminating in the Geneva Summit of 1954. The lowering of tensions between the super powers was welcomed all over the world with a hope that it would lead to greater economic development of the world at large.

However, the most significant contribution to the concept of non-violence and peaceful co-existence was with

the convening of the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in April, 1955. Its main purpose was "to promote good will and co-operation; to consider social, economic and cultural problems and the problems of special interests to Asian and African peoples; and finally, to view the position of Asia and Africa in the world today and the contribution they could make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation".¹⁶

A political committee with a sub-committee dealing with disarmament was established, and it was responsible for the formulation of a final declaration on the subject of disarmament and nuclear tests. It brought into focus the destructive aspect of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and also highlighted the need for an agreement banning such tests.¹⁷

It must be noted that when the Bandung Conference was convened, the situation in Asia had changed for the better despite the insecurity persisting due to the Korean war (1950-53), and the on-going war in Indo-China, in violation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. At the same time military pacts (SEATO, CENTO) were directed against the Afro-Asian community and the fear of the spread of communism in these countries. Keeping this in mind, at Bandung, different

16 C.S.Jha, From Bandung to Tashkent : Glimpses of Indian Foreign Policy (Madras, 1983), p.62.

17 Ibid., p.68.

social and political systems were represented. The countries participating reaffirmed the determination and desire to follow the principles of peaceful co-existence and promote the fabric of peace.

The Bandung Conference enunciated the principle of peaceful co-existence. It appeared as the reaction to the existing fear of war during the Cold War years, in the process of ideological alignment in military and political alliances which seemed to be heading for an armed showdown. At this conference, Nehru took a realistic view of the problem of disarmament. Expressing the fear that there was no guarantee that atomic weapons would not be used, disarmament was regarded as a necessity to ensure the survival of mankind, without which, a holocaust could be triggered off.

The outcome of this Conference was reflected in the 10 principles of Bandung. These were in essence the elaboration of the Five Principles of Panchsheel and of principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter. It was a document of historic importance since it showed the desire of more than half the world population wanting to live in peace, to practice peaceful co-existence and to live by the U.N. Charter. Hence, the Bandung Conference demonstrated that to achieve peace disarmament was essential. India played a vital role in the coming together of this assembly of

Afro-Asian nations which was a forerunner to the Non-aligned movement.

Disarmament Proposals from 1947-1962
and the Role of India

Ever since nuclear arms race began, various proposals had been put forward, in an attempt to curb the growth of the arms race and India has also contributed greatly to it.

As early as 1940 Jawaharlal Nehru said: "Complete Disarmament means in essence the ending of wars between national States, this will only take place when the causes of such wars have been eliminated or reduced very greatly."¹⁸

The attitude of India towards disarmament was of a moralistic nature. It governed India's attitude towards disarmament. To save the succeeding generations from the disaster of a nuclear war the UN adopted disarmament to be its main objective. India's contribution to achieve disarmament through the UN was significant.

India first played the role of a moderator in the disarmament negotiations which took place in 1946, when Justice Chagla, the Indian representative, attempted to find a common ground between the French proposal which propagated

¹⁸ N.Chakraborty, "Role of Non-alignment", World Focus vol.28, (April 1982), p.27.

the establishment of an International Police Force and the Egyptian proposal demanding the "withdrawal of armed forces stationed by the members of the UN on territories of other members without their consent".¹⁹ According to an Indian amendment:

- (a) the Assembly recommended to the Security Council to accelerate...the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;
- (b) it recommended to the Members to undertake a progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking into account the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal, without delay, of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements... (20)

This was a compromise solution in which India's first attempt to act as a moderator was demonstrated. India's amendment formed para 7 of the General Assembly resolution 41(1) of 14th December 1946.²¹

As early as September, 1945, there was the All India Congress Committee Resolution which deplored the appearance of the atom bomb. Following this in 1946, though India was not an independent country she functioned under an interim

19 J.P.Jain, n.4, p.14.

20 Ibid., p.15.

21 Ibid., p.14.

government headed by Nehru, who brought to notice the grave responsibility of any country wanting to use the atom bomb. He realized the danger of the atom bomb and its implications on the future generations, which led Nehru to comment on 4 January 1947:

In essence today there is a conflict in the world between two things. The atom bomb and what it represents and the spirit of humanity.... and I have no doubt in my mind that ultimately in this conflict that is confronting the world the human spirit will prevail over the atom bomb. (22)

Though fortunately one can see that no nuclear war has occurred since the advent of the bomb, it has not restricted certain powers from amassing weapons of mass destruction despite the appeal from the world that there should be an end to such activity. One hopes that Nehru's faith in the human spirit will prevail if such a confrontation is ever to take place.

From 1948 onwards one could see the determined efforts of India to bring about disarmament, keeping in mind her national interest on which no compromise could be made. During this period, Mrs. Pandit voiced her disappointment in the UN General Assembly debate on 25 September, 1948, with regard to the failure of the efforts made by Atomic Energy Commission

to bring about some progress in the disarmament negotiations, and warned that the arms race had to be brought to an end, if war was to be averted. She also stressed the need on reaching an agreement banning weapons of mass destruction. This view emerged in various Indian proposals in subsequent disarmament negotiations. The Gandhian ethics of purity of means and non-violence was the cornerstone of the disarmament policy of India. India expressed the view that if disarmament succeeded defence spending could be reduced considerably and those resources could be utilized for developmental purposes in the under-developed parts of the world. Keeping this in mind, she submitted in 1950 a draft resolution for the establishment of a U.N. Peace fund, for development of under-developed areas.²³ Her interest in disarmament continued despite this, as she realized that she could emerge as the mediator between the two super powers helping them to reach some sort of an agreement which would lead to a disarmed world in which she would be able to pursue her national interest with more vigour and effect.

In the disarmament proceedings one of the major issues that brought out the conflicting attitude of various powers was the concept of arms control. As early as 1949, in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the item "international control

23 J.P.Jain, n.4, p.30.

of atomic energy", was discussed. The outcome of this was that unless mistrust was not removed, there could be no headway in international arms control. There was disagreement on the question of national ownership, operation and management of atomic energy. It was under such situation that India suggested a draft resolution according to which the International Law Commission should draw up a "declaration on the duties of States and individuals in respect of the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and secure elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments..."²⁴ One notes that this Indian proposal kept our interests in mind while at the same time it was an attempt by India to sort out the deadlock between the two major powers since a declaration was not as binding as a convention or treaty. Mr. B. N. Rao, India's representative suggested that the reason why there was no positiveness coming out from various discussions was that though there was agreement on the need for international control and need for prohibition, the disagreement arose as to when it should emerge and what powers are necessary to take international control effective.²⁵ Unfortunately, this proposal did not gain the necessary support from either USSR or USA for each felt it would be disadvantageous to their respective security interests, as the USSR

24 Ibid., p. 20.

25 Ibid., p. 25.

wanted to ban atomic weapons first and then have verification while the Western powers took the opposite stand. Rao held that in such an atmosphere, no disarmament plan could be successful until the Big Powers had some agreement among themselves. India was interested "in an actual beginning of disarmament, which could only come about when there was an agreement among major powers".²⁶

February 1952 saw the United Nations General Assembly amalgamating the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments into a single United Nation's Disarmament Commission, which would be responsible for both atomic and conventional weapons. It was to formulate "proposals for regulation, limitations and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments."²⁷ Thus after two years of stalemate, disarmament negotiations were resumed. India's main effort during this period was to achieve an agreement prohibiting the use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. Her concern about the use of conventional weapons against "...the people of the colonial territories shows her anti-colonial bias in her disarmament policy..."²⁸ She called for the simultaneous reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons. The 1950's witnessed the

26 Ibid., p.34.

27 Ibid., p.35.

28 A.K.Chopra, n.9, p.43.

hectic attempts by various countries for curtailing the race for nuclear arms. There was the Western proposal which stated that disarmament should start with limitations on conventional forces. India also played an important part, during this phase, as she was also responsible for the setting up of the sub-committee of the Disarmament Committee, consisting of USA, U.K., U.S.S.R., France and Canada. She was also instrumental in enabling the various powers to come to some sort of an understanding with regard to membership of the Disarmament Commission. She took a middle of the road position, in accordance with her policy of Non-alignment with regard to disarmament negotiations.

As mentioned earlier, the problem of priority in arms control or disarmament, India felt that both should be carried out simultaneously. Keeping this in mind, the Soviet proposal which stood for the simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons and instituting international control, gained Indian support, as Indian Representative H.S. Malik stated that it was an attempt to combine two approaches, and also highlighted the need to prohibit atomic weapons. India abstained from voting on two draft resolutions put before the First Committee of the Disarmament Commission since she felt that if she had taken one side it would only aggravate the disagreement. India kept on emphasizing the destructive capability of these weapons of mass destruction in her various proposals. 1953 saw Krishna Menon, appealing to the General Assembly to

adopt a resolution for the "non-use of weapons of mass destruction", otherwise the future would only witness the annihilation of mankind. Therefore, one of the most important items put forward at the 8th session of the UN General Assembly (1953) by India related to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

This led to the revised proposal of the Western powers which sponsored the 14-power Draft Resolution and it sought to insert a clause affirming the earnest desire of the General Assembly to "eliminate altogether, as a part of comprehensive coordinate plan, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, the use of, and power to use all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction including atomic, hydrogen, bacterial and chemical weapons through reaching agreement as early as possible as future measure to achieve this end."²⁹ India was not supportive of this proposal as she preferred "words like "elimination" and "prohibition" to "part of" and "balanced". This was more in line with the Soviet position. Another idea put forward by India in 1953, was that an armament race was not economically beneficial besides being a danger to peace. This led to U.K. objecting to the phrase

"armament race". Thereafter India changed it to "competitive rearmament"; this led the USA objecting to it as it felt any armament building for security reasons would be considered as dangerous to the peace of the world.³⁰

Ultimately the clause inserted in the 14-power draft proposal accepted the amendment by Peru which "realising the competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of member States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N. is not only economically unsound but is in itself a grave danger to peace".³¹ It was accepted in the First Committee of the Disarmament Commission. India also stood by it.

India at the same time did have differences at this juncture with the super powers on the question of instituting international controls on the nuclear programme of developing countries. The disagreement between the two go back to the 1950's during the Indo-Canadian negotiations according to which, the Canadian Government was to give India atomic energy assistance. There was disagreement with regard to India's relations with IAEA in the mid fifties. India felt that the safeguards of IAEA represented a sort of

30 J.P.Jain, n.4, p.40.

31 Ibid., p.40.

economic and technological colonialism. Any aspect of a discriminatory nature was always brought to the forefront in India's arms control arguments. Nehru expressed the desire that if arms control measures were brought about it would help in confidence-building measures and this in turn would improve the international climate. But arms control was not disarmament; it should create conditions that would make disarmament possible, disarmament and control should go along side by side. It was in India's national interest also to see that nuclear confrontation between the super powers was avoided as there was no alternative except disarmament to assure the safety of the world. On 2 April, 1954, Nehru took an important initiative, which could be regarded as a real contribution by India in the field of disarmament. He proposed a "standstill agreement" in regard to (1) nuclear test explosions, even if stockpiling and production must wait (2) full publicity should be given by the UN and those countries engaged in such production as to the destructive capacity of these weapons and its effects, (3) continuing discussions in the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission to consider the "standstill" proposal and (4) steps should be undertaken by States and people to bring to the forefront the danger of these weapons, highlighting the destructive potential.

This proposal was forwarded to the Disarmament Commission but unfortunately not much heed was given to it.

as it was neither discussed either by the Commission or its Sub-committees. Meanwhile, one must take account of the fact that the end of the Korean crisis and Indo-China problem helped to create a favourable atmosphere to disarmament. There was the Soviet proposal calling for reduction to "agreed limits" but differences still persisted regarding the "quantum" of the armed forces, powers of the control agency, and the question of veto. This was followed by the Anglo-French proposals of 1954, which called for the "regulation, limitation and major balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments". This was not supported by India, which held that there could be no limiting of atomic weapons. There had to be great Power understanding with regard to disarmament, as it was a world problem. In addition there was the need to assure the smaller nations of their security. This required co-operation with States which were not members of the Disarmament Commission.

Later during the Bandung Conference, in 1955, this desire for world peace was reiterated, which could only be achieved through disarmament. By 1955, most of the differences with regard to disarmament had been sorted out but USA still had reservations which blocked the whole process. President Eisenhower suggested certain steps to be taken by the two great powers to achieve gradual disarmament such as providing facilities for aerial reconnaissance, need for an effective system of inspection - the latter proposal proved to be the

main obstacle in the proceedings. But all these obstacles which emerged, did not stop the Indian efforts to break the stalemate. Krishna Menon requested the Disarmament Commission to achieve an agreement which would lead to the suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Instead of keeping this objective in mind, the four Western powers laid more stress on arms control than disarmament in a proposal of 5 October 1955. This was criticized by India as it was a departure from the ¹⁹⁵⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution which gave equal importance to both disarmament and arms control. This led to India proposing certain amendments, to the Four Power Western draft. The amendment dealt with issues, calling for the need to give "equal priority" to other areas of disarmament, need for reconstructing the disarmament machinery and finally need to draft out a Disarmament Convention. This gained no support from the Western powers.

Later on July 25, 1956, the Government of India submitted the following proposals:

- 1) Cessation of all explosions of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;
- 2) Prohibition of the future use of fissionable material for military purposes;
- 3) Prohibition of the transfer of fissionable material from civilian to military stocks;

- 4) An agreement by those powers most advanced in the production of weapons of mass destruction to dismantle in public, as a token of their will towards disarmament, a limited number of atomic or hydrogen bombs and to make available for peaceful purposes the fissionable material contained in these weapons, and
- 5) Prohibition of export or conveying of nuclear weapons to other countries by those countries at present manufacturing such weapons.³²

These proposals did not call for the elimination or prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Indian Government further put forward suggestions which emphasized the need for the reduction in military budgets, enlargement of the Disarmament Commission - all these efforts did not have any effect as military expenditures were soaring higher and higher, the quality of armament improving, and the quantity also increasing. So India's efforts did not prove to be too successful, during this phase. India continued to voice her opinion against the use of the atomic bomb; Nehru said

we are not interested in making the bomb, even if we have the capacity to do so, and that in no event will we use atomic energy for destructive purposes... (33)

On 6 October, 1961 an agreement was signed between the USSR and India on the "Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy".

32 Disarmament Commission Doc.DC/98 31 July, 1956.

33 India, Lok Sabha Debates, July 1957, p.1435.

This agreement ~~result~~^{ed} in research connected with reactors using natural uranium and for breeder reactors using plutonium. There was a lot of similarity in the disarmament policies of the USSR and India.

India regarded disarmament as a realistic possibility and there was the need to eliminate the arms race rather than to just limit or reduce it. Therefore, arms reduction was a just step towards disarmament. This reflected India's desire for the peaceful use of atomic energy. She was the first country to suggest the suspension of tests in order to reach the ultimate goal - Disarmament. Krishna Menon stated that "there is only one thing to do with atomic weapons, and that is to do away with them."³⁴ This was the bedrock of the claim for General and Complete Disarmament. India was the first to propound the idea of General and Complete Disarmament, when her representative Krishna Menon stated that disarmament was only a step towards a warless world. General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) would bring about tremendous political change, help in social and economic development by releasing resources for peaceful uses, thus helping in converting military uses for economic benefit, as a consequence of which, it could help to bridge the gap between the North and the South.

General disarmament should include all States and complete disarmament, should cover all weapons and systems.³⁵

34 UNGA, First Committee, 9th Sess., 63rd mtg., October 1953, p.127.

35 A.K.Chopra, n.9, p.15.

The Fourteenth session of the UN General Assembly accepted GCD as the objective in the disarmament negotiations. Keeping this as her objective also, India, in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 2 November, 1959, supported the Soviet proposal on GCD. The Soviet proposal called for the achievement of GCD within a four year period. There were to be three stages towards achieving this end. In the first stage the forces of USSR, USA and China were to be reduced to 1.7 million while U.K. and France were to be limited to 650,000 and the rest at agreed levels. This was to be followed by the second stage under which all military bases were to be eliminated and armed forces to be disbanded. The final stage would result in the total elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons and all military organization, expenditure and training.³⁶

This Soviet proposal, according to India, demonstrated the Soviet desire for achieving a peaceful solution to the existing problem of disarmament. Keeping in mind the need to acquire GCD, India at the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1960 made the following suggestions:

- 1) Disarmament should be general and complete.
- 2) It should be carried out in agreed stages and completed as rapidly as possible.

- 3) Disarmament measures should be so balanced that neither side has at any time significant military advantage.
- 4) Such measures should be under effective international control through the establishment of an organization within the U.N.
- 5) There should be an international force within the U.N. for the maintenance of international peace and security.³⁸

The above suggestions show that for India, in order to have a secure world free from nuclear annihilation, it was imperative to eliminate the war-making capacity of all nations of the world, as Krishna Menon put it:

The only choice was between General and Complete Disarmament, which would free the world from the fear of war and limited disarmament which would inevitably lead to a kind of re-armament which the world had experienced after the world wars. (38)

In addition to this, the call for a time limit in which it was supposed to be achieved was necessary as without it there would not be the obligations to meet the proposed goal of total disarmament. This was stressed by Ambassador A.Lall at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee - "...But some idea of how long the disarmament process is going to take is clearly indispensable for without it, obligation to disarm

37 UN Doc. A/PV.906, 17 Oct., 1970, p.754.

38 A.K.Chopra, n.9, p.15.

the world would be meaningless".³⁹

The Soviet proposals, followed by the Indian suggestions, led to the USA also putting forward some ideas in a draft entitled "Outlines of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", according to which disarmament was to be achieved in three stages. India favoured a period in which this goal was to be achieved, not beyond five years; she felt that the quicker the process, the more effective the general control would be. This control was to be of universal applicability and also there was the need with each phase of disarmament of a corresponding machinery of inspection. This would in turn, help in eliminating the possibility of suspicion. At the same time India held that there could be no hundred per cent protection against error and treachery. The Indian approach emphasized the need to lay down a set of rules for negotiations in the future, resulting in an agreement on GCD. India wanted only an internal police force and militia for maintaining law and order to be the main outcome in GCD. She also called for a treaty at the earliest possible on GCD and no stage should allow for the military superiority of any one State.⁴⁰

Seven directives were put forward in a draft resolution

39 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee/PV, 3 May 1962,
p.14.

40 J.P.Jain, n.4, p.136.

by India, which was co-sponsored by eleven other states which would consequently lead to GCD:

- 1) Elimination of armed forces, armaments and armed production;
- 2) Prohibition of manufacture, maintenance and use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and bacterial and chemical warfare;
- 3) Elimination of existing military establishments;
- 4) Elimination of equipments of delivery, foreign bases and launching sites;
- 5) Maintaining of security requirements for internal security;
- 6) Changes in UN for implementation of this Resolution and for maintaining of peace in disarmed world; and
- 7) Use of outer space for peaceful purposes.⁴¹

These suggestions were criticized by the USSR, USA and U.K. as being vague and therefore not acceptable -- but these powers did appreciate the efforts made by India in helping to reconcile the existing differences with regard to disarmament.

At the beginning of the 16th session of the UN General Assembly, a joint statement was issued by both USA and USSR

41 Ibid., p.137.

which recognized GCD as the goal of the disarmament negotiations. But when the issue of whether disarmament should start with arms control or not differences started to creep in. India realized that there was the need for a negotiating body to achieve GCD and moved a resolution calling for the establishment of such a body. But this effort did not prove to be very successful. India was mainly concerned with the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, she was not satisfied with either the Soviet or US plan according to which, the former put forward the elimination of nuclear weapons in the second stage while the latter called for the gradual reduction. India was keen that all armaments production should be stopped at the very first stage. Moreover, India raised objections at the percentage method of cuts in conventional weapons (USA called 30% cut in 1st stage, 35% in 2nd stage and remainder in 3rd stage). India held that there should be no production of armaments at all in the first stage itself.

Hence, it can be observed that India was very keen that there should be a treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which should be feasible and acceptable to all. Unless such a treaty is ultimately achieved national security could not be guaranteed. This treaty would only help save the world from the clutches of nuclear war. The two major powers the USSR and the U.S.A., without whom, disarmament cannot achieve

its end, have to realise the importance of General and Complete Disarmament. Both today have the overkill capacity in nuclear weapons. Therefore, the attempt should be to disarm. One step towards that direction is to come to some agreement with regard to General and Complete Disarmament. India is very keen on the successful conclusion of such a treaty, and that it should not remain a utopia. India's role in disarmament negotiations was mainly one of a mediator attempting to break the existing deadlock in the negotiations.

To sum up, India's policy has been based on its confirmed and consistent belief that mankind has a duty to fulfil in the name of humanity to preserve a civilized form of life for generations to come. It would be appropriate to say that India chose to hand down its wisdom, its knowledge, its tolerance, its compassion, its way of life, by word of mouth. For as long as India requires a tongue to shape the word, a mind to form - the culmination of its belief, it can and will be guided by the principles of a policy of peace, friendship and cooperation between nations and their peoples. It would indeed be normal for India to believe that all qualities of mankind ultimately unite in the attainment of peace.

Chapter - III

INDIA'S DISARMAMENT POLICIES PHASE II : 1963-1973

The second phase in India's Disarmament Policies (from 1963 to 1973) was characterised by three trends: (1) nuclear proliferation became an important issue in international politics with Lop Nor nuclear explosion in October 1964 by China. Both super powers began moving towards containing nuclear proliferation. This resulted in the NPT of 1970. (2) Detente became the key word in super power relations. This relaxation of tensions led to a number of international bilateral and multilateral agreements, and (3) the signing of the PTBT in 1963. India's disarmament policies had to react to these three international developments keeping in mind its security interests and its role as a nation championing the cause of disarmament.

India and the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)

The major breakthrough in the field of disarmament occurred in 1963 with the signing of the PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty). India signed it on 8 August, 1963 but as she had already renounced her nuclear option, there was nothing new for her in adhering to the Treaty. The significance lies in the fact that she signed it at a time when she was acquiring technological and scientific knowledge for conducting nuclear tests. On 29 of August, 1963 the Indian representative

Mehta said at the ENDC "this agreement would help to restrict the speed of nuclear weapons and limit the development of new weapons of mass destruction and thus lead to a slowing down of the arms race...."¹ The efforts towards achieving this objective go back to the year 1958. India was the first country to suggest the suspension of tests. Krishna Menon put forward a draft of 8 points for the support of his proposal for cessation of tests, which were as follows:

- 1) Dangers of nuclear test explosions,
- 2) Cessation of explosion would serve as an important step to nuclear disarmament,
- 3) This stoppage of nuclear tests would affect world opinion in general and particularly in Asia and Pacific area where a strong desire prevails in favour of a cessation of these tests,
- 4) It would lead to a relaxation of international tension as suspicions would diminish,
- 5) It would prevent other countries from acquiring the facilities of production of nuclear weapons,
- 6) Both international law and morality are violated by the pollution of oceans and of the atmosphere consequent on such explosions,
- 7) Existing stockpile can destroy the world, hence there would seem to be no utility even from the military point of view in furthering experimental explosions, and

1 ENDC/PV.156, 29 August, 1963, p.13.

8) The prohibition of further explosion would be to a large extent self-enforcing.²

Her efforts consequently led to the UN General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII) which "condemned all nuclear weapon tests...."³

It was the Soviet Union that took the first step in unilaterally declaring that it would stop test explosions in March 1958, though it reserved its position if other powers went on conducting tests. The efforts made by India and other countries to bring an end to nuclear testing had partial success. The three powers -- USA, UK and USSR agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing from November 1958 to September 1961.

The United States of America, on the other hand, held that she would not limit or put an end to conducting tests unless "nuclear weapons were eliminated or limited and test ban could only be considered as part of a comprehensive disarmament programme subjected to verification arrangements. ..."⁴ The Western powers had agreed to include test ban in their two proposals of 27 August, 1957 but at the same time

2 Disarmament Commission Document DC/98 (31 July, 1958).

3 J.P.Jain, India and Disarmament: Nehru Era, vol.I, (New Delhi, 1974), p.67.

4 Ibid., p.67.

warned that Washington would not allow its or its allies security to be threatened under the quest of a Treaty that gave a false sense of security.

In 1963, three major powers: USA, U.K. and USSR -- agreed to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, under water and in outer space. All this was entered into, keeping in mind that it should not affect their vital national security interests. It was a big step towards the elusive goal of peace. As Dean Rusk, former US Secretary of State said,

it was doubtful that either side would, through further testing achieve major advances in any significant area which could be translated into a military advantage without the other side making either a similar or off-setting gain.(5)

The Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty, by prohibiting test explosions in the three environments would help to reduce nuclear test explosions. It was the first arms control measure though it did not involve disarmament in the proper sense of the term like reduction of weapons, or production of weapons. It did not put a stop to Research and Development. Parties to the Treaty could also withdraw from it. But it helped in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries which did not possess

5 J.P.Jain, n.3, p.68.

them. USA felt that such a treaty was extremely beneficial for her and her allies. More importantly, the treaty represented the translation of efforts and political will into a concrete treaty. Though the treaty had flaws, it proved that super power agreement on issues could be forged on disarmament proposals.

India felt that there was the need for moral pressure on the countries which refused to subscribe to the Treaty. China was one such country. Since China had not conducted her nuclear explosion at the time of the signing of the Treaty and was keen to go nuclear, to achieve a position of prominence in the world, she refused to sign it.

Those which had sacrificed the most in adhering to this Treaty were the non-nuclear weapon States which by signing the Treaty gave up their right to conducting test explosions in the atmosphere. The PTBT was a clear method of controlling the development of atomic weapons by these countries.

Agreement with regard to PTBT was reached as both the major powers realised that there was the need to stabilize the existing situation which was marked by a rapidly increasing arms race and was not really going to prove beneficial to either in the long run. Pakistan is also a signatory to the treaty unlike China which refused to sign it. India reiterated her demand that though, she was glad at the success of the signing of the PTBT, there is no denying the

fact, that there was imperative need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which should extend to cover all tests.

This was the brief background to the signing of the PTBT in which India played a leading role. Her tireless efforts did prove successful partially. Her attempt to reconcile the vast differences of the two super powers -- was an achievement, which cannot be ignored. India, did play a vital role, morally and her ceaseless efforts to make the world aware of the dangers of nuclear test explosions did pave the way in taking small step towards disarmament with the signing of the PTBT in 1963. But it must not be forgotten that unless the major powers participated in the negotiations, there could be no disarmament in the real sense of the word. Whether it was France or China or any other country capable of nuclear test explosions, there was the urgent necessity to participate in the discussions. Only then can the way be made clear towards the objective of disarmament.

The positive aspect of the PTBT was pointed out by the Indian representative, Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit when she stated that "1) it prohibited tests causing radio-active fall out, (2) prevented proliferation, (3) would curtail the arms race, (4) reduced world tensions and (5) would pave way towards other agreements".⁶ The most serious threat to

6 Ibid., p.119.

PTBT was the problem of underground nuclear explosion and India wanted the Disarmament Commission to tackle this problem as soon as possible. The USSR felt that it could not be kept a secret, hence there was no need for on-site inspection while the West believed that there should be some inspection. India's opinion was that the continuance of underground explosions would not be conducive to the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting this sort of explosions. But no worthwhile agreement could be achieved so long as the super powers were busy improving the quality of their weapons with the help of underground tests.

Following the signing of the PTBT on 8 August 1963, India called for an agreement for the stopping of tests above a certain threshold and the super powers should agree to establish the threshold at a particular seismic magnitude, and exchange seismicological data. This would help towards the establishment of CTBT. At the same time India was not prepared to separate PNE's from CTBT. Every country should have the right to conduct PNEs. India was of the view that a CTBT should provide for the conduct of PNEs under a controlled system. Therefore, she proposed that negotiations should lead to the conclusion of an International Agreement on nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes.⁷

The Indian representative V.C.Trivedi subsequently proposed that for achieving CTBT there should be the (1) suspension of all nuclear tests was essentially, (2) super powers should agree to a formal treaty regarding the suspension of underground testing, (3) the treaty should have verification clauses and (4) the threshold agreed upon should be lowered and finally eliminated.

The problem in extending test ban on underground testing mainly has been due to the problem of verification and India believed that unless some agreement could be reached on this issue, the achievement of CTBT would prove to be difficult.

Some other efforts in disarmament had been suggested at the Pugwash Conference in September, 1964 which called for the cut off in the production of fissile material through a policy of "mutual example". In 1965 at the U N Disarmament Commission, the Indian delegate B.N.Chakravarty put forward 5 elements for an international agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons: "(1) An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them, (2) U.N. was to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by powers having nuclear weapon capability, (3) progress towards disarmament and CTBT,

(4) freeze on production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, (5) an undertaking by the Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons".⁸

November 1965 saw the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly adopting a Resolution co-sponsored by eight non-aligned nations setting guidelines for nuclear non-proliferation. It was approved by the G.A. on 19 November 1965. According to the resolution the treaty should not adversely affect the right of any group of States from concluding regional treaties in order to ensure total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

On 27 January 1966, President Johnson propounded a seven-point programme to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to NNWS, international safeguards on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthening international security and the establishment of system of inspection.⁹ Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet Prime Minister held that the Soviet Government was ready to include in the Treaty provision forbidding the use of nuclear weapons against signatory nations which did not possess such weapons on their territory. Kosygin's guarantee did not apply to NNWS which had another power's nuclear guarantee.

8 G.G.Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, (New Delhi, 1968), pp.122-3.

9 Ibid., p.123.

India supported the Russian proposal. On 20 April 1967, the Prime Minister's Secretary, L.K.Jha defined the guarantee as follows: "(1) It would need to be an effective deterrent, (2) U.N. procedures would not prevail. The potential nuclear aggressor would be fore warned by the proposed guarantees about the consequences of his ventures, (3) the deterrent would need to carry conviction both with the attacker and potential victim. (4) It was immaterial whether the guarantee formed part of N.P.T. or was separately negotiated."¹⁰ India felt that both super powers would need to shoulder similar responsibilities with regard to NNWS against potential nuclear aggressors. During this period India once again stressed the need to give up underground nuclear testing.

One notices a change in India's policy towards nuclear weapons testing from 1963. We began to differentiate between various types of tests that could be conducted and had a more moderate attitude by not demanding its immediate cessation.

India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT)

After the PTBT, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was considered the next land mark in the process of disarmament, despite the fact that India did not sign it. India had called

¹⁰ Ibid., p.139.

for steps to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Chakravarty addressing the Political Committee of the General Assembly put it,

another aspect of this nuclear field is something that will be possible for the nuclear powers to assure the world that there will be no trade in these weapons, that there will be no supply of them to other countries from where they ... will be distributed generally.... (11)

1961, saw the Irish Draft Resolution calling upon those States having nuclear weapons to come to some sort of an international agreement, which would help nuclear weapon States to relinquish their control over nuclear weapons for and refrain from transmitting information helpful in their manufacture to non-nuclear weapon States. Secondly, a provision should be undertaken by the non-nuclear weapon States not to manufacture or acquire control over them.¹² This proposal had Indian support since India realised that there would be further complications added to the process of disarmament, if more States started making them. The drawbacks of the Irish Resolution were that it imposed no restrictions on the nuclear weapon States on their continued manufacture. It also overlooked the fact that in the absence of a commitment by the nuclear powers to liquidate their arsenals of

11 Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi, November 1961), p.396.

12 UN Document A/C.1/2. 298/REV.1, 17 November, 1961.

nuclear weapons, there could be no progress towards disarmaments. India wanted a comprehensive Treaty. The draft was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 1965 (XVI) on 4 December 1961. India believed that the nuclear powers had to be firm and insistent in their approach towards the curtailment of the spread of nuclear weapons. But in 1962 and 1963 the UN including the ENDC failed to make a break through on the issue of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Chinese nuclear explosion at Lop Nor took place in 1964 and India voiced her concern with Prime Minister Shastri raising the issue at the Cairo Conference of Non-aligned Nations (where he stated that China should be persuaded not to develop nuclear weapons.). Thus China became the fifth nuclear power in the world. India contributed considerably to conceptual clarity of the term nuclear proliferation. India replaced the word "Non-dissemination" with "non-proliferation". India expressed the view that the nuclear Powers henceforth should enter into a Non-proliferation Treaty to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also stop their production. Otherwise, they had no moral right to condemn the States which possess or were acquiring them. India made it absolutely clear that she would never agree to sign an agreement which imposed restrictions only on the non-nuclear weapon States. There was the imperative need to halt and reverse existing proliferation; therefore, India called upon the concerned States to stop production and reduction of

stockpile at the very first stage of the NPT. At the second stage there should be an agreement by the non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. But the real problem with the nuclear powers was that they were not ready to give up production or reduce the stockpile. They were only interested in prevention of additional nuclear powers from emerging.

At the 20th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, India and seven other Non-aligned members of the ENDC, presented a draft Resolution, which was adopted on 23 November 1965 by 93 votes to nil, as General Assembly Resolution 2028(XX).¹³ There were five major principles that were laid out as follows: "(1) there should not be any loopholes which might permit the nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate directly or indirectly nuclear weapons in any form, (2) the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers, (3) the Treaty should achieve General and Complete Disarmament, (4) there should be a workable provision to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty and lastly nothing in the Treaty should affect adversely the right of any group

13 United Nations, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1969), p.19.

of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons."¹⁴

The Treaty could stop the development of offensive and defensive weapons, by providing for a total test ban followed by the prohibition on the further use of fissionable material for weapon purposes. It should have a provision for the total cessation of further production of nuclear weapons and should be made obligatory. All States should voluntarily impose self restraint in matters of production of nuclear weapons. India voiced her grave concern over the increasing threat to world security by the increase in the existing stockpile of nuclear weapons. The NPT could remove this fear by the nuclear powers undertaking a definite programme on the reduction of the existing stockpile and their delivery vehicles.¹⁵ India wanted peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) to be allowed; however, as it involved the same technology to make nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers were not going to agree to this aspect of India's demand. India did not want the misuse of PNE's and hence called upon all States to accept international safeguards against its misuse. But the nuclear weapon States made no effort to hide their intention to stop the non-nuclear weapon States from the right to conduct

14 Ibid.

15 A.K.Chopra, India's Policy on Disarmament (New Delhi, 1984), p.162.

research in the technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In the draft treaty there was no provision anywhere which made the nuclear powers stop production and reduce their stockpile in nuclear weapons. India wanted the elimination of both horizontal and vertical proliferation. The UN General Assembly accepted the draft treaty on 12 June, 1968 by 95 to 4 as Resolution 2373 (XXII). India abstained from the vote. The USSR, USA and UK submitted a resolution in the Security Council according to which they were willing to provide assistance to any non-nuclear State, party to the Treaty and guarantee its security against any nuclear blackmail or nuclear threat.¹⁶

India was not at all satisfied as she believed that real security lay only in nuclear disarmament. Addressing the General Assembly, Dinesh Singh, the Indian Minister for External Affairs said:

The Treaty of Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot contribute in any way to a balanced process of disarmament. It seeks to bind the hands of the powerless and to license further accumulation of armaments which threaten our very existence. It is for this reason that we remain unable to sign this treaty. (17)

India did not consider the NPT as a major step in the objective of disarmament. The Treaty left the existing stock-

16 Part 2 of Security Council Resolution 235 (1968) adopted on 19 June, 1968.

17 UNGA, First Cttee, session 24, plen.mtgs., 175th mtg. 2 Oct., 1969, p.13.

piles of nuclear weapons and the arsenals of the nuclear powers untouched. She criticized it stating that it did not take a close look at the problem of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. India brought to the forefront the discriminatory aspect when she noted that Article I of the Treaty did not prohibit the nuclear powers from deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear States. It did not ban the training of armed forces of the countries that did not possess these dangerous weapons, by nuclear powers. This would only make the achievement of disarmament more bleak.¹⁸

India also expressed the view that she felt that the countries that possessed nuclear technological know-how, were more concerned about their own security and their allies strategic interests. All this was proving to be very one-sided. Article I did not stop the nuclear powers from assisting one another. Article VI called upon the parties to undertake negotiations in "good faith" to secure cessation of the race for nuclear arms. India expressed its doubt about the utility of this article for the purpose of achieving nuclear disarmament.¹⁹

18 A.K.Chopra, n.15, p.175.

19 Ibid., p.177.

Despite the NPT, vertical proliferation could not be curtailed. India highlighted how certain countries, not party to the treaty, had contributed towards the achievement of the stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had chosen not to manufacture the weapons inspite of having the technical knowhow. There was no link between the NPT and nuclear disarmament. That is why India did not sign it.

The NPT failed to meet the security needs of countries like India. The threat to the security of non-nuclear States would exist so long as there was horizontal and vertical proliferation. India desired that the safeguard and control provision be applicable to both the nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Instead, by allowing the nuclear powers to keep their gaseous-diffusion plants, chemical plants and the centrifuges free of international inspection it only added to the insecurity of the countries who were not privileged to have this type of nuclear know-how. The control provision of the NPT was devised in such a way as to cover only those portions of the problems of proliferation which would not affect nuclear powers and their allies. The Treaty called upon the non-nuclear States to place all their plants under international control. India justified her refusal to sign the Treaty which excluded the plants of nuclear powers from international control. The NPT furthermore does not provide security to countries against nuclear blackmail, for example,

China's growing nuclear capacity poses a serious threat to India. China is in possession of 15,000 square miles of Indian territory. She assists the Nagas and Mizos economically and militarily. Today a war between India and China could escalate into a nuclear war. As China is also not a party to the NPT, the danger of such an event can not be ruled out.

India did not approve the proposed attempt by the nuclear powers to give security assistance to those countries which signed the Treaty as she felt that this was done to pressure Third World countries to sign the NPT. Instead each country should have the independence to judge the merits and demerits of the Treaty on an individual basis. Resolution 255 (1968), of the UN Charter implying that the Security Council would not come to the help of any State that was a victim of aggression unless it had signed the NPT was vehemently opposed by India.

It must be realized that the interest in peaceful nuclear explosion by India, was mainly economic in nature, as it would help raise the standard of living. It could use this technology to extract metals such as copper, zinc, lead, etc., and in exploiting natural gases, oil resources. This would benefit the industrial development of the country. It could enable the building of canals and dams. Article V of the NPT, contained provision for availability of making peaceful nuclear devices to non-nuclear states freely and at

economical costs. India, however, was not prepared to accept the idea of keeping a number of states at the mercy of a small group of nations for the benefits of an important technology, like that of peaceful nuclear devices which was an effective instrument of economic development in the non-nuclear countries. This article was designed to reduce the NNWS permanently to an inferior status. India did not agree to the proposal of acquiring such technology indirectly. This article only highlighted India's view that the NPT had violated the principle of sovereign equality of nations by the division of countries into two categories. It was a very discriminatory treaty that left the monopoly in the hands of a few. India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh said in the Lok Sabha on March 11, 1970:

we can never agree to sign the NPT which is essentially discriminatory in nature.... it puts constraints and restraints which are totally unacceptable to us. (20)

Article II of the Treaty only highlights the discriminatory character by making a rigid and clear cut distinction between the two groups of States. It maintains the privileged position of the nuclear haves while it denies access to the technology to the nuclear have nots. The NPT did not want the knowledge of PNEs to go outside the territories of the Nuclear Power States. Through this clause, the nuclear haves

were bent on achieving nuclear technology hegemony. The analysis of article II and V shows that the only aim of the nuclear powers was to establish their monopoly over nuclear technology and keep the rest of the States dependent on them. It was a Treaty biased in favour of nuclear weapons States. Hence India did not sign it.

India's refusal to sign the NNPT could be considered an example of her policy of judging every issue on its individual merits and demerits. Her support for disarmament was based on a principled stand, that any multilateral treaty should be fair and equitable to all countries. Hence while she supported PTBT, she rejected NPT, as it was discriminatory in nature.

Thus the NPT threatened the development of civilian nuclear technology. It came into effect in 1970. India has reserved her right to explode peaceful nuclear devices, a right which had been articulated by Ambassador V.C. Trivedi as far back as 1966. The West was very keen that India should be a party to the Treaty as: (1) India had a small but sophisticated nuclear programme, (2) had articulated a strong stance against atomic discrimination and (3) had the potential of becoming the sixth horizontal proliferator because of a perceived problem of India's nuclear safety against China. India sought international security through Disarmament and not through the Great Powers. Her goal was General and Complete Disarmament.

K. Subrahmanyam, Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in his article "Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament", stated that India had refused to sign the NPT on the following grounds:

- 1) The Treaty did not ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but only stopped the dissemination of weapons to NNWS without imposing any curbs on the continued manufacture, stockpiling, and sophistication of nuclear weapons by the existing NWS.
- 2) The Treaty did not do away with the special status of superiority associated with power and prestige conferred on those powers which possessed nuclear weapons.
- 3) The Treaty did not provide for a balance of obligations and responsibilities between NWS and NNWS while all obligations were imposed on NNWS, the NNWS had not accepted any.
- 4) The Treaty did not constitute a step by step approach towards nuclear disarmament.
- 5) The Treaty did not prohibit one NWS from assisting another NNWS by providing technical aid.
- 6) Article VI did not create a judicial obligation in regard to the creation of a nuclear arms race at an early date.
- 7) The Treaty imparted a false sense of security to the world.
- 8) It was discriminatory in regard to the safeguards and control which were all imposed on the NNWS while none whatsoever were imposed on the NWS, and
- 9) The security assurances to the NNWS could not be a quid pro quo for acceptance of the Treaty; it must be obligatory for NWS. (21)

India, hence, refused to be party to a treaty, which would not secure her national interests.

The early years of the 1970s saw the on going process of detente lead to reduction in tensions between the super powers. This relaxation of tensions gave disarmament a further boost. The Nixon visit to Moscow in May 1972 resulted in several agreements being signed. Among the most notable ones were: the ABM Treaty, SALT I, environmental protection. Another important that would have a wide ranging impact on super power relations and consequently on disarmament was the joint declaration of 'Basic Principles of Relations between USA and USSR'. Such a joint declaration was designed to give super power competition a structure that would increase confidence in each other, lead to curbing and reducing the weapons procurement programme and move one step towards disarmament.

With the Brezhnev visit to Washington in June 1973, more agreements were signed for collective security arrangements, peaceful uses of oceans and outer space. India while welcoming these agreements, noted that the most important ~~Factor~~ SALT I suffered from shortcomings: (1) the treaty did not ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear warheads. There was no curb on Research and Development (R&D); secondly, it conferred special status on the US and USSR.

During this period also, India expressed her concern over chemical and biological weapons, pointing out their

dangerous effects on mankind. Hence she called for the total elimination of nuclear chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction. India wanted strict observation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by all States, which prohibited the use of poisonous gas or other gases in war. She was a signatory to this particular Protocol and attached an element of sanctity to it.²² The Indian Representative, Azam Hussain called for an agreement on "halting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and biological agents."²²

These weapons could not be treated separately as it would have weakened the Protocol. India felt that both should be considered together as delinking the two would create further problems. The Big Powers did not regard biological weapons as effective battlefield weapons while chemical weapons elimination proved more complex since its capability was important for national security. Therefore, nations are reluctant to give it up.

Another portion of the disarmament negotiations that caused a lot of anxiety was the fear of the militarization of outer space. The question of the use of outer space was a part of disarmament discussions. India favoured a treaty prohibiting the military use of outer space. Both the USA

22 Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Effects of Their Possible Use, UN Doc. A/7575, p.XXI.

and USSR had a special responsibility to ensure against the military uses of outer space, as these powers were directly concerned with the advances made in space research. India was satisfied with the plan presented by both super powers which called upon States not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing enormous destruction. The draft Treaty submitted by the USA and USSR in this regard made no mention of delivery vehicles. India wanted prohibition of delivery vehicles of all types of weapons from outer space. Countries which were advanced in space research should co-operate with other countries in examining benefits of space programme on the basis of scientific and technical knowledge; therefore India supported Resolution 1348(XIII) of United Nations' General Assembly, and General Assembly Resolution 1472(XIV), which called for the increasing co-operation internationally in the peaceful uses of outer space, which are linked with disarmament. Hence, India signed on 3 March, 1967 "Treaty or principles governing the activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space including the Moon and other celestial bodies."²³ This was a significant step in the path of disarmament.

At this stage there was the rapid increase of delivery vehicles long range rockets carrying atomic and thermonuclear bombs. This led India, once again to reiterate her stand that there was the need to eliminate these delivery systems

23 A.K.Chopra, n.15, p.146.

in the course of elimination of nuclear weapons, the elimination of vehicles would reduce the capacity of nuclear weapons to inflict damage. The problem of disarmament could not be solved unless an agreement was reached on delivery vehicles.

The Soviet Union had proposed the complete abolition of delivery vehicles at the very first stage of disarmament. Subsequently it agreed to retain limited number of vehicles up to the end of the disarmament process. The elimination of vehicles could only be completed if the nuclear powers agreed to make substantial reduction in the number of delivery vehicles in their possession as India felt, that the nuclear powers had no moral right to maintain stocks of nuclear weapons at the highest level, especially when they were pressurizing other nations not to develop a nuclear weapon programme of their own. Thus India called for the reduction, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear arms, which could be carried out under the supervision of an International Disarmament Organization to be set up within the framework of the United Nations.

Thus the most important events which characterized detente were (1) PTBT - 1963, (2) The establishment of the Hot line between USSR and USA, (3) NPT - 1968, (4) an agreement banning weapons of mass destruction on the Ocean Bed - 1971, (5) SALT-I - 1972, (6) an agreement to control the production of biological and toxic weapons and measures of notifications

on consultation to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Detente thus far meant an improved international atmosphere and meaningful progress; to expect more at this time was hardly realistic. It demonstrated the desire of the two major powers to "peacefully co-exist", something that India always supported. India believed detente to be a necessary process for the alternative was a spiralling arms race, growing domestic discontentment in both States, increased tensions in world politics, increased possibility of misunderstanding of one another and the increased likelihood of a dangerous confrontation between the two super powers. It should not be overlooked that the resultant improvement of ties between USA and the two Communist countries had been facilitated by the Sino-Soviet split. China has been central in USA-USSR relations and the coming together of the two of these three could change the international balance of power. The US -Soviet detente resulted not only from the necessity to avoid a nuclear holocaust but also from the desire to protect itself from a conflict in Europe, while facing a perceived threat from China in the Far East. While the Sino-American rapprochement (1972) was originally connected with China's fear of a Soviet attack and the impending end of the Vietnam conflict. The nature of the triangular relationship has changed since the 1950's. The approach has become more broad-based and interdependent with regard to the three major powers.

China could no longer be regarded as a junior partner as was perceived by both the USA and USSR. Another reason for China's growing importance was that with its growing power it would have the capability to intervene in situations farther from its border. China was keen to tilt the balance in her favour. But China is not so powerful as the USSR and USA. Though the USA and USSR conduct bilateral negotiations, the China factor is always there. The size and disposition of China's nuclear force is important. Any major reduction of forces in Europe would have to take into account the consequent ability of the USSR to confront China without having to fear NATO's reaction. This is the reason why India was keen that China should also take part actively in the disarmament negotiations.

India was keen that the two super powers should come together, sort out their differences which would ultimately help towards the goal of disarmament. India felt that detente was one step towards that direction because with the reduction of tensions, it would help in the creation of proper climate to negotiate and to come to some sort of a compromise with regard to disarmament. This should be the immediate concern of the super powers.

Chapter - IV

INDIA AND DISARMAMENT, PHASE III - AFTER THE POKHARAN EXPLOSION (1974-1985)

This chapter will mainly concentrate on the events following the aftermath of India exploding a nuclear device on 18 May 1974. It will also deal with the Indian Ocean, its increasing militarization and the vertical and horizontal Proliferation of nuclear weapons. India's approach to the problem of disarmament was responsive to these trends. This chapter will also include India's reaction to Pakistan and Nepalese proposal for a Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia, the Nepalese proposals for a Zone of Peace and the Soviet suggestions for an Asian Security. The security compulsions influencing and effecting India's disarmament policies from mid-seventies to 1985 will be described, and analysed in the context of regional developments.

This period saw the erosion of detente and its ultimate demise on the one hand and the positive interaction between the USSR and USA for controlling and reducing the stockpile of strategic arms coming to a grinding halt on the other. The flow of sophisticated arms to Pakistan affected India's security interests and the emerging US-Pak-Chinese axis have influenced India's security perceptions. The militarization of the Indian Ocean and the increase in the military bases around India by various powers, have qualitatively changed the security environment around India to India's disadvantage.

India's disarmament policies, therefore, have evolved as a particular response to our perceived security interests.

India's peaceful nuclear explosion on 18 May, 1974, demonstrated her desire to keep her nuclear option open. It was also an attempt to safeguard herself against being overly dependent on the advanced industrial States. Her wish to develop her nuclear option was mainly for the following reasons: "(1) To stay abreast of modern technology in case a later contingency required India to manufacture nuclear weapons and (2) to explore the possibilities inherent in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy both for India's economic reconstruction and to explore commercial export possibilities."¹

Ashok Kapur in his book Indian Nuclear Option put forward the following reasons that were responsible for India undertaking the Pokharan tests:

- 1) Technical determination to have the capacity to explode a device.
- 2) Response to the oil crisis, which increased the foreign exchange burden on India's oil imports. The vast benefits of PNEs appeared to have become attractive because of the rising costs of imports of crude oil and of developing other conventional power sources.
- 3) Intended to have a demonstration effect on the super powers, as great Powers attention is

1 Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York, 1976), p.203.

primarily focused on Central and East Asian international relations.

- 4) India's test was a commitment against the NPT.²

Neither the USA nor the USSR was in any position to question India's contention about the concept of Peaceful Nuclear Explosion as long as they subscribed to the concept of Peaceful Nuclear Explosion and were parties to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. (PNET).

South Asian NWFZ

The peaceful explosion by India resulted in Pakistan moving a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly to "establish a nuclear Free Zone in South Asia". On 28 October 1974, Pakistan introduced its proposal in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly stating that: (1) the security of the NNWS should be viewed in the context of spiralling nuclear proliferation by nuclear countries and by countries which had joined the nuclear club and (2) the security prospects of the NNWS should be considered in the establishment of a NWFZ. While India supporting the concept of Nuclear Free Zone in different parts of the world, insisted that (1) if a region was to be declared Nuclear Free Zone, the conditions should be suitable for such a declaration and

2 Ibid., pp. 204-205.

(2) the initiative must come from the countries of that region itself. India also stated that all the countries had the right to equal status under International Law and could in the long run reject the concept which was imposed on them against their wishes.³ India had, therefore, rejected Pakistan's Resolution as she felt that Pakistan had violated International Law since it was not the function of the General Assembly to call upon States of a particular region to enter discussions regarding denuclearization of regions. This should come from the concerned States of the region. India, therefore, moved a draft resolution which stated that: the initiative for the creation of a NWFZ in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned taking into account its special features and geographical extent.⁴

India also believed that South Asia was an integral part of Asia and the Pacific. Therefore, she expressed concern that the demand for Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia could jeopardize the creation of a larger Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the area. According to India, Pakistan had ignored the implications of declaring South Asia as a Nuclear Free

3 A.K.Chopra, India's Disarmament Policy (New Delhi, 1984), p.137.

4 Ashok Kapur, n.l, p.238.

Zone since China a nuclear weapon State is at the backyard of South Asia. There were military bases of the super powers also around the Indian Ocean. According to India, the best course would be for all countries of the region of Asia to sit together and work out a plan for the denuclearization of the whole Asian region. This was one of the major reasons why India did not agree to the idea of a Nuclear Free Zone in South Asia.

The success of any Treaty to establish a NWFZ would depend on the responsible behaviour of the nuclear powers. They should refrain from violating the sanctity of NWFZ by not placing nuclear weapons in those demarcated zones. At the same time India held that Peaceful Nuclear Explosion should not be banned by any Treaty.

At the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly, both the Indian and Pakistani Draft Resolutions regarding NWFZ in South Asia were accepted for different reasons. India's acceptance of the Pakistani proposal would have resulted in India agreeing that Indian nuclear facilities could be inspected and that there would be international verification.⁵

Pakistan, it must be noted feared nuclear blackmail by India, and the Indian Resolution called for an initiative

5 Ibid., p.238.

by the South Asian States but this seemed highly unlikely due to the obstacles arising in the way of the process of normalization in Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan relations. The concept of a South Asian NWFZ is a "potential arms control measure that requires much diplomatic work in Sino-Indian-Pakistan relations before it can even approach the prospect of negotiation...."⁶

Thus the presence in the region of nuclear weapons, alliances with nuclear weapon States, and existence of foreign military bases had to be taken into account, in the process of examining South Asia as a NWFZ. India felt this proposal to be an extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - the objective of both being the denial of nuclear status to non-nuclear States and legitimising nuclear weapons in the hands of NWS by projecting these treaties as guarantees of security against nuclear threats. India felt that the Pakistani leaders had always played a collaborative role in extending the dominance of Western Powers over the developing world and their NWFZ proposal was in line with their traditional collaborations.

India supported the concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones which could achieve the goal of making the world free

6 Ibid., p.242.

from nuclear weapons. However, India made it clear that the declaration of any particular region as Nuclear Weapon Free Zone did not mean that the nuclear powers had the right to attack the areas which were not declared as free zones. She emphasized the voluntary nature of a region in the adoption of such a concept.

India's peaceful nuclear explosion was no indication of her going nuclear. Hence Pakistani Resolution calling for South Asia to be declared a NWFZ in order to prevent a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan was not acceptable to India. The fact that China, is a nuclear power, has also to be taken into account in our security perceptions. Though China supported the South Asian NWFZ Resolution, and declared that she would not use nuclear weapons against the South Asian region, it should not be forgotten that there are nuclear weapon bases in Tibet, closer to India's borders. China was trying to sabotage India's use of nuclear power for both civilian and military purposes. Today South Asia is a non-nuclear region and hence there is no need to establish a NWFZ here.

Nepal as a Zone of Peace

Likewise, India did not accept the proposal put forward by Nepal calling to declare Nepal as a Zone of Peace because it would imply that Nepal was being threatened by India when

in fact both were on friendly terms. The smaller nations in the South Asian region have an insecurity syndrome as they believe that India, a big country, is trying to behave as a dominant regional power in the region.

The peace zone proposal, which Nepal has been pressing India to endorse was first put forward by the King of Nepal in 1975, at the time of his coronation. He explained his view point in an interview to Tanjug, the Yugoslav New Agency on July 19, 1975:

It does not mean neutrality on the lines of Switzerland. We want to maintain friendly relations with all the countries of the world and we want to have a close understanding with our neighbours. In short, Nepal has no enemies and hence the proposal to have Nepal declared as a zone of peace is not promoted out of fear or threat from any country or quarter. Essentially, it reflects our overriding concern for peace and development and our realisation that one is not possible without the other.(7)

The proposal was a major foreign policy goal of the Nepalese government. Pakistan, China and Burma have endorsed it. India felt that endorsing this proposal is unnecessary as there is already a Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed between the two countries in July, 1950. India believes that by accepting this proposal, the Treaty of 1950

7 N.Mitra, "India and its Neighbours", IDSA Journal, vol.XIV, No.3 (New Delhi), Jan-March 1982, p.405.

would lose its effect and would also give scope to third countries getting involved in the affairs of the South Asian region.

Nepal is sharing her border with India and China. She is a land-locked country and must be able to balance her foreign policy in a manner in which she does not tilt too much towards China as this would be a security risk for India. There is a need to remove the mistrust and suspicions of India in their perceptions. Confidence and trust should be brought about between India and Nepal, only then can a fruitful relationship emerge. India's conceding to Nepal's demand on the Zone of Peace is certainly not among the measures which can promote such confidence. The acceptance of the proposal would mean that India "no longer considers the Himalayan crest as its security boundary.... The Nepali elite will be highly tempted to involve India and China in a competing bid for influence in their country, and China's higher rating as a nuclear-weapon Power is likely to prevail. It behoves India as a friend of Nepal, in its dealing with that country, to defer to its sensitivities and win its trust and confidence, but on the idea of Zone of Peace there can be no compromise".⁸

Soviet Proposal for Asian Security

Prior to the proposal of South Asia as a NWFZ an attempt was made by the Soviet Union to establish a new mode for

⁸ Ibid., p.407.

security and peace in Asia. General Secretary L. Brezhnev advanced the idea of Asian collective security in 1969, at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR:

In setting the goal for expanding the zone of relaxation to the whole world, we deem it important that Asia should join this process on a broad scale. Here we proceed not only from the interests of our own country, two-thirds of whose territory is in Asia, we take into account the place holds in the life of mankind, the role of Asian States in world politics and the interests of Asia itself and its people. (9)

Brezhnev reiterated his view at the 'World Congress of Peace Forces' in 1969 when he stated:

...the Soviet Union is advocating the consolidation of peace on the Asian Continent by collective efforts. We conceive this as the progressive development of all aspects of mutually beneficial and mutually enriched relations and peaceful co-operation between all the States, as the consolidation in these relations of the well-known principles, proclaimed by the Asian States at Bandung, of peaceful co-existence with strict observance of the sovereignty and independence of each country. (10)

The Nuclear Weapon Free Zone concept and Asian collective security system (which has had a sympathetic through not positive response from most Asian countries, including India) has serious security implications on India. Would

9 Ajit S. Sarhadi, India's Security in Resurgent Asia, (New Delhi, n.d.), p.5.

10 Shashi Bhushan, Bandung and Problems of Peace and Security of Asia (Bombay) p.XII.

it help the process of disarmament? We can not ignore our vital national interests for the sake of satisfying others in security matters. But at the same time we should look into the matter, see if a solution can be worked out, which would in the long run serve the security interests of all the countries in the region. Presently such an attempt would be futile as there are a lot of extra-regional influences in our region. Until that issue is solved, India has to keep her interest in mind, as that is the most important aspect of our foreign policy.

Janata Government and Disarmament

In 1977, the position regarding nuclear weapons did not change and Prime Minister Morarji Desai addressing the UN General Assembly's special session on Disarmament on 9 June, 1978 observed:

- (1) Utilization of nuclear technology for military purposes including research in weapon technology must be outlawed.
- (2) Formulation of a time bound programme not exceeding a decade for gradual reduction with a view of achieving total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
- (3) Quantitative and qualitative limitations on nuclear armaments and immediate freezing of present stock-piles under international inspection.
- (4) CTBT through independent inspection. The safeguard should be universal.¹¹

11 Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 10 June 1978.

Desai called for the total involvement of nuclear weapon States in the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament and complying with the requirements of Article VI of the NPT which called upon the Parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

UNSSOD-I

The year 1978, witnessed a historic event, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Prior to this in 1976, at Colombo, in the Political Declaration adopted by the NAM members, requested the General Assembly to hold a special session on disarmament not later than 1978. The idea of convening such a session devoted to disarmament under the auspices of the UN was discussed at the first conference of Heads of States of Government of Non-aligned countries, held at Belgrade in 1961, and a proposal to that effect was formally included in the declaration adopted by the conference. Thereafter it was regularly reiterated in the final documents adopted at the subsequent summit conferences (Cairo-1971, Lusaka-1970, and Algiers-1973), Ministerial meetings (New York-1971, Georgetown-1972, and Lima-1975) and other conferences of Non-aligned countries, the underlying motive being the urgent need of setting in motion a process of General and Complete Disarmament.¹²

12 The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, UN Centre for Disarmament, vol.2, 1977 UN, (New York, 1978), p.7.

Keeping all these in view, a draft Resolution was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty first session. It was adopted without a vote on December 21, 1976 as Resolution 31/189 B. By this Resolution, it was decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in New York in May/June, 1978, and to establish a Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly, devoted to Disarmament.¹³

In December 1978, India moved a Resolution in the UN General Assembly, 33/71 B, which declared that "the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity and demanded that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament."¹⁴ This Resolution was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. It had the support of 126 nations including the Soviet Union, China, fifteen nations of NATO (excluding Greece) and Australia opposed this move to delegitimise the nuclear weapons.

At the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-II) India "moved for a convention to outlaw

13 Ibid., p.7.

14 K.Subrahmanyam, "Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament", /Apr. Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), /1985, vol.IX, No.1, p.72.

nuclear weapons on the model of the Geneva Convention on Chemical Warfare. This has now been referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, for further consideration.¹⁵

All these moves demonstrated India's keen desire for the achievement of disarmament in the various fields of weapons development and production.

India, further, had supported the "Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin weapons and their destruction", on the ground that it contained a commitment to solve the problem of chemical warfare. This would help the process of disarmament, and she insisted that there should be a similar convention for biological weapons.

This phase also witnessed the growth of tension once again between the two super powers and the emergence of a new Cold War. Some believed that the new Cold War came about when the USA cancelled its talks on the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union in 1977, while others believed that it started with the USSR's invasion in 1979, of Afghanistan.¹⁶ Prior to this tensions were building up

15 Ibid., pp.72-73.

16 K.Subrahmanyam, "The Second Cold War", Strategic Analysis, vol.VII, Nos.2-3, (New Delhi) May-June, 1983, p.72.

with issues like conventional arms transfer to Third World countries. 1978, also saw the "total exclusive of the Soviet Union from the Camp David Agreement, between Egypt and Israel, promoted by the USA...."¹⁷

Besides this, by the early seventies, in nuclear arsenals the USA still was technologically superior. The Soviet Union felt that there was the need to establish parity with the USA. The Soviet Union wanted to improve her strategic missile force with the introduction of new missiles such as the SS-18, SS-19, etc. The USA on the other hand, was keen to modernize her Polaris and Poseidon class submarines, replace her Minuteman and Titan Missiles with the MX, and respond to the emerging demand to replace the B-52 bombers with new bomber aircraft (B-1 and Stealth) which will be developed in a manner as to be avoid radar detection. Neither super powers showed any concern towards stopping the production of their strategic nuclear warheads.

The United Kingdom, China and France were also involved in the on-going process of armament race. The arms race became the central issue in the second Cold War starting in 1978.

The present Cold War differs from the one waged from the 1940's and 1960's, in the sense, that in the latter case there was a greater alliance participation. Today the involve-

17 Ibid., p.72.

ment by China, Japan and West Europe is not much. Secondly, in the first Cold War more importance was given to the building of conventional arms since at this stage the USA was ahead in the technology with regard to nuclear weapons, but today the Soviet Union has achieved an approximate parity with the US in nuclear armaments capability. There is also a race in sophisticated conventional weaponry. France and China play a prominent role as nuclear weapons powers - they can not be ignored and cannot "be left out of the strategic calculations,"¹⁸ "by either super powers. "In the new Cold War situation the Soviet Union is confronted by four nuclear-weapon powers, unlike in the fifties when it had to face only two nuclear adversaries. The psychological and political impact of this tremendous imbalance in nuclear confrontation is bound to be significant."¹⁹

The impact of the second Cold War on the Third World countries cannot be overlooked and the spill over of the Cold War has quite an effect on the countries that constitute the "Third World".

Ever since the Helsinki accord and SALT-I, were signed, the super powers have been keen to establish their sphere of influence among the Third World countries. In the

18 K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi, 1982), p.6.

19 Ibid.

mid-seventies the USA had evolved the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" which recognized East Europe as the Soviet Union's legitimate sphere of influence. In order to maintain her position of influence in the Third World the USA created the Rapid Deployment Force and the Central Command. Besides the USA, the Soviet Union has today an Ocean going blue-water navy with a massive airlift capacity. This had led to a lot of suspicion arising among the developing countries of the intentions of the two super powers in the Third World region.

The second important point, is that the countries of this region have got political and legal control over their national resources, following their independence. In many instances, for the exploitation of natural resources, the Socialist countries have offered an alternative source of technology much to the embarrassment of the West. These factors have made the developing world the arena of the Second Cold War, of which some countries occupy very strategic locations. The second Cold War is characterized by a high technological arms race, and increasing interventions and pressures being imposed on the developing world. There is also the conduct of proxy wars, which have proved to be very detrimental to the economies of the countries involved in these wars and the accelerating arms race among these countries. Therefore, the impact of the second Cold War has been felt all over the world. In the industrial world the effect is mainly on the economy while in the developing world the impact

is also felt in the political and military arena. India views this situation with grave concern and wants the super powers to realise that neither can win the Cold War, and both should sit down and negotiate in an attempt to bring down the existing tension, create conditions conducive for disarmament, which is important for the survival of humanity. The success in disarmament negotiations is not solely dependent upon India. The countries possessing nuclear weapons are not expected to be convinced by the pleading of a non-nuclear power in favour of nuclear disarmament. Nor can such pleading inspire confidence in other non-nuclear powers and facilitate disarmament.

Furthermore, if any nuclear disarmament agreement was to come about, India felt that it would have no meaning without the participation of China, and her signing it. Therefore, there is the need, despite this drawback, for India, together with other countries of the Non-aligned world to reverse the trend of the new Cold War, as "there are attempts at destabilisation of our territorial sovereignty by overt and covert external support. Part of the difficulties that India faces in pursuing its planned development for eradication of backwardness and poverty is due to the direct or indirect consequences of the Cold War atmosphere. Also the militarization of the Indian Ocean as well as the arms race between India and Pakistan had their effect".²⁰

20 Rasheeduddin Khan, "Second Cold War and Indian Security", Mainstream, vol.22, No.22, (New Delhi), Jan.26, 1984.

International security is a problem concerned with the controlling of the nuclear arms race - the achievement of which looks bleak. The security behaviour of the two super powers during the Cold War phase seemed to be to maintain a stable nuclear deterrent, prevent an accidental nuclear and prevent local conflicts from escalating into super power military confrontation (Korea War, Indo-China War, Arab-Israeli Wars, etc.). Super powers themselves "...fuel regional rivalries by supplying military arms and technology to their clients for commercial and political purposes".²¹ It must be noted that since the end of the Second World War, 148 armed conflicts, most of which have been fought in the developing countries, with arms sold or gifted by leading powers. In most of these conflicts one great power or the other has intervened directly or indirectly to further its own geopolitical and economic interests - especially those countries possessing valuable natural resources such as oil. So, developing countries like India which are non-aligned, advocate the dissolution of military blocs and settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

/ In 1979, when the USSR intervened in Afghanistan, India refused to accept the Soviet explanations that they were invited by the Afghan government. As early as February

21 Ashok Kapur, n.i, p.37.

1980, Mrs. Gandhi government refused to look at the evidence that Gromoyko wanted to present in Delhi in support of Soviet contention of an invitation from the Afghanistan Government. Subsequently, at no international or bilateral forum did India endorse the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. India has consistently asked for a political solution and withdrawal of Soviet troops. // India took this stand on the UN debate and on the Resolution on Afghanistan in November, 1980. Its abstention on the resolution was to show its differences with the US-Pakistani stance of seeking a military backed solution. // Indian analysis was that the Soviet military intervention proved to be counter-productive to its long-term security interests as it legitimised the USA presence in the Gulf. // India believed that by peaceful talks a solution could be found. India, along with some other developing countries, therefore, called for a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis, which had only raised the tension in the region and among the super powers. // In short, the political convulsions that rocked South West and South East Asia have had important repercussions on Indian perceptions of security. The fall of the Shah of Iran, led to a regime that was stridently non-aligned in its foreign policy. American strategy in this area was hinged upon the Shah acting on behalf of them. However, with the fall of the Shah, a power vacuum emerged.

To add to the present problem, in December 1979 the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. This not only changed the tenous balance that was existing, but led to US reaction in the form of the creation of the Central Command and Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Pakistan became a "frontline" state to "stop the Soviet march towards the Persian gulf". There was infusion of new sophisticated armaments into the region. This factor along with the intrusion of super power rivalry in the sub continent made India view the emerging situation with concern.

In South East Asia, the Vietnamese 'invasion' of Kampuchea led to deteriorating conditions on our eastern borders. This along with the crisis in the Horn of Africa and the Iran-Iraq war, made the super powers take confrontationalist postures, that not only reflected in their bilateral relations e.g. the non-ratification of SALT II etc., but also had a spill over into India's neighbourhood -- both on the land-mass and in the Indian Ocean.

India cannot ignore these developments, as the geo-political setting of the 'arc of crisis' is very near India's immediate concern. All these tensions have brought the super power confrontation close to Indian borders. India has supported the plea that Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf be declared as Zones of peace, free from big power rivalry. India has also suggested the holding of a summit meeting with

a view to evolve a regional consensus to help diffuse the tense situation in that area. There is the need for a collective effort to be made in order to meet the challenging situation confronting the countries of South-West and West Asia.

Central to super power relations is the nuclear armament race. By the very nature of its destructive capacity, this arms race has implications for the rest of the world. Hence the progress of any strategic arms control race is vital to the disarmament efforts of the Third World.

The second Cold War saw the deterioration of political relations between the two super powers reach an all time low. This had important ramifications on the strategic level talks. It led to the abandonment of SALT II by the Americans. It led to 'renewed hostility' between the super powers culminating in a massive build up in armaments.

The 'peace offensive' of the Soviet Union to stop the emplacement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe failed. With it, the Soviets walked out of the intermediate nuclear forces talks in Geneva. By 1983, deteriorating political relations led to increased belligerency on part of the Americans to the arms race. The Reagan Administration came to power committed to give the arms control negotiations a new thrust. This was unveiled by Ronald Reagan in his 'Eureka College speech'. He talked about using the defense based systems to render nuclear weapons obsolete and impotent !

This was perceived by the Soviets as an attempt to indulge them in a costly arms race and to destabilize the arms race which based on the tacit understanding, through the ABM treaty that deterrence was best served by mutual vulnerability. The 'Star Wars' programme is an attempt to induce new directions in the arms race and to utilize American technological superiority in the arms race.

These US strategic calculations have increased Soviet fears of a first strike and led to fraying of already tense relations. All this has increased the likelihood of a surprise war. India has urged these countries to take steps to reduce international tension and reiterated that unless the actual powers concerned could not come to some sort of agreements, there could not be positive implementation of some sort of disarmament. India also highlighted the view that the very existence of the Third World is at stake, as they do not have any sort of leverage, hence the achievement of disarmament was imperative.

Therefore, the dangers voiced by India, led the Parliamentarians for World Order to enlist India's support besides that of Sweden, Greece, Tanzania, Mexico and Argentina to launch five-continental appeals in the name of humanity calling for a nuclear freeze, a Complete Test Ban Treaty and resumption of arms control negotiations. This appeal issued on 22 May 1984 also gave a boost to the on-going peace movements

in West Europe and America, simultaneously. The year 1984, saw signs of a dialogue between the two super powers despite the emergence of new types of ABMs and Anti-Satellite Systems (ASAT).

This led to the New Delhi Summit which was initiated by the new Indian Government under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. It was a six-nation summit, voicing the dangers of the impending arms race, which focused the attention on the frightening developments of technological sophistication in weapons leading to the making of "Star Wars" a reality in our life time. The Summit meeting reiterated the call for nuclear freeze and CTBT. India's role has been to once again remind mankind of the perils ahead if the nuclear weapon powers persist with their policies of improving the quality of sophisticated weapons. She once again warned about the radio-active fallout, about the inadequacy of detente limited only to Europe and finally about the dangers of an arms race in space.

The Delhi Declaration of the Six Nation Summit stated:

the survival of the human race depends on the demilitarisation of the global surface and on keeping Outer Space free of weapons. We must strengthen the defences of peace in man's inner space as well as - his mind, soul and spirit. (22)

Rajiv Gandhi went on to say: "we will not defend ourselves with war, we will defend ourselves by building up public opinion against war".²³

There were two strategic options open for India - the first one was to keep up a succession of declarations to voice the collective concern of mankind through the UN, the CCD in Geneva and through the Non-aligned at the Ministerial and Summit Conferences.

The second path that was open was that the six powers should intervene in the strategic debate with substantive arguments which will not in the ultimate analysis lead to all these countries being labelled as pro-Soviet or pro-American.

The Delhi Declaration of the Six Nation Summit spoke in the name of humanity. They gave importance to the fact that disarmament especially nuclear disarmament could not be a matter solely resolved between the two super powers. This summit was the first attempt after the Belgrade summit of the Non-aligned and neutral countries to intervene in the strategic debate and assert themselves.²⁴

23 Ibid.

24 K.Subrahmanyam, n.14, p.74.

The Six Nation Summit was an attempt to persuade the nuclear powers to halt their mad race towards arms build up. With regard to the appeal made by the Six Nations, the Soviet Union, China and several non-nuclear countries have welcomed their appeal but there was no response from the USA and NATO countries.

Behind the raging of the second Cold War, is the underlying quest for military superiority, behind which is the belief that such superiority will translate into effective political influences in diverse situations around the world. Keeping the global conditions in mind, India on her part has stressed that any realistic programme for disarmament would have to be pursued on two planes - the reduction of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and the evolution of a cooperative rather than conflictual international political system. India has further stressed the need for all countries whether nuclear or non-nuclear for achieving this objective not because the end result of the negotiations on disarmament would affect all nations initially but because those countries which are not subjected to pressures of bloc politics could help create a climate conducive to such negotiations. India, as a member of the Non-aligned Movement believes in the universalistic approach to disarmament and has embraced the goal of General and Complete Disarmament, along with other members of NAM, as the ultimate objective of the disarmament effort. Looking ahead at the tasks to be faced, it is clear that disarmament, development, peace and independence remain the key issues to be dealt with.

Having given the broad political and factual trends which have been affecting the prospects of arms negotiations and disarmament, it is necessary that we re-evaluate the prospects in terms of developments on the ground. Since the advent of the Carter administration and more so with the advent of the Reagan Administration, the prospects for a successful conclusion of the SALT talks have faded. The two super powers have been working at cross purposes in dealing with both conventional and nuclear disarmament. A number of countries have acquired nuclear weapons capacity. Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Iraq, India and Pakistan can be mentioned in the context regardless of the assertion of peaceful intentions to use nuclear energy by all these countries.

Given these trends, the prospects of arms negotiations do seem to be bleak unless the advanced military powers particularly the super powers, have the wisdom to perceive the ultimate consequences of their armaments and defence policies.

The Militarization of the Indian Ocean and Indian Security

The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world and its importance lies in its potential resources, trade route and its strategic and political security. The political and strategic importance of this area lies in the fact that (1) None of the littoral countries have sizeable naval forces to compete with the Great Powers, (2) the littoral States are weak and undefended, (3) lack of political unity among

the littoral countries, (4) Mutual relations among the littoral States are not very healthy and this is exer^{abated} by outside forces.

The importance of this Ocean was said by Alfred Mahan

whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the Seven seas... In the twenty first century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.

Till 1947, the British dominated this area but after decolonization, they had two options: (1) Complete withdrawal; or (2) substantial reduction of their forces from the area. Yet they would not disband because of their interests in the economies of various countries in this area namely India and Iran. By the end of the 1960's under Prime Minister Wilson, the British followed a policy of "withdrawing East of the Suez" and her supremacy came to an end. This led to a power vacuum which is a theory considered contrary to the philosophy of Non-aligned, according to some Afro-Asian nations.

The Indian Ocean and who moves in it, must always be of interest to India for though a conventional sea-borne attack is now wholly improbable, naval dominance by others in the seas to our South, can employ pressures of various sorts. We have neither the strength nor the might to prevent others from gaining supermacy or moving freely on the waters of the Indian Ocean but we do have the capacity to remain wholly uncommitted in the efforts being made by the super powers

to establish a naval hegemony in our vicinity. At sea, protection seems to lie in vigilance.

The US interest and involvement in this area were very little before World War II. After the Truman Doctrine, the US needs in military, and economic fields changed perceptibly. The US had established a number of security pacts with countries of the littoral States like CENTO and SEATO. Thus the pretext of supporting and preserving the weak States was coterminous with the 'Containment Policy'. After the British withdrawal, the USA stepped into fill their place. The reason for USA seeking a base was that otherwise it could only reach this area by air, overflying territory of other States. This led to a joint US-British Survey and by 1966, Diego Garcia was made available for US military and defence needs. This base was first leased as a 'communication base' and by 1973 it was fully operational. After the Arab-Israel conflict of 1973 and the opening of the Suez, the Americans felt that (1) the re-opening of the Suez will enable the USSR to send its ships from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean, (2) oil, supply routes to West Europe and Japan had to be protected and lastly there was the necessity to counter the increase Soviet activity in the area.

Thus USA devised to expand the Diego Garcia base into a "permanent" base which would be helpful to its carrier forces and RDF.

To the Soviets the Indian Ocean is the only ice-free sea lane between the eastern and western parts of the USSR. Secondly the USSR has to protect its military industrial complex and cities located near the Indian Ocean. Thirdly, the USSR has sizeable economic links with the countries in the region. Fourthly from the Indian Ocean, the USA can indulge in offensive deployment against the USSR, which can not do the same. The deployment of bases for Polaris submarines in the Indian Ocean has led the USSR forward a memorandum for easing international tensions and restricting the arms race, which also envisaged a nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean.

The history of the Soviet naval build-up in this area began by 1967 and it has increased but the balance is still in favour of the U.S.A. Though the USSR does not have many warships in the area, it does maintain good relations with the littoral States.

Most of the littoral countries are non-aligned and their reactions have been voiced in the non-aligned summit meetings. The Second Non-aligned Summit at Cairo in 1964 called for making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. The Lusaka Conference noted the growing concern of the former "British Lake" becoming a victim of strategy and tactics of outside powers. It proposed to make the Indian Ocean a Nuclear Free Zone. In 1971, the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries met to discuss this subject and reaffirm

the Lusaka Declaration. This issue was also raised at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet (CHOGM) at Singapore in January 1971. The final communique called for declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. This also came up at the U.N. between 1970 and 1971, which was supported by Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan. There was unanimity in this Resolution. The Georgetown Foreign Ministers Conference of NAM in 1975 reaffirmed the stand taken by the U.N. Around this time Sri Lanka put forward three proposals: (1) the matter should be referred to the Committee on Disarmament, (2) States should enter into consultations, and (3) littoral States should come to some sort of agreement among themselves.

The UN appointed an Ad hoc Committee to study the implications and measures that may be taken to further the concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In 1973 and 1975 there were other ad hoc committees requesting the littoral and hinterland States to intensify their efforts. The super powers were indifferent to these efforts while there was a lot of differences of opinion among the littoral and hinterland countries.

The Ad hoc Committee's Resolution of 1971 said:

(1) there was the need for the littoral countries to scale down their competition and contention, military and otherwise in the area, (2) the super powers should halt the escalation and expansion of their military presence, (3) there should be the categorical demand that the Great Powers should withdraw

from their bases and installations in the Indian Ocean area, (4) remove all nuclear weapons and finally the termination of all manifestations of Great Power rivalry in the area.

The significant dimensions of this resolution lies in the fact that warships and military aircraft should not be allowed to use the Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the countries of this area in contravention of the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter. This dimension is prohibitory in nature. The Declaration provides that the right to free and universal use of the Zone by all the nations is unaffected - this meant that the freedom of the sea was not violated.

The Peace Zone ideas does not prohibit the presence of passage of warships as such over the Indian Ocean. Objection arises only when the activity poses a threat to the sovereignty of the littoral States. The USA argues that the Zone of Peace must not lead to undermining or weakening existing and generally recognised principles of International Law. The Peace Zone is meant to contribute to international security.

The underlying idea of a Peace Zone proposal is that the degree of peace and security varies inversely with the degree of great power rivalry in the region. This power

rivalry is the net result of the competitive arms race, and deployment of nuclear weapons in the region. Hence the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal seeks to secure peace and security by preventing such an arms race and deployment of strategic weapons in order to achieve (1) denuclearization, (2) demilitarization, (3) non-deployment of weapons and forces.

The US military capabilities in the Indian Ocean have further increased, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, to protect the oil fields, which were perceived to come under Soviet threat, owing to its proximity to the Gulf oil fields, vital for West Europe and Japan. In April 1980, the then President Jimmy Carter warned the Soviets about the Rapid Deployment Forces to be used in the Indian Ocean. Under President Reagan, there was the re-establishment of American strategic superiority in all areas of defence, both conventional and nuclear. In the Middle East in order to protect its vital interests it relies on the CENTCOM, with headquarters in the Persian Gulf, which was created in January, 1983. The USA naval strategy in the area is to maintain and restore strategic stability and to reduce the response time to meet a crisis. It must be noted that 70 per cent of US strategic forces are at sea. Satellites in orbits and in the interception of ballistic missiles during the so-called "boost phase" in "Star Wars" are some of the options that are being envisioned by

by the USA. Hence, the importance of Indian Ocean which lies in proximity to the Soviet ballistic missile launch areas.

The "pop up" defensive system that is put forward in President Reagan's SDI programme involved the launching of a comparatively light interception missile from a submarine stationed in waters that are close to the Soviet missile launching sites and from one important strategic area in the northern Indian Ocean - Diego Garcia. The USA is going ahead with its SDI programme, USSR will take counter measures to protect its second strike capabilities. The USSR has bases at Socotra, Hodeida, Massawa, Umm Qasir and the Seychelles. The Soviet presence could be related to the possibility of deployment of US Polaris. A-3 Submarines, the expansion of the runway in Diego Garcia which gives rise to the possibility of the US deployment of nuclear weapons on board the B-52 bombers. Furthermore, the Soviet build-up in the Indian Ocean must also be seen in the context of China's growing naval capabilities. In case of convergence of Western and Chinese strategic interests, the Soviets would have to contend with dual threats to their land targets from missiles launched from Indian Ocean. The emergence of Chinese SLBMs like CSS-N-3 abroad "Xia" class nuclear submarines is a distinct possibility in the late 1980s. These missiles could pose a threat to the land targets in USSR, Vietnam and India. When the Chinese ocean based nuclear deterrent is integrated into a US-Chinese

strategic relationship, one can visualize an increase in Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

The problem of security, independence and peace in the Indian Ocean is a critical segment of our contemporary global politics because it is a region that spans and binds together in common destiny of the three continents of Asia, Africa and Australia. The new escalation of the arms race is viewed as a serious threat to our national security. From a fuelling base till the 1950s, Diego Garcia became a communication base in the 1960s, then a base for docking facilities in the early 1970s and then to a full fledged major naval base complete with nuclear operation capability in the late 1970s. It is the centre of the network of military bases for an integrated offensive strategy and it is a vital pivot in the US global and regional stability. Thus there was the need to have a genuine peace zone, for peaceful maritime movements to peaceful trade, mutually beneficial in scientific research, exchange of technology and know how which will benefit the poverty stricken masses of the region.

For India, besides the Soviet and American presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese nuclear threat seems to be coming up. The Chinese nuclear submarines entering the Indian Ocean would need rest and the Karachi port has excellent facilities, but in the process the Chinese "would make themselves

vulnerable to a Soviet attack; hence, they would need an implicit understanding with the Americans to the effect that such type of basing would be consistent with an extension of the American guarantee to Pakistan.

Brezhnev stated at the Communist Party Congress in 1981 that the USSR would be prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of new submarines - the Ohio-type by the USA and similar ones by the USSR. He also called for the banning of modernization of existing ballistic missiles for the new variety of submarines.²⁵ He was reiterating the proposals made in 1971. This was followed by discussions between the USA and USSR in 1977 on limitation and freezing of military presence in the Indian Ocean. But unfortunately in 1978 the discussions were abruptly ended by USA due to Soviet support to Ethiopia in the war with Somalia and the presence of Cuban forces in the Horn of Africa.

A confrontation between the major power blocs in the area, will lead to a situation of destabilization and could lead to a direct conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons on account of misperceptions, miscalculations and rash commitments. Most of the littoral countries are following the non-aligned path in their foreign policy, hence they do not

25 "Brezhnev's Speech to the 26th CPSU Congress",
Times of India (New Delhi) 26 February 1981.

fall into a particular category of military alliances. They have gained their independence recently and thus the "interaction of the arms race and the confrontation between the blocs of industrialized nations with local instabilities will be far more explosive than the Cold War in Europe".²⁶

There is the need for a cooperative approach instead of one of confrontation. "The Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal is not merely a regional arms control measure but the first step in reversing the dangerous drift towards a new Cold War confrontation. This is primarily because the Indian Ocean does not have any great power on its shores and is mostly an ocean of non-aligned developing countries".²⁷

Nearly a decade and half ago, the UN General Assembly passed a Resolution on declaring the Indian Ocean "as a Zone of Peace for all times". But the implementation of the Resolution has been stalled by the USA, as they want the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan first. The USA has acquired the necessary bases or base facilities in Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Oman and Somalia. It must be noted that all the Indian Ocean countries do not support the Zone of Peace concept. Those who do support it can only build-up world opinion in favour of such a concept as the Big Powers are so superior

26 K.Subrahmanyam, "Indian Ocean", IDSJ Journal, vol. XIV, No.3 (New Delhi) Jan-March, 1982, p.353.

27 Ibid., p.355.

in military strength that there is nothing else that can be done.

The littoral countries must build-up adequate defence against the threats they face. In this respect India will have to shoulder the biggest burden in strengthening and expanding its naval and maritime forces. Building a system of close co-operation with the maritime forces of the neighbouring countries is essential and in the process evolve a regional approach, as a credible threshold of deterrence to any potential aggressor. India should undertake joint naval exercise in the region and evolve a common tactical doctrine and signal communication code amongst the littoral countries. This would help in confidence building measures.

The security and self-reliance for littoral States are of utmost importance and there is the need for a naval strategy to provide effective and credible deterrent to defend and safeguard the national interests of these countries. Therefore, for India the militarization of any zone which is contiguous to it will be seen as a threat to India. Hence India under no circumstances can ignore the increasing super power presence in this area. There is an acute necessity for India along with other littoral countries of the Indian Ocean to work towards making it a Zone of Peace.

Economic Benefits Arising from Disarmament

The economic advantages emerging from disarmament are extremely beneficial for the underdeveloping and developing

countries. The military competition between the two super powers has percolated to the countries constituting the Third World of which India is a part and parcel. The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) reflects the desire of the Third World countries of establishing and restructuring new economic relations based on equality, respecting the sovereignty of countries, realising the interdependence between the North and the South and calling for cooperation between all States. The call for NIEO on 1 May, 1974, demonstrated the linkage between peace, development and NIEO and held that disarmament was the only path towards achieving that goal.

India made her first attempt at focussing the economic and social consequences of disarmament when the Indian Representative, B.N.Ganguly, one of the United Nations group of Ten Experts stated:

The world is spending roughly \$ 120 billion annually on the military account of present time.... it is at least two thirds of the entire national income of all under-developing countries.... the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economy and social conditions.(28)

28 B.M.Kaushik, O.N.Mehrotra, "Disarmament and Development", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.VI, No.12, March 1983, pp.447-448.

This was followed in 1973, when efforts were made to establish some sort of linkage between development and disarmament. Various efforts have been made to show how the extreme waste of accumulating and improving the quality of weapons could be used instead to improve the standard of living and promote faster growth rate.

There should be a co-operative approach among the two spheres of the world, in regard to the transfer of technology to the countries that have the resources but do not have the up-to-date technology. Disarmament is a necessary step in the direction of confidence building measures, mutual trust, co-operation and security, which alone can help in the development of the industrialized world along with the developing countries and could help in the long run in finding a solution to the problem of international energy security. The economic and social deprivation and the highly inequitable international political order, existing today lead to the desire of achieving disarmament being of utmost importance.

The countries that are affected most by this high expenditure on military development are those with an extensive agricultural base and low productivity. The mechanized army with modern weaponry and sophisticated arms production increase the military consumption of raw materials and energy. These are detrimental to overall development as there is too much concentration in one major field - military. This also leads to a greater dependence on those who supply various types of

sophisticated weapons to Third World countries. It must be remembered that the content of national interests to a large extent depends on economic consideration and security.

India believes that the path of disarmament should be followed by all in order to achieve economic progress and equality. India calls for self-reliance as the primary instrument of development, she believes in the commonality of interests and co-operation among the two spheres of the world and that there should be the transfer of resources for development. India believes strongly that there should be some way to break the impasse in the North-South negotiations, the immense wastage of financial and technical resources in the armament race, which in turn led to the increasing inequalities in the economic and social structures of the world. India's interest in disarmament as a means to development is a natural part of her declaration of war against poverty and economic backwardness. She believes that the global arms race leads to heavy demands being imposed on the limited human and material resources.

All these ultimately rob the production sector of their resources. Only disarmament can become an effective instrument of global economic and social transformation, which is an acute necessity today. There is the utmost need to equalize relationships and the absolute need for global economic integration as the world today is an interdependent



one. There is the need to create a necessary political and psychological atmosphere for a healthy interaction between the advanced and developing countries in order to remove the imbalances and disequilibrium in the international economic situation.

Chapter - V

INDIA'S NEIGHBOURS, HER SECURITY DILEMMAS AND DISARMAMENT

The First Phases: 1947-1962

Right upto 1947, defense had remained a subject largely closed to the Indians. With independence, the situation changed vastly. Except for Gen. Claude Auchinleck, the defense of India came into the hands of Indians. The end of the Second World War saw new forces emerging the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa who were keen on being heard, and two ideologies - Communism and liberalism -- which were trying to gain influence in various parts of the world, the former represented by the USSR and latter by USA. This trend climaxed in the Cold War. India in such a situation had to take care of her security, and her national interest, which could be affected by events occurring in the South Asian sub-continent and around the world. Thus her defense policy and foreign policy were complementary in each other and had to be worked out in such a manner as to provide mutual support to each other. India's foreign policy had constantly kept a watch over foreign developments and how they affected India's political, economic and security environment. The main theme in her attitude was to "(a) to establish a system which would recognize the need for the economic development of the developing world, (b) search for a global system that recognized the need to diffuse the powers of the militarily powerful States through disarmament and improve the security

of the weaker States and (c) search for a world of Non-aligned States rather than a world of military alliances".¹

The main threat to India's security comes from Pakistan and China. The US military aid to Pakistan, China's take over of Tibet on the one hand and the Soviet help in India's developmental needs on the other shaped India's political and military response in the 1950's.

With regard to Pakistan, there has always been an ingrained hostility, mutual suspicion and distrust. India and Pakistan have waged three wars. The first in October 1947, began with the intrusion into Kashmir, by Pakistani forces. A ceasefire was declared on 21 January 1949, according to the Resolution of 13 August, 1949 of the Security Council, which held that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) would act as the Mediator. The second phase was from 1949-57, when the Security Council made futile attempts to bring about some agreement on the interpretation of the Resolution of 13 August, 1948. But differences were not resolved. The ceasefire line of 1949, was terminologically, replaced by the line of actual control. This was a political line that both would respect. Therefore, ever since 1947,

1 Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option & Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York, 1976), p.6.

Kashmir acquired a security focus with international implications. Kashmir became a "nexus" in India's security policy, therefore a part of the Cold War. Nehru in 1947 said:

Kashmir because of its frontiers with three countries, namely Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India..²

In 1958, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO essentially because of their hostility to India; instead of opting for peace, disarmament and lessening of tensions, there was the encouragement of tendencies which came in the way of disarmament. It was believed that these two military pacts were established to help to contain Communism. But to India, it appeared as an attempt by the West of spreading their influence in the Asian region. India believed that military alliances do not add to a country's sense of security, rather it comes in the way of a country's progress. Each country should be able to develop freely; all should co-operate together for the quest of peace and security of mankind.

The next phase from 1958-65, was marred by mainly a hate-India attitude. In 1960, a joint Defense Pact with India was put forwarded by Pakistan, but India did not concede to it due to Pakistan's military alliance with the USA and other

2 Ibid., p.48.

pro-West Powers. This was the most negative phase of Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan was very keen to acquire military parity with India. The basic problem with Pakistan was that she was suffering from an identity crisis.

Keeping this in mind, one notes that the Kashmir issue became an outward manifestation of Pakistan's inner conflict with India. Its importance lies in the fact that it helps Pakistan leaders to rationalize their hostility to India and channelize their hate-India campaign. She puts forward her demand for Kashmir on geographical, economic and strategic grounds. Pakistan has always reiterated her pledge to use force to upset the status quo in Kashmir. (save the Simla agreement). The pledge to use force to 'liberate' Kashmir had been one of her principal motives to refuse the 'no-war' pact offered by India which was offered as early as 1949. It felt that a 'no-war' pact with India would lead to disengagement of forces with India, which would mean accepting the status quo, in Kashmir and would have an effect on lulling them into false sense of security.

Thus in the early years of Indo-Pak relations, the immediate objective of Pakistan was two folds to isolate India from Britain and other Western countries; and to seek a new base in the Islamic world. They were in search of dependence from anyone but India. This led her to enter into a Mutual Security Pact (1954) with USA, which provided both military

and economic aid. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954) was a precursor to a number of other agreements signed by Pakistan e.g. SEATO, Baghdad Pact. The arming of Pakistan led to adverse reactions in India. Thus with the military aid, Pakistan sought to lessen the power inequality between India and her, and also acquire an edge over India in military know-how. This "alignment" had three advantages for Pakistan (1) Military aid, (2) Economic aid, and (3) Diplomatic support for Kashmir vis-a-vis India. This led to its being drawn into the arena of big power politics. The disadvantages were (1) Political instability internally and isolation from emergent nations, (2) stalemate in the question of Kashmir as India's position hardened, and (3) Soviet support to India on Kashmir.

Though a constant attempts were made to improve relations between the two countries it never materialized. The desire of Pakistan to acquire military parity with India has only led to an arms race in the South Asian Sub-continent. There is the imperative need to bring about disarmament in order to reduce tension between India and her neighbours.

India and China

The second country which is of great importance to our national security is China. Given the qualitative change in the strategic equations between super powers and regional powers in the South-Asian and South-East Asian Region, relations between India and China assume significance. The nature and content

of these relations are bound to have a substantial impact on the entire nature of relations between not only Asian countries but also between Asian countries and various important powers in different parts of the world.

Nehru had a vision of the two great Asian Powers, China and India, cooperating with each other for mutual benefit and to stand firm against forces of imperialism and colonialism not only in Asia but all over the world. For nearly a decade from 1949 to 1959 Sino-Indian bilateral relations were also developed on a healthy pattern. But by the late 1950's, the friendship between China and India was eroded and it evolved into an antagonism borne out of Chinese territorial claims against India, part of which they clandestinely achieved by incursions into NEFA and Nagaland areas of India, into Ladakh and the building of the Aksai Chin road. This clandestine territorial aggrandizement ultimately led to the military conflict between India and China in 1962 resulting in a military defeat for India, which not only changed the world's perception of the military balance in Asia but also affected different aspects of global and regional politics.

China was and is keen on establishing a hegemonistic control over Central and South-East Asia. She realized that India's influence had increased in the peripheral countries. India on the other hand, knew that relations with China in the geopolitical context of India's Asian policy was vitally important. Nehru made numerous efforts to consolidate the

relationship. After the Chinese expansion in relation to Tibet in 1950, India reacted to the Chinese move by improving its security ties with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim -- all buffer States --. Panchsheel was signed in 1954. The underlying theme of this treaty was the concept of Peaceful co-existence. Peaceful co-existence included an assessment of the role of military power in the nuclear age and an appeal to all countries to co-exist peacefully - it sought to accommodate different political and social systems. It helped to structure a new India-China relation.

The deterioration of Sino-Indian relations coincided with the deterioration of relations between China and USSR. For India, friendly relations with the Soviet Union had undoubtedly great advantage both economically and politically. Nehru went to the USSR in 1954, followed by the visit of Bulganin and Krushchev in 1955. India's importance lies in the fact that she was the first non-Communist country in Asia to establish closest diplomatic relations with the USSR.

A major factor which would affect India's security would be the confrontation by both Pakistan and China. The Indian objective should be to contain the Chinese threat, as the former Defense Secretary P.V.R.Rao in his book Defense Without Drift stated:

....The dislike of Asian Powers to the continued presence of the American forces in Asia can be justified only if these countries can work out an

alternative arrangement to preserve their independence from Chinese aggression. India is vitally interested in this problem, in its own interests and must take a leading part in organizing such an arrangement.... (3)

The above statement was in reference to the tense situation in the South-East Asia Region which also affects our security interests. The Great Powers emergence in the region, the steady growth of tensions among countries in South and South-East Asia, the Middle-East -- all affect us.

China is keen to exploit the differences between India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan and China will "achieve their objective if they can set India on a course of spending substantial resources on defense, thus accelerating the pace of self-exhaustion...."⁴

After the debacle of 1962, India had started paying more attention to her neighbours - both in terms of military and economic security, in terms of territorial defense and development. From 1962, India embarked on systematic programme to modernize her defense system. There was a change in her approach towards countries in the sense that Indian foreign policy recognized the availability of "...military force was a vital precondition for peace...."⁵

3 P.V.R. Rao, Defense Without Drift (Bombay, 1970), p.49.

4 Ibid., p.63.

5 Ashok Kapur, "Peace and Power in India's Nuclear Policy", Asian Survey, vol.10, No.9, September 1970.

Another aspect that is a cause of worry for India, is the suspicion that China is helping Pakistan in the latter's effort to reach nuclear capability. Her mutuality of interest with Pakistan as mentioned earlier was by giving India an ultimatum during the 1965 war. Prime Minister Bhutto should be given the credit for establishing Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, and giving clear directions for preparing a programme for rapid nuclear technology development. Bhutto's Beijing visit in May 1976 assumed great significance, keeping in view his obsession to make Pakistan go nuclear. Two Agreements emerged from this visit - (1) Scientific cooperation and (2) Military cooperation. For the first time a joint Military Committee was established. In the nuclear field, China agreed to supply heavy water to Pakistan. There was reported to be cooperation between the two countries in Plutonium reprocessing and collaboration on uranium enrichment through the centrifuge method. For Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology (PINSTECH) (set up in 1960 in collaboration with a Belgium firm Belgonuclaire, Pakistan acquired Plutonium from Canada which withdrew its co-operation from KANUPP in 1976. However, Pakistan circumvented this embargo and obtained considerable quantities of Uranium from Niger with the French and Libyan help. Pakistan did not have any difficulty in manufacturing weapons-grade Uranium and Plutonium. It was

also clear that Pakistan has acquired nuclear capability utilizing Western commercial and other agencies to get the necessary technology and materials. Her signing an agreement with France on the Chashma Reprocessing Plant on 17 March, 1976 under IAEA arrangements, gave weightage to her nuclear intentions.⁶ When France informed Zia in 1978 that it was unable to proceed with the Chashma deal unless Pakistan agreed to a revision of the original agreement providing for "co-processing" of spent fuel which would make ~~Missile~~ PU-239 accessible to Pakistan, the Chinese came to her rescue.⁷ She offered nuclear co-operation to Pakistan, which had rejected the French proposal. There was also sufficient proof that French contractors were still secretly helping Pakistan in the completion of the Chashma Plant, which had been abandoned in 1979. Pakistan's 'delicate facility' for the Plutonium bomb appeared to be Chinese built it is a "less known pilot-scale reprocessing plant, which is capable of producing 10-20 kg. of PU-239 annually, which is sufficient for two or at the most three nuclear war heads".⁸

The history of Pakistan's and China's nuclear collaboration can be traced to Dr.A.Q.Khan, who worked at the URENCO

6 P.K.S.Namboodiri, "China-Pak Nuclear Axis", Strategic Analysis, vol.VI (New Delhi,) No.7, October 1982, pp.407-417.

7 Ibid., pp.407-417.

8 Ibid.

Enrichment Plant at Almelo in the Netherlands. He returned to Pakistan in 1975 and passed on the data he had acquired on the centrifuge methods to his Government. By mid 1976, there were the signs of Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration. The Chinese nuclear scientists were keen to gain an insight into the URENCO secrets, and this could only be acquired through a collaboration. China has also been keen to negotiate for light water enriched uranium reactors with the West. This demonstrated that this Sino-Pak joint enrichment efforts could turn out to be beneficial for both the countries. Today, China is hardly in a position to supply modern military items since its own technology is getting outdated and hence "commenting of its strategic relationship with Pakistan by the nuclear factor is necessary under the circumstances. The construction of the Kharakoram Highway and the Khunjerab Pass road were demonstrations of China's firm commitment to consolidate and perpetuate its close ties with Pakistan."⁹

A nuclear Pakistan from the Chinese point of view might have a Soviet angle in the sense that Pakistan could one day fill the gap in South West Asia in the nuclear containment of the USSR. NATO and China cover two Soviet flanks, the USA covers the Northern flank and Israel part of the Southern

9 Ibid., p.415.

flank. The South-western gap would remain vulnerable without a Pakistani nuclear capability. What matters in the long run is the common security perceptions of the Chinese and Pakistani leaderships and the pooling of resources together in a mutually beneficial manner to enhance the leverage of each in their respective dealings with other States. Arab States would be keen to assist Pakistan financially, with a view of acquiring nuclear technology, which could be used against Israel. But there is no agreement among the Arabs and Pakistan, about sharing of nuclear technology. Israel realises that this sort of a collaboration would have repercussions on the Arab-Israeli equations. That is why her nuclear facilities are located as far away as possible from Israeli reach.

There is another view which holds that there is no real nuclear collaboration between Pakistan and China, as neither country has passed nuclear secrets to the other; furthermore a nuclear Pakistan would tend to assert its independence of Beijing, and lastly by helping Pakistan to go nuclear, it would provoke India to go nuclear, which China would like to prevent. China wants a settlement in which she could virtually dictate terms to India and at the same time disengage India from the Soviet Union. India, should follow a policy which is not doctrinaire but which is based on her own national interests. She should not be drawn into super power conflicts, as they ^{are now engaged in viewing}

South Asia from a global perspective. Today, India is in an emergent position as a great power in South Asia. This does not suit the Chinese as India is the only power that can stand in the way of China's hegemony over the whole South East Asian region.

It must not be forgotten that Pakistan by itself can not be a major threat to India's security and it is for this reason that she is constantly attempting to acquire allies. Neither the USA nor U.K. is prepared to support her openly in a war with India. But both China and Pakistan share a common hostility as mentioned earlier. Pakistan, to add to the tension, is keen on establishing an Islamic bloc of Muslim countries on the periphery of India, as these countries can help Pakistan in procuring supplies from the major armament manufacturers in Europe and USA. Thus all this ultimately lead to an unnecessary arms race in the South Asian region. Therefore, both countries have to maintain expensive and large conventional forces, updating the equipment they held in order to maintain deterrence.

The super powers were aware of this factor, and were keen that both countries constantly strive for military parity as this would in turn ensure a certain international stability in South Asia. Keeping in mind their (Major Powers) wider interests, China was also keen to have such stability.¹⁰

10 J.N.Chaudhari, India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies (New Delhi, 1984), p.15.

The super powers encouraged regional rivalries by supplying military arms and technology for mainly political purposes. This new weaponry also led to the emergence of new strategies and tactics, altered the conduct of war^{and} changed the national interests of States.

To sum up this phase of India's attitude in terms of her national security - the main threat was mainly from Pakistan. China was seen as a problem but not an immediate one, till 1962. Her views on disarmament and other related issues took into consideration her security perceptions in the region and it was reflected in her foreign policy. With regard to Pakistan, there could have been no solution on Kashmir. It had reached a stage of status quo. Similarly with China, the basic factor in the Sino-Indian border dispute (which led to the 1962 war), was that the territories were not economically significant to either China or India. The areas were scarcely populated and here also stalemate existed with neither side wanting to give, in. It was evident that until the border issue was sorted out, there could be no real break through in the relations between the two countries.

After 1954, the structure of India's policy of disarmament and arms control seemed to be more in line with the Soviet Union, whose rejection of the Baruch plan and opposition to the USA, in establishing an international regime for peaceful uses of atomic energy was supported by India. This showed

the similarity in the attitudes of India and USSR on disarmament. India believed that the safeguards applied should be universal and not discriminatory. India was of the opinion that there was the need to provide security for all, need to protect national sovereignty, as we had reached a stage where the balance was dangerous. As Nehru put it: "... we have reached a certain balance - it may be an unstable balance - when any kind of major aggression is likely to lead to a world war, that itself is a restraining factor..."¹¹ He was referring to nuclear weapons posing as the balance, as in a war that used them there could be no victor. Thus, there was the persistent desire for disarmament by India.

The period between 1947 and 1962 saw India's policy undergo a metamorphosis from idealism of world peace to the rude shock of the 1962 war with China. Despite this humiliation India believed that mankind as a whole had a duty to perform in the name of humanity - to preserve a civilized form of life for generations yet to come. Nuclear holocaust was a contradiction of its cultural values that had been time tested.

Phase II : 1963 onwards

First comes Pakistan. The basic differences on Kashmir still continued to act as irritant in Indo-Pakistan relations,

11 J. Nehru, Indian Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches 1947-61 (New Delhi, 1961), p.66.

though both countries should have attempted to "educate the public" to accept a solution, without generating hostility in the process.¹² The 1965 war confirmed Pakistan's vulnerability to Indian military pressure. During this war the American Government declared that it would intervene if China sought to exploit Indo-Pak hostilities.

Pakistan sought to exploit the inadequacies of the Indian border defense arrangement by resort to force from time to time. The anti-India hysteria was always kept alive in Pakistan and proved to be detrimental to Indo-Pak relations. There was the need to develop a feeling of unity and improve "...the economic well-being of the border areas... an essential and urgent step in strengthening India's border defences".¹³

In 1965, it was Pakistan, which launched the war against India by sending troops across the well defined and clearly demarcated international frontier between West Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, an integral part of India. The security of India was threatened and it was the duty of the Indian Government to take necessary steps to protect our national security. Pakistan was helped by Iran, Saudi Arabia and

12 P.V.R. Rao, n.3, pp.57-58.

13 Ibid., p.338.

Indonesia. Following her attack on India, the only country openly supporting India on the Jammu and Kashmir question was Malaysia. The war ended with conflicting claims from both sides as to who won the war. Territory wise India captured much more than Pakistan.

The end of the 1965 war saw the signing of the Tashkent Agreement but Pakistan retained enough bargaining power to keep the Kashmir question open. This phase saw continued Russian support of India while America had withdrawn her former position of strongly supporting Pakistan and was pressing both countries to make peace, but Pakistan kept on pressing for her demand to 'liberate' Kashmir. Pakistan alone was weaker than India but her strength and her strategic situation coupled with another power could create trouble for India. Even today no Indian government can make territorial concession to Pakistan, as there would be a public outcry at such an endeavour. President Ayub's conditions for normalization of relations with India were: (1) settlement of the Kashmir question, (b) change of heart on part of India, and (c) reduction of forces first in India and then in Pakistan.

The significance of Tashkent Declaration lies in the fact that it is concerned with Indo-Pak relations in totality. It reiterated the basic principles of Bandung and Panchsheel and provided a spirit which envisioned long range policies for development of friendly and fraternal relations between

the peoples of the two countries. The essence of the Tashkent Declaration was to resolve that the two countries accept the cordial principle of peaceful co-existence, to live in peace despite existence of disputes and differences. It sought all efforts to create good neighbourly relations and not to have recourse to force. The reaction to Tashkent Declaration was sharp. In West Pakistan the general feeling was that it was a "sell out", in East Pakistan, the whole matter was 'ab initio' wrong. The sum total of the opposition reaction in the West Wing could be summed up in the words of Fatima Jinnah, who said that the Tashkent Declaration "betrays the lack of sagacity, wisdom, forbearance and vision on the part of those who accepted, signed, sealed and delivered on behalf of Pakistan." Pakistan, resumed her anti-India posture and rationalized her acquiring arms from the West stating that India was four times as large as her so it was necessary to maintain a proper balance of power in the region. The 1965 war showed the limitations of the military approach to Kashmir. Hence, Pakistan agreed to renounce the use of force under the Tashkent Declaration but later she rejected it. The Tashkent Declaration saw the USSR making assiduous attempts cultivate Pakistan without at the same time hurting her relations with India. This was to be done in two ways.

- (1) increase the tempo of cultural and political relations,
- and (2) promote Indo-Pak unity. But the basic aim of Soviet

policy during the Tashkent Summit was the keeping out of the Americans from the negotiations. In this they succeeded well.

Thus throughout the years the basic circumstances which led to the military confrontation between the two neighbours remained unchanged. Pakistan had continuously feared India's intentions as a larger and more powerful country, while India's grievances against Pakistan was its present armed strength, fortified by the alliance with the USA, by its military aid programme and by its membership of military pacts. The Indo-Pak conflict reflects the risk and disadvantages of American military aid to an unfriendly neighbour. Her decision to extend military assistance and enter into a mutual security arrangement was a major intrusion of American influence in South Asia. The US assistance to India after 1962 did raise alarm in Pakistan and vice versa her aid to Pakistan has created alarm in India.

After Pakistan's abortive war of 1965, the Kashmir question entered an quiescent phase. But hostility remained. Pakistan was plagued by internal trouble brought about by political suppression and denial of political rights to her people. These led to upheavals both in the Eastern and Western Wings of Pakistan. A strong freedom movement was built up in the Eastern Wing of Pakistan, under Mujib's leadership. Furthermore, the unsuccessful military adventure of 1965, weakened Ayub Khan's position considerable; this also widened the Gulf between East and West Pakistan, as the former was not

emotionally involved in the 1965 war and this demonstrated the non-identity of interests and motivations between East and West Pakistan. This ultimately led to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, from which a new country - Bangladesh emerged. It was a watershed in the relationship between two hostile countries. Pakistan realised that "India was a force to be reckoned with."¹⁴ The liberation of Bangladesh led the USA to consider India as a pre-eminent power in South Asia. The defeat of Pakistan had a decisive effect so far as Kashmir was concerned. It resulted in the Simla Agreement of 1972, which was in the nature of a peace treaty. The ceasefire line of 1949, terminologically was replaced by the line of actual control. Thus it was a political line which both would respect. Bilateralism was one of the most important outcome of the talks. According to this Agreement, (1) India agreed to return to Pakistan the territory occupied by India, (2) it was agreed by both sides that they would settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by the two parties. Hopefully it was thought that it would lead to durable peace on the Subcontinent. But Pakistan's spokesman said in the National Assembly of Pakistan

14 P.M.Pasricha, "Is There an Indo-Pak Arms Race", Strategic Analysis, vol.VII (New Delhi), No.9, December 1983, pp.663, 677.

that the U.N. forum could still be resorted to and that Pakistan would be prepared to shed blood for the liberation of Kashmir. There was no sanctions for the implementation of the Simla agreement except the willingness of the Parties concerned.¹⁵

During this war, the USA clearly supported Pakistan. India had entered into a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971 before the commencement of the Indo-Pak war of 1971.

It was an important landmark. The timing was significant as the USA and China had taken the first step towards rapprochement. In India there was the feeling of a USA-Pak-China Axis. The crucial Article IX of the Treaty between India and Soviet Union says:

In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threats and take appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries. (16)

The nature of this co-operation can be seen from the support which the Soviet Union gave to India's stand on Bangladesh.

The 1971 war proved India's might as a regional power. Yet India's primary responsibility was the preservation

15 A.P.Jain, ed., India and the World (Delhi, 1972), p.97.

16 Ibid., p.97.

of peace in the region. Hence, India's policy was one of friendliness combined with firmness. With regard to Pakistan, there was the need for much greater economic and cultural co-operation and also an attempt to reduce the arms race between the two and bring about disarmament. However, both found it difficult to agree upon disarmament, as both had accumulated fears and suspicions.

With regard to China, since 1962, the Sino-Indian relations were not normal. The main plank of Indian diplomacy during this period 1962-74 was to contain the Chinese threat. China had exploited the area that she had gained by military victory over India in 1962, and also by negotiating settlements of her disputes with other neighbouring countries around India. With China continued to occupy Indian territory, in the North while else where along the border she had discreetly withdrew to a non-controversial, easily maintainable line of control.

Tensions between the two major Asian powers were further heightened with the Chinese nuclear explosion in Lop Nor on 16 October, 1964. It set off a nuclear debate in India. One section of the India public argued that India must develop an independent nuclear deterrent regardless of the cost. Another section, favoured securing guarantees of protection against nuclear attacks from established nuclear weapon powers. A third section called upon efforts to mobilize

world opinion against nuclear proliferation and disarmament.¹⁷

China detonated her second nuclear device on 14 May 1965. This indicated the seriousness of the Chinese to develop her nuclear capability. Yet, India kept on striving for disarmament. On 8 November 1965 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri informed the Lok Sabha that India stuck to the decision not to manufacture nuclear weapons but instead work for its elimination. He also said that if China continued to stockpile nuclear weapons and perfect her delivery system, India would have to reconsider her policy of not making nuclear weapons. He stated that the preservation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity would lead to such a decision.

An openly hostile China now posed a menacing threat and a pro-bomb lobby started coming into the open. On 21 February, 1966 the Indian Defense Minister Y.B.Chavan informed the Lok Sabha that in 1965, China had built missiles of intermediate range. In 1967, China had detonated the Hydrogen bomb, fifteen years after the USA. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh Party clamoured for the production of nuclear weapons in India, as a part of the country's long term defense effort against China. This was the first instance of a political party formally voicing such a demand.¹⁸

17 Lorne J.Kavic, India's Quest for Security : Defence Policies - 1947-65 (USA, 1967), p.214.

18 G.G.Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi, 1968), p.21.

After the 1962 debacle of India pro-bomb lobby advocated vociferously that India should go nuclear or seek a nuclear umbrella. In 1965 one hundred members of Indian Parliament submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister asking for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. As against this demand, a memorandum in August 1966 by two hundred and fifty three members of Parliament "firmly" supporting the Government's policy of utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. Vikram Sarabhai put it aptly when he said that the security of India would need a total defense system and not just one atom bomb. While General, J.N. Chaudhari in his book, Arms, Aims and Aspects, said that the Chinese entry into the nuclear field did pose a number of problems for us. At this stage, a nuclear weapon programme in India would have only increased the hostility of Pakistan, but this does not mean that we should not surrender our nuclear option, as no nation however friendly should be allowed to dictate to India her foreign and defense policy. India's main security problem arose out of China's known belligerence, her desire to neutralise India and to extend her hegemony over South East Asia. China had no intention of accepting any restrictions on her nuclear testing or on her plans to go ahead with her nuclear programme. The shadow of a Chinese nuclear threat hung over India and for her security India could not count on the support of the Soviet Union or Western countries, as

each nation evaluated its own interests before involving itself in a conflict particularly in support of another power. India had to become self-sufficient in sophisticated armaments, so that she would be able to deter external aggression, particularly from China.

Despite these dangerous developments our leadership went on reiterating its stand of using our nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes only. We should learn our lessons from the manner in which the super powers have developed their nuclear capability and strike potential. They have always concentrated on building their military potential to deter external attacks. India should maintain amicable relations with the Soviet Union, USA and Western countries. The Soviet Union is well aware of the expansionist ambitions of China and as such it has a commonality of interest with India.

Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to take a look at Sino-Pak collaboration and its effect on India. On 30 July 1966, an agreement was signed between Peking and Pakistan for "Economic and Technical Assistance". Pakistan's Commerce Minister Ghulam Tarique told reporters that an atomic power station would be built at R^upur in Panna district of East Pakistan with Chinese help. According to the Indian view point this was Peking-Pindi collaboration in the nuclear field. China, on top of this, supported Pakistan in her wars with India in 1965 and 1971.

This was followed by India exploding her first nuclear device on 18 May 1974. She stated that the explosion was for peaceful purposes. It led to a lot of fear being generated among our neighbours, particularly Pakistan. As for India, to become a nuclear power would mean inviting economic, social and political problems of some magnitude. After India's nuclear explosion, seven industrial nations - "the London Club" - decided to withhold the supply of materials and equipments, required for operating nuclear reactors and for associated technology to non-nuclear weapon States unless the recipients either acceded to the NPT and threw open their doors to International Inspection or submitted all their nuclear activities to rigorous inspection by the IAEA. They further held that any nuclear facility set up by such non-nuclear States even without external resistance should also be placed under International Inspection. The explosion demonstrated India's capacity to design complicated instruments and components, produce and fabricate nuclear material unaided. Given the necessary resources, laboratory facilities and some encouragement, it showed that India could further develop her technology. The Canadian and American assistance was terminated as for them there was no difference between a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion and any other nuclear explosion. In India, Tarapur, has stopped getting its reactor fuel from USA unless India agreed to forgo its nuclear autonomy. These pressures slowed down the development of

nuclear technology in India. India believes that nations States can protect their interests, safeguard their security and ensure their survival as independent entities, only if they are strong enough to counter aggression. The sole objective of India in building up her arsenals would be to persuade potential aggressors to leave India in peace. External powers would disincline to encourage their proxies to attack India, who if failed to build-up her arsenals would only invite attacks. India should build up its defenses, so that in case Pakistan or China decide to attack, India will be ready to face them effectively. "The strength of the armed forces of the hostile countries is undoubtedly a major factor in determining the magnitude and nature of India's defense system, but equally important are the strategy and objectives of those countries and India's preparations should be to neutralize effectively probable enemy strategy."¹⁹ In short, the Pokharan explosion did create a stir in the international arena. It strengthened the Non-Aligned nations 'moral force' by its implications suggesting India's decision of abjuring nuclear weapons although it had the capacity to go nuclear.

China, throughout the years continued to build up her conventional forces and her drive for nuclear armament led our policy to be one of caution. We will sign any disarmament measure only if China does so. Nuclear abstention by India is not going to make any other nation to give up its nuclear programme.

19 P.V.R.Rao, n.3, p.61.

Due to the China threat, India stands on the brink of taking one of the major decisions in her entire history - the decision whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. For India, the main reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons would be (1) to deter any Chinese nuclear attack (2) to deter Chinese conventional arms, and (3) to repulse any Chinese conventional attack if it should occur. Presently India is facing a threat from both Pakistan and China, both of which are part of the American global "strategic consensus". The hostility on all sides of India threatens our security, and hence she has to remain in a state of military preparedness.

To cope with the Chinese in terms of conventional arms Homi Bhabha, as far back as January 1964 had said in a paper presented at the 12th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs that India would not rule out the option of recourse of nuclear weapons. He recognized the deterrent effect of atomic weapons. To redress the imbalances created by the might of China, India had to keep her option open. He also spoke of a security guarantee by both the major nuclear powers as an alternative to India's renunciation of her nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Nehru, during this period was irrevocably committed to the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, as he felt that total disarmament was the only way to rid the world from the fear of nuclear war.

Peking's anti-India policy was based on forging a militant political axis in South and South-East Asia with the

co-operation of Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal and Vietnam. The geographical location of Nepal, which is the buffer between the two most populous nations, is regarded as an asset by the Kathmandu Government, since it can play one against the other. Nepal should be careful of Chinese expansionist designs. The close relationship between India and Nepal culturally, socially, historically and religiously should not be overlooked, while on the other hand, the linkage with China was insignificant. The desire of declaring Nepal as a Zone of Peace has brought to light the reservations of the Chinese Government. Instead Nepal should strive for making the whole of South Asia a Zone of Peace. The efforts towards the creation of a Zone of Peace or security does not mean the establishment of a Power bloc or military pact. Instead, it postulates co-operation at the political level to meet the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons in that particular region and to eliminate the insecurity it is confronted with. Political and economic co-operation between different nations would lead to the security and peace in the region. This can be reinforced to a large extent by the organization of armed forces to deter internal or external aggression. In short, the power of the member States should remain defused amongst themselves. India is very concerned about the defense of the Nepal-Tibetan border which is approximately 1,100 km. long. It is very vital for our security and the Indian attitude is shaped by this geographical fact.

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was concluded with Nepal in July, 1950 was against the background of the Chinese annexation of Tibet, which had raised grave concern about the insecurity of our Northern borders. Article 2 of the treaty states that both countries would "inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments." The letter exchanged along with the Treaty further stipulated: "neither Government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor. To deal with any such threat, the two governments shall consult with each other and devise effective countermeasures."²⁰

But inspite of this Treaty, there have been attempts by Nepal to make China a countervailing factor to India. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Nepal in 1956, India has been vigilant to ensure that China did not revive its claim to Nepal being within its sphere of influence. But Nepal seems to be balancing between the two, to her convenience, taking full advantage of the Sino-Indian rivalry. It agreed to build the 104 km. Kathmandu-Kodari Road with Chinese help in 1967. Kodari on the Tibetan border, gives direct access to the Chinese right to Kathmandu.²¹

20 L.Kapileshwary, "India and Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposals", Foreign Affairs Reports (Delhi) Oct., 1978, p.171.

21 N.Mitra, "India and her Neighbours", IDSA Journal (Delhi) vol.XIV, No.3, January-March 1982, p.402.

Nepal with its favourable geographical position has sought to play its two giant neighbours against each other. Taking advantage of this peculiar position as a land locked country Nepal has tried to give itself room for manoeuvre by advocating the concept "Nepal as a Zone of Peace".

Bhutan

The Chinese annexation of Tibet in 1950 enhanced the political and strategic importance of the Kingdom of Bhutan for India. The Lhasa uprising in 1959 and the Chinese aggression on India three years later aggravated Bhutan's sense of insecurity about the Chinese Government's intention; this in turn, led to developing closer relations with India. Bhutan got her U.N. membership with the support of India. The establishment of its relations with the rest of the international community was also with the help of India. A symbiotic relationship is in the interest of both, India and Bhutan. After her admission to the UN on 21 September 1971, Bhutan has supported most of the Indian resolutions with regard to disarmament in the UN and other international fora.

Bangladesh

Like all other countries around us, Bangladesh also from time to time raises anti-Indian hysteria. The political attitude of any regime in Dhaka towards this country is very important. A confrontationist regime in Dhaka can create difficulties for India in its North-Eastern region. It must

be noted that two high level Chinese delegations visited Dhaka in October, 1981 and two consignments of Chinese military supplies reached Bangladesh, the same month. Earlier the Chinese had also transferred armoured cars. It was also reported that the military hardware which came from China included some obsolete Pakistani equipment.

There have been a number of irritants in our relationship, the most prominent being the sharing of water resources. The Teenbigha, the mass immigration of the Chakma tribesmen from the Chittagong Hill tracts to Tripura and Mizoram, the illegal immigration all add to the social, economic and political strains on the Indian States. The security of India and Bangladesh are closely intertwined, and by antagonising India the security of Bangladesh would be endangered.

Maldives

This country is our neighbour in the South West. It is situated almost on the equator. With Diego Garcia 800 Km. away, Maldives dominates the sealanes. It suffers from problems of super power rivalries. The Russians had offered Maldives \$ 1 million annually for rest and recreation facilities for their Indian Ocean fishing fleet, but Maldives had declined to accept the offer. It had voted for the U.N. General Assembly Resolution declaring Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It can not ignore its geo-strategic importance. The Maldives islands have strategic significance for India since the Indian island territories of Minicoy are located nearby.

The location of Maldives in the Central Indian Ocean is tempting to external naval powers who are attempting to play a dominant role in the Indian Ocean. Any super power presence in Maldives would lead to various kinds of intrusions into India's exclusive economic zone.

Burma:

The continued insurgency in northern Burma and the disturbed situation there, poses security problems for India. The Chinese influence has been reduced to quite an extent and they do not egg on the Naga rebels but in the 1960s and 1970s the Chinese assistance had been sent to them through northern Burma. The influence of extra-regional powers in the region is a matter of grave security concern for India as it could affect the stability of her North Eastern States. Thus India's security is vitally linked to the stability of its neighbours.

With regard to the States of South-East Asia, India should develop close relations with these countries in order to confront the common danger emerging from China -- both nuclear and conventional. After India's victory in 1971, the South East Asian countries are once again look upto her as she has emerged as a major power in the region. The fear in these countries of the Chinese menace stems from the following factors: (1) The potential wealth of their region; (2) the ideological objectives of China; (3) To embarass its only competitor in the region - India; (4) Its inability to operate

in the North and West due to the Soviet threat and (5) the vulnerability of the political structure in South East Asia. The threat looms large also due to the fact that the USA has withdrawn her forces from a major portion of this region. India's interest in this region is strategic; so she can not ignore happenings in South East Asia. Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia are of vital significance to India. Burma lies at the door step of China and could be dangerous to Indian security if the Chinese influence started to spread in that area. Thus, it is important for India to establish economic, cultural and political relationships with these countries. There is the need for India to properly assess the power situation in this region, try to bring about some sort of balance, keeping in mind the attempts of some powers to establish spheres of influence in this region and work towards disarmament in this region but not at the cost of sacrificing her national interests.

To sum up this phase, it can be seen that from 1962 till 1986, it has been a period of mutually armed neutrality and distance between the India and China. In this period of 24 years, due to compulsions of real politik, India and the Soviet Union drew closer to each other and by early 1970's a radical change occurred in China's foreign policy with the USA, and led to the establishment of good relations after a gap of nearly three and a half decades. These processes by themselves generated new forces in international relations with a competition for areas of influence by the great powers

in the Asian, African and Latin American regions. This also resulted lately in India and China reassessing the factors affecting the region and their mutual relations. India felt that relations with an important Asian neighbour should not be left in a frozen state. Given the tremendous political and economic ferments happening in Asia, both in terms of national interest and for the sake of regional peace and stability, some sort of contacts should be re-opened with China and that some flexibility should be introduced into regional relationships by opening contacts with this important Asian country. At the same time, both India and China have grown in stature and self-assurance as Societies and Nations. The policies of both countries are underpinned by practicality and realism in the face of the changing international environment. The troubled situation in Indo-China, the increasing militarism in Japan, the enhanced military presence of the Soviet Union and USA in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean were overall strategic and political factors which animated this approach and the first step towards normalization. There is an assured feeling that the purposes of both regional and global stability can be served only if relations are normalized and stabilized. Given the problems of disarmament, development, super power, politico-military confrontation in the Asian region, it is necessary for the two Asian powers to come to terms with each other.

The strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the USA had changed the security environment in Asia as well

as the security perceptions of China and India, both. Though there may be no agreement between the two countries on all accounts, there is an embryonic parallelism in these matters. It implies Chinese and Indian interest to neutralize the competing military and political policy trends between the Soviet Union and the United States. So taking all factors into account, China and India stretching their hands towards each other for normalization, across the Himalayas, is both necessary and desirable. The need for normalization is perhaps even more relevant in the context of the erosion of detente between USA and the Soviet Union and their growing confrontation particularly in Asia.

Talks to help in the process of normalization are going on, and the major issue dealing with the border between the two has still not been resolved. Meanwhile, China's activities in neighbouring countries, most notably in Nepal remains inimical to India. There is no attempt on Beijing's part to show any respect to this country's vital security interests south of the Himalayan Crest. On the contrary, the traditional military and political support by China to Pakistan is being supplemented by the widening of the strategic Kara Koram Highway.

Thus, till India reaches a stage of economic and military self-reliance, direct and indirect pressures on India's neighbours to assume unfriendly postures towards India would also continue.

Among the other factors responsible for hampering the process of normalization in the continent are the lack of effective and close understanding amongst the nations of Asia and the influence of power politics by the two power blocs on some nations. These power blocs through political manoeuvring hamper the unity of Asian nations as well as exploit differences which come in the way of understanding. It has led to an unavoidable arms race in the South Asian Sub-continent as can be seen between India and Pakistan. China has made no attempt to utilize the U.N. for initiating a process of disarmament, whether conventional or nuclear, although U.N. supervised disarmament has been a demand of the Third World. The geo-political compulsions and comparative military strength makes diplomacy rather than military power the prime mover in Sino-Indian relations. India should not relax its military preparedness or vigilance in view of the continued arms build-up by both China and Pakistan. None among our other neighbours pose a direct military threat as China and Pakistan do, and the turmoil in the region only makes the achievement of disarmament in the South Asian Sub-continent a more difficult and complex issue.

Chapter-VI

INDIA, NON-ALIGNMENT AND DISARMAMENT

India had always opposed the relentless search for the ever increasing nuclear systems, which is undertaken in the name of security. She believed that there was no alternative to the world except disarmament. The Non-aligned nations fear that the competitive interventionism in their part of the world may escalate the nuclear level. Non-alignment is opposed to the logic of nuclear theology which requires a hierarchically stratified bipolar world. There is a great sense of revulsion against the nuclear weapon culture in the Non-aligned countries of the world. It is in this context that the concept of Non-alignment assumes current significance and has a role to play in promoting disarmament.

The accumulation of more accurate, more powerful and destabilizing weapons, (some of them so small and mobile that their numbers are incapable of verification) only seems to make a nuclear holocaust more possible. Various war fighting doctrines such as "Counter" force "counter-city", strategies, "MAD", "Flexible Response", "limited nuclear war" have also been discussed.

History has shown that negotiations for disarmament are extremely slow and is often overtaken by the rapid pace of weapons development. Nuclear disarmament is mixed up with conventional disarmament. India and other Non-aligned countries are convinced that only General and Complete Disarmament can provide real and enduring security.

The Non-~~A~~ligned Movement had its origins in the nationalist and anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa during the first part of the present century. At the end of World War II, the political and economic pressures generated by freedom struggles and national liberation movement made the former imperial and colonial powers relinquish their control over these countries. India was the first country to achieve freedom from colonial rule on the 15 August, 1947. During the same year, India hosted an Asian Relations Conference which could be called the event germinating the Non-aligned Movement.

The ensuing Cold War and the acceleration of the arms race in the following years led Nehru in 1946, to declare in the Constituent Assembly, that our foreign policy should keep in mind welfare of the Indian people. The Indian foreign policy would recognize the right of each country to fashion its own destiny, taking into account its own interests and the larger objectives of peace and progress in the world. The underlying assumption of this statement was that India would not forsake her national interests and secondly she would at the same time not lose sight of the larger interests of mankind as a whole.

The continuation of the Cold War in the fifties convinced the newly free countries that they should form some movement which would help in reducing the tension created by

the Cold War. Thus Nehru, Nasser, and Tito alongwith Heads of the States and Government of twenty-two countries met in Belgrade in 1961. This was the First Non-aligned Conference. The basic objectives of the movement as stated in the Belgrade Declaration are as follows:

- (1) Military alliances are not conducive to the development of peace, and therefore, countries should not be members of military alliances engineered by one super power or the other.
- (2) Each country should evolve its own foreign policy within the framework of its own interests and in the interest of world peace and development.
- (3) The international community should prevent an arms race and encourage disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.
- (4) Each country should have the right and freedom to react to international and world problems objectively and should be free from external interference;
- (5) The Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence or Panchsheel should be the basis of the foreign policies of all the countries as the only practical manner in which world peace and disarmament can be achieved.

The Belgrade declaration requested the countries which were members of this movement to stay away from the arms race. It was a strategy by which the economically and militarily weaker countries would be able "...to ensure world peace, so that they could endeavour to develop their economies in order to provide a better life to their peoples...."¹ The main

¹ Brij Mohan Kaushik, "Non-alignment and Disarmament", Strategic Analysis, IDSA, vol.VIII, No.10, Jan.1985, p.987.

force of this movement towards achieving one of its major objective - Disarmament, was going to be moral in nature. The Non-aligned can only exert such a moral force of persuasion. The lack of will and resources of Non-aligned countries precluded them from developing as military powers and entering the arms race with the aligned world. There was the imperative need to achieve peaceful settlement and continuing negotiations until total disarmament and enduring peace could be achieved. This was the crux of the Belgrade message to both Moscow and Washington.

NAM was in favour of disarmament, since it showed a way to achieve peace and it would reduce the danger to humanity. The Belgrade Conference stated that disarmament was the most urgent task facing mankind. General and Complete Disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control.

The members of this Movement were keen to participate in disarmament negotiations, for commencing a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and it favoured arms control measures like the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

The efforts of the Non-aligned countries at succeeding summit meetings, foreign minister meetings, Bureau meetings and in the form of resolutions at U.N. General Assembly did

did result in modest arms control treaties, yet their quest for achieving disarmament continued through their declarations, support for UN Resolutions on disarmament etc.

1962 also saw the establishment of ENDC largely as a result of non-aligned countries pressure. Until then disarmament negotiations were the prerogative of the major powers. It was the first time that Non-aligned countries - India, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nigeria, and UAR participated. They contributed a great deal in finalising the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Non-aligned countries played a critical role in the year 1962, when members of this movement voiced concern at the resumption of test explosions by the super powers. An Eight Power proposal was put forward in which three ideas were to be examined:

(1) A control system and use of improved methods of detection, (2) establishment of an international commission, consisting of "a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from the Non-aligned countries and lastly (3) a system of on-site inspection by invitations from parties to the Treaty. The Commission was given the responsibility of looking into all the data, which was received from observation posts nationally operated, and to report of any "suspicious event" on the basis of all available data."²

2 J.P.Jain, India and Disarmament: Nehru's Era, Vol.I, (New Delhi, 1974), p.109.

The above proposal was accepted by both USA and USSR as the basis of negotiations. Unfortunately, differences still existed with regard to the degree of obligations of the party in whose territory a "suspicious event" had occurred. While the USA believed that there should be on-site inspection by the Commission, Moscow held that the Party "could invite" it. Hence, though this memorandum did not result in anything concrete, it did help in evolving a more flexible approach by the nuclear powers.

Thus, the Belgrade Conference was the first step on a world scale towards nuclear disarmament. The Non-aligned nations, it must not be forgotten, were the pioneers in the struggle for disarmament. The refusal to join military blocs was "the expression of their assertion of their resistance to the concept of military might as an instrument of policy in international relations"³.

The campaign for disarmament by the Non-aligned countries was resisted by the powerful vested interests engaged in arms pile up. Their propaganda was that there would be the collapse of the economy of the great powers whose industries provided employment to millions.⁴

The basic character of Non-alignment was as follows:

- (1) Non-alignment seeks to avoid entanglement in Great Powers

3 Nikhil Chakravarty, "Role of Non-alignment", World Focus, No.28, April 1982, pp.26-28.

4 Ibid.

disputes, (2) Non-alignment seeks to avoid war, (3) it represents a positive moral superiority and (4) it is a substitute for balance of power.

Despite all the criticism levelled against it, this movement has stood the test of times. It is a form of power politics suited for a weaker State which seeks to avoid entanglement in a formal alliance system.

India sought a middle path - Non-alignment. "It was a bargaining strategy that outlines a third way in the study and practices of international relations...."⁵ The Non-aligned Movement has not lost sight of one of its major objectives: the achievement of disarmament. The fact that it consists of nearly three-fourths of the total membership of the United Nations, and the international community proves that its ideology and objectives are considered valid and necessary by a majority of the countries of the world.

The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has highlighted confrontation between the blocs, yet their unreserved support for nuclear disarmament has been reiterated at the NAM Summit Conferences held in Cairo-1964, Lusaka-1970, Algiers-1973, Colombo-1976, Havana-1979 and New Delhi-1983. The Non-aligned have always regarded themselves as "partisans of

5 Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option (New York, 1976), p. 89.

peace".⁶

At the Second Summit Conference at Cairo in 1964, paramount importance was given to disarmament and also stressed on the need to arrive at an immediate solution, in order to save humanity from the throes of a nuclear holocaust.

It urged the nuclear powers to try to reach agreement as fast as possible on General and Complete Disarmament. It also underlined the necessity of concluding an international agreement prohibiting the militarization of Outer Space (Treaty was signed in 1967). This conference once again pointed out that bloc politics only heightened international tensions, it spoke out against military basis as it only pressurized nations that gave them and retarded their development.

Disarmament Resolutions in Summits:

The NAM summit at Algiers in 1973, noted that the flow of conventional arms threaten the security of non-aligned countries and creates tensions. It also called for "Universal and Complete Disarmament" prohibiting the use and production of nuclear weapons. It also called for a halt to testing of nuclear weapons. It again stressed the need for a convocation

6 Govind Narain Srivastava, ed., Non-alignment and Nuclear Disarmament (New Delhi, 1985), p.48.

of an international conference on disarmament.⁷

The Colombo Summit in 1976 reiterated the Algiers Summit resolutions and also declared that

the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order in view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilized for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development particularly of the developing countries. (8)

The Havana Summit of 1979 noted that "serious threats to the process of international detente have appeared, and the arms race particularly the nuclear arms race has continued unabated".⁹ The Conference called for the urgent implementation of the Action Programme drawn up at the 10th Special Session of the UNGA on disarmament. It also called for the immediate halt to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and in the production of fissionable material. It also noted with regret the US, UK and USSR had failed to make any headway on the CTBT. It also affirmed the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, among the States concerned in the region. It also recalled the Algiers declaration on the incompatibility between the arms race and the

7 Two Decades of Non-Alignment - Documents of the Gatherings of the Non-aligned Countries 1961-1982 (New Delhi, 1983), p.97.

8 Ibid., p.202.

9 Ibid., p.405.

new international economic order.¹⁰

India had opposed foreign military bases consistently. As Ambassador Trivedi put it:

India had consistently declared her opposition to military bases for she was convinced that the real way to achieve security was through disarmament. The dismantling of existing bases... would be an important step in the process of arms limitations which the international community wished to initiate as a part of a programme of General and Complete Disarmament under effective International control. (11)

The Lusaka Conference in 1970 spelt out specific steps for nuclear disarmament. This included a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and their transfer to peaceful uses, a stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons, a CTBT, and reduction and destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The Non-aligned countries have emphasized that any realistic programme would have to be dealt with at two levels - the reduction of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and the evolution of a cooperative rather than conflictual international political system. The Non-alignment members are keen to create a conducive climate for negotiations regarding the crucial problem of disarmament to take place.

10 Ibid., pp.424-425.

11 UN General Assembly, 1st Cottee., 21st Sess., 1467th mtg., 29 Nov., 1966, p.245.

The Non-aligned movement continued to voice its grave concern of the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction and held that the ultimate objective is not to control or limit nuclear weapons but to achieve General and Complete Disarmament. The various priorities in nuclear disarmament which the Non-aligned have emphasized over the years were:

- (1) Non-use, was to be given the highest priority. This concept had developed a momentum of its own and in a way the non-first-use Resolution, in the UN had a lot to do with the growing support which non-use has developed in international fora.
- (2) Another priority on the list was to establish a "freeze", followed by a ban on testing, covering not just the conventional testing methods of nuclear weapons but also new technology connected with the testing of nuclear weapons.
- (3) There is also the necessity to curb military spending and the Non-alignment Movement calls upon such spending to be diverted to the developing countries in order to help them reach a higher level of economic growth. This has been the perception of the Non-aligned as a whole. Perceptions of countries do differ and the interest perceptions in terms of local, regional needs also do differ but there is a broad consensus among the Non-aligned nations on major issues such as nuclear disarmament.

It can be observed that India along with other members of NAM was once again attempting to help the super powers sort out their differences. But at the same time, she

reiterated that she would not forsake her legitimate national interests. Her refusal to sign the NPT demonstrated her resolve in not signing a discriminatory treaty that sought control of horizontal proliferation but spoke nothing of controlling vertical proliferation. Her ceaseless efforts towards peace continue despite tension in the South Asian region.

India's Views in the NAM

India's views on disarmament spring from its belief that world peace was essential to preserve India's security, for in a nuclear age, a world war would be suicidal and would result in India's destruction besides the outbreak of a global war would make it impossible for India to get assistance from developed countries by way of capital and technical knowhow, so essential for India's economic development.¹² India in various NAM Conferences has spelt out the urgent need for disarmament. In fact India has been in the forefront of the struggle led by the non-aligned countries for disarmament. India has used the non-aligned forum because as Nehru said:

We must realise that our capacity is limited
... But we have a certain capacity, a moral
strength ... Let us use it at this moment
rightly, ... with a friendly approach so that

12 A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (New Delhi, 1985), p.460.

the main countries who have the power of war and peace in their hands should try, if not prevent war for all time...(13)

India at various times has spelt out its policy for peaceful international relations, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, speaking to the cadets of the National Defense Academy at Khadakvasla, near Pune said:

India will do her utmost to promote disarmament, we have no global interest. We do not dream of power. All we want is to be secure within our borders, at harmony with our neighbours and build our economic strength in order to solve our social problems.(14)

Mrs. Gandhi speaking at the Colombo Summit said,

We are confronted with challenge and opportunity. The challenge despite tremendous pressures, to reinforce our basic unity and integrity to rededicate ourselves to the principles that have served us so well. The opportunity, through collective power and united will, to achieve enduring peace and freedom for all - peace through detente disarmament and cooperation and freedom through development, disarmament and maintaining our distinctive personalities.(15)

This above statement clear underlines our desire to use the NAM on a collective basis for removing the obstacles that come in the way of development. Disarmament is perceived to be one such major obstacle which has to be dealt with in unity and moral force. Thus India's role in the NAM for advocating disarmament is clear and distinctive.

13 Nehru speaking at the Belgrade Summit 1961, quoted in Non-aligned Solidarity and National Security (Delhi, 1983), p.221.

14 Mrs. Gandhi at Khadakvasla, December 11, 1976, quoted in Indira Gandhi, Selected Speeches and Writings, 1972-1977, vol.III (New Delhi, 1984), p.609.

15 Ibid., p.779.

The New Delhi message appealing for peace, development and disarmament at the NAM Summit of Heads of States and Governments 1983, fully reflected the genuine aspirations of the peoples belonging to the hundred countries which are members of the Non-aligned Movement. The significance of this Movement lies in the fact that it is absolutely necessary for maintaining world peace and stability and for avoiding wars and conflicts, and for continuing efforts to bring prosperity, progress and development to the peoples inhabiting Non-aligned countries, which form 75% of the world's population, who are also deprived politically and economically. The strength and success of the movement can be judged by the fact that at the formal level even the great powers like the Soviet Union and USA which are in competition and in conflict with each other, recognise the importance of the movement and acknowledge it as an important factor contributing to peace, stability and economic progress in the world.

CONCLUSION

The strange logic of peace in the present day international scene is that it has to be attained through weapons. However, the weapons to secure peace are those which have the capacity to destroy human civilization several times over. These weapons of mass destruction have changed the entire meaning of war as it had evolved since time immemorial. There are over 40,000 to 50,000 such doomsday weapons deployed, capable of hitting every nook and corner of the world. Their combined power according to some estimates is equal to more than a million Hiroshima type bombs. These weapons have become the central issue in international relations and no nation, howsoever, small can ever remain far removed from its threat.

Ever since the first bomb was exploded at Alamogordo in New Mexico, in USA, in 1945, politicians, strategic thinkers and the common man have been engaged in trying to eliminate these weapons from the arsenals of those who now possess them. But it has remained an elusive concept albeit an Utopian dream. Instead, we find a contradictory theme in international relations. With the proliferation of knowledge about the horrors of such a war, there has been a corresponding increase in the number of the weapons that major nuclear powers have been amassing. The quest for security has been ceaseless.

India with its long tradition of non-violence and ably led by its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru realized

the potential dangers of nuclear war and the arms race that ensued. An early and consistent feature of our disarmament policy has been the advocacy for the elimination of nuclear weapons if peace has to be given a chance to survive.

India's foreign policy and particularly our disarmament policy is the result of the factors of continuity and change. These factors have mutually reinforced each other producing distinct and specific responses for specific periods. The continuity in our disarmament policy has been the moral fervour with which we have advocated disarmament. Our policy springs not only from the traditions of thousands of years of non-violence but from a realistic appraisal of the existing situations. With the availability of such weapons of destruction, India realised that in a nuclear exchange, millions of innocent victims will perish. Such a case becomes a case of morality. Also, India has used the moral argument consistently against nuclear armament because we realized that apart from the moral argument, India and other Third World countries had no other way of combating this menace of nuclear weapons. Hence moral arguments were a constant refrain in our opposition to nuclear weapons and consequently in our plea for disarmament.

Another factor that has always been kept in mind by our policy makers is our security interests in face of ever changing scenarios in the Sub-Continent. There are many who believe that India during the phase prior to the Chinese

invasion, gave too much emphasis on idealistic postures, rather than strengthening our security. They point out that the Indian armed forces underwent a massive infusion of men, material and resources immediately after the end of the 1962 war. While the supporting fact is true, the belief that India ignored and neglected its security is erroneous. With fresh light being thrown on the entire period upto the Chinese invasion, there is no doubt that the Government was aware of threat from the north. But they miscalculated the intentions of the Chinese. Secondly, there was a scarcity of resources as development was given priority. Hence the armed forces were not expanding at a fast pace. This position changed after 1963, when a consensus emerged in the Indian political spectrum for increased militarization.

The Chinese invasion of India had disastrous effects on India's position as the leader of the Third World. Its policy of moral suasion received a severe jolt. Notwithstanding this shock India never abandoned her position that disarmament was the most urgent need of the time. It was not only morally wrong but economically disarmament meant diverting those resources which ordinarily would have gone for armament for developmental purposes. It would lead to the economic uplift of millions starving below the poverty line across the globe.

Throughout independent India's existence we placed faith in the United Nations and used this world body to press for disarmament. Many plans for disarmament proposed by India

failed either due to the lack of understanding among the super powers or because the super powers did not perceive the plans to be in their national interests. On the other hand, India, through the UN was able to get the two major powers come together and sign the PTBT. India, through the forum of the UN-sponsored ENDC, was able to persuade the super powers to atleast come together and discuss problems that affected humanity at large. Ironically, from this very Committee emerged the NPT, which India refused to sign on grounds that it was discriminatory in nature. Here was a clear example that India despite its professions of disarmament, refused to sign an inequitable treaty as it would affect her legitimate national interests. We were willing to give to the UN our whole hearted support on issues that concerned human civilization as a whole. We refused support for any measure that was meant to keep the developing nations in permanent backwardness through the policy of denial.

India, while advocating the cause of disarmament was able to mobilize world public opinion. This was effectively done through the Non-aligned Movement. The first meeting of the Non-aligned countries held in Belgrade, issued a statement calling for disarmament. Prime Minister Nehru spoke of the urgency in getting rid of nuclear weapons, which according to him were even more dangerous than colonialism, racialism and economic deprivation. Without a safe world, Nehru reasoned, there could be racialism, colonialism or poverty.

Thus the Non-aligned Movement ever since its inception has been a consistent critic of armaments and has suggested from time to time various methods of solving this problem. The latest in the series being the Six Nation initiative.

As regards the change in India's foreign policy, it has occurred as result of the changing security environment in our region. In the 1950s the containment policy of the US was used by Pakistan to acquire modern and sophisticated weaponry to offset the Indian advantage in size and numbers. This led to the infusion of the arms race and subsequently tension in the region. India had to take serious note of this destabilizing event. We leaned towards the Soviets for support without compromising our independence in judging individual international events with objectivity. An example of this independence of judgement was Nehru's criticism of the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests during his speech at the Non-aligned Summit in Belgrade. Yet, it was a fact, that to counter-balance the Pakistani tilt towards the US, we had to turn to the Soviets for support both militarily and in international fora particularly in defence of our position on Kashmir.

India's China policy must be looked at from two angles. China, being our neighbour on the northern side was an important and ancient civilization. India and in particular Nehru

realized that if the Asian continent has to remain free from super power rivalry, India and China must strengthen their bonds of friendship. The 1950s saw the high point of "Hindi Chini bhai bhai". This euphoric period was short lived as India miscalculated Chinese designs. The war of 1962 made it abundantly clear that the Chinese were driving for pre-eminence in South and South East Asia. They also realized that India was the only country in Asia to match their influence in these regions. Hence over a period of time, China assiduously built up its friendship with Pakistan, which at that time was member of the Baghdad Pact and later SEATO. It was the failure of India's understanding of Chinese designs that took us by surprise.

However, after the debacle, India's perceptions of China changed considerably. The euphoria was gone and hard-headed assessment of Chinese designs were made. The Chinese nuclear quest was duly recognized in New Delhi for the threat it posed to our security interests and disarmament as a whole. It led to India insisting that any successful multilateral disarmament measure must include China's participation. The Chinese remained reluctant to sign any agreement as they felt the need to bolster up their nuclear forces before entering into treaties. India's position took account of this fact. The most important decision to keep our nuclear option open was a direct consequence of China's refusal to sign the PTBT, NPT or any other arms control agreement.

The war with Pakistan in 1965 exposed the Beijing-Islamabad axis. From then onwards India has had to contend with this two pronged security threat. India has reacted in two ways. By bolstering up her armed forces and by neutralizing the menacing Chinese spectre having closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet rift in the early sixties brought about this fundamental change in the balance of power situation in the Sub-Continent. Our security policies were geared to this change. India's disarmament policies during this emerging period of the Beijing-Islamabad axis did not change comprehensively. We still pressed for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for a reduction and final elimination of nuclear weapons. We supported all such disarmament measures in the UN and NAM. Pakistan's desperate attempt to neutralize India's largeness was nullified by our diplomacy and defence preparedness.

The year 1971 marks a watershed in our history and perhaps in the history of the Asian continent. Prior to 1971, India's pre-eminence in the South Asian region was a matter of debate. The US by siding Pakistan was trying to call such a geographical fact into question. However, the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 changed this position possibly forever. India emerged as the dominant power in the region and this was recognized by all including the US and Pakistan. This position added new responsibilities in her new role as the pre-eminent power. Firstly, she had to contend with the

neighbours who have been fearful of being engulfed by the very size of India. In short it meant containing the anti-India phobia. This was to be done in two ways: first by reassuring the neighbours of India's peaceful intentions and second by bolstering her defenses to keep out external influences in the region. India has never tried to dominate any country but has clearly stated that it would brook no foreign influence which is detrimental to the interests of the region as a whole.

While India was regarded as the major power in the region, fundamental shifts were taking place in the international arena. There was the Sino-US rapprochement, the decline of US power overseas best typified by its withdrawal from Vietnam and the military parity which the Soviet Union achieved. All this led to a belligerent phase in international relations. It was bound to have repercussions on India's security. India through international fora tried to raise the issue of disarmament but without great success. SALT-I and detente were not considered as genuine signs of disarmament as they affected only European and super powers interests. The Third World was to be the battleground of the future.

Hence we had to give top priority to our national defense, as any change or events happening in the area surrounding us would affect our security. A clear example of such events occurring is the upgradation of the communications facility to full base facility in Diego Garcia. It was

perceived by Indian planners as a security threat. We would not ignore the growing militarization of South and South West Asia. They are bound to have spill over effects on our security.

Despite the lofty ideals of disarmament and peace, India has had to contend with hard realities. Her relations with Pakistan born out of mistrust and suspicion have resulted in both countries seeking security through armaments. Both are threshold nuclear powers. It is this particular fact that has resulted in a parallelism in our foreign policy i.e. to continue to profess ideal plans for disarmament and peace and at the same time prepare the defense forces of the country for any eventuality. This is a necessary condition if India is to remain strong, united and peaceful. Only a strong India can guarantee peace in the Sub-Continent. Nuclearisation would not help but India cannot remain an idle spectator and watch her adversaries become nuclear powers. We have voluntarily refrained from producing the bomb, but in the event of Pakistan exploding a bomb we could be forced to reconsider our options in the security interests.

Thus we find that India while subscribing to and promoting the lofty ideal of disarmament has not lost track of her security interests. Any future policy of India's security would have to take this parallelism into account. Disarmament is a long term goal. But in the short run for the security of the nation India must have a credible and strong armed force to deter a potential aggressor.

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