

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A NORMATIVE POWER: A  
STUDY OF AFGHANISTAN SINCE 9/11

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**DECLARATION**


I declare that the dissertation entitled “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Study of Afghanistan Since 9/11” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

  
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**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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*For Everything that I am...*

*To*

*Appa, who desired that I study*

*and*

*Ma, who never forced me to study*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ANA</b>	Afghan National Army
<b>ANP</b>	Afghan National Police
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>ARTF</b>	Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
<b>AWAC</b>	Airborne Warning and Control System
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CNTF</b>	Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategy Paper
<b>E(s)U</b>	European 'security' Union
<b>EAS</b>	External Action Service
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECHO</b>	EC Humanitarian Office
<b>EIDHR</b>	European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights
<b>EPC</b>	European Political Community
<b>ESDP</b>	European Security and Defence Policy
<b>ESS</b>	European Security Strategy
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUPOL</b>	European Union Police
<b>EUSR</b>	European Union Special Representative
<b>ICC</b>	International Criminal Court
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>LOFTA</b>	Law and Order Trust Fund
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals

<b>MIP</b>	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PRT</b>	Provincial Reconstruction Team
<b>TEU</b>	Treaty on European Union
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMA</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>US</b>	United States

## **Chapter 1 - Introduction**

In the last few years, the scholarly debate on the European Union as a global power has centered on the question, 'What characterizes European foreign policy?'. Various concepts such as 'Venus' (Kagan 2003), 'Normative power Europe' (Manners 2002; Scheipers/ Sicurelli 2007), 'post modern state' (Cooper 2000), 'civilian power' (Duchene 1972) float around this debate. In spite of the differences in these conceptions, they share two common features; one, they recognize that the EU indeed has a distinctive foreign policy and has therefore emerged as an international actor. The specific features of this foreign policy with its lack of military capabilities and with its intergovernmental decision-making process, the 'actorness' of the EU in world affairs is not in doubt. Two, the above mentioned concepts engage in identity discourse, whether explicitly or implicitly (Borzel and Risse 2009: 4). As Thomas Diez (Diez 2005: 614) points out, 'the discourse of the EU as a normative power or civilian power constructs a particular self of the EU'.

This chapter will present the three arguments in Civilian Power Europe, Military Power Europe and Normative Power Europe and thereafter, in the following chapters, the dissertation will seek to analyze the EU's normativeness within the context of Afghanistan. This chapter will try to define concepts such as 'normative power', 'civilian power', 'soft power' and 'military power'. In the process, it will discuss the various arguments, for and against the theorizing of the European Union as a 'normative power' and provide the basis to understand the nature of Europe's identity in the international realm.

### **1.1 Civilian Power Europe**

With the aim to 'make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible', French minister Robert Schuman proposed the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 to prevent further war between France and Germany. The Schuman Declaration would mark the birth of a united Europe, making war impossible among member states and would encourage world peace. The general perception was that

the importance of military power was diminishing at the same pace as that of economics was growing. The civilian power Europe approach offered some useful insight into Europe's international relations. In the early 1970s, Francois Duchene argued,

‘[T]he European Community will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. These are primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance’ (Duchene 1973: 20).

Duchene urged the European Community to be an

‘exemplar of a new stage in political civilization. The European Community in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power’ (Duchene 1973: 19).

Duchene warned of the need for the European Economic Community to promote democratic and civilian standards both internally and externally. Otherwise, he predicted that the ‘will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers more stronger and cohesive than itself’ (Duchene 1973: 21). He also argued, ‘the one thing Europe cannot be is a major military power’ because of the questionable value and use of nuclear weapons, which have to be controlled by ‘a European President’ (Duchene 1972: 37).

Duchene's ‘civilian power’ concept was of much debate till the 1990s after which ‘the demise of a two-bloc Europe removed the primary constraint upon the development of the European Union understood as a civilian power’ (Whitman 1998: 144). Kenneth Twitchett and Hans Maull defined civilian power as the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; concentration on non-military, primarily economic means to secure national goals, with military power left as residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (Twitchett 1976: 1-2 and Maull 1990: 92-93). Maull urged the development of a set of values encompassing ‘solidarity with other societies, and a

sense of responsibility for the future of the world – particularly the global environment’ (Maull 1990: 106). Maull in a later work adds three more features to the concept of ‘civilian power’- national interest defined by citizen’s concerns, a foreign policy based on national values and stringent conditions regarding the use of force (Maull 1998).

There are others who have argued in favour of EU’s civilian power. Christopher Hill noted,

‘precisely the kinds of attributes possessed by the European Community – the intellectual impact of a new model interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over the management of the international economy, the possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international system – are those most capable of influencing the very environment which determines whether or not military strength will be used’ (Hill 1990: 43).

Hill however distinguished between two possible models of the Community’s international behaviour: the civilian power model and the power bloc. In the first, the European Community or European Political Community (EPC) relies primarily on persuasion and negotiation in dealing with third countries and international issues; in the second, the EC or EPC uses its economic strength for political purposes, to reach its own objectives. Hill’s civilian power model is close to Francois Duchene’s vision of the Community’s role – ‘The European Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers’ (Duchene 1973: 20). Neither type of behaviour, however, relies on the threat or use of force, and can be subsumed here under the more general category of civilian power. Hill uses four broad ways to categorize exercise of power and influence: an actor can compel another actor to do something, using force or deterrence, or it can sway another actor’s decisions, using persuasion and deference. According to Hill, civilian model powers are willing ‘to envisage open diplomacy and to encourage a more sophisticated public discussion of foreign policy matters’ (Hill 1990: 44).

‘As many conflicts and tensions are rooted in political, social and economic instabilities, the Union is much better equipped than any other international organization to address related problems’ (Jopp 1994: 67). K.J Holsti put forward six ways in which an international actor can influence other international actors: using persuasion, offering rewards, granting rewards, threatening punishment, inflicting non-violent punishment, or by using force (Holsti 1995: 125-6). The EU is being pushed in the direction of an ethical foreign policy precisely because it is so open and visible. It simply cannot engage in the ‘worst types of foreign policy *realpolitik*’ (H. Smith 2002: 271). Jan Zielonka stated ‘[o]pting for a civilian power Europe would represent one of the basic strategic choices that could help the Union acquire a distinct profile – so important in terms of identity and legitimacy’ (Zielonka 1998: 229).

The extent it acted in the international relations, the European Community was a civilian power as it lacked military means and depended on economic and diplomatic instruments to influence other actors. The Community’s values differed from those of the superpowers – economic stability was considered important for political stability, respect for human rights was to be encouraged through quiet diplomacy and long-term independence and regional cooperation was promoted (K.Smith 2000: 13). Christopher Hill had also argued along similar lines. According to him, a distinctive West European position in international affairs developed, which emphasized ‘diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political problems and the need for indigenous peoples to determine their own fate...’(Hill 1983: 200). Hill stressed that one should be less critical of the concept because power politics had important limitations too and that any development in the direction of a superpower would go against the intrinsic nature of the European Community.

The EU is in practice at least a civilian power. Some of its successful international actions and policies have been civilian, including the Pact for Stability in Europe and the enlargement process. The objectives of EU external actions are clearly civilian. They include promotion of human rights and democratic principles, support for regional

cooperation, conflict prevention and settlement etc. It is argued that the means by which the EU has tried to reach those objectives has been exclusively civilian, including aid, association agreements and political dialogue (K.Smith 2000: 16). Smith enumerates the four elements of a civilian power. *Being* a civilian power entails not just the means that an actor uses, but also the ends that it pursues and the way in which it uses those means. The four elements to being a civilian power are: means, ends, use of persuasion and civilian control over foreign and defence policy making. Drawing on Duchene's definitions, Smith lists down the 'civilian ends' of the European Union which include international cooperation, solidarity, domestication of international relations, responsibility for the global environment and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance (K.Smith 2005: 65).

There are other scholars who perceive the EU in terms of soft power. According to Mitchell Smith, soft power enables the possessor to achieve desired outcomes at minimal cost by avoiding the use of military force and sharing the burden of enforcement with allies (M.Smith 2006: 21). Smith contends that the EU and its member states in the realm of humanitarian aid are by far global leaders (M.Smith 2006: 22). He argues that the soft power 'is largely a product of how others perceive the motives of a nation's policies, a concept closely related to trust, soft power tends to reproduce itself'.

'The EU's soft power ascendance does not mean that the EU will achieve all its economic and diplomatic objectives in the coming decade. Scholars generally agree that in order to enhance its global role, the EU will need to balance its stock of soft power with a modicum of hard power- something it has attempted to do through the creation of a 60, 000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force designed to address tasks of peacekeeping and emergency intervention on the European continent and beyond' (M.Smith 2006: 23).

Joseph Nye's conception of 'soft power' co-opts rather than coerces people. 'A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it' (Nye 2004: 5). It is essentially the power of attraction, and Nye explicitly differentiates this from coercion or inducement, which he calls 'command

power' (Nye, 2004: 7). Civilian powers rely on soft power, on persuasion and attraction and not on coercion or carrot and sticks. 'Through massive deployments of "soft power" (such as economic clout and cultural appeal) Europe has made hard power less necessary' (Khanna 2004).

## **1.2 Military Power Europe**

However, there are skeptics like Hedley Bull who have long doubted the merits of a civilian power or a soft power. Bull argues that the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of the superpowers. In his 1982 article criticized the notion of civilian power for its ineffectiveness and lack of self-sufficiency in military power. He argued that the EC should become more self-sufficient in defence and security for three reasons: one, the divergence of interest with American policy; two, to retain the balance of military power with the Soviet threat and three, to regenerate itself through an independent military posture. This self-sufficiency was to be achieved through seven steps: the provision of nuclear deterrent forces, the improvement of conventional forces, a greater role played by West Germany, more involvement of France, a change of policy in Britain, careful co-existence with the Soviet Union and careful co-existence with the United States. According to Bull, the ability of the EC in becoming a powerful actor in international affairs involves the exercise of military power and this actorness involves a movement from intergovernmental cooperation towards supranational integration through an 'appropriate form of political and strategic unity' (Bull 1982: 163). Referring to the EC, Alfred Pijpers (1998) pointed out to the 'limits of a civilian power in a rather uncivilian world'.

Manners (2001: 5) argues that Bull's solution, unimaginable in the Cold War era was to soon turn the EC into a military power Europe. He states that the question of the EU assuming a military dimension has remained a taboo until the ratification of the Treaty on European Union in 1991. The treaty proclaimed, 'The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including



the eventual framing of a common foreign policy which might in time lead to a common defence.’ Whitman in one of his writings suggested, ‘the TEU had signaled the intent of the member states of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union’ (Whitman 1998: 135-136). Manners argues that the expectation prevalent in 1991 was that the move from a single structure of the EC to the three pillar structure of the EU was part of a fundamental shift from civilian to military power, under the assumption that the development of a common foreign and security policy was towards a fourth pillar of defence policy.

While some may view the Petersberg Tasks of the Rapid Reaction Force as evidence of movement towards a military power Europe, there are some others like Karen Smith and Jorgensen who see it ‘within the remit of civilian power as the questions of defence and nuclear capability still remain within the remit of the NATO’. There are others who criticize the militarization of the EU for it would weaken the EU’s ‘distinct profile’ of having a civilian international identity (Zielonka 1998: 229) and it would represent a ‘civilisational mistake’ (Oberg 2000).

After the end of the Cold War, the exercise of power in international relations was less and less dependent on military force. However the European Community was not to reinforce its civilian power image but on the other hand, the European Union established by the Maastricht Treaty set about acquiring ‘defence dimensions’ (K.Smith 2000: 11). The treaty made provisions for using the Western European Union as the military arm of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU could now undertake humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peacemaking using the Western European Union to implement such decisions. The Helsinki European Council took several important decisions to enable the EU to undertake the Petersburg tasks, declaring that by 2003, the EU will be able to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 troops for up to one year in such operations. Smith remarks that the heads of state and government however, took care to state that this did ‘not imply the

creation of a European army'.<sup>1</sup> She argues that despite the current weaknesses of the European defence dimension, it is abandoning its civilian power image.

The commitment of the European Community to civilian power is questionable (K.Smith 2000: 14). Even before the Maastricht Treaty, there were several attempts to add some sort of defence dimension to the European integration process like the European Defence Community, the Fouchet Plans and the Genscher-Colombo process. She argues that there were several factors which blocked the development of a purely European defence identity and the most important factor was that the West European states needed NATO and the United States in defence against the Soviet bloc, and did not want to jeopardize the system. Therefore, the European Community was a civilian power 'by default'. Panos Tsakaloyannis (1989) contends that the European Community had abandoned its civilian posture in the early 1980s when seven members of the Community discussed defence issues without an American presence.

After the end of the Cold War, three considerations prompted moves towards developing a European Security and Defence Identity. One, German unification prompted the deepening of European integration to anchor united Germany to Western multilateral structures which entailed replacing the European Political Community with a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Two, the US was withdrawing its troops from Western Europe as they were no longer needed to be as collateral. Three, military force did not seem to be so relevant but required them in peacekeeping missions around the world (K.Smith 2000: 14-15). The St. Malo Declaration of 1998 led to significant developments in the field of defence. The EU was to acquire the capacity to undertake the Petersberg tasks which involved military intervention and not collective defence. This signaled a major shift towards the development of an EU military capability. The ultimate ambition of the EU of a common defence policy was prevalent and the neutral members too supported enhanced EU intervention capability (K.Smith 2000: 16).

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<sup>1</sup> Conclusions of the European Council, Helsinki, 10- 11 December 1999

The EU by acquiring a defence dimension has repudiated civilian power and this can be observed in three principal arguments made to advance the defence dimension. One, for those who supported the defence dimension of the EU believed that it should acquire the traditional trappings of a statehood including a foreign policy with a military dimension. France and Germany stated in 1991 that the EC should aim to set up a common European defence system, without which the construction of the European Union would be incomplete (K. Smith 2000: 17).

Two, the CFSP will not prove to be effective unless it has recourse to military instruments. If the EU can use force, then its influence will increase. The St. Malo Declaration of 1998 and the Cologne European Council declared that for the EU to play its full role on the international stage, the EU should be able to use military force (K. Smith 2000: 18). The Commission's proposal for the 1996-97 Inter-governmental Conference stated: '[t]he Union's foreign policy suffers from its inability to project credible military force'.<sup>2</sup> European Commissioner Hans van den Broek argued, 'To be credible, the Union needs power behind its diplomacy and power to act if diplomacy fails'. Peter van Ham agrees, 'it is difficult to foresee an effective CFSP which is capable of projecting peace and stability across Europe and beyond, without the option of using military force as a last resort'. And Göran Therborn (1997) asserts, 'without the backing of force and a willingness to use it, 'Europe' is unlikely to become a normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic and social institutions they should have.'

Three, military force is useful and effective in an uncivil world. Civilian power is of a limited utility in the world that is filled with leaders, groups and countries willing to use force to achieve their goals. Wielding military instruments will reap benefits, military power allows states and therefore will allow the EU to exercise influence. By intervening militarily or threatening to do so, the EU will be able to resolve crises and even prevent conflicts from erupting.

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<sup>2</sup> European Commission, "Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement", COM (96) 90 final, 28 February 1996, p. 13.

However, Karen Smith questions these three assumptions. According to her, the most striking loophole in this debate is that the EU's development cannot be neatly categorized as a state-building project in spite of the key actors pushing for such a project since the 1950s. The civilian power debate derives its strength from the example of how inter-state relations can be transformed through intense cooperation which does not entail the creation of a super state. She argues that the debate on EU defence dimension discounts the contributions that a civilian EU could make to international relations. The assumption that the EU will have a more effective foreign policy if it can wield military instruments overlooks other obstacles to foreign policy. Excessive emphasis on foreign policy diverts the attention from the key problem, the members themselves. According to her, if the problem of achieving consensus is set aside then it is not clear what the EU would use military instruments for. She also questions the 'use' of such a military force (Smith 2000: 20). Further, intervention should take place only within an agreed international framework of rules. Smith calls for a critical questioning of these assumptions, in particular, whether these moves will actually lead to a more effective EU in international relations.

In 1995, several European think tanks argued that priority should be given to the elimination of risks that threaten:

- the territorial integrity of EU and member states (such a risk could arise from the insurgence of an aggressive great power in Europe, the spread of local conflicts, terrorist activities, or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by rogue states or groups);
- the EU's economic stability (risks that include threats to sources of raw materials, overseas markets, communication lines, or a massive influx of refugees);
- the EU's ecology (essentially a nuclear threat to the environment) and
- the EU's democratic structure and social stability (the threat here lies in

massive immigration).<sup>3</sup>

In many of these cases, it is difficult to see how military instruments are going to help reduce the threats. The use of military power to prevent the spread of local conflicts on third countries or terrorism is unclear. According to K. Smith, much energy and time has been expended to push for a military capacity but the scope of EU military action would be limited (K. Smith 2000: 22). Jan Zielonka (1998) argued 'aspiring military power status would be an expensive device and basically futile exercise for the Union.' The EU could rather improve its capacities to do what it can already fairly do well, with civilian means.

The creation of an armed EU, capable of intervening in other countries or regions, could have negative effects. It could set off a 'security dilemma'. The development of military capabilities sends a worrying signal about the intentions, particularly since the EU has remained silent about what the capabilities are to be used for. Far from being controversial, the Petersberg tasks could be seen as excuses for unilateral interventions by the EU to promote its own selfish interests by third parties. The enhancement of EU's military resources carries a price. It sends a signal that military force is still useful and necessary and that it should be used to further the EU's interests (K. Smith 2000: 24). And this would close off the path of fully embracing civilian power. The end of civilian power EU would signal an abandonment of key values on which the European Community was built.

Karen Smith rejects Nicole Gnesotto's (2004: 1) argument, 'The idea of Europe as a purely civil power is behind us. The great debate of the 1980s over Europe as a civil power or military power definitely seems to be a thing of the past.' Instead, she contends that the notion of civilian power EU not only stretches the term 'civilian' past its breaking point, but also tends to induce excessively rosy-eyed views of the EU as an international actor. 'Civilian' often means 'good'. And according to Smith deploying the

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<sup>3</sup> L. Stanier, "Common Interests, Values and Criteria for Action", in Martin, L. and J. Roper (eds) *Towards a Common Defence Policy* (Paris: Institute for the Security Studies of the WEU, 1995) p.17. Quoted in Smith, Karen (2000), "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?", *The International Spectator*, 35(2): 11-28.

'civilian power EU' argument can close down critical analysis of actual EU foreign policy activities. She attempts to 'knock off' once and for all the idea of 'civilian power EU' and naming the EU as a specific kind of international actor. Smith clarifies between *exercising* civilian power and *being* a civilian power. The first conception, according to her relates to the means or policy instruments that an actor uses to try to exercise influence. Civilian is non-military, and includes economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments; military involves the use of armed forces. Smith argues that there is a considerable fuzziness over where to draw the line between civilian and military power. She cites peacekeeping forces as an example. The European Union is not a civilian power. 'While some of its activities and policies may be quite close to the civilian ideal-type, not all are, so the EU is not a civilian power' (K.Smith 2005: 70).

K.Smith contends that the far too much literature is concentrated on defending the use of the term civilian power EU, which sometimes can connote that the EU's rhetoric is taken too seriously and its actions are not critically examined. According to her, the EU is 'somewhere along the spectrum between the two ideal types of civilian and military power' (K.Smith 2005: 81). Foreign policy instruments can be used in these different ways: the 'stick' which is not just military, and neither is 'carrot' solely economic. Therefore, theoretically speaking it is argued that just because an actor has only civilian instruments does not mean that it will only use those instruments to sway other actors; civilian instruments can be used coercively too (K.Smith 2005: 67). The EU uses its economic and diplomatic strength to pursue its objective (Hill 1990). Smith defines the 'ideal type' of civilian power based on these four elements: a civilian power is an actor which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign policy process is subject to democratic control or public security. A military power on the other hand uses military means, relies on coercion to influence other actors, unilaterally pursues 'military or militarized ends' and whose foreign policy is not democratic. Smith argues 'there has always been tension within the EU between those who thought that integration would be incomplete without a defence dimension and those who preferred the EU to remain civilian, whether for 'ideological' reasons, such as an attachment to

neutrality, or because an EU with military means would undermine NATO' (Smith 2005: 70).

On the other hand, there are scholars like Richard Whitman who argue 'developing and strengthening the military instrument is not sufficient to validate or invalidate the notion of civilian power Europe' (Whitman 2002: 19). EU military power is developing just as a residual instrument to safeguard other means of international interaction (Whitman 2002: 25). Proof of this is that the EU privileges civilian over other forms of power, and that the Petersberg tasks include humanitarian operations and peacekeeping, which limits the EU's military aspiration and locks the EU into a 'civilian power military posture' (Whitman 2002: 21). Henrik Larsen argues that the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power even though it has acquired military means. 'Military means are articulated as part of a range of means for dealing with international problems, where civilian (political and economic) means continue to occupy a central position' (Larsen 2002: 292).

Thanks to the militarizing of the Union, it is at long last able to act as a real civilian power in the world, as a force for the external promotion of democratic principles. Stavridis (2001: 44) argues that there is need for the EU to move from a civilian power 'by default' to one 'by design'. He contends that just because the EU has acquired military means does not invalidate the concept of civilian power EU. He opines that the EU *must* have military means in order to be a civilian power, because it is only by wielding military power that civilian ends can be pursued. Force can be necessary to promote human rights and democratic principles and the EU should not hesitate to use it for those purposes (Stavridis 2001: 17-20). He rejects the assumption that the concept of civilian power Europe is incompatible with military means. He asks, 'What if military means were sometimes necessary to uphold civilian values?' (Stavridis 2001: 46). He sides with Maull by arguing that the militarizing of the Union's institutions, capabilities and intentions is strengthening the concept of civilian power Europe. He argues that it is not enough to say that civilian power means nothing if it refers only to non-military means. The way in which those means are used is what makes it a civilian power.

According to him, the importance of promoting human rights remains a key element of the civilian power approach. Stavridis concurs with the following opinion. Maull highlighted that a civilian power Europe with military capabilities won't come at a cheap cost because - one, all EU defence budgets are on the decline, two, there is very little chance of a real common European defence procurement policy, three, a supranationalism of defence is unlikely.

The use of military means can be of a civilian type if it promotes human rights and democratic principles. The EU will have to use its developing military capacity with a certain amount of self-restraint. It is argued that a clear distinction has to be made between short-term and long-term solutions. In some cases, rapid military action might prevent a more serious long-term problem. 'A civilian power does not equal pacifism' (Stavridis 2001: 50). A civilian power by design, according to him, should be seen not only as an alternative to military action but as also the first step towards the extreme case of using force. The possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them, thereby adding to the credibility of an international actor.

There are several problems that can be identified with the above definitions of dropping the civilian means element. One, it denies a clear way of distinguishing and comparing actors and determining whether they are moving along the spectrum in one direction or another. This leads to 'fuzzy interpretations' of the line that separates civilian from military. K. Smith argues that by maintaining the civilian means element of the definition, it allows one to establish a clear break on a spectrum: either the EU has and uses military instruments or does not. Smith defines peacekeepers as a military instrument and possessing this instrument is not a pure civilian power. Two, though the Petersberg tasks have expanded, the EU still insists that it is a civilian power, because military instruments are only one of the several that the EU could use. One is left with no clear idea of when the EU might no longer be a civilian power. Three, analysts have argued that by dropping the 'means' element of the definition, the EU is 'safeguarding other means of international interaction'. Smith questions the 'other means of international interaction', and what 'safeguarding' means. Smith questions what the cut-



off point is between civilian and military means. She argues that not only is the idea of 'civilian ends' unclear but also one cannot state uncritically that the EU is actually pursuing civilian ends and therefore is a civilian power (K.Smith 2005: 73).

The EU is increasingly and extensively using both positive and negative conditionality. Positive conditionality entails promising benefits to other states if it fulfills the conditions; negative conditionality involves reducing, suspending or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (K.Smith 2005: 75). Smith also argues that serious questions have to be raised about whether there is adequate and not just civilian, democratic control over EU foreign policy. Smith sums up saying that civilian power EU is definitely dead. According to her, states do not need military instruments – even in 'reserve' - in their dealings with each other (K.Smith 2005: 76).

K.Smith argues that the EU is 'still some way' from the emergence of a 'Hobbesian EU', but the development of the EU's military capabilities is certainly intended to allow it to back up its diplomacy by force (K.Smith 2005: 76) . David Mitrany argued in 1968 that if the problem of war is the existence of self-interested sovereign states, then creating a larger version of a 'sovereign state' (meaning the European Community), an armed 'superpower' of sorts, is not the answer, and in fact just makes the problem bigger. The EU by folding to the supposedly superior hand of military force, it discredits and discards its post-modern cards (K.Smith 2005: 76-77).

### **1.3 Normative Power Europe**

Ian Manners (2001: 6) does not concur with any of the arguments put forth by the other scholars. Instead, he argues that with the transformation in international relations since the Cold War, one has to 'look beyond the notions of civilian and military power in order to conceptualize the EU as normative power Europe'. Manners draws on Duchene's conception of a civilian power to put forward his normative power Europe argument. Though Duchene was concerned with the limitations of a civilian power located in an economic framework, Manners points out that he was also aware that the 'international

diffusion of civilian and democratic standards' was crucial in order for the European Community to avoid becoming a 'victim of power politics'. Duchene was interested in the normative power of the EC as an *idée force* (Duchene 1973: 2,7). Manners argues that the idea of normative power in the international sphere is not new. E.H. Carr in 1939 drew on Bertrand Russell's distinction between economic power, military power and power over opinion (Russell 1938 in Carr 1946: 108). Manners also brings in Johan Galtung's argument, 'ideological power is the power of ideas' (Galtung 1973: 33). According to Galtung, ideological power is 'powerful because the power-sender's idea penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient' and comes through culture. 'He differentiates between channels of power (ideological power, remunerative power and punitive power) and sources of power (resource power and structural power), a distinction he argues is 'fundamental, because it is on the latter that the European Community is particularly strong, even more so than the United States' (Galtung 1973: 36).

Manners writes, 'Simply by existing as different in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 'international relations'. In this respect the EU is a normative power: 'it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from bounded expectations of state-centricity' (Manners 2008: 45). 'The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics. This is a strong claim with a critical aim: to promote normative approaches to the study of the EU in world politics'. The aim is built on the acknowledgement in critical theory that 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose', since 'theory constitutes as well as explains the questions it asks (and those it does not ask)'.<sup>4</sup>

'There is a simple temptation to attempt to analyze EU policy and influence in world politics empirically without ever asking why the EU is or is not acting, or how we might best judge what the EU should be doing in world politics. A

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<sup>4</sup> Robert Cox, 'Social forces, states and world order: beyond international relations theory', *Millennium* 10: 2, 1981, p. 128; Catharine Hoskyns, 'Gender perspectives', in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds, *European integration theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 224; Ian Anners, 'Critical perspectives on European Union politics', in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark Pollack and Ben Rosamond, eds, *Handbook of European Union politics* (London: Sage, 2007), p. 78.

normative power approach rejects such temptations to unreflective and uncritical analysis. Instead it aims to contribute to a better understanding of what principles the EU promotes, how the EU acts, and what impact the EU has by attempting both to analyze and to judge the EU's normative power in world politics....I have attempted to develop an argument that normative power in general, and the EU's normative in particular, is sustainable only if it is felt to be legitimate by those who practice and experience it' (Manners 2008: 45-46).

He (Manners 2001: 6) argues that one of the problems with notions of civilian and military power was highlighted in the debates of the 1970s and 80s following Gunner Sjostedt's attempt to formulate a means of assessing the actorness of the EC using seven properties (Sjostedt 1977) where he focused on agency in the international system and the capabilities of the EC to act in international relations. Manners states that this search for actorness continues in the 1990s when Hill spoke about 'capabilities' (Hill 1993) and Bretherton and Vogler of 'requisites' when the EU was created (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). Manners' argument centers around the fact that one of problems with the actorness debate and the focus on civilian versus military power was 'the unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looked'. Manners looks at two schools of thought that emerged in the 1990s that tried to overcome the tendency to try to measure 'stateness' by using the concepts of 'presence' and 'international identity'. David Allen and Michael Smith developed the notion of 'presence' by looking at Europe's tangible and intangible presence (Allen and Smith 1990, 1998). Building on this, the concept of 'international identity' was introduced to deal with the complex processes and interactions through which the EU is 'being' or 'becoming' determined by both similarities and differences among or between its multiple identities and other (Whitman 1994,1997,1998; Manners 1997; Manners and Whitman 1998).

Manners (2001: 7) is in favour of such a conception as the focus of analysis shifts away from the empirical emphasis on the EU's institutions towards the need to include cognitive processes, including both tangible and intangible components. Manners writes, 'If the TEU declares that the EU is resolved to reinforce 'the European identity' and 'assert its identity on the international scene' in order to 'promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world' then we need to seriously consider the core norms

through which such an identity is internationally constructed.’ Karen Smith argued, ‘the normative dimension’ is essential because ‘the debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity’ (K. Smith 2000: 27). Thus, Manners writes, ‘the notion of normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the *idée force*, ‘power over opinion’, ideological power’, or ‘symbolic power’ and the desire to move beyond the debate over state-like actorness through the understanding of the EU’s international identity.

The European Union represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature utilizing economic tools and international diplomacy, nor a military power of a supranational nature using armed force and international intervention, but a normative power of a ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard notions of ‘state’ or ‘international’. Manners puts forward the argument that the addition of the concept of normative power to the debate over the international role of the European Union allows one to add an important new dimension to the one-dimensional debates over whether the EU is primarily a civilian actor or is becoming a military actor. He argues that at one end of the debate is the assumption that a European Community which is built on economic integration, but with military capabilities reserved for intergovernmental cooperation of its member states will always remain a civilian power. But, on the other end is the assumption that if the EU develops military capabilities then it will become more federal and will thus become a military power (Manners 2001: 7).

These approaches are not without drawbacks. They fail to understand that the EU is a unique example of ‘co-integration’ possessing elements of both intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. The introduction of the idea that the EU represents a normative power in international relations helps one escape the ‘dichotomy trap’ (between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism) by considering the extent to which its ‘co-integration’ allows the development of characteristics of governance and international identity which transcend the limitations of state and international society (Manners 2001: 8).

Manner differentiates between civilian power and normative and military power and normative power. He argues that 'national interest' is central to civilian power and is maintained whether it is a state or a super-state, whereas in normative power what is more important is the degree to which national interest and international relations with their emphasis on security and order are cultivated into discourses regarding distributive power and human-centric concerns. On the other hand, the differences between a military power Europe and a normative power Europe are over the extent to which the EU is primarily using military power as a form of coercion or is primarily changing notions of the role of force in international relations. In normative power terms what is more important is the way in which international violence is conciliated into discourses about structural violence (Manners 2001: 8).

The concept of normative power, according to Manners is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis but this predisposes it to act in a normative way in international relations. 'The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is – a unique international entity which transcends notions of the state and international' (Manners 2001: 9). According to Manners, his presentation of the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it – the EU can be best conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quality to it – that the EU does act to extend its norms in into the international system and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system (Manners 2001: 9).

### **1.3.1 Normative Basis of the EU**

According to Manners, the broad normative basis of the European Union developed through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions. Five 'core' norms can be identified within the vast body of European Union laws and policies which comprise the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*. They are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Manners also suggests four 'minor' norms, that are far more contested within the constitution and

practices of the EU. They are social progress, combating discrimination, sustainable development and the principle of good governance (Manners 2001: 10-11).

These norms are 'not simply declaratory aims of a system of governance (such as the preamble to republican constitutions), but represent crucial constitutive features of a polity which creates its identity as being more than a state.... The reinforcement and expansion of distinctive norms allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than a sum of its parts'(Manners 2001: 11-12). However, Manners expresses reservations regarding the presentation of the EU's norms as being all good. Several of these norms are contested within the EU as well as without and it is in the minor norms that are the most contested. According to him, EU's normative basis stems from a variety of different factors that shape norm diffusion in international relations. They are contagion (unintentional diffusion by EU), informational (strategic and declaratory communications by EU), procedural (institutionalization of relationship by EU), transference (exchange of benefits by EU and third parties), overt (physical presence of EU in third states and organizations) and cultural filter (cultural diffusion and political learning in third states and organizations) (Manners 2001: 13-14).

The common interests of the EU's member states are centered around the promotion of values such as 'peace and security', 'democracy', 'human rights', 'development aid' and 'environmental protection' (Manners 2001: 14). Manners takes Barry Buzan's suggestions of examining these five sectors of security for a more complete analysis of his case studies. They include military concerns (peace and security), political concerns (democracy), societal concerns (human rights), economic concerns (development aid), and environmental concerns (environmental protection) (Manners 2001: 14). He also argues that the EU is a different kind of international actor, a normative power based on five reasons - EU impinges with impunity (state sovereignty), EU intervenes in support of the individual (solidarist society), EU action is costly, not beneficial (non-material basis), EU often faces international opposition from the strangest partners (the unusual suspects) and the EU does not behave as a state or a super-state (normative power). The process of EU's norm diffusion, according to

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Manners is assisted by factors such as contagion and cultural filter when the EU works with civil society and NGOs to go beyond 'traditional' tools such as economic and military power (Manners 2001: 15).

The landmark document on 'Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa' (1995) coincided with the 'conditionality clauses' stating that human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law were 'essential elements' of EU aid and political agreements with third countries. By arguing that the EU is a normative power in world politics, Manners implies that the EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable. He discusses nine substantive normative principles which both constitute and are promoted by the EU. They are sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. He also focuses on the way in which the EU promotes these substantive principles by virtue of the principles of 'living by example', by duty of its actions in 'being reasonable'; and by consequence of its impact in 'doing least harm' (Manners 2008: 46). Since the end of the Cold War, the EU's commitment to the promotion of these nine normative principles has moved from internal and enlargement policies to external, development and foreign policies.

**1.3.2 The Normative Principles**

*Sustainable peace*

According to Manners, the EU principle of sustainable peace addresses the roots or causes of conflict, mirroring the European experience of ensuring that war 'becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. EU policy focuses on development aid, trade, interregional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement as elements of a more holistic approach to conflict prevention. He argues that the EU's growing civilian and military operational capacities also have a sustainable peace mission which focuses



on peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter (Manners 2008: 48-49).

#### *Social freedom*

Social freedom is circumscribed by the need to ensure that other normative principles are not compromised by unwarranted freedoms, such as anti-social behaviour, hate crimes etc. The EU promotes fundamental freedoms such as freedom of thought, expression, assembly and association through the 14 articles of the freedom title of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU accession to the European Convention for the Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Manners 2008: 49-50).

#### *Consensual democracy*

The 'trinity of democracy human rights and rule of law' is to be consolidated and supported in the EU's external action. The treaty indicates three ways in which democracy is to be promoted: first, internally, through the provisions on democratic principles, including democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy, and the role of national parliaments; second, through the solidarity clause, which the EU and its member states can invoke to protect democratic institutions from any terrorist attack and third, through enlargement and accession, as well as neighbourhood and development policies (Manners 2008: 50).

#### *Associative Human Rights*

These include individual human rights as well as collective human rights. One of the aspects is the extent to which human rights provisions are promoted through the interdependent external actions of trade and aid, humanitarian and migration issues (Manners 2008: 50-51).



### *Supranational rule of law*

Manners argues that the EU principle of the rule of law is supranational in three senses – communitarian, international and cosmopolitan. The EU principle of communitarian law promotes the pooling of sovereignty through the *acquis communautaire* – the supranational rule of law within the EU. Secondly, the EU principle of international law encourages participation by the EU and its member states in supranational law above and beyond the EU. Third, the EU principle of cosmopolitan law advances the development and participation of the EU and its member states in humanitarian law and rights applicable to individuals. According to Manners, the promotion of rule of law both within and between states is part of the EU's declared commitment to 'effective multilateralism' involving 'well functioning international institutions and rule-based international order' (Manners 2008: 51-52).

### *Inclusive equality*

The third objective of the Union involves combating discrimination and promoting equality. Manners argues that the promotion of equality in Europe and the world has at least three dimensions emphasizing the equality of citizens and member states as well as identifying the types of discrimination to be targeted by its policies. Firstly, the Reform Treaty identifies the principle of equality of its citizens as being fundamental democratic principles and recognizes the equality of its member states as being fundamental principle of the Union. Secondly, the Treaty and the Charter identify particular common forms of discrimination to be combated, with a particular emphasis on gender equality across EU policies. Thirdly, the seven articles in the equality title of the Charter emphasize the promotion of equality with attention to cultural diversity, gender, the rights of the child and the elderly, and the integration of persons with disabilities (Manners 2008: 52-53).

### *Social Solidarity*

The EU seeks to achieve ‘balanced economic growth’, ‘social market economy’, ‘full employment’ and combat ‘social exclusion’, as well as promote ‘social justice and protection’, intergenerational solidarity and social solidarity among member states (Manners 2008: 53).

### *Sustainable Development*

The EU also seeks to promote the principles of sustainable development beyond Europe through its enlargement, development, trade, environmental and foreign policies (Manners 2008: 53-54).

### *Good Governance*

The principle of good governance has two distinctive elements, both of which have significant internal and external consequences: the participation of civil society and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty suggests that the promotion of good governance has to be achieved through at least three different practices involving participatory democracy, openness and transparency, multilateralism and good global governance (Manners 2008: 54-55).

Having presented the three major arguments that surround the question of EU’s global identity and actorness, the following chapters will contextualize the normative power debate through a case study of Afghanistan post 9/11. The analysis of the European Union as a normative power in the context of Afghanistan offers one the scope of understanding the EU’s role in international affairs post 9/11 and the nature of this role. While the Civilian Power Europe debate most often than not centers on the question as to whether the EU should acquire military capabilities or not, the Normative Power Europe conception renders itself more openly to analyzing the capacity or the incapacity of the EU to act on civilian, defence and security issues. Thus, by relating Europe’s putative pursuit for normative objectives with its power capacity in a failed state like

Afghanistan provides the opportunity to test the common criticism that the normative power literature merely confirms the EU rhetoric.

## **Chapter 2 - European Involvement in Afghanistan**

The European Union has been involved in Afghanistan in three different capacities. Firstly, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, when European members were called upon by the United States to assist in carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom; secondly, under the banner of the European Commission where member states were involved in delivering assistance to Afghanistan and thirdly, individual member states like Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the like headed different portfolios in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Therefore, to understand the involvement of the EU in Afghanistan, its contribution in all three capacities has to be well underscored.

### **2.1 Background**

#### **2.1.1 Perceptions of Threat Post 9/11**

After the speech by the then President of United States, George W. Bush in 2002<sup>5</sup>, individuals who had hoped that terrorism might serve to bridge the differences within NATO worried that the new direction in American foreign policy would only heighten pre-existing tensions. The disconnect between the Bush Administration and the European elites could not have been more stark. Rupp (2006: 109) writes,

‘Europe and Canada did not share Washington’s threat perceptions on terrorism or “rogue states”. Europe’s long acquaintance with political violence had taught European elites that terrorism had to be managed; the phenomena could not be eliminated as President Bush seemed to believe. Though willing to devote extensive resources and energy to combat political violence, European governments, as opposed to Washington, turned to military means only as a last resort. For Europeans, law enforcement, intelligent services, and multilateral cooperation were the primary means to engage terrorism, not fighter aircraft, surface ships and ground forces’.

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<sup>5</sup> George W. Bush’s State of the Union address delivered on January 29, 2002

Europeans were also troubled by the fact that America was reluctant to seriously investigate both the root cause of terrorism and the underlying motivations behind the al-Qaeda. A majority in Europe was willing to examine how 'their own imperial past contributed to modern day political violence'. The Bush administration, however, considered these approaches misguided (Rupp 2006: 109).

Differences between the two sides of the Atlantic extended beyond divergent threat perceptions. Neither NATO nor the European Union was designed to participate in the sort of global war on terror that Washington was promoting in the later half of 2002. The European Union for its part took steps shortly after 9/11 to increase its pre-existing counter terrorism capabilities and initiated programmes to enhance cooperation among the EU's policing agencies, obstruct terrorist financing and monitor crossings and airport security. These initiatives and others, though were considered "useful" from America's perspective, did not enhance the EU's military capabilities. 'If any European security organization was going to play the role in Washington's war on terror, it would clearly have to be NATO'. However, NATO by the end of 2002 did not have forces capable of offering significant assistance to the US and was still far away from seriously debating the construction of the Rapid Reaction forces (Rupp 2006: 109-111).

The dispute within the transatlantic community centering on Washington's strategies for the war on terror was not the only issue that divided the alliance following 9/11. When the Bush administration abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, suspicions were confirmed in Europe and elsewhere that despite the attacks, Washington would continue unilateralist foreign policy which did not take into consideration the opinions of its traditional allies. Moreover, the Bush administration had initiated a series of steps to undermine the International Criminal Court (ICC) throughout 2002. America's position was opposed by all participating members of the NATO including the British which government repeatedly urged Washington but with little effect, to reconsider its policies towards the ICC (Rupp 2006: 114).

In July 2002, the US successfully “maneuvered” the United Nations Security Council into passing a resolution that exempted US personnel from any ICC proceedings for a twelve month period. Other than the ongoing disputes involving major international legal accords, tensions between the US and much of Europe continued throughout 2002 over the Middle East. Though in June 2002, the US had included Iran in the “Axis of Evil”, the EU initiated negotiations with Tehran on a range of issues which included Iran’s nuclear programme that Washington assumed was designed for Weapons of Mass Destruction acquisition. Both the EU and Washington shared a goal of preventing Iran from building nuclear weapons. But the Bush administration favoured a more confrontational approach than most European governments. EU-US relations were also strained due to the EU’s maintenance of limited diplomatic contacts with organizations that the Bush administration labeled as terrorist groups and for being hostile to Israel (Rupp 2006: 115).

Washington’s continued unilateral approach to the nation’s foreign policy after 9/11 perplexed and frustrated many Europeans who hoped that the US would seek to build a greater transatlantic consensus in the aftermath of the attacks. While on one hand, many US initiatives during 2002 offended US allies, on the other hand, Washington paradoxically sought European and Canadian cooperation on issues ranging from the occupation of Afghanistan to major structural reforms in NATO (Rupp 2006: 115). Those nations that aspired to join the NATO saw it as an opportune moment and were quick to respond to the events of September 11, 2001. The national leaders of these states condemned the attacks, expressed solidarity with the United States, and offered Washington aid and assistance. Countries like Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia not only opened their air space to US aircraft and sharing intelligence but also joined the permanent NATO members in dispatching forces to Afghanistan in early 2002. Despite concerns that enlarging the Alliance would weaken NATO’s effectiveness and further shift its identity towards collective security, the states of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were invited to join the Alliance in November 2002 (Rupp 2006: 116-117).

Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks, NATO and the EU were called into emergency sessions. The organizations quickly offered the US access to resources available to their member governments. There were many discussions held in Brussels to discuss the invocation of **Article V**<sup>6</sup> of the Washington Treaty. Though in earlier instances the Article had been invoked without any serious debates, September 11 compelled the NATO members to act. While some remembered the North Atlantic Council's unanimous vote as strength of unity, others had a feeling of uneasiness. Reservations against the invocation were expressed by representatives from Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. These representatives were wary of being interpreted as giving sweeping endorsement to America's response to the attacks. But eventually everybody went ahead with tentative invocation of the Article (Rupp 2006: 94-95).

America was predisposed to see Europe as a reluctant geopolitical partner. Rather than signifying alliance unity, the debate among NATO members following the attacks on the US would serve as a harbinger of the transatlantic disputes just over the horizon. Having resolved to destroy the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, the Bush administration devised the Operation Enduring Freedom which required no significant military aid. Washington sought support based on how foreign states could best facilitate U.S operations. In addition to Great Britain, Washington's key allies were Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Pakistan. However, many European and Canadian elites believed that declaring war on international terrorism would be a counterproductive step (Rupp 2006: 97-98).

Drawing on the lessons from Kosovo, the Americans were determined to keep European and Canadian involvement to the minimum. 'The Bush Administration's

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6 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 - The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

decisions regarding NATO in fall 2001 were a major blow to the alliance. Washington had a unique opportunity to unite the transatlantic community but instead chose to marginalize NATO' (Rupp 2006: 101). Despite Washington's decision to limit NATO's role in Operation Enduring Freedom, the US worked with the design and implementation of numerous NATO contributions to US military operations. NATO's deployment of surveillance aircraft to the US between October 2001 and April 2002 was the most significant contribution to the American effort. NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) aircraft deployments constituted 25 per cent of patrols during this period. Other than the NATO's alliance-based contributions, direct bilateral military assistance was provided to the US by a number of European governments during the 2001 campaign in Afghanistan. Britain and France dispatched naval, air and ground forces, but the contributions by the British were larger and more successfully integrated into the US operational planning. The French government was resistant to deploying its units because the French political and military leaders were not accorded a significant role in decision making by Washington. Other European countries also provided military and logistical support during the war, but most of the European and Canadian personnel were assigned to the AWAC operations, the naval deployments in the Mediterranean or other missions in their own countries (Rupp 2006: 102-103).

'The most notable feature of the European response to the events of September 11 is that it occurred primarily on a bilateral, and not on a multilateral basis. Despite the fact that NATO is one of the most institutionalized institutions ever created, with decades of experience in fostering close ties among its members, the US chose not to use NATO to organize its response to the attacks. NATO was unable to provide command structure or even substantial capabilities that would override US concerns about using the NATO machinery.'

Initially, NATO played a small, supporting role in Washington's war on terror. Lord Robertson, NATO's tenth Secretary General declared that NATO's action since 9/11 had proved the skeptics wrong.

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7 Bensahel, Nora, Senior Political Scientist. RAND Corporation. Quoted in Rupp, Richard E.(2006), *NATO After 9/11- An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, Palgrave Publishers.



‘Some pundits made the mistake of thinking that the transatlantic relationship was coming to an end. In their view, the transatlantic link was simply a marriage of convenience- or more accurately a shotgun wedding imposed by the Soviet Union. And that now, Europe and North America were ready to file for a divorce. 11 September 2001 shattered the myth. Indeed, one of the clearest results of those tragic events has been a total affirmation that Europe and North America remain what they have been for over five decades: a rock solid community of shared values’<sup>8</sup> (Rupp 2006: 104-105).

Prior to December 2001 NATO governments played a minor role in the Afghan campaign. But by early 2002 NATO member states began deploying a range of forces to Afghanistan and by spring 2002, there were more Europeans serving in Afghanistan than US personnel. NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan expanded in 2002 and culminated in August 2003, with the alliance taking formal command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in the country (Rupp 2006: 105).

Throughout 2002, European and Canadian forces participated in a range of battles and peace enforcement operations in Afghanistan. While some in NATO held a lingering animosity towards Washington due to the Bush administration’s decision to relegate the Alliance to the sidelines during the preceding months, the rest did not find fault with the success and speed of US military operations. There was expectation in Europe and Canada that after the success of operations in Afghanistan, Washington would then turn its attention to bring to justice those who had escaped and prevent attacks like September 11 in the future (Rupp 2006: 105).

Most European reactions were highly critical of Washington’s new strategy. The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2001) reported European disapproval for Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech ranging from 62 percent in France to 74 percent in Germany<sup>9</sup>. Rupp argues that European preferences for consolidating gains in Afghanistan and isolating the al-

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<sup>8</sup> Lord Robertson (2002), Speech by NATO Secretary General delivered on 24 January 2002. [Online: web]. URL: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-134D4001-DCF25218/natolive/opinions\\_19888.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-134D4001-DCF25218/natolive/opinions_19888.htm) . Quoted in Rupp, Richard E. (2006), *NATO After 9/11 - An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, Palgrave Publishers.

<sup>9</sup> The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2001, America Admired, Yet its Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders, Washington DC: Pew Research Centre for the People & the Press. Cited in Rupp, Richard E. (2006), *NATO after 9/11 – An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, Palgrave Publishers

Qaeda had been “dashed” and that for many, Bush’s policies and tone were an affront requiring response (Rupp 2006: 107).

French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, called Bush’s speech<sup>10</sup> “simplistic” and publicly berated Washington for acting ‘unilaterally, without consulting others, taking decisions based on its own view of the world and its own interests.’ Following the 9/11 attacks, Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder affirmed his country’s “unlimited sovereignty” with the American people. Joschka Fischer, the then Foreign Minister of Germany rebuked the US for its “heavy handed foreign policy” and failure to consult allies. He said, ‘For all the differences in size and weight,’ he argued, ‘alliance partnerships between free democracies cannot be reduced to obedience. Alliance partners are not satellites.’ (Rupp 2006: 108)

## **2.2 Reconstruction of Afghanistan**

### **2.2.1 Role played by NATO (2001-2006)**

While on the one hand, since 9/11, NATO had expanded its membership, increased its partner relationships, pledged to improve the military capabilities gap, established a Rapid Reaction Force, and committed to operations far from the inclusive borders of the Alliance’s member states, on the other hand, hopes of building upon this ambitious agenda were characterized by political divisions among members of the alliance, particularly over Iraq. Throughout 2004 and 2005, NATO’s status and prospects were inextricably linked to the successful execution of the Afghanistan operation. The NATO’s operation in Afghanistan for some was a logical and appropriate move as an old alliance was establishing a new identity in a changing world. In the aftermath of major combat operations in early 2002, Washington and its NATO allies pledged to “get Afghanistan right” (Rupp 2006: 153-154).

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<sup>10</sup> George W. Bush’s State of the Union address delivered on January 29, 2002

After the collapse of the Taliban government in December 2001, the international community gathered in Bonn, Germany to devise a post-war construction strategy for Afghanistan. On December 5, the participants signed the Bonn agreement<sup>11</sup> that established an interim authority to be led by the Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai. The Bonn agreement set out the guidelines for the framing of an international constitution, the conduct of elections, and the outline of the future Afghan government. As part of the objectives of the Bonn agreement, on December 20, the UN Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that would serve as a multinational force consisting primarily of European states committed to the provision of security in and around Kabul for the Afghans, UN staff and aid workers from various NGOs (Rupp 2006: 157).

The Security Council significantly expanded UN involvement in Afghanistan with the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2003. Among the many responsibilities that the ISAF shouldered in Afghanistan, its fundamental mission was to facilitate the delivery of security, political support and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan people. More specifically, the ISAF was designed to facilitate nation-building in a country that was declared a failed state. Since its genesis, ISAF has been primarily staffed by personnel from the NATO members. Though the NATO had no significant formal association with ISAF until August 2003, from December 2001 throughout fall 2003, ISAF was consistently led by a succession of NATO members such as Great Britain, Turkey, Germany, and the Netherlands. Throughout 2002 and 2003, over 90 per cent of ISAF civilian and military personnel were posted from NATO governments or Partnerships for Peace members. Among the 2 million personnel in European military establishments, only 5,000 were part of the ISAF in 2002 (Rupp 2006: 156).

Most of Afghanistan's security-related problems in 2003 were due to the presence of the al-Qaeda and the nation's warlords and militias that had resisted the ISAF's

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<sup>11</sup> Bonn Agreement signed in 2001. [Online: web] URL: <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>

demobilization and disarmament efforts. Afghanistan's competing warlords proved to be a major challenge for NATO and were also a source of conflict between the Alliance and the US government. While the NATO pursued its Afghan mission in 2004 and 2005, the drug trade continued to expand. NATO's efforts to resist a direct role in combating drugs in the country would only blemish the Alliance's image in the eyes of many (Rupp 2006: 159-160).

In the initial stages of NATO's command of ISAF, its operations limited to provision of security in Kabul and the surrounding area. The ISAF had not taken significant steps to expand its authority beyond the capital region since its establishment in December 2001. In contrast to the NATO, Rupp argues that the US forces assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom had made substantial efforts since the fall of the Taliban to establish military and civilian units in various regions of the country through the development and deployment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). When NATO commenced operations in August 2003, the United States was already administering nine PRTs in Afghanistan. ISAF had over 5,000 personnel in the country at the time and yet to field a single PRT. Only on August 11, 2003 did the NATO formally take control of ISAF (Rupp 2006: 160).

While the NATO was slightly unsure about its future in Afghanistan, the United Nations Security Council had more specific missions planned for ISAF and the Alliance. In concurrence with the US, ISAF and NATO, the Security Council extended ISAF's security mandate in October 2003 to encompass the entire country. In December 2003, responding to the UN Security Council NATO announced its intent to establish five PRTs in the following months. The first was located in the northern province of Konduz under German leadership (Rupp 2006: 160-161).

In January 2004, the Alliance had approximately 5,000 personnel in the country in contrast to Washington's similarly limited deployment of 11,000 troops. By April 2004, approximately 6,500 NATO troops were in Afghanistan; out of which nearly 4000 were Canadian or German personnel. Most NATO members were contributing less than 100

troops and some less than ten. This coupled with the fact that a far larger contingent of European forces was present in the Balkans<sup>12</sup> than in Afghanistan, evoked criticism from the American officials of the Alliance (Rupp 2006: 162-163).

## **2.3 Role of EU in Afghanistan**

### **2.3.1 EU and EC Assistance to Afghanistan Since 2002**

The EU has been a key, although not always recognized, visible or unitary actor in Afghanistan. Between 2002 and 2006, of the EU (European Commission budget and Member states) contributed €3.7 billion in aid to Afghanistan, out of which €1.1 billion was contributed from the European Commission budget. This made the EU second largest donor to Afghanistan after the US during this period (Gross 2009: 21).

The EU has a long standing commitment in Afghanistan. The EU, working with international partners plays a major role in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Being a key donor, the EU member states had committed around €8 billion for the period of 2002-2010. The EU's partnership with Afghanistan is highlighted in the joint political declaration signed on 16 November 2005 and is based on shared priorities such as the establishment of strong and accountable institutions, security and justice sector reform, counter-narcotics, development and construction. The EU has had a Special Representative in Afghanistan since December 2001. The EU Special Representative is in close contact with key stakeholders in the Afghan political process and with international partners and advises the EU on its Afghanistan policy and on the implementation of its priorities for action (EU Council Secretariat 2009: 1).

Working with international players, the EU is making a major contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction and stabilization. In agreement with the Afghan government and the donor community, EU member states and the EC play key coordination roles in crucial areas of assistance, including security related issues. The reconstruction program

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<sup>12</sup> In 2006, over 150,000 US troops were stationed in and around Iraq, and nearly 30,000 European troops were on peacekeeping duty in the Balkans.

managed by the European Commission has pledged €700 million in reconstruction funding for the period of 2007-2010. It includes rural development, alternative livelihoods and food security; governance, including police and justice and health. Between 2002 and 2006, the EU contributed towards the following areas in Afghanistan: rural development, alternative livelihoods and food security (€236 million); economic infrastructure (€106 million); the health sector (€94 million); public sector reform (€393 million); demining (€66 million); Human rights and civil society (€21 million); promotion of regional cooperation, including aid for refugees and specific support to help facilitate refugee returns (€53 million). Twenty-five EU member states, including non-NATO members (as of summer, 2009) are deploying troops to the ISAF. Their combined contribution to ISAF is approximately 27,000 troops. Separately several member states are also contributing to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom coalition conducting counter-insurgency and counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan (EU Council Secretariat 2009: 2).

The European Community is the largest contributor to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA), which pays the running costs of the Afghan National Police and it has already paid over €200 million. The rule of law is critical for the success of counter-narcotics and other efforts. The EU has also contributed significantly to improving access to basic primary health care (from 9% to 80% in 2008) and to the sharp reduction of the under 5 mortality rate (a 25% reduction over 2002-2008). To date it has channeled €280 million into the health sector program. In addition to its leading role in the reconstruction effort, the EU is one of the major donors of development assistance and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan (EU Council Secretariat 2009: 2-3).

From 2002 to 2008, the EU committed €1.6 billion. Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate the EC's as well as the EU member states' contribution to the Afghan Ministry of Finance between 2002 and 2008. The EC's contribution was €1072.7 million and UK topped the list of member states donors at €1080.1 million. The contribution of countries like Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Malta and the rest is negligible. In Table 2 and Figure 2 the EC and EU member states' contribution through the OECD to Afghanistan during the


same period is shown. The EC contributed €1205.4 million, with UK a close second at 1039.9. Countries like Slovakia and Hungary contributed around €6 million while the contribution from other countries like Malta, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia and the rest remained negligible. This commitment would continue into the future and funding is already assured up to 2013.

**Table 1: EC and EU Member States Aid Contribution to Afghanistan Ministry of Finance in Euro million (2002-08)**

Contributors	Afghan Ministry of Finance 2002-08	Contributors	Afghan Ministry of Finance 2002-08
EC	1072.7	Czech Republic	0
UK	1080.1	Portugal	1.2
Germany	658.5	Luxembourg	1.4
Netherlands	334.4	Slovakia	0
Sweden	214.7	Hungary	0
Italy	348	Poland	0.8
Denmark	174.6	Bulgaria	0
Spain	20.5	Cyprus	0
Finland	67.2	Estonia	0
France	85.9	Latvia	0
Greece	0.2	Lithuania	0
Austria	0.6	Romania	0
Belgium	30.8	Slovenia	0
Ireland	7.6	Malta	0

Source: Figures in USD million taken from Afghan ministry of finance ([http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/Aid\\_Coord\\_Effectiveness/ACU\\_Resources/Pledge\\_Table\\_ACU\\_2008%20Final.xls](http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/units/Aid_Coord_Effectiveness/ACU_Resources/Pledge_Table_ACU_2008%20Final.xls)); converted into euros using the average USD-EUR annual exchange rate. Cited in Korski, Daniel (2009), "Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge", *Policy Brief*, European Council on Foreign Relations: London.

**Figure 1: EC and EU Member States Aid Contribution to Afghanistan Ministry of Finance**






**Table 2: EC and EU Member States Aid Contribution to Afghanistan through OECD in Euro million (2002-08)**

Contributors	OECD 2002-07	Contributors	OECD 2002-07
EC	1205.4	Czech Republic	25.7
UK	1039.9	Portugal	19.3
Germany	598.2	Luxembourg	15.5
Netherlands	483.5	Slovakia	6.4
Sweden	238.4	Hungary	6.2
Italy	205	Poland	2.7
Denmark	112.9	Bulgaria	0
Spain	108.6	Cyprus	0
Finland	85.3	Estonia	0
France	84.3	Latvia	0
Greece	66.6	Lithuania	0
Austria	42.5	Romania	0
Belgium	37.2	Slovenia	0
Ireland	30.8	Malta	0

Source: Figures in USD million taken from OECD (<http://webnet.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx>); converted into euros using the average USD-EUR annual exchange rate. Cited in Korski, Daniel (2009), "Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge", *Policy Brief*, European Council on Foreign Relations: London.

**Figure 2: EC and EU Member States Aid Contribution to Afghanistan through OECD**



Other than their substantial military contributions to the ISAF, individual EU member states have also contributed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan by taking up coordinating roles in a number of areas of Security Sector Reform: justice sector reform (Italy), counter-narcotics efforts (United Kingdom), and reforming the national police and border police forces (Germany). It is contended that while the member states have recognized the need for increasing coordination within the EU and the opportunity the EU provides in subsuming individual efforts and improving coherence of international and European efforts, there is however a degree of fragmentation between the national and European undertakings and this is noticeable in the relationship between the military and the civilian dimension of crisis management as well (Gross 2009: 22-23).

Prior to 9/11, the EC was the single largest donor in two key areas; humanitarian support for emergencies and support to the refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. By 2000, the EC support extended to over 400 schools and over 200 basic health clinics. Between 9/11 and 2002, the EC offered its support for the three pillars (human capital and food security, physical infrastructure and trade and investment, public administration and security) and where its expertise lay. This support was essential to stabilize Afghanistan and start the full reconstruction efforts. The EC engaged in massive job creation and funding the government for jobs and also set up a Rapid Reaction mechanism, supported the civil society, media and emergency infrastructure rehabilitation through the ISAF. Regular high-level political contacts were maintained between the EU and Afghanistan (CSP 2003-07). Afghanistan is entitled to a quota and tariff free access for all its goods to the European market under the 'Everything but Arms' initiative. The Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration (2002) provided the political framework for cooperation (CSP 2007-13: 13).

The EC's legal and strategy framework for bilateral cooperation includes multiannual programming documents and annual action programmes. The first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2003-2006<sup>13</sup> and the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2003-

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<sup>13</sup> European Union, Commission, *Country Strategy Paper- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for 2003-2006*.

2006<sup>14</sup> promoted stability and poverty reduction by supporting rural development and food security, good governance, infrastructure and health as well as other areas. The second Country Strategy Paper set out the priorities for 2007-2013 and the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP)<sup>15</sup> defines the EC intervention for 2007-2010 in three focal and three non-focal areas with planned activities, expected results and indicators. The focal areas are rural development, governance and health. The non-focal areas are social protection, mine action and regional cooperation. The total budget under the MIP for 2007-2010 was €610 million. Every year the Commission adopts an Annual Action Programme (AAP) for Afghanistan, with several sectoral actions and projects in line with the MIP.

Afghanistan, in addition to bilateral cooperation under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), benefits from the regional programmes for Asia, in particular the Aid for Uprooted People programme, as well as support through thematic programmes like the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). These programmes are articulated within bilateral co-operations. Humanitarian assistance is provided by the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO).

The Country Strategy papers for Afghanistan (2003-2006 and 2007-2013) brought out by the European Commission are documents that detail the priorities and objectives for the EU's role in Afghanistan. The following section will describe the activities and the involvement of the EU in Afghanistan as enumerated in the Country Strategy Papers and other official documents brought out by the European Commission.

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<sup>14</sup> European Union, Commission, *National Indicative Programme of European Community Support 2005-2006 Afghanistan*

<sup>15</sup> European Union, Commission, *Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007-10- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*

### **2.3.2 Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2003 – 2006)**

The European Commission's *Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2003-2006)* was firmly set within the context of the Bonn agreement, which acted as a roadmap for a democratically elected government in Afghanistan in 2004. Between 2003 and 2004, the European Commission concentrated on four key areas – capacity building, rural government and food security, economic infrastructure and health. Over €295 million were earmarked for all these areas as well as other areas such as demining, civil society and social protection. While the medium-term objective of the CSP was to hold the 2004 general elections, some long-term objectives that the EC was to achieve in Afghanistan were also set. The government of Afghanistan and the European Commission had laid out the following benchmarks under EC cooperation.

- to promote the Bonn agreement and its implementation by all groups
- to promote democracy and the protection of Human rights
- to establish an effective macro-economic and monetary framework
- to reinforce the fight against illegal drugs and terrorism
- to promote cooperation with neighbouring countries, and
- to enhance the role of women (CSP 2003-06: 2)

The overall objective of the EC support was to reduce poverty and promote stability in Afghanistan. This was to be channeled to four main areas of concentration: (a) rural development and food security (b) economic infrastructure (c) good governance, including public administration reform and support for the recurrent budget, and (d) support for the health sector (CSP 2003-06: 3). The Commission was to also finance substantial non-sectoral programmes for human rights, media and civil society, demining and through continued support from the EC Humanitarian Office for returning refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. Key cross-cutting themes such as (a) gender equality (b) tackling poppy reduction through alternative livelihoods (c) environmental sustainability and (d) conflict prevention were built into each programme area (CSP

2003-06: 3). The strategy paper also identified the EC role within Afghanistan's policy agenda i.e., the National Development Framework. EC's role was categorized into three pillars:

Pillar 1: Human capital and social protection

(a) *Rural development and food security*: The overall objective was to support rural recovery and sustainable rural livelihoods, thereby reduce poverty. Specific objectives included promotion of a broad-based rural economic growth, ensuring equitable access to productive assets, markets and services for women in particular, facilitating the move away from poppy cultivation through support to alternative livelihoods backed by law and order, support for human and social development in the areas of health, nutrition and access to water, addressing the issue of social exclusion through the development of more effective provincial and community based institutions and the like. The EC was to also provide support to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Irrigation and Environment, the private sector, NGOs and UN agencies to promote rural development and food security (CSP 2003-06: 4-5).

Apart from bilateral cooperation, Afghanistan is a recipient from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Instrument for Stability. Since 2005, €3.54 million have been allocated in this regard. Humanitarian assistance is also provided by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO). The EU is an important donor to humanitarian assistance and transitional activities implemented by the UN organizations and NGOs providing support for protection of displaced persons, return and reintegration of refugees, response to food crises and mine action. Other cross cutting issues related to opium reduction, human rights, including the role of women and the environment were to be mainstreamed within the sub areas of concentration (CSP 2003-06: 5).

(b) *Health*: The EC's specific objectives in the field of health included increase in number of Afghans, especially women who would have access to Basic Healthcare Package and strengthening of technical and financial capacities of central and provincial government with the end goal of reducing the rates of child and maternal mortality. The EC has been a major donor in the health sector. In 2002, the EC co-funded a nation-wide survey on existing health facilities and embarked on capacity-building of the ministry (CSP 2003-06: 6).

A key cross-cutting theme addressed through health was gender and protection of vulnerable groups, namely ensuring fair and equal access to healthcare for women, children and vulnerable groups. Health was also a cross-cutting issue in EC rural development and food security programmes that target poor nutrition and water (CSP 2003-06: 7).

(c) *Social protection*: The EC's objective was to increase the levels of social protection for persons with disabilities and street children and to reduce demand for drugs internally. The EC support was to focus on supporting the development of a national strategy on disability with relevant players, service delivery to street children for protection, training and literacy, financing programmes that address the particular needs of the increasing number of drug dependents in Afghanistan and the like. The EC's comparative advantage was based on past support and experience in these areas (CSP 2003-06: 7-8).

Key cross cutting issues to be addressed through social protection were acute social vulnerability, drugs and gender. After rural development support which sought to provide alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation, drug demand reduction was EC's major contribution to the drug strategy (CSP 2003-06: 8).

(d) *Human rights, civil society, culture and media*: The EC's objectives were to facilitate cultural expression, the growth of a vibrant civil society and the establishment of a free and independent media. In media, the EC was to ensure that the initiatives

launched in 2002 continued and have a long-term impact. Civil society, human rights and cultural activities were to focus on small projects from individual communities and the EC was to also support direct projects for human rights and gender (CSP 2003-06: 8-9).

Key cross cutting themes were democratisation, promotion of awareness and understanding of the 2004 election process, the rule of law, the protection of vulnerable groups and respect for human rights, including the role of women (CSP 2003-06: 9).

(e) *Repatriation of Refugees*: The EC objectives included providing humanitarian support where needed, and promotion of sustainable return of refugees 'through effective integration humanitarian and development aid', identification of key skilled Afghan nationals to fill human resources needs and supporting the return of Afghan Diaspora in Europe. Humanitarian support through the ECHO was to continue and Commission activities in other areas such as rural recovery, health and the rebuilding of infrastructure was to underpin the sustainability of return (CSP 2003-06: 9-10).

In tackling the sustainability of return, key cross-cutting issues included the promotion of human rights, including the role of women, conflict resolution and demining (CSP 2003-06: 10).

## Pillar 2: Physical Infrastructure

The second pillar recognized within the CSP was physical infrastructure which mainly concentrated on economic infrastructure. Road construction was the focus and support was to be provided for strategy and institutional capacity development in the transport sector while telecommunications, energy and mining came under the purview of the Afghan government. The EC objective under this pillar was to help reconstruct the national road network. The EC agreed to provide assistance to the Ministry of Public Works and of Transport in the reconstruction of the Kabul-Jalalabad-Torkham road, policy and capacity building support for key transport institutions and additional programmes were to be considered in provincial roads and urban development depending on resource availability (CSP 2003-06: 10-11).

Key cross-cutting issues addressed include national unity and security. Refugees and ex-combatants were to benefit by the jobs created in the reconstruction (CSP 2003-06: 11).

### Pillar 3: Trade and Investment, Public Administration and Security

The third pillar was trade and investment and public administration and security. The EC was to support the preliminary studies on micro-finance sector and support the establishment of micro-finance banking system. Additionally, the EC was to also provide essential budget expenditure till the government revenue system was on track, finance programmes that enhanced security and justice, facilitate the government to develop sustainable and modern public administration that promoted gender equality.

(a) *Public Administration Reform*: The EC was to foster reform of the administration where it was feasible and politically supported, establish an effective civil service system based on merit, re-create the physical infrastructure needed to function as a government, evolve a governmental organization structure and operate procedures that are effective in meeting the needs of Afghanistan. The EC agreed to provide assistance by establishing a national payments system, strengthening the revenue position, facilitating trade and investment, building capacity of civil service, reformation of civil service wherever possible, enhancing security and justice and also providing support for the election process. Support in this direction was to address the role of women and the sustainable return of refugees and IDPs and future conflict prevention through helping create a strong, cohesive state (CSP 2003-06: 11-13).

(b) *Demining*: The EC was to clear Afghanistan of mines and UXOs by 2010. The EC was to continue its demining strategy by strengthening the government in mine clearance. The EC was also to continue to direct its support through the MAP framework (CSP 2003-06: 13).

Mine clearance covered three cross-cutting themes: facilitating refugee return and demobilization by clearing settlements and agricultural areas, increasing security around



the country and protecting women and children, the major victims of mine accidents (CSP 2003-06: 14).

In spite of the numerous targets set by the EC and reconstruction efforts that were extended to Afghanistan in first half of last decade, the achievements of the Bonn agreement remained fragile, uneven and were not yet sustainable. The London conference held in 2006 saw the launching of the Afghanistan Compact which presented the strategic goals for the nation in the next five years in the areas of security; governance, rule of law, human rights; economic and social development and counter-narcotics. The conference also launched the interim Afghan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS) which provided a detailed analysis of development activities required in the next five years.

### **2.3.3 Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan (2007-2013)**

The EC *Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013* assessed the progress made by the EC in past, in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and a response strategy was formulated. For the period between 2011 and 2013, the EU has pledged about €600 million, an amount of €200 million per annum. A significant part of this funding has been channeled through the national programmes of the Afghan government or through the multi-donor trust funds that contribute to the central budget of the government.

The strategy for 2007-13 concentrates on three focal areas: rural development, governance and health and three other non-focal areas: social protection, mine action and regional cooperation (CSP 2007-13: 19). Under rural development, the EC would channel significant levels of resources into sub-regional programmes in rural development in specific provinces. The EC would also continue to invest in specific national programmes aimed at shaping policy in sectors that are essential for the country's future development. Through these national and sub-national programmes, the EC aims to attain a wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers in the context of integrated rural development (CSP 2007-13: 19-21).

In the field of governance, EC intervention has two priorities; rule of law (the justice sector) and public administration reform. The EC would support the strengthening of the capacity, the efficacy and the integrity of the justice system as well as counter-narcotic efforts. The EC would also support the Afghan government's future efforts based on the policy document 'Justice for all'. Past EC contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA) has been crucial for supporting the law enforcement efforts, particularly in running of the Afghan National Police (CSP 2007-13: 22-23). The EU continues to be the single largest contributor to the LOFTA and the EU has provided some €272 million to the Trust fund to date (EC 2011: 7).

As far as public administration reforms was considered, the EC was to build on its past efforts and continue to assist the Afghan government in its objective 'of establishing a state structure based on democratic participation, ruled by accountable institutions, deemed legitimate by its citizens and respectful of the rule of law and human rights'. The EC strategy for good governance would follow a two-pronged approach under this CSP – one, interventions would support democratization and local governance through 'assistance to democratic processes, such as elections, empowerment of local communities with a focus on provincial and district levels of administration'. Two, the EC would assist the government of Afghanistan in its efforts 'to bring about sound financial management and accountability with the aim of reaching financial stability by the end of the CSP period'. The EC would also continue 'to support programmes so as to stimulate revenue collection, through assistance in customs field' and in domestic taxation and would enhance the accountability and transparency of public money flows through technical assistance and capacity building to relevant institutions (CSP 2007-13: 23-24).

The EU has contributed significantly to improving access to basic primary health care (from less than 10 per cent in 2002 to 65 per cent in 2010) and to the sharp reduction of the under five mortality rate (EC 2011: 5). To date, the EU has channeled over €150 million into the health sector programme and around €110-125 million is planned for the health sector for the period 2011-2013. The EC would support the government in its

endeavour to reach four of the Millennium Development Goals of which the reduction of child mortality and maternal health are the most critical. Health is a sector where the EC expertise has comparative advantage in Afghanistan. The EC would also focus on human resource development, especially in terms of recruitment, training and participation of women in the health sector (CSP 2007-13: 25).

The EC through this strategy paper, like the earlier one, would also seek to address some non-focal areas such as social protection, mine action and regional cooperation. Human rights, gender and environment are highlighted as key issues that affect a wide range of policy areas and these areas would be mainstreamed in all focal and non-focal areas where appropriate. The EC would also continue to focus on resources for building up sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities through its rural development programme.

#### **2.3.4 EU's Contribution in specific areas**

The next section will look at some key areas of EU involvement in Afghanistan.

##### **Counter-narcotics**

The EU has also played an active role in supporting counter-narcotics efforts from the outset of the reconstruction process for two reasons. Firstly, 90 per cent of the heroin in Western Europe originates in Afghanistan and secondly, the growth in corruption and crime associated with the burgeoning opium economy poses a grave threat to the success of the entire reconstruction and stabilisation process. The EU has ensured that counter-narcotics is central to all its programmes in Afghanistan. These activities include rural development programmes, lessening the dependence of rural economies on poppy cultivation; rule of law programmes, building up the interdiction capacity of the Afghan law enforcement agencies and finally preventing the flow of drugs and precursors in and out of the country through establishing better border management systems. The EC provided €15 million to the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) in 2005 (CSP 2007-13: 17).

## **Elections**

As far as elections go, the EU had allocated € 35 million for the preparation of the 2009/2010 electoral cycle. An Election Observation Mission was sent for the Presidential and Provincial Council elections in 2009. The European Union also deployed an election assessment team in Afghanistan for the Parliamentary elections in September 2010. While in 2009 ELECT<sup>16</sup> ensured a wide overview of the whole electoral process (procurement of election material, collaboration in Independent Election Commission temporary recruitments, delivering of training and communication), in 2010 it focused on core competencies i.e., assistance and support of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaint Commission (EC 2011: 9). The EU has helped plan, fund and monitor election in Afghanistan since 2005. The EU has consistently supported credible and transparent elections that express the will of the people. Long-term EU election observers for both the 2005 parliamentary elections and the 2009 presidential contest were in-country for several weeks prior to the election day, reporting on a range of issues, including access to media, voter registration and equal treatment of candidates. However, during the security limitations and the increase in violent incidents hampered the access of the EU Election Observation Mission observers' to the polling booths. Other weaknesses that jeopardized the election process included lack of independent judiciary, and Independent Election Commission, lack of clarity of some provisions of electoral law, lack of transparency and lack of regulation on the campaign financing (EU EOM 2009: 3-4).

### **European Union Special Representative (EUSR)**

The EU has had a long-term presence in Afghanistan. In 2001, the Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) and also set up a Delegation of the European Commission to Afghanistan in 2002. The then EUSR, Fransesc Vendrell and the Head of the EU delegation continued to be in close contact with key stakeholders in

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<sup>16</sup> A basket funding mechanism entitled Enhanced Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) managed by UNDP and supported by the international community.

the Afghan political process and with international partners. He advised the EU on its Afghanistan policy and on the implementation of its priorities for action. The EU Delegation in Kabul has an important role in intra-EU donor coordination through frequent meetings of Heads of Missions and monthly meetings of the Development Counsellors. As from 2011, there is a single EU Delegation that combined the offices of the Special Representative and the former EC Delegation giving the EU an authoritative representation and voice to promote a consolidated EU approach in interactions with the Government on political as well as development assistance issues.<sup>17</sup>

### **International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)**

As far as security is concerned, 25 EU member states (including non-NATO members) are deploying troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and their combined contribution amounts to 30,000 troops. Additionally, since 2002, the EU and a number of member states have been actively involved in the rule of law sector. Working with international partners, the EU plays a major role in reconstruction and stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. A number of member states participate in ISAF's Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The €700 million reconstruction programme (2007-2010) managed by the EC builds on similar 2002-06 programme and includes funding to support rural development, alternative livelihoods, food security, good governance and health.

More than 38 per cent of EC aid provided between 2002 and 2010 has been channeled through multi-donor trust funds that contribute substantially to Afghan government's core budget, including the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOFTA), the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF). Other major contributors to the multi-donor trust funds include EU member states such as the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as Canada, Japan and the US.

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<sup>17</sup> The current EUSR for Afghanistan is Vygaudas Usačkas (since February 2010).

**LOFTA:** The LOFTA was established in May 2002 by UNDP to enable police to resume operations throughout the country. The EC along with the US is the largest contributor to LOFTA, having contributed around €270.5 million. Support for uniformed prison personnel is expanding with special contributions from the European Commission and other donors. Since 2002, LOFTA has completed five project cycles. LOFTA complements the work of EUPOL Afghanistan. During the previous phases, LOFTA focused on six priorities: payment of police force salaries; institutional development; procurement and maintenance of non-lethal police equipment and supplies; rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of police facilities; gender orientation and payment of salaries of uniformed personnel employed by the Central Prisons department (EC 2011: 7).

With a contribution of €272.5 million, the EU is one of the largest contributors to this Trust Fund (together with the US and Japan). The EU is also an active participant in all policy discussions, for example through the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) and the LOFTA Steering Committee Meetings (EC 2011: 7).

**ARTF:** The EC has contributed more than € 200 million to the World-Bank administered ARTF since its establishment in May 2002. Contributions help finance recurrent government expenditures such as salaries and government operations and maintenance and provide a key source of predictable and pooled resources for the government's investment and development budget. The EC and the member states account for 65 per cent of ARTF contributions between 2002 and 2009. The ARTF investment window has become a key source of predictable and pooled resources for the government's investment and development budget. As of January 2011, close to €1 billion were committed to investment projects, of which €0.9 billion has been disbursed. The investment programmes that the EU has supported include the National Solidarity Programme, the National Rural Access Programme and the National Justice Programme (EC 2011: 6-7).

**CNTF:** The EC and the United Kingdom have been the principal supporters of the CNTF, created in June 2005, to coordinate donor assistance in the field of counter-

narcotics and provide support for alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, awareness-raising and law enforcement. As of January 2009, the fund's 17 donors committed €50 million (EC 2009: 9).

### **European Union Police (EUPOL)**

In June 2007, EUPOL Afghanistan was launched by the EU which is- a civilian European Security and Defence Policy operation and forms a part of the international effort to help Afghans take responsibility for maintaining law and order. It contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements that would ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership. The EUPOL mission is part of an overall EU commitment to Afghanistan, which includes a reconstruction effort managed through the EU's Delegation in Kabul and local political guidance provided by the EU Special Representative. The mission monitors, mentors, advises and trains Afghan Police officers.

EUPOL is the only multilateral actor able to provide highly qualified expertise on civilian policing and rule of law. EUPOL Afghanistan supports the development of sustainable and effective civil policing arrangements that ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership. The mission personnel include police, law enforcement and justice experts are deployed at central, regional and provincial levels. 'The mission trains Afghan police officers in basic criminal investigation techniques, such as crime scene investigation, forensics and interview techniques. It also provides training for Afghan police trainers and has taken the international lead in developing a police training curriculum' (EUinsight 2010). The Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office was established by the EUPOL which is staffed by specialized prosecutors who develop cases against high-profile public officials suspected of corruption. The Office also trains inspectors within the Ministry of Interior in basic anti-corruption investigative techniques. In 2010, EUPOL introduced the concept of 'community policing' to give the uniformed civilian police a model for building a trusting relationship with the community. This enables officers to prevent violence and crime by

being present in the community, advising the citizens, mediating disputes or consulting community leaders. The EUPOL mission budget is set at 54.6 million for the period between 31 May 2010 and 31 May 2010 (EUPOL Factsheet 2010).

### **European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO)**

The EC's humanitarian aid department, ECHO also supports Afghans affected by the ongoing crisis as well as natural disasters affecting the region. ECHO provides emergency assistance and relief abroad to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict and 'it has disbursed €300 million since 2001 to meet the basic needs of the Afghan population, from assistance to cover losses in food, livestock, and agricultural assets for those affected by a severe cold wave to support that facilitates the return and re-integration of Afghan refugees' (EUinsight 2010).

### **Rural Development Infrastructure**

In December 2010, the EU allocated €75 million to the sector of Rural Development giving shape to a new approach where investments would aim both at traditional rural development programmes as well as local governance, technical cooperation and research. Following the Kabul conference of 2010, national priority programmes with the agriculture and rural development would be addressed for the first time on the basis of a comprehensive approach, through the establishment of a coordinating cluster comprising the four main ministries (agriculture, irrigation and livestock; rural rehabilitation and development; energy and water; counter-narcotics) (EC 2011: 5).

### **Justice sector**

In December 2008, the EU contributed €20 million to the justice sector, including support to the National Justice Programme through the ARTF with the aim of strengthening the centralized state justice system and increase access to justice for the Afghan people; remuneration of uniformed prison personnel at the Central Prisons



Department; further support to the UNDP programme ‘Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan’ and technical assistance in continuing activities first financed under the Instrument for Stability in 2007 (EC 2011: 8).

### **Social Protection**

The EU supports the development and delivery of social services to the most vulnerable via an integrated approach promoting a private-public partnership between the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs Martyrs and Disabled as steward and NGOs as service providers. Services include counselling, medical care, protection, reintegration into school for children at risk, legal aid and mediation for women in conflict with traditions and support to community-based activities. In 2008, the EU adopted a comprehensive €24 million social protection programme to strengthen national and institutional service mechanisms for people affected by social, cultural and economic marginalisation. Since 2001, the European Union has committed more than €120 million in projects and programmes in the area of social protection (EC 2011: 9).

### **European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)**

The EIDHR country-based support scheme for Afghanistan for the years 2007-2010 focuses on strengthening the role of Afghan civil society and NGOs in promoting human rights and democratic reform, supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and consolidating political participation and representation. Since 2005, €3.54 million have been allocated to projects for the implementation of activities aiming at fostering transitional justice processes, including truth-seeking, empowering Afghan women to participate in political life through radio programming, public discussions and debates, and supporting freedom of expression in the country by promoting the role of the Afghan media (EC 2011: 10).

## **Food security**

From 2001 to 2008, over €92 million were disbursed to improve the food security situation of the most vulnerable. In 2009, €24 million were committed and contracted from the 'Food Facility' with €13 million for a project with FAO to expand certified seed production and €11 million as direct support to farmers through NGOs. During 2010, grants with a total value of €7.5 million were awarded to link relief food security programmes to rehabilitation and development. As part of promoting an innovative approach to food security, the EU is also supporting the nutrition component of the health sector with grants of some €2 million. In 2011, the EU would also continue support food security programmes by linking relief to rehabilitation and development with a total budget of €66 million (EC 2011: 10).

## **Regional cooperation**

Other than the national policies set for Afghanistan under the country strategy papers, on the issues of drugs and refugees, regional cooperation holds a key position. In this regard, the EC was to promote links between the regional governments' drug enforcement agencies and cooperate with international enforcement bodies. The EC was also to continue to extend help to the Iranian and Pakistani governments to deal with the issue of refugees by supporting health, education and as well as prepare the return of refugees (CSP 2003-06: 14). Regional cooperation as a separate thematic area continued to be a part of CSP 2007-13, under which migration and asylum issues were dominant focal areas. Due to Pakistan's importance to the overall peace and stability of Afghanistan as well as the region at large, the EC came out with a *Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan (2007-13)*. The key focal areas under this paper were poverty reduction, rural development and natural resources management in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, education and human resources development. Other areas of assistance include trade development, democratization and human rights and money laundering. The country was to receive € 398 million during the CSP period. The impact

of this assistance was to be maximized through cross-cutting areas such as environment, conflict prevention, gender, HIV/AIDS, human rights and governance.<sup>18</sup>

As illustrated in this chapter, the European Union has played a significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The EC has been a key donor and stakeholder in the development of the conflict-ridden country. While this chapter analyzed the EU and the EC's 'vision' in terms of aid contribution or other reconstruction efforts for Afghanistan, the following chapter will seek to investigate if the objectives that the EU has sought to be fulfilled have been reflected on and transplanted to the ground. Using this chapter as the basis, the third chapter will aim to scrutinize whether the EU is capable of living up to its 'normative' identity or whether its vision is a mere rhetoric.

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<sup>18</sup> European Union, Commission, *Country Strategy Paper for Pakistan for 2007-2013*: 4-5.

## **Chapter 3 – Rhetoric-Capabilities Gap in European Union’s Role in Afghanistan**

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks into the normative aspect of EU’s role in Afghanistan. The reconstruction efforts that were dealt with in the last chapter will be tested for their normativeness or the lack of it. Here, Ian Manners’ normative principles will be revisited and the Country Strategy Papers of the European Commission for Afghanistan will be placed under the scanner. Having done that, the chapter will move to examine in the second section whether the normativeness that exists on paper has been translated into reality. Analysis will be borrowed from various authors who in the last decade have extensively studied the role of EU in Afghanistan and an issue by issue investigation will be undertaken.

### **3.1 EU’s Normative Basis**

One of the key documents that guide the EU’s role in Afghanistan is the *Country Strategy Paper for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*. This section attempts to examine whether the EU norms described by Manners and ‘concerns’ as suggested by Barry Buzan can be observed in the *Country Strategy Papers for Afghanistan (2003-06 and 2007-13)*.

Expanding on his ‘Normative Power Europe’ theory, Manners argues that it is possible to identify five ‘core’ norms within the vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*. They are peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Other than these norms, he suggests four other ‘minor’ norms within the constitution and the practices of the EU; the notion of social progress, combating discrimination and protection of minorities, sustainable development and the principle of good governance. He argues that the reinforcement and expansion of distinctive norms allows the EU to present and legitimate itself as being more than a sum of its parts. However, there are important reservations that Manners expresses regarding the representation of the EU’s

norms as being all good. Several of these norms are explicitly contested within the EU as well as without. It is in the areas of minor norms that the greatest contestation of their universality is found.

The common interests of EU's member states, according to Manners is centered around the promotion of values such as 'peace and security', 'democracy', 'human rights', 'development aid' and 'environmental protection'. He draws on Barry Buzan's suggestion of examining these five sectors for a more complete analysis by categorizing EU's normative values into areas such as military concerns (peace and security), political concerns (democracy), social concerns (human rights), economic concerns (development aid) and environmental concerns (environmental protection) (Manners 2001: 14).

In the first *Country Strategy Paper (2003-2006)*, among other goals, the European Commission had set up three pillars as part of the National Development Framework of Afghanistan that would be funded by the EC. The first pillar was human capital and social protection that included return of refugees and internally displaced persons, providing educational and vocational training, improving health access for as many as possible, providing funds for livelihood and social protection and also supporting civil society, sports and media. The second pillar that the EC funded was physical infrastructure which included strategy and institutional capacity development in the transport sector, providing support to potable and irrigation water infrastructure and funding telecommunications, energy, mining and urban management. The last pillar was trade and investment and public administration and security. The EC was to support trade and the establishment of micro-finance banking system, support reform in public administration, finance programmes in security and justice and support the government in security and ensure rule of law. Other than the above stated three pillars, the EC also addressed cross-cutting issues like gender, poppy cultivation, food security. In the implementation of this CSP, the European Commission had set certain priorities in order to achieve its goals. The EC was to concentrate on limited number of sectors so as to not dissipate EU response strategy across too many sectors, coordinate closely with the other donors and give sectoral interventions geographical concentration.

However, there were major problems faced by the EU in the reconstruction efforts which exposed its drawbacks. It seems that the EC got involved itself into many areas than it could handle thus failing to bring about sustainable results. Added to this the EC failed to coordinate not only externally with other donors but also internally, within the members. Weak government institutions and security issues led to difficult operational environment in Afghanistan thus raising concerns about absorption capacity. The EC formulated a response to work on its drawbacks and also carry forward its reconstruction efforts through the second *Country Strategy Paper (2007-13)*. The EC was to have a greater social focus, increase geographic concentration to assistance programmes, and continue support to Afghan government capacity and provide support for the legal and counter-narcotics strategy.

Under this CSP, the attention of the EC shifted to rural development, governance and health with social protection, mine action and regional cooperation becoming non-focal areas. The EC would continue to invest in specific national programmes aimed at shaping policy sectors that are key to the country's future development. It also aims to attain a wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers in the context of integrated rural development through national and sub-national programmes. It would continue to focus on resources on building sustainable alternative livelihood programme to prevent poppy cultivation. To fill in the dearth of good governance, the EC proposed to intervene in two priorities: rule of law and public administration reforms. The reconstruction of the justice system becomes a priority for the success of other projections supported by the EC such as establishing the Afghan National Police, the fight against illegal drugs and supporting economic development. Secondly, the EC would build on past efforts and continue its assistance to the government of Afghanistan to establish a state structure based on democratic participation and rule by accountable institutions. The EC was to follow a two pronged objective of supporting democratization and local governance through assistance to democratic processes. It would also assist the Government of Afghanistan to bring about sound financial management and accountability with the aim of reaching financial stability by the end of the CSP period. Finally, in the health sector

the EC has a comparative advantage in Afghanistan. The EU has contributed significantly to improving access to basic primary health care (from 9% to 80% by 2008) and to the sharp reduction of the under 5 mortality rate (a 25% reduction over 2002-2008). To date, it has channeled € 280 million into the health sector program. It would continue to support the government in its endeavour to reach four of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of which maternal health and reduction of child mortality are the most critical.

As far as the non-focal areas are concerned the EC would extend support to vulnerable sections of society, assist the government in acquiring the institutional capacity to mainstream the needs of vulnerable sections. EC would continue to support the demining programme to enable complete clearance of mines in the next decade. The EC would also support closer cooperation on issues of transit trade, regional economic infrastructure, migration, environment and natural resource management. Cross cutting issues that would be focused upon include gender, human rights, environment and mainstreaming of counter-narcotics.

The EU's focal and non-focal areas in Afghanistan as enumerated in these Country Strategy Papers can be categorized within the broad 'concerns' given by Buzan and the 'norms' described by Manners. Table 3 shows the categorization of these areas into their respective 'concerns'. (The areas that are in **bold** are the key focal areas of the EU during the respective CSP period.)

**Table 3: EU's 'normativeness' in CSP for Afghanistan (2003-06) and CSP (2007-13)**

	<i>Military Concerns (Peace and stability)</i>	<i>Political Concerns (Democracy)</i>	<i>Social Concerns (Human rights)</i>	<i>Economic concerns (Development aid)</i>	<i>Environmental Concerns (Environmental protection)</i>
CSP (2003-06)	Demining Regional Cooperation <b>Security</b>	Civil society Promotion of democracy <b>Public administration reforms</b> Governance Rule of law	Refugees/IDPs Drug production control Health <b>Social protection</b> Human rights and women's rights <b>Human capital</b> Social development Counter – narcotics	Capacity building Rural government Economic infrastructure and development <b>Physical infrastructure</b> <b>Trade and investment</b> Counter-narcotics	Food security Counter-narcotics
CSP(2007-13)	Mine action Regional Cooperation	<b>Governance</b> Rule of law Public administration reforms Democracy	<b>Health</b> Social protection Gender Human rights Counter – narcotics Migration and asylum Human capital	<b>Regional cooperation</b> Rural development Counter-narcotics	Rural development esp. addressing environmental issues Food security Environment Counter-narcotics

Source: Compiled by the author



As evident in the previous section, the EU has played a key role in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Through European Police (EUPOL), Election Observation Missions and Security Sector Reforms the EU has primarily used civilian instruments to promote its norms. Individual member states of the EU have also contributed militarily for nation-building under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). But did EU's rhetoric translate into tangible action? If the policies on paper have been realized on the ground, have these activities been sustainable?

### **3.2 Rhetoric – Capabilities Gap?**

Despite the massive international assistance over the past eight years, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. The number of attacks on international military forces is rising. The Kabul government lacks credibility, particularly following the elections in 2009 and 2010, which were marred by widespread fraud. Countries helping Afghanistan to rebuild disagree on how to tackle the political challenges, including corruption within the government administration. There is a lack of progress in developing rule of law and a culture of impunity. The tackling of the burgeoning narcotics industry has also been not possible. According to UN reports, 2010 was the bloodiest year for Afghanistan in the last decade. 2,700 was the total number of civilian casualties in 2010 which was a 15 per cent increase from 2009.<sup>19</sup>

One recurring dilemma for the EU's foreign policy and now its crisis management ambitions as stated by Gross (2008: 40) is the 'capabilities-expectations gap'. While the EU is taking on an increasing number of missions and developing a growing profile as a security actor, the resource crunch is now evident in Afghanistan. Since there is an increasing demand for the EU's crisis management portfolio, it outstrips what the EU is able to supply at its point. Limited commitment of member states and the current institutional framework place restrictions on what the EU can deliver and how coherently it can do so.

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted in "Afghanistan: 2010 bloodiest year for a decade, UN says", BBC News South Asia, 9 March 2011. [Online: web] Accessed on 18 July 2011. URL: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12685213](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12685213)

The EU decision to adopt a 'light footprint approach' towards Afghanistan in post-conflict reconstruction has come to haunt the international community in the form of resurgent violence, overall lack of economic and political progress and fragmentation of individual efforts which has also risked the overall success of international intervention. The challenge that the EU faces is that of improving the internal and external coordination of the Security Sector Reform policies. In addition, political visibility, impact and coherence face hurdles due to the lack of a clear *de facto* international lead under which the European efforts can be subsumed. Although the task of building formal state institutions has been accomplished, imbuing these institutions and their political leaders with legitimacy remains one of the central challenges facing reconstruction (Gross 2009: 13-14).

In spite of the EU spending billions of Euros, most Afghans do not have the benefits in terms of security, access to justice and delivery of basic services. This has been aggravated by the European and American disagreements. According to Korski, a swift and successful end to conflict is unlikely and international presence in the country will continue for years to come. The fighting will continue though at a reduced level (Korski 2008: 1).

A number of European governments argue that if international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan fail, the country will be used as a base for fresh terrorist attacks against the West. An internally violent Afghanistan could destabilize the whole region, drawing Pakistan and other neighbours into the conflict. Other than the US, Afghanistan is one of the top foreign policy priority for several European countries, most notably the UK. Though not all EU member states share the same sense of urgency, most have contributed personnel or money to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It has generated the apprehension that due to terrorism, the failure in Afghanistan would severely damage the credibility of the West (Buckley 2010: 1-2).

Buckley further contends that the EU faces a twofold challenge of sorting out its 'confusing footprint' in Afghanistan and coming up with a coherent set of policy

priorities. ‘These must fit into the global strategy for the country but they must also be rooted in the EU’s particular strengths. The EU must not replicate what NATO or other national delegations do well already; it is important that the EU office in Afghanistan does not become ‘yet another European embassy’ (Buckley 2010: 5).

Criticism of the Afghan government’s multiple failings is on the rise. The corruption within the system, the failure to deliver services and the participation of former warlords in government has been heavily criticized by the Afghans. ‘More and more foreign governments and institutions are coming around to the view that Afghanistan will need some tough love’. Though the Western leaders pressurized Karzai to tackle corruption within the system at his inauguration in 2009, bringing about a change in Afghanistan’s governance is a ‘long-term project’. American and UK officials with experience in Afghanistan have acknowledged that foreign troops and civilian workers will need to remain in the country for many more years<sup>20</sup>. According to Buckley, the EU should pressurize foreign governments and institutions involved in rebuilding Afghanistan to focus on establishing democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are doomed to failure if the Kabul government does not commit to these principles (Buckley 2010: 5-6).

### **3.2.1 Failing Political Institutions**

In 2010, Afghanistan was haunted by four issues which not only shaped politics but also the common man’s concerns. They included, the problem of insecurity due to violent attacks from the Taliban movement, the ‘Haqqani network’ and the Hezb-e Islami all of whom benefit from the sanctuaries in Pakistan; the doubt about the legitimacy of the Afghan government (caused by the scale of the electoral fraud that brought back President Karzai to power); addressing the issue of whether the Afghan government and its international supporters should hold talks with the armed opposition

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<sup>20</sup> ‘UK “may have 40-year Afghan role”’, BBC News Online, August 8<sup>th</sup> 2009, and ‘Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan edition’, Foreign Policy interview with General David H. Petraeus, January/February 2009. Quoted in Buckley, Joanna (2010), *Can the EU Be More Effective in Afghanistan?*, Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, UK.

and, if so, in what way and to what ends and lastly the commitment made by President Obama in December, 2009 that America would start withdrawing troops within the next 18 months (Maley 2011: 1).

Although the task of building formal state institutions has been accomplished, imbuing the institutions and their political leaders with legitimacy remains one of the central challenges that reconstruction faces (Gross 2009: 17). The legitimacy enjoyed by the Karzai government is very limited and it has been contested (Doronsoro 2010: 1). The issue of legitimacy was also compounded by massive fraud that characterized the 2009 and 2010 presidential elections. As the situation stands today, the government appears incapable of rebuilding a state that can assume responsibility for its own security in the foreseeable future. President Karzai lacks the means to carry through with reforms and is increasingly dependent on 'clientelist and criminal networks'. Dorronsoro (2010: 2) regards the 2004 Afghan presidential elections as a benchmark since when the breakdown of institutions has been the dominant trend. Not only have they weakened rapidly but the state's presence in the provinces has also declined sharply.

Afghanistan also faces ongoing problems such as nepotism and corruption. Studies showed that corruption had reached alarming levels. Nepotism was a cause of problem for the international actors too in Afghanistan. This resulted in the weak status of the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies (Maley 2011: 92). Countries assisting Afghanistan in its reconstruction disagree on how to tackle the existing political problems such as corruption within the government administration and there is a lack of progress in developing the rule of law, a culture of impunity exists and there is no control over the burgeoning narcotics industry (Buckley 2010: 2). The Afghans have also been increasingly critical of the government's multiple failings.

### **3.2.2 Deteriorating Security Situation**

The security situation in Afghanistan in 2010 was not very encouraging. The end of the year saw heavy losses in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan

National Police (ANP). Civilian casualties within the Afghan population averaged between six and seven per day. Achieving the 'Afghanization' of security has become unrealistic and the Afghan government is weakened by certain aspects of the US strategy (Dorrnsoro 2010: 2). The latter seeks rapid results which is the privatization of security and the circumvention of Afghan institutions. Dorrnsoro (2010: 2) opines that it would be cheaper to negotiate a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership to form a national unity government. The insurgency in Afghanistan has been growing stronger and simultaneously, the support for the government and the coalition is on the decline where ever the insurgents have a strong hold. Additionally, the Taliban enjoy external support and sanctuaries. For reconciliation to bear fruit, the condition on the ground has to change.<sup>21</sup>

The withdrawal of the Dutch contingent from the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) at end of July, 2010 leaving only 190 troops highlighted a significant challenge to building security in Afghanistan and the vulnerability of multinational operations due to domestic political pressures. Though the Dutch withdrawal did not tip off a dominoes effect among other European states, the loss of Karzai government's legitimacy in the eyes of international powers became apparent towards the later half of the year (Maley 2011: 89).

Neither was the security situation outside Kabul bright. Violence spread beyond established conflict zones such as the southern and the eastern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Ghazni to areas in the north and west that had for long been relatively secure. Taliban strikes continued to be brutal and banditry was a threat. Though the ANA's numerical strength increased, it was in no position to handle security situation on its own (Maley 2011: 90-91).

Despite the massive international assistance over the past years, the security situation is deteriorating. There has been a rise in the number of attacks on international

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<sup>21</sup> Khalilzad, Zalmay (2010) "The Taliban and Reconciliation", *The New York Times*, 18 February 2010. [Online: web] Accessed on 16 July 2011, URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19iht-edkhalilzad.html>

military forces, Afghan governmental officials, aid workers and Afghan civilians as well as the number of provinces in which the attacks occur (Buckley 2010: 2). The instable security situation has led to the incurring of huge costs which has come under the scanner of the European Parliament (van Genderen 2010: 34).

### **3.2.3 Financial Limitations**

Gross (2008: 27) points out two issues that loom large in the field of EU's crisis-management operations. One, there are difficulties in aligning procurement cycles with mission implementation; missions commence frequently before the necessary equipment arrive. Two, the 'costs lie where they fall' principle followed by the member states leads to privileging the larger and wealthier member states and makes it difficult for smaller states to assume leadership. This leads to uneven burden sharing amongst the contributing member states. Smaller member states find it difficult to act as lead nations or to finance missions based on their military and defence resources. This also highlights the issue of simultaneously achieving leadership and legitimacy in ESDP (Giegerich and Gross 2006).

Though the EU can mobilize important financial means, it does not always possess adequate staff and structures to ensure sufficient implementation on the ground. The member states set their priorities, logic and limits on upper and lower limits for the contribution of military, civilian and financial means. It is also contended that the actual contributions differ widely between countries but all are based on the same premise of doing 'just enough' to maintain solidarity with the United States (Coelmont 2009: 17).

Due to scattered funding, the amount committed to be spent on reconstruction is difficult to determine and as a consequence, the Afghan government cannot keep a track of the aid flows. International assistance to Afghanistan has lagged behind when compared to most other reconstruction efforts. The European Commission had pledged €1 billion in reconstruction aid over five years (2002-06) but provided over € 657 million to Afghanistan in reconstruction aid. The financial assistance provided by the US

dwarfed the European contributions in most areas. According to RAND<sup>22</sup>, the US spent 'seven times the resources to counter-narcotics activities provided by the United Kingdom, nearly 50 times the resources to the police provided by Germany and virtually everything for training the Afghan military.' Compounding the existing disparity is the inadequate prioritization on the part of EU which often spends money on projects that are not central to Afghanistan's reconstruction, thereby further limiting the impact of its input. Korski's contention is that a major downfall of the EU's programme proliferation and its decreasing financial contribution is the difficulty it faces in impacting or influencing the US-led reconstruction agenda (Korski 2008: 10-12). Though the EU has multiple offices and assistance programmes, the EU's contribution adds up to less than sum of its parts. This is a result of a vague strategy for Afghanistan and a confusing institutional framework (Buckley 2010: 3). Genderen (2010: 28) states that the EU's aid to Afghanistan remains fragmented and its impact poorly assessed.

Between 2002 and March 2009, NATO countries disbursed \$28 billion to official development assistance out of which USA's contribution peaked at 82 per cent.<sup>23</sup> The rest of the NATO members disbursed approximately 14 per cent of the total. Though the EU is the largest contributor to the LOFTA, it is still behind the US in donations to the ARTF. These numbers demonstrate the substantial and disproportionate burden that America bears. The EU member states, according to Siegel have been far more generous to Bosnia and Kosovo than to Afghanistan. The US donates \$87 per person in Afghanistan on a per capita basis while UK donates \$44 per person (Siegel 2009: 466-467).

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Afghanistan from the international community is shown in Table 4 and Figure 3. The pledged contribution (between 2002 and 2013) of US peaked at \$38,000 million while the EU and the EC

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<sup>22</sup> Research and Development Corporation: Santa Monica CA, 2005, xxii. Quoted in Korski, Daniel (2008), *Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War*, European Council on Foreign Relations, London.

<sup>23</sup> Donor Financial Review, 2009, Ministry of Finance. Quoted in Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010), *Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010*.

collectively stood at the fifth place with inadequate \$2037 million assistance. As far as the disbursed amount goes, the US contributed close to fifteen times more than the European members collectively. This disparity in the contribution towards Afghanistan's reconstruction has also been a cause of severe criticism of the EU's engagement. It has to be noted that UK's pledged contribution exceeds that of the EU and EC combined. Among other nations Japan, Canada and India dominate the list of top ten donors of ODA to Afghanistan.




**Table 4: Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan (in US \$ million)**

Rank	Donors	2002-13 Pledge	2002-09 Committed	2002-09 Disbursed
1	USA	38000	28366	23417
2	UK	2897	1810	1546
3	World Bank	2800	1883	1364
4	ADB	2200	1552	618
5	EU/EC	2037	1973	1576
6	Japan	1900	1378	990
7	Canada	1679	1206	898
8	India	1200	1236	662
9	Germany	1188	1044	584
10	Norway	983	598	324

Source: Donor Financial Review, 2009, Ministry of Finance. Cited in Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2010), *Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 2: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010*. p.25

**Figure 3: Official Development Assistance to Afghanistan (in US \$ million)**



### 3.2.4 Problems in Coalition

The emphasis on 'effective multilateralism' and the EU's commitment to a multilateral, rule-based order make coordination and cooperation with other international actors, mainly the UN and NATO a key feature of coordination efforts. The increasing number of civilian crisis missions in particular, which rely on Commission cooperation and financing and often take place in support of or in cooperation with other international actors, including NATO and the UN, bear witness to the importance of a culture of coordination that is built out of 'cooperation and shared political objectives' in which 'working together is an essential element... of EU crisis management' (Gross 2008: 3).

However, the coalition strategy in Afghanistan has reached an impasse and though a few tactical successes might be possible, the coalition cannot defeat the Taliban or rally local commanders to its side. The coalition faces the risk of an endless engagement accompanied by 'an intolerable loss of life and treasure' (Dorrnsoro 2010: v). The London conference of January, 2010 illustrated the growing gap between the coalition's public discourse and realities on the ground (Dorrnsoro 2010: 1).

There are others like Coelmont (2009: 17) who argue that the EU and the member states do show solidarity but there are exceptions. For example, the UK remains absent from the strategic debate which impedes the development of a strategic vision on the deployment of its own assets. The member states set their priorities, logic and limits on upper and lower limits for the contribution of military, civilian and financial means. He contends that the actual contributions differ widely between countries but are all based on the same premise of doing 'just enough' to maintain solidarity with the US. What the EU lacks is a comprehensive approach and in such a context, such an approach becomes all the more impossible.

The political visibility, impact and coherence face hurdles due to the lack of a clear *de facto* international lead under which the international European efforts can be subsumed (Gross 2009: 14). According to Gross, the EU's coordination has been

hampered by different operational priorities and personalities especially in the case of the UN as well as inter-institutional competition in the case of NATO. Achieving effective multilateralism has been difficult with respect to NATO and has proved to be detrimental in the implementation of a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan especially with regard to deployment of civilian and military instruments. The key problem that she identifies that hampers effective coordination between the EU and the NATO is the reconciling of preferences of non-EU NATO members, especially Turkey. In the case of Afghanistan, issues are discussed bilaterally rather than on an EU-NATO institutional level and this has led to negative consequences for coordination at the ground level (Gross 2008: 4). The sensitive political atmosphere with respect to transatlantic and EU-NATO relations, coupled with procurement shortfalls and a challenging local context are negatively impacting on EUPOL Afghanistan's mission effectiveness. The lack of external coordination in the form of intelligence sharing or issuing a security guarantee to the ESDP operation have forced the EU to conclude technical agreements with the lead nations of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in order for the EUPOL to be operational outside Kabul and inside PRTs. In the sector of police reforms as well as justice reforms, there was an overlap of efforts undertaken by the international actors (Gross 2008: 32; 2009: 40).

According to Korski (2008: 1) the Americans tend to treat a political problem as a military one while the Europeans have lagged behind the US in terms of financial and military commitments and have failed to coordinate their own activities. There is a resource gap between the US and the EU in military, political and economic terms which in turn makes it difficult for the EU to assert its political weight. Consequentially, the ESDP mission in Afghanistan operates in a 'crowded, albeit fragmented' international environment where the conflict is escalating and the security situation deteriorating. The EU faces the challenge of improving the internal and external coordination of the SSR policies. The Security Sector Reform policies in Afghanistan have also faced the brunt of divergent views across the Atlantic over the nature of international intervention. While

the EU works on the basis of a civilian rule-of-law approach, the US has tended to adopt a military approach to police training (Gross 2009: 14).

While the EU considered the eradication of poppy cultivation a prerequisite to bring about stability, the Americans found the counter-narcotics efforts misguided in the fight against terrorism. There is also a problem of the international donors disbursing money to the NGOs without a proper coordinated strategy because of which 50 per cent of the aid money is misused and often fails to achieve the desired results. The general perception among the international community is that the ethnic groups within Afghanistan are deeply divided. However, this is not the reality and the international community should aid in fighting terrorism both within and outside Afghanistan and not abet divisions between groups.<sup>24</sup>

### **3.2.5 Lack of a Comprehensive Approach**

The question of capabilities, staffing and procurement pose significant challenges to the EU's execution of its missions. Identifying and working on the main barriers to effective action would provide the necessary input to increase significantly the EU's delivery of a 'comprehensive approach' and its realization of the desired 'culture of cooperation' Gross (2008: 42).

Coelmont refers to the intervention into Afghanistan as a 'politico-military intervention' where the 'real strategic motivations' were not clearly formulated. As a result, what one confronts today is a complex political situation and equally complex decision-making (Coelmont 2009: 7). The 'differing conceptions not only of the role of ESDP, but also what constitutes a 'comprehensive approach' among member states, have further impeded progress on improving civil-military coordination' (Gross 2008: 4). Multilateralism has proven to be difficult in the case of NATO though both the

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<sup>24</sup> Opinions of a member of the Afghan parliament, Golalei Safi Nur. Quoted in "L'UE est incitée a concevoir une strategies pour l'Afghanitsan", 01 February 2011. [Online: web] Accessed on 13 July 2011. URL: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/node/501777>

organizations operate jointly in a number of theatres that include Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia. This has in turn proved to be detrimental in the implementation of a comprehensive approach when it comes to the deployment of military and civilian instruments in Afghanistan. Instead, Gross contends that operations such as Afghanistan continue to be discussed bilaterally rather than on an EU-NATO institutional level and this has led to negative consequences for the coordination of instruments (Gross 2008: 13).

The lack of coordination and unwillingness among the EU member states to increase their economic and military contributions has led to a dearth of overall strategy. Germany, France and other EU countries have different policies regarding their involvement in aiding Kabul.<sup>25</sup> Though the EU's efforts look impressive on paper, the reality on ground leaves much to be desired. EU countries have treated the common effort in Afghanistan like what Korski calls a 'potluck dinner' where every guest is free to bring their own dish and in doing so the stability of Afghanistan remains impossible (Korski 2008: 8).

The Europeans have failed to define or implement a united strategy for Afghanistan. Reconciliation between divergent national approaches to counter-insurgency and policing is yet to be debated upon and neither has any attempt been made to forge an overarching political approach. The EU efforts in Afghanistan, according to Korski seem disorganized as the chains of command are unclear and coordination is generally weak. Institutional overlap and confusion has caused resources to dissipate in the course of a mission. The EU member states have also failed to act as a coherent donor group. They have instead adopted divergent and often incompatible approaches. There has been no EU agreement and no EU-US consensus on how to develop a political strategy. In areas that are vital such as policing, rule of law and counter-narcotics, EU member states as well as the EU commission and the Council Secretariat have been

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<sup>25</sup> According to the Brussels-based European Foundation for Democracy. Quoted in "L'UE est incitée a concevoir une strategies pour l'Afghanitsan", 01 February 2011. [Online: web] Accessed on 13 July 2011. URL: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/node/501777>

ignoring and at times undermining each other's strategies despite the obvious need for a unified approach. Korski holds the view that stability in Afghanistan cannot be achieved unless the EU unifies its programmes and 'speaks with one voice' (Korski 2008: 8-9, 30).

The Asia Report (2005: i) observed that while the Europe is widely trusted by Afghans, few appreciate the full scale of EU's commitments. The Report argues that though it is partly due to the UN's coordinating role and sheer scale of US military and development involvement, it is also due to the complexity of EU foreign policy structures and lack of coherence among EU institutions and its member states. More often than not, collective political and military action is replaced by development funds.

The EU has not been to capitalize fully on its strengths as a multilateral organization and the member states lack a clear vision of the role they want the European institutions to play. Added to this, the EU has not been able to determine where its strengths lie. The EU has also done a poor job in articulating its view on the right strategy for Afghanistan and its role in it. Though the EU is committed to implementing its agenda as set in the EU-Afghanistan Joint Political Declaration and the Afghanistan Compact, these only provide general guidance that broadly outline the ambitious goals (Buckley 2010: 3).

In vital areas of policing, the rule of law and counter-narcotics, EU member states as well as the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat have been ignoring and sometimes undermining each other's strategies despite the obvious need for a unified approach. The cultivation and production of opium, in Helmand province that is overseen by British troops, have further added to the mistrust in the British capabilities (Korski 2008: 14).

'Meanwhile, in their attempts to rein in the ballooning opium trade, the British have either ignored or deliberately circumvented the police and justice system reforms put in place by the Germans and Italians. This resistance to cooperation has extended to the creation of separate counter-narcotics institutions such as the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police and the Special Court...The UK's weak performance in this area is due to a combination of factors, including a

disproportionate focus on poppy eradication, a flawed attempt at separating counter-narcotics institutions from the overall state-building effort, limited progress in targeting kingpins and their backers in government, and an inability to provide economic alternatives to farmers' (Korski 2008: 14)

### **3.2.6 Organizational Loopholes**

EU's impact in Afghanistan does not match its financial, civilian and military assistance to the country. As a result of being poorly organized it is unable to capitalize fully on its strengths as a multilateral organization. The member states too lack a clear vision of the role they want the European institutions to play. The EU has faltered in determining where its strengths lie and what issues it should focus on in Afghanistan and as a result, the EU is not wielding influence in Afghanistan commensurate with its significant contribution of personnel and finances (Coelmont 2009: 7).

The commitment of the member states to EU crisis management has not translated into adequate capabilities, levels of staffing, or the appropriate financing of missions which has led to detrimental effects on the running of individual missions (Gross 2008:4). The EU's institutional structure has proved to be a bane. With the numerous institutions and governments involved there is no one authority taking the lead on drafting concrete strategies and consolidating them into one 'EU Plan'. The EU also sets a poor example to others because of the lack of coordination between the EU's institutions and its member states. This is due to the profusion of representations. As a result, the EU's various agencies and governments often work at cross-purposes (Buckley 2010: 5).

The EU Special Representative (EUSR) has a mandate for overall EU political coordination but its official influence is limited. Like in most EU missions around the world, national representations of the member states in Afghanistan often cooperate poorly with one another and the EU delegations. But there is an additional challenge posed in the case of Afghanistan; most EU member states also contribute troops to the ISAF. As a result, military mission commands most of the governments' attention and drives their national priorities while the EU is fighting a losing battle for the attention of the European capitals. There has also been little guidance from Brussels to the EUSR and

neither is the latter kept in the loop. Till a while ago, there was only one desk officer handling both Afghanistan and Pakistan though now it has been increased to two. Additionally, the little direction that the EUSR received from Brussels is clouded by the varying domestic political agendas of the EU member states (Buckley 2010: 5).

The divisions in offices are replicated at international meetings on Afghanistan. At the International Conference in support of Afghanistan in Paris in June 2008, officials from the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, European Parliament, European presidency and individual EU member-states all gave speeches. After the appointment of the US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, several EU member states announced their own special representatives, including the British, French and German governments and these 'European' special envoys held coordination meetings among themselves for a period of time (Buckley 2010: 5).

However, the various EU institutions and member states do make an effort to work together. At the ministerial level, policy discussions take place annually between Afghanistan and representatives of the European Council, Commission and the presidency. In Kabul, EU delegations and EU member states discuss policy at several fora, including the monthly EU heads of mission meeting and the EU Human Rights Group. The EUSR, the Commission delegation and EU Presidency also occasionally meet with Afghan officials to convey agreed messages or demarches on certain issues. But these mechanisms are ad hoc, the EU comes together on some issues but institutions and member states contradict each other on others. As a result, the EU is failing to provide sufficient guidance or leadership on policy matters.

Till February 2010 there was an issue of the 'spokesperson' for Kabul which was divided among two offices (Buckley 2010: 5). There was both a resident EUSR and a head of the Commission delegation which made it unclear as to who spoke for the EU in Kabul. Though the EUSR was viewed as the political representative of the EU, his office had no funding at its disposal to support policy decisions as all EU funding was channeled through the EC. According to Gross (2008: 30), the scenario of the EUSR



assuming the role of an EU focal point in theatre has not always proved to be realistic in practice. Though in principle the EUSR had to coordinate operational activities with the EU Presidency, the Commission, ESDP operations and the mission of the member states, in practice, there is limited administrative support and as a result the EUSR is not part of the command of ESDP operations. This has further resulted in the EU not being able to speak with one voice when it comes to implementing crisis management activities.

Though the new Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in December 2009 resolved some of these problems, there is a lack of clarity on how to merge some of the responsibilities of the staff of the Commission delegation and the EUSR's office. This has led to some of the bureaucratic firewalls risk persisting and this has added to the confusion among the Afghan government interlocutors who are not familiar with the EU's intricate institutional structure.

### **3.2.7 Civilian Crisis Management**

As far as the civilian dimension of crisis management goes, the EU is facing a double challenge, most notably in the fields of police and justice. While on one hand the civilian aspect of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a relatively new instrument with limited means, on the other hand, since 2003, the EU has launched over a dozen civilian operations across Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the rest. The availability of means for Afghanistan was assessed only as a secondary step which led to problems in the operation of EUPOL Afghanistan. The strength of the EUPOL was initially envisaged at 400 but only 200 were deployed thus demonstrating the many obstacles met by civilian operations (Coelmont 2009: 16). Gross (2009: 30) contends that the delay in provision of both IT equipment and armoured vehicles prevented the EUPOL staff from venturing outside Kabul and delayed the mission's implementation. The lack of internal coordination can affect equipping missions, cooperation with other EU actors in the field and connecting the operational and political roles of EU crisis management actors. Though the EC and the Council participate and closely co-operate in fact finding missions that precedes the launch of an operation, the inter-pillar divide tends to hamper

coordination on the ground. Additionally, the EUPOL suffers from staff shortages and local police training is carried by other actors. The EU governments appear to give priority to upping their national profile in Afghanistan rather than on leveraging collective EU efforts. Even within NATO, they remain reluctant to commit more combat troops or remove national restrictions on their deployment (Islam and Gross 2009).

The current total number of EUPOL staff members is 290 persons, well below the total number of 400 persons authorized. The key operational impediment for the mission as well as a common source of frustration both within the mission and among the Brussels-based EU officials is the failure of the EU member states to provide the remaining number of staff. Table 5 lists the number of soldiers contributed by the EU member states to the ISAF till 2009. In contrast to this is the civilian troop contribution by the members to the EUPOL (Table 6). The EU that had committed to deploy 400 civilian troops for the EUPOL when the mission first took off but it is lagging far behind with only half of the total committed number in Afghanistan. This wide discrepancy in the number of military troops vs. civilian troops projects the EU's increasing focus on military instruments to deal with conflict situations such as Afghanistan that often overshadows and undermines the civilian contribution of the EU.

The operational experience of the ESDP missions in other parts of the world and more recently in Afghanistan demonstrates the need to combine civilian and military crisis management in order to address security challenges. These include the fight against organized crime, the need to reform the police and justice sector or the provisions of the military forces on a short-term basis in support of the larger peace-keeping missions. Gross argues , 'However, the experience of EU crisis missions over the past five years has shown that the practical application of Civil Military Cooperation in EU crisis management leaves much to be desired when it comes to internal coordination but also when it comes to cooperation with the international actors'. While the availability, training and deployment of personnel in military crisis management are sufficiently structured, civilian crisis management operations have regularly experienced problems in attracting qualified personnel. She further states that though individual members have


military capabilities at their disposal, if these capabilities and troops are not committed to NATO missions or UN operations, then they are 'a distraction from the EU's growing capabilities'. They also bring to light the fact that the national commitments to crisis management are more easily given in principle than in practice (Gross 2008: 3, 29, 39).

**Table 5: ISAF soldiers contributed by the EU member states (till 2009)**

Contributing countries	ISAF troops	Contributing countries	ISAF troops
Austria	1	Latvia	160
Belgium	405	Lithuania	200
Bulgaria	470	Luxembourg	9
Cyprus	0	Malta	0
Czech Republic	580	Netherlands	1770
Denmark	700	Poland	1590
Estonia	130	Portugal	30
Finland	110	Romania	900
France	2780	Slovakia	120
Germany	3640	Slovenia	70
Greece	140	Spain	876
Hungary	370	Sweden	265
Ireland	7	UK	8300
Italy	2350	<b>Total</b>	<b>25973</b>

Source: Cited in Korski, Daniel (2009), "Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge", *Policy Brief*, European Council on Foreign Relations: London, pp.16-19

**Figure 4: ISAF soldiers contributed by the EU member states (till 2009)**




**Table 6: Civilian troops contributed by the EU member states to the EUPOL (till 2009)**

Contributing countries	Civilian troops in EUPOL	Contributing countries	Civilian troops in EUPOL
Austria	0	Latvia	0
Belgium	0	Lithuania	2
Bulgaria	0	Luxembourg	0
Cyprus	0	Malta	0
Czech Republic	5	Netherlands	4
Denmark	8	Poland	3
Estonia	2	Portugal	0
Finland	12	Romania	5
France	2	Slovakia	0
Germany	45	Slovenia	0
Greece	0	Spain	11
Hungary	3	Sweden	1
Ireland	0	UK	0
Italy	15	<b>Total</b>	<b>118</b>

Source: Cited in Korski, Daniel (2009), "Shaping Europe's Afghan Surge", *Policy Brief*, European Council on Foreign Relations: London, pp.16-19

**Figure 5: Civilian troops contributed by the EU member states to the EUPOL (till 2009)**



Inter-institutional competition, different agenda setting and different decision-making processes in respective pillars are the other drawbacks in civilian crisis management (Gross 2008: 3). This however has been improved through the Lisbon Treaty that abolishes the inter-pillar divide and the creation of the European External Action Service (EAS) has brought about increasing foreign policy coherence. However, the civilian presence in Afghanistan pales in comparison to other civilian multilateral actors present on the ground, especially the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (Genderen 2010: 27).

### **3.2.8 Domestic Criticism of EU's Involvement**

The deteriorating security scenario has led to huge costs being incurred by the European member states to sustain their reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan which has been often criticized by the European Parliament (van Genderen 2010: 34). Individual member states also object to the expansion of common costing at the expense of national influence over decision-making (Bendiek and Bringmann 2008). In the past, the European Parliament and the media have voiced concerns and criticisms of the way the EU contributions to multilateral funds are not accompanied by appropriate financial scrutiny measures, leading to allegations of corruption, waste and general aid ineffectiveness (van Genderen 2010:28).

In the recent years, European governments have come under growing domestic pressure to justify their military presence in Afghanistan, especially during times of economic crisis. The governments have responded by prioritizing short-term stability over long-term security. Buckley (2010:3) argues that most EU capitals were unwilling to question the credibility of the electoral process for the August 2009 elections or to take a strong position with the Afghan government on corruption or human rights abuses for the fear of 'rocking the boat'.

In November 2010, the Members of EU Parliament in a Report blamed the coalition forces for “miscalculating their efforts” and for not acknowledging the failure of military intervention in Afghanistan. The Report also demanded a ‘radical rethink’ for Afghanistan. The need of the hour was conceived to be a balanced military and civilian approach and making the Afghans equal stakeholders in the exit strategy.<sup>26</sup> A recent British government Report<sup>27</sup> stated that the EUPOL has achieved ‘very little’ in the past four years due to understaffing and bureaucracy. It also criticized the mission for being ‘woefully inadequate’. Problems such as understaffing (400 promised when the mission started, yet to achieve the target), lack of formal EU-NATO cooperation, US pressure on the EUPOL to extend beyond its civilian mandate plague the EUPOL. Additionally, the Report also pointed to the complicated procurement procedures and decision-making structures run by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in Brussels which are not in proportion with the ‘phenomenally’ fast changing developments in the field.

The general public and many politicians of Europe are skeptical about whether the international efforts would usher in peace and stability into Afghanistan. The Europeans see Afghanistan in the context of America’s war on terror and there are also concerns among them regarding the past strategy which ‘lacked sensitivity to the cultural, ethnic and historical specificities of Afghanistan’. Table 7 and Figure 6 illustrate the support for war in Afghanistan in terms of retaining their troops in the country. Except for Spain, domestically within other major EU countries like Britain, France and Germany, there is a diminishing support from the public. In all the three countries, less than 50 per cent of the populations are in favour of continuing EU’s military operations in Afghanistan.

There is also a widespread opposition among the European countries regarding the involvement of their troops in combat operations mainly in the South of Afghanistan.

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<sup>26</sup> “EU Parliament reports EU needs to rethink Afghan exit strategy”, 10 November 2010, Brussels, European Union @ United Nations. Partnership in Action. [Online: web] Accessed on 15 July 2011. URL: [www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_10349\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_10349_en.htm)

<sup>27</sup> House of Lords, European Union Committee, (2011) “The EU’s Afghan Police Mission. Report With Evidence”, 8<sup>th</sup> Report of Session 2010-11, HL Paper 87, London: Stationery Office Limited. Quoted in Rettman, Andrew (2011), “British Lords criticize EU failures in Afghanistan”, *www.euobserver.com*, 17 February 2011. [Online:web] Accessed on 18 July 2011 URL: [www.euobserver.com/13/31825](http://www.euobserver.com/13/31825)

This has resulted in differences of opinions among member states over their national limits or 'national caveats' (Cirovski and Pistor 2010: 2-3)

Domestically, within the European nations, local party activists view the Afghanistan war as an 'unnecessary and a dangerous war'. Within parliamentary democracies like Germany and Italy, foreign policy agenda is often 'hijacked' by party politics.<sup>28</sup> The German participation in ISAF or Operations Enduring Freedom is widely seen as 'susceptible to domestic political pressures'. There are apprehensions among the Germans about the success of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the public is also averse to the possibility of civilian casualties in these combat operations (Cirovski and Pistor 2010: 7-8).

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<sup>28</sup> Pothier, Fabrice (2009), "Europe: Losing and at a loss?", Op-Eds/Articles, Carnegie Moscow Center, 9 November 2009. [Online:web] Accessed on 16 July 2011. URL: [Carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=24115](http://Carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=24115)




**Table 7: European Support for War in Afghanistan (Per cent responding for keeping troops) (2007-2011)**

Countries	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Britain	45	48	46	49	41
France	48	46	50	47	41
Germany	44	43	48	40	41
Spain	22	34	44	43	51

Source: "Support for War in Afghanistan – Should the US and NATO keep troops in Afghanistan or remove them?", Key Indicators Database, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center. [Online: web] Accessed on 18 July 2011. URL: [pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9&group=3](http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9&group=3)

**Figure 6: European Support for War in Afghanistan (Per cent responding for keeping troops) (2007-2011)**



### 3.2.9 Deployment of Troops

When President Obama announced his commitment to increasing the American troops by another 30,000, he expected the European members of NATO to step up their operations too. But, European governments refused to send more troops and countries like Canada and Netherlands reconfirmed their commitment to pull out their troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. The debates over the war were so intense that it caused the fall of the Dutch government in 2010. Siegel argues that while on one hand, the American politicians complain that Europe is 'not doing enough', Europeans on the other hand argue that their participation is in line with what should be expected of them (Siegel 2009: 461-462). Europe's burden-sharing as far as the NATO troops are concerned is not increasing in proportion to the desired level, but only decreasing. Moreover, development assistance for Afghanistan is not nearly on par with what it should be (Siegel 2009: 477-478).

European national governments have imposed restrictions in providing troops to the ISAF, thereby limiting the ability of the ISAF commander to deploy and allocate forces. There have been various caveats such as prohibition on moving forces to a certain area, requirements for lengthy consultations with national capitals before tactical decisions can be made and restrictions on certain types of activities.

After the American military and civilian surge in Afghanistan in 2009, Europe has receded into the background. European countries contributed less than a third of the combat forces and their civilian presence is insignificant compared to the American deployment.<sup>29</sup> Germany's unwillingness to contribute troops to the ISAF combat missions has been criticized and also blamed for imposing 'the most restrictive national caveats of ISAF contributing nations' (Cirovski and Pistor 2010: 7).

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<sup>29</sup> Pothier, Fabrice (2009), "Europe: Losing and at a loss?", Op-Eds/Articles, Carnegie Moscow Center, 9 November 2009. [Online:web] Accessed on 16 July 2011. URL: [Carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=24115](http://Carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=24115)

### **3.2.10 Police and Justice Sector Reforms**

The problems and challenges in the reformation of the police and justice sector stem from the fact that the international community did not grasp the centrality of the comprehensive reform of both the sectors to the rebuilding of the Afghan state. In the initial stages, police reform suffered the neglect in favour of focusing first on providing security through the ISAF and secondly, on reforming the Afghan National Army. However, rule of law lies at the heart of any government's legitimacy, and reforming the police and the justice sector is the key task in Afghanistan's reconstruction and institution building. But the current state of Afghanistan's police and justice makes this a Herculean task (Gross 2009: 25).

EUPOL Afghanistan from the start was 'entering a messy situation with an unclear strategy and, given its ambitious plan for security reform and local ownership, looks to be under-resourced' (Giji Gya, 2007). The EU police mission in Afghanistan best illustrates the shortcomings of the EU's engagement. Hailed at its launch as the EU's most important commitment, it has suffered from weak leadership, excessive security restrictions, a limited mandate and a lack of strategy. EUPOL Afghanistan is operating in a 'highly fragmented international environment' (Gross 2009: 13). Korski (2008: 13) contends that EUPOL Afghanistan may turn out to be a missed opportunity to increase EU influence in an area where the US is the biggest player with a vast train-and-equip programme and has been asking the EU for further assistance. Compounding this problem is the fact that the EU governments appear to prioritize their national profile in Afghanistan rather than leverage their collective efforts (Islam and Gross 2009).

Problems of coalition creep into the police sector reforms too. The German vision of police training focused on the police as a civilian law and order force while the US regarded them as security force that could also play counter-insurgency role. This resulted in training efforts under their leadership not only overlapping but also contradicted one another on account of their different approaches. The difference between the German and the US approach towards police reforms have revealed not just

a serious gap in terms of amount of funds made available to undertake them but also two varying visions on the role of the ANP and the strategy that needs to be put in place to achieve this role. It also prevented the elaboration of a workable division of labour.

The EUPOL Afghanistan fundamentally faces two challenges: firstly, the internal and external coordination of police reform efforts, mainly with giving EUPOL and related EU instruments enough weight in order to achieve the political impact to which the mission aspires and secondly, the interaction and cooperation with Afghan stakeholders and broader difficulties associated with implementing strategies in an unstable political context make reforming the police a daunting task (Gross 2009: 31). A balance between police experts with political experience in Afghanistan and in sufficient numbers is yet to be achieved. Staffing the mission has been challenging not just because of the hostile environment in which the mission personnel are placed but also due to the demands on member states resources from other civilian crisis missions.

As far as justice reforms are concerned, the resources and coordination is exacerbated. Lack of trust in the system, gaps in the outreach to parts of the population and inadequate training of personnel are some of the problems. The absence of an ethos of judiciary independence has an impact on institution building, none of the judicial institutions have the resources to deliver an effective system of justice, staff is inadequately trained, has no career structure and works in conditions of personal danger. As in the case of police reforms, the efforts made by international actors are overlapping in the justice reform sector too.

### **3.2.11 Human Rights Concerns**

The EU does not have a specific human rights dialogue with Afghanistan but channels its human rights concerns through usual public and private diplomatic instruments (statements, declarations, demarches etc). The key issues raised are women's rights, freedom of expression, the death penalty, traditional justice and torture and ill-treatment in detention. The Human Rights and Gender Unit that constitutes one of the

three key components of the EUPOL rule of law department has many responsibilities. As a result, juggling priorities has never been easy especially when timeframes of internal and external mission activities in which they are simultaneously engaged compete. The level of human rights knowledge varies significantly among the newly arriving staff members. The level of country-specific knowledge in terms of its human rights situation is also usually basic or nil among the newly arriving non-specialist members (Genderen 2010: 29, 31-32).

### **Conclusion**

There is evidently a gap between what the EU aspires to do in Afghanistan and what it has accomplished. There is also a visible gap between rhetoric and capabilities. The sustainability of EU efforts in the region is questionable which also raises concern not only about the future of Afghanistan but also world security at large. The EU's inability to fulfill its normative agenda questions the future of its role in the international arena and also risks undermining its peaceful normative power identity in favour of a more robust, potentially violent military presence. Having thus analyzed the EU and the EC's role in Afghanistan for the past decade, the concluding chapter will try to answer the question, what role does the EU play in international relations given the current scenario and does its normative identity still hold good?

## **Chapter 4 - Conclusion**

The previous chapters looked into the EU's role in Afghanistan, its 'normative' agenda in the country and some of the areas where the EU's capabilities and reconstruction efforts are inadequate and come into question. The concluding chapter is divided into two sets of arguments. One, the normative principles that the EU is identified with are not being upheld in the case of Afghanistan. Two, the first argument finds its cause in the fact that the EU has shifted its focus away from its normativeness to what Manners calls the 'military industrial simplex'. The chapter will also summarize the reasons for European Union's inability to live up to its image of being a normative power and its limitations as a security actor. Finally, it will seek to evaluate the efficacy of the EU as a Normative Power.

### **4.1 Overview of Afghanistan's Current Scenario**

Though initially the Europeans were apprehensive of being a part of Operation Enduring Freedom, eventually they became a part of the coalition forces and contributed financially and otherwise to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Europeans viewed the Afghanistan war as a 'good war' unlike the US intervention into Iraq and therefore extended their cooperation to the American forces. The efforts undertaken by the coalition forces were initially successful as they managed to defeat the Taliban and put political institutions back into place. However, with the re-emergence of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda, Afghanistan once again became a breeding ground for the insurgency forces as well as the terrorists. Today, Afghanistan's political institutions lack legitimacy. The NATO and other international donors are unable to sustain the efforts they have made thus far, and the weaknesses inherent within the coalition forces have come to the forefront. In spite of massive international aid in-flows into the country, security threats continue to loom large. As the insurgency forces grow stronger, the coalition forces are losing their foot-hold in the country.

The European efforts too are at the threshold of challenging times ahead. The EU had adopted a 'light footprint approach' which continues to be scattered and perplexing. The EU had set its foot in more issues than it could handle, thus making coordination difficult. Afghanistan witnessed a profusion of European representatives; multiple programmes were carried out by the EU under multiple offices within a confusing institutional framework. This resulted in the formulation of a vague strategy for the country. Moreover, the institutional inter-pillar divide hampers coordination on the ground level. Due to the profusion of institutions, there is no one 'EU Plan', as a result of which the EU has no clear vision and is unable to recognize where its strengths lie.

Additionally, there is no clear perception of a 'comprehensive approach' among the EU member states or among the coalition forces. The EU member states do not present a united front in Afghanistan as is noticed in the case of UK which abstains from strategic debates that take place within the Union. Moreover, there is no strong international lead to head the overall European efforts made in the country. Internal divisions among member states exist due to different operational personalities of each member state. Often, divergent and incompatible approaches among the EU member states has resulted in lack of a united, overall strategy for Afghanistan.

The EU has also not been able to live up its capabilities in terms of contributing aid and assistance to Afghanistan. Sharing the burden of reconstruction efforts has been uneven between the US and the EU, as well as among the EU member states. The EU has been criticized for not engaging in entirety and has been committing to what is 'just enough'. The national governments within EU set upper and lower limits on aid contribution, known as 'national caveats' which often restricts the budget on spending for the reconstruction efforts. Fragmented spending of aid has also resulted in poor assessment of the impact caused. Neither is the aid amount pledged, disbursed accordingly. Once the aid amount is disbursed, it is often spent in a scattered manner which results in spending on projects that are not central to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, thereby limiting the impact of the input. Moreover, the lack of scrutiny of funds spent has led to severe problems such as corruption, waste and general aid

ineffectiveness. These development funds have also fallen short of any tangible or credible political and military action. In contrast to the Afghanistan, experiences are instances such as aid contribution to countries like Bosnia and Kosovo which show that the EU is more generous to nations in its own backyard for obvious security reasons. But Afghanistan, owing to its distance away from Europe is not a cause of immediate concern for the Europeans. Nevertheless, in the age of globalized terror, 'distance from home' cannot be used as a reason for half-hearted endeavours.

Due to difference of opinions with NATO regarding multilateralism, there is also a clash of civilian and military instruments. Military missions claim most of the EU governments' attention, thereby leaving very little room for civilian efforts. As a result, the civilian presence of the EU fails in comparison to other international donors like UNAMA. There has been domestic upheaval within Europe in the recent years, especially after the 2008 economic crisis, regarding the affordability and the credibility of a military presence in Afghanistan. There is also a dearth of personnel in civilian crisis missions such as EUPOL, which is largely understaffed. The problems that the EUPOL is facing today include weak leadership, excessive security restrictions, a limited mandate and a lack of effective strategy. These woes are also reflected in the EU's overall engagement in Afghanistan.

There is also a lack of willingness among member states to increase their economic and military contributions, largely due to domestic criticism of the war. Since the EU lags behind the US both financially and militarily, it is unable to assert its political weight.

Julian Lindley-French's argument that in the current situation, 'Afghanistan is so much more than Afghanistan' still holds good. There is a lack of resources in spite of massive contributions from international donors. The Afghan people, for most part have lost their faith in the West. He argues that the West is not threatened by failure either by the Taliban or the al-Qaeda or the Pashtun but it is the refusal of the political leaders in the West to recognize the importance of the success, the implications of failure and make



investments accordingly. His solution to the problem is to redouble the efforts and not to reduce it. The desperate need of the hour is grand stability and it is dependent on a sound security architecture with the “enlightened West” as its cornerstone. He rightly contends that the ‘short-sighted and self-defeating factional game playing in the West that places marginal advantage before strategic effect must end’. Among other reasons there is a lack of consensus over the role of Afghanistan as far as grand stability is concerned. This is partly due to the poor American strategic leadership since 2001 and partly due to the lack of European effort in spite of the profusion of representations it has in Afghanistan. His assessment of the Western hopes of withdrawing from Afghanistan resonates with reason. He writes, ‘Withdrawal is not an option because unmolested strategic crime and systemic terrorism will chase the West back to its own back streets’ (Lindley-French 2007: 5-7).

The concept of peacekeeping as encapsulated in the 1992 Petersberg tasks of rescue and humanitarian missions and the role that the combat troops play in peacemaking, Lindley French argues, does not meet the demands of the current situation. ‘Within Afghanistan they are hopelessly anachronistic as is the mindset that underpins them’. The lack of unity among the European member states in supporting the British, Dutch and the Canadian partners in robust counter-insurgency operations in the Helmand and Uruzgan provinces only exposes their political weakness. The Afghanistan quagmire has also revealed the sham of force planning in a host of European states that neither has the numbers nor the quality ‘to sustain operations in such a place if organized in such a shambolic way’ (Lindley-French 2007: 11).

No matter how much the EU improves its strategy for Afghanistan, the changes are unlikely to make much of a difference unless and until the EU transforms the way it operates on the ground. Some of the institutional problems could perhaps be resolved by the institutional and other modifications of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty that created a High Representative for Foreign and Security policy and one unified External Action Service (EAS) by merging the foreign policy units of the Council of Ministers with those parts of the European Commission that worked on issues of external relations could bring in the much needed synergy in Brussels between those who decide on the aid to

Afghanistan and those who set the overall strategy for the country (Buckley 2010: 8). This could also bring about a more visible and unified EU approach on the ground (Muscheidt 2011: 48).

Some observers argue that the EU must commit for the long term in Afghanistan and should build its strategy around addressing the root causes of the current anarchy. The lack of sustainable reconstruction efforts finds its source in this very reason: the dearth of efforts or the willingness to address the 'disease' but hoping to cure it by dealing with the 'symptoms'. The EU has to craft a strategy that builds upon its civilian capabilities which would require it to focus on governance, human rights, reconciliation, police training, regional diplomacy and the rule of law. These priorities would help it to address Afghanistan's most urgent weaknesses and simultaneously also complement America's focus on security (Buckley 2010: 9). Till date, reconciliation with the Taliban and their reintegration into the society remains ambiguous and under-resourced. To bring about the reconciliation, the international community has to engage the state government in reaching out to the Taliban right up to the grass root levels.

The relative success of the recent operations in Afghanistan by the coalition forces, the elimination of Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, the huge amounts disbursed towards reconstruction was a turning point for the American war on terror which prompted President Obama to announce the withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Afghanistan in 2011. Though there has been some progress made in Afghanistan in terms of the Taliban reducing their foothold in the southern part of the country and other areas such as improvement in the judicial system and local governance, the US and its allies cannot relax their efforts (D'Amecourt 2011). Given the current scenario of transition, progress remains fragile.

Many experts of Afghanistan believe that the current transition (when coalition forces withdraw their troops and the Afghan government takes over) that the nation is undergoing is the last opportunity for the creation of the necessary conditions for transforming international support that will reinforce a viable democratic state. They

believe that the key lies in transforming a foreign military operation into a peace-building operation led by the Afghan government and the UN with backing from international actors. In other words, power has to be transferred from the military hands to a civilian leadership. This will demand the EU and the US to work closely and intensively with each other (Peral *et al* 2011: 3).

The ISAF has over the years prioritized doubling the size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) which according to experts seems misguided and could also possibly jeopardize the future democratic progress in Afghanistan. The fundamental concept of civilian police has been overlooked and the potential emergence of military capacity in a vacuum could threaten democracy. Another cause of concern is that the unbalanced approach of the international community has relegated development and governance along with civilian leadership of international action to a secondary role and traditional security schemes have assumed the priority (Peral *et al* 2011: 3).

Among the coalition forces, there is also a lack of clear vision for Afghanistan's transition which implies the lack of accountability, mutual confidence and reliance. The international community should help Afghanistan overcome the lack of a political leadership. Compounding the existing problems is the lack of job opportunities for up to one million young people. In spite of corruption being rampant, the international community should considerably increase assistance channeled through the government. Additionally, the absence of support to the judiciary in the last decade will impact other fields and jeopardize efforts towards sustainable employment and economic development. Experts studying Afghanistan also suggest that the Afghanistan's natural resources and the possibility of boosting its economy remain largely unexplored. They call for new initiatives to be set up which would allow for a 'sustainable, balanced and non-corrupt exploitation of the country's resources' and benefit the Afghan population (Peral *et al* 2011: 3-4).

Among other prerequisites, a regional solution has to be found for South Asia that would induce Pakistan to prevent its territory from being used as safe havens for the

Taliban (Khalilzad 2010). Greater involvement of regional actors such as China in Afghanistan is not only economically viable but also seems essential (Peral *et al* 2011: 4). As far as the EU Action Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is concerned, there are too many priorities on the list. However, on the brighter side, it is argued that there is a declared resolve of the EU member states to work together (Muscheidt 2011: 48). Underlining the importance of regional cooperation to the stability of Afghanistan the French Ambassador to the country (2008-11) rightly remarked,

‘Any lasting stabilization of Afghanistan requires a solution to the crisis in Pakistan...Only a broadening of dialogue, bringing together neighbouring countries, regional actors and the major powers to deal with all the issues – including regional security, cross-border cooperation, trade, technological cooperation, economic development, and energy issues, including civil nuclear power – can lead to a successful conclusion. Pakistan’s military officials should be involved in these negotiations. This is a prerequisite for its success. Talks should include countries that play an active role in Afghan politics (Iran, India and Pakistan) and in Pakistan (China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey). France and Europe must take the lead, but without harboring any illusions concerning the difficulties involved and the time required in undertaking such a project’ (D’Amecourt 2011).

The central location of Afghanistan in the Asian continent has to be taken note of and regional players must be brought on board as stakeholders in the future of the nation. Afghanistan’s peace, stability and security are in the vital strategic interests of the Asian countries and will play a dominant role in determining their national security and stability too.

#### **4.2 Is the EU a Normative Power?**

Knud Erik Jorgensen and Katie Laatikinen (2004) are skeptical of the ‘normative power’ argument because, ‘the EU’s self-image is characterized by a curious blindness to its own interests’. The EU tends to present itself as a force for goodness in international society. It is also difficult to see the emphasis on values and norms as something that is particular to the EU. Not only the US but as well as the former Soviet Union could be described as a ‘normative’ or ‘civilizing’ power.

Since the EU is now developing military capabilities, what good does the normative power argument hold? Are the conceptions of the EU as 'civilian' power and 'civilizing' or 'normative' power are inextricably linked together (Sjursen 2007: 69)? According to Kagan (2003), Kantian Europe is only 'Kantian' by necessity and not by choice. Sjursen (2007: 77) presents the argument that if one considers the EU's European Security Strategy (ESS) where 'new threats' to European security are reviewed and analyzed, then it is apparent that the use of military force is still not considered the first option and multilateralism is upheld. Economic instruments are stressed as important to ensure reconstruction and so is civilian crisis management. Trade and development policies are highlighted as powerful tools to promote reform and stability. Assistance programmes, conditionally and targeted trade measures are underlined as important elements in EU's ESS. Therefore, she argues that the EU does not seem to have abandoned the belief in civilian instruments even though its potential ability to do so if it wishes to is increasing. She further argues that there is a general sense that the EU's external policies are not solely derived from a desire to promote its own interests, but must also be seen as moved by a certain understanding of what 'ought' to be done.

Values and conceptions of what is good vary according to cultural and societal contexts. It is contended that the if the EU defines itself, and thinks of itself as a 'force of good', then it risks being a subjective definition linked to a particular European understanding and defined in a particular European context. This may not match with what is defined as 'good' or 'valuable' in other parts of the world, conditioned by other cultural and social norms. According to her the EU's normative power might simply be an expression of Euro-centric cultural imperialism (Sjursen 2007: 79-80).

Being a normative power does not exclude the possibility of being or acquiring other capabilities such as military and economic. However, normative power must be irreducible to economic and military power if it is to make sense as a separate category (Diez 2005: 616). Diez contends that the more normative power builds on military force, the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of powers since it does not rely on the power of norms alone. Therefore, he argues that the imposition of norms through

military power cannot be equated with successfully changing others, which according to him, primarily relies on socialization processes (Diez 2005: 621). Comparing the course of United States' history with that of the EU, Diez writes that the US during the first part of the twentieth century, like today's EU was 'not at all eager to intervene in conflicts outside its own hemisphere'. Similar to the EU's objectives, Wilson too aimed to spread peace throughout the world so that interventions would no longer be necessary. Another similarity that he points out to is the approach towards achieving this aim, through normative commitments and not through military means. But over a period of time, the military back-up of this normative power grew in importance. He apprehends that the EU could also tread the path of America's military growth.

As far as the EU is concerned, it has increasingly included military means in its foreign policy machinery and this is most obvious in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which is part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar. This also includes the Rapid Reaction Force and various political and military committees to govern military efforts on the EU level (Diez 2005: 623). Diez further argues that though normative and military powers are not incompatible, it should not be ignored that they are in tension as far as the future development of ESDP. Another criticism leveled against EU's normativeness is its inconsistency in terms of not discriminating between different external actors and not undermining its norms from within. Moreover, there have been charges of bias and arbitrariness related to the EU's application of human rights.

The EU's insistence on norms embodies strategic or economic interests and those interests are cloaked in a mantle of values and norms rhetoric (K.Smith 2001). Richard Youngs (2004) too argues along the similar lines. The normative concerns and strategic interests always go together in the EU's external relations and therefore it is necessary to combine rationalist and constructivist approaches in order to assess the respective impact of these factors. However, others like Robert Cooper would argue that the EU as a 'postmodern' world invokes the modern and to a certain extent the pre-modern worlds as threats against which it has to guard itself in order to not jeopardize its civilian standards.

Consequently, this legitimizes the formation of European armed forces and of interventions in the 'pre-modern' world (in this case, Afghanistan) which otherwise would have been seen as illegitimate (Diez 2005: 629).

Given the above juxtaposition of various arguments over the 'normativeness' of the EU, the question is whether the EU in future will be an effective normative actor not only in Afghanistan but in the international arena too. Manners himself provides an insight into the EU's declining 'normativeness' in the age of terrorism. He (Manners 2006: 406) argues that terrorism raises fundamental questions regarding the merits of the EU's normative approach to world politics. The EU as a security actor is a provider of human security in the shape of 'a concern with human life and dignity' with an equal emphasis on 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. These policies of the EU have taken the form of non-military, economic, social and humanitarian help and assistance. But simultaneously, the militarizing processes provided by the European Security Strategy is already weakening the normative claims of the EU in a post-9/11 world characterized by the drive towards 'martial potency' and growth of European homeland security and a defence industrial base by a 'military-industrial simplex' (Manners 2007: 17).

Since the end of 2003, the EU has taken a sharp turn away from the normative path of 'sustainable peace' towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention. Institutional prioritization of military structures and frameworks is apparent today as aspects of civilian crisis management are framed in terms of subservience to ESDP missions. Attempts to develop civilian organizations parallel to those in the military sector are ignored in the drive towards militarization. In the same vein, Mirjam van Reisen, Simon Stocker and Florent Sebban argue 'the increasing emphasis on security issues, the fight against terrorism and concerns over weapons of mass destruction threaten to overshadow all European foreign policy leaving little or no room for policies geared towards human security' (van Reisen, M.Stocker and Sebban F. 2004: 36).

The agenda of global terrorism has diverted both the processes of militarization and policing away from freedom, justice, democracy and peace. The challenges posed by terrorism and counter-terrorism to the EU are leading to a number of normative security dilemmas. According to Manners, this dilemma can be addressed through the strengthening of commitment, coherence and consistency in the promotion of normative principles within a democratic EU. He argues,

‘Any normatively informed EU external action has to be capable of joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks or conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks under a UN mandate as part of a wider peace-building solution....Current militarization processes seem primarily directed towards attacking the symptoms rather than addressing the causes of conflict and insecurity. The consequences of such militarization in the context of total war on terror are important because the war is being lost because ‘the West’ has relied too heavily on military force’ (Manners 2006: 408-409,416).

Manners fears that ‘the rapid and unreflexive insertion of military security policy is having a dramatic effect on the generally benign normative international identity of the E(s)U’ (Manners 2002b). The effect of this will be felt in three ways according to him – on the role, legitimacy and perception of the E(s)U both internally and externally. The role of the E(s)U has without doubt moved beyond the confines of ‘civilian power’ and this has potential negative consequences for the ‘ethicacy’ and the efficiency of the EU’s non-military external policies. In the future, whenever the EU engages in peacekeeping operations or military interventions, it is likely to come under the scanner. The EU citizens as well as those on the receiving side of the intervention are likely to question EU’s intentions if they are not accomplished in a normative way. Finally, the perception of the E(s)U as a benign and pacific force in the lives of Europeans and non-European is guaranteed to change as militarization and its consequences unfold (Manners 2006: 409).

The US war on terror had its consequences on EU’s response to security challenge. The war on terror had significantly impacted EU’s foreign policy relations. What the EU is seeking is to fulfill the demands of ‘foreign policy realism’ rather than its normativeness. This is apparent in EU’s external action, CFSP which is unfortunately the EU’s ‘weakest link’ and least normative policy. Manners criticizes EU’s passive



acceptance of un-normative, counter-terrorist activities in the name of the total war on terror. He also criticizes the ambiguous sanctioning of torture and extraordinary rendition by EU member states in the service of the total war on terror which he describes as the first casualty of normative power Europe. The war on terror has also appeared to shape the EU's development policy in worrying ways. He points out that the first trend is evident in the ESS, where strategic objectives and security concerns appear to prefigure development concerns, where it is argued that the EU should be 'more active in pursuing our strategic objectives....[including] development activities' and 'security is the first condition to development' (Manners 2006: 410-412).

The CFSP and ESS logic of prioritizing strategic security over development aid fundamentally challenges the E(s)U human security approach to the security challenge. The ESS has three major 'blind spots': firstly, the security strategy overlooks the relationship between socio-economic development, government stability, organized crime and terrorism. Secondly, it views transnational terrorism through a Eurocentric lens. Lastly, it has failed to address the concerns of partner developing countries with regard to the MDGs, the Doha declaration etc. By giving priority to the immediate strategic security concerns over those of the developing world, the EU is not only being not-normative but is also irrational because the roots of new security risks that it wishes to address lie in the developing world (Manners 2006: 412-413).

There are likely to be serious problems for the EU in the future, Manners contends, if it continues to use military missions in conjunction with civilian ones. Greater acquisition of military capability could lead to the usage of short-term military responses rather than long-term structural conflict prevention and transformation. Additionally, when EU personnel are employed in peace-keeping tasks, there is a risk of the mission sliding into peacemaking tasks especially when combatants use guerilla and terrorist tactics. The recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the fact that the EU could mix military, political, civilian and humanitarian agenda in post-conflict reconstruction which is guaranteed and dangerous. If the EU introduces military forces in settings that were previously under the purview of the civilian staff, it risks undermining

its normative agenda for 'a more robust and potentially violent presence in the lives and minds of the receiving populations' (Manners 2007: 26).

The European Security Strategy (2003) is perceived as a 'signpost at the crossroads of the militarization of the EU' by Manners (2007: 21). Drawing analysis from Jocelyn Mawdsley, Leonard and Gowan, Manners argues that the pre-2001 agreements on Petersburg tasks and the Rapid Reaction Force were rapidly altered to fit into post-2003 military arrangements for 'preventative engagement'. According to him, the transnational policy institutes themselves see militarization as an opportunity to empower their political role as well achieving deeper security and political integration. The European Union Institute for Security Studies (the EU's advisory body) Manners argues, has led the way towards militarization by encouraging Brussels-based policy centers to see the potential of inter-related security, political and economic logics. These institutes have thereby reached an uneasy agreement on the need to advocate 'preventative engagement' as an European alternative to the US military strategy of 'pre-emptive engagement'. Manners contends that this transnational advocacy appears to be the 'second polarization' of EU civilian crisis management. Normative practices that were historically centered on the commission, with democratic oversight from the Parliament have now been diverted into the Council activities thus making it extremely difficult for the national parliaments and European assemblies to scrutinize and influence the policy-making process (Manners 2007: 21-23).

The interplay between institutional polarization, military missions and a transnational policy network have all contributed to the misdirection of the normative concerns of the human security agenda away from sustainable peace. Though the focus of all human security has been people-centered freedom from fear and want, which is precisely what the normative principle of sustainable peace sought to address, the Barcelona Report (2004), according to Manners, makes clear that the new European security doctrine prioritizes the appropriate use of force over freedom from want and fear. The role of the EU also shifted from the path of sustainable peace to 'marital potency' in 2003 when the creation of a European 'military-industrial simplex' became a priority

(Manners 2007: 24-25). The militarization of the EU does not implicitly increase its power in interstate politics but increasingly risks its normative power (Manners 2007: 26). The prioritization of military intervention over non-military conciliation has undermined normative conceptions of EU such as conflict prevention, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

In the same vein, analyzing the EU's standing in international relations Hyde-Price (2007b: 54-55) argues that over the last decade, the EU has come to be seen as the 'institutional repository of second-order concerns' of its member states. The 'second-order concerns' such as democracy, multilateralism and human rights rank below national security and other fundamental national interests in importance. He argues that slimmed-down professional armed forces have now emerged in Europe and are focused on preparing to fight high-intensity full-spectrum wars of national survival and are now being restructured for military crisis management, peace support operations and humanitarian interventions. This marks a shift from normative identity of the EU. The ESDP according to Hyde-Price is not an 'European army' designed for collective territorial defence but an instrument of 'coalitional coercive diplomacy' and military crisis management. In order to collectively shape the Union's external milieu, using military coercion to back up its diplomacy, it establishes an institutional and procedural framework for limited security cooperation (Hyde-Price 2007b: 62).

After the Cold war, Hyde-Price (Erik 2007: 94) argues, 'the EU was used by its most influential states as an instrument for collectively exercising hegemonic power, shaping its near abroad in ways amenable to the long-term strategic and economic interests of its member states'. The criticism of the EU's role in the crises in former Yugoslavia suggests that for a putative 'normative power, the incapacity to act is considered by many to be as problematic as the capacity to act'. (Gow 1997; Hyde-Price 2007b)

### 4.3 The Likely Future of Normative Power Europe

What Afghanistan needs today is not a military solution. Military means and methods have been tried and tested for the last decade. As can be witnessed today, these instruments have proven to be futile. The current defence policies of the EU are not within the purview of 'Normative Power Europe'. On one hand, the EU contributes to the civilian mission in Afghanistan under the EUPOL umbrella, however, on the other hand, it is also engaged in combat operations as part of the NATO forces. This projects the 'schizophrenic' nature of Europe and also sends across mixed signals regarding the nature of the EU as a global actor (Larive 2011). The EU has developed terms such as 'preventative' instead of 'pre-emptive' and 'diplomacy' has given way to 'coalitional coercive diplomacy'. One could argue that these terms, which are but euphemisms, are being used to distinguish its role from great power tactics such as 'pre-emptive intervention' of the US. The question that the build-up of military forces and the increased focus on defence and security policies raise is whether such military instruments will be employed by the EU in future to enforce normative ideals in other foreign lands? For example, in the recent Libyan crisis, Britain, France and Italy were spearheading discussions at the UN to enforce 'no-fly zone' over Libya in support of democratic ideals. Though it is well-noted that it was not the EU per se that was at the helm of these proceedings, yet one cannot ignore the fact that these countries are the driving motors of the EU engine. So can their militaristic approaches in their foreign policy dictate the future of EU's defence and foreign policy?

As Daniel Keohane (2011) remarked on the recent NATO intervention in Libya, the future is going to witness EU member states of NATO being left to deal with crisis situations without American help. Therefore, mere agreement with the US will not make EU a serious actor. European public support towards the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan is also regressing. There is a lack of willingness to partner with the US in its military operations if there is an unclear security interest or if the Europeans have little say on the strategy (Daniel Keohane in Cendrowicz 2010). This is evidence of a growing

support for the EU to establish itself a strong, powerful international actor which is willing to carve its own niche that is exclusive of American influence.

Given the current scenario that Afghanistan finds itself in, can the EU's efforts in the region actually be equated to those commensurate with a normative power? Has the EU in the post-Cold War world been able to promote its nine normative principles (sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance) in its external, development and foreign policies as Manners argues and especially in the context of Afghanistan? Unfortunately, the answer to both the above questions would be a 'No'. Today, the Afghanistan quagmire is characterized by political instability, existence of major threats that have led to the deterioration of the security situation, lack of sustainable political and social institutions, dearth of a comprehensive agenda of the coalition partners for the country, high costs of stabilization, growing narcotics industry that funds the terrorist groups, deepening ethnic fault lines in the region, cross-border terrorism etc. The potential for success of the targets that the EU had set to achieve through the Country Strategy Papers also remains questionable.

If on the contrary one is to be argue that the EU has been a normative power in Afghanistan, then have the 'means' that it had a adopted, such as contribution of development aid, setting up institutions as part of the nation building process, allocation of civilian troops for rebuilding the country been successful? The EU has clearly and visibly fallen short of its expectations in all these key roles. There is a shortage of funding, which is not in proportion to what is expected out of it and so is the case with allocation of troops, where its civilian missions are understaffed and not reached the set target. And neither have the democratic institutions set up by the EU as part of the development efforts been sustainable.

Like the neo-realists argue, great powers are more likely to undertake regional governance tasks as long as they have a greater stake in the stability of 'their' region and

also because they have capabilities to take on special responsibilities. Therefore, the EU is more likely to take keen interest in nations that are in its 'backyard' like it did in the past; Kosovo and Bosnia, or like the recent Libyan crisis. Great powers like EU are more likely to function as effective actors where they can shape their 'milieu goals' (Wolfers 1962) through instruments such as the 'carrot and stick' policy and would make apathetic contributions where the power has lesser stakes like in the case of Afghanistan. Neo-realism also throws light on the fact that the member states would allow the EU to act as a repository for shared ethical concerns (Hyde-Price 2007b: 55) only when it does not contradict with their national interests. Therefore, the national governments and the public would allow the EU to play a significant role in Afghanistan's reconstruction only as long as their national interests or security is not jeopardized. This also explains the member states' desire to pull out troops from Afghanistan when the governments face domestic criticism. So can the EU play a significant normative role in international politics that stretches beyond its neighbourhood or only where its strategic interests lie? Considering that the EU has successfully completed missions in Aceh, Guinea Bissau, Chad and the like, it would best serve EU's interests to adopt its role, be it civilian or military operations, on a case-by-case basis that is tailor-made rather than having a 'one size fits all' criteria before launching its operations in any region in the future.

As a power that aspires to create its niche by projecting its own unique identity in the international arena, the EU cannot afford to ignore its realist claims and therefore whichever identity it envisages for itself has to be contingent on geo-political considerations as well as the stark ground realities. The EU has to continue to uphold normative instruments like diplomacy, negotiations and promote norms such as governance, rule of law, democracy, free and fair elections, social security but this must be tempered with realist considerations. Ultimately, the success of the mission would be dependent on the nature of crisis it is dealing with. This would imply that the EU has to keep in mind certain criteria before launching its operation: the location of the country within a particular region, the political nature of the country; in terms of whether it is ready to absorb or adopt the normative principles that it would be entrusted with, the

existence of credible legitimate institutions or the lack of it, the economic viability of carrying out such a mission for the EU, consensus among the EU member states including public opinion would determine whether such a mission can be undertaken and the member states' unobstructed commitment towards the mission, adopting a balanced approach between military and civilian instruments, an understanding of whether a mission thus undertaken would lead to successful results and finally, ensuring the sustainability of the efforts made. Therefore, in the future the global identity of the EU should be governed by the above realistic assessments as well its desire and commitment to promote normative values.

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