THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN AID SYATEM:

AN INSTITUTIONAL STUDY

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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INDIA

2011

Date 21ˢᵗ July 2011

DECLARATION

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I declare that the ~~thesis~~ entitled "*The United Nations Humanitarian Aid System: An Institutional Study*" submitted by me for the award of the degree of masters of philosophy at Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommended that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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(Supervisor)

This work is dedicated to

Michael N. Barnett

and

Thomas G. Weiss

prominent scholars of the humanitarianism

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Abbreviation

ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CERF	Common Emergency Resolving Fund
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
DFID	Department For International Development.
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HRU	Humanitarian Relief Unit
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
ICVA	International Council for Voluntary Agencies
IEFC	International Emergency Food Council
IEFR	International Emergency Food Reserve
IFRC	International Federation for Red Cross/ Red Crescent Societies
IGO	International Governmental Organisation
ILO	International Labour Organisation

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRU	International Relief Union
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Overseas Economic Cooperation for Development
OFDA	Office of the Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner of the Human Rights
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Centre
RC	Resident Coordinator
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
UK	United Kingdom
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO	Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organisation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

UNOSAT	United Nations Office for Satellite Technology
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNWRA	United Nations relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
US	United States
USAID	United States Assistance International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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Preface

The relationship between the United Nations and humanitarianism is as old as the UN itself. This dissertation aims to highlight the humanitarian role of the UN in international politics. In this process, it traces the institutional evolution, process of delivering aid, the performance of and challenges to the UN humanitarian system. In process of its evolution, the humanitarian role of the United Nations has been shaped by such systemic factors as: decolonialisation, ideological competition, the hegemonic moment, and now emerging centres of power beyond the Europe and the Atlantic region.

Rendering humanitarian assistance to the needy was one of the first tasks the UN had to address at the time of its inception in 1945. Actually the post-World War II period was a time of refugees and migrants' influx. Immediate perception of the UN was that these problems are short term in nature; therefore, ad hoc strategies like establishment of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) to assist the people who were displaced in Central and Eastern Europe were adopted (Tsui and Myint U, 2004: 02). As the problem of refugees and migrants due to peoples' flight from the Communism dominated Eastern Europe to Western Europe continued, the UN established specific agencies like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) to deal with problems related to refugee (Hyndman 2000: 08).

In the United Nations, a system for humanitarian assistance has evolved. The UN humanitarian aid system is consisting of six key institutions: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), and World Food Programme (WFP) (Reindorp 2002: 34; Walker and Maxwell 2009: 98). Besides these, two other types of UN actors: the institutions specifically devoted to manage the humanitarian affairs like the CERF and DHA, and United Nations main bodies like the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Secretary General are also part of the system. In the UN humanitarian system every actor has different role to play. The six constituting institutions are primarily concerned with the implementing part while agencies specifically

devoted to humanitarianism are concerned with coordination, policy advocacy, advocacy of humanitarian issues, and managing funds for the assistance.

With the progress in the process of decolonialisation and emergence new states' on the political landscape, problem of humanitarian had been agencies increased. The failure to response in the Nigerian civil-war (1967-70), among other factors pushed the UN to create new institutions to look after the victims. The establishment of the Office of the UN disaster Relief Coordination (UNDRO) in 1971 was first such specific institution to coordinate the humanitarian agencies within and outside the UN system. First major institutional reorganisation took place in 1992, when the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) replaced the UNDRO. Along with DHA for coordination, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) were established. In a move towards reorganisation, the DHA was renamed Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998 (Weiss 1998).

The functioning of the UN humanitarian system is based upon four normative principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These are defining principles of classical humanitarianism. The principle of humanity contains three elements: to prevent and elevate human suffering, to protect health and life, and to ensure respect for the individual (Ranganathan 2006: 202). It reminds the relief agencies that assistance should be provided wherever disaster occurs. Principle of independence demands relief agencies to separate themselves from the parties directly involved in the conflict or who have a stake in the outcome.

The principle of impartiality essentially implies that first, no discrimination should be made in relief distribution, and secondly, assistance should be distributed in proportion to needs of the victims. Neutrality is based upon the idea of abstention. It demands relief agencies to refrain from taking part in hostilities and prohibits from taking actions that benefit or disadvantages either party to a conflict. Neutrality and impartiality are slightly different. The principle of impartiality means that no distinction shall be made between persons requiring assistance while principle of neutrality demands that humanitarian agencies should not distinguish between parties to conflict (Ranganathan 2006: 203).

The notion of humanitarianism is changing. Classical humanitarianism was characterised by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence whereas new trends are

emerging in neo-humanitarianism. When the principled humanitarian met the changed reality of post-cold war world, its principles began to change to meet new requirements. Changed humanitarianism has acquired the new principles.

Barnett (2005) has discussed the change in nature of humanitarianism along with causes and consequences from late 1980s. According to him, the purpose of humanitarianism has become politicised so that actors now work close to states and try to eliminate the root cause of conflict. Moreover, field of humanitarianism has also become institutionalised leading to more rigorous and effective assistance in new century.

Mills (2005) argues that distinction between combatant and non-combatant on which principle of neutrality and impartiality of classical humanitarianism was losing salience now a days. Due to politicization humanitarian aid has become instrument for foreign policy. Humanitarianism is not merely the responsibility of international community but right of victims, i.e. right based humanitarianism.

Nascimento (2009) argues that today the humanitarianism has not only been institutionalised and politicised but also has become human rights based and now it is no more merely limited to providing emergency relief but encapsulated the recovery and development. Neo-humanitarians are nowadays engaged in finding out the causes of violence and human suffering and eliminating it.

The humanitarian system under the UN has evolved over the time with its first major institutionalisation in 1971, when the Office of UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) was established. The structural change of post-cold war freed the UN from frequent use of Veto in Security Council on the one hand international community's growing demand for enhanced involvement in international problems provided by the post-cold war turmoil one other hand, pushed the UN to constructively engage in the humanitarian affairs.

Weiss (1998) asserts that main challenge before the UN in 1991 was how to get various elements in the UN family to function more effectively as part of a system. Department of Humanitarian Affairs was established in 1992 to coordinate the functions of various actors of the system. But the essentials of the coordination which are strategic planning, gathering and managing information, resource mobilization, division of labour in the field and leadership are still to be achieved. Coordination could only be achieved through more

centralization by roping in autonomous UN agencies, the ICRC and dysfunctional NGOs. To achieve the coordination OCHA replaced the DHA in 1997.

Kent (2004) argues that the UN should uphold the coordinator role. For, the UN plays the role of strategic planner; therefore, it must ensure accountability by monitoring and assessing the impact that the recipients have. Finally the UN has to play the standard bearer role by upholding the principle of neutrality, impartiality and independence. Upholding these principles along with the global presence, authority and expertise would enhance the UN legitimacy.

The UN humanitarian assistance system is facing several problems which broadly can be divided into two parts: normative and empirical. These problems increased manifold in the post-cold war era as conflicts spread out all over the world. The problems facing the UN humanitarian system includes: the organisational, normative, adequate coordination, operational, security, and financial.

Present humanitarian system is financed mostly by voluntary contributions of states including the DAC and non-DAC, and partially by private donors like individuals, foundations and corporations. Beyond states ECHO also finance to the UN humanitarian assistance programme. In financial terms, uncertainty is a characteristic of the UN humanitarian system. Even the political problems have turned into financial problem. In such a situation, there is need to consolidate the financing of the UN humanitarian system.

Mendez (2001) has proposed blueprint of future United Nations financing. Tax should be levied over the transaction and exchange of currency, on international trade, corrective taxes can be imposed. Along with this global commons: the oceans, air flight, the Antarctica and Southern Oceans, parking fees for geostationary satellites should be taxed. Monetary and other measures should also be used to collect the predictable revenue for the UN operations.

Although for last four decades the UN has adopted several structural and policy level reforms yet the problems is still prevailing. Lack of fund, inter-agency competition and lack of proper information management are still undermining the UN effectiveness in the field. In new century the UN humanitarian system has to face competition from NGO in financial terms. The ECHO and the US still heavily depend upon the local NGOs. The UN

has to find out such ways through which it could not only mitigate the problems but also ensure the principle of neutrality, impartiality and independence with effectiveness.

This study examines the institutional evolution of humanitarian assistance system under the United Nations along with the factors that led to changes over time. The relationship between the changing conception of humanitarianism and its implication for the United Nations is analysed. This study pays critical attention to working of the system at the headquarters, national and field levels. The influence of the humanitarian-military combined missions and UN-NGOs relations upon the normative principles and humanitarian system are also evaluated. How does autonomous nature of specialised agencies condition the coordination and ultimately the efficiency, is also part of the content of the present study. This study would further historically discuss political, normative, operational, financial and organisational challenges which the UN humanitarian system is facing. This study would hopefully prints to further study on the role of the emerging non-western powers in the international humanitarian system.

The hypothesis being tested in the study is: while the UN humanitarianism suffers from a range of deficiencies in terms of shortage of funds and lack of inter-agency coordination the UN espoused principles of humanitarianism too have come under stress.

In this regard, the following research questions have engage the present research.

- What is United Nations Humanitarian Aid System and what principles underline it?

- How does the United Nations Humanitarian Aid System works?

- What are the challenges before the UN Humanitarian Aid System and how have they affected its efficiency?

The discussion in this research is arranged in five chapters. The first chapter in the dissertation is a conceptual one. It deals with the concept of humanitarianism on the one hand and relationship with humanitarianism and the United Nations on the other. It underlines the very 'notion of humanity' and how it has changed overtime. It traces the notion of humanity from the different religious traditions. After describing the classical humanitarianism and its principles, this chapter explains the conceptual changes occurred when the ideas of humanitarianism meet with the ground realities in political contexts.

Simultaneously it deals with the provisions regarding humanitarianism in the United Nations Charter.

The second chapter deals with the institutional aspects of the United Nations humanitarian system. The chapter specially focus on the specific institutions devoted to humanitarian assistance. While dealing with the institutional aspects, the principles characterising these institutions have also been outlined. The attempt here is to the historical evolution of the UN humanitarianism system while paying attention to that point of time including 1971 and 1991 milestones.

The next chapter analyses the process of delivering the humanitarian aid in the UN humanitarian system. The discussion highlights the practice of information management and needs assessment for the resource mobilisation and delivery of the humanitarian aid. What role does the military and NGOs play in the UN humanitarian system has also been pointed out. While dealing with various aspects an attempt has been made to look at the functioning of the system at three levels, namely the headquarters, national and field level. Further this chapter explores with the accountability and improvement tools like evaluations, reviews and lesson learned studied.

The fourth chapter introduces the problems which the UN humanitarian system is facing. The problems coming from the political front including globalisation, ideological, climate change, and global economic crisis; the normative challenges; the organisational and coordination challenges like dysfunction caused by the autonomous nature of the UN specialised agencies and dissonance in mandates of the NGOs working with the UN humanitarian system; the financial problems like increasing earmarking, competition for funds and widening gulf between the required and received funds; and lastly the operational challenges like violence against the aid workers, lack of sufficient trained personnel, the UN-NGOs relations, and military-humanitarian missions. The fifth and final chapter attempts to sum up by offering a few concluding observations.

The study will be based upon the primary and secondary sources, though the main emphasis would be on secondary sources. Descriptive and analytical methods will be used to deal with the case.

This study would not be possible without support of following, to whom, I am thankful.

me an opportunity to engage with international relations and relatively new field of international organisation.

Lastly, i would like to thank my family for their patience and moral support.

21st July 2011

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Chapter 1

Humanitarianism: Conceptual and Historical Aspects

The UN humanitarian system and humanitarian crisis are directly related to each other. Disaster agents are directly responsible for humanitarian crisis. Due to change in disaster agents for the last two decades, nature of humanitarian emergencies has also changed. Before 1990s due to political constraints, the UN could response was limited only to natural disasters. For instance, in case of Nigerian civil war (1967-70), no UN entity had provided assistance. In 1990s, range of disaster agents was diversified. Natural disasters did not remain per-dominant disaster agent but civil wars replaced them. This is the reason why, in literature of international relations, 1990s is characterised as the age of 'Complex Humanitarian Emergencies.'[1] In this period, humanitarian crises were primarily caused by ethnic violence and subsequent state failure. Disintegration of former Yugoslavia and emergence of successive states in Europe had caused immense violence. Simultaneously in Africa, ethnic strife in Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994) were high profile humanitarian crisis, which at least received attention if not proper response from international community. Beside these high profile intra-state conflicts, numerous low scale civil wars leading humanitarian crisis took place in 1990s.

In the 21st Century, the factors shaping the concept of humanitarianism are changing 'from war on terror to war on weather' (Munslow and O'Dempsy 2010: 1223). The terrorist's attack of 9/11 and declaration of War on Terror led by US, has shaped both the UN and humanitarianism. Today, climate related issues have played important role not only in development of complex humanitarian emergencies but also with independent impact. For example, Darfur in Sudan, where continued drought led to peoples' migration and involvement of government in violence as a party has led to a complex humanitarian crisis.

Simultaneously, in last a few years high profile natural disasters like the South Asia tsunami (2004), South Asian floods (2006), cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008), Haiti

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1 According to Natsios complex humanitarian emergency is characterised by: the deterioration or complete collapse of central government authority; ethnic or religious conflicts and wide spread abuse of human rights; episodic food insecurity, frequently deteriorating into mass starvation; microeconomic collapse involving hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and net decrease in gross national product; and massive population movement for the search of shelter and foods. Natsios cited in Koch (1999: 211).

earthquakes (2010), Pakistan floods (2010), and Japanese earthquake (2011) have increased. The increasing number of affected peoples has provided challenges as well opportunity to the UN humanitarian system to engage constructively. In such situation, the humanitarian role of the UN has become more important.

In last a few years, number of natural disasters is increasing. The number of natural disasters rose from 200-250 per year in the mid-1990s to 400-450 a year in 2000-2005 (WFP 2007: 06). In 2006, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) recorded 483 disasters. The figure for 2007 was down slightly to 441 (WFP 2007: 06). In 2010 number of natural disasters further declined to 250 (OCHA 2011: 02). The WFP, one of the constituting part of the UN humanitarian system, delivered an unprecedented amount of food almost four million metric tons to more than 102 million people in 78 countries in 2008 (WFP 2009: 03).

Severity of damage in terms of death, affected people and loss of property is also changing. Number of affected people needing assistance has always been greater than the death. Between 1994 and 2003, natural disasters claimed an annual average of 58,000 lives and affected an annual average of 258 million people (HPG 2006: 10). But in last a few years, death in natural disasters is declining but number of affected people in increasing day by day. Mean of death tool in natural disasters was 140,000 in the late 1980s which reduced to 59,000 by 2003 (Alexander 2007: 04). As the mean of death tool has declined, number of affected people has been increased. It might be caused by development in information technology and improvement in reporting system. Even if we exclude the medium and short term disasters, large scale disasters are alone seems to exceeding the mean of 2003 that is 59,000. For example, the South Asian tsunami (2004), Cyclone Nargis (2008), and Haiti earthquake (2010), have exceeded the mean death of 59 thousands of 2003.

Changing patterns of disasters has provided immense opportunity to the UN humanitarian system. In 21st century, due to changing climate patterns consequently increase in disasters like droughts, floods and famines have increased the number of affected peoples. As number of affected peoples increased, the UN response to affected peoples has also increased. In 2005, the UN humanitarian system assisted 26 million people. This number reached to 31 million in 2006 but it slightly declined to 30 million in 2008. Once again it started rising and pecked up to 50 million in 2011 (Stoianova 2010: 02).

Table 1.1: Overview CAP and beneficiaries of the UN humanitarian aid 2005-2011

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
CAP Requirements in billion US$	1.7	4.7	3.9	3.8	7.0	7.1	7.4
CAP Beneficiaries in million	26	31	27	25	30	30	50

Source: Adopted from Stoianova (2010: 02)

In the humanitarian endeavour, various UN specialised agencies, funds and programmes like Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Health Organisation (WHO), and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations plus humanitarian coordination agencies such as Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) along with main UN bodies are involved on the behalf of the United Nations. These six relief agencies have different roles as per their specialisation in humanitarian domain.

Besides, there are a few other agencies like International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) that also participates in humanitarian assistance missions. The UNHCR is concerned with betterment of refugees while the IOM manages the welfare of the internationally displaced persons and repartition of refugees. The United Nations Volunteers' provide volunteers to assist in the complex emergency (Minear et al 1997: 25).

Besides natural and manmade disasters and the UN humanitarian system's response to it, globalisation, skyrocketing food and fuel prices, and global financial crisis have reduced the living standard, particularly of those who were already below poverty line. Globalisation has weakened the states' capacity to continue social security system. States' capacity to provide basic needs like health food and basic education has declined. The financial crisis of 2008 has further weakened the states' capacity on the one hand and

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made millions of people unemployed on the other. Further, skyrocketing food prices has left millions of people hungry and malnourished. These factors have affected mostly to Underdeveloped states were severely affected by these factors.

Response to these challenges will further test the UN capacity to respond effectively on the one hand and on the other success in it will decide the place of the UN humanitarian system in international humanitarian order.

So for concept of humanitarianism is concerned, there is no general definition for the term 'humanitarianism.' In humanitarianism literature, it is frequently correlated with the benevolent or philanthropic role of an individual and/or organisation to assist the peoples in need, irrespective of their nationality, race, religion creed or ideological/political affiliation. Henri Dunant, the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross, has tried to relate the humanitarianism with the principles of impartiality and voluntarism (Ranganathan 2006: 216). David Rieff in A Bed for the Night has tried to define the humanitarianism that largely rests upon the impartiality, neutrality and independent provision of relief to victims. Jean Pictet defines humanitarianism as a 'doctrine which aims at the happiness of the human species, or if one prefers, it is an attitude towards mankind, on a basis of universality' (Ranganathan 2006: 216). Ideally speaking, humanitarian act is perceived as motivated by an altruistic desire to provide life-saving relief; to honour the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence; and to do more good than harm (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 11).

In essence, the concept of humanitarianism suggests human life and dignity are valuable and should be protected irrespective of gender, race, creed or political affiliation (Macrae 1998: 24). It is often correlated with providing assistance to the victims of disasters without expecting anything in return. Those organisations and actions that stick these goals, principles and outcomes are unambiguously humanitarianism; and the act or organisation as much deviates from these criteria, its' claim to be humanitarian is lesser plausible (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 11).

Humanitarian ideas and principles have been frequently linked to religious beliefs and teachings (Nishikawa 2005: 15). It is a characteristic of the all religion ranging from the Confucianism to Christianity. In Christianity, the New Testament the 'charity' has been regarded as the highest good by Saint Paul (Nishikawa 2005: 15). The Bible teaches

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Christians to 'love thy neighbour as thyself.' It means that a Christian should give the same weight to the interest of others as one gives to one's own interests. The Christianity owes the idea that all are neighbours and those who are unable to get salvation, the able have duty to help unable.

The Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism are also rich source of the notion of humanitarianism. According to the Upanishads every individual has a personal, social, and economic responsibility, if discharged properly; there will be no need for charity (Nishikawa 2005: 15). The Hindu concept of 'daan', meaning 'gift without expectation of return' is inspired by the notion of humanity (Binder, Meier and Steets 2010: 14).

In Islam, there are basically two types of charity: legally prescribed (zakat) and voluntarily (sadauat) (Isaac 1993: 14). The zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, obliges a Muslim to donate 1/40 of his/her property annually. Among different religions the Judaism seems to be keener towards the notion of humanity (Isaac 1993: 14). In Judaism, humanitarianism is considered to be one of the three foundations upon which the world was created (Nishikawa 2005: 15). In China, Confucius and Mencius use to teach that giving is virtuous. The larger family and state also were seen as philanthropic institution.

Classical Humanitarianism

In classical humanitarianism, there were specific conditions and principles that must guide any humanitarian activity, such as provision of relief and protection without advantaging one of the parties to conflict (Nascimento 2009: 60). Classical humanitarianism is based upon three key assumptions: separation between relief and development; recognition and acceptance of the limitations of operation imposed by the sovereignty; and conception of humanitarian aid as neural (Nascimento 2009: 60). Unlike the new humanitarianism, the main objective of the relief operations was to provide life-saving immediate relief. The classical humanitarians were no more interested in altering the structural conditions like extreme poverty and inequality. The relief agencies were supposed not to arbitrarily intervene militarily or politically in domestic affairs without consent of affected state to provide life-saving assistance and promote and protect human rights. Above all the humanitarian assistance was principled. The relief agencies are guided and restricted by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles were 'source of light' for conducting humanitarian relief operations.

The classical humanitarianism is based upon four normative principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles, for classical humanitarianism, are both an end and means to an end. These principles are important because they ensure greater accessibility to victims, tax and visa-free movement of goods and persons provides protections in armed conflicts and reject any distinction among victims if their needs are equal. It is an end because adherence of these principles provides edge over politicised relief in term of gaining access to victims. All these principles have their own meaning and significance for the relief activity.

The notion of humanitarianism has changed. In the beginning, the humanitarian assistance was envisaged as provision of immediate short term relief for wounded in armed conflicts. The basic thrust of immediate relief include care for the sick and victims; supply of food, clothing and medicines; and measures to protect civilians and assist them to recover from the immediate effects of hostilities or disaster and also to provide conditions necessary for survival (Ranganathan 2006: 200). The assistance was provided according to the principles of classical humanitarianism because the principles were considered as 'currency' to ensure the access to victims. In conflict situations, consent of the host state or conflicting parties was supposed to be prerequisite for extending relief assistance. Further, the principles of humanitarianism helped the relief agencies in ensuring safety of personnel, free passage of consignments and exemption from taxes levied on these goods.

In modern age the states, Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) put humanitarianism in practice in different ways. The International Committee of the Red Cross, established by Henri Dunant in 1863 is regarded as first humanitarian agency. In 20th century humanitarian organisations spread all over Europe and America. In the Britain, Save the Children Fund (established by Eglantyne Jebb and colleagues in 1919) and Oxfam (1942) were established (Walker and Maxwell 2009: 26). While in US, American Relief Administration (ARA) took shape during first World War while International Rescue Committee and CARE evolved into humanitarian organisation out of the turmoil of second World War (Slim 2000: 09). Humanitarian agencies have spread in the non-Western world also.

But it was in the aftermath of World War II that humanitarianism gained a new momentum (Belloni 2007: 452). Along with Westphelian notion states' sovereignty, individual human rights were also recognised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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in 1948. The humanitarian crisis in Biafra (1967-70) in underlined the limited effectiveness of classical humanitarianism (Belloni 2007: 452). In late 1960s getting reluctant from the ICRC's performance during Nigerian civil war, a group led by Bernard Kouchner separated itself and established a new relief organisation named Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 1971 (Ranganathan 2006: 218). In contrast to classical humanitarianism of ICRC, the Medecins Sans Frontieres led to emergence of the robust humanitarianism. From that point of time, humanitarian ideal was increasingly extended beyond the ICRC's account of classical humanitarianism that emphasises over principled assistance. Besides these, the UN humanitarian relief agencies, numerous NGOs and IGOs have also interred in the humanitarian field.

The most drastic normative change in humanitarianism occurred in the post-cold war era. The cases of frequent violation of the principles of 'classical humanitarianism' emerged as a usual trend. Newly emerging concept of humanitarianism hides a Western agenda of containment that has little to do with those humanitarian ideals originally used to justify the infringement of Westphalian sovereignty (Belloni 2007: 454). The abuse of humanitarian label has created a certain confusion regarding true character and purpose of humanitarian actions (Nascimento 2009: 59). The challenges to the principles were seen in two different ways: as a lesson learned from conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda in early 1990s, and secondly as manipulation of humanitarian aid by political, military actors (Gibbons and Piquard 2006: 12). Particularly in the case of Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1994), despite massive violence and gross human rights violations against Tutsis, the international community's response was mainly symbolic popularly known as 'too little too late'. In contrast to Somalia and Rwanda, the Gulf-Crisis (1989-1992) and Kosovo (1999) received greater attention of international community, particularly the major power.

The four factors: forces of destruction, forces of production, forces of compassion, and technology, are responsible for the change in concept of humanitarianism (Barnett 2011: 22-29; Barnett and Weiss 2008: 15-21). The *forces of destruction* include those factors that place individuals at risk. These factors have changed overtime. During the Cold-War primarily natural disasters causing human suffering were taken into account while in post-cold war era ethnic cleansing, crime against humanity, war crimes along with natural disasters are considered as threats to wellbeing. The *'the forces of production'* determine

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the responsive capacity of donors' and international humanitarian relief agencies. Such forces include capitalism, the economy, ideology regarding states' role in society, and the funding environment (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 16).

The '*forces of compassion*' refers to the psychological, utilitarian, religious, and biological factors that oblige the donors to help distant strangers (Barnett 2011: 25). Advances in '*technology*' have brought closer those who have and the one who need (Barnett 2011: 29). Changes in transportation and telecommunication like satellite, web-based technologies, and telecommunication have made the international community know about the disasters and quick response to it possible. Simultaneously technological advancement has improved the delivery system and logistical capacities (Barnett 2011: 295). These changes have motivated a new kind of humanitarianism popularly known as 'neo-humanitarianism.'

The Neo-Humanitarianism and its Characteristics

Towards the end of the 1990s, a new or political humanitarianism emerged, claiming to correct the wrongs of the past (Duffield 2001: 75). In humanitarian literature, it is described as 'neo-humanitarianism'. The nature of humanitarianism has changed in such a way that the traditional ideals of neutrality, impartiality, and independence have become myth (Mills 2005: 161). The underlying idea behind change was that humanitarian assistance should incorporate long term objectives such as development, human rights protection, and peace-building instead of focusing solely of humanitarian objectives per se (Nascimento 2009: 61). It views the classical humanitarianism as naive and requires humanitarian actors to address the root cause of the problems. New humanitarianism has three characteristics: the integration of human rights and peace-building into the humanitarian orbit; the ending of the distinction between development and humanitarian relief; and the rejection of the principle of neutrality (Barfod cited in Fox 2001: 276).

Unlike the classical humanitarianism which is based upon providing relief to victims, the new humanitarianism links relief to development, conflict resolution and societal reconstruction (Duffield 2001: 75). Further, in neo-humanitarianism, the policy has started shifting from mere short term assistance towards conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, developing tools and institutions able to take transformations that would lead to violence reduction and conflict prevention (Nascimento 2009: 61). Politicisation

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and inclusion of military in assistance missions has blurred the line between political, military and humanitarian objectives. As a consequence, manipulation of humanitarian action has led to confusion and made matters worse at the expense of the victims.

In the neo humanitarianism, the scope of humanitarian assistance has broadened to include the military intervention, physical protection and human rights protection in addition to the classical idea of providing relief (Ranganathan 2006: 207). The numbers of relief agencies vertically and horizontally expanded. Now the field is no more limited to states and a few NGOs and IGOs. The new humanitarianism is based on a consequentialist ethical framework (Duffield 2001: 75). Like the classical humanitarianism, neo-humanitarianism has some defining characteristics.

The field of humanitarianism has been institutionalised in the last few decades. It is hallmark of the neo-humanitarianism. Before the 1990s there were relatively few agencies that provided relief and they had few sustained interactions (Barnett 2010: 175). In the 1990s, the situation changed drastically. The humanitarian domain very soon witnessed the plethora of intra-state conflicts broke out and hundreds of relief agencies particularly the NGOs responded. Donors' who were providing more funds, expected recipients to be more accountable and demonstrate effectiveness (Barnett 2010: 175). Beside, increasing number of relief agencies and donors' expectations, growing number of conflicts has led the international community to demand a coherent, timely and effective response.

In response to increasing pressure, the humanitarian relief agencies have tended to rationalise their actions and develop code of conduct like the Sphere Project. Not only the NGOs but also the UN developed coordination tools like the DHA and CERF whereas the NGOs formed a common platform like Inter-Action and Inter-agency Council of Voluntary Associations. In the UN humanitarian system, there is a common platform named Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) for the NGOs and United Nations, where they discuss common humanitarian problems and take policy level decisions.

Secondly, in contrast to classical humanitarianism, neo-humanitarianism is politicised. Normatively, classical humanitarianism was based upon the non-political principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The classical humanitarians understood politics as a 'moral pollutant'. In contrast to principled humanitarians, neo-humanitarianism holds the view that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate politics

from humanitarianism (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 04). Neo-humanitarians do not have respect for the principle of neutrality and impartiality. They are of the view that 'we are not sure that speaking out always saves lives, but we are certain that silence kills' (Biberson cited in Fox 2001: 277). In neo-humanitarianism, humanitarian assistance is seen as an integral part of donors' strategy to transform and resolve conflicts, decrease violence, and to promote democracy and human rights (Nascimento 2009: 63). Through transforming structural deficiencies like democratic institution building, reducing poverty, and promoting respect for human rights, neo-humanitarians want to establish a society which will be less prone to conflicts. Their actions have political consequence and are viewed as political in the field therefore, they cannot be apolitical.

Thirdly, unlike classical humanitarianism, neo-humanitarianism is a goal-oriented (Fox 2001: 279). The classical humanitarians aim to provide immediate life-saving relief. But neo-humanitarianism is interested in finding and eliminating structural causes like poverty and inequalities. According to neo-humanitarian logic, action should be undertaken according to its effect and contribution in achievement of long term objectives (Nascimento 2009: 61). Conditionality, threats to suspend or delay assistance until certain conditions are met, is often used tool to achieve desired goal. The goals enshrined in the neo-humanitarianism are supplement to the liberal democratic ideology (Nascimento 2009: 61). Neo-humanitarianism is so closely related with the liberalism that Barnett has called it 'liberal humanitarianism' (Barnett 2011: 09).

This neo-humanitarianism requires humanitarian actors to address the root cause of the crises (Gibbons and Piquard 2006: 13). Under neo-humanitarianism relief agencies are no more inspired by the 'humanitarian imperative' but by the 'consequentialist ethics' (Nascimento 2009: 61). For them, structural conditions like poverty, hunger, resource competition and undemocratic institutions are responsible for the conflicts. Solution of those problems, according to neo-humanitarians, lie in elimination of poverty, hunger through promotion of development democratic institution. This is reason why the neo-humanitarians are not only interested providing emergency life-saving relief but also the elimination of structural factors that causes long term human vulnerability.

Approaches of the Humanitarianism

Nowadays, humanitarian assistance is broadly understood in two distinct ways. First, it is seen as a part of foreign policy and based on rational calculation of states' interests, and second, it is seen as independent of governments and a matter of relieving suffering without distinction. The use of humanitarian aid as tool of foreign policy become usual in 1990s, when the humanitarianism was at crossroad and its' principles were at tight rope. End of cold war has removed the constraints from the functioning of the United Nations on the one hand, and emergence on intra-state conflict and globalisation of conflicts have provides opportunity to engage with it, on the other. The practitioners of humanitarian action were of view to alter the practice. In this regard, a few are of the view that humanitarianism should return 'back to the basis' while others proposed to accommodate the changing dimensions. In this process four views can be identified.

The first debate took place between the '*maximalists and minimalists*' approaches. The maximalists and minimalists differ on purpose of humanitarian assistance. Should the international assistance be aimed at providing short term emergency relief immediately after a disaster or long term prevention of future disasters by eliminating structural causes and building sustainable infrastructure?

The maximalist are no longer satisfied with saving victims today and leaving them to die tomorrow. The maximalists expect relief organisations to be inspired to transform the structural conditions that endanger populations (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 03). The maximalists are often seen as the protagonists of the liberal order because they are concerned with the promotion of particular agenda. The maximalists have a more ambitious agenda for employing humanitarian action as a part of comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts (Weiss 1999a: 02). Their agenda includes democracy and human rights promotion, peace-building and establishing the rule of law (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 03). Those humanitarians, who are concerned with removing the structural causes of human suffering, adhere to 'alchemical humanitarianism' (Barnett 2011: 22).

In contrast to maximalist humanitarians, minimalist humanitarians are concerned with providing emergency life-saving relief. Neo-humanitarians are not crazy about the linking development with humanitarian relief to eliminate the root causes of the problems and rely on immediate relief. Because of its' believe in short term nature of relief, humanitarianism

is also known as 'emergency humanitarianism' (Barnett 2011: 22). Instead of politicisation, they uphold the principles of humanitarianism. Arguing that poorly designed humanitarian assistance can promote violence. The minimalist humanitarians like Marry Anderson believe that humanitarian assistance should 'do good without doing harm' or ;do the least harm' (Anderson cited in Weiss 1999a: 15).

The second debate evolves the divide between the *'principled and politicised'* humanitarianism. The main contrast between these two perspectives is on relationship between humanitarianism and politics. The first group emphasises over the principled humanitarianism i.e. based on principles of humanity, neutrality and independence whereas second over a more overt and intentionally politicised humanitarianism.

Diagram 1.1: Four views of humanitarianism, distinguished on the basis of their attitude and operating principles.

	Classicists ⟷ Minimalists ⟷ Maximalists ⟷ Solidarists		
Engagement with political authorities	Eschew political confrontation		Advocate controversial public policy
Neutrality	Avoid taking sides		Take the side of selected victims
Impartiality	Deliver aid using proportionality and non-discrimination		Skew the balance of resource allocation
Consent	Peruse a sine qua non		Override sovereignty as necessary

Source: Weiss (1999a: 04).

The first school is also known as the 'classists' (Weiss 1999a: 02). This approach is also known as 'Dunantist' account of humanitarianism (Middleton and O'Keefe 2006: 544). The ICRC is leading protagonist of this view. The classists see politics as a 'moral

pollutant' (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 04). They stresses the absolute nature of the principles of impartiality and neutrality as the basis of their action, and has thereby earned access and trust around the world, other bodies put a different spin on these principles (Roberts 1999). The classists define the humanitarianism as opposite of politics (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 04). They have clear preference for the principle of independence because they believe that independence from political actors provides greater accessibility. Evidence confirms their belief. As the diagram 1.1 shows, the more an agency departs from the classical perspective the degree of politicisation increases. The classists' humanitarianism prevailed until late 1980s (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 05). The classists, even today, claim that 'back to the basic' is the reliable way out of the present humanitarian security challenges (Bizimana 2006: 35).

The second school is of view that politics and humanitarian action 'could not and should not be disassociated' (Steering committee cited in Weiss 1999a: 02). This approach is also known as 'Wilsonian' account of humanitarianism (Middleton and O'Keefe 2006: 544). Political humanitarians criticise principled humanitarianism for offering simple philanthropic response focused on providing food, shelter and treating symptoms. Thomas Weiss places himself as protagonist of this camp (Weiss 1999a: 02). They hold the view that it is impossible for the humanitarian agencies to be apolitical (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 05). Political humanitarianists like Hugo Slim notes that when charity and philanthropy are end in themselves and left to float free of any serious challenges to power, humanitarianism is limited to offering help, but never redress (Bridges 2010: 1253). Activities which political humanitarianism touches in the field, are political issues like: human rights, development, democracy promotion and peace-building. They are political because they propose to treat causes not symptoms, thus are indulging in the politics of transformation (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 04).

In their approach, political humanitarians come closer to maximalists. It was the case because aid workers were working in a different environment which was more conflicting and violence prone. The complex emergencies of post-cold war era were characterised by state failure, refugee flight, migration, militia and population at risk from violence, disease and hunger (Barnett 2008: 142). This situation was partiality caused by failure of political institutions, development and protection of human rights. In such situation, unlike emergency humanitarians, political humanitarians offer a rights-based and development

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oriented account of humanitarianism. Therefore, political humanitarians have emphasised over institution building and democracy promotion, protection and promotion of human rights, and ensuring the sustainable development.

The United Nations and Humanitarianism

In the UN, besides the institutions specifically devoted to manage the humanitarian affairs like the CERF and DHA, and specialised agencies, funds and programme, main United Nations bodies like the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Secretary General also look after the humanitarian issues. The main UN bodies are primarily concerned with what to do while constituents of the humanitarian system how to do question. The constituents of the UN humanitarian system, although are not separable in absolute sense, but broadly speaking can be categorised into two parts: first containing the general bodies of the UN system performing the humanitarian function, and second institutions specifically devoted to manage the humanitarian aid.

In the UN Charter, there is no any specific provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of natural or man-made disaster. Among the four goals enshrined in the UN Charter consists the mandate to achieve international cooperation in solving the economic, social cultural or humanitarian problems and to be 'a centre' for harmonising the actions in attainment of those actions.

Nevertheless, Art. 55 of the Charter pertaining to economic and social cooperation states that the UN shall promote the higher standard of living; solution to international economic, social and health related problems; and universal respect for and observance of the human rights and fundamental freedom. Although there is no explicit provision for humanitarian assistance yet the phrase 'and related problems' [Art. 55(b)] provides opportunity for positive interpretation. Art. 56 seems to imposing an obligation on the UN members, through the pledge, with which it opens, to act and cooperate to achieve the aims set out in Article 55 (Macalister-Smith 1985: 58). Thus interconnected interpretation of Articles 55, 56 and 2(2) obliges the members to share the burden of expenditure even of 'and related problems' (Art. 55(2)) might be of humanitarian character [Art. 1(3)] ((Macalister-Smith, 1985: 59; Zwitter, 2011: 52).

The provision for establishment of specialized agencies to enhance social and economic cooperation is enshrined in Art. 59. Similarly, Article 22 of the charter has empowered the General Assembly to established such 'subsidiary organs' as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. To cope with various challenges, Specialised Agencies, Funds and Programmes were created within the UN system. The underlying assumption behind the creation of specialised agencies was that successful international action within each separate field requires participation at the national level and that only decentralized system could cope with the size and task facing the United Nations (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 60). Applying this power, the UNGA had created different bodies like: the United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Refugee, United Nations Children Emergency Fund, and the UN Relief and Works agency for Palestine refugees in west Asia. The most important, among others, was the United Nations office of the Disaster Relief Coordinator.

Because specialised agencies are autonomous body so to prevent the dysfunction of autonomy, the charter envisaged the coordination role of the UN in respect of specialized agencies (Art. 58). Art. 63(2) gave particular responsibility to the ECOSOC (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 60-61). Specialised agencies are autonomous bodies; therefore, coordination is still consultative, deliberative and voluntary. The ECOSOC major responsibility for coordination was to be discharged through coordinating committee with assistance of Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) now Chief Executive Board, established in 1946 (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 61).

The General Assembly is primary deliberative organ in the UN system. Applying the power mentioned in Art. 22 of the charter, which has empowered to established such 'subsidiary organs' as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions, the General has created different bodies like the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the UN Relief and Works agency for Palestine refugees in west Asia. The most important in humanitarian field was the UNDRO in 1971.

Turbulent and full of human suffering last decade of the 20th Century has made the fact apparent that the Security Council could not perform its role to ensure international peace and security if state and non-state actors would remain violating humanitarian norms. If state leaders will continuously violating humanitarian norms and encouraging ethnic cleansing, systemic violence and genocide, international peace and security could not be

ensured. Similarly, non-state actors will continue to violently charging against peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers, it would be difficult for the SC to ensure international peace and security. In such situation, to restore humanitarian norms and ensure international peace and security, the Security Council has to deal effectively with states and non-state actors.

Until the Cold War, the Security Council was not so much embraced with humanitarian maters as today is. Over the time, (Security) Council's interest in humanitarian affairs has certainly grown, even if its wiling to act has expanded at slower rate (Luck 2006: 83). Approximately two and a half year later the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 46/182, in his 'Supplement to Agenda for Peace' the Secretary General taking into account the recent development in field, recognised the need to use the UN forces to protect the humanitarian aid operations (Luck 2006: 84).

In humanitarian domain, the Security Council plays two roles. First, under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has authority to impose sanctions to ensure compliance by governments. It order to ensure compliance, the Security Council has imposed such sanctions that have not only political but also humanitarian consequences. Under such sanctions regimes, humanitarian agencies face serious difficulties in providing emergency relief assistance. In this regard, taking into account to humanitarian consideration, the SC has removed such sanctions that have directly impact upon peoples' life rather than targeted governments. For instance in case of Iraq, taking into account the data about the terrible consequences of sanctions, released by the World Health Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organisation and United Nations Children Emergency Fund, the Security Council Resolution 986 permitted the sale of 'oil for foods and medicines' (Somavia 1998: 359). Second, is to provide security to humanitarian aid workers. The Security Council Resolution 787 recognised that the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia Herzegovina is a step towards restoring peace and security in the region (Fielding 1996: 564). Further, any attempt to disrupt humanitarian supply would be treated as a threat to international peace and security.

The Economic and Social Council is main UN body to discuss international economic and social issues. Since 1998 the Council has incorporated a humanitarian affairs segment. The ECOSOC major responsibility for coordination was to be discharged through coordinating committee with assistance of Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) now

Chief Executive Board, established in 1946 (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 61). OCHA and its humanitarian partners (both the UN and non-UN), contribute to the ECOSOC five-week substantive annual session every year. The Secretary General annually reports to the ECOSOC on humanitarian issues.

The Charter describes the Secretary-General as the 'chief administrative officer' of the organization. He/she plays important role in the UN humanitarian system despite being not such explicit provision for coordination role of the SG in the UN Charter. In the humanitarian field

> "The leadership role of the Secretary-General is critical and must be strengthened to ensure better preparation for, as well as rapid and coherent response to, natural disasters and other emergencies. This should be achieved through coordinated support for prevention and preparedness measures and the optimal utilization of, inter alia, an interagency standing committee, consolidated appeals, a central emergency revolving fund and a register of stand- by capacities". General Assembly Resolution 46/182.

Article 98 has empowered the Secretary General that s/he can bring the attention of UNSC to the issues that can threaten the international peace and security. Interpretation of Article 98 in relation to Articles 55 and 56 expands the role of the Secretary General to relatively new area of humanitarian assistance. The broadening the threats to international peace and security and inclusion of issues like civil war, HIV/AIDS and gross human rights violation have further expanded the role of the Secretary General. Historically, specific function relating to humanitarian assistance were increasingly entrusted to the Secretary General and his initiative, exercised in large scale disaster situation, received endorsement by the political organs (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 62). Following the General Assembly Resolution A/RES./2790 (XXVI) of 1971, Secretary General established the UN East Pakistan Relief Operation.

The Emergency Relief Coordinator of the OCHA works working under the direction of the Secretary-General in humanitarian field (A/RES/46/182: para 33). Being a part of the UN Secretariat, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the behalf of OCHA, reports to the Secretary-General. In the context of complex emergencies the Secretary-General may dispatch Special Representatives or Special Envoys to a country or region in crisis. He/she can also appoint the RC as. At headquarters, OCHA briefs Special Envoy or Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian situation in

the country or region he/she is due to travel to. The Secretary General annually reports to the General Assembly and ECOSOC.

The UN humanitarian system and humanitarianism do not interact in isolation. Numerous intervening variables like politics, availability of funds, and behaviour of the host sate play important role in this process. Politics as intervening variable has played an important role between the functioning of the UN humanitarian system and concept of humanitarianism. In the post-cold war era, political constraints imposed by bi-polar system on the UN no more prevail. The humanitarian enterprise if funded voluntarily therefore, the donors' have great voice. Donors' lust for politicised, development-oriented, and rights-based approach in post-cold war era has left two options before relief agencies. Whether to adopt donors' conditions willingly or unwillingly of lose financial base jeopardising institutional survival.

Such situations have created a dilemma before the UN humanitarian system. On the one hand, there are humanitarian principles of humanity, imparity, neutrality and independence, and on the other institutional survival. The donors' grip over the UH humanitarian system is tightening in the form of increasing earmarked funding. Increasing numbers of NGOs in the field and their flexibility to adjust according to donors' will has provided them edge over the UN humanitarian system. Therefore, donors' increasing dependence on their own national NGOs has posed financial challenge before the UN humanitarian system in 1990s. The situation has left the UN humanitarian system to choose one from the humanitarian principles and institutional survival.

This chapter provides a theoretical overview of the relations between the humanitarianism and UN humanitarian system. Interaction between these two has enabled as well as disabled each other. In cold war politics, when the UN humanitarian system was constrained and any attempt to provide relief was seen as helping any ideological block, humanitarian principles were strictly followed in relief operations. In contrast to cold war, post-cold war situations freed the UN from the ideological constraints and excessive use of Veto power consequently enabled it to engage more constructively with the changed circumstances. Further, in post 9/11 the UN adopted integrated missions, mixing peace-keeping and humanitarianism, in Afghanistan (Atmar 2001; Macrae 2004). In this way both the UN and humanitarianism has affected each other.

Chapter 2

Institutional Aspects of the UN Humanitarian Aid System

During cold war, humanitarian issues have not been given proper consideration in the United Nations, in comparison to today. But for the last two decades, with disintegration of Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, humanitarian issues have been globalized. In this regard, among others, three factors- redefinition of security, which brought the human at the centre in security discourse; changing nature and proliferation of conflict all over the world, which increased the vulnerability of the peoples; and changed power equilibrium at international level, brought humanitarian issues in the mainstream politics. In the post-cold war period, there began a new trend to level conflicts as humanitarian emergencies.[1] To address the concerns of the victims, two types of humanitarianism- Emergency Humanitarianism, operationally limited to save the lives of victims, and Alchemist Humanitarianism, aimed to remove the inherent causes of human suffering, emerged (Barnett 2011: 37-41). In changed circumstances, to deal adequately with the humanitarian concerns, General Assembly, in Dec. 1991, passed the resolution 46/182, which paved the way for the greater institutionalization for the humanitarian issues in the UN. After this resolution, humanitarian issues in the UN relatively shifted from periphery to the core.[2] In this process, this chapter provides an overview of the institutional evolution of the UN humanitarian system, which evolved over past few decades. While highlighting institutional evolution, underlying assumptions and variables of the time that shaped the evolution, have been underscored. Regarding institutions, their mandates, role and functions, and accountability have been taken into account.

Human suffering and disaster agents are not new to humanity. They still exist, however, with varying magnitude of devastating impacts.[3] Beside man-made and technological, natural disaster agents- cyclones, droughts, famine and floods have caused tremendous human

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[1] Ramio Vayrynen (1996), *The Age of Humanitarian Emergencies*, Helesinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, Research for Action 25.

[2] Budget of humanitarian institutions is almost equal to peacekeeping operations. In 2009 UN CAP funding for humanitarian system was $ 7.0 billion, while peacekeeping budget during 1st July 2008 to 30th June 2009 was 7.1 billion.

[3] Forces of destruction, production, compassion, and development of technology have shaped the notion of hum-

suffering beyond the boundaries of region and nation-state. In post-World War II period, numerous people have left their homes as refugees and much more are internally displaced. Furthermore, civil wars and disintegrating empires had also added to the number of vulnerable.

As the disaster agents have affected humanity, response to human sufferings was shaped by specific assumptions of those times. In ancient and medieval times responses were shaped primarily by the religious factors. In the modern times humanitarian relief actions have been rationalised, yet, religious factors are still shaping humanitarian missions. With the origin and evolution of nation-state, based upon the Westphalian notion of sovereignty[4] responsibility to assist the people in need fall primarily within the purview of the affected states. During the First World War International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had approached to needy people through its principled action.[5] During the cold war ideological limits had been set to international humanitarian action. The principles of humanitarian actions were severely tested by the growing ideological tension and deepening cold war. Meanwhile, a new kind of humanitarian organization (Me'decins sans frontie'res) was set up to counter the ICRC, to circumvent the constraints of humanitarian law, which were seen as an obstacle to humanitarian action (Grossrieder, 2003: 12). In case of ICRC, humanitarian assistance was supposed to be a difficult task without the consent of the affected state. Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF), in contrast, believed in interventionist approach to humanitarian action. Both models have a number of strengths and limitations. For example, principled actors, in comparison to interventionists, easily get access to victims, but once consent of parties is denied, they left victims on their own fate.

Normative Principles of the UN Humanitarianism

The UN humanitarian aid system is principles-based system. These guiding principles have been enshrined in the UN charter and reiterated in various GA and ECOSOC resolutions from

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-anitarianism in every period of time. For historical account of humanitarianism see Michael Barnett (2011).

[4] Westphalian notion of sovereignty is characterized by the principle of non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction, which provides immunity from the external intervention, therefore, exclusive right to state in their domestic jurisdiction. For detail see Karns and Mingst (2010: 64).

[5] For detail see Forsythe (2005) and for more recent view see Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan (2007).

time to time including A/Res./46/182 of 1991. They enable the UN to ensure accessibility and enjoy confidence of the victims and warring parties. These principles are not only guiding, but also binding for the UN humanitarian actors. Such principles include the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence along with principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the member states must be fully respected in the delivery of the humanitarian assistance (A/Res./64/84- E/2009/87).

The Principle of Neutrality[6]

The principle of neutrality is an essential ingredient of the modern humanitarianism in general and the UN in particular. Simultaneously, according to Larry Minear (1999) it is one of the most controversial concepts in humanitarian world. Meanwhile, it denotes status of an actor, adhere it, in a given system. Principle of neutrality is described in the ICRC documents as 'in order to enjoy the confidence of all, the movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature' (Cited in Slim 1997: 347). While commenting on Pictet's commentary on ICRC neutrality, Plattne has acknowledged three ingredients of neutrality namely- abstention, prevention and impartiality (Slim 1997: 347). By nature neutrality is a negative principle, when it emphasises upon 'not to do and/or abstain' roles of actors. Non-participation in conflicts (abstention) is at the very core of the provisions for humanitarian assistance in the conventions (Mackintosh 2000: 08). Prevention proscribes the actors, within and outside of organization, from making institution/organization an instrument in the hands of particular individual/class to unnecessarily benefit/or marginalize persons/groups. Impartiality stands for the non-discrimination among victims having similar conditions of suffering.

J. Pictet, one of the well-known commentators on ICRC principles, has distinguished military and ideological neutrality and argued that being neutral means not taking part either in military or ideological conflicts (Pictet 1979: 54-9). In this vein, the Red Cross makes no distinction between good and bad wars... just and unjust causes or even aggressor and innocent (Fox, 2001: 277). Similarly, for the UN, 'neutrality preludes humanitarian actors

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[6] For interpretation of the humanitarian principles, the UN humanitarian system relies on the ICRC interpretations, see, Secretary General Report (A/Res/64/84- E/2009/87) page 7.

from taking sides in hostilities or engaging in controversies of a political, race, religious or ideological nature' (A/Res/64/84- E/2009/87, Para 23). It is a means to an end, a way to bolster impartiality and maximise the possibility of getting access to those who are suffering (Walker and Maxwell, 2009: 03).

The Principle of Impartiality

Principle of impartiality is positive in nature (Principle of Action). In ICRC documents, it is defined as activity which 'makes no discrimination on nationality, race religious belief, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs and to give priority to the most urgent cases of the need.' In operations, it stands for the adhering actors same attitude towards the victims in natural disasters and conflicting parties in complex humanitarian emergencies. Actors adhering, the principle of impartiality, are supposed to treat equally to all falling in their area of activity. At the heart of the principle of impartiality lies three elements- non-discrimination, proportionality of needs, and absence of subjective distinction (Mackintosh 2000: 08). Proportionality of needs means relief/assistance should be given in accordance to need, not discretionary. Non-discrimination means helping the victims according to their needs, irrespective of their class, sex, nationality, or any other basis which is internationally not accepted. Absence of subjective discrimination underlines the notion that no such individual decision can be taken which differentiate the innocent from guilty, good from bad and disserving from undeserving, and in this process assisting those who are at good side.

Principle of impartiality is logical culmination of the interaction between principle of humanity and the scarce resources of the material world. According to Weller (1998) whatever humanitarian action is being undertaken (which, to many, implies that such action must not be unneutral in the above sense), it must be administered in accordance with an objective standard which is applied equally to all parties. Similarly, Walker and Maxwell (2009: 02) observe that the principle of impartiality in given context stands for two interrelated meanings- First, suffering should be addressed without discrimination. Nationality, race, religious belief, class or political opinion should not make a difference. Second, because resources are finite, priority should be given to the most urgent case of need.

The system should be to alleviate the suffering of individuals, guided solely by the severity and urgency of their needs. No discrimination should be made in distribution of relied aids (A/Res./48 (I)).

There is a minor distinction between the principles of neutrality and impartiality. While the principle of impartiality allows the aid agencies to speak out politically during a conflict as long as they apply equal terms to all warring sides, neutrality actually demands that agencies should remain silent and abstain completely from the politics of a crisis (Fox, 2001: 277).

The Principle of Humanity

The principle of humanity adhere to the idea that humanitarian assistance should be extended to everyone in war and disaster based on what they need, not who they are. In Red Cross, humanity is defined as desire 'to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found ... to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being' (Fox 2001: 277). This idea is based on the assumption that 'humankind is one family and it is an intrinsic part of our humanity to both seek assistance and wish to provide assistance to those in need (Walker and Maxwell, 2009: 02). In this family, everyone has equal right to life, more appropriately, right to life with dignity. The multi-dimensional principle of humanity contains three key components: alleviation of human suffering; protection of life; and respect for the human being (Slim, cited in Manzo 2008: 63).

In a wider human family, relief agencies assist on the behalf of those who are comparatively better positioned. Hence, irrespective of where a disaster occurs, principle of humanity emphasises that sole purpose of humanitarian action is to prevent and elevate the human suffering (A/Res/64/84- E/2009/87, para 23).

The Principle of Independence

Originally, the principle of independence was not enshrined in the UN humanitarianism[7], but later GA Resolution 58/114 (2003) added independence as another important principle underpinning humanitarian actions. It underscores the relations of the UN vis-a-vis other

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[7] For detail see A/Res./46/182 of 1991.

actors and issues as well. The principle of independence has two interrelated meanings-general principle of independence and autonomy in relation to public authorities. Independence, in general, refers to a situation, when an actor working in condition of economic, political and religious independence in relation to outside forces, particularly governments and intergovernmental organizations. Autonomy from political authorities refers to a situation of absence of unnecessary intervention from public authorities- both national and international, in international affairs of a humanitarian actor. For the UN 'principle of independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented' (A/Res./60/124). Principle of independence reflects the idea that in policy formulation and operations it cannot be coerced by donors, members or host authorities.

Respects for State Sovereignty

It is one of the organizing principles around which the international system and the UN is organised. It denotes the two levels of supremacy of a state. Domestically no group or body of peoples can challenge its authority and internationally no state or any entity can interfere in domestic affairs of the others. External sovereignty logically culminates in sovereign equality of states. General Assembly reaffirmed that the affected state has primary role 'in the initiation, organization, coordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance' within its territory (A/Res/46/182, Annex 1, Para 3). An essential attribute of the respect for the state sovereignty within the UN system is the principle of consent. GA Resolution 46/182 underlines that- humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of affected country and in principle on the basis of the appeal of affected country.

The consent of affected parties, according to international humanitarian law, does not have impact upon the principles under which international actors operate (Mackintosh 2000: 11). Art. 2 of the UN Charter has enshrined some principles regarding the UN functioning. In this regard, Art. 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) are important. Art. 2(1) has recognised the 'sovereign equality' of member states. Art. 2(4) prohibits the members from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Last, but the most importantly,

Art. 2(7) restricts the UN from intervening in the matters which are essentially within the domestic purview of any state. Because these are cherished and organising principles of the UN, humanitarian assistance by the United Nations should be provided by the afflicted states' consent, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by the affected state.

Above mentioned principles are normative guidelines for the functioning of international, and particularly for the UN humanitarian aid system. In international humanitarian system, there are few actors which believe in interventionist humanitarianism, look these principles as imposing undue restraint in alleviation of human suffering. After highlighting the principles of the UN humanitarianism in this section, next section of the chapter tries to answer the first research question- what is international humanitarian assistance system? Simultaneously, it tries to locate the UN humanitarian assistance system in it.

International Humanitarian Assistance System

To assist the people in need, at international level, a complex network of humanitarian actors has been evolved. In this system different actors with different mandates are cooperate and sometimes compete with each other. In operational terms few are principled while others are interventionists or goal-oriented In terms of authority few are states while others are civil-society organisations. Some operate with maximalist approach (the UN) while others minimalist (the ICRC), some limited to relief while others in preventive. Therefore, they are committed to long term goal of development. For a long time, entire domain was limited to very few NGOs and states, operating with short term assistance (relief).

End of great powers rivalry in post-cold war era witnessed enhanced complexity of the international humanitarian system. Change in nature of conflict and redefinition of security led the analysts to redefine the vulnerability of the peoples. Therefore, since the end of the cold war one can observe multiple changes – increase in humanitarian action, increased number and verities of humanitarian actors, proliferation of tasks between different actors (e.g. militaries as relief and developmental actors), professionalization of relief aid, etc. (Heintze and Zwitter, 2011: 01). Once the UN was politically paralysed during cold-war but with the end of the power struggle between the East and the West, the United Nations engage

more actively in the field of disaster response (Heintze and Zwitter, 2011: 02). In international humanitarian system the UN specialised humanitarian institution along with Specialised Agencies, Funds and Programmes, has indulged in this enterprise. In this system, three set of actors have been involved.

The Donors

In international humanitarian assistance system, donors are those actors who finance the humanitarian operations. It include, broadly speaking, two set of actors namely- the states, and non-states, which includes individuals, corporate sector and foundations.

States are main donors in international humanitarian system. They have created different agencies like USAID[8] and Office of the Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in US, and Department For International Development (DFID) in United Kingdom (UK), in their governmental apparatus to allocate resources either bilaterally, direct to host country, or multilaterally through international organisations/institutions. Among states, there are two categories of actors- OECD and non-OECD donors. Most of the contribution comes from the top twenty donors of OECD states. The non-DAC donors contributed primarily in accordance with the UN guidelines, enshrined in the resolution 46/182, like respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and consent of affected states, while DAC donors on humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality (Altinger and Tortela 2007: 02). OECD's Development Assistance Committee consisting of twenty-two members, has largest contribution in international humanitarian assistance. In DAC countries, Sweden and Norway, in per capita terms, are 'humanitarian superpowers' while, in absolute terms, US is still the largest donor. DAC members jointly contributed approximately 90.1 to 98.7 per cent of total humanitarian funds, during 1999-2009 (DI 2010: 06).

Among non-DAC donors, a very few donors contribute most of the money. For example, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar contributed 64 per cent of non-DAC donation during 2000-2008 (Harmer and Martin 2010: 02). Similarly, top ten donors, in 2009, contributed 93 per cent of total non-DAC humanitarian aid. Largest donor of the group shapes the trends of

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[8] On November 3, 1961 President Kennedy created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead agency for administering U.S. foreign assistance programs.

overall non-DAC member contribution. Saudi Arabia contributed US$500 million to World Food Programme in 2008. Similarly in 2001 total non-DAC humanitarian donation was $732 million out of it $657 million was Saudi Arabia's contribution to Occupied Palestinian Territory (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005: 16). Non-DAC donors traditionally channeled their contribution bi-laterally, in 2007 which was 53 per cent. But in 2009 when Saudi Arabia does not repeated her bi-lateral donation to Yemen and China, more than three-quarter (83.6 per cent) assistance channeled multilaterally through the UN agencies (DI 2010: 32). In the same period, non-DAC contribution to Financial Tracking System was 14 per cent (Harmer and Martin 2010: 15).

Among private sector donors, there are individuals, corporations and philanthropist foundations (Altinger and Tortela 2007: 02). Most of the relief agencies except four- ICRC, Oxfam (GB), UNRWA and MSF, have not systematically maintained their archives pertaining to private sector humanitarian contribution. Among these four data shows that most of fund for ICRC, Oxfam and MSF came from individuals, followed by foundations and corporations. But the UNRWA was exception where 95.7 to 53.5 per cent assistance came from foundations, rest from individuals and corporations respectively (Altinger and Tortela 2007: 15; table 3). In total, private sector humanitarian funding has been constantly increased during 2000-2005. In 2000 it was 13.2, in 2001 13.3, 14.3 in 2002, 14.2 in 2003, in 2004 17.4, and in 2005 it was 24.4 per cent (Altinger and Tortela 2007: 09; table 2). Trends show that private sector funding to humanitarianism has constantly increased, except 2003 when it fell by 0.1 percent.

The Recipients

The recipients are those states that are affected by the disasters and receive assistance from the relief agents are called recipients. Such states are civil-strife, natural and technological disaster afflicted states. In post-cold war era, with globalization of conflicts, recipients of assistance have also globalised, yet developing world is still the largest recipient. In natural disasters US and Mexico, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia are particularly prone to disasters, followed by Latin America, Russia, Europe and Africa immediately (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004: 29).

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In natural disasters, Africa and Asia, during 1974-2003, shared 88 per cent of total reported killed and 96 per cent affected (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004: 29). In terms of affected people in natural disasters, South and Southeast Asian countries particularly China, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar are still ahead. Among these countries, in cases of drought India tops the list while in floods China. Despite being natural disaster prone areas, US and Mexico are far behind in terms of deaths (DI 2011: 01). But in terms of receiving aid they are not behind. During 1992-2003 among top five recipients Central America ranked first followed by India, Bangladesh, China and Egypt (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004: 51; table 11). In contrast to natural disasters, in terms of manmade disasters and causalities, Africa is far ahead than Asia, Europe and Latin America. If include the cases of manmade disasters in total disasters affected people, share of developing world in total victimhood, would increase.

In 1990s, total humanitarian aid increase from $21.billion in early days to $ 5.9 in 2000. A sizable part of assistance went to complex humanitarian emergencies (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois 2004: 50). Because most of complex emergencies were centred in African continent, so it got considerable attention. Although most of the victims fall in developing world, yet allocation of assistance in comparison to developed world is marginal. Even in developing countries, affected countries having greater geo-strategic importance got better response than lesser. For instance, in terms of allocation of funds per affected person, during 1990 and 2000, the Great Lakes region and Former Yugoslavia, get approximately twice in comparison to their surrounded recipient states (Buchanan-Smith and Randel 2002: 04). During 1999-2008, Sudan (11.4), Palestine/Occupied Palestine Territory (9.0), Iraq (8.1), Afghanistan (7.5) and Ethiopia (6.5) were top five recipients. (Figures within bracket denote recipient's percent of shares in total humanitarian assistance). First four of these recipients have geo-strategically, politically or economically important location in international system. While Ethiopia got fifth position in recipients list because she accommodates large number of refugees and immigrants from neighboring countries.

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The Relief Agents

Relief agents are primarily concerned with operational part of humanitarian missions. They provide assistance in the fields. They are links between donors and recipients. They raise funds from the donors- states, corporate or individual on the one hand and assist to disaster affected people, on the other. It includes three set of actors.

The UN Humanitarian System

The UN and its agencies are central to the international humanitarian system and play critical role in disaster response (HPG 2006: 03). In the humanitarian domain, the UN agencies include specialized agencies, funds and programmes along with Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). Among specialized agencies, funds and programmes, particularly six- United Nations High Commissioner of the Refugee (UNHRC) and World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) constitute the UN humanitarian system. Along with these, International Migration Organisation (IMO) and United Nations Voluntary (UNV), occasionally, participate in this system. OCHA, represented by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, coordinates the assistance at headquarter level, and at national and field level through his/her representative i.e. humanitarian/resident coordinator. Simultaneously, s/he manages Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which is permanent financial tool of the UN humanitarian system. IASC, with system wide reach, brings the UN and non-UN humanitarian actors together under a single roof. In this process UN regional bodies (although they are not integral part of the UN humanitarian system) are also important players.

International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement

It is comprised of the International Committee of Red Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and national Red Cross societies (HPG 2006: 03). By 2006 there were 185 national RC societies in the movement (Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan 2007: 01). At

international level, it collect funds from national and private donors while in field assists the local authorities of the affected governments.

Non-Governmental Organisations

They include both international (INGOs) like- Save the Children, MSF and Catholic Relief Service, and the locals. They, particularly INGOs, collect funds from people and states, and assist victims directly and/or in collaboration with local authorities. They are operational partners of the UN humanitarian system, when the un disburses her assistance through NGOs. No reliable data about how much funds are allocated through NGOs is available. However, it was estimated in 2001 that total international humanitarian assistance, including the UN allocation through NGOs, was above $1.5 billion (HPG 2006: 05).

The UN Humanitarian Aid System: Origin and Evolution

In the UN Charter, there is no any specific provision of humanitarian assistance for victims of disaster. Despite the fact, it has been evolved institutionally, functionally and principally overtimes. The evolution of the UN humanitarian system, in beginning, was the UN efforts were guided by two specific assumptions. First, immediately after Second World War, Human sufferings like refugees were short term problems and would be overcome very soon. Second, Primary responsibility to protect the vulnerable peoples lies with affected states. Therefore, the policies adopted by the UN, since its inception, were *ad hocist* and temporary in nature. Various Funds, Programmes and Specialised Agencies of the UN system worked to cope with disaster either in very loose coordination or in isolation. Each agency concentrated and restricted itself to its mandate in the field. For instance, the UNHCR was acting for the welfare of refugees and the WFP to feeding the disaster affected people in camps.

In post Second World War Europe, millions of people were homeless refugee and internally displaced, hence vulnerable. The UN created an *ad hoc* mechanism, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), to assist the people who were displaced in Central and Eastern Europe (Tsui and Myint U, 2004: 02, Hyndman, 2000: 08). The General Assembly asked (A/RES./48 (I)) the Secretary General to find ways to collect contributions, voluntarily from private individuals. The same resolution reaffirmed two operational principles (Macalister-Smith,

1985: 93) - relief assistance should not be used as political weapon and that no discrimination should be made in the distribution of relief aid. But soon assumption regarding refugee, that they were post war legacy was, proved wrong, when people started fleeing from soviet dominated Eastern Europe (e.g. Hungry) to the West.

Similar massive population movement was underway in India, Palestine, China and Korea. This people movement was inherently a political matter (Walker and Maxwell, 2009: 35), therefore, continuation of refugee problem pushed the General Assembly to create the UNHCR as permanent subsidiary organ of the UN. Since its inception, international politics (from predominance of high politics to low politics), and power equilibrium (structurally from bi-polarity to unipolarity to multi-centric world) had changed ...(so) the UNHCR transformed itself from an office of coordination towards a fundraising, operational protection and assistance organization (Walker and Maxwell, 2009: 36). Geographically, it expanded from Europe to Asia, Africa and Latin America. The UNHCR now oversees humanitarian assistance including shelter, sanitation, water and food rather than limited to protection only. But all these activities are limited to refugees.

The UN response to disaster and human sufferings in initial phase was mainly *ad hoc*. There was no such permanent agency or institution in the UN system to coordinate the functions of all relevant agencies including the actors of the UN system. All actors of the UN system in humanitarian field were addressing the particular cause. The agencies were funded voluntarily by the states and non-state actors. Even there was no institutionalised mechanism for information sharing. These factors led to inter-agency competition, therefore, reducing the potential operational capacity and effectiveness. Such approach lasted until 1971. Such *ad hocist* approach to disaster relief was sustained by three prevalent and interrelated assumptions (Kent, 1983: 695).

First underlying assumption regarding the nature of the disaster was different at that time from what it is today. In those days, it was a widespread understanding that disasters were unpredictable and short term, in sharp contrast to the scenario today. It was unpredictable, therefore, it was difficult to have pre-disaster preparedness too. Those days, unlike present times, meteorological science was not so developed. The unpredictability assumption, causing

lack of preparedness, was sustained by 'cultural or religious belief' (Broun, B. quoted in Kent 1983: 695). Second, while addressing the vulnerable, cultural and local factors were not taken into account. In times of need, 'anything which could be eaten, provide warmth and shelter would be utilized' (Kent, 1983: 695) and should be provided to victims. In this respect no matter where the disaster occurs amidst which culture and religion, what determined the usefulness of assistance was the number of saved lives and protection of victims. Third assumption was pertaining to 'supposed inherent resilience of afflicted nation-state and... fundamental distinction between disaster and development aid' (Kent, 1983: 695). In those days it was widespread and accepted belief that all the costs of development could be borne only by the affected states. Developmental aid was supposed to be used for the political, social, economic and environmental development.[9] In contrast, disaster relief did not entail the high cost of social and structural change; its objective was to restore the population to pre-disaster situation (Kent, 1983: 695).

In late 1960s situations begin to change. Once dominant assumption that disasters are short term in nature began to change with development of new knowledge such as disasters had much more incubation period than assumed and the co-relation between various interrelated factors causing it, strongly surfaced. For instance, famine in a state having unstable regime leads to civil disturbance which in turn provokes a manmade disaster; or a manmade disaster triggers off a flood of refugee, leaving the country without farmers willing to plant and harvest, which in turn threatens the onset of a famine (Kent, 1983: 696). Similarly, development of science and technology had opened the way for prediction and preparedness in natural disaster. Watertight compartmentalisation between developmental aid and disaster relief seemed to scramble when correlation between 'social factors' and disaster began to be established. Correlation between social factors like poverty and disaster provided a new insight paving the new way for humanitarianism at the UN.

Changed circumstances of late 1960s required new sophisticated, need based and coordinated approach to meet the challenges of disasters. To this end, some sort of institutional architecture was required. But, the major question was who should take the responsibility to

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[9] Gulsan Sachdeva, a lecture on 'Rethinking Reconstruction through Development Aid' delivered at Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi on 25 Feb. 2011.

coordinate the international humanitarian assistance? Being an intergovernmental body and worldwide presence, the UN took responsibility. Beginning from here, the UN humanitarian aid system has emerged not only as a major player but also as coordinating, financing and information sharing body in international humanitarian system. As the UN got maturity, with the passage of time, humanitarian coordination and cooperation became progressively less *ad hoc*.

In a move toward institutionalization, in 1964 the ECOSOC first requested the Secretary-General to study the arrangement of coordinating the international disaster assistance (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 130). In response to ECOSOC resolution 1064 (xxxvii) of 1964, which requested the SG to study the types of assistance which could provide, SG explained the procedure set up by ACC and expressed the willingness to strengthen coordination. In his report to ECOSOC, the Secretary-General further underlined the need of rehabilitation and reconstruction rather than immediate relief by the UN system.

In 1965, following the report by SG, the GA passed the resolution 2034 (XX) underlining three focal points. First, SG's willingness to provide assistance in coordination. Second, called upon the UN agencies and programmes to intensify their efforts to improve coordination under UNSG. Third, recommended the member states to set up appropriate national machinery to assess relief requirement and if possible in close cooperation of the UN resident coordinator. For coordination, additional staff arrangement in the secretariat was authorised by the GA in 1968, but it was not until 1970, when an Assistance Secretary General (ASG) for inter-agency affairs was appointed, providing initial administrative framework for a permanent focal point for disaster relief coordination (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 130).

Following the disasters in Nigerian civil war (1967–1970), Bangladesh cyclones (1970), Peru earthquake and Bangladesh civil-war[10](1971), where following the disasters, a plethora of relief actors ranging from religious-secular, governmental- non-governmental, local-international and civil-military, had provided assistance in disaster hit areas. Despite all, need of the time was to ensure timely, adequate and effective assistance to save lives and prevent

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[10] For detail of Bangladesh civil war and the UN response to it see Oliver (1978).

sufferings. To make response effective and adequate, timely information, sufficient funds and coordination were required. But, these incidents and response, particularly in case of Peru, where UNDP's Resident Representative along with SG's Personal Representative and two joint missions, revealed that 'the UN family as a system of organisation is not well equipped for assisting countries in the kinds of operations that are called for in the first emergency phase in natural disaster.' Similarly, the UNHCR did not assisted the people displaced by the Nigerian civil war, because in its perception it was a case of internal displacement. These incidents led the SG to confirm that 'the UN system as a whole is not equipped to provide emergency relief', therefore, appropriate institutional architecture should be introduced.

At the time of desperate need, amidst fog of unpredictable responses, the UN took leadership to coordinate the actors' response in international humanitarian assistance system. Proposals were put forward in General Assembly to increase the UN ability to help people stricken by disasters. Ultimately in 1971 the GA resolution 2816 (XXVI) titled 'Assistance in Cases of Natural Disasters and Other Disaster Situations', established the 'Office of the UN disaster Relief Coordination (UNDRO), with office in Geneva. It was first permanent UN agency, created as remedy the institutional weakness noted by the UNSG, to deal with the humanitarian issues (Sheridan, 2000: 946). UNDRO was not supposed to assume all the responsibilities to meet the needs of disasters from its own capacity, but to catalyst and coordinator of donors of aid and assistances. The office was established as an entity under the UN Secretariat (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 132). Its coordination centre in Geneva would maintain contacts with over 90 donors, warn of disaster, inform about relief requirements and maintain as far as possible, the flow of assistance being provided through bilateral and multilateral sources (Kent, 1983: 700). The resolution also laid down the mandate to the coordinator: to mobilise and direct the relief activities of the UN system and to coordinate the assistance with that given by the inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (A/Res./2816 (XXVI). However, the UNDRO was designed to meet two basic purposes- the mobilisation and coordination of international relief and promotion of pre-disaster prevention and preparedness (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 132). Financially, the UNDRO was authorised to receive and channel assistance.

Once established in 1971, the UNDRO was facing problem of how to expand activities and include more and more actors within the system. The newly established office developed the mechanism for coordination and information sharing, vertically in cooperation with INGOs and NGOs and horizontally with similar IGOs (Kent, 1983: 701). Horizontally it expanded functions by signing memorandum of understanding (MoU) and agreements with specialized agencies, funds and programmes within the UN humanitarian system (Kent, 1983: 700). First such MoU was signed between UNDRO and FAO in 1976, under which FAO recognized the UNDRO's responsibility to coordinate and mobilise the disaster assistance (Macalister-Smith 1985: 135). The UNDRO signed similar MoUs for information sharing and coordination with the WFP, the UNDRO signed MoU and agreement with UNICEF, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other actors. Approximately 13 MoU and agreements had been signed between UNDRO and other agencies of the UN system, in addition to multiagency agreements with the ILO, UNESCO, WFP, UNIDO, WHO and WMO. Similar MoU and agreements were signed between IGOs, other than the actors of the UN system and NGOs. Such MoU and agreements include between UNDRO on the one side and ICRC, International Committee for Migration, Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) and the Organisation of American States (OAS). Through such MoU and agreements, the UNDRO had tried to evolve itself as the centre in international humanitarian assistance system (Macalister-Smith, 1985: 136). Between its inception in 1971 and 1987, the UNDRO coordinated and raised money for assistance for more than 380 disasters (Gall and Hobby 2007: 159).

Throughout 1970s and 1980s, the UN humanitarian assistance system underscored three characteristics (Sheridan 2000: 944-945). First, the UN humanitarian relief institutions were based upon an artificial belief that 'refugees' and 'internally displaced persons' are two different categories, and latter do not meet the criteria of former. So IDPs are not entitled to get assistance from the UNHCR. Second, natural and man-made disasters were distinguished artificially. The UNDRO provided assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons displaced by natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, storms and earthquakes, while persons displaced by man-made disasters fall within the mandate of UNHCR. Third, distinctions were made between 'humanitarian relief' and 'rehabilitation and development'.

Early UN humanitarian framework failed to understand the complementarity of these two, therefore, the UN response failed to address the full spectrum of humanitarian needs (Sheridan 2000: 945).

In post-cold war era, two factors: reordering of international politics and emergence of micro (ethnic) nationalism shaped the humanitarian agenda. Reordering enabled the UN to consider the issues beyond the East West politics. In early post-cold war 'the political context in which the UN operates had changed dramatically, and it has no doubt contributed to the some of the crisis... (Hydman 2000: xxiiv). In terms of conflicts, the human situation began to deteriorate in late 1980s. In the end of the decade numbers of average conflicts and affected peoples by them grew drastically. Between 1989 and 1992, total 82 conflicts, including three intrastate conflicts took place (Nascimento 2009: 69 endnotes 3). Among others, in Gulf-crisis[11] Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent US and allied powers air war against Iraq led to 'flight of some 850, 000 third country nationals and 300,000 Palestinians both from Iraq and Kuwait' (Sheridan 2000: 955). Similarly, 'the flight of 1.5 million Iraqis (mostly Kurds) to Turkish border and into Iran during the civil-war in Iraq, which began in March 1991' (Minear and Weiss 1992: 755) exacerbated the Gulf crisis. Despite increasing number of human suffering and concern of international community, the UN could not deal with it effectively, particularly with internationally displaced persons.

The gulf war highlighted the ineffectiveness of the artificially bifurcated institutional, arrangement (Sheridan 2000: 955). The Iraqi operation revealed the deficiencies of the UN operational system. Observers were opting to describe it as 'catastrophe of catastrophes' (Scheffer 1992: 314). At the juncture three major problems weakened the effectiveness of the UN system as the humanitarian actors in the Gulf crisis-

> First: (the) UN organisations were, for the most part, late of the mark. Second: they did not coordinate their
> activities well. Third: their credibility was undercut by their association with the Security Council (Minear
> and Weiss 1992: 757).

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[11] For detail see Minear, L., U. B. P. Chelliah, J. Crisp, J. Mackinlay and T. G. Weiss (1992), *UN Coordination of the international humanitarian response in the Gulf Crisis, 1990-1992*, Occasional Papers # 13, Watson institute.

These events galvanized the UN to rethink its organization and humanitarian assistance system. Hence, demands for the restructuring of the UN system accelerated from both donors and inside the UN.

In deteriorating environment of early post-cold war, to cope with new challenges, the UN had adopted two steps of reform. First: General Assembly passed Resolution 46/182 (A/Res/46/182) to ensure effective and coordinated response to human suffering, on 17th December 1991. Second: the 'Agenda for Peace' to maintain international peace and security. Hereafter, in words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 'humanitarian affairs have become a fourth pillar of the organization, along with peace and security, development and human rights' (Kent 2006: 02).

Adoption of resolution (A/Res/46/182) was renaissance in the UN humanitarianism. It brought institutional and policy level changes. Institutional changes incorporate new financial institutions and much more appropriate coordinating body while policy level challenges include evaluations, learning and knowledge-management systems, policy development and training and internal communications activities. The coordination resolution was crafted to deal with two major problems (Scheffer 1992: 314) - (i) How to coordinate the international humanitarian assistance in emergencies. (ii) How to pressure non-consensual governments to permit aid to people in need during civil war and other international conflicts. General Assembly resolution (A/Res/46/182) 'gave us new tools (institutions and processes) to work with: the Department of Humanitarian Affairs itself, the Central Emergency Resolving Fund, a consolidated inter-agency appeals process and a committee heads... to coordinate humanitarian policy' (Eliasson 1994: 187: For detail see A/Res/46/182, particularly Para 23, 31, 33 and 38).

The UN Humanitarian Institutions

Department of Humanitarian Affairs

The General Assembly resolution 46/182 recognised the UN having 'a central and unique role' to play in 'leadership and coordination' of international community's efforts to deliver the relief assistance to countries affected by complex emergencies (A/Res/46/182, para 12). In

pursuance of the G. A. resolution 46/182, in April 1992, the Secretary General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, incorporating UNDRO, various UN units that had been dealing with the specific humanitarian emergencies. It was a support body of the Emergency Relief Coordinator. Its assigned task was to coordinate the UN system response to humanitarian crisis (Minear 1995: 92).[12] But the DHA's real purpose was to improve international response to the massive suffering from the growing number of manmade disasters of 1990s (Weiss, 1998a: 11).

Although the DHA has headquarter in New York, yet, its major presence is in Geneva[13], where it manages operational functions as chairs and staff meetings among the UN agencies, makes joint fund raising appeals and carries out humanitarian diplomacy with governments, IGOs and NGOs. Similarly, resolution (A/Res/46/182) requested the Secretary General to designate an Emergency Relief Coordinator, with Under-Secretary General level and supported by secretariat, to ensure that the UN humanitarian system is better prepared to cope with the natural disasters and emergencies.

Office of the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Affairs

As newly elected S. G. Boutros Boutros Ghali had provided new life to the UN humanitarianism through creation of DHA, similarly, his successor Kofi Annan through 'Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform' (1997) renewed the DHA through restructuring. In January 1998, through second major institutional reform[14] DHA was renamed as Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) with greater visibility. The Secretary General's reform programme was aimed at reinvigorating the institutions created under resolution 46/182. Its mandate was further expanded to include the 'coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy.' OCHA differs from DHA in the way it takes on a more prominent advocacy role and provocative approach to coordination (Longford, 1999: 03). OCHA's mission statement underscores its role as-

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[12] For DHA's performance during 1992-1997, see (Weiss 1998b: 56-59).

[13] This is the reason why New York is known as 'political capital' while Geneva as 'humanitarian capital'.

[14] For detail see Weiss (1998b).

To mobilise and coordinate the collective efforts of the international community, in particular those of the UN system, to meet in a coherent and timely manner the needs of those exposed to human suffering and material destruction in disasters and emergencies. This involves reducing vulnerability, promoting solutions to root causes and facilitating smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development (OCHA 1999: chapter 2).

The OCHA: Role and Functions

In international humanitarian assistance system, the OCHA has following core functions-

The Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Response

Primary responsibility to coordinate the humanitarian response lies in the OCHA, led by Emergency Relief Coordinator. Coordination is based on the belief that a coherent approach to emergency response will maximise its benefits and minimise its potential pitfalls. Coordination takes place at three levels.[15] At the international level, OCHA works in close cooperation with the United Nations and other relevant actors. Head of the OCHA is appointed by Secretary General (Zwitter 2011: 57). S/he has dual role- as Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-secretary General to play in the UN humanitarian system (OCHA 1999, Chapter 2.). As ERC, s/he chairs the Inter Agency Standing Committee, where most of the humanitarian actors, both from within and outside come together to discuss the issues. While as Under-Secretary General, head of the OCHA is the principal advisor to the Secretary General on humanitarian issues and convener of the Executive Committee of the Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA)[16] (OCHA, 1999, chapter 2).Thus he/she provides link between the humanitarian community and the inter-governmental organs of the UN system.

At national level, Humanitarian Coordinator,[17] appointed by ERC in consultation with IASC, coordinates the works of the humanitarian agencies through the Humanitarian Country Teams

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[15] Arjun Katoch, lecture delivered on *International Disaster Response System: India's Role* at CIPOD, JNU, New Delhi on 2nd Feb. 2011.

[16] The ECHA provides a forum for the humanitarian community and the political and peacekeeping departments of the UN Secretariat to share perspectives on humanitarian crises and issues.

[17] In case of complex emergency a Resident Coordinator has been appointed, but, when there is threat of a full-blown crisis, the IASC may confirm the Resident Coordinator as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) for the -emergency or appoint a separate Humanitarian Coordinator.

(HCT). The primary function of the Humanitarian Coordinator is to facilitate and ensure the quick, effective, and well-coordinated provision of humanitarian assistance to those seriously affected by the complex emergency in question. Because the HC is appointed by the ERC, hence, accountable to him/her for managing and coordinating responses to complex emergencies, as well as natural and technological disaster. While dealing with natural disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness, to ensure national capacity building, the RC reports to UNDP.

The humanitarian reform process (2005) introduced a major reform in appointment of HCs. It introduced 'two key components of the humanitarian coordinator pillar of reform- (creation of) the HC pool and improving the appointment process of the HCs (Thomas, 2007: 24). The 'humanitarian coordination pool' is a collection of candidates from the UN and non-UN background to deploy as humanitarian coordinators. Its rationale was to make humanitarian assistance, at national level, more effective and efficient through deploying more skilled and trained person as HC, rather than appointing RCs as HC.

At local level, On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) coordinates humanitarian assistance. Its primary role is to coordinate the actors in the initial phase of the disasters, in close cooperation with local authorities. It can be established by the first International Search and Rescue Teams (ISRT) or UNDAC whichever arrives first, in collaboration of national authorities. It is expected that an OSOCC would be operational during the relief phase of an emergency until the Government of the affected country together with UN agencies and NGOs can resume the responsibility of coordination of international resources. It helps to assess the need, and provides support to the affected state in managing operations and logistic supports for the ISRT's.

Policy Development and Policy Coordination

OCHA, in close cooperation of other actors, develops policies and programmes to assist the affected people through timely early warning, adequate coordination in the field and their smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. At secretariat level, the ERC policy development and coordination function is supported by the Policy and Analysis Division (PAD), responsible for articulating coherent UN policies on humanitarian issues and

providing the humanitarian community with support in policy development (Sheridan, 2000: 979). In this process, the OCHA is supported by PAD, the IASC, the Humanitarian coordinators and other actors of the field. OCHA develops humanitarian guidelines on when and how to intervene, how to address humanitarian dilemmas and when to withdraw assistance.

Advocacy of Humanitarian Issues

Advocacy function is aimed at spreading awareness about humanitarian concerns and objectives among actors addressing the complex emergencies and natural disasters. Its main purpose is to give voice to victims and ensure that humanitarian issues and concerns are taken into account in all relevant forums (political, humanitarian, peacekeeping, human rights and development) (OCHA 1999: Chapter 2). In this regard humanitarian dimensions of sanctions, proliferation of small arms and landmine and security of the humanitarian personal have been highlighted, so that human suffering could be minimised. OCHA's advocacy efforts ... are not only directed towards the Security Council, other UN political organs and Member States, but, also targeted at the media and civil society at large, including NGO's and academia (Sheridan 2000: 980).

Fund Raising

The UN humanitarian system has no permanent and sustainable financing mechanism, but financed primarily by voluntary contributions from states and private sector. A very few (less than ten per cent) of share comes from the UN regular budget. Therefore, funds for humanitarian assistance are collected voluntarily in two different instruments- first, by appeal mechanism, and second by funding instruments (IASC 2010: 62).

Flash Appeal and Consolidated Appeal Process are two appeal mechanisms of fund raising for victims. Flash Appeal is launched, within a week, by H/RC in consultation with Humanitarian Country Team, in response to sudden onset disasters (HPG 2006: 04). It is aimed at providing urgent life-saving needs and lasts up to six months, depending upon the nature of a crisis. It is a collective appeal made on the behalf of wider international humanitarian community, including UN humanitarian family, the ICRC, and NGOs. Consolidated Appeal Process is

strategic and fund raising tool for protected humanitarian emergencies and/or to extend the flash appeals (IASC 2010: 65). All humanitarian partners- NGOs, International Organisations and UN agencies can participate in it. Government bodies also can join as partners it NGOs and/or UN projects but they cannot participate independently.

Central Emergency Response Fund and Country-Based Pooled Funds are two funding instruments. The Central Emergency Revolving Fund, predecessor of Central Emergency Response Fund, was launched on May 1992, to ensure cash flow particularly in initial phase of the crisis, when donor contributions are not available for use. Worth of $ 50 million loan facility, the CERF, was financed by voluntary contribution and managed by the ERC on the behalf of the OCHA. The humanitarian reform process (2005) renamed Revolving Fund to resolving fund. The goal of new institutionalisation was to provide aid workers sufficient funds within 72 hours to start life-saving relief operations. Resolving Fund is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the Revolving Fund. Quantitatively it expanded from $ 50 million to $ 500 million while qualitatively it was not limited to loan but expanded to providing grant facility. Out of $ 500 million, $ 50 million was for loan purpose while remaining $450 for grant. Country-Based Pooled Funds is consisting of Emergency Response Fund (ERF) and Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF). ERF is a multi-donor fund, managed by the H/RC, to provide small, flexible and rapid fund to unforeseen humanitarian needs outside the CAP. It benefits mostly to NGOs, along with UN agencies and IOM. CHF is a multi-donor funding mechanism to address the critical humanitarian gaps as identified in the CAP and/or humanitarian response plan.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)

Inter-Agency Standing Committee is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination (A/Res/47/57, para 6). It was established in 1992, following the General Assembly resolution 46/182, to support the ERC along with the Consolidated Appeal Process and the Central Emergency Resolving Fund. General Assembly Resolution 48/57 affirmed its role as the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance. Its legitimacy in international humanitarian community lies as 'top decision-making body' (Calvi-Parisetti 2004: 147). In contrast to intergovernmental bodies of operational agencies, the IASC is not

composed of country representatives but of representatives of the major players in the humanitarian assistance (Zwitter, 2011: 58). In the UN system, it represents a significant breakthrough in bringing the all actors of the field, including the NGO's under in a single roof. It is composed of the two types of member- Operational Members and Standing Invitation.[18] But in practice, there is no distinction between Members and the Standing Invite, in the complex functioning of the complex machinery of the committee, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies (Calvi-Parisetti, 2004: 146). Membership of IASC, is subjected to continuous review, therefore, differs from case to case. Members are represented by their 'principals' in the IASC meetings. Head of the OCHA, as ERC, chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. They meet twice a year, usually in April and December.

It is an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key the UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. IASC facilitates inter-agency decision-making in response to complex emergencies primarily by developing and agreeing on system-wide humanitarian policies; allocating responsibilities among agencies in humanitarian programs; advocating common humanitarian principles to parties outside the IASC; identifying areas where gaps in mandates or lack of operational capacity exist; and building consensus between humanitarian agencies on system-wide humanitarian issues (OCHA 1999: chapter 4). Its overall objective is 'inclusive coordination' while maintaining limited number of members. Its primary objectives are-

- To develop and agree on system wide humanitarian policies.

- To allocate responsibilities among agencies in humanitarian programme.

- To develop and agree on a common ethical framework for all humanitarian activities.

- To advocate for common humanitarian principles to parties outside the IASC.

- To identify the areas where gaps in mandate or lack of operational capacity exists.

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[18] *Operational Members* includes- FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO while *Standing Invitees* are- ICRC, ICVA, IFCR, Inter-Action, Office of the High Commissioner of the Human Rights (OHCHR), SCHR, World Bank and Office of the Special Rapports on the Human Rights of the IDP's. (As per on 17th March 2011).

- To resolve disputes or disagreements about and between agencies on system-wide humanitarian issues.

IASC performs its functions through four subsidiary bodies.

1. Sub-Working Groups

They are established for an unlimited duration and are dedicated to long and medium term policy issues in humanitarian response.

2. Task Force

They are subsidiary bodies with limited time frame with objective to complete specific task. These specific tasks include facilitating inter-agency coordination, providing guidelines for large scale emergencies and drafting policy guideline on particular issue.

3. Reference Groups

They have specific task but unlimited time to do. They have advisory role in Working Groups.

4. Other Groups

These are established by the Working Groups.

This chapter has provided an overview of institutional evolution of the UN humanitarian aid system. In the UN charter, although, there is no such explicit provision to provide humanitarian aid, yet in practice it has evolved through interrelated interpretation of the charter. In initial phase the UN response to emergencies was overseen by the Secretary General, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council. Until creation of the UNDRO in 1971, there was no specific agency within UN to coordinate the humanitarian actors. In post-cold war international politics, both donors' willingness and conflict-prone situation, enabled and more appropriately pushed the UN to enhance effectiveness through institutionalisation. The UN adopted the resolution 46/182 which laid down the DHA, IASC, CERF and CAP. In the changed environment DHA was restructured in 1998, which enlarged mandate to policy advocacy and policy development. Further,

inadequate and inefficient response to Darfur crisis and south Asian tsunami paved the way for reform manifested in restructuring the CERF, introduction of Cluster Approach and Humanitarian Coordination pool. In reform process (2005), by introducing Cluster Approach and Humanitarian Coordination Pool, the UN had tried to enhance constructive engagement with non-UN humanitarian community.

Figure 2.1 OCHA organisational diagram of the UN humanitarian system.

UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL/ EMERGENCY RELIEF COORDINATOR
Assistant Secretary-General/ Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator

Executive Office Administrative Office

Strategic Planning Unit

Office of the Director, New York
- External Relations and Partnerships Section
- Funding Coordination Section
- IASC/ECHA Secretariat

Coordination and Response Division
- Geographical Sections
- Early Warning and Contingency Planning Section

Thematic Advisers to the Director:
- *Field Security*
- *Integrated Missions*
- *Transition and Recovery*

Office Of The Director, Geneva
- Displacement and Protection Support Section
- Humanitarian Coordination Support Section
- IASC Secretariat

CERF Secretariat

Communications and Information Services Branch
- Communications Services Section
- Information Services Section
- Information Technology Section
- Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
- ReliefWeb
- Technical Coordination and Partnerships Unit
- Web Services Section

Policy Development and Studies Branch
- Disaster and Vulnerability Policy Section
- Evaluation and Guidance Section
- Intergovernmental Support Section
- Policy Planning and Analysis Section
- Protection of Civilians Section, including the Adviser to the Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG) on Human Rights of IDPs

External Relations and Support Mobilization Branch
- Consolidated Appeals Process Section
- Donor Relations Section
- Geographical Coordination and Monitoring Section
- Brussels Liaison Office

Emergency Services Branch
- Civil–Military Coordination Section
- Emergency Preparedness Section
- Emergency Relief Coordination Centre
- Field Coordination Support Section
- Logistics Support Unit
- Surge Capacity Section

Regional, Sub-Regional and Country Offices

Africa: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA, REGIONAL OFFICE FOR WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA, AFRICAN UNION LIAISON OFFICE, Sub-Regional Office Nairobi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe

Middle East: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND CENTRAL ASIA, Sub-Regional Office Almaty, Iraq, occupied Palestinian territory, Yemen

Asia and the Pacific: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, Sub-Regional Office Fiji, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka

Latin America and the Caribbean: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, Colombia, Haiti

Source: OCHA Annual Report 2010.

Chapter 3

The Process of Humanitarian Aid

While the previous chapter (Ch. 2) dealt with the institutional aspects, this chapter (Ch. 3) deals with the functional aspects i.e. the process of delivering humanitarian aid. This chapter aims to explore the complex process of the UN humanitarian system's functioning. For this purpose, it is divided into five sections. The first section deals with information management i.e. how the OCHA gets information about crisis and disseminates it to international humanitarian community. The second section underscores the process of need assessment including who are involved, where they are functioning and how they do so? The third explains the process of mobilisation of resources. Fourth deals with the process of the delivery of humanitarian aid including NGOs and the military forces. Simultaneously, it deals with coordination, which is the main role of the OCHA. And the last section underscores the process of evaluation and its implication for future planning.

Information Gathering and Dissemination[1]

Information sharing in humanitarian emergencies is critical for three reasons. First, there is a direct correlation between the effective management of information and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the absence of sufficient and timely information, relief agencies cannot assess the needs and response timely. Second, no single entity can be the source of all necessary knowledge so that it can work independently. Each and every relief agency has to mutually rely upon each other. Third, the victims for relief and relief agencies for funds, depend upon the donors. Without adequate information disseminated to international community, neither victims nor relief agencies can secure timely and adequate relief and funds. Nevertheless, actor's collaboration is also important because different actors have their specific leverage and loopholes as well.

The UN system has world-wide presence and better information dissemination system in the form of relief web and international regional and integrated network, but in information collection it is not as quick as the NGOs are. On the other hand the NGOs

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1 Five steps framework of analysis in this chapter is taken from Chapter 4 in Forsythe and Rieffer-Flanagan 2007. Here few changes have been made. For ex. 'knowledge' has been replaced by 'Information Gathering and Dissemination' and 'Future' added between 'Evaluation and Future Planning' in the last section.

such as the ICRC have world-wide presence (in 185 states) and quick enough in information collection, but lacks advanced information dissemination system. Similarly, the NGOs are quick enough in information collection but lack dissemination system. Therefore, the need of the hours is to enhance the collaboration among these actors in information sharing, so that the effective and timely response to the humanitarian disasters could be ensured. The UN humanitarian system, through creation of Inter-Agency Standing Committee, has made an attempt to bring these actors under a single roof to fill up the lacunae.

An enhanced system of information sharing, incorporating NGOs, IGOs and other relevant actors, has been established at international level. But, merely bringing more and more actors in the field and collection and dissemination of raw data is not enough, but it should be qualitative (Currion 2001). In the process of collection and dissemination of information one question still remains important as to what type of information is required and at what point of time?

In process of delivering the humanitarian aid, the United Nations has to be aware about the disasters. Adequate and timely information can save lives, livelihood and scare resources of the victims. In initial phase, a major challenge which the international community, particularly donors and relief agencies, face after the occurrence of disasters is how to get the information about the current situation of the disasters and about conditions of victims? In this stage, collection and dissemination of information is important because effective and timely lifesaving operations and future planning depends on it. For information management, the OCHA has developed an information management toolbox, which includes four main areas information management principles and OCHA standard products, GIS and technical tools, HIC management and administration, and general reference.[2]

In humanitarian information management, the UN plays dual role. It gets information from the national authorities, international and local NGOs, and her own local representatives, on the one hand and on the other it disseminates it to larger humanitarian community at international level. Adequate, reliable and timely situational information enables the

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2 Details of this toolbox could be access from- http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/Pinfrmation.

humanitarian aid organizations and other agencies to identify what goods and services disaster affected people need, where and in what way to deliver it. In this process, being a centre, the UN has the primary responsibility to make others know about the disasters and affected populations. Meanwhile, being primarily financed through voluntary contributions, the UN's future financing highly depends upon the donor's level of awareness about the disasters.

While looking at the information sharing in the UN humanitarian system two questions should be kept in mind. First, at 'what level', and second at 'what point of time' information is shared. So far as level is concerned, primarily at local level information is collected and analysed, and at international level, it is analysed in context of information provided by wider international community and disseminated. As diagram shows, information sharing contains collection and analysis of data at field, national and headquarters level.

In the UN humanitarian system, information management goes through four processes-information gathering, collation (processing) of information, analysis/evaluation of information and dissemination (OCHA 2006: F6).

Diagram 3.1: The Information Management Chain in the United Nations humanitarian system

```
┌─────────────┐
│  Collect    │
└──────┬──────┘
       │
       └──────▶┌────────────────────────────┐
               │ Process (store and retrieve)│
               └──────────────┬─────────────┘
                              │
                              └──────────▶┌──────────────┐
                                          │  Analysis    │
                                          └──────┬───────┘
                                                 │
                                                 └──────▶┌──────────────┐
                                                         │ Disseminate  │
                                                         │              │
                                                         └──────────────┘
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Source: Adopted from the OCHA website[3].

In the process of information management in the UNDAC, the first step is collection of data. Such information covers broader range like effect of disasters, immediate needs and

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3 Accessed from URL http://ocha.unog.ch/drptoolkit/PInformationManagement.html on 18th June 2011

requirements, actors operating and availability of resources, unmet needs and response gaps, and major constraints. In initial phase, International Search and Rescue Teams, UN Disaster Assistance Committee, Humanitarian Country Teams, and UN Disaster Management Teams (UNDMT), with assistance of survivors and local voluntary organisations, collect data at the local level.

The UNDAC is an important data collection, analysis and disseminating tool available to the UN in the field. Information in the UNDAC system is collected primarily through interviews because it operates in initial phases of disasters where other methods like information collection through questionnaires is difficult. Interviews are conducted with wide range of sources including the affected people and their leaders, local and national government officials, NGOs, IGOs and private voluntary organisations. The UNDAC is also responsible for establishing and maintaining information management systems in the field, UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), national authorities, and the international community (OCHA 2006: H 7). The information management units (IMUs) and humanitarian information centres (HICs) are two humanitarian information tools available to local actors.

In process of information collection, local national authorities play important role. Being the primary source of information in disasters, and dependency of decision-makers on it for information, makes them inevitable player in UN led humanitarian assistance. Particularly local authorities are important because they are familiar with the local demographic situations and infrastructure rather than international agencies. They can provide basic data about the number of affected and dead people in detail. They can efficiently categorise people in different need groups like children, women and elderly peoples on the one hand and on ethnic and cultural line on the other. State's local authorities and voluntary groups are more familiar with the local cultural and ethnic needs and requirements, hence they can be better and accurate source of information.

Data *per se* are not very important tool. Between collection of data in the field and sending it to higher authorities, conversion process, which converts data into information, takes place. When it is analysed in a particular context and converted into information, it becomes an important tool for policy makers. At the second stage, collected data and information is structured in a specific order, stored and retrieved. Then, the gathered

information is analysed in broader context of country's disaster history and its coping mechanism.

In the last stage, in case of Situation Reports, information collected and processed by the UNDAC team is addressed to Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator in the affected country, with a copy to Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) at OCHA office in Geneva. But, before proceeding, the UNDAC verifies all information in consultation with relevant local authorities and UN Disaster Management Teams. In addition to the regular UNDAC Situation Report, it disseminates other available information through the meetings, On-Site Coordination Operation Centre and Virtual OSCOC and e-mail services (OCHA 2006: F9).

In the later phase of recovery and reconstruction, clusters are deployed. It provided an opportunity to humanitarian community especially the cluster or sector lead agencies and OCHA, to work with partners to achieve policy congruence in addressing long-standing challenges in humanitarian information management. Policy congruence helps actors in avoiding inter-agency competition. Such policy congruence could only be brought through proper information sharing. In this stage, the responsibility to manage intra-cluster information lies with cluster head while inter-cluster with OCHA (McDonald and Gordon 2008: 68).

At the national level, following the disasters, first of all, humanitarian/resident coordinator collects initial information from different sources such as national authorities, UN agencies, NGOs, International Organisation for Migration and IF/CRC, civil society organisations and most importantly from web generated information systems like Global Disaster and Alert Coordination System (GDACS). On the basis of collected primary information, within twenty-four hours, s/he releases alerts to OCHA and other partners in the field. S/he requests OCHA for the UNDAC team. Later on UNDAC collects information in the field with other relevant actors and sends it to H/RC.

While the UNDAC situation report represents the UN account. At country level H/RC analysed it in broader context. For this purpose s/he uses data and information provided by other international humanitarian actors like HCT, IGOs and NGOs. S/he compiles data and prepares a situation report, and sends it to ERC. At national level, information received from field, before sending to ERC, is confirmed to national authorities.

At international level, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs are important partners in humanitarian information management. At this level, information provided by H/RC is analysed in larger context of information received from wider international humanitarian community. In the UN headquarters, the Communications and Information Services Branch, working with OCHA at headquarters and at field with donors and host states, provides a range of services that allows OCHA to better manage its information and communication.

Information is disseminated through Relief Web, International Regional Integrated Networks and Humanitarian Information Centre (Naidoo 2007: 53). To meet the information needs of international community, the OCHA has developed humanitarian information systems which include Relief Web (http://reliefweb.int/), the regional information networks (IRIN), information management units (IMUs) and humanitarian information centres (HICs) (Van de Walle, Eede, and Muhren 2009: 13). Relief Web and IRIN are the OCHA instruments for information dissemination at international level. Beside these two, 3W website[4] Geonetworks and Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre[5] are also information dissemination instruments at international level. Relief Web is the world's leading online gateway to information on humanitarian emergencies and disasters. It does not only provide information regarding on going disasters but is backed with archival resources of complex emergencies and natural disasters. Through Relief Web, OCHA provides practitioners with information from over 1,000 sources, including UN, governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the academic community, and the media (Van de Walle, Eede, and Muhren 2009: 13).

The disaster affected areas, information concerning humanitarian issues takes various forms like Situation Reports, 3W (who, what, where), maps and graphics, and contact lists (Bhattacharjee and Lassio 2011: 42). Situation report contains information regarding number of affected people, their needs and requirements, major operational constraints and major relief agencies. But, aftermath the disaster, merely producing situation report is not enough. Therefore, according to OCHA guidelines a country office must produce two of OCHA information management contract directory and 3W, after the first month into the

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4   Contract website http://3w.unocha.org/WhoWhatWhere.

5   For detail visit   http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc

crisis (Bhattacharjee and Lassio 2011: 43). Contract Directory provides list of officers in the field and offices, with their contact details, including phone numbers, e-mail address and fax numbers. 3W is aimed to provide information regarding who is working in the field? what s/he is doing and where s/he is operating? Main purpose of the 3W information is to avoid duplication, so that scarce resources could be used efficiently. Maps of the affected areas are also useful tools in humanitarian information, which provides rough idea about the affected people and their geographical locations. Beside these the OCHA press release regarding policy, operations and situations, are also important sources of information.

Assessment of Needs and Planning

Throughout a crisis, OCHA is responsible for identifying overall humanitarian needs, developing a realistic plan of action for meeting these needs, and monitoring progress. Development and deployment of new tools and techniques of information by OCHA is not an end in itself but a means for a greater end, the assistance of the victims. The creation and development of new information instruments and tools in the UN humanitarian system is aimed at integrating the donors, recipients, policy makers and the relief agents into a common pool of knowledge. In the age of information technology, where information has become knowledge (particularly for the victims), integration will empower the relief agents to adequately respond to disasters. Availability of adequate, timely, and reliable information is prerequisite for the proper needs assessment, the second step in the process. For this purpose information is collected from H/RC, UNDMT, local emergency management authorities, situation reports, media reports, and meteorological and scientific/monitoring institutions (OCHA 2006: G 15).

Methodologically, the processes, time and systems for needs assessments vary across stakeholders. Needs assessment, in the UN system, is based upon the review of information provided by various sources. Assessment of needs provides information regarding approximate needs of the victims. Although good needs assessment is not a guarantee for good response but bad information regarding need assessment necessarily leads to bad response. In the process to assess the needs, information gathered through diversified sources play important role.

As figure 2.1 shows, collection and analysis of data is concerned with the first the step (information management) in this process, while use of information as knowledge for the needs and requirements of victims is concerned with second step, which is assessment of needs. In this stage, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF)[6], chaired by OCHA, is intended to promote a coordinated approach to needs assessment. It is a common tool of NGOs, UN agencies, other international organisations, and cluster/sector representatives (IASC 2009: 05) to harmonise and promote cross-sector needs assessment initiatives for consistent, reliable and timely data on humanitarian needs in complex emergencies and natural disasters. The NATF was tasked to work for a period of 24 months with a 12 month work plan.

Needs assessment takes place in five phases- *phase 0*, corresponding to preparedness prior to crisis, *phase 1* corresponding to first day after onset, *phase 2*, corresponding to first two weeks, *phase 3*, corresponding to next two weeks, and *phase 4*, corresponding to the second month onwards. Different phases have different methods and tools which require different set of information (OCHA 2009: 09). In the process of data collection and analysis, actors and agencies are guided by the humanitarian assessment standards.

In this process first phase is pre disaster preparedness. In this phase, by data collection and analysis, periodic surveys and contingent planning, emphasis is over development of surveillance system, through which timely early warning regarding disasters could be disseminated. In phase 1 & 2, which starts immediately after disaster takes place lasts up to first two weeks, actors and agencies make field trips to collect data and information. While collecting information teams keep in mind the size and density, weather and climatic situation, local cultural and other social factors of country; means of transportation and communication; and possible development of the disaster in future (OCHA 2006: G 6).

In this phase, primary as well as secondary data are used. For collection of primary data two techniques interviews and observation are used. Observation can be made by walking around the affected sites, sitting in cafes and tea stalls, and driving alongside the road. Interviews should be conducted with survivors, representatives of survivors or key officials, but questions should not take the format of a questionnaire. It is mostly kept

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6 The IASC Working Group at its 73rd meeting in March 2009 decided to establish a Needs Assessment Task Force NATF.

Diagram 3.2: Flow chart of the needs assessment process in the UN humanitarian system

| Preliminary Review of Information |

⇩

| Is Assessment Needed? | ⇒ | Terminate Process |

Yes ⇩

| Planning Process |

⇩

| Field Trip |

| Collection of Sector Specific Information |

⇩

| Review by Sector Specialists |

| Observation |

| Interview/Observation |

| Analysis and Reporting |

| Requirements for Sectoral Assessments |

⇩

| Requirements for Response |

simple in yes/no format. Such interviews can be individual and/or group. While conducting interviews it should be ensured that all groups and sections are represented. At

this stage Initial Rapid Assessment, IFRC and UNDAC are main tools for need assessment (OCHA 2009: 39), where UNDAC supports other actors on request.

Phase 3 of needs assessment starts from the third week and lasts up to the fourth week, from the onset of disasters. In this phase needs are assessed in detail, on multi-cluster/ multi-sectoral basis. For data collection different agencies use different techniques like random and stratified sampling, questionnaires, and qualitative analysis methods. In this phase, datasheets organise needs into six sections covering demographics, nutrition, shelter and non-food items, water and sanitation and health (OCHA 2009: 16). Here two issues are pertinent first, how the situation is changing before and after the disaster; and second, to find how the disaster has impacted people's access to key services, livelihoods, vulnerability and coping strategies (OCHA 2009: 15).

Phase 4 of needs assessment starts from the second month onwards. In this phase, needs are assessed in detail and programming takes place on sector/cluster specific basis. Clusters are currently not assigned with conducting needs assessments *per se* (PDSB 2011: para 10). Substantive cluster/sector based need assessments are normally made by the host government, UN agencies, or qualified members of the IASC family (OCHA 2006: C 3). The evaluation of the humanitarian response in Philippines, observes that "needs assessments were driven by individual organizations' activities (PDSB 2011: para 08). Various UN specialised agencies assess needs separately. For example, UNHCR's Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and UNDP's Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PNDA) are such tools of needs assessment.[7]

Mobilisation of Resources

The OCHA is funded primarily by voluntary contribution while nominal sums from the UN regular budget. For the biennium 2010-2011, only 0.6 per cent of the United Nations Regular Budget was allocated to OCHA which amounts to $14 million per year. Since 2002, OCHA humanitarian budget quadrupled, nevertheless the UN regular budget allocation has remained almost static. Among voluntary contribution, resource for humanitarian assistance is mobilised through two windows- first, individually by aid agencies, and second, through common instruments- '*appeal mechanism*' which includes

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7 For details of such needs assessment tools of different organisations see OCHA (2009: 17-26).

Flash Appeals and Consolidated Appeals Process, and 'funding instruments' like Central Emergency Response Funds. Meanwhile, organisations such as the UNHCR and WFP get funds directly from the states, individuals, foundations and corporations on the one hand, and receive funds from common humanitarian funds, on the other. For such organisations directly coming resource takes three forms- in cash, in-kind and services. For instance, the WFP receives in-kind from corporations and individuals, in cash from states and common humanitarian funds and voluntary services from local volunteers and civil-society actors. While overall financial resources for the UN humanitarian system takes three forms- pledge, commitment and disbursement.

Appeal Mechanism

Among common fund raising instruments two- Appeal Mechanism and funding instruments are the main financing tools in the UN humanitarian system. On the sudden onset of disasters, first of all among financial tools, Flash Appeal, an inter-agency tool, is launched. Following the disaster, the RC/HC determines whether the event is likely to be of a scale that single agency cannot respond and inter-agency response is required. In the process of preparing appeal, the RC/HC in consultation with the IASC cluster leads, assigns one organisation to lead and coordinate the response in each priority sector or area of activity (i.e. cluster/sector leads). Each cluster lead in consultation with national authorities assesses the needs and meets at national level to map capacity and decide role and responsibility to various agencies. It is prepared by R/HC in consultation with key humanitarian actors including host government officials, donors, UN agencies, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), members of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the NGOs (IASC 2006: 01). Prepared and approved by RC/HC and country teams at field, draft of the appeal is sent to OCHA CAP Section. The CAP Section shares the draft with IASC agency headquarters for 24-hour review, and if required incorporates changes. The CAP Section registers appeal projects on the Financial Tracking Service, publishes the document on line (Relief Web). Ultimately it is officially launched through a donor meeting in the field and/or at headquarters, or through a press release.

In later phases it is reviewed and another revised flash appeal is launched. Revised Appeal provides opportunity to incorporate updated and analysed information, identify gaps in the

previous response plan. For instance, in case of Haiti earthquakes first Flash Appeal which requested requesting $562 million for the humanitarian response was launched within three days on the basis of initial rapid need assessment. It contained the needs and requirements of 12 NGOs, 16 UN organisations and IOM. The Revised Appeal was launched on February 18 requesting US$ 1.4 billion. In revised appeal, needs and requirements of 76 humanitarian organisations for approximately twelve months period January to December 2010, were incorporated (Bhattacharjee and Lossio 2011: 33-34).

Consolidated Appeal Process is the second appeal mechanism for fund raising. It is aimed at avoiding inter-agency competition and duplication through coordination. It brings humanitarian organisations together to jointly plan, coordinate, implement and monitor their response to natural disasters and complex emergencies, and to appeal cohesively for funds. The CAP comprises the whole programme cycle of humanitarian action: needs assessment and analysis, joint planning and strategizing, resource mobilization and allocation, and monitoring and evaluation (OCHA 2010: 01).

In the process to launch CAP appeals, first of all sector specific needs are assessed and analysed in detail by Humanitarian Country Teams, which includes non-UN agencies too. Every cluster lead compiles, organises and reviews its needs and requirements. It is expected from cluster leads to complement their needs by surveys, contingency plans, monitoring reports, government data, academic research, or the like, and referenced accordingly (OCHA 2010: 03). Such plan for needs assessments should be completed by about the end of August (OCHA 2010: 03). The HCT then finalizes the needs analysis for the CAP as early as possible approximately till mid-September- to provide the basis for agreeing on strategic priorities.

In the second step, the OCHA reviews the cluster/sector inter-relations of needs are across sectors. Then OCHA drafts a needs analysis document, which addresses the forthcoming CAP requirements. This document is presented in CAP workshop, where HCTs have to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that the CAP is comprehensive financing tool, including the UN and non-UN actors' requirements. Final CAP appeal document ready for launching typically describes what humanitarian programmes are possible and with what priority within the existing capacity and ambition of humanitarian response actors (Poole 2010).

It is launched by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in a global conference, organised by the UN on the behalf of the affected peoples and associated organisations, usually held in Geneva in November (though new CAPs can be issued as needed). In this conference, all stakeholders- the CAP countries, the donor countries, UN agencies, NGOs and representatives from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) are invited. Following the global launch, in January, a 'CAP funding consultation' takes place, where major donors identify their priorities and intentions.

Table 3.1: Patterns in the CAP financing since inception in 1992

Year	Required US $ billions	Received US $ billions
1992	2.7	2.1
1993	3.9	2.5
1994	2.7	2.2
1995	2.3	1.8
1996	2.3	1.6
1997	1.5	1.0
1998	2.1	1.3
1999	2.4	1.8
2000	1.9	1.1
2001	2.7	1.5
2002	4.5	3.0
2003	7.3	4.3
2004	3.4	2.2
2005	6.3	4.0
2006	6.3	3.9
2007	6.1	4.0
2008	8.5	5.7
2009	10.3	7.0

Source: the OCHA website.

It is launched by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in a global conference, organised by the UN on the behalf of the affected peoples and associated organisations, usually held in Geneva in November (though new CAPs can be issued as needed). In this conference, all stakeholders- the CAP countries, the donor countries, UN agencies, NGOs and

representatives from the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) are invited. Following the global launch, in January, a 'CAP funding consultation' takes place, where major donors identify their priorities and intentions.

A mid-year review takes place during the humanitarian segment of the annual meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Here humanitarian aid organizations working in humanitarian crises come together to revise their strategic response plans to support affected country governments' programmes of relief and recovery for their people in need where, if possible, Flash Appeals are included into new CAP.

Since its inception in 1992, more than 100 donor countries have provided more than US$42 billion for 330 appeals. In 21st century, donors' response to CAP had been generally positive so far. From the period 2002 to 2010 combined CAP requirements were funded between 64.3 per cent and 72.3 per cent (Poole 2010). Despite this, it is fact that its unmet funds varied from one year to another. During 2002-2010, unmet funds ranged from US$1.4 billion to over US$2.7 billion (Poole 2010). Flash Appeals vary from year to year depending upon number and intensity of disasters whereas consolidated appeals consistently increased during 2001 to 2010. In 2005, Flash Appeals saw 75.6 per cent increase from 2004, but in 2006 it fell by 190 per cent (Poole 2010). Since 2003, Flash Appeals accounted about 11.5 per cent while consolidates process were 88.7 per cent of total CAP funding (Poole 2010).

The Funding Instruments

Funding instrument includes *Central Emergency Response Fund* (CERF) and *Country-Based Pooled Funds*. CERF is a permanent financial instrument. Established and maintained by the United Nations, it helps more timely and reliable humanitarian financing to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. It is funded by voluntary contributions from member states of the United Nations, private businesses, foundations and individuals. CERF has up to US $500 million- $ 50 million out of it for loan and $450 million is for grant.

It is first financial instrument meant to disburse funds in case of sudden occurrence of disasters. The Resolving Fund (previously known as Revolving Fund) has two important characteristics. First, it is exclusive in nature open only for the UN agencies and IOM. Non-UN agencies, NGOs, and IGOs cannot participate in it. In case of CERF funding, NGOs could only be implementing partners and/or 'intermediaries' between the UN agencies and affected peoples. Second, donor contributions are unearmarked and allocation decisions are made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The Fund allows the UN to react immediately when a disaster strikes by making funds available for life-saving activities to eligible agencies such as UN (its funds, programmes, and specialized agencies) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Every year in December, CERF calls a donors' conference. In this conference secretariat presents development of the Fund and asks donors to announce their pledge for forthcoming year. This conference indicates how much money is likely to be received next year.

Funding for the CERF comes from states and non-state donors. Since its inception in 2006 to 2010, number of donors increased from 54 in 2006 to 103 in 2010. States, DAC and non-DAC both, are major donors to CERF. During 2006 and 2010, DAC states have contributed US$1.7 billion which equates to an 84.6 per cent share of total funding (DI 2011a: 04). Among DAC members, UK was the top donor to CERF since 2006, but in 2011 Sweden ($66.43) surpassed UK ($ 62.21) (Sweeney 2010). Number of non-DAC donors ranged from 33 to 61 during 2006-2010. In same period they have contributed US$24.5 million to the fund, which equated to 1.3% of the total CERF receiving (DI 2011b: 05). Among non-DAC donors Russian Federation topped the list, followed by China, Ukraine and India.

Beside states, non-governmental actors- individuals, foundations, corporate sector and individual organisation are also donors to CERF. Number and volume of funds from non-state donors have increased since its establishment in 2006. In 2006 only two non-government donors gave money to the CERF. But this number reached up to 22 by 2010, who contributed over US$10,000 (DI 2011a: 06). In 2007, Western Union, through the Western Union Foundation, became the first corporate donor to CERF while Jefferies & Co. in 2010 became largest donor to CERF with a contribution of US$1.0 million.

In the process to get funds from the CERF, relief agencies (UN agencies and IOM) have to make request through the HC/RC to CERF secretariat. First of all the relief agency submits the proposal to humanitarian coordinator in country. HC/RC after approval sends it to CERF secretariat, where budget is reviewed. After reviewing, secretariat sends it to ERC for his/her approval. The ERC sends approval letter back to the agency along with blank Letter of Understanding (LOU) seeking information, to be filled by requesting agency and returned back to CERF secretariat. On showing of project application with budget, signed LOU, project approval letter and a memo requesting release of funding, CERF secretariat disburses funds to agency at headquarters or field level office.

In the case of underfunded emergencies the ERC, with technical assistance of CERF secretariat, selects countries and decides allocation of funds per country (OCHA 2010: 04). Decision regarding selection and the amount of fund depends upon on the severity and vulnerability in the country. Thereafter, RC/HCs of selected countries under this window are invited to submit a country application, consisting of one or several agency-specific funding requests/proposals. Those countries, which are not selected by the ERC, cannot make request under this window[8].

The CERF fund allocation through relief agencies takes two forms- loan facility and grant facility. The CERF provides grant facility of up to US $450 million and a loan facility of US $50 million. Money allocated as loan have to be returned within one year from it disbursement. The grant of $450 million is provided for three life-saving activities- sudden-onset disasters, sudden and unexpected deteriorations of existing crises, and time-critical interventions (IASC 2010: 70). The CERF grant component is allocated through the rapid response window and under-funded emergencies window.

Rapid response window provides fund for rapid onset disaster whether manmade or natural or existing complex emergencies aiming at preventing the further rapid deteriorations. Projects funded under this window have to address critical operations and life-saving programmes that have not been yet funded by other sources. Funds are approved as quickly as one business day after an application is received from an RC/HC. About two thirds of CERF allocations are made through this window. 67 and 66 per cent

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8 For detail of allocation process of underfunded emergencies see (OCHA 2010b).

of CERF funding was released through this window in 2009 and 2010 respectively (DI 2011a: 09).

Forgotten emergencies window is aimed at providing funds to forgotten and under-funded emergencies. In 2009, 33 per cent of total and in 2010, 34 per cent of total CERF funding went to under-funded emergencies through this window. Overall US$1.9 billion since 2006 has been disbursed to 82 countries and of this 33.4% has been allocated through the underfunded window (DI 2011: 02). Maximum up to $30 million can be allocated to each humanitarian emergency, although exceptions can be made where necessary (OCHA 2010: 05). Since its inception in 2006 the CERF has received a total of US$2.1 billion in contributions and a further US$254 million in pledges from over 150 governments and non-governmental donors (DI 2011a: 03). A total of $1.6 billion of this had been allocated to Humanitarian Country Teams in some 75 countries by the end of 2009, remaining to be allocated in 2010 (OCHA 2010: 05). In terms of funding by sector, except 2010, food sector got maximum funds. But in 2010 health got more allocation than food (DI 2011a:12).

Country-Based Pooled Funds

Country based pooled fund plays complementary financial role in the UN humanitarian system. It bridges the gaps and loopholes left by appeal mechanism and fund raising instruments. It consists of *Emergency Response Fund* (ERF) and *Common Humanitarian Funds* (CHF). ERF is a multi-donor fund, managed by the H/RC, to provide small, flexible and rapid fund to unforeseen humanitarian needs outside the CAP. If a disaster occurs in a country where pooled funds already exist they can prove an important tool for coordinating emergency, reconstruction and recovery aid and ensuring that needs are met. The RC/HC manages the fund with support from the OCHA office and is often advised on strategic issues by an Advisory Board. Grant allocated through this window range between $100,000 and $250,000. Main beneficiary of this instrument are mostly NGOs (national and international), as well as UN agencies and IOM.

Common Humanitarian Fund is a mechanism to address critical and unforeseen needs as identified in the CAP and/or humanitarian response plan. It is financially managed by an Administrative Agent (UNDAC 2006: 76). It has two fund allocation mechanisms. First, Standard Allocation Mechanism allocates twice a year- at the beginning of the year and at

mid-year on priority basis as identified in CAP. CHF is managed by the HC with support of OCHA and Administrative Agent. Serving as CHF secretariat OCHA manages the allocation process while Administrative Agent manages fund disbursement to the recipient UN organizations. Allocation through this channel takes two to six weeks. Second, Emergency Response allocates for unforeseen and sudden onset disasters which are not properly covered by other channels. All partners of CAP benefit but the UN agencies benefit directly while others like ICRC and IOM access CHFs through a UN participating agency serving as the Managing Agent (UNDAC 2006: 76).

The Delivery of Aid

In the UN humanitarian system, primary responsibility to assist the victims of disasters lies with the affected country. The host country has responsibility to be the centre in initiation, coordination and implementation, organisation of international humanitarian assistance (A/Res/46/182). Therefore, the host states play four interrelated roles in humanitarian assistance: they are responsible for 'calling' a crisis and inviting international aid; they provide assistance and protection themselves; they are responsible for monitoring and coordinating external assistance; and they set the regulatory and legal frameworks governing assistance (Harvey 2009: 02). The UN humanitarian system role in this context is to assists the national authorities in effectively combating the situation.

The OCHA's main role in disaster response is mobilisation and coordination of resources in order to ensure adequate, timely and effective response. The UN mission starts with formal consent or request of the affected states. Following the disasters, different states offer/send Urban Search and Rescue Teams for quick and life-saving operations. First of all, the UN coordinates various international Urban Search and Rescue Teams (USRT) in the field through the International Search and Rescue and Advisory Group includes (INSARAG) and On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC). Generally, the URSTs work about two-three weeks in the field.

Simultaneously, within twenty-four hours, the UN organises and dispatches UNDAC teams to disaster hit areas. In initial response phase the UNDAC plays two important roles. First, it establishes and manages the On-Site Operation Coordination Centre and second, conducts the initial damage and impact assessment in the affected areas. In practice, the OSOCC is established by the UNDAC team or by the first arriving

international USRT teams, who will then hand over the OSOCC to the UNDAC team when it arrives. It is main instrument for coordination of humanitarian relief at field level. It assists local emergency management authorities with the coordination of international and national USAR teams as well as other sectoral responders like health, water/sanitation, shelter, etc. (UNDAC 2006: H 8). The Clusters are established by HC/RC in close cooperation of the ERC and other relevant humanitarian actors in the field.

The OCHA channels fund through the UNRC's office and other implementing partners including the NGOs. Its role is limited till relief phase of disaster. In later phases UNDP with Relied Coordinator, coordinates the rehabilitation and recovery phase.

In the case of Haiti, following the disastrous earthquake on 12[th] January 2010 international community offered search and rescue teams, which began to arrive within twenty-four hours. Within forty-eight hours, six teams were operational while total twenty-six USAR teams were in the country by 15 January (IASC 2010: 08). OCHA organised a 13 members UNDAC team and send it within 24 hours of disaster to Haiti. It established Onsite Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC) in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) logistics base in Port-au-Prince (IASC 2010: 08). Five key clusters [Food, WASH, Health, Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI) and Logistics] were mobilised within the first two days (Bhattacharjee and Lossio 2011: 21).

In field operations, ranging from relief to rehabilitation and development, NGOs and military are two integral parts of the UN humanitarian system. In last two decades the NGOs have become indispensable partners with the UN system. They play two interrelated roles- as cluster leads and working as its group members, and as partners in delivering humanitarian aid. For example, Emergency Shelter cluster is led by IFRC (in natural disasters) along with UNCHR (in complex emergencies). Nutrition is led by UNICEF but IF/CRC, Action contre la Faim (ACF) and Save the Children participate in the working group. Similarly, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene cluster is led by UNICEF but NGOs participating in working group members include ACF, InterAction, ICRC, IFRC, IRC, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), MSF Belgium, OXFAM, Register Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR), UNHCR, WFP and WHO. In operations the UN subcontracts the local and international NGOs, who are more efficient and quicker than some of UN agencies. Therefore, they ensure the distribution of crucial, life-saving and timely relief

assistance. One thing which is worth mentioning in this respect is that most of the NGOs are operational in initial phase of disasters rather than long term rehabilitation and development phase.

Military forces with humanitarian aid workers are necessary in humanitarian emergencies to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goods. In a recent study (Haiti earthquakes), Butterfield Reario and Dolan (2010) have noticed that in interest of making the humanitarian responses more effective and predictable, the involvement of military forces need to be taken into account and appropriately planned for all parties in such situations.

The military personnel in humanitarian aid operations perform two functions: logistics (relief activities and support for civilian relief agencies) and security. The military forces play three interrelated logistic roles (Harris and Dombrowska, 2002: 164-170) in the humanitarian operations. First, Military personnels can quickly reopen the information and communication channels through- constructing road and bridges, repairing telephone lines, reopening airports and shipyards. Second, armed forces often possess an abundance of precisely those resources that are in the shortest supply when disaster strikes: transport, fuel, communication, commodity, building equipment, medicine and large stockpiles of off-the-shelf provisions (Weiss, 2002: 212) enabling the military personnel to deliver timely humanitarian aid. Third, military personnel can train and develop skills, particularly for dealing with protected crisis, among aid workers. Through this the military can fill expertise gap (Harris and Dombrowska, 2002: 166). In the security domain, military can create 'humanitarian space' where aid workers can operate fearlessly.

In practice humanitarian-military combined operations are more contentious in complex humanitarian emergencies rather than natural disasters. Examples of South Asian Tsunami (2004) and Haiti earthquakes (2010) where large number of military including air force and navy participated without any considerable dispute approve this argument. In initial phase of natural disasters, military has been effective in ensuring accessibility of aid workers by rebuilding roads, bridges and means of communications, but in later phase it has been not so effective. But in case of 'complex humanitarian emergencies' (CHE), military has been essential in delivering and protection of aid workers even in later phases.

In the case of Haiti earthquake, military of twenty-six countries including Argentina, Canada, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and US provided field hospitals, troops, military aircraft, helicopters, cargo ships and port handling equipment. In first two-three weeks military was used only for the relief distribution, managing airport and air traffic but not for rubble clearance and repairing roads and bridges to access victims. The wider role for the military was only possible after two-three weeks.

At field levels, relief coordination is mainly divided into three parts- search and rescue of missing persons, relief distribution, and recovery and reconstruction. Search and rescue operations are coordinated by International Search and Rescue and Advisory Group (INSARAG), while relief operations by OSOCC, UNDAC, Virtual OSOCC and civil-military coordination. The INSARAG is aimed to coordinate the exchange of information between international USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) teams and increase the effectiveness of relief efforts through the development of a search and rescue method and system that is widely accepted internationally (Okita 2007: 63). In order to avoid repetition in operation it promotes use of marking techniques such as 'search completed' or 'no sign of survivors'. Its coordinating structure is divided into three regional groups- Africa/Europe, the Americas and Asia/Pacific.

The relief operations in the field are coordinated by the UNDAC, OSOCC, Virtual OSOCC and civil-military coordination. Following the disasters the OCHA establishes UNDAC to coordinate the initial information management and need assessment. The establishment and administration of the OSOCC is one of the main duties of UNDAC members (Okita 2007: 65). The biggest achievement in the realm of field coordination in last few years is establishment of Virtual-OSOCC (Okita 2007: 66). It is a disaster information network linked with those in charge of disaster relief for each country and organization. Those peoples exchange opinions and information about the extent of damage and relief activity immediately after the occurrence of a disaster. It helps relief agencies by providing more reliable information because in disaster media exaggerates the situation. Particularly in case of extreme natural disasters as earthquakes, where lack of information causes the delay in relief operations, it is emerging as an important tool. The military is used as last resort in humanitarian assistance according to the scale of the disaster.

At the national level the Resident Coordinator as representative of the UN humanitarian system and international humanitarian system (if HC is not designated separately or s/he is also designated as HC) coordinates humanitarian activities. Within twenty-four hours of disaster, the HC establishes a HCT including national authorities and other relevant partners in the field. The HC/RC sends a letter outlining the numbers of clusters and their lead agencies to the ERC, which forwards it to IASC and global cluster leads. If approved, then in consultation with the HCT, s/he also establishes clusters and designates cluster lead agencies co-chaired by national authorities. In consultation with the HCT, s/he assesses the need for cluster coordinators to discuss inter-cluster issues and if necessary establishes inter-cluster coordination mechanism.

If the RC is designated as HC, s/he has three additional coordinating tools- UN Country Teams, Resident Coordinator Office and Themes Groups (ECOSOC 2008: 11-12 para 36-40). At country level, the RC system works mainly through UNCTs where major policy related decisions on collective actions are taken. UN country teams support national coordination efforts under government leadership. In many cases, particularly in later part of rehabilitation and development, the Bretton Wood institutions, and regional development banks also participate in UNCT meetings. But in case of not being the RC, s/he has humanitarian country team, clusters, thematic groups on cross-cutting issues, early recovery network and inter-cluster coordination mechanism to coordinate (IASC 2010: 35).

At headquarters, the IASC, the OCHA and their constituting bodies coordinate humanitarian operations. The IASC, a broader international humanitarian body brings together the UN agencies, funds and programmes, NGOs, IGOs and other relevant actors, is main coordinating body. The Emergency Relief Coordinator chairs the meetings of the IASC where decisions regarding coordination of the international humanitarian response toward populations affected by emergencies/disasters, are taken. S/he in consultation with the members of the IASC identifies the need to designate a humanitarian coordinator, who becomes the most senior UN humanitarian official in the field. The OCHA, chaired by Under-Secretary General, is main decision-making body of the UN humanitarian system. With the aim to maximise response and recovery operations and minimise duplications and inefficiencies, and to bring policy congruence, the OCHA develops policy, common

strategies and coordinates the humanitarian assistance at headquarters in New York and Geneva.

The OCHA has further two financial tools- the CAP and the CERF to ensure coordination. The CAP brings almost all relevant actors of the field to issue a common appeal for fund on annual basis. Similarly, the CERF brings the UN specialised agencies, fund and programmes along with the IOM for quick response to sudden onset disasters and forgotten emergencies. OCHA generally concludes its responsibilities when the operation moves from response to recovery.

Besides main bodies, there are various sections and units within OCHA, both in New York and Geneva, which technically support the field operations. The Emergency Service Branch (ESB), based in Geneva develops- system, expertise and services, and mobilises and coordinates the early and quick deployment of personal, goods and services. Within the ESB, there are three sections and units namely- field coordination support section, military and civil defense section and logistics support and environmental emergencies section, which oversee various aspects of deployment and coordination (Coppola 2007: 460).

First, the Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS) was established within ESB in 1996. Its primary objective was to support national governments and the UN Resident Coordinators in developing, preparing, and maintaining standby capacity for rapid deployment to sudden onset emergencies to conduct rapid needs assessments and coordination (Coppola 2007: 460). It manages four different programmes and offices which include the UNDAC, the INSARAG, Virtual OSOCC and the Surge Capacity Project (Coppola 2007: 460). Second, the Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) was established in 1995 to provide military assets to humanitarian agencies according to need. Its Logistics Support Unit (LSU) manages essential goods like water, shelter, purification and distribution systems, and household items that can be supplied to disaster hit areas within few hours on short notice. Third, the Environmental Emergencies Section integrates UN emergency response mechanism. It quickly mobilises and provides assistance to those countries that are facing severe environmental crisis. The second body in Geneva is the External Relations and Support Mobilization Branch. Different sections under it manage

geographical monitoring and coordination, relations with donors and consolidated appeal process.

In New York, Communications and Information Services Branch and Policy Development and Studies Branch are two coordination tools. The Communications and Information Services Branch manages information collection and dissemination. It manages International Regional Integrated Network and ReliefWeb. The Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) supports effective emergency response coordination and advocacy by providing leadership on issues like humanitarian policy, evaluation and best practice. While the Director of the Coordination and Response Division (CRD) is responsible for providing disaster-related direction, guidance, and support to the ERC, the UN Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinators, and OCHA's field offices, including the deployment of extra personnels as necessary or emergency cash grants (Coppola 2007: 459). It has assumed the lead role within OCHA in advising the USG/ERC on operational decision-making for response. On financial issues, the Funding Coordination Section (FCS) provides support and guidance to OCHA on the establishment and management of country-based pooled funds.

The Evaluation and Future Planning

In the last step in the process of humanitarian aid, the UN humanitarian system evaluates its performance. The Evaluation and Guidance Section of Policy Development and Studies Branch, based in New York is also responsible for planning and implementing evaluations. IASC and General Assembly have mandated to evaluate the system. First, as accountability tools to measure the performance and effectiveness of humanitarian action and second, as learning tools to improve OCHA response (OCHA 2010c:16). To attain these objectives, three types of techniques- evaluation, review and lesson-learned study are used.

Evaluation is an important tool to find out loopholes and shortcoming in the previous missions. If it is done by internal/members it is known as 'internal evaluation' while in case of getting done external consultants it is known as 'external evaluation'. Such evaluation can be done by the OCHA or any particular agency, fund and programme. The funds, programmes and specialised agencies also can separately commission a study to evaluate their own performance. To ensure the credibility, transparency and independence,

two measures should be taken. First, those who were members at the policy formulation and/or implementation teams should not be included into the evaluation teams. Second, staffs from Evaluation and Studies Unit (ESU) should be taken and evaluation reports should be made public. For example, the Evaluation and Studies Unit of OCHA commissioned a study 'Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services During the Emergency in Afghanistan: July 2001 to July 2002' to study the OCHA response in Afghanistan.

Reviews are case studies or desk reviews managed by the Evaluation and Studies Unit (ESU) of the Policy Development and Studies Branch in New York. They are conducted by external consultant, nevertheless it is considered internal. For example 'Coping with Crisis: Coping with Aid' authored by Sue Lautze and John Hammock (1996) was a desk review. Such reviews are shared with donors and other shareholders.

Lessons learned studies are aimed at learning from past experience. For this purpose past operations are critically scrutinised and major shortfalls are pointed out. The incorporation of these lessons into forthcoming studies is aim of lesson learned studies. The OCHA and IASC conduct evaluation studies to improve future operations.

The process of delivering humanitarian aid is five steps process. Nevertheless, there is an 'organic coherence' between different parts in the system and none can perform in complete isolation from each other. Each and every part from information collection to evaluation of this chain is related to one another. Information management has significance for the needs assessment. The needs assessment cannot be done without information but information do not have independent role to play. Accurate needs assessment helps to mobilise resources. Mobilisation of resources decides the effectiveness and timely response. While evaluation provides opportunity to learn from previous mistakes and improve future responses. Weakness affects any affects the entire system. Similarly needs assessment is useless there is no adequate response.

Chapter 4

Challenges to the United Nations Humanitarian Aid System

The institutions and process of delivering humanitarian aid under the UN auspices, the preceding two chapters have provided some problem areas. The inadequacy of institutionalisation, increased complexities in the process of delivering aid, changed nature of conflicts, increased number of relief agencies, operational changes like relief to development continuum are a few of them. At the process level, this present chapter assesses the manifold challenges faced by the UN humanitarian system- political, normative, organizational, financial and so forth.

Demanding Political Contexts

The UN humanitarian system works as a subsystem of a system. According to 'system theory'[1] different sub-systems of a given system continuously interact with each other. In this process both affect each other. The humanitarianism and politics are two subsystems of a broader 'global system.' Like other systems, the humanitarianism interacts with other actor such as political, religious and economic in the world system. In the process of interaction between politics and humanitarianism, humanitarianism is constrained by three types of actors namely the donors, affected states, and the non-state actors. Their behavior in the international system poses constraints to the UN humanitarian missions because the humanitarian assistance is supposed to be principled rather than politicised.

In the international humanitarian system, the primary responsibility of organization, coordination and implementation of the humanitarian assistance lies with the host state. The Charter of the UN does not authorize the UN to intervene in the domestic affairs of a member state. Therefore, the UN humanitarian relief agencies operate with the prior consent of the host government. But in a situation where host state itself is a party in the conflict and is keen to limit or deny access to the victims, the UN system finds difficult to assist the people despite urgent need for assistance. The host states invoke two reasons,

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[1] Taking inspiration from the advances in Anthropology and Sociology, David Easton (firstly) introduced the concept of system in political science. For him a system is constituted by various subsystems like political, economic, social and ecological. These subsystems interact with each other and consequently affect and being affected by each other. This interaction enables and constrains each other's behaviour.

namely the security and the administrative compulsions to restrict the access to the victims.

The host states use security as a pretext to keep aid personnel and/or materials out of certain areas for their own political and military objectives (OCHA 2011: 34). It helps the government forces in internal conflict situation to starve and weaken their enemy. Such security-related access constraints are most evident in Sri Lanka, Darfur, Occupied Palestine Territories, and Pakistan where insecurity, combined with state-imposed restrictions on access and movement had severely limited operational capacity of the relief organisations (OCHA 2011: 34). Such states generally cite security concerns as the basis for access restrictions. For example, the government of Sri Lanka (2008) informed the aid agencies that she was not in a condition to provide guarantee for their safety. The Sri Lankan government was suspicious that assistance provided for the victims of war would potentially be used by the Tamil rebels to continue fight against the government. Then Sri Lankan government's decision led the UN relief agencies to leave the area (Vanni) (OCHA 2011: 34).

The unwilling states put several administrative constraints on the involvement of relief agencies and their goods. In Occupied Palestine Territories (OPT), the UN relief workers had to get clearance at roughly 600 checkpoints and roadblocks in the West Bank in order to carry on with their daily work (OCHA 2011: 34). Similarly, the government of Yemen restricted import and use of security related goods like armoured vehicles, flak jackets, and bullet-proof vests, as well as prohibitions on the import of high-frequency and satellite communication systems on the ground that it could fall in the wrong hands.

From the donors' point of view, the instrumentalisation of aid and withdrawing of aid on security and accountability grounds are major challenges. One obvious question emerges from interaction of humanitarian and political actors is that why donors are keen to assist in particular sector while reluctant in others? For example, the case of Afghanistan reveals the intentions of donors' actual motives behind funding. The coalition force had dropped pamphlets in local language appealing to the local people to provide information about the Al-Qaeda commanders 'in order to have a continuation of the provision of humanitarian aid' (OCHA 2011: 36).

In civil war affected states, where some part of the country has been occupied by such groups, which are internationally banned, the international relief agencies face serious obstacles. Such areas are often not open for aid distribution. However, sanctions imposed by the donors further worsen the situation of the victims. Similarly, designation of some non-state armed actors as 'terrorist' groups by donor states has constrained humanitarian negotiations with those groups.

For instance in US, in a June 2010 ruling (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project) the US Supreme Court upheld a law against providing any 'material' support to organisations considered to be terrorist groups including training, advice, and material assistance such as food, water, and shelter, and seemingly prohibiting the coordination of any such action with such organisations (OCHA 2011: 37). The Hamas in OPT, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Taliban in Afghanistan are example of the groups under target. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab, which has primarily controlled South-Central Somalia since the end of 2009, has been officially listed as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US and other member states.

Similarly, in the case of Occupied Palestine Territories (OPT), which is presently governed by the Hamas has been declared as a terrorist outfit by the US. Therefore, the US government cannot provide any type of material relief to OPT. This decision has serious consequences not only for the NGOs but for the UN also. In such cases US government would impose stricter surveillance on the funds channeled through by the UN system.

Again, the problem of withdrawing the aid on security and accountability grounds occurs in a situation when donors distinguish between good and bad. For example, in the case of Afghanistan distinction has been made between the good and bad Taliban. The donors preferred to assist the 'good Taliban' while prevented the aid from going to 'bad Taliban.' In the case of war torn Somalia, the donors preferred to fund only for those programmes taking place in areas controlled by their favorable regimes. The donors, mostly the Westerns preferred to fund the programmes in Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supported areas. They imposed funding agreements on agencies to limit dialogue with Al-Shabaab, who was a party to the conflict. The donors have tried to block the funds reaching to the areas controlled by rebels led by Al-Shabaab, despite the fact the humanitarian need was greatest in those areas (OCHA 2011: 36).

There is a positive co-relation between the underdevelopment and the humanitarian crisis. The poor, underdeveloped and undemocratic states are more prone to human suffering in the form of chronic droughts, famine and internal strife. Such countries in the age of globalization seem to be left for behind. The severity of existing chronic vulnerabilities have exacerbated by the impact of global challenges and increased frequency and/or magnitude of natural disasters leading to additional acute vulnerabilities and humanitarian caseloads (United Nations 2010: 10 para 37). During the 2007-09, global factors such as high food and fuel prices and the global economic slowdown have led to the coincidence of severe food, water and energy insecurity in such countries.

The supply of food is one of the most important requirements in the time of disasters to victims and responsibility of the humanitarian agencies. The food crisis (2007-08) has posed severe crisis before the UN humanitarian agencies particularly the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP). The shocking price rising of 2008 triggered wide recognition that the world needed to respond quickly and comprehensively, or else risk millions more becoming hungry (Nabarro and Muller: 2009). According to a WFP study, more than one million people slipped (due to global food price rising) below the poverty line in between September 2007 and June 2008 (Gutierrez cited in McMichael and Schneider 2011: 119).

The food crisis had posed two fold challenges before the UN humanitarian agencies. First, the global food crisis raised the number of victims of food unavailability. World Food Programme annual report (2007) noted that rising food and fuel prices threatened to push millions more people into hunger (World Food Programme 2007: 02). In 2007, the WFP provided life-saving food assistance to 86.1 million people in 80 countries. In addition to food and fuel price rise, the financial crisis has tripled the contemporary threats (two are rising food and fuel prices) in year 2008. These factors resulted in an additional 115 million people added to the ranks of the hungry over the past two years (2007-09). Consequently, number of beneficiaries of the WFP run programms reached at more than 102 million in 78 countries in 2008 (World Food Programme 2009: 03). Number of beneficiaries peaked despite the fact that the WFP assisted the victims in 78 countries, two less than 80 countries of previous year. As the food prices started declining, number of beneficiaries also declined to in 2010.

Second, rising food has raised the cost of providing life-saving food assistance (World Food Programme 2007: 02). For WFP, the overall cost of reaching a hungry person was 50 percent higher on average in 2007 than it was in 2002 (World Food Programme 2007: 07). Prices of those crops that supply almost half of the world's calories like wheat rose by 63 percent, rice 61 percent and maize 45 percent, during 2002 to 2007. Due to increase prices of food grains and total number beneficiaries, budget of WFP reached $5.1 billion in 2008 (World Food Programme 2009: 02). In such a situation, when humanitarian agencies are underfunded, the food crisis has further exacerbated the financial situation.

To mitigate the adverse impacts of the food crisis, the UN system along with the Bretton Wood institutions decided to 'bridge humanitarian and development agendas', drawing on the comparative advantage and knowledge of each participating organisation (Nabarro and Muller: 2009). The UN adopted two fold approaches to deal with the food crisis. On the supply side it focused on immediately increasing food availability and access to food and nutrition support by ensuring supply of emergency food assistance and providing safety nets. On the supply side to increase to production of food grains by promoting sustainable smallholder food production, improving international markets and developing an international consensus on biofuels (Nabarro and Muller: 2009).

In the age of globalization and interconnectedness local problems have global ramification. The infectious diseases like the bird flu, influenza, and swine flu have global implications; therefore need for global efforts to combat it. Peoples have been forced to migrate from their homes either by climate conflict related reasons. The role of climate related disasters have increased in first decade of 21[st] Century in comparison to 20[th] Century. Increasing role of anthropogenic factors, have led to cause sudden heavy rains, intense tropical storms, repeated flooding and droughts are likely to increase. According to OCHA, around 70 percent of disasters are climate related while two decades ago it was around 50 percent.[2] In the last decade, 2.4 billion people were affected by climate related disasters, compared to1.7 billion in the previous decade. In 2008, approximately 20 to 26 million people were forced to migrate because of climate and conflict related disasters

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[2] Taken from the OCHA website. For detail see http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/advocacy/thematic-campaigns/climate-change/threats-solutions

(OCHA 2010d: 04). This increase also has financial consequence. The cost of responding to disasters has risen tenfold between 1992 and 2008.[3]

The changing patterns and increasing number of vulnerable peoples will lead to increase in number of humanitarian actors. Potentially the increasing number of actors will pose coordination related challenges before the UN. Increasing number of actors will also stress the UN humanitarian information management system. In such situation the UN humanitarian system will need to increase its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate information to meet the new requirements. The increasing number of humanitarian actors will have with different mandates and goals. They potentially may test the UN humanitarian principle. Therefore, the humanitarian principles will also be on tight rope.

Climate related challenges have greater ramification for the UN humanitarian system. With increase in number and severity of the global challenges, the UN has to face increased workloads. The climate change has posed new physical, socio-economic and security challenges before people. Physically, the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes and tornadoes; higher average surface and ocean temperatures; melting ice causing the rise sea levels; uncertain and uneven rainfall causing drought and floods have intensified the human vulnerability. Between 1990 and 1999, an estimated 188 million people per year were affected by natural disasters, six times more than the 31 million annually affected by armed conflict (Purvis and Busby 2004).

The climate change per se does not have direct implication for the UN humanitarian assistance system. For example, the UN humanitarian system does not have to do with global warming. The logical connection between climate change and migration, migration and food security, and the food security and the outbreak of violence in turn causing human suffering have ramification for the UN humanitarian system. When climate change leads to socio-economic and/ security level challenges to people, it threatens the UN humanitarian system. The increase in disaster situations requires greater, timely and adequate response from the UN. It further leads to the organisational, operational, and financial and security related challenges to the UN humanitarian system.

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[3] More information can be retrieved from OCHA website at http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/advocacy/thematic-campaigns/climate change/threats-solutions

Normative Challenges

Major challenges to the UN humanitarian system occurred in the conflict zones. In order to provide assistance and engage with parties to a conflict, it is important for the UN to ensure that its conduct is neutral, impartial and independent. But since the end of the cold-war and proliferation of unnatural disasters, allegedly the UN principles of humanitarian action have been compromised on several occasions. Deviation from the humanitarian principles has emerged as major issue of discourse within and outside the United Nations.

Undoubtedly not only the United Nations, but also other factors contribute to the observation. All actors involved like the donors, United Nations, NGOs and military in this process are equally responsible for this. The donors who contribute earmarked funds starch the principles of humanity, neutrality and independence. Similarly, involvement of military, particularly in man-made disasters stresses the principle of independence and non-intervention. Combination of military-humanitarian assistance has tested the principle of non-intervention, one of the most important principles enshrined in the UN Charter. The host states, which are mostly from developing world are apprehensive of credibility of the UN assistance is in question. Therefore, working of the UN humanitarian system in collaboration with other partners seems to hampering the principles of humanitarianism enshrined in the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991 and others.

The principle of humanity assumes that humanitarian action will take place irrespective of political, economic and military interest of the relief agencies'. The principle of selectivity undermines the notion of humanity, which according to Franck stands for 'conceptually alike cases will be treated alike' (Franck quoted in Binder 2009: 329). Selectivity in practice, takes the forms of 'earmarking.' Through earmarking they indirectly coerce the UN and affiliated relief agencies to allocate funds for specific case i.e. a particular state and issue areas like health, sanitation, food, shelter and camp. In the UN humanitarian system, while a few funding mechanisms (like Common Humanitarian Fund and Emergency Response Fund) although do not accept earmarked funding, yet main funding mechanism of the UN system, the CAP accepts earmarked funding.

Simultaneously, in cases of high profile crises, where powerful states provide assistance to victims, practically it becomes very difficult for the UN humanitarian system to isolate themselves from donors states operating. Because the UN is funded voluntarily and facing

competition with the NGOs, it is impossible to insulate her from interests of donors. In case of insistence for independence, probability to compromising the funds increases. Thus to ensure sustainable funding, the UN has to collaborate with other actors in the field. For example in case of Afghanistan, donors' presence in the field and their insistence for 'coherence mission', led the UN to adopt coherence mission incorporating peacekeeping and peace-building actors.

Myanmar (2008) is also an important case where principle of humanity was at tight rope. Following the cyclone Nargis, leading to official death toll at 84,537 until 24 June 2008, with 53,836 missing and 19,359 injured (Honda 2009: 01). Three days later, on May 6 the Myanmar representation in New York formally asked the United Nations for help. Allegedly, Myanmar's ruling generals made the United Nations officials and other aid workers to wait for entry visas before they could begin a damage assessment. The planes had waited for two days while the world body negotiated with the military regime to allow the material in. Only on May 7, the government of Myanmar had not officially endorsed international assistance, but stated that they were willing to accept international assistance, preferably bilateral, government to government. Under pressure from neighboring countries, Myanmar government allowed the aid to reach at victims but not aid workers. Nevertheless, due to ongoing tussle (politics) between the UN and international community on the on hand and the government of Myanmar on the other, humanity (the victims) was marginalised.

Impartiality is one of the basic principles enshrined and again and again reaffirmed in the General Assembly resolutions. The principle of impartiality requires that assistance be provided proportionate to need and not according to political efficacy, religious, racial, or other criteria (Macrae 2004: 30). Proportionality lies at the heart of the principles of impartiality. But the practice of humanitarian relief agencies in the field has shown different trends. First of all, the funds have been allocated according to donors' interests rather than needs of victims. Donors' through earmarked and short contribution than as much required funds, have coerced the UN to allocate funds as per their will rather than needs of the victims. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, despite there was an alarming dearth of funds but donors failed to respond. In sharp contrast to it, in south Asian tsunami (2004) donors' responded to relief appeals so copiously that all the money could not be spent quickly enough to justify the reasons for which it was donated (Alexander 2007: 01).

The principle of neutrality underlines the relief agencies' commitment that they will operate without getting involved with any political, military and/or ideological authority. The principle of neutrality means not taking a political position with regards to the justness or otherwise of a particular actor's causes (Macrae 2004: 30). It is the practical expression of the principle of impartiality. In humanitarian affairs it is widely understood as the currency to ensure access in conflict affected areas. In this regard, three cases the Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) provide ample evidence on the compromising on and politicisation of the principles of the UN humanitarianism.

The common people in Iraq developed a negative image of the UN because in their perception the UN after imposing the sanctions which restricted the goods coming into their country and now the UN was helping the occupiers (Dononi, Minear and Walker 2004: 194). Similarly, the evacuation of all staff by the UN just before the US-led military action in Iraq, which according to some observers, 'gave the green light for war' and reinforced the view that aid agencies were Washington's tool (Dononi, Minear and Walker 2004: 194).

Donini and others have argued that although there was no humanitarian crisis in Iraq, yet it was propagated to justify the presence of relief agencies and the NGOs. The UN's appeal for $2.3 billion in April 2003 was driven by political considerations and institutional survival (if we don't go, someone else will) and the sheer magnitude of the funds that were being made available (Dononi, Minear and Walker 2004: 194). In the three high profile cases (Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq), the UN found to ignore humanitarian principles in favour of institutional survival. Therefore, to ensure institutional survival and sustainable funding from the Western occupiers, the UN humanitarian system would not escape politicisisation.

Neutral humanitarian space seems to shrinking generally and has practically disappeared in volatile situations like Iraq and Afghanistan. In such situation Donini and others have rightly raised question whether the term 'humanitarianism' at all made sense when the priests who are supposed to be the custodians of principles have, happily or reluctantly, joined the service of the powerful.

Principle of independence is among corner stones of humanitarian principles. Recent experience in Afghanistan has shown the trends towards politicisation of humanitarian

action. From humanitarian perspective, humanitarianism and politics are supposed to be two separate fields. However, if humanitarian action takes place in changed situations of cold-war, it cannot be expected to meet all the challenges it encounters without the political support. Therefore, learning lessons from experience, the UN humanitarian system adopted 'integrated approach' in the form of multidimensional response to internal strife (Eliasson 1999: 195).

In humanitarian domain, 'Integrated missions' or 'coherence agenda' has emerged as a challenge for the principle of independence. In post-cold war era, changing nature of war and donors' interests based allocation of funds pushed the relief agencies to adopt coherence agenda. Coherence or integration means bringing political, military, economic and humanitarian actors closer to respond the humanitarian emergencies. Under coherence agenda, humanitarian action becomes part of a comprehensive political strategy (Macrae cited in Curtis 2001: 09). Close cooperation among political military, economic and humanitarian actors under coherence agenda, is supposed to be an essential instrument to eliminate the root causes of conflicts rather than symptoms.

The coherence agenda seems to be blurring the dividing line between humanitarianism and politics. Further, it seems to be based more upon the domestic politics of powerful states rather than need of conflict-affected people. Primary purpose of humanitarianism is the alleviation of suffering not to resolve conflict or achieve a particular political objective. Latter falls into the political domain. In extreme cases like Kosovo (1999), the humanitarian action was subordinated to political action rather than being complementary to political and military actors. Bringing humanitarian and political actors in the field was seen as compromising the principle of independence. This is the reason why one observer has noticed that the overriding challenge faced by the policy-makers in the post-cold war era is not... the achievement of integration into the prevailing politico-military context... rather (it is) protection of its independence (Minear 2004: 53).

The 'integration-independence debate' has posed a dilemma before the UN. If the UN chooses to integrate humanitarianism with political and military dimensions, there is an inherent possibility to lose its credibility as an independent and principled actor. In contrast, if it opts to strictly ensure independence, it may lose financial resources because the UN is financed voluntarily by the donor states. In case of latter donors' will prefer to allocate their funds either through NGOs or bilaterally. At the same time, politicisation of

humanitarian aid pose security related challenges before the UN humanitarian system. Therefore, it would be a challenge before the UN system to make adjustment between the independence and integration.

Coming out from the dilemma, the UN decided to adopt the coherence agenda rather than jeopardizing funding. In the UN system to facilitate the cross-agency and cross-departmental discussions regarding the response to emergencies, new mechanism such as 'Executive Committee' have been created since 1997 (Curtis 2001: 09). Creation of such agencies to facilitate the coherence agenda in the UN system signaled the UN readiness to accept the politicisation rather than compromising the funding. Politicisation of humanitarian action is the pursuit of political objectives by humanitarian means (Atmar 2001: 322).

Organisational Challenges

The UN humanitarian system work, as a 'system as a whole' was firstly institutionalised in 1971. It was a time when number of humanitarian relief operations was limited and restrained to relief rather than recovery and reconstruction, primarily due to ideological constraints. As the ideological constraints disappeared and intra-state conflicts globalised, the UN's humanitarian role was redefined. To deal with the new challenges like increasing conflicts and mushrooming the relief agencies, the UN humanitarian system was reorganised and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and Inter-Agency Standing Committee were established. Similarly to cope with changed circumstances the UN humanitarian segment was reformed.

Despite the reorganization of the UN humanitarian system, organizational constraints still prevail. It is the case because the UN humanitarian system is conglomeration of the various specialized agencies, funds and programmes. Along with the UN specilised agencies, funds and programmes, the NGOs and IGOs are also partners with the UN. In the UN humanitarian system various relief agencies have overlapping mandate leading to duplication, response gap and interagency competition. Such overlapping of mandates exists between the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP), Unite Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The overlapping in mandate results from duplication and response gap in operations. This discrepancy leads to malfunctioning. Hence, challenge before the UN is how to adjust the relief agencies that the problem of duplication and response gap could be bridged.

The UN humanitarian system is conglomeration of the various 'specialised agencies, funds and programme'. Among the UN agencies, the specialized agencies like the World Health Organisation, International Labour Organisation and Food and Agriculture Organisation have autonomous status, with separate constitution, regularly assessed budgets, executive heads, and assemblies of the state representatives (Taylor 2003: 18). They are politically, financially and constitutionally self-contained; therefore do not fall under direct control of the UN system. The heads of the specialized agencies have the Secretary General status. In relation to the specialized agencies, the funds and programmes are quasi-independent less autonomous and closer to the main UN body. Their management arrangement are under the General Assembly supervision, hence can be modify by the Assembly resolution (Taylor 2003: 18). The OCHA is led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, who has the Under-Secretary General status. In such situation the heads of other agencies, particularly the specialised agencies are hesitant to be coordinated by an officer, who holds lower status than them. Along with the UN system agencies, the NGOs and IGOs are also significant players of the system. The NGOs and IGOs have their own hierarchal governing bodies with different lines of chain of control and accountability.

In this respect, Ladislas Bizimana has picked up the exact problem in the coordination. According to him 'everybody commends co-ordination but no one accepts to be co-ordinated' (Bizimana 2006: 38). Every relief agency of the system wants to be a co-ordinator/integrator but no one likes to be co-ordinated or integrated. In an official statement issued on 31 March 2004, the ICRC reiterated its readiness to be part of dialogue, consultation and coordination with others but not part of coordination and integration by others (Krahenbuhl cited in Bizimana 2006: 38).

The military humanitarian combined missions indirectly pose problems to the UN in two ways. First, when military contributing states try to pursue their national interests in the name of protection of humanitarian relief agencies, training of aid workers, and providing logistic supports to relief agencies. Second, the host states seem unwilling to accept the militarized humanitarian assistance. Particularly the Third World countries, who are the largest recipients of humanitarian aid, are more conscious about their sovereign rights.

Inclusion of the military forces in humanitarian domain is considered to be a challenge for humanitarianism. The UN humanitarian system does not have direct problem with the humanitarian- military combined missions. Nevertheless, the host states' perceptions about the instrumental role of military in humanitarian missions make them reluctant to receive the humanitarian aid. Further, the combined missions have created two interrelated problems for the UN. First, the problem of security for the aid workers, and secondly challenge to the humanitarian principles. In the cold war era, attacks on aid workers were limited. But as intra-state conflicts increased, the deployment of military personals became necessity as violence against the aid workers increased. The combined missions are perceived as the challenging the basic principles of independence of the UN humanitarian system. It is based on the perception that the UN humanitarian missions are getting politicised. Besides these, it poses a dilemma for the UN to decide, that in what situation, when, why and how much military to be used.

The UN-NGO Relations has emerged as a problem in coordination of the UN humanitarian assistance. The cluster mechanism was introduced in 2005 to improve the field level coordination. It was supposed to help in better identification of response gaps and to reducing the incidence of duplications, to predictable leadership in sectoral response and to stronger and inclusive partnerships between United Nations and non-United Nations actors (UN 2010: 13 para 47). From here the humanitarian system departed from the agency mandates to a broader focus on each sector led by particular cluster leader.

But vey soon NGOs found that their condition has not been improved as they expected. They were still in supplementary role distributing the relief rather than leading the relief works through leading the clusters. Moreover, the NGOs from South were not taken into account properly (Holmes 2007: 05). Southern NGOs were not given proper consideration despite the fact that global South is the most disaster prone region in the world. Lack of representation of the Southern NGOs has two-fold significance. First, it supports the South's perception that the global humanitarian assistance is the West dominated enterprise. Second, the Southern NGOs are well aware about the local situations because most of the disasters occur in the underdeveloped countries. By including them at implementing and policy-making level, the UN can enhance its operational capacity and effectiveness. If they are not given proper role at policy-making and implementing level, it

will be not only undemocratic and the West dominated but also affects the effectiveness of the system.

Since starting in 2005, two cluster evaluations have taken place in 2007 and 2010 respectively. The second cluster evaluation (2010), conducted in six countries, has revealed the fact that despite enthusiasm and optimism in NGOs and the UN humanitarian system about the clusters, basic problems still exist. Because of lack of proper analysis of local structure and capacities before the cluster implementation, the clusters largely excluded national and local actors (Steets et al. 2010: 09). Furthermore, the cluster evaluation team found that there is little integration of cross-cutting issues and inter-cluster coordination is ineffective in most cases. The multi-dimensional and cross cutting issues were not taken into account properly.

Financial Bottlenecks

The financing patterns of the UN humanitarian system have changed over time. Several factors are like donors' interests, nature and scale of dangers, frequency of occurrence of humanitarian disasters, and donors' relief agency relations have affected this change. During the cold war, volume of humanitarian assistance was limited as donors preferred to provide intra-bloc bilateral assistance. In todays changed situations, the UN humanitarian aid system is facing fourfold: increasing gap between requested and received funds; financial competition with NGOs; earmarking; and global financial crisis, financial challenges.

The global demand for the humanitarian assistance is increasing since 2004 with an exception of 2007, when it slightly come down from US$ 6.3 to 6.1 billion (see table 3.1 in chapter 3 page 62). The increase in requests is triggered and sustained by the increased severity of natural hazards, escalating conflicts, and a dramatic increase in vulnerabilities caused by the global financial crisis, continuing high food prices, the scarcity of water and energy, population growth and urbanization (United Nations 2009: 02 para 02).

With the increase in demand for greater humanitarian assistance, the financial response from the international community has not increased in consequence with the demand. During 2005-10, the gap between the required and received money has been widened. In 2005, it was US$ 2.3 billion US$ since then it went up slowly to 2.4, 2.1, 2.8, and 3.3 and reached at its highest level in 2010 at 4.5 billion US dollar. In terms of percentage,

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difference between required and received has increased from 27.5 in 2007 and 28.2 in 2008 to 40.2 per cent in 2010. The widening of gap between requirement and receipt of funds has important implication for the UN. It has made the UN response to humanitarian assistance primarily driven by 'supply side' rather than 'demand side'. Therefore, the adequacy (quantity and quality) of the UN response is often questioned.

Figure 4.1: Overall requirements and the level of funding for UN CAP appeals 2000-2010

Source: Stoianova (2010: 03).

Second, the donors' earmarking of funds has emerged as financial trend in financing of the UN humanitarian system. The donors' preference for the earmarked funding has also emerged as major challenge for the principled humanitarian assistance system of the UN. Due to their foreign, regional or domestic policy compulsions, donors have tightened the grip over relief agencies. Every year in January, following launching of the Consolidated Appeal Process, donors earmark their allocated funds. To fulfill their interests, donors decide preferred country, sector or projects to be funded. Because the UN does not have autonomous funding mechanism for the humanitarian issues, it has to work as per its donors' will.

The donors' national interests in Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq have led them to provide sufficient funds to the UN and NGOs. On the other hand despite severe humanitarian crisis

many African countries are underfunded. Despite channeling through the multilateral institutions like the UN, applying earmarking the donors' have deviated their funds towards their favorite designation. For such discrepancies, directly the UN is not responsible. Thus not the UN itself, but donors policies force the UN humanitarian agencies to work in specific ways which latter on problems for the UN. Nevertheless, increasing trend of earmarking has reduced the flexibility and hampered the ability of relief agencies' like UNHCR and WFP to respond quickly to changing circumstances (Randel and German 2002: 22).

Thirdly, global financial crisis (2008-09) has posed financial challenges before the UN humanitarian system. It has two fold implications for the UN humanitarian system. First, it has adversely affected the prospect of the UN humanitarian funding. Secondly, the growing budget deficits, falling tax revenues have led to decline in states' ability to maintain social safety nets and provide other social services, such as health and education (GA 2009: 03 para 08). Further, it has increased the level of unemployment, poverty and hunger all over the world particularly in the least developed and developing countries. It has led to increase in number of affected people which increased from 25 million in 2008 to in 30 million in 2008 and 2009 each. Further in 2011 appeal, number of the CAP beneficiaries reached to 50 million (Stoianova 2010: 02).

Fourthly, the UN-NGOs competition for the funds has also a challenge for the UN humanitarian system. It is caused by the voluntary nature of funding for the UN and NGOs. While the sources of funds are limited and number of relief agencies are increasing day by day. Problems emerges when two are more agencies of the UN system compete for the single source of funding. The NGOs have emerged as donors' favorite in channeling their funds. In this competition for funds, the flexibility of the NGOs provides them relative advantage over the UN. The donors prefer to fund the NGOs because they can pursue their interest in better way than to the UN. This way competition for the funds among the UN and NGOs poses challenge to the coordination. Declining UN's share in total humanitarian financing underlines the intensity of competition between them. Competition reached at its highest level in 1999. In 1999, due to the Kosovo crisis and donors' preference for the MGOs and bilateral funding has reduced UN's share to 11.67.

Beside these, the UN humanitarian system is characterized by uncertainty if terms of funding. The UN's share in total humanitarian has been fluctuating over time. If look at the changing patterns in the CAP funding, clearly two phases can be identified. First phase was during 1992-96, when appeal was high and second from 2006 to 2011. Because of ongoing conflicts in the Europe and Africa, the CAP appeal was high in first phase. While in second phase, some high profile crises like Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), South Asian tsunami (2004), Pakistan earthquake (2010) and Haiti earthquake (2010) have led to increase in UN humanitarian funding.

In 1988, 45 per cent of humanitarian assistance was given in the form of multilateral contributions to UN agencies (Randel and German 2002: 21). But the UN share of total humanitarian has decline in 1990s. During 1994-98 the UN share of total humanitarian declined only to 25 per cent (Randel and German 2002: 21). In 1999 it reached to 11.67 per cent but in 2000 once again it raised about quarter of total multilateral humanitarian aid. The Kosovo crisis was main reason behind sharp decline in the UN's share of total multilateral humanitarian aid.

Figure 4.2: humanitarian aid and funding for the UN CAP, 2005-2010

Source: Stoianova (2010: 03).

Figure 4.2 shows that the UN sharing of total humanitarian has increased in comparison to 1990s, but it is still uncertain and fluctuating. From 2005 to 2010, the UN share was at lowest level at 30.5 per cent in 2005. It was mainly due to donors' preference for bilateral funding. But in neat year it reached at 47.88 per cent. In 2008 it once again declined to 44.34 per cent. The UN share was highest in 2009 with 67.64 per cent of total humanitarian funding. Once again it fell to 50.37 per cent in 2010.

Operational Challenges

In post-Cold War era, security emerged as major issue of concern for the humanitarian aid workers. The violent attacks, hostage taking, looting of aid and increase in number of death of aid workers became usual. On 19 August 2003, a suicide bomb decimated the Canal Hotel, the United Nations (UN) headquarters in Baghdad, Iraq. The bomb killed 22 individuals, including the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and wounded more than 160 others (Fast 2010: 365). In 2009, there were 89 security incidents directed at humanitarian relief personnel and assets, including the killing of 10 humanitarian relief personnel, the abduction of 7 others and a further 10 being held in captivity (UN 2010: 05 para 13). One observer has noted, 'it is more dangerous to be a United Nations humanitarian workers handing out food to starving o helping refugees than to be a soldier in peacekeeping duty in a war zone'.

A study they found that many deaths occur early in an assignment (one-third within the first 90 days) and that the timing was not correlated with previous experience, meaning the risk was likely due to a new context as opposed to a lack of experience (Fast 2010: 369). Further, 'intentional violence' has the cause of death in 253 (68 per cent) deaths. In total, Stoddard and others reported that out of 408 major incidents of violence comprised 941 victims and 434 fatalities between 1997 and 2005. In this period, average 127 major incidents occurred per year during 2006 to 2008. During 1997–2005 kidnappings and hostage-takings appeared to be a declining trend and 'ambushes at road blocks, firing on vehicles, banditry, car-jackings and other targeting of staff on the road remained by far the single most common means of violence against aid workers' (Stoddard et al., 2006: 14). For the years 2006–8, kidnappings and attacks against international staff increased from the previous three years, and incidents in the three most dangerous contexts (Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan) accounted for the majority of the incidents (Stoddard et al., 2009 cited in Fast 2010: 371).

According to report (*Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of UN Personnel* 2000) total of 198 civilian staff killed in the line of duty due to malicious acts since 1992, including 21 during the previous reporting period (Fast 2010: 372). The number of causalities of the UN personals seems to increase in 2000s in comparison to 1990s (UN 2010: 07 para 23). For instance, 260 humanitarian relief personnel were killed, kidnapped or seriously injured in 2008, compared with 69 in 1998. At the same time, King suggested that NGO personnel die more often than UN personnel (59 per cent versus 41percent). For the period of 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 the *Department of Safety and Security* reported 27 casualties among United Nations civilian personnel and 36 among NGO personnel (UN 2010: 07 para 23).

Violence against the aid workers represents large-scale and deliberately targeted actions against humanitarian actors and therefore presents a serious challenge to the principles that underlie humanitarian action (Fast 2010: 366). Violence may occur because of various factors including compromise on the humanitarian principles. The compromising the humanitarian principles are seen as both cause and consequence of increased violence against the aid workers. Supporters of politicisation of humanitarian action like Thomas Weiss argue that the continuous increase in violence against aid workers has compelled the UN to combine military-humanitarian operations to protect the aid workers. While those in opposition like the ICRC argue that aligning with particular group and '*instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid*' had provoked the warring groups to attack aid workers. The explicit refusal to acknowledge the political faction of relief in conflict situations and playing into the hands of the powerful contributes to the violence. Similarly, the politicization of humanitarian assistance through selective aid delivery and the militarization of delivery have increased the security threats to agencies (Macrae and Zwi cited in Fast 2010: 377). Moreover, severe food crisis may lead the victims to attack the aid workers.

In this reference two perspectives are worthy of reference. First, the '*purists*' argue that increased insecurity is caused by the 'degradation of humanitarian principles' while second, the '*integrationists*' argue it has more to do with the changing context in which violence is taking place. Both agree that humanitarian action is changing, but differ on the remedy (Donini cited in Fast 2010: 366). For many, targeting results from perceptions of being a part of a conflict, yet the core principles of humanity, impartiality, and operational neutrality are supposed to ensure that humanitarian actors remain seperate even as they

respond to violence and suffering (Fast 2010: 366). In this respect practitioners and the scholars seem to have different and diverging views.

In the last few years NGOs have emerged as indispensible player in the UN humanitarian system. During Cold-War, such political factors as the East-West and North-South divide had largely shaped the prospect for the NGOs participation in the UN. Until 1990s, interaction between UN and NGOs was limited to implementation part. In post-Cold War years, the establishment of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee provided an opportunity to the NGOs to participate at headquarters level, where major decisions are taken.

At the operational level, the NGOs have their specific grievances. The major bone of contention, after the 2005 UN humanitarian reforms, between the UN and the NGOs is about the appointment of the Humanitarian Coordinator. The Humanitarian Reform 2005 introduced 'Humanitarian Coordination Pool' for appointment of the Humanitarian Coordinators. In theory, it is open for the non-governmental organisation as well as for the UN system actors. By putting forward names of their candidates for the HC Pool, NGOs could potentially ensure their participation at national level. However, the NGOs point out that their candidates from the pool are discriminated while recruiting the Humanitarian Coordinators. Their grievances seems to be true because, from the first pool of fourteen candidates only one NGO candidate was appointed as humanitarian coordinator in 2007 in Uganda. Thus inadequate representation of NGOs at the high positions international humanitarian system makes them reluctant consequently causing adverse effect of the UN humanitarian system.

At the field level, the NGOs are key partners of the UN humanitarian agencies in aid distribution. Despite this fact, they are not given appropriate leadership role in the cluster lead except the Emergency Shelter which is led by IFRC in natural disasters and by the UNCHR in complex emergencies.

The effective response to humanitarian crisis depends upon the ability and efficiency of relief workers and quick decision making. Ability and efficiency of relief workers can be improved only through proper training programmes while quick decision making through integrated and flexible decision-making process.

Nevertheless, responses to previous earthquakes including the South Asian show chronic shortage of well-trained staffs. This is the case because the UN has tried to reduce its permanent staff and works with staffs hired on contract basis (Hicks and Pappas 2006: 46).

Further, the survivors and local people with whom the UN works, are not trained to work in desired manner. Such untrained relief workers are more vulnerable while working in conflict for lack of proper training risks their lives.

The OCHA also undermines its own credibility by uneven performance. Diffusion of authority is a hindrance in quick decision making. It has two headquarters the humanitarian and political located in Geneva and New Work respectively. Besides these two headquarters, the UN humanitarian system is interconnected with the main UN bodies. The General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council have significant voice on humanitarian issues. All these are interlinked with each other. The Secretary General on the behalf of the humanitarian system annually reports to the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council. Nevertheless, decision-making under the hierarchical and step to step system is root cause of delays.

For instance, the Humanitarian Coordinator is lead voice of the international humanitarian community in the field. S/he is appointed, in theory, by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, but in practice s/he is appointed in consultation of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. In the IASC, a few years ago the UN agencies particularly the United Nations Development Programme used to propose the name of HC and the IASC members routinely approve the name. But nowadays, discussions take place to appoint the HC, which cause delay in the process of the appointment.

The second cluster review 2010 has highlighted the fact that coordinators are not trained well enough in facilitation techniques, lack a common basic handbook or toolkit and, especially at the sub-national level, often do not have sufficient time dedicated for coordination (Steets et al. 2010: 10).

In a nutshell, humanitarian assistance system is facing numerous challenges ranging from coordination to security today. In post-Cold War era with the globalisation of conflicts and change in nature of conflict from inter-state to intra-state has not only engendered humanitarian responses but also required these responses to depart from merely relief to recovery and development. The political environment has changed from Cold War to the era of globalisation, where new challenges like climate change, financial crisis and demographic shift have replaced the old problems like ideological constraints. Increase in number of relief agencies particularly the NGOs has made the UN's task of coordination difficult.

Again greater preference for the domestic and foreign policy goals and greater earmarking in financing have pushed the UN humanitarian system on back foot. The donors'

increasing reliance on NGOs and bilateral donations has further weakened the UN humanitarian financing. The change in environment and politicisation of the humanitarian assistance has tested the UN humanitarian principles on several occasions particularly in man-made crises like Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, the UN-NGOs relations and the military-humanitarian integrated missions have supposedly compromised the integrity of humanitarian assistance missions resulting in violence against the aid workers. Further, lack of appropriate training and trained personals have put the UN humanitarian aid workers at unavoidable risk.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Humanitarianism has emerged as an issue of major concern in contemporary world politics. In terms of funding, it has emerged as a 'humanitarian business.' Share of humanitarian assistance in total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was 5 percent in 1989; that increased to 10.1 percent in 1999. It peaked to 10.5 percent in 2000 (Macrae 2002: 11). In absolute terms, funding of humanitarian relief increased from US$ 2.1 billion in 1990 to US$ 5.5 billion in 1994 and US$ 5.9 billion in 2000 (Randel and German 2002: 20). In 2010, it reached US$ 13.3 billion and still emerging (Stoianova 2010: 03). In terms of actors involved, the states, both as donor and recipients of aid, non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Governmental organisations (IGOs) are involved. In fact, the numbers of relief agencies have been increased approximately ten fold in the post-cold war era (Kent 2004a: 221). Nevertheless, number of involved agencies varies from case to case.

In the emerging humanitarian scenario, the UN humanitarian system has emerged as an important player. For instance, in 2011 UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) more than 425 aid agencies participated (Stoianova 2010: 02) with record volume of money. In terms of beneficiaries, it almost doubled from US$ 26 million in 2005 to US$ 50 million in 2011. Similarly, in financial terms the volume of UN aid has also increased from US$ 2.1 billion in 1992, US$ 3.0 billion in 2002, US$ 4.0 billion in 2007 to US$ 7.0 billion in 2009 (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3 page 62). The UN's share in total multilateral humanitarian aid has been fluctuating over time. In 2005, the UN's share was 30.53 percent (4 billion out of total 13.1 billion US$). It slightly increased to 47.88 percent (US$ 3.4 billion out of total US$ 7.1 billion) in 2006 and 48.68 percent (US$ 3.7 billion out of total US$ 7.6 billion) in 2007. During 2005-10, it was at highest level of 67.68 percent (US$ 6.9 billion out of total US$ 10.2 billion) in 2009 but declined again to 50.37 percent (US$ 6.7 billion out of total US$ 13.3 billion) in 2010.

In the wake of emerging concern for humanitarian issues, the present study has highlighted the humanitarian role of the UN humanitarian system. Interesting aspects emerge regarding the institutions, process and challenges associated with the system along with the changing notion of humanitarianism and its consequences for the functioning of the UN humanitarian system. Proposition of humanitarian assistance

channelled through the UN is compared with the other channels like bilateral and the NGOs.

The United Nations humanitarian system is an integral part of the international humanitarian system. The international humanitarian system has three ingredients: the donors, recipients and relief agencies. Among the donors, states: DAC and non-DAC are the most important. The DAC states are main donors. DAC members jointly contributed approximately 90.1 to 98.7 per cent of total humanitarian funds during 1999-2009 (DI 2010: 06). Besides the DAC donors, in recent years non-DAC has emerged as substantial contributor to the humanitarian funding.[1] Among non-state donors, the individuals, foundations and corporate sector also provide funds to the humanitarian system. Their contribution has been fluctuated, depending upon the situation variables.

The recipients are those states who are affected by disasters and accept international humanitarian assistance. In absolute term, it is difficult to find a state that is donor alone. Most of the states are both donors and recipients. The relief agencies are intermediaries between the donors and recipients. They provide assistance to the victims. The relief agencies are broadly categorised in three types: the UN humanitarian agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Governmental Organisations (IGOs). In these three broader categories, the UN system coordinates other actors in humanitarian field.

The UN humanitarian system is conglomeration of the UN specialised agencies, funds and programme along with coordination bodies like Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance and Central Emergency Response Fund. Although the humanitarian system seldom works with the Bretton Wood institutions and other IGOs, yet the constituents of the UN humanitarian system are six agencies: Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations

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1 In recent years, India has emerged as a main non-DAC donor to UN humanitarian system. Since 2001 to 2010, overall India has contributed US$ 315 million in humanitarian aid, out of that 76.2 percent (240 million) went to south Asian region (Meier and Murthy 2011: 15). India contributes a relatively high amount to the WFP and CERF but relation with the OCHA is still reluctant. WFP is India's favourite designation of humanitarian aid. India has allocated worth of US$ 10 million in Afghanistan through WFP. India's special relations with WFP led Meier and Murthy (2011: 28) observe that Rome (WFP headquarter) is closer to New Delhi than Geneva (OCHA headquarter) in humanitarian terms. India has contributed to CERF between US$ 500,000 and US$ 1 million annually (Binder, Andrea, Claudia Meier and Julia Steets 2010: 15). Nevertheless, India's contribution to the UN humanitarian system does not match with her claim to be an emerging economy in general and as a permanent member seat in Security Council in particular.

Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Beside these six main ingredients, the UN humanitarian system works closely with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). The ingredients of the UN humanitarian system were established at different point of time, as per requirements.

In process of evolution, first landmark event was the establishment of the United Nations Office of Disaster Relief (UNDRO) in 1971. The changed circumstances of the post-cold war era, led the UN to reorganise its humanitarian system. The first major reorganisation took place in 1991, when the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC is responsible for the management of OCHA and IASC, and linking the humanitarian system with the main UN bodies. In 1998, the DHA was renamed as the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and additional role of 'policy advocacy' and 'policy development' was assigned. Similarly, in humanitarian reform 2005, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund was renamed as Central Emergency Response Fund. Total amount of the Fund was increased from US$ 50 million loan to US$ 500 million, out of that 450 million was for grant and 50 million for loan purpose.

In a given humanitarian crisis, the UN humanitarian system responds is five steps. In the first step, the UN humanitarian agencies like United Nations Disasters Assessment Committee (UNDAC) and United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) in cooperation of Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), International Search and Rescue Teams (ISRTs), NGOs and local government authorities collects information about the victims and their needs and requirements. Collected information is analysed at field, national and international levels in broader context and disseminated through web-based systems such as ReliefWeb and Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) to international community.

Using the information provided by international humanitarian community, the United Nations humanitarian system assesses needs at two levels. Primary needs assessment, in early phase of disasters focus upon emergency life-saving assistance. In later phases

sector-wise in detail needs are assessed. As per needs of victims, resources are mobilised. The CERF is among first agencies that funds crises from 'emergency response window.' Thereafter Flash Appeals are launched. Ultimately, the Flash Appeals are included into the Consolidated Appeals Process.

Delivery of aid, in fourth phase, begins with the arrival of international Urban Search and Rescue Teams and its coordination by International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSRAG). Within 24 hours of disaster, the UN organises and dispatches UNDAC teams in the disaster affected areas. In the field, the UNDAC manages On-Site Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC), which coordinates humanitarian actors of the field. In the later phase delivery of aid is handed over to clusters leads. The cluster leads, deliver aid in cooperation of NGOs and national authorities. At the national level, Humanitarian Coordinator, as representative of international humanitarian community manages the delivery of humanitarian aid.

In last a few decades practice of humanitarian aid has changed. Previously, humanitarian actors were not supposed to do developmental work rather limited to life-saving emergency relief. Adoption of 'relief to development continuum' is as operational advancement in the UN humanitarian system. Now, UN relief agencies are no more limited to merely life-saving assistance but concerned with the elimination of 'structural cause' of disasters. Further, in recent years they have tried to develop such an environment that should be conducive to sustainable peace. The western donors are interested in long term development because they want development in a unilinear way following the liberal path of the development.

In the last phase of its working, the UN humanitarian system evaluates its performance. For this purpose it conducts evaluations, lesson-learned studies and reviews. Purpose of these is to accommodate the shortcomings of previous disasters response into the future response missions.

Basically the present dissertation is centred around three themes: shortage of funds, lack of inter-agency coordination, and challenge to the UN espoused humanitarian principles that can be characterised as the challenges to the UN humanitarian system.

Shortage of funds is one of the main alarming challenges to the UN humanitarian system. Donors have preferred to fund humanitarian crisis either bilaterally or by resorting to

earmarking. Total requirement of the Consolidated Appeals is increasing year by year. 2011 witnessed the highest amount of request in the history of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). Received fund in CAP appeals have also increased but not proportion to requirements. Therefore, gaps between required and received funds have widened. Simultaneously, in comparison to early 1990s receipts (in percentage terms) have declined in relation to total appealed in 2000s. In 1992, the receiving of funds are 23.23 percent behind requirement level. It had gone up to 35.9 percent in 1993, but declined to 18.52 in 1994 and 21.74 percent in 1995. In comparison to early 1990s, in late 2000s deficit has increased. Deficit between required and received was 36.51 percent in 2005 which went up to 38.10 percent in 2006. The deficit was at 34.43 percent, 32.95 percent and 32.04 percent in 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. Thus, the trend shows that about one-third of CAP appeals are unmet.

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) does not tell different story. During 2006-10, the CERF share in total humanitarian assistance ranged from 6 precent in 2006 to 9 percent in 2010 (DI 2011a: 03). In absolute terms it ranged approximately from US$ 300 to US$ 450 million in given period. It has upper limit of US$ 500 million dollar, generally it does not crossed US$ 450 million. In comparison to the CAP, the CERF has performed better but not as expected. Both the CAP and CERF show shortage of funds.

Interagency competition and lack of coordination is a common phenomenon in the UN humanitarian system. The UN humanitarian system is not a 'coherent body' but conglomeration of various actors like the specialised agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system. Participation of different types of actors like the NGOs, further leads to interagency competition and subsequently lack of coordination.

In the UN humanitarian system, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Health Organisation (WHO) are two specialised agencies. Over these two, the UN Secretary-General has no legal control (Ingram 1993: 175). These specialised agencies have their separate constitutions, decision-making process and policy-making organs constituted by states representatives. The Secretary-General's authority is limited even in case of funds and programmes because funds and programmes are 'quasi-independent' bodies.

The six constituting parts of the UN humanitarian system are led by officials with the rank equal to Secretary-General while the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs is headed by an official with the rank of Under-Secretary General. Relief agencies were reluctant in accepting the lead role of the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordination (UNDRO). This reluctance manifested in appointment of a Resident Coordinator (since 1977) because these agencies did not consider the UNDRO as well-equipped to deal with high profile crises such as Ethiopian famine. The Resident Coordinator was representative of the UNDP that was asked by the Secretary General to play a coordinators' role (Ingram 1993: 175).

Thus, inter-agency problems caused by autonomous and quasi-independent nature and overlapping or competitive mandate have hindered effective coordination among elements in the UN humanitarian system. Besides the autonomous and quasi-independent nature of these agencies, a fundamental obstacle to getting an effective UN response arises gaps and overlapping mandate of these agencies that increases inter-agency competition. For instance, the mandate of the Food and Agriculture Organsation (FAO) and United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) mandate seems conflictual when the UNICEF tries to provide supplementary food to children, despite the fact nutrition falls under the FAO mandate. The same is the case with the United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF. Both deal with overlapping categories of beneficiaries. The UNICEF looks after the wellbeing of children while the UNHCR tends to refugees (indecently, refugee could also be children).

Again, working of the UN humanitarian system has undermined the humanitarian principles. In theory, the UN humanitarian system is supposed to work according to humanitarian principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. But practice has differed from the theory, showing compromise of the humanitarian principles.

The principle of humanity has been compromised by the donor's unequal allocation of funds in response to CAP appeals.[2] Clearly humanitarianism is not sole guiding principles

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2 For instance, North Korea for her 1996-97 Consolidated Appeals received 79.20 percent funds because it was important from donors' strategic and foreign policy perspectives. Similarly, widely publicised humanitarian emergencies such as Great Lakes Region received its 88.2 percent for the Consolidated Appeals in 1995-96. In contrast to these underfunded crises, as of 20th July 2011 top five underfunded emergencies got less than a third of their needs. For example, West Africa (28 percent), Zimbabwe (29 percent) Djibouti Drought Appeal (30 percent) Niger (31 percent) Republic of South Sudan (34 percent). In contrast to these underfunded crises, well-funded emergencies top five recipients got above 50 percent of

for donors. Donors have allocated funds on extra-principle basis. Practice of humanitarian funding shows donors' deviation from principled approach. In a situation of same needs, affected states' that are geographically close, having colonial ties with donors, media coverage, common language, and important from donors' foreign policy point of view, got more aid than others (Stromberg 2007: 218). This is reason why a few humanitarian emergencies got too less funds as required in Consolidated Appeals. Although it is the UN's fault, yet, this trend leads the UN to assist the victims in a particular way that is decided by the donors' interests neither according to needs of the victims nor the UN principles.

Such forgotten cases have one more option to get funds from the Central Emergency Resolving Fund. But, as trends show the CERF emergency response window had allocated only approximately 33 percent of fund to such crises in the last two years (DI 2011a: 09). As mentioned above, the CERF has never received the maximum stipulated resources in its history since its inception in 2006. Even if fully funded, the forgotten emergencies get only about US$ 150 million dollar while Emergency Response Window allocated the remaining approximately US$ 300 million. If we look at the number of forgotten crises and allocation of US$ 150 by CERF to such crises, this amount stands far behind what the high profile humanitarian emergencies get. Thus, the UN humanitarian system (although unwillingly) is forced to fund the humanitarian crises in such a way that undermines the principles of humanity.

Further, earmarking has turned to be an additional tool in the hands of donors through which they have diverted funds according to their interest rather than needs of victims. In the last decade humanitarian funding for the UN system has increased, but a bulk of this increase has been allocated in earmarked funds to specific programmes and crises (Dalton et al 2003: 10). The increase in earmarked funds has widened the gulf between neglected emergencies and high profile emergencies consequently leading to uneven allocation of funds and compromising the notion of humanity.

The second principle, the principle of impartiality that envisages the idea that relief agencies would not take part with the conflicting parties has been practically

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total appealed funds. For instance, Japan earthquake and tsunami, Sudan (55 percent), Afghanistan (63 percent), Democratic Republic of the Congo (49 percent) and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya unrest and neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Niger and Tunisia (60 percent).

compromised. Case of Somalia underlines this fact. The UN stand towards Al-Shabaab group in Somalia is closer to US stand that is negative. The statement made by Security Council president before the 6494th meeting of the Security Council, held on 10 March 2011, affirms the US position on Al-Shabaab (that it is a terrorists group). In his statement he said:

> "The Security Council strongly condemns the targeting and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid by Al-Shabaab and other armed groups in Somalia and demands that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid." (Security Council 2011: 02).

This statement might have been made to exert good impression on US that is largest door. Nevertheless, such statements send wrong message in international humanitarian community. It has led to perception about the compromising the principle of impartiality.

Similarly, in Afghanistan political expedience of the donor states has determined the purpose, extent and type of 'humanitarian response' rather than human needs alone (Atmar 2001: 322). The principles of humanitarianism are increasingly coming under assault from the sectarian foreign policy objectives of donors.

Therefore, the UN humanitarian system espoused principles are under stress because theory and practice of humanitarian system does not match. In a few cases like integrated mission in Afghanistan, it was in sharp contrast to humanitarian principles. In principle, the UN humanitarian system is still closer to classical humanitarianism but in practice it is much closer to neo-humanitarianism. The neo-humanitarianism is politicised, goal-oriented and operationally aims to eliminate the root causes of the problem rather than respect for the humanitarian principles. Elimination of the root causes of a problems, protection and promotion of human rights and building democratic institutions are not value neutral but closer to liberal ideology. Thus, the UN humanitarian system is politicised rather than principled.

Problems that the UN humanitarian system is facing today can be divided into two parts: normative and empirical. At normative level, principles of humanitarianism are under pressure. It is caused by two reasons: normative changes taking place in the concept of humanitarianism *per se*, and secondly, changes in practice of humanitarianism in the field have caused security related problems for aid workers. Neo-humanitarianism does not believe in principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Rather it is politicised,

In cases such as Darfur, inaction of humanitarian agencies in the name of neutrality led the observers to define 'neutrality as a sin' (Udombana 2005).

Emerging role of the military forces under the banner of neo-humanitarianism has posed security related operational challenges. Inclusion of military has sent a wrong message to parties of conflicts. Amidst the lieu of politicisation, increasing role of military forces has made conflicting parties suspicious, consequently leading to violence against humanitarian aid workers. Further, role of NGOs in humanitarian assistance along with the UN humanitarian system has intensified the competition for funds on the one hand and their increasing number and working procedure has brought a coordination problem on the other.

Besides these, a few large scale humanitarian crises of 21st Century such as Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), South Asian tsunami (2004), South Asian floods (2006), cyclone Nargis (2008), Haiti earthquakes (2010), Pakistan floods (2010), and Japanese earthquake (2011) have put immense pressure on UN humanitarian system. Situation was exacerbated by rise in food and fuel prices, and global financial crisis in last a few years (2007-10). Due to these, number of victims risen up on the one hand and cost of delivery of aid has gone up on the other. According to World Food Programme data in 2009 number beneficiaries has gone up to 102 million in comparison to 86.1 million in 2007 (see Chapter 4).

Particular challenge to the humanitarian system should not be seen in isolation, but in context of other related problems. All challenges are interconnected with each other. For example coordination related challenges are related to financial. Increase in number of relief agencies poses problems in coordination. Rising number of relief agencies consequently tightens the competition for the funds. Increase in number of humanitarian relief agencies is not only related with financial problems but also operational. All relief agencies not necessarily adhere to the same mandate and guiding principles. Difference in guiding principles and operational mandate, has correlation with security related challenges. As practice has shown, those relief agencies that do not adhere to the principles of humanitarianism are more prone to violence situations in relation with those that adhere.

Despite such normative and empirical challenges, the UN humanitarian system has made valuable difference in effective delivery of humanitarian aid. Its importance in international humanitarian system lies in its world-wide reach. The UN humanitarian system has shaped the international humanitarian order in five different ways: as standard bearer, coordinator, advocate, innovator, and as an anticipator (Kent 2006).

There are many organisations that can deliver humanitarian aid. As a standard bearers, the United Nations plays five roles: upholding humanitarian principles; fostering and promoting humanitarian norms and standards; coordinating and facilitating the efforts of humanitarian actors; assessing the needs of affected; and monitoring and evaluation the impact of humanitarian operations (Kent 2004b: 868). The UN not only promotes humanitarian norms and values but also ensures compliance of those norms and values. Its global presence, expertise and authority make the UN's humanitarian standard bearer role possible.

As coordinator, it coordinates the relief operations at international, national and field levels. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) are two instruments in the hand of UN humanitarian system to coordinate relief work. The IASC, which membership includes the UN humanitarian organisations, the International Committee of Red Cross, and major consortia of Non-Governmental Organisations, coordinates policy related decision-making at international level. In this regard, Humanitarian Coordinator, appointed by Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), coordinates the humanitarian actors at the national level.

The UN's large experience provides it an opportunity to advise relief agencies that future crises should not be handled in today's way but differently in specific ways as prescribed. The United Nations being conglomeration of issue specific organisations, as innovator it uses issue specific organisations expertise to reduce human vulnerabilities and miseries. By using advanced tools and technology, the UN humanitarian system could emphasise prevention and preparedness for future catastrophes.

Finally, as anticipator the United Nations brings conflict, climate and development related issues and actors together to develop a proper understanding about the nature of problems and response to it. It is necessity of the day because mono-causal explanation of any

disaster situation might lead to inadequate understanding to the problem consequently, ineffective response.

The UN has played important role in humanitarian domain since its inception. First major institutionalisation that can be regarded as '*humanitarian institutionalisation*' took place in 1971, when Office of the United Nations Disasters Relief Coordinator was established. In the post-cold war era, a new international humanitarian order has been emerged (Barnett 2010). In newly emerging humanitarian order, that is normatively and empirically different from previous one, to cope with changing circumstances, the UN has made various institutional and procedural adjustments. The roles that it has played in last few decade, has made the UN humanitarian system an indispensible player in emerging international humanitarian order. In 21st Century, the UN humanitarian aid system has become more pragmatic; therefore, relevant than ever.

In conclusion, the hypothesis of the study viz. '*The UN Humanitarian Aid System: An Institutional Study*' stand prove in the light of discussions and findings above.

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