


**Nuclear Deterrence and the Crisis Stability:
A Study of the India-Pakistan Crises, 2001-2002**

**Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

Khurshid Ahmad Mir



**International Politics Division
Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament
School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067
India
2010**



Date: 21.07.2010


DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “Nuclear Deterrence and the Crisis Stability: A Study of the India-Pakistan Crises, 2001-2002”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work and has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university.


Khurshid Ahmad Mir

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan
Chairperson, CIPODASIS

Chairperson
Centre for International Politics,
Organization & Disarmament
School of International Studies
J.N.U., New Delhi


Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan
Supervisor

Dedicated

To

My Family

For Its Consistent and Invariable Support

Contents

| | Page |
|---|---------------|
| Acknowledgement | I |
| <i>Chapter One</i> | |
| Introduction | 1-14 |
| <i>Chapter Two</i> | |
| The Debate: Proliferation Optimists and Proliferation Pessimists | 14-33 |
| <i>Chapter Three</i> | |
| The Operation Parakram | 34-59 |
| <i>Chapter Four</i> | |
| Conclusion | 60- 71 |
| References | 72-77 |


Acknowledgement

First and foremost I would like to thank and convey my heartiest gratitude to my supervisor **Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan**. He corrected my work consistently and incessantly. He took much pain and spared his precious time to give me valuable and enlightening suggestions. He remained cool and cooperative throughout my research which provided me extra confidence in finishing the work. This work would not have been possible without his customary inputs.

I would like to thank faculty members of CIPOD specially Dr. J Madan Mohan, Dr. Siddarth Mallarvapo, Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Prof. C.S.R. Murthy and Dr, Archana Negi for their encouragement and inspiration. I would also like to thank Dr. Amin Malik and Syed Humayu Qaiser for their consistent encouragement.

The contribution of my friends provided me an informal academic acumen. The friendly discussions and debates relevant to my work proved extremely fruitful. This work reached to its logical culmination because of my friends;, Prashant Kumar, Abhay, Jeetendra, Javiad Bhat, Zaheen, Ulfat, Yasir and Farooq Malik. They spared their precious time. They backed and supported me time and again in improving the work. It is not possible to mention each and every name here; I would like to thank everyone who helped me during my work. A Special thanks to Rashid Raina and Vineet Thakur for their consistent encouragement and investment.

Last but not the least; I would like to thank my respected parents and other members of my family. They gave me moral and financial support to continue my studies. It was not possible for me to do this research without their blessings and backing.


KHURSHID AHMAD MIR

Chapter One

Introduction

This research project is an effort to learn or explain the behavior of India during Parakram Crisis of 2001-2002. The crisis began on December 13, 2001 when militants attacked the Indian Parliament while it was in session. The study is an attempt to look at a variety of factors that prevented India from going to a full-fledged war against Pakistan despite such provocative actions by Pakistan. The study examines domestic, systemic and deterrence factors during the Parakram Crisis. The study through the prism of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists debate tries to explain the Indian behaviour during the Parakram Crisis. The research provided some description, analysis and explanation of 'Operation Parakram', which India launched after the Parliament attack. It is an effort to point out the factors which led to the end of Parakram Crisis without a major war. The research juxtaposed the arguments of both proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists in the context of Operation Parakram. It makes a comparative analysis of optimist and pessimist approach in order to bring out the differences between the two theoretical camps and their stand on the impact of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of India and Pakistan during the Parakram crisis of 20001-2002. The research provided a brief account of the crises that occurred between India and Pakistan since their partition. These crises have been classified into two categories like the crises that occurred before the 1998 when India and Pakistan were non-nuclear states and the crises, which occurred after 1998 when both the countries were nuclear powers.

Background

Historically, India and Pakistan relations have mostly been conflictive in nature. Both India and Pakistan have claimed sovereignty over the former Indian princely state of Jammu and Kashmir since the British departure from the subcontinent in 1947. Their dispute over the Muslim-majority territory was the root cause of two Indo-Pakistani wars, in 1947-48 and 1965; Kashmir has been divided between India and Pakistan since the first war. Neither country has been willing to compromise over Kashmir, partly for strategic reasons, but mainly because this would threaten the legitimating ideology on

which each modern state was founded. Pakistan's claims that the subcontinent's Muslims could safeguard their legitimate political rights only through the formation of a separate nation-state. India's idea of a secular nation-state rested on the successful integration of all minorities, including Muslims, into the Indian political order. Therefore, since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, when Britain left the sub-continent, India and Pakistan have been arch rivals. So far, the two countries have fought four wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 and in 1999. In 1999, both countries fought a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir. In 2001-2002, both the countries were at the verge of war after the Indian Parliament attack took place. The attack triggered a ten-month crisis between the two nuclear powers of South Asia that in turn caused apprehensions about nuclear escalation in the region. A brief description of these crises that occurred before or after 1998 is pertinent to mention here in order to get an historical overview of volatile relations between India and Pakistan.

The 1947 War

This war is called the First Kashmir War. The war started in October 1947 when the Maharajah of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was pressured to accede to either of the newly independent states of Pakistan or India. On October 22, 1947, Tribal forces prompted by Pakistan attacked and occupied the princely state, forcing the Maharajah to sign the agreement to the accession of the princely state to India. The war ended with the intervention of the United Nations. The United Nations was invited by India to mediate the quarrel. The UN Security Council passed Resolution on April 21, 1948 and insisted that the opinion of the Kashmiris must be ascertained. The war ended in December 1948 with the Line of Control dividing Kashmir into territories administered by Pakistan, which include northern and western areas and India which include southern, central and northeastern areas ((Paul, 20005).

The 1965 War

This war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar. The operation was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan that for trying to precipitate insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir against Indian rule. India retaliated against this operation by launching an attack on Pakistan. This resulted into the outbreak of second Kashmir war. The war lasted in five-weeks and caused thousands of casualties on

both sides. The war was witness to the largest tank battle since World War II. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequently with the Tashkent Declaration. This was the second war between India and Pakistan since their partition. The war like the first one was fought on the issue of Kashmir. The external intervention prevented both the countries to go from a certain limit. However, the war had not any global repercussions, as both India and Pakistan were non-nuclear weapons states (Paul, 2005).

The 1971 War

India and Pakistan relations witnessed some thaw of seven years duration after the 1965 war. The relations once again came to a standstill with the outbreak of the 1965 war. This time war was unique in that it did not involve the issue of Kashmir, but was rather precipitated by the crisis brewing in erstwhile East Pakistan. Following Operation Searchlight, about 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighboring India, because of the impending humanitarian crisis; India intervened in the ongoing Bangladesh liberation movement. After a pre-emptive strike by Pakistan, full-scale hostilities between the two countries commenced. Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces surrendered to India following which Bangladesh was created. Therefore, since their Independence India and Pakistan fought three major wars. However, the impact of these three wars had not been a global one as both India and Pakistan were non-nuclear states. The crises that occurred in the post-1998 era such as the Kargil war of 1999 and the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002 were seen in a different way as both the countries had now joined the nuclear powers club in 1998 (Ganguly, 2005).

The 1999 War

Commonly known as Kargil War, this conflict between the two countries was mostly limited. In February 1999, Pakistani troops along with Kashmiri insurgents infiltrated across the Line of Control (LOC) and occupied some Indian territory particularly in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir State. India establishment later detected this development and launched an offensive to regain the posts in May-July 1999. In this way, India and Pakistan got involved into Kargil war. In the end, India recaptured its territory and Pakistan pulled out its forces from beyond Line of Control. The Kargil war finally came to its end, when the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif met the President of

the United States Bill Clinton on June 1999. Both the countries resumed their talks. India called it 'Operation Vijay' while Pakistan termed it 'Operation Badr'. The 1999 crisis was different from other crises in the sense that this crisis occurred when both India and Pakistan were nuclear powers. There were apprehensions that both the countries might use the nuclear weapons. However, the conflict did not escalate to the nuclear level.

The 2001-2002 Crisis

Operation Parakram was biggest and longest ever mobilisation of the Indian armed forces along the International Border and Line of Control (LOC) in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In this operation, India mobilised thousands of Indian troops along the India-Pakistan border. India held Pakistan responsible for assisting the perpetrators behind the attack. The operation was the largest military exercise initiated by any Asian country. The operation was launched with an intention of utilizing military pressure for meeting political ends in addition to regular diplomacy. The crisis is also known as 'Parakram Crisis'. The crisis began on December 13, 2001 when militants attacked the Indian Parliament while it was in session. The Government of India determined that the attack was carried out by the two militant groups, Lashker-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamad and blamed that both were backed by Pakistan. India Government took the attack seriously by describing it an assault on India existence and honor. India reacted by launching 'Operation Parakram'. Under Operation Parakram, more than 500,000 troops were mobilised by India along the Line of Control (LOC) and the International border. India blamed Pakistan for the assault and demanded that Pakistan should crackdown on both, Lashker-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamad militant groups by taking certain concrete measures such as dismantling their hideouts and ceasing bank accounts of their leaders. India asked Pakistan to handover twenty most wanted persons who were involved in different terrorist activities on Indian soil. India warned that if Pakistan did not comply with Indian demands, then India would strike to dismantle the training camps of militants in Pakistan controlled Kashmir. In return, Pakistan too mobilised its troops along the Line of Control (LOC) and International border. The ten-month mobilisation of forces was on both sides and there were apprehensions that India and Pakistan might go for an all out war. The statements made by the political and military leaderships of both the countries caused great concern that the region might witness nuclear crisis. However, the region

witnessed a peaceful end of the crisis. The crisis left back a number of questions unanswered particularly about the Indian behaviour during Parakram Crisis: why did India not go for a war against Pakistan despite such provocation from Pakistan? What deterred India to dismantle the militant camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir? Why did Indian behaviour changed from a hard stand in the beginning of the crisis to the soft attitude towards the end of the crisis? The research was an effort to answer some of these and other complicated questions.

Literature Review

The literature survey of this study finds several scholarly books and articles dealing with the crisis. The famous debate between Kenneth N. Waltz and Scot D. Sagan in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* provided the theoretical underpinning to the study. Most of the literature in this context has been broadly classified into two schools of thought: proliferation optimist school and proliferation pessimist school. The scholars who belong to the category of first school think that nuclear deterrence works across cultures and different political systems. They hold an opinion that the attainment of nuclear weapons by more states does not necessarily undermine the interstate relations and may even create circumstances for a more peaceful world. The scholars, who belong to the second school, however argue that some of the important differences such as technological conditions, political and organisational cultures of the states could obstruct deterrence stability. Kenneth Waltz, an important theorist of international relations belongs to the first school. Scott D. Sagan is the principal proponent of the second school. In what can be termed as the most illuminating scholarly dialogue, these two scholars have put together their arguments in their famous work *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*.

The nuclear weapons optimist position flows from the logic of rational deterrence theory. This theory specifies that the possession of nuclear weapons by two states diminishes the chances of war between them as the costs of war and its consequences are immeasurable. Waltz holds a view that more new nuclear weapons states would in fact lead to greater stability on a systemic level. The other scholars who support the Waltzian thesis are Bruce de Mesquita, Peter Lavoy and John Mearsheimer. They believe that nuclear weapons act as tremendous deterrent. The dominant view emanating from this school is that the rhetoric of threat between the two countries is nothing more than mere

rhetoric to deter the other from considering the nuclear option. Michael Walzer in *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* argues that though the two states might experience a sense of desperation because of their vulnerability to conventional attack but in crisis situations, both countries have exhibited a greater sense of desperation to avoid the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

Sagan, on the other hand holds a contrary opinion. He debunks the thesis of nuclear optimists and strongly affirms that such an optimistic view of nuclear weapons is risky for the world. He puts his argument within the theoretical underpinning of organisational theory and argues that military organisations in nuclear weapons states go through from certain common biases such as rigid routines and parochial interests that could lead to the breakdown of deterrence and trigger off a major nuclear exchange with catastrophic consequences. In the context of South Asia, there has been an extensive debate about the spread of nuclear weapons and their impact on the security of the region. Several scholarly books and articles are available. The literature can largely be classified into the two camps of nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists. Basrur in *Minimum Deterrence and India's National Security*, Ganguly and Hagerty in *Fearful Symmetry*, and Rajagopalan in *Second Strike* supports the Waltizian position that nuclear weapons have acted as a deterrent in the India-Pakistan context. They argue that the perception that India and Pakistan may use nuclear weapons against each other during any crises is nothing more than mere rhetoric to deter the other from considering the nuclear option. The matter of fact is that both countries have displayed a greater sense of fear to avoid the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

Sagan dismisses this position and claims that states like India and particularly Pakistan lacks institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision-making, so the decisions regarding nuclear weapons would be taken based on issues of domestic stability, rather than systemic threats what optimists believe.

In other scholarly articles, Dinshaw Mistry, S. Paul Kapur, Sumit Ganguly among others have extensively debated the issue whether nuclear deterrence prevents war or not. Ganguly argues that nuclear weapons do prevent the states to go for an all out war (Ganguly, 2009). He adds that contrary to the views of the proliferation pessimists, nuclear weapons have reduced the risk of full-scale war in the region and have therefore

contributed to strategic stability. Mistry and Kapur hold a contrary opinion and believe that it is not nuclear deterrence per se that prevents states to go for an all out war, instead there are other factors like diplomatic pressure, and domestic circumstances which leads to de-escalation (Kapur, 2009). Mistry substantiates his point with the example of South Asia's military crises particularly the crises that occurred between India and Pakistan in the post 1998 era. He argues that the crises of 1999 and 2001-2002 ended because of non-nuclear factors rather than because of nuclear deterrence. He adds that during Parakram crisis a larger war was prevented not because, as supporters of nuclear deterrence theory would suggest, the threat of Pakistani nuclear retaliation deterred Indian military action against Pakistan. Instead, war was averted because of U.S. diplomatic efforts that restrained the parties from military escalation. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, significant military escalation was quite possible (p.149). Kapur holds a less optimistic view argues that nuclear weapons had resulted into two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, the ability of nuclear weapons to defend Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India encouraged hostile Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. He argues that it is true that Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or all-out conventional conflict, however such fortunate outcomes did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. The second destabilising effect of nuclear weapons on the South Asian region according to Kapur is that these crises have triggered aggressive changes in India's conventional military posture. Such developments may lead to future regional instability (Kapur: 72). P.R. Chari and A. Rajan ed. Book *Nuclear Stability In South Asia* explores issues like risk of war, strategic stability, reduction or proliferation of weapons and involvement of military. B.M. Jain and E.V. Hexamer in their edited book *Nuclearisation of South Asia: Reactions and Responses* explore the inner and outer dimensions of threat perceptions and political decisions in South Asia. Therefore, the presence of Nuclear weapons in the South Asia has given rise to various speculations about the possibility that such weapons might be used in times of crisis or war. The main concern is that India and Pakistan have a long history of wars and various crises like bloody partition, and both countries are intrinsically hostile towards other. So, both

countries could use be nuclear weapons against each other with inconceivable consequences. However, nuclear optimists do not depict such amount of fear about the spread of presence of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region. Rajagopalan argues that though there have been more than a few crises between India and Pakistan since both of them became nuclear powers but none can be termed as 'nuclear crises.

There is also a copious literature about Parakram Crisis such as S. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney work *Operation Parakram: The war Unfinished* is a scholarly contribution about 'Operation Parakram' in which following issues were mainly focused: Why was Operation Parakram launched? What were the military and political objectives? Was the political leadership at all serious about the war? What role did international pressure play in weakening the government's resolve? What role did the military feel about the decision? The literature reviewed here reflects a strong but uneven debate between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. The former believe that offsetting nuclear weapons will keep the peace while the latter upholds that more nuclear weapons will result in more dangers situations. Kenneth Waltz and Sagan presented an important beginning to this debate in their two editions of *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*. In the context of South Asia, deterrence optimist Devin Hagerty, concluded in *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*, that "there is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with one another." Hagerty later modified this conclusion to account for the Kargil war in the collection of essays edited by Ganguly and Kapur, *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb*: "Nuclear weapons constituted one of many factors in Islamabad's decision to undertake low-intensity operations in Kargil, but they were the main factor in containing the ensuing conflict within the Indian side of disputed Kashmir." Ganguly and Hagerty are leading proponents of this camp of deterrence optimists. Their famous work of 2005, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons*, concludes that there were three factors which prevented a major war between India and Pakistan during Parakram crisis. The timely and forceful U.S. interventions, a sufficiently stabilizing conventional military order of battle and particularly a mutual fear of nuclear escalation and dangerous escalation on the subcontinent. A more in-depth account of Indian-Pakistani crises written by P.R. Chari,

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, arrives at far more cautionary conclusions. These authors note, "Neither side in our four crises had a sure grasp of the other's fears and hopes, and at times one or both sides miscalculated the role that outsiders might have played." Kapur is among the ranks of proliferation pessimists, having written at book length shredding the arguments of deterrence optimists. His co-edited volume *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behaviour and the bomb* with Ganguly is built around the promising idea of pairing a deterrence optimist and a proliferation pessimist to assess each crisis dating back to the 1986- to the 2001-2002 crises, which was sparked by the attack on the Indian Parliament. The book though covers a whole range of issues, but its chapters seem logically inconsistent and unbalanced.

Despite all-embracing and all-interesting literature on the study, there are some issues which the existing literature failed to answer particularly the issues that are about the inconsistent and changing behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002. The issues include: why did Indian political establishment change its behavior from an unbending stand to a flexible approach during the Parakram Crisis? Is India too soft to act against Pakistan despite India being repeatedly provoked by the latter? Did Nuclear weapons really constrain India to go for a major conflagration against Pakistan after its Parliament was attacked? Why was 'Operation Parakram' called off by the India without meeting its professed objectives? Whether proliferation optimists or proliferation pessimists will explain the Parakram Crisis? The research made an effort to provide some novel insights about the whole crisis. The research also tried to answer some unanswered questions about the behavior of India during Parakram crisis which the existing literature could not answer.

Scope and the Objectives of the Study

The attack on the Indian Parliament was infringement of the highest order, which forced India to carry out a game of bargaining in the form of Operation Parakram. Since, the game of bargaining needs a least two players, so the response of second player is crucial. The Parakram Crisis is an epitome of the game of bargaining. The operation was intended as an attempt at coercive diplomacy that was meant to assert India's demands on Pakistan with a threat of punishment for non-compliance. India started with an extremely sturdy

stand against Pakistan after its Parliament was attacked but botched to meet its professed objectives in the end. It is still a puzzle that why India could not achieved the perceived objectives of the operation. Even after the ten-month long mobilisation, neither the demands of India were fulfilled by Pakistan nor the opponent was punished. This puzzle in itself manifests the scope of the study. Therefore, the objective of the study was to investigate what deterred India to call off Operation Parakram without achieving the predetermined goals. The Parakram crisis also provided an opportunity to revisit the debate of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists about the spread of nuclear weapons. Proliferation Optimists believed that it was nuclear capability of Pakistan that constrained India to attack Pakistan while Proliferation Pessimists consider other factors such as influence of internal and external forces. The external forces include role of the United States to ease the tension between two Nuclear powers of South Asia. The internal forces include domestic preferences of India such as strengthening economy and eliminating poverty. Therefore, the debate between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists provided the theoretical underpinnings to explain the ten-month long operation. From the day to day incidents the effort was made to observe whether it was nuclear capability of Pakistan that deter India to go for a full-fledged war or were there other factors which compelled India not to escalate a war form a certain limit. The study located the internal, external and nuclear factors that occurred during the ten-month long crisis and reached to the conclusion that the influence of non-nuclear factors on Indian behaviour was minimal while the nuclear factor was the prime factor which influenced the behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis. The study explored history, operation and closure of 'Operation Parakram'. The study made an elaboration of the statements made by the political and military establishments from both the sides during the Parakram crisis.

Research Problem

The attack on Indian parliament triggered a lot of debate over Indian response to Pakistan. The Indian response to the attack was a serious one in the form of Operation Parakram. The then Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee called this assault, as 'Aar Paar Ki Ladayi' and warned for a strong action against the perpetrators of the crime. The Ministry of External Affairs in India too advocated that this time it was mandatory to

teach the enemy a lesson. The preparations were made to launch an operation against the Pakistan. This operation was a combination of mind and muscle power. The mind portion of the operation was in the form of diplomacy to pressurise Pakistan while the muscle power was in the form of huge mobilisation of military forces across the Line of control and International border. In short, the operation was intended as an attempt at coercive diplomacy that was meant to assert India's demands on Pakistan with a threat of punishment for non-compliance. However, the operation could not yield the perceived and intended objectives. Pakistan neither was pressurised nor was muscle power used against its non-compliance. Therefore, the operation did not bear such results as was predetermined. This gave birth to a problem of Indian behaviour that was inconsistent during the Parakram crisis. This whole episode of crisis, forces one to study the variation in the behaviour of Indian establishment. The puzzle is what happened to Operation Parakram and why it ended without a beginning of war and, how proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists would explain this whole episode.

The research work at the outset was premised on the following hypothesis: that India did not go for an all out war against Pakistan after its parliament was attacked because of threat of nuclear escalation.

The behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis gave birth to a number of questions. Though the reviewed literature answered certain questions, still there are a few unanswered questions especially about how the different theories about the consequences of proliferation view the crisis. Why, for example, did not India go for a war against Pakistan? How would proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists explain Indian Parliament attack? How far had troop mobilisation on both sides escalated the conflict? Why did Indian political establishment change its behavior from an inflexible stand to a very flexible approach during the Parakram Crisis? Is India too soft to act against Pakistan despite being repeatedly provoked by the later? Did Nuclear weapons really constrain India not to go for a major conflagration against Pakistan after its Parliament attack? And most importantly, what was the influence of nuclear weapons on the resolution of 2001-2002 crisis?

The study is mostly exploratory in nature, as not much work has been done on the topic. The methodology is mainly deductive in nature as the researcher deduced from the

various sources and reached to particular conclusion. Mostly material is available as secondary source in form of books and journal articles. The newspaper articles, magazines and archival sources provided the require material in order to describe the day-to-day developments of the ten-month long mobilisation. The statements made by the political and military establishments from both sides were collected, analysed, debated and summarised. The newspapers were further classified into four categories such as newspapers from India, Pakistan, United Kingdom and United States of America so to present a balanced view with least scope for any bias. This sub-categorisation added the dimension of comparative approach. The research also includes a case study of 'Operation Parakram'. This case study provides the details of the events, which occurred during the ten-month long crisis between India and Pakistan. The case study also includes the statements from the political and military leaderships from both the countries. This case study enabled the researcher to draw some inferences about the possibility of the use of the nuclear weapons from either side. The study also made the use of different archival sources, which provided insights about the unpublished opinions and facts regarding the Indian behaviour during the crisis. The researcher also consulted some of the important seminars papers on the subject as a subject matter of the study. The primary logic for studying the variety of sources and adopting methodological pluralism was to make research more inclusive in nature and count every opinion on the subject. The comparative method is used in the study in order to juxtapose the nature of various crises, which have occurred between India and Pakistan since their partition. The comparison is further made between the crises, which occurred before and after the arrival of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region. This helps us to understand the popularity of the crises, which resulted in the post 1998 scenario.

The study is organized as follows. The second chapter of the study provides the theoretical underpinnings to the study. The chapter will present arguments of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. The focus is to look at the take of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists on the Parakram Crisis of 2002, which occurred between India and Pakistan after the Indian Parliament attack. It also focuses whether nuclear weapons actually decrease the likelihood of war in the context of South Asia in particular and how the spread of nuclear weapons affect the interstate relations in

general. The chapter makes a comparative study of the views of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists approach in order to point out the areas of divergence between the two theoretical camps. Then chapter makes an effort to clarify the differences between the proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. This in turn helped to draw some of the conclusions regarding the impact of the nuclear weapons in the South Asian region and beyond. The chapter also presents some of the empirical accounts of the crisis through the prism of optimists and pessimists debate. This is important because, despite extensive scholarly research, many of these confrontations' details remain unknown. Thus, the chapter contributes in understanding a broader vision of Indo-Pakistan crisis behavior in a nuclear environment particularly in the context of Parakram crisis and Indian behaviour. To put it precisely, the chapter undertakes the opinions of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists on Indian behavior during Parakram Crisis.

The third chapter is about Operation Parakram which is the case study of the research. Since the research largely deals with the Indian behaviour during the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002, this case study includes the very operation that India launched after its Parliament attack. The case study provides various details about the crisis and answers some of the complex question about the Indian Parliament attack. Some of the important issues, which the study answers, are: how the eruption of the crisis took place. What was immediate response of Indian establishment to the parliament attack? How India mobilised its forces on LOC and international border. What demands Indian made to the Pakistan? What was the immediate response of the Pakistani establishment to the Indian government? What steps Pakistan took to curb the activities of the outfits that launched the assault on the Indian parliament. What was the ultimate result? Which statements flow from both the countries during the crisis and what was the impact of such statements on the crisis? Why the Indian establishment called the operation off? Ultimately, what were the consequences of the crisis? Therefore, the case study includes description, analysis and explanation of Operation Parakram.

The concluding chapter sums up the findings of the research. The chapter summaries the major arguments of the study. It is more of a recapitulation to all that which has been already discussed, analyzed and concluded. The conclusion also makes an observation about the validity of the hypothesis whether it has been falsified or it has proved valid after going through details and events of the research.

Chapter Two

The Debate: Proliferation Optimists and Proliferation Pessimists

The chapter will examine the arguments made by both proponents and opponents proliferation of nuclear weapons. The focus would be on finding out the bases of each argument. The findings would be used to analyse whether nuclear weapons really reduce the probability of nuclear war. The effort would be to analyse in what ways the spread of nuclear weapons affect the interstate relations. The main focus is on finding out the take of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists on the 'Parakram Crisis' of 2002 between India and Pakistan. In the first instance, a comparative analysis of optimist and pessimist approach would be done to bring out the differences between the two theoretical camps. Clarifying the differences would help to understand better the nature of the debate over South Asian proliferation. This in turn will help draw informed conclusions regarding the impact of the nuclear weapons in the region and beyond. Lastly, the opposing analyses offer not only competing theoretical arguments, but also somewhat different empirical accounts of the crisis. This is important because, despite extensive scholarly research, many of these confrontations' details remain unknown. Thus, the effort would contribute to a broader vision of Indo-Pakistan crisis behavior in a nuclear environment.

Background

Ever since the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan, many people have wondered about nuclear weapons and the risk they pose to the world. A host of countries has nuclear weapons, and the threat of a nuclear war brings fear to many. The concerns about the spread of such weapons date back to World War II. After the detonation of the two atomic bombs in August 1945, the world understood how massively destructive these weapons could be. The world also realized the powerful security value of nuclear weapons. These security benefits were not ignored by other nations. In 1949, the Soviet Union became the second nation to develop and test a nuclear weapon. Thus began the nuclear arms race. Hosts of countries, since then, are engaged in pursuit of nuclear weapons, overtly or covertly. Since the appearance of nuclear weapons on the global

scene, scholars are engaged in locating the divergent factors, which motivate the states to go nuclear. Many scholars try to find out the implications of these weapons on the interstate relations. Some argue that spread of nuclear weapons will bring more stability to the interstate relations, while others claim that unregulated spread of nuclear weapons will be detrimental to the security of nation states. Those who believe that the spread of nuclear weapons would stabilise the interstate relations find themselves in the category of proliferation optimists such as Kenneth Waltz and others, which subscribe to Waltzian variant of the realism. Those who are cynical about the spread of nuclear weapons are known as proliferation pessimists like Scott D. Sagan. Therefore, primarily the scholarship on the spread of nuclear weapons is divided into two camps. Both the schools made efforts to explain whether the spread of nuclear weapons would stabilize the world or destabilise the interstate relations. In this way, Waltz and Sagan made an introduction to this debate in international relations. In the context of South Asia, the debate between Proliferation optimists and pessimists was revisited when China, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers. The nuclear crisis of South Asia particularly between India and Pakistan in the post-1998 era such as Kargil war and Parakram crisis also contributed in reviewing the debate.

Proliferation Optimism

The school of proliferation optimism is an analytical and policy position that suggests that the spread of nuclear weapons need not be a bad thing, and could even be a good thing. It has its origin in the writings of Kenneth N. Waltz. Waltz in his famous article, "More may be better" argued that as more countries gain nuclear weapons and as more countries achieve nuclear capability, the difficulties and dangers of making preventive strikes increases. He adds that the presence of nuclear weapons make the chances of war less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains. Waltz thought that because of America's nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union could hardly have destroyed the forces of Britain and France (Waltz, 1995). Commenting on the origin of proliferation optimism Varun Sahni argues that as a body of thought, nuclear optimism has passed through two distinct stages. Although its lineage can be traced to the classic deterrence theorists, its first robust articulation was Kenneth Waltz's iconoclastic "more may be better" argument. Waltz uses rational deterrence theory and structural realism to advance two

interconnected propositions. First, “nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly.” Second, the first proposition holds true “for small as for big nuclear powers;” thus, “the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared (Sahni, 2009: 121). The optimistic school of thought has its basis in certain assumptions; its origin is largely drawn from the writings of Waltz, the pioneer of structural realism or neorealism. Waltz makes some arguments, which mostly form the bedrock of proliferation optimism. According to Waltz in an anarchic world in which there is no central authority at the top, states are concerned about their security and survival as self-help is the main principle of action. This logic of self-help drives these states to achieve all possible means of security in order to sustain in the system. Some of the arguments needs a mention in order to get some idea about the logic why after all states need nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1995).

Waltz argues that the primary reason which drives states to achieve nuclear weapons is the logic of self-help system. According to Waltz, “Self-help system is the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security” (Waltz, 2002). He argues that states require nuclear weapons because of following reasons: A country without nuclear allies, writes Waltz, will want nuclear weapons if some of its adversaries have them. A country may want nuclear weapons because it lives in fear of its adversaries' present or future conventional strength and some countries may find nuclear weapons a cheaper and safer alternative to running economically ruinous and militarily dangerous conventional arms races (Waltz, 2002).

Waltz has put these reasons in order to explain the *raison d'être* behind the spread of nuclear weapons. One can argue here that Waltz primary argument about the spread of nuclear weapons is embedded in his theory of structural realism. The structural theory revolves around the structure, which according to Waltz is anarchic (Waltz, 1979). Now, question arises how nuclear weapons for proliferation optimists influence the likelihood for peace. Waltz responds by saying that the logic of deterrence and defense works in this case. He presents some of the points to substantiate his argument. States act with less care if the expected costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. “Why fight if

you can not win much and might lose everything?”(Waltz, 2002). War can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. Purely defensive forces provide no deterrence. Waltz argues, “Although we can not strike back at you, you will find our defenses so difficult to overcome that you will dash yourself against them” (Waltz, 2002). The deterrent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country’s security than does the conquest of territory. Deterrent effect depends both on capabilities and on will to use them. Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. He actually talks about the balance of power by saying that the possession of nuclear weapons by adversaries can reduce the chances of war precisely because it makes the costs of war so great. This is called rational deterrence theory (Waltz and Sagan, 1995). The rational deterrence theory needs a brief elaboration, as it is an important component of proliferation optimism school. The rational deterrence theory suggests three major operational requirements for its stability:

1. There must not be a preventive war during the transition period when one state has nuclear weapons and the other state is building, but has not yet achieved, a nuclear capability.
2. Both states must develop, not just the ability to inflict some level of unacceptable damage to the other side, but also a sufficient degree of “second-strike” survivability so that its forces could retaliate if attacked first, and
3. The nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use (Waltz and Sagan, 2002).

Nuclear optimists believe that new nuclear powers will meet these requirements because it is in their interest to do so. These realists argue that since the magnitude of the destruction by nuclear weapons is great, because more states obtain these capabilities, the possible gains begin to reduce and the likely risks and costs for entering or engaging in nuclear war diminish. Mearsheimer expounds upon the idea of nuclear deterrence in a world with growing nuclear states. He claims that nuclear weapons are an “excellent deterrent” because “the potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so grave that it is very difficult to conceive of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war.”

(Mearsheimer, 1985).He explains that, with the advent of the nuclear age, no state will be willing to initiate such actions because decision-makers must think about the perceived political consequences of military action against the military risks and costs of going to war (Mearsheimer, 1985). Waltz contends that states look for their own security and their own fate. This is the reason why some states violate the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Waltz also argues that with the existence of nuclear weapons it is too difficult for leaders to ignore the possible risks of using them. He argues that even small amounts of nuclear forces negate conventional and nuclear advantages and that because the sheer power of nuclear weapons is so great, a small second-strike force is just as deadly and intimidating as a large-second strike force (Waltz, 2002). They also claim that political leaders are very sensitive to the cost, which in turn will make this theory work. Therefore, nuclear optimism has faith in nuclear weapons as a stabilizing force in the international relations.

Proliferation Pessimism

The school of proliferation pessimism is an investigative and policy position that suggests that the spread of nuclear weapons is dreadful and unsafe. Scott D. Sagan is one of the well-known proponents of nuclear pessimism. He, in his famous article, “More may be worse” argued that unregulated spread of nuclear weapons would be detrimental to the security of nation states. He adds that the presence of nuclear weapons increases the chances of war (Sagan and Waltz, 1995). In common language, Sagan’s perspective is known as organizational perspective. It primarily questions the command and control of nuclear weapons. Sagan’s organizational perspective depicts rationality as relatively easier way of making conjectures about the anticipated behavior of organizations/states by linking it with their supposed interests. This view of rationality however is constrained. In his opinion, it is not sufficient to use these assumptions to make accurate predictions about nuclear proliferation. He argues that in the functioning of large and complex organizations such as military, which is an important component of decision making when it comes to nuclear weapons, various other organizational features such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), organizational culture, a general rigidity to adapt to the situation, etc. have to be factored in. Sagan demonstrates such restrictions in their functioning can have great consequences for stable deterrence. He adds that

Organizations are tough when it comes to adapting to changes. The rules of these organisations are rigid and their routines are well-set which makes it difficult for them to adapt to changes. Organizations are also characterized by multiple, conflicting goals and they usually sift the available information through their predisposed frames of reference crystallized by their unique experiences, training, current responsibility etc. Sagan writes, "To the degree that such narrow organisational interests determine state behavior, a theory of rational state action is seriously weakened" (Sagan, 2002). Sagan includes political dimension to normal 'accidents theory', which creates even greater pessimism about the possibility of organisational accidents.

The organisational perspective further argues that the conflicting views unavoidably subsist within a large organization that manages any dangerous technology. It holds that while some higher authorities may stress on a high priority for security, others may put more premium on fairly insular objectives like increasing production levels, enhancing the size of their subunit, promoting their individual careers, and so on. As a result, organisational learning about safety problems is often severely limited. Sagan emphasises that the politics of blame inside organisations also minimizes the chances of learning from the accidents. Organizational leaders have great incentives to blame operators at lower levels for any misadventure; this frees higher leaders from any responsibility. Additionally, it is usually cheaper, and more convenient, to fix the blame on a junior staff and fire him/her than changing accident-prone procedures or structures. Similarly, field-level operators too have strong incentives not to report safety incident, whenever there is such a possibility. Even though, none of the nuclear states have experienced any serious nuclear accident, there are good reasons to believe that chances increase over time. It can take place from a false warning, a misperception, a wrong signal or an unauthorized use like pictured in the Hollywood movie *Dr. Strange love* (Sagan, 1993).

Therefore, proliferation pessimists argue that deterrence is an outdated strategy that rests on various assumptions and claims that may not be relevant to many state leaders today. Deterrence theory assumes that the opponent is rational and mutually vulnerable, and that the opponent is a state (Brunk, 1987: 229-31). They also point to the fact that, as a theory, deterrence has not actually been tested. It cannot be said for sure

that the Soviet Union was actually deterred by the US' nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Even if deterrence actually worked during this time, it was successful in a different historical and political context, with unique circumstances and very different people. In today's context, with the rise of non-state actors and the so called 'rogue states', among other factors, dependence on nuclear capability today would be absurd. As the core of deterrence theory, rationality is no longer a reliable measure since the leaders of rogue states do not conform to American hegemony, and are driven by more insidious ideological or religious concerns. (Segal, 1988).

Areas of Disagreement between the Proliferation Optimists and Pessimists

The first nuclear age ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Walton and Gray, 2007). The end of bipolarity, arguably the most peaceful period in European history (Howard, 2001), raised new questions about national security: specifically, the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. During this period, there was no actual use of nuclear weapons per se, but use of such weapons was a tactical one as a means of deterrence (Segal, 1988). We are now in the second nuclear age, and the role of the nuclear weapon is still a contesting and debatable one. The debate revolves round certain conjectures such as; should world retain nuclear weapons or should they be discarded? Is deterrence still a plausible strategy? Can we actually engage in international discourse without them? Do nuclear weapons really stabilise the interstate relations? Theorists, scholars, moralists, politicians and military commanders throughout the world, debate these questions and many others. In the section, the effort is to point out the key areas of disagreement between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. Both proliferation optimists (Waltz, 1981) and proliferation pessimists (Sagan, 1994) find substantiation of some of their key claims. As proliferation optimists contend, when two states possess nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop sharply. However, in most other respects, proliferation pessimists find justification of their position. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. Waltz argues that with a gradual and controlled spread of nuclear weapons the frequency and intensity of war should become less, since states need to be more careful when there is a nuclear option available. One nuclear power will not

TH-18696

be willing to threaten the existence of another nuclear power for fear of one last all out attack. Waltz also responds to the question of rogue states and nuclear weapons by arguing that nuclear programmes require large amounts of time and money. Therefore, unstable states are unlikely to maintain them and even if such states were to acquire nuclear capability, it would be unlikely that they would use it since the internal factions would see each other as a greater threat than outsiders (Waltz, 2002).

On the other hand, Scott Sagan, approaching the issue from an Organizational perspective, counters this view by arguing that we should do the utmost to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. His argument is based on the belief that proliferation will threaten security and lead to wars more frequently because the organisational structure of the military as a group is biased towards war and only civilian checks and balances system will protect world peace (Sagan, 2002). However, as Sagan argues, many new nuclear powers are likely to lack this kind of a system. Moreover, he believes that proliferation to nations with no previous nuclear experience will lead to accidents and in less stable countries, might run the additional risk of unauthorised use. The core arguments, which Waltz made, are as under:

1. There is a fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. Gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better than no spread or rapid spread.
2. Nuclear weapons make war less likely, because nuclear weapons encourage both defense and deterrence. The possibility (however remote) and unacceptably high cost of destruction makes states more careful and miscalculation complex.
3. Given second-strike capabilities, the balance of forces isn't what counts – (asymmetric capabilities, just a threat, credibility need not be proven)
4. Not only do nukes deter attacks on the homeland, they deter attacks on any vital strategic interests, lowers the stakes of war, intensity of war
5. Weaker states are not more likely to use nukes irresponsibly – they would lose in a conventional war, so they need to save their nukes – they will only use them if survival is at stake, not for irresponsible aggression.
6. The last thing anyone wants to do is make a nuclear nation desperate – so nukes affect the deterrer and the deterred.



7. The spread of nuclear weapons cannot totally stop each state will always strive to seek its own security and survival in the anarchical system.
8. Even terrorists are not irrational. Just as unlikely to use nukes as weak states if they do manage to get them. (Waltz, 2002).

Sagan contends the Waltizian arguments by making some counter-arguments, which are as under:

1. Military organizations, unless managed by strong civilian-controlled institutions, will display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war, because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests.
2. Future nuclear-armed states will likely lack the requisite civilian control mechanisms, and military interests, not objective interests will dominate.
3. Talks at length about characteristics of military organizations such as offensive culture, operational culture and conditions fostering instability like inflexible routines that undermine development of second-strike capability all of these play into undermining three assumptions or assertions made by Waltz:
 - (I) There must not be preventive war during the period of building nukes,
 - (II) Both states must develop second-strike capability and survivability,
 - (III) Nuclear arsenals must not be prone to accidental use.

Waltz's response in this connection is that there are several reasons, which can contribute tremendously in protecting the misuse of nuclear misuse. The first one is to build fortifications and build defenses. The second way to counter an intended attack is to build retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor. Thirdly, Waltz claimed that nuclear proliferation is more stable than conventional weapons by mentioning the conventional perspectives (Waltz, 2002). An essential facet of the proliferation debate revolves around the perceived efficacy of nuclear deterrence. If deterrence works reliably, as optimists argue, then there is most probably less fear in the spread of nuclear weapons. However, if nuclear deterrence does not work reliably, pessimists maintain, more nuclear weapons states will presumably lead not just to a more complicated international arena but a far more dangerous one. In other words, the crux of these political scientists' disagreement is whether even one bomb

would deter a potential attacker: Waltz believes it would, Sagan does not believe so. Waltz, the optimist, argues that because nuclear weapons "will nevertheless spread," the end result will be stabilizing. His main point is that "nuclear weapons make wars hard to start" and that even radical states will act like rational ones because of the mutually deterrent effort of nuclear weapons (Waltz, 2002). Sagan, the pessimist, fears the worst because of "inherent limits in organizational reliability." The parochial interests of professional military leaders in emerging nuclear states, who will tend to see war as "inevitable" and skeptically view any nonmilitary alternatives, will lead to deterrence failures or accidental war. In addition, Sagan argues these states will probably lack "positive mechanisms of civilian control" to restrain militant tendencies (Sagan, 2002).

South Asia and the Proliferation Debate

Nuclear weapons in the South Asian context have given rise to numerous speculations about their possible use in a war. Since the arrivals of nuclear weapons in South Asia, there have been some nuclear-tinged crises in region particularly the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002. In addition, there are apprehensions that new crises could occur due the unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan. This nuclear-tinged crisis of the past and the apprehensions regarding the recurrence of such crisis in the future has resulted into the renewal of the nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists debate in the context of South Asia. Kapur and Ganguly argue that the impact of nuclear proliferation on the South Asian security environment has been the subject of various scholarly works that fall into optimistic and pessimistic groups. Optimistic believe that nuclear weapons have a stabilizing effect on the South Asian security milieu (Kapur and Ganguly, 2009). Optimists thus believe that, despite their potential dangers, nuclear weapons have made South Asia considerably safer. Proliferation pessimists hold a contrary view about the impact of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region. They argue that nuclear weapons have had destabilising effects in South Asia. Pessimistic arguments fall into two broad categories. Arguments in the first category maintain that, despite nuclear weapons' cautionary effects, organizational, political, and technical problems can lead to accidents and war in a nuclear South Asia. In this view, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not fundamentally change the behavioral incentives of new nuclear states.

Rather, particular pathologies lead proliferators to behave sub-optimally and can result in extremely dangerous outcomes (Kapur and Ganguly, 2009). (Kapur and Ganguly, 2009). The chief concerns in this regard are that India and Pakistan have a history of wars; they had a bloody partition, and both states are inherently hostile towards the other's existence. Given the emotional volatility of their relations and the geographical proximity of their borders, both countries could be engaged in a devastating nuclear arms race, strike each other with nuclear weapons with unimaginable consequences and come to oversee their mutual destruction.

As mentioned earlier, nuclear optimists believe that offsetting nuclear weapons will keep the peace while nuclear pessimists uphold that more nuclear weapons will result in more dangers and perhaps increase rapidly clouds of war. In the context of South Asia, there are some prominent scholars who have explored the debate like Devin Hagerty, one of the deterrence optimist for South Asia argued, "there is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this: nuclear weapon states do not fight wars with one another"(Hagerty, 2005). Hagerty later amended this conclusion to account for the Kargil war and said, "Nuclear weapons constituted one of many factors in Islamabad's decision to undertake low-intensity operations in Kargil, but they were the main factor in containing the ensuing conflict within the Indian side of disputed Kashmir" (Hagerty, 2009: 26). Ganguly and Hagerty are foremost proponents of deterrence optimists camp. They claim that a mutual fear of nuclear escalation have prevented major war and dangerous escalation on the subcontinent. They also argue that during the 1986-87 crisis, Pakistan's conventional capability was strengthened by the inflow of sophisticated weapons from the US. From 1990 onwards till Kargil 1999 and Parakram of 2001-2002, the shadow of nuclear weapons played a strong deterring role as well as US played pro-active role as a security facilitator. By the 1990s, Pakistan had the rudiments of a nuclear weapon and the US was heavily engaged in South Asia through its involvement in Afghanistan since 1979 (Ganguly and Hagerty, 1998). Kapur and Mistry are among the proliferation pessimists. They argue that the arrival of nuclear weapons has increased the propensity of war and currency of crisis. Waltz claims that theory of deterrence has passed the litmus test in the context of South Asia (Waltz, 2002). He made this reference in the context of certain crisis that occurred between India and Pakistan in

the post-1998 scenario. Sagan refutes the efficacy of rational deterrence theory in this context, elaborating that actors' rationality in a nuclear environment is an assumption, not backed by evidence. He mentions that though India has an extremely assertive civilian nuclear command structure, the Pakistan military is in complete control of its nuclear weapons. Both sides have a history of misunderstanding, have engaged in four wars in the past, and a violent dispute over Kashmir. They have also shared pre-colonial, colonial and common cultural traits. Such a situation contrast sharply with the American-Soviet nuclear balance during the Cold War. These two countries did not have any territorial dispute and hardly knew each other in cultural terms. Though admitting that the new nuclear powers would not repeat the mistakes of the Cold War adversaries, Sagan argues that the India- Pakistan historical rivalry, protracted ideological and territorial disputes may drive them up the nuclear ladder during a crisis. This might happen willfully, either accidentally or by miscalculation (Waltz and Sagan, 2002).

Waltz differs with Sagan. He contends that the gloomy views about the South Asian nuclear situation are inconsistent and tend to look at the South Asian decision makers as lesser breeds possessing lower levels of rational conduct (Waltz and Sagan, 2002). According to Waltz, nuclear arms race is neither inevitable nor are there any signs of it being visible in the present South Asian landscape. In his assessment, both India and Pakistan are likely to contain their nuclear arsenal to the requirements of a credible second strike. Waltz claims that Indians have understood well that building large nuclear forces are a waste of resources and foolhardy. An arsenal of sixty for India and twenty for Pakistan would be sufficient for the purposes of deterrence. The chief purpose of Pakistan's nuclear strategy is to deter India's superior conventional capabilities not their use as weapons of coercion (Waltz and Sagan, 2002). Rajesh Rajagopalan agrees with Waltz and suggests that India should not give undue importance to Pakistan's refusal to subscribe to the 'no first use' doctrine and its easy resort to nuclear rhetoric during the crisis situations. These are essentially aimed at deterring India's overwhelming conventional superiority. When it comes to actual crisis between the two sides, it is clear that central control tightens over nuclear weapons reducing the possibility of a nuclear crisis. He argues that both the Pakistan and Indian nuclear strategies are extremely

cautious and are meant primarily to deter the other. He stresses that Indian nuclear doctrine falls within the limitations existential deterrence (Rajagopalan, 2005).

The debate with regard to nuclear weapons in the South Asian context is no more about whether these weapons are a viable tool of statecraft. Rather, the debate has swung to the realm of numbers; how many nuclear weapons should a state possess in order to establish a credible nuclear posture of deterrence? The answer, which emerges from the above discussion, is not many. Neither India nor Pakistan possesses the resources or the need to enter into a nuclear arms race. A few survivable weapons with second-strike capability, however, are within these states' finances and public support. States co-exist in anarchy at the systemic level where the dominant rule is self-help. So long as states are suspicious of each other, nuclear weapons are here to stay. In addition, as long as this is the existential order of the day, states have to make such tactics to limit the possibility of their own destruction. Nuclear weapons bring about stability despite the fact that their existence threatens humanity with annihilation. These weapons are not usable weapons but their existence is a reality that states have to learn to deal with. In a very Waltizian sense, perhaps the threat to use nuclear weapons is much more morally defensible than their actual usage (Goswami, 2006).

Parakram Crisis of 2001-2002 and the Proliferation Debate

Just before the eruption of crisis in 2001-2002, Sagan made an affirmation that there is lack of empirical foundation for much of the literature on the consequences of the nuclearisation of South Asia. He said, "A new history of nuclear India and nuclear Pakistan is emerging, a history by which scholars and policy makers alike can judge whether the predictions of the deterrence optimists or the organizational pessimists have been borne out". Moreover, in the same month, the Parakram crisis occurred and paved a way to renew the ongoing debate of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. India and Pakistan have a lengthy and problematic history of affairs. India and Pakistan became two separate sovereign countries in August 1947. Both the countries have fought three full fledged wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and one limited war in 1999. The contention has become even further risky with the advent of nuclear weapons. In May 1998, both the countries conducted back-to-back nuclear tests, sparking fears of a nuclear arms race in the South Asian region. The post-1998 confrontations, which took place between the two

nuclear powers of the South Asia, were seen in a different way. Unlike the earlier wars, the Kargil war of 1999 and the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002 caused deep concern not only at the regional level, but also at the global level, largely because both countries had achieved nuclear capability by then. Kapur argues that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia threatens to make regional conflict catastrophically costly (Kapur, 2005). Mistry mentions that South Asia has become an important test bed for assessing the contending claims of proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists. India and Pakistan are among the world's newest nuclear powers, and they were involved in two military crises after their 1998 nuclear tests. In 1999, the two sides fought a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir that caused over one thousand fatalities. In 2001-02, they mobilised a million troops on their borders and were prepared for a wider conflagration. Eventually, these two military crises did not escalate into larger conflicts, and optimists argue that nuclear deterrence kept the peace in South Asia while pessimists give credit to some other factors not to the deterrent factor per se (Mistry, 2009). Kanti Bajpai mentions that the Indo-Pak crisis of 2001-2002 was the most recent in a sequence of crises and conflicts in South Asia, going back to 1986-87, in which nuclear weapons cast a shadow over decision-making. Bajpai argues that nuclear weapons played an extremely negative role in 2001-2002 crisis. He argues that Pakistan's nuclear capacity facilitated its widespread support of the Kashmiri separatists who launched the Parliament raid and triggered the 2001-2002 crisis. Pakistani actions, in turn, persuaded Indian leaders that they had to take a hard position during the crisis, demonstrating that they were not frightened by the danger of nuclear escalation and were willing to launch a retaliatory conventional attack against Pakistan. Thus, according to Bajpai, nuclear weapons were an important cause of the 200-2002 crisis. They encouraged the Pakistanis to back violent separatism in Kashmir, facilitated the attack on the Indian Parliament, and drove the Indians to adopt a forceful response. Bajpai however adds that nuclear weapons were not responsible for the de-escalation of the crisis. Pakistani nuclear weapons did not deter Indian leaders, who believed that Pakistan would desist from nuclear use even in the event of conflict. Instead, Bajpai maintains, conventional force shortcomings and third-party diplomatic intervention prevented India from striking Pakistan (Bajpai, 2009). Mistry makes a similar type of argument that South Asian military crises of 2001-2002

ended because of non-nuclear factors rather than because of nuclear deterrence. He affirms that a larger war was avoided not due to the nuclear factors or what followers of nuclear deterrence theory would advocate that the threat of Pakistani nuclear retaliation deterred Indian military action against Pakistan. He however argues that the war was averted because of U.S. diplomatic efforts that controlled both India and Pakistan to go from military escalation. He further mentions that had these factors not been the result would have a significant military escalation between the two parties. After the crisis ended, the parties had mobilised their forces and were on the brink of expanding hostilities despite nuclear signals from their opponents. Therefore, despite Pakistan's nuclear signals during 2001-2002, India came close to considerably expanding military operations across the Kashmir line in January 2002 and into Pakistani territory in the Punjab and Sindh sectors in May and June 2002 respectively (Mistry, 2009: 56). Kapur also takes the stand of proliferation pessimists. He at length debunks the arguments of deterrence optimists. He mentions that from 1998 to 2002 period, Indo-Pakistani tensions reached levels unobserved since the early 1970s, resulting in the 1999 Kargil war as well as a major militarised standoff that stretched from 2001 to 2002. He argues that an assessment of this period discloses that nuclear weapons facilitated Pakistan's adoption of the low-intensity conflict strategy that triggered these confrontations; however, the crisis eventual resolution resulted primarily from non-nuclear factors such as diplomatic calculations and conventional military constraints (Kapur, 2008).

The proliferation optimists take a different stand on the escalation and de-escalation of 2001-2002 crisis. Their argument is that the presence of nuclear weapons did contribute in the de-escalation of 2001-2002 crisis. Pravin Swami argues that nuclear weapons played a central role in ensuring that the crisis provoked by the terror strike on India's Parliament did not lead to war. Nuclear weapons helped focus the minds of policy establishments on both sides on the need for peace. He adds that it is a matter of fact that the presence of nuclear weapons still plays an important role in securing results favorable to peace and stability in South Asia. While South Asia's nuclear landscape controlled India from unleashing its conventional forces across the border, Pakistan also was forced by these new conditions to scale back its decades old proxy war against India. He also contends the argument of Mistry that non-nuclear factors played an essential role in de-

escalation of the crisis. He argues that neither non-nuclear factor in itself explains the long-term outcome of the 2001–2 crisis, because the US diplomats had long tried to rein in Pakistani support for terror groups, but had little success until their calls were supported by the Indian war threat. Nor had India's fast economic growth convinced Pakistan that its best interests lay in seeking peace (Swami, 2009). With regard to Kargil and Operation Parakram, Rajagopalan argues that though both crises were evidently conventional in nature, the threat to use nuclear weapons appeared largely on the horizon. He affirms that the nuclear signaling during 2001-2002 crisis was inadequate. He states that the claims that India was deterred from crossing the Line of Control (LOC) because of the presence of nuclear weapons could be partly true. However, it is also equally true that the Indian decision not to cross the LOC was also informed by the diplomatic advantages of not crossing the LOC. The positive role of the Clinton administration in diffusing the crisis cannot be discounted. While it is tempting to credit Indian restraint to nuclear deterrence alone, one should not underestimate the image of war held by Indian political leaders. The belief that India could win the war without having to escalate perhaps played no small part in the Indian calculations (Rajagopalan, 2005).

Rajagopalan argues that Parakram was more a strategy of force and compulsion, rather than deterrence. Both sides conducted nuclear signaling with regard to missile tests. Though the idea of a preventive strike across the border was contemplated by India on terrorist camps, it was given up on the face of intense international pressure and the existence of nuclear arsenal in Pakistan. After the Kaluchak attack on May 14, 2002, Pakistan conducted missile tests, perhaps intended to deter Indian conventional forces from getting on a military venture across the International Border (LOC). However, actual behaviour suggests that the leaders on both sides were careful with regard to nuclear threat rhetoric (Rajagopalan, 2005: 79). Basrur argues that Parakram crisis of 2001-2002 symbolised a significant strategic shift in India's nuclear policy; that of deterrence to one of compellence as Indian leaders took the initiative in projecting military force, backed by nuclear capabilities to coerce Pakistan into dropping its support for terrorist groups in Kashmir. India sought to pressurise the US into influencing Pakistan by the compellence strategy. India's military mobilisation during 2001-02 was an attempt to test the limited war theory in the reverse. Ever since the end of hostilities

over Kargil in 1999, many in the Indian strategic community had been suggesting the possibility of stretching the elasticity of space between the Kargil-type of limited response and a nuclear conflagration. The objective was to convince Pakistan that its nuclear weapons would not deter India from responding appropriately to Pakistan's hostile actions. The 2001-02 military buildup was preceded by diplomatic pressure by India, stopping rail and bus service to Pakistan and recalling its ambassador. The Indian Army moved if not deployed the Prithvi missile from Skinderabad to the border. Basrur argues that the whole exercise was a bluff and was obvious as such to the other side. The US would have stopped any war at that stage and Indian Armed Forces had neither the wherewithal nor effective plans to attack Pakistan. Compellence failed as Pakistan also resorted to nuclear signaling by deploying its Shaheen Missile on 20 May 2002. Nuclear weapons so far viewed as a political tool in India's strategic culture was elevated to the realm of operational strategy and as a result could have had unforeseen consequences and failure of control(Basrur, 2006).

Ganguly and Hagerty present a tripartite division of assumption to evaluate the factors of crisis behaviour particularly the behaviour of India and Pakistan during Parakram crisis of 2001-2002, which are as under:

1. India and Pakistan were discouraged from attacking each other due to timely and forceful US intervention.
2. In spite of some compelling incentives to attack each other India and Pakistan were did not do because both had a fear that war might escalate to the nuclear level.
3. India and Pakistan did not attack due to lack of conventional military superiority.

Ganguly and Hagerty argue that from 1990 onwards till Parakram of 2001-2002, the shadow of nuclear weapons played a strong deterring role in determining Indo-Pak relations (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005).

Both Ganguly and Hagerty focused on the grand strategy of Pakistan and India, analogous to Rajagopalan's view of grand strategy in the domestic level of analysis. They conclude that despite strong domestic rhetoric in both countries against the other, preventive war as a policy option was given up as any rational actor feared the terrible consequences of retaliation (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005). Therefore, the debate whether the presence of nuclear weapons did play any role in Parakram crisis of 200-2002 has two

poles of opinion. On the one hand, nuclear optimists give credit to nuclear weapons, which according to them constrained both India and Pakistan to go for an all out war. While on the other side, nuclear pessimists claim that non-nuclear factors did play a vital role during the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002.

Conclusion

The debate whether proliferation of nuclear weapons particularly among new states will bring stability to the interstate relations in the international system or will destabilise the inter-state relations has history of its past and relevance in the present context as well. The debate led to the emergence of two conceptual units- the rational deterrence theory and organisational theory. The advocates of rational deterrence theory are proliferation optimists such as Waltz while the adherents of organisational theory are proliferation pessimists like Sagan. Waltz argues that the stability or peaceful situation during the half of the century was precisely because of the two reasons; one was the bipolar system between Soviet Union and United States and other was because the two countries had the nuclear arsenals. The nuclear weapons optimist position flows from the logic of rational deterrence theory. This theory indicates that the possession of nuclear weapons by two states reduces the likelihood of war between them primarily because the costs of war and its consequences are immense. Having its embeddings within the neorealist structural theory, Waltz indicates that systemic pressures disable any two nuclear weapons state from deviating from the point of logical decision making. Therefore, nuclear weapons are primarily a tool of deterrence and their existence is a stabilising factor in international politics. Sagan contests this stand of proliferation optimists and claims that states lack institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision-making. Military organisations are too inward looking, heavily influenced by domestic politics and therefore, decisions regarding nuclear weapons would be taken based on issues of domestic stability, rather than systemic threats. Sagan also argues that there are always possibilities of accidents or unauthorized use of such weapons. It is possible to misuse any kind of weapons even if they are nuclear weapons. Both proliferation optimists (Waltz 1981) and proliferation pessimists (Sagan 1994) find confirmation of some of their key claims. As proliferation optimists contend, when two states possess nuclear weapons, the odds of war drop precipitously. However, in most other respects,

proliferation pessimists find vindication of their position. In disputes where only one of two parties possesses nuclear weapons, there is an increased chance of war. Moreover, nuclear weapons are generally associated with higher likelihoods of crises, uses of force, and conflicts involving lower-levels of casualties (Rauchhaus, 2009). Similarly, the impact of nuclear proliferation on the South Asian security environment has been the subject of various scholarly works particularly into proliferation optimistic and proliferation pessimistic groups.

Optimistic scholars argue that nuclear weapons have a stabilizing effect on the South Asian security environment and believe that, despite their potential dangers, nuclear weapons have made South Asia considerably safer. Proliferation pessimists, by contrast, argue that nuclear weapons have had destabilizing effects in South Asia and believe that organizational, political, and technical problems can lead to accidents and war in a nuclear South Asia. Kapur and Ganguly argue that in this sense, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not fundamentally change the behavioral incentives of new nuclear states, rather particular pathologies lead proliferators to behave sub-optimally and can result in extremely dangerous outcomes. Although some scholars discuss issues specific to South Asia, the most prominent work in this category focuses on problems that afflict states generally, such as organizational pathologies. According to this scholarship, nuclear weapons' effects on South Asia do not differ fundamentally from their impact on the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Kapur and Ganguly, 2009). The debate was renewed and reviewed due to some crisis between India and Pakistan particularly the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002. Mistry tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence, has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, he disputes the affirmation by Kenneth Waltz that nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, he mentions that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises particularly during the Parakram crisis. Instead, non-nuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have

averted such an escalation. He contends that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term (Mistry, 2009: 149). Kapur holds less optimistic view about the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. He argues that nuclear weapons had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Although, the resulting Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict, such outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these crises have triggered aggressive changes in India's conventional military posture. Such developments may lead to future regional instability (Kapur, 2008: 81). Rajagopalan argues that though there have been more than a few crises between India and Pakistan since both of them became nuclear powers but none can be termed as 'nuclear crises in the real sense of the term ((Rajagopalan, 2005). Ganguly argues that nuclear weapons do prevent the states to go for an all out war (Kapur, 2009). He adds that contrary to the views of the proliferation pessimists, nuclear weapons have reduced the risk of full-scale war in the region and have therefore contributed to strategic stability. Therefore, the debate whether nuclear weapons bring stability or not in inter-state relations seem complicated one. The pessimists presented their argument with some evidence that nuclear weapons have destabilise the inter-state relations. They also hold that during Parakram crisis of 2001-2002, the de-escalation of crisis was due to non-nuclear factors. However, when one follows the details of the 2001-2002 crisis, the argument of proliferation optimists seems more valid. The details given in the next chapter manifests that mere possession of nuclear weapons had a huge impact on the strategic calculations within the political leadership of both the countries.

Chapter Three

The Operation Parakram

Introduction

Operation Parakram was a massive build-up ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Indian Parliament. Under Operation Parakram, more than 500,000 troops were mobilised by India along the Line of Control (LOC) and the international border. The Operation was intended as an attempt at coercive diplomacy. Generally, coercive diplomacy is meant to assert ones' demands on an adversary, with a threat of punishment for non-compliance, which is potent enough for the adversary to comply. India blamed Pakistan for the assault and demanded that Pakistan should crackdown on two militant groups (involved in the assault), Lashker-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamad. It called for certain concrete measures against them such as dismantling their hideouts and ceasing bank accounts of their leaders. It handed over a list of twenty most wanted suspected to be residing in Pakistan and demanded their extradition for their involvement. However, Operation Parakram didn't achieve the perceived ends and in October 2002, the 10 month long deployment came to its end. The chapter will provide a brief account of the crises between India and Pakistan proceeding operation Parakram. It will then document the proceedings and developments between India and Pakistan from 13. December 2001 onwards till October 2002 that is the duration of operation Parakram.

Background

India and Pakistan have a long and thorny history of shared relations. Born in the most unfortunate circumstances, with a raging partition causing hurt and anger on both sides, India and Pakistan became two separate independent countries in August 1947. The rivalry has become even more dangerous with the introduction of nuclear weapons into the subcontinent. Smarting under its defeat by the Chinese in 1962, India until then had clear aversion to nuclear weapons despite its own promising nuclear programme, began developing nuclear capability. It conducted its nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran. Coming only a few years after it handed a defeat to Pakistan in 1971 war, the Indian test triggered off a nuclear programme in Pakistan. The 1971 was also a turning point when the strong

state and weak state relationship between India and Pakistan was completely established. Since before that for various reasons India had not attained much strategic superiority over Pakistan. Not only the Pakistani top brass but also nuclear scientists and scholars from different disciplines since the late 1970s stressed repeatedly that Pakistan could not afford a conventional arms race with India. By late 1980s, Pakistan had reportedly acquired nuclear capability about which even India top brass was aware of (Tanham, 1992). In May 1998, both the countries conducted back-to-back nuclear tests, sparking fears of a nuclear arms race in the South Asian region. The post-1998 confrontations which took place between the two nuclear powers of the South Asia were seen very differently. Unlike the earlier wars, the Kargil war of 1999 and the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002 caused deep concern not only at the regional level, but also at the global level, largely because both countries have nuclear arsenals.

Historical Overview of the conflict between India and Pakistan

The history of wars and crises between India and Pakistan can broadly be divided into two phases i.e.; the pre-nuclear phase and the post-nuclear phase. The first phase is the period when India and Pakistan were not nuclear powers and in second phase both of them were nuclear powers. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars, one minor war and numerous armed skirmishes. A brief account of these crises, given below is instructive in pointing towards the explosive nature of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and their wider consequences.

Wars and Crises in Pre-nuclear Phase

In pre-nuclear stage, India and Pakistan fought three major wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. The first war started in 1947. This war is also called the first Kashmir war. The origins of it can be traced back to the final status of Kashmir following the establishment of an independent India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947. British policy held that the various princely states would have to accede to either Pakistan or India based on geographic location and on demographics. While the final status of many of the states was easily concluded, Kashmir and two other states presented special problems. Kashmir was strategically located between India and Pakistan and though it was led by a Hindu Maharaja, Muslims made up the majority of the population. Sikhs and Hindus made up the other major ethnicities though they were a minority compared to the Muslim

population. At that time, Maharaja had two options, either to accede with India or with Pakistan. Maharaja was unable to decide which state to join. Both states applied a significant degree of pressure to sway Kashmir's government. In 1947, the tribal forces prompted by Pakistan invaded Kashmir and were fifteen miles away from the state's capital city, Srinagar. Alarmed by this invasion, Hari Singh sought India's military assistance, but India refused to help unless the Maharaja signed the instrument of accession, a standard procedure under which other princely states had acceded to India or Pakistan. Maharaja signed accession and India agreed to the accession after receiving the consent of Sheikh Abdullah, the secular and popular leader of the National Conference (NC) in the state. Singh signed the accord on October 27 and on the same day Indian armed forces entered Kashmir to repel the raiders (Indurthy, 2003: 09). The United Nations was then invited by India to mediate the quarrel. The UN mission insisted that the opinion of the Kashmir's must be ascertained. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on April 21, 1948. The war ended in December 1948 with the Line of Control dividing Kashmir into territories administered by Pakistan which include northern and western areas and India which include southern, central and northeastern areas.

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan began in August 5, 1965 and ended in Sept 22, 1965. It is also known as second Kashmir war. The war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule. The initial battles between India and Pakistan were contained within Kashmir involving both infantry and armor units with each country's air force playing major roles. It was not until early September when Pakistani forces attacked Ackhnur that the Indians escalated the conflict by attacking targets within Pakistan itself, forcing the Pakistani forces to disengage from Ackhnur to counter Indian attacks. The domestic Indo-Pak conflict transformed into an international conflict and raised Super Power concerns. The U. S. suspended military supplies to both sides during the war. Both the Soviet Union and the United States took a united stand to restrain the conflict within the boundaries of the Sub-continent from escalating into a global conflict. China threatened to intervene and offered military support to Pakistan. It was to keep China away from this conflict that both the Soviet Union and the United

States pressured the U. N. to arrange for an immediate ceasefire. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and was witness to the largest tank battle in military history since World War II. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequently with the Tashkent Declaration. Although the war was brief, it was a bitter one. Neither country was a winner. In January of 1966, at the invitation of Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin, both Shastri and Khan met in the city of Tashkent (Republic of Uzbekistan) and signed the agreement known as the Tashkent Declaration. On January 10, the agreement was formalized and the hostilities ended followed by the withdrawal of the Indo-Pakistani forces to the previous cease-fire lines (Indurthy, 2003).

The third major war between India and Pakistan erupted in 1971. Unlike the first and second Indo-Pakistani wars, it did not involve the status of Kashmir. Instead, it began as a Pakistani civil war in which East Pakistan, the eastern province of Pakistan, sought to secede from the country. This conflict escalated into a 14-day war between India and Pakistan after India's military intervened to support the secession of East Pakistan. Although even shorter than the previous wars, the third war resulted in 11,500 battle deaths, the highest of all three conflicts. It also resulted in a truncated Pakistan, as East Pakistan became the sovereign nation of Bangladesh. Following Operation Searchlight, about 10 million Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighboring India, because of the impending humanitarian crisis; India intervened in the Bangladesh liberation movement. After a pre-emptive strike by Pakistan, full-scale hostilities between the two countries commenced. Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces surrendered to India following which Bangladesh was created. India and Pakistan have not gone to war ever since 1971 though they came close on several occasions. Their closest call came in January 1987, when the Indian armed forces held their biggest exercise in history, Brasstacks. The size, the location (35 to 50 miles from the Pakistani border), and a lack of communication influenced Pakistan to think that Brasstacks was not an exercise at all, but an operation meant at provoking an attack, which would then be met by retaliation. The crisis could have triggered a conflict more by accident and misperception than by design and plan. It was last time when India and Pakistan were so close to war before both went nuclear.

Wars and Crises in Post-nuclear Phase

In the post nuclear period, India and Pakistan have fought a war in 1999 and were close to another war during the Parakram crisis in 2001-2002. The 1999 war is commonly known as Kargil War; this conflict was limited and did not escalate into a major war. Before the Kargil crisis, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan armies to abandon some forward posts in winters on their respective sides of the Line of Control (LOC). Subsequently, when weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed. The only reason for such a practice was the extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir. In February 1999, Pakistani troops along with Kashmiri insurgents took the advantage of this practice and infiltrated across the LOC and occupied some Indian territory, mostly in the Kargil district. This was subsequently detected by India and Indian forces launched an offensive to reclaim the posts in May-July 1999. This whole duration can broadly be classified into three principal stages. The first phase started when the Pakistani forces infiltrated into the Indian-occupied part of Kashmir and controlled strategic locations. This occupation enabled the intruders to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The second phase of the conflict started when India discovered that infiltration had taken place in the region which prompted an Indian response to it. India quickly mobilised its forces. In the third and last phase India and Pakistan got involved into major battles. In the end India recaptured its territory and Pakistan pulled out its forces from beyond Line of Control. India called it 'Operation Vijay' while Pakistan termed it 'Operation Badr'.

In making a study of the Kargil war, Indian analysts Sood and Sawhney argue that Pakistan planned the Kargil war in two parts. In part one, regular Pakistani troops in civilian clothes belonging to its Northern Light Infantry were to make deep intrusions and occupy Indian territory in the sparsely patrolled higher reaches of the Kargil sector in Jammu and Kashmir. Part two of the plan was to infiltrate a large number of *mujahids* into Jammu and Kashmir to form the actual vanguard. Regular troops were to keep the Line of Control alive with fire, keep the Indian Army engaged, and provide cover to mujahids infiltration (Sood and Sawhney, 2003:62).

Devin Hagerty holds that although New Delhi and Islamabad had been waging a bitter low-intensity conflict in Kashmir since late 1989, the 1999 Kargil conflict was the

first major clash involving regular Indian and Pakistani forces since 1971. He adds that, blatantly initiated by Islamabad, this fourth Indo-Pakistani war was significant for other reasons too. An estimated 1,300–1,700 soldiers perished in the fighting, which involved the use of substantial airpower, heavy artillery, and close-quarters infantry combat. The war shattered a promising effort at India–Pakistan conflict resolution known as the “Lahore process,” as well as a back-channel dialogue on Kashmir between personal representatives of the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers. The Kargil episode also started a chain of events that culminated in the October 1999 overthrow of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the return to power of the Pakistan Army after a decade of nominally civilian, democratic rule. Together, Hagerty believes, these developments contributed progressively to de-hyphenation of India Pakistan relationship in the eyes of the United States as Washington gained interest an enhanced relationship with New Delhi and Pakistan continuing fell from grace in the United States’ estimation, a downward trajectory that had been evident since 1990 (Hagerty, 2009:100).

The 1999 crisis was different from other crises in the sense that this crisis occurred when both India and Pakistan were nuclear powers. It caused profound apprehension not merely at the regional level, but also at the international level. The Indian defence Minister George Fernandes feared that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons. In an interview with the French daily *Figaro*, he stated that Pakistan could be tempted to use nuclear weapons in the event of a full-blown conflict with India and termed Pakistan as an irresponsible country.

Fernandes noted that Pakistan had refused to sign with India a no first use treaty (NFU) treaty because Pakistan knew that we are superior in conventional weapons. He added that Pakistan had lost three conflicts with India, and in case of a fourth conflict, they could be tempted to push the nuclear button.

The apprehension that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons in Kargil crisis grew when Bruce Riedel, a White House official presented a paper at the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Advanced Studies of India. According to Riedel, US intelligence had information that the Pakistani military, then led by Musharraf, was preparing its nuclear arsenal for possible use in a wider war arising from the Kargil clash, most likely without the knowledge of Sharif (Reidel, 2002). However, it remained

uncertain whether both the countries could have escalated the conflict up to the nuclear level. Rajesh Rajagopalan is skeptical of the claims that the Indo-Pak confrontation during the Kargil crisis could have escalated to a nuclear level. He argues that the concerns of the Pakistani nuclear preparations that Riedel revealed in his dramatic account of 4 July, 1999 were not apparently serious enough to communicate to New Delhi. He quotes the then Indian Army Chief V.P Malik put it subsequently,

If the US President had any such information, he would have communicated that to the Indian Prime Minister and we would have known about it. The only reports that India had were about some missile sites being read and political rhetoric; Riedel's account about this was that what General Malik stated was exaggerated.

Rajagopalan believes that the nuclear dimension to the Kargil crisis arose primarily because both India and Pakistan were nuclear powers. He however, is dismissive of any overt nuclear threat given by any side. He says that there were only two statements when one may infer remote chances of having given a nuclear threat. The first statement, by Major General Rashid Quereshi of Pakistani's Inter-Services Public Relations was made in direct response to the India's decision to use air power against the Pakistani aggression. The second, slightly more overt threat was made by Foreign Secretary Shamshad, who claimed that Pakistan will not hesitate to use "any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity" (Rajagopalan, 2005:110). Rajagopalan argues that when one goes into the context of this statement, Ahmed's statement was referred to Pakistan's desire to settle all the disputes with India peacefully. And he adds that Pakistani desire for peace should not be considered as weakness. The Kargil war finally came to its end, when the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif met the President of the United States Bill Clinton on June 1999. Both the countries resumed their talks. The telephonic conversation between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif also contributed in improving the relations between India and Pakistan. It led to Vajpayee's announcement in the Parliament that India would resume diplomatic and air links with Pakistan as part of a decisive attempt to restore peace in South Asia. Pakistan welcomed the move and Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri said that Islamabad would reciprocate the decisions taken by India. These developments were hailed by world leaders. US Secretary of State Colin Powell

encouraged this breakthrough. He said that India's decision to resume diplomatic and air links with Pakistan is very promising. Infact, President Gen Pervez Musharraf called it a new beginning. The relations took a sharp turn when India invited President Musharraf for talks. The two day summit was held at Agra on 15-16 July, 2001. It was planned with the aim to resolve very old issues between India and Pakistan. The summit however collapsed and no prescribed accord could be attained. The two sides remained stiff on the core issue of Kashmir, despite five long and difficult face to face rounds between the two leaders and hours of discussion between the two delegations.

Attack on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly

While the world was busy dealing with the mayhem created by the incident of 9/11, it was just 20 days later that the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly was attacked by the militants. On October 1, 2001 the militants belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed carried out an assault on the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislative Assembly complex in Srinagar. The militants used a car bomb and three suicide bombers. No Lawmaker was killed because they were meeting in temporary facilities as the legislature building was earlier damaged in a fire. Many senior leaders had already left the building. In the incident 26 people were killed. This was for the first time when an assault was carried on a governmental body since the eruption of militancy in the state in 1989. India strongly condemned the assault and lodged a strong protest against Pakistan. India called on Pakistan to ban the activities of the terrorist groups, operating inside Pakistan. India issued a virtual ultimatum to Pakistan to stop aiding and abetting terrorism. "India cannot accept such manifestation of hate and terror form across its borders. There is a limit to India's patience", a hard-hitting statement issued by the Ministry of External Affairs after a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (The New York Times, 2001). Pakistan too condemned the attack, but refused to take any action. This led to the deterioration of the relations between the two countries. The Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee called it a planned conspiracy on the part of Pakistan. He said that the killing of a large number of people inside and outside the Assembly premises indicated that it was a preplanned conspiracy (The New York Times, 2001).

Evolution of the crisis

Operation Parakram as already mentioned is the operation, wherein more than 500,000 Indian troops were mobilized along the Line of Control (LOC) and on the international border, in response to December 13, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament. There was a 10 month-long mobilization and deployment of troops along the LOC. It comprised of three distinct strands namely diplomacy, conventional Military capability and had a nuclear aspect as well. The Operation was aimed at curbing the proxy war which Pakistan has been carrying on for so long in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and, to put an end to the cross border infiltration. The mobilization was intended to back diplomacy; hence, the entire exercise was attempted at coercive diplomacy. The Operation pressed into service the Indian Army and Air Force. The big picture sketched out for the Operation Parakram consisted of four essential ingredients and one underlying assumption. The four ingredients were; the application of military pressure for meeting political ends, backing coercive diplomacy with regular diplomacy, asserting the importance of war as an instrument of last resort and, reiterating the primacy of political will. The underlying assumption to the operation was the unflinching support and cooperation of the US to end Cross Border Terrorism (Indo-Pak- Seminar Report, 2003).

For Sood and Sawhney Operation Parakram was a "bottom up" operation. It was a "bottom up" operation because the political leadership in India was taken aback by the attack. They were clueless about what to do. In a state of hurry and confusion they called for mobilization. In this scenario at least the Army knew what it was doing and had definite plans (Sood and Sawhney, 2003:88).

What Actually Happened?

The crisis, as already mentioned, had its origin in the December 13, 2001 militant attacks on the Indian Parliament in session. The assault was carried out by five gunmen who infiltrated the Parliament House in a car with Home Ministry and Parliament labels. Both the houses of the Parliament (Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha) had been adjourned 40 minutes earlier to the incident. Most members of the Parliament and government officials like Home Minister LK Advani and Minister of State (Defence) Harin Pathak were believed to be still in the building at the time of the attack. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Opposition Leader Sonia Gandhi had already left. Five policemen, a

Parliament security guard, and a gardener were killed, and 18 others were injured. No members of the government were injured. The gun battle ended in a 45-minute duration in which nine policemen and parliament staffer were killed. All the five terrorists were killed and identified as Pakistani nationals. The attack took place around 11:40 am (IST), minutes after both Houses of Parliament had adjourned for the day (Khare, 2001).

Vajpayee's statements

Responding to the terrorist attack on the Parliament House, the Vajpayee vehemently asserted that, "we will liquidate the terrorists and their sponsors wherever they are, whosoever they are". This assertion was made in a resolution passed by the Union Cabinet. A similar sentiment was earlier expressed by Vajpayee in a brief "message to the nation". He said the attack "was not just on a building, but a warning to the entire nation, and we accept the challenge. We will defeat each one of their (terrorists) attack". Vajpayee saw the attack as the continuation of the decades old terrorist onslaught against India and added that "our fight is now reaching the last stage, and a decisive battle would have to take place. The entire country is united in this hour of crisis" (Khare, 2001)

Intervening in the special debate in both Houses of Parliament on the incident, Vajpayee said India had exercised much restraint and that diplomatic initiatives were being explored. "Other options are also open," he added. At the same time, Mr. Vajpayee was keen on not sounding unduly aggressive: "Whatever course of action we decide upon, it will be well-considered and thought-out. It will not be the decision of the ruling party alone, it will reflect national consensus. It will be the national decision." He rejected Pakistan's demand for a joint probe into the attack, saying there was no question of agreeing to it. Accusing Islamabad of playing a "dangerous game," he added that, "We expect that you should take action. We expect there will be action... we are not relying only on diplomacy. We are confident that international opinion is on our side." Reiterating that India would fight the battle on its own, he said amid all-round applause "it is a challenge to our sovereignty, we will face it. We do not say that somebody should fight our battle. I repeat, we will fight terrorism with all our might on our own strength" (The Hindu, 2001).

Musharaf's Reaction

On January 12, 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave a speech anticipated to

decrease tensions with India. He affirmed that Pakistan will fight extremism on its own soil, but said that Pakistan had a right to Kashmir. Indian leaders reacted with skepticism. Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah said that the speech was nothing new, and others said that it would 'not make any change in the Indian stand'. Still, tensions eased to some extent. Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf announced that Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have been banned and said that any group involved in terrorist attacks on Indian Parliament or Jammu and Kashmir assembly would be dealt with a heavy hand. India had demanded a ban on LeT, JeM for their involvement in the December 13 attack on Parliament. "We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October one and December 13," Musharraf said, adding any group involved in such terrorist acts would be dealt with a heavy hand.

Reiterating Pakistan's stand on Kashmir, he said that, "Kashmir cause runs in our blood. No Pakistani can snap ties with it. We will continue to provide moral, political and diplomatic support to it." He also made a fresh offer for dialogue on Kashmir, but harped on the oft-repeated theme of resolving the issue through dialogue in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people (The Hindu, 2002). B. Raman makes a critical analysis of the Musharraf's speech. He argues that Musharraf in a typical manner tried to carry conviction to India and the rest of the international community that his determination to act against terrorism in all its manifestations was a definitive change of policy and not just a change of posture as believed by India. At the same time, he sought to ensure his own survival in power by reassuring his people that his denunciation did not indicate a change of policy vis-a-vis the future of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). It must be go to his credit that no other Pakistani leader, political or military, had ever condemned in general terms the activities of religious extremist and sectarian parties and highlighted the devastating effect which their activities were having on the Pakistani State and society in such strong terms as he did. At the same time, so far as India is concerned, his speech only partly met the concerns of New Delhi. He banned the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), both blamed by the Government of India for the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, but attributed the ban to their activities inside Pakistan and not to their acts of terrorism in India (Pape, 2002).

The General had then firmly rejected any notion of handing over a Pakistani national for trial in India. And if there was any foreign national on the Indian list, then he would be dealt with appropriately when found, he promised (Muralidharan. 2002:02)

Demands by India

The Indian establishment warned Pakistan of dire consequences, if the later would not take any serious action to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in its occupied part of Kashmir. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, who was then Pakistan's high commissioner to India, was summoned by India's then foreign secretary Chokila Iyer who set out a three-point demarche: a ban on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed; their leadership, to curb the financial assets of these groups, and their access to these assets. India asked Pakistan to hand over twenty most wanted persons who were involved in different terrorist activities on Indian soil. India formally asked Pakistan to take immediate steps to put a stop on the activities of and Jaish-e-Mohamad. The demarche to Pakistan followed minister of external affairs Jaswant Singh's statement that India had 'technical evidence' linking the two Pakistan-based terrorist groups with the suicide attack. On a query whether India was prepared to reveal the nature of the 'technical evidence,' a ministry of external affairs spokesperson said this was not the appropriate juncture for India to reveal the evidence to the general public. when asked what the word 'technical' meant in this context, the spokesperson said enough evidence had been collected by several intelligence agencies, but it would not be right to comment on it now. However, the Lashker-e-Taiba denied any involvement in the suicide attack on parliament. The group's spokesman Yahya mujahid described Indian government's accusations as "baseless" and blamed Indian intelligence agencies for orchestrating the attack (Srivastava, 2001: 34).

Arguments that the list of demands made by Indian Government was too long to be rewarded started circulating through various channels of communication. Commenting on the nature of demands made by the Indian Government, Sood and Sawhney believe that India diluted its demands rather being focused on a specific demand. They argue that India should have utilized the opportunity by making a single, focused and attainable demand in exchange for an Operation Parakram. India's singular demand should have been that Pakistan stop infiltration across the Line of Control forth with. Even if the jihadis were not under total control of Musharaf, the Pakistani army had total control

over its side of Line of Control. The later could completely stop infiltration if it so desired. At this juncture, the US would probably have pressed Musharaf hard to ensure that Operation Enduring Freedom did not fall into jeopardy. India could have then have utilized the cessation of infiltration, though temporary, with intensified counter-insurgency operations against the jehadis in the state, it would have been time for bilateral talks between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, missile and nuclear issues, besides others matters as agreed in the composite dialogue formula. India, instead, let the opportunity pass by diluting its demands and asking what was impossible for Musharaf to give. The defence and external affairs ministry wanted cross-border terrorism to end. The home ministry prepared a list of a twenty one criminals-later revised to twenty (Sood and Sawhney, 2003).

Praveen Swami tries to distinguish these demands from those demands which India have made earlier. He holds that India had made such demands several times in the past, to little effect. This time, however, New Delhi put military muscle behind its demands. India moved its offensive formations to assault positions along its 2,200-kilometer frontier with Pakistan and ordered its Air Force to prepare for strikes (Swami 2009:144).

Pakistan's Response to Indian Demands

Pakistan rejected the Indian demands. But, Pakistan announced that it will freeze the assets of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan's Information Secretary Anwar Mahmood said "the Indian government, so far, has not given the Pakistani government any evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba was behind the attack. We have been telling them they should provide evidence to a third party ... if that neutral committee finds someone responsible, certainly we will act," As already mentioned, Pervez Musharraf promised to crack down on the Lashkar-e-Taiba group if his government found evidence to support. "If we find evidence of it, we would like to move against them," Musharraf was quoted by the Associated Press, during the final day of an official trip to China. "We are already taking measures to move against all groups who are involved in any form of terrorism anywhere in the world" (The Washington Times, 2002).

Therefore, Pakistan declined having any proof. India, on the hand declined to hand over the on the grounds of 'technical intelligence.' Such proof was, however, given

to the Americans, who in turn branded both the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Lashkar-e-Taiba as terrorist outfits. At the same time, Washington clarified this did not necessarily indicate the involvement of the Pakistan government.

Rolling Apprehensions

The apprehensions escalated with each passing day. The diplomatic ties were ceased between the two countries. India recalled its high commissioner to Pakistan. It terminated bus and train service to Pakistan to show its deep displeasure with what it called Pakistan's failure to crackdown on two Pakistan-based groups that India had accused. It was the first time since 1971, that India had recalled its high commissioner to Pakistan (Dugger, 2001). India remained adamant, and the troops it deployed on the border by the year-end continued to pile up. Pakistan warned that, given the tension on its other border, it would be unable to lend its soldiers to assist the US in its campaign against terror in Afghanistan. Despite the constant pressure for talks, India insisted a dialogue was impossible until Pakistan complied with the conditions laid down by New Delhi. That was how Home Minister L K Advani described the terms set by India for talks with Pakistan in March 2002. "We are ready to talk with Islamabad if they fulfill these five demands. We are ready to discuss even the Jammu and Kashmir issue, if they meet these demands." The terms were: the dismantling of all terrorist training camps across the border, including those in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, no arming and abetting of terrorists, halting all financial assistance to terrorist and jihadi outfits, the cessation of cross-border terrorism and, the extradition of 20 terrorists wanted for terrorist acts in India (Hindustan Times, 2001).

Mobilization: Parakram in operation

Only after two days of the assault, Indian government ordered the abrupt mobilization of its armed forces. The troop deployment was massive, extending from Gujarat to Kashmir. The army received reinforcements from Central and Northern India to counter the Pakistani build-up which had not ebbed since their winter exercise, codenamed Operation Khabardar. It commenced in October 2001, with troops from the strike corps, Mangla-based 1 corps, Karachi-based 5 corps and Bahawalpur-based 31 corps, an armoured brigade and infantry divisions, in the sensitive Jhelum-Chenab and Chenab-Ravi corridors close to the LoC.

There were reports of massive Indian troop movements along the border in the Sindh-Rajasthan sector, as well as in the Chenab-Ravi corridor and along the Line of Control which divides Indian and Pakistani-ruled Kashmir. On 27 December 2001, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes termed the border situation as being grave and said that the Indian forces deployment on the forward areas would be completed within two to three days. By 01 January 2002 the Indian Defence Ministry denied allegations by Pakistan that it was continuing its military buildup along their tense borders, saying that the mobilisation is more or less complete" (The Hindu, 2001). India was about to complete its military mobilisation along the International Border and the Line of Control, and had already taken the crucial decision of pushing its 33 Corps that faces China in the east towards the northern theatre. The presence of these troops in the north was meant to enhance the asymmetry in the force levels between the two countries. By early January 2002 India had reportedly mobilised over 500,000 troops and its three armored divisions along the 3,000 km frontier with Pakistan. India also placed its navy and air force on "high alert" and deployed its nuclear-capable missiles. Pakistan reacted in kind, concentrating forces along the line of control that divides Kashmir. The deployment, which included troops in the states of Rajasthan, Punjab and Gujarat, was the largest since the 1971 conflict between the two rivals. Over 300,000 Pakistani troops were also mobilized.

While giving an account of the preparation of the Indian establishment about the operation, journalist Rahul Bedi mentions that, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had within two weeks prepared itself for executing long-standing plans for special forces strikes against terrorist training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The strikes were contemplated to destroy bridges linking Pakistan-administered Kashmir with the rest of Pakistan and obstruct both the logistical chains of military formations in the region and possible Chinese replenishment efforts in aid of its ally.

Bedi mentions that the Precision Guided Munitions and other sophisticated weapons were loaded onto some 20 Mirage 2000H and MiG-27 "Flogger" attack aircraft, and the fighters were ready to take off for bombing raids from various bases in northern and western India, awaiting political clearance. The first wave of air strikes lasting 15 minutes was to be followed by a raid on militant training camps by helicopter-borne

Special Forces in a multi-tiered operation that involved IAF fighters as escorts. The commando raids were to last less than 45 minutes, after which the Russian Mi-35 gunships would ferry the troops back across the border. The entire operation was timed to be completed within an hour. According to this version of events, an enraged Vajpayee favored the immediate initiation of these special forces strikes. He was, however, dissuaded by other senior members of the Cabinet Committee on Security, who cautioned against the enterprise on the grounds that the Army was not yet prepared to meet the inevitable Pakistani retaliation (Bedi, , 2002).

Kanti Bajpai also deals with some length about the mobilisation of Indian as well as Pakistani troops. He says that as far the Indian military movements were concerned; it was an immediate military response from India. He mentions that militarily things moved quickly. On December 17, Indian officials reported a Pakistani troop buildup in Kashmir after the conclusion of the Pakistan Army's winter military exercises, as well as the infiltration of Pakistani regulars into the Indian-administered portion of Kashmir. Already on December 18, the Indian Army had been put on "maximum alert," the Indian Air Force (IAF) had been placed on "high alert," and Indian troops had pushed forward along the international border and the LOC in Jammu and Kashmir. Military leaves were cancelled for four to five months, according to press reports, and families were to be readied for evacuation. India suggested that this was in response to reports of Pakistani Army movements to forward areas and the relief of Pakistani Rangers by heavier forces (Bajpai, 2001–2002:164).

On December 21, the Indian press reported that the Indian Army was on the move. Army units were deployed in the Anoopgarh and Sri Ganganagar areas in the western state of Rajasthan. Army units were dug in behind the Border Security Force (BSF). Civilian trains were stopped in the sector, and special trains "with a large number of troops" left Suratgarh. Pakistani Army activity was also reported opposite Barmer and Jaisalmer and the area across from Sri Ganganagar. Residents estimated that Indian troop movements were on the same scale as during the Kargil War in 1999. Suddenly, in the midst of these military developments, Pakistan moved its Hatf-I and Hatf-II missiles into eastern Punjab. The same day, the press secretary to Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf warned India that if its troops crossed the LoC, Pakistan would use force.

India ratcheted up. On December 21, it recalled its high commissioner from Pakistan, asked the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi to reduce its staff, and announced the closing of all land and rail transport links with Pakistan. Islamabad, by contrast, insisted that its high commissioner would remain in Delhi in order to keep lines of communication open. It accused India of a massive troop mobilization and promised to take appropriate countermeasures (Bajpai, 2001–2002:164).

Mobilization by Pakistan

Pakistan reacted by moving great numbers of its troops from the border with Afghanistan, where they had been trying to suppress Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, to the Indian border. It made accusations against India of a massive troop mobilization and asserted that it would take necessary countermeasures to deter any kind of Indian attack on its soil.

Pakistan put its armed forces on high alert following threatening statements by Indian leaders. President Gen Pervez Musharraf presided over a meeting which decided to keep vigil to meet any eventuality. The chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the three services chiefs and vice chief of the army staff attended the meeting at the GHQ in Rawalpindi. The meeting reviewed the situation and decided to take “all necessary steps” to counter any threat coming from across the border (Haqu, 2001).

Pakistan moved seven to nine divisions of its army towards the Indian border. With the Pakistani Army having to cover shorter distances from its cantonments to its borders, it had the advantage of mobilising much faster than India. On 25 December 2001, Pakistan's Army canceled all leaves for its troops and told them to report for duty immediately. India was moving troops by the trainload from south and central India to the northwestern border with Pakistan. The buildup was not just in Kashmir, but also along the International Border [IB] dividing the Indian states of Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab from the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sind.

Operation Parakram was divided into two phases. The December 2001 to January 2002 is broadly taken as part one of the operation while May-June 2002 is termed as phase two of the operation. Though they were closely related, there were actually two distinct crises (Rajagopalan, 2005:115). The liminal space between the two periods may be termed as a process towards relaxation. During the time both the countries showed some positive gestures. However, the in-between period can't be termed as period of de-

escalation. Kanti Bajpai argues that although the events of December 2001 to October 2002 are usually referred to as a “crisis” (in the singular); in fact there were two crises. The first lasted from December 13 to the middle of January 2002. The second lasted from May 14 to the middle of June 2002. The two crises were linked by the fact that, throughout the period, the Indian Army remained mobilized and ready to go to war (Bajpai, 2001-2002:163). Since the first phase has already been dealt with some length, it is appropriate here to deal with the second phase of crisis. The second phase is can be linked to “Kaluchak Incident”.

Kaluchak Incident of 2002

This unpleasant incident took place on May 14, 2002 when three terrorists attacked a tourist bus killing 33 people near the town of Kaluchak in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. This bus was on its way from Himachal Pradesh. In what was considered as one of the deadliest attacks, India had witnessed till then, three men disguised in army outfits killed 30 people and wounded 48 with sprays of automatic gunfire in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was the kind of attack that the diplomats at that time feared could provoke a military retaliation by India, which had already amassed troops on the border after the attack on its Parliament last December. Indian intelligence officials said the attack was probably carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of two Pakistan-based militant groups that stood accused in the December attack (Dugger: 2002).

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee termed the May 14 massacre in Kaluchak as most inhuman and brutal carnage. “Terrorists who have brutally engineered this carnage of innocent women and children will not go scot-free and will be punished”, Vajpayee said after meeting those injured in the attack at the military hospital in Jammu (Times of India, 2002). After this incident the already strained relations between the two countries worsened further. India termed the attack as the latest in a string of provocative attacks sponsored by the Pakistani military government and its intelligence agency, the ISI. The long-established tension between the two countries immediately worsened and they sent a million men to their mutual border (The Guardian, 2002).

According to some reports, by late May 2002 as many as 700,000 Indian Army and paramilitary forces were deployed along the Indo-Pakistani border and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan had reportedly deployed as many as 300,000

troops, and perhaps as much as three-fourths of the army at or near the Indian border. Both Pakistan and India placed their forces in the disputed border area on alert. India's paramilitary contingent comprised several hundreds of thousands of combat-ready troops, a major portion of which were already deployed on the Line of Control.

Musharaf in an interview with some senior journalists and editors talked about the developments which were taking place on border, criticized India of being too aggressive. Describing the situation on Pakistan's eastern borders as "grim," President Musharaf said that Pakistan and India were closer to war than they had been at any time since the Dec 13 attack on the Indian parliament (Khan, 2002).

The Pakistani President said that the aggressive Indian rhetoric had come in the wake of complete operational capability on the part of India which was why it could no longer be dismissed as mere rhetoric. However, he added, Pakistan armed forces were fully prepared to meet any threat and were capable of matching all forms of Indian aggression. Moving on to the national political scene, he said it was because of the tense border situation that he had decided to invite all political parties for a consultative meeting (Khan, 2002).

After Kaluchak incident, the whole army was prepared and mobilised. The plans were much more determined. There was to be a wide front offensive. Precisely, India then geared up for a strong military response.

Nuclear Aspect of Operation Parakram

The operation Parakram was characterised by nuclear dimension as well. Since both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapons states, there were apprehensions that conventional war could possibly escalate into a nuclear one. Both the Indian and Pakistani officials made statements regarding the use of nuclear weapons in the eventuality of the crisis escalation. Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said on June 5 that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. He added that India's policy was clear and unambiguous on the 'no first-use' policy (Asian Political News, 2002). Musharaf said on the same day that he would not renounce Pakistan's right to use nuclear weapons first.

Reacting to Pakistani President Pervez Musharaf's speech, Singh said the address was both dangerous and disappointing since it merely repeated promises that remain unfulfilled and added to tensions between the two countries. Singh criticised Musharaf

for contradicting his own statements and mocking the world's efforts to fight terrorism. Singh remarked that world must recognise that Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism (Asian Political News, 2002). Leaders of both nations attended a regional summit in Kazakhstan but showed no sign of modifying positions that brought them close to war. They refused to meet face to face with each other (Irish Examiner, 2002). It was not since the Cuban missile crisis that the world came so close to a nuclear war. Rising tensions between India and Pakistan created a scary scenario. Defusing South Asian tensions was, therefore, an American priority (Ayoob, 2002). Prime Minister Vajpayee warned, "that all military options were open in India's war against terrorism. He said that no weapon would be spared in self-defence. Whatever weapon was available, it would be used no matter how it wounded the enemy. India was a worshipper of peace but if the situation demanded, it was always ready to fight" (Shukla, 2002).

Vajpayee's provocative statements made during his visit to Kashmir got a sharp and equally vehement response from Pakistan. Pakistan test-fired its five Shaheen-II missiles, one of which was tested over a 2,000 kilometer range. The Indian foreign office said in response that it was "not impressed" by the tests (Hindustan Times, 2002). The level of the tension was raising high and both the countries started deploying their Ballistic Missiles along their respective borders. India and Pakistan reportedly moved ballistic missiles and troops close to their border regions and evacuated villages as tensions between the two countries mounted. The reports of deployment come as the leaders of both countries issued blunt statements on their tense relationship, reiterating that they do not want a war but are prepared to fight if necessary.

General Padmanabhan's Speech

Gen. S. Padmanabhan had more inclination to go for a large-scale war with Pakistan. As mentioned above, some termed Operation Parakram as "bottom-up" operation. The operation was called as such owing to the fiery statements like those of Padmanabhan, which put the political leadership into the backseat. The decision-making became more of military in nature than political. Several inferences can be drawn from the provocative statements made by Gen. S. Padmanabhan. C. W. Dugger argues that the remarks surprised India's own political leadership for their baldness; the army chief declared that the military was fully prepared for a large-scale conventional war with Pakistan. He

added that the army was ready to deliver a devastating nuclear strike should Pakistan use its nuclear arsenal first (Dugger, 2002).

"If we go to war, jolly good!" Gen. S. Padmanabhan exclaimed. Asked how India would respond if attacked with a nuclear weapon, he assured a packed news conference that "the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful." In answer to another question, he said, "We are ready for a second strike, yes," and added that India had sufficient nuclear weapons. "Take it from me, we have enough." "I am a man of peace," General Padmanabhan said. "But if there is a war, they will find out this man can bite." However, senior Indian officials in the government were quick to say that the general's pithy, bellicose remarks were not cleared or sanctioned by the Prime Minister's Office" (Dugger, 2002).

Critics of Gen. Padmanabhan's management of Operation Parakram have argued that air strikes against terror training camps could have been carried out within days of the December 13 outrage. The Army, in turn, said that it needed time to prepare for the escalatory consequences of such attacks. Pakistan, Army planners, had an interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as possible. The Army believed the best prospects of avoiding such a situation was having force in place that could rapidly secure war objectives.

Waning of Mobilisation

The period between December 13, 2001 and June, 2002 was a period of anxiety between the two countries. The period is referred to as the phase of crisis between the two nuclear powers. As already mentioned, this period can be divided into two phases. The first lasted from December 13 to the middle of January 2002. The second lasted from May 14 to the middle of June 2002. There was prevalence of uncertainty within the establishments of both the countries. Claims and counter claims was a significant feature of their relations during that period in time. The synthesis, at last, came in the form of demobilization. Both the countries after taking an account of the cost-benefit analysis came to conclusions that the war was going to lead them nowhere. Though, both the countries claimed victory in their own sense of the term, but the fact remains that the two countries came very close to the war without actually going for a one.

The 10 months deadlock finally came to an end after a large number of the Army troops deployed along the international border (IB) with Pakistan were finally relaxed. The government had chosen the middle path of a phased withdrawal from the IB while maintaining operational readiness along the volatile Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The Cabinet Committee on Security, which took the decision under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Vajpayee, however, called it "redeployment" and not "withdrawal" of troops. 'The Army, in effect, will now scale down its aggressive posture along the IB in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Punjab and parts of the Jammu region by pulling back "strike" and other formations along with armoured and mechanized elements' (Times of India, 2002).

Both the sides started phased withdrawal of their respective troops from the border. These postures were aimed at providing positive signals furthering de-escalation. The visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage contributed significantly towards de-escalation. While conceding India as the aggrieved party in the then military confrontation with Pakistan, Armitage stressed the importance of India giving Gen. Musharaf some space by responding positively to his first step on cross-border infiltration. After talks with Armitage, External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, placed on record India's deep sense of appreciation of the spirit that persuaded President Bush to send his top officials to the region in pursuit of the much needed peace.

But before moving towards a substantive de-escalation, India wanted to satisfy itself fully with the evidence on declining cross-border infiltration. India appeared ready to accept intelligence inputs from the United States and Great Britain to ascertain the verification (Mohan, 2002). Toeing the line put forth before Richard Armitage, Musharaf said, "I think the chance of war is minimal. The threat (of war) in the last four or five days has diminished" (The Hindu, 2002). Responding positively to the visible decline in infiltration from across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, India took the first steps towards easing the six-month-long standoff with Pakistan.

The calibrated reaction by the Government involved decisions to reopen its skies to the over flight of Pakistani aircrafts, identified a new envoy to Islamabad. It also ordered some naval ships in the Arabian Sea return to their home bases. The key decision on the naval front were designed to reflect India's readiness to reduce the military

tensions with Pakistan "in tandem with Islamabad's progress on ending cross-border terrorism" (Mohan, 2002). In an Interview Gen Mehta while answering a question of how close the two countries came to war, Mehta said that it was touch and go on many occasions with special reference to six strategic opportunities that came India's way. While the first two opportunities, pre 9/11 and post 9/11, were prior to the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament, the others came in the wake of the attack on Parliament; 16 December, 9 January and 9 June were some of these critical occasions. December 16 saw passions run high after the Parliament attack, making war with Pakistan seem inevitable. January 9 provided an opportune time for India to initiate an offensive against Pakistan, which was preoccupied with the Taliban on the Durand Line. US assurances and Musharraf's speeches defused the volatile situation. Musharraf's 12 January and 27 May speeches need special mention. While the former was seen as a statement of intent that helped defuse the January 9 crisis, the 27 May speech embodied a guarantee to end cross-border terrorism and thereby facilitated defusing the June 9 situation. However, by June 9, the surprise element was lost. What followed in later months were incessant deliberations about the future course of action. September-October provided the much needed window closing incentive that brought to an end the 10 month long deployment (Indo-Pak- Seminar Report, 2003).

Operation Parakram: A critical Analysis

The objective of Operation Parakram was to put pressure on Pakistani establishment to control the ISI led militant outfits operating from the safety of their bases in Pakistan. The aim was to deter Pakistani government from aiding these outfits in carrying out attacks on the Indian soil. However, the strategy did not work as was expected. India's actions to include the stationing of military units on the border indicated the lack of a clear strategic position against the challenges from across the border (Muralidharan, 2002). Sood and Sawhney argue that when Operation Parakram was called off on 16 October 2002 without meeting its supposed objectives; it left an array of questions unanswered (Sood and Sawhney, 2003: 63). The opinion as to whether operation Parakram was a success or a failure is divided. The political leadership claims that it was only after achieving its goals, that operation Parakram was called off. Contrary to this, the military leadership believes that operation Parakram has not achieved its supposed

objectives. The political leadership holds an opinion that withdrawal of troops was only made when there was some evidence that the level of infiltration has come down. The Indian officials credited Pakistan's military ruler with ordering a halt to the infiltration of militants into Indian Kashmir, and acknowledged that the orders are were being put into the practice. That fulfilled the most important condition India had set for stepping back from the brink of war. In an official statement, the Indian government welcomed a promise by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharaf, to permanently end infiltration across the Line of Control into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. India's external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, told Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that the pledge was a "step forward and in the right direction." In the statement, India said that after a satisfactory evaluation of the implementation of the pledge, it would "respond appropriately and positively" (Dugger and Shankar, 2002).

Contrary to this opinion, the army leadership held that 'Operation Parakram' turned out to be a fiasco and nothing else because its objectives remained unfulfilled. Most of the military officials who were at the helm of affairs during the crisis blame the political leadership for the unsuccessful end of the Operation Parakram.

In response to the criticism that a slow mobilisation of the troops "gifted" Pakistan time to prepare its defences. Consequently, the Operation had to be called off. Gen. Padmanabhan argues that significant military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians decided to go for the war. These objectives, he argued, could have included "degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed. It remains unclear, however, just why the politicians who ordered the build-up finally chose not to use the military machine they had assembled." "Everyone seems to feel that the U.S. held us back," Gen. Padmanabhan said.

"Perhaps they did; perhaps they didn't. I don't know anything specific on this. I do know that there was great concern on the other side, Pakistan, because of the huge Indian build-up. Finally, it was a decision that had to be made by our political masters" (The Hindu, 2004).

The decision to put to an end to the operation needs to be understood in the context of the objectives that impelled it. Most of the demands spelt out by the Indian establishment remained unfulfilled, though there was reduction in the infiltration across the LOC to some extent. There are various reasons that contributed towards an abrupt ending of the operation. According to Mehta, the following points contributed towards achieving this end. These are; Firstly, Coercion was not calibrated. Issues like who is coercing whom and to what ends, were not deliberated beforehand. Last step, i.e. deployment, was taken first. Secondly, the entire Operation lacked synergy and packaging. Thirdly, there was absence of an exit strategy. This resulted in the futile threat of war for a period long beyond its relevance.

However, Mehta is quick to add that Operation Parakram had both positive and negative fallouts. The positives include- Professional benefits for the Army, there was no loss of morale, and infiltration came down considerably by as much as 53% according to one estimate and for the first time the complicity of Pakistan Army and its support to militants came under international scrutiny. Further, the Operation dispelled doubts of nuclear instability in the region. The negative fallouts of the Operation included; Pakistan was emboldened by the episode. It felt that it had deterred India. However, India was in reality 'self-deterred'; and only slightly deterred by the US. India felt let down by the US in its mission of tackling cross border infiltration, and failed to achieve strategic space as well as strategic autonomy (Indo-Pak- Seminar Report, 2003).

Sood points out two flaws in the Operation Parakram. The first was the lack of political will. This was the reason for India's inability to wage a war against Pakistan, as also for Pakistan ignoring the threat. Despite the mobilization being initiated in December, no political directive was provided to the Service Chiefs for execution as late as in August 2002. On the contrary, the Chief of Army Staff was asked to draw up a directive in August to extricate the Army from the imbroglio.

Second was lack of exit strategy: Exit strategy for the adversary as well as own self is of paramount importance to the success of any operation. Operation Parakram lacked this basic component. Only at the time of demobilization was some objective 'contrived'; and put forth as reasons for pulling out which was termed as 'strategic relocation' (Indo-Pak- Seminar Report, 2003).

Conclusion

Sood points out two flaws in the Operation Parakram. Operation Parakram was biggest and longest ever mobilisation of the Indian armed forces along the International Border and LOC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was a response to December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. This exercise saw tens of thousands of Indian troops being deployed along the India-Pakistan border. India blamed Pakistan for backing the perpetrators behind the attack. The operation was the largest military exercise initiated by any Asian country. Broadly speaking, the operation was launched with an intention of utilizing military pressure for meeting political ends in addition to regular diplomacy. It was a 10 month long affair in which more than 500, 000 troops were mobilized by India along the Line of Control (LOC) and the international border. Operation Parakram was not able yield any desirable results as Indian establishment did not get the results it wanted. India started the operation with well-defined and coherently devised objectives. Nevertheless, at the end the events took a different turn. The operation was not able to meet its desired ends effectively. Although the opinion is divided on the matter, yet the results were ambiguous and ambivalent. While, on the one hand, political leadership termed it as successful, the military leadership, on the other hand, expressed dismay and apprehensions at the results. Whether 'Operation Parakram' was a success or not is still a matter of debate, yet it proved the capability of the nuclear weapons to act as effective deterrent devices. The mere possession of these weapons had a huge impact on the strategic calculations within the political leadership of both the countries. Their contribution towards the ending of the operation will be dealt in with detail during the progression of the research.

Chapter Four

Conclusion

The principal purpose of this study was to understand the behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002. Towards this objective an extensive analysis of the existing literature on the topic has been carried out. The hypothesis, formulated at the outset, when tested with empirical evidence yielded a similar result. The following general conclusion need to be highlighted: India did not go for an all out war against Pakistan after its parliament was attacked because of threat of nuclear escalation. The study was aimed to answer these questions: Why, for example, did not India go for a war against Pakistan? How would proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists explain Indian Parliament attack? How far had troop mobilization on both sides escalated the conflict? Why did Indian political establishment change its behavior from an inflexible stand to a very flexible approach during the Parakram Crisis? Is India too soft to act against Pakistan despite India being repeatedly provoked by the later? Did Nuclear weapons really constrain India not to go for a major conflagration against Pakistan after its Parliament attack? And most importantly, what was the influence of nuclear weapons on the resolution of 2001-2002 crisis? The research made a comprehensive study of the details of the crisis and the factors which constrained India and Pakistan not to fight a major war. The study carried out a comparative analysis of the proliferation debate. This was done for the sole purpose to test the hypothesis; whether the presence of nuclear weapons really deterred India to launch an all out war against Pakistan or not? After carrying out the analysis of both the schools of proliferation debate, the study reached to the conclusion that the role of non-nuclear weapons in de-escalating the Parakram crisis was minimal and the presence of nuclear weapons largely deterred India to limit the war from a certain level. In this way, the study supported the argument of the proliferation optimists.

Parakram Crisis and the Proliferation Debate

The Parakram crisis generated a lot of debate about the behaviour of India. The crisis reactivated the debate between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists in the

context of India and Pakistan. The eruption of crisis took place after the Indian Parliament was attacked. Indian blamed Pakistan backed the assault and reacted strongly by mobilising its troops along the Line of Control (LOC) and international border. The mobilisation was huge and endured for a long period of time. The operation lasted in ten months and caused economic cost on the part of the Indian government. India mobilised more than 500,000 troops. Indian response to the Parliament attack was massive in the form of coercive diplomacy in which diplomatic channels were backed by muscle power to pressurise Pakistan to comply the Indian demands. India demanded that Pakistan should crackdown on the camps of Lashker-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohamad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and complete curb on cross border infiltration. Pakistan's response to the Indian demands was a mixed one. Pakistan partly acquiesced to the demands by a crackdown on selective training camps of the outfits and partially infiltration level came down. Pakistan sensing the danger and mood on the other side of the border, at the same time mobilised its forces along the Line of Control and International border. Therefore, India and Pakistan came close to fighting a war. This created apprehensions among the academicians and scholars that both the countries could have gone for a major war. However, the matter of fact is that the crisis could not escalate beyond a certain level. Both the countries withdrew their forces across the border. This put to all the scholars into a puzzle that despite such a huge mobilisation across the border and provocative statements by the political and military leaderships, the two countries ended their ten-month conflagration without a major war. This led to the revival of the debate between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists in the context of India and Pakistan.

Proliferation Optimism and the Parakram Crisis

The proliferation optimists believe that during Parakram crisis the presence of nuclear weapons played a central role in keeping away both the countries from fighting a major war. Ganguly and Hagerty argue that inspite of some compelling incentives to attack each other India and Pakistan did not do because both had a fear that war might escalate to the nuclear level (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005). Pravin Swami holds a similar view. He argues that nuclear weapons played a central role in ensuring that the crisis provoked by the terror strike on India's Parliament did not lead to war. He mentions that the presence of nuclear weapons influenced the mindset of policy establishments on both sides on the

need for peace. He adds that it is a matter of fact that the presence of nuclear weapons still plays an important role in securing results favorable to peace and stability in South Asia. While South Asia's nuclear landscape controlled India from unleashing its conventional forces across the border, Pakistan also was forced by these new conditions to scale back its decades old proxy war against India. He also contends the argument of Mistry that non-nuclear factors played an essential role in de-escalation of the crisis. He argues that neither non-nuclear factor in itself explains the long-term outcome of the 2001–02 crisis, because the US diplomats had long tried to rein in Pakistani support for terror groups, but had little success until their calls were supported by the Indian war threat. Nor had India's fast economic growth convinced Pakistan that its best interests lay in seeking peace (Swami, 2009: 171). Ganguly and Hagerty also argue that from 1990 onwards to Parakram of 2001-2002, the shade of nuclear weapons played a sturdy deterring role in determining Indo-Pak relations (Ganguly and Hagerty, 2005).

Proliferation Pessimism and the Parakram Crisis

Proliferation pessimists claim that non-nuclear factors played an important role in de-escalating the Parakram crisis. Mistry argues that South Asian military crisis of 2001-2002 ended because of non-nuclear factors rather than because of nuclear deterrence. He affirms that a larger war was prevented not because what supporters of nuclear deterrence theory would suggest that the threat of Pakistani nuclear retaliation deterred Indian military action against Pakistan. He emphasised that war was avoided because of U.S. diplomatic efforts that controlled the parties from military escalation. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, significant military escalation was quite possible. After the crises ended, the parties had mobilised their forces and were on the edge of increasing hostilities in spite of nuclear signals from their opponents. Therefore, despite Pakistan's nuclear signals during 2001-2002, India came close to considerably expanding military operations across the Kashmir line in January 2002 and into Pakistani territory in the Punjab and Sindh sectors in May and June 2002 respectively (Mistry, 2009). Kanti Bajpai adds that nuclear weapons were not responsible for the de-escalation of the crisis. Pakistani nuclear weapons did not deter Indian leaders, who believed that Pakistan would desist from nuclear use even in the event of conflict. Instead, Bajpai maintains, conventional force shortcomings and third-party diplomatic intervention

prevented India from striking Pakistan (Bajpai, 2009: 163). Let us suppose that there was a role of non-nuclear forces in deescalating the crisis of 2001-2002; still, the matter of fact is that these non-nuclear factors in itself were derived from the major factor i.e. nuclear factor. The US made diplomatic and other efforts to de-escalate the crisis. The reason behind such efforts was that the US also feared that India and Pakistan might use nuclear weapons if the crisis continued. Therefore, the external efforts and other factors in de-escalating the crisis were mainly a result of the nuclear factor that motivated India and Pakistan to end the crisis without confronting a major or a nuclear war. Hence, proliferation pessimists give credit to non-nuclear factors which saved the two countries to fight a major war.

The issue of command and control in South Asia Context

Here the opinion is divided between the proliferation optimists and pessimists. The pessimists show concern about command and control of nuclear arsenals. This perspective is called as organisational standpoint. Scott Sagan mainly questions the command and control of nuclear weapons. Sagan's organisational perspective portrays rationality as relatively simple way of making predictions by relating supposed interests with predictable behavior. He argues that it is not sufficient to use these assumptions to make accurate predictions about nuclear proliferation. Giving an example of large organisations such as military one, he explains certain restrictions in their functioning, which inflict immense costs for stable deterrence. Organisations are not flexible in adapting to changes in vibrant environment, but rather have stiff routines, standard rules and regulations, which make them less thriving in meeting outside uncertainty. Organisations are also characterised by having multiple, conflicting goals, they are prejudiced instead of surveying the whole milieu for information, organisational members have predisposed searches, focusing barely on specific areas stemming from their experience, recent training, and existing accountability. He also distrusts the ability of Central Commands in India and Pakistan to maintain control over their weapons (Sagan, 2002). Mistry in the context of India and Pakistan argues that the prospect for an additional escalation into a major conflict cannot be overlooked. He adds, "In general, analysts have pointed out the many ways conflict can escalate, both deliberately and inadvertently, due to factors not fully controlled by policy makers, such as misperception,

poor intelligence, and command and control problems. An additional factor that could have caused escalation in South Asia was the prevailing thinking about limited wars and red lines” (Mistry, 2009).

The pessimists make this argument without going into the nature of command and control of nuclear weapons. The matter of fact is that nuclear weapons are not placed under the control of a single button, which in the eventuality of the crisis can be pressed to use such weapons against the opponent. The placement of nuclear arsenals is a very complex exercise, these weapons are not placed at a particular place but at a number of places, that includes a chain commands. In case of crisis, their use becomes a long process with the element of responsibility and accountability. These weapons cannot be used without the proper approval of the concerned command. For instance, the military leadership of India during the Parakram crisis of 2001-2002 was keen to attack Pakistan and to use weapons of any kind so to teach the enemy a lesson. However, the case with the political leadership was altogether different. The political leadership even didn't endorse the statements of military establishment. In one of the statements, General Padmanabahn exclaimed, "If we go to war, jolly good! Asked how India would respond if attacked with a nuclear weapon? He assured a packed news conference that "the perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful." In answer to another question, he said, "We are ready for a second strike, yes," and added that India had sufficient nuclear weapons. "Take it from me, we have enough." I am a man of peace," General Padmanabahn said. "But if there is a war, they will find out this man can bite." However, senior Indian officials in the government were quick to say that the general's pithy, bellicose remarks were not cleared or sanctioned by the Prime Minister's Office” (Dugger, 2002).

The attitude of Kenneth Waltz towards organisational issues was dismissive: “All nuclear countries must live through a time when their forces are crudely designed. All countries have so far been able to control them.” The new nuclear states, according to Waltz, would be no different: “We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so. They will not want to risk retaliation because one of their warheads accidentally strikes another country” (Waltz,

2002). In the context of South Asia Waltz argues that India and Pakistan can tackle their nuclear arsenals effectively. He adds that though India has an extremely assertive civilian nuclear command structure, the Pakistan military is also in complete control of its nuclear weapons. Therefore, there is no threat of command and control as far as the management of these weapons is concerned.

Indian behaviour and the Parakram crisis:

The behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis was inconsistent. India kept changing its behaviour from the beginning of the crisis to the end. The study tried to locate the factors which influenced the behavior of India. After going through some of the details and day to day developments, the study came to the conclusion that the behaviour of India was largely influenced by Pakistan's nuclear capability. Therefore, India changed its behaviour from a stiff stand against Pakistan in the beginning of the crisis and ended in a soft manner as India feared any more escalation of the crisis. Pakistan showed at a number of times certain gestures that it might use nuclear weapons in the eventuality of the crisis. Therefore, the behaviour of India during the crisis was affected largely by the presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the "enemy".

Ganguly and Hagerty present argue that the behaviour of India during the Parakram crisis was mainly affected by three factors:

1. India and Pakistan were discouraged from attacking each other due to timely and forceful US intervention.
2. In spite of some compelling incentives to attack each other India and Pakistan were did not do because both had a fear that war might escalate to the nuclear level.
3. India and Pakistan did not attack due to lack of conventional military superiority.

The other argument about the behaviour of India, which particularly emerged from the Indian military leadership, is that whether India is too soft to act against Pakistan. Gen. Padmanabahn argues that significant military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians decided to go for the war. These objectives, he argued, could have included "degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces

had gradually changed. It remains unclear, however, just why the politicians who ordered the build-up finally chose not to use the military machine they had assembled." "Everyone seems to feel that the U.S. held us back," Gen. Padmanabahn said, "Perhaps they did; perhaps they didn't. I do not know anything specific on this. I do know that there was great concern on the other side, Pakistan, because of the huge Indian build-up. Finally, it was a decision that had to be made by our political masters" (The Hindu, 2004).

One can draw the inference from the above statement made by Padmanabahn that, India was too soft to act against Pakistan. This argument has largely been ignored and least debated. However, when one goes into the nuances of the Indian behaviour during the crisis, it becomes clear that India was not too soft to act against Pakistan, despite the fact that the later provoked India more often. India acted in a soft manner during the Parakram crisis because it was in India's long-term interest to do so. Pakistan is largely known as a revisionist state, which has always tried to balance against India. Military leadership mostly controls the government of Pakistan, so the command and control of their nuclear arsenals are also controlled by the military establishment. In simple words, Pakistan position in relation to India is 'nothing to lose' kind of position. It means that even if India had attacked Pakistan, yet India would have been on a losing side, as any retaliation from Pakistan would have resulted in devastating costs on India. India could not afford such an attack given the fact that it is still in the phase of economic development and national consolidation. Pakistan too being a nuclear power could have been dangerous for India. In addition, the clandestine support from the China and speculations that China might provide tactical nuclear weapons to Pakistan were other factors that constrained the Indian establishment not to go for a full-fledged war against Pakistan. This signified that during Parakram crisis, Indian stand against Pakistan was not a soft one; rather it was a calculated and well decided. The decision was taken keeping in view the long term interest of India. Hence, it was again the larger factor of nuclearisation, rather any soft stand by India, which directed the India behaviour during the whole episode of Parakram crisis.

Implications of the study

Taking into account both deterrence optimism and proliferation optimism, one policy

implication concerns the question of how the presence of nuclear weapons could stabilise and keep the peace in regional security environments over the long term. The study reveals several implicit implications for peace and stability in South Asia in general and for the behaviour of India and Pakistan in particular on account of the presence of the nuclear weapons. It has significant implications for the proliferation debate and for International theory in general.

Implications for India and Pakistan behaviour

Since the time the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, many countries have wondered about nuclear weapons and the risk they pose to the world. The world has realised how devastating these weapons could be. The world also realised the powerful security value of these weapons. The existence of nuclear weapons has since then affected the behaviour of the countries which possess them and also those who don't own such weapons. Given the fact that both India and Pakistan are declared nuclear powers, it is logical that their presence would always be taken into calculations in the event of decision making. The contention here is that the presence of nuclear weapons did influence the decision making significantly during the Parakram crisis, and would continue to do so in the coming years. The behaviour of India was affected given the fact that it did not attack Pakistan. At the beginning of the 2001-2002 crisis, the minister for defence (India) George Fernandes affirmed that 'Pakistan can't think of using nuclear weapons ... We could take a strike, survive, and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished'. This implied that the balance in vulnerability was to India's advantage. The logic was neat, but in practice, the prospect of absolute damage counted for more and the Indian Government preferred to be prudent and avoid war altogether. The behaviour of Pakistan was more or less similar as Gen. Mushraf in one statement said that he would not renounce Pakistan's right to use nuclear weapons first while on the other statement he announced that Lashker-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have been banned and said that any group involved in terrorist attacks on Indian Parliament or Jammu and Kashmir assembly would be dealt with a heavy hand (The Hindu, 2002). These later on turned out to be mere rhetorical statements and nothing more as they did not manifest themselves as a tangible outcome. The primary reason for the fluctuation in the behaviour of two

countries was the shade of nuclear weapons. The two countries feared that the crisis could escalate into the nuclear level.

The study highlights that nuclear weapons played an important role in de-escalating the crisis. The chief purpose of Pakistan's nuclear strategy is to deter India's superior conventional capabilities rather to use them as weapons of coercion. Rajagopalan argues that both the Pakistan and Indian nuclear strategies are extremely cautious and are meant primarily to deter the other. He believes that India should not worry about the Pakistan's refusal to subscribe to the 'no first use' doctrine and its easy resort to nuclear rhetoric during the crisis situations. He mentions that these gestures and the rhetoric are primarily meant to deter the overwhelming conventional superiority of India. He adds that when it comes to actual crisis between the two, both the countries tighten the central control over nuclear weapons. This in turn reduces the chances of a nuclear crisis.

The presence of nuclear weapons diminishes the prospects of full-scale wars. The Parakram crises demonstrated that Mutually Assured Destruction is operational in South Asia. That was the main reason which prevented both India and Pakistan not to escalate the crisis up to the nuclear level. Since the advent of nuclear weapons the leadership of both countries is more conscious of the utility of their as a political tool rather than as a military tool. The leadership of each side has apparently learned from past crises. The crises showed that deterrence is more effective than coercion, regardless of which side assumes which posture. Therefore, the presence of nuclear weapons plays a prominent role in influencing the behaviour of the two countries. India and Pakistan would behave more or less in a similar manner if there will be any future crisis. They will do so because of the 'deterrence factor'. The recent Mumbai attack manifested the deterrent logic worked once again. India blamed Pakistan for backing the attack but did not go for any major war. The behaviour of India during Mumbai attack was more moderate as compared to the Parakram crisis. Therefore, the behaviour of India and Pakistan will be largely influenced by presence of nuclear weapons the in the future as well. Both of them would behave rationally if the outbreak of any crisis would take place. There are least chances that these countries may use nuclear weapons in the eventuality of the crisis. There are chances that the two countries would observe maximum constrain in future as

even to indulge in crisis. Hence, the nuclear weapons will guide the behaviour of India and Pakistan in their future relations.

Implications for stability in South Asia

Waltz argued that theory of deterrence has passed the litmus test in the context of South Asia (Waltz, 2002). The Parakram crisis supports the argument. Despite such a massive build up during the crisis, the two countries restrained themselves from fighting a major war. Here the logic of deterrence also worked and strengthened the claim of proliferation optimists that the arrival of nuclear weapons have a stabilising effect on inter-state relations. In the South Asian region, it has increased the prospects of peace and stability. Pravin Swami as mentioned above argues that the existence of nuclear weapons still plays an important role in securing results favorable to peace and stability in South Asia (Swami, 2009). Therefore, the existence of nuclear weapons would continue to contribute in stabilising the inter-state relations in the region.

However, this may encourage other nations of the region to acquire nuclear weapons so that they could also use them as deterrents with one another. In future, the security-insecurity dilemma would characterise the relations among the states in south-Asia in the coming years. The presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the two countries has the potential to trigger a chain reaction, wherein more states would vie each other for the acquisition of the nuclear weapons. The resultant arms race may in turn create an atmosphere of instability and insecurity as the pessimists believe. My contention is that nuclear weapons in the hands of more countries have the potential to create a stable strategic environment in the South Asia region.

Implications for Proliferation debate

The debate between proliferation optimists and proliferation pessimists provided the study its theoretical foundation. The case study of 'Operation Parakram' was taken to bring out factors which prevented India and Pakistan to fight a major war. After going through the various details of the crisis, the study reached to conclusion that the nuclear factors played a prominent role in preventing both the countries not to go for a major war. The whole episode of crises indicated that deterrence was more effective than any other compulsion. The case study strengthens the argument of proliferation optimists that nuclear weapons stabilise the inter-state relations. The study also dismisses the pessimist

argument that presence of nuclear weapons is detrimental to the peace and stability of South Asia. The study contends that such a notion of fear is more of exaggeration than real. Hence the study significantly denounces the fears of proliferation pessimists and contributes towards strengthening the resolve of those who favour more countries to acquire such a weapon. It contributes towards reinforcing the belief of the optimists.

Optimists argue that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more states does not necessarily destabilise the international order and may even create conditions for a more peaceful world. However, one can not generalise their argument in every case. The case of Iran may not necessarily have a stabilising effect what optimists claim. Therefore, the optimists argument needs to make distinguish between different regions as for as the spread of nuclear weapons is concerned. The nuclear weapons have no doubt stabilised the inter-state relations in the South Asian region, but the same cannot be generalised to in the case of Iran.

Implications for International Relations theory

Realism, as we know focuses attention on the security of state as being the primary motive of actors in the international environment. The international system is characterised by self help and anarchy. Survival is the primary motive of all the states. Towards this end they always focus attention on the ways and means to achieve the same. Most states in the contemporary scenario find nuclear weapons as cheap means to achieve the required security. The tremendous deterrence capability of the nuclear weapons makes them suitable for the purpose. So realism would suggest that all the states acquire the weapons to ensure their security. If self help is the rule in the anarchic world, then it can be said that realism would approve of all the states to acquire the weapon. If security is the goal of the states in the international system, then every state has a right to ensure its own security by whatever means possible, so why not the nuclear weapons? Realism suggests that states vie each other for power and influence. Every state tries to enhance its capability relative to others. The ensuing balance of power needs efficient means to maintain its stability and the nuclear weapons come handy for the purpose to be fulfilled. These weapons have the proven capability of bridging the asymmetries in the capabilities, as is evident from the example of India and Pakistan. Acquisition of nuclear

References

- Ahmad, Faruqui (2009), "The guns of August", *The Dawn*, Islamabad, 31 August 2009.
- Ayoob, Mohammed (2002), "South Asia's nuclear dangers", *The Washington Times*, 4 April 2002.
- Bajpai, Kanti (2009), "To War or Not to War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001-2" in Summit and Kapur (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behaviour and the bomb*, Park Square, Milton Park, Routledge.
- Basrur, Rajesh, M. (2006), *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security*, Stanford: Calif Stanford University Press.
- Bearak, Barry (2002), "Indian Leader's Threat of War Rattles Pakistan and the US", *New York Times*, New York, 23 May 2002.
- Bedi, Rahul (2002), "A Strike Staunched," *Frontline*, 19(12): 2-16.
- Bruce, Reidel (2002), *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House*, Policy Paper series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.
- Brunk, C. G. (1987), "Realism, Deterrence, and the Nuclear Arms Race", in Fox and Groarke (eds.), *Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives*, New York: Peter Land.
- Chari, P. R. (2004), "Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia: An Indian perspective", in P. R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajan (eds), *Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications.
- _____ (2004), "Nuclear Restraint, Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia," in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (eds), *Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia* New Delhi: Vision Books.
- Chengappa, Raj (2000), *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest To Be A Nuclear Power*, India: HarperCollins Publishers
- _____ (2004), "Nawaz Sharif Speaks Out," *India Today*, 26 July 2004: 18-24.
- _____ (1999a) "Pakistan Seeks Early Talks to End Tension," *Dawn*, 29 May 1999.
- _____ (1999b) "They Are Freedom Fighters, Not Intruders: Nawaz," *Dawn*, 1 June 1999.
- Dugger, Cellia W. (2001), "India Recalls Envoy to Pakistan Over Attack on Parliament", *The New York Times*, 21 December, 2001.

_____ (2001), "Gunmen Kill 30, Including 10 Children, in Kashmir", *The New York Times*, 15 May 2002.

_____ (2002), "A Blunt-Speaking General Says India Is Ready for War", *The New York Times*, January 11, 2002.

Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, Paul S. (2009), "Introduction", in Sumit and Kapur (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behaviour and the bomb*, Park Square, Milton Park, Routledge.

Ganguly, Sumit (2008), "War, Nuclear Weapons, and Crisis Stability in South Asia", *Security Studies*, 17 (1): 164-184.

_____ (1991), "From Aid to the Civil to the Defense of the Nation: The Army in Contemporary India," *Journal of Asian and African Affairs*, 26 (1-2): 1-12.

Ganguly, Sumit and Michael Kraig (2004), "The 2001-02 Military Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," *Security Studies* 14 (2): 290-324.

Ganguly, Sumit and Devin T. Hagerty (2005), *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press,

Global Security (2001), Global Security Network for Security Information, Accessed on 15 November, 2009 URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir-2002.html>.

Goswami, Namrata (2006), "The Essence of the South Asian Nuclear Debate" *Strategic Analysis* 30 (3): 2-12.

Hagerty, Devin T. (2009), "An optimistic assessment the Kargil War" in Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, Paul S., (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behavior and the bomb*, Park Square, Milton Park, Routledge.

_____ (1998), *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*, Cambridge, Mass MIT Press.

Haqu, Ihtasham (2001), "Pakistan forces put on high alert, Storming of parliament," *The Dawn*, Islamabad, 15 December 2001.

Harding, Luke (2002), "Kaluchak keeps the flag of vengeance flying, in Kaluchak, *The Guardian*, London, 8 June 2002.

Hindustan Times (2002), "Pak N-Warning on Launch Pad," *Hindustan Times*, May 25, 2002).

Hindu Special Correspondent (2001), "Troop mobilisation almost complete Monday", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 31 December, 2001.

_____ "General Padmanabhan Mulls over Lessons of Operation Parakram", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 6 February 2004.

Howard, M. (2001) *War in European History*, Oxford University Press: Oxford

Indurthy, Rathnam (2003), *Kashmir between India and Pakistan: An Intractable Conflict, 1947 to present*, Ph.D. Thesis, Rathnam Organization: Appalachian State University.

Jain, B.M. and E.V. Hexamer (1999), (eds.), *Nuclearisation of South Asia: Reactions and Responses*, New Delhi, Rawat Publications.

Joseph, Josy (2002) "The Mood Is for War," *India Abroad*, May 31, 2002.

Kapur, Paul S. (2008), "Ten Years of Stability in a Nuclear South Asia," *International Security*, 33(2): 45-70.

_____ (2003), "Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security", *Security Studies*, 13(1) 79-105.

_____ (2005), "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe", *International Security*, 30(2): 127-152.

Karl, David (1996-97), "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," *International Security*, 21 (3): 87-119.

Karnard, Bharat (2002), *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, New Delhi, Macmillan Press.

Khan, Aamer Ahmed (2002), "Pakistan, India Close to War, Says Musharraf," *The Dawn*, Islamabad, 23 May 2002.

Khan, Feroze (2004) "Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia," in Krepon Michael (eds), *Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia*, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.

Kleinfield, N.R. (2007), "Unreal became the unimaginable", *The New York Times*, New York, 21 September 2007

Khare, Harish (2001), "A decisive battle has to take place: PM", *The Hindu*, New Delhi 14 December 2001.

_____ (2001), "All options are open: PM," *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 20 December 2001.

- _____ (2002), "Chances of war minimal: Musharraf", *The Hindu*, 10 June 2002.
- Lavoy, Peter R. (2009), "Introduction: the Importance of the Kargil Conflict," in Peter R. Lavoy (eds), *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1985), "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, 9(3): 19-46.
- Mehta Ashok (2003), "Coercive Diplomacy: Operation Parakram: Indo-Pak- Seminar Report, 88, 30 August 2003, An Evaluation Report of the IPCS seminar held on 8 August 2003, Aisha and Prafulla Ketkar, Research Officers, IPCS).
- Mistry, Dinshaw (2009), "Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia", *Security Studies*, 18 (1): 148 – 182.
- Mohan, Raja C. (2001), "Towards a global war against terrorism", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 13 September 2001.
- _____ (2002) "Musharraf's pledge a step forward", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 9 June 2002
- _____ (2002), "India allows Pak. over flights", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 11 June 2002.
- Muralidharan, Sukumar (2002), "Lacking in strategy, *Frontline*, 19(11): 9-23.
- Nayak P. and Krepon M. (2006), "US crisis Management in South Asia", *Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 57. (Online Web) Accessed on 15 april 2010. URL: <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=327>*
- Pape, Raman (2002), "Musharraf's Speech: a critical analysis", *South Asia Analysis Group*, January 13, 2002.
- Paul, T.V. (eds.) (2005), *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Qadir Showkat "An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict", *Royal United Services Institution Journal*, 147(2): 1-33.
- Quinlan Michael (2005), "India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited", *Survival*, 47(3):102-116.
- Raghavan, V.R. (2001), "Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia", *Non-proliferation Review*, 3(5): 1-98.

Quraishi, Ash-har (2001), "High alert on India-Pakistan border", *archives.cnn.co.*, 1 December, 2001.

_____ (2001), "Pakistan, India 'move missiles' to border", *archives.cnn.co.*, 26 December, 2001.

Rajagopalan, Rajesh, (1998), *The Second Strike: Arguments About Nuclear War In South Asia*, New Delhi, Penguin Viking.

Rauchhaus, Robert (2009), "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53: 258 - 277.

Sagan, Scott D. (1999), "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", *International Security*, 18(4): 66–107.

Sahni, Varun (2009), "A Dangerous Exercise: Brasstacks as Non-Nuclear Near War" in Summit and Kapur (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behaviour and the bomb*, Park Square, Milton Park, Routledge.

Segal, G. (1988), "Strategy and Survival" in Gerald Segal, Moreton, Freedman and Baylis (eds.), *Nuclear War & Nuclear Peace*, London: Macmillan Press.

Shah, Khan (2002), "U-turns in South Asia Ghazi Salahuddin", *Bharat Folder-III Archive*. URL: <http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthr...& threaded=2847>.

Shankar, Thom and Dugger (2002), "India Sees Hope as Pakistan Halts Kashmir Militants", *The New York Times*, New York, 9 June 2002.

Shukla, J.P. (2002), "No weapon will be spared for self-defense: PM", *Global Security Newswire*, 3 January 2002.

Singh, M. (2002), "India will not use nuclear weapons first", *The Asian Political News*, Asia, 3 June 2002.

Sisson, Richard and E. Ross (1991), (eds.), *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*, California, University of California Press.

Sood, V.K and Pravin, Sawheny (2003), *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished*, New Delhi, Sage Publications.

Srivastava, Siddharth (2001), "Govt. names Lashkar, tells Pak to act", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

Swami, Praveen (2002), "Beating the Retreat", *Frontline*, 19(22): 4-13.

_____ (2009), "A War to End a War: The Causes and Outcomes of the 2001-2 India-Pakistan Crisis" in Summit and Kapur (eds.), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, Crisis behaviour and the bomb*, Park Square, Milton Park, Routledge.

Tanham, George K. (1992), *Indian Strategic Thought*, Rand, California. 11(2): 2-50

Walton, C. D., Gray, C. S. (2007), "The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century" in John Baylis, Writz, Colin, Gray and Eliot Cohen (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. and Scot D. Sagan (1995), *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* New York: W.W. Norton, 1995)

_____ (2002), *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New York, W.W.Norton.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1987) "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review*, 84(3): 731-745.

_____ (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw- Hills.

Walzer Michael (2000), *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, New York, Basic Books.

weapons bridged the conventional parity in the capabilities between of India and Pakistan.

In the anarchic international system every state aims at enhancing its prestige within the world community. Nuclear weapons are seen by many as an element which provides a tinge to their prestige on the international fora. Every state, argue realist, are driven by self interest within the international system and they are in constant search of the means to full fill the same. Almost all the states see the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons as reinforcing their interests. The states would make every possible effort to acquire such weapons as it is in their interest to do so.