

**THE UNITED STATES' INVASION OF GRENADA:
A Perspective on the Political and Military
Dimensions of a 'Low Intensity' War**

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
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(Vijay Tiwaria)
Major

GLOSSARY

APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier.
Bn	Battalion (approximately 800 men).
CAROCOM	Caribbean Community (established 1974).
CPF	Caribbean Peacekeeping Force.
D Day	Date of commencement of operations.
GNP	Grenada National Party (founded 1956).
JTF	Joint Task Force Joint Task Force 120 - US Forces earmarked for invasion of Grenada.
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict.
NJM	New Jewel Movement (founded 1972).
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit.
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (established 1981).
PRA	People's Revolutionary Army.
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government (formed 1979).
Psyops	Psychological Warfare.
RFG	Radio Free Grenada
RMC	Revolutionary Military Council
SEALS	Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (US Navy's commandos).
SOCOM	Special Operations Command.
USFG	United States Forces Grenada.
USMSE	United States Military Support Element Grenada.

Chapter - I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter - I INTRODUCTION

On 25 October 1983 the United States Armed Forces invaded Grenada, the small, vulnerable and undefended island state in the Eastern Caribbean. The invasion, which was preceded by three years of constant political, economic, psychological and military pressures, degenerated into a nine-day war. The Grenada war, notwithstanding the brevity of military operation, has worldwide ramifications, as the precedent of Grenada is closely linked to the fate of literally a hundred different independent, but equally vulnerable, third world states in the throes of socio-political and ideological flux.

In this dissertation the reasons for the American invasion of Grenada are analysed, the military doctrine that inspired and guided it is examined, the Grenadian setting is discussed, and the nature of the war against the island is briefly outlined and evaluated.

This is not a comprehensive study of either the Grenadian Revolution, which caused the American invasion, or the Grenada war, but of some salient features of current American foreign and military policy precepts and practices which came to the fore as a result of the American action against Grenada.

Reasons for the American Invasion

Why the United States invaded Grenada - a country with an adult male population, less than one third that

of the total females in the US Army¹ - is never going to get a satisfactory answer. The motives of nations are, if anything, more complex than those of humans. The reason why the US went in for Grenada is linked to many other questions raised by its action in the past and the present, which have never been satisfactorily explained. For instance, why has the US used its armed forces to coerce other sovereign independent states on over 260 occasions since 1945; or why has the U.S. been involved in a majority of the wars recorded during the last forty years; or why the US has intervened in the small and vulnerable Caribbean nations on an average of once every year since the turn of the century; or why the United State is assisting the Contras to wage war against the legally constituted regime of Nicaragua; or why is it helping the Government of El Salvador to carry on an equally bloody war against Guerrillas in that country?

There are other questions too that deserve attention, in the context of the Grenada war. They are more fundamental, and more difficult to grapple with in a

1 There are 74,360 women in the US army whereas there are less than 25,000 male adult Grenadians. Morse Stan, Modern Military Powers : USA (London: Temple Press, 1984), p.68. For demographic details on Grenada see Chapter II.

satisfactory manner, as they are issues of psychology [and American domestic politics]. For instance, why is the US so paranoid about Cuba, a country with a population no more than that of New York city; or why the greatest power on earth should have felt threatened by Grenada; or why is the US - more specifically, President Ronald Reagan - so preoccupied with the communist threat? And lastly, why is the US military so incompetent in waging what it itself calls, Low Intensity Operation? These questions have been asked merely to raise issues that in one way or another caused the Grenada War.

But beyond these questions, the reason why the United States embarked upon a war against Grenada has much to do with the personality, politics, and psychology of those who ordered the war, i.e. "Ronald Reagan and his Ruling class". As BH Liddel Hart, after years of preoccupation with the causes of war, concluded:

I used to think the causes of war were predominantly economic. I came to think they were psychological. I am now coming to think that they are decisively personal - arising from the defects and ambitions of those who have the power to influence the current of nations.(2)

2 Liddel Hart, Thoughts on War (London, Faber and Faber, 1943), p.19.

If there is any one single, consistent attribute of President Ronald Reagan, and his immediate advisers, it is aggressive anticommunism. Previous American administrations since the Second World War, have also been devoted to crusades against communism, but none of them has had such an institutionalised, fundamentalistic, and almost irrational streak of anticommunism - anti Sovietism -- as the Reagan Administration.³ According to the Reaganites, as Professor Robert Dallek notes:

The enemy or problem everywhere abroad is Soviet Russia or Left Wing totalitarianism opposing conventional American ideals.(4)

In the Reagan world view every country or movement that espouses marxist ideals - or ideals contrary to its own - does so not as reflection of indigenous socio-political realities but at the behest of the Soviet masters. It views communism as a commodity [of foreign origin] that is being exported to different parts of the world by

3 President Ronald Reagan's tolerance of communism needs no comment. However, it is of interest to find that, he appointed 32 members of the 'Committee on the Present Danger', to key staff and advisory positions in his administration. The fact that he was member of this organisation explains the preference. Ronald Bronstein and Easton Nina, Reagan's Ruling Class (Washington, D.C.: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982). For the ideological stance and the nature of activities of the "Committee on the Present Danger" see Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis (London, Pluto Press, 1983).

4 Robert Dallek, Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1984), pp.163-64.

the Soviet Union. This rather simplified explanation for the popularity of left-leaning ideas in the third world, undoubtedly, has caused more suffering and bloodshed than any other single cause in the developing world. For instance, Reagan in a not-so-veiled reference to two highly popular social revolutions in the Caribbean - Grenada and Nicaragua - warned in October 1982:

Counterfiet revolutionaries who are armed by the surrogates of a faraway power ... whose goal is the destabilization of our government and economies. This is aggression, pure and simple.(5)

This was surely exaggeration: aggression means much more than merely a commitment to different political ideology. Commenting on the policy and practices of the Reagan administration, Professor Dallek, concludes:

Some of the most significant forces influencing the Reagan movement are irrational;

and that

Reagan policies are less a response to actual problems at home and abroad than a means of ... boosting the self esteem of Reaganites.(6)

5 The Los Angeles Times, 26 October 1982, p.1.

6 Dallek, n.4, p.viii.

But, beyond the irrationality of the rhetoric, the Reagan Administration has shown an uncanny understanding of the possible and the popular. In its drive to contain communism, and if possible to roll it back, the Reagan Administration is not looking for Vietnams - and failure - but Grenada's - and glory. That, in a nutshell, is the Reagan Doctrine.

The approach of the Reagan Administration to containment - a highly soggy and porous concept now⁷ - unlike his predecessor's, is indirect and clever, but not necessarily more effective. The strategy now is to fight the 'Evil Empire'⁸ through both Guerrilla and counter-Guerrilla war. In Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola, it supports Guerrilla warfare; in El Salvador and other Central American states it supports counter-Guerrilla war. But in all these countries it refrains from direct military involvement.

7 Since the 'Containment' doctrine came to light in 1946, 23 states have opted for marxist rule, ten of which have done so since the US withdrawal from Vietnam. See Bogdan Szajkowski, The Establishment of Marxist Regimes (London: Butterworth, 1982), pp. 136-37.

8 President Ronald Reagan labelled the USSR as the 'Evil Empire' on 08 March 1982. See Ronald Reagan 'The nature of Totalitarianism: The 'Evil Empire Speech' in Emil Arca and Pamel, The Triumph of the American Spirit: The Presidential Speeches of Ronald Reagan (Detroit, 1984), pp. 236-39.

Another postulate of the Reagan Doctrine is the pursuit of policy through the blood sacrifices of the local people.

But Grenada was different. It was fail-safe, riskless, and notwithstanding its small size, it had symbolic magnitude. Grenada was merely a pawn; a light weight boxing bag to send signals of US strength and resolve. Grenada, as a Reagan official put it, gave the opportunity

to take a direct punch at the other side's nose with the maximum chance of success and minimum risk of tangling with the Soviet themselves. (9)

Considering the objectives of the Reaganites, the Grenada war was not an aberration. It was the most perfect illustration of the Reagan Doctrine in practice. It was even rational; more rational than, ^{for instance,} going to the source, Cuba and getting involved in a long-drawn bloody war, or getting at the USSR - the Evil Empire - and ending up in a smoky holocaust.

Grenada became a target because it was the perfect victims close, vulnerable, and far from the Soviet Union. It was even acceptable to the JCS.¹⁰ Cuba and Nicaragua

9 Cited in Jonathan Steale, "The Corrosive Effect of the Cuban Obsession", The Guardian Weekly (Manchester), vol.129, no.23, week ending 4 December 1983,p.9.

10 Richard Halloran, "Joint Chiefs Supported U.S. Action as Feasible", New York Times (New York), 27 October 1983, p.A-23.

were not. In Grenada both the Reaganites and the Pentagon Generals and Admirals saw possibilities of glory. The Reaganites saw in it an opportunity of going beyond mere rhetoric in their crusade against the 'godless communists'.¹¹ The Generals saw in it an opportunity to get 'Vietnam' (1964-74) and Mayaguez (1975) and 'Desert-one' (1980) and Beirut (1983) firmly behind them. The Grenada War was for success and victory which the American military had not tasted since 1945. Even a super power needs to succeed sometimes. Grenada served that purpose admirably. At the end of the War President Reagan declared:

Our days of weakness are over. Our military forces are back on their feet and standing tall. (12)

Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine

The Grenada war, according to the American military designation, was a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), as was the Vietnam conflict.¹³ Low Intensity Conflict is a term coined since the end of the Vietnam War. It has gained

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- 11 It was small matter that the Grenadian were not communist in the strict sense of the word.
- 12 Time (New York), 26 December 1983; p.11.
- 13 Robert W. Komer, "How to Prepare for Low Intensity Conflict in the 1980s", in William J. Taylor and Steven A. Maaranen (eds.), The Future of Conflict in the 1980's (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath and Company, 1982), p.19.

prominence and acceptance with the coming of the Reagan administration. Low Intensity Conflict is the newest buzz word in American military circles. The Grenada War and involvement in Central America has given the study of LIC a big filip.¹⁴

The military doctrine for LIC is stated in the US Army's Field Manual 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict. This manual, issued in January 1981, is under revision. The current proposed definition of LIC is:

A broad term describing political-military struggle short of conventional warfare between national armed forces to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism to insurgent war. The military aspects of LIC are characterized by constraints on the level of violence, weaponry and tactics. LIC includes such activities as demonstration of forces, security assistance, peace keeping, rescue operations, terrorism, counter action, special operations and limited direct use of regular military forces. (15)

There is nothing really new about the LIC concepts. It is part of American writers' [and policy makers]

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- 14 The prestigious and immensely influential Military Review, the professional journal of the US Army, has so far carried an article on LIC in every single issue in 1985, except in three. See January, March, April, May and August issues of Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).
- 15 Cited in William J. Olson, "The Light Force Initiative", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), vol. LXV, no. 6, June 1985, p. 7. (emphasis added).

preoccupation with words and acronyms. LIC is old wine in a new bottle. Insurgency and counter-insurgency, revolutionary war and counter-revolutionary war, Guerrilla war and counter-Guerrilla war and similar categories of political violence that do not fall under the designation of conventional war are all covered by the wide canvas of this term. The rise of the LIC concept is part of shedding the 'Vietnam syndrome'; replacing old terms that smell of defeat is part of that pattern. The LIC concept is the military counterpart of Reagan's resurgent, ready-to-act American image.

Briefly, the LIC concept lays down the military doctrine for intervention in third world countries. It has two aspects: aggressive and defensive; i.e. how to conduct low intensity conflicts and how to counter threats of low intensity conflicts.¹⁶ LIC has been designated the threat of the future to the United States.¹⁷ To meet this new (sic) 'challenge', it has embarked on an ambitious programme of restructuring existing forces and raising new

16 Ibid.

17 For a detailed geopolitical assessment of future conflicts from the American perspective, see Richard H. Schultz, Jr., and Allan Ned Sabrosky, "Policy and Strategy for 1980s: Preparing for Low Intensity Conflict" in Richard A. Hunt, Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts, Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Schultz, eds. (Elmsford NY, Pergamon Press, 1981), pp.191-227.

ones.¹⁸

In the Grenada War almost the entire range of US Light Forces (LIC forces) saw action; as did much of the Rapid Deployment Force. The LIC forces and RDP, in practice, are much the same thing. In Grenada, the Low Intensity Doctrine also saw its first application. And from how LIC was applied in Grenada, there seems to be little change in the way the US makes low intensity war. The only thing that has changed is the label. The word 'low' in LIC, in practice, seems to have little significance. For instance, a hypothetical war waged against India of an intensity comparable to the Grenada pattern and for the same duration would cause ^{approximately} a quarter million deaths, six million injuries and about seven million refugees.

18 LIC is an important element in Reagan's frame of priorities. The Reagan Administration in the Pentagon Budget for Fiscal Year 1984 has given added impetus to projects which prepare the US to respond to LIC. These projects include restructuring the Army and Marine Forces, including commando units, purchasing intercontinental planes and speedier ships. One of the main conclusions of the Report 'Strategic Requirements of the Army for the year 2000' is that LIC will be a major commitment for the US Army in the next two decades. To meet this danger the US has plans to convert/raise four light Infantry Division and number of special forces units. James Berry Motley, "Grenada: Low Intensity Conflict and the Use of US Military Power", World Affairs (Washington, D.C.) vol.146, no.3, Winter 1983-84, pp.235-36 and James B.Motley (Colonel, US Army), "A Perspective on Low Intensity Conflict", Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), vol.LXV, no.1, Jan.1985, pp.2-11.

The Low Intensity Conflict, notwithstanding the prefix low, is total in its impact on the host society.¹⁹ For the targets are not merely the opposing armed forces (as in a conventional war) but the socio-economic and political structure of the targeted society/state. The doctrine encompasses economic, political, and psychological warfare, in addition to military means.²⁰ Seen against this perspective, the war against Grenada was total and extended for almost four years, rather than just nine days (25 October to 2 November 1983), the formal period of hostilities.

Semantics

There are a few more terms that need to be clarified. The Grenada action by the US has spawned semantic confusion.²¹

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- 19 LIC by some American military commentators has been categorised as total War 'at the grass root level', the level at which all politics, in the ultimate analysis, begins and ends. See, John D. Waghelstein, (Colonel, US Army), Military Review, "Post-Vietnam Counter Insurgency Doctrine", (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), vol.LXV, no.5, May 1985, p.42.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 The Indian Government termed US action as an 'invasion by outside forces'; the UN General Assembly labelled it an 'Armed Intervention'. 'Reagan Action Underfire' Hong Kong Standard (Hong Kong) 27 Oct. 1983; "Reagan Say Grenada War 'Rescue Mission'", The Washington Post (Washington) 4 November 1983, p.A.1; and "Assembly Calls for Cessation of 'Armed Intervention' in Grenada, UN Chronicle (New Delhi) vol.XXI, no.1, Jan 1984, p.4.

Modern wars tend to do that, it is part of the Orwellian tendency. Aggressors invariably attempt to have their military effort categorised in pacific terms. The American use of force in Grenada has been categorised as an invasion, intervention, 'commando mission', and sometimes as war. But none of these categorisations pleased President Reagan, he described it as a 'Rescue Mission' or a 'Liberation'.²² But very few were convinced.

'War' has been defined by Clausewitz

as an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will. "It is," he said

not merely a political act but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce. (23)

A more contemporary and criteria-based definition of war has been offered by Istvan Kende; 'violence' becomes war if it meets all the following criteria:

(a) activities of regular armed forces at least on one side, that is, the presence and engagement of the armed forces of the government in power

22 President Reagan, 11 days after the Grenada war was declared ended, said: "To call what we did in Grenada an invasion as many have, is a slur and a misstatement of fact. It was a rescue mission". Ronald Reagan, "On the Frontier of Freedom", in *Arca*, n.8, p.258.

23 Carl Clausewitz Von, On War, Colonel J.J. Graham, trans. (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp.1, 23. War implies an equal right to kill. Whether in Grenada the Grenadian had an equal right to kill is a matter of conjecture. see Michael Walzer., Just and Unjust Wars (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1977), p.41.

- (b) a certain degree of organisation and organised fighting on both sides, even if this organisation extends to organised defence only;
- (c) a certain continuity between armed clashes, however, sporadic. Centrally organised guerrilla forces are also regarded as making war, in so far as their activities extend over a considerable part of the country concerned.²⁴

Intervention has been defined as the dictatorial or coercive interference, by any outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state. Intervention may be forcible or nonforcible, direct or indirect, covert or overt, armed or unarmed. Intervention under international law is justified under the most exceptional circumstances. These are: (1) if the intervening state has been granted such a right by treaty or invitation; (2) if the intervention is necessary to protect a state's citizens; (3) if it is necessary for self-defense; or (4) if it is collectively authorised by the international community itself, through an international organisation, whether international or regional; (5) if the state violates international

24 Estavan Kende, "New Features of the Armed Conflicts and Armaments in Developing Countries", Strategic Digest (IDSA, New Delhi), vol.14, no.3, March 1984, p.199.

One other term in relation to US operation in Grenada which needs clarification is 'Special Operations'. The American Department of Defense has defined them as follows:

Military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organised US Department of Defense forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives ... Special operations may include unconventional warfare, counter-terrorist operations, collective security, psychological operations and civil affairs measures.(26)

In the context of these definitions the American action in Grenada was a war waged in the context of the doctrine of low Intensity Conflict, in which special operations and Special Operation Forces were the most conspicuous. The LIC concept as well as special operations are invariably in the context of armed intervention in third world countries.

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- 25 Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (Oxford London Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.1-2. Jack C.Plano and Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, third edition (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 1982), p.175.
- 26 US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Publication 1, Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington D.C., June, 1979, Revised); Frank R.Barbet¹, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C., National Strategy Information Centre, 1984).

Outline

American aim in invading Grenada was clearly political, although the US Government took a long time in acknowledging it. In the context of American aims, the political, social, economic texture of Grenada acquires added significance.

Chapter II - Grenada Setting - examines salient characteristic feature of Grenada. Wars, even Low Intensity Wars, are not a sudden aberration, but an outcome of detailed, and often, thorough planning and preparations. United States preparations for invading Grenada spanned over three years, and consisted of political, economic and military measures. Some of these measures are discussed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, the United States' invasion is examined. Finally, in Chapter V - conclusion - the Grenada war is evaluated and its impact on international relations is considered.

In the end some shortcomings of this study need to be placed on record. The present study lays no claim to comprehensiveness. Infact, it is a micro study. A number of issue related to the US invasion of Grenada remained either unexplored or not adequately examined. To name a few the aspects relative to US foreign policy and interventions in the third world, more specifically, the Caribbean - the region of increasing American embroilment; the impact of the invasion on international institutions and International law; the state of US armed forces and how they wage war

against inadequately defended third world countries; and the role of the media in America's foreign wars.

Finally, for the record, it needs to be stated that this dissertation is based primarily on published sources, most of which are not free from bias. Reconstructing a war from media account is never easy. In the case of the Grenada war it has been made all the more difficult because of the blanket barring by the United States military of the world and American media from the island for the first crucial sixty hours of the war. Even after the ban on the media from entering the island was lifted, American policy with regard to information about the war changed only marginally. The consistent aim was to manage information -by misinformation, deceit and denial - to create a favourable reality. The result has been that even media accounts about the invasion and related issues are rarely untainted.

To circumvent the inherent pitfalls to objectivity from such an information source base, the attempt has been made to see the issues critically and use as wide a source base as was possible in Delhi.

Chapter - II

GRE N A D I A N S E T T I N G

Chapter - II

GRENADIAN SETTING

Four hundred years - we shall take no more !
Forward ever, backward never.

PRG Slogan painted
on the walls of Grenada.¹

The Revolution was a revolution of words. The words had appeared as an illumination, a short cut to dignity. They were too big; they didn't fit; they remained words.

V.S.Naipaul²

Introduction

V.S.Naipaul, the Caribbean malcontent, understates the significance of the Grenadian Revolution. Like all revolutions its words were big but not without significance. If nothing the obsessive American pre-occupation with the revolution [and its wordy postures] proved that. What, however, is true is that Grenada, till the revolution and the American invasion, was an island of little significance and was largely ignored by the world. Even the great Encyclopaedias give it scant space. For example, the

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- 1 Cited in Chris Searle, "Maurice Bishop on Destabilization: An Interview", Race and Class (London) vol.XV, no.3, 1985, p.3.
- 2 V.S.Naipaul, "An Island Betrayed", Harper's(New York, NY), vol.268, no.1608 March 1984, p.72. For a rejoinder to Naipaul see Chris Searle, "Naipaulcity: A Form of Cultural Imperialism", Race and Class (London), vol.XVI, no.2, 1984, p.60.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1950 edition, gave Grenada less space than ^kgrenade which is listed immediately after it. Not only did Grenada get fewer lines in the text than grenade but there was no map to accompanying the Grenada text, whereas there were two sketches of great detail to explain the shape and construction of a grenade.³ But times have changed now. In the latest Encyclopaedia Britannic Yearbook, Grenada gets about the same space as India.⁴ Nothing like being invaded by a super power for instant prominence !

GRENADA : A PROFILE⁵

Location

Grenada is a micro island, shaped like a grenade, which till recently was more known for its beauty and

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- 3 Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.4 (London, 1950), pp. 874-75. For similar bias also see, The Encyclopaedia Americana (New York, NY, The American Corporation, 1961), vol.XIII, p.459.
- 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica Year Book 1984 (London, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984), see index.
- 5 Data on Grenada is based on Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1983), vol.4, pp.423-424; Europa Yearbook 1984 (London, Europa, 1984), pp.1618-1621; Encyclopaedia of the Third World vol.3 (London, 1983), pp.669-675; Commonwealth Yearbook 1984 (London, HMSO, 1980), pp.194-96 and Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1983 (Washington, D.C. Defence and Foreign Affairs Limited, 1983).

salubrious climate than for any 'geostrategic' significance. It is the southern most of the Windward Islands (other Windward Islands are St. Lucia and Dominica; St. Vincent and the 100 tiny Grenadines in the Eastern Caribbean sea). It is about 160 kilometers north from the coast of Venezuela, 241 kilometers south-west of Barbados, 109 kilometres south of St. Vincent and about 2600 kilometres from continental United States. The country consists of the islands of Grenada, the island of Carriacou and Petit Martinique, and a number of smaller islets of the Grenadines, which extend in an arc from Grenada to St. Vincent. The island north of Carriacou, the largest of the Grenadines are dependencies of St. Vincent. (see Map I). It is situated between $12^{\circ} 15'$ and $11^{\circ} 59'$ north latitude and $61^{\circ} 35'$ and $61^{\circ} 48'$ west longitude, which makes it roughly in the same latitude as the South Andamans, Pondicherry, and the Maldives. It is approximately 34 kilometers long and 19 kilometers wide, with a total area of 311 sq.kilometers. It has a coastline of 121 kms. Carriacou is about 32 kilometers north-north west of Grenada with an area of about 33 square kilometres. The total area of Grenada is 344 sq. kilometers (129 sq.miles). Out of the 17 Island territories in Caribbean, Grenada is smaller than all except Montserrat and the British Virgin Island.

Grenada is larger than Malta, the Maldive islands,

and it is about seven times the size of Bermuda.⁶ Looking at it another way, it is about eight times the size of Delhi cantonment or less than one quarter the size of the Union territory of Delhi.⁷ But relative to the size of number of newer states, Grenada is a modest-sized micro state.

Demography

The population of Grenada is about 113,000.⁸ The majority of the population is of African and mixed descent: a reflection of its slave past. There are no traces of the Arawaks and Caribs, the original inhabitants of the island. The present population consists of 75 percent pure-blooded negroes, 17 percent mulattoes (people of mixed race), 4 percent people of Indian origin, and the balance of the population is a mixed ethnic lot. The total adult population is about the same as total students in Delhi

6 Jacques Rapaport, Muteba Ernest and Ther a Hil, J. Joseph, Small States and Territories : Status and Problems (New York, NY, Arno Press, 1971), pp.34-35.

7 Research and Reference Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, India 1984 : A Reference Annual (Delhi Publications Division, Government of India, 1984), p.548.

8 Europa Year Book 1984, n.5, p.1620.



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University.⁹ About 30 percent of the island population is concentrated around St. Georges, the capital. The rest is distributed evenly throughout the island. The town of St. Georges has an estimated population of 7,500. The other towns are Gouyave, Victoria, Grenville, Sauteurs, and Hillsborough in Carriacou. The majority of the population speak English, although a French patois is also spoken. Grenada's population has grown at an average rate of less than half percent annually, mainly because of large scale migration. About 500,000 Grenadians live in other countries. Trinidad has slightly more Grenadian than Grenada. Another 75,000 live in the USA. An equal number is in Venezuela,¹⁰ and a large number are in Canada and the UK.

Terrain

Grenada is a volcanic island, with an abrupt, steep ridge of mountains that run north and south throughout the

9 56 percent of 63,280 of Grenada's population is above 14 years old. For demographic indicators in respect of Grenada see, The Encyclopaedia of the Third World, n.5, p.670. Grenada is not the only country with small-sized population. There are 96 states/territories with less than 1 million population, of which only 50 percent have more than 100,000 population. See Rapport, n.6, p.37.

10 J Maurice Bishop, Selected Speeches 1979-1981 (Havana, Cas de las Americas, 1982), p.117.

length of the island. The highest point is Mount St. Catherine 840 metres, (2757 feet) in the northern part of the island. The mountain ridge has steeper slopes to ^{the} west and more gradual slopes to the east and south-east. The northern two thirds of Grenada has few beaches, but the southern coastline is indented with a number of beautiful beaches. The mountains are covered with thick rain forests. The soil is fertile. The main crops (and exports) are bananas, cocoa, mace and nutmeg.

Climate

The climate is semi-tropical with a dry season that extends from January to May and wet season which occupies the rest of the year. From July to October there is greater humidity with higher temperatures with minimal variation between night and day. The average annual temperature is 28°C (82°F) in the low lands. The annual rainfall averages about 1,500 mm (60 in) in the coastal area and 3,800 mm to 5,100 mm (150-200 in) in mountainous areas. In the extreme south-western area, (Point Salines) the average is 76 cms (30 inches), in St. Georges (507 ft. above sea level) the average is 178 cm (70 inches), and in the area of the lake Grand Etang (1,740 ft.) some 11 kilometers (7 miles) from the capital it is as much as 416 cms (164 inches). Considering that all these are in a radius of

less than 16 km. the variation in rainfall temperature and humidity is indeed great. October/November are the wettest months. Grenada lies south of the usual line of hurricanes, but when they do occur, as in 1955 and 1980, they are devastating.¹¹

HISTORY

Early History

Grenada's past, like that of the rest of islands in the West Indies, is shadowy. Its history is a history of slavery, of cruelty, of racism, and inhuman exploitation. It is a history of white men against the black and the brown.

Grenada was sited on 15 August 1498 by Christopher Columbus on his third trip to the Caribbean in search for the fabled 'El Dorado' treasure and the elusive passage to India.¹² He did not land on the island. He merely

11 Till the American invasion, the violent landmarks in Grenada's history were usually provided by hurricanes. The 1955 hurricane, called Janet by Grenadians, had washed away countless huts and left 137 dead - a figure higher than the total deaths caused by the US invasion. See Carleton Mitchell, "Isles of the Caribbees", National Geographic Special Publications Division (Washington, D.C., 1966), p.23.

12 For a brief History of Grenada see Washington Eves "West Indies" (London, Spottiswoode and Co., 1889), pp.206-209. For a more recent and sympathetic history see Ecumenical Programme for Interamericas Communication and Action Task Force. Grenada the Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C., EPICA, 1982).

christioned it 'Conception'. But this remained a little known fact, and for reasons that remain unknown, the island found itself called Grenada on the maps of the 16th century explorers.

And Granada it remained till the Caribbean was dominated by the Spanish. But with the decline of the Spanish and with the rise of the French and the British presence in the region, its name alternated between Le Grenada and Grenada. Eventually the English variant stuck. They were the last rulers.

For over a century after the Island appeared on European maps, it was, by and large, left alone. It's original inhabitants, a fierce, proud, warlike tribe, who called themselves Callinagos, inhibited the stray adventurers. The first serious attempt to colonise the island was made by a company of London merchants who sent three ships to take over the island. The British arrived on the island on 01 April 1609. But their attempts to gain control of Grenada by force were defeated by the islanders, who were called Caribs - man eaters - by Europeans. In 1650, the French Governor of Martinique, Du Parquet, counting more on fraud than force, established a toehold on the island by making a gift of some knives, hatchets, beads and three bottles of brandy to the local chief. The French

gift caused problems. The French treated the 'gifts' as purchase price for the islands. The 'Caribs' were not convinced. The French declared war and began a policy of ruthless extermination. The Caribs resisted, but were no match against the guns and Christian fanaticism of the French. In the end the gun and Christian fanaticism won. In 1654, as a 'final solution' to the Caribs problem, the remnants of the Caribs - men, women, and children - were chased toward a precipice from where they threw themselves in the sea, rather than be enslaved. There are no Caribs on the island today.

To commemorate their act of majestic courage, the French labelled the cliff from where the Caribs reputedly leapt into the sea as - La Horne des Sauteurs or Leapers Hill.¹³ The Island was officially annexed by the French in 1674.

The French imported white indentured labour from French prisons and slums. White slavery did not succeed. So, like all other Europeans in the new world, the French turned to West Africa, from where black slaves were imported

13 The French were not the only ones involved in systematic genocide in the Caribbean. It was common enough practice. Columbus set the pace. He boasted that he had got rid of two-thirds of the inhabitants of Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic). Cited in Naipaul V.S., The Overcrowded Barracoon (London, Penguin Books, 1972), p.221.

to make the island pay. According to a census taken in 1700, there were 251 white, 53 coloured, and 525 black slaves spread out on 55 Indigo/sugar plantations on the island.¹⁴ From the beginning of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century, sugar and slavery dominated the economy and history of the island. By 1750 the black population on the island had reached 1200.¹⁵

The slaves were kept compliant and free from the thought of freedom by the Code Noir. The code prescribed cutting off the ears for a first attempt at running away; and for the bolder spirits who tried to do so a second time the code prescribed slicing off the buttocks; and for those foolhardy and desperate who made a third attempt (apparently men without buttocks) the punishment was death. Under the circumstance, not many slaves attempted to escape.¹⁶

In 1762, after over a century of French rule, the British captured the island. British rights over the island were given formal recognition in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris. One of the first acts of the British on acquiring the island was to remove traces of French influence. The name of the island was

14 Washington, n.12, pp.204-205.

15 EPICA, n.12, p.13.

16 Ibid.

changed from La Grenada to Grenada. Similarly, all the main towns and parishes were given English names. The catholic church was suppressed and its properties seized for protestant use. But notwithstanding the discrimination against the catholics, the catholic order survived. Even today sixty percent of Grenada's population is catholic, and only forty percent protestant. But more than anglicising Grenada, the English colonialists were interested in profits. More slaves were imported into Grenada, and in mere ten years of English rule, sugar exports from the island were doubled. By 1773, exports from tiny Grenada was more in value than from the English colonies of New York and Pennsylvania.

In 1779, the French, taking advantages of Britain's preoccupation with the American War of Independence returned to the island with a force of 30 ships and 10,000 men. The invaders quickly defeated the 540 British Garrison after a brief but bloody battle in the vicinity of St. Georges. This was the last time the island was invaded till the US marines landed on it almost 200 years later in October 1983.

The French rule over the island, however, was brief. It was terminated four years later in 1783 by the Treaty of Versailles, which restored the island to the British.

The return of the British to the island was accompanied by ruthless discrimination of the catholic French planters and the coloured middle class it had spawned. The humiliation of the French plantocracy, the suppression of the catholic church, and the French revolution (1789) triggered the first black rebellion on the island in 1795. The rebels led by Julien Fedon, a mulatto, killed the English Governor and 45 others,

But in the end, the English, after almost an year of struggle, prevailed over the rebels. Thirty eight rebels were hanged and many others shipped to distant Honduras, but Julien Fedon managed to escape. Julien Fedon is honoured by modern day Grenadians as their first revolutionary.

After the suppression of the Fedon revolt, British repression, forced many French plantation owners to flee to Trinidad. They were replaced by British plantation owners. By 1808, the year slave traffic into British colonies was banned, the population of Grenada had grown to 29,000, of whom 2000 were whites, 1,600 free coloured people and 25,000 slaves. Twenty-five years later, slavery was abolished by the Emancipation Act of 1833. In the following years many former slaves left the plantation to establish small independent farms in the interior and on

abandoned plantations.

The emancipation of the slaves had radical social and economic consequences for Grenada. The immediate impact was shortage of pliable plantation labour. To offset the labour crisis, the plantation owners imported white indentured labour from Malta and Mediera. Between 1836 and 1856, 162 Maltese and 438 Portuguese were brought to the island to work in the sugar plantations.¹⁷ White labour was not quite upto the task, and the experiment in European indentured labour was given up. In 1856, the Government of India came to the rescue of the plantocracy. It allowed the export of Indian indentured labour to the West Indies. In the next five years nearly 2500 Indians, mostly from the districts of Eastern Uttar Pradesh, were brought to Grenada. The Indians - East Indians as they were labelled -- at the end of their indentureship were offered a choice of land on Grenada or Guyana instead of a passage home. Two-thirds opted for the land.¹⁸

17 Ibid. USSR Academy of Sciences, Grenada : History, Revolution, US: Intervention (Moscow, 1984), p.21.

18 2570 Indians came to Grenada from India under the indenture system. Malcolm Cross, The East Indians of Guyana and Trinidad (London, Minority Rights Group, 1972), p.4. According to the last ethnic count, there were 3,767 Asians in Grenada. The Encyclopaedia of the Third World, p.670.

The infusion of outside labour, however, did not save the sugar plantations. By the end of the nineteenth century, the British plantation owners were forced into selling their estates, often to their former managers or overseers. On the estates a system of tenancy was gradually established. The tenant received a plot of land on which he was obliged to grow cocoa and nutmeg trees. By 1880s cocoa and nutmeg replaced sugar as the island's principal marketable crop.¹⁹

Concurrent with the demise of sugar plantocracy, the British extended the franchise, albeit slowly. In 1877 the year Grenada was proclaimed a crown colony, the electorate consisted of one percent (white propertied class) of the population; by 1925 it was extended to 3.25 percent of the population; and by 1951, the year full franchise was granted to all irrespective of colour or financial status, it covered 15 percent of the population.²⁰

Recent History

The extension of franchise to all Grenadian in 1951 led to the rise of the colourful and eccentric Eric Mathew Gairy to power and prominence.

19 USSR Academy of Sciences, n.17, p.21.

20 EPICA, n.12, pp.28-29.

In 1950 Eric Gairy had founded the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). In 1951 GULP won a majority of the elected seats on the Legislative Council but in 1957 it was defeated by Grenada National Party led by Herbert Blaize. In 1961, Gairy was re-elected, and he became the chief minister. But next year he had to be removed by the English Governor following charges of corruption.

In the meanwhile, Grenada, still under British colonial rule, was incorporated into the West Indies Federation in 1958 together with other Eastern Caribbean islands. It remained there until the federation fell apart in 1962.²¹

The British gave Grenada a constitution in 1967, under which the local elected government was given full autonomy on all matters except defence and foreign affairs. Under the new constitution fresh elections were held in August 1967, in which the GULP, under Eric Gairy, defeated Herbert Blaize's GNP. Gairy was sworn as Prime Minister. His principal instrument of governance was the army (green

21 The other British dependencies which were part of the Federation were St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, St. Kitt-Nevis-Anguilla and the UK. The Federation shared the same supreme court and currency. Defence and Foreign Affairs were controlled by the United Kingdom. The Encyclopaedia of the Third World, p.671.

berets) and a notorious private para-military force (Kongoose gang) -- which was modelled after Papa Doc Duvalier's infamous Tonton Macoutes of Haiti.

By the time of the next election in 1972, most Grenadian had become disenchanted with Gairy's rule. But Gairy shrewdly deflected opposition by fighting the 1972 election on the issue of total independence from the British. He won the election, but by a narrower margin than previously. By now Gairy's policies had nothing to do with the GULP or its ideals, but were primarily motivated by personal loyalty. His erratic rule led to the formation of political parties by young Grenadians, which opposed not only his misrule but the demand for total independence under him.²² In 1973 the New Jewel Movement (NJM) was formed after the merger of the Joint Effort for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL) and the Movement for the Assemblies of the People (MAP) led by two young lawyers, Maurice Bishop and Kendrick Radix. This organisation was inspired by the 'Black Power' movement and ^{its} ideals but it did not identify itself publicly with "scientific socialism".²³ The merger

22 The NJM was the only political organisation that was opposed to independence. Even the Grenada National Party, headed by Herbert Blaize (the present Prime Minister Grenada) gathered 14,000 signature against independence under Gairy. Cited in Gregory Sandford, and Richard Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York, NY, Madison Books, 1984), p. 34.

23 For a brief history of the various political parties in Grenada see Alan J. Day and Henry W. Legenhardt, ed., Political Parties of the World (London, Eastern Press Limited, 1984), pp. 190-91.

of these two parties brought together disaffected educated middle class elements opposed to Gairy under the leadership of Bishop. Gairy reacted to the new threat with characteristic ruthlessness. On November 18, 1973 (since famous as bloody Sunday) Gairy's mongoose gang assaulted leaders of the NNM, amongst whom were Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, Selwyn Strachan, Hudson Austin, Kendrick Radix and Simon Daniel. The assault was followed by arrest and further brutalities.²⁴ Maurice Bishop and his associates' heads were shaved with broken bottles. Maurice Bishop's jaw was broken and vision in one eye was endangered. He never quite recovered from the beating. The police officer responsible for 'bloody Sunday' was promoted. Bloody Sunday was followed by 'Bloody Monday', on 21 January 1974, when the police shot and killed Maurice Bishop's father, Rupert Bishop. These excesses and the overwhelming opposition to independence under a Government headed by him did not stop the British from going ahead with granting Grenada independence.

On February 7, 1974, Grenada became independent, and Eric Gairy its first Prime Minister. Independence was accompanied by widespread riots and strikes. Maurice Bishop was kept in jail during the independence celebrations. To see through the ceremonies connected with independence - as also to support Gairy - the British had three Frigates in St. George's harbour.

24 Sandford, n.22, p.37.

Independence accentuated Eric Gairy's ⁱⁿ egotism.

On independence day, he pompously declared to the Guardian ^W correspondents

I was appointed by God to lead Grenada.
I have known this from the beginning.
I don't care what you hear about this
situation. Right is right. (25)

Gairy ruled Grenada for the next five years, as if it was his personal fief. None of the norms associated with 'Westminster' type democracy were followed. But this in no way compromised his position in Washington or London. The British knighted him ⁱⁿ 1977, and in Washington he was received with bemused tolerance by President Ford and Henry Kissinger. He found favour in Washington primarily on account of his foreign policy, which was characterized by close friendly ties with dictatorships such as the those in Chile and South Korea. The foreign policy initiative of Gairy, which attracted the greatest interest and amusement, however, was his preoccupation with unidentified flying objects (UFOs). He approached both the United States and the United Nations to investigate UFOs.

Gairy's other interests were in the acquisition of property (Government accounts were not audited even once during his tenure); pornography, white women and night clubs.

25 "Freedom and the Vice in the Night", The Guardian Weekly (Manchester) vol. 120, no. 19, week ending, 6 November 1983, p. 1.

During these years of Gairy's rule Grenada became member of ^a number of international organisations.²⁶ In 1977 Gairy even hosted the OAS conference, at which he showered high praise on Pinochet, the notorious Chilean leader. In return Chile helped Grenada with arms and 'experts' for military training.

Gairy's domestic and foreign policy shenanigans as was to be expected, further polarised the political scene in Grenada. The NJM grew in prestige. In the 1976 elections, inspite of considerable rigging, the NJM in alliance with GNP and United Peoples Party (UPP) won 48.5 percent of votes, but only 6 out of the 15 seats in parliament.²⁷ The 1976 election - and the rigging - convinced the NJM that Gairy could not be removed through 'democratic means'. As a result it enlarged its covert activities within the trade unions, the army and the police.

On 12 March 1979, when Gairy left for the United States to address the United Nations on UFOs, the NJM moved into action. The next day, 13 March, Gairy's rule came to an end, when the NJM seized power in a bloodless coup.

26 Grenada joined ^{the} Caribbean Community in August 1973, the United Nations in September 1979, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in April 1975, the Organisation of American States in April 1975 and ^{the} Non-Aligned Movement in August 1979. In addition, Grenada was member of some 14 other international organisations, Countries of the World and Leaders Yearbook, vol.1 (Detroit, 1984), pp.560-564.

27 USSR Academy of Sciences, n.17, pp.49-50.

THE NEW JEWEL REVOLUTION

At 1030 on 13 March 1979 Maurice Bishop went on the air on Radio Free Grenada and told his countrymen:

At 4.15 A.M. this morning the People's Revolutionary Army seized control of the Army barracks at True Blue.

The barracks were burned to the ground. After half an hour struggle, the forces of Gairy's army were completely defeated and surrendered.

Every single soldier surrendered, and not a single member of the revolutionary forces was injured.

At the same time, the radio station was captured without a single shot being fired. Shortly after this, several cabinet ministers were captured in their beds by units of the revolutionary army. (28)

Maurice Bishop concluded his first speech to his countrymen with the promises:

People of Grenada, this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and a bright future for our children and great grand children. (29).

The 'coup' was immensely successful. The army and the police, surrendered without offering opposition. ³⁰

28 Bishop, n.10, p.3.

29 Ibid., p.4.

30 Bogdan Swajkowski, The Establishment of Marxist Regimes (London: Butterworth, 1982), pp.127-28.

Gairy's ministers were arrested while still in bed. Only 3 persons were killed. The coup was widely welcomed. The local chamber of commerce congratulated the NJM on the efficiency with which it got rid of Gairy's rule. It hailed the revolution as 'a glorious opportunity to build something new and different in the Caribbean.'³¹

After the coup the NJM formed the Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG), with Maurice Bishop as the Prime Minister. The new Government suspended the 1974 constitution. But Grenada remained a monarchy, with the British Queen as head of state, represented in Grenada by the Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, who had been appointed Governor General in 1978 on Gairy's recommendation.

Political Process

The PRG during its four-and-a-half-year rule substantially fulfilled the promise that it made on March 13, 1979. The social, economic and political life of Grenada was transformed.

The revolution produced a new political system of effective participatory governance, in which the PRG involved the largest possible segment of the population. Mass

31 Robin Cohen, "Unmaking Grenada's Revolution", New Society (London) November 3, 1983, p.196.

participation was encouraged through a number of organisations created by the PRG. The prominent mass organisations were trade unions, the National Youth Organisation, the National Womens Organisation, the Peasant Organisation and the Young Pioneers. In addition, there were 'Organs of popular power' - the Zonal Councils, Workers' Parish Councils, and Farmers, Women and Youth Council and the Militia.³² At the apex of the power structure was the political Bureau (8 members) and the Central Committee (16 members).

The lead in the participatory process was provided by the charismatic Maurice Bishop who spoke to his countrymen - much like Fidel Castro, his mentor, - frequently and with rare sincerity and eloquence - on a wide array of subjects that concerned them. He lectured them on Foreign Policy, CIA destabilisation tricks, imperialism, revolutionary process, foreign aid, the projects undertaken by the Government, the economic problems that the country faced, adult education, annual budgets, tourism, etc.

In 1981 the PRG, in a bold experiment, democratised discussion on its annual budget by involving grassroots elements such as zonal and parish councils. These experiments

32 Searle, n.1, p.5.

in alternative form of political process were viewed with alarm by the staid, conservative governments of the Eastern Caribbean. There was in the NJM experiment, notwithstanding its socialist orientation, a refreshing pragmatic approach that took pains to ensure the cooption of the largest segment of the population in political, economic and social programmes.³³ There was Marxist-Leninist posturing as well but that did not affect the ordinary Grenadian, and was restricted to a narrow circle of NJM members.

Economic Affairs

The PRG inherited a shattered economy from Gairy. Unemployment was 50 percent, the real per capita income had been falling at about 3 percent per year throughout the Gairy years; there was a serious trade deficit; most food stuffs were imported; schools were on the verge of collapse; and corruption and waste had become endemic.³⁴

The PRG in four-and-a-half years restored the economy to reasonable health by cutting down corruption and waste, by instituting tight fiscal management, and by securing aid

33 Cohen, n.31, pp.196-97.

34 Raymond W. Duncan, "Grenada" in 1982 Yearbook of International Communist Affairs & Parties and Revolutionary Movements (California, Hoover Institution, 1982), pp.101-102.

from a remarkably wide variety of countries. Primarily, under the PRG, the aid came from Cuba, Soviet Union, East European Countries, EEC, OPEC countries, and the Arab countries. During the PRG rule, the GNP grew a healthy 10 percent, and per capita income rose from \$ 780 in 1980 to \$ 883 in 1983. (during this period growth declined in most of the Caribbean countries). Unemployment was reduced from 50 percent to a manageable 14.2 percent.³⁵

Although the PRG prided itself on its 'socialist orientation', it was entirely pragmatic in its approach to economic development. More than 50 percent of the economy remained in private hands. There were no large-scale expropriations. And the properties that the state did take over were those that had been illegally acquired by Gairy; farms, hotels, brewery etc.³⁶ The State sector was expanded but not at the expense of the private sector.³⁷ Maurice Bishop's Government concentrated on three sectors of Grenadian economy : Agriculture, Fishing and Tourism. By mid 1981, 31 new state farms were opened, most of them on

35 UN Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1982, vol.II (Santiago, Chile : Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, UN, 1984), pp.98-101.

36 Duncan, n.34, p.102.

37 Maurice Bishop described the Grenadian economy as 'mixed economy state sector dominant', Seabury, n. p.64.

lands previously owned by Gairy. A new fishing school was opened, and 40 trawlers were imported from Cuba. A 'new Tourism' policy was conceived.³⁸ The aim was to make tourism independent of wealthy American patronage which the PRG rightly thought was dangerous economically, politically and socially. Tourism in the Caribbean, especially in the context of a small island, is no longer innocent in its impact. Most islands get annually more visitors than their total population. Many of the islands as a result are only nominally sovereign,³⁹

The PRG plan for tourism was to keep it integrated into the local economy, with most benefits flowing into Grenadian hands directly rather than through transnational corporations. During the PRG rule, the number of tourists that came to Grenada were fewer than in the previous years. This was primarily because of the sustained anti-PRG propaganda in the U.S. media.⁴⁰ The most important element in Grenada's plan for expanding tourism was the construction of a new airport at Pt. Salines, at the cost of \$ 75 million

38 See, "The New Tourism" in Bishop, n.10, pp.67-74 and Duncan, n.34, p.102.

39 In 1982 more than half of Grenada's foreign exchange earnings were on account of tourism, Commonwealth Year Book 1984, n.5, p.98.

40 Threat to Grenada Tourism from the US came within weeks of the revolution, See Bishop, n.10, p.8.

which would make Grenada accessible to aircrafts as large as Boeing 747s. It was to replace a rundown landing strip at Pearis (4500 feet), near Grenville, which served only small planes (HS-748). The question of the new airport at Point Saliner will be dealt with in more detail subsequently, as it became an important justification for the invasion, and an important objective for the invading forces. The Grenadian economy in cum, under the PRG, was buoyant, a fact which even the World Bank in its annual Report for 1982 acknowledged.⁴¹ Table ^{below} shows the main indices of the Grenadian economy under the NJN Rule.

**GRENADA MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS DURING
THE NEW JEWEL RULE (Mar 79 to 83)**

	1979	1980	1981	1982
A. Basic Economic Indicators (GDP at 1977 market price millions of EC dollars)				
GDP at 1977 market price millions of EC dollars	144.2	148.6	153.1	161.5
Population(Thousands)	108	109	110	110
Per capita GDP at 1977 price (EC)	1335	1363	1392	1468
B. Growth Rates				
Real GDP at market rates	2.1	3.0	3.0	5.5
per capita GDP	1.1	2.1	2.1	5.5
Unemployment Rate		27.9		14.2

Sources: UN Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1982, Vol. XI (Santiago Chile, 1984), pp.98-101.

Note : The EEC continued to be Grenada's principal market accounting for 56% of exports, with the UK taking well over half of this.

⁴¹ Cynthia Hamilton, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Grenada", Race and Class (London), vol. XXVI, no.2, 1984, p.68.

Social Programme

Economic success was matched by creditable achievements in education, health, housing, road construction and the creation of many infrastructures.⁴² The PRG built 80 km of new roads, renovated 20 percent of all housing, increased piped drinking water by 50 percent, and laid the foundations for new sewage plants, a telephone system and port facilities. In addition, construction of a new airport was commenced at Point Salines in November 1979, and a new 50 KW Radio Transmitter was installed at Morne Rouge, near St. Georges. In the field of health the gains were no less creditable. Health care was made free. Health care centres were increased and the number of doctors in the country were doubled and the number of dentists increased by five times.⁴³

The most spectacular gains were, however, in the field of education, an area which the NJM considered of vital importance for raising mass consciousness, furthering the

42 For the various achievements of the PRG in building infrastructures and instituting new progressive social policies see, Cris Searle, "Maurice Bishop on Destabilisations: An interview", Race and Class (London), vol. XXV, no. 3, 1984, pp. 4-5 and Yearbooks of Communist Affairs, 1982/1983/1984.

43 Searle, n.1, p.4.

revolutionary process and enhancing the development effort. All the schools were renovated through self-help campaigns. In three years, secondary school students were increased from 11 percent in 1979 to 36 percent in 1983. Primary school education was made universal and free. Mid-day meals and free milk were instituted for primary school children. Their uniforms and books were heavily subsidised. For University education, the PRG sent students abroad at state expense. In the first two-and-a-half years alone, 300 students went abroad to pursue higher studies.⁴⁴ In 1982, there were 250 Grenadians studying in Cuba alone, and 18 were in the Soviet Union. In Gairy's last year of rule, only three students were sent to universities abroad. The slogan of the revolution was: "Only an Educated Productive People can be Truly Free".⁴⁵ And what was even more important than the programmes of formal education, was the massive adult education programme through the New People Education Centre which reduced illiteracy to just 3%.

Grenada's Foreign Policy

Grenada foreign policy,⁴⁶ considering its size and resources, had an extremely high profile and was activist.

44 Bishop, n.10, p.233.

45 Ibid.

46 For a PRG account of Grenada's foreign policy see "Foreign Relations Report", Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington, D.C., Department of State and Department of Defense, 1984), pp.106-1, 106-8.

The aims of the PRG were twofold: first, to secure much-needed aid and, secondly, to build up what Maurice Bishop called the "fourth pillar" - world public opinion - to protect the revolution, so that "whenever they (U.S.) came, it was not a hundred thousand they face, but millions around the world".⁴⁷

The single most important factor which influenced PRG's domestic and foreign policy was the threat that it perceived from the United States. The threat was real enough and it manifested itself within a month of the revolution. To begin with, it was from Gairy and his associates in the United States who threatened a counter-revolution.⁴⁸

47 The other three pillars were - the people, the national economy and national defence. Cited in Fitzroy Ambursley and Winston James, "Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Revolution in Grenada", New Left Review (London), no.142, Nov-Dec, 1983, p.95. Also see Bishop, n.10, pp.189-200, Maurice Bishop placed great hopes on world public opinion to prevent US action against Grenada (and other third world countries). His speeches reflected this. On July 13, 1981, he told a conference of small island states in St. Georges: "We can also fight back successfully if instead of having to face Grenada, a small country of just 100,000 people, the imperialists are made to face a force of 3 billion strong as we build a powerful, worldwide, anti-imperialist alliance in defence of our independence our freedom and our right to choose our own path". Bishop, n.10, p.199. *Emphasis added*

48 Ecumenical Programme for Inter American communication and Aeron Task Force. Grenada the Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C., EPICA, 1982), p.61.

Later the threat was from the United States itself. To face the danger from Gairy and his associates, Grenada appealed to the United States and Britain for help, but without success. It next turned to Cuba, which responded with alacrity. The United States reacted immediately and predictably. It warned Grenada in writing on 8 April 1979:

that it would not be in Grenada's best interests to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba ... We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba. (49)

Grenada refused to be browbeaten; five days after the US threat, Maurice Bishop declared:

Grenada is a sovereign and independent country... No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country, or who to be friendly with... We are not in anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale. (50)

Three days later Cuba and Grenada established diplomatic relation. Cuba also became the first country which Maurice Bishop visited after the revolution, and remained Grenada's principal ally till the American invasion.

49 Bishop, n.10, p.9.

50 Ibid.

The Cuban assistance covered a wide range of activities. It assisted Grenada in the construction of a new international airport at Point Salines, health care, culture, housing, sports facilities, advisers on planning, agro industries and development of the island's electricity network. In addition, Cuba made a number of gifts to Grenada, such as 40 tractors in 1982, and ten fishing trawlers between 1979 and 1982.⁵¹ Cuban aid also covered assistance in helping to organise the militia and the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA). At the time of the American invasion, 784 Cubans were in Grenada, of whom 636 were construction workers, with others in public health, education, fishing, transport, trade, culture and communication. Out of the 784 Cubans, 43 were members of the armed forces; of these 22 were officers and the rest translators and other support personnel. The bulk of the Cubans were engaged in constructing the new airport at Pt. Salines, for which Cuba had agreed to bear as much as 40% of the total cost of \$ 75 million.

51 For Cuban assistance to Grenada, see, Raymond W. Duncan, "Grenada" in Richard P. Starr, ed., 1982/1983/1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: Parties and Revolutionary Movements (Stanford, California, Hoover Institution, 1982/83/84), pp. 102-104; 90-94; and 125-129 respectively.

These close economic ties were matched by very close personal, diplomatic and political relations. Castro called the NJM revolution "big revolution in a small country."⁵² Bishop lost no opportunity to praise and acknowledge Cuban help and inspiration. To the assembled leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, where Grenada made its debut on September 6, 1979, he said: "Cuba laid the basis of Grenada".⁵³

A month later on the first anniversary of the NAM revolution Maurice Bishop, in^a stirring speech against imperialism to a large gathering in St. George, acknowledged that Cuba was a 'major source of inspiration for our country and our process'.⁵⁴ The personal and ideological bond between NJM leadership, especially Maurice Bishop and Fidel Castro was close, and the two countries did not hide that.

The other country^{which} with Grenada established close relations within the Caribbean basin was Nicaragua after the Sandinistas seized power on June 23, 1979. Bishop called it 'best news we had'.⁵⁵ Grenada became the second

52 Bishop, n.10, p.41.

53 Ibid., p.49.

54 Ibid., p.109.

55 Ibid., p.96.

country to recognise Nicaragua. As an expression of solidarity with the Sandinista Revolution, Grenada sent its youth to assist the 'Nicaraguan Government in its Adult Literacy Campaign.⁵⁶ In February 1980, Maurice Bishop went to Managua to address the 46th Commemoration of the Sandino's assassination. There, in an eloquent speech to a rally, he called for an "end to the Monroe Doctrine, and all other doctrines aimed at perpetuating hegemonism, interventionism and backyardism in the region".⁵⁷

The relations with other countries in the Caribbean were not so close although Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Guyana had recognised the PRG within 10 days of its establishment.⁵⁸ The smaller island states of the OECS were disturbed by the NJM's reformist surge and were uniformly antagonistic to the Grenadian revolution. They gave the PRG neither support nor recognition.⁵⁹ Their small size and political vulnerability made them ready tools of American policy in the region. Leading the anti PRG campaign in the Caribbean was Tom Adam, Prime Minister of

56 Grenada Document, n.46, pp.106.

57 Bishop, n.10, p.101.

58 EPICA, n.49, p.57.

59 Ibid., pp.57-58.

Barbados, Eugenia Dominica Prime Minister of the Dominica Republic, and John Seaga Prime Minister of Jamaica.⁶⁰

From these islands states a vicious anti-PRG propaganda (sponsored by the CIA) was carried out for much of the period that the PRG remained in office.⁶¹

Grenada's relations with the Soviet Union were an extension of its relations with Cuba. The Soviet Union initially at least was reluctant to get involved in a distant and vulnerable island. By the end of 1979, however, it got over its inhibition and the two countries established formal diplomatic relations.

In the next three-and-a-half years, Grenada signed a number of trade agreements with the Soviet Union. These covered the purchase of Grenadian spices and cocoa by the Soviet Union. Grenada received from the Soviet Union construction material, some vehicles, generator sets, and light airplane and 84 scholarships (of which the Grenadians could avail of only 18) for academic, technical and military

60 The PRG was a target of continuous media attack from Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad - often seemingly coordinated by a single agency - for most of the time that it was in power. For various destabilisation measures see EPICA, n.48, pp.56-68. Also Bishop, n.10, pp.55-74 and 201-29.

61 Duncan, n.51, p.104.

training.⁶² The Soviet Union also sent teachers to Grenada; 16 of them were present when the United States invaded the country. In addition, Grenada signed three secret 'agreements' for free military assistance from the Soviet Union. These agreements mostly covered the supply of infantry weapons and equipment. Out of the three treaties only one had gone into effect before the American invasion. Grenada had received less than one-third of the items listed in the three agreements by the time of the invasion. The total value of all the items in all the three treaties was 19 million roubles (\$ 23 million).⁶³ These agreements gained a great deal of notoriety as a result of the U.S. propaganda.⁶⁴

Grenada also signed a number of agreements -- all covering aid, and to a lesser extent trade - with East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Syria.⁶⁵

62 For the treaties and agreements that Grenada signed with various countries, see Paul, Seabury, and McDougall, The Grenada Papers (San Francisco, California, ICS Press, 1984), pp.17-52.

63 Ibid.

64 The treaties after the invasion became a prominent element in the American propaganda for justifying the invasion and excessive use of military force. Out of all the PRG papers that the America forces captured the first to be made public were the 'Secret Treaties'. For the various treaties that Grenada signed see Seabury, n.62, pp.17-52.

65 Ibid.

The East Germans supplied trucks without any payment, some equipment for the PRA (typewriters, telephones, etc.), a printing machine and technicians to set up a new telephone system in Grenada. The aid from OPEC countries, some \$ 19 million, went primarily for the construction of the new airport. The North Korean agreed to supply small arms free of cost. Amongst the Arabs, the most lavish donor was Libya, which gave \$ 4 million interest-free loan for the airport.

Grenada relations with the third world were primarily conditioned by its search for security through mobilisation of public opinion. Grenada was prominent in many third world forums, especially the Non-Aligned Movement. Maurice Bishop invariably raised the issue of the threat from the United States to its security at all Non-Aligned Movement meetings.

Chapter - III

AMERICA PREPARES TO INVADE GRENADA

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AMERICA PREPARES TO INVADE GRENADA

Propaganda War can never be taken in isolation and propaganda destabilisation, violence and terrorism, usually help to lay the psychological and material basis for an invasion to come.

Maurice Bishop¹
13 July, 1981.

For the entire period that the PRG was in power the United States Government viewed Grenada as the 'other Cuba'. And Grenada, therefore, became a target of American economic warfare, propaganda war, military threats and destabilisation measures.²

The history of the PRG is a history of a government under siege; its bragga docio was more a reflection of American-induced paranoia than an urge to power. The brave, and sometimes arrogant, speeches of Maurice Bishop; the attempts in the U.N. and NAM to raise the issue of its security; the raising of the pathetic People's Revolutionary Army and the militia; the holding of 'route marches' and

~~Maurice~~

1 Bishop, Selected Speeches 1979-1981 (Havana, Cas de las Americas, 1982), p.117.

2 For various measures see chronology at Appendix 'A'. Also see Ibid., pp.15-25; 55-66; 131-148; 201-224; "Draft Resolution", March 21, 1983 in Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington, D.C., Department of State and Department of Defence, 1984), pp.109-4; Chris Searle, "Maurice Bishop on Destabilization: An Interview", Race and Class (London), vol.XIV, no.3, 1985, pp.1-13.

night manoeuvres to meet the danger of impending invasion; the signing of the so-called 'secret treaties' for arms (and uniforms) -- all these defiant gestures reflected not Grenada's ambitions but hysteria.³

The hysteria was real. The captured 'Grenada Documents' released by the State Department after the invasion, are full of it.⁴ The PRG had thought that courageous posture and words would help. The effort merely tired the people, and in the end, split the NJM and the PRG, which caused the coup and killings, and paved the way for the American invasion. Bishop had been aware of the danger. He had warned against it. But in the end, he could do little about it. Grenada was too small and too fragile to face up to the stream of threats that emanated from Washington.

The invasion of Grenada has been projected by American officials as an unpremediated, spontaneous action. But facts don't match this posture. The incontrovertible fact remains

3 The PRA and the Militia were subjected to well-publicised periodical 'manoeuvres' with every perceived American threat of invasion.

4 Selected captured documents belonging to the PRG were released first on 4 November 1983, and then on 14 November 1983, by the United State as a Psyops measure, primarily to justify the invasion. The documents prove more than anything else the ubiquity of the American threat to the PRG. Major portions of the captured documents were released in 1984 in a book form. See Michael Ledeen and Romerstein Herbert (eds.), United States Department of State Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1984).

that for three years preceeding the invasion, the United States had been psychologically, and even militarily, preparing for invading Grenada. The most concrete evidence of this is provided by President Reagan's pronouncements and the military preparations of the Pentagon.

The final focus of the US psychological and military endeavours was pinned down into concrete, emotive terms around two institutions in Grenada: The Point Salines International Airport; and the Saint Georges American Medical School.

Reagan's Propaganda Blitz

The psychological basis for the invasion began to be laid by the Reagan Administration from the moment it came to power in January 1981. For the next three years - till the invasion - the greatest power on earth was pitted against one of the smallest. It was pure theatre. President Reagan personally led the propaganda blitz against Maurice Bishop and the PRG. By 1982 Grenada was repeatedly designated as threat to American vital interests. In February 1982 Reagan told the OAS leaders that Grenada was in the "tightening grip of totalitarian left".⁵ On 17 March he

5 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States January 1 to July 2, 1982 (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1984), p.213.

warned the United States Congress that the "cost of ensuring our security" against the "New Cubas" will rise.⁶

On 8 April, he told the OEC's leaders gathered in Barbados that Grenada had the 'Soviet Cuban trade mark'.⁷ By 1983, Grenada found constant mention in U.S. Presidential pronouncements. The aim of these pronouncements was to transform Grenada into a plausible enemy - a danger to the 'National Security' of the United States.

Pt. Salines Airport : A Superior Air Base

In March 1983 the world was told that it was not nutmeg but American security that was threatened by Grenada.⁸ In support of this theme it was asserted that 'a naval base, a superior air base', was being built on Grenada to threaten American Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), refineries in the Caribbean, and as an airhead for reinforcing Nicaragua and Angola. To give credence to these claims, Reagan in a televised address to the American people on 23 March 1983, said:

On the small island of Grenada at the southern end of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans with Soviet financing and backing are in the process

6 Ibid., p.313.

7 Ibid., p.448.

8 Ronald Reagan, "Strategic Importance of El Salvador", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol.83, no.2073, April 1983, p.19.

of building an airfield with a 10,000 foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passageway for our international commerce and military lines of communication. More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The rapid build up of Grenada's military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the patterns of the eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed.

The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada can only be seen as power projection into the region.⁽⁹⁾

To convince the gullible American public of the 'threat' from Grenada, this speech was accompanied by a display of satellite pictures of Pt. Salines Airport,¹⁰ even though American students lived barely a kilometer from it. Satellite air photos tell the layman nothing. But when a President uses them to make a point about national security on national television, the psychological impact cannot be discounted. The satellite photographs proved nothing -- even the length of the airport, announced by the President, apparently after the photograph had been interpreted,

9 Ronald Reagan, "Peace and National Security Address to the Nation", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 83, no. 2073, April 1983, p. 11. Emphasis added.

10 For Satellite photos of Pt. Salines airport, see *ibid.*

turned out to be off the mark by 1000 feet. The Presidential inaccuracy was probably deliberate; it was helpful in magnifying the 'threat'.

Point Saline Airport needs more detailed consideration as it was both an objective and to an extent the cause of the Grenada War. The construction of the airport at Pt. Salines, at the south-western tip of Grenada, was begun by the PRG towards the end of 1979 with Cuban assistance. At the time of the American invasion, it was 85 percent complete.¹¹

The project had been under consideration for over 25 years but nothing concrete had been done either by the British rulers or the Government headed by Gairy. It was the single most important construction work undertaken in the history of the island. The estimated expenditure of \$ 75 million was raised through loans and grants from a wide variety of countries and institutions including the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community.¹²

The length of the runway was 9000 feet; the American assertion that it was larger was a deliberate act of

11 'Grenada Air Port Project Halted by U.S. Invasion', Aviation Week and Space Technology (New York), vol. 119, no.19, 7 November 1984, p.26.

12 See, Ecumenical Programme for Interamericas Communication and Action Task Force. Grenada the Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C., EPICA, 1982).p.69.

misinformation. The Americans said the airport was too large for the small island, and that it was intended for military purposes.¹³ The fact remains that the airport had not a single facility that is associated with a military airport, as Plessey Airports Limited, the London-based British Company which had been sub-contracted to instal all the operation subsystems, testified after the invasion.¹⁴ The British company representative said that the airport was meant for tourism, as the existing airport at Pearls was unable to take on the wide-bodied aircrafts, such as Boeing 747 -- a point that the PRG had been making since the project was undertaken. The United States Government, however, remained unconvinced. The airport became a major element in the American propaganda to convince the world of the threat it posed to American 'National Security'.

Ironically, the first military use that the airport was put to was by the invading American forces. Through it were inducted soldiers and supplies for the invasion.

13 Similar objections were not raised against airports, with similar or more length, on the other islands near Grenada. St. Lucia, Antigua, Barbados and Trinidad have all got airports which are ^{as} large if not larger, than Pt. Salines Airport. "OECS Meets in Grenada", Congressional Record-Senate (Washington, D.C.). vol. 130, no. 26, 28 March 1984, p. 3275.

14 "Grenada Air Port Project halted by US Invasion", n. 11, p. 26.

At that time there were 636 Cuban construction workers working on the airport. They were housed in barracks constructed near the airport. These barracks too became a major target for the American armed forces. In addition to the Cubans, there were 17 employees¹⁵ of the British Plessey Airports, at the time of the invasion. The Airport suffered considerable damages; Plessey Airports Limited alone claimed £ 1 million in damages.

Military Rehearsals for the Invasions
Exercise Ocean Venture 1981 and 1982

The psychological preparation was accompanied by real time military preparations for the invasion of Grenada. The first military threat came in the form of contingency planning for the blockade of Grenada in 1980. It was followed in the next two years with elaborate exercises which rehearsed the actual invasion of Grenada. These exercises - Ocean Venture 1981 and Ocean Venture 1982 - very substantially conformed to the invasion plan. These rehearsals, more than ^{any} other act, explain and put into perspective the American invasion of the island. The larger of these two exercises was 'Ocean Venture 1981'. It was the largest combined services exercise conducted by the

15 Raymond, W.Duncan, 'Grenada' in Richard F.Starr, ed., 1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: Parties and Revolutionary Movements (Stanford, California, 1984), p.128.

United States during peacetime since World War II.¹⁶ It lasted from August 1 to October 15, 1981. The manoeuvre involved more than 100,000 troops, 250 ships, and 1000 aircrafts from 14 countries; but mainly the armed forces belonged to the United State. In one of the four-phase exercise, the focus was on the Caribbean. In this phase, an island, code-named Amber and the Amberdines (read Grenada and the Grenadines) was labelled 'our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean'. The scenario involved rescuing 'American hostages' from 'Amber', by an invasion involving the 82 Airborne Division, Rangers, and others, after 'negotiations with the Amber government break down'.

The site for the 'Amber' part of the exercise was Vieques Island, the America base next to Puerto Rico. The terrain and size of Vieques island (designated Amber for the exercise) is about the same as Grenada. In the exercise the invasion of the island began on 10 August with a simultaneous assault by the 82 Airborne Division, and a marine battalion, which were supported by naval gunfire, helicopter gunships and carrier-based aircraft. Paratroopers for the exercise were flown from their home bases in the United States. The invasion force had its complement of 'special forces', such as the Navy's SEAL Commandos, and

16 EPICA, n.12, pp.123-24.

other "guys that do dirty tricks" from Fort Bragg. After the 'rescue', according to the exercise scenario, American troops were to remain behind 'to install a regime favourable to the way of life we espouse'.

In 1982, 'Ocean Venture 1982' was held. It was patterned exactly on the 1981 scenario. The troops that took fleet were also the same [the 82 Airborne Division, 1 SOCOM, Marines, and 'Military Airlift Command in addition to the second fleet]. The purpose of the exercise, according to the Commander of American Caribbean Command, was twofold: first, "to send signal to those people who are friends and those who would oppose us in this part of the world that we can project military force".¹⁷ The second purpose of the exercise was [military] to prepare the troops for the actual 'invasion', as an officer of the 82 Airborne (which captured an airfield during the exercise) explained, "so that if ever we have to do it -- fight the real thing -- we will be prepared".¹⁸

In 1983 there was no 'Ocean Venture' exercise [the real thing took place], but there were many other

17 Michael Klare, "The Reagan Doctrine", New Statesman (London) vol.106, no.2746, 4 November 1983, pp.9-10.

18 Ibid.

'exercises'. One of these was held just a month prior to the invasion. This exercise involved the capture of an airfield by the 2nd Ranger Battalion by airborne assault, in Ephrata, Washington. In the exercise the 2nd Ranger Battalion parachuted at night on a 'airport', cleared it of building material, machines and equipment, occupied a perimeter defense, after which aircrafts of Military Airlift Command landed troops on the airstrip. This was very nearly the sequence of events for the capture of the Grenadian airfield.¹⁹

As would be expected, these military exercises caused much alarm in Grenada. And Grenada did the only thing that it could: Raise the issue of the danger from the United States at international forums (see Appendix A). It is not surprising that by 1983, Maurice Bishop thought that "Reagan is the greatest disaster to hit mankind".²⁰

As will be noticed, the constant factor in both Ocean Venture 81 and 82, is the rescuing of American 'Hostages'. In Grenada the hostage factor was built into the

19 USSR Academy of Sciences, Grenada History, Revolution US Intervention (Moscow, 1984), p.81.

20 Gris Searle, "Maurice Bishop on Destabilisation an Interview", Race and Class (London), vol.XIV, no.3, 1984, p.2.

the situation by the existence of the St. George's American
 This University
 Medical School and University with its contingent of
 American citizens was -- for rehearsals as well as for the
 invasion - to be the pretext for the American attack.

Saint Georges Medical School

The Medical School was founded in 1976 by the American entrepreneur, Charel R. Modica, who also was the School's Chancellor.²¹ The school charging \$ 6000 as annual tuition fee, was intended for rich American students who were unable to get into medical colleges in the United State on account of poor grades. There are over a dozen such American medical educational establishments that have come up in Mexico and on the small Caribbean islands in need of American dollars.²² The school in Grenada as such was frowned upon by the American medical fraternity on account of its indifferent standards. It had about 650 students, most of whom were American citizens. The St. Georges Medical School campus was divided into two parts, Grand Anse- which was near the Grand Anse Beach - and True Blue, which was about four kilometres - further South,

21 World of Learning (London: Europa Publications, 1983), p.537.

22 Dena Kleiman, "Island School Draws Many from the U.S.", New York Times, (New York), 26 October 1983, p.A-20.

next to the new airport under construction. The students enjoyed on the island a remarkable degree of freedom notwithstanding the fact^{that} President Reagan had dubbed the PRG as 'totalitarian'.

Economic Pressures

The American military threats were orchestrated with political and economic pressures, such as isolating Grenada from its neighbours; placing obstacles in its attempts to secure loans from international financial institutions and denying it a place in the Americaⁿ-sponsored Caribbean Basin initiative.²³ Considering the range of activities that the United States directed or inspired against the fragile PRG, what is surprising is not that the PRG scuttled and fell, but the fact that it lasted so long.

Events Leading to the Invasion

As can be imagined, these economic, psychological, and military measures cast an ominous shadow on the politics of Grenada. In an attempt to bridge the widening gap between the PRG and the United States, Maurice Bishop went to Washington in June 1983 in face of opposition from some of

23 Cynthia Hamilton, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Grenada", Race and Class (London), vol. XXVI, no. 2, 1984, pp. 70-71.

his party colleagues. As was to be expected, the visit was abortive. Maurice Bishop met National Security Adviser William Clark but was denied a meeting with President Reagan. He returned home dejected. Nothing much came out of the trip, but it did exacerbate leadership problems within the NJM.²⁴

Events in Grenada Leading to the American Invasion

On October 13/14, 1983, Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest by a hardliner Leninist faction in the NJM, led by Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin. The ideological disputes, and leadership wrangles in the NJM had been going on for a year, and had been especially pronounced since October 1982, when the powerful Bernard Coard had resigned from the Central Committee over, amongst other things, power-sharing.²⁵ The ideological and leadership wrangles that led to the arrest of Maurice Bishop and his subsequent killing on 19 October, no doubt were accentuated by the pressures and problems that the PRG faced as a result of the American

24 Duncan, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984, p.129.

25 For an insider's account of the political events leading to the overthrow of Maurice Bishop, see "Interview with George Louison : New Jewel Leader describes Revolutions Overthrow", Communist Affairs (Cardiff, UK), vol.3, no.4, October 1984, pp.444-59.

hostility.²⁶

Maurice Bishop's²⁷ killing by elements of the PRA, on 19 October, after he had been freed by a Grenadian crowd, led inevitably to internal violence and a military Government which provided the politically perfect moment for American intervention.²⁸ On the same day (October 19), it was announced that Grenada would be governed by a 16-man Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) led by General Hudson Austin. The United States raised the issue of the safety of American citizens on the island on October 19, and set the ball rolling for the invasion. Next day, a 24-hour curfew was imposed.²⁹

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- 26 "Harvest of Failure in Grenada", New York Times, (New York) October 21, 1983, P.A 34.
- 27 In addition to Maurice Bishop, three of his Cabinet colleagues, a union leader and some 18 members of the crowd were also killed.
- 28 For a description of events connected with the murder of Maurice Bishop, and the subsequent violence, see "Army in Grenada Takes Over Power", New York Times, October 17, 1983, p.A 1; "From a Grenadian Diplomat: How the Party Wrangle led to Premier's Death", New York Times, October 30, 1983, p.A 20.
- 29 The American government alleged that Cuba was behind the coup and killing. But that was far from the truth. Fidel Castro denounced the coup and the killings in no uncertain terms on October 20, 1983. An official Cuban statement said: "No doctrines, principles or proclaimed revolutionary positions, and no internal disagreements, can justify the cruel actions that led to the physical annihilation of Bishop and the group of prominent, honest and noble leaders", "Statement by the Communist Party and Revolutionary Government of Cuba on events in Grenada", The Current Digest of Soviet Press (Columbus, Ohio), vol. XXV, no. 43, p. 3.

On 21 October the EMC expressed its great concern over a likely attack by American forces. In the meanwhile, the American invasion force had already started to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Grenada. On 23 October the CARICOM decided to cancel trade agreements with Grenada and to expel it from the community.³⁰ On the same day, four members of the seven member Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS), under American pressure, sent an invitation in writing to the United States to intervene in Grenada.³¹ On October 25, the United States invaded Grenada.

30 Raymond W. Duncan, n.24, p.128.

31 The OECS members which were not signatories to the invitation were Grenada, St.Kitts-Nevis, and Montserrat. Jamaica and Barbados, not members of OECS, did, however, sign the invitation. See Aldon Kenworthy, "Grenada as Theatre", World Policy Journal (New York, NY) vol.1, no.3, Spring 1984, p.646. The inspiration for the invitation came from the United States. The American Ambassador to OECS, Milan Bish, was present throughout the deliberations by the leaders of the OECS. Richard Hall, Nigel Hawkes and Hugh O'Shaughnessy and Robert Chestyre, "Why Washington Lied", The Observer (London) October 30, 1983.

Chapter - IV

I N V A S I O N

Chapter - IV

INVASION

Every Military history is a tale of violence and destruction out of all relation to the requirement of combat: massacres on one hand and, on the other, ill planned and wasteful battles that are little better than massacres.

Michael Walzer¹

We blew them away.

Vice Admiral Joseph
Metcalf Commander
of Joint Task Force 120.²

Planning Process

Almost immediately after Maurice Bishop was placed under arrest on 13 October 1983 by General Hudson Austin and his henchmen, the United States activated its long rehearsed plans for the invasion of Grenada.³ The first to get into action were American diplomats in Barbados, who as early as 15 October started sending feelers to the local leaders for a joint 'rescue mission'.⁴ Ironically,

1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, 1977), p.130.

2 Mark Whitaker and others, "The Battle for Grenada", Newsweek (New York) 7 November 1983, p.31.

3 Gregory Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada: The Untold Story (New York, 1984), p.4.

4 Ibid., p.11.

the pretext at this stage to get into Grenada was to rescue Bishop, the very same Bishop, who had till then been the most of consistent target of American denunciations [and much else] in the Eastern Caribbean. Bishop, of course, remained unrescued. His death, at the hands of the People's Revolutionary Army, saved the Americans from the embarrassment of contending with him.

On 19 October, the US Defence Department issued a Warning Order to United States Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia, to initiate preparations and plans for the invasion of Grenada. Simultaneously it was announced that Battle Group CV 62 (5 ships) and Amphibious Squadron 1-84 (6 ships including 22 Marine Amphibious Unit) had been diverted to Grenada from its original destination, Beirut where it was proceeding to relieve 24 MAU.⁵

The next day, 20 October 1983, the situation in Grenada was considered by the apex body of the National Security Council (NSC), the Interagency Crisis Preplanning group. It found the situation in Grenada serious enough for consideration by the NSC Special Situation Group. The Group meeting which was chaired by Vice President George

5 Michael Byron, J., "Fury from the Sea : Marines in Grenada", Proceedings : US Naval Institute (Annapolis, MD) vol.110, no.5, May 1984, p.125.

Bush, met the same day and recommended that planning [and preparation] for the 'non combatant evacuation' (sic) continue .. On 21st October a verbal invitation from some of ^{the} OECS leader was secured by Milan Bish, US Ambassador to the Eastern Carribbean. By late evening the request was conveyed to President Reagan in Augusta, Georgia, where he had gone for a weekend of golf. At 6.00 P.M., 22 October the President gave his approval to the invasion.

In the meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) ordered the U.S.Army's elite 82 Air Borne Division and the newly created 1 Special Operations Command (1 SOCOM) to start preparations for the invasion. On 22 October, the JCS approved the invasion plan put up by the Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), Admiral Wesley McDonald, the operational commander of the invasion. The JCS told Admiral Wesley McDonald that the invasion was to be launched no later than early morning 25 October. The plan which the JCS approved was an expanded version of what had been conceived earlier.

According to the original plan, it seems, the invasion of Grenada was to be undertaken only by the US Navy and the Marines. In the approved plan, the US army, the Airforce, the Coast Guard, and a Caribbean Peace Keeping Force (CPF) were also included in the invasion order of battle. The

incorporation of the US Army and Airforce in the order of battle, according to many reports, was largely due to the insistence by the these services for getting a piece of the action.⁶ The inclusion^{of the} Caribbean Peacekeeping Force of 300 men from Jamaica, Barbados and four OECS states was purely for political reasons. It was to give the invasion a multinational flavour.

On 23 October, the fate of Grenada was sealed. The American diplomats in Barbados were able to get a written request for an US invasion of the island from four out of the seven states that constitute the OECS.⁷

But more important than the dubious invitation for the invasion, the event that confirmed President Ronald Reagan's decision to invade Grenada was the Bierut bombing which killed 249 US Marines on that day. On 23 October, the invasion plans were put on war footing. A new command, Joint Task Force 120, under Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalfe, Commander Second Fleet, who had been involved in the

6 JCS, "JCS Replies to Criticisms of Grenada Operation", Army (Arlington, Va), vol.74, no.8, August 1984, pp.30-31.

7 This invitation later became the main legal basis for the invasion. For a discussion on the legality of this invitation, see Christopher C. Joyner, ., "United States Action in Grenada: Reflection on the Lawfulness of Invasion", American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol.78, no.1, January 1984, pp.137-144.

Grenada invasion plans from inception stage, was created.⁸

The Commander of JTF 120 was given three tasks:

- (a) Protect and Rescue American citizens on the island.
- (b) Neutralise enemy forces.
- (c) Restore democracy on the island.⁹

Order of Battle US Forces

By 24 October the following units and formations placed under Commander JTF 120 were poised around Grenada, and at airbases in the United States and the Caribbean for Urgent Fury.¹⁰ (code name for the US invasion).

- (a) Battle Group 62 (5 ships including aircraft carrier USS Independence with 70 aircrafts).
- (b) Amphibious Squadron 1-24 (6 ships, including USS Guam helicopter carrier, and 22 MAU - 1900 men).
- (c) U.S. Coast Guard Units.
- (d) 82 Air Borne Division (Two Brigades, approximately six thousand men).

8 Byron, 5, p.124.

9 Ibid and Drummond B. Ayres, "Grenada Invasion: A Series of Surprises", New York Times, 14 November 1983, p.A-1.

10 The total figure involved in Urgent Fury is likely to be between 24,000 and 30,000. "U.S. Declare Grenada Hostilities ended: Troop Withdrawal Begin. Cubans Returned", Facts on File (New York), vol.43, no.2242, 4 November 1983, pp.825-26.

- (e) 1st Special Operations Command (6000 men).
- (f) US Air Force, mainly, Military Airlift Command and 1st Special Operations Wing (800 men).
- (g) Caribbean Peace Keeping Force (300 men).

Opposition on the Island

Against this amazing array of Forces, the Grenadians People's Revolutionary Army had [on paper] some 600 demoralised and confused soldiers, whose officers were more politicians than professionals. In addition, there were about 2500 men in the militia, which even more than the army was in a state of disarray. For weapons the Grenadians had mostly small arms. The only weapons of any significance were 6 ZU-23-2 Soviet anti aircraft guns, which were distributed between the two airports at Pt. Salines and Pearls, and the capital city of St. Georges. These weapons had only been recently acquired, and it is unlikely that the PRA had more than rudimentary training in their use. In addition to the anti-aircraft guns, the Grenadian army had 12, 12.7 mm guns, 6 BT-60 P APCs, and some 81 mm mortars. None of these weapons, however, were used by the PRA in the defence of the island.¹¹

11 Military Balance (London, IISS, 1983), pp.116-7.

The only other soldiers on the island were 43 Cubans, who had come to the island to train the PRA. In addition to Cuban military assistance team, there were about 700 other Cubans, of whom the vast majority were construction workers who were housed in pre-fabricated barracks located on the northern fringes of Pt. Salines airport.

There were no defence works on the island. The PRA and the Cubans had failed even to dig trenches. It was a costly failure, for which they had to pay dearly with their lives.

U.S. Aims and Objectives

United States invasion aims were announced by President Ronald Reagan on 25 October, at 9 A.M., four hours after the American attack on the island had commenced. The objective of the invasion, President Reagan said, were:

- (a) to protect American citizens;
- (b) to facilitate the evacuation of those who wanted to leave;
- (c) and to help in restoration of democratic institutions. (12)

12 Ronald Reagan, "Grenada : Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 83, no. 2081, December 1983, p. 67.

In justification of the invasion the President Reagan gave three reasons:

- (a) to protect innocent lives;
- (b) to forestall further chaos; and
- (c) to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order. (13)

The American military mission in Grenada can broadly be categorised under two heads: immediate and long-term. The immediate mission was to rescue first, the American students, who were mostly located on the two campuses of the St. Georges American University at True Blue and Grand Anse, and second, the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, who was located in the 19th century Government house overlooking St. Georges harbour, and some other sympathetic political figures languishing in Grenada's only jail at Richmond Hill, some two kilometers south of the Government House. The rescue mission clearly involved a speedy and discrete 'coup de main' operation. The long-term mission was to neutralise the PRA, NJM sympathisers, and to install a Government according to state Department specifications. Clearly the second mission was the real aim of the invasion, the first was merely a justification for achieving it with the least political fallout.

The Invasion

Broadly, the Urgent Fury can be divided into four phases: Pre-invasion; assault, mopping ^{up} and occupation, and peace-keeping.

Pre-Invasion Special Missions:

The armed invasion of Grenada began on 24 October, some twelve hours before D Day, 25 October, 1983. The first US forces to land in Grenada were a set of at least three teams belonging to the United State Navy's elite Sea Air Land (SEAL) commando units. The SEALs slipped into Grenada on board small specially designed boats, in the still of the night on 24 October on a secret reconnaissance mission to confirm details about topography, and troop deployments.¹⁴ It was a military text book mission.

Of the three SEAL teams sent from the ships of JTF 120, which had by then encircled the island, one was directed at Point Salines, another at St. Georges, and one at the Eastern Coast of Grenada, in the vicinity of Pearls Airport. Of the two mission sent in the area of Pt-Salines and St.

14 The account of special missions on D minus 1 and D Day are based primarily on, Byron, Michael J., "Fury from the Sea: Marines in Grenada", Proceedings US Naval Institute, vol.110, no.5, May 1984, p.125; JCS, "JCS Replies to Criticisms of Grenada Operation", Army (Arlington, Va), vol.74, no.8, August 1984, p.31 and Failka, "In Battle for Grenada Commando Missions Didn't Go as Planned", Wall Street Journal, 15 November 1983, p.1 and Drummond Ayres, "Grenada Invasion: A Series of Surprises", New York Times, 14 Nov.1983, p.A.1.

Georges, at least one ended in disaster. Four SEAL commandos were swept by the turbulent October sea to a watery grave. The endeavour of the SEAL in this area as a result remains unknown. Failure invariably, at least in the military, inspires secrecy.

The SEAL mission on the East Coast, however, was a success, and as a result more details have been forthcoming. There the SEAL landed at 10 P.M., climbed up to the Pearls Airport, and exfiltrated back to report to JTF 120 a full two hours before the assault that there were two anti-aircraft guns and some PRA soldiers in its vicinity. The SEALs also reported that the selected beachheads was unsuitable for amphibious landings.¹⁵

One wonders why the SEALs were risked when the same information could be had from the hi-tech 'aerial sources' or from American diplomats, and citizens who had a free run of the island, till as late as 24 October.

The SEAL efforts at last minute information gathering were also supplemented by AC 130 spectre Gunships which arrived over the island at about 3.00 A.M. on 25 October, to keep it under surveillance with its array of Infra-red and low light television cameras, and a plethora of guns. (the spectre gunships have 20 mm, 40mm, and 105 mm

15 Byron, n.5, p.125.

guns aboard). The spectre gunships reported that the Point Salines airport was blocked with construction equipment and other obstacles.¹⁶

The information from the SEALs and spectre Gunships, of 1st special operation wing (1 SOW), led Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalfe, onboard his flagship USS Guam, located off the coast of Eastern Grenada, to modify the plans for assault. The 22 MAU amphibious-cum-helicopter assault in the Pearls airport area was altered to only a helicopter assault. The Landing Zone for helicopters was, shifted from the airfield to the race course, about 700 metres from the Airport. (See Map II). In the south, the attack on Pt. Salines was changed from air assault to airborne assault.¹⁷

Assault

At dawn on 25 October the invasion of Grenada was signalled by a tremendous coordinated burst of fire from the US Navy ships, A-6 and 7 attack aircraft from USS Independence, the spectre Gunships of 1 SOW, and AH-1T sea cobra attack helicopters of 22 MAU. In coordination with this devastating

16 Henry Zeybel, "Gunships at Grenada", National Defense (Arlington, Va), no.395, February 1984, pp.53-56.

17 Byron, n.5, p.125.

aerial and naval attack, twenty helicopters mostly seakings and sea cobras, of 22 MAU carried two marine companies ashore from USS Guam. The marines landed without mishap and secured the Pearls airport and the roads into Grenville, by 7.30 P.M., without suffering any casualties.¹⁸ The Grenadians on the ground were not so lucky.

In the south elements of US 1st and 2nd Ranger Battalions (about 300 paratroopers) paradropped at Point Salines at 5.34 A.M., half an hour later than scheduled due to inflight delay.¹⁹ The dropping zone of the Rangers was a mere 300 metres from Cuban construction workers' battacks. But the Cubans, who had small arms including a few light machine, had orders from Fidel Castro not to shoot except in self-defence. The Cubans obeyed their orders.²⁰ The para-landing, and the subsequent securing of Point Salines airfield, which were supported by the spectre Gunships, were completed without any American casualties. Within an hour

18 "Marine Corps Assault Chief Details Grenada Invasion", Defense Week (Washington, D.C.), vol.5, no.42, 24 September 1984, pp.10-11.

19 Ayres, n.14, p.

20 The Cuban workers on the island had only small arms. They had constructed no fortification whatsoever. Their orders were to fire only in self-defence. The Cuban senior officer on the island, Colonel Pedro Tortolo, after the invasion, in an interview said that if the Cubans had attacked first, they could have massacred the U.S. parachutists as their DZ was less than 300 metres from Cuban positions. Havana Home Service. "Cuban's Return from Grenada : Statement by Tortolo", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, (Reding) vol.7484, 7 November 1983, pp. D/1-D/2.

of the paradrop, at 6.30 A.M., C-130 hercules began to land on the cleared airfield with the remainder of the Rangers, in full view from the Cuban barracks. But the Cubans did not respond, for if they had, the Americans would have suffered fearful number of casualties while still enclosed in their aircrafts.²¹

At 7 A.M., the Rangers, supported by the ubiquitous spectre Gunships, began engaging the Cuban barracks from a distance of 700-1000 metres.²² Eighteen Cubans were killed in this attack; 180 surrendered. By the evening of D-day, the strength of surrendered Cubans had risen to 500.²³ The Cuban construction workers, mostly a middle-aged lot, did not put up the kind of resistance that the American and the Cuban propaganda said that they had. The Cubans exaggerated the fighting prowess and courage of the construction workers mostly on account of patriotism, the Americans because of propaganda considerations, but primarily to justify the invasion.

At 8 a.m., True Blue Medical Campus, located just at the edge of the runway, was contacted. The students who had been scared witless by the American attack on the airport

21 Ibid.

22 JCS, n.6, p.32.

23 Ayres, n.14.

were ecstatic at the opportunity of escaping from the war. One hundred and twentyfour students, almost all American, who were there, were flown out the same day to the United States, where they were received with great fanfare.

The second Ranger Objective, Grand Anse Medical Campus, about 6 kilometres to the north of the airport, however, remained unsecured. It seems there had been a planning snafus: the Rangers were not told that St. Georges University had two campuses. The Rangers, like the Pentagon, the State Department and much of North America, learnt of this oversight to secure 'Grand Anse Campus' and 'rescue the American students', from an American ham radio operator at Grand Anse, who provided an unusually well-informed running commentary on the progress or otherwise of US military operations.²⁴

On learning that the majority of the American students, who were at Grand Anse, were still not rescued, the Rangers began to advance towards Grand Anse, but with neither dash,

24 Considering the role that the ham operators played in providing information and guiding US operations during Urgent Fury leads to a strong suspicion that there were CIA operatives amongst the medical students. In addition to the ham radio operator, there was at Grand Anse a student who was in constant short-wave radio contact with the US forces on the island, "Under Fire Ham Radio operators Describe Invasion", New York Times, 26 October 1983, p.A-20.

nor improvisation. The presence of the Cuban Construction Workers' barracks enroute paralysed performance.

In St. Georges area, which was in the US Army's jurisdiction for operations, a number of coup de main missions were planned. The U.S. objectives here were to rescue Sir Paul Scoon from Government House, political prisoners from Richmond Hill Prison, and secure Radio Free Grenada (RFG) and the Power Station. U.S. Navy's elite SEAL commandos were to perform these duties. They were assigned the task of rescuing Sir Paul Scoon and securing RFG and the power station. Delta Force, US Army's high profile counter-terrorist unit, was assigned Richmond Hill Prison. US Air Force's 1 Special Operation Wing was to provide the air support. In spite of this array of special mission specialist [or was it because of it], except for securing the power house all other missions ended in a fiasco.

The most important D-Day mission, after securing the American students, was clearly getting hold of Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General, as he had an important role in justifying the invasion as also in consolidating it. The task of getting hold of him was given to a team (about 12 men) of commandos. The SEALs arrived over Government House in a Blackhawk helicopter, early morning D Day. The plan was to land on the Government House tennis court, get hold of Sir Paul Scoon and whisk him away to USS Guam, the

flagship of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalfe.²⁵ But beyond reaching over Government House, the SEAL plan went awry on every count. First, the tennis court, which was to have served as a helipad, was found to be too much enclosed by foliage. As a result, the SEALs had to slither down from the hovering helicopter. The delay and the noise, caused by the hovering helicopter, alerted and, one would imagine confused, and frightened Government House police guards and others in the neighbourhood. The result was that there was panic-stricken and aimless firing, as a consequence of which, it is conjectured, the hovering Blackhawk helicopter, which was to whisk away the Governor General, beat a hasty retreat leaving behind not only the Governor General but his SEAL rescuers. Under any other circumstance this would have been a disaster. But in Grenada it did not matter, as the PRA had mostly deserted and the average Grenadian had no heart in the fighting, leave alone harming the Americans. For the next twenty four hours till the US marines reached the Government House with tanks and APCs, the SEALs and the Governor General remained unharmed and safe in the Government House compound.²⁶

25 Winston Churchill, "Secret Steps that led to Invasion", The Times (London) 17 February 1984, p.12.

26 Highly exaggerated accounts of the danger to SEAL commands left behind at Government House appeared in the American press. Most were as a result of official press briefing. Although the SEALs were in the Government House for nearly 24 hours, not single SEAL became a casualty. The threat that they faced was entirely a work of overheated imaginations. To give credence to stories of PRA attacks and SEAL valour, Newsweek carried a story to say that 10 out of 11 SEALs were wounded in the defense of Government House. The story was a lie. No SEAL was harmed. See Whitaker, n.10, and JCS, n.6, p.31.

The Americans, however, taking no risks established a cordon sanitaire of aerial fire around the Government House.

The second SEAL team which was sent to take over RFG moved in at first light, but failed to secure the radio station because of some confused firing from it. Frustrated by the spotty resistance, the SEALs blew up the radio station. (The result was that it was not available for immediate Psyops).

US Army's Delta Force, the elite counter-terrorist unit, which was to take Richmond Hill, did no better than the SEALs. It reached its objective in helicopters one hour late at 0615 because it could not get ^{the} local time right.²⁷ But after having reached, it unaccountably failed to take Richmond Hill Jail even though it had been abandoned earlier because of aerial attack.

By midday the reports of the failed special mission started to pour into HQ JTF on USS Guam. The four failures, - two of them crucial (failure to rescue the Governor General and the American students at Grand Anse) - had an unsteady

27 Harold Jackson, "Delta Force Good For Home Morale", Guardian Weekly, (Manchester), vol.132, no.26, Week ending June 30, 1985, p.6.

impact on the United States military hierarchy. The immediate result of the D-Day's frustrations were: First, Army-Marine corps operational boundary was altered and St. Georges placed under Marine jurisdiction; second, additional army reinforcements were ordered into the army sector; third, aerial effort against the island was escalated, and lastly the failures were blamed on entirely fabricated Cuban resistance. To give credence to reports of Cuban resistance, the strength estimates of Cubans on the island were hiked.

As a result of the morning's frustrations, during the second half of D-Day, the island was subjected to escalated aerial attacks by naval attack aircrafts, spectre Gunships, and helicopter gunship. Targets which suffered repeated punishment were, the eighteenth-century Fort Rupert, the Prime Minister's House, Cuban construction workers' barracks, Fort Fredrick, and the area around Grand Anse and Government House. The effect was devastating, Grenada's only mental Hospital was destroyed, in which at least 23 occupants were buried alive.²⁸

28 Drummond B. Ayres, "U.S. concedes Bombing Hospital in Grenada, Killing at least 12", New York Times, 1 November 1983, p.A.1 and Michael T. Kauffman, "Grenadians Are Searching Through Rubble of Asylum", New York Times, 2 November 1983, p.A.16.

Concurrent with the air war, army reinforcements continued to pour into Grenada. By the evening, in addition to the two Ranger battalions in Pt. Salines, a battalion from 82 Air borne Division and a 300 men Caribbean Peace Keeping Force had also been inducted into Grenada through Point Salines. This was just the beginning. In the following three days another five battalions of 82 Air Borne Division were to follow them.²⁹

The first night of the invasion was horrific. Curfew was imposed over Grenada from the air, by AC 130 Gunships and helicopters with night vision.³⁰ The curfew was not entirely successful, and on the ground there was tremendous looting. Grenada's capital had fallen under the sway of hoodlums and lunatics from the bombarded hospital. The civilian population suffered much.³¹

D-plus-1-Day

On 26 October operations began early. Preparations for these had begun during the previous evening and night, during which the 22 Marine Amphibious Unit except for one company was moved to the Grenada's East coast in helicopters and amphibious ships.

29 JCS, n.6, p.32.

30 Henry, n.16, p.55.

31 'US Triples its Forces on Grenada', Hong Kong Standard (Hong Kong) 30 October 1983.

The first mission on 26 October was launched by the US Marines, who after advancing in an armour column (five tanks and about a dozen APCs) from Grand Mal, a beach two kilometres north of the capital, reached Government House at 4.00 A.M.³² This bottom-heavy and laboured advance, punctuated with tank gunfire, rescued the Governor General, belatedly, at about 7.00 A.M. Immediately, Sir Paul Scoon, and his family, were flown to USS Guam, where bleary-eyed but relieved American Admirals and Generals welcomed him. Next day, 27 October, the Governor General's written invitation to invade Grenade was made public.

In the meanwhile, in St. Georges, the US marines, quickly occupied the rubble that was once Fort Rupert, Richmond Hill, Fort Frederick, the Prime Minister's House, and other bomb-blown landmarks of the capital. The presence of American troops on the island was welcomed by many Grenadians, for it promised, not only an end to the bombing but the nightmare of looting that had gripped St. Georges during the last two days.

Further south, in Point Salines area, which was under the U.S. Army's operational jurisdiction, operations were not executed with the same despatch as the US Marines had

32 Byron, n.5, p.128.

done in St. Georges. Grand Anse, the D-Day objective of the Rangers, was not reached till 4.30 P.M. 26 October. And when it was secured, it was not by ground advance, but an 'Apocalypse Now' - type of helicopter assault, which was preceded by thick and lengthy barrage of aerial and ground fire.³³ The assault on Grand Anse caused many Grenadian casualties and destruction of many homes and two of Grenada's best hotels. But as there was no contest by the Grenadians for either the students or the campus, there were no American casualties either among the students or the assault troops on account of the anticipated opposition. But Americans did die: the cause was helicopter collisions. In the Grenada War, like the disastrous 'Desert one' rescue mission, more Americans died because of helicopter and other accidents than from any other single reason.

The 224 dazed American medical students at Grand Anse were flown out to Point Salines (about 4 kilometers away) in helicopters. From Pt. Salines they were taken straight to the United States, where a heroic welcome was organised for them. On landing in America, some students, in an emotional display of patriotic surge, kissed the tarmac, much like the returning Tehran hostages had done in 1980, while TV camera's recorded the event.

33 Whitaker, n.2, p.27.

By late evening all resistance by the Cubans and the Grenadians [it had, in any case, never been significant] ended.³⁴ Most American objectives had been secured, and over 600 Cuban had been made prisoners of war. The Soviet and Cuban embassies, which had both suffered on account of the air war, had been encircled. But still, the link-up between the US army and the Marines on the ground had not taken place.

An objective assessment of the situation on the island at this time would have demanded that hostilities be ended. But that was not to be. The Grenada war was prolonged for another seven days, for propaganda reasons, and to ensure that US occupation of the island was of a more permanent nature than a mere rescue mission would have entitled it to be.

D-plus-2-Day

On 27 October, the United States military command, more sure of itself than on the first two days of the war, brought 15 selected American journalist to the island to see

34 Drummond B. Ayres, "US Officers Give Invasion Details", New York Times, 9 November 1983, p.A-13.

the United States military in action.³⁵ On this day, the US Command launched three attacks on objectives which had been long abandoned and which had little tactical or any other significance. Two of these objectives - Richmond Hill Jail and Fort Fredrick -- which were assigned to the marines had, in fact, already been secured.³⁶ The third objective was Calvigny Barracks (see Map II) which was assigned to a freshly inducted battalion of 82 Air Borne Division.

All the three attacks were highly stylised heliborne assaults, designed primarily to impress onlookers with the power of the US armed forces.

All the three attacks were, of course, successful. All caused casualties, but only on the Grenadians, except the 82 Air Borne assault on calvigny Barracks, which was supported by every single weapon system in Grenada, including 155 mm howitzers. In the American attack on Calvigny barracks 12 U.S. soldiers were injured by a 500 pound A-7 bomb which on account of flawed ground air radio links and instrumental error fell on the Americans instead of the intended target, the Grenadians.

35 For a discussion on the Reagan Administration's management of the media in the Grenada War see, Drew Middleton, "Barring Reporters from the Battle Field", New York Times Magazine (New York, NY) February 5, 1983, pp. 36-7.

36 Richard Hall and Nigel Hawkes and Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Commonwealth Puts Heat on in Grenada Row", The Observer, (London) 30 October 1983.

In the evening, when the reporters were flown back to Bridgetown, Barbados in C-130 Hercules of the United States Air Force, the sky over southern Grenada was thick with smoke of the day's war. The selected media were impressed by the stage-managed war. Next day the world press carried headlines in bold print of 'Heavy Fighting' and 'Pitched Battles'.³⁷

Occupation of the Island

Between 28 October to 2 November, when the United States Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger declared that hostilities had ceased on the island, the US army was engaged in mopping up of 'suspects' (PRA, militia, and NJM members), occupation of the island, instituting population control measures, and in generally consolidating their hold over the island.

On 31st, 22 MAU, after executing a dramatic motorised movement along Grenada's coastal roads from Grenville and St. Georges, concentrated in Sauteurs, the small coastal village on Grenada's northern tip.³⁸ The same evening, 22 MAU left for Carriacou, the mini-island 32 km, north of

³⁷ "US Troops Make Final Assault on Grenada, Army Barracks Seized", Indian Express (New Delhi) 28 October 1983.

³⁸ Byron, n.5, p.129.

Grenada for its last mission of the war. At dawn on 1st November 22 MAU executed a heliborne cum amphibious assault on the island. The assault was uneventful. Sixteen Grenadians, labelled PRA soldiers, were captured. Next day, 2 November, 22 MAU was relieved, by units of 82 Air Borne Division. On the same day the war was declared ended and it was announced that 22 MAU had left for Beirut, its original destination.

In the meanwhile, the 82 Air Borne Division, which had been following in the wake of the marine corps advance, undertook a number of 'search and destroy' missions in the interior, hilly areas of Grenada to hunt out guerrillas. No guerrillas were found but Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin were captured. The whole Guerrilla war danger, which had surfaced on the 27/28 October, was a result of overheated imaginations rather than objective intelligence assessments.³⁹

Peace Keeping (3 Nov. - 15 Dec.)

The announcement ending the war did not end U.S. military endeavours on the island. The 'search and destroy' missions continued. The enemy now became 'small individual

³⁹ James Peron, "82nd Airborne Moves into Replace the Marines", New York Times, 1 November 1983.

bands in the mountains' and 'suspects' and 'snipers' in the towns and villages.⁴⁰ Maj.General Jack Ferris, Deputy Commander XVIII Air Borne Corps, who had relieved Maj.General Edward Troughbaugh, as commander USFG, said on 8 November that snipers and 'small commando groups' of Cubans were still battling U.S. forces. The battle by these commando groups was rather ineffectual, for they were unable to cause any casualties. On 8 November the Commander USFG was still preoccupied with directing a sweep by 2000 US troops to fish out the Cubans.⁴¹ Even as late as 18 November the Cubans had not been got rid of, and US casualties were being ascribed to 'snipers'.⁴²

the
 Simultaneously with/search for commandos in the mountains, the U.S. military launched a number of measures to deal with the suspects in the towns and villages. Stringent 'population control measures' were instituted; road blocks were established; house-to-house searches were undertaken; curfew was imposed; and computer lists of

40 Bernard Weinraub, "G.I.'s on Island Settling Down to Police Duty", New York Times, 3 November 1983, p.A1.

41 Drummond B. Ayres, "US Officers Give Invasion Details", New York Times, 9 November 1983.

42 The wounds were, however, described as slight, not even necessitating hospitalisation. "Grenada Sniper Wound 2 GI", New York Times, 18 November 1983, p.A-14.

'suspects' were made.⁴³ Eventually over 1000 Grenadians were detained, i.e. one male adult Grenadian in every twenty-five. And as was to be expected, the detained suspects were not uniformly well treated. There were allegations of infringement of human rights. The Amnesty International highlighted the problem in a letter to President Reagan. The suspects - almost every one associated with the PRG and the NJM - were categorised into three lots according to their reliability: those who were found to be 'no risk' were put into list A; those about whom information was inadequate, were classified as "uncertain" and put in list B; and those who were 'hard core communist' were placed in list C.⁴⁴

43 'Data' on as many as 4000 Grenadians was gathered and fed into computers. "Interview with George Louisons, New Jewel Leader Describes Revolution's Overthrow", Communist Affairs (Cardiff) vol.3, no.4, October 1984, p.456.

44 A total of 1,130 Grenadians were detained by US Forces in Grenada. During the detention, screening and interrogation was carried out by the 819 Military Intelligence Battalion. Most of those who were arrested were members of the former government. Among those detained was Bernard Coard, deputy leader of the PRG; Selwyn Stretchen, former Minister of Mobilisation in the PRG; and General Hudson. Bernard Coard and his wife, were particularly singled out for harsh measures. They were made to roll over ant heaps and dung. Later they were locked for 9 days in a steel cage under the noisy engine room of USS Guam. Amnesty International (London) wrote twice (4 Nov. and 17 Nov.) to President Reagan protesting the 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' meted out to those under arrest. US authorities denied any ill-treatment. On 16 Nov. US authorities handed over those detained to Grenadian authorities, who in the meantime had passed a 'Preventive Detention Ordinance', which permitted the Govt. to arrest anyone without ascribing reasons. Amnesty International Report 1984 (London, Amnesty International Publications, 1984), pp.153-155.

Those who were unlucky enough to get their names on lists B and C became post-war pariahs; many till today remain unemployed.⁴⁵

The human problem caused by the Grenada war was not only on account of post-war neutralisation of suspects. There were war refugees too. The war rendered 1400 Grenadians - men, women and children refugees.⁴⁶ The number of refugees for such a short-duration war, which has been classified as a Low Intensity Conflict, was indeed very large. In the Indian context it would mean almost 9 million refugees. The large number of war refugees were primarily on account of indiscriminate U.S. aerial war and confused psyops instructions. The refugee exodus started from about mid-day of 25 October, when the aerial attacks against the island were escalated. The maximum movement was towards Point Salines, the American base, which was the only haven against air attacks. The refugee movement was aggravated, no doubt, by the confused directions contained in the propaganda leaflets dropped on the island on 25 October and again on the 26 and 27 October. The 25 October leaflets

45 Louison, n.43, p.456.

46 Richard Halloran, "1000 US paratroopers leave Grenada", 13 December 1983, p.A-3. and Alex Brunner, "Grenada Pax Americana", Telegraph (Calcutta), 14 November 1983.

advised Grenadians to stay in their homes. The next day it was contradicted by new leaflets which advised them to evacuate their homes.⁴⁷ This change of mind was probably occasioned by change in operational policy. After the first day's frustrations in Saint George's area, homes had, it seems, become possible targets.

In addition to population control, the other features of the 'Peace Plan'⁴⁸ encompassed actions in political, economic, psychological and civic action fields. On 9 November an interim Government was announced by Sir Paul Scoon, the only pre-war leader to survive the events of October. Leadership for the interim government was imported from amongst expatriate Grenadians, who had been untouched by the stigma of the NJM.⁴⁹ The actual day-to-day management of the country, however, remained in American hands - more specifically in the hands of Richard Gillespie, who was flown to Grenada in the wake of the invasion. He was, to begin with, designated as the American official liaison to

47 "Diary of an Invasion", Race and Class (London), vol.XXX, no.3, Winter 1984, p.24.

48 Rosenblum Jonathen, "Grenadian Dilemma : Lingerig Questions about US Occupation", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), 9 January 1984, p.15.

49 For the important post-war events see Grenadian chronology at Appendix .

the interim government.⁵⁰ The immediate economic measure constituted the sanctioning of \$ 3.4 million 'disaster relief'.⁵¹ Civic action measures were coordinated by USAID officials and to begin with executed exclusively by 82 Airborne Division Engineers and others. Psychological measures were by and large left to 1 psychological operations of 1 SOCOM.

On 15 December, the US announced that it had withdrawn all combat troops from Grenada.⁵² The 300 US 'non-combat' troops that remained after the withdrawal were placed under a new command called United States Military Support Element Grenada (USMSEG).⁵³ The USMSEG, located

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- 50 Richard Gillespie, before the invasion was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He was closely involved in events leading to the invasion. Power was primarily in the hands of Gillespie and Maj. General Jack Farris George Alan, "Scoon and US 'run Grenada'", New Statesman (London) 16-23 December 1983, p.5.
- 51 "AID Administrator McPherson's statement, Nov.2, 1985", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.) vol.83, no.2081, December 1983, pp.77-78.
- 52 All US troops were to be withdrawn from Grenada within 60 days of US invasion in terms of stipulation fixed by US Congress under the War Powers Act. See Ronald Reagan 'Letter to the Congress Oct.25, 1983' Department of State Bulletin, vol.83, no.2081, Dec. 1983, pp.68-69. (Washington, D.C.), November 1983, pp.260-61.
- 53 Gene Harper, "Duty on the Spice Island", Soldiers (Alexandria, Va), vol.39, no.9, p.16.

itself in Grenada's swankest hotel, the Grenada Beach Hostel, (\$ 100 per day). The USMSEG comprised a military police company, a medical clearing company, an aviation ambulance detachment and most of 1 psyops Battalion.

In addition to U.S. troops, the Grenadian Garrison had 320 soldiers from Jamaica, and 200 from the OECS states (Barbados, Dominica, Antigua, St. Lucia and St. Vincent).⁵⁴ Incidentally, the Grenada Garrison of 820 soldiers would be as visible in Grenada as 6 million foreign soldiers in India or about 1,30,000 in Afghanistan.

This foreign garrison is still there - two years after the invasion. There are, however, plans to replace it with 560 locals trained by US special forces in American military methods and ideological orientation.⁵⁵

54 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. XXX, no. 5, 5 May 1984, p. 32849.

55 On 7 February 1985 US announced that all foreign troops would be withdrawn by end September. Facts on File (New York), vol. 45, no. 2313, March 22, 1985, p. 215.

Chapter - V

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Grenada is like a kernel of corn that a bear has seized, and the kernel is giving the bear indigestion. Imagine how difficult it will be to swallow a whole ear of corn.

Tomas Borge, Nicaraguan
Minister of Interior(1)

US Soldiers' boot prints on Grenada's soil do more than the MX will do to make US power credible.

George F. Will²

In the unseemly elation and jingoism following the Grenada victory, a White House official, echoing George F. Will's sentiment, declared: "After Grenada any thing is open".³ Is it? Not many are convinced. The Nicaraguans and the Cubans who followed the course of the Grenada War closely, and who were supposed to be warned by the American victory, were unimpressed. Immediately after the Grenada War, the editor of Newweek interviewed the Nicaraguan head of security, Tomas Borge. The American editor asked the

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- 1 Larry Marts, "Next Target : Nicaragua?", Newsweek (New York), 10 November 1983, p.12.
 - 2 George F. Will, "The Price of Power", Newsweek (New York), 7 November, 1983, p.39.
 - 3 Cited in Fred Halliday, "Ominous Lesson of Grenada", Times of India (New Delhi), 27 December 1983.

Nicaraguan leader if Nicaragua could defeat the United States? Tomas Borge, without so much as batting an eyelid, replied: "Absolutely".⁴ He explained:

The American government may have a great technological and military capability far superior to ours. And the resistance we would offer with our technology will be insufficient. But later there will still be hundreds of thousands of armed men throughout the country who will ambush an occupying Army with every step it takes.

The philosophy of the prolonged popular war is the only one possible here. A man with a rifle is more dangerous than a tank because tank is limited in its mobility but the man with the rifle can thrust himself in any location.⁽⁵⁾

Tomas Borge could just as well have said that in a people's war a man with the rifle is also more versatile, and in the long run more dangerous than a multimillion dollar helicopter gunship.

Clearly, the American military performance in Grenada failed to impress many. This is ironical considering that one of the aims of the war was to do just that.

The failure of the American victory to impress may be attributed primarily to two reasons. First, the phenomenal

4 "We are not a threat to the US", Newsweek, 14 November 1983, p.13.

5 Ibid.

effort that the United States had to use to ensure victory, and, secondly, the inept way in which the mammoth American military instrument was applied in Grenada. 'Urgent Fury', all things considered, was more fury than anything else. It had the subtlety of a sledge-hammer, and the discretion of a Caribbean hurricane.

The 'Indirect approach' - the economical way in War - was prominent by its absence in Urgent Fury.⁶ This was reflected in an excessive use of force; the hesitant advance; the high civilian casualties; and the hamhanded efforts at 'population control' and 'reality management'. Tactically, the absence of the 'indirect approach' was reflected in the over-reliance on Air war to accomplish objectives which could have more efficiently been undertaken by the infantry. The indirect approach in LIC, amongst other things, demands good human intelligence; minimum force; minimum material and human damage; and, more than anything else, subordination of technology to the purpose of war. As the goals of war are related to people, it demands that technology be humanised by being placed in the hands of those who are

6 'Indirect Approach' - a term coined and made famous by Liddell Hart - is essentially a psychological concept. For what indirect approach means see B.H.Liddell, Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, Faber, 1967), pp.18,19,24-26.

thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that the purpose of violence in LIC is not merely to dispense destruction, but to dispense it in a politically acceptable way, i.e., with discrimination.

The American military, with its techno-management bias, is often prone to forget that violence has a human context. As Jeffery Record, the Pentagon watcher, notes:

The American military is culturally, as well as by professional training and education, prone to disregard the fact that war remains first and foremost a human encounter - notwithstanding advance in weaponry. (7)

If in Grenada the war was better managed than led, it is not surprising. It is merely a reflection of the dominant pathology that afflicts the American military machine, in which professional rewards go more to managers than leaders. And as far as the management of the Grenada war was concerned, it was superlative. Few countries could have moved so many, over so many kilometers, with all the paraphernalia of war, in such quick time. It was impressive, but alas, unnecessary and counterproductive, for it exposed their vulnerabilities. It stretched American military power thin. As a State Department official

7 Jeffrey Record, "After 35 years. Can US make war Even if it Wants to?", The Guardian Weekly (Manchester) 5 February 1984.

observed:

Grenada came too close to our worst-case scenario. The top brass can see how hard it would be on bigger scale. (8)

In recognition of the difficulties faced in engineering what the New York Times called a 'flyswat victory',⁹ the United States has embarked on an extensive expansion of its interventionist forces, Special forces alone have, since the end of the war, been expanded from 4000 to 6000.¹⁰

The great lesson of the Grenada war, thus, is that the power of even a superpower is limited. And that the

8 Cited in Time, 14 November 1983, p.13.

9 'Grenada High', New York Times (New York) 2 November, 1983, p.A-3.

10 Other measures announced to improve the LIC posture of the United States that followed in the wake of Grenada War were: the formation of a new special operations Aviation Task Force; the procurement of more MC 130 combat Talon aircrafts, and a new naval special warfare craft; steps to improve special operation training, language, skills, area orientation, and the creation of Joint Special Operations Agency to develop "truly effective joint special operations". In financial year 1984 defence authorisation provided for about half a billion dollars for special operations. Clinton Schemmer, H. 'House Panel Formed to Oversee Special Operation Forces', Armed Forces Journal (Washington, D.C.), October 1984, pp.15-18.

United States, notwithstanding its panoply of power, is unlikely to rush into foreign interventions, as frequently as many in the American Government would wish it to do.

But this by no means heralds days of American innocence. Far from it. On the first anniversary of the invasion of Grenada, Secretary of State George Schultz gave a call to Americans to pursue an active strategy. He said:

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption and retaliation. (11)

A month after Schultz's call for an activist policy, the Defence Secretary, Caspar W. Weinberger, outlined 'six major tests' for 'use of US Combat Force abroad'. The foremost test for foreign military interventions was, as was to be expected in the post-Grenada era, guaranteed victory. As Weinberger explained:

If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of victory. (12)

11 "Terrorism in the Modern World", Survival (London), vol. XXVII, no. 1, January/February 1985, p. 33.

12 For the other five tests see, "The Uses of Military Power", Survival (London), vol. XXVII, no. 1, January/February 1985, p. 34.

can
 If anything that can be deduced about future policy with regard to third-world interventions, it is, that the United States is more obsessed with success and victory than with purely ideological issues. In future it is more likely to be guided by the pursuit of quick, decisive, Grenada-type victories, than by anything else. As the real world offers few such opportunities, it may be conjectured that the American use of force will not go beyond symbolic acts such as the skyjacking of the Egyptian Airliner carrying the Achille Luaro hijackers -- which revealingly has been dubbed by Newsweek magazine as Reagan's Second term Grenada.¹³

Beyond America's preoccupation with its image (and credibility), the Grenada war has established a dangerous new precedent which has added a new dimension of uncertainty in the conduct of international relations. It needs to be reiterated that the United States invaded Grenada without so much as a warning or consulting the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the United Kingdom (The British Queen, it may be remembered, was the head of state of Grenada), or any other of its NATO or other allies. This

¹³ The forced landing of Egypt Air 737 aircraft by U.S.-F-14 at Sigonella, Sicily in October 1985, triggered off a Grenada-type upsurge of public approval in the United States. Both Time and Newsweek called the episode Reagan's second term Grenada. Morton M. Kondracke, "Luck'O, the Gipper: Reagan has been winning a lot lately", Newsweek, 21 October 1985, p.27.

flouting of norms and sensibilities of international organisations and allies is without precedent. As can be expected, it upset many, and, worst of all, it has left behind a legacy of uninhibited unilateralism.

Ominously, the first country to take advantage of the Grenada legacy was none other than the international outlaw, South Africa. On 6 December 1983, South Africa invaded Angola. In justification of its new war on Angola, the South African Regime cited the American invasion of Grenada. The chief of the South African Defence Forces, General Constand Viljoen, said:

As little as the US can afford a Grenada sitting on its doorstep, so little can we allow in our bordering territories the enemies of the people that we are protecting to have a Carte blanche. (14).

14 Allister Sparks, "Pretoria Plays The Grenada Card", Amrita Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta) 12 January 1984.

APPENDIX

GRENADIAN CHRONOLOGY

Appendix 'A'GRENADIAN CHRONOLOGY

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
<u>1974</u>	
7th February	Grenada gained independence from the UK. Eric Mathew Gairy named Prime Minister.
<u>1979</u>	
13th March	Gairy overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop, the leader of the NJM. Formation of new Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) announced. Gairy was absent in New York, where he had gone on 12 March to address the U.N. on UFOs.
14th March	Sir Eric Gairy, requested help from the British government to oust Maurice Bishop.
21st March	Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica recognised new government.
23rd March	The US and the UK announced recognition of the PRG. But no Ambassadors were exchanged between Grenada and the US.
8th April	Maurice Bishop asked the United States for security assistance against threats of counter coup from US based Sir Eric Gairy.
10th April	The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Frank Ortiz, handed over a written warning from his Government to the PRG. It said: "we would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of the Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba"
13th April	Maurice Bishop, in an address to his countrymen declared "No country has the right to tell us what to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with . . . We are not in anybody's backyard."
16th April	Grenada and Cuba established diplomatic relations.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
8th May	Maurice Bishop accused the CIA of plotting a campaign of "arson and violence" against Grenada. Maurice Bishop outlines the 'The Pyramid Plan of the CIA' to attack the PRG.
13th June	Finance Minister of Grenada claimed Gairy was recruiting mercenaries in the US for invading Grenada.
6th July	<u>Washington Post</u> revealed that the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) had considered plans for blockading Grenada.
11th July	PRG signed a two year technical assistance pact with Cuba.
6th September	PM, Maurice Bishop, addressed the 6th Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Movement in Havana, Cuba, where he told the assembled leaders that the threats from US to Grenada continued. Grenada was elected to the NAM Coordinating Bureau.
13th September	Diplomatic relations established between Soviet Union and the PRG.
2nd September	PRG announced plans to construct Airport at Point Salines with Cuban help.
10th October	President Carter announced the establishment of new 'Caribbean Contingency Task Force' to combat 'possible communist domination'.
16th October	Plot to assassinate, PM Maurice Bishop uncovered. 20 persons arrested, including the opposition leader Winston Whyte.
4th November	Prime Minister Maurice Bishop announced that sixteen conspirators were arrested for conspiring to overthrow his Government with the aid of a US sponsored seaborne invasion.
<u>1980</u>	
19th June	A bomb aimed at assassinating Maurice Bishop exploded at a rally in St. Georges. Three killed and 110 wounded. Same evening in a speech on Radio Free Grenada, Maurice Bishop held the US responsible for the bomb attack.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
24th June	US Embassy in Barbados categorically denied that it had anything to do with the blast on 19th June.
2nd July	The PRG ambassador to UN sent a formal diplomatic note to all the missions alleging that "imperialism and its local agents had attempted the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop".
<u>1981</u>	
1st January	In a speech at a meeting of the Commonwealth Caribbean Foreign Ministers, Bishop charged US with trying to overthrow his government and cited a "three stage CIA plot".
13th March	US urged EEC governments not to give financial aid for the Point Salines International Airport.
29th March	Maurice Bishop told his countrymen in an address over RFG that the US had declared Economic and Propaganda War against Grenada.
19th June	Maurice Bishop in a rally in St. Georges disclosed US hand in counter-revolutionary procedures against Grenada. He said: "What we are facing today in other words, is the full might of US imperialism." He labelled "CIA" as 'True enemy of the People'.
August	The PRG launched a worldwide diplomatic initiative to solicit help in preventing US invasion, which Maurice Bishop thought would occur no later than November 1, 1981.
August to 15th October	The U.S. 2 fleet, 82 Air Borne Division, and Army Rangers participated in an Exercise 'Ocean Venture'81. Exercise practised plans for invasion of Grenada on Vieques Island near Puerto Rico.
26th August	Bishop charged that the recent US and NATO military exercises in the Caribbean were a practise run for an invasion of the island.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
2nd August	The Grenadians participated in the 'Heroes of the Homeland' manoeuvre in response to threat of US invasion posed by Ex-Ocean Venture 81.
9th November	Bishop claimed "irrefutable proof" of US-planned invasion.
1st December	The US announced formation of the Caribbean Force Command. The responsibility of this command extended to all the Caribbean islands and adjacent waters, the Gulf of Mexico, and portion of the Pacific Ocean bordering Central America. The Caribbean Forces Command is the primary planner for all joint military matters in the region, p.94.
31st December	Iraq extended \$ 5 million loan to finance Point Salines airport.
<u>1982</u>	
24th February	The President Reagan, announced the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) Grenada excluded from the CBI.
13th March	Grenada celebrated the third anniversary of the revolution by the 'Third Julien Fed on National Manoeuvres' in which the PRA, the Militia, and others practised defending of the island against sea/air borne invasion.
8th April	President Ronald Reagan in an address at Bridgetown, Barbados, to heads of OECS declared Grenada had the 'Soviet and Cuban Trade-mark'.
10th April	President Reagan declared that the Caribbean Basin is 'our-third border'.
26-28th July	Bishop visited Moscow. There he signed agreement on economic and military assistance from the USSR.
8th October	At a Plenary meeting of the NJM General Committee Maurice Bishop criticized for weak leadership. Finance Minister Bernard Coard resigned from the Central Committee.

Date Event

1983

- 13th March As a reaction to President Reagan's mention of Grenada in the 'Star Wars' speech, PRG's fears of US invasion were heightened. It ordered mobilisation and renewed diplomatic action to prevent US action.
- 31st May Bishop in an effort to improve relation with the US
9th June visited Washington, D.C. and met with US National Security Advisor William P. Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam. President Reagan refused to meet the Grenadian PM.
- 26th Aug. The IMF approved a \$ 14.1. million loan for the PRG despite opposition from the Reagan Administration.
- 16th Sept. Members of the NWM Central Committee discussed 'option' of removing Bishop at meeting chaired by Bernard Coard.
- 13th Oct. Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, placed under arrest by opponents in the PRG led by the Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, and General Hudson Austin, Commander of the PRA. U.S. started preparation for military intervention in Grenada.
- 14th Oct. The Soviet Union launched a Cosmos 1504 Satellite,
6th Dec. carrying high resolution cameras. Cosmos 1504 passed over the Eastern Caribbean on several occasions between 25 October - 2 November. The Satellite was recovered on 06 December 1983.
- 15th Oct. US Government Official discussed plan for invasion of Grenada with Barbadian official.
- 18th Oct. ^{An} / 11 ship US Navy Task Force (Battle Group CV-62 and Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group I-84, including 22 MAU) left Norfolk, Virginia, for the Mediterranean.
- 19th Oct. Maurice Bishop and three members of his cabinet killed by the PRA. General Hudson Austin announced formation of Revolutionary Military Council to govern the country. Island placed under 24 hour curfew.
- Battle Group CV-62, and Amphibious Ready Group I-84 diverted to Grenada.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
19th October	US Joint Chiefs of staff gave warning order to US Atlantic Command, for the conduct of 'non-combatant' evacuation operations in Grenada.
20th October	<p>US State Department communicated its concern about the safety of 800-1000 US citizens on the island to the new Government.</p> <p>US National Security Council Inter agency crisis pre-Planning Group met and decided that situation in Grenada was serious enough to warrant immediate consideration by National Security Council's special situation group.</p>
21st October	<p>Battle Group CV 62 (11 ships) ordered to close in on Grenada. US 82 Air Borne Division started preparation for 'Urgent Fury'.</p> <p>Gen. Hudson Austin, Chairman of Revolutionary Military Council, invited a delegation from Barbados to look into the safety of US and UK citizens. Delegation included two US diplomats and a representative of British High Commissioner.</p>
22nd October	<p>Fidel Castro sent a message to the US Government saying it was ready to cooperate with the US in ensuring the safety of US citizens. The US ignored the note and did not acknowledge it till after the invasion.</p> <p>British Deputy High Commissioner in Barbados visited Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General of Grenada, in the Government House. The Governor General made no request for invasion or intervention in this meeting.</p> <p>The British Government ordered <u>HMS Antrim</u> to be diverted to Grenada, as a 'precautionary measure' to protect its nationals in the island.</p> <p>The United States Joint Chiefs of staff issued instructions to CINCLANT to be ready to launch 'Urgent Fury' no later than dawn 25 October 1983.</p>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
22nd October	Staff of 82 Air Borne Division attended 'Urgent Fury' planning conference at US Atlantic Command.
23rd October	<p>General Hudson Austin sent cable to US Ambassador in Barbados guaranteeing the safety of all foreigners on the island. Parents of the American students at St. Georges Medical School requested President Reagan not to take any provocative action in Grenada. In St. George's only ten per cent of students expressed desire to leave.</p> <p>Four members of OECOS sent a formal invitation to US to intervene in Grenada to restore order and democracy. The invitation was allegedly drafted in Washington. The leaders of all the CARICOM states met in Trinidad on 22 and 23 October and decided to support sanctions to isolate the RMC, but ruled out military measures.</p> <p>Joint Task Force 120 activated. Commander Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III designated commander of invasion Force.</p> <p>US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, attacked by Lebanese militants. 249 Marine killed. National Security Planning group met in Washington. President Reagan gave the decision to move ahead with 'OP Urgent Fury'. US Invasion plan for Grenada expanded to give berth to US Army elements in the Task Force.</p>
24th October	<p>Curfew in Grenada lifted. Normal classes in St. George's Medical College resumed.</p> <p>Jamaica and Barbados at the behest of the US prohibited airlines from flying to Grenada. US accused Grenada of shutting down Pearls Airport. A US diplomatic plane landed in Grenada and took out three Americans. Several Charter flights left island with foreign residents wishing to leave.</p> <p>Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons that foreigners in Grenada were not at risk and that the RMC had given assurances that those who wished to leave were free to do so.</p>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
24th October	<p>Similar assurances were communicated to the US. The British Foreign Secretary also told the House of Commons that he had 'no reasons to think that American military intervention is likely'.</p> <p>In the evening White House spokesman, Larry Speakes, told reporters in Washington that the idea that the US would invade Grenada was 'preposterous'. At 1800 hours, President Ronald Reagan affixed his seal on 'Operation Urgent Fury'.</p>
25th October	<p>At 5.30 AM Grenada was invaded by 22 MAU, 82 Air Borne Division, 75 Ranger Regiment, Seal Commandos, and others. At 0909 hours President Reagan announced invasion at a news conference.</p> <p>Pt. Salines and Pearls airport captured. True Blue Medical School Campus seized. Fort Frederick secured. Induction of 82 Air Borne Division began.</p> <p>The Pentagon issued first communique at 9 PM. It said 2 US troops killed in first hours of fighting, 23 wounded, 3 missing in action.</p> <p>Soviet News Agency Tass described US invasion as an "act of undisguised banditry and international terrorism".</p> <p>French Government agency described the invasion as "a surprising action" in relation to international law.</p> <p>US announced that a 80 kilometre military zone had been established around Grenada, and that any aircraft flying over that zone would be regarded as enemy.</p>
26th October	<p>Defence Secretary Weinberger told reporters that the invasion of Grenada was progressing 'extremely well'. US casualties announced: 6 killed, 8 missing, 33 wounded, 600 Cubans made PWs. Cuba announced end of all resistance by Cubans.</p>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
27th October	<p>U.S.State Department received the letter inviting the U.S. to invade Grenada from the rescued Governor General Sir Paul Scoon.</p> <p>US casualties announced: 8 dead, eight missing and thirtynine wounded. Cuban casualties estimated about 42. No figure for Grenadian casualties released.</p> <p>A batch of 15 reporters bought to Grenada for brief conducted tour on a US Air Force aircraft.</p> <p>Official US estimate of Cuban strength put at 1100. Cuban were reported to have taken to the hills to continue Guerrilla Warfare. US artillery, helicopter Gunships and Naval aircraft continued to blast 'objectives'.</p> <p>In a televised address to justify the invasion President Reagan said that the Soviet Union "assisted and encouraged" the recent violence in Grenada.</p>
28th October	<p>US troop strength on island put at 6000. US announced all 'major military objectives' captured.</p> <p>US casualties announced: 11 dead, 2 missing, 67 wounded.</p> <p>Soviet Union formally accused US of attacking its Embassy in Grenada on October 26 and wounding a staff member.</p> <p>By vote of 11-1 (US veto), UN Security Council voted on a resolution deeply deploring the US armed intervention in Grenada which it called "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Grenada. It also called for cessation of the intervention and withdrawal of foreign troops.</p> <p>US House Speaker O'Neill denounced President Reagan's foreign policy as "gunboat diplomacy"</p>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
29th October	<p>82 Air Borne Division began relief of Army Rangers and 22 MAU.</p> <p>Vice Admiral Metcalf announced that 69 'enemy troops' had been killed in combat.</p> <p>Pentagon officials reduced estimate of Cubans on the island to between 700 and 750 against the initial estimate of 1,100.</p> <p>Bernard Coard, captured by US Marines.</p> <p>Sir Paul Scoon on his first radio broadcast to Grenadians thanked the US soldiers for the intervention.</p> <p>In London, Commonwealth Secretary General Shridath Ramphal, announced a plan to create Commonwealth Security Force (CSF) with troops belonging to India, Canada, Nigeria, Australia, and some Caribbean countries. The plan called for the replacement of US troops by CSF.</p>
30th October	<p>General Hudson Austin, leader of Revolutionary Military Council captured.</p> <p>US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Gillette named as the official US Liaison Officer to the Interim Government.</p>
31st October	<p>82 Airborne Division completed relief of 22 MAU, 22 MAU diverted to Carriacou Schools and Government offices reopened.</p> <p>US Defence Department acknowledged that at least 12 civilians were killed when a Navy plane mistakenly bombed a civilian hospital on October 25th. Reporters visiting the site said at least 50 people had been killed.</p> <p>150 reporters allowed into Grenada.</p> <p>US armed forces strength in Grenada touched the peak figure of 7335.</p> <p>US announced \$ 475,000 as 'disaster relief for Grenada'. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) despatched a disaster</p>

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
	survey team which began work with U.S. military disaster survey team to survey the damage caused by the war.
	Sir Paul Scoon, on instruction from the American occupation authorities, sent a note to the Cuban Embassy in Grenada, saying that all Cuban diplomatic personnel should leave the country immediately. The Cuban refused to comply.
1st November	Three hundred US Marines landed in Carriacou. 17 men described as soldiers detained.
	Task force USS America (9 ships) ordered to begin exercise in the Caribbean.
	Pentagon confirmed that many US casualties in Grenada were on account of accidents.
	Jamaica expelled Soviet diplomats.
2nd November	UN General Assembly called for an immediate end to the "armed intervention" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Grenada. The resolution called US action a "flagrant violation of international law" 108 countries voted in favour, 9 against (OECS, Jamaica, Barbados, Israel, El Salvador, and the USA) and 27 abstained.
	US declared hostilities in Grenada had ended. Aircraft carrier battle group (CV 62) and Amphibious Assault Group 1-84 left Grenadian waters.
	Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf, US Task Force Commander, handed over command to Maj.Gen. Edward Trobaugh, Commanding General, 82 Air Borne Division, and to Brig. Rudyard EC Lewis Commander of the CFF.
	Pentagon announced US casualties: 18 killed and 91 wounded. 'Opposition' casualties put at 59 killed.
	57 Cuban wounded including 8 women, 3 children and the dead were transported by International Committee of Red Cross to Havana.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
	Anthony Rushford, British Constitution/Lawyer, sent to Grenada by Commonwealth Secretary General Sonny Ramphal to act as legal adviser to Sir Paul Scoon. Reagan
3rd November	President/objcted to use of word 'invasion' to describe US action in Grenada. He said it was a rescue mission.
4th November	US State Department released some captured documents in justification of the invasion. The release included agreements Grenada had concluded with the Soviet Union, North Korea and Cuba for arms. \$ 3.475 million 'emergency disaster aid' granted to Grenada. 49 Soviets, 6 East Germans, 15 Koreans, 3 Bulgarians and 53 Cubans who had taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy compound in Grenada during the invasion were evacuated to Mexico.
7th November	President Reagan hosted a reception for American Medical students at the White House. Sir Paul / Scoon requested the US Government to keep its troops in Grenada for as long as possible.
9th November	Cuban PW evacuation completed. Sir Paul Scoon, named nine Grenadians to an Advisory Council, to serve as an interim government until elections.
14th November	Fidel Castro in a eulogy for Cubans killed by the US troops outlined 19 lies that the US Government told with regard to its action in Grenada.
15th November	Interim Government of Sir Paul Scoon appointed Anthony Rushford, a British lawyer, Attorney General in the administration. The Interim Government of Grenada issued a Preventive Detention Ordinance which gave it and US Forces and the CDF the power to arrest and search any persons "acting, or likely to act in manner adverse to public safety, order or defence".



<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
16th November	White House officials announced that US Combat troops withdrawal from Grenada to be completed by December 23, 1983.
17th November	Amnesty International wrote a letter to the US President expressing its concern at the "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" being given to the Grenadians detained by US Forces.
28th November	Strength of US troops in Grenada announced as 2723.
5th December	British lawyer Anthony Rushford, Attorney General in the interim Government resigned from Sir Paul Scoon Government after accusing Sir Paul Scoon of "lacking enthusiasm" for an end to the US occupation.
10th December	US Combat troops strength on island 915.
15th December	US announced that all US troops had been withdrawn from island except 300 'support personnel'. Amongst these 300 was the 1 Psychological operations Battalion.
	Headquarters US Forces, Grenada, was dissolved and replaced by U.S. Military Support Element, Grenada (USMSEG), Maj.Gen. Jack Farris, the Deputy Commander of XVIII Air Lorne Corps was the last USFG Commander. Lt.Col. Arthur Graves was designated commander of USMSEG.
	In addition to US troops 320 Jamaicans and 200 OECS troops also continued to stay in Grenada.
	Final casualty tally announced: US 18 killed, 116 wounded; Grenadian 45 killed, 337 wounded; Cuban 24 killed and 59 wounded.
21st December	6000 Grenadians in a signed Petition asked for 'political association' with the U.S.
<u>1984</u>	
21st January	Sir Eric Gairy, returned to Grenada from the USA. He said if his party Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) won the elections, it

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
	would request US military and British naval presence in Grenada. He also said that in internal policy "we were too soft last time. This time we shall be much tougher on the communists".
	Mr.Radix inaugurated a new organization in St.Georges, called the "Maurice Bishop and 25th October 1983 Marty's Foundation".
30th January	The US Agency for International Development (USAID) study noted that the length of the Point Salines airport was 9000 feet. [and not 10,000 feet as asserted by President Reagan] and that the project was essential for the development of tourism.
22nd February	Leaders of overthrown RMC were charged with murdering former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and others.
29th March	U.S.Department of Defence announced that 8,612 medal had been awarded to U.S.military forces involved in the invasion of Grenada.
5th April	A select committee on Foreign Affairs of UK House of commons issued a report on the findings of its inquiry into the military intervention in Grenada. The report said that the British Government had reacted passively to the events in Grenada, and that the Government had not taken any steps to halt the US invasion.
24th May	U.S. signed a military training agreement with Grenada under its International Military Education and Training Program.
28th October	The airport at Point Salines was opened to commercial flights. The airport was named Point Salines International Airport inspite of number of suggestions to have it named after President Reagan or Mr.Maurice Bishop.
	The Supervisor of Elections, Mr.Roy Chasteau, and his assistant, were dismissed after they alleged that there were irregularities in the preparations for the polls.


<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
3rd December	The New National Party, recently formed by Mr. Herbert Blaize, won 14 of the 15 seats in a general election in Grenada.
4th December	Mr. Blaize sworn in as Prime Minister. Soon after being sworn in as the Prime Minister Mr. Blaize told a rally that he was "dedicating this land to the service of Almighty God, who sent us the Americans". The American President in Washington hailed Mr. Herbert Blaize's electoral victory as an "achievement of historic importance".

1985

7th February	U.S. announced all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Grenada by end of September at which time Grenada would have deployed its own 560 member police force. The pull out of 250 U.S. military personnel and 450 member peace keeping force from the Caribbean nations, it said, would begin in mid-April.
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MAPS

GRENADA (map-1)




DISTANCES

GRENADA:-

Carriacou	32kms
Venezuela	160kms
Barbados	141kms
St Vincent	109kms
U. S. A.	2600kms

SOUTHERN GRENADA (map-2)



DISTANCES

ST GEORGE:-

Pt Salines 8kms
 Grand Anse 4kms
 Pearl Airport 16 kms

PT SALINES :-

True Blue 1kms
 Calivigny 4kms
 Grand Anse 4kms

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