REALIST vs. NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIST EXPLANATIONS OF POST-COLD WAR JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**Realist vs. Neo-liberal Institutionalist Explanations of Post-Cold War Japanese Foreign Policy**", submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan
(Chairperson, CIPOD)

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan
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— A 'reactive' or 'proactive' state—Traditional or non-traditional security—Hard power or soft power—Reaction to foreign threats: 'balancing', 'free-riding' or 'bandwagoning'

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ASDF: Air Self-Defence Forces
BMD: Ballistic Missile Defence
DJP: Democratic Party of Japan
DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan
GOJ: Government of Japan
GSDF: Ground Self-Defence Forces
HST: Hegemonic stability theory
IPCA: International Peace Cooperation Activities
JSDF: Japanese Self Defense Force
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party
MSDF: Maritime Self-Defence Forces
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPR: National Police Reserves
NSF: National Safety Forces
NTS: Non Traditional Security
ODA: Official Development Assistance
PD: Prisoners' Dilemma
PKO: Peace Keeping Operations
R&D: Research and development
SDF: Self-Defense Forces
US: United States
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WW-II: World War-II

Chapter 1
Introduction

Can Japan be called a realist state, given that it has no major indigenous military capabilities and that in fact, its national defence is partly ensured in conjunction with an external entity—the United States? If realism is all about self help in an anarchic world and increasing one's power in order to ensure one's security, then how does one account for a country like Japan, which is not only surviving but also thriving, almost sixty years after forfeiting militarism? Since the end of the Second World War Japan has given up its right to re-militarize, as laid down in Article Nine of its Constitution, and at the turn of the century it is none the worse for it. In this light it is worth deliberating why Japan *consciously* opted to refrain from becoming a military power even though it had the economic means to do so, rather than adopting the tenets of self help and maximization of power to ensure its national security. Does it not deem military power important enough, like other states do? Is this behaviour of Japan consistent with the realist theory of international politics or do theories other than realism, like neo-liberal institutionalism better explain the conduct of Japan's foreign policy?

The change in the international structure from multipolarity to bipolarity after the end of WW-II had a radical impact on Japan's foreign policy, as is evident from fact that it saw the transformation of Japan from a highly aggressive and militarist nation, to becoming one of the most pacifist nations of the world. Realists have usually attributed this change to shifts in the international distribution of power, while constructivists have highlighted the strong role of the domestic anti-militarist norms that were believed to have developed after Japan's nuclear experience. Liberals on the other hand have pointed at variables like the shift from a non-democratic to a democratic state, the increasing inefficacy of hard power in a world of interdependence, and the ability of international institutions to bring about 'cooperation under anarchy' to explain Japanese behaviour.

The next big change in the international structure came about with the end of the Cold War, marking yet another shift in the global distribution of power from bipolarity to unipolarity. Since the unexpected end of the Cold War, standard arguments about power politics could, as Katzenstein (2008) points out, no longer be

adopted uncritically. This led to a renewed interest in Japan's unusually peaceful security policy. With the end of the Cold War era Japan has become cognizant of its changing realities and the difficulties of having to match its post-WW-II legacies with post-Cold War realities. As Kenneth Waltz remarks, "Japan has the capability of raising herself to great-power rank, but has lacked the inclination to do so" (Waltz, 1986: 343). This has important implications in terms of the changes in Japan's *ability* and *willingness* to engage in large-scale military operations and actively balance in the post-Cold War era, which not only need to be captured but also theoretically explained.

It is with these puzzles that the research at hand intends to contend with. The research puzzle stems from a certain outcome or behaviour in the realm of international relations, namely Japan's decision to refrain from becoming a military power. The explanation/s for this particular behaviour will however be sought for from the theories of international politics. In this quest, the research proposes to re-visit two theories of international relations in particular—realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, as well as make forays into the realm of the actual practice of international politics, by taking instances from the conduct of Japan's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

It is important to note that none of the aforementioned questions are as such novel queries. They have been both asked, as well as addressed before. Both realists and neo-liberal institutionalists have come up with their respective explanations for the particular decision by Japan to refrain from developing major military capabilities. Realists have advanced the 'free-rider' hypothesis which postulates that when a public good (in this case military security) is being provided by a hegemon, the tendency of the lesser powers is to enjoy the benefits without bearing the cost for as long as possible. The liberals on the other hand, have advanced the theory of complex interdependence to explain Japan's bid for economic power without entering the race for military power. However, this research problematises the explanations advanced by scholars on both sides of the theoretical divide, as shall be eventually elucidated.

Background

Till the 1960s the general perception within the academicia was that politics, the domain of power, security and prestige was largely separate from the sphere of economics (Holsti, 1986). However, the rebirth of International Political Economy as a sub-field of IR changed this perception, at least for some. By the mid-1970s, along with political interactions between nations, a simultaneous phenomenon was taking place in the realm of IPE—that of increasing international flow of goods, services, finance, capital, technology etc. Among the first to realize these changes was Richard Cooper who came up with the term "interdependence" in the 1960s (Cooper, 1968: 12). Later scholars took this concept further to advance the theory of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1988). The basic tenets of these concepts fall within the neo-liberal paradigm and are an alternative to the realist explanation and way of looking at things. While classical realism re-iterates the importance of military or hard power as the means to the end of attaining security in an anarchic world; its contending theory, neo-liberal institutionalism draws our attention to soft power and the realm of economics where international cooperation is taking place due to patterns of complex interdependence between nations.

The present conventional wisdom takes the best of both worlds and says that governments pursue both security and economic goals simultaneously. As Gilpin puts it, there is a "reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power[1] (Gilpin, 1975: 43). However, Holsti does not fail to point out that though 'governments seek both power and plenty, when the two are incompatible, the former predominates. Governments will sacrifice significant or even critical economic opportunities when their independence, autonomy or national security is at risk' (Holsti, 1986).

It is against this backdrop that this research proposes to take a look at the case of Japan and *its* balance between the objectives of 'power' and 'plenty'. In the post-WW II era Japan enjoyed the unique status of being a regional-and-global economic power to be reckoned with, without having commensurate or even adequate indigenous military capabilities or hard power. Japan, a non-nuclear country, is not even a permanent member of the Security Council! Yet it is a member of the G-7,

[1] This is an echo of what Jacob Viner stated way back in 1948 in his article "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" (Viner, 1948).

with the second largest GDP in the world, after the U.S. and among the top shareholders in international financial institutions. Does the above statement about power predominating over plenty, then hold true in the case of Japan which as William Nester puts it, "was the first government to understand that military power was becoming more and more irrelevant in an increasingly interdependent world" (Nester, 1990: 25)?

The end of the Cold War was singularly the most important event that changed the post-World War II foreign policy for all nations. Japan was one of the nations whose foreign policy was particularly affected by the end of the Cold War. This situation was in many ways due to the uniqueness of Japanese foreign policy and the country's constitutional restraints. For much of the post-World War II era Japanese foreign policy was modelled along the Yoshida Doctrine, which permitted Japan to focus on economic development while depending on the United States for its national security needs. This policy worked out well only until the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War that followed. The war had a major impact on the politics of Japan because the economic giant was forced to face the true reality of its economic superpower status for the first time in a major international crisis. Thus we see that for Japan the simple world that it knew during the Cold War had become complex. Decisions became much more complicated and far-reaching and the rules had changed. Since World War II Japan has done well to live by the dove of pacifism. But now the time has come for Japan to choose whether to "let its role in the world dwindle and perish by its self imposed pacifism or take up the sword and risk the enemies it has avoided since the end of World War II" (Cooney, 2006: 45). Most of this research is aimed at finding out which course of action Japan is likely to take among the options available to it and what are the imperatives behind it.

Will Japan be compelled by the structure of the new post-Cold War environment to affect radical strategic changes in her security initiatives and foreign policy doctrine, or can she hold her own against such systemic forces, is what a major part of this research attempts to do. The establishment of the above (i.e: impact of structural change on state behaviour) however, does not however help in determining conclusively whether Japan is guided by realist or non-realist factors, because there are a number of strands of realism, like its neoclassical variant, that have prised open the 'black box' of the state to include sub-systemic level independent variables

alongside structural ones. This necessitates a closer look at the context of the changes occurring in Japanese foreign policy, alongside the sources of such changes.

Definition and Scope of the Study

Nye says that international relations theory is constrained by the fact that "history provides a poor substitute for a laboratory" (Nye, 1988: 19). This makes it quite difficult to verify a particular claim once it has been made, and ascertain whether it holds true across time and space. On the other hand, however, Peter Gourevitch notes that "big events in world politics provide students of international relations and comparative politics with the closest thing to a natural experiment (Gourevitch, 1977: 281). During the Cold War Japan lacked both the willingness as well as the ability to balance. Therefore, one could not be sure whether it was eschewing its rise to great power status owing to realist reasons like free-riding or liberal explanations like commitment to international (as well as domestic) norms and institutions. It did not even matter much because whether it was the 'logic of consequences' or the 'logic of appropriateness' that governed Japan's behaviour, they both advocated the same optimal outcome—abdicating the 'sword' in favour if the 'chrysanthemum'. However, the end of the Cold War shook Japan out of its complacency, as a lot that it earlier took for granted was up for change. The logic of structural realism, in particular its offensive variant, predicted that since U.S. was the sole, unbalanced power in the system, Japan would undergo a marked shift in its interaction with its ally from 'free-riding' to active balancing against it. It would also balance against other foreign threats like North Korea and the rising economic challenger—China. Neoliberals on the other hand did not expect any drastic turn in Japan's post-Cold War security strategies and postulated that it would remain a pacifist nation.

One of the objectives of the current research is therefore to examine the changes in Japanese foreign policy and determine which theoretical paradigm best explains these changes in the post-Cold War Era. Is it neo-realism, neo-liberalist institutionalism, or some other variant of realism or liberalism not captured by conventional definitions and core assumptions of either research programme? Realists argue that Japan has already begun to translate its economic power into military power and that policy makers in Japan have gradually "whittled away at Yoshida's pacifist constitution" (Samuels, 2007: 119). According to this view, Japan is once

again becoming a "natural" major power. It is spending more money on developing its military prowess and power projection capabilities. Japan's military is beginning to equip itself with both "shield and spear" and the Japanese are signalling their intention to play a more active role in regional security. According to Katzenstein (2008) the above news items are like dots that we can connect to create an image of a Japan readying itself to strike militarily once again. But these dots can be connected in many other ways. How we go about drawing connections depends largely on the implicit analytical lenses that we use to interpret Japanese politics. Because it regards as "natural" the displacement of a 1960s style of liberal pacifism by a 1930s-style militant nationalism, a pessimistic interpretation of the evidence neglects many facets of Japanese politics and society that may be worth consideration. Falling back on past events to make sense of snippets of current news is a mistake. Instead our analysis should also focus on the institutional norms and practices that Japan's political and other public leaders use to evolve novel forms of politics and policy (Katzenstein, 1996b).

Since Japanese foreign policy cannot be neatly categorized in to either structural realism or complex interdependence, the attempt in this research also extends to finding out if it is possible to explain the pattern of Japan's interactions through any theoretical prism at all. One way of looking at this issue is to say that just because Japanese conduct in international affairs is not consistent with realism in its current form it should not be assumed that it is not realist, without digging in deeper. For this purpose it is necessary to explore in details the increasing importance of economic power-based conceptions of security policy. Japan's perception of threat is slightly different from that advanced in classical realist theory, therefore its conception of power and security are also different. Thus, if the parochial connotation of realism to include only military conceptions of power and security are relaxed, we see that Japan, one of the best students of the neo-liberal institutionalist school, is more realist than meets the eye. This research therefore also aims at factoring in these new strains of realism which can be extended beyond hard power and applied to other aspects of power.

Again, it is reasonable to question whether Japan's actions are a product of rational choice or shaped by the particular experiences, ethics, norms, values of the country. Was Japan motivated by '*realpolitik*' or by '*normpolitik*'? For instance, Christopher Hughes' book *Japan's Economic Power and Security* reveals that after

the devastating defeat of Japan and the past experience with the Japanese Imperial forces, the Japanese public was highly averse to rearmament after the war. Was this a rational egoist actor speaking or the scars and painful memories of a past that even time could not alleviate?[2] We see that the proponents of the free-rider hypothesis have taken for granted that the Japanese 'decision' was a rational one without taking into account domestic, sub-systemic variables. The research at hand, however, proposes to analyse this particular outcome from the point of view of a rational choice perspective as well as a constructivist perspective.

Rationale of the Study

The relevance/rationale of the study stems from Waltz's basic premise about international politics, namely that structural realism does not say that all states are realist; it merely says that if states do not follow the tenets of realism, they will pay a penalty in future. It is important thereby to gauge if Japan has (or alternatively has not) followed the tenets of realism or intends to follow them in future if it has not done so yet. George Friedman opines in his book *The Coming War with Japan* that this is just a transition phase before Japan embarks on a full-fledged race to become a military superpower (Friedman et al., 1991). Some others are of the opinion that Japan will stop "passing the buck" and start bucking up instead, as it moves beyond the legacies of WW II into the realities of the post Cold War and of late the post 9/11 world (Green, 2001). Another set of scholars link Japan's movement towards increasing realism with the decline of American hegemony, while some others like Christopher Layne and Waltz predict that it will be among those responsible for the decline of America's preponderant power (Layne, 2006; Waltz, 2000). Some like Calder have remarked about Japan's apparent passivity in international affairs and its unwillingness to take risks and assert its interests in world affairs (Calder, 1988). Japanese foreign policy has undergone changes major changes since the end of the Cold War and is expected to do so in future.

[5] Excerpt from *Gaikō Seisho* translated by Christopher Hughes: "The path to peace that Japan should follow is not one for its achievement based upon the exercise of armed force. Instead the painful experience of the past has taught us that the way to achieve peace and prosperity for the world is through technical knowledge and economic cooperation" (Hughes, 1999)

Americans find it especially important to address the Japanese question because it is fundamental to the resolution of the paradoxes and anomalies in the present Japanese-American relationship. With the end of the Cold War these anomalies and paradoxes can no longer be overlooked. In the post-Cold War era, even a small change in Japanese security policies is expected to have major ramifications especially in terms of the complex dynamic of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has considerable geopolitical and economic interests in the Pacific. The United States is the only country with both economic and military power resources in the region, and its continued presence is desired by Asian powers who do not want Japan to remilitarize. Japan's current political consensus is opposed to such a military role, and Japanese leaders realize it would be destabilizing in the region. Even for her Asian neighbours it is extremely important to know in which direction Japan is headed. Some of these countries like China and Korea are particularly wary of the Japanese owing to the bitter memories of Japanese war atrocities during WW-II. These memories are like embers that can spark off a fire in Japan's relations with her neighbours, even today[3].

This is what makes it important to try and gauge the nature and direction of the changes in Japanese foreign policy doctrine, both that have already occurred and are expected to occur in the immediate future. Expectations about future course of action will be shaped by the kind of theoretical paradigm being used to explain Japan's foreign policy, which is why it is vital to know whether Japan has so far being towing in line with the expectations enunciated by realists or those advanced by realists.

Review of the Literature

There is no dearth of literature on the theories of international politics and on Japan's international relations, separately. However, the literature dealing specifically with the theoretical aspects of Japanese foreign policy and the conduct of her international affairs, is less vast but by no means scanty. There are a number of contending views on the theoretical orientation of Japanese foreign policy since the end of WW II, i.e. on whether Japan is a realist state or is consistent with the theory and practice of neo-

[3] A good instance would be the indignation of China at the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi, to the Yasukuni Shrine, commemorating a number of Japanese war criminals.

liberal institutionalism and complex interdependence. Neo-realist thinking on one hand is highly critical of the 'Yoshida Doctrine' and maintains that the type of moderate Japanese pacifism that it represents is naïve, as this type of security policy had only been made possible in the first place by the luxury of having entrusted to the U.S. the role of protecting Japan from military threat during the Cold War (Hook et al., 2005). Others have chosen to exclusively highlight Japan's economic and technological power and how it has effectively been using these to attain its goals in an increasingly interdependent world (Sternheimer, 1981).

However, as has been mentioned and substantiated before, there have been numerous instances of Japan's interaction with the world that do not fit the bill of either realism or neo-liberalism. Some like Christopher Hughes have dealt very well with the issue of how Japan can use its current economic status to address security issues both regionally and globally (Hughes, 1999), but these works have remained ambivalent as far as putting it into any theoretical paradigm is concerned. Green has pointed out in his book *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power,* that Japanese foreign policy is reflective of a 'low cost, low risk, benefit maximizing strategy' (Green, 2001) which makes it consistent with the rational egoist clause of neo-realism. However this only reinforces the fact that most of the realist scholars have chosen to focus solely on the military side of Japanese security policy while underplaying the importance of its economic power. According to them, Japan is not only realist at present due to the increasing size of the JSDF (Kliman, 2006); but has been so right from 1945 because it took the option of free-riding the U.S. for its defence, thereby allowing it to divert resources to consolidate itself economically which could later be used to consolidate itself militarily. For these scholars, complex interdependence and neo-liberalism with which Japan is associated, is only an illusion and would not have existed if Japan had to watch her own back.

No doubt the free-rider hypothesis is difficult to refute because it is theoretically backed by the realist version of the hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1984b); yet it does not scratch beyond the surface and analyse the reasons behind the specific behaviour of Japan. One author correctly points out that the U.S.-Japanese alliance that was entered into after the Second World War was one between 'the victor and the vanquished' (Kawashima, 2003:24). So it is worth deliberating whether Japan at that time had much of an option but to accept the terms being meted out to it by the U.S. It has also been observed by Kawashima that the Japanese people

themselves were extremely wary of the remilitarization of Japan after the war, as they were haunted by the memories of the all-powerful, erstwhile imperial forces. Rather surprisingly they were extremely receptive to the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan (Kawashima, 2003). It is interesting to note that in Japan the credibility of the U.S. defence commitment did not become a key issue in parliamentary debates, in marked contrast with Western Europe where this has been the dominant concern among NATO members (Kawashima, 2003: 33).

This indicates that there is an alternative way of interpreting Japan's actions, rather than presupposing that they were motivated by structural causes like free-riding. As Green succinctly puts it, one cannot overlook the fact that Japanese foreign policy choices are filtered through the powerful ideational lens of Japanese norms, aspirations and insecurities (Green, 2001). Constructivists like Peter Katzenstein too, have provided theoretical frameworks for examining norms and institutions as determinants of foreign and security policy (Katzenstein, 1996b). This is one aspect which is overlooked by the rationalists focusing solely on the free-rider's theory. Thus, we see that most of the existing literature, whether inferring the existence of realism or otherwise, has rooted its explanations either in a rational-choice approach or in a constructivist one. This research attempts to synthesise both these approaches before it draws any theoretical inferences about Japan's foreign policy and international relations.

Richard Rosecrance, in the article titled 'Japan and the Theory of International Leadership', discusses the role that Japan should assume as U.S. power declines. As has been mentioned before, most scholars, notably realists who advance the free-rider hypothesis predict that as U.S. hegemony declines, Japan will be compelled to shift from focusing merely on its economic strengths, manifest through structural power, to ensuring its own security. However, Rosecrance postulates that:

> "For declining leaders as well as their rising competitors the high politics of relative international gains no longer dominate foreign policy calculations. Competitor states taking on the role of creditor nations will act to bolster the system." (Rosecrance, 1990: 189)

Robert Keohane makes the same point in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* This is the liberal institutionalist alternative to the realist viewing of Japan's international relations. However, this too is not free

from problems. The glitches involved in taking Japan to be a country modelled purely along the lines of complex interdependence have already been discussed before.

Thus we see that, what most of the literature reviewed so far basically does is, to refute the basic assumptions of liberalism and interdependence, if realist, and vice versa if neo-liberal institutionalist. What this research, on the other hand, intends to do is to avoid arriving at a certain inference by ruling out assumptions of the opposing camp altogether. For instance, realists barely acknowledge the economic power side of the story and its efficacy in obtaining desirable international outcomes[4]. This research proposes to start off by exploring all the core assumptions of realism as well as neo-liberal institutionalism, and then using observations from the actual practice of Japanese foreign policy to test if it can prove these initial assumptions invalid or suggest a better explanatory framework.

Thus, after the literature review we are left with contending perspectives, various insights and numerous ways of approaching the research problem. The big task at hand now, which has to be undertaken in this research, is to synthesise all the above and provide a comprehensive analysis before attempting to answer the research puzzle: namely what is the dominant theoretical paradigm explaining Japan's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The following section will go onto elaborate how the research at hand is proposed to be conducted.

Research Methodology

The research at hand is designed to be deductivist, subjective and interpretative rather than inductivist, objective and positivist. Deductive reasoning is one which adopts a top-down approach, in that it begins from one or the other theory, from which firstly a set of specific hypotheses is generated, followed by looking at observations to test the hypothesis. In this case the two theories from which hypotheses are being generated are realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, while the set of observations, putting the hypothesis to test, are to be drawn from Japanese foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War era. An interpretative approach allows for understanding the context behind the particular outcomes that form a part of the observation set. This is as opposed to a positivist approach which simply puts empirical fact to theory in an objective manner.

[4] A part of this problem is redressed by newer versions of realism like post-classical realism, which do not assume that military security interests will always trump economic interests (refer to Chapter 2).

Using a positivist approach in this research would be inadequate, since most of the observations viz-á-viz Japanese foreign policy have to be understood in the broader and larger context of its past experiences, its present opportunities and constraints, as well as its future options. Again a subjective rather than an objective analysis is required because as Ken Booth notes it is not only important to determine "what is", but also "who is telling" (Booth, 1997: 111). Yet again, this is extremely pertinent for the Japanese case as the inferences drawn from the same set of observations differ, on the basis of whether they are being interpreted by realists or liberals; Americans or Japanese; allies or threatened neighbours etc. For instance, the same observation of Japan not having a regular army since the end of WW-II has been interpreted by realists, and some American scholars as corroborating with the 'free-rider's hypothesis' while by liberals and some Japanese scholars as Japan's commitment to pacifism.

Thus, keeping all these in mind, it was deemed that the most suitable *research methodology* for the research at hand is the *qualitative research strategy*. Qualitative research methods were developed in the social sciences to enable researchers to study social and cultural phenomena. Examples of qualitative methods are action research, case study research and ethnography. Among the different *research methods* that exist within the qualitative research methodology, the *single case study method* has been chosen as the preferred option. Van Evera has proposed certain situations for when the case study method is appropriate. It is used when the researcher wants to "establish a theory or theories, for testing theories that already exist, for identifying conditions that lead to or contribute to a phenomenon or when the researcher wants to establish the relative importance of the contributing conditions (Evera, 1997 cited in McNabb, 2005: 213)

The data gathered during the research shall be qualitative as well as quantitative; however, qualitative research methods shall be used to interpret both. Among the *qualitative research techniques* used will be *document analysis*—namely government records and reports—as well as *article and content analysis*, which entails a careful study of the external material on and revolving around the subject at hand (McNabb, 2005). Besides the secondary sources mentioned in the literature review, reference will be made to primary sources like open source official policy documents, important declarations and announcements made by key foreign-policy decision makers, who that would throw light on changes (if any) in Japan's official

foreign policy doctrine. For instance, it is important to trace the changes in the Japanese Constitution since 1945, especially the introduction of Article 9 which puts legal constrains on the re-militarization of Japan, as well as the re-interpretations that were made to it thereafter, reflecting changing domestic attitudes as well as a changing international scenario. Apart from books and articles on the subject therefore, newspapers and journals (of course English transcripts) also need to be scoured for an insight into the prevailing mood of the polity and the public. Artefacts of decisions are the traces that foreign policy decisions leave in newspapers or chronologies. These are formally called 'events data' (Hudson, 2007). The question of representativity often crops up while researching official foreign-policy doctrines. Certain aspects to representativity that Edstrom (1999) has taken into consideration are the choice of the decision-maker who has the authority as a *spokesman* for Japan as an international actor. The higher one is in the decision-making hierarchy, the more reasonable it is to assume that the government is answerable to statements made by the spokesman. In the case of Japan, the Prime Minister has the primacy in decision-making regarding matters of foreign policy both in fact as well as institutionally therefore speeches made by him shall be looked at as the most dependable source of changes in foreign policy. Since these speeches are carefully formulated statements of the views of the decision-making bodies and are delivered by the highest official in Japan's political system in the most important formal arena, they are considered as important declarations and binding for Japan. Also it should be noted that these speeches are written by government officials, therefore rarely reflective of the personal beliefs of the prime minister. Speeches and documents together are expected to contain enough evidence of the ascription of goals, roles, and relations in Japanese foreign policy making.

Quantitative data on the other hand would form a relatively small part of the total data gathered and would mainly include raw numerical data, for instance, data showing the changes in Japanese defence expenditure as a percentage of its GDP relative to other countries; the gradual increments in the size of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in absolute terms; the composition of military spending; the amount of ODA given to its neighbouring countries and so on. Opinion surveys, relaying changes in public and elite conceptions of security will also be an important quantitative data source. All such data would be availed of from internet sources and other statistical databases that are periodically published by the government. Qualitative analysis will

help put these figures into perspective by throwing light on their meaning and implications.

Next we come to the unit of analysis that shall be adopted in the research. The method adopted in this research has to be sensitive to the 'levels-of-analysis' problem as pointed out by David Singer (Singer, 1969), and reconcile between the systemic and sub-systemic levels of analysis. Some of the theories alluded to in this research, like realism, especially its structural variant as espoused by Kenneth Waltz are systemic theories which do not concern themselves with the 'black box' of the state[5]. But in order to get a grasp of the case at hand it is absolutely necessary to look into the internal dynamics of Japanese foreign policy-making for which one has to analyse sectors like domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, interest groups etc., which are not structural variables. However, this problem can be reconciled by adopting a variant of realism called 'neo-classical realism' (Rose, 1998), which synthesises sub-systemic and structural variables. Thus, it is seen that the study is not divided along ontological lines as it involves both structural and sub-systemic level independent variables, some of which are realist (both structural as well as neo-classical realist), while others liberal. Dealing with realism in general, rather than neorealism per se, therefore also solves the problem of using theories of *international relations* to interpret and explain *foreign policy outcomes.* Generating realist explanations of state behaviour is ontologically consistent, because neither the older classical strain nor the newer neo-classical realist variety, rule out the impact of the first and second levels of analysis.
The other point to be noted is that this study is also not epistemologically divided as rationalist as well as constructivist approaches shall be used to generate both realists well as liberal-institutionalist explanations and understanding of Japanese foreign policy behaviour.

Conclusion

What according to realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are the changes that *should* have come about in Japanese foreign-policy in the post-Cold War period? What are the *actual* changes observed in terms of foreign policy outcomes? Do the observed changes correspond with the expected changes? What are the drivers of this change—

[5] Waltz in fact, has unequivocally stated that 'International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy' (Waltz, 1996).

external pressures (commonly alluded to as *gaiatsu*), changing internal political dynamics, systemic changes, or attitudinal transformations?

Chapter 2 takes up the first of the two theoretical prisms used in this research to explain Japanese foreign policy—Realism. This chapter, as well as the next, is divided into three sections. The first is essentially a theoretical stock-taking, wherein the evolution of this theoretical paradigm from classical, to structural, to neo-classical realism is briefly traced. The second section lays out in detail how the realist paradigm has analysed the Japanese case and interpreted its actions during the Cold War era. Finally, in the third section an attempt is made to put together the set of predictions that this particular school of thought posits for Japanese behaviour in the post-Cold War era.

Chapter 3 is also organised along similar lines, just that the theory being taken up in this case is Neo-liberal Institutionalism. The first section purports to trace the roots from which neo-liberal institutionalism evolved into its present state—namely the transition from classical liberalism, to liberal internationalism, to neo-liberalism. The second section of this chapter seeks to advance some liberal, in particular, institutionalist explanations for some of the most outstanding features of Japan's foreign policy behaviour during the Cold War. Different strands of liberalism like theories of interdependence, regime theory and theories of international institutions are advanced to explain Japan's reticence to engage in balancing behaviour or taking on a more active role in international politics. Lastly, the range of scenarios for Japan's future foreign policy trajectory that are anticipated by liberal-institutionalist theory are discussed in the third section.

Chapter 4 forms the substantive case study chapter of this research. It is essentially conceptualised along the lines of a Lakatosian style, "three-cornered fight" which pits the actual behaviour of Japan in the post-Cold War era against the expected behaviour predicted by the theories of realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. In particular, changes in the foreign policy of Japan are traced by observing changes in the interpretation of Article Nine of Japan's pacifist constitution, and the fast transforming nature of the JSDF in terms of its roles, missions and capabilities. Owing to the fact that it is not merely structural realism that is being tested here, but neoclassical realism as well, this chapter finds independent variables at the systemic as well as the sub-systemic levels of analysis. Some of the state-level variables being

tested here are the degree of divisiveness in domestic politics, the influence of domestic constrains on foreign policy-making posed by public opinion, while at the individual level the role of strong political leadership and its impact on foreign policy outcomes is explored.

Finally in Chapter 5, the basic inferences drawn from the case study undertaken in Chapter 4 shall be discussed. An analysis of Japan's foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War period is essential to be able to answer the basic question—what does it conform to—realism or neo-liberalism. Post-Cold War trends in foreign policy are discussed along broad thematic debates like the deliberation between Japan as a 'reactive' or 'proactive' state; Japan's continued use of 'soft' power or its reversion to the more traditional version of 'hard' military power; and its strategic choice between balancing, bandwagoning or free-riding while responding to foreign threats. A brief mention is also made about the futility of the "neo-neo debate" (Weaver, 1996) in international politics and the need to adopt more "analytically eclectic" (Katzenstein, 2008) approaches to research in general.

Chapter 2

Realism and the Japanese case

Introduction

As a theory of international politics, realism makes a certain set of assumptions about the international system and the pattern of outcomes of interstate behaviour. One of the most notable proponents of this theoretical tradition, Kenneth Waltz, argues that the structure of the international system determines what types of international behaviours will be rewarded and punished through the dual processes of "competition" and "socialization", essentially resulting in the 'shaping and shoving' of the behaviour of individual states or the units that constitute this system (Waltz, 1986). Since neorealism by default postulates that all states in the system are functionally alike and will therefore exhibit similar behaviour, not much focus has been laid by this theory on explaining the behaviour of individual states. However, trying to generate a set of assumptions about state behaviour is not as inconsistent with the realist paradigm as has been portrayed by neorealists.[1] Predicting state behaviour—as opposed to international outcomes or 'structural' analyses—can be more closely associated with classical realism, a point that has been sadly overshadowed by the newer structural variants of the school. Neorealists like Waltz (1996) vociferously maintain that "international politics is not foreign policy" and consider the latter to be 'reductionist' theories designed to explain the behaviour of particular states rather than systemic outcomes. But despite such demarcations, even Waltz, apart from a number of other IR scholars, has not been able to refrain from making conjectures about the way particular states are likely to behave[2]. However, as shall be discussed later, it is the newest variant of realism, neo-classical realism that has actually taken to this trend of generating analyses of particular state behaviours. Thus, whether one views realism as a theory of international politics or alternatively

[1] Classical realists like Morgenthau (1946) maintain that the primary function of a theory of international politics should be to explain why states behave as they do. Even contemporary realists like Stephen Krasner have to say that "realism as a theory of international politics seeks to explain both—the behaviour of individual states as well as the characteristics of the system as a whole" (Krasner, 1992).

[2] In his book *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, Waltz (1967) compares the differences between American and British foreign policy from the perspective of their domestic political structures with an eye towards crafting a theory of foreign policy.

as an explanatory framework invoked by theories of foreign policy[3], it can be safely established that it is not an inconsistency to be talking about a realist prognosis for the behaviour of individual states.

Since the research interest of this study lies in finding out whether the realist paradigm provides a satisfactory explanation for the Japanese case, the prime question that this chapter is designed to address is—what is it that realist scholars have to say about the way Japan has behaved in the past and what are their predictions for its behaviour in future. This forms the basis for the subsequent task of ascertaining whether Japan has, in actual practice, behaved according to these predictions made by realist scholars or not. Japan's foreign policy, both in terms of its *intended* policy statements as well as its *resultant* actions, precludes it from being analysed in the same frame as other nations, because of which it is often not considered to be a 'normal' nation. To reiterate some of the reasons to which one can attribute this uniqueness, it may be pointed out that post-World War II, Japan has not tried to ensure its security by increasing its military power; war as an instrument of national policy is constitutionally unacceptable to Japan; and that well after post-war economic recovery, Japan never sought to actively convert its economic power into military power.

Japan's 'uniqueness' has invited a lot of analytical interest from scholars of different theoretical orientations who have always been eager to subsume Japanese behaviour within the explanatory folds of their respective theories. Realists have come up with 'free-riding' as the explanation for Japanese behaviour, constructivists with norms, and liberals with institutionalism. However, the problem with most of these positions is that they are post-facto rationalizations. It is difficult to say, whether any of these theories had actually anticipated or predicted the kind of outcomes that Japan has exhibited since the end of the Second World War or whether they are merely trying to defend the hard core of their respective theoretical paradigms on an *ad hoc* basis. It becomes especially important to determine this because if a proposition is made randomly and solely to uphold the core, without adding to the existing stock of knowledge, then there is a fear, as cautioned against by Lakatos (1970), of it being "degenerative" rather than "progressive". It was the changes in the structure of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity, ushered in by the end of the Cold

[3] Walter Carlsnaes (2006) and Colin Elman (1998) have written in considerable detail about the possibility as well as plausibility of realist theories of foreign policy.

War, which threw up opportunities to actually verify the claims and predictions that were being made by different theoretical positions about Japanese behaviour in the post-Cold War period. Japan is an exemplary instance of how a particular unit of the international system has managed to exhibit behaviour which is different from its functionally similar counterparts, placed likewise in the international system. This is a prima facie contradiction to neorealist claims of units comprising the system being functionally similar. Thus, as far as the realist tradition goes, it is important to ascertain whether Japan has responded to structural change in the way that realists have envisaged or is it less responsive to such changes than has traditionally been attributed by realists (especially neorealists) to states 'powerless in the grasp of the international system'.

The following sections therefore, shall begin by taking stock of the existing body of realist thought and revisiting the set of recurrent concerns and conclusions that mark these varying works as part of a single tradition. In the process, realism shall be traced from its ancient roots, through its modern and structural formulations, right up to its neo-classical and post-classical departures. Thereafter, a common set of realist propositions about the nature of the international system and state behaviours will be generated and this realist position shall be used in the subsequent sections to make predictions about Japanese behaviour in the post-Cold War period. The second section will give a brief overview of how the realist paradigm has analysed the Japanese case and interpreted its actions during the Cold War era. Finally, an attempt shall be made to come to a common meeting ground between realists and put together the set of predictions that this particular school of thought posits for Japanese behaviour in the post-Cold War era.

I. The Realist theoretical paradigm

Writing in the interwar period, Reinhold Niebuhr referred to the proponents of the realist tradition as "the children of darkness" as distinct from the "children of light", with the former being wise but evil and the latter being virtuous but foolish. The latter are the ones who believe that self interest should be subordinated to more universal laws and put in harmony with universal good, whereas the former are those who know no law beyond their will and interest and fully understand that the power of self will

does not underestimate the risk of anarchy and disorder in the international community (Niebuhr, 1944: 2-45). Years down the line, realists remain unified in their suspicion about the extent to which the international political system can be made more just in the face of the conflictual nature of international politics; and scholars are unanimous in their outlook that realism is essentially a pessimistic theoretical tradition (Keohane, 1986; Burchill, 2001) founded on a "certain cynicism regarding moral progress and human possibilities" (Gilpin, 1984a: 292). However, given the myriads of strands of realism that have currently come into existence resulting in "nearly as many realisms as realist protagonists" (Guzzini, 1998), realism as a theoretical paradigm is afflicted with internecine conflicts and disparities between these different strands. But despite all these copious 'children of darkness', each clamouring to be the most accurate reflection of the existing 'realities' of international political life, there are still some familial resemblances which mark them all out as part of the same tradition. Donnelly sums it up neatly by pointing out that despite realism's diversity it is undoubtedly a distinctive style or tradition of analysis and "though we may not be able to define it, we certainly know it when we see it" (Donnelly, 2000).

The Early Realists: Though realist thought has existed since as early as 400 BC, it was not before the 20th century that it was consolidated as a distinct theory of international politics. Thucydides' classical text, *The History of the Peloponnesian War,* is one of the earliest scientific treatises on the causes of war between political entities and is rich with realist insights. The modern antecedents of this tradition, however, include thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, who, as Rosecrance (2001) points out, understood early that conflict, deception, bullying, coercion, and war were the crux of international politics. Whether as a description of the existing realities of their times or as prescriptions to cope up with their respective political environments, the writings of these thinkers are resonant with realist notions and are heavily reflected in the works of modern realists of the twentieth century. For instance when Carr (1939) talks about the lack of an overarching authority which allows strong states to 'get away' with whatever their power allows them to achieve, it is reminiscent of old realists like Thucydides who pointed out that 'the strong do what they will while the weak endure what they must'. Similarly, when Morgenthau (1946) speaks of the drive for power inherent in human nature or *'animus dominandi'*,

as much of the reason behind the perpetual state of struggle in international politics, it instantly brings to mind Hobbes' words that "men would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them". Yet again, Waltz's conception of structural realism is believed to be drawn from the 18th century writings of Rousseau.

Classical Realists: The 1930s and 1940s saw the resurgence of the timeless insights of realism in the works of a new generation of realist writers like E.H. Carr, Bertrand Russell, Reinhold Niebuhr, John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan etc., who shaped much of the early history of both the discipline of international relations as well as its reigning theory of realism. In fact, it was Carr who originally came up with the term 'realism' as an antidote to 'utopianism' or 'idealism'. Writing on the eve of the Second World War, Carr was desperate to rescue the world from being 'blinded' by 'interwar idealists' or 'alchemists', who ignored the role of power in the conduct of international relations and over-estimated the degree to which men can transcend their basic nature (Carr, [1939] 1964). For Carr, individual states seek power as a form of promoting their respective 'national interests' and there is no natural 'harmony of interests' between states in the international system, only a "temporary and transient reflection of a particular configuration of global power" (Carr, 1939: 66). However, it must be pointed out that despite Carr's notions about the operation of power and realism in international politics, he was not completely oblivious to the role of ethics and morality. Influenced by 'liberal realists' like Niebuhr, Carr's realism was moderated to acknowledge that "utopianism must also be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism" since "pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible".

Given the backdrop of two successive wars which human agency was powerless to avert and keeping in view the 'realities' of *their* times, scholars who wrote in the aftermath of the Second World War adopted a more rigid approach towards realism, unadulterated by the rhetoric of universal morality.[4] The most notable among them would be Hans Morgenthau who advanced his theory of 'power politics' or *realpolitik* as encapsulated in his six principles of political realism (Morgenthau, [1948] 1956). Morgenthau, who was 'perhaps the purest as well as the

[4] This can be contrasted with Carr and other 'liberal realists' like Herz and Niebuhr who believed that there is a sort of dialectical movement of expediency and morality which has its impact on international politics.

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most self conscious apostle of realism of his generation' (Burchill, 2001), was also among the first few realist writers who was not reluctant to proclaim that "considerations of national interest transcend all principles of morality", unlike his other classical counterparts. Though he did not rule out morality completely, he made a clear demarcation between individual and group ethics and pointed out that the two called for different moral standards and modes of conduct. In a nutshell, Morgenthau's political realism envisages all nations as political actors pursuing their national interests defined in terms of power. The ensuing struggle for power resulted in the formation of 'balances of power' through which nations tried to defend themselves against each other. Morgenthau also attributed both conflict and evil to two human traits—selfishness (man's desire for scarce things) and lust for power (animus dominandi), thereby concluding that "politics is governed by objective laws which have their roots in human nature" (Morgenthau, 1946). Morgenthau wanted to instil certainty into the field of international politics by providing a guide that would help one 'look over the shoulder' of a statesman, enabling the other to 'read and anticipate his very thoughts' (Burchill, 2001) His first contribution has therefore been to give a form and direction to realism turning it into a distinctive school of thought.

Neorealism: Since classical realism was born in 'dark times', it understandably placed an unwarranted focus on certain aspects of international politics like the importance of power, security, war, and use and threat of force, for these had been witnessed in the recent past. However, as other aspects of international interactions, like economic co-operation and interdependence between nations and the political ramifications of vulnerability in the economic realm (as evident from the first oil crisis), came to the forefront, classical realism with its complete disregard for economic factors in international political life, was left in a quandary. Thus there was a crying need to revamp the realist paradigm for a modern context and audience.

Neorealism, as the name suggests, was a new variant of classical realism which emerged on the eve of the Second Cold War, partly as a response to the challenges posed by non-realist counterattacks, and partly as an intellectual extension of the broader realist theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by the rapidly shifting agenda of world politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Kenneth Waltz, who is said to be the 'father of neorealism', departed from his classical predecessors when

he came up with the concept of 'political structures' which when added to traditional realism lead to the inception of 'structural realism'[5].

The means-end and cause-effect dichotomy: As Gilpin notes, neorealism retained the main tenets of *realpolitik* since like its classical predecessor it also believed that the arena of international politics is full of inevitable conflicts. However, the distinction lies in the fact that 'means and ends are viewed differently' by the two, 'as are causes and effects' (Gilpin, 1984b). To elucidate, Morgenthau based his theory of power politics' on the drive for power and selfishness, inherent in human nature which made all 'rational' statesmen strive to accumulate more and more power as an *end*. But as Waltz was quick to diagnose, human nature does not adequately account for variation in international political outcomes. By avoiding references to humans pursuing power as an end, and viewing it instead as the means to the more sought after end of security, Waltz succeeded in provided a more elegant theoretical basis for Realism (Nye, 1988). As far as the difference in cause and effect is concerned, neorealists contend the classical realist conception of human nature as the root of all conflict, and as an alternative propose that international politics can only be understood if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism.

Reductionism vs. Structuralism: In his book *Man, the State, and War* (1959), Waltz distinguishes between unit-level variables and systemic-level variables that affect international outcomes and maintains that by concentrating on the internal dynamics of the units that make up a system, one is bound to move away from explanation to description, which is not very conducive for theory formulation. Theories of international politics that concentrate on causes at the individual or national level are called 'reductionist' while theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are 'systemic' (Waltz, 1959:19). Classical realists were mostly state-centric realists for whom the international system was nothing more than the summation of its constituent parts; therefore for them international affairs could be gauged simply by analysing the behaviour of states. However, realists like Waltz highlighted the inability of earlier realists to "handle causation at a level above states because they failed to conceive of structure as a force that shapes and shoves the

[5] This Waltzian synthesis is what has been termed by Richard Cox as 'neorealism' (Cox, 1986).

units" (Waltz, 1990). In contrast to state-centric realists, these system-centric realists regarded the international system as being made up of not only units but also structure. Structures essentially define the ordering of the units in the system, therefore, according to them an analysis of the international system warrants a look at the characteristics of the structure as well, rather than merely at the behaviour of individual states. The identification of these systemic forces is perhaps neo-realism's greatest contribution to international theory (Burchill, 2001)[6].

The three attributes of international structures: Waltz has defined the structure of the international system on the basis of three elements or parameters, namely—organizing principle, differentiation of units and distribution of capabilities. The first structural characteristic of the system is that it is *anarchic*, as opposed to hierarchic domestic orders, which essentially implies the absence of a legitimate central authority to regulate the behaviour of the states that constitute the system. Therefore, as Waltz points out, 'wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them from occurring' (Waltz, 1979). The second structural characteristic is that of the similarity of the units that constitute the international system, namely nation-states. These units are similar, or as Waltz would put it 'undifferentiated', due to the impact of the dual processes of 'competition and socialization' which generate order in the system (Waltz, 1986). The system punishes certain behaviours of its units, while rewarding others, thereby restricting the range of outcomes in international politics that can be expected. In the face of anarchy, all states have to perform the same primary function—that of survival. However, although they are functionally akin, states differ vastly in their capabilities to dispense these similar functions. The capacity of each state to pursue and achieve these common objectives varies according to their placement in the international system, and specifically their relative power. This is the basis for defining the third and probably the most distinctive dimension of the international structure, identified by structural realists—namely that the distribution of

[6] Carr and Morgenthau have also spoken about a similar force, just that they were not able to identify it precisely. Carr talks about how the laws of politics are impervious to our preferences and that wisdom lies in 'accepting and adapting oneself' to the irresistible strength of 'existing forces and tendencies' which we are 'powerless to influence or alter' (Carr, 1939).

capabilities among states in the international system is the only variable characteristic, affecting international outcomes[7].

Thus we see that apart form certain shifts in emphasis in terms of means-end and cause-effect; replacement of unit-level explanations for systemic ones; and difference in the conception of power and security, the overall neorealist approach to an understanding and explanation of international politics remains pretty much the same. The fundamental principles of orthodox realism like supremacy of national interest, inevitability of conflict, power as an instrument of policy, and irrelevance of the role of morality, retain their importance under neorealism as well.

Neoclassical Realism: Neorealism has undergone a series of criticisms from different quarters on different counts. Liberals criticize it for its over-emphasis on relative power as opposed to absolute power which in many cases forges a basis for international co-operation. Constructivists have criticized realism's excessive focus on material rather than ideational factors as well as the excessive focus on structures, leaving the role of agency in the shadows. A number of auxiliary hypotheses were developed within the structural realist research programme to defend the hard core of realism from non-realist challenges. Some of these were hegemonic realism, alliance theory, the concept of balance-of-threat, realist versions of regime theory etc. which reclaimed the role of the state in international affairs, re-emphasised the role of power considerations which inhibit undeterred co-operation, and on the whole gave a keener insight to realism. However, besides facing criticisms from other theoretical standpoints, realism or what has been discussed of it so far has been challenged by many on its own home turf as well. The product of one such challenge to neorealism is the brand of realists called neoclassical realists. The neoclassical challenge arose from the fact that Waltz's structural realism was increasingly unable to explain why different states behaved differently under the same structure. This is tantamount to turning Waltz's puzzle—'why do states differently placed across time and space act similarly'—on its head. Another motivation underlying the development of neoclassical realism was the fact that neorealism was only useful in explaining political outcomes (coming under the ambit of theories of international politics) but

[7] The inability to transcend the condition of anarchy and the fact that states are functionally similar makes both these characteristics of the international structure constants rather than variables.

was limited in its understanding of particular state behaviours (coming under the scope of theories of foreign policy). Yet, another shortcoming as pointed out by Sprout was the inadequacy of systemic theory to support deterministic conclusions due to its indifference to the construction of state interests (Sprout, 1971).

Neoclassical realism can be seen as the third wave of realism, coming after the first wave of classical realists, followed by the second wave of structural realists. Eminent neo-classical realists are Gideon Rose who came up with the term itself, Fareed Zakaria, Randall Schweller, Thomas Christensen etc. Like neorealists, neoclassical realists also acknowledge the impact of structures on outcomes in international politics, but like classical realists they insist on including sub-systemic and unit-level variables. Therefore, they do not restrict themselves merely to the system while explaining outcomes and so parsimony paves the way for a multi-level and multi-factorial analysis of international politics. For neoclassical realists the system is undoubtedly the most important variable influencing international politics and they are in unison with Waltz when he says that structures 'shape and shove'. However, the exact outcome will differ from state to state owing to various factors like the perception of state leaders, state-society relationships, the motivation of states etc. So their basic argument is that the manner in which the structure influences states depends on intervening variables at the sub-systemic level, resulting in different foreign policy behaviours (Rose, 1998). This is where neoclassical realists depart from Waltz, since they look into domestic and individual-level variables that make different states similarly placed, behave differently. For neorealism in general, especially Waltz's neorealism, the opportunities and constraints thrown up by the structure come between state intentions and state outcomes. For neoclassical realists it is state intentions which come between relative material power distributions among states and finally shape state behaviours. However, despite these essential differences, neoclassical realism has more often been viewed in conjunction with neorealism rather than in opposition to it. Though it has not yet acquired the standing of an acutely developed theory, neoclassical realism picks up precisely where Waltz left off[8], by attempting to incorporate state behaviours in their analysis thereby prising

[8] In a response to his critics, Waltz (1986) leaves a window of aspiration open when he says that "someone may one day fashion a unified theory of domestic and international politics".

open the prohibited 'Pandora's Box'[9]. The basic approach then for these new realists is to 'refine, rather than refute Kenneth Waltz' and they do so by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state's foreign policy decisions.

Conflict and Consensus within the Realist paradigm

It was the periodic inability of the existing stock of realist ideas at a particular point of time, to explain outcomes and behaviours in the international realm that necessitated the development of newer explanations, thereby deepening and widening the larger realist school of thought. For instance, the genesis of neorealism by Waltz is usually attributed to the rapidly changing international scenario in the 1970s and the inability of classical or traditional realism to provide satisfactory explanations for the same. Similarly, the end of the Cold War and subsequent developments in international political life in the 1990s found neorealism on the slippery slope (though sterling efforts were made by some like Waltz, Layne and Mearsheimer to regain lost ground), resulting in some scholars writing it off as a 'degenerative research programme' (Vasquez, 1997). Subsequent attempts that have been made to 'correct the theoretical and empirical flaws of realism', by way of developing newer variants, have often resulted in the advertent or inadvertent digression from structural realism, especially from the Waltzian variety, so much so that realists often have 'much ado to know themselves'. However, in the face of several upheavals, challenges, as well as responses to these challenges, realism has managed to retain at least some of its basic features across the ravages of time, spanning the works of ancient and modern realists alike.

Vasquez defined the realist paradigm through three tenets, namely, the assumptions of anarchy, of statism, and of politics as the struggle for power and peace (Vasquez, 1998). However, Holsti pointed out that this was more of a definition of what he termed as the wider category of a 'classical tradition', which also includes non-realists, rather than 'realism' in particular (Holsti, 1985). The elements mentioned by Vasquez cannot by themselves become the defining features of realism, since many contending theories like neo-liberal institutionalism also begin with the

[9] The term is borrowed from Finel's article, "Black Box or Pandora's Box: State Level variables and progressivity in realist research programmes", *Security Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter 2000-2001).

same premises. Such a definition might have been adequate to set classical realism apart from utopianism or liberal internationalism in the early folds of the development of the discipline of international relations; but over the years, a more well-defined distinction from its counterparts was necessitated. Thereafter a number of scholars have attempted to identify certain incontrovertible assumptions which form the basis of the realist approach. Along with the elements of statism, anarchy and power-centricism delineated earlier, these later approaches would highlight the fact that realism is essentially based on a *self-interest* which is defined in a predominantly *materialist* way thereby distinguishing it from idealism. As Keohane (1986) points out—the state-centric assumption, the rationality assumption and the power-centric assumption together form the three pillars of realism. Statism and rationality together postulate states in the international system to be unitary, egoistic and rational actors. On the other hand, the international system which is made up of these unitary state actors, is marked by the prevalence of anarchy which, exacerbated by the power-centric assumption, makes survival the primary function of every state, thereby necessitating them to engage in self-help. However, taking up each of these elements in detail we see that realism cannot be treated as a monolithic. Rather one must distinguish between its variants given the series of oppositions in realist thought—state-centric vs. system centric realism (Waltz, 1959); specific vs. generalist (Gruber, 2000; Rosecrance, 2002); structural vs. biological or minimal (Doyle, 1997); offensive vs. defensive (Snyder, 1991; Frankel, 1996); balance of power vs. hegemonic realism (Levy, 2002); and classical and neorealism vs. neoclassical and post-classical realism (Brooks, 1997).

Statism: Realism identifies the primacy of the sovereign state, or territorially organised entities—whether it is the city-state, empires or nation-states—as their basic unit of analysis, as well as the most important actors in international politics. As Krasner puts it, the ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system (Krasner, 1992). However, there are nuances within this seemingly simple assumption. The hard version of this assumes states as the *only* actors in international politics while the soft version considers them to be the *most important* actors. At this juncture one can differentiate between the state-centric and system-centric versions of realism. State-centric realism associated with Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Morgenthau, etc. emphasizes the state

(in all its different forms) as the principal actor in international affairs and the fact that there is no authority superior to these sovereign political units. Thus analysis should focus on the behaviour of individual states. In contrast to state-centric realism's emphasis on the state and state interest, Waltz's systemic version introduced the element of political structure within an international system as the principal determinant of state behaviour. But whether state-centric or system-centric realism, there is a high degree of consensus among realists that states are 'unitary actors' in international politics—which means that states should be treated as the analytical units for studying the international system rather than delving into the black box of sub-systemic variables. Apart from being unitary, states are also attributed with being rational and egoistic actors. This can however, be better explained through the rationality assumption and the imperatives of international anarchy that induce such behaviour.

Rationality: The rationality assumption postulates that states are rational, egoistic actors meaning that their behaviour can be explained rationally by using a cost-benefit analysis. The rationality assumption is essential to the theoretical claims of structural realism in particular, since taking rationality as a constant permits one to attribute variations in state behaviour to variations in characteristics of the international system. Though the element of rationality has always existed in realist thought and practice, there is a slight difference between classical conceptions of rational behaviour and Waltz's utilitarian conception of rationality. The classical insights which were more of maxims for the conduct of foreign affairs, were known as 'reasons of state' or *raison d'état*, a term first used by the historian Friedrich Meinecke way back in 1924[10]. The idea of states as egoistic actors can also be traced back to classical realist conceptions of human nature with its inherent selfishness and egoistic passion (Morgenthau, 1946) and "the inability of human beings to transcend their own interests sufficiently to envisage the interests of others" (Niebuhr, 1932). Waltz's rationality, on the other hand is more influenced by microeconomic theory which leads him to conceptualize international political systems like "economic markets, formed by the co-action of self-regarding units" (Ashley, 1984). Conceptions

[10] "For every state in every situation there exists one ideal logic of action, one ideal raison d'état—this to recognise is the insistent attempt of the acting statesman and the reflecting historian" (Meinecke, 1965 [1924] in Guzzini, 1998)

of rationality have been further refined by borrowing from game theoretical models (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Oye, 1986), like the Prisoner's Dilemma which was used to explain the crux of rational egoism. Another important development within the assumption of rational cost-benefit analysis by realists was made by Joseph Grieco (1988a) who emphasised that states are 'positional players' and therefore calculate their costs and gains in *relative* terms rather than *absolute* terms. This was an important breakthrough since explanations of impediments to cooperation based on absolute gains were increasingly being diluted by liberal alternatives.

Anarchy, survival and self-help: All realists (in fact some non-realists too) acknowledge that in the absence of an overarching authority to regulate the behaviour of nation-states, interstate behaviour takes place in an environment of international anarchy. In anarchical environments each unit's incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so (Waltz, 1979). In such an anarchic international system, self-help becomes the necessary principle of action. Again, since the pre-eminent goal of all states is that of ensuring their survival, they are bound to act rationally and preserve their respective national interests, which has been defined by some in term of power (Morgenthau, 1946) and by others in terms of security (Waltz, 1979)[11].

Donnelly (2000) too has distinguished between sub groups of realism on the basis of the relative emphasis they give to egoism and anarchy. Structural realists (eg: Waltz) emphasise international anarchy whereas biological realists (Morgenthau, Carr, Kennan etc.) emphasise a fixed human nature. Radical realists (eg: Thucydides) adopt extreme versions of the three realist premises of anarchy, egoism and power politics. Strong realists adopt realist principles in a way that allows only modest space for politically salient "non-realist" concerns (eg: Morgenthau, Waltz, Mearsheimer etc). Hedged or minimalist realists (Doyle, 1997) on the other hand accept the realist definition of the "problem" of international politics—anarchy and egoism—but show varying degrees of discomfort with the solution of power politics (eg: Carr, Niebuhr, Herz).

[11] This has resulted in the division of realism in to two factions—offensive and defensive realists, as shall be discussed a little later.

Struggle for power and security: Realism maintains that the search for power and security is the dominant logic in international politics which is best viewed as a zero-sum game. It is the interaction of egoism and anarchy that leads to the 'primacy in all political life of power and security' (Donnelly, 2000). The most basic versions of realism believe that international relations are a kind of state of nature in which the rule of the stronger prevails. In such a formulation "clubs are trumps"[12] and those who do not acknowledge this dictum fall by the wayside. Therefore, as John Herz accurately pinpointed, realism is rather a set of ideas which takes into account the implications of security and power factors (Herz, 1951).

The power assumption too however, has several nuances within its folds. For classical realists "clubs are trumps" because of the simple observation that 'the strong do what they will, while the weak endure what they must' and because human nature is inherently characterised by an insatiable drive for acquiring power. For those like Waltz, it was the relative distribution of power among states that was more consequential than merely acknowledging that "clubs are trumps", since this was the main variable affecting international outcomes. What unites these different realists is the underlying assumption of the presence of rivalry and strife among nations in some form or the other—an unending contest for power or influence, uncontrollable by international law or government. But then again there is a huge difference in the manner in which power and security are conceptualised by various realists leading to the distinction between offensive and defensive realists. Waltz's neorealism unequivocally states that "the primary goal of states is not to maximize power, but to achieve or maximize security" (Waltz, 1979). This can be contrasted with Morgenthau's realism which maintains that states are driven by their lust for power and every political action seeks to keep power, to increase it or to demonstrate it (Morgenthau, 1946). This distinction is not however, one between classical and neorealism alone. Even within structural realism there are many like Mearsheimer who believe that maximum security, can only be achieved when you are the sole and preponderant power in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001). Since it is difficult to demarcate precisely how much power is enough to ensure security, states deem it prudent to maximize power instead of security. Jervis on the other hand remarks that

[12] This term is used by Gruber (2000) in his book *Ruling the World* and has a double entender since in one sense 'clubs' refers to a weapon to wield power (a realist connotation) while in another it refers to an association or organization (a liberal connotation)—and both are considered by Gruber to be 'trumps'.

for defensive realists like Charles Glaser, Stephen Van Evera and Jack Snyder, a great deal depends on the severity of the security dilemma and the intentions of the state actors, leaving these scholars in a position between offensive realists and neoliberals (Jervis, 1999).

After exploring the commonalities and range of disparities within the realist paradigm, it is evident that generating hypotheses based on the very skeletons of the realist paradigm would result in very general predictions about state behaviour. Distinguishing between factions within the realist camp, each with competing sets of hypotheses increases the overall predictive power of the theory as a whole. Keeping this in mind, Rosecrance differentiates between 'specific' and 'generalist' realists (Rosecrance, 2002). Specific realists posit particular behaviour on the part of states. Apart from the common assumptions alluded to earlier; the essential ingredient in specific realism is the existence of a balance of power or a tendency in that direction. By advancing conceptions of 'generalist' realism the point which Rosecrance seeks to make is that realism is moving away from "relatively specific, clear, and testable claims about the nature of the international system to a more generalist formulation in which outcomes are increasingly indistinct or opaque". In this new formulation the balance of power is no longer characteristic of international relations. The key distinction here between specific realism and generalist realism, is therefore between a concept of realism based on conflict and material power capabilities conjoined with balancing on the one hand, and a much broader and inclusive notion of realism that involves no necessary balance of power on the other (Rosecrance, 2002).

Stephen Brooks, in his article titled "Duelling Realisms" made the important distinction between neorealism of the Waltzian variety and what he terms as "post-classical realism" (Brooks, 1997). The two undoubtedly share some common ground as both have a systemic focus, both emphasise material rather than non-material factors like ideas and institutions, apart from the usual commonalities about states as egoist actors in an inherently competitive self-help world. However, while neorealists base their predictions about state behaviour on the *possibility* of conflict, their post-classical counterparts do so on the *probability* of the same. While neorealists view the international system as a relentless competition for security; within postclassical realism, the strength of security pressures fluctuates according to a variety of material

factors besides the distribution of capabilities, namely technology, geography, and international economic pressures. Yet another important point to note is that for most structural realists of the Waltzian camp, the distribution of power is the most important variable affecting state behaviour. But some other realists have pointed out that anarchy is not the only systemic variable that has an impact on state behaviour. Instead of emphasising the role played by the distribution of power in the international system scholars such as Stephen Walt, Robert Jervis, Barry Buzan, Charles Glaser, and Stephen Van Evera pointed to the importance of source and direction of threats, defined primarily in terms of technological and geographical factors (pg 336, Handbook). These factors are distinctively material factors and do not involve ideas or institutions, setting them apart from non-realist theories such as liberalism and constructivism[13] (Brooks, 1997).

Therefore, it is seen that the attempt to conjure up a unified theory of 'realism' has been criticised by many, including both proponents and opponents of realism (Doyle, 1997). It is thus believed that there is not one realism, but many. The somewhat ironic implication of this argument is that if one defines realism as a coherent, distinct and determinate theory, there has, as Guzzini (1998) points out, never been such a thing as a realist theory. The question is therefore not as Legro and Moravcsik (1999) ask—"is anybody still a realist", but rather "was anybody ever a realist"? Thus we see that there is, as Guzzini puts it, a tension between the need to define a more restricted field of realism and the fact that "this very narrowness impoverishes realism" (Guzzini, 1997). This problem can, however, be addressed by viewing realism "not as a theory defined by a particular set of assumptions and propositions (Donnelly, 2000), but rather as "a general orientation or a philosophical disposition about the world" (Gilpin, 1984a), or "a 'big tent' with room for a number of different theories" (Elman, 1996a: 45). Nonetheless, concerns have been expressed by some over the development of new breeds of realist theories and the "important questions that they pose both for the antecedent tradition as well as for the opposition between liberalism and realism" (Rosecrance, 2002).

[13] It is also important to note that postclassical realism is distinct from neoclassical realism in that it does not engage itself with domestic level variables.

II. Realist explanations of Japanese foreign policy behaviour

After its historic defeat in the Second World War, Japan underwent a sea change in its foreign policy behaviour, its national aims and its overall demeanour. From being an overtly aggressive, heavily militarised nation with expansionist and revisionist motives, it became a meek and subdued nation, taking its place alongside other peaceful countries of the world. So deep were the horrors of nuclear warfare that Japan formally relinquished war as an instrument of state policy through Article Nine of its constitution. Satisfactory theoretical explanations for this act of Japan have long been absconding scholars of international relations. Realism provided a perfect explanation for the way Japan behaved during the interwar period, attributing it to Japanese dissatisfaction with the status quo which urged it to seek revision of the existing power relations in its favour[14]. However, Japanese behaviour immediately after the Second World War took realists completely by surprise. What could possibly make a country go to the extent of renouncing war and prohibiting the use of force as a sovereign right in the midst of a self-help, anarchical international setting, was beyond realist conception. Why was it that Japan's national interests could no longer be defined in terms of power as encapsulated in Morgenthau's six principles[15]? Where did Japan's instinct for *animus dominandi* suddenly disappear after WW-II?

However, even after finding themselves on the slippery slope, realist scholars were extremely circumspect about conceding this shift in foreign policy behaviour to a change in the national character of Japan or a normative line of reasoning which is the explanation usually advanced by liberals and constructivists. A number of questions have therefore been raised about the source and genesis of Article 9 to ascertain whether it was actually indigenous to the people of Japan or was imposed by the Allied Forces occupying Japan after WW-II. Determining the origin of Article 9 is key to answering the question of whether it violates Japanese sovereignty and prevents it from acting as a "normal nation" or not. The Japanese term for structural

[14] This was a point highly emphasized by classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau to counter liberal institutionalist notions of utopianism and internationalism.

[15] The realist approach regards the foreign policy of a state as solely dependent upon power or influence. According to Morgenthau, every political action seeks to keep power, to increase it or to demonstrate it; therefore it is national interest alone defined in terms of power that should be the sole guide to foreign policy. A foreign policy based on any other consideration is bound to meet with failure (Burchill, 2001).

factors affecting its behaviour is called *gaiatsu*. Many a times in the last two decades, *gaiatsu* or the imperatives of external pressure have been advanced by Japanese leaders to justify a lot of their actions. However, it is extremely difficult to be able to discern the degree of this external pressure from the personal ambitions and goals of the national leaders. Whether Article Nine was a product of *gaiatsu* (pressure from outside) or was a manifestation of the "pacificism that had rapidly become ingrained in Japanese culture" shall be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.

The first question that should be raised if the 'genie in a bottle' argument[16] is true is—why did the Japanese genie not fly away and reclaim its 'freedom' even after the bottle was virtually uncapped? To elucidate, as the realities of the Cold War began to dawn upon the United States they increasingly wanted Japan to provide for its own self-defence and to ally itself with the US against the Communist bloc. This was in total contrast to their talks of pacifism immediately after WW-II and their insistence that "no revision to the Japanese peace constitution, whether on a large or small scale would be quick or easy"[17]. During the Diet debate on the new constitution itself, several changes were made to Article 9 with the consent of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers. The most important among these was the Ashida Amendment which relaxed the total ban on self-defence by adding an extra clause. It is important to note these dilutions in the initial Article 9 more so in light of the changed priorities of the US during the Cold War and its requirements from Japan. As a result of the onset of the Cold War, Japan was pressurized by the United States into establishing the SDF, an entity that was to have only defensive capabilities and was to provide a domestic defence against foreign invasion. The linchpin of this arrangement was the US-Japan Security Treaty first signed in 1952 and thereafter revised in 1960, which promised US support if Japan was ever attacked, thus negating the need for Japanese force projection of offensive capabilities. Thus we see that by the early 1950s the US was all out to reverse the process of pacifism that it had inadvertently set in motion in Japan in the late 1940s, not having anticipated the Cold War that was soon to follow.

[16] This was the justification given to Japan's neighbours for the physical presence of American troops in the region; namely America portrayed itself as taking on the onerous task of assuring that Japan does not re-militarize and become a threat to either regional or international security.
[17] From Cooney Pg 31.

So the question that remains is, if Japan was operating under *gaiatsu* in the 1940s, why was it so resistant to it in the 1950s and the years to come? For much of the post-World War II era Japanese foreign policy has been modelled along the Yoshida Doctrine, which permitted Japan to focus on economic development while depending on the United States (US presence and its nuclear umbrella) for its national security needs. The great benefit of this was that Japan did not have to spend much of its GNP on defence and on other needs related to national security. Thus realists are primarily left to answer two sets of puzzles pertaining to Japanese behaviour. Firstly, they have to find a suitable explanation for why Japan did not jump at the opportunity of re-militarizing even after receiving continued US fillip which even bordered on insistence at times? This was what one would expect of a 'normal nation' striving to ensure its security through self-help in an anarchical system of states. Secondly, despite the insistence by realist scholars that there is no international division of labour and that all states have to perform essentially the same basic functions of making provisions for their own security, a realist explanation for the US-Japanese Security Treaty and Yoshida Doctrine is still awaited. Liberal institutionalists have compelling arguments like interdependence, regime theory and a long shadow of the future to explain this phenomenon. But even then, seldom has history witnessed a situation where the military responsibilities of a nation are *entirely* shouldered by another, while it steadfastly concentrates on its economic security. Neorealists certainly do not view economic capacity as unimportant. However, neorealists consider it irrational for a state to focus on the enhancement of economic capacity to the extent that the likelihood of being subjected to a military defeat by potential rivals increases to any degree.

However, despite Waltz's insistence that the ordering principle of the international system forces states to perform exactly the same primary functions regardless of their capacity to do so (Waltz, 1986), a lot of realist scholars have pointed out, and very rightly so, that the security policies of very strong states are different from those of very weak ones, and both differ from those of states that are neither very strong nor very weak (Mandelbaum, 1988). Though neorealism maintains that military preparedness always trumps economic capacity if the two are in conflict, some other strains of realism especially of the post-classical variety say that rational policymakers may trade off a degree of military preparedness if the potential net gains

in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses (Brooks, 1997). Again there have been instances—all perfectly explicable by some or the other version of realist theory—of nations giving preference to strengthening themselves economically before they do so militarily. For instance, in his compelling study of U.S. foreign policy in the late nineteenth century—*From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Fareed Zakaria (1999) asks why is it that "as states grow increasingly wealthy, they build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders, and seek international influence". Echoing the basic answer of the first wave, he argues that this behaviour stems from the tendency of states to use the tools at their disposal to gain control over their environment. When individual states moved from one rank to the next, their foreign policies eventually followed suit. This explains the stark contrast in US foreign policy from a long period of isolationism before WW-II, to a policy of active and overt involvement in international affairs thereafter. However, even if we go by this realist explanation we see that Zakaria's causal hypothesis between wealth and power does not seem to hold true for Japan. This is because even after reaching the peak of its economic supremacy in the 1970s when other nations as powerful as the US also often lagged behind, Japan did not show the least bit of interest in taking on a more militarily powerful role, commensurate with its international economic status. The development of an alternative type of thinking in Japan about security matters is also sharply reflected in the comments of Fukuda Takeo, the then Japanese Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, when he stated, in 1972:

"We wish to employ our own economic strength to gain an increasing voice in the international community. The tradition was that a nation used its economic power to become a military power, but this is not the case with us today" (Cooney, 2005).

However, wary of the gap between the rhetoric of political statements and the actual reason behind a particular action, realists have come up with a host of alternatives to liberal and normative explanations, by way of rationalist reasoning like free-riding and explanations grounded in alliance theory, hegemonic stability theory, neo-classical realism etc, some of which also invoke a certain degree of constructivism. It is important to reiterate at this juncture that this research is essentially conceptualised as a 'three cornered fight' between realism and neo-liberal institutionalism which is not necessarily a clash between rationalist and constructivist explanations. Any conceptualisation that equates rationalist explanations with realism

and constructivist ones with institutionalism is essentially incorrect (Fearon and Wendt, 2002). Therefore in this section, the range of rationalist as well as constructivist realist explanations for Japanese foreign policy behaviour during the Cold War shall be explored.

The free-riding hypothesis: There is a huge amount of literature on the aspect of Japanese free-riding of the US in the security realm which has allowed it to partake of benefits in the economic realm. The central argument supporting this proposition runs as follows: while the United States devotes a disproportionately high share of national resources to military spending and thereby weakens its global competitive position by diverting resources away from productive investments, Japan, protected by the U.S. security umbrella, spends little on defence and devotes freed-up resources to improving economic competitiveness, and thereby beats hands down its military protector in the international marketplace (Harrison and Prestowitz, 1990 in Islam, 1993). This non-aggressive military posture which enjoys immense support within Japan, has lead to a gamut of responses from the international community often resulting in what Johnson (1986) refers to as the "Japanese defence dilemma". On one hand, most countries, especially Japan's immediate neighbours have been able to breathe a huge sigh of relief as their fears of revived Japanese militarism were quelled by her decision to restrict her defence expenditure. However, on the other hand, Japan is constantly being pulled up for taking a free ride on the backs of the Americans and shirking from her international responsibilities.

Free-riding is a concept drawn from public choice theory whose most simple version conceptualises two players both wanting to consume a certain public good. Public goods are characterised by two attributes that set them apart from private goods—namely that of *non-rivalness* and *non-excludability*[18], which expose it to the problem of free-riding. In economic parlance, free-riding is a situation where one of the two players (assuming a simple model) wants the public good more acutely than the other and is therefore willing to contribute to it even if the other party declines from bearing its fair share of the cost. This, along with the peculiar circumstances of non-excludability, leaves an incentive, rather a temptation for any rational, egoist,

[18] *Non-rivalness* refers to the fact that one can consume a public good without reducing the amount consumed by others. *Non-exclusion* means one cannot prevent others from consuming a public good even if they do not pay for it (Samuelson, 1954).

self-regarding actor to pass of as much of the burden onto the first party, leading to a situation where the latter is virtually 'riding the back' of the former. Following game theory, those who contribute nothing are called defectors as opposed to the contributors who are called co-operators. The defector is also called a free-rider. Thus the Nash equilibrium for this game would be unrequited co-operation—co-operation by the first player, whose preferences are defined by CC>CD>DD (since player wants the public good more acutely, a situation of defection from its side, DC, will normally not occur especially if the other party is willing to cooperate); and defection by the second, whose preferences are defined by DC>CC>DD>CD.

Now transposing the US-Japan case on to the two-player public good game we see that in this scenario the public good in question is international peace and military security and the cost of this public good is measured in terms of the defence expenditures of the respective players as a proportion of their GNP. Going by this formulation Japan stands out as the free-rider because America spends 5-6 percent of its GNP on maintaining its military supremacy while Japan, committed to nonaggression formalized by its "peace constitution" and protected by the 1960 United States-Japan mutual cooperation and security treaty, limits its military spending to about 1 percent of GNP. Such feelings of Japan taking a free hike have intensified even more since the oil-shocks of the mid-1970s when US actually began to feel the brunt of shouldering the burden of its post-war allies[19]. This is doubly galling for the US because Japan over the years has metamorphosed into an economic, financial and technological power to be reckoned with, at times even threatening the US which till then enjoyed sole supremacy in these realms. The fledgling that the US had so magnanimously offered to take under its protective wing had long come of age, yet was unwilling to take off from the nest.

From the Japanese point of view it was solely the Yoshida Doctrine that both prescribed and proscribed its range of behaviours. However, realists have deconstructed the Yoshida Doctrine and chosen to explain it through the rationality assumption—one of the central tenets of the realist schools of thought. The rationality assumption postulates that states are rational, egoistic actors meaning that their behaviour can be explained rationally by using a cost-benefit analysis. States will pursue that course of action which after careful perusal of all the available choices

[19] These arguments resonate with Paul Kennedy's 'imperial overstretch thesis' which developed around the same time.

gives them maximum expected utility (Keohane, 1986). This essentially reduces Japanese action to a cost-benefit analysis and maintains that it is a product of the 'logic of consequences' rather than the 'logic of appropriateness'[20]. As Waltz puts it, in structural-functional logic, behaviours are selected for their consequences (Stinchcombe, 1968 in Waltz, 1986). Therefore, this particular course of action was followed by Japan for the simple reason that it is one where the benefits far out-weigh the costs, rather than arguments like the development of internal anti-militaristic norms or domestic politics etc. This is because, as Waltz points out, the pressure of competition weighs down more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures, in self help systems (Waltz, 1986: 329). Waltz undoubtedly acknowledges that after WW-II there was a change in their [Japan's] national character but this was largely because "their and our international positions have become profoundly different". For Waltz, their post-war pre-occupation with self, their inclination to take a free or cheap ride by spending disproportionately on defence follow mainly from the new structure of international politics rather than from their internal political attributes (Waltz, 1986: 332). Therefore, while it is not being denied that state behaviour varies with differences in ideology, in governmental forms or internal structures; for realists, especially neorealists, it does more so with differences of power than with anything else.

Problems with the free-riding hypothesis: However, there are a number of inherent weaknesses in the free-riding hypothesis, especially in the alleged negative security-economics linkage highlighted by many. To begin with, in the classic economic conception of free-riding, the one who is engaging in it does not have any thing at stake. It is a situation where one person wants a collective good more acutely than another so is willing to bear the entire burden of it. However the case of US-Japanese alliance cannot be considered to be a case of free-riding because there are mutual exchanges of benefit, and costs are borne by both, though in different realms. U.S. has to bear the economic cost of Japanese defence and reaps the fruits of military presence in the Asia-Pacific. The justification that the US has advanced to the neighbouring countries of Japan is the "genie in a bottle" theory, namely that this is the most effective way of ensuring that Japan does not re-militarize. Japan has advantage in

[20] Wendt and Fearon (2002) have distinguished between the two with the former being invoked by *homo economicus* who pursues the most efficient means to an end; and the latter being invoked by *homo sociologicus* who operates more out of habit and is constrained by a web of norms and roles.

that the opportunity cost of defence expenditure helps it consolidate its economy. However the stakes become evident when viewed from a purely realist perspective. Realism does not accommodate instances of one state overseeing the security of another. In an anarchic set-up it is every country for itself with self-help being the primary principle of action rather than 'pro-social' or 'other-help'[21]. So Japan is playing with fire when it is depending on the US for its security because in a realist set-up there is no assurance against reneged promises (Waltz, 1979); no permanent enemies or allies (Mearsheimer, 1994); and certainly no provision for international division of labour where one country oversees the military realm and the other, the economic aspects. Therefore, in a situation where US declines from defending Japan it will be left to fend for itself, an even worse scenario being one where US itself becomes the prime threat to Japan.

Secondly, the US-Japan Security Treaty was *conceived* in such a way that part of the agreement was actually to ensure that one ally remained the military and nuclear superpower by spending a lot on defence while the other one maintained limited national defence capability by spending much less. Put another way, Japan's "military free ride" was a mutually agreed-upon component of the treaty because both parties saw it as serving their own national interests (Islam, 1993). The problem arises from the fact that the US did not expect Japan to voluntarily choose 'butter' over 'guns' once both choices were made available to them. As for the argument that America's relative economic decline and Japan's economic prosperity are rooted in Japan's security free ride under U.S. protection, it has been pointed out that during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States reached the peak of its economic supremacy; which were coincidentally also the years when the nation assumed a much larger burden of defence as compared to the last two decades (Islam, 1993). Another set of scholars point out that it is not true that Japan attained economic prosperity because she was free-riding; for if one goes by the economic graphs of countries like South Korea, Taiwan etc. who have a high proportion of defence spending, it is easy to extrapolate that Japan would have easily managed to have done so even otherwise, i.e. without 'free-riding' (Okimoto, 1982). This, however, would have been more threatening to the US and others in the region as it would have projected a "rich nation, strong army" image of Japan.

[21] The concept of 'pro-social' and 'other help' is given by scholars like Wendt and Mercer as alternatives to self-help which is usually considered to be logically flowing from anarchy.

The other defence against the free-riding hypothesis is that military security is not the only coveted international public good any longer, especially since the end of the Cold War which has lead to the development of "new wars" against which the traditional instruments of old wars are no longer effective. In this new age, Japan, walking tightrope between its international and national obligations, does well to contribute by way of other "international public goods" such as development assistance, alleviation of the Third World debt problem, international peacekeeping, preservation of the environment, the fight against international terrorism and drug trafficking, prevention of international transmission of communicable disease. Apart from that, in response to US pressure, which intensified during the Gulf War, in addition to money, Japan has also begun to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping force. Future historians may look back at this development as a first step toward Japan's rearmament, the historical irony being that the country which helped Japan embrace pacifism after World War II is the one that may turn out to be responsible for pushing Japan to break out of it half a century later.

Thus we see that despite being the preferred realist explanation for Japanese foreign policy behaviour, the free-riding hypothesis is ridden with gaps and as a stand-alone fails to form a sound argument in favour of a realist case for Japanese behaviour. It should therefore be viewed in conjunction with other explanations grounded in extended realist theory like alliance theory, hegemonic stability theory and neo-classical realism for a more comprehensive account of state behaviour.

Hegemonic Stability Theory: One of the criticisms of the free-riding hypothesis was that it concentrated too much on the rationality aspect of realism at the expense of considerations like anarchy and self-help and balance of power politics. A realist redressal can be sought by way of an alternative to balance-of-power realism, namely hegemonic realism. Though the mainstay of realism is that anarchy or the lack of a central authority leaves the realm of international politics unregulated, several realists argue that some semblance of order can be created from anarchy by the exercise of super ordinate power. Hegemonic theorists share core realist assumptions but de-emphasise the importance of anarchy while emphasising system management within a hierarchical order (Jack Levy, 2002). There are many versions of hegemonic realism; however the discussion here merely solicits a reference to Gilpin's formulation of hegemonic stability theory (HST). Like most neorealists Gilpin (1981) also assumes

that states as the principal actors in world politics make cost-benefit analyses about alternative courses of action. But he problematises some aspects of the realist tradition and by way of an answer puts forth his theory of hegemonic stability which indicates that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power or hegemon. Transposing this to the US-Japan scenario we see that the hegemon (in this case the US) has taken up the responsibility of providing the international public good of stability and security, while Japan has found a more successful part to become the second-most-powerful economy in the world sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella. Though this seems almost similar to the free-riding hypothesis, the difference is evident when one takes into consideration what has been termed as the 'prestige argument'[22].

The logic of HST in the operation of US-Japan relations, as an alternative to the free-riding hypothesis, makes itself most manifest through what has been termed as the 'prestige argument'. This becomes especially evident when one conceptually distinguishes between "burden-sharing" and "responsibility sharing". Though the US keeps insisting on it, it fails to see that burden-sharing, by construction, is a one-sided concept, since it focuses solely on a hegemonic nation's financial and human cost of assuming leadership of a collective security arrangement, and ignores the power, privilege, and prestige that come with it. By contrast, responsibility sharing is a more balanced concept because it recognizes the positive correlation between burden and power; that is, greater burden-sharing will result in greater power sharing. Analytically the more significant issue, however, is that a hegemonic nation's international commitments cannot be neatly separated from its national interest: America's financial and human costs of assuming leadership of a collective security arrangement (NATO, the United States-Japan security treaty, and so on) are precisely what bring it various economic, political, and psychic benefits. In other words, the burden that the United States seems increasingly unwilling and apparently unable to bear (as per the free-rider's argument), is the burden of being the superpower and forms the basis of America's global power, prestige, and privilege.

[22] Advanced by a number of scholars against the free-riding hypothesis this argument postulates that by dint of being the 'leader' and the 'first among equals' the hegemon gets to bear a larger share of the burden of providing the international public good. This is also fair from the equity perspective since the hegemon's efforts are in consonance with its ability and the prestige that ensues from being the leader.

Problems with the HST explanation: A related hypothesis of the HST is that as the power of the hegemon decreases or is perceived to be on the decline, it would automatically seek to reduce its international commitments and lop-sided contributions in order to avoid "imperial over-stretch". Neorealists argue that the hegemon supports the system so long as it is in their interests. As and when the hegemon finds that it is not in its interests to maintain the existing system any longer, it will begin to undermine the institutions that it had created earlier. Going by this hypothesis, however, we are again left in a lurch as HST fails to completely explain the US-Japanese Treaty and the Yoshida Doctrine. This is because the US did not retract from her commitments, whether economic or military, even when the feeling that US power is on the decline was rife both domestically and internationally.

Thus as Rosecrance admits, hegemonic stability theory may have some relevance, but he argues that it does not explain "why there has not *already* been a marked decline in international economic cooperation well after the onset of decline in American economic and military power" (Rosecrance, 1984). The answer may as Nye points out, lie in the success of economic regimes or in the exaggeration of the decline of American power; or in Waltz's theory of the stability of bipolarity; but on the whole causation remains unclear (Nye, 1988). This propels us to look for better realist explanations for Japanese foreign policy behaviour, bringing us to the next section on theories of alliance politics.

Alliance theory: Despite alliances being problematic to conceive given the 'relative gains' assumption, alliance theory is essentially a product of the realist school of thought. Though it explains aspects of security co-operation which is usually associated with neo-liberalism, it differs from the latter in a number of ways. While accounting for co-operation between states, alliance theory never loses sight of Mearsheimer's axiom that there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests and that today's friends can potentially be tomorrow's allies (Mearsheimer, 1994). However, for the neo-liberals the same outcome (i.e. cooperation) would be attributed to repeated Prisoners' Dilemma games, a long shadow of the future, regime theory etc. Under the neorealist paradigm, shifts in the relative balance of economic and military power are presumed to dictate state behaviour. States may form coalitions to preserve a favourable balance of power against a strong rival (external balancing) or in the absence of viable allies a state may align with the dominant power

(bandwagoning). Alternately, a state may directly challenge the dominant power by increasing its own military capabilities (internal balancing). The problem with balance-of-power theories is that they simply say that states will engage in internal or external balancing, with the latter involving making allies. However, neorealist theory of the Waltzian variety under-specifies the conditions under which alliances are formed, or maintained or discontinued. Alliance theory steps in, in this regard with proponents like Glenn Snyder, Walt, Powell etc. whose hypotheses about alliance behaviour have added to the explanatory power of neorealism without compromising much of its parsimony.

In his seminal work on alliance behaviour, Glenn Snyder (1984) came up with a cost-benefit calculus determining the 'value of alliances' which he put forward as an important determinant of outcomes in alliance politics. According to alliance theory, the 'abandonment' versus 'entrapment' dilemma—which is a problem inherent to every alliance—influences a state's security behaviour. Abandonment is the fear that the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected (Mandelbaum, 1981). Entrapment occurs when an alliance commitment turns detrimental to one's interests. It is the entanglement in a dispute over an ally's interests that one does not share, or value or values only partially (G. Snyder, 1984). Again Snyder's assessment of the security-autonomy level of a state and Rothstein's focus on 'strength differences' as important indicators of alliance behaviour, provide greater insight by postulating that in general the weaker the state the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than balance. In his book *Alliances and Small Powers,* Rothstein observes that "weak states can do little to affect outcomes or add to the strength of a defensive coalition; therefore theyare more likely to choose the winning side" (Rothstein, 1968). According to alliance theory then Japan's behaviour can be explained by the fact that the "value of the alliance" was higher for the US during the Cold War period and because it stood to benefit much more from the US-Japan Security Agreement, the latter was more willing to contribute disproportionately higher towards it. As Glenn Snyder observes, "when a strong and weak state ally, most of the value goes to the weak state when the opponent is weak and most goes to the strong state when the opponent is strong" (Snyder, 1997). In Cold War dynamics, the USSR was a strong opponent; therefore most of the benefits of any alliance would by this way or the other accrue to the US.

However, this argument both resonates as well as negates the free-riding hypothesis. From the point of view of equity, the fact that US benefitted more from the agreement only makes it fair that it contributes more towards the agreement. However, the very fact that the US needed the alliance more acutely than Japan raises the ideal conditions under which a typical free-rider's problem emanates. It is a matter of perspective whether Japan free-rode by disguising its actual value from the alliance or it contributed only as much as it deemed necessary, i.e. proportionate to its perceived value. The point however remains that the actual or observed outcomes were because of the fact that during the Cold War period both the US fear of abandonment and the Japanese fear of entrapment were running high. Yasuhiro argues that aversion to the military among Japanese people during the Cold War was a result of not only the genuine antimilitarist culture but also the people's awareness of the risk of entrapment by U.S. containment policy (Yasuhiro, 1995). This can and eventually shall be contrasted with the post-Cold War period where the roles have been reversed since it is now the Japanese fear of abandonment and US fear of entrapment that are running high.

Thus we see that alliance theory provides a cutting edge to the limited predictive and explanatory powers of neorealist theory. For instance, alliance theory dwells on the nuances of offensive realism as well as assumptions about relative cost sensitivity of states. Alliance theory, while fully aware of the counsel of offensive realism—that today's friends are potentially tomorrow's enemies—concerns itself with trying to identify friends and enemies. This is based on the assumption that alliances with at least some would reduce the pervasiveness of insecurity created by anarchy, as opposed to older realist thought which precludes anything other than 'self-help' in an anarchical set-up. This process of *identification* of friends and foes in turn has implications for the assumption of relative cost sensitivity between states. Unlike Greico who maintained that states are *always* concerned about relative rather than absolute gains and losses, Snyder's findings testify that the 'identification effect' of alliance formation increases concerns about relative gains with respect to adversaries while reducing such concerns between allies (Snyder, 1997). This distinction between adversaries and allies brings us to a related distinction between balance of power and what Stephen Walt (1987) terms as balance-of-threat theory. According to Walt, states form alliances primarily to balance against *threats* rather than against *power*.

Threat is a function of a number of things like power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions[23]. States balance against the state that poses the greatest threat, and that state might not necessarily be the most powerful. Thus, the reason why Japan has not engaged in balancing behaviour on many occasions when one would expect a 'normal nation' to do so could be attributed to the fact that it has not felt threatened in such situations[24]. Thus theories of alliance politics explain to a certain extent why a small power like Japan choose not to project its power capabilities or engage in balancing behaviour against either of the states with preponderant concentrations of power after WW-II. It did not balance against the US as it found it more rational not to do so. Powell offers an intriguing analysis of alignment decisions in which bandwagoning or waiting are typically superior to balancing—"a state is less likely to be part of a winning coalition if it aligns with the weaker side and more likely to be part of a winning coalition if it aligns with the stronger side." Again, according to alliance theory, the reason why Japan did not actively balance against USSR is not (only) because it was free-riding the US but because as Rothstein points out "the weakest states cannot provide for their own security, so they bandwagon with the strongest while hoping that others will defend them anyway". Using alliance theory to assess the value of the alliance as well as factoring in the balance-of-threat hypothesis therefore not only helps in explaining past behaviour of Japan but could be extremely valuable in sketching out future scenarios for Japanese foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War era, especially in delineating its relations with countries like the US, China, North Korea etc.

Neoclassical Realism and 'Buck-passing': Juxtaposing the basic essence of the free-riding argument along with the cutting edge of alliance theory brings us to yet another explanation of Japanese foreign policy—namely, buck-passing. Jack Snyder and Thomas Christensen came up with the terms *buck-passing* and *chain-ganging* to

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[23] In his exemplary piece *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis (1976) deals with the aspect of how relations among states are shaped by each state's assessment of the other's intention, in considerable detail.

[24] Japan's perception of threat to its national security is slightly different from the security concerns propounded by classical realist theory. For instance, as Yutaka Kawashima elucidates, the Japanese perception is that as long as they are not on the offensive, they do not face any threat to their security. This situation can be starkly contrasted with the economic realm where Japan has always been fiercely competitive, aware of its limitations in terms of natural resources.

highlight the two extreme kinds of outcomes on the spectrum of alliance behaviour[25]. Chain-ganging is a situation where states bind themselves unconditionally to reckless allies as doing so is regarded as indispensible to their survival. On the other hand, buck-passing is a situation where in the face of a rising threat balancing alignments fail to form as some states try to free-ride on the balancing efforts of others (Snyder and Christensen, 1990). They may do this to avoid bearing unnecessary costs or because they expect their relative position to be strengthened by standing aloof. Buck-passing is different from free-riding because it is not true that a country passes the buck strictly driven by a craven desire to minimize the costs of fighting, regardless of strategic consequences. Public opinion and domestic politics undoubtedly influence strategic calculations, as do other systemic variables apart from the distribution of power, like geography, technology etc. For instance, Mearsheimer points out that "threatened states separated from an aggressor by a barrier are less likely to feel vulnerable to invasion and therefore more likely to pass the buck" (Mearsheimer, 1994). Again Posen notes that it is the perception of offence-defence advantages which shape foreign policy by filtering systemic incentives through the prism of national perception (Posen, 1984). Buck-passing is therefore essentially a neo-classical realist concept while free-riding is based on neorealist conceptions of pure instrumental rationality.

A neoclassical realist explanation is necessitated by the fact that "the logical ambiguity of neorealism is no good for predicting outcomes" (Elman, 1996a: 23). However, Elman is quick to point out that this can be resolved by adding more variables. This is precisely what Snyder and Christensen have done by adding the variable of "perception of offense-defence advantage" to their analysis to provide a more determinate outcome. Snyder and Christensen conclude that there is a connection between offensive advantage and chain-ganging and conversely between defensive advantage and buck-passing. In multipolarity, the greater the vulnerability of states, the greater is the propensity to align unconditionally. Conversely, the lesser the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to pass the buck. This is either because of the expectation that the other state will be able to manage without assistance or because the process of fighting is considered to be costly, therefore they wish to remain at full pre-war strength (Snyder and Christensen, 1990). One of their

[25] Entrapment and abandonment are closely related to the concept of chain-ganging and buck-passing and alluding to the former can help better comprehend the latter.

hypotheses is that soldier's and policymaker's perception of international structural incentives, including the offense-defence balance are shaped by their formative experiences, especially their last major war. The other hypothesis is that uncontrolled militaries often favour offensive strategies as opposed to situations of civilian control over the military.

Thus we see that going by the buck-passing rationale, Japan behaves the way she does because she perceives a concrete military advantage in defensive strategies rather than offensive ones. Defensive buck-passing is the preferred strategy of weak or declining powers only when defence is perceived to have the advantage and thus offers compensation for weakness (Snyder and Christensen, 1990). Also, her geographical position as an island precludes her from 'checkerboard politics'[26] thus weakening her tendency to feel that her destiny is closely linked with her allies, thereby preventing her from indulging in chain-ganging. Last but not the least important is the fact that Japan's unique experience of having faced a nuclear explosion on her soil during WW-II has shaped her perceptions accordingly and paves the way for a distinct preference for defence as opposed to offense. Realists would explain Japan's choice by arguing that this strategy was consistent with Japan's strategic environment: until the late 1970s the Soviet threat was focused on Europe, not Asia; Japan had the protection of a water barrier; Japan had a rich ally on which it could depend; hence Japan could afford to avoid the potentially high costs of fighting. So effectively speaking, throughout the Cold War Japan has passed the buck of countering the threat posed by USSR on to its American allies, and is essentially doing the same vis-à-vis North Korea in the post-Cold War Era.

Though buck-passing as a concept is essentially attributed to Snyder and Christensen, other scholars have also laid out what according to them are the conditions under which states would engage in it. An offensive realists understanding of buck-passing is reminiscent of free-riding as it focuses only on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat. Other scholars like Glenn Snyder have incorporated additional determinants like the importance of that ally's credibility (Snyder, 1997). Again it must be pointed out that a number of

[26] Checkerboard geography makes ones neighbour an enemy and the enemy's neighbour, a friend (Snyder and Christensen, 1990). Checkerboard politics is debilitated by the increased domination of sea and air power in the military equation as also by technological changes that have been ushered in by nuclear weapons.

scholars have dealt with related concepts like waiting, under-balancing, non-balancing etc. Schweller, for instance, has used a number of sub-systemic variables like elite preferences and consensus, social cohesion, state power and state coherence which influence state preference and therefore the choice between different situations. Thus he has tried to lay out a neoclassical realist explanation for when states will under-balance, over-balance, non-balance or bandwagon by looking into both the aspects of a state's ability as well as willingness to balance or otherwise (Schweller, 2004).

III. Realist predictions for Japan in the post-Cold War period

Nye says that international relations theory is constrained by the fact that 'history provides a poor substitute for a laboratory' (Nye, 1988). This makes it quite difficult to verify a particular claim once it has been made, and ascertain whether it holds true across time and space. Realism too, like most other theories of international politics, has a certain conception of and explanation for the way Japan behaved in the Cold War period; as well as a set of claims about how it is likely to behave in the post-Cold War period. However, realism cannot be treated as a single, coherent theory with a specific set of predictions for state behaviour, since there are serious cleavages within it which result in multiple philosophies of international outcomes and state behaviours. Neorealists argue that states generally prefer balancing to bandwagoning (Waltz, 1986). However, a spate of other responses is both rationally possible and plausible and very much in tune with a state's national interest or *raison d'état.* As Paul Schroeder (1994) points out in his article "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory", states have bandwagoned with or hidden from threats far more often than they have balanced against them. The aim of this section is to therefore to take account of these nuances within realism and lay out the range of expected Japanese foreign policy behaviour, generated by different strands of realists. An examination of realist expectations of Japanese behaviour and measuring it up against Japan's *actual* or *observed* behaviour in the post-Cold War period will thereafter help in demonstrating realism's predictive and explanatory powers—two of the most important criteria for a good theory.

The end of the Cold War was singularly the most important event that changed the post-World War II foreign policy for all nations. Japan was one of the nations whose foreign policy was particularly affected by the end of the Cold War. This

situation was in many ways due to the uniqueness of Japanese foreign policy and the country's constitutional restraints. For much of the post-World War II era Japanese foreign policy was modelled along the Yoshida Doctrine, which permitted Japan to focus on economic development while depending on the United States for its national security needs. This policy worked out well only until the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War that followed. The war had a major impact on the politics of Japan because the economic giant was forced to face the true reality of its economic superpower status for the first time in a major international crisis. Thus we see that for Japan the simple world that it knew during the Cold War had become complex. Decisions became much more complicated and far-reaching and the rules had changed. Since World War II Japan has done well to live by the dove of pacifism. Whether it was the 'logic of appropriateness' that was responsible for this or the 'logic of consequences' was not important to determine because both logics advocated the same course of action—to abdicate the 'sword' in favour of the 'chrysanthemum'. But now the time has come for Japan to choose whether to "let its role in the world dwindle and perish by its self imposed pacifism or take up the sword and risk the enemies it has avoided since the end of World War II" (Cooney, 2006). The reason for this is because a lot has changed with the end of the Cold war—some of the conditions that made free-riding or buck-passing or waiting, indisputably the most appealing and rational courses of action during the Cold War, no longer exist. The existence of a rich ally both able and willing to shoulder international threats cannot be taken for granted any more. Rosecrance has pointed out that after the fall of the Berlin Wall there remains no common enemy to bind together erstwhile allies; thus it cannot be completely ruled out that Japan will at some point of time or the other balance the inordinate power of the US in the international system (Rosecrance, 1991). On the other hand, neoclassical realist explanations advanced by the likes of Schweller, can be used to forecast that Japan will continue to engage in non-balancing because of the simple reason that it perceives its own well-being as inextricably tied up with the well-being of the hegemon[27]. Schweller (1994) has shown that bandwagoning—joining the stronger side rather than balancing it—is compatible with realist premises if one assumes that the objective of this type of alliance is not

[27] This is also substantiated by classical realist logic because as Carr expatiates in his book *Twenty Years' Crisis,* in certain cases a harmony of interest exists between the hegemon and the potential balancer because the latter perceives itself to be benefitting from the status quo and therefore seeks to preserve it by siding with the hegemon rather than balancing against it (Carr, 1939: 80-82).

security, but gain. The conviction that balancing is not the inevitable course of action is also substantiated by alliance theory which says that weak states usually prefer alternatives to balancing like bandwagoning, hiding, buck-passing, waiting, distancing, engaging, appeasement etc (Powell, 1999; Rothstein, 1967; Snyder, 1990). This leaves us with a spate of questions and associated prognoses about the impact of the structural change from bipolarity to unipolarity on Japanese foreign policy. Given the end of the Cold War will Japan behave aggressively and aspire for regional hegemony; will she follow more defensive strategies like building military power, finding allies, and confronting aggressive states; or will she be content with keeping her head down by buck-passing or free-riding? Again it is important to determine whether Japan will make a shift from being *passively* involved in balance of power politics as it was during the Cold War—what Schroeder would term as 'hiding'; or will be *actively* involved in international affairs by making the transition to becoming a 'normal' nation. These are important questions and crucial to be able to determine whether the future of Japan lies in the 'sword' or in the 'chrysanthemum'. And is not just the US vis-à-vis which it is necessary for Japan to answer these questions. Japan also has to take a stance and charter a course for her interaction with other actors of both regional and international political consequence like China, North Korea, Russia etc. Does Japan perceive a threat from any of these states, and will it accordingly indulge in balancing such a threat, or will it under-balance or alternatively pass the buck to the US?

In this section, all the realist theories that have some or the other implication for Japanese foreign policy behaviour have been divided into two camps on the basis of what they conceive of as the future scenario for Japan. Neorealism in general and its offensive variant in particular posit a sharp break from the kind of behaviour exhibited by Japan immediately after the Second World War. According to them, Japan in the post-Cold War period is envisaged to revert to the kind of aggressive behaviour that it exhibited before the outbreak of WW-II. This is resonant with Mearsheimer's conception of international security which highlights the alarming similarities between pre and post-Cold War situations, leading many to believe that we are heading "back to the future" into an all too familiar world of balance-of-power

politics and extreme instability and conflict[28] (Mearsheimer, 1990). However, another set of scholars have a diametrically opposite set of beliefs about the post-Cold War world order. According to Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War marks the universal acceptance of the Western model of capitalist market economy and liberal mode of thought as the final form of human government which all countries of the world have either already adopted or are soon going to adopt. This state of affairs is supposed to continue for a good while thereby perpetuating Western thoughts and ideals. History, in this sense has thus come to a standstill—therefore the term "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1989)[29]. Thus, as Samuels marks, at one extreme there is the view that the United States is Japan's most important source of security, and must be hugged closely. At the other extreme is the view that in a unipolar world, the United States is a particularly dangerous bully that must be kept at some distance, for fear that Japan would become entangled in American adventures.

Theories favouring the 'back to the future' scenario: Neorealists are in general pessimistic about the prospects for peace in the new unipolar world, because some state or alliance of states is bound to step in to fill the vacuum ensuing in a tussle between the declining hegemon and the rising challenger. With respect to Japan, neorealists would point out that since there is a single structure of power and power is fungible (Waltz, 1979), economic power has to be translated into military power first in order to have any meaningful impact on international politics—therefore economic power alone cannot directly condition international politics according to neo-realists. As far as the US side of the commitment to the security arrangement is concerned, neorealists would caution that "the most powerful states, if they are dependent on other actors for vital economic and material supplies, will use their military strength to secure access to these material necessities (Waltz 1979: 222). Going by this logic then Japan should constantly be on guard lest the US regards itself to be too dependent on it financially and economically and retaliates by using military strength to make itself feel more secure.

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[28] Other scholars who hold a somewhat similar conception of world politics in the post-Cold War period are Kaplan who talks about the 'coming anarchy' and Samuel Huntington for whom a 'clash of civilizations' is imminent.

[29] The reason why the end of history argument is conceptualised as a realist scenario is because Fukuyama highlights the fact that the non-Western nations are left with no choice but to adopt this mode of governance and economy and so have to reconcile themselves to this reality.

With respect to the current environment therefore, neo-realism's main hypothesis is that international incentives will compel Japan to rise to great power status to balance the United States' military preponderance (Waltz, 1993; Layne 1995). For neorealists, even if the US does not actively seek to threaten the interests of Japan, balancing behaviour will occur since "the hegemon's possession of actual or latent military capabilities incites balancing regardless of its intentions" (Waltz, 1991). This view that Japan will strengthen its military in order to guard against the mere possibility that the United States might act coercively clearly reflects neorealism's worst-case perspective, as pointed out by Brooks (1997). Christopher Layne insists that Japan will not continue down the path it has taken since World War II - namely, focusing on economic capacity while avoiding large expenditures on military security, and vociferously criticizes those who argue that Japan will "eschew military strength in favour of economic power" (Layne, 1995). The rationale behind this is since eligible states that fail to attain great power status are predictably punished, Japan will strive to become a military power even though pursuing such a policy will entail substantial economic costs. Again it is not just the US against which the Japanese will feel the need to balance. During the post-Cold War period it has became clear to Japan that North Korea either possesses or is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. When assessing the North Korean threat, a neorealist would anticipate two modes of Japanese behaviour. If the U.S. nuclear umbrella remained credible, Tokyo should respond indifferently to North Korea. Conversely, if US extended deterrence is no longer convincing, Japan should develop its own defence vis-à-vis Pyongyang.

Even balance-of-threat theory has a similarly ominous prediction and notes that perceptions of US-Japanese rivalry are growing, now that the Soviet no longer provides a powerful motive for cooperation. Relations among Japan, China and Russia are likely to be shaped less by power or geography than by each state's assessment of the other's intention. According to balance-of-threat theory therefore, the end of the Cold War implied a diffusion of threats leading scholars like Walt to anticipate a "stronger and more assertive Japan" (Walt, 1987). The central empirical prediction of neoclassical realism is also that over the long term the relative amount of material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition—the envelope, as it were—of their foreign policies: as their relative power rises states

will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly (Rose, 1998; Zakaria, 1999).

Offensive realists in particular envisage a "back to the future" kind of a scenario for Japan. According to them, the best way a great power can achieve security under anarchy is by pursuing regional hegemony and gaining control of one's neighbourhood. This along with the belief that "there are no status-quo powers in the international system" (Mearsheimer, 1994) leads offensive realists to conclude that changes in the relative balance of world power might cause Japan to balance or challenge the United States. Using a counterfactual analysis then a neorealist, especially an offensive realist Japan should have responded to 9/11 by using it as a perfect justification (both domestically as well as internationally to become a 'normal' nation. By similar logic, the Iraq War too provided a further occasion for Japan to overcome remaining constraints on its defence policy.

Theories favouring the 'end of history' scenario: For postclassical realism, in contrast to neorealism, Japan is not likely to balance the United States because a choice by Japan to bolster its military forces for the purpose of balancing would entail considerable economic opportunity costs. Apart from having to be David to the US Goliath, Japan would also risk a reduction in its substantial international export markets and access to certain technologies. Given these large economic costs, postclassical realism asserts that balancing behaviour will occur only if there exists a significant probability—and not just the possibility, as neorealists argue—that the United States will use its superior military capabilities in a coercive manner.

Though there is a unanimity among those supporting the "end of history" scenario that Japan is not likely to balance the United States in the near future, they are divided on the issue of whether Japan will become a 'normal' nation or not. Going by the logic of free-riding, Japan should contribute very little to the US- Japan alliance after the Cold War. It should stop balancing so vigorously, rely more on the United States, and resist further expansion of its military roles. Going by hegemonic stability's predictions for Japan's security behaviour too, we see an inherent "free rider" incentive which suggests a very calculated defence policy. According to this logic, Tokyo should extract maximum economic benefits from the US security umbrella while offering the minimum upkeep needed to preserve the bilateral alliance.

However, an additional clause that HST adds to this calculus in specific terms is that, Japan should develop indigenous military capabilities and deploy forces overseas only when not doing so might jeopardize the US security guarantee. This brings into the calculation matrix the element of determining the 'value of alliances' for both the parties to the alliance.

Invoking alliance theory however, we see that the fear of both entrapment and abandonment should lead Japan to cut a few strings loose from the US-Japan Security Agreement and develop independent and indigenous military capabilities, both *de juro* as well as *de facto*. Fear of entrapment will make it move away from the US, as a result of which it will have to develop indigenous capabilities; and the fear of abandonment will make it try and increase its 'value' to the alliance by increasing its effort, which will again necessitate a shift from its erstwhile pacifism. As Kliman has pointed out, foreign threats have and will continue to indirectly contribute to Tokyo's strategic transition by increasing the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance, thereby spurring Japan's *realpolitik* orientation (Kliman, 2006). Thus either way, the logic of alliance theory predicts a gradual strengthening of Japan's indigenous capabilities. A more robust SDF would decrease the possibility of abandonment by raising the utility of the alliance to the United States. At the same time, enhanced indigenous capabilities would reduce the likelihood of entrapment by providing Japan with a more credible exit option. This argument helps to explain some important aspects of Japanese foreign policy for instance why is it that Japan has become more willing to play an active role in the alliance after the Cold War (Yasuhiro, 1995). The end of the Cold War weakened the Japanese fear of entrapment while increasing that of abandonment by the United States, which were materializing especially when Clinton was warming up to China.

Thus we see that based on the degree of their willingness to use force, two sub-scenarios emerge within the "end of history" camp—one which predicts bandwagoning with the US as the future path of Japan and the other which advocates buck-passing or free-riding as the preferred strategy. As Samuels points out, those who support the US alliance would be more willing to deploy the SDF in order to "share alliance burdens" than others who would prefer that Japan continue to limit itself to rear area support (Samuels, 2006).

Conclusion

Thus it is interesting to see how realists have come up with two diametrically opposite scenarios for Japan—one where she obsequiously falls in line with the US and does its bidding, and the other where it reverts to a strong, remilitarised nation actively involved in counterweighing inordinately powerful nations, by internal and external balancing, like it did during WW-II. However, most scenarios for Japan's expected behaviour would ideally fall somewhere in between the spectrum defined by these two extremes. Some of these scenarios include what has been termed by Kliman (2006) as a 'normal' Japan that remains allied with the United States; an independent and remilitarized state or what has been termed by Samuels (2006) as a "neo-autonomist" Japan; and a "middle power internationalist" Japan, that walks tightrope between national and international interests (Green, 2006) etc.

A 'normal' Japan would find strengthening the bilateral alliance desirable, if not indeed necessary. In this situation, Japan would alter the composition of its budget by increasing allocations for military R&D and emphasize light expeditionary forces at the expense of traditional heavy units within its procurement budgets. Again North Korean threat would propel it to deploy or at least start developing pre-emptive capabilities like cruise missiles and long-range bombers. Gradually the Diet would alter its interpretation of Article Nine as requiring an "exclusively defence-oriented defence policy," thus paving the way for making the development of pre-emptive capabilities legal. It is also expected that the Diet would enact a permanent dispatch law permitting the SDF personnel to participate in peacekeeping and to use armed force overseas as well. Again it anticipated that in order to facilitate missile defence cooperation with the US, Japan would relax the non-export principles. However, despite becoming a 'normal' nation, Japan would probably continue to spend only 1 percent of GDP on defence in this scenario. Also there would be no modification whatsoever in the Three Nonnuclear Principles—which would remain the continuity in the changing landscape of Japan's defence policy.

Alternatively, a remilitarized and autarkic Japan on the other hand would unilaterally terminate the bilateral security alliance and provide for its own defence, notwithstanding financial and diplomatic costs or normative constraints. Tokyo would develop extensive power projection capabilities and boost defence spending above 1 percent of GDP and bereft of the US nuclear umbrella it might even be compelled to

shelve its nuclear taboo and develop nuclear weapons alongside cruise missiles, long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, and heavy cruisers. In the absence of the U.S. security umbrella, the SDF would be charged with deterring nuclear attacks on Japan. Therefore, Article Nine, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as well as all kinds of laws on export restrictions would be repealed or modified to accommodate a more aggressive Japan with not only modified defensive capabilities but with offensive ones as well. Thus after laying out the range of expected Japanese behaviour by the realist camp, it remains to be ascertained which (if at all any) of these scenarios and counterfactual analyses aligns itself closest to the actual trajectory of Japan's post-Cold War foreign policy; and this is precisely what is attempted in chapter 4 of this research.

On a concluding note, it can be said that realists have only just begun to specify and test theories of foreign policy that describe when a state will choose one strategy over another. As critics of realism have correctly noted, many different foreign policy strategies—conquest, bandwagoning, buck-passing—could be claimed by realists, in an ad hoc fashion, as consistent with their expectations. As Led Nebow points out, almost any outcome can be made consistent with some variant of realist theory. These critics are right in pointing out that the realist paradigm does not predict when a state will chose one of these strategies over another. As for the case of Japan, realism does not make specific predictions about which security strategy Tokyo should have adopted after World War II. Nevertheless, it is possible to determine whether Japan's post-war security policy has been consistent with one of the realist strategies e.g., balancing or free-riding, or whether Japan has followed a foreign policy that has been driven primarily by other non-realist factors.

Chapter 3

Neo-liberal Institutionalism and the Japanese case

Introduction

Interpretations and predictions about Japan are largely influenced by which set of *a priori* assumptions about Japan's place in the structure of world politics is adopted. Some who follow the logic of neorealism have identified Japan as the next superpower, one which will eventually but inevitably acquire nuclear weapons and develop force projection capabilities. Others of a more liberal bent have labelled Japan as the precursor of the pacifist nations of the future. One of the major issues of debate between international relations thinkers has been over whether conflict can be transcended or mitigated or not. Not all thinkers are equally pessimistic about international cooperation. This became the main cleavage between two groups of thinkers—the Realists and the Idealists—who had a pessimistic and optimistic stand respectively, on the aforementioned issue.

In the first "great debate" that raged between the interwar Idealists and Realists, realism emerged victorious because the logic invoked by Liberals about the peaceful impact of free trade and democratic institutions; and the capacity of international law and collective security to prevent the outbreak of war were both belied in 1914 and 1939 respectively. This gave realism greater leverage as the most accurate theoretical paradigm explaining international realities. However, liberalism got an opportunity to revamp itself as a more refined theoretical paradigm, when instances of international cooperation—which were getting increasingly difficult for realist theory to explain—began to make themselves manifest in the 1960s. It is from here that theories on interdependence (Cooper, 1969), with its more refined version developing in the 1980s by way of "complex interdependence" came about, laying the foundation of neo-liberalism as a theoretical paradigm within the international relations discourse. This was furthered by the inception of regime theory (Krasner, 1983; Jervis, 1978) and theories on international institutions in the 1970s. This was also the time when game theoretical models were receiving increasing interest in explaining international outcomes (Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986). As a result of all these developments, over the years, liberalism evolved from a wishy-washy, feeble utopian theory to a more logically and empirically compelling

one with neo-liberal institutionalism defining the apex of this evolution. The cutting edge provided by the new liberalism meant that it could no longer be dismissed as an 'unrealistic' reflection of international politics. This is precisely why this chapter is designed to look at the liberal side of the argument vis-à-vis the Japanese case, as an alternative to realist explanations discussed in the previous chapter.

Joseph Grieco (1988a) talks at length about the contrasting paradigms that modern Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism espouse. However some like Keohane (1984) are quick to point out that the two are not intrinsically incompatible and seek to demonstrate that the formation of institutionalized arrangements, which promote cooperation are consistent with realist assumptions about world politics. In particular, liberal institutionalists acknowledge that states "dwell in perpetual anarchy", and must therefore "act as rational egoists in what is essentially a self-help world" (Oye, 1986). The main critique of liberalism of the twentieth century was that it was founded on the tenets of idealism. Neo-liberal institutionalism is a major corrective to this because as Keohane says in *After Hegemony*, he is "adopting the realist model of rational egoism", and by doing so is proposing to show that on the basis of their own assumptions, the characteristic pessimism of realism does not follow (Keohane, 1984). Thus we see that both theories see the state as a rational utility-maximizing entity fashioned after the strategic interaction models that game theory prescribes; both assume that dealings between nations take place under the conditions of anarchy. However, Neoliberal Institutionalism believes in the power of international regimes, institutions and organizations[1] to foster cooperation and reduce defection, while Realists consider the security dilemma, exacerbated by the problem of cheating and the relative gains issue, to be the major impediments in the facilitation of international cooperation. The problem of relative gains was pointed out by Greico (1988a) who maintained that states will fail to cooperate when they perceive other states might stand to gain more. However, even 'pessimistic' realists like Greico were in due course of time, compelled to modified realist theory to better accommodate the growing reality of cooperation. In a reformulation of his theory, Greico has specified the conditions under which the relative gains problem may be relaxed, and thus cooperation may have a better chance of being achieved. These include the admittance that the past, i.e. whether the other state has been for an extended period a

[1] Regimes and institutions are used interchangeably in most of neo-liberal literature (Mearsheimer, 1994). The references made to these terms in this chapter shall also follow the same nomenclature.

friend or a foe, influences threat perception and results in different outcomes vis-à-vis relative gains calculations (Greico, 1988b).

The relaxation of this realist theory seems to augur well for the Japanese case for going austerely by the relative gains argument one would never be able to explain security cooperation between Japan and the United States, nor could one satisfactorily explain why Japan has so far eschewed its ascent to a military power. The puzzle emanates from the fact that security cooperation implies relying for an essential objective, national survival, on the resources, intentions and activities of other states, which is hard to reconcile with the notion of security being guaranteed exclusively by self-help. The puzzle that theorists try to solve is how is it that states develop interests[2], interpretations and perceptions that permit them to jump into security cooperation. A theory of interests defined solely in terms of power is an impoverished theory of interests (Burchill, 2001). It is here that liberalism steps in with its more sophisticated variants that provide a useful supplement to realism by directing attention to the ways in which domestic and international factors interact to change the way in which states define their interests.

The crucial point here is that one is now dealing with a set of factors and arguments that is outside the realm of realism proper as it bears no causal relation to anarchy, the distribution of capabilities and polarity. This brings to mind Nye's words about "non-power incentives" affecting state choices, which are also essentially systemic processes just like the power incentives identified by realists. Thus, at the systemic level—in addition to the distribution of power—states experience constraints and opportunities because of changes in levels of world economic activity, technological innovation, shifts in patterns of transnational interactions, and alterations in international norms and institutions (Nye, 1988). Again it has been pointed out by Schmiegelow that it is not just a one-way causation between structure and action, with the former always impacting the latter, despite neorealists harping on the fact that structures constrain and shape state action. To make his point he takes the instance of economic policies of a particular nation which according to him, if pursued over a long time can in turn affect structures both at home and abroad and may even lead to the formation of new structures (Schmiegelow, 1990). Looking at it then in the specific context of Japan and its "strategic pragmatic" model of action,

[2] Realism, in particular its neorealist variant, is slightly handicapped when it comes to deconstructing preferences as they take interests to be given, and more importantly unchangeable.

Schmeigelow notes how as a result of the adoption of this model, Japan is increasingly accounting for shares in international process outcomes, that too so far exclusively by virtue of non-power incentives (Schmiegelow, 1990).

This has important implications because if it were true that the scale and extent of its ones economic linkages, as expressed through international markets, and economic regimes and institutions, suffice to shape the environment and hence the policy options and behaviour of other states in the international system, then Japan's reluctance to develop military power could be explained by the fact that it did not require to do so any longer. And this was not—as realists do not tire of pointing out—because it was 'free-riding' on the shade provided by the nuclear umbrella of the US, but because, as Rosecrance (1986) marks, the 'military state' was gradually paving the way for the 'trading state'. If power is understood as the ability to affect outcomes in international affairs and if a country is able to exert this power without the use of military or "hard power", and by resorting to the use of norms, institutions and regimes as constrains on behaviour instead, then it is more rational by any standard—whether basic Benthamite rationality or simply instrumental rationality—to divert resources towards the development of such non-coercive influences rather than "hard power". Since war brings more costs than gains and no can longer effectively dispenses the same functions as it used to earlier owing to the changing nature of international interactions, it has become an anachronism and 'rationally unthinkable' (Müller, 2002).

Heed should be paid to the term 'rationally unthinkable' because of the sheer relevance that it has on two counts. The first point is that this explanation of Japanese behaviour though rooted in liberalism, draws its argument from *rationality* rather then utopian concepts like idealism focusing on morality and basic altruism inherent in human nature. The second point to be noted is that the term 'rationally unthinkable' brings about an easy reconciliation between the normative and rational aspects of neo-liberalism. Norms form an intrinsic part of regimes—one of the cornerstones of neo-liberal institutionalist theories. However, norms are more closely associated with constructivism, which seems to contradict the rationality side of the argument that neo-liberal institutionalism claims to be premised on. The term 'rationally unthinkable' establishes that rationality and norms can exist concomitantly as in this case the greater rationality lies in the adherence to a different kind of morality and ethical consciousness about war. To reiterate a point made in the earlier chapter, the

divide between rationalism and constructivism should not be drawn along the lines of ascribing the former to realism and liberalism. One would do well by realizing that neo-liberal institutionalism is essentially liberalism "tainted" by realism, so bears elements of both liberal idea-lism (not ideal-ism) as well as rationalism.

In the same mould as the previous chapter, the first section of this chapter will explore the roots from which neo-liberal institutionalism evolved into its present state—namely the transition from classical liberalism, to liberal internationalism, to neo-liberalism, finally culminating in neo-liberal institutionalism. In the previous chapter we explored some realist explanations advanced to understand security cooperation—the most outstanding feature of Japan's foreign policy behaviour both during and after the Cold War—along with its reticence to engage in balancing behaviour or take on a more active role in international politics. The second section of this chapter seeks to advance some liberal, in particular, institutionalist explanations for the same. Specifically, theories on interdependency and soft power shall be looked into to explain the reluctance of Japan to convert its economic resources into military power, while regime theory and theories on international institutions will be alluded to for explaining the continuation of security cooperation between Japan and the US as well as Japan's proclivity towards international and regional institutionalization. Lastly, the range of scenarios for Japan's future foreign policy trajectory that are anticipated by liberal theory shall be discussed in the third section.

I. Liberal Theories of International Politics

Liberals differ in their assumptions and predictions about international politics in a number of ways from realists, especially over perspectives on power, security, human nature, prospects for inter-state cooperation etc. Though liberalism as a theory of international politics is fairly well-developed now, till quite some time this paradigm did not have a coherent liberal theory of peace and war per se. However, the development of the democratic peace research programme, renewed interest in the hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes peace, the formulation of a theory of international institutions, and attempts to combine all of these into a single integrated liberal theory of war and peace has led to the redressal of this situation. Two aspects of systemic processes—non-power incentives and variations in the

capacity to communicate and cooperate—have traditionally been emphasized by liberal theory. Liberal theorists often stress the ways in which trade and economic incentives may alter states' behaviour. Similarly, Liberal theorists talk about the effects of increased transnational and trans-governmental contacts on attitudes and abilities to communicate. Institutions and norms have also always played a role in liberal theory. However, it must be pointed out that not all of liberal theory addresses processes at the systemic level. Michael Doyle's work on the possible causal relationship between democratic governments and foreign policy choices is one such instance. Formally termed as the democratic peace hypothesis, this is one such process which delineates the *systemic* impacts of a *domestic* level independent variable, namely the kind of domestic institutions that exist in a country.

Therefore, as has been pointed out by Moravcsik (1997) and as shall be seen in the ensuing sections, liberalism as an alterative to the realist paradigm, applies equally to economic and national security affairs, conflictual and non-conflictual situations, liberal and non-liberal states, and most importantly doubles up as a theory of foreign policy as well as international relations as it explains the behaviour of both individual states as well as aggregation of states.

Classical Liberalism: In 1975 Condorcet wrote a treatise which contained everything considered as the essential basis of idealism in international relations. He envisaged a world order marked by the absence of war, inequality and tyranny and marked by constant progress in human welfare brought about by the use of reason, education and science. The theoretical position of idealism in international relations is the offspring of the liberal outlook of the Condorcet type (Burchill, 2001). The intellectual foundations of international idealism can also be traced from the nineteenth century Benthamite rationalism which was based upon the supremacy of reason. The reverberations of classical idealism were heard in the exhortations of those who propounded the doctrine of the harmony of interests. Keohane has identified three major causal strands of classical liberal theory, namely—commercial liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of trade; democratic liberalism, which asserts the pacific effects of republican government; and regulatory liberalism, which asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting relations between countries (Keohane, 1987). It is easy to see how the first strand developed into hypotheses like those expounded by Norman Angell (1910) in his book *The Great Illusion* and thereafter

into theories on interdependency and complex interdependence; the second strand laid the foundation for the democratic peace hypothesis which received renewed interest in the post-Cold War period manifest in the works of Bruce Russett, Polachek and others; and the third initially paved the way for concepts like collective security and the power of international law and organization but which over the years metamorphosed into refined theories on international institutions and regimes.

Idealism: In the immediate aftermath of the First World War there was a huge amount of optimism among countries like the US, driven by Wilsonian Idealism, about the efficacy of an international order that could ameliorate the outbreak of conflict. The core elements of idealism as it evolved during the period between the two world wars and even earlier include the belief that human nature is essentially good, perhaps even altruistic, bad behaviour emanates from bad institutions, war is not inevitable and institutions can hep ameliorate it. Idealism focuses on free trade, the rule of international law, the prominent role of international institutions, and the proliferation of democratic states as factors encouraging interstate cooperation and global stability. All this was epitomised in Wilson's Fourteen Points which constituted the basis of the formation of the League of Nations and which provided the first formal idealist conceptualisation of international politics—liberal internationalism. This conceptualization of international politics was greatly derided as "utopian" by realists like Carr, Niebuhr, Herz because it was thought to be an idealistic deliberation on how politics 'ought to be' rather than a realistic reflection of how it actually 'is'. The outbreak of the Second World War rang the death knell for the idealists and their optimistic take on international politics as Niebuhr's "children of light" were held in contempt for their excessive naivety which took a huge toll by way of their inability to foresee, therefore prevent the recurrence of large-scale warfare. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War with increased international cooperation born out of the Marshall Plan, Japanese reconstruction etc, perspectives that emphasised interstate cooperation began to engender a renewed interest and greater acceptance in the lexicon of world politics. This second chance was capitalised on soon after by interdependence theorists like Richard Cooper by the late 1960s. These perspectives were based on functional incentives laid out most articulately by David Mitrany (1966) and neo-functional paradigms of international cooperation suggested by Ernst Haas (1964) and others. Thus the older debates about

international order, cosmopolitan values and greater co-operation, as opposed to inter-state conflict and anarchy, resurfaced once again.

Neo-liberalism: By the 1960s, realism was so dominant that one reviewer of the field concluded that "genuine anti-realists are hard to find" (Fox and Fox, 1961). However in the late 1950s and the 1960s, an anti-realist counter-attack developed momentum, focussing on problems in realist accounts of national interest and balance of power. A substantial challenge to a realist world of autonomous sovereign states, alone and adrift in the sea of international anarchy, was provided by those who envisaged the world as comprising of multiple actors bound together in a complex web of conflictual and cooperative relations. (Donnelly, 2000: 34)

Neo-liberals retained the core of the classical concerns for international cooperation but proposed different mechanisms for its furtherance. For neo-liberals the motivation for interstate cooperation derives primarily from the interests of state actors. But these interests are not of the state actors themselves. Eschewing the "utopian" aspects of classical liberalism, which has been a patent charge of the realists levelled against the idealists, neo-liberalism relies on functional and neo-functional arguments rooted in the belief that cooperation in the non-political field, or in the arena of low politics can, can build bridges of understanding among nations and motivate them to cooperate in the politico-military field or in the area of high politics. These ideas were gradually consolidated by Keohane and Nye (1977) into a fully developed theory of complex interdependence, as shall be discussed.

Interdependence and liberal institutionalism: The major developments in the Liberal tradition of international relations theory in the post-1945 period started from studies on regional integration. What these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such interaction. Many of the insights from integration theory were transferred in the early 1970s to the growing and broader dimensions of international economic interdependence.

Free trade and the removal of barriers to commerce are at the heart of modern interdependency theory. The rise of regional economic integration in Europe, for example, was inspired by the belief that the likelihood of conflict between states

would be reduced by creating a common interest in trade and economic collaboration amongst members of the same geographical region. States would then have a joint stake in each other's peace and prosperity (Haas, 1964). As Mitrany also argued, initially co-operation between states would be achieved in technical areas where it was mutually convenient, but once successful it could 'spill over' into other functional areas where states found that mutual advantages could be gained (Mitrany, 1966). In a development of this argument, Keohane and Nye have explained how, via membership of international institutions, states can significantly broaden their conceptions of self-interest in order to widen the scope for co-operation.

Complex interdependence: By the 1980s it had become clear that the use of force was counter-productive in the post-Second World War period because it threatened the stability of the global trading and finance system, despite neo-realists harping over strategic primacy (Nye, 1986). Complex interdependence denotes a reluctant recognition of the growing dependence of states on each other. Since this interdependence had very much become a part of international reality, realists could hardly afford to ignore it. Though realists maintain that states are unitary, coherent and autonomous actors, those like Keohane and Nye have pointed out that this is not always the case, for many a times states are better understood as coalition partners whose objectives and interests result from the powers and bargaining processes among several groups of nations. This is a characteristic tenet of complex interdependence, emphasising transnational and trans-governmental relations and it clearly indicates that the new reality falls well short of the realist assumptions about states being coherent actors.

Complex interdependence, as conceived of by Keohane and Nye (1977) as an ideal-type diametrically opposed to realism, is characterized by three properties. First, societies are connected through multiple channels of communication, including government-to-government contacts, informal elite networks, and transnational organizations. This is as opposed to realist assumptions about states being unitary, coherent and autonomous actors. Second, the agenda of interstate relationships lacks a distinct hierarchy of issues; and that domestic politics, not merely security considerations, influence a state's foreign policy. Realists have traditionally given preference to issues of national security or what can be termed as "high politics" over economic and other concerns which have been relegated by them to the domain of

"low politics". Also most mainstream versions of realism do not acknowledge the impact of domestic politics on systemic outcomes. Third, the use of military force is becoming increasing inefficacious where relations of complex interdependence prevail. In such relationships of complex interdependence, the "distribution of power within each issue," rather than overall national capabilities, determines the outcome of interstate bargaining (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Consequently, complex interdependence predicts that national initiatives are not executed by unitary state actors alone, as trans-governmental bureaucratic alliances may exist on certain issues and so bureaucracies with distinct organizational interests may implement policy. Finally, the networks, norms, and institutions that exist under complex interdependence also exert inertia on new policies.

Democratic peace: A common thread running through liberal thinkers, both old and new, is that the 'disease' of war could be successfully treated with the twin medicines of democracy and free trade. Free trade and commerce would overcome the artificial barriers between individuals and unite them everywhere into one community while democratic processes and institutions would break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence. The previous sections on interdependence have been dedicated to show the casual relationship between free trade and peace. This section devotes some attention to the other pillar of liberal thought, namely the link between democratic domestic institutions and peace.

Liberal thinkers from Rousseau, Kant and Schumpeter right up to Doyle, Russett, Oneal etc. more recently, have always believed that wars are created by militaristic and undemocratic governments for their own vested interests. Though Kant established way back in 1795 in his *Perpetual Peace* that democracies are more peaceful than other states, it was only in the mid-1980s that this was concretized in the form of a theory of international relations which made a systemic case for the claim that "democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other" (Doyle, 1995). This modern resurrection of the dual themes of domestic legitimacy and the extent to which liberal-democratic states exercise restraint and peaceful intentions in their foreign policy—taken up more recently by Doyle (1995) and Russett (Oneal and Russett, 1999), but nonetheless based on age-old liberal concepts of democratic institutions, free trade and international law—is what has come to be known as the "democratic peace hypothesis".

It also becomes important to discuss the democratic peace theory because it is a particular form of liberal theory that predicts systemic outcomes based on fundamental assumptions about the domestic attributes of states. This constitutes an 'inside-out' approach to international relations, where the exogenous behavior of states can be explained by examining their endogenous political and economic arrangements. Therefore, as far as the democratic peace hypothesis is concerned it can be held up for being 'reductionist', stressing the importance of legitimate domestic orders in explaining foreign policy behavior rather than the 'systemic' features of international relations. However, one can invoke Colin Elman's rejoinder to Waltz's 'International Politics is not Foreign Policy' to show that it is not a problem to use democratic peace theory to generate predictions about the international system. Elman says that Waltz erroneously distinguishes between theories of international politics and foreign policy on the basis of levels of analysis, with the former having systemic level dependent and independent variables and the latter having domestic level dependent and independent variables (Elman, 1996b). Many a times the dependent and independent variables cut across the levels of analysis e.g. Waltz (1988) himself has attempted to demonstrate the impact of the development of nuclear weapons (a domestic level independent variable) on international stability (a systemic level dependent variable). In the same vein we have the democratic peace theory which has essentially a sub-systemic level independent variable but with system-level repercussions.

Rawls' Law of Peoples: One of the problems with the "democratic peace hypothesis" is that it is essentially a dyadic theory which basically postulates that pairs of democracies seldom go to war. At a structural, non-dyadic level some scholars/theorists insist that democracies are as likely to go to war with one another as authoritarian states, especially imperial wars; and are more likely to be the initiator rather than the target. Also democratic-authoritarian dyads are more war-prone than pure authoritarian dyads (Levy, 2002). Rawls on the other hand, is concerned with the extent to which *both* liberal and non-liberal peoples can be equal participants in a 'society of peoples'. He argues that principles and norms of international law and practice—the 'Law of Peoples'—can be developed and shared by both liberal and non-liberal or decent hierarchical societies, without an expectation that liberal

democracy is the terminus for all (Rawls, 1993). The guidelines and principle basis for establishing harmonious relations between liberal and non-liberal peoples under a common Law of peoples, takes liberal international theory in a more sophisticated direction because it explicitly acknowledges the need for utopian thought to be realistic.

Neo-liberal institutionalism: By making the important distinction between cooperation and harmony of interest, neo-liberal institutionalists have come a long way from their idealistic liberal forefathers. Harmony as understood by early twentieth century liberals was the absence of all conflict in international relations due to no imminent clash of national interest. This premise is however rejected by the new liberals who are instead in consonance with realists about the existence of the state of international anarchy exacerbated by the "security dilemma". However, the *liberal* part of neo-liberal institutionalism is upheld by the fact that these theories differ with realists over the possibility of cooperation in such an anarchical and conflictual inter-state setting. Cooperation is different from harmony as it does not flow automatically but requires conscious and concerted efforts by all those party to it. In particular, liberal institutionalists believe that developing a pattern of institutionalized cooperation between states is laden with unprecedented opportunities for the promotion of a more durable and stable security system.

Two features that set neo-liberal institutionalists apart from older strands of liberalism are the use of rational choice and game theoretical models to anticipate the behaviour of states; and the central role of regimes and institutional cooperation which they believe can mitigate anarchy.

The contribution of Game theory: One of the primary factors behind making the basic claims of neo-liberal institutionalists more credible than their idealistic predecessors is the fact that they are firmly grounded in rational-choice theory and backed by game theoretical models. The point where neo-institutionalists score over their realist counterparts is the fact that the origins of realist theory did not emerge from the rational choice paradigm, though realism in general and neorealist thinking in particular have been modelled by some in rational choice terms. Neo-institutionalist analyses on the other hand, are rooted in the rational-choice paradigm right from their very inception with their most important foundational texts starting from rational

choice (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986). International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Game theoretical models have been used by liberals to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. In particular, Axlerod (1988) has shown that cooperation can emerge among egoists under conditions of strategic interdependence as modelled by the game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Such a result however, as Oye (1986) points out requires that these egoists expect to continue to interact with each other for the indefinite future, and that these expectations of future interactions be given sufficient weight in their calculation. Jervis (1978) also uses the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual non-cooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate (Jervis, 1978).

Therefore, the crux of the argument is that the ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redefinition of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political outcomes.

International institutions and regime theory: Since the mid-1970s the analysis of international regimes has been a central area of concern within the discipline of international relations and international political economy. Stephen Krasner (1982) presented a definition of regimes in a special issue of *International Organization* as "a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area". Institutions were defined as "a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other". Norms were understood as "standards of behaviour" defined in terms of rights and obligations (Krasner, 1983) while rules are negotiated by states and typically formalized in international agreements and may entail in the "mutual acceptance of higher norms" (Mearsheimer, 1994).

Conflicts between state interests and international regimes are typically interpreted by neo-liberal institutionalism as the divergence between short-term and long-term interests (Katzenstein, 1990). This is how Neo-liberals claim that it is rational to look for long-term benefits, whereas Realists worry about relative power in the short-term and thus fear that others will defect. If states interact frequently over time, they should learn that not cooperating means both states will enjoy fewer benefits. International institutions help provide these repeated iterations. Therefore, institutions are more important than realists are willing to concede, in addressing issues of international security as they "can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and facilitate the operation of reciprocity" (Keohane and Martin, 1995)

The importance of international regimes, for neoliberals is that they effectuate the coordination of international behaviour in such ways that are in line with expectations from rational actor models. In this neo-liberal institutionalist frame, decision makers become rational actors who see the realization of their national objectives in cooperative behaviour rather than in continuing conflict. And they do so in the belief that this is the demand of the new compulsive reality itself. Thus neo-institutionalism in a way incorporates a 'realist' element in its theoretical structure and in doing do it rejects the Wilsonian reliance on shared norms and altruism as motivating factors for international cooperation. However this is not to say that the role of norms is completely excluded from the matrix. It is worth keeping in mind that while postulating outcomes on the basis of rational behaviour, the preferences of 'rational' actors in the whole scheme of affairs is usually assumed to be given. Doing so however, greatly restricts the predictive as well as explanatory power of the theory being invoked. It is on this dimension that constructivist arguments focusing on the role of ideas, changing knowledge, and possible shifts in preferences through learning provide significant insight that could help in creating more logically compelling games predicting outcomes. Again, explaining the jump from the mere motivation to cooperate to actual cooperation calls for including cognitive factors into rationalist cooperation theory. In an important article Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie have argued that the core of regime analysis concerns the role of norms in social life (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). The interpretative perspective suggests that we cannot analyze regimes without understanding the values, beliefs, and knowledge of actors.

It is therefore important to realise that international conflict and cooperation do not just result from a process open to reductionist logic of analysis that takes interests as given. Instead the preferences of actors are changed by historical experience as are their views of how the world works. Conflict and cooperation also emerge from a never-ending process of redefining social and political identities that generate consensually shared and contextually appropriate norms that provide standards for action. In international society these standards are called regimes. International regimes are not only variables which govern behaviour by altering the strategies with which state actors pursue their interests, but also provide a context—through the operation of norms which play a central role in the formation and continuation of regimes —that makes it possible for actors, through the use of practical reasoning, to define their interests in the first place (Upham, 1987).

To sum it up, liberal institutionalists accept many realist assumptions like the one about the continuing importance of the security dilemma and international anarchy, but argue that institutions can make it easier to facilitate cooperation and thereby address security competition issues between states. For the neo-liberal institutionalists, the implication of anarchy is the absence of a central international authority that fails to provide guarantees for carrying out of international accords, thereby inducing the fear of being cheated. International institutions and regimes are deemed by liberal-institutionalists to hold the solution to cheating in international cooperation under the conditions of anarchy as they reduce uncertainty and foster cooperation. In the context of game theory, the major function of international institutions is that "they reduce the state of anarchy as they play the role of partial Leviathans in a presumed Hobbesian world" (Vassilev, 2007: 5).

II. Neo-Liberal Explanations of Japanese foreign policy behaviour

The primary focus of this section is to provide an answer to the question—how do liberals go about explaining the Japanese case. Realism is pessimistic about the prospects of co-operation beyond those based on hegemonic guarantee, and those necessitated by alliances. However, Robert Jervis, in Cooperation under the Security Dilemma (1978)—his classic restatement of the realist cooperation problematic—along with enumerating the formidable obstacles that anarchy puts in the way of

security cooperation has also acknowledged the capability of institutions to change preferences over outcomes. This is a strong break with the realist creed which believes that state preferences are fixed by the survival imperative of anarchy (Jervis, 1999). Thus on one hand we have realists who believe that institutions matter only at the margins and are not an important cause of peace and cooperation, rather they are a consequence of the same (Mearsheimer, 1994); while on the other we have the institutionalists who directly challenge this view of institutions arguing instead that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behaviour.

Theories on international institutions and security regimes in particular, are extremely relevant for explaining the dynamics of the US-Japan Security arrangement. As far as other aspects of Japanese foreign policy behaviour—especially those like the adoption and extended adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine—are concerned, commercial and democratic liberal theories like those on interdependency, the trade-promotes-peace hypothesis, the democratic peace hypothesis, development of domestic anti-militarist norms etc. could be invoked by way of an explanation. Some like Schmiegelow have pointed out in the specific context of Japan's "strategic pragmatic" model of action, how the distribution of economic and technological resources and therefore the power distribution in the international system are being affected either through Japan's own government or corporate action or through the emulation of the Japanese model by an increasing number of non-Japanese international actors, superpowers included (Schmiegelow, 1990). Klauss Knorr (1969) terms this type of power as "non-coercive influence", and Robert Keohane and Joseph S.Nye Jr. when elaborating complex interdependence theory refer to it as the "control over outcomes". Again some like Nye, in his book *Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power,* have drawn attention to the idea of 'soft power', which is usually manifest through dominance over information flows, the setting of norms in the world economy, and the dissemination of universal culture. Nye deems soft power to be as much responsible for the maintenance of US hegemony as its military and economic preponderance (Nye, 1989). It is interesting to see how the soft power argument works out in explaining the Japanese case. This section will therefore analyse how all these different liberal theories provide insights into various aspects of Japanese foreign policy behaviour since 1945.

International regimes and institutions: Institutionalists have constructed theories about the effects of international institutions on cooperation between states. Like realists they start from the assumption of self-interested actors operating in an international structure of anarchy. However their assumptions about the consequences of anarchy are less rigid and preoccupied with the imperative of survival in an environment of perpetually lurking danger. For realists, the principal obstacles to cooperation between states, is the possibility of cheating along with the problem of relative gains. The appeal of institutionalist theory lies in the fact that it provides a number of ways by which these problems can be overcome to facilitate inter-state cooperation. Firstly, institutions can affect the calculation matrix of a state through institutionalized iteration which increases the possibility of cooperation by creating a shadow of the future through increased number of transactions between states over time; giving the victim an opportunity to retaliate against the cheater or defector; and conversely, rewarding states with a reputation for cooperation (Oye, 1986; Axelrod, 1984). Secondly, institutions can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas, thereby raising the cost of cheating and providing ways to retaliate. This is known as *issue linkage*. Finally, information provision allows for more accurate and less costly monitoring, thereby increasing the chances that defectors are caught and providing victims with an early warning (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

Apart from the aforementioned ways to generate cooperation, a number of neo-institutionalist have pointed out that the nature of the game that is played influences the propensity to cooperate or otherwise, as it can alter the payoff structure for different actors. For example the game leader, in which players will always earn their best payoff by cooperating, is obviously most favourable to cooperation, whereas a game like 'rambo' where one player always reaps his best benefit by defecting is least likely to engender cooperation. The game of Prisoners' Dilemma is somewhere in between (Müller, 2006). As Robert Powell also says, "nations have strategies of waiting, balancing, or bandwagoning in cases of potential danger and depending on the nature of the game, the first and third strategies may be as appropriate as the second" (Powell, 1999). Pointing out to the futility of viewing international relations as a zero-sum game, as do most realists, Powell notes that variable or increasing-sum games induce the more cooperative responses.

International regimes and institutions are important because they provide this very scope to alter the nature of games played by actors in the inter-state system. For

example, Jervis (1978) gives the classic example of Rousseau's Stag Hunt to show how anarchy leaves all those concerned worse off even when they know that if they cooperate to 'hunt the stag' they will all 'eat well' and can enjoy their most preferred outcome. The actual scenario being referred to here in terms of international outcomes is international cooperation and disarmament. However, this rarely ends up happening because of the fear among all the actors that even if one person defects to 'chase a rabbit', which he prefers next to a stag, none of the others will get anything. The international analogue for this is that the defector maintains a high level of arms while others are disarmed. In order to avoid a situation where one is left with a "sucker's payoff" i.e. a situation of being disarmed while everyone else is armed, all the actors end up 'chasing rabbits' rather than waiting to hunt the stag, thereby finally resulting in arms competition and an unstable international system.

However the kind of international outcomes predicted above can be altered by converting the game of Stag Hunt into one where the costs of defecting are high and the gains from doing so are low, like a mutual assurance game or an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). The flow of information between actors changes the initial conditions of a PD, while shadow of the future allows for iterated PDs. If the PD game is played only once, it is always rational to defect. However, as Axelrod (1984) has demonstrated, if the game is played multiple times with a strategy of Tit-for-Tat, it becomes rational to cooperate. How does this all translate in the case of US-Japan relations?

During the last 50 years, the US-Japan security alliance has become embedded in a host of institutions such as the Defense Guidelines and the Security Consultative Committee. Thus we see that rational choice institutionalism is in a much better position to analyse and explain the *perseverance* of security cooperation once it has been established in the first place (Keohane, 1984) rather than accounting for the initial establishment of the US-Japan security agreement. The institutionalist argument helps one understand why institutions show an astonishing robustness despite challenging changes in the international structures that existed when they were created. This leaves liberal-institutionalism one up against realism with regards to explaining the US-Japanese treaty. Most realists say that it was because of the peculiar circumstances thrown up by the Cold War, along with the existence of a liberal hegemon that allowed Japan to free-ride. However, the continuance of the

treaty and in fact its renewal in the post-Cold War era increases the weightage of neo-liberal institutionalism in explaining Japanese behaviour.

Neo-institutionalism, built upon the rational choice paradigm, gives a good explanation as to why countries should wish to cooperate in the security sector (Keohane and Martin, 1995). Security regimes occur when a group of states co-operate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behaviours of others (Jervis, 1982). Games played over extended rounds within the framework of an established institution have resulted in a sort of expectation about the behaviour of the other party—a likelihood that it will cooperate rather than defect. Thus lowered transaction costs, provision of information, institutionalised norms and their enforcement, a long period of repeated interactions in the past along with a likelihood of the same in future, all imply that Japan and the US have got into a sort of habit or 'comfort zone' with regards to cooperating with each other.

Again it is not just with regards to Japanese behaviour vis-à-vis the United States that the institutionalist argument holds. Neo-liberal institutionalism is built on the basis of policy collaboration and coordination among actors, which offers an explanation of institutionalized regional arrangements such as regional communities, regimes, and organizations (Keohane, 1984; Young, 1982). This perspective on regime formation has been at the heart of the analytical approach to Japan's collaborative role in promoting regional integration in East Asia (Aggarwal, 1993; Park, 2006). It is, therefore, the neo-liberal institutionalist approach that can offer the best insight into Japan's regional as well as international policy activities.

Absolute over relative gains concerns: In addition to the different conceptions of anarchy between the two paradigms, the notion of gains is a crucial element in the opposition between Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism. For the former paradigm, gains in absolute terms are what matters to states, while to the latter the gains differential lies at the crux of negotiations and is responsible for state decisions to defect from cooperation. Whereas neo-realists, such as Waltz and Greico argue that states are concerned with 'relative gains'—meaning gains are assessed in comparative terms of who will gain more; neoliberals such as Keohane claim that states are concerned with maximizing their 'absolute gains' instead—namely an assessment of their own welfare rather than their rivals'. Liberal-institutionalists, believe that

international relations does not need to be a zero-sum game, as many states feel secure enough to maximize their own gains regardless of what accrues to others. In his book *In the Shadow of Power,* Powell (1999) shows how by basing ones analysis on non-zero-sum games, one frequently finds bandwagoning rather than balancing to be in the interest of the members of the interstate system. Cooperation may also in fact be a positive sum game where both parties can stand to gain. Mutual benefits arising out of co-operation are possible because states are not always preoccupied with relative gains.

Strategic interaction theories provide a direct rebuttal to the relative gains position of realism. In studies on individual, as well as group behaviour, it has become apparent that rational actors are significantly more concerned with not incurring relative losses rather than with incurring relative gains (Müller, 2002). In this context it is clear that international cooperation will be a preferred strategy since maintenance of negotiations between nations will be a more stable guarantee to the maintenance of balanced economic or political relations among the nations involved. The relative gains argument becomes especially dubious since it fails to account for the accords between smaller powers and larger ones, where, by default one side would invariably stand to gain more than another. In the distribution of commitment to NATO as well as the US-Japan Security Agreement, the US shoulders the lion's share of the burden. This would be seen as asymmetric distribution of benefits by Realists and would be deemed impossible. However, it is possible to explain this through the absolute gains argument because the US, as the economic hegemon calculates a greater benefit from maintaining the system, despite the fact that all other members free-ride to a significant extent.

Thus the absolute gains argument explains to a considerable extent the security cooperation between the US and Japan. As has been pointed out by Harold Müller, security co-operation does not come for free. States opting for security co-operation sacrifice a security asset to gain higher security by obtaining another asset that according to them helps them better provide for their security—the collaboration of their enemies and the pursuant agreements and organizations (Müller, 2002). This explains why Japan is not hesitant to forgo the realist counsel of "self-help" and is willing to rely on "other-help" instead as part of the security regime that it has created in conjunction with the United States.

In the post-Cold War world however, Japan's security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to securitize itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Therefore it is worthwhile to re-assess the role of absolute and relative gains in the making of Japanese foreign and security policy, especially in the light of alternative security issues.

The trade-promotes-peace argument: The idea that trade and other forms of economic interdependence promote peace was a central theme in nineteenth-century liberal economic thought. It was expressed most famously by Norman Angell when he argued in *The Great Illusion* (1912) that the economic costs of a great power war would be so devastating that such a war was unthinkable. Though his hypothesis was refuted in less than two years, his line of thinking was revived after WW-II as the cornerstone of American liberal internationalist ideology. The economic deterrence argument goes like this: trade generates economic benefits for both parties, so the fact that war will disrupt trade and increase losses for both sides, will deter states that are major trading partners from going to war with each other (Polachek, 1980; Oneal and Russett, 1999). The line of argument advanced by some like Schumpeter and Veblen is that trade increases prosperity and prosperity lessens domestic problems that often lead to war. The indirect causation chain between trade and peace can be traced as—trade leads to prosperity, which in turn creates conditions for democracy to prevail which finally results in peace (Weede, 1995). Others argue that trade alters the domestic balance of power by increasing the influence of groups who benefit from trade and who have a vested interest in maintaining a peaceful environment for trade (Rogowski, 1989). A good example of this in the context of Japan is the *keiratsu,* the class of economic elite which exerts a great a deal of impact on political outcomes.

Yet some others point out to the sociological perspectives—trade increases contact and communication, which can reduce misperceptions that contribute to war (Deutch, 1957). Hegemonic stability theorists have yet another take on the link between trade and peace. They argue that one of the primary conditions facilitating trade is the existence of a liberal economic hegemon able and willing to maintain a stable political economy, thereby strongly implying that a liberal economic hegemony also promotes peace (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984). So essentially trade and peace are actually linked through the erstwhile invisible factor—economic hegemony. Again there is more trade between allies than between adversaries and allies are less

likely to go to war with one another, so alliances may account for part of the association between trade and peace (Levy, 2002).

The trade-promotes-peace argument is no doubt useful but only as far as its importance in laying the basis for more refined argument like interdependency. By itself it does not provide too valuable an insight into Japanese foreign policy. By drawing partial causality from alliance and hegemonic stability theories it loses its distinctiveness as a liberal theory and commits the error of tautology, or circuitous logic. Whether the deterrent effects of the gains from trade outweigh the potentially destabilizing effects of economic asymmetries and economic competitions and whether the magnitude of these economic effects is outweighed by strategic considerations depends on numerous factors thus making it necessary to specify the conditions under which trade promotes peace.

Complex interdependence: Complex interdependence is a more refined, structural variant of the trade-promotes-peace hypothesis and is premised partly on commercial liberalism and partly on regulatory liberalism. The three most important claims made by those advancing the theory of "complex interdependence" are that—military force is becoming increasingly ineffective as an instrument of state policy in an increasingly interdependent world; inordinate concerns over issues of "high politics" are gradually paving the way for "low politics" as the erstwhile hierarchy of issues is getting diluted; and the state is not as autonomous or coherent as realists would have it owing to the existence of multiple channels of communication between states including non-state actors linked through trans-national and trans-governmental networks (Keohane and Nye, 1977). It is interesting to see how each of these claims plays out in the case of Japan.

The 'trading state' replacing the 'military state': The neoliberal assertion about the increasing inefficacy of military power in today's world is best articulated through Rosecrance's claim about the "rise of the trading state" (Rosecrance, 1986). According to Rosecrance, the growth of economic interdependency has been matched by a corresponding decline in the value and importance of territorial conquest for states. In the contemporary world the benefits of trade and co-operation among states greatly exceed that of military competition and territorial control. Nation-states have traditionally regarded the acquisition of territory as the principle means of increasing

national wealth. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that additional territory does not necessarily help states to compete in an international system where the 'trading state' rather than the 'military state' is becoming dominant. This understanding has had two significant effects. First, the age of the independent, self-sufficient state is over. Complex layers of economic interdependency ensure that states can not act aggressively without risking economic penalties imposed by other members of the international community. It also makes little sense for a state to threaten its commercial partners, whose markets and capital investment are essential for its own economic growth. Secondly, territorial conquest in the nuclear age is both dangerous and costly. The alternative, economic development through trade and foreign investment is a much more attractive and potentially beneficial strategy.

Rosecrance does not share all of the illusions of the classical free trade Liberals. He is fully aware that high levels of trade and other transactions did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, and that trade was often associated with conflict in earlier eras. But he argues that the world was different then as "the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented the apex of the military political system". What changed in the world since 1945 was that peaceful trading started enjoying much greater efficacy than ever before and according to Rosecrance as this lesson would by and by dawn upon nations of the world "they would reach 'the Japanese period' in world politics" (Rosecrance, 1986). Thus the theorist himself uses Japan as a case in point and as an example par excellence to prove his claim that 'the trading state' is displacing the 'military state' in the contemporary world because "competition for global market shares has become more important than territorial conquest" (Rosecrance, 1991).

Rosecrance's argument fits in well with the Japanese case as it convincingly explains Japan's disinterest in focusing on developing its military powers and concentrating on honing its economic and financial capabilities instead. The Yoshida Doctrine which formed the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Second World War era bears testimony to this. Throughout history, states have generally sought to get larger, usually through the use of force. However, as Rosecrance (2010) explicates in a recent article, countervailing trends briefly held sway in the 1970s and 1980s as smaller countries, such as Japan, West Germany, and the "Asian tigers," attained international prominence by growing faster than giants such as the United States and the Soviet Union. These smaller countries, or what Rosecrance (1986,

1991, 2010) refers to as "trading states", did not have expansionist territorial ambitions and did not try to project military power abroad. Contrasting them with 'military states' like the United States and the Soviet Union who were embroiled in the Vietnam War and Afghanistan respectively, he points out how 'trading states' concentrated on gaining economic access to foreign territories, rather than political control (Rosecrance, 2010).

Importance of non-state actors: In his paper, 'Post-State Origins of Peace? The Case of Japanese Pacifism', Jayman (2005) has attempted to demonstrate the role and importance of the pressure applied by sub-national actors in Japan in the maintenance of peace for the last half century. Sub-national Japanese actors have thwarted US government and Japanese conservative-led movements to re-arm Japan by forcing the state to maintain institutional mechanisms preventing any serious attempt at reviving a war-culture, training an aggressively indoctrinated military force, or supporting a military-industrial complex. The failure of the US and Japanese governments to rearm Japan is periodical and consistent from the 1960s to the present. Such failures by a superpower and a strong state suggest that foundational assumptions of state-centrism and anarchy within theories of international relations are ripe for reconsideration. Upon close examination, this case provides evidence that, as Kuhn would have it, a paradigm shift is in order, where one conceptual world view is replaced by another. The more accurate worldview suggested by this study is that the real world of international politics is both hierarchical and driven by sub-national agents of society.

'Low politics' replacing 'high politics': In neoliberal parlance, 'high politics' refers to issues of national security, while 'low politics' refers to economic affairs and other less consequential issues that find their way on the agenda of inter-state relationships. Complex interdependence was initially conceived of as an 'ideal type', diametrically opposed to basic realist claims. The essence of realism, whatsoever variety it may be of, is marked by the excessive importance given to issues of power and security by this paradigm. It is not true that realists consider economic factors to be unimportant. As Mearsheimer (1992) points out, "states operate in both an international political environment and an international economic environment"; however the former dominates the latter in cases where the two come into conflict. The reason is straightforward— the international political system is anarchic" (Mearsheimer, 1992).

Complex interdependence on the other hand claims that in an increasingly interdependent world, issues which were earlier relegated to the domain of 'low politics' are receiving more importance and are gradually taking their place alongside issues of 'military' security or high politics. Japan is an excellent instance of a state completely dissolving the distinctions between high and low politics, and startlingly so, for it completely reverses the traditional primacy given to security over economic affairs. Therefore, in actual practice, 'reality' has as a matter of fact, gone a step beyond the scenario envisaged by the 'ideal-type' of complex interdependence, as is evident from Japan's relinquishment of the right to use force in its inter-state interactions and the adoption of the Yoshida Doctrine instead, with its exclusive focus on developing Japan's economic capabilities rather than its military might. Though realists have a tough time explaining this action of Japan, they have advanced arguments like the free-rider's hypothesis, while liberals have explained the same through a gamut of theories like security regimes, game theory, democratic-peace hypothesis etc. The complex interdependence argument which is essentially a structural version of the trade-promotes-peace, in consonance with the other liberal theories, explains the Japanese behaviour by simply pointing out that with the introduction of multiple players in a cooperative setup, the interdependence of these players will change the payoffs and the structure of the strategic interaction and will allow for checks on individual state behaviour. This is why in a situation of complex interdependence states are less wary about the intentions and actions of others because they know that one actor cannot be harmed without having repercussions on all the others—therefore it allows issues of high politics to be taken off the constant radar and permits other considerations like economic matters to enter the strategic calculus.

The other point of relevance here is Japan's attempt to securitize itself in non-traditional ways that impact traditional security. The theoretical foundation of this line of thinking can be found in Barry Buzan's *Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1986). This is important because if 'high politics' concerns itself with issues of 'national security' and if the definition of this 'national security' is extended to include concerns related to world economic stability, environmental issues, threats posed by international terrorism etc. then there is not much to distinguish issues of high from low politics. To address national security, Japan enunciated a "comprehensive security" concept in 1980. Premised on a continuing security relationship with the US to provide traditional security, it sought

to use Japan's economic power as a non-traditional defence of a resource-poor Japan. The idea was to preserve Japan's access to critical resources and global markets by leveraging its wealth and technological sophistication in its external political and security relations (Arase, 2007). This calls for a discussion on the non-coercive ways through which Japan exerts "soft" rather than "hard" power as a means to shape international outcomes.

Preference for 'soft power' over 'hard power': Nye defines soft power as the ability to "induce others to do what you want them to do without forcing them to do so", namely getting others to want the outcome that you want (Nye, 2004a). Therefore soft power essentially rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise by and large from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Nye notes that sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight would suggest because "they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping" (Nye, 2004b). Japan is one such instance and as Nye (2004b) rightly marks, has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country.

As Arase also points out, Japan's wealth and technological sophistication give it the potential to be a leader in the area of non-traditional security, which is a promising route to wider international recognition and appreciation and a reputation built on soft, rather than hard, power (Arase, 2007). Japan is first in the world in terms of development assistance, second in high-tech exports, first for life expectancy and third in expenditures and development as a percent of gross domestic product[3]. Perhaps the most visible and successful use of Japanese soft power as an instrument of national policy so far has been in the field of official development assistance (ODA). Japan's ODA policy has been and continues to enjoy a prominent role in its effort to promote international peace and security. As noted earlier, Japan is one of the world's leading providers of official development assistance. Between 1994 and 2004, Japan shouldered almost one-fifth of the world's total volume of development assistance. Another area in which a nation can exercise its soft power is

[3] Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook, 2003

international peacekeeping. Here, too, Japan has come a long way since its first direct participation—as opposed to financial contribution—in Cambodia in 1992-93. As of June 2004, Japan was participating in 16 UN peacekeeping operations around the world (Akaha, 2006). Yet again, Japan is the world's largest exporter of capital, enabling her to play the leading role in shaping the development of other nations. It can hardly be ignored that in large areas of the world, including its fastest growing region, East Asia, it is Japanese-style capitalism that is spreading, largely through the subsidiaries and suppliers of Japanese corporations. The one outstanding difference between East Asian newly industrialized countries and Latin American middle income countries is the presence of Japanese style strategic pragmatism in the former and its lack in the latter (Schmiegelow, 1990). Hence, it is clear that the Japanese model of action has had an unmistakable, if still not fully articulated influence on development strategies in the Third World.

Thus in the face of an increasingly globalised world with both positive and negative spill-overs and the changing nature of global threats rendering traditional conceptions of security ineffective and obsolete, Japan is realizing the need to utilize its soft power more effectively as a means to secure itself in non-traditional ways.

The democratic peace hypothesis: One liberal approach to international security that has received renewed attention in the post-Cold War period is the democratic peace theory associated with the works of Michael Doyle (1995) and Bruce Russett (1999) whose writings are heavily influenced by the Kantian insights on the notion of Perpetual Peace (1795). According to this theory, democratic representation, an ideological commitment to human rights and transnational interdependence provide an explanation for peace prone tendencies of democratic states. Democracies also almost never end up on opposing sides in multilateral wars and engage in more peaceful processes of conflict resolution when the get into disputes with other democracies.

The rationale behind the democratic peace theory and its relevance for explaining the Japanese case are explicated as follows. The 'democratic culture and norms' model by Owen, Russett, Oneal suggest that democratic societies are inherently averse to war because (as Kant also argues) citizens will not vote to send themselves off to war. The 'institutional constraints' model on the other hand,

emphasises the role of a system of checks and balances, the dispersion of power and the role of a free press as underlying the democratic peace theory. Therefore leaders are risk averse with respect to decisions taking the state to war. Much of this is explained by the alternative institutional game theoretical model advanced by Bueno de Mesquita (1999), more fully incorporating strategic interaction between democracies and their adversaries. Viewed in terms of the desire of political leaders of a state for survival and a continued pressure in politics, he has pointed out that democratic leaders are more sensitive to the outcomes of war than are authoritarian leaders, since the former are more likely to be removed form office after an unsuccessful war than their authoritarian counterparts. This compels them to go all out on war effort i.e. they choose their wars very carefully for once they decide to go to war they are likely to devote enormous amounts of resource to win it. Since wars with other democracies imply a large war effort from both sides, democratic leaders have strong incentives to seek a negotiated peace with other democracies. Schultz (1998) provides an alternative explanation of the democratic peace based on a signalling game and the transparency of democratic institutions and processes. Democracies are better able to send credible signals of their thereby reducing crisis escalation due to misperception. Also a democracy is less susceptible to the vagaries of the personal attributes of leaders because democratic institutions and complex decision making procedures considerably reduce arbitrary shifts in national policy. Transparency, an essential condition for deep and intense security cooperation, is an attribute of democracy, but not quite of totalitarian and autocratic states.

Though the democratic peace theory is usually dismissed as an "inside-out" theory its importance cannot be discredited in the Japanese case. It is interesting to note the drastic change in Japanese foreign policy before and immediately after the Second World War. From being an aggressive and militaristic nation with revisionist motives during the inter-war period it metamorphosed into one of the most peaceful and docile nations of the world after the war. Despite arguments like the devastating impact of nuclear warfare on the minds on people; the development of norms of anti-militarism; coercion by the victorious United States into accepting Article Nine; the opportunity to free-ride etc., one very important change that took place in Japanese political life at this time can barely be overlooked—its transformation into a democracy.

Though there was supposedly a democratic constitution in Japan since the Meiji period, it was just a travesty because it allowed the gradual ascendance of the military making it so powerful that it could get away with disregarding the will of the people. The militaristic elements of the society slowly but steadily began to gain ascendency in political life until they were all in all by the time of the First World War. Winning the war against Russia in 1904 had earned Japan the title of 'honorary whites' and this episode not only left them with a greater penchant for international power and prestige but also ensured them that they were not inferior to their European counterparts. The treatment received by Japan after its contribution to the First World War however, came as a rude shock to the Japanese as they had expected to be rewarded by way of territorial acquisitions. This bred revisionist tendencies within the Japanese militaristic elite who 'bandwagoned for profit' with other like-minded states like Germany and Italy who were equally disillusioned with the status-quo of power, thus jeopardizing the entire nation and consigning it to a fate disastrous beyond conception.

One of the main thrusts of the Potsdam Declaration laying down the goals for the occupation of Japan after its defeat was to gradually establish a peaceful and responsible government conforming as closely as possible to a democratic self government without impinging on the free will of the people by transferring power from the elites to the hands of the people. General MacArthur intended that unlike the Meiji Constitution where the military was able to control the Cabinet, the post war constitution should reflect the will of the people as the will of the people is the primary factor in any democratization effort. This emphasis on constitutional reforms in accordance with the will of the people is based on adherence to the "democratic peace theory". The democratic peace reinforces rather than supplants arguments like norms of anti-militarism owing to historical experiences for the simple reason that public opinion would come to nought had there been no conduit for it to be expressed through democratic institutions giving people the power to constrain the behaviour of the elected decision-makers who make foreign policy.

III. Neo-liberal predictions for Japan in the post-Cold War period

In the previous section it was seen how different liberal theories could be applied to

provide an explanation for Japanese foreign policy in the Cold War period. However, the end of the Cold War brought about a change in the structure of the international system as the condition of bipolarity, known to the world for almost half a century, gave way to an unfamiliar world of unipolarity. What, according to liberals, were the anticipated changes, if any, that this phenomenon was deemed to bring about in Japanese foreign policy? This section therefore explores the range of expected Japanese behaviour for the future with the liberals now doing the crystal-gazing, instead of the realists.

In an article titled 'Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future', Takeshi Inoguchi (1988) very succinctly conveys how Japan is going through a transitional phase, and thereafter goes on to lay out a range of postulations about the course Japanese foreign policy is likely to take in the years to come. According to him, in an assiduous yet uncertain search for their place in the world the Japanese could either form a "bigemony" with the United States or be content to play a continued role in the second phase of American hegemony—or what he terms as "Pax Americana II". Alternatively, Japan could also become a part of a world of many consortia in which no single actor can dominate the rest—"Pax Consortis"[4]; or seek to approach a state of "Pax Nipponica" where its economic power reigns supreme in the world (Inoguchi, 1988).

Japan's roles in Pax Americana phase II would not be significantly different from its Cold War ones. Essentially, Japan's role would be primarily of an economic nature while the security leadership of the United States would remain strong, with the bulk of global security shouldered by the United States. Japan's regional roles in this scenario would be heavily economic as it moves towards becoming the vital core of the Pacific growth crescent. The difference between this situation and the scenarios of 'bigemony', Pax Consortium, and Pax Nipponica lies in the degree to which Japan is willing to assume international as well as regional leadership. Bigemony implies that it is on an equal footing with the US and is willing to engage in equivalent burden-sharing in managing the world economy. Again bigemony differs from Pax Nipponica in that the former envisages far higher levels of cooperation on a range of issues than does the latter. By making a bid for bigemony Japan would increasingly

[4] This is very similar to the kind of scenario envisaged by Rosecrance (1991) in his article "A New Concert of Powers ".

translate its economic power into military power, but the form in which this transfer would take place would differ from other countries. Under bigemony "the technical, economic and strategic cooperation and integration between the United States and Japan would become formidable, and of the largest scale in history" (Inoguchi, 1989). Therefore, according to Inogouchi it is not difficult to foresee, for instance, advanced fighter aircraft being developed jointly and manufactured primarily for Japanese use, with Japanese finance, though with American know-how, and possibly a situation where it may even be sold to third countries under the label, 'Made in the United States'. Under this scenario, the potentially heated contest between the United States and Japan over the structural framework of Pacific Asia's economic relationship with the United States will be largely dissipated.

This can be contrasted with Rosecrances' prediction that the most potent future antagonism that the world could witness is a radical division between the United States and Japan. As economic conflict with the United States intensifies, burgeoning economic ties in the Asian-Pacific region might tempt Tokyo to forge another "co-prosperity sphere" there (Rosecrance, 1991). Rosecrance fears that Japanese economic influence could even be stretched into a form of political tutelage or even imperialism. Such policy becomes the more credible if partially masked by financial and economic controls that merely 'induce' dependent parties to yield resources and territorial demands. Rosecrance reminisces how the United States once ruled Latin America through its own "dollar diplomacy" without having to employ military force. Japan would have much less need for overt intervention today and could thereby gradually usher in a period of Pax Nipponica without majorly compromising its pacifist sentiments. Inouguchi does not consider "Pax Consortis" to be a very likely future scenario for Japan as compared to the other state of affairs. According to him Pax Americana II and bigemony are more likely in the intermediate term of 25 years (Inouguchi, 1989). In either condition, any drastic restructuring of Japan's foreign relations away from the ties with the United States does not seem likely[5].

Under no circumstances whatsoever, do liberals expect Japan to resort to

[5] It is instructive to learn that in Japan only 7.2 per cent of the population are neutralists, who want to abrogate the country's security treaty with the United States, while in West Germany as many as 44 per cent are neutralists (Inouguchi, 1989).

traditional security wherein states uses military force—hard power—to defend threats to its existence and interests. Traditional security is inherently problematic for Japan because of constitutional limits imposed by Article Nine; therefore Japan cannot freely make use of force against other states through collective security or balance of power mechanisms to secure its interests. This is in sharp contrast to the predictions made by some realists, especially neorealists that Japan will begin to actively balance the preponderant power of the United States in the near future (Waltz, 1999; Layne, 1996). Even if one were to go by the predictions of those brand of realists who envisage a close relationship between Japan and the US, this sort of bandwagoning would not entail in the increasing entwinement of Japan in American military exploits. There are a number of drawbacks of this hard-power approach that together, more than justify the serious and systematic exploration of an alternative leadership role in non-traditional security areas. Apart from normative considerations, the utilitarian argument stresses the costly nature of war as a policy instrument. The alternative is to construct cooperative, multilateral mechanisms to address security issues that are currently managed unilaterally through the threat or use of force. A pragmatic argument is the case against getting involved in US schemes of global military dominance, especially if this means assuming larger military responsibilities in this strategic framework. Essentially, it would be too costly and dangerous to inextricably entwine Japan's military commitments with those of a reckless U.S. Instead, Japan should resist US pressure and go no further than the status quo arrangement (Arase, 2007).

These predictions are in line with the soft power rationale and its focus on Non-Traditional Security (NTS) which expect Japan to continue its erstwhile activities like disbursing ODA, being involved in peacekeeping missions in conflict areas, being an economic model for developing countries, strengthening regional influence etc. However, given the mounting pressure of its American ally with regards to increasing its hard power and making greater and more concrete contributions towards the cause of international peace, stability and security; soft power is likely to be in troubled waters in the post-Cold War era. Japan will have to walk tightrope between allaying its ally and at the same time avoid threatening its neighbours who might feel insecure if they see Japan preparing to unsheathe its sword after all these years. How to

translate its substantial and growing soft power potential into international influence while expanding its hard power-based cooperation with the United States will remain the most challenging task facing Japan's security policy in the first half of the 21st century. Nevertheless, overcoming the difficulties in this area may be much easier and more beneficial to Japan than embarking on the course of turning itself into a major traditional security actor in the world.

As far as the predictions of complex interdependency are concerned, it can be said that given the proliferation of supporting institutions, complex interdependence would suggest that the bilateral alliance should remain central to Japan's security strategy in the indefinite future. Complex interdependence would predict that path dependency should inhibit Japan from adopting new roles within the bilateral alliance. The distribution of roles and missions within the alliance reflecting the interests and operating procedures of long-established bureaucracies also highlights the increased importance of non-state actors—one of the key features of complex interdependence. U.S.-Japan complex interdependence is therefore expected to generate trans-governmental coalitions on issues, especially on those pertaining to defence (Kliman, 2006). A satisfactory theory of interdependence and conflict theory must therefore appreciate that Japan is not likely to balance the United States in the post-Cold War era owing to the continuation of 'liberal' concerns like the opportunity costs of the loss of trade, the influence of domestic actors like the *keiratsu*, who might have an interest in maintaining trade, the political power to influence state decisions etc.

According to the democratic peace theory as well, there should be a continuation of non-conflictual relations between the US and Japan as both continue to share a commitment to democratic norms and culture in the post-Cold War period. However, the other prediction from democratic peace theory is that Japan should take a hard line against non-democracies. The New York Times noted in an editorial that "in recent months Tokyo has shown a new willingness to stand up to North Korean bullying, deflect criticism from China and involve itself in regional defence arrangements".

The prediction for institutionalism is that Japan will seek to be actively involved in international as well as regional institutions. Though the most common version of this prediction is that Japan will continue its robust security regime with the

US, another line of argument is that it will gradually move away from the latter, though not completely, in favour of more regional arrangements and agreements. Thus while some see international and regional institutionalisation as taking place concomitantly, others view increased institutionalization in one as decreasing the scope for institutionalization in the other. Kliman (2006) has termed this scenario as "regionalism to the fore". He begins by asking what Tokyo's defence strategy would look like if Japan were to start perceiving her interests and responsibilities as regional rather than global. By way of a response his first prediction is that Japanese policymakers would avoid deepening the U.S.-Japan security relationship; however it would not be suspended and Tokyo would expend the minimum material and political resources necessary to sustain the alliance. Moreover, the Japanese government would seek to enhance multilateral security organizations in East Asia. Japan would also cultivate closer bilateral relationships with South Korea, members of ASEAN, and possibly China. In response to regional threats, Japan would seek an East Asian solution rather than look to the United States. SDF participation in peacekeeping would decline after Japan adopted a regional focus. Japanese peacekeepers would operate primarily in East Asia; the SDF would not take part in the reconstruction of Iraq. Rather than legislate a permanent SDF dispatch law, the Diet might attempt to place Japanese peacekeeping activities under the auspices of a regional security institution. Finally, counterterrorism would not constitute a new, major SDF role. Japan would decide against deploying the MSDF to the Indian Ocean in the wake of September 11 (Kliman, 2006).

On the whole, absolute levels of defence spending would probably remain constant. Japan's fiscal state of affairs would prevent higher defence budgets. Like absolute spending, the composition of Japan's defence budget would be unchanged. Unconvinced of the need to achieve greater alliance interoperability, Japan would not invest substantially in military R&D. Procurements would continue to emphasize counter-invasion units. Conversely, Tokyo would possess no imperative to produce light expeditionary forces that could be deployed outside of East Asia. Given Japan's legacy of imperialism, power projection capabilities would only frustrate a defence strategy premised on regional integration. Thus, Japan would forgo cruise missiles and in-flight refuelling. For similar reasons, Japan would eschew missile defence as BMD would antagonize both China and North Korea.

In the case of Article 9, regionalism would discourage possible amendments because neighbouring countries would perceive changes to the peace clause as portending a resurgence of Japanese militarism. On the same grounds, priority on regional integration would compel the GOJ to retain an "exclusively defence-oriented defence policy." A regional focus would reinforce other institutional constraints on Japan's defence policy. Tokyo's acquisition of nuclear weapons would alienate most countries in East Asia. Therefore, the Three Nonnuclear Principles would continue as a fundamental tenet of Japan's security strategy. And finally, given Tokyo's lack of interest in missile defence under this scenario, political leaders would have no incentive to review or relax the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

Conclusion

Thus we see that unlike the realist paradigm, the set of predictions made by the liberal school are much more consistent since the conjectures made by different strands of theorists within the same paradigm are not diametrically opposed to each other. It is important to point out that there is a certain degree of overlap in terms of some of the outcomes predicted by realists and liberals, for instance, the realists favouring the "end of history" argument posit the continuation of the US-Japan alliance, as do most liberal institutionalists. However, it should at all time be remembered that despite coming up with the same set of predictions, these theories essentially differ in terms of the basic rationale that they advance in order to explain similar outcomes. Thus, while expected behaviour might concur, the theoretical premise explicating these outcomes rarely ever will.

Chapter 4

The 'Three-Cornered Fight': Linking Theory to post-Cold War Evidence

Introduction

In his seminal methodological treatise, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', Imre Lakatos came up with the term "three-cornered fight" to refer to a tussle between rival or competing theories and actual observations or the body of evidence relevant to the particular hypothesis being tested (Lakatos, 1970: 91). As can be gauged from the dissertation title itself, the research at hand has been designed to explore the relative explanatory power of two contending theories of international politics—realism and neo-liberal institutionalism—vis-à-vis Japanese foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War period. In the previous chapters, the theoretical underpinnings of each of these two theories; their respective explanations for Japanese behaviour during the Cold War; as well as the specific set of predictions that each of them puts forth for post-Cold War Japanese security policy, have been taken up. This chapter, in typical Lakatosian terminology, is conceptualised as a "three-cornered fight", which seeks to link theory to evidence by checking whether the explanations and predictions advanced by different theories of realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are in accordance with the actual conduct of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War provided an ideal opportunity for theorists, making a variety of speculations about the future of Japan, to put their respective claims to test. Neorealists had predicted that Japan would increasingly move towards re-militarization and autonomy from the U.S. and also envisaged situations where the former might engage in balancing the latter. While other strands of realists did not consider balancing a likely or rationally viable option for Japan, they were more sanguine about the fact that Japan would gradually gravitate towards becoming a normal nation, and eventually abdicate the restrictive Article Nine of its Constitution while increasing the functions of the SDF to that of a fully standing, regular army. Again owing to the impending threat of North Korean possession of nuclear weapons, that was increasingly making itself manifest in the post-Cold War period, neorealists would expect Japan to scrap its constitutional commitments under the non-export and

Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and develop its own nuclear defence, either jointly with the U.S. if the alliance remains credible, or independently, if US extended deterrence is no longer convincing. Yet another set of realists expected Japan to continue with her Cold War strategy of free-riding by extracting maximum economic benefits from the US security umbrella while offering the minimum upkeep needed to preserve the bilateral alliance. However, for realists in general, Japan was most likely to maintain close cooperation with the U.S. while becoming a 'normal' nation which would mark a shift in Japan's relations with its ally from 'free-riding' and 'buck-passing' to active 'bandwagoning'.

As far as neo-liberal institutionalists are concerned, under no circumstances whatsoever, do they expect Japan to resort to traditional security to defend threats to its existence and actively balance either the US or North Korea. The prediction for institutionalism is that Japan will seek greater degrees of bi- and multilateralism by being actively involved in international as well as regional institutions while focusing on soft power and non-traditional security (NTS) to protect itself from international threats. Therefore it will continue its erstwhile activities like disbursing ODA, being involved in peacekeeping missions in conflict areas, being an economic model for developing countries, strengthening regional influence etc. Though complete scrapping of the constitutional clauses currently constraining Japan, is highly unlikely according to liberals, this does not rule out changes in the interpretation of Article Nine and the new roles carved out for the JSDF. However, priority on regional integration would compel the GOJ to retain an "exclusively defence-oriented defence policy" and such changes would therefore be nothing more than a reflection of Japan's commitments to international norms of upholding the universally shared principles of democracy, human rights and to ensure peace and international security. Some of the scenarios envisaged by the two theories are similar, for instance both institutionalism and defensive realists preclude Japan from aspiring to become a great military power, actively balancing against international threats and power. However, the rationale behind them would differ; realists would advance the logic of alliance politics while liberals the logic of international regimes, to explain the same outcome. This chapter therefore not only seeks to test observed against expected behaviour, but also closely analyse the specific causal factors that brought about this observed behaviour in order to be able to determine whether it was shaped by Japan's

increasing movement towards realism or its continued and intensified commitment to liberalism.

The 1990-91 Gulf War, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, combined with greatly increased tensions over nuclear and other issues with North Korea, and the U.S.-Iraq confrontation have, drastically altered the face of Japanese security policy making, which has led to a series of policies which can longer be labelled antimilitarist—the most dramatic of which is the first foreign deployment of the Self-Defense Forces since their creation in the 1950s, to Iraq in March 2004. Some like Lind have pointed out that Japan can no longer be viewed as a "military pygmy" as it used to be in the past, given its increased spending on developing its military prowess and power projection capabilities (Lind, 2003: 5). They fear that by passing the International Peace Cooperation Law authorizing the Japanese military to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations; purchasing modern fighter planes such as the F-22; acquiring airborne refuelling capabilities, developing spy satellites, and adopting a ballistic missile defence system, the Japanese are signalling their intention to play a more active role in regional security. According to these scholars therefore, Japan's military is beginning to "equip itself with both shield and spear" (Katzenstein, 2008: 142). Thus it is established without a doubt that a lot has changed in the post-Cold War period which has led scholars to repose the erstwhile questions about Japanese anti-militarism, Japanese free-riding, thereby necessitating an enquiry into the changes in her *ability* as well as her *willingness* to take on a larger military role commensurate with her economic stature and alliance commitments.

This chapter therefore attempts to find out whether or not there has been a strategic change in Japan's security initiative and official doctrine in the post-Cold War period. In this endeavour both structural as well as sub-systemic level independent variables will be considered, putting both neorealism as well as neo-classical realism to test. Though structural factors are of utmost importance as sources of changes in Japanese foreign policy, Schweller aptly notes that "statecraft is not just a function of cost and risk calculation and of objective material factors at the structural-systemic levels of analysis" (Schweller, 2004: 169). Neoclassical realists like Rose also point to how international pressures are filtered through intervening variables at the sub-systemic level, resulting in different foreign policy behaviours (Rose, 1998). These intervening variables could range from political psychology

operating at the individual decision-maker's level, to national role perception by elites and the public, to small group dynamics expressed through bureaucratic and organizational politics. Therefore, it is not only important to pinpoint the structural upheavals that Japan went through as a result of the end of the Cold War, but also necessary to gauge the domestic climate in terms of how the political leaders reacted to them and how the public opined on them, before one can finally grasp how these international pressures were relayed into corresponding foreign policy behaviours.

According to Kliman, the benchmark for strategic change is best articulated in terms of expected versus observed behaviour; elite conceptions of security; and public attitudes toward defence. Though, by themselves, none of these criteria could definitively categorize new defence initiatives, when combined, the three criteria become a rigorous measure for evaluating strategic change (Kliman, 2006). This chapter will therefore trace the changes in Japan's official doctrine in the post-Cold War period as a result of forces operating at all three levels—systemic, state and the level of the individual[1]. As Edstrom (1999) points out, the principal sources of this doctrine are the utterances of officials and foreign policy decision-makers responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and entitled to speak for the nation. The two main spheres in which such changes shall be traced are—the manner in which Japan has interpreted and re-interpreted its Constitution to keep it in line with post-Cold War realities, and the changes in the roles, missions and capabilities of the Japanese SDF which have, as compared the Cold War period, increased in scope and degree. This will throw light on questions of whether Japan is still a free-riding "military pygmy" (Lind, 2003: 5) or is gradually becoming a "normal" nation (Green, 2001: 152; Kliman, 2006: 39; Cooney, 2006: 115), or for that matter is reverting to its pre-war "rich nation, strong army" model (Samuels, 2007: 116). More importantly, this will give an insight into the ability of Japan to balance, whereas looking at factors like elite and public opinion will help us determine the willingness of Japan to acquire great power status.

After confirming limits of international systemic explanations, three sub-systemic level factors will be analyzed in particular. Of these, two are variables at the state level and one is at the individual level. At the state level firstly, the degree of

[1] This also conforms to Walter Carlsnaes' (2002) view of foreign policy outcomes as the product of the complex interaction between the structural, the intentional and the dispositional dimensions acting in a step-by-step logical manner for an exhaustive and comprehensive explanation of foreign policy actions.

divisiveness in the domestic politics of Japan will be looked at to get an idea about 'elite cohesion and consensus'. This is relevant because as Schweller (2004) points out, greater the degree of divisiveness at the domestic political level, lesser is the willingness and ability to undertake high political and policy risks by way of marked changes in official state strategy. This is evident in Japanese politics from the fact that the disintegration of the Japanese Left considerably reduced the strong opposition to Japan playing a larger military role. Thus along with other factors operating at the structural level, the degree of elite cohesion also has a bearing on the kind of foreign policy outcomes exhibited by a state.

The second state-level variable to be analysed is the role of public opinion in the shaping of Japanese foreign policy. Berger (1998) believes that new elite conceptions of security are most significant when accompanied by parallel shifts in public opinion. Over an extended time period, opinion surveys reveal changes in public attitudes toward national security. Together, the changes in elite and public attitudes on matters of security and their perception of Japan's national role and international standing would help to test claims about the erosion or alternatively, continuance of the domestic anti-militarist norms as constraints on foreign policy behaviour.

The third variable that shall be studied closely in the context of this research is the role of individual leadership in the making of Japanese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It is important to do this because of the inadequacy of factors at the other levels to explain the difference in Japan's responses to three international crises, namely the Gulf War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq War. All these events took place under similar structural conditions of the new post-Cold War world order. Again, there was only a marginal change in public and elite opinions after 9/11 and the 2003 Gulf War pertaining to Japan's stance on these issues. However, Japan's response to the Gulf War or for that matter 9/11 was not as drastic and radical as its reaction to the 2003 Iraq War when President Koizumi took a firm hand and decided to dispatch SDF forces overseas to Iraq—an unprecedented occurrence in Japanese foreign policy at least since the end of WW-II. The ability of personal leadership to affect such changes in foreign policy, in the face of both inter- and intra-party opposition, as well as unfavourable public opinion, thus makes it necessary to analyse factors operating at the individual level, in conjunction with those operating at the state and systemic levels.

I. The Changing Roles and Capabilities of the SDF

Although Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution declares that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained" the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were created shortly after the end of U.S. occupation of Japan. Before the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1952, the United States was still the principal occupying power in Japan and in this capacity they instructed the Japanese to organize a 75,000 strong National Police Reserves (NPR) in 1950. It was ostensibly justified on the grounds of being essential for maintaining internal security following the transfer of Allied forces to Korea. By 1952 the NPR had been renamed the Japanese National Safety Forces (NSF) headed by Prime Minister Yoshida and by 1954 it had received its present name, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The JSDF is one of the most technologically advanced armed forces with Japanese military expenditures standing at the seventh highest in the world (Cooney, 2006) which is why there is a renewed debate in the post-Cold War period over whether Japan is still a "military pygmy and economic giant" (Lind, 2003: 2) or has alternatively reverted to the "rich nation, strong army" (Samuels, 2007: 5) model of the pre-World War-II period.

Changing roles and missions of the SDF: Japan's security policy during the Cold War period focused exclusively on preventive measures against the invasion of Japan and reaction to invasion, as laid out in the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. However, after 1991 drastic revisions were made to keep Japan in step with the changing environment of the post-Cold War era. This is evident from a simple comparison of the earlier NDPO with the one formulated in 1995, which stipulated participation in international peace cooperation activities as a new role for defensive power, and is therefore of great importance. The SDF first took part in peacekeeping operations following the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992. However, the legislation precluded Japanese participation in many standard peacekeeping activities like separating combatants, monitoring disarmament, and patrolling buffer zones (Kliman, 2006). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, the SDF viewed peacekeeping as a secondary responsibility. Since 2001, however, the scope of SDF peacekeeping has evolved rapidly. Following the terrorist attacks of September

11, 2001, and the 2003 Iraq War, the SDF was deployed to the Indian Ocean and Kuwait, and participated in peace building activities in Iraq and Afghanistan through legislative acts such as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Simply by following the trail of SDF participation in such international activities, it becomes obvious that Japan's defence policy has undergone major changes especially in the post-Cold War period.

Changing roles after the Gulf War: Immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the Japanese government made the decision to deploy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf for post-war reconstruction. Subsequently, the Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Other Operations which stipulates participation by the Self-Defense Forces in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO) was approved by the Diet in 1992, and the Act on Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team was revised to include the participation by the Self-Defense Forces in UN PKO. Since then, the SDF has participated in UN PKO and international disaster relief activities in Cambodia (1992-93), Mozambique (1992-95), the Golan Heights (1996-present), Honduras (1998), and East Timor (2002-2004). The legal framework governing the SDF's response to regional conflicts dates back to 1999 when the Diet passed the law on situations in areas surrounding Japan. By enabling the SDF to provide rear-area support for U.S. forces during a regional contingency, this legislation maximized Japan's role under the then-prevailing interpretation of Article Nine (Kliman, 2006). However, since 1999, the GOJ's interpretation of Article Nine has changed subtly and insidiously.

Expansion of international peace cooperation activities after 9/11: The role of the SDF with regard to international missions further increased after the terrorist attacks which occurred in the US on September 11, 2001. Passed by the Diet in October 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law permitted the SDF to provide rear-area support for the United States and other nations in the "war on terror" (Cabinet Office, 2001). The geographic scope of this legislation included the high seas and the territory of consenting foreign countries. At the same time, a proposed revision to the SDF Law was also passed to allow protection of the areas surrounding U.S. military installations in Japan under conditions where an order is not given for public security operations. Based on this law, the following were stipulated as activities to be carried

out by Japan: 1) cooperation and support activities by the SDF including the provision of supplies; 2) search and rescue activities for personnel in distress; and 3) victim relief activities including the transportation of daily necessities, and medical and other humanitarian aid activities (Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2003). The majority of these items are identical to the activities stipulated earlier; however, the NDPO 1995 did not go so far as to approach the aggressive exercise of the role of being an "active creator of order" directly as a statement of policy (Yamaguchi, 2004: 7-8). However, a limit was set such that the activities do not consist of the threat of armed force or the execution of armed force, and the goals were set to be humanitarian reconstruction activities and support for the military forces of other nations involved in reconstruction or peace keeping and peace building.

Humanitarian and reconstruction aid activities after the Iraq War: In 2003, Japan enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. As a result of this law the GDSF was permitted to provide medical care, water supply and assistance for the recovery and improvement of public infrastructure in Iraq. The creation of this policy for the SDF deployment to Iraq is clearly distinguished from that related to the UN PKO decision making that had taken place previously since it marked the transformation of Japanese foreign policy to a "proactive" and "independent" policy. Shortly after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated:

"We will make a proactive contribution. I want to consider the possibility of Japan doing something independently" — (Announcement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on May 23, 2003 in *Yomiuri Shimbun*).

For the Prime Minister to express Japan's independence here was a major breakthrough. In the international peace cooperation activities until then, it was typical for Japan to take a more passive stance in deciding to participate in response to strong demands from the international community representing the United Nations. While the region of activity in the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was expanded to include the open seas and the territory of foreign nations (when the respective nation gave its permission), the preconditions regarding those regions were the same as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. However, in the context of the 2003 national emergency bills, the Koizumi administration broadened the right of self-

defence to include an armed response to any attack on U.S. forces defending Japan. The SDF could even use force to support U.S. military assets stationed outside the home islands, provided that the ensuing conflict appeared likely to endanger Japanese territory. The National Defense Program Guidelines prepared in December 2004 reflected this experience and learning. NDPG 2004 also clarified that Japan would actively get involved in establishing order in regions which were important to it (Japan Defense Agency, "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005–", December, 2004). More notably, during SDF participation in Iraq reconstruction for the first time in its history, the SDF was deployed to a country that, in effect, remained a combat zone. Further, the SDF operated under the auspices of a U.S.-led occupation force rather than as part of a UN mission.

Thus it is seen that throughout the 1990s, the SDF viewed peacekeeping as a secondary responsibility. Since 2001, however, the scope of SDF peacekeeping has evolved rapidly. Thus, following the experience from participation in international peace cooperation activities amassed since the 1990s and the involvement in the international peace cooperation activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, following the terrorist attacks in the US, the independent and proactive involvement in such activities finally became a central element of Japan's security policy.

Changing power projection capabilities of the SDF: In assessments of Japanese security policy, scholars often highlight Tokyo's defence spending as a percentage of GDP. While other great powers spend 1.5 - 3% of their GDP on defence, Japan devotes only about 1% to defence (See Fig: 1). Studies often conclude from this measurement that Japan is militarily weak. A frequent observation of the 1980s and 90s was that Japan was "an economic giant and a military pygmy" (Lind, 2003: 5). Since 1994, Japanese defence expenditures have declined in both nominal and real terms, and Japan's defence budget has been reduced for five straight years between 2003 and 2007 (Samuels 2007: 195; also see Figs: 2 and 3). In November 1995, the Japanese Cabinet approved a new defence plan outlining significant military spending cuts. Therefore, it is believed by many scholars that Japanese foreign-policy makers have realized that "they can best advance their international influence by continuing to enhance their economic, and not military, strength" (Brooks, 1997: 14).

However, Lind (2003) on the other indignantly points out that defence spending as a fraction of GDP is not a valid measure of military power. It is possible for a state with a large economy devoting only a small share of its wealth towards defence to amass a high level of military power. Conversely, a small economy devoting even a huge percentage of its wealth to defence can generate only a limited amount of real military capability. As a result, as Lind observes, "analyses have tended to focus on gaps in Japanese capabilities, rather than on the military capabilities Japan actually possesses" (Lind, 2003: 5). Lind suggests two measures of military power to assess the strength of the Japanese Self Defense forces. The first measure is aggregate defence spending (i.e., total spending, not spending as a fraction of GDP). A second way to measure Japan's military power is to assess its operational capabilities across a broad range of military missions.

Christopher Hughes also questions the extent to which caps on defence expenditure have actually constrained Japan from becoming militarily more capable. While it is clear that the size of the defence budget is an important constraint on Japan's remilitarisation, he notes that "Japan has used sleight of hand to maintain the 1% limit", and therefore defence expenditure is growing in certain ways as a consequence of which apparent *quantitative* restrictions have not been an absolute bar on the *qualitative* expansion of Japan's military power (Christopher Hughes, 2008: 5). A case in point is the irony that since 2003 the graph of defence related expenditure has been showing a consistent downward trend (See figure 7). Yet it was in this very year that Japan decided to embark on joint research with the U.S. on Ballistic Missile Defense Systems. The fact that the apparent cuts in defence expenditure are channelized into other less obvious conduits like military related R&D is evident from the following statement:

"When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the GOJ will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the SDF in order to improve efficiency and reduce defence-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and financial conditions of Japan into consideration" — Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision on the introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures (December 19, 2003).

The earlier NDPG of the 1990s had a definitive counter-invasion focus, but as and when it became clear to Japanese policy-makers that such threats are less imminent than the "new threats" that have emerged in the global context, the subsequent NDPGs articulated major cutbacks in equipment dedicated solely to counter-invasion

operations. Excerpts from the Defense of Japan White Paper, 2008, therefore further confirm the fact that the changes have been more in the *type* of defence spending rather than in a quantitative decrease in military equipment and outlay:

"Regarding the GSDF, the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be appropriately down-sized and a defence build-up concept focussed on anti-tank warfare will be developed, that can promptly respond to the new threats. As far as the MSDF is concerned, the defence build-up concept will be altered to one that is focussed on anti-submarine warfare. Again the destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircrafts and other equipment will be downsized. With regards to the ASDF, the current defence force build-up concept focussed on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats and the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed."

— (Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008: 427)

Thus as Lind (2006) insists, Tokyo's military capabilities, though not commensurate with its economic resources, are still relatively formidable. In particular, the MSDF constitutes the most powerful navy in the world behind the U.S. Navy. Although quantitatively inferior to most East Asian militaries, the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF and ASDF, respectively) possess a qualitative advantage over their potential adversaries in the region. Finally, Japan's sophisticated technological-industrial base allows for a host of latent military capabilities including the production of nuclear weapons. Therefore, as far as changes in Japan's qualitative military powers is concerned, it can be said that it has succeeded in creating a more mobile ground force, an air force with greater regional and global reach and a maritime force with amphibious and carrier technologies. It is moving steadily forward with the deployment of BMD and new space technologies, and the SDF, MSDF, ASDF as well as Japanese Coast Guards (JPG) are expanding their capabilities and the range of their missions (Kliman, 2006; Lind, 2006; Hughes, 2008). Hughes also seems to be of the opinion that Tokyo is in many ways engaged in something of a quiet arms race with China, matching growing Chinese air power with its own enhanced air-defensive power; countering growing Chinese blue-water naval ambitions with its own more capable anti-submarine and carrier assets; and attempting to nullify Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles (Hughes, 2008: 52).

By quietly altering the definition of self-defence, there has been a diminution of the SDF's traditional role in favour of other security responsibilities—peacekeeping and more broadly, contributing to the maintenance of global order. The Japanese government has therefore achieved a de facto expansion of the SDF's ability to participate in regional contingencies. Some U.S. government officials have called this a process of "maturation," while other analysts have welcomed the "erosion of

anti-militarism" and "strategic tinkering" (Samuels, 2006: 116). The most decorously indirect expression of this process is from a report by the JDA's National Institute for Defense Studies that refers to the "lateral expansion and greater depth" of Japan's defence capabilities since the end of the Cold War (Report on Defense and Strategic Studies, 2001-2002). However one may choose to put it, one thing is established beyond doubt that change has been aplenty and Japan has modernized its military and begun to shift its doctrine, and it is poised to continue.

Figure:1



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

Figure: 2



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

Figure: 3



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

II. Post-Cold War Changes in Article Nine: Interpretation and Constitutional Reform

The Peace Clause laid out in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution "outlaws war and denies the state the right to belligerency". As such it is regarded by many to underpin the set of legal norms that constrain Japan's defence policy. The Japanese Constitution was formally adopted in 1947 and has not been amended or revised since—rather, as many scholars have pointed out, it has been reinterpreted to fit the need of the times and the scope of what constitutes self defence has been expanded over the years. Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, as it came into effect in 1947, prohibited Japan from owning military forces. However, after 1954, the government decided that Article Nine would permit the maintenance of purely defensive units (Katzenstein, 1996a). During the Diet debate on the new constitution itself, several changes were made to Article Nine with the consent of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers occupying Japan at that time. The most important among them was the Ashida Amendment which relaxed the total ban on self-defence by adding an extra clause (Cooney, 2006). Thus, the first re-interpretation came about when 'military forces' was construed as meaning 'offensive' military forces.

It is important to trace the trajectory of these dilutions in the initial Article Nine both during and after the Cold War, in order to get a better idea about the changing face of Japan's foreign policy. For decades, Japanese pacifism and pragmatism have been "close cousins in the well-honed practice of constitutional reinterpretation", since they established Japan's right to individual self-defence and also, through Japan's close security cooperation with the U.S., allowed a right to collective self-defence while prohibiting any exercise of it (Samuels, 2005: 25). The 1991 Gulf War, the lingering North Korean crisis, China's rise, and the redefinition of global security in the wake of the September 11 attacks have created international and domestic pressures for reconsidering Japan's strict prohibition against participation in international peacekeeping operations involving use of military force. A flexible reinterpretation of Article Nine has therefore facilitated the deployment of the Japan Self Defense Forces abroad.

Immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the Japanese government made the decision to deploy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf for post-war reconstruction. Subsequently, the Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping

Operations and Other Operations which stipulates participation by the Self-Defense Forces in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO) was approved by the Diet in 1992, and the Act on Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team was revised to include participation by the Self-Defense Forces (Yamaguchi, 2004). After the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992, Japan subsequently dispatched GDSF personnel to Cambodia in September of the same year, the country's first participation in a UN peacekeeping operation. Since then the Defense Ministry and the SDF have proactively participated in various international peace cooperation activities in an effort to improve the international security environment. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the US led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law. Based on these laws the MSDF was permitted to conduct refuelling and water supply operations in the Indian Ocean to the vessels of various countries participating in maritime interdiction operations (Defense of Japan White Paper, 2008). After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the Diet also enacted legislation permitting the deployment of the Japanese army to Iraq to aid in reconstruction and the stationing of the Japanese navy and air force in the Persian Gulf to provide logistical support for the American war (Defense of Japan, 2008; Kliman, 2006; Cooney, 2006).

Thus it is seen that in the dispatch of SDF troops under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enforced after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the way was cleared for "cooperation and support activities," and "relief and rescue operations" as long as troops are sent to "non-combat zones." In addition, in activities under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, it became *theoretically* possible for SDF troops to undertake "maintenance of safety" in "non-combat zones" after an end to major combat operations in Iraq was declared (Japan Defense Agency, Hand Book for Defense, 2005: 668). In 2003, the Japanese government took the momentous decision to acquire a ballistic missile defence system in close cooperation with the United States, which raises serious questions about the verity of its claims of having a "pacifist constitution".

Changing interpretation of the Constitution: How has the interpretation of the Constitution changed in order to incorporate the spate of new legislation? Are the laws that have been enacted from time to time within the constitutional provisions or have they subverted Article Nine? As has been mentioned earlier, prima facie the

Japanese Constitution has not undergone any changed; however de facto constitutional re-interpretations have left major doubts about the extent to which Article Nine *actually* constrains Japanese security strategy.

At the time of the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) ruled that the use of weapons under a UN mandate was different from the overseas use of armed force. According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) the interpretation of the Constitution was that while serving abroad, Japanese troops could discharge firearms (1) in self-defense, (2) to protect SDF war materiel, and (3) to safeguard unarmed foreigners who fulfill carefully defined conditions (Japan Defense Agency, Hand Book for Defense, 2005). In all other settings, SDF peacekeepers employ weapons without constitutional sanction (Kliman, 2006).

Article Nine proscribes the involvement of Japan in any from of collective security activities. Short of sweeping reinterpretation or amendment of Article Nine, no viable avenue exists for enabling the SDF to fight under the UN flag. However, yet again, non-constitutional means like narrowing the definition of combatants—to offer logistics support to a wider range of UN troops was employed by the Japanese government. As of mid-2005, the Japanese government's working definition of collective defence could be summarized by two criteria: (1) a bilateral mission that is not aimed at defending Japan and (2) a mission where the SDF participates in combat or directly facilitates the use of armed force by U.S. troops (Japan Defense Agency, Hand Book for Defense, 2005). However, in practice, this classification leaves space for considerable ambiguity. What operations qualify as Japan's self-defence and when does logistics support become abetting combat?

The ban on collective defence poses the primary obstacle to new bilateral missions. However, several forms of tactical cooperation exist in a constitutional gray zone. Some have become enabled despite the fact that the government's definition of bilateral combat operations outside the Far East clearly fall under the Japanese government's working definition of collective defence. This is justified by the interpretation that during a regional contingency, the SDF may provide U.S. forces with logistics support and intelligence. Anything beyond that would be tantamount to violation of the prohibition on collective defence.

The elastic definition of self-defence therefore offers a constitutional loophole. The GOJ may invoke the right of self-defence when responding to the commencement of an attack on Japan; however the criteria for defining an impending act of aggression are relatively flexible. This is naturally bound to leave many anxious, because under the present scheme of affairs then, for instance, determining whether something like a conflict in Northeast Asia, prefigures an attack on Japan would largely be a matter of political will. As Kliman remarks, "should the Japanese government desire to intervene militarily in a China-Taiwan conflict or a clash on the Korean peninsula, it could do so under today's Article Nine (Kliman, 2006: 182). This is also evident from the fact that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau condoned the inadvertent use of Japanese BMD to defend U.S. territory by ruling that "if it is judged to have a significant probability of targeting Japan, it will be considered to have justified our right to self-defense," (Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director General Osamu Akiyama quoted in Kliman, 2006: 185).

In short, although the official interpretation of Article Nine remains largely unchanged, the Japanese government has in practice relaxed the prohibition on collective defence. The GOJ's decision to introduce missile defence led to a limited relaxation of the Three Principles on Arms Exports. If strictly enforced, these principles would have prevented the United States and Japan from exchanging BMD hardware, raising the cost of missile defence and possibly hindering interoperability. The Three Principles on Arms Exports prevent Japanese firms from selling military hardware and technology on the international market. Like the Three Nonnuclear Principles, these export restrictions were established by Prime Minister Sato in 1967. Since then, the GOJ has institutionalized the export restrictions through successive Diet interpretations. The Japanese government exempted missile defence from the non-export principles in a statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda at the end of 2004. Notably, this exclusion only applied to BMD technology rather than all forms of U.S.-Japan defence-industrial cooperation. The way the MOFA and Ministry of Defense view the BMD vis-à-vis issues of violation of the legislation on collective self-defence, can be gauged from the following remark by Masatoshi Shimbo, the President of the National Institute for Defense Studies:

"The BMD system that the government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of

collective defense"— *At the U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue, Wednesday, October 15, 2008, Washington, D.C.*

All this naturally makes one wonder whether Japan's claims of having a pacifist Constitution are well-founded or not. Is anti-militarism actually the reason behind the unchanging Article Nine or is it again because re-interpretation works as an ideal substitute for complete replacement, by catering to international pressures for taking on a large military role, as well as allaying domestic apathy towards such roles? As many scholars (Lind, 2006; Kliman, 2006) would insist, the alleged unchanging and sedentary, passive and "reactive" nature of the constitution is only a façade because major and perceptible changes have taken place in Japan's foreign and security policy over the years, often reversing original positions. Two such instances are those of non use of jet airplanes and the three "non-nuclear principles" that it would not possess, manufacture or permit nuclear weapons to be brought to Japan (Cooney, 2006). The second clause of Article Nine states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained". Yet, there is *only* one SDF capability—an aircraft carrier—that is, as of mid-2005 clearly and unambiguously forbidden by the peace clause. Under the GOJ's current interpretation of Article Nine, Japan may possess armaments at the upper tier of the intensity spectrum—nuclear weapons, pre-emptive capabilities; the middle tier—long-range fighters, a blue-water navy; and the lower tier—expeditionary units and counter-invasion forces. Thus, despite all talks about the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and public intolerance towards the development of nuclear power for any other purpose apart from energy-use, it is seen that even nuclear weapons and long-range missiles—currently absent from the SDF's inventory—are partly exempted from the peace clause (Samuels, 2006).

Debates on Constitutional reform: As Katzenstein (1996a) puts it "in seeking to create flexibility in policy through a politics of interpretation and reinterpretation of text, ambiguity is a defining characteristic of Japan's security policy (Katzenstein, 2008:39). Yet, reinterpretation has not sufficed to overcome the most intractable problems stemming from Article Nine—namely Japan's inability to use armed force overseas and the prohibition on collective defence. The GOJ has interpreted Article Nine as barring the overseas use of armed force. This determination restricts the scope of Japanese peacekeeping operations and limits the SDF's participation in UN-

sanctioned multinational coalitions. Owing to all these difficulties, during the years 2001–2005, the Diet laid the groundwork for amending Japan's constitution. In January 2000, the Lower and Upper House Constitutional Research Commissions first convened to discuss revising Japan's supreme law. Five years later, after conducting open hearings and receiving expert testimony, each panel issued a final report. A majority of the Lower House panel favoured amending Article Nine, but the Upper House commission failed to reach a similar consensus. While both the LDP and DPJ advocate amending Article Nine, inter-party (and intra-party) differences exist as to the nature of specific changes. Although both parties recognize the need to stipulate the right of self-defence, the overseas use of armed force and the prohibition on collective defence remain contentious issues. A bill passed in May 2007 permitted the government to hold a referendum on the subject by 2010, following a two-thirds vote favouring such an amendment in both houses of the Diet (Katzenstein, 2008). The issue of constitutional revision is a crucial part of the deep-seated conflict about Japan's identity. It matters for Japan's democratic politics, for Japan's standing in East Asia, for Japan's aspiration to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and, arguably, for Japanese and Asian security.

III. The degree of divisiveness in domestic politics—elite consensus and cohesion

Neoclassical realists believe that understanding the links between power and policy requires a close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented. As such, variables at the sub-systemic level, for instance domestic perception of national role and international pressures have to be analysed alongside systemic variables in order to understand particular state outcomes. Kal Holsti's idea of "national role conception" seeks to capture how a nation views itself and its role in the international arena. Operationally, Holsti turns to elite perceptions of national role and the external environment, arguing that these perceptions are arguably more salient to foreign policy choice (Holsti, 1970). Kliman (2006) too emphasises, how the ideational lens through which government elites approach national security, has a bearing on perceptions of national interest, threat evaluations, the ranking of policy choices, and, consequently, strategy.

In his study of the domestic politics of Great Britain and France on the eve of the Second World War, Schweller attempted to demonstrate the impact of sub-systemic variables like 'elite consensus' and 'elite cohesion'—which show a state's willingness to balance—and 'social cohesion' and 'regime vulnerability'—which reflect its ability to balance—on the kind of foreign policy decisions that a state exhibits, i.e. whether it will end up under-balancing, or over-balancing or non-balancing (Schweller, 2004: 164-180). Schweller is against the core neorealist claim that states are coherent, unitary actors (operating as one unit). Based on this premise, he points out that when states are divided at the elite and societal levels i.e. the degree of coherence in the policy-making process and in actual state-society relations of a state is low; they are less willing and able to undertake high political and policy risks to balance, as compared to leaders of coherent states (Schweller, 2004:161).

In the same breath as Schweller, this section seeks to determine the degree of both Japan's *ability* as well as *willingness* to balance in the post-Cold War era by examining the degree of divisiveness, or alternately, cohesion among its political elite. This could help in better understanding certain Japanese foreign policy behaviours like its ostensible 'under-balancing' towards North Korea, and 'non-balancing' vis-à-vis the United States.

In order to investigate how perceptions matter, one has to, as Rose puts it "get inside the heads of key state decision-makers", and to be able to incorporate state structure as an intervening variable, "one has to know a decent amount about how different countries' political institutions work, both in theory and in practice" (Rose, 1998: 14). Kliman makes use of two measures to gauge elite conceptions of security—loaded terms[2] and convergence of opinion. Changes in elite usage of loaded terms, as evidenced through various contexts like high-level speeches, policy documents, and personal interviews are highly indicative of a strategic shift in policy. Again growing elite consensus on an erstwhile controversial issue may reveal the first signs of new and changing conceptions of security.

[2] As Kliman (2006) elaborates, 'loaded terms' are essentially words or phrases that encapsulate a conceptual framework of security, for instance "war on terror", and can be better understood in conjunction with the concept of 'securitization'. Basically what qualifies as a threat to national security will depend on what is articulated as a threat and what is not.

As far as state structure is concerned, it must be pointed out that despite a cascade of studies of Japanese defence and foreign policy recently, very few studies paid special attention to the legislative process of the post-Cold War national security policies. Among the few studies on this subject, the study by Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krause (2005) stresses that the change in the political party system allowed parliamentary confrontation over security issues. In Japan's legislative process the ruling party's majority does not mean an automatic approval in the Diet. Opposition parties have blocked about one in every five cabinet bills, despite their minority position (Shinoda, 2009). One of the largest factors in the legislative process, and one that works against the ruling party, is time – time to get a bill through the Diet before the Diet session comes to a close. These constraints have made the way the ruling party deals with the opposition parties very important.

In order to evaluate this parliamentary confrontation and track changes in the degree of politicization, the positions of Japan's political parties on some post-Cold War developments with major implications for Japanese national security policies shall be looked into to explain Japan's particular response to them. In this context, the international events that shall be looked into in particular are the 1992 international peace cooperation legislation; the 2001 anti-terrorism legislation; and the 2003 Iraq legislation.

The 1992 international peace cooperation legislation after the Gulf War: After the outbreak of the 1990 Gulf Crisis, the LDP single party government under Toshiki Kaifu prepared the UN peace cooperation legislation that would enable the SDF to assist the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf area. The Socialist Party strongly voiced its opposition against overseas dispatch of the SDF and the two non-leftist opposition parties, Komeito and the DSP, aligned with the Socialists to oppose the government's initiative to provide a personnel contribution in the Gulf War. The legislation was resubmitted by the new Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, in September 1991. Although the Miyazawa cabinet passed the legislation in the lower house with support from Komeito, it failed to pass it in the upper house committee. As a result, the Miyazawa cabinet gave up trying to pass the PKO legislation in the 1991 Diet session. It was not until the end of April 1992 that the deliberation over the PKO bill restarted in the upper house. At the 21 April party conference, DSP

Chairman, Keigo Ouchi, announced his intention to cooperate on the PKO bill (Shinoda, 2009). Although the two leftist parties tried to block the legislation, it passed the committee in two days with support from Komeito and the DSP, and was finally enacted on 15 June.

The 2001 anti-terrorism legislation after 9/11: In October 2001, the coalition government of the LDP, Komeito, and the Conservative Party, under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, introduced the antiterrorism legislation which would enable provision of rear-echelon support for US forces by the SDF to the Indian Ocean area. The Socialist Party denounced the US intention to retaliate, and portrayed the Koizumi plan as a step toward Japan's remilitarization. The Liberal Party (which had left the coalition government in April 2000) led by Ozawa, maintained that the use of armed forces must be approved by the United Nations, as in the case of the Gulf War, before Japan could send its troops into an international conflict. Wishing to avoid a Diet passage by the ruling coalition alone, the Koizumi government sought cooperation from the DPJ. DPJ leader, Hatoyama, presented the conditions for support, which included requiring prior Diet approval for 'stronger civilian control' over the SDF. Although Koizumi was willing to offer compromises to the DPJ, LDP's coalition partner, Komeito, strongly opposed. As a result, negotiation between Koizumi and Hatoyama broke up. Once the decision was made to push the legislation through without any support from the opposition parties, Diet action was swift. On 16 October, the revised government bill was introduced and the lower house special committee approved it. Two days later, the lower house passed the bill. DPJ leader Hatoyama had a difficult time persuading some 20 Democratic lower house members, who were supportive of the bill, not to vote for it. The bill was enacted on 29 October, only 24 days after the upper house passed it. The Koizumi government managed to quickly pass legislation with strong public support, overcoming resistance from the opposition parties.

The 2003 Iraq legislation after Iraq War: When U.S. forces initiated hostilities against Iraq in March 2003, Koizumi immediately declared Japan's support for the United States. After President George W. Bush announced the end of major combat operations, the Koizumi Cabinet moved swiftly on drafting a new legislation to allow the SDF to offer humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in post-war Iraq. The

Koizumi government submitted the Iraq legislation to the Diet on 13 June. In order to pass the legislation in the current session, the ruling parties needed to extend the ordinary Diet session by 40 days. When the three parties asked the speakers of both houses of the Diet for the extension, however, all the opposition parties were united in opposing it. With compromise in mind, the government sought an early conference with the DPJ, but the DPJ refused. The DPJ argued that as long as there was no clear difference between combat and non-combat areas, sending the SDF might violate Article Nine of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan's belligerency. The DPJ's refusal made it impossible for the Koizumi government to win an overwhelming majority to pass the legislation as it had done for the emergency legislation. By submitting its own bill, the DPJ also disassociated itself from the other opposition parties, weakening the solidarity of the opposition camp. However, despite all this deliberations in the upper house moved ahead as scheduled. Even though the opposition parties introduced a no-confidence motion against the Koizumi cabinet on 25 July in a bid to delay passage, on the following day, the ruling parties voted for and enacted the legislation to dispatch Japanese troops to Iraq.

Interpreting the above cases in terms of the degree of parliamentary confrontation, it is seen that full confrontation only appeared in the 1990 UN peace cooperation legislation. In all the other cases, at least one opposition party showed some degree of understanding. A proportion of the opposition parties supported the government proposal in the case of the 1992 PKO legislation. On the 2001 anti-terrorism legislation, the DPJ held a conference with the government parties. Against the 2003 Iraq and the 2008 antiterrorism legislation, the DPJ participated in the Diet deliberation by introducing an alternative proposal. Although a conference was not held with the government parties, the DPJ recognized the significance of personnel contribution in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In short, Japan's political parties in general became less confrontational against overseas dispatch of the SDF in the post Cold-War period. This minimized politicization of national security policies, turning the issues from 'position' ones to 'valence' ones. In his 1963 classic article, Donald Stokes describes that there are two different kinds of policy matters on which political parties compete: 'position issues' and 'valence issues'. In position issues, parties take up the 'pro' and 'con' positions, creating a more confrontational environment (Stokes, 1963: 370). The national

security policies during the Cold War era, which created the left–right confrontation between the LDP and the Socialists, can be classified as position issues. On the other hand, valence issues are defined by Stokes as ones on which "parties are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public's mind with conditions or goals of which almost every one approves or disapproves" (Stokes, 1963: 372).

After the Cold War ended, Japan's '1955 system', which was based on ideological confrontation between the LDP and the Socialists on national security, collapsed, as a broad public consensus in favour the US–Japan alliance and the Self-Defense Forces arose. Since the 1990s, Japan's debate on national security largely focused on the role of the SDF to contribute to international peace and security in addition to defending Japan's territory. After the heated debate on the dispatch of the SDF to the 1991 Gulf War, and especially after the successful PKO activities of the SDF in Cambodia and other places, a broad consensus for Japan' personnel contributions arose among the LDP and the other non-leftist parties. A new political debate focused on how, when, and under what conditions Tokyo sends the SDF overseas. In the early twenty-first century, however there still remain strong differences within the classes about how Japan should provide for its security. These differences are not simple matters of left versus right. Nor do they strictly reflect party or other institutional affiliations. For example, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) supports the U.S. alliance unconditionally but is divided on how to deal with Asia, whereas the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is unified on regional integration but divided on the alliance (Samuels, 2007).

This development suggests that national security policies shifted from position issues toward valence issues, at least between the LDP and the non-leftist, moderate parties. That process was assisted by the depolarization of Japanese politics with the Left and factions inside the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposed to deployment and eventual revision fading in importance, with the strengthening of the position of the prime minister within the LDP and the policymaking process, and with the entry of the idea of constitutional revision into the political mainstream.

However the other point to be noted is that there have been times when there was a considerably high degree of political divisiveness and lack of elite consensus, for instance during the anti-terrorism legislation and the 2003 Iraq legislations being cases in point. This highlights the fact that it is not just factors at the state level of

analysis that can provide a manual for state policy and action, bringing us to yet another level of analysis—the individual level, focussing on the role of individual leadership in Japanese politics. Yet again, one of the factors behind the support or otherwise received from a certain political party depends heavily on the opinion of their respective electoral bases. This makes it important to look into the role of public opinion as one of the decisive factors behind foreign policy outcomes in international politics.

IV. The Role of Public Opinion

Throughout the Cold War period, constructivist scholars have highlighted the constraints on Japanese foreign policy placed by the strong domestic norms of anti-militarism that prevailed among the public especially since the end of the Second World War (Berger, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996a). This explanation has been advanced as an alternative to the realist one invoking free-riding. However, in the post-Cold War period Japan has undergone a number of changes in both its external as well as internal environment. Therefore, it is important to find out the degree to which domestic norms expressed through public opinion affect Japanese foreign policy making as opposed to structural factors. Do domestic norms of anti-militarism still prevail in Japan, and if they do, are they still as important as they used to be in constraining foreign policy behaviour?

Samuels (2007) aptly remarks that one of the most relevant domestic factors, which still continues to exercise a restraining influence on the conduct of Japanese security policy, is public opinion. Schweller has pointed out time and again that apart from structural factors "statecraft is also a consequence of elites' preferences and perceptions of the external environment, the policy and decision-making procedure and the domestic political risks involved in certain foreign policy choices" (Schweller, 2004: 161). The last of these factors is the one that forges the link between the stance taken by political leaders of a state and the role of public opinion in determining foreign policy outcomes. Elite conceptions of security do not automatically translate into tangible policies. Public views on national defence constrain decision-makers. In a democracy, implementing defence policies that run contrary to popular opinion may engender a political backlash and subsequently electoral defeat (Kliman, 2006).

As has been mentioned earlier, during the Cold War, the Japanese public was not much interested in international affairs, which was also the reason why Japanese foreign policy has traditionally been predominated by the MOFA and other bureaucratic influences, rather than the Diet. However, owing to a number of reason spanning from foreign threat, to a desire for redefining and delineating its national role and international standing, or what had been termed by Tsutomu as the "*Nihonjin-ron* boom" (Tsutomu, 1976: 1), Japanese public has become more sensitive to their country's international affairs (See Fig: 4). Therefore, as far as the Japanese public is concerned, Yamamoto remarks that "as Japanese foreign policy becomes more high-profile, people are paying more attention to it and there is a growing awareness among them of how the world is interlinked and how national interests cannot be secured only from domestic sources" (Yamamoto, 1997 in Cooney, 2006: 181).

Public opinion on the SDF: The shift from 'position issues' towards the 'valence issues' that Tomohito (2009) alludes to, is probably a reflection of the trend of opinion poll results over national security policies. Public opinion showed significant changes before and after the 1991 Gulf War. In the first case of the UN peace cooperation legislation, public sentiment was generally hesitant for the first overseas dispatch of the SDF, and was on the side of the opposition parties. In the October 1990 *Asahi Shimbun* opinion poll, only 19 percent of the respondents supported the SDF dispatch by revising the current laws or the Constitution. On the other hand, 67 percent preferred a 'non-military contribution' (Kliman, 2006). There was very limited public support for the SDF dispatch. However, Japan's public opinion had significantly changed after the 1991 Gulf War. The international criticism against the lack of man-power support to the war contributed to the change. When the Kaifu cabinet successfully dispatched SDF minesweepers in 1991, the public strongly supported the government decision (Berger, 1998). This significantly lowered public reservation against the SDP dispatch. During the Diet deliberation of the second case, *Asahi Shimbun* conducted an opinion poll to find how much support the 1992 PKO legislation received. In strong contrast to the poll on the 1990 legislation, as many as

Figure: 4



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

Figure: 5



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

71 percent of the respondents supported the overseas dispatch of the SDF, and only 24 percent were opposed to it (*Asahi Shimbun*, 1992). During the Diet deliberation of the Iraq legislation, 46 percent of the respondents supported the legislation, while 43 percent opposed (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2003). The 2001 anti-terrorism legislation and the 2003 emergency legislation also saw strong public support, by a more than 20 percent margin (Tomohito, 2009).

As Yoshizaki (2009) says, these tendencies can be confirmed in Public Opinion Survey on the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issue, conducted by the Cabinet Office every three years. In the 2006 survey conducted during the period when the GSDF troops were undertaking humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support activities in Iraq, a high percentage, 66.7 percent of those who polled, supported the SDF's activities. Of over 80 percent of the respondents supporting IPCA (International Peace Cooperation Activities), 53.4 percent said the "current level of efforts should be maintained", surpassing the 31.0 percent who replied Japan "should get involved more actively than before" (See fig. 6). Summing up these results, Japanese public opinion appears to expect the SDF to undertake activities focussing on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support.

Figure: 6



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

Public opinion on foreign threats: After September 11, one representative poll conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* found that 81 percent of respondents were "uneasy that a terrorist incident may occur in Japan like in the U.S." (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2003). That the public responded strongly to September 11 was as expected; yet the public's sense of unease did not automatically translate into support for government action. On the one hand, the anxiety engendered by September 11 might have prompted the public to favour participation in Operation Enduring Freedom. From this perspective, securing Japan against the threat of global terror required SDF dispatch. On the other hand, public threat perceptions might have actually deterred support for the antiterrorism legislation, as it was feared that by visibly joining the anti-terror coalition, Japan could become a target for Al Qaeda (Kliman, 2006). Indeed, more than two-thirds of the public predicted that SDF dispatch would "likely bring about terrorism in Japan" (2006: 86). Nonetheless, fear of retaliation failed to decisively influence public opinion. A majority of Japanese—some 57 percent—of the population, backed the antiterrorism legislation. Whether this majority reflected threat perceptions or other factors such as U.S. expectations and prime ministerial leadership is impossible to ascertain, given the limited scope of opinion surveys.

In contrast to American neo-conservatives, despite North Korea's nuclear program and missile tests threatening the Japanese homeland, most members of Japan's military elite and general public remain firmly opposed to the government's active exploration of its nuclear options (Lobe, 2006 in Katzenstein, 2008). Japan's nuclear allergy was in plain sight once again when, only four weeks before the July 2007 Upper House elections, Japan's defence minister was forced to resign because one of his comments appeared to justify U.S. use of atomic weapons against Japan to end World War II (Katzenstein, 2008). Hughes (2007) therefore rightly argues that domestic factors continue to be of much greater importance in accounting for Japan's lack of interest in a nuclear option than are changes in Japan's external conditions.

As far as public opinion on U.S.-Japanese relations is concerned, despite sustained protests against American bases in Okinawa, public opinion polls typically show above 60 percent of the Japanese public favouring the United States, which is about twice as many as corresponding numbers for various European countries (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007; Tanaka 2007 in Katzenstein, 2008).

Figure: 7



Source: Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008

With China, Japan is one of East Asia's two leading military powers. Yet, since 1994, Japanese defence expenditures have declined in both nominal and real terms, and Japan's defence budget has been reduced for five straight years between 2003 and 2007 (Samuels 2007: 195). The public's realist recognition is thus tempered by a democratic politics that continues to prefer butter to guns. Furthermore, as Paul Midford (2006) argues, public opinion is firm about recognizing the usefulness of military power *only* for homeland defence and not for the pursuit of any other political objective such as democracy promotion, the defence of human rights, or the suppression of weapons of mass destruction. Instead, and very much in line with Japan's doctrine of comprehensive security, Japan's public continues to strongly support non-military instruments of foreign policy. As Samuels infers, "Japanese voters may not be more engaged in the minutiae of security policy than U.S. voters, but they certainly are no less so. They are not likely to reward excessive tilts by their leaders in one direction or another for long." (Samuels, 2006: 119).

Thus as far as domestic anti-militarist norms are concerned we see that Japanese public is gradually becoming more amenable and open to the idea of inching towards becoming a 'normal' nation. No doubt, issues like nuclearization and complete scrapping of Article Nine are out of the question, at least at present; but the winds of change are visible in the fact that these have at least managed to reach the discussion table. For a long time these issues were taboo and a deliberation on them was far from conceivable, leave alone possible. Since the North Korean missile tests in 1998 the Japanese public has come to accept the fact that war is an ever-present possibility even for a civilian power. It is this awareness that provides the ground on which the issues of constitutional revision and nuclearization is debated.

The other point is the degree to which public opinion is able to constrain Japan's foreign policy choices. Though the logic of two-level games as expounded by Putnam (1988) spells that political leaders will be constantly vigilant about public opinion, there have been instances when leaders like Koizumi have managed to trump the mood of the public without having to face dire political consequences. This highlights the importance of strong political leadership alongside public opinion among the set of domestic factors affecting Japanese foreign policy.

V. The Role of Individual Leadership: A case of the Koizumi Era (2001-2006)

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, there were a number of leaders who came to the helm of political affairs, but were unable to charter a decisive course of action for Japan or steer her in any particular direction. Some of them served their usual two-year period without any marked contribution, while others left even before completing their tenure. Thus it is seen that there was a quick succession of political leaders, each serving short, inconsequential terms, mainly representing the basic, static ideologies and beliefs of their respective political parties, without wavering much off the main course. Even if a spark of dynamism chanced to show up it was usually smothered by the lack of consensus among the political elite and opposition from the non-ruling parties. This is evident from Kaifu and subsequently Miyazawa's attempt to introduce the UN peace cooperation legislation in 1991 that would enable the SDF to assist the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf area. This reinforces what Schweller (2004) and Kliman (2006) have to say about the degree of divisiveness at the political level—

captured thorough variables like 'elite cohesion' and 'elite consensus'—having a bearing on the kind of foreign policy outcomes exhibited by a state. The greater the internal coherence among the political leaders, the more is the 'ability' to engage in balancing or even take bold political decisions that are a break from the past.

However, Samuels rightly points out that "a new security discourse has taken shape in the context of a new national leadership" (Samuels, 2006: 114). However, at the turn of the century, Japan witnessed a dynamic political leadership in the form of Junichiro Koizumi, who transcended all the constraints normally placed by domestic political divisiveness, and at times even overrode public opinion (though more often than not he enjoyed great popularity among the Japanese public). Koizumi was determined to make Japan's intent clear to the world rather than maintaining an untenable and wavering stance on international issues and national policy, especially on those pertaining to the security and defence of Japan. The longest serving Prime Minister that Japan had witnessed since the end of the Cold War, Junichiro Koizumi who came into office in 2001 and was in power till 2006, when he was succeeded by Abe Shinto, left an indelible impression on the face of Japanese politics in the post-Cold War era.

In 1991, Japan pledged billions of dollars to support the Gulf War but constitutional arguments prevented a participation in or support of actual war. Iran criticised Japan for just pledging money and didn't appreciate the way Japan co-operated in the Gulf War. Eager to change Japan's image from a 'reactive' state to a 'proactive' one, following the Iraq War, in 2003, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Cabinet approved a plan to send a total of about 1,000 soldiers of the Japan Self-Defense Forces to help in Iraq's reconstruction. This was the biggest overseas troop deployment since World War II without the sanction of the United Nations and was unprecedented in Japanese history since the end of WW-II. Political leaders in Japan have long been deliberating on the issue of overseas deployment of Japanese forces, and the conditions under which such acts are within the limits prescribed and proscribed by the constitution; whether Japan should operate under the command of the UN or is it permitted to be part of a 'collective security' operation; what is the geographical extent over which something qualifies as a 'threat' to the security of Japan therefore defining 'self-defence'. Koizumi realizing that time is of the essence and the need of the hour is to act effectively and immediately, and at the same time

aware of the winding process of getting the required legislation passed though both the Houses of Parliament, took a firm decision and in the face of all opposition and criticism from those outside as well as within his Liberal party, managed to get the legislation passed in a record time of 40 days (Shinoda, 2009). Even the 2001 anti-terrorism bill has a similar story to tell as the Koizumi government managed to quickly pass legislation with strong public support, overcoming resistance from the opposition parties.

Prime Minister Koizumi's strategy has been to attach Japan even more closely to the United States than in the past, while toying with the idea of bringing about an opening toward North Korea. Although Koizumi's foreign policy was focused on closer relations with the United States and UN-centered diplomacy, which were adopted by all of his predecessors, he went further to pursue supporting the U.S. policies in the "war on terrorism" (Samuels, 2007; Hughes, 2006). When meeting with President Bush on September 25, Koizumi reiterated that Japan would "make all possible contributions to the war on terror that do not require the use of armed force (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2001b) Moreover, he clarified the scope of Japan's assistance by proclaiming that Tokyo "will no longer hold that the Self-Defense Forces should not be sent to danger spots" (Cabinet Office, 2001). The latter comment clearly outdistanced the Diet and, for that matter, Koizumi's own cabinet (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2001a). Again, in 2003 he decided to deploy the Japan Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, which was the first military mission in active foreign war zones since the end of the World War II. As Cooney (2006) rightly notes, so far as U.S.-Japan bilateral relations are concerned, even though the ruling LDP and the MOFA have long been inclined to stick with the America security relationship; it was the special relationship shared by Koizumi and President Bush forged after 9/11 that has propelled Japan into maintaining and further strengthening the alliance[3]. Koizumi's government also introduced the landmark bill to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to ministry status. Finally, his efforts bore fruit a few years later when the Defense Agency became the Japanese Ministry of Defense on January 9, 2007.

Finally, Koizumi's leadership had a powerful impact on Japan's antiterrorism contribution. Although SDF dispatch might have occurred in his absence, the rapidity by which Tokyo deployed forces overseas is due to the prime minister's initiative.

[3] Former President Bill Clinton did not have this advantage since Japanese Prime Ministers during his tenure turned over at an almost annual rate (Cooney, 2006)

The 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law required nine months of debate, and Diet members considered the 1999 law on areas surrounding Japan for nearly one year. In contrast, lawmakers approved the antiterrorism bill in less than three weeks (Kliman, 2006: 87). The bill's swift passage should be directly attributed to Koizumi rather than his advisers.

Initially favourable, public opinion towards SDF dispatch rapidly soured as attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq became a daily occurrence. Thus, from late July to December 2003, approximately 55 percent of the Japanese public opposed contributing troops to Iraq. Over the same time period, supporters of SDF dispatch stood at about 33 percent of the population (Kliman, 2006). Thus it can be seen that Koizumi disregarded domestic sentiment by positioning his country in the pro-war camp. In February and March 2003, approximately 80 percent of the Japanese public opposed a U.S. attack on Iraq. Throughout the ensuing conflict, this proportion never fell below 60 percent (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2003). Yet, despite the risk of alienating his electorate, Koizumi remained one of Washington's most steadfast supporters. The prime minister chose to defy public opinion, explaining in his own words:

> "When asked which would you choose, war or peace, everybody naturally chooses peace. But when the government conducts the affairs of state in compliance with public opinion, it might make mistakes in some cases. History proves this."
>
> –Koizumi quoted in "Is the Prime Minister Turning His Back on the Public on the Iraq Issue?" *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 6, 2003.

The strength of Koizumi's resolve and his confidence in the popularity that he enjoyed among the Japanese public can be gauged from the fact that when he was unable to get the postal privatization bills passed in 2005, he dissolved the House of Representatives and called for snap elections. He also did not hesitate to expel rebel LDP members for not supporting the bill. The September 2005 elections were the LDP's largest victory since 1986, giving the party a large majority in the House of Representatives and nullifying opposing voices in the House of Councilors. In the following Diet session, the last to be held under Koizumi's government, the LDP passed 82 of its 91 proposed bills, including postal privatization.

Kliman (2006: 181) notes, "the Koizumi administration has demonstrated great skill in quietly redefining collective defence to expand the scope of U.S.-Japan security cooperation". Additionally, Koizumi may provide a model for his successors to emulate—be they from the LDP or DPJ. By championing controversial defence initiatives while retaining popular approval, Koizumi demonstrated that strong

leadership appeals to the Japanese public (Kliman, 2006). Moreover, unlike his predecessors, the current prime minister repeatedly defied popular opinion on security issues without lasting consequences. Thus, Koizumi may represent the forerunner of a new breed of Japanese executive shaping the future course of action for their country.

Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War period, Japan's defensive defence posture was predominantly defined by Yoshida's post-WW-II "pacifist" Constitution. In the new post-Cold War environment, however, some parts of that posture have changed while others have not. On one hand the antimilitarism that had characterized post-war Japan is gradually losing ground, while on the other there is no doubt that in the case of a global conflict, the public opinion still tends to favour non-military solutions such as diplomatic negotiations via the United Nations and conflict prevention through development assistance (Katzenstein, 2008: 19).

As far as the tussle between realism and neo-liberal institutionalism is concerned it is clear that the actual responses to the rise of international threats has not exactly been in line with the kind of outcomes predicted by realists, especially neorealists. But on the other hand, it is observed that neither international regimes nor domestic norms of anti-militarism have prevented Japan from acquiring a first rate, technologically equipped army (Lind, 2003; Cooney, 2006; Kliman, 2006). Japan has significantly been pushing forward its defensive and as alleged by some "potentially offensive" power-projection capabilities since the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines. Japan's ongoing military modernisation has thus not been halted by budgetary constraints or by political tribulations, and is set to continue in future to fully become a 'normal' nation. However, a counter-argument can be made based on the fact that Japan has over the years acquired the *ability* to balance, yet is not completely *willing* to balance. This speaks a lot for normative and institutional explanations of Japanese foreign policy behaviour.

Regionalization is becoming an increasingly important aspect of Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's security affairs. This claim has been supported by Katzenstein (2008) by showing the existence of a variety of formal and informal bilateral arrangements in Japan's security policy that in turn help generate different forms of incipient multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific. The increasing institutionalisation of

Japan, however—evident from the country's evolving regional and global military cooperation with the US, the UN and other international actors, which continues to push the JSDF towards enhanced power projection—leaves it in a peculiar kind of a quandary. Though more institutionalization should resonate with the claims of neo-liberal institutionalists, more often than not, Japan's attempt to upgrade its military to bring it in line with the requirements of its regional and global military commitments, has led many realists to make this observation corroborate with realist theory, wherein Japan is viewed as becoming a normal nation with enhanced power projection capabilities. On the other hand, Japanese policymakers argue that the acquisition of the capabilities outlined above does not breach the ban on the possession of power-projection capacity.

However, the point that the people who view Japan as shedding its normpolitik for realpolitik, overlook is the nuanced manner in which Japan has poised itself between acquiring hard power capabilities and manifesting "soft power" by using its constitution to constrain the use and purposes of its hard power. Yoshizaki (2009) argues that the SDF, which carries out international peace cooperation activities in a highly restrictive manner, has soft power that the militaries of other advanced countries hardly possess. Until now, the restricted activities of the SDF have solely been considered as a symbol of Japan not being a "normal nation" and have been criticized by those who argue for Japan becoming so by possessing a normal military which dispenses all the functions of a regular army.

IPCA however is not the only realm in which Japan is exhibiting its soft power. There is a growing popular pride in Japanese contributions to the international community in the form of Official Development Assistance or ODA. As one Diet member proudly proclaims, "Japanese ODA is the pillar of Japanese foreign policy, and Japan is number one in the world" (Yamamoto, 1998 in Cooney, 2006: 178). Of late the upper house of the Diet is taking increasing interest in ODA and has formed a sub-committee on ODA because ODA is Japan's most important 'foreign policy card' (Yamaguchi, 2004). In 2004, Japan announced that it plans to provide a total of $5 billion in aid to Iraq (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). From that amount, $1.5 billion of grant aid has been approved and aid has been provided in the areas of electricity, water and medicine, peace and security, and education. The aim of this aid is to rebuild the social infrastructure of the Iraqi people, and improve peace and security conditions. While the aid aims to provide basic services to the Iraqi people, it

leads directly to the reconstruction of industry which is essential for further development. Thus by appreciating the positive spiral between safety and affluence, Japan has realized that it is not enough to engage in IPCA and that the growth of industry is essential for long-term peace and stability (Yamaguchi, 2004).

On a concluding note, it can be inferred that Japan is becoming increasingly sensitive to international threats in the post-Cold War Era, however, the manner in which these threats are viewed by the Japanese preclude them from behaving in the same way as most nations similarly placed might have. This is not non-realist, just not structural realist. Whereas other nations fall back on traditional security to ensure themselves against the security dilemma, Japan seeks recourse in a broader concept of comprehensive security, because it realises that the security dilemma is not the sole threatening factor to Japanese national interests. International and more importantly regional security and stability is more important and Japan seeks to maintain this by way of a multi-pronged approach taking recourse to both bilateral and regional security arrangements, non-traditional security, and maintaining both hard as well as soft power, but projecting only the softer aspects of its hard power.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Introduction

In the post-Cold War period Japan's situation is undoubtedly different from what it was during the Cold War period, despite claims by some like Lindt (2006) that structural change has had less of an impact on Japanese foreign policy than is usually attributed to it. The structure of international politics and therefore the rules of the game had changed when bipolarity paved the way for unipolarity. With the end of the Cold War era Japan has become cognizant of its changing realities and the difficulties of having to match its post-WW-II legacies with post-Cold War realities. Japan has therefore revamped itself from a state where it allegedly had no foreign policy (Scalapino, 1977; Drifte, 1983) to one where it is increasingly making its intent clear to the world by taking on new and unprecedented global roles. As Kenneth Waltz puts it, "Japan is an example of a nation working very hard not to be a great power" (Waltz, 1999, cited in Cooney, 2007: 176). This has important implications as it suggests a change in Japan's ability and willingness to balance in the post-Cold War era, thereby necessitating a close look at the nature and direction of such changes. This would throw light on important aspects of Japanese foreign policy, currently under debate, for instance, the question of whether Japan has shifted from being a "reactive" state to a "proactive" one, whether she continues to make use of soft power and non-traditional security to protect herself from international threats, or has she reverted to the use of hard power in line with traditional realist security concerns.

At the end of the Cold War, Japan found herself at the crossroads where she could either continue on her previous path of pacifism and free-riding, or embark on the path of becoming a normal nation. Japan has however, done well to create new options for herself by retaining certain elements of its post-WW-II pacifist constitution while taking on a greater set of international responsibilities to do away with the stigma of being labelled as a 'free-rider'. In the post-Cold War set-up Japan

can no longer be accused of free-riding as after a long period of 'growing pains' when she was confused about her national role and identity and place in the world, she has finally evolved and carved a novel niche for herself. Noteworthy is the fact that while other countries concentrate on traditional ways to deal with the security dilemma, Japan for a number of reasons, has chosen an alternative path for herself by focussing on comprehensive security, with both hard and soft power options at her disposal to protect against international threats.

The verdict: Realism or Neo-liberal Institutionalism

The end of the Cold War shook Japan out of its complacency, as a lot that it earlier took for granted was up for change. The logic of structural realism, in particular its offensive variant, predicted that since U.S. was the sole, unbalanced power in the system, Japan would undergo a marked shift in its interaction with its ally from 'free-riding' to active balancing against it. It would also balance against other foreign threats like North Korea and the rising economic challenger—China. In order to facilitate this, it would need to do away with the constrains placed on it by Article Nine of its constitution, which would allow it to become a 'normal' nation with a regular army rather than a mere 'self-defence' force. Since realism advocates self-help rather than "other help" (Wendt, 1999: 300), Japan would also have to stop depending on the U.S. and develop its own nuclear deterrent. Other strands of realism like neoclassical and post-classical realism took into account factors operating at other levels of analysis, to predict two alternative outcomes: one where Japan is likely to continue free-riding the U.S. and not increase its military power; and the other where it is likely to increase its power but still remain closely aligned with the United States. Liberals on the other hand predicted that Japan will remain committed to pacifism as it continues to be involved in a web of international and national institutions, norms and regimes. Those highlighting the importance of domestic norms would predict that Japan will not increase its military power at all while those underlining Japan's regard for international norms would expect Japan to step up her contributions towards maintaining shared values like democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and preserving a stable international environment among others. These contributions despite requiring Japan to increase her military power would not, however, be tantamount to compromising Japanese pacifism. Internationally embedded norms are

manifest through Japan's continued bilateralism, and increasing multilateralism in the form of both Asianism as well as internationalism.

The post-Cold War "new security practices" adopted by Japan's leaders are difficult for structural realists to fathom or satisfactorily explain. Japan has not balanced against power, nor has it actively balanced against threats a la Waltz or Walt. Instead Japan has formed friendly strategic partnerships constructively with most of the major powers of the world. Offensive realism also fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of Japanese foreign policy behaviour. Firstly, as Samuels (2006) notes, Japan did not expand in history when it was strong. Secondly, Japan has not sought a conflictual settlement over disputed territory with regards to its border conflicts with neighbouring countries. Kliman (2006: 30-38) had laid out three scenarios for Japan: "autarky and remilitarization", "Britain of the East" and "regionalism to the fore"[1]. Current trends show that neither of them in totality is an accurate depiction of Japan's current national strategy. The absence of a fear of entrapment, a vigorous fear of abandonment and a complete rollback of normative constraints is a prerequisite for the "Britain of the East", which is yet to occur, even though Japan is showing potential signs of becoming a 'normal' nation. Despite incipient leanings towards Asianism, "regionalism to the fore," is disconnected from a world where U.S.-Japan security cooperation has reached an unprecedented level bearing testimony to the fact that Japan's defence strategy is increasingly global (rather then regional) in scope. Like the previous two scenarios, "autarky and remilitarization" also bears little resemblance to reality as Japanese leaders push for greater independence within, and not outside the bilateral alliance. Besides, institutionalized norms, though in many cases weakened, continue to limit Tokyo's strategic options.

Going back to the four scenarios[2] put forth by Inoguchi (1989), we see that in the post-Cold War period, Japan has definitely moved on from being a subordinate to the U.S. under the Pax Americanna-II scenario. However, despite making concerted efforts to becoming a 'normal' nation—which is interpreted by realists as a mark of 'normpolitik' increasingly giving way to 'realpolitik', while by liberal institutionalists

[1] Refer to Chapter 2, pp.
[2] Refer to Chapter 3, Section III

as appropriate internationalist behaviour[3]—Japan does not exhibit signs of a bid for hegemony, therefore precluding 'Pax Nipponica'. This leaves two scenarios: U.S. Japan 'bigemony' and 'Pax Consortis'. During the closing years of the previous century and the early years of the present one Japan seemed all geared for a scenario closely corroborating with 'bigemony'. Under President Koizumi, Japan and the U.S. closely collaborated on two counts—after the 2001 terrorist attacks and during the 2003 Gulf War. However, Japan under the present political leadership of the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) seeks to strengthen ties with her Asian neighbours and other countries of the world apart from the U.S. denoting a move towards a 'Pax Consortis' kind of a scenario.

Just like realism, on its own, liberal theory also encounters serious difficulties. Some analysts have suggested that the U.S.–Japan alliance can last only if it articulates common international norms and values. An alternative neoliberal analysis of the U.S.–Japan alliance however, focuses not only on shared values but on efficiency (Kahler 1995; Inoguchi and Stillman 1997). This reinforces the point about the erroneous linking of rationalist or interest-based actions with realism, while associating idealist or norm-based actions with liberalism. It is not always rationalist foundations that explain a realist turn in policy and it is not always just a commitment to a common set of international norms that underlies institutionalization of the kind witnessed between Japan and the U.S. The efficiency derived out of collaboration on things like information sharing to combat international terrorism, technology sharing to prevent against threats from ballistic missiles, joint exercise training are all instances of a more functionalist kind of an institutionalization between Japan and the U.S. where government policies are seeking to lower transaction costs and enhance efficiencies through institutionalized cooperation (Council on Foreign Relations Independent Study Group, 1998).

Some of the most important debates revolving around the basic features of Japanese foreign policy as it has evolved in the course of the post-Cold War period are summed up as follows.

[3] The examples of both participation in UNPKO and prompt payment of budgetary contributions to these institutions are embedded as 'normal' and appropriately internationalist behaviour (Hook et al., 2001).

A 'reactive' or 'proactive' state: There is no doubt that like any other state, Japan reacts to the occurrence of international events and changes in the structure of the international system. However, for many observers, Japan appears anomalous, if not aberrant or abnormal, in terms of its international behaviour (Hook et al., 2005). A key reason for this perception is the tendency for Japan to adopt a reactive stance in dealing with international affairs. Throughout the Cold War period Japan was portrayed as passive, risk-avoiding, and ineffective in conducting foreign policy (Calder, 1988).

Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction aid activities marked the transformation of Japanese foreign policy from a "reactive" to a "proactive" and "independent" one. The creation of policy for the SDF deployment to Iraq is clearly distinguished from that related to the UN PKO decision-making that had taken place previously. In the international peace cooperation activities until then, it was typical for Japan to take a more passive stance in deciding to participate in response to strong demands from the international community. However, shortly after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed Japan's desire to make a proactive contribution, which was an important landmark in the face of Japanese foreign policy. This shift cannot be attributed to any one factor but is rather an interplay of increased *gaiatsu*—usually U.S. pressure, the changing nature of foreign threats, changing domestic attitudes towards anti-militarism and strong leadership at the helm of affairs, all of which can be corroborated by evidences from Chapter 4. There has been a deliberation, however, over the relative importance of the factors behind Japan's initial reactive status. While Hughes (2008) argues that domestic factors continue to be of much greater importance in accounting for Japan being a reactive state, Calder suggests that the quintessence of the characterization of Japan as a reactive state, is not simply a response to international events and changes, but rather a lack of leadership in seeking to shape their outcome (Calder, 1988: 518). Yet again, to counter the claim that Japan usually acts at the behest of externally manifested *gaiatsu*, in the form of U.S. pressure, Cooney (2007) has demonstrated the "myth of *gaiatsu*" by emphasising mass attitudes and antimilitarist institutions in Japan as important barriers to changes in Japanese defence policy.

Actual evidence from the post-Cold War Era shows a bit of all three factors—*gaiatsu*, domestic public opinion, as well as role of individual leadership at work. To begin with, strong leadership at the hands of Koizumi signalled Japan's firm resolve

towards changing its stance from a reactive to a proactive state. The fact that he often defied public opinion in order to accommodate pressures from the U.S. however, have been interpreted by some like Arase to be a sign of the Japanese government's increasing alliance realism vis-à-vis the United States which has had "trumped the wisdom of the Japanese people" (Arase, 2007: 14). More evidence for this is provided by the fact that the oft-advanced antimilitarist norms have not prevented Japan from building a first-rate military[4]. The fact that Japan accomplished this feat, in spite of a constitutional ban on military forces and widespread public opposition, should, as Lind (2003) points out, cast doubt on the power of domestic norms relative to other factors in security policy.

However, it must be noted that the domestic anti-militarist norms themselves were undergoing a change in the post-Cold War period, especially after the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2003 Iraq War. Therefore a simplistic abdication of domestic factors for structural realist ones would be erroneous. Evidence from the previous chapter leads one to conclude that attempts to become a proactive state were not always against public opinion (as emphasised by realists, who favour the 'trumping' of domestic normpolitik for realpolitik, line of argument). Again, one has to closely look at Japanese politics to realize that public opinion during this period was itself majorly influenced by the manner of 'securitization' (Buzan, et al., 1998) engaged in by political leaders[5]. Leading newspapers as well as policy statements made by top-ranking political leaders can majorly influence and even swing the way in which the public perceives international pressures, foreign threats and therefore forms national preferences. For instance as can be seen from the Defense White Paper, 2008 data, the public did not have a very high opinion, nor was it much interested in the activities of the SDF till before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Prime Minister Koizumi's declaration of the 'war on terror' (Prime Minister's Speech, September 11, 2001). But all said and done, the Japanese public still exerts a certain degree of influence on foreign policy outcomes as the acceptance of the norm on the popular level acts as a powerful constraint on the government's use of military force as a legitimate instrument of state policy. The Japanese public is not very amenable to exploring

[4] It should be noted that the Japanese government's decision to support the U.S. military action in the absence of international consensus was met with strong disapproval among the Japanese public, who remained unconvinced that all peaceful means had been exhausted before the military action was taken.
[5] The term was coined by Ole Weaver (1998) to refer to a process by which a given subject that is not necessarily of objective essence for the survival of a given state can be successfully constructed into something like an existential problem, through speech acts.

nuclear options of securing itself, nor is it very eager to have Japan involving itself indiscriminately in activities like peacekeeping and humanitarian activities in far-flung places, unless they are of direct consequence and relevance to Japan's national interests.

Thus while many interpret Japan's movement from a reactive to a proactive state as being commensurate with realist predictions, they cannot afford to ignore that Japan is still not completely free from the shackles of domestic norms. Again going by the ways in which public opinion has changed as a result of different ways of "securitization" through "speech acts", it is clear that a purely structural realist lens cannot capture such nuances, necessitating one to invoke a neo-classical realist take on Japanese foreign policy dynamics. Yet again, as Hook (2005) points out, is the rather bizarre observation that realists notwithstanding, a number of internationalists too consider Japan's move towards becoming a 'normal' nation as reifying her commitments to international institutions and norms, like her desire to uphold commonly shared values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Thus there are two ways to interpret Japan's move towards becoming a normal nation. First is the replacement of domestic factors by structural factors in Japanese foreign policy-making, which is the argument advanced by structural realists. The other is the realization that the move from domestic to the structural level does not necessarily mark a shift from normpolitik to realpolitik, since the weakening of *domestic* norms has been compensated for by the strengthening of *international* norms.

Traditional or Non-Traditional Security: Until the Second World War, Japan attempted to gain influence in the international community through military means. Thereafter, for a period of approximately forty five years, it has closely abided by the Yoshida Doctrine, which sought to concentrate on economic affairs rather than military ones, as evident from the declaration to renounce the right to wage war, in Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. This national security strategy seemed to work out fine for Japan but only as long as the Cold War lasted. The end of the Cold War had changed the rules of the game, so Japan was compelled to revamp her security strategies. Ironically, it was observed that after having depended on non-traditional security for a greater part of the Cold War, when great power conflagrations were more likely; Japan increasingly adopted traditional measures to

ensure its security in the post-Cold War era—a point of time when most countries of the world were exploring non-traditional security options for the first time.

In 1996, the Council on Defense Affairs issued the "Higuchi Report," assessing the post-Cold War security environment in the Asia-Pacific, which discussed basic issues facing Japan's security policy and defence capabilities, and recommended a shift from a Cold War-oriented defence strategy to a multilateral security strategy. Taking account of the changing realities of the post-Cold War, the newest NDPG of Japan states that regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion has become less likely, the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other diverse contingencies are together posing what is viewed as "new threats" to international peace and security (Defense of Japan, White Paper, 2008: 324). Japan seeks to tackle these "new threats" through a three-pronged approach combining its own efforts along with the cooperation of allied nations and the international community. Thus given the new security environment, Japan will firstly develop close and intensified collaboration with the U.S. (under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as well as a host of newly developed institutions); secondly, seek to cooperate with other nations as well as being more closely involved in international and regional organizations; and thirdly affect domestic changes in her defence capabilities. Such a scheme focusing on both traditional and non-traditional security signals a defence strategy that can effectively deal with "new threats" as well as older fears of large-scale invasion.

Japan's return to a focus on traditional security is evident through *qualitative* rather than *quantitative* shifts in the composition and capabilities of the JSDF (as demonstrated in Chapter 4), some instances being the development of BMD systems and airborne refuelling capabilities, procurement of modern fighter planes such as the F-22 etc. On the other hand, the changing roles and missions of the SDF demonstrate the focus on non-traditional ways to ensure Japan's freedom by undertaking IPCA and extending ODA. This can be interpreted as follows: Japan seeks to ensure its security *traditionally* by increasing its military capabilities and thereby signalling its move towards becoming a 'normal' nation, while it seeks to engage in *non-traditional* security by closely collaborating with the U.S. and the international community at large, to uphold international norms like democracy, human rights etc. which are

deemed conducive to maintaining a peaceful and secure international environment, which is, in turn, in Japan's best national interests.

Thus we see that the realist focus on exclusively protecting national interests and the liberal focus on internationalism is fused, as Japan has realized that improving international security to ensure that "threats do not come to Japan" (National Defense Program Guideline, 2004), is as important as maintaining the national security environment. This scenario therefore, makes Japan stronger but not threatening, while at the same time affording new comprehensive security options.

Hard Power or Soft Power: In the 2004 Report on Security and Defense Capabilities prepared by Prime Minister's Koizumi's advisory group, its chairman specifically called on the nation to "make the best use of Japan's hard and soft power as a means to preserve peace and security". Affecting international outcomes predominantly through control over chief international economic and financial affairs was something that worked for Japan in the past. But owing to a number of reasons, most important among them being the changing realities of the post-Cold War; Japan found it necessary to revise its national roles and international image by altering the mix of hard and soft power strategies. The post-Cold War period also witnessed a change in the nature of the soft power exerted by Japan, from purely economic manoeuvres, to a kind of amalgam of hard and soft power.

The $13 billion Japanese contribution to the Gulf War crisis did not receive the approval of international society as it did not coincide with a contribution in personnel, such as troop deployments. Thus, Japan's "check book diplomacy" was rendered ineffective in the post-Cold War period. This was the moment when the Japanese diplomats and defence planners first began to seriously consider newer roles involving the use of defence forces for international peace keeping and peace building. In this endeavour Japan began to establish a visible SDF personnel presence for purposes of substantive humanitarian assistance and aid in post-conflict reconstruction but in a manner that does not violate its peace constitution. Although the legal limitations constrain what the SDF can do in Iraq, it does allow Japan to demonstrate a very important part of its soft power.

However, the point is that while Japan views this as a mere shift in the nature of its soft power, others have expressed their fears over the increasing roles and missions, as well as the enhanced capabilities of the JSDF as indicative of a shift from

the erstwhile use of soft power to an increasing and exclusive focus on hard power. Their fears are founded in the changing composition of Japanese defence budget from military procurement to an increasing outlay in military research and development, which are in a way camouflaged by Japan's claim of maintaining a 1% cap on defence spending. Also the changing interpretation of Article Nine of the Japanese constitution according to convenience and contingency makes Japan's neighbours extremely queasy. However, what they tend to overlook is the self-imposed limitations—a product of Japanese pacifism— that Japan has placed on its use of hard power, strictly restricting it to peaceful and defensive ends. Thus, while the decreasing aversion to adopting hard power might signal the movement towards becoming a normal nation, Japan still retains its unique identity by dint of the novel role that she is dispensing in the post-Cold War World.

Nevertheless, soft power as an instrument of policy has its limitations which are beginning to make themselves manifest the post-9/11 world, as Japan is being pressed to shore up its hard power, particularly in the context of its alliance with the United States. This presents the nation with a difficult task of finding an optimum balance between hard power and soft power in its security policy. Consequently, even over a longer time horizon, limiting the overseas use of armed force and the exercise of collective defence will represent an optimal trade-off between Japan's manifestation of hard and soft power. Other limitations to Japan's soft power are provided by the fact, as Katzenstein (2008) notes, that the nation has not fully come to terms with its record of foreign aggression in the 1930s, and this limits Japan's attraction to the international community, particularly to the Asian neighbours. In particular, Japan suffers from what Professor Tadafumi Ohtomo has aptly identified as the "wolf in sheep's clothing" problem, one that is endemic to states with a bad reputation. As he notes, it takes a very long period of good behaviour to overcome the distrust of other states, and Japan has not gone nearly far enough to merit the trust of its neighbours. It still has a very poor reputation in East Asia (Ohtomo, 2003 cited in Samuels, 2006: 121).

Reaction to foreign threats: balancing, free-riding or bandwagoning: After the Soviet Union disappeared, the most serious threat to Japanese security went with it. Apart from the "new threats" of international terrorism, the main foreign threats perceived by Japan in the post-Cold War period were, a rising China, a miscreant

regime in North Korea, and the possibility of abandonment by the United States. Japan responded to each of these threats with strategic agility. It responded to China by trying to establish strong economic ties with it through different regional fora. It responded to North Korea by alternating between warm and cold diplomatic initiatives. It responded to the possibility of abandonment by the United States by giving up free-riding and engaging in burden-sharing by forming what the Hatayoma government terms as "a close and equal Japan-US alliance" (Prime Ministerial Speech, 16 September 2009).

As far as 9/11, the Iraq War and threats from North Korea are concerned, counterfactual analysis reveals that Tokyo's defence policy falls somewhere short of strategic change. While a pure realist would predict a 'normal' Japan, that used the occurrence of these international occurrences, as a justification to its public, for effecting drastic changes in its foreign policy like complete abdication of Article Nine and the three Non-Nuclear Principles, one sees that such a reaction has not quite come forth. On the one hand, evidence from post-Cold War public surveys and examination of statements and policy documents by political elite shows that both groups are gradually adopting realpolitik attitudes toward national security, and that creeping realism has weakened the pacifist norms that traditionally constrained Japan's defence. However, on the other hand some observations continue to confound realism for instance the continuation of constitutional constraints on Japanese foreign policy despite considerably weakened domestic norms, Japan's reluctance to engage in outright balancing of either power (in the case of the U.S.) or threat (in the case of North Korea).

North Korea: With regards to North Korea, according to the theory of realism, Japan should have militarized and obtained nuclear weapons to deter the former from continuing its nuclear program. Under the circumstances, Japan should have been able to adopt the Rational Actor Model (Berger, 1998) of foreign policy formation. However, despite the fact that the Japanese government's decision to procure BMD systems is a direct response to the North Korean threat, Japan's foreign policy vis-à-vis this state is still essentially based on a Culturally Bond Actor Model, which not

only inhibits it from developing hard-core nuclear defences[6], but also explains the continuation of large sums of ODA disbursed to North Korea by Japan.

U.S.-Japan relations: As far as U.S.-Japan relations are concerned, Japan has as opposed to neorealist predictions failed to exhibit balancing behaviour towards the U.S. The basic reaction of Japanese policy-making agents and other political actors to the transformation in the structure of the international system has been to follow their traditional pattern of international relations by maintaining strong bilateral support for the dominant power of the day, the US. For Japan, the U.S. remains the principal provider of economic, political and security public goods (Islam, 1993: 326–31). In this sense, Japan in the post-Cold War world continues to act as a supporter of the US, as in the Cold War period (Inoguchi, 1988), and increasingly in the early twenty-first century. This is against structural realist predictions.

Again those who predicted that Japan would continue to free-ride post-Cold War would be disappointed. Japan cannot be said to be a free-rider any longer given its clear intent to step up its contributions to the Japan-U.S. alliance, in both quantitative as well as qualitative terms. Thus as Samuels (2007) notes, what was once a highly asymmetric arrangement, in which the United States was pledged to defend Japan but received no reciprocal commitment, is now one in which the raison d'être of the alliance has de facto already been transformed. However, despite the expanding roles and missions of the SDF evident from the case study undertaken in the previous chapter, some realists point to the effectively flat defence budgets of Japan since 1994 to make a case for continued 'cheap-riding realism'. But on the whole, the most outstanding feature of U.S.-Japan relations has been the increasing degrees of institutionalization between them as they collectively seek to further strengthen their post-WW-II alliance.

With regards to foreign threats therefore, Japan has realized that United Nations resolutions and economic/financial sanctions are the most effective diplomatic efforts against a military threat from North Korea; the establishment of good relationships with other Asian nations is vital for Japanese national interests; and that conducting an active Japanese foreign policy that secures it against threats old and new would be

[6] Lind (2003) points out that the Japanese government has not seriously considered developing nuclear weapons; for if this were the case, new power projection capabilities like cruise missiles and ICBMs—the tools of pre-emption and deterrence—should have accompanied missile defence.

possible in some bilateral and multilateral frameworks while in other cases Japan would have to make solely individual arrangements.

Conclusion

Japan is currently poised in a situation where she can choose between economic and military instruments, between hard and soft power, traditional and non-traditional security, balancing and bandwagoning, bilateralism or multilateralism owing to which some have remarked that she is in a "strategic halfway house" of sorts (Kliman, 2006: 53) while others have pointed out that she is partaking of what can be termed as the "goldilocks consensus" (Samuels, 2006: 115). It is no doubt true that from a foreign policy guided by a pacifist constitution, closely aligned to the Yoshida Doctrine, in the post-Cold War period Japan has managed to reach a position from where she can catapult herself to great military power status at any time that she deems right. Japan has sought to do so not only by gradually beginning to maintain a minimum degree of hard power and defence-related technological know-how, but also through the age old practice of reinterpreting its Constitution in its characteristic 'salami-slicing' or piecemeal fashion. This is what has given rise to apprehensions among many about the future course of Japanese foreign policy behaviour. Is this the transition phase before full-on military expansion and resumption of all the activities of a normal nation takes place or is it the new equilibrium defining Japan's unique international role and national identity that it has carved out for itself? Looking at recent trends and evidences at hand, however Japan does not seem to be poised for a bid to attain international or regional hegemony, but nor is she willing to tolerate anyone else bidding for the same. In order to ensure this she is increasing looking to work in conjunction with the international society of states, in accordance with international and regional norms and institutions[7].

After looking at the changing trends in different manifestations of Japan's foreign policy behaviour, it can be concluded that Japan in the post-Cold War era has in general exhibited *outcomes* that resemble those postulated by neo-liberal institutionalists, but which are essentially driven by a commitment to attain realist

[7] This is reminiscent of the "Pax Consortis" scenario laid out by Inoguchi (1989) in his article 'Four Scenarios for the Japanese Future".

goals. Japan has depended on the US-Japan Security Treaty and the United Nations as well as regional arrangements for its security needs. However, Japan's institutionalist approach to its foreign policy is not purely based on beliefs in institutionalism, but on a realistic assessment of the country's options as well. It has increasingly been pointed out how certain normative structures may at times serve as effective tools of a realpolitik defence strategy (Cooney, 2007; Hook et al., 2005). A case in point would be Japan's domestic anti-militarist norms which by placing limits on the extent to which Japan can engage in collective security ventures alongside the U.S., can protect Japan from getting dragged into unnecessary international conflicts. In other words normative constrains are a hedge against entrapment, a common feature of alliance politics. Going by the same logic then, the fact that Japan under the present political leadership of the DJP seeks to strengthen ties with her Asian neighbours and other countries of the world could be interpreted as a liberal institutionalist way of dealing with the realist fear of abandonment by the U.S. Thus, it is held that despite its robust bilateralism and incipient multilateralism, Japan is fundamentally practising a form of realism, even if it is not necessarily of the Waltzian variety.

This kind of an interpretation forges a link between and therefore reconciles realist and neo-liberal institutionalist explanations of Japanese foreign policy behaviour in the post-Cold War era. It must be appreciated, therefore that a single theory cannot, by itself, completely identify and explain all the processes and dynamics being analysed, not just in the case of Japanese foreign policy, but even on a more general note. One theory may be more convincing in explaining a particular outcome while another theory may have an equally good explanation for yet another aspect of the same phenomenon being analysed. This may be frustrating for those seeking a single, comprehensive meta-theory of international relations. As Wight says in his piece titled 'Why is there no International Theory?', no one theory can ever be proven correct, and it is the debate between them that is important as "truth is not an attribute of one tradition but of the dialogue between them" (Wight, 1966: 34). Japanese foreign policy is typically not well explained by the exclusive reliance on any single analytical perspective—be it realist, liberal, or constructivist as its security policies are neither shaped solely by power, interest, or identity but by their combination. Adequate understanding therefore requires as Katzenstein (2008: 262) puts it, "analytical eclecticism", rather than "strict parsimony". Such an approach

would bring out the futility of what Ole Weaver calls the "neo-neo debate" (Weaver, 1996: 149) while appreciating the fact that there still can be a relationship between idealism and pragmatism, norms and interests, rationalism and constructivism, and realism and institutionalism, in Japanese foreign policy and that these different conceptual approaches to international security can perhaps co-exist.

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