

**INTERPRETING NON-ALIGNMENT:
THE RATIONALIST- CONSTRUCTIVIST DEBATE**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Interpreting Non-alignment: The Rationalist-Constructivist Debate**” submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Introduction

For last two decades or so, questions dealing with the relevance of non-alignment have definitely been out of the academic as well as the policy debates dealing with the 'general line' of Indian foreign policy in the post cold war era. As C. Raja Mohan (2003) puts it, initial Indian reactions immediately after the cold war "were defensive and amounted to an insistence that the principle of non-alignment remain valid even after the end of the cold war." Whereas, "[i]n reality Indian diplomacy, throughout the 1990s, wrestled to come up with alternative ideas to non-alignment." Thereon he forcefully argues that, "[a]lthough India did not formally discard it, the contours of its future foreign policy would bear *no resemblance* to the idea of non-alignment, which had shaped its image in the world so definitely in the early decades of the Republic" (Emphasis added). Given this line of argument emphasizing the obsolete nature of non-alignment on one hand; and the recent debates about the issue of 'independent foreign policy' in the context of Indo-US nuclear deal on the other hand, it becomes important to revisit non-alignment.

There exists a substantial body of academic work dealing with non-alignment over the last four decades, to which both Indian as well as non-Indian scholars have abundantly contributed. This body of work can be divided into four broad streams. The first stream dealing with the 'conceptualization' of non-alignment mainly includes the works of K.P.Mishra (1977, 1981, and 1993) and a few others. The conceptualizations offered by this strand of scholars in the initial period were mainly aimed at 'rectifying' the misrepresentation of non-alignment, largely brought about by the western world by characterizing non-alignment as neutrality, isolationism, immorality, obsolescence, opportunism and so on. So these conceptualizations are often negative in nature (defining non-alignment as non neutrality, not isolationism, not opportunism, not passivity and so on). This is essentially aimed at defying the charges levied against non-alignment by the western audience and sometimes also to respond to the doubts or criticism raised within the domestic arena. These 'rescue' or 'recovery' efforts were definitely

important and much-needed, given the historical compulsions of alignment from both camps, supplemented with the misconceptions, confusion, hostility and suspicion prevailing in the international as well as the domestic sphere. Nonetheless, over time, they fell into a repetitive loop and could not bring fresh perspective to the understanding of non-alignment.

The second stream dealt with the trajectory of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with issues like development, disarmament, peace and so on. This stream, mainly characterized by the works of M.S. Rajan, (1965, 1986) along with few other scholars such as M.S.Rahman (1969) and Subrata Banerjee (1985), largely dealt with the issues of the criterion of membership of NAM, the agenda setting i.e. arriving at the common points of agreements among the member countries across the globe with distinct historical -cultural contexts, political-economical systems, critical assessment of the performance, relative success or failure and, later, the issues of relevance of NAM and so on.

The third stream dealt with the 'bilateral' aspect of non-alignment, especially looking at non-alignment from the point of view of other states like the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and of other regions like Arab world, Western Europe and so on (See; Imam 1981; Deshpande 1981; Bahadur 1981; Vivekananda 1981; Wolpin 1981; Agwani 1981; Chopra 1981). This stream relatively comes much later in time and their focus has largely been to locate non-alignment from various strategic, political, cognitive vantage points. The fourth stream looked at non-alignment from the points of view of strategy, diplomacy, security and international law (See; Kumar 1981; Mates 1981; Swaroop 1981; Muni 1981). This is more of a thematic juxtaposition of various dimensions of this complex concept.

Each of these streams has significantly contributed to the understanding of non-alignment in their own ways, yet, none of them has adequately focused upon 'explaining' this specific foreign policy framework adopted by India in theoretical terms, especially in terms of the theories of IR. There have been few exceptions such as J.W. Burton (1965), A.P. Rana (1967, 1976), V.T. Patil (1998) and Nand Lal (1998) who have tried to engage with 'non-alignment' in theoretical terms. Of

these, Rana has attempted to explain 'non-alignment' in Realist terms. He characterizes 'non-alignment' as a 'normative balance of power' which definitely does have power implications and which exercises 'balancing behavior by transcending it in order to protect not only the "notional" structure of the Westphalian state system, but also the physical roots of the state system itself, which have been fundamentally threatened since the invention of nuclear weapons.

One can also find echoes of this kind of formulations in M.J.N. Russett's (1977) and A. Appadorai's (1977) writings. Russett locates 'non-alignment' within a distinct Asian tradition of Realism (though he does not use the term Realism), in which there exists a tradition of using passive forms of power (like Gandhian non-co-operation). These passive forms of power do have an influence in terms of power distinct from their moral justification. On the other hand, Appadorai problematizes Russett's characterization of Asian civilization as One, unified civilization as being ahistorical as well as unscientific. He tries to locate 'non-alignment' outside the exclusive domain of 'Asian' or 'Indian' tradition into "universal history", where, according to him, one finds more cases of settlement of disputes through mediation and conciliation (which is what non-alignment does, according to him) than resorting to the use of force.

The limitation with each of these works is that they largely operate outside the mainstream IR discourse gradually developed over last three decades. This gap in the existing literature in IR in India in general and in the studies of foreign policy in particular is mainly due to, as put by Kanti Bajpai (2005), the prolonged aversion or apathy towards 'theory' in Indian IR. This aversion has been largely shaped by Indian IR scholars' negative bias towards theorizing as an irrelevant exercise for guiding policy formulation especially in a developing world and also due to suspicion towards theory as a 'neo-colonial trap'. This study has attempted to respond to this prolonged lacuna. After all, theories not just 'explain' but also in certain ways 'make' the world we are living in.

The theoretical engagement with non-alignment implies engagement, not only with the already existing body of works dealing with non-alignment, but also

with the broader thematic of the historical evolution of Indian foreign policy in general, of which the adoption of non-alignment by post independence India was a culmination. Within as well as outside the tradition of foreign policy studies, one can find a sizable amount of work being done in unearthing the civilisational, historical, philosophical, ideological, economical roots or origins of Indian foreign policy, either in the larger Asian tradition, ancient civilisational history of India (Power 1977; Rusett 1977) or/and in the Indian struggle for independence in general and the foreign policy of Indian National Congress in the particular (Prasad, Bisheshwar 1955; Prasad, Bimal 1960; Bandopadhaya 1977 and 2003; Brecher 1977;Chandra 1989). Scholars like Adda Bozeman (1958) had attempted to synthesize these two sources and also to point out the impact of ideational influences from the western world, like capitalism, Marxism, Liberalism and so on upon the trajectory of the evolution of Indian foreign policy.

The historical narratives dealing with the evolution of Indian foreign policy largely narrate the sequential shifts or developments within foreign policy thinking without analyzing or systematizing the causal as well as constitutive links between different versions of the same cultural heritage, the values-norms-philosophies guiding certain kinds of foreign policy behavior, the national identity which is being constructed and the strategic interests which are being identified, not just at the empirical, but also at the theoretical level. I shall propose to fill these important gaps and forge these invisible links by importing some valuable insights from critical perspectives on the narratives of (Indian) anti-colonial nationalisms, post colonial modernities from the vantage point of sub-altern studies, and post colonial theory in India especially by referring to the seminal works of Partha Chaterjee (1986) and Ashis Nandy (1980,1983, 1994).

We shall juxtapose the historical narratives of the evolution of Indian foreign policy with three of Jawaharlal Nehru's major works reflecting his understanding of world history, contemporary world politics and his (re)'discovery' of Indian identity -'*The glimpses of world history*' (1934), '*Autobiography*' (1936), '*Discovery of India*' (1946) as well as his foreign policy speeches titled '*India's Foreign Policy*' (1961) explaining as well as rationalizing

India's basic foreign policy positions. We shall also look at scholarly commentaries interpreting, evaluating and contextualizing historical, political, economic, and most importantly the foreign policy aspects of Nehru's thought (Das 1961; Nanda 1990, 1995; Ravindran 1980; Patil 1998; Lal 1998; Doctor 1994; Wiedemann 1998). These works, read with the larger historical narrative of the evolution of Indian foreign policy, can help us contextualize the policy of non-alignment, which is otherwise generally believed to be solely Nehru's brain child. In fact Nehru himself has often dismissed this claim by emphasizing non-alignment as a "...policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom and inherent in the circumstances of the world today" (Nehru 1961).

The theoretical engagement with non-alignment is, at one level, a straightforward explanation of a specific outcome i.e. the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India; at another level it is a complex explanatory account of the historical processes which culminate into the adoption of non-alignment. In the first case, the question we ask is: What explains post independent India's choice of remaining non-aligned than aligning with either of the power blocs? In the second case, the question we ask is: what made it possible for India to remain non-aligned, and how? The first question comes from a Rationalist framework, which seeks to explain a particular outcome with reference to the actor's beliefs and preferences. The second question comes from a Constructivist framework, which seeks to understand and also explain the historical processes of construction of an actor's identity and interests underlying the actor's behaviour.

There is a popular tendency among IR scholars to pose these two kinds of explanations, Rationalist and Constructivist, one against the other, drawing strict fault lines. The result is to consider these two explanations as mutually exclusive. The stalwarts in the field, like Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (1998) have hinted almost a decade ago that the 'Rationalist-Constructivist' debate is going to be 'the main axis of debate in the field of

International Relations (IR) in the coming years.’ Such antagonistic framing of ‘Rationalist-Constructivist’ debate, resulting in a ‘ghettoisation’ of the field of IR theory, has been a matter of serious concern for some Rationalist as well as Constructivist scholars. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, renowned Rationalist and Constructivist scholars respectively, have co-authored an essay entitled, *Rationalism v. Constructivism a Skeptical view* (2002). This essay not only problematises the commonly perceived fault lines between Rationalism and Constructivism but also opens up possibilities of meaningful dialogue between these two methodological approaches, which can *complement* each other and enrich our understanding of international politics. Hence, I find it theoretically interesting and significant to juxtapose the theoretical engagement with non-alignment with the ‘Rationalist-Constructivist’ debate. It can illuminate the inter-linkages between the actor’s beliefs and preferences as well as identity and interests, at the theoretical as well as empirical level. Given the open-ended possibilities of relationships between Rationalism and Constructivism, the nature of this study has been largely exploratory, and the methodology adopted has been broadly interpretivist.

The Rationalist interpretation of non-alignment broadly applies the ‘preference-strategy-outcome’ approach discussed in a volume titled *Strategic Choice in International relations*, edited by David Lake and Robert Powell (1999), which has, so far, been one of the most comprehensive and systematic attempts of relating the Rational Choice approach to the particularities of International Politics in general. Their appropriation of the strategic choice approach allows room for a ‘non-formal’, ‘verbalised’ Rationalist account which can transcend the standard materialist-egoist bias which is popularly associated with the Rationalist approach, by bringing the ideational as well as non-self regarding variables into play.

The Constructivist interpretation of non-alignment draws upon Ted Hopf’s (2002) work which attempts to reconstruct the state’s identity at the level of domestic society. His effort is to “domesticize” the social Constructivist approach to international politics, “to bring society back into social Constructivism -the

society within the states rather than *between* them” (xiv). Domestic-level Constructivism will enable us to engage with the particularities of history, culture, ideology, social systems and religion of states, which play an important role in the shaping world view and consequently, the foreign policy of those states.

The first chapter attempts to provide us with a general outline of the strategic setting of the adoption of non-alignment which consists of strategic environment (composed of possible actions and information structure) and the actor (composed of beliefs and preferences). The principal focus of the chapter will be upon the formation the actor’s beliefs and preferences as the decisive factor influencing the adoption of non-alignment. But the explanatory weight will be shared by both, the strategic environment as well as the actor’s beliefs and preferences.

The second chapter attempts to provide us with a broad account of India’s identity formation during its struggle for independence, mainly by locating three decisive ideational moments (identification, subversion, accommodation) in the construction of a particular kind of Indian Self, while interacting with the significant external as well as internal others. It will attempt to specify and elaborate upon particular Indian identities and interests, which constituted the adoption of non-alignment, while drawing upon Ted Hopf’s (2002) social cognitive approach.

The third chapter engages with the Rationalist-Constructivist debate. It elaborates upon the main fault lines of this debate and then compares the Rationalist and Constructivists explanations of non-alignment (discussed in the previous two chapters) in the light of these fault lines. While doing so, it seeks to problematise the formulation of the Rationalist-Constructivist divide as antagonistic and mutually exclusive, mainly in the light of the alternative formulation of the Rationalist-Constructivist relationship not as a divide, but as a conversation, as proposed by Fearon and Wendt (2002).

Chapter One: Non-alignment: A Rationalist Interpretation

After elaborating upon the broader rationale and purpose of this dissertation in the introduction, namely, ‘the need for theoretical engagement with non-alignment’ from the vantage point of mainstream IR theory and the significance of juxtaposing this theoretical engagement with ‘the Rationalist-Constructivist debate’, supposedly ‘the main axis of debate in the field of international relations (IR)’, as argued by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (1998); I shall proceed further in this chapter with the ‘Rationalist interpretation’ of the adoption of the general line of foreign policy by post- independence India, popularly known as ‘non-alignment’.

Apart from the larger significance of engaging with the ‘Rationalist-Constructivist’ debate, another added advantage of using a ‘Rationalist approach’ (which I shall also refer to interchangeably either as a Rational Choice or strategic choice approach during the course of this chapter) is the ‘analytical flexibility’ it offers. It does so by making the ‘strategic interaction’ of two or more actors the object of analysis (See; Lake and Powell 1999:7). In order to do this, it needs to assume two important things –firstly, the analytical separation of the ‘actors’ and their ‘strategic environment’ and secondly, the assumption of actors being ‘purposive’ i.e. that “they survey their environment and to the best of their ability, choose the strategy that best meets their subjectively defined goals” (Lake and Powell 1999:7).

These two underlying assumptions along with the choice of placing the ‘strategic interaction’ as the object or the unit of analysis automatically make a ‘Rationalist approach’ agnostic towards the appropriate level of analysis. This ‘agnosticism’ primarily stems from the ‘pragmatic’ view of the theory it takes. To state the obvious, the Rationalist or strategic choice approach is not a theory of international politics, but an approach or orientation. Theories are defined by particular sets of assumptions about human nature or a focus on certain variables, like technology or institutions. A Rationalist approach, not being a ‘theory’, is

relatively free to a large extent of such ontological and methodological commitments which tend to antagonize and ghettoize competing theoretical camps, makes any meaningful interaction or dialogue among them almost impossible. Thus the added analytical advantage offered by a Rationalist approach I am subscribing to, primarily because of the 'pragmatic' view of theory it adopts, very much complement the larger project of this dissertation i.e. exploring the possibility of a meaningful dialogue between the 'Rationalist' and the 'Constructivist' approaches, which are usually painted as mutually exclusive or rather irreconcilable antagonists. While discussing the analytical flexibility of this approach we have very briefly opened the discussion on its basic tenets or defining features. Yet the purpose of this chapter and that of my argument require in depth discussion of a Rationalist approach; firstly, to clarify certain popular misconceptions or preexisting biases around it, secondly, to briefly discuss the nature of sharing, overlaps of a Rationalist approach with other mainstream IR theories (especially Realism, with which it often tends to get conflated), to bring out the points of differences and departures, thirdly, to lay down the particularities of the conceptual experiment, I shall be undertaking in the second half of this chapter in order to interpret non-alignment through a Rationalist lens.

Defining features and common misconceptions regarding Rationalist approach

As Lake and Powell (1999:7) argue, by 'rational' most theories tend to mean that "actors can rank order the possible outcomes of known actions in a consistent manner – or more formally, that they possess complete and transitive preferences." This does not mean that the actors are fully informed or are 'human computers' or 'walking encyclopedias'. This approach bases itself on a minimalist assumption about the actors' cognitive abilities i.e. their being purposive. Besides, it also takes into account the possibilities of 'uncertainty' and 'incomplete' as well as 'imperfect' information involved (which is assumed to be costly to get) while

two or more than two ‘purposive’ actors are interacting in either ‘co-operative’ or ‘non-cooperative’ scenarios or games. (See; Harsanyi 1986:90-92)

John Elster’s definition of ‘Rationalist behaviour’, which re-iterates some points made by Lake and Powell, is more exhaustive and can serve as a “useful benchmark”, as argued by Kahler (1998:923). Elster’s (1986:4) definition includes three important elements –

The first element is the feasible set i.e. the set of all courses of action which (are rationally believed to) satisfy various logical, physical and economic constraints. The second is (a set of rational beliefs about) the causal structure of the situation which determines what course of action will lead to what outcomes. The third is a subjective ranking of the feasible alternatives, usually derived from a ranking of the outcomes to which (they are expected to) lead. To act rationally, then simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set.

Now if one carefully looks at Elster’s definition, one would realize that Rational Choice approach only has some very general substantive commitments. As Snidal (2002:75) argues, the focus on ‘goal seeking’ presumes that explanation should proceed in terms of relevant actors, the goals they seek and their ability to do so and lastly, some specification of constraints –which may be technological, institutional or arising from interdependence among actor’s choices. “Within and beyond this, Rational Choice is remarkably open to alternative specifications” (Snidal 2002:75). Apart from these three features, Snidal also mentions two broad methodological commitments. One is ‘simplification’ (the notion that good explanations are lean and minimize the assumptions made) and second is ‘generalization’ (through abstract concepts and models which transcend substantive problems). But Snidal further argues that in reality none of these commitments are logically entailed by or unique distinguishing features of a Rational Choice approach. Thus for Snidal, a Rational Choice is a methodological approach, rather a large family of approaches, that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints.

Clarifying the broad defining features of a Rationalist approach takes us to the second important task i.e. to clarify the popular misconceptions regarding a Rational Choice approach in mainstream IR discourse, especially the ones which have a direct bearing on our present discussion regarding non-alignment.

The first misconception is to believe that 'Rationalists' are only talking about material interest of a given actor. Fearon and Wendt (2002) assign this commonplace association of Rationalism and Materialism to the sociology of knowledge of how Rational Choice theory entered IR. As used in the IR context, 'Rationalism' refers to any work of drawing on the tradition of macroeconomic theory from Alfred Marshall to recent evolutionary game theory. Early in the 1960s, it was seen as a useful way of exploring the logic of nuclear deterrence and military strategy more generally. They further argue, that "[s]ince these intellectual enterprises were influenced by political Realism and Realism gives pride of place to material power in international politics, it was perhaps natural for Rationalism to acquire a materialist connotation" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:59). This 'natural' affinity to Materialism may have been "reinforced" by the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, in which "neo-Realism combined implicitly materialist definition of system structure with micro economic analogies for thinking about the logic of anarchy" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:59). Though Waltz does not explicitly argue that 'ideas don't matter' but at the same time equates the international systemic structure with the distribution of material capabilities, which according to him is the 'determining' or 'decisive' factor in shaping state behaviour. Thus, a kind of "disciplinary hegemony" of Rationalist Realists, as perceived by the Constructivists and the Postmodern critics, which these critics failed to disentangle, led to a further reinforcement of this misconception i.e. of Rationalism being equal to Materialism.

On the other hand, Fearon and Wendt (2002:59) interpret Rationalist explanations as "intentional" explanations. It means they explain the action as the "sum of the (actor's) desire and belief", (the second element in Elster's definition discussed in the last section also emphasizes the same thing). Thus, at the core of

Rationalist explanation, ideas (beliefs and desires) play not a secondary but crucial role. Moreover at the level of social interaction (the interaction between two or more actors), game theory typically explains aggregate outcomes by referring to the concept of 'equilibrium', which broadly means every player's strategy is the best response to all other players' strategies, which are "made up of patterns or structures of beliefs that satisfy various stability properties" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:59). So when Rationalist explanation tends to downplay ideas, for Fearon and Wendt, it is a function of Materialism rather than that of Rationalism. Referring to John Ferjohn's distinction between 'thin' and 'thick' Rationalist explanations, they argue that 'thin' Rationalist explanations which assume the simple instrumental rationality, following the logic of 'intentional' explanations as discussed above, say nothing about the content of desires or beliefs. Thus, to say that 'maximization of self-interest' leads to a particular kind of action is enough for 'thin' Rationalist explanations, while the 'thick' explanations add assumptions about the content of desires and beliefs. Thus it makes sense to look at Rationalism as consisting of 'materialist Rationalism' and 'idealist Rationalism' than placing 'ideas' and 'Rationalism' against each other.

The second misconception about Rationalism is to conveniently equate 'rational actor' with 'homo economicus' which implies that actors are only engaged in 'self' regarding behaviour. Thus, they are only concerned with 'maximising' self-interest. But this may be true in case of 'thin' Rationalist accounts which prefer to keep mum about the content of the desires and beliefs of actors, which in turn shape their respective conceptions of self-interest. Fearon and Wendt (2002:61) argue that actors (conceived in a 'thick' Rationalist way) can go beyond a narrowly defined 'self' interest and can act out non-selfish and other-regarding or collective behaviour interests, either because they believe (belief) that such other-regarding behaviour is 'useful' to further their 'self' interest or because such behaviour is seen by the respective actors as possessing intrinsic worth (i.e. being ends in themselves) (desire).

Fearon and Wendt argue that such other-regarding behaviour, in order to become the actor's desire, needs to be 'internalized' by the actors over a period of

time and needs to be made an integral part of its conception of 'self'. Then such other-regarding behaviour (or, to use Constructivist vocabulary, norm-driven behavior, broadly following the logic of appropriateness than just the logic of consequence) would be driven by perceived obligatory force and can go beyond the logic of 'usefulness', shaped by actor's 'belief'. Besides, there is no need to think that the other-regarding behaviour would always be either driven by self-interest or arising out of a perceived sense of obligation. Different actors may vary in the extent to which they have internalized a given obligation (or norm) and the same actor may vary in the extent to which it has internalized different kinds of obligations (or norms). Thus instead of arriving at any apriori judgment, it would be theoretically interesting as well as challenging to identify the conditions under which each hypothesis holds (See; Fearon and Wendt 2002:61).

The third major misconception is to believe that Rationalist explanations have to necessarily assume actors' preferences as being 'exogenously given', in order to explain the actors' behaviour or particular choices, without problematising or endogenising the actors themselves. It is true that it tends to treat actors' preferences as 'given' without asking from where they came (i.e. causal explanation) or what system of beliefs and practices have created or defined it (i.e. constitutive explanation). Fearon and Wendt (2002:64) argue that the 'choice' of exogenous preferences (which are in turn held constant) can be purely treated as analytical claim than a substantive claim about the nature of the world. They refer to Jeffery Legro's (1996:119) use of dance metaphor named 'two step', in which the first step is to explain preferences and the second is to explain behaviour (i.e. actor's choices). They argue that it is perfectly legitimate to engage with the latter while holding the former constant. Another way of resolving this misconception is to look at Rational Choice approach as having a nature of 'boxes within boxes' or 'brackets within brackets'. In which, for one round of explanation i.e. in a given bracket or box, the preferences are held constant, purely for analytical purposes, in order to explain a particular choice made by the given actor. Then for the next round of explanation, one can open the earlier 'given' box or bracket and look at the preferences (which were held

constant) in it as 'choices' or 'outcomes' to be explained in this particular box or bracket. (See; Lake and Powell 1999:15-17)

The next two misconceptions, to be discussed, are interlinked with the earlier one (i.e. the necessity of assuming preferences as 'given' without problematizing them) and also with one another. First is to assume that Rationalist explanations can only be 'causal' explanations. The second one is to conflate Rationalism with 'methodological individualism' .i.e. the belief that Rationalist explanations can explain wholes only in terms of the actions of the parts, the explanations which move only from micro to macro and have no separate account of how the macro level phenomenon such as 'social structures' impinge on individual actors. The answer to both these misconceptions can be given by emphasizing the centrality of the equilibrium analysis in Rationalist theory (See; Fearon and Wendt 2002:65-67; Lake and Powell 1999:32; Snidal 2002:76). In a strategic interaction, involving two or more actors, there is always a 'co-ordination problem'. In such a case, one's optimal choice (or the best strategy) depends upon how others choose and how some patterns of choice are better for all (i.e. the equilibrium point). In this case there are two structures (wholes) affecting actors' behaviour or choice – one is 'exogenous' and the other is 'endogenous'. The 'exogenous' structure is generated in a sense by the physical constraints (i.e. the unaffordable costs any actor has to pay for not going for the optimal choice) which prevent an actor from going for any other choice than the optimal one. The 'endogenous' structure is generated or rather mutually constituted by every actor's beliefs (or expectations) about what every other actor should do. Every actor wants all the others to opt for 'optimal choice for all' (i.e. the equilibrium point). This collective belief about the optimal choice is not determined or caused by material conditions but is mutually constituted by all the other actors. This makes it clear that Rationalist explanations can neither be conflated with methodological individualism nor with only causal explanations.

Dealing with all these misconceptions brings us to the last one, which is purely methodological in nature. It is to conflate Rationalist approach with scienticism and formalization. On the other hand one does not need to consider

'formalization' as a necessary feature of Rational Choice, simply because formal models are after all arguments which can be readily 'verbalised' or translated into relatively more comprehensible, ordinary language terms (See Fearon and Wendt 2000:55; Snidal 2002:77). Fearon and Wendt (2002:55) criticize some users of formal models for presenting them as if "they were magic boxes", in which assumptions go in at one end and from the other end hypothesis and results come out without little or no attention paid to explaining what is happening in between. They argue that the appearance of mathematics and symbols make many scholars (not very familiar with Rational Choice) believe that Rationalism wants to erase the fundamental difference between natural science and social science by uplifting the latter to the level of theoretical physics. Snidal (2002) does not deny that many advances and important developments in the Rational Choice approach have been generated or significantly improved by formalization, yet he argues that non-mathematical approaches have been equally important in the development of theory and its application to specific problems. He cites notable examples from both Rational Choice political economists such as Adam Smith, David Hume along with traditional as well as contemporary IR theorists such as Hans Morgenthau, Robert Keohane, David Lake, Kenneth Oye and so on, who did not invoke mathematics or formal models. Then he gives the apt example of PD (Prisoner's Dilemma) which has now become such an integral part of IR's theoretical vocabulary, especially as a 'metaphor' for international anarchy, demonstrates its power as a soft theory. Rationalism has Materialist and Idealist selves as argued before. Similarly it also has formal and non-formal selves, which are complementary in nature than being mutually exclusive.

The discussions regarding the basic tenets of Rational Choice approach and subsequently the essential clarification of some common misconceptions regarding this approach leads us to the next step of our discussion, which is to lay down the particularities of the conceptual experiment I shall be undertaking in order to interpret non-alignment in Rationalist terms. Here I shall largely follow the 'preference-strategy-outcome' approach discussed in a volume titled *Strategic Choice in International relations*, edited by David Lake and Robert Powell (1999)

(to which I have already referred earlier in this chapter). It has so far been one of the most comprehensive and systematic attempts of relating Rational Choice approach to particularities of International Politics in general. Their appropriation of 'strategic choice' approach allows room for a non-formal, verbalised Rationalist account which can transcend the standard materialist-egoist bias which is popularly associated with Rationalist approach by bringing the ideational as well as non-self regarding variables into play. Thus, it would be useful to discuss the particularities of their version of 'strategic choice' approach in the light of the discussion in the previous section about the common misconceptions surrounding the Rationalist approach in general.

Strategic Choice approach

At the outset, I would like to clarify that the co-editors as well as the authors of the edited volume, *Strategic Choice in International relations*, have provided us with a set of definitions, guidelines, insights regarding the application of strategic choice in International relations, and not an approach as such. For the sake of analytical coherence I am grouping their guidelines and insights under one heading and labeling them as the 'strategic choice' approach.

The strategic choice approach bases its explanation on the analytical separation of 'actors' and 'environments'. This separation is assumed purely for an analytical purpose and from a pragmatic view of theory without making any substantive claims about the nature of reality. Out of these two analytically separable components of this approach, strategic environments are said to be composed of two attributes: the possible 'actions available to actors' and the 'information structure' that defines what the actors can know for sure and what they have to infer if possible from the behaviour of the others. Actors, the second principal analytical component of this approach, are again said to be composed of two attributes. Firstly, preferences, defined simply as how they rank the possible outcomes defined by their environment, which simply means the possible outcomes preferred by actors over the other available ones. Secondly, the actor's

prior beliefs about the preferences of others. It is a kind of probabilistic assessment of the 'type' or nature of the other actors and their respective beliefs as well as strategies. For example, in international politics, states have to guess whether the other state is 'status-quoist' or 'revisionist', 'risk-averse' or 'risk-acceptant' etc. Thus, environments disaggregated into a set of actions and an information structure and actors, decomposed into preferences and beliefs, together form a 'strategic setting'. For analytical purposes it is assumed that available actions, information structure, preferences and beliefs can vary independently from one another and strategic choice analysis can seek to deduce and identify their respective effects on actor's strategic behaviour.

Jeffrey Frieden (1999:41-53), elaborating upon the 'actor' side of the analysis discusses the relations between preferences, strategies and outcomes. Frieden defines 'strategy' as tools an actor uses "to get as close to its preferences as possible" (45). Strategies are particular means to relatively general ends. In any given strategic setting, preferences are fixed (for one round of analysis or within a give box as discussed in the last section) and strategies are derived from the preferences. Given the empirical 'unobservability' of preferences, it is never inherently obvious, whether actors' behaviour is the result of preferences or strategies or the environment in which they play themselves out.

This leads to what Frieden calls 'sins of confusion' i.e. to confuse actor's 'preferences' either with the 'strategic setting' or with its 'strategies'. While discussing this point he interestingly refers to one of "the oldest and the least fruitful debates" in international relations between the 'offensive' and the 'defensive' Realist approaches, i.e. what do states 'prefer'- Maximization of power, or probability of survival? Frieden's argument sees this debate in an interesting new light (Frieden 1999:49). He argues that both the approaches are "positional" and somewhat "analogous to maximizing relative gains". So he asks us to keep aside the differences between these approaches for a while and to focus upon this sameness. Viewed from Frieden's point of view, both the approaches seem to suggest that "desire for power is an actual preference of states". But the implication of such an assumption makes states value power for its own sake and

to subjugate all the other goals to power, irrespective of the setting. This, as even Frieden argues, is certainly not what most Realists have in mind. In fact Realists often make explicit that it is the international system that forces states to maximize power or survival probability. If so, power maximization does not remain a preference (i.e. the most desired outcome) but comes out as a strategy (i.e. the tool to get closer to the most desired outcome). If 'desire for power' is the strategy of states, then what, according to Realists, is the states' preference? Frieden argues that most Realists don't specify the states' preferences clearly, which according to him makes their analyses inherently incomplete.

Considering the centrality of knowing actor's preferences in strategic choice analysis, it is fair to argue that, not knowing and in turn specifying them would make the analysis inherently incomplete. But as mentioned earlier, the preferences are unobservable. So how does one obtain knowledge of these preferences? Frieden introduces us with three different yet not mutually exclusive ways of determining actor's preferences – by 'assumption', by 'observation' and by 'deduction'.

'Assumption', the easiest of the three, according to him, can proceed by believing certain things without looking out for their proof, like to assume that 'states prefer to maximize wealth, territory, resources or national welfare', without actually looking out for proof. It is the method most similar to the one used in economics, where it is typically assumed that individuals and firms are wealth (or profit) maximizers. Though most economists accept that this is not an accurate description of reality, still they accept it as a useful method for economic analysis. On the other hand Frieden provides three characteristics of the study of international relations which make the simple assumption of states' preferences more difficult and less unproblematic than the assumption of preferences in economics. Firstly, in international politics there is a great *variation of cast of characters* i.e. there are different kinds of actors (like individuals, ethnic groups, nation states, international organizations, transnational firms, terrorist groups etc.) which makes it difficult to assume similar or even analogous preferences like one does in economics in case of individuals and firms, to assume them to be wealth

and profit maximizers respectively. Secondly, international relations as a field of study or discipline “lacks economics-like consensus” regarding the content of the ‘purposiveness’ of its actors, even though it assumes actors to be purposive on Rationalist lines. Thirdly, the ‘multiplicity as well as complexity’ of issue areas to be analysed or studied ranging from trade, defense, immigration to human rights, terrorism, environmental issues, ethnic conflicts etc. makes it difficult in the study of international politics to assume ‘non-trivial’ preferences which can prove to be analytically useful across the issue areas, as these issue areas tend to become non-comparable beyond a point. Thus for students of international relations, it makes more sense to be more attentive towards actors’ preferences especially while dealing with complex, multi-dimensional strategic interactions involving different kinds of actors (See; Frieden 1999:54-57).

‘Observation’ (which is sometime also called ‘induction’) implies determination of national preferences by investigating the country’s behaviour. It is typically done by studying statements and actions of the nation and its policymakers or by tracing national preferences more narrowly to the ideological perspectives of the national elites or by focusing upon the sub-national interests (i.e. groups, parties, bureaucracies) whose interests dominate the formation of national preferences or by focusing upon a particular temporary political conditions (like famine, war, partition) which can have direct bearing upon the formation of preferences. Observation, as a method, too, has its problems. As per Frieden there are primarily three ‘risks’ involved in it. Firstly, one can confound the actor’s preferences with its effects or behaviour. Secondly, the actor’s behaviour includes both its underlying preferences and its strategic responses to the setting it faces which are difficult to separate by observation alone. Thirdly, it can be “egregious” and “tautological” to induce preferences from observed behaviour and then using the same preferences to explain this very behaviour. Yet, Frieden argues that these risks don’t make observation useless or futile. In fact, according to him, in many instances, it may be “the best research strategy available” (60).

'Deduction' implies determining actor's preference on the basis of pre-existing theories. One applies pre-existing theories to identifiable characteristics of the actor and the environment in order to derive the anticipated preferences of different actors. To quote some examples given by Frieden, the smaller the country, the more favourable it is to trade liberalization; the more negative the country's trade balance, the more favourable it is to trade protection, etc. Frieden argues that this sort of comparative static exercise, using actor's features and the context to derive their preferences on the basis of theory is analytically valuable. He mentions that due to its reliance on prior theories of incidence of economic policies, international political economy does have the best developed 'theories of preferences', regarding foreign direct investment, immigration, financial liberalization and so on. He also cites examples from other areas of international relations generating important work in this regard. Like among realist theorists, John Mearscheimer associates military bureaucracies with a desire for decisive victories while Bary Posen associates them with a preference for the offense. But in many cases however, the national preferences don't emerge seamlessly from existing theories. Especially in order to deal with the issue of 'aggregation' of preferences (i.e. while moving from the preferences of sub national groups like parties, bureaucracies etc. to national preferences) one requires a complementary theory. The higher the level of aggregation, the more complicated the derivation of the "collective preferences". Yet while using pre-existing theories of individual and group preferences, one has to keep in mind that the deduced or derived preferences can only be as good or as valid as the pre-existing theories. Besides Frieden warns that many a time such pre-existing theories of preferences may not serve as "ready made tool box for all purposes" (65). Then the analyst has to provide his own prior theory of preferences, possibly by referring to some roughly similar problem. But as Frieden argues, it doubles the task and similarly "doubles the likelihood that others will disagree" (65).

After an elaborate discussion of the methods of determination of actors' preferences, let me go back to the broader picture of 'strategic choice' approach from where we started our discussion. As we have discussed in the beginning of

this section, 'strategic environment' (composed of possible actions and information structure) and 'actor' (composed of beliefs and preferences) together form the 'strategic setting'. Considering 'environment' and 'actor' to be our broader and analytically separable variables, Lake and Powell (1999:11-13) suggests two possible conceptual experiments. The first varies the properties of the actors i.e. their preference or beliefs, while holding the environment in which they interact constant. For example, if one were to ask what the effects of the changes preferences of post Stalin Russia on the cold war would be, or on the super power rivalry in general? If one argues that the 'changed' preferences of post-Stalin Russia had a direct bearing or was an important cause of 'détente', then one is indulging in a conceptual experiment of the first kind. The second experiment varies the environment while holding the attributes of the actor constant. As an example Frieden discusses Neo-realist position, especially held by Waltz (1979) and Mearscheimer (1990), which argues that 'bi-polarity' tend to be more transparent than multi-polar systems. Thus if one argues that a change in the 'environment' (from multi-polar to bi-polar system) causes variations in the available actions and information available to actors while holding their preferences and beliefs constant, then one is indulging in the second kind of conceptual experiment.

In this chapter I shall be broadly indulging in the conceptual experiment of the 'first' kind by placing the explanatory weight upon the actor's preferences as well as beliefs and by holding the strategic environment relatively constant. Even so, it is not completely the conceptual experiment of the first kind, as the adoption of 'non-alignment' as a general line of foreign policy coincides with the birth of post-independent India, one wouldn't get to see a shift in certain earlier beliefs and preferences (the way we discussed in case of pre-Stalin and post-Stalin Russia) as a decisive casual factor in the adoption of 'non-alignment'. So, instead of the shift in actor's preferences and beliefs, our focus would be upon their 'formation', coming into existence of particular beliefs and preferences (and also strategies) as the decisive causal factor in the adoption of 'non-alignment.' Yet, as Frieden (1999:74) argues, for a clearer statement of the problem "to generate less

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heat and more light”, I shall also prefer to look at the outcome i.e. the adoption of the policy of ‘non-alignment’ by post-independence India as a result of the ‘interaction’ of actor (beliefs and preferences) and strategic environment (information structure and available actions).

Before moving on with the further discussion regarding the adoption of ‘non-alignment’, it is necessary to specify the scope or the limits of the present inquiry. Firstly, the Rationalist interpretation of non-alignment is particularly limited to the adoption of ‘non-alignment’ as a general line of foreign policy by post-independent India and not about the international movement Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as it went on to become later on in 1960s. The period chosen for the present inquiry is broadly from 1946 to 1955. The logic of the periodisation mainly lies in the fact that this was the period when ‘non-alignment’ as a general line of foreign policy emerged, formulated, contested, evolved, regularized, advanced; eventually to gain international recognition, legitimacy and support (See; Malik 1967). Of course, subsequently, it matured and metamorphosed to become a huge platform for coordinating foreign policies of newly independent Afro-Asian and Latin American states. India played a crucial role in initiating and leading NAM along with Egypt and Yugoslavia. For analytical purposes it makes sense to focus upon the adoption of ‘non-alignment’ only in relation to India, one of its earliest champions and experimenters. The period between 1946 -when it was initially announced by Jawaharlal Nehru (without using this term ‘non-alignment’)- till roughly around 1955 when the international community experienced and recognized the value of non-alignment, especially during the Korean Crisis; marks the first full circle in the life cycle of non-alignment. Thus, though the first announcement of non-alignment came in 1946, I look at the period from 1946 to 1955 as one single event of its ‘adoption’.

In the chosen period the policy of non-alignment not only guided or led to certain specific decisions and foreign policy actions but also as Rana (1976:3) argues these specific decisions and actions in turn “contributed to defining and establishing it”. So clearly this chosen period has been a period of constant evolution, defining and redefining of this general line of foreign policy named

'non-alignment'. Yet, purely for analytical purposes, one will have to treat the adoption of non-alignment as one single, relatively static choice made by Indian policy makers; by defocusing the numerous sub-choices it consisted of and also the shifts and turns in it. It makes sense to do so, because being a general line of foreign policy, it operated as the "unifying and overriding strategic imperative" connecting the 'area' (for eg. policies for Far Eastern, European, Middle Eastern regions etc.) as well as 'functional' (for eg. military, economic, immigration etc.) policies of all priorities and for both the short and the long run (See, Wilkinson 1969:17-18). Following the same logic, unlike most of other Rationalist accounts, instead of focusing upon one particular episode of strategic interaction involving limited actors, this study shall focus upon the adoption of this 'unifying and overriding strategic imperative' as one single choice, event or episode involving numerous actors and activities. Again for analytical purposes, this study shall assume certain key actors and sets of actors (such as the super powers- The United States and The Soviet Union, cold war pacts- NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad and Warsaw pacts, Newly Independent Afro-Asian states, Pakistan and China) which are contextually more important and have a direct bearing on our discussion regarding India's adoption of 'non-alignment'. This analytical move automatically limits the scope of this inquiry, giving us a relatively tighter plot with only the essential cast of characters methodologically necessary for Rationalist inquiry, which largely bases itself upon relative abstraction and simplification.

Strategic Environment and *Non-compliance*

If one were to describe the strategic environment in the context of the adoption of non-alignment in a single expression or phrase, one wouldn't find a better expression than that by Michael Mandelbaum (1981:66), who calls it's a 'nuclear, managed balance of power of system'. For Mandelbaum, 'balance of power' is not defined by the 'composition' (i.e. the distribution of capabilities) of the international system but is a 'condition'. For him, condition is a 'behavioral

attribute' and not a 'formal' one. This condition of international system was shaped by the 'nuclear revolution'.

He uses an analogy with the market to illustrate the effect of the nuclear revolution on the balance of power. In eighteenth century Adam Smith's *laissez faire* market, with its invisible hand was believed to be the favoured instrument of achieving equilibrium. Similarly, in the eighteenth century, war was seen as the 'favoured instrument' of achieving the balance of power. Later in the nineteenth century the military revolution (which he calls as 'Napoleonic revolution') made general wars as well as the unfettered workings of the balance of power "too costly to permit" (55). So unlike the eighteenth century 'natural balance of power system', the nineteenth and twentieth century balance of power systems needed to be 'managed' (like the Keynesian 'managed economies'). The favoured instrument of achieving the balance of power could no longer be the 'unaffordable war' but diplomacy. The possibility of nuclear option leading to mutual annihilation, in a way, compelled the two great powers to exercise limited diplomatic intervention like the limited governmental intervention in the economy, as prescribed by Keynes to prevent the cyclical bursts.

While comparing the post 1945 'managed balance of power of system' with the post 1815 one (which could be materialized after the Britain, Prussia and Russia- the victors finally overcame Napoleon), Mandelbaum argues that in each case the victors had four possible options or choices before them to restore the order of international system. The four options are – first, the *laissez faire* balance; second, managed balance of power system; third, collective security system; fourth, world government. Yet in each case, the victorious powers "dreamt of the fourth way, aimed for the third and achieved the second" (Mandelbaum 1981:60). But interestingly, in neither of these cases the international system returned to the wholly decentralized pattern of the eighteenth century. He points out two major similarities in each of these systems. Firstly, war and common enemy (Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany) knit both coalitions together and in both the cases once peace came both fell apart. The historical as well as political reasons for both the coalitions falling apart in each of

the cases are multiple and different from each other as well as are contested. But the result in both the cases was broadly speaking the same, a 'managed balance of power system', which Mandelbaum calls a kind of "failed version of collective security" in each of these cases (1981:65).¹

Apart from these broad similarities the differences are also historically as well as analytically crucial. The second system born out of a 'nuclear revolution', opening up irreversibly an unprecedented possibility of mutual annihilation, making the future systemic war not just costly but almost unthinkable or rather impossible. Thus the post 1945 post Hiroshima system was not just a managed but a 'managed nuclear system'.

The second crucial difference is the number of great powers which emerged out of the war. In case of post 1815, the system was a managed balance of power system, but was managed by four great powers (Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia) i.e. multi-polar system whereas in case of post Hiroshima, the system was managed by only two great powers i.e. bipolar system.

Thus in spite of a similar beginning the post 1815 and 1945 system went on to two different tracks. The former turned out in to a '(non-nuclear), multipolar, managed balance of power system', while the latter in to a 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system'. Thus the two differences (non-nuclear/nuclear, multi/bi polar) in these systems make the former more war prone while the later relatively less or very little war prone. Because in multi-polar systems, especially non-nuclear ones, there is a greater uncertainty about whom the opponent is and also about its intentions, which can lead to greater miscalculation. Whereas in the bipolar system as Mandelbaum (1981:74) argues, "there is a less risk of miscalculation", because both the great powers (in this case the United States and the Soviet Union) know who the opponent is. The only

¹ Mandelbaum is comparing the series of provisions for collaboration by the great powers that were written in to the Treaty of Chaumont of 1814, affirmed and extended at the Congress of Vienna with the 1945 Charter of United Nations, saying both were equivalents in terms of the aims, aspirations as well as degree of coordination required to achieve them. Thus, in spite of the fact the term 'collective security' was coined in the twentieth century, it can still be applicable to the aspirations of the members of anti-Napoleonic coalition as well.

danger or rather threat to equilibrium is the 'possibility of overreaction' in case a conflict involving both of them escalates into a major one.

Apart from the possibility of overreaction Mandelbaum talks about two other major potential obstacles to the post Hiroshima 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system'. Out of the two, the second is the 'ideology'. For Mandelbaum, the "ideological differences have fuelled the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United states". Though 'ideology' may be one of the most important sources or causes of the rivalry between these super powers, it was not the sole or the only cause. When the mutual rivalry gave way to what we call the cold war, leading to the formation of alliances counterchecking each other in different theatres of world politics; it, as Burton (1965:173-176) argues, had very little to do with the central ideological conflict. For both the great powers, pursuing more power through greater control over territory, resources and population (without direct invasion or colonization, which could have disrupted the delicate balance of power) by enlarging one's 'sphere of influence', was equally important or rather more important than the commitment to their respective ideologies. Rather as Mahendra Kumar (1978:280) argues, "[i]deologies in the context of power are thus a cover to hide the real nature of the objectives of a foreign policy". Considering the contestations over the exact role of the 'ideological conflict' in shaping the rivalry between the two super powers; lets keep this obstacle to the post Hiroshima 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system' aside. But one thing can not be ignored, that, in the realm of perceptions, 'ideological conflict' played a crucial role in sustaining the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, distrust and fierce antagonism. The continuous efforts of both the super powers to retain the delicate balance of power yet while increasing their respective 'spheres of influence' on the backdrop of mutual suspicion, distrust and fierce antagonism formed the general setting of the post Hiroshima world.

Now let's come to the third potential obstacle (after 'overreaction', 'ideology'), which has a more direct bearing on our discussion regarding non-alignment. Mandelbaum calls it "the vastly enlarged scope of the international

system". This 'enlargement' and 'diversification' was mainly due to the process of decolonization leading to the emergence of new African, Asian and Middle-eastern states on the world scene. Their emergence on the world scene marked a unique as well as unprecedented 'historical irony', where the 'power vacuums' themselves were 'generating power' as argued by A.P.Rana (1976:102). These 'power vacuums' were created by the retreat of the European colonizers. The peculiarity of the 'cold war' scenario as discussed above made these 'power vacuums' decisive both in the context of mutually shared need of retaining the delicate balance of power as well as the mutually shared need of their respective spheres of influence by both the super powers. Thus the potentiality of these newly independent states to decide which way to go, which side to tilt, which power bloc to join (in a way partially compelled by the cold war bipolarity) made them an important source of power.

The decision to 'align' with either of the super powers could also have been the result of both the 'internal unrest' (either pre-existing or induced/assisted by foreign agents/powers) as well as 'external compulsions' (either in the form of manipulation or as a response to the deliberately enforced isolation by either of the super powers) (See; Burton 1965:176-185). Burton categorizes the cold war alliances into various sub-groups such as 'subversive alliance' (alliance caused by externally assisted or induced internal unrest; eg. Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and many countries in the Middle-East and Latin America), 'rejection alliance' (alliance formed as a response to deliberately enforced isolation by either of the super powers for eg. China, Pakistan) and so on. With all this he attempts to argue that most of these alliances had in reality very little to do with the central conflict between the super powers. In case of Australian alignment through SEATO and ANZUS was not primarily anti-communist but born out of the consciousness of the potential threat from the China and the new states of Asia (replacing the earlier Japanese threat now tamed by American control). Even the European alliances which were relatively more directly concerned with the major power conflict also were not solely caused by it. Because, alliance formation has been traditional in Europe and, as Burton (1965:176) argues, would occur "even in the absence of the world conflict between the western and the communist system". The NATO alliance was designed not just to counter a potential communist

aggression but also to provide some protection against potential aggressor in Western Europe itself. Besides, the major west European states were not willing to hand over to the United States all the responsibility for determining when and what situation calls for a deterrent action.

The crux of Burton's larger argument about alliance formation is that alliances are not always formed in the presence of specific or discernible external threats but are mainly a result of the traditional expectations of aggression. To summarise his position, "...alignment arises out of pre-conceived notions regarding the behaviour of nations, out of subjective expectations, out of long standing enmities, and traditional fears, out of internal unrest and out of policies which isolate nations; in many cases the major power conflict is but a cloak under other reasons for alignment are disguised" (185). We will come back to Burton's point regarding the relation between the pre-conceived or traditional expectations of aggression and alignment in the next section while discussing the strategic beliefs underlying India's choice of non-alignment. For the time being let's move back to our discussion regarding strategic environment, information structure and available actions.

Let's restrict our discussion regarding information structure and available actions to two kinds of principle actors we are going to deal with- 'the (two) superpowers' and 'the newly independent states' (primarily India, China and Pakistan). The information structure can be logically deduced from the discussion had so far. Its focal points are as follows-both the super powers as well as the newly independent states knew that both did not want an escalation of any regional or local conflict into another systemic war due to its unimaginable costs; both the superpowers and the newly independent states knew that owing to the emergence of power vacuums both the superpowers would invariably attempt to fill them up by gaining control over them to increase their respective spheres of influence in order to contain each other; both the super powers as well as the newly independent states knew that not all of the newly independent states would voluntarily want to align with either of the super powers; even if they choose to align, it would not be just out of the compulsions of bi-polarity (which was evidently not enough) Or due to their stakes in or identification with the super

power conflict. As Burton (1965) argues these states may have their respective motifs, concerns, insecurities and fears cloaked under the super power conflict.

Lastly both the superpowers as well as the newly independent states knew that it was very unlikely that any of the super powers would choose to overtly invade any of the newly independent states even if it meant an increase in their respective spheres of influence. As the extreme delicateness of the bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system almost ruled out the possibility of overt military invasion of the newly independent states by any of the superpowers to contain the other super power. This four point information structure is of course a hypothetical deduction from the discussion we had so far, which now leads us to the actions available to each of the two kinds of actors, we have assumed, vis-à-vis each other.

The actions available to the super powers can be divided into two categories. One, the actions to be directed towards the compliant type i.e. those newly independent states which were willing to align or at least not averse to aligning with either of the super powers depending upon the particularities of their respective national histories, geo-strategic locations, resources, relative capabilities (both economic and military), regime types and more importantly, to use the Rationalist terms, their strategic beliefs and preferences. Secondly, the actions to be directed towards the non-compliant type i.e. the newly independent states which were not willing to align or fiercely averse to aligning with either of the super powers. The available actions to be directed towards the compliant types were mainly two: either 'alliance formation' (the United States forming cold war alliances such as NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, Baghdad pact etc.) or 'formation of [to use David Lake's (1996) term]² an informal empire' (the Soviet Union). Lake (1996:13-16) assigns the choice between either of them to the 'costs' involved; 'opportunity cost' in the case of the former while 'governmental cost' in the case of the later. The available actions to be directed towards the non-compliant types were either 'manipulation' or 'voluntary recognition' (as overt military invasion was out of question).

² David Lake (1996) lays down four principle grand strategies great powers employed in the post WW II era to secure themselves and contain each other. These grand strategies are- *alliance formation*, *protectorate*, *informal empire* and *formal empire*. For him these four grand strategies form the entire spectrum of international order ranging from *anarchy* to *hierarchy*.

Manipulation can either be through inducement or assistance of internal unrest; or by deliberately enforced isolation. The motif behind both the strategies remains the same i.e. to manipulate the non-compliant type to turn it into a compliant one. Yet, the danger in opting for deliberately enforced isolation was greater, because it could have proved to be counter productive i.e. the state joining hands with the other super power instead of the manipulator. This is what happened in case of China, which Burton calls 'rejection alliance'.

Voluntary recognition implied not just the recognition of the legitimate right of the particular state/s to remain non-compliant but also recognition of the utility value of their non-compliance in maintaining the delicate 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system'. Considering the cold war environment filled with mutual suspicion, distrust, ideological antagonism and overall uncertainty; to distinguish genuine non-compliant from the fake non-compliant, which essentially implied the fear of it being already secretly or covertly aligned (or to be aligned) with the enemy camp, was very difficult for both the super powers. Besides, the fierce ideological antagonism implied a kind of extremist stance i.e. "those who are not with us are against us". Thus, out of the four available actions to superpowers vis-à-vis the newly independent states in general (alliance formation, formation of an informal empire, manipulation and voluntary recognition) voluntary recognition was bound to be the least preferred.

Now the actions available to the newly independent states become fairly obvious. The states belonging to the compliant type could 'align' either with the western or the eastern bloc, either as a member of a relatively anarchic alliance or an informal empire; again depending upon their respective national histories, geo-strategic locations, resources, relative capabilities (both economic and military), regime types and strategic beliefs as well as preferences. The states belonging to the non-compliant type could either be 'passively neutral' (in the traditional European sense, eg. Switzerland) or could 'isolate' themselves from international politics (eg. Burma) again depending upon their respective national histories, geo-strategic locations, resources, relative capabilities (both economic and military), regime types, strategic beliefs and preferences.

It is important to note here that the four kinds of actions/grand strategies (assumed to be) available to both the kinds of actors (the two super powers and the newly independent states) have been logically deduced from the logic of the situation and not simply abstracted out of the actual historical practices. Yet, while doing so, one has deliberately tried to avoid the replication, classification and representation of all the historically known actions/grand strategies from that period. The references to historical examples are given only for the sake of substantiation. The point is not to cover and classify all the actually employed strategies, but to imagine logically available courses of actions in the given logic of the situation. Again one has to subtly differentiate between logically available and logically possible course of actions, as the former requires mere calculation while the later demands both calculation and imagination.

Now keeping this note in mind and looking at these four actions/grand strategies, in a way logically given actions/grand strategies (alignment with the Western bloc, alignment with the Eastern bloc, passive neutrality, isolation) available to the newly independent states vis-à-vis the super powers, one can easily make out that the action/grand strategy employed by post-independent India does not square with this. For many it marked similarities with neutrality, isolationism. In fact many equated India's non-alignment with neutralism or isolationism. Those who did that could not grasp the positive, participatory, dynamic, evolving aspects of India's non-alignment. For which both the Indian as well as foreign commentators had to stress upon the fact that non-alignment did not mean any of the following- neutrality, isolationism, passivity and so on. The point is that these recovery or rectifying efforts indirectly suggest the fact that the particular action/grand strategy (or general line of foreign policy) opted for and pursued by post independence India can not be said to be environmentally or situationally given or logically available to India, as the other four kinds of actions were to the other newly independent states. I argue that the grand strategy India adopted was not logically available to but was logically possible for India in the given strategic environment. Though the strategic environment did not readily provide this course of action, it did not restrict it either. Logically available

strategic choices, as I have argued, demand both calculation as well as imagination. Calculation leads to strategy, imagination leads to innovation or improvisation. So such logically possible choices can be called as strategic innovations/improvisations.

Of course, in case of the other four actions/grand strategies we have discussed, adoption of any one of these four would still depend upon a strategic *calculation* influenced by contingent factors such as national histories, geo-strategic locations, resources, relative capabilities (both economic and military), regime types and strategic beliefs as well as preferences. So in these cases also, the adoption of their respective strategies cannot be said to be completely determined by the strategic environment. There is an element of strategic choice, yet the choice exists in a particular framework, follows a particular predictable, given pattern.

In the Indian case, as I argue, these contingent factors, especially the strategic beliefs and preferences (of course inseparable from the other contingent factors discussed above, yet for the sake of analytical convenience needs to be assumed as analytically independent or autonomous) played a far important or crucial role (in shaping the strategic imagination) than the strategic environment. The choice India made was not an exactly a tailor made choice, made out of the available ones, but needs to be seen or interpreted as strategic innovation/improvisation.

If one closely looks at India's policy of non-alignment, there are clearly two aspects to it, one is *negative* [the firm decision of not 'aligning' with any of the power bloc i.e. the 'non-compliant behaviour' but only in a very broad sense] and the other is *positive* [creating an 'area of peace', forging Afro-Asian solidarity, initiating NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), playing mediatory role in peaceful resolution of International conflicts, initiatives towards disarmament and so on]. So one can argue that the strategic environment influenced India's adoption of non-alignment *only* in terms of *creating an opportunity and providing an incentive* to the actor (India) for *not complying* i.e. for not aligning with any of the super power bloc. But as we shall see in the next section, the actual course of

action adopted by the actor (India) showed only apparent similarity to non-compliance. Because India's no to alignments was not just no. It implied yes too in some other regards. This yes implied playing the game and not passive neutrality or isolationism. So what the actor (India) meant by not complying was not just 'non-compliance'. It meant much more for the actor, not just a strategic calculation but a strategic improvisation. For this, to explain the positive and improvisational aspect of it, one will have to look in to the actor, to examine its strategic beliefs and preferences.

Before moving to the next section, let's summarise the key arguments of this section in a table form –

Strategic Environment

(Bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system)

<u>Information</u> <u>Structure</u>	<u>Available Actions</u>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Neither of the super powers wants a Systemic war. 2. Both the super powers want to increase their respective spheres of influence by filling the power vacuums created by the process of decolonization. 3. Not all the newly independent states would want to align with either of the power blocs. <p>No super power could afford to invade any of the newly independent states to gain control over them.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">To Super powers</p> <p>A] vis-à-vis Compliant type</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alliance Formation. 2. Informal Empire. <p>B]vis-à-vis Non-compliant type</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Manipulation. 2. Voluntary Recognition. 	<p style="text-align: center;">To Newly independent states</p> <p>A] Compliant type</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alignment with Western bloc. 2. Alignment with Eastern bloc. <p>B] Non-Compliant type</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Passive Neutrality 2. Isolation.

(Table no.1)

In the following section we shall discuss the key strategic beliefs as well as the preferences which not just kept India away from 'aligning' with any of the power bloc but more importantly determined the positive or improvisational aspect of non-alignment. For determining actor's beliefs and preferences we shall largely use observational or inductive method. For locating, deducing and justifying the source/s of those beliefs and preferences, I shall refer to Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya's (1969) theoretical propositions which are pointing towards certain common characteristics or features of the making of foreign policies of states from the South Asian sub system, of which India is an important part. Actually the sources (especially Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National Congress) of India's strategic beliefs and preferences are historically well known and hardly need any justification or substantiation. Yet it would be methodologically more sound and useful to provide a pre-existing theoretical framework to them.

Beliefs, Preferences and the adoption of (not just) *Non-alignment*

Bandopadhyaya (1969:27-39) essentially advances five (of which we are going to discuss three) theoretical propositions regarding the 'making of foreign policies' in the context of South Asian sub system, especially with reference to India and Pakistan.

His first theoretical proposition argues that in case of developing countries 'ideology' plays a far more decisive role in shaping their international outlook, especially those developing transnational societies which have experienced a 'nationalist movement' or 'political revolution'. Bandopadhyaya opposes the Morgenthau kind of criticism of 'the role of ideology' as "...a mere camouflage for a national power drive" (1969:34). He argues that the intellectual and cultural Renaissance of the second half of the nineteenth century and the national movement of the first half of the twentieth century threw certain political ideals like anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, pan-Asianism, co-operative internationalism, non-violence, and democracy, which was largely responsible for preventing

“...any alien ideology from striking deep roots in India” (Bandopadhyaya 1969:35).

The second theoretical proposition deals with the ‘profound influence of personality factor’. He calls south Asian sub system a ‘transitional’ sub system, characterized by relatively stable infrastructure and the absence of industrial and material power especially at the beginning of the career of these states. In such cases, “some heroic act” performed by a charismatic and semi charismatic leaders before rising to power like leading a national movement or revolution or a coup d’état (For eg. Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse Tung, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno, Sukarto and in the Indian case Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and so on) enjoy a profound influence in the formulation and manipulation of foreign policy (1969:36). The charismatic or semi charismatic *heroes* play a decisive role in the “...interpretation of the tradition and values....in particular its manipulation to suit the exigencies of national and international politics, are the handiwork of single individuals (for eg. Jawaharlal Nehru) or small cluster of individuals (for eg. Indian National Congress) who dominate the political scene” (Bandopadhyaya 1969:36) (Brackets added). So as we have argued earlier, even if the broad values thrown up by the Indian National Movement are the matrix on which Independent India’s foreign policy has been built, it is the (re) interpretation and manipulation of these values by Jawaharlal Nehru and Indian National Congress ‘to suit the exigencies of national and international politics’ have played a decisive role in shaping the adoption of non-alignment.

The decisive role of ideology and the profound influence of personality factor leads us to the third theoretical proposition i.e. the higher chances of ‘non-rationality’ in foreign policy decision making, mainly because in such transitional sub systems, the bulk of electorate being ‘uneducated, little informed about the problems of national politics, even less informed about the complexities of international politics, where the masses are often sharply divided or swayed by non-logical pressures’ ; ‘where different stages of policy formulation either do not exist or themselves exist characterized by non-rationality due to ignorance or

passion'. Therefore, 'the chances of non-logical pressures or of non-rationality on policy formulation' would be relatively higher than otherwise.

Bandopadhyaya's emphasis upon the role played by the sentiments, passion, emotions and also by non-rational beliefs (about one's traditions, history, identity and the behaviour of the other states) can help us building a strong case for (the role played by) the non-material or ideational factors in the adoption of one course of action/ grand strategy (non-alignment) over the others (alignment, passive neutrality, isolationism). Besides, as we have already discussed, its emphasis upon the role of nationalist ideology and of the charismatic personality factor can guide us in locating and justifying the source of those strategic beliefs and preference formation which, as I argue, have played decisive role not just in the adoption of non-alignment but also in providing positive, normative, and dynamic content to it.

Taking off from these theoretical propositions, let us now move on with the discussion regarding the strategic beliefs and preferences, locating their source largely in the nationalist ideology (broadly consisting of anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, pan-Asianism, co-operative internationalism, non-violence, and democratic socialism) of Indian National Congress (INC) which found its clearest expressions/itself most clearly expressed in Jawaharlal Nehru's essays, articles, books and speeches etc.

The explicit mention of the first of and one of the most important strategic beliefs, deeply influencing post-independent India's strategic outlook and foreign policy behaviour, first appeared jointly in Jawaharlal Nehru's two articles titled *The Defense of India* published in *Young India* in 1931 (284-5), on 24th September and 1st October respectively. Those two articles were Nehru's answer to those of his critics who seriously questioned India's ability to maintain her independent status in the international state system without the military support of the British. Nehru argues that politically, the world situation favoured India and made an "invasion of her extremely unlikely". Once India achieved freedom from British domination, the "master desire" of other great powers would be to prevent any other nation from possessing India, because no country would tolerate the

idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the position which England occupied. If any power were covetous enough to make such an attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. Thus, “[t]his mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India” (Nehru 1931).

Let us label this belief as ‘the mutual rivalry amongst the great powers as the surest guarantee against an attack of India’. This belief operates at two levels. At one level it is a belief about an international situation, about a particular kind of balance of power or a particular kind of an international order. At another level, it is a belief about one’s own potential strategic importance vis-à-vis this particular international situation or balance of power. This belief, as I argue, had held the pivotal position in post independence India’s strategic thinking because of its enduring nature and value. The international situation it believed in or imagined as well as interpreted was going to remain there for considerable amount of time, perhaps some decades. In fact this situation was yet to materialize completely in 1931 when this article was written. So in way it was also ‘forecasting’ an order or situation, which was yet to unfold itself, which in turn increases its potential lasting value.

On the other hand, the potential strategic importance upon which it was banking India’s future security too was going to be a short-term phenomenon. In fact, this potential strategic importance, as one can argue, had always been there. It certainly/On can state with some certainty that it predates the British Empire and even the invaders who came before that. In fact what this belief was trying to do was to ‘reclaim’ that ‘lost’ potential strategic importance anticipating the independence from British Empire in near future. It was trying to temporally ‘reconnect’ with that ‘lost’ potential strategic importance in a modern nationalist framework and to relocate and contextualize it in the anticipated mutual rivalry amongst the great powers i.e. the particular kind of international situation or order or balance of power we have been discussing. So again there is anticipation at two levels, of two distinct yet closely interrelated events –one’s own political independence and the emergence of that particular kind of international situation or order conducive to the exploitation of its potential strategic importance. What

matters the most is the anticipated simultaneity of these two distinct events, which would mark its powerful hold on the post independence India's strategic thinking.

Now what does this belief tells us? What is implied in it? Again, it can be read at two levels, strategic and normative. At the strategic level it is a wise, confident and yet cautious, low-key recognition of India as an important source of power i.e. recognition of a strategic fact. At the normative level it is a more compelling and high key recognition of India's natural position of preeminence in the world i.e. the recognition of one's role to played. Now the recognition of a role, in a way destined for one, inevitably comes with a desire to play or fulfill that role. What is that role? As Nehru wrote in *The Discovery of India* (1946) once India gained independence it "... could not be a mere hanger-on of any country or group of nations, her freedom and growth would make a vital difference to Asia and therefore to the world" (Emphasis added). We will discuss the particularities of that role while discussing the other key strategic beliefs. For the time being let us assign some adjectives (as used by Nehru) to this role, such as vital, decisive, important, special, to get a sense of its gravity and grandeur. So the desire is to play a special, vital, decisive, important role in world affairs.

If one were to avoid the overtly 'idealist' and 'messianic' overtones of this desire, popularly framed in those days as 'India's message to the world' and so on; considering its potential strategic importance, history, culture; holding such a desire (or ambition) is not unreasonable or megalomaniac. But considering its present weakness, holding such a grand desire is not enough either. As Rana (1976:98) argues that believing in the 'mutual rivalry amongst the great powers as the surest guarantee against an attack of India' would not imply a 'sitting on the fence' kind of a policy, because strategically, it would be too naïve and simplistic to believe this mutual rivalry amongst the great powers to be self-regulatory. In spite of its inherently predictable stability, there was always a chance of this mutual rivalry 'spilling over to the rest of the Indian sub continent, carving up India into spheres of influences or of possessions or in to both, replicating the dismal history of the sub continent'. (See, Rana 1976:99) So

strategically it would have been utterly unwise to be simply passive or neutral or isolationist towards this mutual rivalry among the great powers.

From a normative point of view, it could only have been undesirable. The reason for this was the problem of how a nation could fulfill its grand desire of playing a decisive role in world affairs while remaining passive or neutral? This would be especially problematic if the nation was to be materially weaker and thus could not be able to fulfill its desire on that plane either. So, in order to be strategically cautious and normatively faithful to one's desire India needed to take this rivalry (which was soon to lead to the cold war compulsions of alignment) head on, with a pro-active policy, yet without taking sides i.e. without aligning with any of the great powers. What could be the advantages of such a stand? What makes it strategically rational as well as essential to have a proactive policy without alignment?

As one can argue, India could have easily got a better deal out of an alignment, especially considering its potential strategic importance. It could have easily compensated for its material weakness by aligning with a great power. By aligning it could have surely aggregated its capabilities and made itself far less vulnerable and more secure. Indeed, such a move would surely have antagonized the other superpower with which it did not align. It would have created (an unnecessary) potential danger to its security. As I have cited before, Nehru had predicted in 1931 that "...no country would tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the position which England occupied. If any power were covetous enough to make such an attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder." So going by Nehru's logic, an alignment could have caused such a tussle amongst the super powers to stop each other from realizing (what Nehru calls) 'the master desire' of gaining control over India, which would have been disastrous for India. But the situation was not the same in 1946 as it was in 1931. The strategic environment had drastically changed. The 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system' had already started emerging. Considering its extreme delicateness, it could be reasonable to believe, that such a tussle, as predicted by Nehru, wouldn't have occurred. Rather the

delicateness of the balance of power system could have considerably diffused or neutralized the danger of such a tussle. So India could have enjoyed the so-called benefits of alignment without really making itself excessively vulnerable or insecure.

At the same time, it is also true that such a move would mean having to give up the desire to play an important role in world affairs, because the obvious power asymmetry of such an alliance could not have allowed India to be more than a 'hanger-on' of either of the power bloc, leave aside any special, unique or exclusive status in International community. For a materially weaker country like India, without such a distinct, unique, exclusive status, it would have been extremely difficult to play a decisive role in world affairs. So going by the normative drive of this belief it was not at all desirable to align. But as we have seen in the above paragraph, from a strategic point of view, it was not altogether irrational or unwise to align. Yet, an explanation must be given as to what made it unwise and irrational.

First of all, the core of this belief is 'the relative absence of any real or immediate threat' to India's security. So going by Burton's (1965) theory about 'the traditional fears of aggression leading to alliance formation', India would not really need such an alliance, however hypothetically profitable it may sound. So even if it was not entirely unwise to align, it was surely *needless* from the strategic point of view. Besides, to align with any of the great powers in such a setting would mean to unnecessarily and unwisely lose 'the strategic leverage' India could otherwise possess (owing to both its potential strategic importance and the mutual rivalry amongst the great powers). Again, it would be difficult to argue in quantitative terms whether retaining such strategic leverage would be strategically more beneficial than what India could have otherwise gained through alignment. A more intelligent and sensible way would be to make an indirect argument about it i.e. to ask what the implied costs in each of these cases are. As James Morrow (1999:103-6) argues, the most obvious cost of any alignment is "the cost of commitment", which invariably restricts the strategic maneuverability, especially for a weaker partner in an asymmetric alliance, in a

cold war context where the intentions of the stronger partner are explicitly imperialist in nature, not to colonize the weaker but at least to gain the control over the territory, resources and population to contain the other superpower.

When the weaker partner is a nation recently emerging from a prolonged colonial domination through nationalist revolution, the influence of the anti-imperialist ideology on the strategic imagination and prioritization would be definitely more real and decisive to make other calculations of material gains strategically as well as normatively less important. We have briefly discussed this point in the beginning of this section while referring to Bandopadhyaya's four theoretical propositions concerning the making of foreign policies of the nations of south Asian sub-systems, where he argues that in such nations the nationalist ideology and in general non-rational (or sentimental) factors play a decisive role in shaping foreign policies. We shall again return to it while discussing the last (or the fourth) key strategic belief later in this section. For the time being, it would be reasonable to conclude the present discussion regarding the first key strategic belief on a note that alignment would not just have been normatively undesirable but also strategically needless and unwise.

Furthermore, in order to retain the strategic leverage as well as the opportunity to pursue its genuine desire of playing an important role in world politics (which could in turn give it a distinct and prestigious position in the international community) strategically as well as normatively, it made sense for India to pursue a policy of non-alignment. But non-alignment not in the narrower sense of the term i.e. just the refusal of an alignment by being otherwise passive, neutral or isolationist, because as we have already argued the strategic leverage was not self regulatory or not enough on its own. As Rana (1976:99) also argues, this strategic leverage needed to be 'complemented' with a policy which would take "...advantage of such rivalry and prevented it from making incursions damaging to India's freedom". Such a policy needed to be dynamic and proactive to fulfill its desire as well.

Hence, from both the strategic as well as normative point of view, India needed a non-compliant and yet pro-active, dynamic policy, which was obviously

not readily *available* in the given strategic environment. Thus India had no option other than to devise or improvise a policy to achieve the strategic as well normative gains set out by its strategic belief/s. Considering India's material weakness, such an improvisation or innovation was only possible entirely in (a non-militarist and) a diplomatic way. To sum up, what India needed was a non-compliant yet pro-active, non-militarist and only diplomatically imaginable as well as operationable strategic improvisation or innovation.

Now as we move on with our discussion regarding the next i.e. the second key strategic belief, we would realize that the preference for a non-militarist and pacifist policy was not just out of the compulsions or constraints of one's own material weakness. In fact it had several strategic as well as normative layers to it. It was not, as popularly caricatured or stereotyped, a convenient pacifism of the weak. In fact, as we shall see in this next belief, even the material compulsions underlying it did not simply stem from one's own relative weakness or inability, but arose from larger historical necessities and compulsions. Where one's relative material weakness could become just one of the important and yet incidental factors instead of being the only one.

To realize these historical necessities and compulsions (which invariably come with the subsequent realization of one's role or special responsibility assigned by history) one would require a really broad and sweeping grasp of world history, without getting burdened by it. Of course such a grasp of history comes with its *burden* but that burden instead of crushing the knower, *liberates* the knower in a sense, because such a *burden* comes in the form of a responsibility, an assigned task. Hence the knower, having become aware of that responsibility feels *liberated* from the other kind of burden, the chaotic burden of purposelessness, ignorance and confusion.

This all might sound too dramatically exaggerated or unnecessarily prophetic and spiritual. But I am not trying to argue or justify that India's adoption of non-alignment was actually driven by such liberating historical burden, which may or may not have been the case. That is not the issue at all. What I intend to do is to take this belief as a real (and not the historical burden as

real, which it may or may not be), objective strategic fact and then to interpret how it made Indian policymakers share this burden, and while doing so invariably shaped India's strategic imagination and behaviour. So my task is not to test or problematise the philosophical or historical claims or validity of this belief (which could very well be done in any other research project), but to see, what this belief does or did, which strategic and normative possibilities it opened up or allowed and which ones it prohibited or completely ruled out. The interest of my research is to locate and interpret the real effects of such belief on Indian foreign policy behaviour.

To revert back to our main discussion, it is an undisputed historical fact that Jawaharlal Nehru had such a broad and sweeping grasp of Indian as well as World history (and the complex and subtle interconnections between these two histories), again however problematic and contestable it could be, which is evident enough from his two giant works *The Glimpses of World History* (1934) and *The Discovery of India* (1946). These two works are enough to substantiate Nehru's bonafides or qualifications to interpret and hold such, not just logically consistent and but also strategically persuasive, beliefs without feeling burdened by the weight of history.

Let's call this key strategic belief as the belief in the 'indivisibility of both peace and disaster' especially in the context of this "One world that can no longer be split into isolated fragments" (Nehru 1949:26). The realization of the progressively increasing 'oneness' of the world we live in stems from his passionate study of the world history. In *The Glimpses of World History* (1934:1102) he writes, "[o]ur incursions in history has shown us how the world has come together and become interdependent. The world has indeed become one single inseparable whole, each part influencing and being influenced by the other. It is quite impossible now to have a separate history of nations".

This increasing oneness and inseparability, as Nehru believed, was not smoothly and seamlessly moving towards some kind of a harmonious and peaceful unison of all nations and civilizations. In fact, it was quite the contrary. The compulsiveness (or involuntariness) of this inseparability was making the

world potentially far more dangerous. The inseparability was of conflicts. So in the future it was going to be simply impossible to separate out or to insulate regional or local conflicts to prevent them from having unavoidable global repercussions of an unimaginable scale. So in a way it shared and mirrored the inevitable uncertainty and insecurity of the post Hiroshima 'bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system'. Yet, it was far from being the product of it, because it stemmed from a much deeper analysis of much broader and long durée historical canvas. It was thus analytically independent of its immediate strategic environment.

Yet this belief found its first official utterance in the same post Hiroshima world at the very moment of independent India's official entry into the international community. Nehru articulated it in his first speech to the parliament of independent India which he delivered at the midnight of 14th August 1947. He said, "... [p]eace has been said to indivisible, so is freedom, so is prosperity now, and so also is disaster in this one world that can no longer be split into isolated fragments." (Nehru 1949:26)

Now this belief in the 'indivisibility of both peace and disaster' had several strategic as well as normative implications at different levels. At the international level it meant that strategically as well as normatively the peace of post independence India would be inseparable from the dictates of the delicate bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power. This was because considering India's potential strategic importance; the possibility of it aligning with any of the power blocs would surely disrupt the delicate balance of power. Strategically, it meant bringing the cold war to its doorsteps, unnecessarily involving it in the super power rivalry and thus harming India's national security as well as the process of nation building and development. Considering that the political independence came to India with a heavy price in terms of its internal political instability caused due to hurried partition, communal riots, inflows of millions of refugees straining the already badly shaken Indian economy due to generations of colonial rule and the splitting up of its entire infrastructure during the partition, and natural disasters (such as famines, draughts, floods, irregular rainfalls); the violent

rebellious attempts by the Communist Party of India (CPI) to overthrow the government, the pressures from the communal, feudal forces, the private entrepreneurs and the Big businessman to tilt towards the West for technological aid and capital investment ; the mammoth task of integrating 568 princely states in Indian Union, the almost war like situation with Pakistan over Kashmir etc.; it desperately needed 'prolonged peace' (at least "fifteen years of peace" as expected by Nehru) to put things in place, to restore and consolidate political order and to initiate and gear up a self reliant economic development (Mallik 1967:36-41). Thus the strategic need for prolonged peace was a non-negotiable essentiality for India not just at the international but also at the national level.

In the light of this particular belief it would not have made strategic sense to align with either of the super powers. Aligning with either of them at that stage meant not just disrupting the desperately needed prolonged peace but also to 'lay all one's eggs in one basket' as Nehru called it. Such excessive dependence on either super power would surely come with some strings attached i.e. a consistent and severe pressure to remodel its economy either in purely capitalist or in purely socialist terms, which would invariably mean threatening one of the fundamentals of post independence India's polity and economy i.e. the ideology of democratic socialism. Besides, the lack of any strategic incentive to align could not mean India maintaining either a passively neutralist or a cocooned isolationist posture just to avoid conflict and to preserve much needed 'prolonged peace'. Such a posture would prove to be strategically not just unproductive but also unaffordable.

In order to face the serious and urgent challenge of restoring internal political disorder and gearing itself up for self reliant economic development, India would need a proactive and dynamic policy, mainly to make new international contacts, to procure capital investment and aid from diverse sources. Further it would need to diversify international trade and to keep the democratic socialist order intact. Seen from this strategic/economic point of view again, all the available actions offered by a strategic environment prove to be disastrous and unaffordable, which means again there is no option other than to look for a 'a

non-compliant yet pro-active; non-militarist and only diplomatically imaginable as well as operationable strategic improvisation.

Normatively too, prolonged peace was inevitable to India at both the national as well as the international level. At the international level, to align (with either of the power bloc) meant the disruption of the delicately maintained indivisible and cold world peace by nearing the inseparable global disaster. To do otherwise i.e. to be either passively neutral or isolationist would mean to indirectly allow or rather invite the danger of the cold war to enter its own neighborhood without pro-active prevention (thus disrupting the indivisible cold peace). Considering India's normative commitment to this belief, at the international level, it would have been undesirable and senseless to pursue any policy out of the four available ones offered by its strategic environment. So again to repeat the earlier conclusion, no option other than a particular kind of 'strategic improvisation' appeared realistic. Now India's normative commitment to this belief might appear to be too general or abstract and idealist, at least considering the international level. But if one carefully looks at the implications of 'the indivisibility of the peace', one wouldn't really be able to demarcate where one's domestic need for prolonged peace ends and where the normative commitment to the so called world peace starts. The peculiarity of the situation and also of this belief makes these two levels of peace indistinguishable, by bringing them on the same footing.

At the national or domestic level, the normative aversion to military alliances (which can be interpreted as one of the essential implications of this belief) came out of Nehru's fierce opposition to traditional European-style power politics, fuelled by narrow and selfish nationalism and imperialism. This kind of nineteenth century power politics looked at war as an instrument of restoring balance of power and attaining peace. But in case of Nehru's understanding of peace, the logic stands reversed. For him it is not peace through security but security through peace. For him the jargon of German geo-politicians of heartland and rimland were the major cause of world disasters (Patil 1994). He believed that the American refinement of Mackinderian and Hanshoterian geopolitics by

Nicholas Spykman injected a fear of encirclement into the American mind at the moment of its greatest involvement with the world (Damodaran 1995:195). He was of the opinion that a foreign policy formulated in the light of the narrow and selfish view of national interest (which he contrasted with enlightened, rational national interest) would tend to aim at the expansion of power and influence and the creation of balance of power through the vicious circle of alliances and counter alliances (Lal 1994:30, 32). So like the indivisibility of peace and disaster Nehru viewed “rational interests of all states conceived in the long run were almost indivisible” (Lal 1994:32).

Indivisibility of the rational interests, I argue, is the second important normative implication of the belief in the indivisibility of peace and disaster. Now this proposition lends itself to two possible readings. In a purely idealist and utopian sense, it could mean an essential harmony of rational national interests of all the states. So the rational national interests of all the states would automatically overlap and would form One indivisible whole on its own. From a much more pragmatic point of view, however, as Burton (1965:232-240) argues while theorizing non-alignment, it can mean that the existence of conflict of interests among the states does not rule out the possibility of their indivisibility, because such indivisibility is not automatic or self-regulatory. It has to be worked out again and again. It comes from inseparable interrelatedness, which is structurally compulsive and thus can not mean absence of conflicts. Yet conflicts need not give way to power politics, alliance formation and war. Conflict of interests can be negotiated. This in turn implies that “conflict is either subjective or that the interests involved are not objectively vital and therefore subject to negotiation” (Burton 1965:236).

For Burton, non-alignment meant “...devaluation of power in communication” (236). An alliance for him is a “...symptom of a breakdown of communication” (237), which also contributes to a further deterioration in perception, reception, feedback and other parts of a flexible international system. In such cases of breakdown of communication “only through power can a state afford to maintain an inefficient communication system” (Burton 1965:237,238).

India, being materially weaker, could never have afforded to use power over communication to further its interests. So it opted for communication over power (and alignment). Communication implies a proactive and dynamic role as opposed to passively neutral or isolationist behaviour. Again, no course of action was meant for India out of the available four. India had to find its own way, for which it needed to use power (not in the material sense) more imaginatively, subtly; not through threat explication but through threat latency (in terms of playing with the continuously open possibility of tilting towards or aligning with the rival power bloc) which would be inherent in such a non-compliant, non-militarist and diplomatic improvisation, especially given the potential strategic importance and leverage India enjoyed.

Now let us come to the discussion of the third key strategic belief, which I term as the belief in, 'essential Asian solidarity'. It derives, as Burton (1965:186-207) argues, not so much from the racial or cultural ties as from the traditional relations most of the Afro-Asian states shared with the imperialist powers. So the ideology of anti-imperialism and anti-racialism became a common meeting ground for these states. As stated as early as in the 37th report of Indian National Congress (INC) in 1922, India's destiny was viewed as linked with her Asian neighbours. In his presidential Address of 1922, C.R. Das emphasized India's participation in the impending secular union or the federation of the oppressed nationalities of Asia. Further, in the next presidential address, Maulana Mohammad Ali referred to the idea of Eastern federation (See, Mallik 1967:5). As Mallik argues "...it was an urge devoid of any desire for the leadership of Asia for friendship, cooperation and partnership with Asian people for freedom..." (5). In his presidential Address of 1929, Nehru explained the link of the Indian National Movement with the world movement including the national movements of China, Turkey, Persia, Egypt and so on.

In fact, this tendency to take a 'comprehensive view of international politics' and to 'internationalize the Indian freedom struggle' as a part of the general world struggle against Imperialism, took a serious turn with Jawaharlal Nehru's participation on behalf of the INC in the Congress of the Oppressed

Nationalities held at Brussels from 10th to 15th February 1927 (Wiedemann 1994:164). The first major wave of Socialist thinking in the Congress was the most dominating note in its outlook on foreign affairs in this phase. It was manifest in the internal developments like socialist youth movements, rise of the young blood in the Congress symbolized by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose, radical views for India's independence and the socialist views of the left wing in the congress. With the Brussels conference the anti-imperialist and pan-Asiatic drives came together as two inseparable sides of the same coin. For the first time, opposition to imperialism came to have an ideological orientation (Mallik, 1967:7). It was a radical democratic socialist ideology inclusive of the Marxist-Leninist view of capitalism and imperialism and yet was far from subscribing to the orthodox faith in the dictatorship of the proletariat and the role of the communist party as the vanguard of the proletariat. On the backdrop of this ideological development the urge of the earlier phase for friendship with Asian countries gradually developed into belief in an essential Asian solidarity.

This belief in an essential Asian solidarity, as argued by Mallik (1967:8), had four manifestations. The first manifestation, as discussed earlier, lay in the tendency to link India's freedom struggle with that of the rest of the Asia. The second one lay in sharing the sense of achievement of other national movements in Asia. In 1927, greetings, congratulations, and assurances of sympathy were sent to the people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. The third one lay in establishing fraternal bonds with other national movements. The forty-third Indian National Congress directed its working committee to correspond with the popular leaders of national movements in Asian nations and to take other steps 'to summon the first session' of a pan Asiatic federation in 1930 in India. This was the beginning of, to use Mallik's phrase, an "Asian get-together", which saw its fulfillment in the non-official Asian Relations Conference at Delhi in 1947, the Asian conference on Indonesia at New Delhi in 1949 and the Bandung conference of 1955 (Mallik 1967:9, 10). Finally, the fourth manifestation of Asian solidarity was reflected in the tendency to assert the position of Asia in the world politics.

For Nehru, with decolonization came the 'awakening of Asian consciousness'. As he declared in 1929, Asia, including India, 'would play a determining part in future world policy', as she did a few centuries ago in history (Mallick 1976:10).

The ideological and historical contextualization of this third belief leads us to its two important and interlinked strategic implications. First, this belief places a rather concrete special responsibility (compared to the relatively general and abstract special responsibilities discussed in the first two beliefs, yet very much consistent with them) on India's shoulders vis-à-vis its Asian neighbours. As Nehru experienced from his position in 1949 regarding India's role in Asia after the experiences of two Asian conferences, "...it is true that, because of the various factors I have mentioned, a certain special responsibility is cast on India. India realizes it and other countries realize it also. The responsibility is not necessarily for leadership, but for taking initiative sometimes and helping others to cooperate" (Nehru 1961:44). This special responsibility, as envisaged by Nehru, was to guard the political, economic and social freedom of these newly independent states by guarding its own freedom i.e. by not aligning with either of the power blocs (we will discuss the link between freedom and alignment at length while discussing the fourth strategic belief). As Indian policymakers, Nehru, believed, the freedom of many countries depended largely on the India's freedom. Considering India's potential strategic importance, if India remains free, it could be argued that the old imperialism would end and world politics would be refashioned in a new, more stable and more peaceful contest (Rana 1976:81).

The second strategic implication of this belief logically flows from the first. It says, "...[i]f India ceases to have a neutral policy with regard to these power conflicts, many other countries would also be forced to line up with either power bloc. There would be no neutral countries left...Indeed India's lining up might bring the world war nearer" (Nehru 1948:609-614). Thus in Nehru's mind, there existed an inseparable and organic link between India guarding its own freedom (by not aligning), the other newly independent Asian states being able to guard their respective freedom (which would mean India playing a dynamic, proactive, diplomatic role to stand by this special responsibility), and the

prevention of any future war (which in a way flows from the belief in the indivisibility of peace and disaster). This organic link further reinforces the strategic irrationality (defined in terms of unaffordable costs) of alignment (with either of the power blocs) as well as the impossibility of passive neutrality and isolationist behaviour. Thus, once more, we return to the need for a non-compliant, non-militarist and diplomatic improvisation.

The fourth and the last key strategic belief stems largely from the grossly asymmetric and imperialist nature of cold war alliances. For the newly independent states, emerging from prolonged colonial domination, to align with any of these power blocs meant not just 'losing their bargaining power' but also their 'freedom to conduct foreign affairs', which essentially meant 'losing their hard-earned (overall) political independence'. From the point of view of super powers (as referred in the last section, while discussing the actions available to the super powers) the cost of an alliance formation (either with weaker states or middle powers) could at worst be an 'opportunity cost' i.e. the cost incurred by the super powers if their partners behave opportunistically. Such opportunistic behaviour could come in the form of "abandonment", "entrapment" or "exploitation" (Lake 1996:13).

In each of these cases, the cost of alliance formation for the newly independent weaker states would be no less than their hard-earned political independence. More importantly, in case of super powers the opportunistic behaviour is not essential or necessary but only probable. In case of the weaker state the loss of freedom is self evident. As we have already discussed, the super powers looked at these cold war alliances precisely as an extension of their respective spheres of influence, by gaining control over the territory, population, resources and infrastructure, the form of government and economy as well, almost in a colonial sense.

The choice of establishing a direct empire through invasion was both strategically and normatively constrained as well as legally prohibited as it would mean disrupting the delicate balance of power. Normatively, the popular wave of decolonization delegitimised colonialism and imperialism. Legally, the

establishment and the continuation of (earlier) colonial domination were proscribed. So, as argued by Lake (1996:29-33), in spite of the involvement of governance cost (which in the case of the Soviet Union was relatively lower compared to the opportunity cost involved in alliance formation) the Soviet Union had to settle for the construction of an informal empire, as a formal empire had ceased to be an option by then. In case of the United States, however, the expected opportunity cost was lower as compared to the expected governance cost. Hence, the United States opted for, to use Lake's term, an 'anarchic alliance formation'. In both cases the super powers were the relationship "makers" and the others were relationship "takers" (Lake 1996:13).

So India's fourth key strategic belief stems from the awareness of this built-in asymmetry and imperialist logic of the cold war alliances, which found eloquent expression in Nehru's speech to the Constituent Assembly delivered on March 8, 1949, where he said, "[w]hat does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relations go out of your hand in to the charge of somebody else (in the cold war context either in the form of being a weaker partner in an asymmetric, imperialist alliance or by being a member of an informal empire), to that extent and that measure you are not independent" (Nehru 1958:241).

This belief straightway rules out the possibility of alignment with either of the power of bloc, from both strategic as well as normative point of view. As any material gain whatsoever could never be able to compensate lost freedom, especially for a nation recently coming out of prolonged and humiliating colonial domination. So to guard such a hard-earned freedom in a 'notional' as well as 'real' sense would become one of the top most priorities for such nation. Especially when such nation would have to face severe political as well as economic instability bordering on the verge of chaos, that too, at the commencement of its career. In such circumstances the notional value of one's freedom would be almost incalculable and more than the real considering the mammoth challenge of socio-political cohesion and nation building. Loosing

one's freedom at this stage would mean losing the people's morale, national character and thus putting a big question mark on the nation's very existence and survival.

Considering the compulsions of alignment for India, mainly due to its potential strategic importance in the particular strategic environment and its potential vulnerability to such alignments due to the internal instability (providing a fertile ground for super powers to induce or assist coup to overthrow the existing nationalist government); the other options i.e. passive neutrality and isolationism were equally unfeasible and worse. So again in this case also the only remaining option would be to face the internal instability as well as the external pressures of alignment with a non-compliant yet proactive, dynamic and innovative policy.

Considering the four key strategic beliefs we have discussed so far (and their strategic as well as normative implications) and the internal political and economic instability (which we briefly referred to while discussing the second strategic belief) now the question to be asked is, what would the preferred outcomes for India (i.e. the preferences) in such scenario? Before moving on with this question we need to pause a little to discuss the immediate external environment (essentially the Pakistan and the China factors) of India which would have a direct bearing on determining the preferences.

In the last week of October 1947 India had to take the responsibility of repelling the raiders immediately after Kashmir's accession. As the year 1947 ended the Kashmir was a matter of acute concern. Apart from the task of military operations, it involved the risk of an open war with Pakistan putting "India's peaceability to crucial test" (Mallik 1967:38). Though Pakistan was yet to be aligned with any of the power bloc in 1947, it was anticipatable that sooner or later it would choose to do so to externally balance India's overwhelming strategic as well as material superiority. Considering Pakistan's dissatisfaction over the post partition settlements, its reservations over the accession of Kashmir, its hostile and revisionist designs against India's much more status quoist one, its anti-secular Islamist ideology, internal political instability, the class character of

the leadership and so on, it was very much likely that it would choose to align with the western bloc, which it finally did in 1954.

On the other hand India also had to start thinking about the then latent yet identified potential Chinese threat. K.M. Pannikar, a close confidant of Nehru, writing about his assignment to communist China as India's first ambassador, then admitted that he 'knew, like anyone else, that with a Communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of question' Even Nehru had implicitly appreciated the potentiality of the Chinese threat as China's somewhat inherent tendency to be expansive when she is strong (Rana 1976:65). In the Chinese press, Nehru figured as a 'running dog of imperialism' and a 'stooge of the Anglo Saxon bloc'. For the China Asia's march towards Socialism had taken an important step ahead in the China's revolution. So the colonies of Asia and Africa now were bound to follow China's road. In such circumstances for the Chinese India's choice of liberal democracy along with the mixed economy, the ideology of democratic socialism did not make sense. At the best the China looked at it as a clever device of some 'running dogs of imperialism' which were keen to avoid the transition to Socialism in their respective countries (Deshpande 1981:471). In February 1950 China signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union and became an aligned power. On 19th October 1949, Mao Tse Tung in a message sent to the Communist party of India (CPI) expressed his belief in the CPI saying, 'India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators...that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind'. (Rana 1976:64) Therefore, Indian leaders could not have been unaware of the potentiality of China's threat right from the inception of the Communist regime.

Apart from these two identified external threats, one would argue there were two other logically anticipated (or at least anticipatable, as there is no concrete evidence of such an anticipation), (not threats but) unfavourable external circumstances as well, especially if one were to compare India's strategic beliefs with its strategic environment in general. All the strategic beliefs converged at one point and that was the inevitability of non-compliant behaviour (yet without

being passive or isolationist). The strategic environment was marked with fierce antagonism and mutual suspicion.

In such circumstances, any kind of a non-compliant behaviour was expected to be welcomed with coldness, resistance and antipathy from both the rival super powers. Because, firstly, in case of such fierce ideological as well as political antagonism, the tendency of both the antagonists would be to treat the non-compliant essentially as an enemy following the logic which says 'those who are not with us are against us'. Secondly, the bonafides or the genuineness of the non-compliance would always be suspected, treating its non-compliance as a guise to hide the alignment with the enemy camp. So Indian policy makers knew that if India were to hold on to its key strategic beliefs and act accordingly, it was very likely to be received with coldness, antipathy, and resistance from both the United States as well as the Soviet Union.

Taken in to account the combined hold of the four key strategic beliefs, the internal political instability and the consequent challenges of nation building, potential threats from two of its neighbours (Pakistan and China) and the anticipatable antipathy from both the super powers, we can now move on to determine India's strategic preferences.

The first and the foremost preference would be 'to ensure India's survival and to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity' considering its internal political instability coupled with identified potential threats from two of its neighbours the anticipatable antipathy from both the super powers. Survival in this case implied not mere physical survival but the survival of those socio-economic values (for eg. secularism, democratic socialism) which were believed to be 'essential for the state in its task of nation building and providing a particular, desirable domestic order based upon such values' (Shukul 1993:26).

The second immediate preference than would be 'to pursue a long term self reliant economic development' in order to progressively move away from the initially unavoidable external dependence [in this case on the West, especially the United states, as the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc was not quite in a position to offer economic assistance or to do significant trade with India] in the form of

capital investment or in the field of technology. This preference in India's case was directly linked with a long term aim of achieving self reliance in defense production through the industrialization of the country. Indian policy makers, as Mallik (1967:42) were acutely aware of the military needs of their country as a potential great power. Mallik has cited Nehru's speech addressing the Indian Army officers at Wana in South Waziristan on 19th October 1946; where he described India as one of the four great powers (the other three being the United States, the USSR and the China) and underlined the desirability of having the best forces with the best weapons for India. Yet India's strategic thinking guided by its strategic beliefs regarding 'a relative absence of any immediate and real threat to India' and 'indivisibility of peace' (along with its then present material weakness and the problems of nation building) preferred to perceive its security on a strictly defensive sense and preferred the non-militarist or rather the diplomatic option for generating capabilities for its security in strictly minimalist and defensive sense (Shukul 1994:34-37).

After responding to the immediate challenges of having to deal with internal instability and underdevelopment (not sequentially but analytically) the next logical step would be to respond to the external compulsions (of alignment from both the power blocs) and to the identified potential threats from two of its neighbours. The most important and urgent danger in India's broader strategic environment, as argued before, would stem from the possibility of spilling over of cold war rivalry in its neighbourhood. Though there were other concretely identified potential threats from the Pakistan and the China in sight, the way India perceived its security and independence (guided by the beliefs such as 'the indivisibility of peace and disaster', 'essential Asian solidarity' and 'political independence as independence in conducting international affairs') the possibility of spilling over of cold war in Asia (taking away the hard-earned independence of newly independent Asian states, disrupting the delicate balance of power and consequently harming the indivisible peace) was seen as the most imminent danger. So logically India's most preferred outcome vis-à-vis this most imminent danger would be to prevent cold war from entering into its neighbourhood. But

how could have India prevented this compulsive cold war from entering in to its neighbourhood? We shall come back to this question while discussing the strategies to achieve these most preferred outcomes.

These three preferences discussed above are not only closely related to each other but in a way could be argued to be working in the service of the fourth and the last preference i.e. to attain special status in world affairs (Also see; Shukul 1994:37). This preference stemmed from all the first three strategic beliefs, which were largely about the recognition of India's potential strategic importance (or rather the reclamation of India's lost potential strategic importance), the recognition of the special historical role or responsibility India would have to shoulder vis-à-vis maintaining the indivisible (world) peace, initiating the awakening Asian consciousness and protecting the hard-earned political independence of its Asian neighbours and so on. All the three strategic beliefs could be said to have found their expression in the formation of this preference.

Consideration of the beliefs and the preferences discussed so far along with the identified, potential external threats (from Pakistan and China) and the logically anticipatable unfavourable external circumstances (the U.S. and the Soviet antipathy, coldness and suspicion) together makes it relatively easier to deduce the strategies out of them. In case of the Pakistan, it would not have been impossible for India to unilaterally tackle the Pakistan's military threat (in the pre 1954 period) since India could have mustered much more superior military capability against the Pakistan than Pakistan could, on its own, against India. But to do that meant to contradict one's strategic beliefs and more importantly to sideline the more pressing issues of economic development and nation building. Such an overt military confrontation would have surely provided a readymade opportunity to both the super powers to intervene, which would mean inevitable spilling over of the cold war in India's neighbourhood. After 1954 Pakistan officially entered in to a military alliance with the West which gave her an edge over India's own military capability. It was a matter of great concern for India which preferred to prevent the spill over of cold war politics in Asia. In order to contain this Pakistani move, an alignment with the rival bloc evidently wouldn't

have been an option and internal balancing would be neither desirable nor possible. So the only available strategy India had vis-à-vis Pakistan was 'to diplomatically neutralize the advantage to the Pakistan of her alliance with the United States' (Shukul 1993:41).

To respond to the Chinese belligerency with any definitiveness was strategically as well as normatively impossible. To unilaterally tackle the China was never an option for India. So to respond to the Chinese threat strategically meant to either assuage such hostility by aligning with the two communist powers by allowing oneself to be reduced to the status of communist satellite or to incur the hostility of a communist bloc from Berlin to Peking by lining up with the west in the cold war (Rana 1976:68). Again any of these moves would have brought cold war to its doorsteps and would have simply contradicted all the four of its strategic beliefs as well as sidelined its preferences.

Besides such a move would have contradicted Nehru's strong predilection that good relations between India and the China were desirable and possible (essential Asian solidarity), which he had expressed long before the communist seized power or China became a power to reckon with (Rana 1976:64-67). So it made a great sense to India to not to choose to believe that the communist China would be axiomatically hostile to India, in spite of its likelihood. So the apt strategy vis-à-vis the China would be to inoffensively contain (or at least postpone) potential Chinese threat through the diplomacy of amelioration, emphasizing peaceful co-existence, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, non interference and so on (which eventually in 1954 characterized as Panchsheel) generating a mood of optimism and enthusiasm (Rana 1976:67-69). So the subsequent Indian moves such as the formal recognition of Tibet as a region of the China, the delimitation of the Sino-Indian frontiers when the China was not asserting any claim, disapproval of the western policy of keeping the China out of the United Nations and also pressing for a legitimate place for the China in the security council and so on needs to be seen as the manifestation of this strategy of inoffensive containment of potential Chinese threat.

Let's couple these two strategies, which India devised or improvised to deal with the identified potential threats from its neighbours, under one heading i.e. 'diplomatic neutralization and inoffensive containment of potential threats from Pakistan and China respectively.'

In order to pacify the internal as well as external compulsions of alignment India needed to improvise a patient strategy of maintaining cordial relations with both the super powers without antagonizing any of them. This of course did not mean either bi-alignment or equidistance, but 'to move towards the polarities of alignment (without actually aligning) according to the favourable international environment' (Rana 1976:100). This strategy would be the best possible strategic improvisation to exploit both India's own potential strategic importance as well as the delicate balance of power (playing with the open ended possibility of aligning with the rival power bloc without actually aligning i.e. threat latency without explication) opening up the possibilities of fulfilling India's desire to play an important role in world affairs and attaining the special status in world affairs. This strategy exactly possessed the potential of generating capabilities which would have proved useful in dealing with both the super powers, pacifying the compulsions of alignment and also simultaneously contributing to the state survival, protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to the task of nation building, restoring internal political order and achieving self reliant economic development. The flexibility, elasticity, unpredictability and dynamic nature of this strategy made it more than capable of shielding India from the compulsions, threats, insecurities caused by its strategic environment, of buying time as well as prolonged peace for India which would allow it to concentrate upon its more urgent internal issues. As a strategy it had all the required attributes we have been discussing. It was non-compliant, non-militarist, solely diplomatically operationable and innovative.

In order to prevent the spill over of cold war in its neighbourhood (going by its beliefs in indivisibility of peace and essential Asian solidarity) India needed to devise a strategy of 'creating, maintaining and widening a zone or area of peace'. The earlier strategy was largely about shielding oneself from the

compulsions of cold war politics. Here the task is to shield one's neighbourhood, to protect the political independence of the newly independent states, and to eventually soften the cold war rivalry.

Then lastly in order to deal with the anticipatable antipathy and the suspicion of both the superpowers (as a reaction to India's non-compliance) and to establish the credentials or bonafides of one's non-compliance India needed to devise a strategy. The task of this strategy would be to effectively signal to both the rival super powers that India was not genuinely aligned with any of them. What could be a better opportunity for such signaling than the situations of international conflicts/crises (for eg. Korean crisis) or disagreements at the International forums like the United Nations; involving both the (or even one of the) superpower/s. Such signalling needed not only to validate the credentials of India's non-compliance but also to convince both the super powers of the utility value of non-compliant nations as peaceful and impartial arbiters of international conflicts, especially when the power, due to the fear of disruption of delicate balance of power, could not be the final arbiter of conflicts, as popularly believed by the Realist IR theory. So let's formulate the fourth strategy as a strategy to play, positive, impartial, mediatory role in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disagreements (also at the international forums like the United Nations), which essentially implied the maxim 'to judge each issue on its own merit'. This strategy possessed the potential to gain international legitimacy, recognition and in turn the special status for India.

If one were to sum up all these four strategies under one heading, one would get the grand strategy (or general line of foreign policy) called non-alignment. In the particular Rationalist framework we have chosen either the strategic environment or actor's belief and preference (and in turn strategies) cause the outcome. In our case the outcome is the adoption of the non-alignment as a general line of foreign policy by post independence India. The strategic environment provided an incentive to the actor (i.e. India) for not complying i.e. for not aligning with any of the super power bloc. The actual course of action (i.e. the general line of foreign policy) adopted by the actor (India) showed very


apparent or surface level similarity to the available courses of actions in actor's strategic environment. The similarity was only restricted to the choice of not complying i.e. not aligning. What the actor meant by not complying was not just not complying. It meant much more for the actor. What the actor (India) did by remaining not complied or not aligned was simply not readily available to the actor (but was definitely possible) in its strategic environment. So what India did was to innovate and adopt a new course of action taking off from the available ones and then innovating in the realm of the logically possible and not just the logically available. If it was not the strategic environment then what else could have caused/constituted this innovation or the adoption of new course of action?

I argue that, actor's (India's) beliefs and preferences constituted this innovation or what I prefer to call it, a grand strategic improvisation. It is the beliefs and preferences of the actor, which provided a positive, proactive and dynamic content to this strategic improvisation and at the same time led to its adoption. These beliefs and preferences, I argue, were not only logically consistent and complexly interlinked with each other but also were logically apriori and analytically independent from the actual course of action (non-alignment) the actor (India) adopted. In order to stand by these beliefs (to be consistent with them) and to fulfill the preferences actor had to devise certain strategies. The grand strategic improvisation (non-alignment) we are talking about was more than the sum total of these, again complexly interrelated yet analytically independent, strategies. The outcome (i.e. the adoption of non-alignment) meant the pursuit or the exercise of these (interrelated yet separate) strategies by the actor (post independence India) between the chosen period (from 1946 to 1955). In that case the adoption of the grand strategic improvisation was not a single event like the formal announcement of non-alignment as a general line of policy by Indian policy makers, which happened only once and for all. It has to be seen a continuous process which implied the exercise of these various strategies (either simultaneously or sequentially or both) by the actor over a particular period of time.

Thus, to conclude, the adoption of the grand strategy/the general line of foreign policy by post independence India (from 1946 to 1955) was *co-constituted* by India's *strategic environment* and its *beliefs, preferences*. The strategic environment constituted an opportunity and provided an incentive to India (along with the other newly independent states) for non-aligning. Finally the adoption of the policy of non-alignment, which turned out to be significantly different and much more than non-aligning - a strategic improvisation, was constituted by India's strategic beliefs and preferences, (listed as follows in the table no.2).

<u>Beliefs</u>	<u>Preferences</u>	<u>Strategies</u>
1. The mutual rivalry amongst the great powers as the surest guarantee against an attack of India. 2. Indivisibility of peace and disaster. 3. Essential Asian solidarity. 4. Freedom fundamentally consists of freedom in conducting international affairs, rest is local autonomy.	1. To ensure India's survival and to protect its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 2. To pursue a long term self reliant economic development. 3. To prevent cold war from entering into its neighbourhood. 4. To attain special status in world affairs.	1. Diplomatic neutralization and inoffensive containment of potential threats from Pakistan and China respectively. 2. To move towards the polarities of alignment (without actually aligning) according to the favourable international environment. 3. To create, maintain and widen a zone or area of peace. 4. To play, positive, impartial mediatory role in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disagreements (also at the international forums like the United Nations)

Table no.2



Chapter Two: Non-alignment: A Constructivist Interpretation

The first chapter explored the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment as a Rational Choice by post independence India, by focusing upon the beliefs and preferences which constituted this choice. The beliefs and the preferences (listed in the table no.2) formed the endogenous structure of the actor. The strategic environment which consisted of the information structure and the available actions (listed in the table no.1) formed the exogenous structure. The adoption of non-alignment by post independence India as a grand strategy was the strategic outcome of the interaction between these two structures, the endogenous and the exogenous.

Now in the second chapter, we shall focus upon the actor's identity/identities (which is/are constituted of cultural and ideational factors such as norms, values, ideology, discursive practices and so on) through Constructivist lens. The focus is to explore the relation between these identities, interests and the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment. The term identity comes from social psychology which refers to the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant others. Thus conventionally speaking the term identity refers to "mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other." (See; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 59). We shall come back to the detailed discussion of identity, the process of collective identity formation, the relational aspect of identity and the link between actor's (state's) identities, interests and the foreign policy choices it made, later in the chapter while discussing the particular Constructivist methodological framework to be adopted to explain the adoption of non-alignment by post independence India. Before that one needs to briefly discuss the basic tenets or the defining features (i.e. the common ground) of Constructivism in general which are unanimously shared by different contesting IR Constructivist approaches. But even before that one has to first locate and contextualise the Constructivist scholarship within the contemporary debates in IR theory.

According to 'orthodox historiography' of IR, the field's history has been characterized by three successive 'great debates': the first between the inter war 'Idealists' and post war 'Realists', the second between the 'traditionalists' and the 'behavioralists' or 'scientists' in the context of behavioral revolution, and the third described as an 'inter-paradigm' debate between realists, pluralists and structuralists which took place in early 1980s (Schmidt 2002:10, 11). It is commonly argued that IR Constructivism was a result of IR theory's third debate and the end of the cold war made it popular. Brian Schmidt (2002:12-16) problematizes this 'orthodox historiography' and points out the problems and difficulties involved in understanding the history of IR within the framework of the three 'great debates'. He brings out the limitations of this framework in understanding the increasingly pluralistic nature of the field, especially during the 1980s (2002:15). During 1980s, argues Schmidt, "there seems to be plethora of debates" (2002:15). There is the debate between 'Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism', between 'Rationalists and Reflectivists', between 'Rationalists and Constructivists', between 'Offensive Realists and Defensive Realists', between 'Communitarians and Cosmopolitans'. Besides, there are also numerous debates within specific approaches such as Constructivism, Feminism, Realism and Post-Structuralism.

Even if one keeps aside the issue of historiography of IR for a time being, one has to accept the fact that, the penetration of a century or more of interpretative sociological scholarship into IR discourse at least a decade before the end of the cold war made IR Constructivism possible. This penetration reinforced by "the partial disenchantment with materialist and positivist views of social science and in the wake of the end of the cold war, by the dismal record of prediction in IR" (Adler, 2002: 98) constituted the immediate conditions of Constructivism's acceptance and its growing influence as alternative way of doing IR theory and research which has made substantial contribution to IR discipline.

According to the common narrative, to begin with there was Nicolas Onuf (1989) who first referred to the interpretative turn in IR as Constructivism along with Frederic Kratochwil's (1989) book on rules, norms and decision making,

who became the beacon for 'modernist linguistic' and 'rule-oriented' Constructivist research and along side these two, Alexander Wendt through a series of seminal and important articles (1987, 1992, 1994) followed by a book (1999) brought structuration and scientific Realism to the attention of IR making a crucial argument that international anarchy does not have one single, given logic instead '[a]narchy is what states make of it' [which has become a popular 'Constructivist myth' as termed by Cynthia Weber (2001)] thus establishing himself as the leading 'modernist' Constructivist scholar. But the real picture is not as simple and linear as it is projected by the common narrative. IR Constructivism has older and deeper roots (even within the IR scholarship) and needs to be understood in pluralist terms with synergetic links between various scholars, trends and research programmes (See; Adler, 2002: 99, 100).

Constructivism in social sciences builds on centuries of intellectual developments in philosophy, sociology and social theory. Though it is not easy to speculate about its origins; generally Constructivism, as argued by Adler (2002), can be traced back to Immanuel Kant, whom Ian Hacking (1999:41) refers to as 'the great pioneer of Constructivism'. Out of these diverse and centuries old intellectual origins Adler (2002: 96) enlists four major currents of thoughts (neo-Kantian 'Objective Hermeneutics', linguistic 'Subjective Hermeneutics', critical theory and the pragmatist philosophy of science) that affected the IR Constructivism. Then he divides the IR Constructivist scholarship in to four main approaches (modernist, modernist linguistic, radical and critical) which rely, directly or indirectly, on one of the above currents of thought and a strategy for bridging between them.

There is a great deal of variation as well as substantive differences (especially on epistemological questions) amongst these approaches which we are not going to discuss here. The point is to highlight the fact that Constructivist IR is not a single approach but a family or combination of approaches. One also needs to emphasize that (like Rationalism) Constructivism (in either ontological or empirical or analytical terms) is not a substantive theory of world politics. This is important to note because Constructivism has sometimes been identified with the

latter, and then compared to bona fide theories of world politics like Realism and liberalism. (For eg. see Walt, 1998) In fact "...when it comes to content and nature of international politics, Constructivism is not a 'theory' at all, any more than is Rationalism." (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56). Though Constructivism in IR is not a single approach or a substantive theory of world politics or even a theory; it is still possible to talk about certain defining features or common ground or single recipe of Constructivism. This single recipe can help us to make important generalizations about Constructivism by looking beyond the substantive differences. These generalizations can in turn help us to narrow our focus, to bring more clarity and stability before moving on with the discussion of the particular methodological framework to be adopted to explain the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India.

Defining features or common ground of Constructivism

To start with the obvious, Constructivists are interested in the objects and practices of social life are 'constructed', and especially those that societies or researchers take for granted as given or natural. Naturalization is problematic because it obscures the ways in which social objects and practices depend for their existence on ongoing choices, and as such it can be oppressive and barrier to social change. However, while the general purpose of de-naturalizing a previously unquestioned object or practice –for example, power politics, ethnic identity, or sovereignty – is therefore to open up possibilities for progressive transformation, it need not have that effect. In some cases actors may decide that a practice should not be changed, but if so at least its acceptance would then be more self conscious and democratically accountable (See; Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56-58).

Despite the divisions among Constructivists concerning serious issues, all Constructivists (modernist, modernist linguistic and critical with the exception of the extreme post modernist wing of radical Constructivism) share two understandings: what Stefano Guzzini (2000: 149) summarized as 'the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality'. In combination

these two understandings are Constructivism's common ground, the view that the material world does not come classified, and that, therefore, the objects of our knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language. This means that different collective meanings are attached to the material world twice, as social reality and scientific knowledge. In other words knowledge is both 'a resource that people use for the construction of social reality' as well as 'a tool (theories, concepts, meanings, symbols) which scientists use for the interpretation of social reality'.

Unlike positivism and materialism which take the world as it is, Constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. Constructivists, of all types, are not interested in how things *are* but how they *become* what they are. Unlike idealism and post-structuralism and post modernism, which take the world only as it can be imagined or talked about, Constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and that there is consequently some foundation for knowledge. (See; Adler, 2002: 95-101) One can enlist at least four characteristics and inter-related features of Constructivist thinking about the construction of social objects and practices. (See, Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57-68).

First, Constructivism is centrally concerned with the role of ideas in constructing social life. These ideas will often be shared by many people and in order to have social relevance they need to be instantiated in practices, which on both counts means that they may have considerable objectivity, "factivity" or "materiality." (This view is shared by all the Constructivist approaches except the post modernist wing of radical Constructivism). Constructivism is not subjectivism or pure idealism. Instead, the emphasis on ideas is meant to oppose arguments about social life which emphasize the role of brute material conditions like biology, geography and technology. This is not to say that these have no role whatsoever but rather that their impact is always mediated by the ideas that give them meaning. Thus Constructivism does not imply a radical 'ideas all the way down' idealism which denies any role whatsoever to material conditions. From Constructivist point of view material factors matter at the limit, but how they

matter depends upon ideas. (For detailed discussion, see Wendt, 1999:ch. 3) Yet according to Wendt (1999) Constructivism is too limited when it simply tests ideas as causal factors against realist variables such like power and interest, without exploring the degree to which these apparent 'material' variables are constituted by ideational processes.

In this world 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.'(Wendt, 1995:73) As argued by Adler (2002:100) four critical implications follow from this, which broadly form an ontological common ground for Constructivists. First, the social world is made up of intersubjective understandings, subjective knowledge and material objects. Second, social facts, which are facts only by human agreement and which account for the majority of facts studies in IR, differ from rock and flower, unlike the latter, their existence depends upon human consciousness and language. Third, although individuals carry meanings, knowledge, ideas in their heads, they also know, think and feel only in the context of and with reference to collective or intersubjective understandings, including rules and language. Fourth, Constructivists (except for radical Constructivists) all consider 'the mutual constitution' of agents and structures to be part of Constructivism's ontology.

Second, Constructivism is concerned with showing the socially concerned nature of agents or subjects. Rather than taking agents as givens or primitives in social explanation (as Rationalists tends to do), Constructivists are interested in problematizing the agents, in making them a dependent variable. This concern operates at two levels. One the more superficial level the focus is on the casual processes of socialization by which the particular agents acquire their identities and interests. On a deeper level, Constructivists are concerned with the constitutive conditions of possibility for certain modes of subjectivity in the first place. Some of these conditions are historical in the sense what it means to be an agent may change over the time, and thus are culturally relative rather than reducible to universal features of human beings.

Third, Constructivism is based on a research strategy of methodological holism rather than methodological individualism. In a strict sense methodological individualism requires that explanations in social science be reducible in the last analysis to 'micro-foundations', which is to say statements about ontologically primitive individuals and/or their interactions. For various reasons holists argue that this effort must ultimately fail, and so we need to make social wholes and internal relations rather than the primitives in social scientific explanations. (For detailed discussion see, Wendt, 1999:ch. 4)

One also needs to take in to account that the commitment to holism and the commitment to endogenizing or problematizing the given individual are not the same things. There are two broad senses in which one might try to endogenize actors, causal and constitutive. The causal approach asks where actors come from or come to have qualities they have today. In contrast, the constitutive approach asks not where the actors or their properties come from, in an historical or process tracing sense, but about their social conditions at a given moment. Constitutive explanations of actors explain in the sense of telling us what actors are made of, or how their properties are made meaningful or possible by the society in which they are embedded. The casual approach of endogenizing actors falls more on the individualist side, while the constitutive one on the holist side.

Yet one has too keep in mind that Constructivism, as interpreted by Fearon and Wendt (2002), does not discard the analytical value of methodological individualism as a research strategy, which take actors/agents as givens, by pitting it against the methodological holism. Rather they argue (and as we shall see in the next chapter) that the difference between these two research strategies (individualist and holist) needs to be understood in a more flexible and purely analytical terms rather than in ontological terms as substantive claims about the nature of the world. It is possible to explain certain aspects of agent's 'subjectivity' in ways that don't violate the individualist requirement of reducibility.

Finally, what ties the three forgoing points together is a concern with constitutive as opposed to *just* causal explanations. Causal theorizing seeks to

establish the necessary and the sufficient conditions relating a preexisting cause to a subsequent effect in a more or less mechanistic way. An assumption of such theorizing, therefore, is that cause and effect are independently existing phenomenon. Constitutive theorizing, in contrast, seeks to establish conditions of possibility for objects or events by showing what they are made of and how they are organized. As such, the object or event in question is an 'effect' of the conditions that make it possible, but it does not exist *independent* of them. A common example illustrating this point is the master-slave relationship. The nature and the meaning of 'master' and 'slave' as modes of subjectivity are constituted by their relationship in the sense they can not be 'masters' and the 'slaves' except in the relation with each other. This highlights the way in which social relations can be a primitive in analysis, or irreducible to propositions strictly about pre-existing individuals. This is not to say that Constructivists, particularly on the positivist wing [the 'modernist' according to Adler's (2002) typology], are uninterested in casual explanations. After all, masters and slaves are also effects of shared ideas in the causal sense that their identities and interests are generated by the interaction between them. But, as Fearon and Wendt (2002) argue, the constitutive aspect of Constructivist scholarship is more distinctive.

The concern with 'the role of intersubjectively held ideas in constructing social life and the limited role of the material conditions mediated by the ideas'; 'the agents not as givens but as but as dependent variables to be problematized or endogenized'; 'methodological preference for holism over individualism without discarding the analytical value of the later'; 'concern with constitutive explanations as opposed to just causal explanation': arguably form the defining features or common ground of Constructivism (Fearon and Wendt, 2002).

This discussion of the defining features or the common ground of the Constructivism (combined with the discussion about the defining features of and the common misconceptions regarding Rationalist approach in the chapter one: 2-8) has proved to be analytically useful for two reasons. Firstly, it has provided a kind of general guideline for choosing specific (either Rationalist or Constructivist) theoretical sub-approach or framework within these larger families

of approaches to explain the adoption the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India. Secondly, it has partially opened up the discussion regarding the mutual misconceptions and stereotyping (amongst the Rationalists as well as Constructivists) upon which we can build up the discussion in the next chapter. Our larger project is to approach this so called Rationalism vs. Constructivism divide, without any preconceived notions or biases regarding any of these approaches. Discussing common ground of each these approaches (which are not singular but are actually family of approaches) can surely help us to see through their respective internal differences, which can help us in turn to locate the real source of the divide. The divide which, as one can presume, appears to be exaggerated due to overemphasizing respective ontological and epistemological commitments (and pitting them against each other) instead of taking a more flexible, pragmatic view of theory. After finishing this general discussion about Constructivism one can now turn to the discussion of the particular approach of Constructivism to be adopted in this account.

Identity Construction: the Structural and the Domestic, the Self and the Other (s)

The story of identity formation can be told at two levels, structural or systemic as well as domestic. The structural level operates at the level of the society of states and the interaction amongst the states. While the domestic level focuses upon the society within the states. The overarching aim of Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) is to for Constructivism what Waltz did for Realism, namely, the building of a parsimonious systemic or structural theory of international politics that reveals the overarching constraining and shaping force of structure- this time from an ideational perspective. This ideational structure has a constitutive and not just regulative effects on the actors. That is, the structure leads the actors to redefine their interests and the identities in the process of interacting with each other. They become socialized by process. Yet, as we have argued earlier in the last section, the structures are not independent of

actors. Ideational structures and actors (agents) co-constitute and co-determine each other. Structures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, but structures are also produced, reproduced and altered by the discursive practices of agents. Thus, structures are not reified objects about that actors can do nothing about, but to which they must respond. Rather structures exist only through the reciprocal interaction of actors. This means that agents, through acts of social will, can change structures (For detailed discussion see Copeland, 2000: 190-192).

So the structural side of the identity formation story boils down to the interaction between the states. Drawing on symbolic interactionism, Wendt argues that interaction with other states can lead actors to the significant redefinitions of self. In the process of interacting, two states, designated as 'Ego' and 'Alter' take on certain roles and cast the other in corresponding counter roles. Such role taking and alter-casting, depending upon the type of behaviour exhibited (egoistic vs. other regarding, militaristic vs. co-operative) can lead to one of the two results: a reproduction of initially egoistic conceptions of self and the other, or a transformation of the shared ideational structure to one that is more collective and other regarding (Wendt, 1999:327-326).

But as Copeland (2002:203) argues, Wendt's bracketing off domestic processes to focus on the effect on interaction between states, fails to consider the implication of liberal and especially domestic-Constructivist arguments on the conclusions of Wendt's systemic Constructivism. States do not form a conception of themselves *only* through interaction with other states. Socialization processes internal to a state can change the state's identity and interests independently of such interaction. Wendt (1999:224-233) captures this point in his discussion of the four forms of identity: "corporate", "type", "role" and "collective". The first two develop through processes within state, reflecting the self-organizing aspect of the unit, and do not require the recognition of other states for their meaning. Role and the collective identities, on the other hand, are constituted only through interaction between states.

On the other hand scholars like Ted Hopf (2002) have attempted to reconstruct state's identity at the level of domestic society. His effort is to "domesticise" the social Constructivist approach to international politics, "to bring society back in to social Constructivism -the society *within* the states rather than *between* them" (xiv). His empirical focus is on the Soviet Foreign Policy in 1955 and Russian Foreign policy in 1999. His aim is to show that how a state's collection of identities, how it understands itself, can affect how that state, or more precisely its decision makers, understands other states in the world affairs. To bring society back in, the approach he has adopted is largely inductivist and the method he has employed is chiefly interpretivist, aimed at recreating the intersubjective reality of the subjects. So instead of choosing apriori theories and deducing hypothesis from them, then to gather data against which to test their implications; what he has done is to empirically find out which collection of identities existed in Moscow in 1955 and 1999, to develop an idea of kinds of discourses that predominated there and to lay out the boundaries of these discourses for the society as a whole. After constructing 'the identity terrain or topography', in the second step, Hopf has tried to suggest how these identities of Self might affect the identities of the Others in international affairs. In the third step he looks at, the dependent variable, that is the understandings of the Soviet or Russian state had of the other states in the world, especially through the eyes Soviet or Russian policy makers, whom Hopf posits to be an integral part of 'social cognitive structure', which comprises of identities and discourses.

Arguing that "Soviet national identity was Russian" (p. 56), Hopf focuses on class, modernity, nation, and the New Soviet Man as the four primary identities that dominated the Moscow debate or identity topography in 1955, whose overarching theme was difference versus deviance: could the difference from the ideal model of the New Soviet Man, be permitted without the emergence of the dangerous deviance, the bourgeoisie degeneration of Soviet socialist project? He posits a direct connection between tolerance of diversity at home—in this case, the literary thaw—and tolerance of diversity abroad, in this case, Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito. This seemingly domestic issue was projected

into Soviet foreign policy towards not just Yugoslavia but also the Third world. To those who understood difference at home as natural and non threatening, such as Nikita Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan, difference abroad, difference abroad, in the form of Tito's Yugoslavia and non-aligned states such as India and Egypt, as a possible opportunity, not threat. To these Soviet leaders, toleration of difference at home, when projected abroad, implied a multiplication of Soviet alliance opportunities in the world. In contrast, Vyacheslav Molotov, was convinced that, difference at home was a dangerous deviance, argued against the rapprochement with Tito and was not supportive of expanding ties with India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and other decolonizing states. Their distance from socialism, to him, meant danger.

Hopf's discussion of emerging Russian identities in 1999 has gone far beyond the conventional division of Russian commentators into 'Atlanticists' and 'Eurasianists'. Hopf focuses on four main identity discourses. The first, 'the New Western Russian', which identified Russia as the West, seeking full integration with the West on its terms, rejecting a unique Russian identity and favoring a free-market economy. The second, 'the New Soviet Russian', understood Russia through its Historical other the Soviet Union, expressing nostalgia for the Soviet period, seeking to restore Russia's great-power status and its state-run economy. The third, 'the Liberal Essentialist', understood Russia as a meaningfully unique in the world of unique states, each of which has an authentic, essential and irreducible self, taking a position between the previous two, which implied believing in the uniqueness of Russian national identity but favoring some attributes of Western society and preferring closer ties to Europe than to the United States. The fourth, the Liberal Relativist, treated each of the other discourses as ridiculous efforts to achieve some kind of an illusory unity of Self, because Russia and the entire world, was just an ironic, incommensurable pastiche. The implications of these discourses for the Russian foreign policy are perhaps best observed in the discursive treatment of the NATO's bombing of Serbia. The 'New Soviet Russian's read this as an attack on Russia itself, through its ethnonational Serbian Ally. The New Western Russian discourse was

completely discredited by the West, the Other, Russia wished to become, because of that Other's indefensible barbaric behaviour in contravention of international legal norms. The Liberal Essentialist discourse inferred a threat from NATO's actions, not because of any ethnonational concern with Serbian brothers but from the implications of NATO's illegal act had for Russia's legal sovereign rights to pursue its own war against Chechen separatist. The Liberal Relativist discourse never made it to foreign policy implications; it appeared only at the very margins of Russian foreign policy with few ironic parodies of the other discursive treatments of the war.

The purpose of detailed discussion of Ted Hopf's treatment of Soviet and Russian identity topographies in 1955 and 1999 respectively and their constitutive link with the respective foreign policy choices made by the policy makers in those years, is mainly because of its potential utility for interpreting the adoption of non-alignment through Constructivist framework. It would be methodologically more useful and apt framework than Wendt's structural Constructivism for two reasons.

First, there is an inherent tension between the constructedness and the givenness of identity in the Wendt's systemic Constructivism. (For detailed discussion, see, Zehfus, 2006) In other words, as argued by Zehfus, Wendt needs identity to be constructed but at the same time in some ways given. The necessary givenness can only be upheld by excluding dimensions of constructedness from view. Zehfus calls it the 'dilemma of identity in Wendt's Constructivism. Due to which Wendt's structural framework, in spite of the first two forms of state identities: 'corporate' and 'type' kept outside the purview of the interaction with the other states, does not give enough justice to the complex discursive formations within the domestic boundaries of the state, which (as we have seen in Hopf's treatment) can have important role to play in constituting state's understanding of the Self and the Other states in the world, independent of the ideational structure which is co-constituted or co-determined by the interaction between the states. This is not to say that the ideational structure or the interaction with the other states have no role to play. Both the structural as well as domestic levels are

important for understanding and explaining world politics. But, one can argue that the structural framework proves to be more useful in understanding and explaining systemic changes or transformations (the transformations from the Hobbesian to Lockean, and from Lockean to Kantian culture of anarchy), while the domestic level Constructivism proves to be more useful in understanding and explaining specific foreign policy choices made by particular state and/or group of states. The domestic level Constructivism enables us to engage with the particularities of history, culture, ideology, social systems, religion of states, which plays an important role in the shaping world view and consequently foreign policy of those states. This point takes us to our second reason of choosing domestic level framework over the structural one that is the Eurocentric bias of the Wendt's structural theory which, according to me, makes it less sensitive towards the particular histories of the post colonial states. Wendt's structural theory largely presupposes and built upon the experience of and the history of European nation-state system, projecting the respective cultures of anarchy within European system as the systemic or the universal one. In contrast, the domestic level Constructivism does not carry any inherent or built-in historical bias. Rather the particular framework adopted by Ted Hopf can be treated as an empty vessel, which we can fill by the particularities of history, society, culture of states, whose understanding of the Self and the Other and in turn the foreign policy choices we choose to explain. We have already discussed the empirical focus of Hopf's work earlier in this section. Now we need to discuss his methodological framework in greater detail before moving ahead with the discussion of identity discourses within pre independence India.

To start with, Hopf (2002:1-3) criticizes social psychology for not providing enough attention to the social aspect of identity and focusing solely on the individual so far. He also critiques the frameworks which portrays identities as intentional and oppositional in character. For him identities are not always internationally or deliberately chosen for strategic or manipulative reasons. Identities, according to him, are not always the result of material conditions,

innate drives, dangerous others or strategic choice. Then what is left is a thin cognitive account of identity that is thickly inductive and empirical.

The approach Hopf adopts is called 'social cognitive approach'. According to which Society is assumed to be consist of 'social cognitive structure', within which operate many 'discursive formations'. Identities constitute these formations. Individuals have many identities, they participate in many discursive formations and their daily social practices constitute both themselves and the others. One needs to look at these identities as empirically testable than as through untested assumptions. The theoretical account of identity, elaborated by Hopf, provides for the empirical inductive recovery, their interpretations and aggregations into discursive formations and their application to the understanding of how a state understands other states in International Politics.

Hopf emphasizes the cognitive dimension of identity. (2002:4, 5) Where he deals with the fundamental question: why should one focus on identity? His answer (which is also the underlying assumption of his theory) is, the only motive for the ubiquitous presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand the social world and consequent cognitive need for order, predictability and certainty. Individual needs identities in order to make sense of oneself and the others and needs the identities of the others to make sense of them and oneself. Thus identities, in Hopf's model, operate like cognitive devices or heuristics. Identities are essential for cognitive economizing, for categorizing people, according to common features, making the other's action intelligible and making one's actions intelligible to oneself vis-à-vis the others. Individual choices are affectively bound by the social cognitive structures, its discourses and their identities. Individual experiences this delimitation of choices as objective but in fact it is the product of the intersubjective social structure, which according to Hopf without "great conceptual violence", can also be called as Berger and Lukmann's 'social stock of knowledge', Michael Foucault's 'discursive formations, Bourdieu's 'habitus', Clifford Greetz's 'web of meaning' or Edmund Husserl's 'life-world' (2002:5).

For Hopf, as we have argued earlier, Self's treatment of the Other is a 'critical empirical question' and not an assumption. Identities, for him, are always "relational" but only sometimes "oppositional". The interesting quality of the Other is most often associated with its difference, with its lack of similarity to the self. If one avoids "pretheorization" of the relationship between the Self and the other, then a wide range of possible responses to a different Other can be empirically observed.

Hopf provides us with such a range of possible responses while referring to the works of other cognitive theorists, symbolic interactionists and so on. One possible response of the Self can be to assimilate the difference, making it familiar and thus averting the danger of destabilizing what an individual knows about his one's own Self. If the differences seem too great, the Self can try to suppress those differences in order to protect the pre-encounter identity of the Self by categorizing the Other as deviant or abnormal. This 'strategy of nihilation' can involve the physical destruction of the deviant other or their public recantation and avowed integration in to the normal world of the Self. Difference from the Other can result in the alteration of the Self's identity in the direction of that Other.

Accommodation to the other instills fear in the Self, which is always concerned with its loss. Even so, this kind of a resolution may be a strategic act of Self preservation—a toleration of difference in order to save the self. The greatest threat to the Self is a comprehensive alternative identity, an Other that can plausibly be understood as replacement. Similarly, the single gravest threat to the Self comes when an individual meets an Other that can account for all of her, plus some additional content. Perhaps the most threatening Other is the closest Other, closest in the sense of being able to replace the self more easily than alternative. It is not nominal difference that threatens but intersubjectively relevant difference. This also suggests another category of Others, irrelevant Others, Others so far out of the symbolic universe as to pose a little or no threat to the Self. One final relationship is a situation wherein the Self regards the Other as its negation, its

opposite. This particular rendition of identity relations is associated with critical theorists, who argue that, 'dichotomies are exercises in power'.

After elaborating upon the wide range of possible relationship between the Self and the Other, he makes an important point regarding the conception of Other in International Relations. He argues, "the international literature investigates Self and Other as if the only Other for a state were another state". But there is no priori theoretical or indeed, empirical reason to believe so. Drawing upon the works of George Herbert Mead and Mikhail Bakhtin, Hopf argues that, Self has not only multiple Others but multiple kinds of Others, such as the real Others with whom we are currently involved; imagined others, including characters from our own pasts as well as from cultural narratives, historical others and the generalized others. We shall employ this framework of multiple and multiple kinds of others (both internal or domestic as well as external) while discussing the construction of identities of pre independence India. But these are possible conceptual categories and not priori theories about what constitutes the other. Eventually what constitutes the Other for any given self, as argued by Hopf, is an empirical question of the first order. The main purpose of Hopf's as well as our work is to explore how state understand themselves through domestic others, how state identities are constructed at home as well as through interstate interaction.

The question of identities takes us to the question of interests. For Hopf, "interests should be derivable from identity in the sense that identity implies interests" (2002:16). This relationship should furnish a non-tautological understanding of the origins of an interest that is more endogenous to the more general theoretical account of the identity and interest in another state. It is non-tautological because an evidence of the interest and its content is not the interest itself. It is endogenous because the origins of interest and the identity of an actor are both located within the theoretical account of the identity. The Social cognitive theory of identity provides an account of how a state's own domestic identities constitute a social cognitive structure that makes threats and opportunities, enemies and allies intelligible, thinkable and possible. The state's

interests are the social cognitive products, which are particular historical constructions.

Hopf's theoretical account of identity, as we have argued earlier, proceeds in three steps. The first step is 'the inductive empirical reconstruction of the identity topography'. The second is 'the synthetic creation of discursive formation that brings various identities together'. The third is 'to posit that any decision maker (in Hopf's case, the Soviet or Russian decision maker) making a particular foreign policy choice, being an integral part of the social cognitive structure, is bound by that choice'. Hopf establishes the meanings of identities both 'contextually' and 'intertextually'. His sources, other than the official foreign policy documents (speeches, resolutions, reports and so on), include daily newspapers, scholarly journals, popular novels and film reviews.

While discussing identity formation in the case of pre independence India and the consequent adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment, we shall loosely follow Hopf's framework, with a few significant departures. The significant departures are as follows: Considering the paucity of space and the time span I have chosen for discussion (approximately from the middle of the nineteenth century till 1947), mainly to get a very broad overview of colonial India's identity formation; I shall restrict myself only to the discussion of broad trends, decisive shifts in the formation of colonial Indian identity vis-à-vis its significant Others. So like Hopf, I shall not be able to look at the detailed primary sources such as official documents, speeches, resolutions, reports and so on; instead, I shall focus primarily on the secondary scholarly works dealing with anti-colonial nationalism, the culture and psychology of colonialism and its impact upon the identity formation of the colonized Self [Chatterjee (1986) and Nandy (1980, 1983, 1994)].

Yet, it would not be 'pre-theorization', where the relation between the Self and the Other would be left to apriori assumptions. The historical context will be given its due importance. The ideational strategies devised by the colonial Indian Self are argued to be rooted in particular contexts and specific to the Indian case. The locus of this constitutive explanation shall be the discussion of three

such major ideational moments (or ideational strategies- 'identification', 'subversion', 'accomodation') in the formation of the post-colonial Indian Self through its constant struggle with the Colonial Other. The purpose of this exercise is to enable us to construct a broad identity topography and a broad sketch of discursive formations which went into the construction of Indian Self, then to derive particular interests from it, in order to offer a constitutive explanation of the adoption of non-alignment.

India and its Significant Others: Identification, Subversion and Accomodation

Strategy of Identification

Hopf argues, as we have discussed in the earlier section, that in International politics, 'another state need not be the only Other for a state'. States do have 'multiple Others and multiple kinds of Others', such as real and imagined, historical and generalized, external and internal. For India, a state then under the colonial domination, the most significant Other was the colonizer i.e. British Empire. India was said to be the 'jewel in the crown of the British Empire', strategically and geo-politically the most crucial colony for the British. The encounter with the colonizer in the form of the British Empire marks the most decisive and deeply constitutive influence on the formation and consolidation of the Indian identity. India's understanding of the Self as well as the world has largely been a product of prolonged colonial domination and the resistance to it in the form of the nationalist freedom struggle. The British Empire, the real Other, embodied and represented the generalized others i.e. Colonialism [as a cultural ideology, a shared culture between the colonizer and the colonized, and which presumes a particular style of managing dissent/resistance (see, Nandy 1983:2,3)], Imperialism (as an economic ideology, a world system of organized economic exploitation of the colonies, largely in the Leninist sense) and the West (as the agent of reason, modernity, history, science, progress, development and also of

oppression and exploitation legitimized by the self-proclaimed mission of civilizing the barbarians).

India's encounter with the British Empire was also its encounter with these generalized Others: colonialism, imperialism and the West. The anti-colonial movement generated in India due to this encounter, like all the other anti-colonial movements of our times, had been the product of the imperial culture itself. Even in opposition, the anti-colonial movement in India had paid homage to its various cultural origins (Nandy, 1983:3). Thus the strategy adopted by the colonized Self (i.e. India) to respond to its Other, the colonizer, was not just one of resistance and opposition, but one of identification with the aggressor, both in friendship and in enmity. In the colonial culture, as argued by Nandy (1983:7), "...identification with the aggressor bound the rulers and the ruled in an unbreakable dyadic relationship. The Raj saw Indians as crypto barbarians who needed to further civilize themselves. It saw the British Rule as an agent of progress and as a mission. Many Indians in turn saw their salvation in becoming more like British, in friendship or in enmity".

Nandy (1983:4-29) discusses in detail, how both the liberal reformists as well as the Hindu revivalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century India sought salvation in becoming like the British in their own ways. The former opted for the path of 'rectification' of the so-called regressive and undesirable elements within the degenerated Hindu religion through 'self-redefinition' (judged by the liberal, Rationalist, individualist paradigm of the modern West) 'out of a sense of cultural inferiority'. The latter, meanwhile, committed themselves to 'self-affirmation' through the 'revival' of the so-called 'lost golden age of Hinduism' [which was now 'semiticized or Christianized, as an organized religion with The Book (i.e. The Bhagavad Gita), organized priesthood, legitimacy to proselytization, ideas akin to monotheism and Puritanism, emphasizing Ksatriyahood (the ideology of a martial race) as the exclusive indicator of authentic Indianness, a loss of contact with this true Ksatriyahood and the textual Brahminism as the reasons for the decline of the once great Hinduism; valorizing the hypermasculinity, aggression, possession, technologism, sense of real politics

and so on i.e. the qualities of Christianity which seemingly gave Christians (the colonizers) their strength were projected in to the Hindu past, in to a lost golden age of Hinduism'] in order to militantly resist the colonial Rule.

This identification with the aggressor (by valorizing “hypermasculinity” and considering “the psychological feminity-in-masculinity as a final negation of man’s political identity”) as well as a certain tacit legitimacy given to the colonial project (as a ‘transient but historically inevitable and legitimate stage, a necessary stage for maturation of the infant colonial society’ in to the superior forms of political and economic organization) was firmly rooted in ‘the colonial ideology in British India’, built on ‘the cultural meanings of the two fundamental categories of institutional discrimination in Britain: sex and age’. Through ‘a cultural consensus in post-medieval European societies’, political and socio-economic dominance symbolized ‘the dominance of men and masculinity over women and feminity’. This ‘homology between sexual and political dominance’ saw colonialism not as an absolute evil but as ‘a product of one’s emasculation and defeat in power politics.’ The ‘subsidiary homology’ between childhood and the state of being colonized saw ‘colonialism as a necessary stage for the maturation of the infant Indian society into adulthood’ either through “the reform of the childlike Indian” (‘innocent, ignorant, willing to learn, masculine, loyal and thus corrigible’) through ‘Westernization, modernization or Christianization’ or through “the repression of the childish Indian” (‘ignorant, but unwilling to learn, ungrateful, savage, sinful, unpredictable violent, disloyal and thus incorrigible’) by ‘controlling rebellion, ensuring internal peace and providing tough administration and rule of law’ (See, Nandy 1983:16).

Strategy of Subversion

One has to keep in mind that the identification with the aggressor, both in friendship and in enmity i.e. both in reform as well as in militant resistance were not the only and given set of responses or strategies a colonized self would adopt vis-à-vis the colonizer, the aggressor. The Self’s treatment of the Other is a critical empirical question. This means that the question of possible strategies to be

adopted by the Self vis-à-vis the Other needs to be settled, not through pre-theorization or assumptions alone, but by complementing a theoretical framework (in this case certain theoretical propositions concerning the political psychology of colonialism) with an open and flexible empirical inquiry. Nandy's (1983, 1986) account, from which we have derived certain fundamental strategies adopted by India vis-à-vis its significant Others (the British Empire, colonialism, the West), largely follows a pragmatic and eclectic methodological approach [not fundamentally different from Ted Hopf's (2002) approach discussed in the last section] without discounting the rigor of empirical inquiry otherwise avoided mainly for the sake of guarding certain theories.

While identification was a dominant strategy adopted by Indian elites vis-à-vis the colonizers in the early phase of colonialism (i.e. 1830s onwards till the beginning of the twentieth Century), the alternative model or strategy, that of 'subversion', was not entirely absent. Nandy (1983:27-29) discusses a subversive figure like Ishwarchand Vidyasagar (1820-1891) who did seek to create 'a new political awareness, which would combine a critical awareness of Hinduism and colonialism with cultural and individual authenticity'. He too, fought institutionalized violence against Indian women, giving 'primacy to social reform over politics'. But his 'diagnosis of Hinduism did not grow out of the sense of cultural inferiority'. Even when he fought for Indian women, he did not operate on the basis of 'Westernized ideals of masculinity and femininity' or on 'the basis of the theory of cultural progress'. He refused 'to semiticize Hinduism and to adopt the result as a ready-made theory of state'. He refused to use 'the imagery of a golden age of the Hindus from which contemporary Hindus had allegedly fallen'. He refused to be 'psychologically tied to the history of the non-Hindu rule of India' and he refused 'to settle the scores with the West by creating a nation of Super-Hindus or defending Hinduism as an all-perfect antidote to the Western cultural encroachment'. His effort was to protect not the formal structure of Hinduism but its 'spirit, as an open, anarchic federation of sub-cultures and textual authorities which allowed new readings and internal criticisms'. His model resolutely resisted the ideology of 'hyper masculinity' and 'normality'. His

combination of aggressive defiance of authority and authoritative reinterpretations of authority challenged some of the basic postulates of the colonial theory of progress, particularly the “joint construction of ‘legitimate inequality’ by the Indians and the British” (Nandy 1983:29) (Emphasis original). But Ishwarchand’s times did not allow him to fully politicize his dissent or to take it outside the urban middle class, to mobilize the peripheries of his society, or ‘to make a more creative use of folk-as opposed to Sanskritic- Hinduism’, all of this was accomplished with an unmatched success by his more radical successor, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, ‘the subversive, internal Other’ of the modern Indian Self emerging with the attainment of political freedom.

One may find the categorization of Gandhi as an internal Other rather strange, especially considering the centrality of Gandhi in the radicalization of the Indian freedom struggle, making it a nationwide mass movement in a true sense. But one has to differentiate his unmatched mass appeal, his exceptional mobilizational and organizational skills, his radical pacifism, practical idealism from the modern Indian identity which emerged with the attainment of formal political independence in 1947. One finds a strong inner resistance to internalization and full scale actualization of Gandhian ideas, ideals and values (which were regarded as naïve and unfeasible in addition to being anti-modern and thus regressive) by the ruling elites of independent India in all spheres: social, economic, political as well as foreign affairs. Yet one could not completely sidestep or abandon the socio-political vision of this Other, considering its normative weight. The policy makers of independent India had ‘to accommodate’ the ideas, ideals and values propagated, practiced and reinforced by Gandhi through a process of pragmatic moderation and selective appropriation in order to fit them within the particular framework of modernity, nation building and economic development adopted by the ruling elites. We shall discuss this process of negotiation, selective appropriation and pragmatic accommodation of this internal Other and its implications for the adoption of non-alignment in greater detail later in this section as well as in the next section. For the time being we shall return to our discussion of the essence of Gandhi’s subversion and its

conception of politics not as self-redefinition (reformists, nativists) or as self-affirmation (revivalists) but as autonomy seeking, which brought to the centre of the political culture the traits that had come to be associated with femininity, primitivism, passivity and cowardice. Elements which were considered by the earlier modernizers as a weakness of that society seemed to Gandhi the strengths of an older, more compassionate order (See; Nandy 1980:60-62).

The essence of Gandhi's subversion lies in grasping 'the sharedness of colonial culture, which harms both the colonized and the colonized equally by altering cultural priorities of both sides, bringing forth previously recessive elements from both cultures'. In the beginning of this section, we have briefly discussed the deep impact of the colonizing experience on Indian subjecthood especially the psychological uprooting and cultural disruption. But, as Nandy argues, 'India was a country of hundreds of millions living in a large land mass. In spite of the presence of a paramount power which acted as the central authority, the country was culturally fragmented and politically heterogenous. It could, thus, partly confine the cultural impact of the imperialism to its urban centers, to its Westernized and semi-Westernized upper and middle classes, and to some sections of its traditional elites. That was not the case for the rulers from a relatively more homogeneous small island. They were overwhelmed by the experience of being colonial rulers'. As a result, 'the long-term cultural damage colonialism did to British society was greater'. In the case of the British, argues Nandy, 'the colonizing experience de-emphasized speculation, intellection, and femininity, and openly sanctified new forms of institutionalized violence, ruthless social Darwinism and false sense of social homogeneity' (See; Nandy 1983, 29-48).

Gandhi, argues Nandy, identified with 'critical Christian ethics and the traditional West', as opposed to 'the hyper-masculine, masquerading Christianity and modern, imperial West'. Albeit a non-westerner, Gandhi always tried to be 'a living symbol of this other West'. He 'could sense' and use the fundamental predicament of British culture caught in the hinges of imperial responsibility and subjecthood in victory', but he implicitly defined his ultimate goal as 'the

liberation of the British from the history and psychology of British colonialism'. That is why, according to Nandy, 'Gandhi's spirited search for the other culture of Britain, and of the West, was an essential part of his theory of salvation for India'. It was 'an affirmation', argues Nandy, 'that on one plane, some of the recessive elements of Christianity were perfectly congruent with elements of Hindu and Buddhist world views and therefore, Gandhi's project of subversion was a universal (and not universalist) project to rediscover the softer side of human nature, the so-called non-masculine self of man relegated to the forgotten zones of the Western self-concept' (See, Nandy 1983: 49, 50).

If one takes into account Gandhi's spirited search for the other culture of Britain, and of the West; it is possible to locate Gandhi's non-violence, which as Nandy (1983: 51) argues, "...was probably not a one-sided morality play. Nor was it purely a matter of humane Hindus versus inhuman Britons. The shrewd Bania, a practical idealist, had correctly seen, that at some levels of national consciousness in Britain, there was near-perfect legitimacy for the political methodology he was forging. On the other hand, he knew well that he would have to fight hard to establish his version of non-violence as true Hinduism or as the central core of Hinduism in India. After all, Gandhi himself said that he had borrowed his idea of non-violence not from the sacred texts of India but from the Sermon on the Mount...It was in this sense that Gandhi wanted to liberate the British as much as he wanted to liberate Indians".

To put this awareness to political use, Gandhi first challenged 'the biological stratification acting as a homologue of –and providing legitimacy for– political inequality and injustice'. As already noted, the colonial culture's ordering of sexual identities assumed the superiority of manliness to womanliness and womanliness in turn to femininity in man (i.e. androgyny). We have seen earlier in this section that the first Indian response to this was 'to accept the ordering by giving a new salience to Ksatriyahood as true Indianness'. But, according to Nandy, 'in an unorganized and plural society like India, with a tradition of only parochial, not absolute legitimacy for warriorhood, such Dionysian games with the colonizers were doomed'. This is what the Bengali, Punjabi and Maharashtraian

terrorist found out to their own cost during the early part of this century. They had isolated themselves from the society even more than the British when Gandhi entered Indian politics in the nineteen twenties (See, Nandy 1983:52).

Gandhi's solution was different. He used two kinds of orderings, each of which could be invoked according to the needs of the situation. The first, 'borrowed intact from the great and little traditions of saintliness in India, and probably also from the doctrine of power through divine bi-unity', that is, that 'manliness and womanliness are equal, but the ability to transcend the man-woman dichotomy is superior to both, being an indicator of godly or saintly qualities'. To do this, argues Nandy, 'Gandhi had to ignore the traditional devaluation of some forms androgyny in his culture'. Gandhi's second ordering was invoked specifically as 'a methodological justification for the anti-imperialist movement, first in South Africa and then in India'. It went as follows: 'the essence of femininity is superior to that of masculinity, which in turn is better than cowardice or failure of masculinity'.

The second ordering implied two beliefs, both of which are 'culturally defined' and thus, as Nandy (1983:53) argues, were "assumed by Gandhi, but could be missed by an outside observer." First, 'the feminine principle is a more powerful, dangerous and uncontrollable principle in the cosmos'. Second, 'the traditional Indian belief in the primacy of maternity over conjugality in feminine identity i.e. the woman as an object of and source of sexuality was inferior to the woman as an object of motherliness'. Then Nandy (1983:54) argues further that given the cultural meaning of womanhood, non-violence gives men access to the powerful, active, maternal principle of the cosmos, the protective maternity and by implication, to the godlike state of ardhhanarisvara, a god who is half-woman, half-man. Along the same continuum, Gandhi's 'new' courage allows one to rise above cowardice and become a 'man' (in the popular sense), on the way to becoming the authentic man who admits his drive to become both sexes. This 'new' courage is not 'definitionally wedded to violence as Ksatriyahood', but it may involve 'unavoidable violence under some circumstances', particularly in circumstances where 'the alternative is passive tolerance of injustice, inequality

and oppression-willing victimhood and acceptance of the secondary gains of victimhood- which are all seen as worse than violence'. In sum, Gandhi was clear in his mind that 'activism and courage could be liberated from aggressiveness and recognized as perfectly compatible with womanhood, particularly with maternity'. This 'subversive' move by Gandhi, as Nandy argues (1983:54, 55), certainly 'negated the very basis of colonial culture which depended heavily on Western cosmology, with its built-in fears about losing potency through the loss of activism and the ability to be violent'.

Gandhi's otherness, as I argue, lay in shifting the paradigm of the Indian freedom struggle, from an anti-colonial struggle against the colonizer i.e. British Empire to win a political freedom for India (antagonistic, egoist) to a shared, universal struggle against the ideology of colonialism, the colonial culture, Western cosmology itself, and the respective strategies or responses (liberal reformist, militant revivalist) it generated in Indian society (merging the self-regarding in to the other-regarding, by broadening the boundary of the Self). Thus, as we have argued earlier in this section through the writings of Nandy, Gandhi wanted to liberate the British as much as he wanted to liberate Indians. This subversive paradigm shift in the nature, content and the aim of the anti-colonial struggle was also a paradigm shift in the constitution, conceptualization or political imagination (following Hopf's 'logic of imaginability') of an Indian identity, which was an alternative Indian Self, the Other India; 'radical pacifist', 'critical traditionalist', 'anti-statist', 'counter-modernist', 'anti-colonialist'.

The *interests* which could be derived from this Other Indian Self (which, of course, could not be directly translated into foreign policy, but still played an influential role through their selective appropriation) as follows: to achieve complete *independence* from the British Raj *not as an end* in itself but to allow the *radical decentralization of power*; to facilitate the process of *radical social-cultural reforms* not from the top (engineered by the state machinery) but *gradually through social activism from below*; the attainment of economically self-sufficient villages (also as the social as well as an autonomous political unit of organization; a republic or *panchayat* having full powers to rule and defend

itself) i.e. *Gram Swaraj* through *small scale industrialization* (For detailed discussion, see Chatterjee 1986: 85-125).

Strategy of Accomodation

After identification and subversion, the third strategy or response (and most decisive one in terms of its implications for identity formation as well as foreign policy formulation) adopted by the Indian elites engaged in the freedom struggle, was that of accommodation, which consisted of a pragmatic and selective appropriation of the significant internal as well as external Others. Before moving ahead with the discussion of this strategy of accommodation of the Other, we shall pause and discuss those internal as well as external significant Others (of all kinds, real, imagined, historical, generalized and so on) which have not been discussed so far.

If the encounter with the British Empire (and consequently with colonialism, imperialism and the West) marks the most decisive and deeply constitutive external influence on the formation and consolidation of Indian identity, then the discovery (interpretations and appropriations) of India's History (especially in the context of the larger scheme of the world history) by the Indian elite during the nationalist freedom struggle marks the most constitutive internal influence on India's understanding of its Self, the reasons for its civilisational decline/degeneration leading to the present colonial rule, the modes and the means (as well as the desirable ends) of the resistance to be employed against the colonizer, the possible and desirable political destinies/futures of post independence India and so on. The discovery of India's history by the Indian elite came largely in response to the encounter with the significant external Others discussed above, the British Empire, colonialism, imperialism and the West.

History as a linear process, sometimes with an implied cycle underlying it (moving from prehistory to objective stage-bound history to end of history), which emphasizes causal relations, progress and evolution, following the Judaeo-Christian cosmology, was alien to Indians before the arrival of the British (Nandy

1983: 57). Indian culture, as Nandy (1983:57, 59) argues, has traditionally given salience to the myth as a structured fantasy, as an essence of history, which is seen as contemporary in nature and amenable to intervention/interpretation i.e. which in its dynamic of here-and-now looks at history as a special case of an all-embracing permanent present (and not the present as a special case of an unfolding history in a causal and deterministic way, as understood by the modern West) waiting to be interpreted and re-interpreted which in turn opens up possibilities of alternative future(s) in a non-causal and non-deterministic way.

Gandhi was a product of such a society, which conceptualized the past as a possible means of reaffirming or altering the present. From such a viewpoint, the past can be an authority, but the nature of the authority is seen as shifting, amorphous and amenable to intervention. The Gandhian position (i.e. the subversive position) does make subsidiary anti-historical assumptions, that as myths contain history, and as they (myths) are contemporary and, unlike history, are amenable to intervention, myths are the essence of a culture, history (as the generalized Other), at best superfluous and at the worst misleading. Gandhi implicitly assumed that history was a one-way traffic, a set of myths about the past, built up as independent variables which limit human options, and pre-empt human futures. Myths, on the other hand, 'allow one access to the processes which constitute history at the level of the here-and-the-now' (Nandy 1983: 57-59).

For the modern West and for those influenced by its concept of time, the cultures living by myths are ahistorical, and thus, representative of an earlier, second-rate social consciousness. Historical societies (the adult) are 'the true representatives of mature human self-consciousness' and therefore, 'their constructions of the ahistorical societies (the child) are more scientifically valid than those of these societies themselves' (See; Nandy 1983:60). The strategy of accommodation, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru, tried to bypass this paradigm of the adult-child relationship (without fundamentally challenging or problematising it; but by making it 'less paternalistic and hierarchical'). This provided legitimacy to the colonial project by de-linking (and thus reclaiming and

selectively re-appropriating) the project of modernity (including the two essential modern myths, History and Science) from the West, the European civilization, the colonizers.

The accommodationist challenged the organic and essential relationship between the project of modernity and the West. For them, this relationship, and thus the difference between the East and the West, which resulted into the colonial domination of the latter by the former, was 'conjunctural'. The cultural values or the 'spirit' which go with a particular sort of growth of a civilization are seen as capable of being extracted from their particular civilisational context and made universal historical values. The cultural values or the 'spirit' as well as the conjunctural economic and political factors (in this case the spirit of science or scientific temper, Rationalism, pragmatism, sense of history, secularism, nation-state, industrialization, democracy, socialism and so on) leading to the ascendancy of any particular civilization (consequently allowing it to conquer and colonize the other civilizations and cultures), are no longer considered the 'property' of that particular civilization, nor are they essentially or organically tied with that culture. These cultural values or the 'spirit' leading to the growth of a particular culture, nation or civilization are understood as 'the *Zeitgeist*, the *Yugadharmā*, the universal spirit of the age'. This *Zeitgeist* determined the norm of the world-historical development, in relation to which particular nations could be shown to be advanced or backward. In the nationalist re-interpretation of the colonial impact, historical time itself becomes episodic. According to it, every civilization has its periods of growth and decay. Particular cultural values which go with a particular civilisational context can be extracted and made universal historical values (See; Chatterjee 1986:136, 137).

To elaborate the accommodationist strategy, and its implications for identity formation as well as foreign policy formulation, one has to discuss how the dominant representative of this strategy, Jawaharlal Nehru, accommodated (and in turn re-appropriated) this significant external Other, History, and how his concept of *Zeitgeist* selectively re-appropriates the West, modernity i.e. the spirit of progress and development, democracy, scientific socialism, secularism without

completely abandoning or disowning (yet not completely internalizing either) the alternative Indian identities, such as radical pacifist, critical traditionalist and so on, emerging out of Gandhi's subversion.

Nehru's idea of history prioritized the conception and composition of universal or world history or the history of mankind, of which regional and national histories are integral parts and can only be understood in relation to world history. Nehru's idea of history and its historical internationalist character emerge from his belief in the essential unity of all cultures and civilizations. For him, each country's culture or any regional culture is only a variant of the world culture. National cultures, in other words, are only the branches of the main trunk of world culture and the mutually antagonistic, deviant or particularly similar traits exhibited by each of them are, in the same manner, only the local peculiarities, manifestations of the central culture (For detailed discussion see, Ravindran 1980:35-39).

Nehru's analysis of the problematic of the rise and fall of civilizations in the East and the West [the theme he elaborated in *Glimpses of World History* (1934)], as argued by Ravindran (1980:43), seems to agree with the law of history formulated by E.H. Carr, that the group- call it a class, a nation, a continent, a civilization-which plays a leading role in the advance of civilization in one period is unlikely to play a similar role in the next period, and this is for the good reason that it will be too deeply imbued in the traditions, interests and ideologies of the earlier period to be able to adapt to the demands and conditions of the next period, which are manifested in the form of the *Zeitgeist* or the 'spirit of the age' of that particular period, the norm which governs world historical development.

Looking at the world scene one thousand years after Christ, Nehru finds flourishing civilizations of Asia, when Europe was in unrelieved darkness, backward and semi-barbarous. But below the surface of the human progress of Asia he detects forces that sapped away the inner life and strength of civilization. Contrary to this, behind the disorder and uncouthness in Europe at this period, Nehru perceives a new pulsating life and energy trying to lift itself to the level of Asia that dominated her. Now the cycle is complete; history has run its course

with regularity and rhythm, and Europe has become dominant. A new cycle started with Asia struggling painfully to win freedom from the west. Looking below the surface, Nehru finds again a new energy in Asia, and a new life, indicating a rebirth, a flight to a creative spirit. Alongside, there appears in Europe or more specifically, in Western Europe, some signs of decay beneath the surface of her greatness (See; Ravindran 1980:42).

From Nehru's recounting of India's past, it would appear that there are two great movements in the nation's history, consisting of a long cycle and a short cycle. The long cycle begins with the earliest known historical period, that of the Indus valley civilization, and ends with the first Turko-Afghan invasions of the 11 Century. It is a period which saw the flowering of great civilization, rich and vigorous, marked by some astonishing achievements in the fields of philosophy, literature, drama, art, science and mathematics. The economy expanded and prospered, and there was widespread trade and cultural contact with many other parts of the world. And yet, well before the close of the millennium, an inner weakness seized India. Ideas started becoming rigid and lost their earlier creativity and innovation, the most significant evidence of which was in the growing rigidity and exclusiveness of the Indian social structure as represented chiefly by the caste system. But it did not mean the death of the Indian civilization. Some vitality remained, and even as it succumbed to a whole series of invasions, there was a historical continuity as India moved in to its second, this time a somewhat shorter, cycle of efflorescence.

The short cycle occurs in the period of Islamic empires, reaching its peak during the reign of Mughal Emperor Akbar. It takes a form of a new cultural synthesis between indigenous and Turkish, Afghan, Iranian and Arabic elements [in this emphasis upon the new cultural synthesis during the Mughal era, one finds the roots of the historical legitimation of the Indian National Congress' project of constructing a 'plural' and 'secular' Indian identity vis-à-vis the pro-partition Muslim League's (the extremist, internal Other of the accommodationist self) two nation theory, which can only be sustained and reproduced through the adoption of secular democracy as a form of government]. Yet, to Nehru, this new cultural

synthesis during the Mughal era leading to the attainment of great brilliance in arts, architecture, literature, music and even some synthetic religious cults and philosophies, is very much a state sponsored effort, the personality of the Emperor playing a crucial role. Akbar was, by far, the most remarkable figure in this movement, who with wise statesmanship and imaginative patronage sought to unite the country politically and culturally. In Akbar, Nehru (1946:256) argues, “the old dream of a united India” [the historical Other of the fragmented Indian nation with no centralized state, the Other which had largely been prevalent in Indian history except the Mauryan Empire of 3rd and 4th centuries B.C, Gupta dynasty of 4th and 5th centuries A.D., and then after the Mughals only under the British Raj, when British India was unified politically as well as economically to serve the colonial interest] “again took shape, united not politically in one state but organically fused into one people”.

Thus the nationalist search for deep historical roots, as argued by Tanham (1992:7-9), was also a search for the periods of political unity in Indian history, which made them search for the characteristics of the European nation state in their own history. The figure of Ashoka, the great Mauryan emperor, (whose empire covered almost all of India, having a vast and effective administrative structure supporting the central, indigenous ruling authority, enhancing and encouraging loyalty to the emperor), a peaceful and moral leader, was not positively identified as the great king until about 1915. Yet the nationalist search for cohesion and political unity in India’s past discovered, except few short periods of national unity, only long periods of disunity. For the accommodationists, these long periods of disunity and the fragmented Indian nation without a centralized state, was the Historical Other (the Other which is to be resisted, suppressed and wiped out) of the politically as well as culturally cohesive and unified Indian nation, which is being ruled by a strong, indigenous centralized state (the India of the Mauryas, the Guptas and the Mughals). For them, the establishment of such a sovereign, nation-state was the ultimate goal of the nationalist freedom struggle.

This search for political unity in India's past was triggered by the encounter with the colonial rulers and their culture (i.e. the Other), "which had taken a clear stand on the ability of Indians -mired in their village society, devious, and when not greedy and corrupt, impractical and other worldly- to run a proper modern state", which requires a single cohesive cultural and political community, called nation (Nandy 1994: v). Nandy (1994:v) refers to a political thinker, an educationist from Calcutta, Bhudev Mukhopadhyaya (1827-1894), "who was not merely a staunch nationalist but was one of the first national-integrationists of India" (Emphasis added). These national-integrationists (an identity which can be subsumed under the larger accommodationist strategy), had a significant Other within India itself, who challenged the legitimacy of anti-colonial nationalism which aimed at establishing a modern European-style sovereign nation-state. These internal dissenters, as Nandy states (1994: vi), regarded nationalism as a byproduct of the western nation-state system and of the forces of homogenization let loose by the western world view. To them, a homogenized universalism, itself a product of uprootedness and deculturation brought about by British colonialism in India, could not provide an alternative to nationalism. Their alternative was a distinctive concept of universalism embedded in the tolerance encoded in various traditional ways of life in a highly diverse, plural society.

Nandy (1994:1-8) discusses the critique of nationalism offered by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, two men he calls "the two most influential theorists of Indianness of our times." These two, according to Nandy, are the ultimate prototypes for negotiating the three basic sets of contradictions or oppositions (which the Afro-Asian reformers of the last hundred and fifty years have tried to reconcile in order to construct their post-colonial identities): that between the East and the West, that between the tradition and the modernity, and that between the past and the present. To Tagore, argues Nandy (1994:1), these oppositions could best be handled within her classical Sanskritic traditions, leavened on the one hand by the elements of European classicism, including aspects of European Renaissance, and on the other hand by India's

diverse folk or little traditions. In Tagore's world modernity had a place. To Gandhi, on the other hand, resolution of the contradictions was possible primarily within the little traditions of India, and the West, with occasional inputs from Indian and Western classicism, but almost entirely outside modernity. Nandy (1994:2) argues these differences, when examined closely, "turn out to be a matter of emphasis". In spite of the overlapping trajectories of both these thinkers, almost merging into each other as they evolve, Nandy argues, one can still stick to the significant difference between them: Tagore sought to resolve the contradictions mentioned above at the level of 'high' culture, Gandhi at the level of the 'low'. Here, Nandy (1994:2) interestingly comments, "... [i]t is fitting that independent India's first prime minister claimed to be an heir to both traditions". "Being a practiced politician," continues Nandy, "Jawaharlal Nehru was aware that a durable basis of political legitimacy (in order to build an internally stable nation-state after achieving political freedom) could be built only by simultaneously drawing upon both (which is essentially what the strategy of accommodation aimed at)" (Emphases and bracketed comments added).

In one area, argues Nandy (1994:2), Tagore and Gandhi's endeavors overlapped and ideologically re-inforced each other. Both recognized the need for a 'national' ideology of India as a means of cultural survival and both recognized, that for the same reason, India would either have to make a break with the post-medieval western concept of nationalism, or give the concept a new content, different from the one given by the accommodationists. As a result, for Tagore, nationalism itself became gradually illegitimate; for Gandhi, nationalism began to include a critique of nationalism. For both, over time, the Indian freedom movement ceased to be an expression only of nationalist consolidation; it came to acquire a new status as a symbol of the universal struggle for political justice and cultural dignity. It was as if they recognized an unselfcritical Indian nationalism (the product of the accommodative self, especially when looked at from this anti-statist Other's point of view) to be primarily a response to western imperialism and, like all such responses, shaped by what it was responding to. Here one can see how the accommodative Self which emerged in the last phase of the Indian

freedom movement [which Chatterjee (1986) calls the moment of arrival] was losing the 'other-regarding' or 'universal' identity in substantive terms (though it continued to project its internationalist identity in formal terms by making a case for essential harmony between rational nationalism and internationalism) while whole-heartedly embracing the 'unself-critical nationalism'.

For both Gandhi and Tagore, argues Nandy (1994:3), the fear of nationalism was not an expression of the easy internationalism that became popular among the Indian middle classes in the inter war years. In both of them, the fear of nationalism grew out of their experience of the record of anti-imperialism in India, and their attempt to link their concept of Indianness with their understanding of a world where the language of progress (expressed in terms of *Zeitgeist* or the spirit of the age by Nehru as we have argued earlier) had already established complete dominance. They did not want their society to be caught in a situation where the idea of the Indian nation would supersede that of the Indian civilization (which it eventually did), and where the actual way of life of Indians would be assessed solely in terms of the needs of an imaginary nation-state called India.

This anti-statist and counter-modernist identity of India, constructed by Tagore and Gandhi, recognized the sanctity of the anti-colonial movement, but it also rejected the ideas of the accommodationists, which were based on western history (the Other). For Tagore, the East, through such ideas based on the Western History, was attempting to mould itself into a history which was not the outcome of its living. For him, India never had a real sense of nationalism. Instead, for him, the real tradition of India is to work for an adjustment of races, to acknowledge the real differences between them, and yet seek some basis of unity. The basis for this tradition has been built in India at the societal level, not the political, through saints like Nanak, Kabir, Chaitanya, and others. Unlike the nationalist search for political unity (which had been historically rare in case of India) by projecting the Western historical experience on its past, it is an affirmation and assertion of the traditionally continued existence of such unity at the societal level. For Tagore, the salvation of India lay in offering this solution- unity through

acknowledgement of differences- to the world, for Gandhi it lay in continuing the Indian freedom movement as 'India's contribution to peace'; i.e. sharing the cultural values or the traditions essential to the Indian civilization.

The accommodationist strategy which de-links the cultural values or the spirit (of both the East and the West) leading to the progress of a civilization from that particular civilization, giving it a status of *Zeitgeist* or the 'spirit of the age', offered a completely different vision of salvation for India. Nehru classified the *Zeitgeist* of the age we live in under two heads: 'humanism and scientific spirit'. For Nehru, argues Chatterjee, 'the true modern mind is practical and pragmatic, ethical and social, altruistic and humanitarian. It is governed by practical idealism for social betterment'. It has discarded, to a large extent, the philosophical approach of the ancients, their search for ultimate reality, as well as the devotionalism and mysticism of the medieval period (Nehru 1946 570-571). Nehru's conception of the *Zeitgeist*, argues Chatterjee (1986:138), depended upon 'a distinction between the material and the spiritual'. So India's salvation, according to Nehru, lay in learning from the modern West, 'the spirit of the age' (i.e. the scientific spirit) which it represented. On the other hand, the West needed to learn the deeper i.e. spiritual lessons from the thinkers from all ages and all countries, and not particularly from the East.

The distinctions upon which the Nehru's conception of the *Zeitgeist* was built, 'the general distinctions such as the scientific and the unscientific', 'the rational and the irrational', 'the practical and the metaphysical', which according to Chatterjee, had come to dominate 'post Enlightenment Rationalist thought, and more specifically positivist thought in Europe'. It accepted the 'givenness' of science, as a body of knowledge with its distinctive, methodological principles and techniques of practical application that had demonstrated its usefulness, and hence its validity. The 'spirit of science' or the 'scientific temper' meant, therefore, not just a Rationalism, but a Rationalism solidly based upon empirical facts, on 'empirically verifiable truths' ('to judge each issue on its merits' which became the cardinal principle of Nehru's foreign policy in the post independent years; one of the foundational postulates of the policy of non-alignment stems

from this pragmatic, positivist Rationalism solidly basing itself upon empirical facts). It meant a concern with 'practical' questions and a refusal to engage in 'excessive' and 'fruitless' speculation.

For Nehru, the 'scientific method', as argued by Chatterjee (1986:139), also meant, quite specifically, the primacy of the sphere of the economic in all social questions. This, in particular, was what men like Nehru believed to be the distinctively modern, or the 20th century way of looking at history and society. Whether it was a question of political programmes, or economic policy, or social and cultural issues, a 'scientific' analysis must proceed by relating it to the basic economic structure of society. "If there is one thing that history shows," declared Nehru (1936:544), "it is this: that economic interests shape political views of groups or classes. Neither reason nor moral considerations override those interests."

This new theoretical framework, argues Chatterjee (1986), supplied 'the key to a whole new series of Rationalist positions on vital political questions such as the assessment of colonial rule, defining the boundaries of the nation, the role of traditional social institutions of religion, the communal problem, the scale and pace of industrialization, and above all, the role of the state' (which, in turn, would constitute the adoption of foreign policy). This 'primacy of economic sphere' approach even allowed to appropriate, for purely nationalist purposes, 'the scientific method of Marxism', as the most advanced expression of the Rationalism of the European enlightenment. This appropriation of Marxism (the external, ideological Other of the nationalist ideology) was, as argued by Chatterjee (1986:140), deliberately selective. The purpose behind this selective appropriation was to provide scientific legitimacy to a whole set of Rationalist distinctions between the modern and the traditional, the secular and the religious, the progressive and the obscurantist, the advanced and the backward. In every case the argument was as follows, in the present day and age, there is but one general historically given direction in which the economy must move: the direction of rapid industrialization. Those whose real economic interests are in accordance with those requirements (i.e. large-scale, heavy industrialization) are

'progressive' classes: those, whose interests are opposed to those requirements are 'reactionary' classes, the internal Other (represented by Gandhi) which demanded decentralized, small-scale industries at the village level.

But apart from the objective economic interests (based upon reason), there also existed subjective beliefs, backward ideologies, primordial ties, sectarian sentiments, religious obscurantism (based upon unreason, passion, spontaneity, fear, instinct and so on) which, coupled with the British policy of divide and rule, 'paying off' one side against the other by distributing special privileges on sectarian basis to further its own particular interests, had created the problem of 'communalism' (the divisive, internal Other) which had consistently dogged Indian nationalism in 20th Century. For accommodationists, the solution to this 'communal' problem involved two steps: The first was 'the elimination of the colonial state' [i.e. the rule of the 'wrong England' (not 'the England of Shakespeare, Milton, of noble speech and writing and brave deeds, of political revolution, of struggle for freedom, of science and technical progress' and so on) which represented 'the narrow and regressive interests of British capital'. The same interests also destroyed the traditional industrial base of the country in the early phase and impeded industrial growth in the later phase to protect the dominant interests of the British industrial and commercial capital. Thus, an obsolete feudal order propped up in the countryside and prevented a solution to the massive agrarian problem without which no country can industrialize on a stable basis (See; Chatterjee 1986:145)] The second was 'the creation of a true national state'.

Once these premises of national state were granted, there could not exist a 'communal' problem any more as the true national state would provide the legal guarantee of full and equal rights of citizenship. The only problems which would then be real economic problems. The solution of these 'real economic problems' would require a 'fundamental restructuring of the economic processes of society' (through the 'eradication of feudalism in the countryside, fundamental land reforms, centralized planning of the industrial development under the central coordinating aegis of the state, using the best available scientific and technical

expertise and taking the broadest possible view of the range of interrelated social consequences' and so on), so that 'a massive increase in the social product could yield sufficient resources to satisfy the urge for equitable distribution and welfare of all groups'. Thus the choice between two alternative paths of economic development, one based on large-scale heavy industry and the other on decentralized small-scale industry, "had already been made –Elsewhere, by history, by 'the spirit of the age'" (Chatterjee 1986:144) (Emphasis original).

By the same logic, argues Chatterjee (1986:144), the requisite level of industrialization for the nation (the key to its economic and political independence) would always have to be set by global standards, for science sets its own technological standards, its own standards of efficiency and obsolescence; and science, of course, was a universal value. Thus the progression of Time in the domain of science was also something which took place Elsewhere.

It is also worth noting that when this nationalist understanding appealed to the 'scientific outlook of Marxism', it found ready theoretical support in the Bolshevik understanding of the problem of economic development, popularized in particular in the phase of Soviet industrialization (the significant, external Other: to look up to and learn from its great economic experiment, to sympathize with and support its anti-imperialist identity and at the same time to maintain cognitive separation between its totalitarian, dictatorial identity and its egalitarian and anti-imperialist identities i.e. a selective appropriation). "Nationalists like Nehru," argues Chatterjee (1986:145), "found in the 'the primacy of the economic' a particularly useful theoretical foothold, from which they could reach out and embrace the Rationalist and egalitarian side of Marxism, leaving its political core well alone."

Nehru constantly emphasized that Socialism should not be looked at in purely political terms. A constant emphasis on politics and the class struggle, the inevitability of violence 'distorts' the vision of the Socialism. Socialism, for him, was a business of rational management of productive resources. It should not be defined in a priori theoretical terms. It was something that must evolve from concrete, particular and empirically verifiable facts. While criticizing the Indian

communists (the internal, ideological and political Other of the accommodationist national Self; the Other which was to be resisted and to be kept at the margins for creating a politically stable, cohesive national state) for being overtly dogmatic and theoretical and not paying enough attention to the cultural peculiarities of India, Nehru said, socialism was more than mere logic. (For detailed discussion, Chatterjee 1986:157-162.)

Scientific planning and industrialization would enable the state to revitalize the productive processes and to increase production; otherwise there would be nothing to distribute. Socialism would come only when one would have a plan to distribute production evenly. Chatterjee (1986:159) argues that, for Nehru, the adoption of equality as a goal of planned development was justified by 'the spirit of the age' which was in favour of equality. The need for equality was entailed in the very logic of progress: progress meant industrialization; industrialization required the removal of barriers which prevented groups from fully participating in the entire range of new economic activities, hence industrialization required equality of opportunity. It did not mean fundamental reallocation of rights in society, or a revolution in nature of property. It did not mean the equalization of incomes either. Thus, neither industrialization nor equality was an innately political question to be resolved in the battlefield of politics. The universal principle [in favour of equality, centralized and scientific planning while falsifying the economic dogma of Laissez faire and the mythical balancing mechanism of the 'hidden hand'] and the global standards (of the scale and pace of industrialization, technical advancement) had been already set by history (the legitimating Other of the accommodationist national Self): there was no room for choice on these matters. Only the specific national path remained to be determined. But it was now a technical problem, a problem of balancing and optimization, a job for experts.

This selective appropriation in turn limited further deeper identification with the political, ideological programme of this significant Other named Socialism both at domestic and international level. It also put a break upon the possibility of a closer co-operation or alignment on the political and ideological

plane (and not strategic one) with the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, the super power pursuing a policy of expansionism for strategic and not imperialist reasons. It also managed to keep India free of communism's crucial ideological baggage of political and strategic antagonism with the capitalist, imperialist United States; another significant, external Other of India; the champion of liberal democracy, a sympathizer of the Indian freedom struggle and also an influential ally of Britain in the second world war and having the power to pressurize Britain to liberate India.

Yet the selective appropriation of the Rationalist and egalitarian side of Marxism, which implied a particular model of economic development for independent India (largely influenced by the Soviet experiment), believed to be the key to India's economic and political independence, meant a certain cautious political distance (and not a complete estrangement) from the United States, the champion of liberal democracy but also a capitalist state, and a strategic as well as ideological antagonist of the Soviet union. The United States would obviously want India to take up an unbridled capitalist path instead of socialist one and possess adequate coercive power to enforce this, mainly to countercheck the Soviet expansionism in Asia.

In short Nehru's selective appropriation of the Rationalist and egalitarian side of Marxism left its political core aside in order to construct and preserve a certain kind of 'accommodationist national Self of India' (at its very heart lay the idea of 'true national state'), as we have discussed so far. This 'accommodationist national Self' imagined India's economic and political independence in a particular way, which, in turn neutralized the possibility of India aligning with either of the strategic as well as ideological antagonists, the Soviet Union and the United states.

The accommodationist strategy de-linked the modernity project from the West by turning it in to 'the spirit of the age' thus selectively appropriating it (not as Western but as Universal, rational and progressive), the way it selectively appropriated the Rationalist and the egalitarian side of Marxism leaving its political core aside. In a similar fashion, it de-linked Gandhi's pacifism, non-

violence, the idea of peace from its moral foundation i.e. Gandhi's idea of Truth, his larger project of liberating both the colonized as well as the colonizer from the burden of hyper-masculinity, the continuation of the Indian freedom struggle as India's contribution to peace and thus the construction of a truly other-regarding Indian Self, and so on. The accommodationist strategy selectively claimed non-violence and pacifism from Gandhi's subversive struggle with the ideology and culture of colonialism, leaving aside the moral as well as political core of the subversive struggle. The moral core of this subversion was believed to be based upon unreason, passion, impulse, intuition, religion, mysticism and so on, thus was considered as incomprehensible, obscurantist and irrational. The political core was believed to be naïve, unfeasible, regressive and anti-modern i.e. against 'the spirit of the age', thus undesirable for the creation of 'the true national state' i.e. the ultimate aim of the accommodationist strategy (See; Chatterjee 1986:151-156).

The true national state, after coming into existence would need 'prolonged peace' in order to realize the path of economic development it (or rather history) had chosen for itself. So to assume moderate pacifist and non-militarist identities would become functionally necessary to realize the historically chosen path of economic development and nation building. Besides, 'the true national state' would require a durable political legitimacy to achieve political stability at home [considering the political pressure created by the internal Others such as – Hindu nationalists, Communists and Radical Socialists (within and outside the Indian National Congress) especially against the backdrop of bloody communal riots and the atrocities that took place during the partition of India] which could be gained only by claiming the inheritance of Gandhi's pacifism and non-violence, which had an unmatched pan Indian mass appeal and the ability to unify people across religious, cultural, linguistic and ideological boundaries.

The internal chaos and political instability stemming from the abovementioned factors were considered the primary threats or sources of insecurities (and not the external one) to the consolidation of the true national state, the agent of reason and progress. Thus security of this true national state

would depend upon the ability of its policy makers to neutralize these internal threats by pursuing the historically chosen path of planned economic development, for which it would need to insulate it from the great power rivalry and the cold war compulsions of alignment, which was seen as a continuation of the imperialism, the exploitative but historically contingent Other of the benevolent, progressive modernity i.e. 'the spirit of the age'. Yet, historically, the chosen path of economic development would require assistance (in terms of capital investment, technology) from these expansionist powers. Thus, such insulation could not mean isolation, but rather the adoption of a cautious and flexible course of foreign policy, constantly adjusting to the (empirically verifiable) global realities of power by judging each issue on its own merit, ultimately in the service of the true national state.

This cautious and flexible course of foreign policy was considered the expression of rational nationalism, following the scientific and humanist spirit of the age. Thus it was seen as an expression of essential harmony of interests of all the states, thus automatically compatible with internationalism and the 'indivisible' world peace (the essential condition for building and consolidation of the true national state). This rational or enlightened nationalism was contrasted with its Other, the irrational or narrow nationalism which would contradict the essential harmony among the states, thus making the states unnecessarily insecure, aggressive, militarist; compelling them to indulge in power politics leading to alignments and counter-alignments. Here, power politics or alignments were not seen as inherently evil or undesirable, but as simply unnecessary and irrational in a functional sense, something which would be a deviation from 'the spirit of the age'.

In fact, the adoption of such a cautious and flexible course of foreign policy was further reinforced by the collective Asian identity, which was constructed and consolidated during India's freedom struggle, while India forged solidarity with the anti-colonial struggles of its Asian neighbours (the significant, external and generalized Other, sharing a common fate and destiny). The Asian identity reproduced and consolidated itself by sharing the sense of achievement of

the other national movements in Asia, establishing fraternal bonds with other national movements and asserting the position of Asia in world politics

According to Miloslav Krasa (2000:85), it was only the simultaneous encounter with modern colonialism (the common Other) in the 19th century which triggered a common bond uniting all Asian people in a political sense, in contradistinction to the people who lived north of the Mediterranean and Black seas. Such a common bond, forging a sense of 'we' ness, a collective identity was strange and hitherto unknown to Asians in spite of their age old socio-cultural ties. While interacting with this collective Other (the Asian neighbours) during the freedom struggle, the Indian elite realized the strategic significance of India. The Indian elite started perceiving India as 'the key to the exploitation of the Asiatic and other non-European races of the Earth' and 'which was held under bondage not merely for the sake of its own exploitation but that of its neighbours near and distant' and 'whose freedom meant the freedom of the whole coloured world.' Indian leaders believed that once 'India would be free the whole edifice of imperialism would collapse as this was the keystone of the arch imperialism' (Krasa 2000:94,100) (Emphases added).

The identification of the exceptional geo-strategic importance of one's Self, as the jewel in the crown of British Empire, the keystone of the arch of imperialism, the key to the exploitation of the Asiatic and other non-European races not just at regional but at global levels would have implied two things. First, as we have argued in the chapter one (p 30), it must have provided immense self-confidence and assurance to the Indian elite (which could be extremely important for a nation under prolonged colonial domination) so that, to use Nehru's (1931:284-5) words, "...no country would tolerate the idea of another gaining dominion over India and thus acquiring the position which England occupied. If any power were covetous enough to make such an attempt, all the others would combine to trounce the intruder." Secondly, it would have placed an implicit demand on one's Self 'to attain (or rather retain) a special status in world affairs after independence'.

The first implication would largely have rescued the Self from the constant fear of external attack, which could otherwise have compelled it to find security either through internal balancing and/or through external alignment (e.g. Pakistan). Thus, the conceivable source of threat would largely remain internal: domestic political instability, communal riots, communist uprisings, peasant rebellion etc. (except Pakistan and China in the later years). The conception of threats in internal terms would have allowed it to pursue non-militarist security policy, and thus claim the inheritance of and project a glorious pacifist identity, of course in a moderate way. The second implication provided an Internationalist dimension to the Self, which, as we have already discussed, was believed to be naturally compatible with rational nationalism. The demand it placed upon one's Self could be fulfilled in multiple ways, by projecting India, as the leader of Asia, guardian of the freedom of newly independent states, guardian of world peace and so on. This internationalist dimension of identity later found its expression in leading the Non-aligned Movement (NAM).

Extending the essential ideational link between the colonization of India, as a 'key' to the colonization of its Asian neighbours; the accommodationists argued, that after decolonization, the political and economic independence of these Asian neighbours would inevitably depend on the political and economic independence of India. Thus, India would have to take up the special responsibility of guarding the political and economic independence of these Asian neighbours. India would be able to do this successfully only if it chose not to align with either of the power blocs. Alignment was seen as the ultimate loss of independence by the accommodationists, not because freedom or independence was seen as an end in itself, but because alignment implied a loss of freedom to pursue the historically chosen path of economic development and was seen as a major threat to the internal political stability, without which the consolidation of the true national state, the ultimate objective of the freedom movement, would be inconceivable.

Thus, the invocation of the Asian identity to justify or validate the adoption of non-alignment (by implicitly projecting India as the legitimate leader

of Asia) was an invocation of a collective identity constructed through the shared historical experience of the struggle against imperialism and the identification of India's exceptional strategic importance. But not all collective identities are essentially other-regarding in nature, to the extent that one sacrifices one's basic interests for the others. Wendt (1999:337) specifies the limits of the collective identities saying they are always relationship and issue-threat specific and even within a relationship and issue covered by collective identity, they will often be in tension with egoist or self-regarding identities. On similar lines, India's interest in preventing the cold war from entering the Asian neighbourhood was driven by self-regarding considerations, such as the protection of internal political stability, social cohesion, economic development, and most importantly the true national state. These self-regarding interests (stemming from an egoist identity) were believed to be conceived in perfect harmony with India's Asian identity, but actually they were not. India did not treat the protection of its Asian neighbours as an end in itself either. Most importantly, in case of a clash of interests, the guideline for the political representatives was simple: national interest would prevail.

To sum up, through selective appropriations of the significant Others, both internal as well as external, of multiple kinds (as we have discussed so far), an accommodationist national Self was constructed. The ultimate goal of this Self was to establish and consolidate a true national state. It managed to do so through a series of accommodations and appropriations (which we have discussed so far), which not only enabled it to subsume, neutralize, contain or resist the competing internal Others successfully but also gave it a clean mandate to establish a national state and form its policies.

Thus the accommodationist Self, which emerged victorious in this contestation projected itself as the true national Self of India. Let us summarise the identities of this true Indian Self which emerged during this process: 'statist', 'modernist', 'socialist', 'secular', 'democratic', 'non-militarist', 'moderate pacifist', 'Internationalist', 'Asian'. As we have argued in the last section one can

derive the interests of an actor from its identities. The interests derived from India's identities (as we have argued before) are as follows:

- To establish and consolidate a true national state.
- To pursue the historically chosen path of planned economic development.
- To maintain internal political stability and security of the national state through non-militarist and moderate pacifist ways.
- To protect the cold war from entering its neighbourhood.
- To attain a special status in world affairs.

One could argue that the abovementioned interests constituted the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India. None of the abovementioned interests (and in turn the underlying identities) could be said to be truly other-regarding in nature. Thus, contrary to the conventional beliefs and popular projections, the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India, as argued above, was driven more by self-regarding than by other-regarding Indian identities as well as interests.

India and its Significant Others

External Others:		Internal Others:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The West • Colonialism • The British Empire • Imperialism • History • The Soviet Union • The United States • Asian Neighbours 	<p>Indian Selves constructed Through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification • Subversion • Accommodation <p>Vis-à-vis the external As well as Internal Others.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gandhi • Hindu nationalists • Pro-Partition Islamists • Communists and Radical Socialists

Table no. 3

Accommodation and the adoption of Non-alignment

<p style="text-align: center;">Subversive (Indian) Self</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Identities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radical pacifist • Critical traditionalist • Anti-statist • Counter-modernist • Anti-colonialist 	<p style="text-align: center;">Accommodationist (Indian) Self</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Identities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statist • Modernist • Socialist • Secular • Democratic • Non-militarist • Moderate pacifist • Internationalist • Asian 	<p style="text-align: center;">Indian Self</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Interests</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To establish and consolidate a true national state • To pursue the historically chosen path of planned economic development • To maintain internal political stability and security of the national state through non-militarist and moderate pacifist ways • To prevent the cold war from entering its neighbourhood • To attain a special status in world affairs
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Table no.4

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The Adoption of Non-alignment

Chapter Three: Rationalist and Constructivist interpretations of Non-alignment: A Comparative study

The first two chapters have attempted to deal with the first half of the broader rationale and purpose of this dissertation: *the need for theoretical engagement with non-alignment*. They have provided us with a baseline to proceed with the second half of the broader rationale and purpose of this dissertation: *to engage with the Rationalist Constructivist debate*, supposedly ‘the main axis of debate in the field of international relations (IR)’, as argued by Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner (1998). Now the question is, how does one interpret this supposedly main axis of debate i.e. the relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism- as a battle or war of theoretical paradigms, or as one open to complementarity in spite of some of the important differences between them?

Before proceeding with this question of interpretation, one has to keep in mind that both Rationalism and Constructivism are not, in the first instance, theories of international politics like Realism or Liberalism. Rather, Rationalism seems to refer to a methodological approach, which, as Fearon and Wendt (2002:52) argue, may imply a philosophical position on what social science explanation is and how it ought to work, the nature of which is debated. Constructivism seems to refer to a set of arguments about social explanation that may imply preferences over specific questions and methods of social inquiry, the nature of which are again also debated.

Thus, if IR scholars interpret this main axis of debate as Rationalism versus Constructivism, then, as argued by Fearon and Wendt (2002:52), the central debate in IR will not be about international relations but about how to study international relations. Structuring the field of IR in this way, as a battle of analytical paradigms, would encourage method-driven research than problem-driven research. This may result in important questions being ignored because they are not amenable to the preferred paradigmatic fashion. For the time being,

Fearon and Wendt (2002) prefer to keep this vital issue (of ignorance of important questions or problems due to overemphasis upon paradigmatic differences) aside, mainly for analytical reasons. Instead, they focus directly on the perceived differences between these two analytical paradigms, which according to them, are not unimportant but not irreconcilable either. For them, most of these significant differences are often complementarities than contradictions. Thus, “the most interesting research is likely to be the work that ignores zero-sum interpretations of their relationship and instead directly engages questions that cut cross the Rationalist/Constructivist boundary as it is commonly understood”(52).

Their key argument towards this conclusion is that “...Rationalism and Constructivism are most fruitfully viewed *pragmatically* as analytical tools, rather than as metaphysical positions or empirical descriptions of the world” (Emphasis original) (52), mainly because the ontological and empirical interpretations of the debate seem more common in literature and lead to more zero-sum pictures. Fearon and Wendt resist framing the Rationalist-Constructivist debate in purely ontological terms (as sets of assumptions about what social life is made of and what kinds of relations exist among these elements; for eg. Rationalism is usually seen as assuming an *individualist* ontology, in which wholes are reducible to interacting parts, and Constructivism as assuming a *holist* ontology, in which parts exist only relation to wholes) and empirical terms (as a disagreement about substantive issues in the world like how often actors follow a logic of consequences or appropriateness, or whether preferences are exogenous or endogenous to given social interaction).

They recognize the theoretical importance of ontological issues, since the failure to do so can lead to analytical tools becoming *tacit* ontologies foreclosing potentially interesting lines of arguments without justification. However they don't believe in framing the Rationalist-Constructivist debate in ontological terms as theoretically the most useful, mainly for three reasons. First, the ontological issues are, by definition, philosophical; and as such not likely to be settled soon, if ever, and almost certainly not by IR scholars. Second, some Rationalists and Constructivists may have strong ontological commitments while the others may

not, since there is no inherent *need* to commit to an ontology to work in these traditions. Scholars can proceed *pragmatically* by remaining agnostic about what society is *really* made of. Finally, it seems doubtful, considering our knowledge of international life, to rule out certain arguments a priori on purely philosophical grounds.

Considering the empirical issues, Fearon and Wendt (2002:53) argue, that in their purest, most stripped down forms, neither Rationalism nor Constructivism makes many significant empirical predictions about the social world. To a large extent, it is only with the addition of auxiliary assumptions (eg. a particular theory of preferences) that such predictions emerge. Moreover, although one *can* interpret an assumption of, to say, exogenous preferences, as factual claim about a certain social system, there is *no* need to do so. Rather, as seen by Fearon and Wendt, it is perfectly legitimate to view it as merely a methodological convenience necessitated by the fact that one cannot study everything at once. As in the case of ontology, there is always a danger here that analytical assumptions (assuming preferences as exogenously given) will become tacit empirical ones (to believe that in reality, an actor's preferences are always exogenously given), but given sufficient methodological self-consciousness this problem can be avoided.

This brings us to the *pragmatic interpretation* of the Rationalist-Constructivist debate, as analytical tools or lenses to theorize about world politics. Analytical lenses do not, in themselves, force the researcher to make ontological or empirical commitments. If one keeps the seemingly irreconcilable ontological and empirical issues aside for the time being, then what makes a comparison of these approaches theoretically interesting? For Fearon and Wendt (2002:53) the analytical value of this comparison lies in the fact that these two approaches view society from opposing vantage points-roughly speaking, Rationalism from the 'bottom-up' and Constructivism from 'top-down'. As a result they tend to ask different questions in practice and thus bring different aspects of social life in to focus.

Yet, considering the already perceived conflictual relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism in contemporary IR, based largely on treating them in ontological or empirical terms, Fearon and Wendt deliberately choose to downplay the differences between these two approaches. Instead, they focus upon two areas of potential convergence that are not sufficiently appreciated. First, the two approaches often yield *similar*, or at least complementary, accounts of international life. Second, even though their respective vantage points tend in practice to highlight some questions and not others, in many cases there may be much to be gained by using the tools of one to try to answer questions that tend to be asked primarily by the other. Such a cross paradigmatic exchange of characteristic questions and answers, argues Fearon and Wendt (2002:53), can be analytically more useful to advance not only these two research agendas, but more importantly our understanding of world politics. Drawing on Fearon and Wendt's arguments concerning the potential convergence and the possibility of cross paradigmatic exchange between Rationalism and Constructivism, in this chapter we shall seek to deconstruct some of the supposed contradictions between the two approaches, and highlighting the convergences. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no differences, but once viewed in an analytical, tool-kit fashion, many putative disputes lose much of their force.

We shall proceed with this discussion in three steps. First, we shall briefly discuss the commonly perceived differences between Rationalism and Constructivism which lead to framing their relationship in conflictual and zero-sum terms. Drawing upon the discussion of the defining features, common misconceptions regarding Rationalism and the single recipe or common ground of Constructivism from the first two chapters respectively, we shall test the validity of these 'zero-sum' claims. Then we shall discuss possible ways out of such framing of Rationalist-Constructivist debate in conflictual terms.

Second, we shall comparatively discuss Rationalist and Constructivist interpretations of non-alignment discussed in greater detail in the first and the second chapter respectively. We shall try to relate the general discussion concerning the relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism with the

particular Rationalist and Constructivist interpretations advanced in the earlier chapters. Here, we shall discuss how deeply the Rationalist approach manages to explain the actor's (post independence India's) preferences and how the Constructivist interpretation compliments this explanation by providing a detailed theoretical account of the actor's identity formation and interests. One can also discuss the possible relation between the actor's beliefs and preferences (determined through the *observation* method) and actor's identity.

Third, in the concluding section we shall briefly discuss the particular possibility of convergence and cross-paradigmatic exchange between Rationalism and Constructivism, which emerges out of our study of non-alignment, and its general implications for the Rationalist-Constructivist divide.

From Rationalism vs. Constructivism to Rationalism and Constructivism

Fearon and Wendt (2002:58) indicate at the outset that 'Rationalism v. Constructivism' can be framed at two levels, agentic and structural. Out of these two Fearon and Wendt address only the former mainly for "slicing off a manageable piece" of argument for that particular essay (58). From agentic perspective, argue Fearon and Wendt, there seem to be at least five ways of characterizing what 'Rationalism v. Constructivism' is all about. These ways are as follows: "material versus ideational", "logic of consequences versus logic of appropriateness", "norms as useful versus norms as right", "actors as exogenously given versus problematizing or endogenizing actors", "methodological individualism versus methodological holism" (see; 58-67).

The first 'bone of contention', material versus ideational, is not uncommon in the literature concerning the Rationalist-Constructivist divide. Rationalism is commonly perceived as being about material factors and Constructivism about ideas. This common perception, as argued by Fearon and Wendt (2002:58), often gets translated in to the proposition that "Rationalists believe that people always act on the basis of material self-interest, and Constructivists believe that people always act on the basis of norms and values." Even if one keeps the issue of self-interest and non-self-interest aside for a while, treating 'Rationalism v.

Constructivism' as an issue of material conditions versus ideas is not very useful. The problem here lies more in the perception of Rationalism than that of Constructivism.

As we have argued in the first chapter, the commonplace association of Rationalism and materialism is attributable to the sociology of knowledge of how Rational Choice theory entered IR. In the early phase, Rationalist intellectual enterprises in IR (such as exploring the logic of nuclear deterrence and military strategy) were under the influence of political Realism which gives "pride of place to material power in international politics" and, thus it was "natural for 'Rationalism' to acquire a materialist connotation" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:59). In the later phase i.e. in the 1980s and the early 1990s, argue Fearon and Wendt, Postmodern and Constructivist critics, facing what they saw as a disciplinary hegemony of Rationalist Realists, "failed to disentangle the two strands, *reinforcing* the perceived materialist bent of Rational Choice theory"(59) (emphasis added).

Fearon and Wendt accept the fact that in the hands of Rationalists who were influenced by materialist conceptions of politics the explanatory role of ideas has tended to be ignored or downplayed. But they further argue that "this should be seen as a function of materialist commitments, not Rationalism." They support this conclusion with three considerations (for detailed discussion see chapter one: 4, 5). First, Rationalist explanations are a species of *intentional* explanation, the basic structure of which is the formula, 'Desire + Belief = Action'. This means at their core- at the level of individual *Rational Choice*- ideas are an essential, not just a secondary element of Rationalist explanation. Second, at the level of social interaction, game theory typically explains aggregate outcomes by reference to 'equilibria', which are made up of patterns or structures of beliefs that satisfy various stability properties. Third, it is not clear in what sense desires are necessarily material. In some cases desires are material in the sense of having a biological basis like the desire for food or sleep. But in most cases the desire (or preference) for material things such as wealth, prestige, security seem more about ideas than biology. Thus one can argue that at some

level there is always a material basis to desires (because human beings are physical creatures), “but in most cases this base is ‘directionless’ in the absence of ideas that give it content” (59).

Fearon and Wendt draw two conclusions from these three considerations. One is that there is little difference between Rationalism and Constructivism on the issue of *whether* ideas ‘matter’. The difference lies in the way these approaches study ideas and also with respect to *how* they think ideas matter. Rationalists tend to draw clear cut distinction between ideas, beliefs and desires or preferences. This may be related to a more basic feature of Rationalist thinking about ideas, which is to treat their explanatory role in terms that are more causal than constitutive. Ideas, for Rationalists, are causal mechanisms like any other, existing independently of other causal mechanisms and explaining some aspects of the variance in the actor’s behaviour. Constructivism on the other hand, tends to emphasize the constitutive role of ideas, the ways in which ideas give other factors the explanatory role that they have by investing them with meaning and content. From this perspective “ideas *permeate* social life than from a distinct variable whose explanatory force can be isolated” (60) (emphasis added). These are important differences, to which we shall return in the course of our discussion. But one has to keep in mind that these differences are *within* a largely shared agreement that ideas ‘matter’.

The other conclusion follows from the first, which is that when Rationalist models do seem to downplay ideas (which they sometimes do) “this is a function of materialism than Rationalism” (59). Here Fearon and Wendt make a reference to John Frejohn’s (1991) distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ Rationalist models. The ‘thin’ model is simply the logic of the intentional explanation referred to above, which does not explicate the content of desires or beliefs. The ‘thick’ model adds assumptions about the contents of desires and beliefs in a given case. Drawing upon this distinction, Fearon and Wendt argue that there are *materialist Rationalisms* and *idealist Rationalisms*, and if one wants to debate the relative importance of ideas in social life then it makes more sense to focus within

the larger family of Rationalist approaches (materialist and idealist Rationalisms) than to pit Rationalism against Constructivism.

The second bone of contention, *the logic of consequences versus the appropriateness* stems from interpreting 'Rationalism v. Constructivism' in IR in terms of the contrast between *homo economicus* (a calculating machine who carefully assesses different courses of action, choosing whichever provides the most efficient means to its ends) and *homo sociologicus* (a rule follower who acts out of habit or out of implications of one's identity). Partisans, argue Fearon and Wendt (2002:60), face powerful temptations to reduce one logic to an instance of the other. Economists are apt to see the logic of appropriateness as consequentialist. On the other side, sociologists are apt to see the logic of consequences as simply rule-following in settings where it is regarded as socially appropriate to be calculating about the choice of efficient means to given ends.

Fearon and Wendt agree with March and Olsen's (1998:953-4) skepticism about either reduction (in the form of blanket statements i.e. ontological claims about nature of decision making) being a good idea. Yet Fearon and Wendt (2002:60) argue that the distinction between the two logics points to an empirically interesting phenomenon. They point out the fact that actors sometimes do decide by attempting to calculate consequences, whereas some choices seem so tightly constrained by webs of norms and roles that they scarcely seem like 'choices'. They further make an important argument saying, "[e]ven if it were possible to subsume one logic theoretically as an instance of the other, if we are not to obscure these empirical differences we would then simply need to introduce a new linguistic or conceptual distinction to capture them" (60).

Fearon and Wendt accept the possibility that both Rationalist and Constructivist analyses, as commonly practiced, may have a comparative advantage in analyzing settings where one or the other mode of decision-making is predominantly at issue. They accept the fact that Constructivist approaches are better equipped to provide insightful analyses of the ideational logics embedded in complex ideological or religious systems, or their consequences for debates and actions, while Rationalists have developed a powerful set of tools for thinking

about the choice of means to diverse ends in multi-actor settings. But they also caution us not to push this so called division of labour (stemming from comparative advantages) too hard, because “[t]here is no reason to rule out, a priori, the possibility that a Rationalist (Constructivist) analysis might yield valuable insights applied to a domain where the logic of appropriateness (consequences) predominates” (60). Fearon and Wendt elaborate this point stating that a consequentialist analysis that assumes that the actors, as “calculator-scheming-consequences” might none the less be valuable for “revealing” how the observed pattern can be stable and self-reproducing (i.e. habitual and norm-based) over time [especially against ‘entry’ by agents espousing alternative norms and against agents who experiment with new (non-habitual) actions], while a Constructivist analysis that problematizes the logic of consequences by “challenging its empirical universality and theoretical necessity” may also yield valuable insights. All of this can only be accomplished through a pragmatic interpretation of Rationalist-Constructivist debate as an analytical tool.

A closely related framing of ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism’ see the two approaches as differing in their understanding of social norms and the reasons thought to explain norms. Here, the issue is not so much whether actors follow the logic of consequences or appropriateness, but why do actors follow norms? What motivates them to do so? The common perception says, that from a Rationalist framework, actors follow norms only because (and when) it is useful; whereas Constructivists allow the possibility that actors can be motivated to follow norms because they think it to be the right or appropriate thing to do. This brings us to the third bone of contention between Rationalism and Constructivism: ‘norms as being useful versus norms as being right’.

Fearon and Wendt (2002:61) argue that in order to generate a real debate on this issue, it is necessary to restrict the Rationalist position to a particular thick theory of actor’s preferences, namely one in which actors do *not* have an intrinsic preference to follow norms. So the actors follow norms, not as ends in themselves, but as the means to an end. This amounts to saying that actors’ attitudes towards norms is a ‘realist’ one of ‘self-interest’. This move restricts

the intrinsic worth of norms, and in effect “limits the role of norms to the Belief side of the intentional action equation, rather than allowing them to appear as arguments in the actor’s utility functions (Desire)” (61).

The Constructivist position then becomes equivalent to “a different, ‘non-Realist’ thick theory of preferences, namely one in which actors *do* have an intrinsic desire to follow norms, rooted in a belief that this is the right or obligatory thing to do, given a certain identity” (61). This implies that actors possess non-selfish or collective interests towards norms, which means that they identify with or make the others part of their conception of self, and as such make the group’s interest in upholding norms their individual interest as well. In this case norms figure “as arguments in actors’ utility functions, rather than being limited to beliefs about the environment” (61).

This move of constraining the Rationalist position (and its subsequent implication for the Constructivist side) would result, at one level, in a “genuine empirical disagreement” between Rationalism and Constructivism about actors’ motivations. But on the other level it can also be seen as “the degree to which norms are internalized” (61). To place norms in an actors’ utility functions, saying that norms have become desires with perceived obligatory force, imply deeper internalization than saying that norms are only beliefs about the environment to which actors relate instrumentally. Thus, one can argue that “in Rationalism, the main explanatory role of norms is ‘regulative’ of the behaviour of exogenously given agents, whereas in Constructivism, norms are ‘constitutive’ of actors’ identities and interests in the first place” (61) (Emphasis original).

Fearon and Wendt provide us with three more reasons for not treating the differences between these two views about an actor’s motivations for norm compliance in zero-sum, let alone paradigmatic terms. First, there is a little reason to think that human behaviour towards norms is either *always* self-regarding or *always* a function of perceived legitimacy. As we have already stated in chapter one instead of arriving at any apriori judgment, it would be theoretically interesting and challenging to identify the conditions under which each hypothesis holds true. Second, it may be empirically impossible to discriminate between

these views, especially when both predict-as they often do-the same outcome. Third, the two motivations for norm compliance- fear of bad consequences and desire to do right-may interact with each other over time, in either direction. It means when norms are new, one might expect the fear of bad consequences for violation to dominate. Over time, with internalization, the logic of appropriateness may take over. In sum, “the two explanations are *complementary rather than mutually exclusive*” (Fearon and Wendt 2002:62) (Emphases added).

The most widely cited issue thought to divide Rationalist and Constructivist scholarship concerns what the dependent variable or explanandum should be, in particular whether to take actors as ‘exogenously given’ and focus on explaining their actions or to ‘endogenize’ actors themselves. Rationalism is seen as doing the former and Constructivism, the latter. We have identified this issue as the fourth bone of contention between Rationalism and Constructivism: *actors as exogenously given versus problematizing or endogenizing actors*. Fearon and Wendt approach this issue by making two important analytical distinctions, one between different ways in which actors might be problematized or explained, the other between different kinds of actor properties, which could be at stake in such a process.

There are two broad senses in which one might try to ‘endogenize’ actors, causal and constitutive. The causal approach asks where actors come from, or come to have the qualities they have today. Fearon and Wendt give examples of causal explanations such as Hendrik Spruyt’s (1994) explanation of how, over the centuries, states become the dominant actors in world politics by driving out competitors like city-states and city-leagues or Rodney Hall’s account of how changes in the domestic organization of states from dynastic to national foundations transformed inter-state relations. They further argue that a similar kind of causal argument, that state identities and interests have evolved over time through interaction with other states and NGOs, have been made by a number of Constructivists in IR (Fearon and Wendt 2002:63).

In contrast, the constitutive approach asks, not where actors or their properties come from, in a historical or process-tracing sense, but explains “what

actors are made of or how their properties are made meaningful or possible by the society in which they are embedded” (63). Fearon and Wendt argue that the causal approach to endogenizing actors is not at odds with Rationalism, whereas the constitutive approach may be more difficult to reconcile with it.

The second analytical distinction is between different kinds of actor properties which could be at stake in such process. Whether approaching actors from a causal or constitutive standpoint, we can categorize three things about them as given or not: their bodies, beliefs and desires.

A body is the platform on which actorhood is constructed. It is constituted by an internal organizational structure and process that enables them to move, act and acquire meaning in the first place. In the case of corporate actors like states, it is constituted by biologically given people engaging in ongoing collective action enabled by the structure of the organization. As argued by Fearon and Wendt, on the question of whether to take bodies as given the main theoretical cleavage is not between Rationalists and Constructivists; but between Rationalist and Constructivists ‘moderns’ who both see themselves as part of the Enlightenment, the liberal project in which the individual or agent is granted a privileged status, and ‘postmoderns’ who reject that project and want to deconstruct the individual or agent all the way down. Thus, like Rationalists, modern Constructivists have been largely content to take an actor as exogenously given, be it a state, transnational social movement, international organization and so on. The Constructivist concern with identity formation has typically focused on the construction of variation within a given actor (type or role identities), rather than on explaining how organizational actors come in to being in the first place (corporate identities) (For detailed discussion see; Wendt 1999:224-30).

Like with the actors’ bodies, there is little disagreement between the Rationalists and Constructivists regarding an actors’ beliefs. Rationalists, through non-cooperative, game theoretic solution concepts (such as the Nash equilibrium), dynamic games with incomplete information try to explain evolution of beliefs and changes in beliefs. The debate is about how deeply Rationalism can explain beliefs, whether it can handle the ‘complex’ learning involved in preference

formation or the ways in which individuals' beliefs may be constituted by social collectivities.

That leaves preferences, desires, or, in Constructivist parlance, 'identities and interests'. This is where most of the debate has occurred, with Rationalists tending to treat preferences as given and Constructivist trying to endogenize them. Fearon and Wendt (1999:63) consider this a characteristic difference but not as fundamental as sometimes posed to be. They put forth three arguments (which we have already touched upon briefly in chapter one: 6) for caution when making this difference the basis for a deep, paradigmatic divide.

First, the choice of 'exogenous versus endogenous preferences' can be treated as 'purely analytical' rather than as 'a substantive claim about the nature of the world'. Fearon and Wendt treat this issue as consisting of two separate questions: what are the causes of X behaviour? ('an action in the world') what are the causes of X preference? ('a state of mind'), and argue that it is not obvious that we have to answer one in order to answer the other. It is perfectly legitimate to answer the former while holding preferences constant, and to answer the latter while bracketing the causes of behaviour. We shall come back to this point later in this section while discussing Jeffrey Legro's (1996) summarizing of this overall situation with a dance metaphor, the 'two-step': first we explain preferences, then we explain behaviour. Fearon and Wendt seem to be aware of risk involved in separating the two questions, especially the assumption that preferences are given, brings baggage with it, an implicit assumption of stability. The 'division of labour' approach to the 'two-step' can transform otherwise harmless analytical assumptions into tacit ontologies, where Constructivists and Rationalists address their respective questions in isolation from each other. The only way to avoid this regression, argue Fearon and Wendt, is to make sure that partners are coordinated, rather than go their separate ways.

Second, the boundary between preferences and action, on which the debate over this issue inherently turns, is question-relative and thus unstable. We have, in other words, a potentially endless means-ends chain in which any given end can be seen as a means to some other ends, depending upon what question is

being asked. This absence of a fixed boundary between action and interests may help explain their occasional conflation in Constructivist critiques of Rationalist models, in which the claim to explain interests sometimes turns out to be difficult to separate from an explanation of action. Thus, as argued by Fearon and Wendt, if 'Rationalists' can be turned into 'Constructivists', or simply by pushing the research question one step up (or down), then whether or not preferences are taken as given seems like a slippery foundation for a paradigm war.

Third, it is not even clear that the 'two-step' accurately describes the division of labour between Rationalists and Constructivists on either side. Fearon and Wendt cite an example of a Rationalist in IR like Andrew Moravcsik (1997) who does not take preferences as exogenously given, who accepts the logic of the two-step but nevertheless seeks to explain foreign policy-makers' preferences with reference to domestic politics. In sum, the decision about whether to causally explain preferences does not seem like an occasion for a profound or divisive debate.

Now we come to the fifth bone of contention, which, according to Fearon and Wendt, (2002:65) has been one of the most persistent and at least superficially plausible ways of characterizing 'Rationalism v. Constructivism' in IR: "methodological individualism versus methodological holism." Rationalism is commonly associated with methodological individualism, which implies an explanation of macro-level phenomena or wholes (such as 'balance of power system') with reference to more micro-level phenomena or parts (such as state motivations and capacities). On the other hand, Constructivists in IR argue for understanding parts, such as states, in terms of wholes like international systems or reigning ideas, rather than exclusively the other way round.

Another way of expressing this opposition is with contrasting causal and constitutive forms of explanation. Causal explanations, which refer to the action of pre-existing, temporally prior causes that produce the effects to be explained, would seem to have an affinity with the micro-macro program of Rationalism. Constitutive explanations, which characterize systems of beliefs and practices,

that, in effect, create or define social objects and actors-such as master and slave, or states, for instance-would seem to illustrate holism in action.

Fearon and Wendt (2002:65, 66) are trying to counter a common misconception in IR theory that Rationalists have no account of how macro-level phenomena, such as 'social structures', impinge on individual actors. They counter this misconception by emphasizing the centrality of the equilibrium analysis in Rationalist theory. They take up an example of a 'regulative' social convention such as 'people in the United States drive their cars almost exclusively on the right side of two-lane roads' and then apply a Rationalist recipe to explain it. They construct a model/argument in which the actors are a large number of individuals who must choose simultaneously whether to drive on the roads or not, and if on a road on the left, in the middle or on the right. Individuals are assumed to desire to arrive at their destination quickly but without damage to body or car. Now this is a coordination problem- a problem in which one's optimal choice depends on how others choose and in which some patterns of choice are better for all than some others. The observed pattern in which more or less everyone drives on the right side of the road is explained as an 'equilibrium pattern of optimal choices'. That is, given that every one else is expected to drive on the right, driving on the right is an efficient means to reach one's destination quickly without harm.

Fearon and Wendt argue that there are two sorts of 'structures' implicit in this model, exogenous and endogenous. The 'exogenous' structure is generated in a sense by the physical constraints (i.e. the unaffordable costs an individual will have to pay for not driving on right) which prevent an actor from going for any other choice than the optimal one i.e. 'to drive on the right'. Apart from this exogenous structure, the individuals also face a social structural constraint that derives from the fact that everyone expects everyone else to drive on the right. This is endogenous structure, in that it is mutually constituted by the beliefs and the attendant actions of all individuals in the model, and it is explained within the model rather than postulated. From the vantage point of any actor, this endogenous structure of beliefs and attendant actions is just as objective and real

as the tree on the roadside; and this social structure is not determined by material conditions: the convention could just as well be to drive on the left.

They argue that even if this is a causal explanation, it is not causal in the most straightforward sense of pre-existing causes that reliably produce subsequent effects. Actions are explained in part by reference to beliefs in this account, but at the same time beliefs are explained as correct perceptions of actions (in an equilibrium). Explanation with reference to an equilibrium pattern of beliefs and behaviors answers a ‘how is this possible?’ question more than it does a ‘what caused this to come about?’ question. In this respect, it appears closely akin to the constitutive form of explanation associated with holism.

Having discussed ‘regulative’ conventions such as driving on the right, Fearon and Wendt argue that Rationalist accounts can also provide useful insights into more complex ‘constitutive’ conventions, the conventions which are constituted by rules, actions or actor identities. They take up the oft cited question of social identity, the ‘master-slave’ dichotomy and argue, that to be a master is to be accorded certain powers with respect to certain other individuals, by *social convention*. Just as in the case of driving convention, the coordinated actions and beliefs that constitute a system of slavery could be otherwise, but nonetheless have for any one individual an objective reality posed by the beliefs and expected actions of others in various contingencies. In this approach, an actor’s identity, a complex of beliefs about self, others and relations between them, would be endogenously explained as an equilibrium in a coordination game rather than posited as an exogenously given fact about an individual.

So in showing how identities can be seen as constituted by an equilibrium in a coordination game, Fearon and Wendt hint at a way going beyond typical Rationalist story, in effect using a Rationalist approach to answer a question normally asked only by Constructivists. Fearon and Wendt evaluate the value of such a move in both rhetorical as well as substantive terms. They argue that “[b]y highlighting the flexibility of Rationalism to accommodate the ‘Constructivist’ insights it suggests there may be less opposition here than is often thought” (66).

In spite of highlighting Rationalism's flexibility to accommodate Constructivist insights, an important theoretical issue remains, i.e. whether a Rationalist approach necessarily implies that conventions are aggregates of, and ontologically reducible to, pre-existing beliefs and meanings. If so, this would conflict with the holist argument that the contents of the actor's beliefs that sustain social conventions do not exist apart from those conventions. But as we have discussed so far, the equilibrium explanations of the driving and master-slave conventions in themselves do not necessarily carry such implication of reducibility. The meanings that constitute and sustain these conventions may or may not be pre-existing in actor's heads. If Rationalism is viewed in analytical rather than ontological terms, it can be agnostic on this question and thus be compatible with holism. Fearon and Wendt (2002:67) do not suggest that the ontological debate between holism and individualism is thereby settled or unimportant. They simply argue that IR scholars are in no position to settle this dispute. However, if the Rationalist-Constructivist debate is understood in methodological rather than ontological terms, argue Fearon and Wendt, "then it is not clear that IR scholars *need* to settle it to do their work" (67) (Emphasis original).

Fearon and Wendt argue that constitution of actor identity is not an 'exclusive' Constructivist terrain as it is generally claimed by the Constructivists themselves; a claim seldom questioned by the Rationalists. They simply suggest a possibility that the Rationalist approach appears to have the conceptual resources for an endogenous account of actor identities, both constitutive as well as causal. They are also aware of the possibility that this Rationalist account of identity may or may not ultimately capture the essence of the Constructivist argument, and it may or may not yield insightful analysis of the phenomenon in question. "But in the meantime, there is a strong pragmatic case for treating the two stories as *complementary* at least" (Fearon and Wendt 2002:67) (Emphasis added).

Discussion of the five major bones of contentions between Rationalism and Constructivism (focusing on the 'agency' side of the debate) brings us to the conclusion that both Rationalism and Constructivism are simply "two approaches

to answering questions about international politics, rather than two competing *Weltanschauungen*” (Fearon and Wendt 2002:67) (Emphasis original). If the debate is defined as a matter of ontology, then it approaches zero-sum and then it is not clear how much this would help one understand world politics. Thus, “[i]f ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism’ is to be another ‘Great Debate’ in IR, then let it not be constructed as an argument about ontology” (67). Instead, if the debate is viewed in more empirical terms then the relationship between the two approaches is more complex. In some cases they offer rival hypotheses, in others they seem complementary, in others they are redundant.

In short, argue Fearon and Wendt, “the most fruitful framing of ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism’ is a pragmatic one, treating them as analytical lenses for looking at social reality....Thus, even the question of what lens to use for a particular research question, should be left open and not fixed by a priori, methodological or theoretical considerations” (68). Advocating a pragmatic view, argue Fearon and Wendt, does not mean an endorsement of method-driven social-science i.e. an inquiry driven by a concern to validate one or another methodological ‘ism’ than a concern to answer normatively important questions about international politics. After the first ‘Great Debate’ between Realists and Idealists, who disagreed about the essential nature of world politics; argue Fearon and Wendt, all of the subsequent debates (including the ‘Rationalism v. Constructivism’) have been “more about method than substance” (68). In that case a “method becomes a tacit ontology”, which may lead to the neglect of certain problems it is poorly suited to address (68). In a method-driven inquiry, both the sides in a debate may try to marginalize or subsume the other in the name of methodological fundamentalism. So the need, according to Fearon and Wendt, is to view the relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism “not as a debate but as a conversation” (68). The relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism, when understood pragmatically as a conversation, is largely “either *complementary or overlapping*” (68) (Emphasis added). Now we shall take off from this conclusion and discuss how our case study of non-alignment,

from both Rationalist as well as Constructivist perspectives, helps us in this direction.

Interpreting Non-alignment: the Rationalist-Constructivist *Conversation*

Rationalist Interpretation

The Rationalist interpretation of non-alignment has been structured as an intentional explanation, which takes into account both the actor's (post independence India's) beliefs as well as desires (preferences), which, in turn, leads to a particular action (in this case adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment) (see; table no.2:51). Thus, as argued by Fearon and Wendt, at their core-the level of individual choice-ideas are essential, not just secondary, element of Rationalist explanation. But this does not mean 'ideas all the way down'. Here, we have consciously tried to avoid the material versus ideational framing of the Rationalist-Constructivist divide.

The material factors (such as India's unique geo-strategic location, vast resources, huge population, economic exploitation, lack of military and economic power) are given due importance as necessary conditions in shaping (and not causing) India's strategic beliefs, especially the constitution of the first and the third belief: 'the mutual rivalry amongst the great powers as the surest guarantee against an attack of India' and 'essential Asian solidarity' (See; table no.2). But these material conditions are not sufficient to explain the adoption of non-alignment. These material factors have a role to play, but their impact is always mediated by the ideas that give them meaning.

The unique (and insulated) geo-strategic location of India, its vast resources and huge population could be interpreted in two ways; either as the surest guarantee of an attack of India i.e. an invitation to exploit these vast resources, or as the surest guarantee against an attack of India. To choose to believe in the second possibility over the first one is not arbitrary. In fact considering its then present material weakness (both in economic as well as military terms) it seem

rather natural as well as convenient for Indian policy makers to believe in the first possibility than the second one, mainly out of a sense of vulnerability about oneself. But here the conception of one's Security and one's Self don't remain two different things. The later (i.e. causal as well as constitutive account of actors' identities) generally considered an exclusive Constructivist domain in this case comes as an object of Rationalist inquiry, as suggested by Fearon and Wendt.

The mutual rivalry amongst the great power is surely an important but still not the only factor in constituting the actor's choice to believe in the second possibility over the first one. This choice is constituted by conception of India as 'an important source of power' (in strategic sense) and as one having 'a natural position of preeminence in the world with a positive role to play' (in normative sense). Through these two Self-conceptions the Indian policy makers manage to rescue the Indian identity from the 'traditional fears of aggression', which, according to Burton (1965), happen to be at the root of alliance formation.

The self-perception in the strategic sense surely relies upon the material factors such as size, geo-strategic location, potential resources, and population and so on. Even so, as we have argued in the chapter one, the ideational factors such as the *ideology* (which is nationalist, secular, pacifist, democratic and socialist) do play an important role in interpreting these material factors in a certain way. A more aggressive ideology of Hindu nationalism would interpret the same material factors in a completely different way. Then the project would be to 'revive' and 'recreate' the so called 'lost glory': the ultimate dream of *Akhanda Bharat* (the undivided India), the Hindu nation-state. Going by this logic, it would make sense for the Indian policy makers to be excessively insecure or paranoid (and not just cautious) about the sheer existence of the Pakistan, the existential threat to the Hindu nation-state, lying along both, the western as well as the eastern borders. Such paranoia would translate itself into an aggressive, militarist and revisionist posture. Such a posture would find expression at the foreign policy level either in the form of 'internal balancing' (domestic military build up) or 'external alignment' (to aggregate the capabilities), or a combination of both. Given the relative material weakness, the 'internal balancing' would not really be

an available course of action. Thus, what remains, is the option of 'alignment', preferably with the capitalist bloc: a 'natural' ideological ally of the right wing, an ally which would be in a far better position to provide adequate material benefits (advanced technology, capital investment) essential for building the economy and military.

On the other end of the ideological spectrum, a communist ideology would interpret the same scenario, both the domestic as well as the international situation in a drastically different way. It would interpret the domestic material weakness and poverty solely as a result of the exploitative transnational regime of imperialism and the convenient ideological consensus between the colonial rulers and the domestic propertied class (both the feudal landlords as well as the big industrialists): the beneficiary as well as the facilitator of the colonial exploitation. So the task of nation-building out of colonial ashes would require the abolition of this indigenous propertied class and fundamental restructuring of property relations under state control. Subsequently, at the international level, it would interpret the struggle between the Western and the Eastern bloc as *the* ideological struggle, as the final battle between socialism and the 'highest stage of capitalism', in which it would be immoral not to take sides. Thus, alignment with the socialist bloc would not just be a strategic or a tactical issue but a moral, political and historical responsibility.

Our discussion of the two extreme ideological routes Indian policy makers could have taken and their subsequent foreign policy trajectories help us emphasize the centrality of ideational factors in Rationalist explanations. As we have argued, going by the Hindu nationalist route, it would be rational to align with the Western bloc. Similarly, going by the communist route, it would be rational to align with the Eastern bloc. As we have argued at length in the first chapter; going by the centrist ideological route (i.e. secular, pacifist, democratic-socialist), it was rational not to align with any of the rival blocs but to play an active, positive role in world affairs by remaining non-aligned.

In each of these cases, the meaning of 'rationality' differs. It is not static or given, but rather elastic and open ended. Rational Choice, as Snidal (2002:75)

argues, is not all limited to conceptions of self-interested, materialistic, profit-maximizing 'economic' actors or to anomic, power-seeking state actors in international affairs. Rational Choice is "a methodological approach that explains both individual and collective (outcomes) in terms of *individual goal seeking under constraints*. This broad conception needs to be filled in considerably before it can have much specific content" (Snidal 2002:74) (Emphasis original).

In each of the above cases it is the actor's (alternative) conceptions of Self and the relevant Others i.e. the actor's identities and interests, provide a specific content to the meaning of rationality. According to the Rationalist interpretation it is the actor's beliefs and preferences (see; chapter one: table no.2) which constitute the adoption of non-alignment. These beliefs and preferences are determined neither by the method of assumption nor deduction, but by the method of observation. Assumption, as we have already argued, is the method most similar to the one used in economics. It typically assumes that individuals and firms are wealth (or profit) maximizers. Thus, it invariably ends up treating the actor's beliefs and preferences as pre-existing and, identity and interest as exogenously given i.e. outside the analysis. Deduction, which implies determining the actor's preference on the basis of pre-existing theories, has its own problems. Observation, as a method is not completely unproblematic, but is still the closest to the empirical specification of actor's beliefs and preferences by taking into account the particular historical and ideational context.

By adopting the observational method, we have tried to avoid treating India's beliefs and preferences (and thus its identity and interests) as exogenously given, one of the cardinal sins associated with Rationalism. We have contextualized those beliefs and preferences in particular historical and ideational context. These beliefs and preferences are treated not as pre-existing or deducible from any pre-existing theory but as the properties of India's identity and interests. It is a 'thick' Rationalist explanation, which is not silent about the content of actor's beliefs and desires (i.e. preferences) as it is not devoid of a particular historical and ideational context in which the actor is situated.

By treating the issue of the actor's beliefs and preference formation as one linked with the actor's identity, we have taken an 'endogenizing' route. As we have argued earlier in the last section of this chapter, actors can be 'endogenized' in two ways, causal (where the actors come from in an historical or process tracing sense) and constitutive (what actors are made of or how their properties are made meaningful or possible by the society in which they are embedded).

The Rationalist interpretation of the adoption of non-alignment takes the constitutive way of endogenizing the actor. The origins or sources of India's beliefs and preferences are not traced in the historical or process tracing sense. Instead, the question asked is how the actor's properties (beliefs and preferences) are made meaningful or possible by the society (both the domestic as well as the international) in which they are embedded. The internal structure of the actor's beliefs and preferences (domestic level; see, table no.1) along with the strategic environment comprising of the information structure and the available courses of action (systemic level; see, table no.2), as we have argued in the first chapter, co-constitute the adoption of non-alignment. The reference to domestic as well systemic level structures or wholes for explaining the adoption of non-alignment shows that the Rational Choice approach need not be equated with methodological individualism (an explanation of macro-level phenomena or wholes with reference to more micro-level phenomena), but is also compatible with methodological holism (understanding parts in terms of wholes).

The actor's beliefs and preferences, which form one part of the co-constitutive explanation of the adoption of non-alignment, are empirically (observationally) specified by locating them within a particular historical and ideational context, the context in which the actor's identity and interests are in turn embedded. With this analytical move, we can argue that the actor's beliefs and preferences are not pre-existing or given, but are properties of the actor's identity and interests. On closer inspection, these beliefs and preferences can be argued to be constituted by the actor's identity and interests (see; table no.2 and 3 together).

Yet, in our case, the Rationalist explanation does not provide us with an in-depth constitutive account or explanation of what the actor's identity and interests (represented in the table no.3) are made up of. As I argue it is not a shortcoming or a handicap of Rationalism. It is a genuine limitation of Rational Choice as a methodological approach, at least in my assessment. Rational Choice, as a pragmatic analytical tool, may be able to locate an actor's beliefs and preferences in a particular historical and ideational context, but may not always be able to provide a thorough account of an actor's identity and interests. While doing so, Rational Choice may manage to provide us with an endogenous, constitutive account of an actor's beliefs and preferences, but it may or may not always go deeper than that. In our case, the Rationalist interpretation treats the actor's identity and interests *only* in relation to the behaviour or the outcome (i.e. the adoption of non-alignment) it seeks to explain. If one compares table 2 to table 4, one can clearly see the constitutive account provided in table 4 is a much wider and deeper constitutive account of the actor's identity and interests. Again, I neither intend to horse race the Rationalist and the Constructivist approach one against the other, nor do I want to label this difference (and may be a genuine limitation on Rationalist side) as a fundamental fault line between these two paradigms.

Before moving on with the discussion of the Constructivist interpretation of non-alignment one needs to dissociate Rational Choice from one more baggage i.e. to equate the Rational Choice explanations with the logic of consequences as against the logic of appropriateness, which is believed to come under the purview of the Constructivist camp. As we have discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, this issue needs to be settled empirically than apriori. If one looks at table 2 closely, one can clearly see the two beliefs – 'indivisibility of peace and disaster' and 'essential Asian solidarity' - which are driven not solely by self-regarding but more so by other-regarding concerns. These beliefs are further made up of or constituted by the actor's identity and interests (discussed in the table no.4), which, as we have argued, attempts to strike an accommodative balance between

the self-regarding and the other-regarding concerns, the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness.

The two beliefs we are talking about are not merely beliefs about the world around the actor, but, as we have argued in the first chapter, they do have strong bearing on both the actor's utility functions or desires (preferences) as well as behaviour (the adoption of non-alignment). The third preference in table 2 is- 'to prevent the cold war from entering its neighborhood' and the third as well as the fourth strategies (the tools to actualize actor's desires) in the same table i.e. 'to create, maintain and widen a zone or area of peace' and 'to play a positive, impartial, mediatory role in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disagreements (also at the international forums like the United Nations)'. This preference reflects the similar other-regarding concerns expressed in the two beliefs mentioned above. The logic driving the belief in the indivisibility of peace and disaster, the desire 'to prevent the cold war from entering its neighborhood' and the strategy 'to create, maintain and widen the area of peace' is not purely a logical consequence but rather one of appropriateness.

In this case one can say that the norm of pacifism influences not only the actor's beliefs but also its utility function (preferences), which suggests a deeper internalization of the norm. As we have argued in the earlier section, over time, with (deeper) internalization the logic of appropriateness i.e. compliance with norm as right takes over the logic of the consequences i.e. compliance with the norm as useful. The Rationalist account takes off from the internalization of the norm and provides us with a regulative account of the norm on the actor's behaviour. As Fearon and Wendt (2002:61) argue, for the constitutive account of how the norm gets internalized by actor over time and how it constitutes actor's identity and interests, one has to turn to Constructivism. Here, I am not suggesting a strict division of labour as such but more so a difference in emphasis. As I argue, one need not consider them separately as two logics (of consequences and of appropriateness), and these two explanations (norm as useful and norm as right) as mutually exclusive (or even subsumable by each other), but as complementary in nature.

Constructivist Interpretation

Constructivist interpretation of non-alignment does not restrict itself to the explanation of the actor's behaviour or an outcome i.e. the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment per se. It is a more general and deeper constitutive account of Indian identity and interests constructed during the freedom struggle. It is rooted in a particular historical context and also follows a chronology, but it is not a historical or chronological account of Indian identity. It is a Constructivist account which attempts to locate significant shifts and decisive ideational moments (identification, subversion, accommodation) in the construction of a particular kind of Indian Self while interacting with the significant external as well as internal others. The adoption of non-alignment is not caused by this particular kind of Indian and identity and interests, but is rather constituted by it. If the Constructivist account of the actor's identity and interests is complemented with the detailed Rationalist account of the actor's beliefs and preferences, then the account of the actor's behaviour (the adoption of non-alignment) gains more explanatory weight.

The Constructivist account of non-alignment does not conveniently take 'ideas all the way down' approach. It takes into account the materiality of the colonial domination and its exploitation. The whole exercise of building an accommodationist national self (see, table no.4) is not purely an ideational exercise, but it has important territorial, economical, security dimensions as well as implications. The tension between the strategy of subversion and accommodation (which is at the heart of the Constructivist account of Indian identity) is also not purely an ideational tension i.e. tension between competing ideas regarding how to deal with the West, the modernity project, the conception of History and so on. The two strategies are, after all, two competing socio-political and economical programmes with serious and long term material implications. Ideas, without doubt, play a more important role in interpreting, mediating, conferring meaning and value to the various material factors we have mentioned before than in case of

the Rationalist account, but again, it is a matter of difference of emphasis. One need not put it in terms of an 'ideational versus material' conflict.

A Constructivist account of non-alignment is not purely about the logic of appropriateness alone as it is commonly believed. In fact, the tension between the strategy of subversion and the strategy of accommodation is, at one level, a tension between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. At another level, it is a tension between a radically other-regarding Self and a moderate other-regarding or a more self-regarding Self. In the course of identity construction, as discussed in detail in the second chapter, the logic of consequence does not take over, but surely dominates the logic of appropriateness (and also the other-regarding concerns) in some ways.

The dominance of the logic of consequences finds its most prominent expression in pragmatically internalizing or rather accommodating the western modernity project (concept of reason, modern rational sciences, modern nation-state, large-scale industrialization and so on) as a useful *Zeitgeist*. The general utility or the usefulness of this culturally de-contextualized *Zeitgeist* in order to survive and to rise or flourish as an ancient civilization (now in the form of a modern nation-state) becomes more important than the logic of appropriateness underlying it. This is so mainly because the logic of appropriateness underlying the western modernity project loses its ethical, cultural and civilizational particularities (along with its ethical complexities and contradictions) in the form of a de-contextualized *Zeitgeist* i.e. a universal spirit of time.

Similarly, the conception of the Indian Self is radically altered (and compressed) during the moment of accommodation. The accommodationist Self retains some of its other-regarding concerns (such as radical pacifism, anti-colonialism, Internationalism) wholeheartedly present in the moment of subversion in a dilute and moderate forms. The expanse of the subversive self, which was wide and compassionate enough to contain even the predicament of the colonial rulers, shrinks with the wholesale accommodation of the western modernity project as the unquestionably progressive, universal spirit of the time in the service of the creation and consolidation of the true national state. This

accommodationist Self provides a concrete meaning or specific content to the rationality of underlying the adoption of non-alignment as a *grand strategy*.

The Constructivist account of non-alignment is also not an ideal specimen of methodological holism, to be posed against methodological individualism. It refers to the 'wholes' or the ideational structures such as identity discourses, identity topography, ideational moments to provide a detailed constitutive account of the construction of Indian identity and interests. But the particular methodological framework adopted in the second chapter locates these 'wholes' or the structures at the domestic level, not at the more macro or systemic level. It is a domestic-level Constructivist account and not a structural one. The identity of the actor is explained not by referring to a more macro-level phenomenon but to a more micro-level phenomenon. So, in spite of being a Constructivist account, it can be argued that it loosely follows methodological individualism i.e. an explanation of macro-level phenomenon or wholes with reference to more micro-level phenomenon.

If one compares the Constructivist and the Rationalist accounts of non-alignment in the light of the discussion so far, one will find that they neither conflict with each other in any way, nor are they mutually exclusive. The difference is more one of emphasis. The Constructivist account emphasizes upon how a particular kind of an Indian identity is constructed over the period of time, while the Rationalist account emphasizes upon the behavioral effects of this particular kind of Indian identity by translating them in to the actor's beliefs and preferences. It does not mean that the Constructivist approach is not interested in explaining actor's behaviour or that the Rationalist approach takes actor's identity as exogenously given. Instead, one can see that these two methodological approaches *complement* each other.

It does not mean that one casts their relationship in to a necessary sequential 'two step' metaphor (discussed in the previous section), in which first we explain preferences (Constructivist), then we explain behaviour (Rationalist).

It makes sense to share Fearon and Wendt's skepticism regarding such 'division of labour' approach to the 'two-step', because the 'two-step' approach can transform otherwise harmless analytical assumptions into tacit ontologies, where Constructivists and Rationalists address their respective questions in isolation from each other. The only way to avoid this regression, argue Fearon and Wendt, is to make sure that partners *coordinate*, rather than go their separate ways.

Conclusion

Non-alignment as a *policy* was operationalized by India after attaining political independence, but as a *world view* was conceived much before. The ideas, values, norms which influenced India's freedom struggle (Pacifism, Pan Asianism) found their expression in non-alignment as a world view. Later, non-alignment turned into an international movement, a platform for the newly independent Afro-Asian nations to safeguard their political and economic freedom. We have discussed non-alignment as a policy in the first chapter and non-alignment as a world view in the second chapter. Non-alignment, as a *movement*, has not been included in the agenda of discussion, mainly because of its huge scope and secondly, because it involves multiple actors with their respective national histories, identities, interests.

The adoption of non-alignment as a *policy* by post-independence India was co-constituted by the strategic environment (composed of information structure and available actions) and, the actor (composed of beliefs and preferences). The principal actors of this strategic environment were the super powers and the newly independent states. Both, the super powers as well as the newly independent states knew (the information structure) that neither wanted an escalation of any regional or local conflict into another systemic war due to its unimaginable costs. Both the superpowers and the newly independent states knew, that owing to the emergence of power vacuums, both the superpowers would invariably attempt to fill them up by gaining control over them to increase their respective spheres of influence and contain each other. Both the super powers as well as the newly independent states knew that not all of the newly independent states would voluntarily want to align with either of the super powers; even if they chose to align, it would not be just out of the compulsions of bi-polarity (which was evidently not enough) or due to their stakes in or identification with the super power conflict.

The strategic environment provided both, the superpowers as well as the newly independent states, with available course of action vis-à-vis each other. The

actions available to the super powers can be divided into two categories. One, the actions to be directed towards the compliant type i.e. those newly independent states which were willing to align or at least not averse to aligning with either of the super powers. Second, the actions to be directed towards the non-compliant type i.e. the newly independent states which were not willing to align or fiercely averse to aligning with either of the super powers.

The available actions to be directed towards the compliant types were mainly two: either alliance formation or formation of an informal empire. The available actions to be directed towards the non-compliant types were either manipulation or voluntary recognition (as overt military invasion was out of the question). Manipulation can either be through inducement or assistance of internal unrest; or by deliberately enforced isolation. Voluntary recognition implied not just the recognition of the legitimate right of the particular state/s to remain non-compliant but also recognition of the utility value of their non-compliance in maintaining the delicate bipolar, nuclear, managed balance of power system. Thus, out of the four available actions to superpowers vis-à-vis the newly independent states in general, voluntary recognition was bound to be the least preferred.

Given the logic of the situation, the actions available to the newly independent states become fairly obvious. The states belonging to the compliant type could align either with the western or the eastern bloc, either as a member of a relatively anarchic alliance or an informal empire. The states belonging to the non-compliant type could either be passively neutral or could isolate themselves from international politics.

The course of action adopted by post independence India, non-alignment, did not figure in the four courses of action logically available to the newly independent states vis-à-vis the superpowers. Thus, in the initial phase of its adoption, many western commentators, who could not grasp the 'positive', 'participatory', 'dynamic', 'evolving' aspect of India's non-alignment, equated it with 'neutralism', 'isolationism', 'passivity' and so on. I argue that non-alignment as a course of action was not logically available but was logically possible for

India in the given strategic environment. The strategic environment did not readily provide this course of action, but it did not restrict it either. Logically available strategic choices, as I argue, demand both calculation as well as imagination. Calculation leads to strategy, imagination leads to innovation or improvisation. So such logically possible choices can be called strategic innovations/improvisations.

In the Indian case, as I argue, the actor's beliefs and preferences played a far more important or crucial role in shaping the strategic imagination than the strategic environment. The strategic environment constituted India's adoption of non-alignment only in terms of creating an opportunity and providing an incentive to the actor (India) for not complying i.e. for not aligning with either of the super power blocs. Finally, the adoption of the policy of non-alignment, which turned out to be significantly different and much more than non-aligning – a strategic improvisation, was constituted by India's beliefs and preferences.

The beliefs of Indian policy makers in: 'the mutual rivalry amongst the great powers as the surest guarantee against an attack of India'; 'indivisibility of peace and disaster'; 'essential Asian solidarity', 'freedom as freedom in conducting international affairs, rest being local autonomy'; and the preferences for: 'India's survival, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity'; 'long term self reliant economic development'; 'prevention of cold war from entering its neighbourhood'; 'attainment of special status in world affairs'; together provided the positive, participatory, dynamic content to the grand strategy of non-alignment. It was not a singular strategy, but consisted of several strategies, such as: 'diplomatic neutralization and inoffensive containment of potential threats from Pakistan and China respectively'; 'movement towards the polarities of alignment (without actually aligning) according to the favourable international environment'; 'creation, maintenance and widening of a zone or area of peace'; 'assumption of positive, impartial, mediatory role in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disagreements' (also at the international forums like the United Nations).

Non alignment as a *world view* was constituted by complex, historical processes of construction of the Indian Self while interacting with multiple and

multiple kinds of Others, such as 'real and imagined', 'historical and generalized', 'external and internal' (listed in the table no.3). For India, a state then under colonial domination, the most significant Other was the colonizer i.e. British Empire. The encounter with the colonizer in the form of the British Empire marked the most decisive and deeply constitutive influence on the formation and consolidation of the Indian identity. India's encounter with the British Empire was also its encounter with the generalized Others: 'colonialism', 'imperialism', 'the West'.

The anti-colonial movement generated in India due to this encounter had been the product of the imperial culture itself. The strategy adopted by the colonized Self (i.e. India) to respond to its Other, the colonizer, was not just one of resistance and opposition, but one of 'identification' with the aggressor, 'both in friendship and in enmity'. Both, the liberal reformists as well as the Hindu revivalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth century India sought salvation in 'becoming like the British' in their own ways. The liberal reformists opted for the path of 'rectification' of the so-called regressive and undesirable elements within the degenerated Hindu religion through 'self-redefinition' (judged by 'the liberal, Rationalist, individualist paradigm of the modern West') out of a sense of cultural inferiority. The Hindu revivalists committed themselves to 'self affirmation' through the 'revival' of the so-called lost golden age of Hinduism, in order to militantly resist the colonial Rule.

While identification was a dominant strategy adopted by the Indian elite vis-à-vis the colonizers in the early phase of colonialism, the alternative model or strategy, that of 'subversion', was not entirely absent. Subversion meant grasping the 'sharedness' of colonial culture, which harms both the colonized and the colonizer equally by altering cultural priorities of both sides and bringing forth previously recessive elements from both cultures. Grasping this sharedness meant identification with 'critical Christian ethics and the traditional West', as opposed to 'the hyper-masculine, masquerading Christianity and modern, imperial West.' It demanded 'a creative use of the fundamental predicament of British culture caught in the hinges of imperial responsibility and subjecthood in victory.' It was

a universal project 'to rediscover the softer side of human nature, the so-called non-masculine self of man relegated to the forgotten zones of the Western self-concept.' To put this awareness to political use, it challenged the colonial culture's ordering of sexual identities, which assumed the superiority of manliness to womanliness and womanliness in turn to femininity in man (i.e. androgyny).

The essence of subversion lay in shifting the paradigm of the Indian freedom struggle, from an anti-colonial struggle against the colonizer to a shared, universal struggle against the ideology of colonialism, the colonial culture, Western cosmology itself, and the respective strategies or responses (liberal reformist, militant revivalist) it generated in Indian society. This subversive paradigm shift in the nature, content and the aim of the anti-colonial struggle was also a paradigm shift in the construction and conceptualization of Indian identities, an alternative Indian Self, the Other India; 'radical pacifist', 'critical traditionalist', 'anti-statist', 'counter-modernist' and 'anti-colonialist'.

After 'identification' and 'subversion', the third strategy or response (and the most decisive one, in terms of its implications for identity formation as well as foreign policy formulation) adopted by the Indian elite was that of accommodation, which consisted of a pragmatic and selective appropriation of the significant internal as well as external Others, one of the most important of those being History. History as a linear process, which emphasizes causal relations, progress and evolution, following the Judaeo-Christian cosmology was alien to Indians before the arrival of the British. For the modern West and for those influenced by its concept of time, the cultures living by myths were ahistorical, and thus, representative of an earlier, second-rate social consciousness. 'Historical societies' (the adult) were the true representatives of mature human self-consciousness and therefore, their constructions of the 'ahistorical societies' (the child) were more scientifically valid than those of these societies themselves.

The 'strategy of accommodation' tried to bypass this paradigm of 'the adult-child relationship', without fundamentally challenging or problematising it, but by making it less paternalistic and hierarchical. This ideational move implicitly provided legitimacy to the colonial project by de-linking (and thus

reclaiming and selectively re-appropriating) the project of modernity (including the two essential modern myths, History and Science) from the West, the European civilization, and the colonizers.

The accommodationists challenged the organic and essential relationship between the project of modernity and the West. For them, this relationship was 'conjunctural', and thus, so was the difference between the East and the West, which resulted in the colonial domination of the latter by the former. The cultural values or the 'spirit' as well as the conjunctural economic and political factors (in this case, the spirit of science or scientific temper, Rationalism, pragmatism, sense of history, secularism, nation-state, industrialization, democracy) which go with a particular sort of growth of a civilization were seen as capable of being extracted from their particular civilisational context and made universal historical values i.e. the *Zeitgeist*, the *Yugadharmā*, the 'universal spirit of the age'.

It offered a completely different vision of salvation for India. The conception of '*Zeitgeist*' (which consisted of humanism and scientific spirit) depended upon a distinction between the material and the spiritual. So India's salvation lay in learning from the modern West, 'the spirit of the age' (i.e. the scientific spirit) which it represented. The 'scientific method' also meant, quite specifically, 'the primacy of the sphere of the economic' in all social questions. This, in particular, was believed to be the distinctively modern, or the 20th century way of looking at history and society. Whether it was a question of political programmes, or economic policy, or social and cultural issues, a scientific analysis must proceed by relating it to the basic economic structure of society. This 'primacy of the economic sphere' approach even allowed to appropriate, for purely nationalist purposes, 'the scientific method of Marxism', as the most advanced expression of the Rationalism of the European enlightenment. This appropriation of Marxism (the external, ideological Other of the nationalist ideology) was deliberately selective.

The purpose behind this selective appropriation was to provide scientific legitimacy to a whole set of Rationalist distinctions between the modern and the traditional, the secular and the religious, the progressive and the obscurantist, the

advanced and the backward. In every case in this present day and age, there is but one general historically given direction in which the economy must move: the direction of rapid industrialization. It demanded the abolition of subjective beliefs, backward ideologies, primordial ties, sectarian sentiments and, above all the problem of the communalism (the divisive, internal Other), which meant 'the elimination of the colonial state', the source of the communal problem and also representative of the narrow and regressive interests of British capital and, the establishment and consolidation of 'the true national state', the final aim of the freedom struggle.

Scientific planning and industrialization would enable this *true national state* to revitalize the productive processes and to increase production; otherwise there would be nothing to distribute. *Socialism* would come only when one would have a plan to distribute production evenly. The adoption of equality as a goal of planned development was justified by 'the spirit of the age' which was in favour of equality. The need for equality was entailed in the very logic of progress: progress meant industrialization; industrialization required the removal of barriers which prevented groups from fully participating in the entire range of new economic activities, hence industrialization required equality of opportunity. Thus, neither industrialization nor equality was an innately political question to be resolved in the battlefield of politics but was now a 'technical' problem, a problem of balancing and optimization, a job for experts.

This 'selective appropriation' of Socialism in turn limited further deeper identification with its political, ideological programme both at the domestic and international level. It also put a break on the possibility of closer co-operation or alignment on the political and ideological plane (and not strategic one) with the Soviet Union, the leader of the socialist camp, the super power pursuing a policy of expansionism for strategic and not imperialist reasons. Yet, the selective appropriation of the Rationalist and egalitarian side of Marxism meant a certain cautious political distance (and not complete estrangement) from the United States, the champion of liberal democracy but also a capitalist state, and a strategic as well as ideological antagonist of the Soviet Union.

The accommodationist strategy de-linked Gandhi's pacifism, non-violence, the idea of peace from its moral foundation i.e. Gandhi's idea of Truth, his larger project of liberating both the colonized as well as the colonizer. The moral core of Gandhi's subversion was believed to be based upon unreason, passion, impulse, intuition, religion, mysticism and so on, and thus was considered as incomprehensible, obscurantist and irrational. The political core of subversion (attainment of complete independence from the British Raj only as a means to radical decentralization of power, facilitation of gradual socio-cultural reforms through social activism from below, attainment of economically self-sufficient villages as social as well as autonomous political unit of organization, a republic or panchayat having full powers to rule and defend itself i.e. Gram Swaraj through small scale industrialization) was believed to be naïve, unfeasible, regressive and anti-modern i.e. against 'the spirit of the age', thus undesirable for the consolidation of 'the true national state'.

The accommodationist believed that 'the true national state', after coming into existence, would need 'prolonged peace' in order to realize the path of economic development it had chosen for itself (or rather 'History' had chosen for it). So to assume moderate pacifist and non-militarist identities would become functionally necessary to realize the historically chosen path of economic development and nation building. Besides, 'the true national state' would require durable political legitimacy to achieve political stability at home which could be gained only by claiming the inheritance of Gandhi's pacifism and non-violence, which had an unmatched pan-Indian mass appeal and the ability to unify people across religious, cultural, linguistic and ideological boundaries.

The accommodationists considered the 'internal' chaos and political instability (especially against the backdrop of bloody communal riots and the atrocities that took place during the partition of India) and, not the 'external' factors (such as neighbouring states, power blocs), as the primary threats or sources of insecurity to the consolidation of 'the true national state', the agent of reason and progress. Thus, the security of this 'true national state' would depend on the ability of its policy makers to neutralize these internal threats by pursuing

the historically chosen path of planned economic development. For this, it would need to insulate it from the great power rivalry and the cold war compulsions of alignment, which was seen as a continuation of the imperialism, the exploitative but historically contingent Other of the benevolent, progressive modernity i.e. 'the spirit of the age'. Yet, historically, the chosen path of economic development would require assistance (in terms of capital investment, technology) from these expansionist super powers. Thus, such insulation could not mean isolation, but rather the adoption of a cautious and flexible course of foreign policy, constantly adjusting to the (empirically verifiable) global realities of power by judging each issue on its own merit, ultimately in the service of 'the true national state'.

This cautious and flexible course of foreign policy was considered the expression of 'rational' nationalism, an expression of essential harmony of interests of all the states, thus automatically compatible with internationalism and the 'indivisible' world peace (the essential condition for the building and consolidation of 'the true national state'). This rational or enlightened nationalism was contrasted with its Other, the irrational or narrow nationalism which would contradict the essential harmony among the states, thus making the states unnecessarily insecure, aggressive, militarist; compelling them to indulge in power politics leading to alignments and counter-alignments. Here, power politics or alignments were not seen as inherently evil or undesirable, but as simply unnecessary and irrational in a functional sense, something which would be a deviation from 'the spirit of the age'.

In fact, the adoption of such a cautious and flexible course of foreign policy was further reinforced by the collective Asian identity, which was constructed and consolidated during India's freedom struggle, while India forged solidarity with the anti-colonial struggles of its Asian neighbours (the significant, external and generalized Other, sharing a common fate and destiny). Extending the essential ideational link between the colonization of India, as a 'key' to the colonization of its Asian neighbours; the accommodationists argued, that after decolonization, the political and economic independence of these Asian neighbours would inevitably depend on the political and economic independence

of India. India would be able to do this successfully only if it chose not to align with either of the power blocs. Alignment was seen as the ultimate loss of independence by the accommodationists. This was not because freedom or independence was seen as an end in itself, but because alignment implied a loss of freedom to pursue the historically chosen path of economic development and was seen as a major threat to the internal political stability. Without these, the consolidation of the true national state, the ultimate objective of the freedom movement, would be inconceivable.

The invocation of the Asian identity to justify or validate the adoption of non-alignment (by implicitly projecting India as the legitimate leader of Asia) was an invocation of a collective identity constructed through the shared historical experience of the struggle against imperialism and the identification of India's exceptional strategic importance. Nonetheless, 'not all collective identities are essentially other-regarding in nature', to the extent that one sacrifices one's basic interests for the others. On similar lines, India's interest in 'preventing the cold war from entering the Asian neighbourhood' was driven by self-regarding considerations, such as the protection of internal political stability, social cohesion, economic development, and most importantly the 'true national state'. These self-regarding interests (stemming from an egoist identity) were believed to be conceived in perfect harmony with India's Asian identity, but in reality, they were not. India did not treat the protection of its Asian neighbours as an end in itself either.

To sum up, through selective appropriations of the significant Others, both internal as well as external, of multiple kinds, an accommodationist national Self was constructed. The accommodationist Self, which emerged victorious in this contestation, projected itself as the true national Self of India, whose ultimate goal was to establish and consolidate a true national state. The identities of this true Indian Self which emerged during this process were: 'statist', 'modernist', 'socialist', 'secular', 'democratic', 'non-militarist', 'moderate pacifist', 'Internationalist', 'Asian'.

The interests of this true national Self derived from these identities were as follows: 'to establish and consolidate a true national state', 'to pursue the historically chosen path of planned economic development', 'to maintain internal political stability and security of the national state through non-militarist and moderate pacifist ways', 'to protect the cold war from entering its neighbourhood', 'to attain a special status in world affairs'. I argue that the adoption of the grand strategy of non-alignment by post independence India, was in turn, constituted by these interests, which, contrary to conventional beliefs and popular projections, were more self than other regarding.

Having discussed the Rationalist and Constructivist interpretations of non-alignment, we come to the second axis of our discussion, 'the Rationalist-Constructivist' debate. The popular framing of the 'Rationalism vs. Constructivism' characterizes the divide along the following lines of disagreement or bones of contention: 'material versus ideational', 'logic of consequences versus logic of appropriateness', 'norms as useful versus norms as right', 'actors as exogenously given versus problematizing or endogenizing actors', 'methodological individualism versus methodological holism'. These fault lines are, of course, problematic, which would merit engaging with at the theoretical as well as the empirical level. The comparative study of Rationalist (focusing upon the actor's beliefs and preferences) and Constructivist (focusing upon the actor's identities and interests) show us that the relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism can be conceived as a *conversation* than as a divide. The fault lines between them are negotiable, and not as stark and mutually exclusive as they are posed to be.

The Rationalist interpretation of non-alignment has been structured as an intentional explanation, which takes into account not only material factors (such as India's geo-strategic location, vast resources, huge population, colonial economic exploitation, urgency of self-reliant economic development for political and social stability and so on), but also ideational factors such as the actor's beliefs and ideology, which provide a specific content to its rationality. These beliefs, as well as the preferences, need not be treated as exogenously given

(either through assumption or deduction), but can be empirically observed through contextual reading of the official policy documents, speeches, articles of the policy makers.

These beliefs and preferences need not always be driven by the logic of consequences. Whether the actor's behaviour is driven by the logic of consequences or appropriateness, is a critical empirical question, which needs to be settled by observing the actor's beliefs and preferences. Of the four beliefs, two: 'indivisibility of peace' and 'essential Asian solidarity' can not be argued to be driven solely by the logic of consequences. The norm of pacifism and the pan-Asian identity constructed during the freedom struggle are decisive in this case in shaping the actor's beliefs and, in turn, constrain its behaviour. Similarly, the preference for the 'prevention of the cold war entering into its neighbourhood' is not purely driven by the logic of consequences.

The Rationalist interpretation of non-alignment is a thick Rationalist explanation, which is not silent about the content of actor's beliefs and desires (i.e. preferences), because it is not devoid of a particular historical and ideational context in which the actor is situated. By treating the issue of the actor's beliefs and preference formation as one located in a particular historical and ideational context, we have taken an endogenizing route.

It is the constitutive way of endogenizing the actor. The origins or sources of India's beliefs and the preferences are not traced in the historical or process-tracing sense. Instead, the question asked, is how the actor's properties (beliefs and preferences) are made meaningful or possible by the society (both the domestic as well as international) in which they are embedded.

The internal structure of the actor's beliefs and preferences (domestic level) along with the strategic environment comprising of the information structure and the available courses of action (systemic level), as we have argued in the first chapter, co-constitute the adoption of non-alignment. The reference to the domestic as well the systemic level structures or wholes for explaining the adoption of non-alignment shows that the Rational Choice approach need not to

be equated with methodological individualism, but is also compatible with methodological holism.

The actor's beliefs and preferences are empirically (observationally) specified by locating them within a particular historical and ideational context, the context in which the actor's identity and interests are embedded. With this analytical move, we can argue that the actor's beliefs and preferences are not pre-existing or given, but are properties of the actor's identity and interests. If one looks at them closely, these beliefs and preferences can be argued to be constituted by the actor's identity and interests.

In our case, the Rationalist explanation hints at the actor's identity and interests underlying the beliefs and the preferences, but does not provide us with an in-depth constitutive account of what the actor's identity and interests are made up of. As I argue, this is not a shortcoming or handicap of Rationalism, but a genuine methodological limitation, at least in my assessment. It may manage to provide us with an endogenous, constitutive account of an actor's beliefs and preferences, but it may not always go deeper than that.

The Constructivist interpretation of non-alignment does not restrict itself to the explanation of non-alignment as a *policy*, but goes to a deeper level to provide a constitutive account of the *world view* underlying the adoption of non-alignment. It does not take 'ideas all the way down' approach. The construction of the accommodationist Self as the true national Self is not purely ideation, but has important territorial, economical, security dimensions as well as implications. The tension and contestation between the strategy of subversion and accommodation is, at one level, a contestation between two competing socio-political and economic programmes with serious and long term material consequences for India. Ideas certainly play a more important role in interpreting, mediating, conferring meaning and value to the various material factors we have mentioned before than in case of the Rationalist account, but again it is a matter of difference of emphasis. One need not put it in terms of the 'ideational versus material' conflict.

The Constructivist account of non-alignment is not purely about the logic of appropriateness alone, as it is commonly believed to be. In fact, the tension

between the strategy of subversion and the strategy of accommodation is at one level a tension between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences and at another level, a tension between a radically other-regarding Self and a moderate other-regarding or a more self-regarding Self. The dominance of the logic of consequences finds the most prominent expression in pragmatically internalizing or rather accommodating the western modernity project (concept of reason, modern rational sciences, modern nation-state, large-scale industrialization and so on) as a useful *Zeitgeist*. The general utility or the usefulness of this culturally de-contextualized *Zeitgeist* in order to survive and to rise or flourish as an ancient civilization (now in the form of a modern nation-state) becomes more important than the logic of appropriateness underlying it.

The Constructivist account of non-alignment is also not an ideal specimen of methodological holism, to be posed against methodological individualism. It is a domestic-level Constructivist account and not a structural one. The identity of the actor is explained, by referring to a micro level phenomenon rather than a macro level one. . The particular methodological framework adopted, in this case, locates the 'wholes' or the structures (such as identity discourses, identity topography, ideational moments) to explain the actor's identity and interests at the domestic level, not at the more macro or systemic level. So, in spite of being a Constructivist account, it is not averse to methodological individualism. It is thus an explanation of a macro-level phenomenon with reference to a more micro-level phenomenon.

To conclude, the relationship between Rationalism and Constructivism, as pragmatic, analytical tools and methodological approaches, need not be conflictual or mutually exclusive. The difference between these two approaches is principally that of emphasis. In our case, the Constructivist account emphasizes how a particular kind of an Indian Self (identities and interests) was being constructed over the period of time, while the Rationalist account emphasizes the behavioral effects of this kind of Indian identity by translating the effects into beliefs and preferences. It does not mean that the Constructivist approach is not interested in explaining the actor's behaviour or that the Rationalist approach

takes actor's identity as exogenously given. Instead, one can see that these two methodological approaches *complement* each other.

Complementary does not necessary mean that one casts their relationship into a necessarily sequential 'two step' metaphor, in which first we explain preferences (Constructivist), then we explain behaviour (Rationalist); because such an approach can transform otherwise harmless analytical assumptions into tacit ontologies, where Constructivists and Rationalists address their respective questions in isolation from each other. The only way to avoid this regression is to ensure *co-ordination* between these two complementary approaches.

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