

**Mujahideen to Taliban: US Policy in Afghanistan,
1979-1994**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Mujahideen to Taliban: US Policy in Afghanistan, 1979-1994**”, submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.



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Dedicated to the memory of my Grandparents and Smt: Shantha P.

Reghunath...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ISI	INTER SERVICES INTELLIGENCE
NSC	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSD	NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE
PD	PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
US	UNITED STATES

PREFACE

Afghanistan, for all through its history has been a part of the power wrangles between empires, nations and super powers due to its unique geo-strategic position. With its northern borders close to Central Asia, Xinjiang on the east, Iran on west and south west and Pakistan on its south, Afghanistan is one of the few nations strategically placed among nations with extremely contradictory ideologies, political-ideological systems and religions.

Afghanistan's domestic political systems were also conflicting in nature with factions, tribal groups and local satraps who were never on a path of convergence and would assert their fierce sense of autonomy. Apart from these factors, an indomitable presence of Pashtun identity which spreads beyond its British-drawn borders with Pakistan also shapes Afghanistan's polity, policies and politics to a significant extent. In other words, the interspersing factors of ethnic assertion, external political interference, and a glaring lack of coreless political administration has caused Afghanistan to be a non-evolving state.

In its external dimension, Afghanistan appears to be a state, but in political reality, it remains as a space between states and the reason for this stems from its inability to contain and congregate diverse ethnic and regional formations under a common Afghani identity. International powers have played their part in making Afghanistan their battleground and buffer frontier which plunged Afghanistan into a continuing spiral of statelessness.

Both Tsarist Russia and Soviet Union had displayed a proprietary attitude towards Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had no compulsion on the tilt of Afghan Monarchy as long as it had a Soviet leaning in its policy disposition.

Mohammed Daoud Khan became the President of the Republic of Afghanistan on 1973, after seizing power from King Zahir Shah with support from the Parcham faction of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The first instance in which Soviet Union lost its grip over Afghani ruling class occurred when Daoud tried to forge relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, to provide

financial backing; to India for increased military support; and to Iran for assistance in economic development. His failure in improving the economic and social reforms and the deteriorating domestic situation resulted in the Saur revolution, which changed Afghanistan's political landscape, once and for all.

The Saur revolution is inferred as an indirect catalyst of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Saur Revolution, co-ordinated by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's takeover of political power from Mohammed Daoud Khan in Afghanistan on 27 April 1978.

On assuming power, the PDPA initiated a slew of reforms which went against the conventional tribal traditional codes and practices. The political situation in Afghanistan worsened as the PDPA and its leadership showed little understanding of the complexity of Afghan tribal society and widespread rural revolts occurred, culminating in the fundamentalists declaring a jihad on the communists. The civil turmoil worsened as the government began to repress the dissidents in brutal ways, resulting in increased civil strife and the rise of guerrilla fighters and Mujahideen forces against the government.

The formation of Afghan Mujahideen was based on a perfect background for tribal leaders and *ulema* to converge, for the existing communist rule was an antithesis to the very fundamentals it espoused an atheist political ideology. As the Russians invaded the nation, it completed the missing puzzle of invaders, especially infidel non-believer invaders. This situation prompted the United States to step up its covert offensive against Soviet Union by funding and arming the Mujahideen via Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence acting as a strategic conduit.

The United States, along with its pro-Mujahideen alliance upped the ante against Soviet Union all the while covering their acts in secrecy. The strategic stake for each partner was varied, but the only factor that bound them together was to push Soviet Union in to a long drawn war, costing it economically and politically.

The Success of Mujahideen over Soviet army lies in the fact that it was provided with state of the art weapons including Stinger missiles, which crumbled the air power of the Soviets. On the political front, United States gained its assertive image back, after being labelled as a reluctant, helpless superpower.

The US policy was not free from faults either. The very mistake it committed was to institutionalize radical Islamic assertion and giving legitimacy to such acts by its support. It also failed to check the hostile situation after the Soviet retreat, which gave a free run to Mujahideen leaders, warlords and commanders who plundered the country. It was this inaction that caused the rise of Taliban, which in turn shielded Al Qaeda, the bête noire of America that strikes not just America, but every other part of the world with impunity.

The rise of Taliban and US policy towards the organization is also a tale of convenience till US realized that its ideological moorings are far radical for comprehension. In the early days of Taliban regime, US perceived it as a counterweight to Iran in the region due to their hostility towards Iran.

However, all these calculations on Taliban proved wrong as the Taliban administration began to perform as one of the most repressive administrations Afghanistan has ever witnessed.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Union, a fragile *multi-national* state, featuring an amalgamation of diverse identities held together through the iron fist of communism, has always been an interesting phenomenon worth academic deliberation by researchers and scholars. To understand the vast mass of diverse geography, containing an equally diverse populace controlled by an iconoclastic ideology based governance system is an effort worth academic merit.

The communist revolution in 1919 marked the transition of political behaviour of Russia from a monarchic state to a proletarian-led communist state. However, this change in ideology and political practice did not necessarily alter the external relations it had with proximate states. The Soviet Union, under the communist rule, more or less carried out a dominant and hierarchical relation with its neighbours and Afghanistan, being the closest one with late communism, had to endure the harshness of Soviet might with catastrophic results.

Before analyzing the dynamics of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it is imperative to analyze the doctrinarian underpinning that became the governance ideology of Soviet Union. Communism, based on Marxist-Leninist notions propound a vision of a global proletariat composed of the working class. However, various leaders who ruled Soviet Union had in fact made their own applications to the ideology, often resulting in disastrous consequences for the polity and their target states.

Dual Policy of Proletarian Internationalism and Peaceful Coexistence

The Second Congress of Soviets in November 1917 adopted Vladimir Lenin's *Decree on Peace* which forms the basic pattern of Soviet foreign policy. The character of this policy is that it features the promotion of both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence.

The very nature of the policy displayed a non-synergic dichotomy. Proletarian internationalism implies the Soviet support to the common cause of the working classes of all countries, struggling to overthrow the bourgeoisie, exploitative governments and to install communist regimes. While Peaceful coexistence, focuses on using measures that would ensure relatively peaceful government-to-government relations with capitalist states. Such a duality, with few points of convergence was set forth for a collision course with the western world which was having a liberal, capital-driven economy, where the Soviet proletarian internationalism meant aggression against the state and its overthrow¹.

Apart from this curious nature of duality, the Soviet foreign policy displayed a peculiar shrewdness in its construct. The notion of peaceful coexistence part of the policy was crafted as a short-term approach originally intended to develop relations with the same countries that ironically supported the enemies of revolution in the Russian civil war of 1918–21. The major objective of peaceful coexistence was thus to check further capitalist attacks on USSR².

However, peace with other states, especially the capitalist states lasted longer than anticipated and the building, maintaining and safeguarding of socialism in USSR became a greater priority rather than calling for an overthrow of world capitalism, the temporary nature of peaceful coexistence thus became a permanent strategy.

After the Second World War, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence underwent many modifications. Of prime importance in the early post-war years was the fact that the socialist camp now consisted, not of an isolated and vulnerable Soviet Union, but a bloc of communist-controlled countries headed by an emerging global superpower. Peaceful coexistence was, therefore, recast in more assertive and aggressive terms as a relationship imposed on capitalism and imperialism by the superior strength of socialist forces³.

¹ Roberts Geoffrey, (1999) *The Soviet Union in World Politics -Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945–1991*, London: Routledge , p.4

² Ibid

³ Ibid, p.5

In the 1950s, more and more emphasis was placed on peaceful coexistence as a means of avoiding a catastrophic nuclear war that would make redundant, the political and economic competition between the socialist and capitalist systems.

In the 1960s and 1970s—in the heyday of détente—peaceful coexistence came to mean positive co-operation, collaboration and interchange with the west. But that did not mean the abandonment of the USSR's global socialist aspirations; détente was seen as part of the process of consolidating the position of the socialist camp and as the harbinger of further shifts to the left in world politics⁴.

The revolutionary and political dimension of peaceful coexistence was abandoned only in the very last years of the Soviet regime when the communist reformer Mikhail Gorbachev radically redefined the Soviet Union as a status-quo power, committed more to the spread of humanism than socialism.

This focusing on peaceful coexistence as an ideology of coexistence and revolution is only one way of conceptualising post-war Soviet foreign policy. It should certainly not be seen as providing a neat explanation for everything Moscow did in the international arena.

Peaceful coexistence was a doctrinal and strategic context for action— a referential framework for the main orientations of Soviet foreign policy, not a dictator of specific decisions. To explain the particular actions and patterns of Soviet foreign policy, it is necessary to take other factors into account.

Alternate Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy.

Beneath the visible foreign policy parlance of any nation lies certain alternative perceptions and Soviet Union too, had its alternatives coursing under the visible policy.

Soviet national interest, security, power, ideology and politics were the undercurrents of Soviet foreign policy.

⁴ Ibid

The security perspective of Soviet foreign policy highlights the latent insecurity of Soviet orientation to the outside world. It provides an explanation to most of the acts of post-war Soviet foreign policy. Yet, this aspect blindfolds the commitment of Soviet Union as a revolutionary state avowed to transform the world order to a socialistic one⁵.

It is at this point where ideology and ideology-based fraternity poses as a problem before researchers attempting to unravel the multiple layers of Soviet foreign policy

The peculiarity of Soviet foreign policy lies in the peculiar positioning of its desire to amalgamate with the then-existed world order, all the while contradicting itself from that objective by fraternalizing ideology, which is evident in its Afghan overture.

The policy aspects of Soviet national interest and security are at an irreducible vector in its decision to engage in Afghanistan as the above cited aspects were paramount while considering the Muslim populace in Soviet Central Asia who might get inspired by the rising resistance against the Marxist administration in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union saw the likelihood of a snowballing effect cutting across borders with an added strength of religious solidarity.

The aspect of power in Soviet foreign policy is observable in Soviet engagement in Afghanistan . Alien influence in their periphery could alter the balance of power Soviet Union enjoyed till then. The Americans closing in could also undermine Moscow's hand in the regional fronts they held from the beginning of cold war power contest.

The context of Soviet action collides with ideology further in the case of their march to Kabul. It can be seen that Soviet leadership had to act on circumstances which were not of their making or in their control in Afghanistan. The events in Afghanistan and its situational context did not necessitate the level of action that Moscow found dragged itself in, had it not been for the part-coercive force of ideology.

The Soviet Union, despite criticisms was a state based on a visible ideology and its ideological orientation transgressed its borders and found a fraternal parallel with all

⁵ Roberts Geoffrey, (1999) *The Soviet Union in World Politics Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, London: Routledge .p.5

states, groups, and organizations that practised socialism, the key component of Soviet state's ideology.

The clash between Soviet ideology and foreign policy occurred mainly because of Soviet leadership's attempts at altering both the foreign policy and ideology with their personal assertions and interpretations. From Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev and Brezhnev and finally till Gorbachev, this tendency of alteration of policies continued.

As cited above, it is an administration of overarching personal preferences, ideological compulsions, and national security considerations that formed the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan, which is explained hereafter.

It is in this context, the policy of the United States in Afghanistan, post- Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is examined. The policy of the United States received a push after Soviet Union dragged itself in to a war which eroded their very existence. The study of American policy towards Afghanistan assumes significance as the chain of events leading to the 9/11 attacks, the prolonged war on terrorism led by the United States are all interlinked with its policies adopted through 1979 to 1994.

Event premises of Soviet action in Afghanistan

Before moving on to the analysis of Soviet action in Afghanistan, it is imperative to understand the event premises which prompted the Soviets into action.

Rise of Marxism in Afghanistan

Political socialization and political organization in Afghan polity, albeit its limited success began in the 1930's, resulting from Amir Amanullah's educational reforms, prompted by a group of Pashtun intellectuals to promote Pashto language⁶.

This movement broadened into a reformist paradigm in late 1940's, attracting non-Pashtun intellectuals into its fold.

⁶ Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.36

The first political movement in Afghanistan which took roots on 27th May, 1948 in Kabul, was known as *Wesh Dzialmian* or *Awakened Youth*. This organization had no elected leaders and it advocated a constitutional monarchy, separation of powers, free elections and civil liberties⁷.

2nd wave of political reforms in Afghanistan

Political activism in Afghanistan got more differentiated in the second wave of political formations and they included leftists, moderates, conservatives and Islamic radicals. Such a diverse form of political organizations occurred due to the commissioning of constitution in 1964 by King Zahir Shah, envisaging the rise of political parties.

The importance of this proposal in constitution was that, despite the provision being deliberated and passed in the parliament in 1968, the King reneged from giving it a statutory legal status.

This volte-face by King Zahir Shah can be seen as the root cause of extended assertion of both the leftist and Islamic radical formations in their activism. It was this action by the King that increased their organizational activism and emboldened their ideological grounding.

The rise of PDPA

Nur Mohammed Taraki- the founder of Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was born in the aptly named Sur Kelaye (Red Village) in Ghazni province in July 1917⁸.

The only nobility he possessed were of poverty and toil; two unlikely factors for leadership in a tribal society, where prosperity made one person as the most favoured by god.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ See Edwards David B *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, p.35

Taraki moved to Kandahar and sought employment as an office boy at an overseas trading company which sent him to its Bombay branch.

It is an unverifiable possibility that Taraki was exposed to works of socialist philosophy and his first contact with a Soviet agent occurred at Bombay. Taraki returned to Afghanistan in 1937 and began a new career as a journalist. Through his articles he began to propound his political philosophy and began to meet like-minded members of the educated, urban middle class intelligentsia.

It was 1943 to 1948 that Taraki began to actively engage in establishing a political party and his role in founding *Weesh Zalmanyen* or *Awakened Youth* was important, yet obscure⁹.

Taraki was exiled to Washington DC which according to PDPA reports was due to his political activism. Taraki resigned his post as press attaché in Washington DC in protest against Mohammed Daoud Khan being appointed as Prime Minister by Zahir Shah.

Taraki returned to Afghanistan and the political atmosphere in the country was conducive for leftist politics as Daoud was sympathetic to the positions of leftist parties which earned him the moniker 'Red Prince'.

The context of the founding of PDPA was the period democratic liberalization initiated although in a cautious way by King Zahir Shah with promises of opening up political processes. This era of reforms commenced with a new constitution drafted in 1964 and election of representative parliamentary assembly in 1965. PDPA, founded in 1965 also held its candidates including Taraki. Taraki ran for the lower house of parliament from his native district in Ghazni, but was defeated. Other Marxists, including Babrak Karmal and Dr: Anahita Ratezbad got elected. With this election, the Marxists were able to mark their presence in the assembly¹⁰.

Taraki also founded the *Khalq* news paper and began to organize PDPA. The main themes of his rallying of activists held on the premises of class struggle, importance

⁹ Ibid p.36

¹⁰ Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.38

of October revolution, scientific socialism and international socialism. Through this ideological stance of PDPA one can highlight the Marxist ideology being pushed by the PDPA in Afghanistan, which slots Soviet Union and PDPA in an ideologically driven fraternal relation.

The Khalq news paper was banned in 1966 for its increasing attempts at political socialization on Marxian lines, but other papers like Parcham and *Shula-yi-Jawed* (eternal flame) were launched¹¹.

Roots of contention between Islamic clergy and Marxists

The early eruption of animosity between Islamic clergy and Marxists began in Afghanistan can be traced back to a poem written in Parcham news paper, written by Bariq Shafi. The poem '*Bugle of Revolution*' stirred a hornet's nest as it used forms of eulogistic praise used traditionally for Prophet Mohammed to celebrate Lenin.

The '*Bugle of Revolution*' created a nation-wide agitation, sparking the beginning of concern over leftist influence was publicly expressed through protests¹².

The Afghanistan parliament was also becoming a fierce zone of contesting between Islamic parties and Marxists, resulting in a hostile situation filled with extreme acrimony¹³. This standoff between Islamic parties and Marxists caused a virtual stagnation of administration. The matters turned worse with an equally incendiary press complicating issues further in public realm.

This commotion and hostile environment, complete with an ineffective King resulted in the bloodless palace coup initiated by Mohammed Daoud Khan with support from some sections of the leftist organizations.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Op.cit, p.39

¹³ For further details, Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.39

Mohammed Daoud-From Uneasy Ally to Unleashed Renegade

Post-palace coup, Mohammed Daoud's relations with Moscow can be viewed as shifting dramatically from one end of trust to visceral conflagration, which was not at all deemed to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union.

The analysis of Daoud's coup as being a plot by the Soviet Union has long been discredited. The primary reason behind Daoud's palace coup was the curtailment of authority and restriction of terms of office moved by King Zahir Shah, which were obviously aimed at restricting the ambitious Daoud¹⁴.

Another scenario, offering a rationale for the coup was King Zahir Shah's cautious response to growing Pakistan provocation against Pashtun Baluch tribesmen as well as a call for Afghan linked Pashtunistan favoured by Daoud¹⁵.

In spite of the denial of direct involvement of Soviet Union in the palace coup, the role of Soviet trained military officers cannot be discounted here.

Daoud staged the coup with the help of Soviet trained military officers with ties to Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow. However, Daoud's affiliation to these officers was not based on a fraternal camaraderie, but a political decision in which he saw them as expedient, temporary allies who could easily be controlled and discarded when convenient.

Red Prince Turning Expendable to Moscow

Daoud, known as the Red Prince was gradually growing out of favour with Moscow as he began to shun the leftist leanings of his government; forming the snowballing events leading to the Saur revolution.

The first step Daoud took as his move to shift from the leftist milieu was to remove two hundred Soviet trained officers in July 1974. In the legislative front Daoud downgraded one of the leading communists in his cabinet in September 1974. He has

¹⁴ Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.14

¹⁵ Ibid

sent the downgraded communist minister by sending him on an ambassadorial assignment. The replacement of communist interior minister with anticommunist hardliner General Kadir Nuristani and in October 1975, he further dismissed forty Soviet trained military officers. Adding to all this, he moved forward a policy shift on reducing the dependence on Moscow for military training by engaging in training arrangements with India, Egypt and the United States¹⁶.

Another move by Daoud which proved a fertile space for anti-administration sentiments in Afghan policy was the shifting posture on two nationalist issues, the Helmand treaty and Pashtunistan assertion, earlier vociferously supported by Daoud¹⁷.

Daoud's earlier position on Helmand water treaty, which gave Iran extensive access to the waters of Helmand River and on Pashtunistan issue being ineffectively treated by King Zahir provided to instigate animosity towards his administration among the polity¹⁸.

The calamitous moment for Daoud arrived as he decided to sever ties with the Parchamites as it put him directly against Soviet interests.

Daoud announced that he would start his own National Revolutionary Front and would ban all other political activity under a new one-party constitution. He further called for dissolution of Parcham and Khalq organizations and in December 1975, removed the remaining leftist members of cabinet¹⁹.

This drastic manoeuvre confirmed Soviet's apprehension of Daoud and they expressed their mounting concern through the visit of Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny to register the same.

Apart from political and domestic policy alterations, Daoud tampered with the strategic external policies by closing up on the Iranian designs of creating a modern

¹⁶ Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.17

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press. p.17

¹⁹ Ibid

day version of ancient Persian empire, through forming a pro-west, Tehran-centric regional, economic, security sphere embracing India, Pakistan and Persian Gulf states.

Moscow was deeply concerned by this move by Iran as it did not only meant undercutting of Soviet influence in these states, but also the move was encouraged by United States.

It is important to note here that the perception of Afghanistan by both great powers. The Soviet Union, prior to 1973, displayed a trend of politically correct relation, even to the conservative government in Kabul, as long as they showed a Soviet tilt.

The United States on the other hand, accepted Afghan monarchies Soviet tilt as an unavoidable fact of life, owing to its vulnerable, landlocked position. This perception, however, changed dramatically with the ouster of King Zahir Shah and the United States began to view Afghanistan as a new-cold war battle ground, where communist presence was more than visible.

Anti-Dependence, Proto-Autonomous moves by Daoud

Daoud's determination to offset military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union expedited between 1977 and 1978.

On the military front, Daoud increased his realigning moves by despatching more officers for military training to countries such as India, Egypt, the United States and he negotiated a training programme for air force officers with Turkey. These overtures by Daoud became a concern for Soviet Union as it had been holding training for Afghan officers for long. On the economic front, he gradually developed aid linkages with Iran to the tune of \$ 40 million as early as in 1974, as the first instalment of a \$2 billion package spanning ten years²⁰.

Daoud further pressed ahead with several aid agreements with China, the Kuwait fund, OPEC special fund, Islamic bank of development. He also concluded a \$500 million aid package with Saudi Arabia for hydroelectric development.

²⁰ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.21

These moves by Daoud by all strategic rationale were viewed by Moscow as a potential threat to its influence in a state, which was held as a strategic backyard by them for ages²¹.

Anti-Soviet Diplomatic Offensive by Daoud

Moscow viewed Daoud's diplomatic engagements with nations that were out of its strategic, doctrinarian, and strategic ambit with suspicion.

Daoud made two visits to Egypt with considerable stopovers in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Daoud's second visit to Cairo gave the Soviets conclusive evidence to his transformed policy posture as President Anwar Sadat of Egypt openly applauded Daoud for his rejection of alignment, a wise nationalist policy and renouncing subservience and spheres of influence. This event took place in the presence of the Soviet Ambassador.

The upcoming scheduled visits of Shah of Iran to Kabul in January, 1978 and Daoud's preparation for a Whitehouse meeting with President Jimmy Carter, apparently for requesting an increase in American economic assistance made Soviets uneasy. For Moscow, any alignment of Afghanistan with Iran and United States would mean erosion in their strategic stronghold and increased Iranian activity might flare up Islamic assertion, ultimately fanning on to Soviet Central Asia's Islamic belt.

Kabul-Teheran Bonhomie

Iran was gradually gaining a strategic leverage in Afghanistan with its financial aid programs and this increased Moscow's concerns. Iran and Afghanistan began to develop an informal co-prosperity sphere, facilitating cross- border labour movements for Iranian development projects. Apart from this, a cultural percolation occurred in

²¹ Ibid

the form of Teheran radio upping its broadcast in Dari and Iranian publications saturating Afghan market²².

The expanded activity of Iranian Intelligence Agency SAVAK, along with covert operatives from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, Pakistan and India occurred in Afghanistan after 1973.

Iran's affairs with Afghanistan in Daoud era had an ulterior motive as well. SAVAK used its aid bargaining chip to press Daoud for removal and suppression of suspected communists. SAVAK also channelled American weapons, communication tools along with other paramilitary aid to anti-Daoud groups. Iran's motives were not just limited to attain a leverage in Afghanistan, it nurtured a revived expansionist plan, owing to its bright economic scenario²³.

The last straw; Brezhnev-Daoud clash and assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber

An explosive onset of events were unveiled in the Soviet-Afghanistan relations, precisely on 12th of April 1977 as Brezhnev and Daoud clashed directly during the latter's visit to Moscow. Brezhnev opposed the increase in number of NATO experts working in Afghanistan, especially in its Northern parts. During the meeting, Brezhnev had said that unlike in the past, there has been an increase in NATO operatives and demanded Daoud to get rid of the American satellite and seismological experts who were suspected to be spies.

Daoud reacted strongly against this demand, denying it outright, he emphasized that Moscow will never be allowed to decide on Afghanistan's internal affairs as it was their prerogative.

This event followed by a walkout on Brezhnev had effectively ended the already estranged relationship(Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S, 1995:20)

²² See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.16

²³ Ibid

Meanwhile the domestic environment in Afghanistan was swinging towards a pall of depression. A stagnant economic development, high inflation, and mounting financial burdens on workers and caused anger and unrest against the government.

Daoud's power shrunk to a coterie of ultra conservatives, which ran its own agenda, conducting its private vendettas against the communists and other alleged anti-government elements. Islamization process started by Pakistan under the reign of Zia-Ul-Haq emboldened Islamic fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan as a natural spill over effect.

Akbar's Murder and Popular Unrest

The writing in the wall for Daoud became clear on 17th April, 1978, following the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber, a Parchamite leader. This assassination was attributed to Interior Minister Nuristani, who was already engaged in suppressing communists. Meanwhile Hafizullah Amin, the Khalq wing leader was also being viewed as the perpetrator of Akbar's murder as it was widely held that the Khaqis were carrying out an operation to eliminate Parchamites in anticipation of a seizure of power in Kabul²⁴.

Setting conspiracy theories apart, the murder of Mir Akbar Khyber ignited an unprecedented popular uprising led by the communists.

A mass rally during the funeral procession led by Marxist leader Taraki, alarmed Daoud about the communist strength. It was this protest demonstration that prompted Daoud to heed to his advisers long standing demand of rounding up communist leadership.

On April 25th, Afghan police imprisoned Taraki and five other Politburo members, charging them with instigating violence and maligning Islam. However, Amin was put under house arrest and military officers with alleged communist affiliations were not arrested. The house arrest of Amin proved to be blunder, which gave Amin a leeway to operationalize a contingency plan for a communist coup drafted and approved by Taraki.

²⁴ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.23

The plan proposed a possible timeframe for coup in August, but with the arrest of Taraki, Amin decided to act and rumours of an execution of arrested leaders were doing the rounds.

Saur Revolution-Harbinger of an Empire's Collapse

The events of the 7th Saur (April 27, 1978) changed Afghans contemporary political history in a radical way.

Saur revolution, under the instruction of Amin was carried out by Amin's prime air force contact Colonel Syed Gulabzoi and Major Aslam Watanjar, Deputy Commander of Fourth Armoured Division.

By the time Amin was imprisoned, the plan for revolution was set rolling.

It was Major Aslam Watanjar who started the coup by moving a column of T-62 heavy tanks by noon. The attack was to begin as soon as air force squadron flew low sorties over the Presidential palace. Watanjar saw no signs of air force fighters and he decided to move ahead with his men. By the time Daoud began to initiate a response, most of the military contingents were stalling for the time to gauge which direction the coup would turn. At around evening, the air force fighters started to bomb the palace and ground troops freed Amin and other leaders.

By late evening, around 7 Pm, the coup was successful and the declaration of Revolutionary Military Council taking over Kabul was broadcast by Radio Kabul.

Later at that same night, President Daoud and his family members were executed this event ended the dominance of Durrani, rulers of Afghanistan since 1747.

On April 30, PDPA, after two days of deliberations, formed the Revolutionary Council of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Taraki was the President, Babrak Karmal was made the Vice President, Amin was the first Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister, Watanjar was made Deputy Prime Minister and Communications Minister and Abdul Qadir was given the defence portfolio²⁵.

²⁵ See, Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.27

PDPA Administration in Afghanistan's Social Milieu

The PDPA government and Afghan society stood at stark contrasts, right from the beginning for a host of reasons. The government composed itself on an ideological framework that in no way, represented the primordial, stratified, clan-based society it was ruling over. The government in its mode of self representation misjudged the needs and wishes of the Afghan polity at every stage.

The social contract existed hitherto was based on providing an orderly and peaceful atmosphere in which subjects of the state would be free to fulfil their divinely allotted duties as god-fearing Muslim in concordance with their clan's code of conduct, traditions and honour²⁶.

Taraki government propagated a slew of economic and social reform programs intended originally to improve social conditions. However, the execution modes and grammar of political communication it applied had a contravening effect due to its Marxian lexicon which struck no chords with Afghan polity. The abstract principles of western ideals proved to be having a reverse assimilation effect on the polity.

Yet, the PDPA had a core constituency, composed of small landholders, tenant farmers, agricultural labourers, and women. These sections were rendered dormant in political life by all other forms of administration.

Through these groups of supporters, the PDPA mounted a bulwark for its regime, albeit weak in front of a mounting opposition.

Three Decrees and Unsettling of Social Cohesion

While looking at the socio-political underpinnings of the three critical decrees passed by PDPA, it can be observed that, there emerged a progressive antipathy from Afghan society against these statues.

²⁶ Ibid, 57

Decree No 06, ordered an excuse on paying back all mortgages and debts by landless peasants while allowing those who owned modest amounts of land to pay back only the principal amount on debts and mortgages²⁷.

Decree No 07, ensured equal rights to women and it sought to remove unjust patriarchal feudalistic relations between husband and wife. The decree also forbade the exchange of bride price, limited dowries to a token amount and outlawed the practice of widows remarrying their husband's relatives.

Decree No 08 aimed at land reforms and stipulated that no family shall own more than thirty Jeribs of first quality land and none shall mortgage, rent or sell land in excess that amount.

The PDPA government claimed these programs to be a success and to an extent they were right as redistribution of 3193937 Jeribs of land was undertaken by June 1979²⁸. Along with land reforms, PDPA government carried out development activities including establishment of veterinary clinics, agricultural co-operatives and immunization drives for cattle.

In spite of these sectoral successes, the difference between Marxian socialism and tribal codes were rising. PDPA lost their appeal with the decrees 7 and 8 as they were seen as an attempt to intermix kinship, family and tribal relations with Marxian socio-political milieu²⁹.

Government in Afghan society was identified as a Kabul-centric extraterrestrial organ which holds manifested divine right to rule. However, PDPA attempted to change that perception by closely engaging with people. This move, in turn created suspicion and caused a defensive orientation among afghan polity. Land reforms and remission of marriage norms further prompted a defensive solidarity for the rich landlords and tribal codes as well.

²⁷ See, Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.65

²⁸ Ibid,68

²⁹ See, Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.70

The Khalqi officials, mostly deracinated Pashtuns were seen with contempt for their attempts at debasing the landed gentry, who were unlike their counterparts in Tsarist Russia as they were generally not taking profits out of the area³⁰.

Rift between Amin and Taraki and Parchamites

Hafizullah Amin emerged as an unlikely influential figure in Kabul's political scene. The rise of Amin was least expected by Moscow as they were rooting for Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction. Amin gained his support mainly from closely held army cell of Pashtun descent. Amin's disposition gave enough signals to Soviets that he would be a misfit in the Soviet dominoes set for Afghanistan's new communist government.

Amin was also known for his fierce nationalist views, which he never hid from public view. He vouched for the unity of Afghans, especially the Pashtuns in Baluch. Such a stand was anathema to the Soviet Union as it wished to avoid a Pakistani opposition to Kabul's new communist regime.

Amin's rift with Taraki began as early as in March 1979, after Amin was promoted to first Minister. Both leaders developed a difference of opinion concerning relations with Moscow. Taraki remained a staunch pro-Moscow leader while Amin wanted to maintain neutrality and a nationalist approach on Pashtunistan issue. Amin's aggressive consolidation of power had impeded the brittle unity of PDPA government, as Amin not only made Taraki, but Parchamites and Soviets hostile to him³¹.

Amin devised many plots to restrict Taraki as a figurehead so that he can assert authority in government. Amin tried to build a cult of personality around Taraki by

³⁰ Ibid,74

³¹ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.25

showering honorific titles. However, Taraki resisted the marginalization attempts under the guise of iconizing³².

Amin's showdown with Parchamites aggrandized soviets further. Amin argued against allocating half of cabinet position to Parchamites, which was an outcome of Soviet mediation. Parchamites were seen as Daoud supporters and they were often dubbed as *royal communists* for their links with Afghan monarchy. Amin struck a blow to Parchamites by being able to successfully send many Parcham leaders in exile under the guise of diplomatic assignment after having the proposal ratified by the PDPA politburo in June 1979.

Moscow engaged efficiently and succeeded in convincing Taraki to send Karmal as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. This move by Moscow indicates a Soviet reservist plan to keep Karmal as a possible returnee in a changed political atmosphere.

By this time a systematic rounding up of Parchamites continued, as leaders of Parcham faction including Defence Minister Qader was arrested on charges of plotting a coup, scheduled to have been staged on 4th September, on the day of Eid.

The *Eid conspiracy* gave a reason for Amin to summon Parcham leaders back to Kabul for trails on treason. Sensing danger, none of the Parcham leaders returned. The in-exile leaders of Parcham faction reached Moscow and other Soviet bloc capitals. Karmal was under Soviet protection in Prague and later in Moscow, till his return as Afghanistan's new President, post-Soviet occupation.

Retribution and falling popular support for PDPA

PDPA government enjoyed an initial support after its reform measures, but soon all that was going to change radically. PDPA government driven by its Marxist ideology, based its application of reforms on two basic assumptions that material concerns were foremost in peoples minds and moral force of dialectical socialist principles could alter the socio-political scenario. It was on these misjudged assumptions that the

³² See, Edwards David B (2002) *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*, London: University of California Press, p.88

reforms were pushed through and it produced nothing but an antipathy towards the government and beneficiaries of reforms.

Brutal repression of protestors and anti-government demonstrators too dealt a blow to the government. Highhandedness of government in suppressing dissent can be observed in detaining practices like arresting people at night and isolated confinement.

Summary justice dispensed by revolutionary military courts, torture and execution of prominent personalities of ancient regime in Pul-I-Chaki prison and atrocities of the secret police led by Assadulah Amin, nephew of Hafizullah too made the wave of unrest gain strength.

Of all repressions, the massacre of more than a thousand civilians in the village of Kerala in Kunar valley proves the brutality of PDPA regime³³.

Anti-government uprising gaining momentum

Anti-government uprising took a drastic turn with resistance groups becoming more determined in their mission.

Pech uprising, involving members of Safi and Nuristani tribes in June 1978, occurred barely three months after Taraki assuming office. Pech uprising, even though not entirely based on anti-Marxist platform did reveal disturbing signs of resentment against highhanded officialdom by government appointed officials misusing their office.

After four months into Pech uprising, government centres at Kandesh and Bargematal in Balgalvalley were seized and attached. This event resulted in Nuristan and Pech valley being nearly free from any government presence.

Similar uprisings took place in Pazawand in Hazarajat and Heart saw major uprisings in October 1978 and March 1979 respectively³⁴.

³³ Maley William, (2002) *The Afghanistan wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmilian, p29

³⁴ See, Maley William, (2002) *The Afghanistan wars*, New York: Palgrave Macmilian, p.29

Kabul too began to witness anti-government actions and in July and August 1979, Shiite protestors rose up in Kabul and briefly took over a central army base. Resistance forces began to avail better organization capabilities and schema as Pakistan launched its military training support program for insurgents.

The CIA also moved into the fray along with ISI on planning training programs for insurgents and co-ordinating the Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and Kuwaiti funds, which began to trickle in³⁵.

Moscow's assessment of Afghan crisis

Rising resistance movements and factionalism in PDPA was making Moscow uncomfortable and they were reviewing the situation intently. Moscow was clearly unsatisfied with PDPA regime and its repressive actions.

Taraki and Amin were repeatedly requesting soviet military intervention in the face of rising insurgency. This request put Moscow in a fix and the Soviet politburo initially pressed against intervention, only to be upturned in December 1979.

Politburo meeting held in 17th March, 1979 shows Moscow's reluctance to intervene, through the words of KGB director Yuri Andropov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Andropov argued that Afghanistan, due to its economic backwardness, dominant hardliner Islamic religion, and illiterate population would make an intervention move an incorrect decision. Gromyko endorsed this stance and cited that the army of Afghanistan in unreliable and PDPA leaders were lacking support of people due to their mistakes³⁶.

The PDPA leadership was criticized severely by Andrei Kirilenko, Central Committee Secretary of Soviet communist party. He minced no words against PDPA leaders and

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³⁵ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.34

³⁶ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.37

said they were shooting their own people and justify their acts by showing Lenin's precedent.

Brezhnev gave assent to the Politburo's decision in its final session by stating that it would be unfit and inappropriate for Soviet Union to be drawn in Afghan quagmire.

The politburo was also clear about international ramifications on an intervention by Soviet Union. Gromyko pointed out that détente, SALT-II talks, relations with western countries would all be jeopardised by an intervention as it would be seen as an occupation.

Assassination of Taraki

Perhaps the worst decision a leader could take, amidst a destabilizing domestic political situation is to antagonize the only available support, which in Amin's case was the Soviet Union. The defeat of government forces at Herat intensified the rift between Amin, anti-Amin Khalqi groups focused around Taraki and Parchamites.

Amin saw the 'gang of four' comprising of Watanjar, Sherjan Mazdooryar, Syed Gulabzoi and another Khalqi leader as detrimental to his designs. Moscow in the meanwhile attempted to arrange for the return of Karmal from Prague. This message was conveyed to PDPA government by Vazil Bilak, a top ranking leader of Czech communist party ranks. Amin saw this move as a definite sign at removing him and turned more defensive. Amin intensified his moves against Taraki and succeeded in removing Watanjar from Defense Ministry³⁷.

Amin also had a close watch on Taraki's moves through Daoud Tarun, an Amin loyalist and Commander of Presidential Guards. Taraki was also barred from granting interviews to foreign journalists.

By August 1979, Soviet leaders were contemplating on providing more military support, but short of direct intervention to carry out a broader reshuffle of PDPA.

³⁷ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.41

The reshuffle plan by Moscow put Taraki as president and General Secretary of PDPA, Amin sent on an ambassadorial mission, half of seats in government going for non-communists and Karmal as the Prime Minister.

The Soviets did not want any further instability in Kabul and foiled a plot by the gang of four to kill Amin.

There was another attempt at Amin's life by the gang of four and during the attempt, Daoud Tarun was shot down. With this attempt, Amin turned more aggressive and consolidated power within hours of this incident. Amin made PDPA central committee accept Taraki's resignation and became the General Secretary of PDPA central committee and Revolutionary Council and President of Afghanistan.

Taraki was secretly arrested and he was smothered to death in early October. The news of Taraki's death was falsified as resulting from ill health. Later, when Karmal took charge, a white paper was issued revealing Taraki's death was due to smothering, carried out by three of Amin's agents.

Execution of Taraki and Amin controlling Kabul, enraged Moscow, raising the pitch for intervention, which marked a detour from its early position of non-intervention.

Brezhnev was livid as he took Taraki's murder as a grave insult to him personally and confirmed his suspicions Amin going away from Moscow's control. The Soviet politburo regarded the showdown in Kabul as counterrevolutionary coup, which would only help Pakistan and Iran to destabilize their southern border³⁸.

Pashtunistan issue, a long time policy choice of Amin began to shift as he assumed office. Amin pushed for an intense relation with Pakistan by hinting at shelving Pashtunistan issue and accept Durand Line as the de-facto border.

Amin even arranged a meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi on 22nd December, 1977 which was rescheduled to 29th December, but by then history had charted a new course.

³⁸ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press p.41

Intervention finalized

Discussions and deliberation on intervention in Afghanistan originated after the Herat uprising in March 1979. In this period, the general mood in Moscow was against intervention, owing to both domestic and international ramifications.

The events in October changed this view and a pro-invasion move gathered currency. This wave was strong enough to overcome the reservations posed by prominent members of politburo as KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov.

The onus of policy making on Afghanistan was delegated to a politburo commission composing of KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and B N Pomonorev, Director of the international department of the Central Committee.

In a memorandum submitted to the politburo by the commission, Amin's policy balancing with western powers is stressed upon. It also emphasizes Amin's duplicity and insincerity on relations with the Soviet Union. An opinion favoured by a section of Soviet army top brass including the Commander of Ground Forces Valentin I. Varennikov was a 'garrison variant' intervention, wherein soviet forces would be confined to garrisons and not involve in combat³⁹.

The decision to intervene was finally approved on 12th December, 1979 with select members of politburo.

The secret meeting presided over by Brezhnev concluded with a two paragraph report recording approval of considerations and measures proposed by Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko and authorizing them to make necessary adjustments to carry out those measures.

In order to ensure secrecy and to prevent unauthorized activity, the report was made to be approved by the entire politburo other than those nine members believed to have attended the crucial meeting.

³⁹ See, Feiffer, Gregory (2009), *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan*, New York Harper Collins. Pp.9-10

Based on this decision by politburo, a limited contingent of armed forces of Soviet Union including Special Forces, motorized rifle, paratroops and other divisions launched their attack on Afghanistan⁴⁰.

Observations

While analyzing Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, one could observe an unlikely combination of factors of international politics merging in a common time and temporal space. It is this confluence of multiple vectors which deemed the soviet intervention an exceptional case deserving deeper academic understanding.

Historically analysing, Tsarist Russia had had displayed a proprietary attitude towards Afghanistan. Such an attitude not only grew from an imperial angle but also from a geopolitical reality which till date puts Afghanistan in a quandary.

Dilemma of Being a Frontier State

Being a frontier state has been the base of all problems suffered by Afghanistan. Being a frontier state puts a nation in a unique geography, with defining characteristics such as remoteness, positioning on the margin of regional and global systems, internal fragmentation, diffused authority, competing subgroups, traditional assertive ethnicities, legitimacy of internal conquest, perceptive and reactive intervention by neighbours. Apart from these factors, Afghanistan includes boundaries of its population shared by at least six nations.

It was this *frontierness* of Afghanistan that made it the arena of several defining battles including Anglo-Afghan wars.

While analysing Soviet-Afghanistan relations, it is clear that Moscow was content with the political formations as long as they were on par with Soviet interests.

Despite showing a relatively non-interfering gesture towards Afghanistan, Moscow was carefully filtering in communist ideals by gradual means. The support for PDPA

⁴⁰ Ibid, 14

and its later incarnation of Khalq and Parcham were clear indicators of Soviet ideological infiltration of its southern neighbour.

The main source of Marxian consolidation was Soviet trained afghan army officers and teachers but PDPA enjoyed miniscule support in rural areas.

A build-up of Marxian coup originated with Daoud's tilt to the right wing and western powers. With Daoud's removal of soviet trained army officers, replacing of communist oriented interior minister and break up with Parchamites forced a significant change in Soviet policy towards Afghan communists. Moscow facilitated a merger of communist factions to consolidate the organization.

Despite the merger Soviet Union had lend its weight to Parcham faction and its leaders. The Soviets found the Parchamites easy to control and organize. If Babrak Karmal was the preferred choice of Moscow, Amin was the likely renegade in soviet scheme of things as Amin had a nationalist view and assertive nature making him unmanageable.

The Soviet Union was in fact forced into a scenario where it had to maintain its strategic hold over Afghanistan, which since Daoud's time began to swivel towards the west and Islamic nations.

On the doctrinarian angle, Moscow found Daoud's repression and purging of communists as an assault on its ideology. Historically the soviets have displayed a vigorous counter reaction to any forces attempting to derail Marxist communist forces in its sphere of influence.

Daoud's leanings towards Iran, Arab nations of Middle East namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt and most importantly the United States necessitated an involvement at one point or other in Afghanistan.

PDPA too was adding up to Moscow's worries as the regime engaged in brutal repression of protestors and constantly antagonized the tribal sensitivities. Amin, the unlikely winner of Saur revolution proved to be a liability for his freewheeling style and nationalist policies which he retracted as a tool to engage closely with Pakistan.

On the domestic front, Soviet Union, which had troubles in pacifying its Muslim population living under an atheist ideology, assessed that repression of Muslims, even

if they are anti-PDPA, would create a spill over effect. On the reverse side of this argument, Soviet Union concurred that a victory by anti-communist forces led by Muslim forces would rekindle the dormant irredentist aspirations of its Central Asian population. On the domestic security front Soviet Union found itself entrenched in a '*Gordian Knot*' situation, and to untangle it, they applied the classic Hellenistic logic of cutting it straight down.

The strategic factors that prompted the decision to invade Afghanistan are equally important to be subjected to analysis.

United States, the chief contender of Soviet Union in the race to global dominance lost a critical regional ally, Iran after the Islamic revolution.

This situation in Iran was assessed by Moscow on par with Amin's shift from Soviet line. The parallels used by Soviet strategic thinkers was of Anwar Sadath, who snapped Soviet ties and aligned with the united states after receiving Soviet aid for years.

The '*Sadath analogy*' had a profound impact on analysing Amin's moves and Soviet politburo believed that Amin might approach the Americans and offer them Afghan territory to install electronic intelligence bases they lost in Iran.

Apart from this, Soviets analyzed the possible security implications of the United States and anti-Soviet nations involving in Afghanistan.

A wave of pragmatism prevailed in Soviet Union while discussing about Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Rejection on intervention stemmed mainly from a desire for improved relations with the western bloc for gaining a trade and economic tie up.

A majority of Soviet leaders were disappointed by stagnation resulting from decades of Stalinist economic mismanagement and the last thing they wanted was any event leading to a disruption in attempts at improving relations with the west.

However, all this wishful thinking came to a naught by December 1979. The politburo emphasized that détente was at a dead end as the United States was becoming more irreconcilable. It also found the reduced chances of Congressional ratification of SALT II agreement. The biggest blowback for Soviet reconciliation with the west

came as NATO Council formally announced the deployment of 464 Tomahawk cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II rocket launchers in Europe.

With these actions from the west, Soviet positions on keeping a positive note on relations with the western world became irrelevant.

Soviet Union found no more reputation issues on intervention in Afghanistan and it founded its actions on the primary foreign policy tenet of supporting fellow socialists from internal or external aggression. To conclude, the intervention was the last of Stalinist group's dogmatic expansionism.

Review of the literature

The event that changed contemporary world history was the decision taken by a group of Stalinist old-guard to push itself in last and ideologically bound decision to Cross the Amu Darya and invade Afghanistan, a primordial nation with fierce tribal assertion furthered by a passion for Islam. There are many works that throw light upon the engagement of United States in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen forces and its engagement with the Soviet army, the engagement with Taliban forces. And as far as the United States policy in Afghanistan in the specific time frame is concerned, it has been discerned differently by different authors in scattered and diverse perceptions, arising mainly due to the lack of primary material depicting covert acts of a period of political covertness.

However, there are diverse views regarding the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison (1995) in their book *Out of Afghanistan : the inside story of the Soviet withdrawal* have thrown light on the aspect that both versions of administration, the Tsars and the Marxists were displaying a proprietary attitude toward Afghanistan. The Tsars, in their 19th century Great Game, had attempted in annexing northern Afghanistan and the Marxist rulers of Moscow had kept up correct relations with nonaligned Afghan conservative governments so long as their nonalignment had a Soviet, leftist tilt. The Soviet Union had kept their plans to compose a Communist Afghanistan behind the veneer of correct relations, while making quiet efforts to strengthen pro-Soviet forces.

Apart from this view, the authors, Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison in their book *Out of Afghanistan: the inside story of the Soviet withdrawal* have also factored in the Parcham aspect in connection with Iran. Moscow increased its support to the Parcham Communists led by Babrak Karmal, long the Soviet Union's favourite among Afghan Communist leaders. The Iranian factor is also dwelt upon by the authors here. The role of SAVAK channelling U S weapons, communications equipment, and other paramilitary aid to anti-Daoud groups to foster resistance and Teheran using its aid leverage to press Daoud for the removal of suspected Communists. The Iranian intelligence agency, SAVAK expanded its activities in Afghanistan and they directly challenged the KGB.

The United States viewed the developments in Afghanistan keenly and its response was multifaceted and far-reaching considering different political and strategic vectors.

Meredith L. Runion, (2007) in his book, *The history of Afghanistan (Greenwood histories of the modern nations)* has given details about 'Operation Cyclone'. The Mujahideen rebels received support, cites the author, mainly from the United States and other nations such as Israel, Great Britain, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Jordan. The support provided by these nations, the author claims, was to not only to champion Afghanistan's freedom from communist rule but also as a primary effort to stop the Cold War aggression into the Persian Gulf. The chief architects and executors of 'Operation Cyclone' were Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter and Charles Nesbitt Wilson, former Democratic United States Representative and Michael G. Vickers, a Paramilitary Officer from Special Activities Division /Special Operations Group, and Gustav Lascaris Avrakotos, the CIA's regional head. Codenamed 'Operation Cyclone', the covert operation carried out by the CIA was the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken in terms of funds and duration.

'Operation Cyclone', the CIA-managed covert operations had peculiarities in the funding for the operation due to a rare amalgamation of interests between the United States and the Arab countries. Dr Nabi Misdaq (2006) in his book, *Afghanistan: Political frailty and external Interference*, states that The Jimmy Carter administration allocated \$30 million for the anti-Soviet programme in 1980 and about \$50 million in 1981. Under the Reagan administration this amount increased to \$120 million by

fiscal 1984 and in 1985, Congress released \$250 million. By 1987, the United States released \$630 million in 1987. Saudi Arabia approximately matched the aid given by United States on a dollar to dollar scale which brought the total to \$1.3 billion.

Supply lines for arms and ammunitions were also arranged in a premeditated manner so as to put Soviet Union in a tactical *catch-22*. Dr Nabi Misdaq, (2006) in his book *Afghanistan: Political frailty and external Interference*, throws light in this aspect. He states that supply lines for arms and ammunition were set up with countries that produced Russian arms such as China and Egypt. This move was two-pronged as the west can categorically deny helping the Mujahideen resistance and since the Mujahideen were capturing Russian weapons both from Afghan communists and Russian soldiers, it would be easy for the fighters to complement these with what they procured from the western supply channels. The political and diplomatic response by United States in order to counter the Soviet Union is also indicated by several authors. Robert McMahon(2003), in his book *Coldwar, a very short introduction* states that president Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy experts came to a conclusion that Soviet state was vying to seize the strategic initiative from an America, which was weakened by Vietnam, Watergate, the Iranian hostage crisis, and various economic crises. The conclusion was that the goal of Soviet Union was to dominate the Persian Gulf region and denying its oil to the West. Jimmy carter, as part of building the diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union instituted a grain embargo against the Soviet Union, ordered a symbolic boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics scheduled to be held in Moscow, re-established military draft registration, and proclaimed a new 'Carter Doctrine' that promised to repel any effort by an outside power to gain control over the Persian Gulf 'by any means necessary, including military force'.

Pakistan was a key and critical component in the United States led offensive against the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan. Pakistan analyzed the Soviet move in Afghanistan as a direct security threat to its western province, Balochistan. Apart from it, Islamabad also perceived that the Soviets might also use Afghanistan as fulcrum point to destabilize Pakistan and achieve its long pending objective of access to a warm water port on the Indian Ocean.

Apart from being the channel of arms and ammunition, Pakistan played a crucial role in providing training to Afghan resistance fighters as well. Between 1983 to 1997, the

ISI (Inter Service Intelligence) trained about 83,000 Afghan Mujahideen and dispatched them to Afghanistan.

Gregory Feiffer (2009) in his book, *The Great gamble, the Soviet war in Afghanistan*, states that Pakistan had its own plans to provide support and training for Afghan fighters. General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, the Chief of ISI convinced Zia of the feasibility of opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan and also to allow Mujahideen to establish base camps in its Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan. Gregory Feiffer argues that Washington had no real strategy other than to inflict as much damage to Soviet forces as they can. Pakistan also succeeded in having the United States to allow it a sole discretion on the allotment of the foreign assistance, both in arms and financial aid.

After the victory of the Mujahideen forces and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Afghan territory, the United States was able to enjoy the control of the state spanning three presidencies, from Jimmy Carter, Reagan and the early presidency of George H. W. Bush. However, the United States did little to help the country in the aftermath of the war and virtually abandoned the Mujahideen forces to restore the country. After asserting itself in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, the United States lost interest in Afghanistan and the biggest folly it committed was not to assist in the rebuilding of the war-torn land.

Meredith L. Runion, in his book (2007), *The History of Afghanistan*, states that in the event of the United States abandoning the country, the Mujahideen forces turned on each other in their fight. The military weapons provided by the west were no longer used against the Soviets but instead among the Mujahideen forces, which resulted in the killing of Afghan citizens and thrusting the country deeper into a civil war. Despite their withdrawal, the Soviets continued to support President Najibullah of Afghanistan until the Mujahideen forces led by Rashid Dostam and Ahmed Shah Massoud gained control of Kabul. The capture of the capital was a devastating blow to the Pashtuns, who had held control of the city for nearly 300 years.

The massive influx of refugees after the removal of Soviet forces has also played a role in compounding the ground situation in Afghanistan, which gave credibility to system based on the notions of puritan Islamic notions, the author argues. The return of refugees from Pakistan began in April 1992, totaling 1.2 million throughout the

spring and the summer. With the influx of people came the overarching sentiment of lawlessness, massive poverty, and the destruction of cities, particularly in Kabul. Many young Afghan girls who were barely 16 had been repeatedly kidnapped and raped by the Mujahideen forces, and beaten by gangs of Mujahideen.

The Taliban were quick to assert control over Afghanistan as it was initially able to win over the common populace by its apparently puritan Islamic notions, which was an anti-thesis of the corrupt, in-fighting Mujahideen groups. Mullah Mohammed Omar, the architect of Taliban movement along with his supporters, comprising of students of madrassas from Pakistan captured the capital of Kabul in September 1996. The era from 1996 to 2001 under the control of the Taliban may be regarded as one of the darkest periods in the history of Afghanistan. It is also pertinent to note the role of Pakistan in promoting the Taliban regime. In a report co-authored by Robin Bhatti and David Hoffman, in 1999, published by *Human Rights Watch* cites that Pakistan had a sweeping objective in Taliban controlled Afghanistan and it provided support in soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives.

There were also broader commercial interests for Pakistan in Afghanistan. When the Taliban carried out its first major military operation in October 1994, it reportedly quickly secured the support of Pakistan's trucking cartels based in Quetta and Chaman on the Afghanistan border. The traders, predominantly Pashtuns who shared tribal affinities with the Taliban, reportedly saw in the Taliban a way to secure trade routes previously contested by predatory warlords. The levies imposed on trucks transiting Afghanistan from Pakistan became the Taliban's most important official source of income. A World Bank study estimated that income to the Taliban from taxing the Afghanistan-Pakistan smuggling trade amounted to U.S.\$75 million in 1997.

The economic interests of the United States also needs to be analyzed here as the Afghanistan pipeline route was pushed by the US-based *Unocal oil company*, which engaged in intensive negotiations with the Taliban regime as it had signed a tentative agreement with the Turkmenistan government to research the possibilities of

constructing an oil pipeline to Pakistan by way of Afghanistan. As the project progressed, Unocal began to seek the agreement of the Taliban, who had recently risen to power and on two separate occasions, in February and December 1997, Taliban officials were flown to the US to meet with Unocal executives.

However, the relations between Taliban and the United States ended in disarray in 1998, as the United States was enraged by the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for which Osama bin Laden was held responsible. In August 1998, the Clinton administration launched cruise missile attacks on alleged bin Laden-funded training camps in eastern Afghanistan. The US government demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden and imposed economic sanctions.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of Study

This study aims to examine the policies and strategies of the United States in Afghanistan from the beginning of the Soviet occupation in 1979 with special reference to its support and aid of Afghan Mujahideen up to 1994, when Taliban began to be reckoned as force. This study is important in the sense that it will give a consistent and systematic analysis of the American policy in this region. This study will also throw light on policies adopted by the United States and their impact on the current global security situation, especially on the rise and proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism.

Research Objectives

1. To analyze the policies of United States in Afghanistan during 1979-1994
2. To examine the various strategies employed by the United States during the Afghan resistance to Soviet forces.
3. To evaluate the systemic errors in the foreign policy of the United States during the Soviet-afghan war
4. To examine the implications of U S policy for the rise of the Taliban

Hypotheses

1. The United States failed to learn and understand the Afghan war and apply the lessons of the conflict in its engagement against the Taliban, which is costing it heavily.
2. Despite the US support to the Afghan Mujahideen, there has been no consolidation of Afghanistan's political forces which in turn, has adversely affected the national stability and security in Afghanistan.

Methodology

The proposed study would be explanatory and descriptive in nature by utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods. Data collected from primary and the secondary sources shall be used. Internet sources would be useful in my research for the procurement of secondary sources. Apart from the available secondary sources like books, periodicals, Journals, newspapers, official reports, and documents will be used in this research work. Various treaties, agreements, and joint statements signed by the parties of Bonn agreement and United Nations Resolutions and documents briefing Afghanistan's political situation would be examined. The technique of the study will be deductive in approach.

Chapter 2

UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

United States, A New-Age Parallel to Roman Empire

The last five hundred years of human history has seen tectonic shifts in power which reconfigured the world and its political, economic, and cultural life radically. A rising western society announcing a change from all known notions of culture made its formal arrival in the fifteenth century. This wave reached its peak in the late eighteenth century, resulting in what we now accept as modernity, complete with science and technology, commerce and capitalism, and agro-industrial revolutions consolidating a predominance of 'west' as an all-encompassing politico-social entity⁴¹.

It is in this historical background that United States, the most powerful nation state since Rome emerged and it began to dominate the world in every sphere, from commerce, to politics, culture and scientific advancement. It is experiencing an unrivalled dominance in global affairs for the last twenty years, to be precise, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the only power which gave it a direct and fierce competition. Thus the events unfolded in Afghanistan after Soviet invasion becomes an important academic discourse.

The fall of Soviet Union was fuelled by its flagging capacity to hold forth its ideological alliances which it marshalled throughout Europe and across African and Asian continents. One of the major reasons for this phenomenon rose from the emergence of United States as a harbinger of an economic revolution addressed generally as free market capitalism, which showed the soviet allies, a new course in charting economic independence which they seldom experienced under Soviet partnering.

⁴¹ See, Zakaria, Fareed, (2008) *The post-American world*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.p.2

However, what accelerated the dissolution of once mighty Soviet empire was the disastrous battle it engaged in Afghanistan, against a loosely held group of Mujahideen guerrillas, under the strategic support and co-ordination of the United States.

This chapter attempts to analyse the response of the United States towards soviet invasion in Afghanistan in detail.

Prior to analyzing the United States response, it is imperative to understand the evolution of American foreign policy which would facilitate the creation of a rational knowledge platform for American responses in Afghanistan.

The growth of American foreign policy is an interesting academic topic as it displays a significant shift and dynamism parallel to its ascendancy in international politics.

United States displayed a regional focus in its foreign policy during its early days as its thrust area was on creating an '*Empire of Liberty*', stemming from a philosophical angle of state formation ethics.

Within a short period, an anti foreign –entanglement notion gained credence as George Washington counselled it. This policy move displays how the united states, from its early days began to align its commercial interests and strategic alliances. The policy of non-interference in issues between trade and alliance partners of the United States was based on the Jay Treaty of 1795, which necessitated a neutral stance with Britain, its trade partner and France, its ally.

Classical American foreign policy experienced a major shift with the introduction of Monroe doctrine in 1823, which declared opposition to Europe's interference in America. Monroe doctrine became the reference point for America's assertive posture on foreign policy and it has influenced her leaders since then. Its is a glaring disparity to see that while practising Monroe doctrine which resents external interference, united states was practising classical colonial imperialism by occupying the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and establishing a protectorate over Cuba by rationalizing these adventures under '*Manifest Destiny*' concept during 1898-1913. This imperialist

overture resulted in United States transformation in to a global power for the first time and asserted its expansionist capabilities⁴².

By 1904, the Roosevelt corollary of Monroe doctrine emerged and it proclaimed a right for United States to intervene and stabilize weak states in the Americas. This doctrinal corollary can be identified as an early experiment of regional hegemonic aspirations.

Another important foreign policy shift was initiated Franklin D. Roosevelt whose 'Good Neighbor Policy' in 1933, allowed for recognition and good friendship with dictatorships.

A modern day foreign policy deliberation of the United States begins with Woodrow Wilson's fourteen point agenda of 1918, albeit not being ratified by the senate. Wilson's agenda called as Wilsonianism, aimed at spreading democracy and peace under American auspices had a profound impact on American foreign policy ever since.

The Second World War changed the landscapes of American foreign policy as it was facing a new adversary whose capabilities were on par with it. The rise of Soviet Union as a super power with a foreign policy based on a different schema of ideology posed a challenge to the United States in unprecedented terms.

The period of cold war which began after the Second World War dominated American foreign policy and its global diplomatic initiatives. The tense stand-off between Soviet Union and United States created twin power blocs in the world with most countries lining up on both side and some deciding to form non aligned league in order to meet their political and strategic gains by adhering to calculated neutrality.

Containment policy was adopted by the United States as counterbalance against soviet advances in order to spread Marxist ideology in Eastern Europe, China, Korea and Vietnam. Devised by American diplomat George Kennan, containment policy viewed Soviet Union as an aggressive power that necessitated containment. It also proposed to match soviet aggression with force while not resorting for nuclear option. Containment policy gave rise to a zero-sum situation in global power order, where

⁴² See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.6

ideological conflicts between contesting powers provided a no-win, no-losses situation.

By analysing these doctrinal and policy postulations of the United States, one could see a gradual yet, decisive shift in American world view in concordance with their political, strategic, and commercial interests.

It is in the peak of cold war that Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and that created the final proxy war of strategic regional domination resulting in the dissolution of Soviet Union and a long chain of events, which later could be harmful to peace and security of the United States.

A condensed understanding of containment policy is minimally essential towards piecing together the complex mosaic of American foreign policy towards Soviet Union in the Afghanistan invasion.

Containment policy gave American policy-makers an interpretative framework and it reduced the discourse international policy making to simplified calculus with basic vectors such as competition and East–West balance with flexibility for evolving political, military and economic conditions. It also invoked the national security framework, which could legitimize practices otherwise deemed as inappropriate. The first revision of containment policy was effected in 1950, under Truman administration, where international system had turned into a rigid bipolar formation.

The event background for policy shift lay in global events where communists were gaining an upper hand in terms of gaining China, soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe, and above all, harnessing nuclear technology. National Security Council Resolution 68 (hereafter cited as NSC-68), advocated by President Harry S. Truman was the change effected in containment policy and it confirmed America's apprehensions about the Soviet Union as an expansionist communist force which can destabilize the prevailing world system⁴³.

The militarist tone changed the earlier flexibility of containment policy significantly. It suggested that the United States and its allies had to develop conventional force capabilities to supplement the nuclear deterrent and be prepared and able to act

⁴³ See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.33

wherever communism threatened. This feature became the signifier force in the development of a vast military– industrial complex and dominated American policy during the rest of the cold war.

NSC-68's vision had a fundamental flaw; it failed to exploit initial opportunities of fragmentation within the communist camp. The rise in military spending was a direct result of NSC-68 which legitimized soviet fears of American dominance. This policy also viewed Soviet Union as state of lesser moral values, prepared for communist proliferation at all costs. Yet, the NSC-68 chose to resist communism by all means, covert or overt, violent or non-violent and it did not factor in the potency of an ideological threat which can be overwhelming than a geopolitical threat⁴⁴.

The 'New Look' shift in containment policy was initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the policy was more or less same character, but its prosecution themed around a renewed focus on nuclear weapons, burden-sharing with allies, and covert, economic and psychological warfare. Desired result of 'New look' was covert operations, which hallmarked Eisenhower Era. The CIA helped to overthrow governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 and owes to its credit, a botched attempt in Indonesia in 1958⁴⁵.

A revaluing of containment took place again during the Presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerard Fiord and Jimmy Carter. A multidimensional assessment of American policy became imperative as a chain of events, strategic and economical began to unravel in the seventies. The failure of Brettonwoods systems, organizations, the challenge from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), energy crisis in 1973, along with Vietnam fiasco had all reshaped the application patterns of American policies.

President Jimmy Carter, the central figure in American proxy war on Soviet Union in Afghanistan had a nuanced approach on American policies with a focus on human rights and idealistic notions of a global community based upon economic welfare cooperation in an interdependent world. This reassessment was based on several factors, primarily a faltering American power, international systemic change and anti-

⁴⁴ See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.33

⁴⁵ Ibid, 35

communism proving to be a thinner aspect for unity. Carter's readjustment of policy had in fact, a pragmatic touch to it as it reaffirmed the original aspects of containment policy with a functioning hierarchy of interests based on calculations of geopolitical power.

Rise of Détente

Carter's redefining of containment policy resulted in the rise of détente, which can be summed up as evolution of 'habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately, co-operation'. Détente too had containment as its primary objective, but it was conducted in a long series of US–Soviet summits. An attempt at integrating the Soviet Union into the international system led by United States was a key feature here. Détente aimed at engaging Soviet Union in a series of talks where each party's stake was enhanced⁴⁶.

The prime achievement of détente was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in May 1972, which was designed to limit Anti Ballistic Missiles and establish interim agreements to limit offensive strategic missiles⁴⁷.

President Carter's role as the architect of building post -World War II, moral, ethical and pragmatic American policy is undisputed. Carter pursued a passionate human rights policy to restore America's moral authority and to engage in foreign policy that hinged on values such as international law, open diplomacy, universal human rights, and nuclear non-proliferation.

Carter administration engaged in negotiations with Cuba and Vietnam to restore diplomatic relations and recognized the People Republic of China⁴⁸.

Carter also vouched for the second Phase of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SALT II) with further reduction in American and Soviet nuclear arsenal. The SALT II treaty

⁴⁶ See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.41

⁴⁷ Ibid, 43

⁴⁸ Ibid

agreement chose to limit American and Soviet nuclear forces to 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, restrict the number of warheads to be placed on each missile and provide for verification.

However, decisions based on realpolitik continued to obstruct the ethically hallowed ideals of détente. Soviets continuing the propagation of communist ideology and liberation movements coupled with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) engaging in covert operations are cases in point.

The weakness of détente in realpolitik schema lies in the fact that geostrategic realities were absolutely different than policies. President Carter, being a champion of human rights too was not free from acting against the realpolitik framework. His propounding of morality and humanitarianism was in total contradiction with action as he too had to collaborate with dictatorships like that of Iran under shah, and Philippines under Marcos. Carter also had to back down from welcoming soviet dissidents as Moscow threatened of reverse consequences in the arms reduction talks⁴⁹.

President Carter received further setbacks both domestically and externally. Iranian hostage disaster had angered the American public. This situation occurred from a complex inverse setting of policy and doctrine, compounded further with Carter's inability to gain domestic legitimacy for his policy postulations.

The most critical blowback to Carter's policy of tacit co-existence came in the form of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, which forced him to shun down détente. It is from this temporal space that one would go forth with the response of United States to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Storm-333- A Fatal Blowback To Carter Values

Carter administration received the news of soviet invasion with a feverish response which was a near total detour from early liberalist stance which was the hallmark of Carter administration to a significant extent.

⁴⁹ See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.45

Before analysing the rationale behind an arched response by the United States, one has to comprehend the domestic American political scenario for President Carter.

Carter administration chose to tread a calculated path of departure adapting human rights against anti-communism as its policy plank. Human rights was substituted as the policy cornerstone, but the ability of human rights to fill the moral, ideological and political void left by rejection of anti-communism proved limited. Public apathy towards Carter's policies coupled with a lack elite consensus made policies inefficient, neither horizontal nor vertical in acceptance and support.

The opposition was taking political advantage of Carter administration's diminishing public support. They ramped up a near-hysterical version of Soviet Union's military capability and international designs referring to the Soviet Brigade in Cuba. Another development was that Carter administration began to align to a conservative stance with more conservative members of Carter's team holding control over policy decisions.

The most significant change in personnel came about with the resignation of Leslie Gelb, who acted as an intellectual force behind Carter's early strategy of adjustment. Leslie Gelb resigned his post as the State Department's Director of Political-Military Affairs after repeated clashes with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was gaining dominance over policy making over the more moderate Secretary of State Cyrus Vance⁵⁰.

The passage of SALT II was in great doubt long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Carter's efforts to salvage Senate approval prompted him to make a series of concessions on related policies such as domestic defense spending⁵¹.

The Soviet invasion and response by the United States government can be analysed as a response rising from an amalgamation of excess of moralism which was in direct conflict with geostrategic realities, lack of public support for its liberal internationalist overtures, and domestic political counterbalancing against conservatives. The response

⁵⁰ See, Skidmore David, (1996), *Reversing Course Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform*, Nashville, Tennessee Vanderbilt University Press.p.136

⁵¹ Skidmore David, (1996), *Reversing Course Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform*, Nashville, Tennessee Vanderbilt University Press. P.138

also includes a deliberate display of resolve by an incumbent President on the run-up to elections.

Immediate response by Carter Administration

Carter administration began to initiate a set of measures diplomatically and politically and the foremost of all was Carter's denouncement of détente, which served as a policy bulwark and a theoretical referral point of his moralist views and liberal internationalist views in foreign policy execution.

The symbolic gestures by President Carter to express American indignation included invoking of economic sanctions, and as in case of direct US-USSR relations, cancellation of American team's participation in Olympics, scheduled to be held in Moscow in 1980 and a free grain shipments were embargoed and high-technology transfers were halted. On a larger plane of reducing détente, the Carter administration complemented nuclear weapons sufficiency with a countervailing strategy. Endorsed in Presidential Directive -59 on 25 July 1980, this determined that US nuclear forces had to be sufficiently flexible to enable a graduated response to Soviet attacks. This theoretically enhanced the US deterrent and indicated Moscow that any level of aggression would incur an unacceptably high price⁵².

The diversity of measures against Soviet Union signifies that Carter was departing from the early posture of understanding towards an aggressive one, which symbolized the general electoral trend in the United States at that moment. It also signifies an attempt to reconcile with the popular mood back home, which was already being capitalized effectively by the opposition conservatives.

The Carter Doctrine was another form of response towards Soviet move asserting that any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an attack on vital American interests.

⁵² See, See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.46

Carter Doctrine- a Policy Detour from Liberal Internationalism to Aggression

Carter Doctrine is a definitive policy realignment which reconfigured Carter administrations American foreign policy posits from liberal internationalism to a defensive rationale. It is imperative to understand various steps undertaken by Carter administration towards reducing cold war tensions. Carter, through his initiatives promoted a flexible version of international containment and international peace.

In 1978, Carter initiated the Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and despite stiff opposition, concluded the Panama Treaties resulting in the end of US occupation of the Canal Zone and the gradual reversion of the Zone and the Canal to Panama. On the diplomatic front, Carter administration stepped ahead with restoring diplomatic relations with Cuba and Vietnam and the most significant move was to recognize the Peoples Republic of China and withdrew formal recognition of Taiwan on 1st January, 1979. Carter also pushed for deeper reduction in US-Soviet nuclear arsenal under the SALT –II Treaty than those agreed by the Ford administration⁵³.

The Carter Doctrine asserted that any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an attack on vital American interests. The sudden shift towards an aggressive posture occurred mainly from two important events that sought to undermine the American dominance; the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan⁵⁴. Through Islamic revolution in Iran, the United States had lost important loci in its strategic calculus and with Soviets marching on to Kabul; the United States was forced to reassert its space in global politics.

Despite the aggressive policy posturing, Carter administration was fading in popularity and intra-party disputed in the Democratic camp culminated in carter being defeated by republican conservative Ronald Reagan. With conservatives in power in the Whitehouse, the strategy on Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan became more pronounced.

⁵³ See, See, Dobson Alan P and Marsh Steve (2001) *US foreign policy since 1945*, Oxon: Routledge.p.95

⁵⁴ Ibid,122

Reagan Presidency and US Response to Soviet Invasion

Reagan, right from his early days in the Oval Office ensured that he was well-versed on the subject of Afghanistan. Reagan even consulted Afghan dissidents and rebel leaders about how from his first days in office, Reagan made sure that he was well-versed on the United States could best proceed.

Reagan also referred Mujahideen fighters as 'freedom fighters' on par with their Nicaraguan and Polish counterparts who were encouraged by the United States covert support and assistance in anti-government activities.

With his definitive conservative and anti-communist disposition, Reagan began to make effective of his bully pulpit of the Oval Office to denounce the Soviets and their intervention, and to ratchet up rhetorical support for the resistance.

Reagan lost no opportunity to spread the message of Soviet invasion and its brutality. He passed on the message of Soviet imperialism in every Captive Nations Day statement, human rights address and in most speeches. This move by Reagan can be seen as an attempt to keep the media attention on Soviet Union on the defensive. The continuing Presidential offensive was characterized by frequently pointed references such as Moscow employing "blanket bombing and chemical and biological weapons".

Reagan's verbal confrontation was not just limited to media and he reprimanded Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit by stating that Moscow was abusing human rights by dropping booby-trapped toys which were picked up by children. He further rebuked Gorbachev by asking whether they were still trying to take over the world. Through these outwardly emotional stances, he was equating Afghanistan rebellion to situation in Poland about which he had an attachment.

Russians Stepping up Afghan heat

In a significant move, Soviet Union stepped up its military efforts in 1985, by drafting a new war plan under General Mikhail Zaitsev. Under the new plan, Soviet Union planned to shift one-third of total Special Forces, known as Spetsnaz, to Afghanistan. Apart from the Elite troops, paratroops and KGB operatives were sent in, along with

top battlefield communications equipment. Gorbachev gave General Mikhail Zaitsev at the most an year or two to win.

NSD-166 and US Response

American response was swift in countering the Soviet Military's war escalation. Reagan administration was looking for an opportune moment to strike Soviets effectively and Moscow's act provided the right impetus.

National Security Directives are a form of executive order issued by the President with the advice and consent of the National Security Council and it is the national security instrument that carries the full force and effect of law, articulating the executive's policy.

NSD's form the crux of American foreign policy and concerning Afghanistan; NSD-75 is the precursor. NSD-75 was signed in January 1983, which cited that that the U S objective in Afghanistan was to "keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal" and to "ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues." NSD-75 defines the course of American policy towards Soviet Union and NSD-166, signed though classified till date has been analyzed through various reports suggest that NSD-166 provided the firepower in US policy towards soviet union in Afghanistan⁵⁵.

NSD-166 reinforced American policy with definitive goals including stepping up of covert military aid to Afghanistan, defeat Soviet troops and encourage Soviet withdrawal by all means available. NSD-166 took a sharp ascend to attain a decisive victory against soviet union in contrast to Carter's classified directive featured a less ambitious goal of harassing the Soviet forces.

Thus the NSD-166 by Reagan upped the ante against Soviet Union and took the war to a new course in terms of intensity, involvement and scale. The impacts of NSD-166 were changing the rules of engagement immediately as it flushed the battle scene with advanced weaponry and financial support. The CIA, in 1985, delivered 10,000 rocket-

⁵⁵ See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, p.232

propelled grenades and 200,000 rockets to the Afghan rebels, which exceeded the total supplies for the previous five years.

In the year 1987, a stream of specialists was also moving in to Pakistan. Specialists on psychological warfare, satellite imagery, communication, and demolition experts began to provide the much needed technical back up which gave the Mujahideen fighters an edge over the Soviet monolith. CIA also fielded operations officers who set up training schools to educate Afghan rebels in sabotage, guerrilla warfare, mine-laying, antitank attacks, and secure communications. This training ground was jokingly labeled “CIA U”, hinting at the Pakistani connection. The US effort became intense and there began an ambitious plan to push the battle right into Soviet territory by crossing Amu Darya.

The CIA mulled over gunning down Soviet troops on their own turf and to target Soviet factories, military installations, and storage depots. This ambitious plan of extension was viewed with anxiety by the intelligence officials as it might spark off a reaction from the Soviets. However, the idea of extending the war within the Soviet Union and its prospects appealed to Reagan primarily as the Soviet casualties were not running high enough as far as the Reagan administration was concerned. The decision to extend the war beyond Amu Darya took off once the Mujahideen commanders and ISI embraced the idea and the Whitehouse adopted and pursued the extension concept only then⁵⁶.

As the extension plan became operational, specially trained Mujahideen units operating inside the Soviet Union, equipped with high-tech explosives from the CIA and Chinese rocket launchers, sabotaged Soviet targets during 1985 and 1986. The Mujahideen fighters derailed trains, attacked border posts, and laid mines. On one occasion, thirty Mujahideen fighters attacked two hydroelectric power stations in Tajikistan and in another instance they conducted a rocket attack on a Soviet military airfield.

At one point of time, the Reagan administration even debated about shipping sniper-rifle packages equipped with long-range, sophisticated sighting scopes to the rebels.

⁵⁶See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, p. 234

These would be employed to infiltrate the Afghan capital of Kabul and assassinate Soviet generals and senior military officials. An aggressive intelligence assessment of identifying the residences of Soviet generals in Kabul and tracking their regular movements was carried out by the American intelligence.

However, this idea ran into trouble as providing sniper rifles might violate the 1977 presidential directive precluding assassinations. In the end, the rifles were sent, but without the intelligence inputs, nor the night goggles necessary to carry out assassinations.

On the financial assistance front, it was the Reagan administration that dramatically increased the funding for the covert operation. On the whole, the Reagan administration funneled over \$2 billion in money, compared to the \$30 million sent under President Carter. The challenge posed to the Soviet Union by United States through the largest US covert action program in the history of the CIA took a sharp tone under Reagan administration.

The principle of plausible deniability was held paramount by the United States throughout the Afghan proxy war as it sought Pakistani help in order to keep its role under wraps. However, Reagan's ambitions for ending the war in the shortest possible time became unattainable as Gorbachev adhered to his two-year commitment to victory. The war was having a severe, negative impact on the Soviet Union, both in terms of military commitment and stretching budgets and Reagan administration was determined to push the Soviets more to the wall.

Arms Race – An Unconventional Tactic to Weaken the Soviets

Apart from the strategic and military offensive, another move, which was more of a derivative, came about in the U S- Soviet proxy war. Due to the scaled up offensive by both sides, an arms race began to emerge and it had a disastrous impact on the Soviet Union.

Reagan administration posed a significant challenge to the Soviet Union in the form of an arms race and that had an impact on Gorbachev, a communist but a pragmatist who chose to break away from the Stalinist old guard over time. Gorbachev believed

in a delayed, yet definite victory in Afghanistan, but he was unsure about the lethal, costly and dangerous arms race in which Soviet Union found it dragged into. Gorbachev, viewed the arms race as capable of tearing the Soviet economy apart and he convinced his colleagues about the situation⁵⁷.

Reagan administration was also convinced of the arms race pushing Soviets into a collapse and they focused on zeroing in on the internal fissures that Soviet Union hid. Reagan and his team finally came up with information about the detrimental impact to Soviet economy caused by the arms race. Gorbachev's opposition to arms race was primarily arising from Soviet Union's inability to sustain it and Reagan on the other hand, continued with arms procurement, upon realizing the potency of this situation as the most powerful weapon against the Soviet Union.

For every dollar the United States spent on a weapon, the Soviets increased spending by a corresponding amount. Moscow was struggling to compete with the American spending. Such a policy initiative was thought about by Reagan, right from the start of his presidency. The opinion on arms race was pondered over by Reagan, right from the early sixties. In a speech, delivered in early sixties, Reagan said that "the only sure way to avoid war is to surrender without fighting." "The other way is based on the belief (supported so far by all evidence) that in an all-out race our system is stronger, and eventually the enemy gives up the race as a hopeless cause⁵⁸."

Reagan believed that if the United States turned its full industrial strength into an arms race the Soviets cannot keep pace with it as it would force them to spend money beyond their means. Reagan's views on arms race also pointed the economic and systemic crises faced by the Soviet Union that would either force them to refocus their plans for a realistic disarmament program or face a legitimate arms race. Reagan's confidence on succeeding in the arms race was based on his belief in the capitalist system and technological advancement achieved by the United States.

The fiscal impact of the arms race was visible by 1985 as the Soviet establishment began to voice their concern over Reagan's economic war adding up to the burden in

⁵⁷See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, p.237

⁵⁸ See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, p.239

Afghanistan. Soviet deputy R. N. Stakheyev stated that exhausting the Russian economy was the aim of Reagan administration.

Meanwhile, attempts at finding a precise data on the Soviet spending was carried out and external estimates on Soviet military spending ranged from as low as 7 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to as high as 73 percent whereas most estimates pegged the GDP in a range of 20 to 50 percent. These figures were speculative and Gorbachev was able to gain reasonably accurate figures, which slotted military expenditure at a staggering 40 percent, which was equivalent to 20 percent of GDP.

The traditional official military budget figure for the Soviet Union was 17 billion rubles per year, or about \$3 billion, but projections otherwise suggest that they spent roughly \$30 billion annually on the military. By comparison, United States military spending hit \$250 billion per year, eight times higher than Soviet levels.

The impact of the arms race reached its climax in the Geneva Summit in November 1985, in which Gorbachev requested for western aid and admitted that the arms race is wiping Soviet Union out. He also requested Reagan to end the arms race and Reagan on the other hand, cited the choices to be exercised are either an agreement to reduce arms or a continuation of the arms race.

Unadulterated form of economic warfare was being aggressively pursued by the Reagan administration against communism and its empire, the Soviet Union. This economic assault on the Soviet Union has had its spillover effect on its intervention in Afghanistan as well. In 1985, Reagan's team dragged Soviet Union into a bleeding arms race which began to dry its coffers but they had zeroed in on another vulnerable point in Soviet armor; oil and natural gas.

The 1985-1986 oil shock affected the Soviet Union badly and the role of United States in propagating it, still remains as the mysteries of cold war even though the relation between Saudi Arabia and United States throws light in to the possibility.

Reagan administration was aware of the role that natural gas and oil played in the Soviet economy. In the face of overwhelming pressure to compete with America in the arms race, these two commodities had come to form the backbone of the Soviet economy, accounting for a remarkable 80 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings

The modus operandi for bringing down Soviet Union's hard currency base was to lower global oil prices and diminish Soviet ability to earn hard currency. It was here that Saudi Arabia came to play a key role in Ronald Reagan's economic warfare campaign against the Soviet Union.

The United States was able to convince Saudi King Fahd and his regime to help the administration weaken the Soviets economically by increasing Saudi oil output. In late 1985 Saudi Arabia agreed to increase oil production from less than two million barrels a day up to nine million barrels per day. This overflow caused prices to plummet worldwide from \$30 in 1985 to \$10 in April 1986. For the Soviets, every \$1 drop in oil meant a hard currency loss of \$500 million to \$1 billion and soon the \$700 million trade surplus with the West in 1984 turned to a deficit of \$1.4 billion in 1985, indicating the hard currency crunch⁵⁹.

By the end of the eighties, Soviet Union which began the decade with a bright credit rating, displayed an exorbitant trade deficit, a significant general budget deficit, large external debts, and payment delays on imports, occurring from the exhausted oil earnings.

The secrecy of US-Saudi involvement remained intact to a great extent till 2002. It was after 9/11 attacks, when the Saudi regime desperately needed a damage control in self image, that Saudi officials finally gave even minor indications of the collusion.

An op-ed column in the Washington Post, published on September 17, 2002, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Director of the Saudi General Intelligence Department from 1977 to 2001, sought to compensate for the fact that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by fifteen Saudi nationals by saying that the increase in Saudi oil production in the mid-1980s would not "have taken place without Saudi-U.S. cooperation." This, he said, "lead to lower oil prices." The prince's op-ed piece was far from a tell-all, but it nonetheless constituted the Saudis' biggest public admission of their role in the shock.

The oil shock, combined with a resource crunching arms race proved to be a burden on the Soviet fiscal stability and it had a debilitating impact on the war it was leading in Afghanistan as well.

⁵⁹ See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, p.254

Observations

Response by United States appears puzzling while taking into account, the fact that Afghanistan had never before been considered critical to Western security. United States had in fact resigned to the fact of Afghanistan being a definite sphere of Soviet influence, owing to its landlocked position and its status as a frontline state.

Carter had pursued a liberal internationalist policy and détente was active, yet adventures of installing communist governments and upsetting existing political orders were a part of Soviet Stalinist policy which was revived by Brezhnev. Despite these measures, both Soviet Union and United States never missed an opportunity to bring one more nation into their domain and kept undercutting each other.

Hence there existed a sense of mistrust and ideological competition even when détente was practiced. This pattern of political behaviour emerged from the perceived status of both countries being the leaders of and champions of two ideologies. The force and necessity of expanding their spheres of influence was a precondition that outran all other policy practices.

However, Soviet behaviour toward the Third World had influenced American foreign policy and its response systems. Throughout the seventies, Soviet Union was active in third world countries and this move was contradicting the assumptions underlying the Carter administration's policies of détente toward the Soviet Union.

The prime assumptions about Soviet Union were that during the seventies, the Soviet Union engaged in a calculated strategy designed to outrun western positions in the Middle East by sowing and reaping a harvest of unrest along an "arc of crisis" stretching from Southern Africa, through Afghanistan and ending in South East Asia. The regime changes that took place in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Iran, and Nicaragua between June 1978 and July 1979, are seen as resulting from Soviet plans. However, these events were primarily resulting from internal conflicts in the respective societies, which had an ideological undercurrent of socialism.

Carter administration was witnessing a failing domestic support, making Carter's position vulnerable and Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was an opportunity to shore up

his popularity as a resolute war-time president and to counter Conservative arguments of his administration being soft on communism. Reagan's administration, with its definitive stance and attempts to extricate communism out of the world system and to reassert American policy dominance reformulated the Carter policy with a definitive aggressive tone.

Chapter 3

US AID TO AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN

Clandestine Operations – A Statutory Response

The foreign policy of United States includes secret actions, such as covert actions to topple foreign government including governments which are elected democratically.

Covert operations became a part of the United States foreign policy as response mechanism against a multitude of factors changing the policy landscape of international system. The rise of Soviet Union after the World War II, as a superpower crated a rigid bipolar system challenging the flexibility on American foreign policy ideals of containment.

International events, much like the international system was deteriorating, much to the dismay of the United States. China, a former tactical ally was lost after the arrival of Maoism and Moscow had consolidated its influence and power in the Eastern Europe, leading to the creation of a powerful European communist bloc. Above all, the American monopoly over nuclear bomb as challenged by the Soviet Union.

On the domestic front, United States feared a recurring of the economic crisis of 1930's and would provide ideological relevance to communism and socialism as an alternative to market capitalism. The added concerns of Britain and France being decolonised leading to a possible scenario of communism becoming the dominant political ideology too, had effected a change in American foreign policy with respect to tackling communism.

The response to all these strategic concerns was National Security Council Resolution 68 (NSC-68), one of the most important documents in contemporary American history. The resolution details an exhaustive assessment of values, objectives, fundamentals and possible course of action in the event of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The concept of covert operations is highlighted in the clause 9, Sub Section D of NSC-68, which states that "*Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and*

operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries”.

By declaring through a National Security Council Directive, the United States had officialized the concept of covert operations into its foreign policy schema⁶⁰.

Covert operations became the hallmark of President Eisenhower’s era as the CIA helped to overthrow governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 and bid an unsuccessful attempt at in Indonesia in 1958.

Covert operations became the preferred choice of intervention for the United States as it helped avoid large scale wasting of American troops as happened in Vietnam.

Covert operations also allowed United States to avoid the attention of the press and most importantly, congressional oversight.

However, by using covert means to oust the administrations of other nations, the United States was putting at stake, its claims of moral superiority and ethical grand standing against Soviet Union. Through adhering to extrapolated measures of conflict, one of the foundational principles of United States, that good causes can only be achieved by good political means was being rejected on the face of political correctness and superpower balancing.

Operation Cyclone

In any event analysis, especially in international relations, one cannot sideline the cause and effect rationale affecting a change in foreign policy conduct. A host of domestic situations and external setbacks can be cited in the Carter administration deciding upon diluting détente and posing a more realistic old-school Kennan containment policy with emphasis on NSD-68’s covert operations angle.

⁶⁰ See, Dobson, Alan P. & Marsh, Steve (2001), *US foreign policy since 1945*, New York, Routledge.p.33

The divide between hardliners and rationalists, especially between National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was becoming sharper with the former gaining more influence over policies.

Brzezinski's arguments were hinting at Soviet Union expanding its presence over Indian Ocean and creating an extended sphere of influence over oil-producing countries in the Gulf. Vance on the other hand, held a softer view on Soviet designs in the region and he conceded that United States should not engage in any activities that will start a conflagration.

However, the domestic mood against Carter administration's liberal policies got beset by a lukewarm response, owing to the aggressive campaigning against anti-communism by the conservatives, especially after the discovery of Soviet brigade in Cuba.

On the external front, United States suffered a setback after losing its key ally Iran in the wake of Islamic revolution in January 1979, offsetting American strategic advantage cultivated through two decades.

The killing of Adolf Dubs, United States Ambassador to Afghanistan on February 14, 1979 and Kabul's unapologetic stance resulted in freezing the already cold relation between the two countries. Dubs death in fact, served as a curtain raiser for the larger events to be revealed in Afghanistan. President Carter, by August 1979, had cut off all American aid as response to Kabul's stance⁶¹.

It was in this situation that Soviet invasion in Afghanistan began and that gave the hardliners in Washington a shot in the arm to pursue their policies aimed at vitiating communist dominance.

It is in this background that support rendered to Mujahideen resistance fighters should be examined. Even before Operation Cyclone become functional, there existed a tacit indirect support to the Afghan insurgency, through the military regime of General Zia by encouraging it to device its own scheme for military support to the rebels.

⁶¹ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.34

The CIA and ISI worked together in planning training programs and co-ordinating foreign aid that was beginning to funnel down from the Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, and Kuwait.

Codenamed Operation Cyclone, given a go-ahead by President Carter, the United States began its longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever. The main objectives of the operation were to arm, train, and finance the Afghan Mujahideen against Soviet forces.

In the initial stage, the funds flow were a trickle as compared to huge sums placed in the second stage of Operation Cyclone. Pakistan was serving as the strategic vestibule through which the objectives of Operation Cyclone would be fulfilled and Pakistan took advantage of this situation as well. There ensued an intense bargaining by Pakistani leadership with Brzezinski who met Pakistani leaders including General Zia. In one of the meetings, General Zia had promptly dismissed the aid offer of US\$ 400 Million by Brzezinski as 'peanuts'.

Meanwhile, the soviets were stepping up their operations from garrison based one to major scale offensive and on the contrary, most resistance attacks were staged haphazardly by locally based groups with little coordination among field commanders or between field commanders and the seven Pakistan-based resistance parties. Resistance was also being divided by Pakistan and it showed a preferential attitude towards Pakistan-leaning groups, particularly for Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf.

Change of government in the United States brought about a radical posture in terms of approach and action on Afghanistan covert operation. Reagan administration, with its hard-line approach concurred that Carter had not moved aggressively enough to exploit the situation in Afghanistan. This thought gained currency and what resulted was a stepped up aid and thorough reappraisal of the whole program.

Reagan administration stepped up the support and offered two packages of economic assistance spanning two phases and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The first six-year assistance package (1981-87) reached a final agreement in June, after a visit by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance James to

Islamabad. The agreement amounted to US\$3.2 billion, was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales.

The United States also sold 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan during 1983-87 at a cost of \$1.2 billion outside the assistance package. The second six-year assistance package (1987-93) amounted to \$4.2 billion. Out of this, \$2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan⁶².

The rest of the allocation (\$1.74 billion) was in the form of credit for military purchases. Somewhere around \$3-\$7 billion in American funds were channelled into Pakistan to train and equip Afghan resistance groups.

Plausible Deniability Mode in US Policy in Afghanistan

Amidst all these functions, the United States was careful to not to expose itself as helping the Mujahideen. As achieving this end, the supply and use of American made weapons were ruled out, which is seen as move to ensure plausible deniability in case of being exposed.

A majority of weapons, especially rifles were brought from arms black market and some were procured from countries that were recipients of Soviet aid, particularly Egypt. In fact, a large portion of arms of soviet model were replicated in ordnance factories in Egypt. In the case of Soviet model weapons, such as rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, and grenades were found with an unsatisfactory replication level in Egypt, the upgradation process was carried out in American defence factories.

China too was providing surface to air missiles (SAM-7), AK-47 rifles, RPG -7 Rocket Propelled Grenades in the thousands to Mujahideen forces through CIA and Pakistan. China also provided hundreds of mules to be used as pack animals by the Mujahideen. United States and China had were thus in a substantial collaborative alliance against the Soviet Union.

⁶² See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press. p.67

Reagan administration, through CIA, succeeded in stepping up support from Saudi Arabia through a sale of five Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) planes in a \$8.5 billion deal⁶³.

CIA Director William Casey's role in rising appropriation for the Afghan aid program to \$80 million for the 1981—1982 fiscal year is a notable achievement. Through aiding Mujahideen, the United States gained significant insights into Soviet military technology by inspecting various weapons confiscated by the Mujahideen fighters.

In an analysis of American aid to Mujahideen, the role of Charles Wilson, a democrat congressman is important. As a member of the House Appropriations Committee, Charles Wilson pushed through billions of dollars in funding for weapons for the Mujahidin, including the shoulder-fired Stinger missiles that negated the Soviets' air advantage.

Charlie Wilson and his role in stepping Mujahideen support

The critical importance of Charlie Wilson's campaign for Mujahideen fighters lies cutting down the Soviet air power which was shaking the resistance. As the fortunes of the resistance declined during 1983 and 1984 which prompted both democrats and republicans to criticize about the inadequacy in quality and quantity of weaponry being supplied to Mujahideen fighters.

A delegation of members of the House of Representatives led by chairman of Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee visited Pakistan in which Wilson was also a part. The committee members held meetings with Pakistani officials including President Zia, other key officials and resistance leaders. The need for better weaponry, especially antiaircraft missiles more effective than the Soviet Sam-7 missiles in stock was emphasized by all of them.

Charles Wilson forced the CIA to expand the Afghan program during early 1984 by pushing through a substantial increase in appropriations for the 1984-1985 fiscal year causing the initial request of CIA for \$30 million rise to \$120 million. Charles Wilson

⁶³ See, Cordovez, Diego & Harrison, Selig S. (1995), *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*, New York, Oxford University Press. p.70

also helped quadruple the Afghan aid program from \$250 million in 1985, \$470 million in 1986, and to \$630 million in 1987. Charles Wilson effectively used his position as a member of the Defense Subcommittee of Appropriations for seeing the proposed increases actually occur.

Charles Wilson also played an important role in getting the Foreign Affairs Committee and Foreign Operations Subcommittee in maintaining military aid to

Pakistan by providing an additional \$50 million than the originally proposed \$40 million of reprogrammed Defense Department funds. The introduction of stinger missiles or other American weaponry was never considered by the CIA, due to its adherence on preserving the 'plausible deniability' factor.

However, Charles Wilson persuaded William Casey to experiment European anti-aircraft weaponry. This proposition resulted in spending a part of the expanded appropriations on purchasing Swiss anti-aircraft cannon, the *Oerlikon*, advocated by Wilson.

Flow of sophisticated weaponry and data

The ISI was supplied by critical information such as satellite reconnaissance findings on Soviet targets in Afghanistan and intercepts from Soviet communications. On weaponry front, ISI was provided with advanced communications gear, delayed-timing devices for plastic explosives, long-range sniper rifles, a high-precision targeting device for mortars that was linked to a U.S. Navy satellite, and wire-guided tank missiles.

The reason behind this move was based on analysis of intelligence information. The National Security Decision Directive – 166, signed by President Reagan authorized efforts to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan by all means available.

Stinger Missiles – the Game Changer

If a compilation of efforts by the United States to aid the Mujahideen is to be compiled, one cannot rule out dividing the policy options and their chronology as pre-Stinger and post-Stinger era.

The Stinger missiles were a potential addition to the arsenal of Mujahideen fighters as these missiles forced an alternation on the course of a war which was set on unequal combat capabilities. The American bureaucracy was proving to be a proving to be a stumbling block in the effective and timely delivery of the Stinger missiles.

The pre-Stinger era

The Pre-Stinger era began six months before the Soviet invasion, was characteristic by its modest program of propaganda. This moderate character was altered radically after the invasion and President Carter escalated U S support for the Afghan Mujahideen, indicating that the CIA should take action to begin transferring weapons to the rebel groups. Working closely with Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency, the CIA oversaw the coordination of an operation designed to allow the Mujahideen to harass the Soviet troops occupying Afghan territory.

The basic concept of conflict remained largely in abusing the Soviets and making their stay in Afghanistan costly, an argument that was propagated by Zia.-The conflict according to suggestions by Zia, was to remain contained in Afghanistan, obviously due to the spill over possibility of a battle which has a religious undertone. President Carter subscribed largely to Zia's prescription for the conduct of the Afghan conflict and the CIA had discretion to coordinate the intricacies of the operation as it saw fit. In this phase of conflict, the tactics largely remained soft and it in a way prolonged the

The election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 resulted in a re-evaluation of the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan and Cold War proxy conflicts in the Third World in general. Around that time, leaders in Congress also began to advocate substantially increased aid for the Mujahideen, allocating vast sums to the Afghan anti-communist cause. As a result, the CIA officials controlling the operation in

Afghanistan saw an increase in their budget from about \$30 million in fiscal 1981 to about \$200 million in fiscal 1984. The CIA staff in Islamabad, Pakistan, led at the time by station chief Howard Hart, coordinated with the ISI in order to determine the rebels' needs in terms of new weapons systems, as well as the means of arms acquisition and distribution.

William Casey, Director of the CIA under Ronald Reagan, felt that the singular mission of his agency was to combat Soviet influence worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, Casey advocated an ambitious approach to the operation in support of the Mujahideen.

With growing support on various fronts within the U.S. government, calls from the Mujahideen for increased action on the part of the CIA, and increased financial aid from international partners such as Saudi Arabia, Casey felt confident in seeking to update the policy set forth by the Carter Administration, which had laid out only a limited scope of operations in Afghanistan. After a series of interagency meetings, National Security Decision Directive 166, titled 'Expanded U.S. Aid to Afghan Guerillas', was signed by President Reagan in March, 1985. NSDD-166 redefined the United States' goals in Afghanistan and within the document was the provision which allowed for the CIA to provide American-made Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen.

Post-Stinger era

Soviet Union suffered a critical blow when the US assistance to Mujahideen fighters received a major fillip in the form of advanced weaponry, especially the Stinger missiles.

The introduction of Mi-24 helicopter gunships in to the battlefield was reducing the edge of fight from Mujahideen forces as the gunships were decidedly effective in terms of destruction of both men and infrastructure.

Even before facing the challenge posed by Soviet helicopter gunships, the necessity of supplying Stinger missiles were mooted by Reagan. During a campaign speech in Pensacola, Florida on January 9, 1980 Reagan cited the importance of anti-aircraft

missiles in Afghanistan. The statement from Reagan came when the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was reaching its second week. Reagan also cited that the weapons should be supplied through Pakistan.

The Stinger missiles had many advanced features. It had a range of almost five kilometers, or 15,000 feet, racing upward 1,200 miles per hour to its target. It weighed only thirty-five pounds with a lesser recoil. Apart from these features the Stinger had an all-weather infrared heat-seeking mechanism that facilitates easy target location, enabling the operator to successfully destroy his target without needing to aim precisely at an aircraft's heat source. The Stinger could also differentiate between real targets and flares⁶⁴.

The kill rate of Stinger missiles dealt a disastrous blow to the Soviet army as the Mujahideen averaged one destroyed plane or helicopter for each of the next 200 days. A study conducted by the U S army after the war found that of the 340 firings of Stingers in combat, 269 downed aircraft. The Stingers were deadly against both the Soviet helicopter gunships and high-flying planes.

Reagan's passionate support for the Mujahideen was visible in his decision to send advanced weaponry, including Stinger missiles to them. Reagan started communication with the representatives of Afghan resistance in the first week of his administration itself.

Two rebel leaders visited Washington in late February 1981. They held a press conference at the Capitol in which they expressed hope that they would receive not just rifles and ammunition from the administration but also, ground-to-air missiles.

Despite US assistance pouring in quicker, there was a delay in delivering Stingers to the Afghans. The delay was caused primarily by the bureaucracy who debated upon the wisdom of handing over one of the U S military's most precious weapons, allowing it to be not just used but also replicated. This move was also facing challenges from the Senate and it was not until 1985 that there was bipartisan support for sending Stingers. Nearly every Democrat on both intelligence committees opposed the idea. A key turning point was a June 1985 trip to Pakistan by Democratic Senators

⁶⁴ See, Kengor Paul, (2006), *The crusader : Ronald Reagan and the fall of communism*, New York, Harper Collins Publishers

Bill Bradley and David Boren, members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. When they returned, they lobbied for increased support for the rebels. Despite this bipartisan support the bureaucratic hurdles remained.

However, in April 1986, Reagan placed his signature on a decision memo that explicitly authorized Stingers to be delivered.

Chapter 4

US SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN AS FRONTLINE STATE

Pakistan, an oscillating polity

Excessive optimism set in an unlikely environment of religious zeal is what one could define as the fundamental flaw in the views of Pakistan's founding fathers.

Set in a complex religious setting with a near absent democratic political socialization followed by successive military coups, Pakistan has become an oddity in international politics, albeit it's trickling inculcation of democratic practices.

Pakistan, since its inception has been oscillating between unstable democracy and benign authoritarianism. It had shifted from economic prosperity to fiscal crises and its levels of political violence, except for the recent surge of Pakistani Taliban has not been pathological. Pakistan also did not turn out to be a mature democracy, neither a religious authoritarian state.

The roots of Pakistan's faltering can be traced back to its formative days as the expectations of its leaders were higher than the socio-political reality Pakistan as a nation experienced in real terms. Pakistan's leaders hoped to carve out a modern state with its pillars fixed on the solid ideological foundations of a modern Islamic state where tolerance and secularism would rub shoulders with religious codes of statecraft.

However, this vision came to an abrupt halt, due to the overbearing grip of military bureaucracy and staunch pro-religious forces in power at Islamabad who were incapable of carrying out the grandstanding political vision of its founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Pakistan plays an important role in regional security calculus, even though its importance in South Asian security in early days was underplayed by an importance of India. Before 1947, independent Pakistan was deemed to be acting as a buffer

against India and Soviet Union by the founders of Pakistan as well as a safeguard for India against radical Islamic fundamentalism and Soviet pressure⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, these principles were later to remain in papers as Pakistan, as a nation with inherent complexities with itself had to relocate its foreign policy postulates according to rapidly changing domestic and external situations.

However, counter views were also prevailing in the regional security debate. Shaukatullah Ansari, a Muslim member of the Congress gave a prophetic analysis of Pakistan's strategic future. He argued that Pakistan would have insufficient resources to defend itself without external assistance and it would face three conflicts involving two fronts. On its western border, Russia and Afghanistan, in its eastern flank would be Japan and China and east and west would face security crisis from India. Ansari also added that British would use independent Pakistan to control India.

When one looks at Pakistan as nation, it is hard to override the complex interlaying of identities enmeshed in it. The strong yet subdued Indian component inherent in it by default, which is overlooked by Pakistani leadership and intelligentsia, its implied notion of becoming an Islamic hub of modern South Asia, a legacy of British India, its cultural links with Central Asia which along with its military tradition would transform it as a guardian force of South Asia, and finally its shared destiny with the rest of Islamic world.

It is these complex identities that form the political and socio-economic character of Pakistan even now and these elements in varying degrees have impacted its foreign policy and strategic schema as well.

Strategic Narrative of US-Pakistan Foreign Policy

Early foundations of Pakistan's foreign policy rested on the liberal pillars of promotion of peace and prosperity, friendliness and global goodwill. These outlines of Pakistan's foreign policy were conceived by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, upholding a liberal world view.

⁶⁵ See, Cohen, Stephen P (2004) *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, p.31

Pakistan was successful in cultivating relations with the United States, Soviet Union, and China. The relations with United States were on a promising note whereas, Soviet Union showed a marked indifference, primarily for Pakistan's visible pro-west tilt and particularly for bonhomie shared between Pakistan and the United States.

One of the reasons for Pakistan's pro-west tilt was resulting from India's non-aligned policy with a Soviet angle. Pakistan showed its allegiance to the United States by joining SEATO and CENTO military alliances and the United States went on to enter into a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in 1954, further bolstering mutual ties, much to the chagrin of Soviet Union.

It was under General Zia Ul Haq's military rule that relations between United States and Pakistan displayed a haphazard graph which put United States in an uneasy position of accommodation despite its reservations about growing nuclear ambitions of Pakistan.

The relations between the two countries hit a stalemate as United States cut off aid to Pakistan in response to Pakistan's exposed nuclear program to build a plutonium reprocessing plant with French help in 1978. The relations reached its nadir after the torching of American embassy in Islamabad in November 1979⁶⁶.

It was in this stifling strategic environment that Soviets entered Afghanistan and that transformed the relations, although borne out of necessity, to a resetting position.

Operation Cyclone - 'Giving Soviets Their Vietnam War'

On July 3, 1979, U.S. President Carter signed a presidential order authorizing funding for anticommunist guerrillas in Afghanistan. The seriousness with which the US administration viewed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is evident from the remark "*the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War*", by President Carter.

It is evident from the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter that the U.S. effort to aid the Mujahideen was preceded by an effort

⁶⁶ See, Cohen, Stephen P (2004) *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, p.85

to draw the Soviets into a costly and presumably distracting Vietnam War-like conflict. In a 1998 interview with the French news magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Brzezinski recalled: *"We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would... That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap... The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, "We now have the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War."*

President Carter, who was on an aggressive disposition against the soviet invasion on Afghanistan gave the CIA, a go-ahead in orchestrating a covert assistance program and Pakistan exploited the possibility of the afghan situation and agreed to act as strategic conduit for anti-soviet covert offensive.

Pakistan agreed to engage along United States after intense bargaining through which it extracted a commitment of over US\$ 1 billion in military aid for General Zia's armed forces. The main planks of bargaining by Pakistan during the Brzezinski mission in February 1980 were predating the Soviet invasion; resumption of strategic intelligence connection and recommencement of economic aid cut off after Pakistan's nuclear program.

Apart from these bargaining blocks, Pakistan also wanted a NATO-model treaty which would bind united states to use armed forces in the event of an Indian or soviet aggression. The United States affirmed that it was not necessary to go beyond the objectives of mutual security agreement of 1959, which cites support for Pakistan against aggression by any country controlled by international communism.

Reagan administration stepped up the support and offered two packages of economic assistance spanning two phases and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The first six-year assistance package (1981-87) amounted to US\$3.2 billion, equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The U.S. also sold 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan during 1983-87 at a cost of \$1.2 billion outside the assistance package.

The second six-year assistance package (1987-93) amounted to \$4.2 billion. Out of this, \$2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan that carried the interest rate of 2-3 per cent.

The rest of the allocation (\$1.74 billion) was in the form of credit for military purchases. Somewhere between \$3-\$7 billion in US funds were funnelled into the country to train and equip Afghan resistance groups with weapons, including Stinger man-portable air-defence systems.

The leverage exercised by Pakistan lies in the fact that General Zia had allowed the United States to install the electronic monitoring facilities in northern border of Pakistan lying adjacent to Soviet Central Asian missile testing and anti-satellite launching sites. This proposal was an advantage for the United States as it lost its monitoring facilities in Teheran after the fall of Shah and Pakistan was the next best natural location closer to Central Asia.

There were opposing views in Islamabad against United States as well. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi wanted to limit the role of United States in Afghanistan as he had his reservations against getting close and he preferred a rescheduling of Pakistan's debt and wanted the early offer 400 Million Dollar aid package exclusively as economic aid. Agha Shahi also put forth a view that unless and until United States guaranteed Pakistan's security against India, the military aid should not be considered. Agha Shahi had to step down as his differences with the administration became untenable.

In addition to bargaining on political front, Pakistan too had some genuine security concerns, regarding Soviet advance to Afghanistan. Pakistan posited some likely scenarios corresponding to the situation. Its doubts were focused mainly on scenario setting and analysis.

Pakistan feared that if Soviet Union were able to consolidate the political situation in Afghanistan, how far it would go to rake up the age-old irredentist demand for an allied Pashtunistan, carved out of its North West Frontier Province.

Another cause of concern for Pakistan was based on Soviets extending the aggression towards Pakistan as it had antagonized Soviet Union by shifting towards the western led security alliances during the cold war.

The decision by Pakistan to support the United States rose from its regional analysis as well. Pakistan gathered that Soviets will not be successful in quelling the dissent as popular unrest was beyond the scale of uprisings which the Soviets managed to

subdue in Eastern Europe. Pakistan also assumed that a systematic scaling up of military and economic costs of occupation and counterinsurgency campaign would exhaust the Soviets.

By all means, Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was a rare opportunity for Pakistan to reset the relation with United States, which it exploited to the hilt.

Organizing the Resistance Coalition in the New Great Game

The resistance coalition composed an umbrella grouping of countries including China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Britain, Turkey along with the United States and Pakistan. It was Pakistan which acted as the facilitator on the ground for channelling the efforts.

The entire effort relied upon Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as an intermediary for funds distribution, passing of weapons, military training and financial support to Afghan resistance groups.

Along with funding from similar programs from Britain's MI6 and SAS, Saudi Arabia, and the People's Republic of China, the ISI armed and trained over 100,000 insurgents between 1978 and 1992.

The ISI encouraged the volunteers from the Arab states to join the Afghan resistance in its struggle against the Soviet troops based in Afghanistan.

The ISI trained Mujahideen guerrillas at camps that were even hidden from the Pakistani army. ISI's Afghan bureau was based at Ojhri camp near Rawalpindi and it was from here that General Zia was briefed about the progress of operations. ISI was also instrumental in forging the alliance between warring Mujahideen factions of varied ethnic and ideological features into a composite forum with their leaders forming a military committee⁶⁷.

⁶⁷ See, Mehmud Ali .S (2005)*US–China Cold War Collaboration, 1971–1989*, Oxon: Routledge.p.175

The military committee reviewed operational plans, ordnance delivery and past operations with ISI's Afghan bureau commander. The ISI held its prerogative of guarding distribution of supplies and training of guerrillas as well.

Pakistan, despite its direct involvement in anti-Soviet Coalition, did not want to openly provoke Soviet Union into an open conflict. It was for this reason that Pakistan wanted to funnel the assistance package through ISI.

Chapter 5

RISE OF TALIBAN AND US POLICY

Taliban Phenomenon Analysed in the Domain of Deconstruction

The boundary between genesis of Taliban and eclipse of Mujahideen are blurred as they are positioned in a continuum of conflicting events and value systems, exhausting the process of compartmentalized analysis.

One would attempt to posit the rise of Taliban in the realm of Deconstruction, ideated by French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction approach pursues the meaning of a text to the point of exposing the contradictions and internal oppositions upon which it is apparently founded and showing that those foundations are irreducibly complex, unstable, or impossible. It is an approach that is used in philosophy, and can also be used in political analysis.

Taliban, as an organization is based on a broad set of structures, which are political, religious and tribal identity.

The political structure of Taliban is observable in its resistance movements against the warring factions of Mujahideen which made normal life difficult in Afghanistan.

Religious structure of Taliban is visible in its attempts at consolidating a polity structured on the caliphate with medieval theocratic rules applied as universal with a reduced option of consent.

Tribal facets of Taliban movement are apparent in its successful mobilization of Pashtun tribes and other groups through coercive and relative manoeuvring.

In deconstruction terms, these three base systems, which can be called as the ontological base of Taliban as a movement, an enterprise and political force.

These very rationales of the theoretical foundations of Taliban are complex, unstable and contradictory, when applied to a larger political spectrum in a complex, proto-tribal society like Afghanistan.

Application of these basic philosophies of Taliban and the manner in which they were applied again shows that Taliban was a self-conflicting being, placed in a complex landscape with composite political narratives in play.

Taliban's period of active political engagement gives more references of contradictions and complexities that assert the deconstruction analytics with further evidence for analysis.

Taliban, although proclaiming to be Islamic in composition was in fact, applying medieval obscurantist version of Islam by intending to install a caliphate model of Islamic governance system. This complexity was criticised by Islamic circles in different parts of the world, practising a modern version of Islam. The ayatollahs in Tehran issued a statement condemning Taliban for defaming Islam by contradicting it with medieval obscurantism.

On political front, Taliban further confused its political socialization process, based on proto-religious codes. They used several key motifs from high modernism, especially western modernism and their power depended on modern tools such as state, radio, tank corps and machine gun-mounted Toyotas⁶⁸.

The use of these tools of modern societies to establish dominance shows the inherent and visible juxtaposition between base political ideas and their application.

Taliban's understanding of the Afghan state, as a predominantly primordial class is another contradiction which marred their possibilities of governance. Taliban's basic codes, depicting a primordial view of Islam deemed a belief that the use of coercion and violence was normal. However, despite being impoverished and ravaged by prolonged wars, a section of Afghan society was not alien to modernity and technological advancements which kept them in connection with the rest of the world. This percolating effect of modern world gave rise to a subdued resentment against the Taliban, which was evident in the way people expressed their respite and elation of Taliban's ouster by the allied forces.

⁶⁸ See, Crews Robert D. and Tarzi Amin, (Eds.) (2008), *The Taliban and The Crisis of Afghanistan*, USA: Harvard University Press. *The Taliban, Women and the Hegelian Private Space*, Cole R.I.Juan, p.118

Origins of Taliban

The beginnings of Taliban are in connection with a chain of events unravelled in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989. Despite the soviet withdrawal, the last communist president of Afghanistan Dr: Najibullah was able to hold on to power and this resulted in a fierce battle culminating in the capture of Kabul by Mujahideen in 1992⁶⁹.

The capture of Kabul by the rebel forces had a devastating side effect; it was not the Pashtuns, but Tajik and Uzbek forces which seized the day. This event was momentous as Pashtuns for the first time in 300 years had lost control of Kabul.

The bitterness in Pashtun groups resulted in an extended civil war which divided Afghanistan into warlord fiefdoms and turned the country's domestic situations into chaotic disarray.

Post-communist Afghanistan was controlled by President Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul, three provinces centring on Herat by Ismael Khan, northern Afghanistans six provinces by General Rashid Dostum, Bamiyan province by Hazaras, A small region to the south and east of Kabul was controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar. The most notorious of all provinces were Southern Afghanistan and Kandahar, divided up amongst dozens of petty ex-Mujaheddin warlords and bandits⁷⁰.

A reign of medieval terror was prevalent in Kandahar as atrocities against people ranging from murder, extortion, robbery and rape were carried on at will by commanders. Meanwhile the warlords seized homes and farms and added to the chaos.

Pakistan, Truck Cartel and Taliban

The environment for business and commerce was rapidly deteriorating in Kandahar and the losses were more pronounced for the truck cartel, a powerful group of

⁶⁹ See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.21

⁷⁰ Ibid

transporters based in Quetta and Kandahar. The transport mafia found it increasingly difficult to carry out regular operations as loose groups demanded toll at will. The mafia was also attempting to open up routes to smuggle goods between Quetta and Iran and Turkmenistan found it difficult to do business.

It was in this environment that Taliban was formed in 1994, initially as a group of young men, intending to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.

Their leader was Mullah Mohammed Omar and most of its members were students of madrassas, and they chose the name of the organization as Taliban meaning Islamic students. The name Taliban was an indication of the organizations character as it implied a non-political tone, which could be associated with all section of the people whose primary common bondage, apart from their tribal affinity was religion.

The disadvantage Taliban had in its later political role lies in the fact that most of the Taliban's early members were educated in Pakistani madrassas, which exposed them to Islam, but not to Afghan society, culture and politics⁷¹.

Public appeals to Taliban to involve resolving local disputes and in other issues began to rise as their involvement against atrocities began to yield results. The increasing support for Taliban was also due to the fact that they did not demand rewards or credit from those they helped and their only demand was to follow their path in restoring an Islamic system.

Taliban also started to send emissaries to commanders in other provinces to gauge their mood and support. The Kabul government was eager to support any Pashtun formation that mounted a resistance to Hikmethyar. Following a meeting between President Rabbani and Mulla Mohammed Rabbani, a founding member of the Taliban, Rabbani promised to help the Taliban with funds if they opposed Hikmethyar.

However, the defining point for the rise of Taliban came as Pakistan began to notice the group, after a briefing by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, in whose madrassas most of Taliban's key members grew up and studied.

⁷¹ See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam; Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.24

The basis for Pakistan to support Taliban, mainly in a political sense, comes from its teetered Afghan policy. After the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, there emerged new states from Soviet Central Asia and they offered lucrative trade possibilities through land routes. However, Pakistan faced a major hurdle in realizing this prospect as Afghanistan was already on a fresh round of civil war between the Mujahideen factions.

Pakistan was left with a difficult and time-consuming option of continued support to Hikmetyar to bring a pro-Pakistan Pashtun group to power or alter its policy course to a power-sharing agreement between all the Afghan factions to create a stable administration which would in turn open up road access to Central Asia.

The composition of Pakistan army was significantly of Pashtun origin and policy positions of ISI and military was bent on seeing a final Pashtun victory and this made Pakistan continue its support for Hikmetyar.

Despite Pakistan's support, Hikmetyar proved to be a failure and this event gave Pakistan a chance to scout for potential Pashtun proxies who could carry on the Pakistani agenda.

The overarching ambition of Pakistan of opening a trade route to Central Asia was vigorously moved by Benazir Bhutto and a proposal by transporting groups to clear up a route from Quetta to Kandahar, Herat and on to Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenistan.

To achieve this objective, Islamabad began a negotiation with Kandahar warlords and Ismael Khan in Herat to allow traffic through to Turkmenistan. On 28 October 1994, Benazir Bhutto met Ismael Khan and General Rashid Dostum in Ashkhabad and urged them to agree to open a southern route, where trucks would pay just a couple of tolls on the way and their security would be guaranteed.

In between Pakistani negotiations with Afghan warlords, an event took place which buttressed the trust of transporting cartel in favor of Taliban. A group of Taliban from Kandahar and Pakistani *madrassas* arrived at the small Afghan border post of Spin Baldak on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border just opposite Chaman.

The Taliban group attacked Hikmetyar's garrison successfully, shaking the warlords with their determined force. The control of Spin Baldak was critical for the transport cartel as it was the point from where they would transfer smuggled goods to Afghanistan.

The transport cartel then donated large amounts of money to Mullah Omar and offered a monthly stipend if his group could clear the roads free from bandits and other groups demanding toll at will.

Pakistan also helped Taliban by providing them with an arms dump outside Spin Baldak which contained artillery pieces, ammunitions and a large cache of automatic rifles.

The Taliban was successful in capturing Spin Baldak and instead of resisting the new threat, the warlords kept on their internecine rivalry, allowing Taliban to grow.

Taliban's rise as a potent political force was consolidated after they were able to successfully fend off an attempt by commanders in Kandahar to extort money in exchange of a seized Pakistan convoy composed of thirty trucks with a load of medicines to Ashkhabad. The commanders demanded money, a share of the goods and that Pakistan stop supporting the Taliban.

Pakistan asked the Taliban to free the convoy and they were able to release the convoy successfully after a raid on 3rd November 1994. On the same day Taliban moved to Kandahar, routed the commander's forces and got hold of a critical weaponry stockpile including tanks, armored cars, military vehicles, weapons and most importantly, six Mig-21 fighters and six transport helicopters from Kandahar airport.

With this event, Taliban began to be known as a force worth reckoning in the byzantine mosaic of fratricidal Afghan political landscape, offering a new set of political proxy for Pakistan in the years to come.

Taliban was remunerated significantly by the transport cartel as Taliban cleared the chains from the roads, set up a one-toll system for trucks entering Afghanistan at Spin Baldak and patrolled the highway from Pakistan⁷².

The ranks of Taliban were swelling as young afghan Pashtuns from Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province reached Kandahar to join the Taliban, followed by Pakistani volunteers from madrassas, who were inspired by the new Islamic movement in Afghanistan. Taliban within months from capturing Kandahar was able to assume control of 12 of Afghanistan's 31 provinces, opening the roads to traffic and disarming the population.

Taliban's march towards Kabul was gaining momentum and most warlords fled their fiefdoms or surrendered. After capturing Herat in 1995, Taliban intensified their drive towards Kabul and captured Kabul on 26th September 1996 and began their rule over most of Afghanistan from a multi-ethnic, semi-modern city and issued some of the most oppressive codes of Islamic law.

Taliban's governance practices

Within twenty four hours of assuming control of Kabul, the Taliban imposed one of the most fundamental modes of governance by implementing Sharia laws. The worst victims of Taliban rule were women, who were subjected to severe repression, both in the public and private sphere. They were not allowed to walk in the street without a close male relative and were prohibited from seeking employment and confined them to homes.

Men were not allowed to trim their hair and beard and dancing, music, kite flying and pigeon training were banned. These repressive measures though observed for fear of extreme punishment began to cultivate a strong undercurrent of resentment against Taliban as well.

⁷² See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.28

US Policy towards Taliban

United States was getting concerned about the complex interplay of external powers ranging from Iran to Saudi Arabia. The United States began to include afghan in their policy processes after a gap of four years since they disengaged from the covert offensive, following the collapse of Soviet Union.

As an indicator of response and interest in Afghan affairs, the United States sent its first American elected representative in six years to visit Kabul and other key areas. The visit of Senator Hank Brown, a member of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations for South Asia was followed by a visit of US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel visited Kabul, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif⁷³.

Robin Raphel later indicated that desire of the United States for a resolution to the crisis and creating political stability in Afghanistan, based on the economic potentials the nation has.

The response by United States was an open declaration of American commercial interest in Afghanistan as UNOCAL, an American oil corporation was proposing a pipeline to carry gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan. United States, as apart of pursuing this specific interest, wanted Pakistan to reconcile with Rabbani government and bring the Taliban and Kabul to negotiations.

Another important move by the United States on Afghanistan was to propose an international arms embargo on Afghanistan, during a United Nations Security Council debate on Afghanistan on 10 April 1996. This move was clearly designed to prompt regional countries engaged in Afghanistan to agree to non-interference there.

Washington's anti-Iran policy was visible in its response to Taliban as eth Clinton administration was sympathetic to the Taliban. The soft approach towards early-Taliban was also factoring in the unavailability of any power in Afghanistan, for the plans of installing any southern pipeline by avoiding Iran would not be possible without pitching in Afghanistan.

⁷³ See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.45

Washington initially suspected Taliban's fighting prowess when it compared significant advances made against the Taliban by Ahamed Shah Massoud's forces. Washington also attributed Taliban's weakness in its inexperience, lack of leadership and inept administrative capabilities.

The reluctance on the part of United States to extend a support to Taliban is also influenced by Pakistan's inability to forge an anti-Rabbani front. In a major setback to Pakistan's plans for forging an anti-Rabbani alliance, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar took up the post of Prime Minister offered by the regime, along with nine other cabinet posts.

The policy responses of United States towards Taliban should also be seen in the context of prospective hydrocarbon reserves in the newly independent Central Asian States. The pipeline chain stretching Central Asian states to Pakistan and beyond cannot be complete without factoring in Afghanistan.

Strobe Talbott, in July 1997, gave a speech that highlighted the future course of American policy in the region. Talbott pointed out that the driving dynamic of the region will be oil and there will be a competition by big powers for consolidation. He also cited that the new great game will not be of a zero-sum variety⁷⁴.

Along with Talbott's speech, the United States administration adopted a stand in favor of UNOCAL, an American oil company with interests in Afghanistan and Central Asian states.

Declared American support for UNOCAL made Russia and Iran suspicious about American interest in Afghanistan and they affirmed their belief that America was backing Taliban.

The response of American State Department about Kabul's capture by Taliban was a mistake giving rise to speculations about American interest in the region. The State Department announced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul and this announcement was quickly retracted.

⁷⁴ See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.164

State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found 'nothing objectionable' in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law. He described the Taliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western. Congressman Hank Brown, a supporter of UNOCAL, weighed in on the side of the Taliban and viewed it as capable of building a government in Afghanistan. These opinions were not made in consultation with the American Embassy in Islamabad⁷⁵.

Speculations about American interests were rife and a dominant view was that Taliban formed a part of American game plan for isolating Iran by creating a Sunni buffer on Iran's border and break the monopoly of Iran on Central Asia's southern trade routes.

However, American position on Taliban was that it would not engage with Taliban, until a recognized government is established.

The definite flashpoint in American policy towards the Taliban came when Osama Bin Laden harbored in Afghanistan began to set off deadly strikes against American assets.

While coming to a conclusion, one can see a lack of coherent and cogent strategic framework in policies towards Afghanistan. Between 1994 and 1996 the United States supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as Washington viewed Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western force and ignored the fundamentalist strains inherent within Taliban. This assumption may have arisen from experiences of Mujahideen groups with which America interacted were not as vehemently radical.

Between 1995 and 1997 United States support was visibly motivated due to its support of the Unocal project and this approach is reflective of the lighter assumptions Washington had over the nature of civil war in Afghanistan and its religious tenor, tribal assertions and external support, making it irreconcilable.

⁷⁵ See, Rashid Ahmed (2001) *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, London: Yale University Press, p.166

In 1997, as the tacit alliance between UNOCAL and Taliban, angered American feminists for the Taliban's blemished human rights and women's rights record, American policy on Taliban and Afghanistan turned another circle.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

While defining foreign policy, one cannot avoid factoring in the domestic angles, as foreign policy is basically an extension of actions aimed at consolidating domestic factors successfully. While analyzing American foreign policy on Afghanistan it can be seen that policies were resulting mostly from domestic situations. Despite the presence of strong external reasons the force of domestic situations cannot be ruled out while analyzing American foreign policy in Afghanistan.

This peculiarity of American foreign policy rises from its self-assumed responsibilities as a world power. This assumption of world power began to emerge after the dissolution of British Empire and the natural western contender for the position was United States. The United States foreign policy then began to emerge in a superpower tone more clearly with the rise of Soviet Union as a dominant contender for global dominance with a different ideology, which was percolative.

The cold war intensified the conflict between the two and there merged a bipolar world order which divide most nations into either western of Communist camp.

In this scenario both the super powers began to intensify their drive for superiority by pushing their ideals politically by supporting, dismantling and forming alliance where the other holds sway.

This situation led to complex political mistrust and the line between an enemy and ally became narrow. With new formations taking place everyday and both jostling for extending their power, the global world order became a chaotic mess.

The soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the last attempt by a superpower to assert control over its strategic domain and the American response was the last attempt at executing cold war era covert operations.

However, the involvement of Soviet Union in Afghanistan gave the United States an opportunity to push the mighty empire into a slow and agonizing conflict which was fought in an asymmetric manner.

The American decision to lend its support top Mujahideen fighters proved to be fruitful in localizing the resistance and lending a regional flavour to the whole conflict. Yet, the fact remains that United States failed to learn and understand the Mujahideen war and apply the lessons on Taliban, which is causing it heavy damages on personnel and resources front.

Yet, supporting the Mujahideen whose ideal purpose of fighting should not have been seen as a contestation between scientific socialism and primordial logics, which the Americans did, but it was for the majority of fighters a contestation between atheistic system and monotheist religious school of thought represented by Islam.

A reason for the failure to understand the Mujahideen war arose mainly from the lack of direct involvement by the United States as it was Pakistan which had a tight control on Mujahideen forces. The folly of United States lies in its loss of interest after the fall of Soviet Union.

This lack of interest in Afghanistan gave the Mujahideen and others fringe groups a free run in the country which ultimately gave rise to Taliban, America's bete noire.

The lack of interest shown by the United States in consolidating a viable political system resulted in a gradual downfall of Afghanistan to anarchy and above all, to extremist fundamental politics. If the United States had shown a little interest in restructuring Afghanistan, it would have been able to compensate the loss of Iran and made a manageable ally than Pakistan which keeps it on tenterhooks by reaping a windfall of its alliance status.

With Afghanistan becoming a continuing battleground and the recent discovery of mineral reserves, the possibility of another great game involving the powerful nations cannot be ruled out. It could also mean a wrangling for power among different groups to dominate the political scene in Afghanistan, plunging it into deeper chaos. However whichever world power claims the ultimate victory should not leave it in the middle as such a scenario could prove to be detrimental to the security framework o the whole Asian theatre.

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
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ANNEXURE -I

SOVIET INVASION ROUTES AND TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY SOVIET FORCES DURING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN



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ANNEXURE-II

DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR INSURGENT GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

January 17, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 75

Declassify/Released 7/16/94
under provision: E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council
894-1102

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.
3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors. (S)

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ANNEXURE-III

NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE -75, CITING AMERICAN POLICY
AGAINST SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM

Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
- To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
- To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (S)

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. (S)

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).
- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as "peace." (S)

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

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and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

(a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

(b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)

(c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

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(d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. (S)

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. (S)

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. (S)

C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. (S)

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

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The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.

- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

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- Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.
- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
- Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.
- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. (S)

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. (S)

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It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Robert Reagan

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