ETHNO-NATIONALISM IN POLITICAL THEORY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"Ethnonationalism in Political Theory"**, submitted by me in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

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DEDICATED TO MY PARENTS...

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE FRAMEWORK

1.1: The problem in Perspective

A closely bound yet distinctive discourse of identity represented by nationalism and ethnicity began to lose its relevance with the onslaught of Globalisation and Liberalisation. It became a concept where nobody wants to talk about it anymore. This loss in the multi-cultural debates of our times, made it easy to forget that ethnic and national identities struggled to find common ground in our history. However the recent development in Malaysia, India and the Middle East, the Balkans, etc. brings to the fore the revival of strong nationalist components in the present social system. The recent declaration of independence by Kosovo; deep discontent and open unrest among the Malaysian ethnic communities, identity and separatism movement promoting an exclusive ideology with language, religion, caste, ethnicity, race, etc. provided space to reorient our understanding of the concept of nations and nationalism vis-a-vis with the concept of ethnicity. While the interest is largely implicated around the question about the two contradictory theories of nationalism-promordialist and the modernist- and to analyse where it failed and what should be the correct approach to understand of the two variegated concepts- nation and ethnie.

In the contemporary world, the term nationalism and ethnicity are used to defend and justify a variety of ideas and causes, which range from a political leader or the elite group competing for their own interest to favouring the separation or

1

formation of a nation-state, uniform civil code and minority rights, a mobilisation towards unity and oneness, etc. However, confusion arises when we reconsider the two concepts as separate entities; we see that there is little agreement as to what begets - nation and ethnie. There are as many interpretations of nation and nationalism as there are different schools of intellectual orientation; Primordialist argues that nations were there all the time and that the past matter a great extent. The modernist on the other hand, believes that the modern western nations are constructed retrospectively out of the conditions of statehood rather than ancient ethnic groups taking national form. The instrumentalist however, argues that nation is when the intellectuals begin to conceive it and mobilise them as group. Thus, the instrumentalist believes that elites, who thus, define ethnic groups and group interests, may be using ethnicity instrumentally in pursuit of their own personal interests. This perspective also compels attention to the fact that these elites may appeal to other, non-ethnic issues, for the same instrumental reasons; and they will, if convenient, redefine those issues in ethnic terms. It should be noted that, different interpretations imply different things in many ways. For instance, the intellectuals for a variety of reasons, around a host of issues, seek to advance their interest, mobilise groups to indicate a healthy, vibrant democracy facilitating political activism around new concerns. However, the political activities of these groups in particular represent the failure of forces long expected to work to promote assimilations. The mobilisation of such particular territorial sub-cultures represents a trend which contradicts centuries of national identities formation, which strikes the very heart of the existing nation-state. To such groups, any denial in their significance, or even existence, of cultural pluralism as states sought to consolidate their territory and population, group identity becomes important. Moreover, while tracing their ancestry, shared commonness together with deprivation forms a group.

Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the political activity of ethnic groups demanding special institutional provisions to preserve their distinct identity. This mobilization represents the relative failure of centuries of assimilationist policies among some of the oldest nation-states and an unexpected outcome for scholars of modernization and nation-building. In its wake, the phenomenon generated a significant scholarship attempting to account for this activity, much of which focused on differences in economic growth as the root cause of ethnic activism.

2

Thus ethnic mobilisation may signify more than simply democratic activism spreading to a new issue era.

However, in one of its modern expressions, nation or nationalism is the self-identification of a community of people who see themselves as having an observable sovereignty, and culturally, linguistically or historically homogeneous group. What this means is that there is a relative congruence of a political unit and a high-culture where a kind of homogeneity is necessary for a cohesive nation-state.[1] The nation-state is a power body in which community and polity come together. Likewise those groups whose exercise of nationalism clothed with the ethnic element are considered to be nations that have had to come to terms with the political developments of alternative civilizations elsewhere[2]. Feeling the dominance and perceived superiority of other nation-states, these groups may increasingly feel the need to become apart of this civilization in order to survive, progress, modernize and to be successful.

As the result of the practice of universal citizenship the process of nation-building inevitably favours the majority culture. This is why minority communities and their cultures find themselves at a distinct disadvantage in matters of cultural viability. In the absence of institutions or other tools that may unite these people(such as class), the groups turn to themselves identifying their own unique characteristics that set them apart from the 'other' in order to assert their sovereignty. The insecurity of the state, and its strategies for domination, thus have deeply affected its legitimacy in the eyes of those who are at the receiving end of it, and exert deep influence in the shaping of inter-group relations. As mentioned, this acts as social glue in uniting a group of people via the vehicle of culture and also providing a method by which to distinguish one culture from the next. Ethnic differentiation becomes very particular when a cultural distinction is attempted between two very similar neighbours, for example the Serbs and Croats, the Russians and Byelorussians.[3] This drive towards differentiation becomes paramount as a consequence of cultural preservation and assertion. In its politicised form, the drive towards cultural preservation and ethnic

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[1]Ernest Gellner, "The coming of nationalism and its interpretation: The Myth of Nation and Class" in Gopal Balakrishnan, (ed), *Mapping the Nation*, London: New Left Review, 1996, pp.78-97

[2]Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995

[3]For details see Santosh C. Saha, *The politics of Ethnicity and National Identity*, New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. 2007 and also Jeff Pratt, *Class, Nations and Identity*, London: Pluto Press, 2003.

differentiation becomes a pursuit for the establishment of nationhood and manifests itself into nationalism. In order for an *ethnie* to survive in this modern world it must politicise, whether it is pursuing the establishment of its own nation or not, or whether it is seeking independent statehood.

The need for differentiation is more a case of a cultural assertion that arises out of the desire to preserve the current state of a community as it transforms into a society. When faced with change, particularly such as that heralded by the age of modernity, the immediate reaction is to preserve what remains, but this change can arrive in many other ways also such as invasion or war. This means cultural preservation, and as culture becomes deferential to other factors of modernity, and the weaker, smaller or just unfortunate cultures assimilate into the more dominant ones, cultural preservation and differentiation becomes more pressing.

The internal need to preserve one's culture grows into a state where cultural differentiation is demonstrated in a variety of ways, no longer just culturally (and therefore ethnically as it is ethnicity that often describes the culture). To enclose this new political community, and separate it from any cultures that threaten to dilute it, a nation is sought to act as protector of a fragile cultural element, whether this element be religious, dialectical or otherwise. For example, Irish nationalism, categorised both as a rural and as a religious nationalism used religion in order to protect and preserve its culture from the threatening authority of Britain[4]. Differentiation is needed politically and economically also to ensure total preservation from the threat of external cultures. Nationhood is an assertion of independence and equality amongst other cultures already recognised in this modern form. Herein, it is imperative to question the need for differentiation. But why there is a need for differentiation? And is it internally or externally determined?

If cultural differentiation is internally determined then so too is nationalism, determined by either the mandate of the elite or by the will of the mass. However this assumes that nationalism is *only* a case of cultural assertion, but there are political, economic and social pressures to be considered also. This sets nationalism as just a

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[4]Marc Howard Ross, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; pp.88-126.

4

consequence of subjective changes with no consideration of the objective features. To the ethnicists, it is a case of internal self-determination, where differences are located according to those chosen by the elites or the mass of that culture.[5] Often when something is internally determined and consciously elected, the most obvious and malleable tools are used, which is ethnicity.

However, when ethnic identities are asserted, we often tend to dismiss them as 'primordial'. Ethnic demands and the politics of ethnic identity are thought of as expressions of people's primordial instinct for association with a group which is unchanging and static, an almost immature way of thinking about belongingness that follows from the inability to forge new and more satisfying identities. Modernists view primordial identities as essentially disruptive, unlike modern identities which include nation, because ethnicity supposedly uses elements or attributes, essentially constructed, as unchanging features that define the group which is patently false. However, this notion of the primordiality of ethnicity and the modernity of nation needs qualification, as the positive forces that were once claimed for nationalism have now been intensely disputed, amidst the outburst of movements based on group solidarity and identity all over the world.

Though socially constructed, ethnic identities, or for that matter all identities, cannot be separated from the context in which they are constructed, consolidated and asserted, and are not fundamentally different from other forms of identities. Social constructionism should be seen as a function that is determined by the context in which it is undertaken involving many factors, and not merely the claims of the subject group. As Steve Fenton puts it, "ethnicity refers to the *social construction* of descent and culture, the social mobilization of descent and culture, and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them. People or peoples do not just possess cultures or share ancestry; *they elaborate these into the idea of a community founded upon these attributes.*"[6] (Emphasis in original). If social construction of identity takes place within a specific context, then it should also be clear that the elaboration of the idea of community is intended to demarcate itself

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[5] This has been considered as the most acceptable theory in the present social sciences.
[6] Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. p. 3

from another so that relations between them can be defined to achieve or maintain domination, or to break that domination so as to address mutual concerns.

In view of the preceding discussion, it is important then, to ask why is it that ethnicity is treated as like an illegitimate concept in our social and political discourse? Why is the state, itself an amalgamation of several ethnic groups, and our social and political discourse, so suspicious of a concept like ethnicity? Apart from this contestation over what constitute its correct conception, it involves a question as to whether this divisive mobilisation can be resolved at all. What support to such mobilisation and how can it be compared across time, countries and groups? While the ethnic groups increasingly reject their assimilation into larger national identities, they occasionally even turn to internal conflict and war to advance their cause. This is so because, having a vibrant discourse on minority rights, they found themselves a sense of insecurity felt by groups in relation to some other group, and the perceived threat, real or imagined, that keeps the movement going. The insecurity that groups face in relation to each other is not of a local nature. It is also determined by the structural political framework and institutions which place the constituent states highly dependent on the central authority of state power, and policies which have effectively ignored the regional needs and aspiration by subordinating them to a 'pan' national agenda.

This insecurity on the part of the state has consequent effects on the kind of policies that are framed for states in the region. It has reinforced a complex structure of domination with repressive laws and military subjugation, maintained through the effective use of political offensives as may be seen in the use of the government offices or through mechanisms of party control. A part-response to the central question I posed above is my hypothesis for this proposed study wherein, nations and ethnie are two distinct concepts but is all related, to be call as ethnonationalism, a term coined by Walker Connor; and that the state's insecurity feeds into the policy of domination which percolates down to the different layers of group relations, and result in, what I would call, a 'hierarchy of domination'. A multicultural framework for resolving the nationality question must seek to address the inter-link of domination and insecurity. By hierarchy of domination, I mean a structure of relationship between the state and its subunits at the primary level, and among various groups at different

6

levels, characterized by formal and informal layers of domination and repression corresponding to their proximity to resources of power—whether governmental (the state) or some other entity (major militant organizations). So, the task here is cut out to highlight the inter-link of domination and insecurity in problem cases so that a sound understanding of it can guide us towards working out the required structural-institutional framework and policies to deal with the problems.

The 'hierarchy of domination', I propose, is both an outcome of and a feeder to the sense of insecurity that flows from the top. At every level of hierarchy, there is to be found an adversarial relation which puts the weaker side in a profound sense of insecurity and thus forces it to dominate a weaker group or party at another level, continuing down to the bottom of organized social and political life. I believe there is a pattern to be found which points towards an inter-linking chain of insecurity and domination in terms of which the many group conflicts and the persistence of war and atrocities can be better explained. A hierarchy may not necessarily be so obvious but subtle.

Too often, problems of militancy and group conflict are attributed simplistically to some innate crisis of identity or multiplication of identities[7] or to underdevelopment[8]. It has to be noted that since an identity such as ethnicity is a given, the mobilization of such identities toward a certain goal always needs a trigger mechanism. In fact, identity fragmentation or its consolidation is a function of the phenomena of insecurity and domination. Likewise, underdevelopment may also be due to the fact that the state has always viewed some areas or regions as no more than a susceptible frontier in terms of national security, and partly due to the fact that the states have no effective political voice to command a good bargain in the larger political arena of the state.

So, in tracing the genesis of identity movements and group conflict, the task of the researcher should be to seek causal mechanism, interconnecting links of different factors and a pattern. It is my contention that certain crucial factors which account for

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[7]H. Srikanth, 'Militancy and Identity Politics in Assam' in *EPW-Nov. 18, 2000*
[8]Madhab, Jayanta, 'North-East: Crisis of identity, Security and Development' in *EPW*-Feb. 6, 1999

the state of affairs in the neglected areas or regions can be attributed to the role and attitudes of state actors. By virtue of controlling the command authority structure, its policies and institutions can have profound consequences for society. Even more importantly, it is also the absence of, or the failure to carry out, its policies that can have devastating effects. Such effects are quite visible in the form of a pervasive phenomenon of insecurity. In this line of analysis, actual practices of identity mobilization and militancy are not in themselves self-actuating, but are related to the response and attitudes of state actors. In fact, the state's insecurity with identity movements, its hostility to identity consolidation and the ad hoc nature of its engagement with these movements have been responsible for the fragmentation of identities and identity-based movements.

The state's role in the fragmentation of identities may be seen in the selective use, co-option or patronage by the state of certain groups/sections in the form of a server-client relationship, to maintain its control without corresponding responsibility for creating material and economic opportunities for the bulk of the population. In a society marked by ethnic loyalties and identity considerations, the state's use of particular groups is not random, thereby creating a near-permanent chasm between different groups. Groups which are dominated organize themselves with the aim of redressing the imbalance and protecting their own interests, wherein the reference for mobilization is most often framed in relation to the 'other', meaning the immediate dominant group.

So, even in group conflict, the state is, in significant ways, not a neutral arbitrator. For the state, it is more convenient, especially when divested of democratic responsibility, to deal with the larger society through the mediations of certain sections or groups who are most favourably tuned into the preconceived agenda of the state. Once the agenda of the state are delinked from the interests and aspirations of the people, there is a heightened sense of insecurity among the various groups which result in the formation of militant outfits. These outfits not only put pressure on

governmental mechanisms to fulfil their aspirations but come to serve crucial needs, especially security needs, of the groups they claim to represent.[9]

In such a situation, social cohesion, peace and group harmony is not possible. For the state, it is a situation wherein the principle of diminishing return has already taken hold. The more it tries to get involve, the more it is distrusted, since it cannot conceive of any profound change other than the beaten path. Worse still, the more it tries to disentangle from the mess and arrogate powers to frame policies, the more it loses control over the situation. Perhaps it may be apt to recall what Atul Kohli described as the parallel growth of centralization and powerlessness in a democracy. Of late, the state seems to have realized this, but a radical change is not on the horizon.

In brief, the topic for the proposed research has been chosen keeping in mind that there are some significant insights to be had by looking at the various layers of insecurity and structures of domination. I propose that the way to proceed should be a tentative hypothesis which outlines a theoretical structure incorporating insecurity and domination as two axes. Underdevelopment, group conflict and multiplication of identities then naturally fit into the broader picture. It may be summed up in an integrated statement thus: In a heterogeneous society, a relationship (state and society) founded on insecurity has the effect of a spiraling down of insecurity which creates layers of domination among various groups. I have tried to capture this in the use of a twin theoretical axis: the hierarchy of domination and the trickle down effect of insecurity.

For nationalism to be successful it must involve an interplay of the principles of both civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, rather than these components acting as mutually exclusive concepts. The nature of this interplay will be examined throughout the thesis and the collaboration will be explored via the two competing perspectives: that held by the modernists and that proposed by the ethnicists, both operating within the framework of modernity. The key distinction between the two is

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[9]Sanjib Baruah, 'Gulliver's Troubles: State and Militants in North-East India' in *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW)-Oct. 12, 2002

their focus and the point at which they identify a group imagining themselves as a community and society. Their respective cases will be critically examined with respect to those elements that determine where an interplay occurs.

Recent scholarships on multiculturalism have produced a bulk of evidence to support the view that the project of creating a common national culture is not a neutral project, but one of majority nation-building. The multicultural response to this process of nation-building is to call for certain group-specific rights for those who are subjects of systemic disadvantages due to their being a minority. As Kymlicka would say, there seems to have emerged a consensus which not only upholds the familiar set of common civil and political rights of citizenship, but also group-specific rights and/or policies which are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethno-cultural groups.[10] The justification for such 'multicultural citizenship' rights follows from the most important value that multiculturalism is concerned with—that of the equality of groups.[11]

1.2: Framework, Scope and Objectives:

Before proceeding with the main part of the study, a delineation of the conceptual framework, scope and objective of the study is due. This work is primarily one on political theory, and as such, it is mainly concerned with normative and conceptual issues. Significantly, the study also incorporates some useful historical perspective into understanding how concepts and norms should be understood, especially in analyzing the context in which a norm or ideal acquires definitive meanings. So, the approach is varied, primarily normative but also historical in some contexts. As with any work on normative theory, it is based on a critical conceptual analysis of normative theories, by assessing standard texts and their interpretations. Though the work is based on a critical assessment of the modernist and the

[10]Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p-42
[11]Gurpreet Mahajan, *The Multicultural Path: Issues of Diversity and Discrimination in Democracy*, New Delhi: Sage, 2002, p-15

primordialist, it is nonetheless situated within their debates on the whole. One distinction makes a crucial difference, i.e. between civic and ethnic nationalism. The significance of research on the proposed topic also lie in the assumption that the tentative theoretical perspective for empirical analysis of the phenomena of insecurity, inter-group relation of domination and subordination, and group conflict has significant bearing on the sustainability and growth of nationalism and subnational movements in the contemporary world.

Secondly, most of the explanations of ethnic problems and identity movements tend to look at these movements on a horizontal basis, i.e. different parallel movements competing to fulfill their aspirations. They do not adequately bring out the nature of hierarchical group relations layered through levels which I'm proposing. I think there already exist enough literature to suggest my contention, but hardly a well-integrated theory which brings out this characteristic of group relations clearly. We have studies which talk about discrete phenomena, even inter-connecting, but not vividly as conveyed by the twin axes of insecurity and domination, and their interplay which shapes crucially the configuration of group relations. The immediate factors responsible for arousing feeling of insecurity may be varied, but invariably they are always triggered by something in relation to an 'other'.

As regards the scope of this study, it might have been clear from the preceding section. The topic suggests two important components of this study—modernist and primordialist debate on nationalism and how various theories understand nationalism. Thus, the scope extends to a coherent analysis of the assumptions of various theories, such as the liberal and the Marxist theories of class conflict, ethnic mobilization, its conceptions of nationalism, autonomy accompanying with the principles of justice. Secondly, it analyses the rise of ethnic mobilization, a seemingly recent phenomenon with deep historical roots. Central to this analysis will be the clash of identities, where ethnic groups seek to (re)assert themselves in a context of developing national identity and state-nation building. Ethnic mobilization presses demands for recognition of the distinct identity of ethnicities and for institutional accommodation based on that distinctiveness; as such, these movements challenge both the national identity and the institutional character of the state, rendering them as very real challengers to the nation-state. The various institutionalized political and cultural mechanisms, and

11

socio-economic factors that accentuate the domination of one group by another is the key theme of the study. I propose to approach the nationality question from a more nuanced analysis of the ground reality pertaining to the present context. This does not, in anyway, undermine the importance of historicity of events and phenomena. But I hope an intelligible approach would be to address the problems in the changing contexts.

To take into account a variety of potential factors that plays a role in the political mobilization of ethnic identity with an eye towards building a new model of ethnic mobilization. This study will proceed through various levels of analysis corresponding to the generalized patterns outlined above: regional, state, and group-level of identity formations and its major interpretations and its criticisms in the contemporary world. In understanding the two components of the study, there is a third aspect to which it extends. That is, in contextualizing the assumptions held in both, certain historical perspectives have been deemed necessary.

Chapter II looks into the definition of the two categories (.i.e. nations and ethnic) and the discourse of how the two categories are used in the social sciences. Though the two categories are treated as a separate concept, both find it allegiance to the meaning from the other. A clearly defined concept, thus, needs to be categorised so as to better understand the two concepts. Many modern nations owe its origin to ethnic roots, thus, making the two categories inseparable in an analysis which attempts to explain nationalism based on ethnic identity.

The later section revisits the debate on nation and ethnicity. All modernist theories of nationalism have accepted the imaginedness of nation. But being imagined is no less real, scholars of the primordialist school argued. The imagined element extends from its supposed primordial existence to the contemporary process of nation-building.

Chapter III is concerned with the notion of domination and insecurity as the root of ethnic mobilization, as have been used by some scholars and writers in some not fully developed arguments. The theoretical perspective that underlies the study will be dealt with the 'contestedness of nations' and the relevant theories on

nationalism; how a post-colonial state's insecurity set the discourse of nation-building; the changed context and the setting of a multicultural discourse. In this chapter, more emphasis will be placed to two theories - the Liberal and the Marxist-of how they considered the growth of group identities, of mobilisations, and their possible solutions towards a divisive identity groups. For liberals and Marxists alike, traditional theories on domination and oppression have been couched in class terms. Liberals believed that class domination and oppression could be prevented or corrected with the politics of redistribution. Marxists went further in saying that the whole economic structure should be overhauled to bring capitalist domination and exploitation to an end. The various aspects of domination and the insecurity that it fuels are enmeshed within the complex web of relationships between groups within the society. It is precisely because some of these groups were not the victims of oppression that goes far back into history but of an on-going process of marginalization as a result of a present institutional context. Therefore, there is a need to see the neglect of their particular needs and requirements as the failure of the distributive paradigm of justice to take into account various factors other than economic. Redistributive policies are, at best, conceived as temporary measures which fall short of the kinds of rights that certain marginalized groups require. In fact, in most cases of minority nationalism, what is sought is some kind of closely-guarded protection beyond the reach of majority decision in the state. They tend to focus thinking about justice on the allocation of material goods which tends to ignore the social structure and institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns. Therefore, in this chapter, I intend to develop it into a more precise model of explanation.

Chapter IV discusses the understanding of nations and nationalism in the Third World. It is true that almost all the countries of the third World are once under the dominations of other foreign rule. Therefore, the key to this chapter will be exploring why traditional 'Nation-Building' theory fails to explain the emergence of national movement mobilisation in the Third World countries. Central to this will be the analysis of the cyclical nature of national mobilisation and how the great wave of nation building that occurred had marginalised national communities. Also I will explore the attractiveness of nationalism as a doctrine of social agency for protest communities seeking longevity within the established political order. The populist,

democratic and mobilisational nature of nationalism will be explored within the context of peripheral counter mobilisation to the centre's expansion. Furthermore, nationalism's reciprocal dynamic nature and its ability to restructure the political environment according to the strategic needs of the periphery will be examined in detail. Nationalism has come to be seen as the panacea for all marginalised disenfranchised political peripheries. The nature of the state's own ideology will be shown as the catalyst for such mobilisation. Thus, the ideological, social and cultural role of nationalism as a doctrine of socio-political liberation will be explored, with the aim of placing the state as the reasoning behind such peripheral mobilisation. Moreover, one of the most potent influences on thinking about community identity finds its source from colonial historiography and anthropology, and these we shall discuss in this chapter with regard to the understanding of nations and nationalism in the Third World countries.

Chapter V is the conclusion. It wraps up the arguments laid out in the main chapters in a unified perspective. I need not say more here.

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1: Defining the concepts: Nation and Ethnic

A dramatic growth of nationalism in the 19th century has signalled a breakdown of the old conflation of an empire into smaller units, redrawing the boundaries, challenging the existing authorities, imagining its own political unit - trying to create a homogeneous state - thereby building and directing their new powers to construct a state of matching grandeur. Under a diverse society with varying background, languages, interest and experiences, constant reliance on power or force to achieve a centralised popular support became unworkable and inefficient, unlike that of the ancient empires or that of the kingdom which commanded obedience in spite of their differences. Consciousness of identity become popular, and that consolidating centralised rule often provoked local resistance, creating a potentially mutual reinforcing process of state building. The new emergence of the local elites create an interlocutors between the individuals and the masses, forming their own groups and slowly began to give popular loyalty and obedience coinciding with the boundaries of political power, either institutionalised as state or asserted against those controlling states. This collective sentiment or identity, binding together with some commonalities among the groups which coheres a population within a territory and which demarcates those who belong and other as not, give rise to what is called nationalism.

However, the question of "What is a nation" posed over a century by Renan[1] still awaits a satisfactory answer. One of the most difficult issues to address in the studies of the term nation is in determining what elements differentiate nation from an ethnic group and also from other social groups. Nation and ethnic are intricately linked in many ways and that nation and national identities have been subject to huge pressures and have undergone considerable transformations. In the twentieth century, however, the most significant political expressions of ethnicity occurred where it become the building block of nations seeking either self-determination or to preserve their ethnic purity. And for that matter, to fully understand what nationalism is all about, one must have some idea about 'what a nation is' and 'what it is to belong to a nation' that claims differences from an ethnic group.

Many scholars or thinkers who study nations and nationalism try to make out the differences between nation and ethnic, and so is, to that of race and tribe. No doubt they bear similar meaning of understanding when we look recklessly. This does not to mean to say that they all are the same thing. Though they have shared some commonness, they do not in some connotation, and so they are not the same. To mark out their differences, let us first reconsider their meanings and definitions of the three concepts (nation, ethnic and race) given by the scholars and thinkers. The word 'nation' has its origins from the Latin word *'Nasci'* which means 'to be born' or 'be born'. The Oxford Dictionary thus defined nation as, an extensively large group of people united by common descent, history, culture or language inhabiting a particular state or territory. It also has the original meaning of a 'breed' or 'stock' of people who share a common descent or were regarded as so doing. Thus, the idea of common descent and the idea of people of a territory are both present in this context. This idea of 'nation' is defined by Anthony D. Smith as a, *named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.*[2] And that nationalism is equated with 'national sentiment', a feeling of belonging to, and identification with, the nation.[3] He places emphasized to the past histories of culture,

[1]See in Eric J. Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme,Myth, Reality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 2
[2]Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity,* London: Penguin Books, 1991, p.14.
[3]Anthony D. Smith, "Nationalism and the Historians" in Gopal Balakrishnan (eds). *Mapping the Nation,* London: New Left Review, 1996, p.176.

language, rituals, emblems and dress, and more fundamentally, shared memories, myths, values and traditions, and the institutionalised practices that derived from them. However, modernists like Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawn, etc. criticised Smith by saying that nation is the product of modernity, denying the continuity of the past. In the words of Ernest Gellner, Nationalism is 'primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.'[4] And if this principle is violated, then nationalist sentiment can be aroused. Therefore, nationalism he means holds that nations and states were destined for each other; that without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy.[5] In fact, historical evidence suggests that the states have emerged without nations, and some nations have emerged without the blessing of their own state. Crawford Young, on the other hand, define nationalism as an ideology claiming that a given human population has a natural solidarity based on shared history and a common destiny. This collective identity as a historically, constituted "peoples" crucially entails the right to constitute an independent or autonomous political community. The idea of nationalism takes form historically in tandem with the doctrine of popular sovereignty: that the ultimate source of authority lies in the people, not the ruler or government.[6]

On the other hand, the word 'ethnic' is derived from the Greek *'ethnikos'* (an adjective) meaning 'heathen' from *'ethnos'* (a noun) which means people, nation, and foreign people. This is also refers to, sometime as people of non-Jew, Gentiles, class of men, etc. However, this adjective word ethnikos, 'heathen' has broadened its meaning as ethnic in the 19th century where, in the noun sense, meaning as 'a member of a particular ethnic group' came into existence. Ethnic (an adjective), therefore is pertaining to a group of people having a common national or cultural tradition; referring to origin by birth rather than by a constructed identities; pertaining to a non-western cultural tradition. Thus, we see the Latin word *natio* is quite close in meaning to the Greek word *ethnos*. For Anthony D. Smith, *ethnie* is defined as, a named unit of population with common ancestry myths and shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, a link with a historic territory, and some measures of solidarity, at least

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[4]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1983, p.1
[5]Ibid, p.6.
[6]M. Crawford Young, *Revisiting nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa*. Retrieved: 12 March 2008. www.repositories.cdib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article.

among the elites.[7]   However, this definition of Smith could not bring a clear distinction between the concepts of ethnic community (ethnie) and nation. His definition of nation and ethnie is criticised by the modernist, saying that the world was created at about the end of the 18th century, and that nothing which happened before makes the slightest difference to the issues we face. What the Modernists argue in relations to culture and tradition is that, there is a cultural break between premodern and modern times and that there is an elevation of the members of a community to being both social and political participants; nations are viewed as political units that are products of industrialisation and capitalism; and thus nation are socially constructed. As Gellner tells us, "[n]ationalism is neither universal and necessary nor contingent and accidental, the fruit of idle pens and gullible readers. It *is* the necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions". However, there are some scholars who believe that they (ethnie and nation) are constructed but nevertheless real. Thus, according to Steve Fenton, ethnicity refers to the *social construction* of descent and culture, the social mobilisation of descent and culture, and the meanings and implications of classification systems built around them. People do not just posses culture or shared ancestry; *they elaborate these into the idea of a community founded upon these attributes.*[8]

Finally, we come to the word of 'race' which is derived from the Old French and Old Italian word '*rasse*' or '*razza*' meaning 'lineage' or 'breeding' which later came to term as a group of people of common ancestry with distinguishing physical features such as skin or build, a genetically transmitted physical characteristics; pertaining to a group of people united or classified together on the basis of history, nationality, or geographical distribution. The 1986 Oxford Reference Dictionary states that the notion of 'race as a rigid classificatory system or system of genetics has largely been abandoned'. To the fact that, in a modern society the usage of the term race has shown its decline for it no longer characterise by just physical appearance but also defined by a shared commonness among their groups, which is referred to as an ethnic.

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[7]Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p.57.
[8]Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p.3.

However, so far we have only discussed the shared meaning rather than any clear distinct markers between the three (ethnic-nation-race). Though the three shared in its meaning, there is some divergence where they do not much considered the other. In the case of race, in spite of shared meaning in descent and culture communities, the point of divergence is the idea that 'local' groups are instances of abstractly conceived divisions of mankind and that race makes explicit reference to physical or visible difference as the primary marker of difference and inequality. Thus, the 'word' race is inappropriate when it is applied to national, religious, geographical, linguistic or ethnic groups, nor can the physical appearances associated with race be equated with mental characteristics because to classify humans on the basis of physical traits is difficult, for the existence of race through conquests, invasions, migration, and mass deportation has produced a heterogeneous world population.

The co-existence of descent and culture communities with that of territory is distinct to a nation. A nation is, only when it lays claim to some definite territories or boundaries in addition to its commonness so as to identify themselves from the others. In other words, protracted ethnic conflicts followed with the demand of their own political unit which in the issue forth in to seeking to fulfil the condition of a nation. This shows that a nation is nothing but a nation-state, which lays claim to a state just as the state seeks to render its citizens as a nation.[9] Ethnic group on the other hand is referred to descent and culture communities with the believe that the group is a kind of sub-set within a nation-state which made a reference of difference in typical culture rather than physical appearance, where non-ethnic group referred to them as 'other'. Territory or boundaries are not a necessary condition to be called an ethnic. However, even in regards to ethnic group to be known to others, to show its existence as an ethnic group or to become effective, they need to be politicised, i.e. marked with a boundary. In a majority dominated society or in multi-cultural society ethnic minorities make a reference point for action, and in particular for political action in order to make known to others that they exist which in a prolonged struggle to get recognition, is in no way different to what is call a nation in the modern concept. Such mobilisations of ethnicity leads to nationalism, which later claim to have emerged out of a protracted ethnic conflict, which is quite frequent in a modern multicultural society.

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[9]Ibid, p.13

These show how ethnicity demoted in the dimensions of descent and culture act as strong agents to mobilized and sustain public definition of a group and boundaries between them. Also determining how ethnic groups are crucial in forming societies and social actions sometimes misled into action, conflict and social relations which create a division in the existing soothing society. Therefore, an ethnic group which remained detached over a long period of time emerged as a result of such mobilisation. Group of such mobilisation often combine with political aspirations to be more functional in a society. When these political aspirations include independence, for some scholars ethnic groups become nations, but groups with political aspirations short of independence are seemingly not classified as nation. Ethnicity of such groups which await political mobilization are described by Anthony Smith as 'latent nationalism'[10]

From these brief definitions, it is clear that the triad concepts of ethnic, nation and race share a core meaning like common descent, common history, myth of the past, belief about their people, etc. with some notable and important differences at the periphery. For this reason many scholars and writers very often interchange the terms to denote the other. It is because of this complication in the concepts of nation and nationalism; we need to qualify who preceded – nation or ethnic. Such is the shared meaning where Steve Fenton and Stephen May observed that all the three terms are popular, and sometimes in academic discourse, understand as 'descent and culture communities'. He means groups and population which are, at least in part, distinctive because they see themselves, or are seen by others as sharing ancestry and cultural heritage in ways that distinguish them from other groups. The emphasis on "seeing themselves" or "being seen by others" is not because the claim or portrayal is always misleading. People actually can do share ancestry, belief and custom, and they claim to ethnic identity may broadly reflect this[11].

Hence, in the course of the classification between nation and ethnic along the dimension of territory as a factor in determining group, it appears that groups characterized by cultural, religious, linguistics, historical or other criteria yet lacking claims of territory would be called as an ethnic groups, yet nations seemingly require

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[10]Anthony D. Smith. *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.24.
[11]Steve Fenton and Stephen May, "Ethnicity, Nation and Race: Connections and Disjuncture", in Steve Fenton and May (eds), *Ethnonational identities*. New York: Palgrane Macmillan, 2002. P-2

claims of territory as part of their effort to form a state. According to T.K.Oommen, the critical dimension is that a nation combines culture with territory and, therefore, has some potential basis for political institutions, whereas an ethnic group, lacking territory does not.[12] It is because of this development; Walker Connor argues that the formation of nations is a process, not an event, 'Events are easily dated; Stages in a process are not'[13].

2.2: Nationalist Imagination and the Politics of Ethnic Identity or Ethnonationalism

Perhaps, notwithstanding ethnic and nation, the term, 'ethnonationalism', believe to have first used by Walker Connor gain more fuel to the debates on the contested concept of nation and ethnic. According to him 'ethnonationalism' denotes both the loyalty to a nation deprived of its own state and the loyalty to an ethnic group embodied in a specific state, particularly where the latter is conceived as a 'nation state'[14]. This has brought to us a question of, why 'ethnonationalism', when a more conventional and clear term 'nation' is easily available. To Connor identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions. Perceptions are as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues[15]. Ethnic based identities, thus is more than facts. In its claim, it includes both reality and perceptions, which in the modernists' version is 'constructed'. It is therefore real as well as constructed as seen in the above.

Moreover, in trying to define nation he categorises as a self-differentiating ethnic group, defining nation as the largest group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related, and the largest group that can be aroused or energised by appeals

TH-17378

[12]T. K. Oommen, *Citizenship and National Identity: From colonialism to Globalisation.* New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1997, p. 34

[13]Cited in Anthony Smith, "Dating the nation", in Daniele Conversi (eds), *Ethno nationalism in the contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism,* New York: Routledge,2004.p.57-58

[14]Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding,* Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1994, p.204

[15]Cited in Daniele Conversi (ed), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of Nationalism,* London: Routledge. 2004, p. 2

to a common blood link[16]. What he means in this definition is that he postulates continuity between the ethnic and the national dimensions, emphasising on self-awareness based on the perception of their psychological realm. He considers this self-awareness of their psychological realm as constructed with which the modernists have advocated, however, not forgetting the real identity that flows from the past. Putting his arguments on the two concepts, he points out that 'ethnos' and 'natio' or 'nasci' are equivalents: the former derived from the Greek, the latter from Latin. It follows that the term ethnonationalism is largely tautological, since ethnicity permeates nationalism anyway[17]. Thus, envisaging the nation as a product of modernity and also not denying the continuity of the past. This has remained a critique to Connor's modernist approach which emphasise the continuity between pre-modern ethnic institutions with the modern nations, far there is no way of asserting that the majority of the population in the pre-industrial societies had notion of ethnic self-awareness of kinship[18]. Instead, most of the modernist perceived in terms of a radical break from the past, putting its emphases on industrialisation to capitalist development, introductions of educations, etc. in defending the origins of a nation.

Moreover, until in recent times, the term "ethnopolitics" has come into use to reflect the broad spectrum of behaviour and goals short of seeking independence encompasses aspirations short of the creation of a nation state and the congruence of culture and polity. This is mostly used by a political leader, so as to gain more confidence from the group to which he or she belong. Further, the concept of ethnopolitics has the advantage of including politics that are not conflicted; although ethnopolitics can be conflicted, it can also be cooperative. While these scholars continue to differentiate between ethnopolitical and nationalist mobilisation, by incorporating a wider range of activities a larger number of groups are encompassed. In such a situation we can possibly ask questions like what determined a group to be called as an ethnonationalist? Who are the ethnonationalist? Why some groups are considered as nationalists while the other as ethnonationalists? Is nationalism always a form of ethnicity?

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[16]Ibid, p. 3

[17]Gellner 1983 or Connor 1972, 73;87,90

[18]Ernest Gellner, "The coming of nationalism and its interpretation: The myth of nation and class" in Gopal Balakrishnan(ed) *mapping the nation*. New York: New left Review 1996,pp.99-103

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Well, while tracing the historiography of nationalism, in Europe, the period from the French revolution of 1789 up to the outbreak of the First World War was central to the development of nationalism. When the France nation state was formed under the revolutionary struggle of 1789 a national language was chosen from among a variety of different dialects written down, and made the basis for mass literacy in specific state[19]. This was done because industrial society requires a standard means of communication, who thus define ethnic groups and group interest may be using ethnicity instrumentally in pursuit of their own interest. Since the France nation-state was created on the principles of equality and liberty, one can agree to what they referred to as civic. However, in reality, there is little doubt that for most Jacobins, a Frenchman who did not speak French was suspected, and that in practice the ethno-linguistic criterion[20] of nationality was often accepted. Any person or groups who accepted or acquired French were given the full-French citizenship. Thus, without giving an elaborate provision, France at the time of the formation of a nation-state recognised and gave freely their citizenships to every ethnic groups once they accepted 'French' as their national language. Based on this provision, Hobsbawn brings out the argument that Dreyfus could not really be French because he was of Jew descent, was rightly understood as challenging the very nature of French revolution and its definition of the French nation[21]. Therefore at the time of the integration of France, it was civic in a sense; no discrimination was made to every groups or individual who freely accepted the guided provisions and principles of state formation.

Besides, a clear analysis to the fact is that even from the very formation of France, ethnicities persist, though not directly, as we see in the case of the Jews. Initially, being fought together against the absolute monarchy, the Clergy and other privileged class; most groups remained silent and get normalised. However, in the early 19th century many ethnic groups emerged out of it. Briton, Corsica, Alsace, Basque and Catalan emerged as strong ethnic groups in France. Since different groups have a different culture, tradition, history, etc. they see among themselves as different. For instance, the Basque believes that the Basque language is the *Prima facie*

[19]Eric Hobsbown *Nation and Nationalism since 1780:Programme, Myth, Reality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.53

[20]Ibid, p. 21

[21]Ibid.p.22

evidence that the Basques were the original settlers of Iberia since it was conserved many years, until its inhabitants were, at different times oppressed by diverse nation, and they forgot their primitive tongue and received those used by their conquerors, as subjects of their violations[22]. Living in minority with economic backwardness in their home, while marginalizing their culture and language in rural enclaves, the Basques as a result of the abolished political particularism by the triumph of Jacobin centralism, as well as among the least sensitive to ethnic differences let alone ethnonationalist claims within its border[23]. However, the Basques when tried to differentiate them as group, there were not neat dichotomies but a system of difference. They marked out their differences which served as ethnic markers and weld them together. In doing so, they also created something new in order to make more efficient and real. Thus, 'Civic nationalism' within territorially demarcated limits is also a historically contingents idea. When increasingly faced with challenges to the very idea, it means that the historical context that made it contingents has been outlived. New ideas and arrangement are then called for. The Basque identity however is not made out of it, but they articulated around the right of a people who recognised themselves as having common culture, one which is distinct from their Spanish or French rulers. Nevertheless, they have the continuity from the past cultural tradition and unbroken residence in a territory, or descent of qualities or relations[24].

It is apt to say that to mark out their identity and to create a difference from the rest of the society is resulted because of the past that have had its encountered from their own state. To put it in the words of Anthony D. Smith, the creation of these new narratives to suit the times and its mobilisation was to place collective memory and shared cultural experience at the centre of much of the political focus[25]. For, in France, these developments of differences had two political implications that had its immediate effect and continued for a long time. First was the assertion that the existing nation- state with diverse ethnic groups could not bring equality or uniformity of development in the state. In spite of various reforms and policies, regional

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[22]William A. Douglass, "Sabino's Sin:Racism and the founding of Basque nationalism" in Daniele Conversi(ed), *Ethnonationalism in the contemporary world: Walker Connor and the study of Nationalism*, New York: Routlegde, 2004, p. 99

[23]Ibid p.103

[24]See the details from Jeff Pratt, *Class, nation and identity: The Anthropology of political movement,* London: Pluto Press, 2003,pp.101-130

[25]Anthony Smith, *Theories of nationalism,* London: Gerald Duckword and Company Ltd, 1983,p.x

imbalance grows wider. They failed to assimilate or integrate the minorities' in spite of various minorities' right they implemented. Thus, groups which remained silent over a period emerged out of these differences.

Secondly, they failed to attribute the culture of others, violating the obligations of the state and the implications that there could be only one supreme authority in the political affairs of the state. By denying the degree of Foral autonomy to the revolutionary Basques, abolished their political particularism by the triumph of Jacobin centralism. Thus, with the emergence of sizeable minorities it was too big to be silenced within existing national boundaries; it took the form of civil strife.

In Britain, the division among ethnic groups are mostly based on religion, though culture and descent is not denied to the formations of an identity. In Northern Ireland, there are a generations of violent conflict between the Catholics, who are considered as nationalist or republicans favouring reuniting the island into one political unit and the Protestant Paramilitary groups who are the loyalists of Great Britain favouring the continued union of Northern Ireland. Conflict between Protestant and Catholics in Northern Ireland goes back at least to the seventeenth century when they were colonised by Scottish and the English Protestants on Crown-appointment land put them in direct competition with the indigenous Irish Catholic populations'.[26] Although there had been English colonization in Ireland as early as the twelfth century, Rauane and Todd like others, identify the early seventeenth century and the colonization accompanying it as the period of shift from efforts at reconciliation and bringing the Irish into the framework of law and government into one coercion and displacement. Thus, Ireland, especially the North, became the settler colony in which there was "the wholesale confiscation of Catholic lands, the expulsion of Catholics from the major towns and the banning of their priest and bishops"[27]. Though the Catholics continued to struggle against this discrimination and domination, it continued till 1920 when the British decided to partition Ireland. In 1949 the southern 26-countries became the Irish Free State and six of the nine countries in historic Ulster in the north, which were nearly two-thirds Protestants, remained part of the United Kingdom. The Irish republic, the successor to the Free

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[26]Marc Howard, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.p.91
[27]Ibid, p.92

State of 1949 only accepted the division in 1998 with the approval of the Good Friday agreement in a referendum. Following partition, the British parliament granted Ulster self-rule within the United Kingdom and the protestant dominated all aspects of its political and economic life, discriminating the Catholics of Northern Ireland[28]. Thus in Northern Ireland, an identified people lost its position of supremacy and their power passes sideway. The alternative for them is to remain dominant but to abandon what one once defined them: power continues to pass down through the generations but what was once a core characteristic is lost.[29]

In trying to understand the course of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, it is appropriate to begin with their history, prior to the coming of the British and the Scottish to Ireland, for that has created the circumstances for mutual hatred and intolerance on such a massive scale. The Protestants were minorities in Ireland with majority of the population living in Northern parts of the Island in adjacent with the British Protestants. In such a situation, the Catholics being a majority of the island enjoyed privileges, dominating the society. When the Britishers and the Scottish came into play in Ireland, things change. The protestants, who were minorities in Northern Ireland gained support from colonial power whereas the Catholic were made minority in Northern Ireland by dividing the Island into Irish republic and Northern Ireland where Northern Ireland remain under the political legitimacy of the British government. Therefore, rather than inquiring on what bases ethnic identity is built, the question becomes: what aspects of differential fact, if any, are inhibiting Breton mobilization?

One of the most significant problems is a function of Breton success as a kingdom is the expansion into non-Breton areas. In Northern Ireland, the Northern Irish Protestants have constructed an identity based on a subtle link between religious identity, common ancestry and national identity. For this community, the appellative British is a given political fact considered part of their ethnic cultural background. For Northern Irish Protestants, being a protestant is not only a personal-spiritual choice, but part of the cultural heritage bestowing British identity. Hence, religion and national identity merge into one national structure of identification. If Protestant was

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[28]Ibid. p.92

[29]Steve Bruce, "The strange idea of the Protestant Britain" in Eric .P. Kaufmann(eds), *Rethinking ethnicity: Majority groups and dominant minorities*, London: Routlege, 2004, p.103.

the legacy of the British, religion is understood to be part of the British culture and hence part of the British identity. Thus in Northern Ireland, Catholic Irish identity is clearly and powerfully differentiated from British. However, the differentiation between Ulster Catholics and Protestants is much less so and is based primarily on religion. Though, Irish (both catholic and protestant) are unique from that of the Bretons, the protestant, the Ulster Protestantism consciously and enthusiastically manifests a clear British identity, embracing those symbols as its own[30]. In this case, though Ulster Protestants are ethnic in a sense different from that of the Britishers but is not an ethnonationalist. However in the case of the catholics in Northern Ireland they can be called as an ethnonationalist because the construction of ethnic identity may be functional but is also real and their struggle is towards political unification of the Irish into one political unit.

Besides, the identity politics as a mode of organising is intimately connected to the idea that some groups are oppressed and that more and more identity politics began to spread, not only in Europe but also to the other parts of the World. For there are as much number as the minorities, ethnic groups or identity began to take its shape with the coming of the modern state. Thus, even in countries like Spain, Yugoslavia, Balkans, Soviet Union, Asia, Africa Latin America, etc. many ethno-political conflicts arise, thereby bringing atrocities and a division in the society. For instance, as many as ethnic groups in Yugoslavia began to form its own political unit, as the Croats become Croatia, Serbs got Serbia, Slovenes got Slovenia, and the Muslim dominated areas got Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in Bosnia conflict continues to persist as a result of some divided ethnic groups who became a part of Bosnia in the process of their nation building. The Croat minority in Bosnia was encouraged by the newly independent Croatian government to take advantage of the unsettled situation to pursue autonomy. Appealing to such understanding, one can also conclude that, a divided ethnic group, though arranged for temporary solution, rather create a potential for future conflict. And so is the case of the Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Thus, one is bound to a group as a result of not merely personal

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[30]Ibid.p.107-121

affection, common interest, and practical necessity but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import to the very tie itself.[31]

In Soviet Union, the collapse of the Soviet Empire was caused not so much by ethnic clashes and fierce fighting as by the balanced and coordinated politics of ethnic groups, including (or, one might say, first and foremost) the Russians. However, a fear of discrimination, dominations or insecurity was always faced by the smaller ethnic groups even in its well coordinated empire. The Russian people emerged as the dominant group in Soviet ideological constructions and served as an example to be emulated by other nationalities. Being the majority, they started to impose their symbols, language, and their ideologies to the other ethnic groups in addition to unevenly developed regions. The Russian people served as the "hegemonic" working class, whereas Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, and other major nationalities were analogues of the "working peasantry," whose class-consciousness could potentially reach that of the working class.[32] In this way, ethnic, like social stratification regulated social mobility. Thus, by the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many states such as Ukraine, Georgia, Byelorussia, Estonia, Armenia, Latvia, etc. emerged as the result of their ethnic differences.

In Malaysia, groups are divided on the basis of Malays and non-Malays. But the question is, how fixed is these ethnic categories are? In the case of the Malays, it also include the tribal people of Sabah and Sarawak, the Dayak and the Kayan, who are close cultural kindred of the Malays called themselves as the people of 'up-country'. In fact, no single group – say Bidayut – is really a large enough group on which to build a political career. Thus, appeal to the other group, say Dayak, a status which native peoples of Sarawak share with Malays. Not only that, they also divided their society on the basis of religion as Muslim and the non-Muslim.[33] So in classifying groups, there arise a number of boundaries as 'sub' even in a group to mark out one group from the others and those that are latent, lying concealed in the

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[31]Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Book Inc., 1973, p.259.

[32]Dina Zisserman-Brodsky, *Constructing Ethnopolitics in the Soviet Union: Samizdat, Deprivation, and the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.25

[33]Steve Fenton, 2003, pp. 4-6. Also see in Clifford Geertz, 1973. And Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic conflict in World Politics*, UK: Westview Press Inc., 1994.

enduring structure of primordial identification, ready to take explicit political form given only the proper sorts of social conditions, must be revealed.[34]

Most of the countries in Africa, Asia and Caribbean, the rise of self assertion of colonized population after World War I produced yet another form of nationalism. A 'people' was constituted by the shared subjugation of an alien colonial power. Thus, nationalism emerged to overthrow the imperial the imperial rule and to demand for independence. In this form, nationalism explicitly repudiated ethnicity as a legitimate basis for nationhood. The diverse culture communities subjugated by a given colonial power formed the 'people', nationhood belong to the collectivity, and not to the individual ethnic communities. Thus, although in many versions nationalism is ethnic, in a number of ways it is not.

However, in Africa the central debate has been over whether Africa has nation and nationalities or tribe and ethnic groups. The so-called lack of nations has been used to debunk the delegitimized African nationalist movement and their achievements. With the current hegemony of neo-liberalism and the imperialist comeback, the speakers of imperialism have been quick to condemn nationalism as nothing more than an expression of ethnicity and tribalism[35]. Conversely, ethnicity frequently gives rise to ethno nationalism, but does not necessarily involve the claim that the ethnic group represent itself as a 'nation', with a legitimate claim to a right for sovereignty. In Europe and large part of Asia, ethnic groups commonly appropriate the language of nationalism in their political status claims. In the modal Eurasian country, which bears the name of its ascendant ethno national groups other than, ethnic communities are commonly regarded as 'national minorities', as the classification upon which they insist[36]. However, in most Africa and large parts of South and South-east Asia, communal identity is not politically expressed as nationalism. Though, the citizen invariably has an ethnic as well as a territorial self it merely represents them as civic. The nation-building project has not erased ethnicity, nor confined it merely to the private realm. Some major ethnic groups may well become ethnonational. Such groups as the Zulu in South Africa, the Ganda in Uganda,

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[34]Clifford Geertz, 1973, p.264.

[35]Ibid, p.5.

[36]Gerard Clarke, "From ethnocide to Ethnodevelopment? Ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in South-East Asia." *Third World Quarterly*, 2001, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp 415-16

the Yoruba and Igbo in Nigeria, the Oromo in Ethiopia have well-developed cultural ideologies, and come close in their recent political claims to embracing an ethno national agenda. The incumbent rulers have thus carefully structured politics to preclude effective use of this clause, but their ascendancy may not endure.

Infact, even in civic countries like United States of America, group differentiations was prevalent, discoursed as race, instead of the term ethnicity. In a crucial innovation, settler communities in America revolts against Britain or Spain needed the doctrine of self-determination embedded in nationalism, but also claimed distinctiveness based not on ethnicity but on their American residence. Legitimating of the new states necessitated activation of a common sentiment; 'we the people' of the American constitutional preamble of living reality rather than mere rhetoric flourish. Both shared political values -republicanism, democracy- and a territorial self designation American pre-empted by the United States, administrative subdivision of the former Spanish empire in Latin America - replaced ethnicity as defining content of a nascent nationalism. One should also note a clearly exclusionary dimension even in the heart of this most civic country. The connotation of WASP (White Anglo-Saxons Protestant) rule was used to represent the so called Civic nation of the United States of America.[37] This is so because the White Anglo-Saxons bears the majority in USA, and thereby they just normalised the minority groups as a part of their citizens. African slaves and indigenous peoples were not for a long time a part of the nation.[38] Though it has been changed today, the term WASP still continues to be a major debate among the scholars of nationalism.

2.3: Nation and Ethnie Reconsidered

Notwithstanding the predicament of successive political leadership with the reasons outlined above, does it make intellectual sense to suppress a concept of ethnicity and therefore an identity built around it? Whatever may be the reasons for the state to treat ethnic identity with skepticism, it is necessary to look into the wider

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[37]Edward Mortimer, *People, Nation and State: Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers,1999, p. 72
[38]Ibid.

issues why ethnicity and ethnic identity matter. A fruitful approach, suggests Fenton, to analyzing 'ethnie' and ethnicity would be to recognize that ethnicity, race and nation share a core meaning among them, with each having particular connotations which are not fully shared with the others. Though it is widely accepted that they are socially constructed and 'imagined' communities, the stress on their being imagined has gone too far to make them sound like 'imaginary'. Far from being imaginary communities, these (all three categories in Fenton's reference—ethnie, nation and race) should be thought of as 'descent and culture communities' which are essentially constructed but nonetheless real.[39] It is real because when we talk about ethnicity or nation or race, we are not imagining a thing which has 'nothing there'—there clearly is something.

Nation or nationalism, far from being an idea that has run its course, has been resurrected in new forms and in new terrains, its main ideas appropriated by groups which have hitherto been deemed to situate at a level different from the category of nation, increasingly by ethnic groups. Scholars and writers have debated over the emancipatory potential of the concept of 'nationalism' in our times. Within this debate it is pointed out that certain forms of identity politics, as in the case of national minorities, increasingly use ideas of a separate collective personality and a right to its distinctive particularity. Such ideas are not very far removed from the idea of self-determination that is thought to characterize the personality of a nation. Whatever its moral standing and the role it plays in a democratic society, it is clear that the influence, appeal and impact of identity politics is growing, eliciting puzzlement and downright hostility from traditional social and political theorists.

Will Kymlicka, from the viewpoint of liberal culturalism, has been an ardent defender of minority rights for disadvantaged groups in a democratic state. More specifically, Kymlicka defends a sort of 'self government' rights for what he calls 'national minorities'. According to him, national minorities are nations, in the sociological sense of "being historical communities, institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, and sharing a distinct language and

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[39]Ibid.: p. 5

history."[40] In other words, they possess a "societal culture" which makes them a complete national group in themselves. What these national minorities demand in the form of self-government rights is precisely the same tools of nation-building as the majority nation in a state possesses so that they can maintain or rebuild their own societal culture.[41]

However, it should be noted that assessment of political feasibility underlies Kymlicka's defence of self-government rights for national minorities. It is obvious that a minority group that is territorially scattered has to surmount immense practical difficulties in constituting a nation-state. So, it's a climb-down from 'what is not morally right is never right politically' to 'what is not politically feasible is not morally urgent.' But leaving the issue of urgency and practical feasibility aside, to define national minority by incorporating an element of territoriality leaves us with no good guide to analyzing those 'nations' that straddle across state boundaries, if we distinguish 'nations' from states as I do.

As opposed to the position I take, some of the most influential works on nation and nationalism are too heavily inclined to the idea of 'nations' as 'nation-states'. So we see that since the publication of Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, the widespread understanding of 'nation' is a political community 'imagined' into existence. As Anderson says, such a community is both inherently 'limited' and 'sovereign' meaning that such a community coincides with the 'nation' as defined by its territorial boundaries within which it is sovereign. Groups that employ the same language of nationalism within existing nations are hyphenated with the prefix 'sub' whose connotation is that they are not nations yet but dream of shedding this 'subness' oneday.[42]

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[40]Will Kymlicka, "Three Forms of Group Differentiated Citizenship in Canada" in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 153-154.

[41]Will Kymlicka, "The New Debate over Minority Rights" in Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001

[42]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: New Left Books, 1991, p. 3-7

32

In fact, all the modernist theories of nationalism, including Gellner's[43] and Hobsbawm's[44], situate the emergence, creation or maturity of modern nations within the formation of modern states. But there are crucial differences in the accounts of different theorists even when they all emphasize its modernity. Thus, for Gellner, the invention or construction of the idea of nation and the sense of nationalism has an aspect of being fabricated and, therefore, artificial.[45] Anderson sought to correct the latter's formulation of invention-as-fabrication, saying that such a formulation implies that there exist 'true' communities upon which the idea of nation has been juxtaposed. In Anderson's view, all communities, except perhaps the primordial village of face-to-face contact are imagined.[46] Contrary to these modernist theories of nationalism, an older generation of historians looked for and found nations even in antiquity—among the Greeks, Jews, Persians, or even the French, English, Swiss or the Scots in the Middle Ages, which I find problematic.

Today, most scholars accept the modernity of the nation. However, the complete denial of continuity from the past historical communities has not been accepted by many. Anthony Smith stresses that even with a modernist definition, the process of 'nation-formation' was unforeseen and unintended, with many modern western states being forged around dominant ethnic communities, and in turn gradually becoming national states. Elsewhere, such processes required external stimuli and planned activism. Locating the nation and nationalism exclusively in the transition to a modern era and treating them as products of modernity makes difficult to trace the felt continuities with an ethnic past. He says that many modern nations which had been socially and culturally structured in terms of a past ethnic community (ethnie) share with the latter some elements like the myths of ancestry, memories, some cultural elements or even a name.[47]

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[43]See Ernest Gellner, 'The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretations: The Myths of Nation and Class' in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996 also Gellner, *Nations And Nationalism* , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983

[44]Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992

[45]See Gellner, 'The Coming of Nationalism and its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class' in Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*.

[46]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*: p. 6

[47]Anthony D. Smith, 'Nationalism and the Historians' in Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*.

One of the most significant moments in history, the fall of communism in East European states and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by the dismemberment of larger states. The new nationalisms that emerged were not quite 'imagined' into existence but supplanted older forms of solidarity based on ethnic lines. Rather than the result of formation of new states, the national identity was very much present before the dissolution of the previously larger states and it was due to this national consciousness in the first place that the bigger states dissolved. A clear continuity from an ethnic past is evident here. Whether these new nations have successfully democratized is not wholly a question of the triumph or failure of nationalism *per se*, but is influenced by the complex power configuration along ethnic lines and a process underscored by past as well as present ethnic repression.

An unmediated continuity with an ethnic past is not valid argument for modern nations. This is as true of the American 'nation' or the British 'people' as it is of an Indian 'nation.' Nonetheless, even to admit that nations have an ethnic continuity itself is not to discount the 'imagined' element of an ethnic community. In other words, ethnie and nation may have a shared terrain more than modernist theories assumed. To further accentuate the impossibility of a sharp distinction between these two—ethnie and nation, we may even argue that both are imagined communities, as Anderson himself suggests. They are imagined as 'culture communities' with a claimed common ancestry in the case of ethnicity and an identification, most often, with a state in the case of nation, perhaps with a dose of a claimed common ancestry in the latter too.

How sustainable is the distinction apart from its sociological import is not clear. Thus, we speak of Han Chinese both as 'ethnic' Hans and Han 'nation', or the 'ethnic' Timorese as indistinguishable from the Timorese 'nation'. Since modernist theories of nationalism situate the creation or maturity of modern nations within the formation of nation state,[48] a distinction of political significance is sometimes made by each one's relationship to the state. According to this line of reasoning, the nation is a political community and is indistinguishable from a nation-state, as in Anderson's

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[48]The term 'United Nations', appropriately an international body of independent states, reinforces such an idea.

sense of the term, and ethnic solidarities or identities are implicitly content with some form of recognition short of a national identity and statehood.

But how does this distinction hold in multiethnic, multinational states, institutionally admittedly so or even otherwise? Modern states, which are very different from the heydays of European nationalism when 'nation-states' were being formed and consolidated, are invariably pluralistic and multicultural, though to different degrees. So, in the face of this pluralistic, multicultural, multiethnic context, it is difficult to maintain strictly, that some culture communities are nations while others are ethnic communities. Many ethnic identity groups, built around a claimed common culture and/or descent with a sense of shared destiny, entertain a dream, and articulate this dream, of attaining statehood, or at least a greater degree of autonomy in the form of a 'homeland'.

In other words, in any politically modernized state, no group which has or claims to have some descent-language-culture commonality, all or some, and seeks to gain or preserve its statehood would ever describe itself as merely an ethnic group. In short, let me put it this way: 'nations' may not have weightier moral claim to their sanctity than the commonness of an ethnic group. What distinguishes them is not even an objective political criterion that one is associated with the state while the other is not, since a national group can coexist with other such groupings within the framework of a state. The distinction may be found, however tenuous, in the degree of political imagination each may have employed to justify or press their political claims. Or as Steve Fenton and Stephen May put it, the "way to turn if we wish to make some differentiation between these terms (ethnie, nation and they include 'race' as well) is not in the direction of how peoples lay claim to their 'groupness'. Rather, it is in the uses, especially the political uses, to which those claims are put."[49] Thus, while ethnie and nation have a shared terrain of claims of groupness, a national group can be seen as more successful in making its claims towards political recognition. It is thus not only a culture community, but also a political one having institutionalized safeguards to its norms and practices. Nations may or may not have a separate state of

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[49]Steve Fenton and Stephen May, "Ethnicity, Nation and 'Race': Connections and Disjunctures" in Fenton and May (eds.), *Ethnonational Identities*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3

their own.[50] Those that have attained statehood are invariably likely to call themselves nation-states while others who co-exist with other national groups within a state may aspire for a separate statehood through secession or make claims on the state to maintain a thoroughly decentralized polity allowing for autonomy of groups.

Those groups, once considered ethnic, are not immune to making political claims themselves. These claims may be in the form of formal recognition to their cultural distinctiveness within the state, a measure of political autonomy in the idea of a homeland, or even outright independence in the form of secession. A group doesn't become a nation by virtue of making a political claim but the whole array of supportive resources that are employed to press its national claims are important to successfully impart it a national character. In most cases, if nations are people who see themselves as those already 'in place', ethnic minorities are people who can be seen, however begrudgingly, as being *in situ*, but who still remain, by the exclusivist definitions of nation so often applied, invariably 'out of place'.

What kinds of demands take form depends on the perceived injustices ethnic or national minorities face in the state, an assessment of what may be politically feasible, and most importantly their calculated chances of a negotiated reconfiguration of power with a dominant majority group. An indication that can be drawn in making a political claim is that they no longer consider themselves as merely an ethnic group but a 'people' or a nation. Nationalist assertions by a hitherto ethnic minority are invariably met with repression and various strategies by the ruling majoritarian order to entrench its domination.

Thus, in so far as minority 'nations' attempt to thwart the domination of the majority and act as a potent threat to the established order, competing nationalisms can be seen as both an outcome and a cause of the failure of the nation-building project of the dominant majority in a state. The answer to why certain ethnic groups project themselves as 'nations' while others do not has to be sought in their relations with a dominant majority, both in the larger national community and in the context of

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[50]Unlike Anderson's definition of nation as political community which is both limited and 'sovereign', nation as a political community can live within the boundaries of a state shared with other groups. I think the differentiation between nation and nation-state should be maintained both for analytical and conceptual purposes.

its immediate neighbourhood, i.e. how oppressed they feel and what are their calculated chances of coming out of domination by another.

Such a critical stance towards the established order doesn't deny that there are good and bad claims. But even here, we need to see through how a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' is structured into the dominant discourse. A familiar distinction between 'civic nationalism' which is supposedly liberal and inclusive, and 'ethnic nationalism' which is based on racial or ethnic particularity and is, therefore, illiberal and exclusive, is made to push the point that a nationalist claim made by a national minority is directed towards maintaining its particularity of culture and membership. We may need qualification in such distinctions.

'Civic nationalism' like those in the United States and France has a good measure of cultural component as enforcing a 'national' culture and inculcating a 'national' history or requiring a particular language to become its members. Injustices can be done not only by political exclusion but also by forced inclusion when the culture and institutions one is forced into is either hostile or indifferent to one's particularities. As Kymlicka would tell us, the French language was quite brutally imposed on the Basques, Bretons and other linguistic minorities through prohibition on publications in minority languages as well as a requirement that the medium of instruction in schools and communication in public institutions and agencies must be in French. The Americans didn't lag behind. Coercive imposition of the English language over the Spanish-speaking people in the territories annexed from Mexico and in Puerto Rico stands out as attempt by a majority to impose its own language and culture on the minorities.[51]

On the other hand, 'ethnic nationalisms' are portrayed as backward-looking, illiberal and exclusivist. They are blamed for national conflict and other forms of brutal atrocities on 'outsiders'. But all forms of nationalism, at one point or the other, have gone through intolerant histories. A nationalism based on ethnonational identity may not be necessarily exclusivist. Like all other constructed identities, ethnonational identities have a degree of fluid boundary that admit members previously not included. It is quite possible that an existing minority may incorporate other

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[51]Will Kymlicka, 'Misunderstanding Nationalism' in Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.*

37

minorities within itself. Ethnic majority is almost an unaccustomed thought precisely because the majority tends to assume, without much reflection, the normalized and normative status of their identity, and its place of pre-eminence. In other words, majority group members, being neither 'ethnic' nor a 'minority' simply represent modernity or the 'national', that is to say their nationalism comes to be seen as 'civic'.[52]

Defending the claims of ethnic minorities might seem like emphasizing the ethnic origins of nationalism. It will bring us to the old question of which one first— ethnie or nation. In other words, are nations and nationalisms the ideological constructions of modern states, or states the modern form of nation superimposed upon pre-existing ethnies? As discussed above, modernist theories of nationalism argue that modern western nations were constructed retrospectively out of the conditions of statehood rather than ancient ethnic groups taking national form. By this logic, 'civic nationalisms' that arose as a product of modernity are inclusive and forward-looking, while 'ethnic nationalisms' or 'ethnonationalisms' that are said to be the characteristic feature of Eastern Europe and elsewhere are exclusive, regressive and reactionary.

On the other hand, some theorists who emphasize the primacy of 'people who believe they are ancestrally related' as the bases of both groupness and political action, i.e. defenders of ethnonationalism, sometimes go too far. Walker Connor's account is one such example. Connor maintains that 'there is no difference (between ethnie and nations) if nationalism is used in its pristine sense... nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. Nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one's nation as just defined.'[53]

Such an approach doesn't simply suggests that there is a wide terrain of shared meanings in ethnie and nation along with 'race' as a concept, it virtually obliterates all distinctions altogether. It will be a mistake if we take all claims of groupness around a belief in common ancestry as nationalism. In that logic, 'race', for example, as a concept is built around a belief in common ancestry, which has often been notoriously employed to claim racial superiority and inferiority with a tendency to demarcate a

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[52]Fenton and May, 'Ethnicity, Nation and 'Race': Connections and Disjunctures'; p. 11-12
[53]Quoted in Fenton and May, 'Ethnicity, Nation and 'Race': Connections and Disjunctures'; p. 6

morbidly defined boundary.[54] However, any national group, mindful to get legitimacy and sustain its appeal, must have an element of inclusiveness even though the nationalist imagination may begin within the notion of ethnicity. The end result of exclusivist ethnonationalistic political projects has been social and political disasters can be seen in many parts of the world.

But there can be a middle way approach to seeing nationalism. As Steve Fenton and Stephen May suggest, "the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms will continue to be important for a conceptual and political understanding of the framing of nationalist ideas. But we also need to recognize that 'civic' and 'ethnic' elements will invariably be combined in most nationalisms."[55] Such an approach has been counselled by others like Smith that we have seen above. With this approach in mind, the search into the origins of present-day nationalism, at a time when nationalism of the old order is increasingly challenged, should be sought in the effect of nation-building project pursued by the majority and the domination that a group faces, real or imagined, at the hands of another—national or provincial. Most nationalisms do show core elements of an ethnic continuity. The articulation of so-called 'civic' national identity camouflaged a strategy of dominance. Assimilation as a policy is one form of domination in which groups being assimilated have to make major sacrifices in terms of social and cultural costs. Minority identity, though very mush based on ethnicity, gets reinforced into a nationalist form, and even a politically militant form, due to domination that they endure.

Based on the above discussion, it is seen that a process of congealing cultural ideologies surrounds major ethnic categories. The instrumental uses of ethnicity as a competitive resource in the political realm – struggles over distribution and domination – have reinforced its place in the social repertoire of the individual citizen. In those instances of high ethnic polarization – the Nigerian civil war, genocide episodes in Rwanda and Burundi – the deep anxieties and mutual fears produced by communal violence convey a special intensity to identity. Agonizing security

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[54]With a concept like race, what often is asserted is not only a commonality in culture, language or shared destiny. It insists on genealogy or parentage to demarcate its boundary. This is despite the widely accepted anthropological and sociological conclusion that there's no such a thing as 'authenticity' in race.

[55]Fenton and May. 'Ethnicity, Nation and 'Race': Connections and Disjunctures'; p. 7

dilemmas also emerge when ethnic militia appear, as in the Sri Lanka, Congo-Brazzaville, Southern Sudan or Nigeria. Slowly and unevenly, a tendency towards deeper primordialization of ethnicity seems in progress. Culture and descent pay an important role in its ethnopolitical mobilization which makes movements seeks to preserve or revive a fading identity. The politicization of these movements comes, if at all, well after cultural activism begins.

Secondly, the construction of ethnicity represents a clear and effective goal for ethnopolitical elites. The expansion of the foundations of ethnic identity appears to be both a necessary effort and a general concern for these activists. On the other hand, no ethnic identity as seen in the above is purely constructed; in each case there were some primordial elements in place upon which ethnic entrepreneurs could build.

Thirdly, the argument of differential fact appears to be confirmed. It is not any single or handful of dimensions of identity difference that are necessary for ethnopolitical mobilization; rather, activists and supporters seize on what differences there are to emphasize their unique identity. However, while the expansion of differential fact explains the evolution of ethnopolitical mobilization, how extensively a group can mobilize may be a function, in part, of how much primordial difference there is; in other words, constructing identity may only take a group so far along the ethnopolitical mobilization trajectory

Finally, it indicates an increase in elite interest in ethnic identity while assimilation of the masses continued. Successful mobilization requires, therefore, not merely the generation of interest among the masses, but counteracting ongoing assimilation. As noted above, however, elite attempts to reverse this trend do not appear political; indeed, the transformation of cultural ethnicity to a basis for political support frequently requires decades of cultural mobilization. Thus elite behaviour appears, at a minimum, to be more complex than merely creating a basis for gaining political power, perhaps best explained by assuming ethnic identity to have a powerful emotional appeal in its own right. Such awareness of identity, in most cases, is the result of dominations and insecurity that a group felt in their past experiences, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER: III

DOMINATION, INSECURITY AND THE POITICS OF IDENTITY: A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION

Theoretical debates on nation, nationalism, domination and oppression, and identity have exploded all over the world, though by no means they have exhausted new insights to be gained. For many thinkers, a new theoretical exploration into a concept or a problem, to give it a new interpretation, is not enough; concepts need a wholesale reconstruction of philosophical foundations. However, I think we have sufficient theoretical formulations at hand without going through a wholesale philosophical reconstruction to the currents of thought—on identity politics, nationalism, sub nationalism, multiculturalism, etc. But it seems imperative that an appropriate understanding of the context should inform theoretical formulations to avoid distortion of the particularity of the context and the responses it demands.

There is wide recognition in academic discourse to the fact that India provides an example of a polity that gives due importance to its characteristic multinational state status befitting its diversity based on certain identity markers. In fact, identity politics has occupied prime space in Indian politics—as movement and mobilization of dalits, women, linguistic identity groups or religious communities. Though on the face of it, one can say that such identity groups do not face systematic institutional repression to articulation of their needs, it needs to be seen how far the state and its institutional mechanisms have been responsive to the articulation of those needs and demands. How the state and such other public institutions engage with the challenges

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posed by the politics of these disparate groups has been dealt with predominantly within the discourse of social justice, democratization and secularism.

Democratization, i.e. granting and entrenching democratic values of equality and freedom, is deemed to be a remedy for the inequalities that stems from socio-cultural and historical reasons of domination and oppression of groups such as dalits and women. Social justice is most often seen as the equitable distribution of democratic rights and liberties, wherein provisions to correct historical discrimination are designed and ensured so that oppressed and disadvantaged groups are enabled to come on par with the larger society. Distributive justice is predominantly framed in plural terms such as affirmative action, preferential discrimination, reservation etc. which are temporary and provisional. The democratization process has been accompanied by rationalizing political constituencies and administrative units based on linguistic identities. Indeed, one of the first tasks independent India undertook to break from the colonial legacy was to reorganize provinces on the basis of linguistic compactness.

While it is not our purpose here to delve deep into the ideal of secularism, it will be instructive, we think, to point out how the secularism debate has also highlighted the need for group rights and the challenges they pose to the autonomy of the individual and equality within the group. A constitutive aspect of the secular debate in India is the recognition that the special rights embodied in the constitution do not infringe the principle of secularism.[1] While it is true that such special rights are necessary, the secularism paradigm may not be sufficient to theorize all kinds of group rights. This is so because there are minority groups other than religious groups which it cannot possibly include in its term of reference.

The perspective of domination and insecurity on the origins and growth of identity politics and national movements encompass the whole array of cultural, socio-political and economic factors. However, conventionally, for liberals and

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[1] See Bhargava, 'What is Indian Secularism and What is It for' in *India Review 1,1*; see also Galanter, 'Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian Judiciary' in Bhargava (ed.), *Secularism & Its Secularism & Its Critics*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998

Marxists alike, traditional theories on domination and oppression have been couched in class terms. Liberals believed that class domination and oppression could be prevented or corrected with the politics of redistribution. Marxists went further in saying that the whole economic structure should be overhauled to bring capitalist domination and exploitation to an end. Class politics informed by economics is considered, above all, a notch higher in the calculus of human progress, and a step away from the stagnancy of primordial groups. Where conditions for class politics do not already exist, they have to be manufactured or created. It was hoped that individual identities and affiliations would take shape as dictated by material interests.

Lenin as a Marxist, polemicised with Rosa Luxembourg by recognizing the right of 'self-determination' that allow differences to exist and preserve for better unity among the Proletariat. He opposed or rejects any division of proletarian organization along the lines of nationality. But recognizing the right he allow a space for self determination with full equality of nationalities and language. He wrote, "A nation is not based on common culture or fate but on common language, language and territory are eternal."[2] He showed interest in the question of language as a base for the demand for such right. However, in calling for right to self-determination he encompassed only the right to secede that is for choosing nationalism not to separate but allow differences that call for equality. Lenin could thus argue that merely extending the right to secede (self-determination) reduced the dangers of complex nationalism. Thus, allowing self-determination as the right of the community he emphasis equality in his discourse. But we are not sure as to how that equality can achieved in a complex society.

Also, considering the debates which I had discussed in the previous chapter between ethnicity and nationalism, we come to a question, why is it that ethnicity almost seems like an illegitimate concept in our social and political discourse? Why is the state, itself an amalgamation of several ethnic groups, and our social and political discourse, so suspicious of a concept like ethnicity? In India, there may be several reasons, but the obvious ones may be three. Firstly, the state is heir to the British

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[2]Isabelle Kreindler, "The Neglected Work of Lenin's Nationalist policy," *Slavic Review,* Vol. 36, No. 1, 1977, p. 11

legacy of a cauldron of politicized communal and ethnic identities. A nation-building state, mindful of its integration, wouldn't want a diversity it cannot handle. Religious and linguistic identity groups are sufficiently and thoroughly diverse, and recognition of these identities gives it a colour of a multicultural society and helps to redeem its slogan 'unity in diversity'. Besides, an ethnic community, when sufficiently large and territorially concentrated, invariably tends to demand political rights. Demand for political rights by minority groups, while not a taboo, is looked down upon with deep suspicion for historical reasons that flow from India's experiences with colonial politics of 'divide and rule' and the trauma of partition of the subcontinent.

Secondly, the fear that once conceded, the demand for such rights would lead down a 'slippery slope' from which the Indian state could never redeem itself, is something that is held out as closely bound up with its integrity itself. This argument is at best political, an overstatement of the importance of the national community, if we concede that there are good reasons in India's historical experience of having to live with distinct identity groups, and allowing them space for self-development.

The deep insecurity which accompanies the project of building a national state is reflected in a third reason, i.e. the geopolitical location of the Northeast, which holds special significance in India's view of strategic interests. It is true that there are, and have been in some cases until recently, not so friendly, sometimes hostile, neighbours which are a threat to the sanctity of India's borders. However, the same can be said to be the failure of its diplomatic relations with such neighbours, which leads to tackling such threats inside its own territory. In the process, the communities in the region are made to bear the brunt of its own insecurity with its neighbours, be it in the policies with regard to immigration in Assam and other states, and the draconian laws that are a symbol of its domination and oppression.

The assumption here is that the insecurity of the state, and its strategies for domination, have deeply affected its legitimacy in the eyes of those who are at the receiving end of it, and have exerted deep influence in the shaping of inter-group relations. Social relations between the different communities reflect the characteristic structure of domination and subordination at different levels.

3.1: Domination and Insecurity: Defining Identity and the Nationalist Moment

In liberal discourse, most accounts of discontent that are concerned with injustices to groups—women, backward classes, dalits, and minorities and so on—are theorized within the notion of distributive justice. Thus, Rawls defines 'a conception of justice as providing in the first instance a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed.'[3] It is precisely with a fair distribution of what he calls primary goods—basic rights and liberties, opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—that the challenges to inequality and injustice should be met. The distributive paradigm of justice has been so predominant that liberals like Will Kymlicka and Anne Philips seem to have borrowed the Rawlsian principle of distributive justice in order to redistribute rights to disadvantaged *groups* in society.

Kymlicka argues that liberals should recognize that there are compelling interest related to culture and identity which are essential to realizing the liberal values of freedom and equality. Thus, the 'politics of recognition' is apparently an extension of the distributive principle of equal rights and liberties, wherein 'the inequalities' in rights as implicit in the concept of group-differentiated citizenship is to broaden the liberty and enable the full self-realization of members of disadvantaged minorities.[4] Anne Phillips argues that injustices that follow from political exclusion of social groups who by virtue of their 'race' or ethnicity or gender are underrepresented must be met by a 'politics of presence' rather than a 'politics of ideas'. By politics of ideas, she means the representation of ideas, views and belief system of particular groups, and means by politics of presence, the actual physical representation along group lines. She is, in effect, arguing for a redistribution of the rights of representation of groups.[5] Rights and liberties, in the distributive paradigm, are thus conceived as goods that people possess.

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[3] John Rawls, *A Theory Of Justice*, Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 9

[4] See Chapter 6, 'Justice and Minority Rights' in Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995

[5] Anne Phillips, 'Dealing with Difference: a Politics of Ideas or a Politics of Presence?' in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996

Iris Marion Young sees problems in thinking about rights as possessions. She points out that 'rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions. Rights are relationships, not things; they are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do in relation to one another. Rights refer to doing more than having, to social relationships that enable or constrain.'[6] A focus on possession tends to produce thinking about what people are doing, according to what institutionalized rules, how their doings and having are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their positions, and how the combined effect of their doings has recursive effects on their lives.

While distributive issues are crucial in any conception of a just social order, the tendency to reduce justice to distribution may have problems. Young observes that the distributive paradigm tends to focus thinking about justice on the allocation of material goods which tends to ignore the social structure and institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns. The distributive paradigm when extended to non-material goods, she claims, represents them as though they are static things, instead of a function of social relations and process. Therefore, she insists that, since the concept of justice includes all aspects of institutional rules and relations insofar as they are subject to political collective decision, it should begin with the concepts of domination and oppression, rather than the concept of distribution.[7]

But why focus on justice? Many critics of distributive justice take the position that, precisely because justice is associated with distribution, we need some other concept to evaluate institutional context to see whether they are free from domination, meet needs, and provide conditions of emancipation going beyond justice conventionally understood in distributive terms. Thus, according to Charles Taylor, confusions arise when norms of distributive justice are applied across social structures and used to evaluate basic structures. In criticizing social injustices, both left and right critics speak from a perspective that involves a project to construct different

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[6]Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 25
[7]Ibid, p. 15-38.

institutional forms corresponding to specific conceptions of the human good, a project beyond merely articulating principles of justice.[8]

Transcending the idea of justice, Taylor with originality formulated his idea of the 'dialogical' nature of identity as opposed to the 'individualized' identity that is predominant in liberal discourse. In his view, accepting the dialogical identity of the self requires us to evaluate social and political institutions not merely in terms of equal dignity supposedly satisfied by an equal package of rights, but in terms whether or not harm is done by not recognizing or misrecognizing what is required in ensuring equal dignity for different individuals who are unique in themselves.[9] (This I will turn back to in a later section).

Identity is dialogical in the sense that we defined our identity in dialogue or exchange with others by acquiring "rich human languages of expression" which include both verbal and non-verbal forms. In talking about the dialogical nature of identity, Taylor recognizes that our identity is sometimes formed "in struggle against the things our significant others want to see in us."[10] Thus, even when identity-formation is dialogical, the trend that we see in nationalist consolidation can be said to be in struggle against the dominant group's attempt to belittle or delegitimize the claims of minority or marginalized groups and foisting its own identity as the 'national' upon them.

A related argument is found in Michael Sandel's *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. For Sandel, normative social philosophy must transcend the familiar notions of justice and conceptualize aspects of the self in social context that lie beyond what we can evaluate with the principle of justice. The argument is that liberal philosophy has painted a picture of an 'unencumbered self' of the individual whose needs are taken care of by an equalized apportionment of rights.[11] Both the above critiques assumed the distributive nature of justice, which they consider is too narrow to

[8]See Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985
[9]See Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition' in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994
[10]Taylor, *ibid.* pp. 32-33
[11]See Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982

evaluate institutions and social contexts that lie beyond what is familiarly distributable.

Young notes that 'whether normative theorists who focus attention on issues of decision-making, division of labour, culture and social organization beyond the distribution of goods call these issues of justice or not is clearly a matter of choice.'[12] She says that the main reason why a social theory, concerned with emancipatory imagination and extending it beyond distribution, should lay claim to the term 'justice' is that appeals to justice still have the power to awaken a moral imagination and motivate people to look at their society critically, and ask how it can be made more liberating and enabling. For her, it is a mistake to reduce social justice to distribution.

While criticisms are ranged at distributive focus in theories of justice, it is not the case that distribution should be abandoned or transcended, but to ask whether it sufficiently highlights all relevant aspects that go into making a situation or social order unjust. Marxist analysis, Young points out, while providing a fruitful starting point in bringing in class relations, is itself too narrow for treating class relations exclusively as the phenomena of social structure or institutional context that the distributive paradigm fails to evaluate. She provides insights into aspects of social relations by pointing at feminist critique of dominant theories of justice presupposing the existing social structure involving issues of sexuality, intimacy, childbearing and household labour.[13]

What does it mean to analyze group relations with the various concepts we have just noted? How does it matter where we begin—distribution or domination? One crucial reason why it's important to note the inadequacies of distribution is to see the predominant language of distribution in discussing issues of social justice, in India as elsewhere, which inhibits the analysis of ethnic identities and the demands of sub-national groupings. While the distributive emancipatory policies are prescribed for historically oppressed communities or sections of society—dalits as the prime

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[12]Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference.*; p. 35
[13]Ibid.; p. 18-23

example—we are not so sure as to how it will work in the case of ethnic communities, who do not stand out as historically oppressed communities in the way the dalits are, and how oppressed they were before they became part of the larger Indian state. There is, in fact, reason to believe that oppression and domination of ethnic groups have deepened, if the process didn't begin, with their association with a modern state.

This aspect of domination and the insecurity that it fuels is enmeshed within the complex web of relationships between groups within society. It is precisely because some of these groups were not the victims of oppression that goes far back into history but of an on-going process of marginalization as a result of a present institutional context, we need to see the neglect of their particular needs and requirements as the failure of the distributive paradigm of justice to take into account various factors other than economic.

Within the distributive paradigm, the concept of 'non-decision making' first put forward by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz is instructive of how resources of power are allocated. Bachrach and Baratz argued that 'when the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for decisions, it can be said that a non-decision making situation exists.'[14]

Non-decision making, in their analysis, take several forms, direct force being the extreme form, with intimidation and co-option coming in between as the direct forms. But the indirect forms of non-decision making are the most important: use of an existing bias in the political system such as a norm, a precedent, rule or procedure, or reshaping and strengthening of 'mobilization of bias' as a whole. Mobilization of bias refers to the extent to which the society's dominant groups have shaped the values, rules and attitudes of the prevailing political system. Power lies not only in the

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[14]Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework" in *American Political Science Review, 57,* September 1963; see also Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" in *American Political Science Review, 56,* December 1962

actions and decisions of people but also in their possession or control of the society's valued items. This is power as resource control.

Besides, in an institutional context working within a framework of an unequal relationship of different groups, unequal in their strength—material, social and cultural resources—the question of how decisions are made may not have direct correlation with the individuals who make decisions. Decisions are made within a structural and institutional context, and an individual who is given a formal position of decision-making authority doesn't take decisions unaffected by the dominant structural and institutional factors that surround his position. For instance, the fact that even if a person from a minority groups, in a majority dominated society, are given a chance to take formal position of decision making authority, his authority will severely limited in a political environment where the very extent of his or her authority depends on how the dominant group perceives his position as affecting their interests.

Thus, while we focus on the subtle and not so subtle structures of domination and oppression that characterize group relation to study the response mechanism that can be seen in the form of politics of identity, group consolidation and mobilization of cultural distinctiveness, we should not lose sight of the issues of justice. Justice in such context would mean that each group would try to secure a broader social and institutional relation within which groups would find mechanisms to address their insecurities in order to resolve them. A social theory with concepts such as domination, insecurity and the politics of identity, above all, would ring hollow if it were not addressed to the questions of justice. For this, the 'redistribution' of rights, no doubt, constitutes the core argument for many classes of oppressed and marginalized groups.

However, it would be too deterministic to define justice only in distributive terms. One crucial reason why it's important to note the inadequacies of distribution is to see the predominant language of distribution in discussing issues of social justice, in India as elsewhere, which inhibits the analysis of ethnic identities and the demands of subnational groupings. While the distributive emancipatory policies are prescribed

for historically oppressed communities or sections of society—dalits as the prime example—we are not so sure as to how it will work in the case of ethnic communities, who do not stand out as historically oppressed communities in the way the dalits are, and how oppressed they were before they became part of the larger Indian state. There is, in fact, reason to believe that oppression and domination of ethnic groups have deepened, if the process didn't begin, with their association with a modern state.

The various aspects of domination and the insecurity that it fuels are enmeshed within the complex web of relationships between groups within society. It is precisely because some of these groups were not the victims of oppression that goes far back into history but of an on-going process of marginalization as a result of a present institutional context, we need to see the neglect of their particular needs and requirements as the failure of the distributive paradigm of justice to take into account various factors other than economic. Redistributive policies are, at best, conceived as temporary measures which fall short of the kinds of rights that certain marginalized groups require. In fact, in most cases of minority nationalism, what is sought is some kind of closely-guarded protection beyond the reach of majority decision in the state.

3.2: The Individual and the Politics of Identity:

For long, the discourse on individual identity and citizenship has been that individuals forge identities on their own, and their shared interests are taken care within an environment of associational pluralism. Liberal individualists go far as to say that the self is prior to its ends; individuals are not antecedently attached to any sort of purposes or goals. They can stand back and evaluate their goals and purposes which they may have chosen. Their ends or ends do not come in the way in determining how they choose their life, which they are free to shape and define.[15]

In this framework, associational pluralism enables individuals to forge their own identity by voluntarily associating with groups defined by the interests they

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[15]John Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 77, 9.

pursue. Thus, interest groups are the constituents of a pluralistic society which is the embodiment of a free and open society. Individuals seeking to escape historically induced oppression and emancipation from domination, from whatever source it comes, should transcend the confining identities thrust upon them. Not only liberals, but socialists also conceived emancipation as the transcendence over social context and particularities of one's ascriptive identities.

The reason why liberals distrust ascriptive groups and culture communities as the site for emancipatory action is because such groups presume a core or bedrock identity which supposedly entrenches divisive cleavages in society. The prescription is that no single group should enjoy a monopoly within its particular domain, and individuals should be able to move between various affiliations with relative ease, sustaining simultaneous memberships. The idea that one is part of an embattled minority or an oppressed grouping, seems to threaten to upset the ecology of a democratic civil society, demanding too much of their members and reinforcing, rather than mediating, divisive social cleavages.

In the eyes of many liberals, the romantic tradition provides the key to the interpretation of identity politics. Continuing its critique of Enlightenment thought, current advocates of identity politics, they suggest, repeat the fallacies of anti-rationalism, and set themselves against modernity's promise to emancipate the individual from custom and hierarchy. Identity-based groups, be it the cultural community or the ethnic community, promote a sectarian and determinist logic whereby one arbitrary, unchosen part of a person's overall identity is rendered a defining feature of their beliefs and destiny.

In fact, several liberal arguments are ranged against group identity.

(a) There is an incompatibility between the moral requirements of citizenship in a democracy and the obligation demanded of individual members of overly encompassing communities. Citizens have to leave their particularistic identities behind in order to have a satisfactory interaction with the larger

society (Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)

(b) The values of liberalism are not culturally biased, as the theorists of 'differences' maintain. It is founded upon impartial principles of right (Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001)

(c) Human interests are transient. Cultural or ethnic identities are oppressive by their very nature to the individual members. Associational rights are therefore adequate constitutional safeguards. Groups with unchanging, fixed characteristics and boundaries are harmful to individual freedom (Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" in *Political Theory* 20, 1 (Feb. 1992); p. 112

It would be tempting to agree with these and other related arguments regarding the individual and his interests to maintain an identity, if we were left with the other alternative interpretation of the self and its constitutive identity which the above theories are directed against. Communitarian theory of the self and the idea of community, these theories criticizes, gives rise to the communitarian-influenced theory of the primordialist community. Such a theory of the community tends to present the identity around which the cultural and moral lives of groups are ordered as both homogenous and primordial in kind. The identity which the group members share is presumed to arise from relatively stable and usually fixed communal inter-relations, creating a closed group with fixed boundaries.

The debate on the individual and its identity is not limited to political theory, but cut across public debate and academic disciplines such as anthropology and historiography. One of the most potent influences on thinking about community identity finds its source from colonial historiography and anthropology, which we shall later on see with regard to the understanding of nations and nationalism in the Third World countries.

The liberal-communitarian debate need not detain us here. There are significant insights to be had from the communitarian perspective while we do not wholly accept its premises and foundations. The idea of the 'dialogicality' of the nature of identity, propounded by Charles Taylor if special interests. Taylor with originality formulated his idea of the 'dialogical' nature of identity as opposed to the individualized or 'monological' identity that is predominant in liberal discourse. In his view, accepting the dialogical identity of the self requires us to evaluate social and political institutions not merely in terms of equal dignity supposedly satisfied by an equal package of rights, but in terms whether or not harm is done by not recognizing or misrecognizing what is required in ensuring equal dignity for different individuals who are unique in themselves.[16]

Identity is dialogical in the sense that we defined our identity in dialogue or exchange with others by acquiring "rich human languages of expression" which include both verbal and non-verbal forms. In talking about the dialogical nature of identity, Taylor recognizes that our identity is sometimes formed "in struggle against the things our significant others want to see in us."[17] Thus, even when identity-formation is dialogical, the trend that we see in nationalist consolidation can be said to be in struggle against the dominant group's attempt to belittle or delegitimize the claims of minority or marginalized groups and foisting its own identity as the 'national' upon them.

I emphasize this aspect of dialogicality (dialogical here because it involves identity formulation in struggle against what is received as given out by the other, say an identity or an image) because it always takes place in an environment where the individual encounters an already structured configuration of power, resource allocation, status, norms and culturally differentiated practices. Individuals in similar situation by dint of their own evolved identity would try to alter the situation. This is evident in cases of nationalist mobilization in which the ethnic base becomes a ready element on which to build a national identity. So, in contrast to the view that an individual chooses his identity freely based on his material and cultural interests, we

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[16] See Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition' in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994
[17] Taylor, *ibid.* pp. 32-33

should note that individuals are not free-floating entities who land on whichever culture they like. They are rooted in cultures which they help to shape and define. Besides, the associational freedom which presupposes the existence of diverse economic and cultural opportunities doesn't say anything about the advantages or constraints that different individuals face. The social and institutional context in which opportunities are offered already has structural bias.

This is evident because the introduction of modern political economy doesn't smoothly supplant the traditional structure of social relations with all its faultlines and alignment. Though the discourse on underdevelopment, economic marginalization and class domination has its basis in reality, it is nonetheless grossly inadequate for thinking through nationalist claims. Therefore, theorizing justice beyond distribution and capturing the logic of identity as instrument of domination and oppression, and as a strategy for dominated groups to break free of such domination, should inform our thinking about problems as those that confront us in inter-group relations in India as elsewhere. Minority nations make nationalist claims against a dominant majority whose values, culture and language are overwhelmingly reflected and used in the public culture.

Domination and oppression are forms in social relations that are possible within inclusion and exclusion. We can oppress people by forcibly including them into a dominant structure so that they are 'prevented from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings' which are more easily available in their own cultures.[18] In fact, one way of seeing social conflict is to see it as the outcome of social and political exclusion, and the other is as a response to the invidious way of forcible inclusion or assimilation. Many of the national conflicts— Turkish-Kurds, Spanish-Basque, British-Irish, etc.—can be said to be not of 'ethnic exclusivity' but of forcible assimilation by the majority.

The aspect of domination that a group perceives itself to be the object may not have a dominant national majority in the state as the subject of domination. An ethnic

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[18]Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*; p. 38

community can be sufficiently aroused to political consciousness due to the perceived domination it endures at the hands of a dominant group in its immediate context which may itself be a minority in the larger society of a state. So, in a context specific to a region, while both the dominant and dominated groups are themselves dominated within the overall institutional structure, a politics that is grounded on their distinctiveness would take the form, at least initially but not necessarily, of a claim for redressal of felt injustices in relation to its immediate dominant 'other'. Thus, domination is never simply a dominant group and a dominated one, or a dominant group and many dominated groups enduring together. It is always a multidimensional, multilayered structure, which I call 'the hierarchy of domination', extending down to the bottom of organized political and social relation.

And so if domination is so pervasive a phenomenon and all the dominated groups potentially able and liable to make political claims on the state, where do we draw the line where the claims can be adjudged to be legitimate or illegitimate in the political arena? Claims do not go unregulated. If in decentralized Spain, minority nations like the Catalans, Basques and others are designated 'nationalities' and autonomous areas as 'regions', or the United Nations deal with the claims of ethnic minorities 'native' to their states with the appellation of 'Rights of Indigenous Peoples', the omission of the plain term 'nation' is not an innocent one. Or as in America, Indian tribes are recognized as 'domestic dependent nations', while Puerto Rico is a 'commonwealth' and Guam a 'protectorate'.

As Fenton and May pointed out, the reason for consciously avoiding according the term 'nation' to such groups by established nation-states and supranational bodies is that 'the status carries with it the corollary, or at least possibility, of claims of self-determination, claims that would be potentially disruptive to the larger states within which national minorities and indigenous peoples are encapsulated.'[19] The existing order which is in the favour of one group or the other is thus reinforced with social and institutional practices and norms that claim universality and impartiality. Dominant groups choose the terms of the socio-political and cultural discourses which go into lending legitimacy to what actually happens in reality.

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[19]Fenton and May, 'Ethnicity, Nation and 'Race': Connections and Disjunctures'; p. 5

The potential disruptiveness of nationalist claims to the established nation-states does not say whether the continuation of the established order provides a justifiable ground for its continuation. The emancipatory potential of nationalism in modern contexts must be seen through the question of justice and democracy. So, when Amitai Etzioni argued, at a time when new nationalisms were emerging in Eastern Europe within the context of the end of the Cold War, that 'it is time to withdraw moral approval' from self-determination movements because they no longer have the capacity to create more democratic states,[20] its contrast with Francis Fukuyama's declaration of 'the end of history'[21]—that benevolent civilization has reached its zenith in the liberal democratic states of the West, and henceforth, it would be a march of democracy in the rest of the world too, with liberal democracy having no serious moral challenge—cannot be missed. Both the claims seem premature and one-sided. Different contexts present different pictures.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was proclaimed as the triumph of western democracy over communist systems. The effect of the fall of communism in East European states was followed by the dismemberment of larger states. The new nationalisms that emerged were not quite 'imagined' into existence but supplanted older forms of solidarity based on ethnic lines. Rather than the result of formation of new states, the national identity was very much present before the dissolution of the previously larger states and it was due to this national consciousness in the first place that the bigger states dissolved. Whether these new nations have successfully democratized is not wholly a question of the triumph or failure of nationalism *per se*, but is influenced by the complex power configuration along ethnic lines and a process underscored by past as well as present ethnic repression.

The struggle of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples for a 'nationalist' claim to political recognition can be no more immoral than the claims of various other forms of identity politics, in the name of 'difference', culture, or identity to renegotiate the boundaries of the political. In fact, the struggle for renegotiating the terms of their

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[20]Quoted in Sanjib Baruah, *India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 2

[21]Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History' in *The National Interest*, Summer 4, 1989; also see Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992

representation in public institutions, and the rights that should be institutionalized to recognize the particular needs of groups are all based on the issues of justice. The particular claims of national or ethnic minorities may be subject to negotiation, but to foreclose their admission into the political arena would be to deny justice to such groups perpetuated through many ideas designed to defend the domination of majority groups.

3.3: Nationalism and Marxism

The whole arena of Marxist discourse is based on the economic structure of domination and insecurity in a capitalist society. They had made an immense contribution in the field of class conflict, economic structure of the society, and consciously worked towards an all-inclusive explanation of human history and social transformation. For the Marxist, class division is inevitable in a society and that class is generally refers to a structural position within a production system. And for that, a class mobilization involves a question about the relationships between economic and political processes, which a 'class-in-itself' can become a 'class-for-itself'. The argument is that rather than classes pre-existing their mobilization, class is constructed through mobilization, in a society marked by structured economic inequality. Class, in this sense, is constructed politically, and hence, in part is constructed 'discursively'.[22] However, of all the historical phenomena discussed by the Marxist, their treatment of nationalism, nationalist movements and the emergence of the nation-state is the least satisfactory. They did not discussed nationalism in a systematic way, and what we have are a number of disjointed statements, dealing with the issue sometimes on a very general level.

In fact, Marx in response to the developments leading toward the unification of Germany and Italy gives the explanation of nationalism as a modern superstructural expression of the bourgeois need for larger markets and territorial consolidation.[23]

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[22]Jeff Pratt, *Class, Nation and Identity: The Anthropology of Political Movements*, 2003, p. 15
[23]Shlomo Avineri, "Marxism and Nationalism". *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Sept. 1991), Vol. 26, No. 3/4. P. 5

Thus, Marx situates nationalism as a 'building block' of capitalism. Nationalism is no longer pre-modern for Marx - it is the epitome of the processes of capitalist development and industrialization. Capitalism needs large economic entities and it is the direct economic interest of the bourgeoisie that the nationalist ideologies emerged as superstructural strategies of ligitimation for these economic interests. Marx, in this context, nationalism or nationalist policy of the state is only accountable to the bourgeoisie and is progressive. He directly rejects the nationalist struggle of the working class justifying that "nationality was an irrelevance or an illusion: 'The working men have no country."[24] Marx also opposed to the various national movements that emerge in Central and Eastern Europe for they were 'reactionary' in the sense that should they succeed, industrialization and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe would be slow down, and hence the eventual victory of the proletariat would be hampered. What hastens capitalist development is 'progressive', what hinders it is 'reactionary', and should be opposed.[25]

Yet a curious inconsistency becomes apparent. His stands towards the Polish lands bear the difference. Marx strongly supported Polish independence and the restoration of Polish political integrity. This appears as a straightforward view, which, while wholly instrumental, and devoid of any substantive assessment of nationalism, is consistent with Marx's general view about the relations of 'developed' to 'non-developed' societies. He is instrumental in regard to his stands towards nationalism. In these sense, we can conclude that Marx is probably now more dominant and has led to a more critical, and less rigidly determinist. Such complexities of Marx's attitude to the question of nationalism left the socialist movement an ambiguous heritage, in so far as it relied upon Marx as a guide to its policies towards the national question. In fact, it is argued that, nowhere in Marx's writings is there any mention of a right to self-determination or support for 'national liberation' as such.[26]

However, the conditions of the multi-ethnic tsarist Empire was introduced into Lenin's thought and revolutionary strategy the notion that all the nations of the Old

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[24]Quoted in Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Sage Publication, 2002, p. 9
[25]Shlomo Avineri, p. 6
[26]Ibid, p. 6

Empire - come the revolution -would perhaps have the right to self-determination and secession.[27] The assumption here is that Lenin is more liberal in a sense, he was prepared to go in for mini-nations, and to curve up the administrative units of the Old Russian Empire where these included more than one nationality. His calling for the "right of self-determination of nations" endorse with the idea that nations have right. He argued that capitalism had, as he put it, 'singled out a handful of exceptionally rich and powerful states' to divide up the world for the purposes of plunder and the extortion of super profits. In this context, some have argued, the struggle for self-determination is a core part of the struggle of oppressed nations against (oppressive) imperialism, which are claiming the legitimate right of self determination.[28] However, his notion of self-determination was limited which extent only upto a certain point, those who wished for self-determination he said must first see the error of their way, while at the same time allowed full cultural freedom for their respective nationalities.

In fact, Lenin's policy towards the border people however was two-pronged. On the one hand, the central Bolshevik government went to great lengths to recognize the desire of these peoples for freedom if they desired it. On the other hand, his policy towards the borders people was to mobilize in each territory the friends of the revolution, to have them set up a revolutionary government which is not inconsistent with his policy of self-determination.[29] Thus, Lenin by advocating his notion of self-determination is more rational and instrumental, for each individual with given wants for whom action consists solely of satisfying those wants according to the scale in which he subjectively rank them.

As opposed to the position taken by Lenin in his notion of the 'right of self-determination', Rosa Luxemburg opines that the smaller nationalities would be better within the larger (imperialist) country. Defending on the claims she argues that there was no right as such, and putting forward her arguments that such slogan will not contribute to solving the problems but a means of avoiding it, rather she allowed a

[27]Horace B. Davis, 1978, Toward a Marxist theory of Nationalism, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, p. 59.
[28]Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, 2002, p. 14
[29]Horace B. Davis, 1978, p. 69

place for federation and autonomy[30]. Whilst she did not deny that people could identify themselves in national terms, she was resolutely opposed to the politicization of such identities. Thus she says, Socialists had to challenge the concept of the nation as a category of bourgeois ideology . . . [since] in a class society, 'the nation' as a homogeneous socio-political entity does not exist . . . There literally is not one social arena – from the coarsest material relationships to the most subtle moral one – in which the possessing classes and the class-conscious proletariat hold the same attitude, and in which they appear as a consolidated 'national' identity.[31]

This does not mean that she completely rejects the identity formation in a society but she was against nationalism because it leads to fragmentation. According to her, solution to the problem of popular control was in the Marxist tradition, to have the Proletariat of the advance nations, making common cause with the minor nationalities, overthrow capitalism and bring freedom to the smaller nationalities and to the colonies from the centre, under the socialist government.

Later, Stalin who followed most of the Lenin's definition of a nation is noteworthy for its restrictiveness. A nation, he says, is an historically evolve, stable community arising on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture. If it lacks one of these characteristics, it is not a nation.[32] He rejected the notion of national-cultural autonomy but did not explain how nations could be formed at all within his definition when the nationalities were all mixed in together. He only considered that the struggle is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is chiefly favourable to and suitable for the bourgeoisie'.[33]

They agree that national peculiarities are a kind of nations 'residue' of the struggle man against nature, and of class against class. They believe that as the class conflict of their time intensified, nations as categories were tending to be dissolved into class categories united on an international basis. They agree that the proletariat

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[30]Ibid, pp. 56-59
[31]Quoted in Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, 2002, p. 11
[32]Horace B. Davis, 1978, p.71
[33]Ibid, p.75

should struggle against the oppression of the minorities and should seek to eliminate hostilities among the national minorities. As Lenin would tell us that, 'the true socialists are those who recognize the right of the oppressed nations to liberation. But this can be secured only by overthrowing the international bourgeoisie.[34] In support of these propositions they argue that the national hostility in general and oppression of minorities in particular, 'interfered with' and 'obscured' the class struggle. The fact of human insecurity makes prohibition against the use of violence necessary, the fact that human desires are indefinite entails that there will be always scarcity so that the rules of property are essential. Which is why, Marxists went further in saying that the whole economic structure should be overhauled to bring capitalist domination and exploitation to an end. Marxist, on the other hand, conceived emancipation as the transcendence over social context and particularities of one's ascriptive identities. They maintained that social order is a product of social force and that classes are the irreconcilable conflict. In such circumstances agreement over values is impossible so that progress does not come about through rational criticism but through the wholesale reconstruction of society according to rational principles.

In fact, all the Marxist theories of nationalism have been couched the national liberation struggle in not less than the class struggle. Class consciousnesses among groups are constructed and thus, sought to reject ethnicity as merely an epiphenomenon or as an instance of false consciousness. For Marxist the only form of true consciousness was class consciousness. Class consciousness arises, as Marx proclaim, from an objectively different relationships to the means of production, distribution and exchange shared by those who sell their labour power, own capital or trade in commodities or services. These different positions give them different interests. However, a more fundamental critique of the idea of class consciousness as the only true consciousness is that class awareness is predominantly an awareness of interest. And despite the beliefs of the Marxists, people live not just by interests alone but also by their emotions.

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[34] Ibid, p.79

As I noted at the beginning, the link between domination and (sub)nationalism is never simply a bipolar opposition of two groups of a local nature, but determined by the insecurity of the state at large. The structure of domination is institutionalized in the relationship between the state and its units, i.e. province at the primary level, and among various groups at different levels. The state's interests to maintain its oppressive control stems from its insecurity.

The structures of domination are already present in the structural political framework and institutions which place the constituent states highly dependent on the central authority of state power, and policies which have effectively ignored the regional needs and aspirations by subordinating them to a pan-Indian national agenda.[35] In fact, the state has its own insecurity from the subnational challenges to its project of nation-building that are common to all diverse societies. Its insecurity can be traced to three bases. First is the philosophical basis of a plural, secular democratic republic which is sought to be captured in the slogan 'unity in diversity'. The diversity that it allows is one which is permissible in cultural matters, but not in the political arena. Any talk of separate political rights by groups is viewed with deep suspicion and met with repression. Secondly, the geopolitical situation of the North-East with not so friendly, and sometimes hostile, neighbours contribute to India's fears that such neighbours can destabilize the polity and threaten its integrity, if the North-East is not monitored tightly under central domination. And lastly, a political reason that a politically autonomous state or states in the region will lead to a 'slippery slope' with similar demands from the rest of the country has no less limited its maneuverability in relation to the problems in the North-East.

This insecurity on the part of the state has effects on the kind of policies that are framed for states in the region. It has reinforced a complex structure of domination with repressive laws and military subjugation, and the selective use, co-option or patronage by the state of certain groups/sections in the form of a server-client relationship to maintain its control, which leads to the fragmentation of identities. In a society marked by ethnic loyalties and identity considerations, the state's use of

[35]Sanjib Baruah, *India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 204, 207

63

particular groups is not random, thereby creating a near-permanent chasm between different groups. Groups which are dominated organize themselves with the aim of redressing the imbalance and protecting their own interests, wherein the reference for mobilization is most often framed in relation to the 'other', meaning the immediate dominant group. It may be argued that this is common to all societies, but most sharply and ominously heightened in the society of the Northeast which accounts for the high incidence of group conflict.

So, even in group conflict, the state is, in significant ways, not a neutral arbitrator. For the state, it is more convenient, especially when divested of democratic responsibility, to deal with the larger society through the mediations of certain sections or groups who are most favourably tuned into the preconceived agenda of the state. Once the agenda of the state are delinked from the interests and aspirations of the people, there is a heightened sense of insecurity among the various groups which result in the formation of militant outfits. These outfits not only put pressure on governmental mechanisms to fulfill their aspirations but come to serve crucial needs, especially security needs, of the groups they claim to represent.[36]

Thus, a democratic structure notwithstanding, there still exists a whole array of institutional factors that hampers the deepening of democratic institutions and processes, and a syndrome that is synonymous with distrust and insecurity has developed and seeped into the very fabric of group relations. An analysis of the politics of identity that is all over the place has to begin with the concept of domination and oppression. 'Domination', according to Iris Young, 'consists in institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions.' They can be said to 'live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their action, either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of their actions.'[37] Sociologically speaking, domination and oppression go beyond formal institutional conditions; they can be felt experiences in everyday life where there are no obvious institutional backings.

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[36]Sanjib Baruah, 'Gulliver's Troubles: State and Militants in North-East India' in *Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) October 12, 2002.*

[37]Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference..*; p.38

CHAPTER IV

UNDERSTANDING WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD NATION
AND NATIONALISM: A COINCIDING PHENOMENON?

As seen in the previous chapter, the politics of identity did not materialize out of a historical vacuum but is the result of domination and insecurity that a group faced in the long process of history. In understanding an ideal, it is first necessary to understand the context in which it evolves and to see what purpose it is meant to serve. But merely understanding the historical context does not indicate what is implied or not implied in the idea. Thus, an ideal is always justified through a background complex of moral assumptions that make it coherent and comprehensible, amendable through revaluation and be meaningful in different contexts. An ideal will become a dogma unless it is reinterpreted and reformulated to suit a new context or a changed environment. However, in the course of reinterpretations, it is also subject to contesting assumptions, thereby exposing it to attacks that can either lead to a firmer restatement or to losing its relevance.

4.1: The Exercise of Nationalism: Exploring Western and the Third World Nationalism

The questions of nation, Nationalism and ethnic conflict have gained more popularity in the Third World countries however many scholars try to understand the emergence of nationalism as not less than the European import which has a purely created or

constructed discourse. Thus, this chapter relooks at the nations and nationalism in the third world countries, and sees how the divisions of nationalism as civic or ethnic, western or eastern, good or bad, constructed or real, liberal or illiberal could fit in this discourse. Most of the countries of the Third World were colonies of different powers over a period of time. No doubt, these had created a situation where the western influences in the Third World continue to dominate even after its independence for its political, economic and social stability. Not only in administration but also in understanding their unique cultures and tradition, western influences were always referred to as the beginning of activism in social consciousness and mobilisations. The western influence and the imperial experience have exerted on the remodelling of the vision in Third World countries thereby generalizing them into the same discourse with that of the western model as merely the outcome of nationalism that developed in the 19th century in Western Europe.

Most of the general literatures on nationalism still concern the existence of distinct civic and ethnic types, with the former supposedly preponderant as Western, and the latter as Eastern. According to this explanation, civic nations are those characterized by an emphasis on citizenship, individual rights, and obligations within a political community, and which have been observed in countries with the early development of a unified state, a long and shared political history, and strong and adaptable political elites within a defined territorial and legal framework. Ethnic nations, on the other hand, have the emphasis placed upon shared myths of ancestry and historical memories, as well as common culture, and have been observed in places with threatened elites, and early democratization or late modernization.[1] These divisions of nationalism can be found in John Plamenatz distinction between 'western' and 'eastern' types of European Nationalism. Western nationalism, though, there is the feeling that the nation is at a disadvantage with respect to others, is nevertheless already 'culturally equipped' to make the attempt to remove those deficiencies. Eastern nationalism, on the other hand, has appeared among 'peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly

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[1] For a critical discussion of the strengths and weakness of the civic and ethnic framework of nationalism see Edward Mortimer (ed.), *people, Nation and State: The meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999.

dominant standards'.[2] Those standards have come from an alien culture, and that the inherited culture of the nation did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable it to reach those standards of progress. The search therefore was for a generation of the national culture, adapted to the requirement of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness.[3]

The major perception in the light of this argument is that nation and nationalism in the Third world countries are not less than the European import though their bases of nationalism are in much different. The universality of these views which make to think that the world has a single centre[4] has failed to understand the true nature of the complex society of the Third World which are believed to have a deep root in their history. What we see as nationalism in the Third World countries is that the masses are still 'deeply religious' and 'historically cultured'; the ruling classes are partly 'neo-traditionalist' and partly 'Westernised' which still seems to have based on a strong dose of non-rational elements in their political behaviour.[5] These 'westernised' factors of culture and behaviour are considered by the instrumentalist or the constructivist as socially constructed nations and those ethnic group boundaries are not primordial. For that matter, I consider the constructivist or the instrumentalists are true because ethnicity, as an independent variable can be abused and manipulated in the process of forming a group and its mobilisation. Yet, it is questionable whether, and how far, they can be constructed. There is, I believe, a sincere desire to preserve something from the past instead of fully employed in the hands of the elites as an instrument for material gain or as the product of modernity.[6]

Let me begin with Partha Chatterjee's[7] argument on Anderson's 'imagined communities' which he found inadequate to describe nationalism in the Post-colonial societies. Though he regards the modernity of nationalism, thing which does not

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[2]Quoted from Partha Chattarjee, *Nationalist thought and the Colonialist World.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 1-2

[3]Ibid.

[4]Considering Europe as a reference point, to which, all other regions are to be located and said to have received their meaning.

[5]Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism,* New York: Routledge, 1992, p. xv

[6]Though I accept that nation and nationalism is a modern concept, I disagree with their complete rejection of the past which the modernist and the instrumentalist have advocated.

[7]Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and post Colonial Histories.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

convince him in Anderson's arguments is that, the most powerful as well as the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a *difference* with the "modular" forms of the national society propagated by the modern West. His two domain - outside and inner – spell out that the outside domain (economy, statecraft, science and technology) are subject to change due to the superiority of the West. However, the inner domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity left unchanged and thus, is not Western. This essential domain, for him is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hand of the colonial power.[8] In fact, he gives emphasis on the middle-class elites to have first imagined the nation into being in this spiritual or inner dimension. Thus, it is not only the print capitalism or modern education alone but the elite actors which play an important role in imagining the nation or in bringing such consciousness to the society.

I have less problem in regards to his arguments that nationalist text which addressed both to 'the people' who were said to constituted the nation and the colonial masters whose claim to rule nationalism, sought to demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world.[9] His idea that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining their cultural identity. I find it disturbing with the allegation of placing nation as a handy works of the elite middle class who led to imagine the nations. If it is conceived as an elites creation, from where these elites come from? Do they not belong to the same community to which nations are sought? It is obvious that though higher in status they belong to the same community. Being exposed to, or taught more of the other culture he/she is the first person to feel the need to preserving his/her societal identity. Thus, it is not his/her creation but rather recreates or reinvents existing identity.

A similar problem arises as to the linkage between consciousness and action, it is difficult to specify whether action precedes consciousness as materialist maintain' or consciousness precedes action as psychologists postulate. One cannot deny the role

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[8]Ibid, p.5-6

[9]Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonialist World*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986. p.30

of the politically literate classes' conscious discovery of society as an entity, but we must also see the real element of tradition, of symbols, of myths and culture which is a key to the subjective meanings attached to nationalist elements. For instance, national identity is psychologically nothing but an other-induced reference point which indeed 'takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course'.[10] Therefore, what is conceived as elites creation is because the literate classes first felt the need of preserving their cultural identity, it is not equal to saying that they created, but rather they "re-invented" which is already there but lost its existence for a long time. Although a certain amount of learning process is involved, there is a serious limit to imitation unless supported by favourable *objective* conditions of shared culture, cohesive social structure and common communication system of any historical society that has provided the necessary conditions for the rise of nationalism in the Third World.

If we conceived nation as an elite's creation as many scholars of nationalism do, how can the masses just blindly accept those imaginations? Unless there is something as real, people do not just follow. For, the Third world nationalism is based on the salience of culture in national identity formation, the voluntaristic process of mass mobilization as a means for a nation-in-the making.[11] Therefore, it exists and has their base on some real elements as symbols, myth, memories, histories, etc. in order to bind them together as one. Even if nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self consciousness and is invents, where it does not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on,[12] what is that pre-existing differentiating mark? From where do those pre-existing marks came from? As Smith notes, that the very continuity of existing states was often proffered as evidence of the primordiality of the nation they embody. And these visions were 'heavily influenced by an organic nationalism which posited the "rebirth" of nations after centuries of somnolence, amnesia and silent invisibility'.[13]

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[10]Dawa Norbu. 1992. p. 4

[11]Ibid, p.5

[12]Partha Chatterjee, 1986. p. 4

[13]Anthony D. Smith, 'Dating the nation', in Daniele Conversi (ed.), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World*, New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 53

Drawing from this duality of arguments, it is to come across the assumption that the western world modernized and came to have liberal secular societies through a single, universal process of historical development. Nothing can be seeing farther from the truth. In fact, even a cursory look at the history of Europe and America would shows that equality, liberty, fraternity, etc., considered as the hallmark of western civic nationalism, came through different historical trajectories.

In tracing the root of nationalism in the Third World, the Western influence has often assumed as the beginning. This is because; they create a condition to the people awareness about their culture without which, they may lose their originality. No written document was available to such society, though they have rich culture and traditions, and as such education became the prime, in awareness. For instance, Partha Chatterjee precisely brings out the argument in the statements of Bankimchandra's called for the people of Bengal that, "We have no history! We must have a history" was, strictly speaking incorrect.[14] He argued that the colonial historiography distorted the history of the Bengal through the writing which resulted into discrepancy far from the truth. Partha Chatterjee points out thus, "This reproach was that there was no history of Bengal written by Bengalis themselves. "In our judgement, there is not a single English book which contains the true history of Bengal." Why? Because the English had based the histories of Bengal on the testimonies of foreign Muslim chroniclers; there was no Bengali testimony reflected in those histories. Consequently, Bengalis could not accept them as their own history. "Anyone who uncritically accepts as history the testimony of these lying, Hindu-hating Musalman zealots is not a Bengal".[15] As I see it, it is too simple to conclude with Chatterjee's arguments whose imaginations of this culture as credited in the hands of middle class for their own material interest by recounting the political events of the past.

Though he criticised this Bankin's nationalist call saying that the historical consciousness he is seeking to invoke is in no way an "indigenous" consciousness because the preferred discursive form of his historiography is modern Europe. However, it is also important to note that nationalism or cultural consciousness or

[14]Partha Chatterjee, 1995, p.76
[15]Ibid.

mobilisation can be a result of misinterpretation or miscalculation, favouritism of one's culture over the other, distortion of one's history by the colonial historiography. Being coming to conscious of culture, those educated people from the community by recalling the past as well as preserving what is available as source of culture, say symbols, myth, etc. try to create their history. In doing so, they are not just imagining. Through imagining they also try to collect as much data as they can from their past, which coincide with its elements of real.

In turning towards one's identity and to induce effective mobilisation, culture, religion, language and tradition became very important in the Third World countries. In other words, in these traditional universe as represented by most parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, it is primarily cultural symbolic that enhance the sense of national or ethnic identity mixed with some aspect of modern ideology of equality and freedom. Why is this happened in the Third World countries and not in the western society? As being mixed with the alien culture, at first the nationalist in the Third World countries try to adopt the policies of the western culture, i.e. the principles of equality and freedom in order to rule out foreign dominations. And these were accepted by the majority in the state because everyone had experienced the evil effect of foreign domination, and it was not possible for one ethnic group to fight against the dominant foreign rule. Therefore, the predominant objective of the Third World nationalism was to do away the colonial dominations from the states. As a result, various groups, in spite of its differences cooperated themselves to achieve it predominant objectives and in such moves mostly the majorities lead the way. For instance, India at the time of freedom struggle set together all those ethnic groups to fight against the Britishers and the Hindus, a majority group, led the way. As Bhargava argues that "well before the radical politicization of the Indian National Congress, a distinct liberal stream existed which merged with and inherited a diffuse but persistent strain of something akin to a liberal view."[16] The introduction of western modernity through British imperialism had helped the emergence of a middle class committed to liberal demands of equality of opportunity and the treatment of persons as equal individuals. The adoption of a liberal democratic constitution with

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[16]Rajeev Bhargava, "Liberal, Secular Democracy and Explanations of Hindu Nationalism", in Andrew Wyatt and John Zavos (ed), *Decentring the Indian Nation*, London and Portland: Frank Lass, 2003, p. 79

fundamental rights of individuals as one of its core features was the high point of the nationalist phase. It was not done by political elite in a fit of absent-mindedness without a thought on its possible impact.[17]However, such nationalism did not actually rule out their differences, ethnicity prevailed even at the time of their struggle against the British. Thus, placing within the framework of ethnic nationalism, Christophe Jaffrelot argues, "It is this ethnicity, that distinguishes Hindu nationalism from the universalism of Indian nationalist ideology, with its projection of 'all individuals, all communities living within British India' as the nation."[18]

Though, nationalism seems to represent all group of society, in a strict sense it is not. The nationalist in the struggles for in its reinterpretations of themes draw from the established tradition of Hinduism.[19] It has been said that Hinduism is not merely a religion, but a way of life and a culture. And that in the pretext of this arguments, start to imposed on other, though not directly, the minority groups start to feel their insecurity and dominations, which in term leads to communalism, conflict and war. Hindu nationalism, for instance, is defined as an ideology that seeks to imagine or over a period coterminous with the development of elite-led Indian construct a community (i.e. a nation) on the basis of a common culture – a culture configured by a particular notion of Hinduism. And that Hindu communalism is a kind of structure that aligns the interests – social, cultural, political, economic – of this imagined or constructed community precisely against the interests of other religious communities, particularly, to that of the Indian Muslims.[20] Though initially nationalism was started to fight against the colonial power bringing equality to every group, however, this liberal views of the initial nationalist slowly turn to radical, excluding communities of other groups, forming its own group in the name of promoting common interest of the whole society. Hindu Sabha, for example, was formed to 'protect the interests of the Hindus by stimulating in them the feelings of self-respect, self-help and mutual cooperation so that by a combined effort there would be some chance of promoting

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[17]Ibid, pp78-82
[18]John Zavos, Identity politics and nationalism I colonial India, in Steve Fenton and Stephen Mays, *Ethnonational Identities*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 113
[19]Ibid
[20]Ibid, p.112

72

moral, intellectual, social and material welfare of the individuals of which the nation is composed'.[21]

Minimally, a secular state has to be committed to values like religious liberty and equality understood within a broad framework of liberty and equality in all other spheres, and civic peace or anti-barbarism.[22] It is also sensitive to minimal procedures upon which it relies when competing values and ideals generate conflict. How far the state can coincide with these secular principles is a question. India, though is a secular state, is never lost its domination. The majority group, often try to influence their culture while forming an identity or in implementing policies which in term brings a counter rivalry among various other groups. Indeed, faced with a multiplicity of competing identity, the clash and intertwinement between the dominant cultural symbols and the indigenous or the minority's symbols produces a dialectics of appropriation and expropriation that generates a politics of 'otherization', a conflict of authenticity, ownership and legitimacy over these symbols.[23] This domination of culture can be hierarchical where a group from below is not opposed directly to the actual dominant group but is directed to his immediate dominant group. Such politics of culture, is then perceives as a moment of making culture an instrument of survival by an ethnic community which served as a root to its identity. That example is also seen in the case of the North-East part of India, where the thematic of insurgency in the North East is the recovery of the lost terrain, and the reconstruction of a legitimate and autonomous identity. [24]

Now with a strong emphasis on the equality and freedom of the individuals, the majority through a common interest try to dominate the others. If we analyze clearly the above discussion, I think there is a 'hierarchy of domination' existing in the society where domination flows from the upper to the lower i.e. the Britishers before India's independence were placed in the upper hierarchy, then come the Hindus as the dominant group in the Indian society, who tries to imagine or construct communities against the interest of the other religious communities, particularly the

[21]John Zavo, 2002, p.116
[22]Rajeev Bhargava, 2003
[23]Prasenjit Biswas and Chandan Sukabaidya, *Ethnic Life-Worlds in North-East India.* New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2008, p. 154
[24]Ibid

Indian Muslims,[25] then move towards the lower level of Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, etc. and these institutionalized process continued in its units, i.e. province at the primary level, and among various groups at different levels. Assam was apportion into smaller states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh as a result of domination and insecurity felt by those minority groups that falls within the premise of the dominant group of Assam. This cult of ethnic separation is getting further boasted by the trend of dilution of secular values and growing signs of religious intolerance within the mainstream Indian communities. Therefore, in every level there involved an 'internal colonisation'[26] where the minority groups always remain suspicious of the majority actions and policies towards the larger national goal.

However, it does not mean minorities are always in the inferior positions. What is important here is the existence of hierarchy whether it is the majority that dominates or vice versa. There are some cases –Sri-Lanka, Rwanda, etc. - where the minority groups, have over a period enjoyed domination over the majorities. In Rwanda, the Hutu constitutes around 85 percent of the country's population. However, the minority's Tutsi who were originally the cattle herders took up soldiers and civil servant which gave them a dominant position in the society. The original inhabitants, i.e. the descendants of the Hutus, though live as majority in Rwanda, they remained mostly as farmers. It has been said that the Hutus and the Tutsis spoke the same language, shared many customs and traditions, intermarried, and lived together unsegregated. But what distinguished them is the occupational status. Such occupational status has later created a hierarchical system, in which patrons were mostly Tutsi and clients mostly Hutu. As the hierarchy was multi-layered, some Tutsi were also clients, but rarely of Hutu.[27] These social structures, eventually led to the domination of Hutus by Tutsi both politically and economically and thus this ethnic difference became the most important social cleavage in the post-colonial era. Such a society, though a major divide was mostly between the Hutus and Tutsi, there exist a number of structural levels even among the Hutus and the Tutsis. However, in spite of

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[25]See the details from John Zavos, Identity politics and nationalism in colonial India, in Steve Fenton and Stephen Mays, *Ethnonational Identities*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Also in Andrew Wyatt and John Zavos (ed), *Decentring the Indian Nation*, London and Portland: Frank Lass, 2003.
[26]Ibid, p. 13
[27]Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 25

these divisions at the national level or in the larger level, they gain unity on the basis of the ethnic groups to which they belong.

With the emergence of Rwanda as an independent state, the Hutu called for decolonization and democratization, denying that Tutsi were anything but immigrants with no place in a Rwandan nation. Tutsi, on the other hand, drew very different inferences from history and rejected any Hutu role in the running of the emerging country because of their own superiority. However, when an election was held after much hardship, the Hutus being majority won the elections breaking down the year long domination of the Tutsis. Such ethnic conflict and sentiment grew much stronger which ultimately led to genocide in 1994.[28]

Similar conflicts arise in Sri-Lanka where the Sri-Lankan Tamils after independence became dominant in business and in civil service which was not received well by the majority Sinhalese community. Thus, when the Britishers introduced universal suffrage in 1931 the Sinhalese being a majority was placed in a better position and dominated over the Sri-Lankan Tamils. This created an ethnic tension between the two. Slowly these differences began to grow as the Sinhalese began to dominate not only in the share of power and influences but also discriminate them (Sri-Lankan Tamils) culturally. The replacement of English by Sinhala as the official language of the Sri-Lankan Nationals fuelled more tension between the two communities. However, unlike Rwanda, the Sri-Lankan peoples are divided on the basis of their religion, race and language. The Tamils originated from the Dravidian Stock of South India, speak Tamil and are mainly Hindus. Whereas, the Sinhalese lay claimed their descent from the Aryans of north India, Speak Sinhala and are mainly Buddhist.[29] Thus, we take into account the debates of the primordialist and the modernist whose account could at best answer to these growths of nationalism Does there exist any real identity or is then mere construction of identity? The primordialism would say that these complex and opaque histories of contemporary national communities mean that we cannot show the factual truth of their claims to

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[28]Ibid, pp. 25-27
[29]See the details from Kousar J. Azam (ed), E*thnicity, Identity and the State in South Asia,* New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 2001. Also in Stefan Wolff, *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. And Devin T. Hagerty (ed) *South Asia in World Politics* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

common ancestry. Indeed, most would accept Walker Connor's formulation that the nation is 'a group of people who *feel* that they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of *felt* kinship ties'. But the primordialist suggestion is that such beliefs are likely to be strongest when they are most authentic. Their transmission through the generations may indeed involve some distortion and simplification; they may well be adopted by assimilating minorities; and they may well be embroidered and elaborated by intellectuals and political elites. But it is suggested that kinship ideologies articulated by élites will only engender nationalist sentiment where they resonate with the collective memories of the wider populace, and where they refer to myths of common ancestry which are substantially true.[30] We can possibly ask how is the myth of ancestry in the case of the Sri-Lankans if is so argued? The Sri-Lankans, be it the Tamils or the Sinhalese are both immigrants which claim their ancestries to the Tamils in South India and the Aryans in North India respectively.

If the early nationalist were primarily concerned with the fate of their great tradition in the emerging world, their successors employ those traditions which they inherit from the earlier ancestors to command effective mobilisations be it in religions, culture, tradition, myths, or even the symbols as a means to its national identity. Thus, in many instances certain aspects of the symbolic data are then constituted as factors of their national identity; and the differences among various national identities so as to maintain their respective uniqueness are made possible by the emphasis each social group makes on a specific ethnic variable, which in turn becomes the key symbol during a mass mobilization. Thus when a leader seeks to mobilize the masses, he consciously or subconsciously manipulates certain symbols that effectively penetrate the heart and soul of social self-hood, self-identity and self-interest. He is instigating the collective ego to assert its general will so that common interest, both cultural and material, may be protected or advanced by means of mass mobilization which is served as agents of social power in the Third World.

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[30]David Brown, *Contemporary nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics,* London: Routledge, 2000, p. 6-7

However, this does not mean that all forms of nations and nationalism in the Third World countries are identical. Each state has its own uniqueness in identifying themselves, where some countries are religious in nature, some cultural-tradition; some are racial and ethnic, having its own diverse interests. For instance, communalism is not the same in every state. In the case of India communalism is referred to religious contrast; whereas, in the case of Malay it is concerned with racial disparity and in Congo with tribe division.[31] But what is important here is the historical component, which Anthony Smith referred as the 'Naval' is never lost its significance. Although Partha Chatterjee advocates nation and nationalism as elites' creation, he finds problems with the nation-sate and spelt out forcefully at the start of his book, *The Nation and its Fragments*, in which he says, the result is that autonomous forms of imagination of the community were, and continue to be, overwhelmed and swamped by the history of the postcolonial state. Here lies the root of our postcolonial misery: not in our inability to think out new forms of the modern community but in our surrender to old forms of the modern state.[32] What is important here is his arguments of 'in our surrender' which clearly depicts how strong and important is the European influence in imagining communities. But being a powerful agent is not to deny the existence of a real society. It is always there. As we have seen from the above few cases, nationalist of those countries are directed more towards their consciousness of traditions than following the liberal principles of modern state as they go further in search of their identity. It was because at that point of time (when nation or nationalism first begins) the local groups or communities were too weak to imagine their communities. However, the fact that the Indians in Malaya has not so far posed a very serious threat to the viability of the state does not mean that it will not do so if something odd happened to them as well. Primordially based political solidarities have a deep abiding strength in most of the new states, but it is not always an active and immediately apparent one.[33]

The typology here is that ethnic feeling is always present in the society either the civic or the ethnic state. Ethnic feeling is found not only in a state but also found

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[31]Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of Cultures: Selected essays*, New York: Basic Books Inc. 1973, p. 256
[32]Partha Chatterjee, 1993, p. 11
[33]Clifford Geertz, 1973, p. 264

even in simple tribal societies, but what made western colonialism perhaps the most powerful agent of arousing these social consciousness about social self-hood and identity in the minds of the colonized was the fact that the capitalist imperialists radically differed from the existing society in history, racially, culturally, politically and above all technologically. Such deep-rooted and overwhelming differences naturally tended to accentuate the notions of 'we' and 'they' differentiation and demarcation lines much more than in earlier historical cases. Having faced with the conditions of domination under western colonialism over a period, even after independence, those countries remain suspicious of the activities of one ethnic group or communities over the other –a fear of domination through neutralization- and as such conflict begins when toleration, policies and programmes. This happens when one community crosses the domains of the other. Thus, even the small ethnic group remains sensitive to what the other group is up to, and that keeps them united and preserve their distinct common identity, not necessarily involving conflict, but want to be different from the mainstream to let the people know that they also exist, to recognise, and respect their identity.

Apart from groups who are already in conflicts, there are also many potential groups who are yet to give their assurance to reveal it. So, in this crucial stance towards conflict, we need to see it through the distinction between 'civic nationalism' and 'ethnic nationalism'. On what basis these distinctions are made and how do they differ? Most nationalisms are civic or ethnic in varying degrees, with some like those in the US, France and in India are predominantly civic. However, in USA, in spite of the claims that the overarching national identity exist almost completely independent from individual ethnic identity, their affirmative action programmes are perhaps the most obvious indication that ethnicity is politically relevant. Though civic, different ethnic identities do not stop people from identifying themselves and the other as 'fellow Americans'.[34]

What is amiss in such accounts is the fact that there are ingrained hierarchies of status in the social and cultural life of the political community, which liberal individualists think are irrelevant, and, therefore invisible, to the state. Thus, the

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[34]Stefan Wolff, 2006, p. 32

WASPM (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Male) concept, say in North America or in Britain, has real dimensions in creating a status hierarchy. It says that it is better to be white than black, yellow or red, better to be of Anglo-Saxon origin than Caucasian, Latin or Asian, better to be Protestant than Catholic or others, better to be male than female, or even better to be heterosexual than homosexual. This status hierarchy involves defining what is 'liberal' by the advantaged groups, and creates discrimination such as discernible in the invisibility or stereotyping of the 'different' others in the media, schools, museums, state symbols and other public institutions.[35]

This is not less in France as well. France is also not less than an ethnic state; ethnic differences emerged with distinct identities, history and traditions focusing upon their uniqueness and to preserve such identity which remain latent over a period of time. Linguistic and cultural distinctiveness of primordial identity differentiations – Basque, Bretons, Catalans, Corsican, etc. emerged in France. The characteristics of civic nations thus vanished because the existing institution failed to cherish with the terms and condition on which the state was formed; where the institution fails identity in fact show off. As long as the state is strong and the oppositions are weak, it endures as civic nationalism however it becomes ethnic when it fails. Thus, Stefan Wolff argues that civic nationalism by default is the advantage of the majority cultures; their language, traditions, customs become 'official' whereas the minorities are relegated to the private sphere, and it is the responsibility and choice of individuals whether or not they want to maintain certain aspects of their identity that 'diverge' from the national identity, which, although defined as civic, is in fact nothing but the majority's ethnic identity writ large.[36]

Thus, though the distinction we draw between civic and ethnic nationalisms as an important tool in analyzing nationalist ideas, it does not correspond to neat examples in reality. Civic national identities are also sometimes not properly classified and rather create more confusion as on what grounds the classifications are made. For instance, in India, in the context of the Northeast, when we call some identity—Assamese or Manipuri identity—civic national identities and others—Naga

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[35]Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.344
[36]Stefan Wolff, 2006, p. 53-53

identity—ethnic national identity,[37] what we are actually doing is only privileging what is already in place and denying others that favourable appellation for seeking to change an arrangement which upholds domination over them. With the former being adjudged 'civic' for having a definite territorial limit, which was based on colonial demarcation.

In fact, the Manipuri 'nationalist' identity has not succeeded to transcend the core Meitei identity though their nationalist imagination includes historical claims over the whole territory of the present Manipur state. Beyond the core attributes of Meitei language, culture and the history of the erstwhile kingdom of Kangleipak, Manipuri 'national' identity has little resonance in the rest of the population who do not share these attributes. The common history that can be said to have been shared is the subjection at one point or another of the neighbouring communities and the rule of the Meitei kings. Even this subjection had more and more diminished effect as we go further away from the Imphal valley, the seat of authority of the Meitei kings. For most Nagas in the then Manipur, that subjection didn't extend beyond the paying of annual house-tax to the Meitei kings which began only after the British and the Manipuri rajas collaborated to subdue the turbulent Nagas.

If one follows closely the trajectory of Naga nationalism, one is bound to observe that Naga nationalism, though originally concerned with its ethnic identity and culture, has come to be shaped, in a very crucial sense, in struggle against the Meitei domination as Nagas of Manipur came to have a decisive say in the nationalist agenda. This dialogicality, which I derived from Taylor's, can also be seen in the case of Meiteis orienting their national assertions in the form of a movement to safeguard the territorial integrity of Manipur in confrontation with a pan-Naga consolidation move. It can be interpolated in many instances, the most obvious ones being those of Bodo 'nationalist' mobilization as opposed to Assamese domination. Extending further down, we observe this opposition between various groups. As I noted at the beginning, the link between domination and (sub)nationalism is never simply a bipolar opposition of two groups of a local nature, but determined by the insecurity of

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[37]See H. Srikanth and C. J. Thomas, 'Challenges and Predicaments of Naga Nationalism' in *Eastern Quarterly (MRFD)*, Vol. 3, IV, 2006

the state at large. The structure of domination is institutionalized in the relationship between the state and its units, i.e. province at the primary level, and among various groups at different levels. The state's interests to maintain its oppressive control stems from its insecurity.

4.2: Nations and territory

As mentioned earlier, a nation is different from an ethnic only when it lays claims to territory. The justification here is that territory is the most essential element of a nation, without which it is not less than a community of ethnic groups or racial groups which is based on their claims towards commonality in tradition, culture, history, etc. What confuses me in this argument is that, Can a nation exist without a territory? Does the claim of territory begin with the imagining of nation or it exists as a form of mobilisation by an ethnic group or communities? As we see in the definition, a nation cannot be called as given, without a territory, but history has shown us that some nations exist even without a territory. The Jews had a long mention of their nation; constitute all Jews as one people and spoke of 'the distinctive nationality of Jews' but does not have a definite territory. This lack of definite territory made the Jews to spread over to different parts of the world, however, wherever they lived, they constitute a distinct nation. Wherever they were, they were destined to be persecuted. As a result, they began to think that the Jewish question (Zionism) could be achieved only through the restoration of the Jewish State, in which sovereignty would be granted over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation.[38] However, it is also equally impossible for any group or communities to carve out their own states anywhere in the world. It has to have a significance of history, culture, traditions, symbols or at least even a reason to demand such state.

Thus, measuring their authenticity, concerning whether the state should be established in Argentina or Palestine. Theodor Herzl focussed on political symbolism envisaged on the Biblical origins of Israel saying that, 'Palestine is our ever-

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[38]Michael Prior. *Zionism and the State of Israel,* London: Routledge, 1999, p. 3-4

memorable historic home. The very name Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvellous potency'.[39] The creation of Israel as home of the Jews involved an element of contrivance, and even artifice, in Zionism's selective adaptation of tradition religious images, symbols, and practices in it creation of a secular, nationalist iconography. But Zionism exaggeration of its links to the past in order to legitimize its political-modernization project need not lead us to dismiss all claims regarding the antiquity of Jewish national identity as spurious. Certainly ethnicity—in the sense of collective identity based on the notion of common ancestry—is the fundamental basis for the Hebrew Bible's classificatory schema for humanity.[40] Thus, the Jews had a nation before the creation of Israel though there was no defined/definite territory for them.

Moreover, the Kurds who says their ancestors lived for at least two hundred years in the mountains and valley that lie north and east of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin are culturally distinct national group. With the fall of empire, they were divided and spread over to the different parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and thus lack a definite territory to fulfil the condition of a nation. Though divided geographically, they still have the feeling of oneness which they believe in the shared traits of common homeland and culture, a myth of common origin, a shared faith in Islam, similar languages, and a history of bitter conflict with the outsiders.[41] Based on such political and cultural symbolism the demands for contiguous territory of Kurdistan developed, though much later than their assertion of ethnic group. It is clearly evident from this fact that an ethnic Kurds nation becomes stronger and united when it laid claims to definite territory – Kurdistan- but one cannot say that Kurds nation was not there before the demands of Kurdistan. They believe in culturally distinct national group which their ancestors once had a territory but loss its preservation as a result of the growing mixed culture that had developed in the society. Drawing to this conclusion, it is therefore not an invention of tradition but rather is the "reinvention" of the loss tradition. On the other hand, ethnic mobilisation becomes durable when it

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[39]Ibid.

[40]Aviel Roshwald, "Jewish Identity and the Paradox of Nationalism" in Michael Berkowitz (ed.), *Nationalism. Zionism and Ethnic Mobilisation of the Jews in 1900 and Beyond*, Boston: Brill Leiden, 2004, p. 12

[41]See details from Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.

laid its claim to territory, and that ethnic conflict begins with domination; when one group start to deny the right of others, spearheaded social mobilisation which later earn territory as a desire to have their own state.

This is true not only to ethnic Kurds alone but also to many ethnic conflicts as well. Turks in Germany, who in the beginning demanded citizenship rights, took to political aspects in order to improve their status.[42] Likewise, many ethnic groups' conflicts in Sri-Lanka, Rwanda, Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Malaysia, Yugoslavia, Balkans, India, etc. began with the political demands to obtain more prominent social mobilisation among their group. Thus, if we take into account this view, territory, which is one of the most basic elements of a nation, becomes secondary. It needs territory for coordination and effective mobilisation among their group and more affirmation to the nation-states but not as all important to be called a nation. I think therefore, what is considered as ethnic conflict turns to nationalism with its claims to territory. Likewise, ethnic nationalism can also be call as civic nationalism, when two three smaller ethnic groups join together as one with a defined territory promising equality and freedoms to those groups having equal opportunities, since no single group is in a position to fight against the dominant group, they cooperate among themselves and that is possible because both feel their insecurity as being living under one dominant group.

Most of the western countries, in contrast, were colonizers and therefore have not undergone such instant domination. What they see domination is more of class domination, more or less of equal status, that is to say, they are culturally equipped. To put it in the words of Atul Kohli, in the West, the question of which group constituted a 'nation' that was to be wedded to a specific state was often resolved prior to the introduction of mass suffrage. In this sense, democracy in the west indeed came to be a 'solution' to governing power conflicts in society, especially among economic elite and across class lines.[43] However this does not mean that there was no existence of ethnic identity in the west. It is how they were able to negotiate their national identity during nationalism. As Maiken Umbach pointed out that during the

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[42]Ibid. p. 70
[43]Atul Kohli, "Can democracy accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of self-determination movements in India", Journals of Asian Studies. Vol. 56, May, 1997, p.326

heyday of European nationalism, in the decades around 1900; regionalism and national identities coexisted, and were mutually reinforcing. This also means that civic and ethnic identity constructions intermingled.[44]

That one faithful event was the beginning of the third world nationalism is like that of the western nationalism, having no much concerned on the ethnic and cultural differences unite together to fight against the common enemy, i.e. the colonial powers. Many regard them as little more than historical curiosities, as well as embarrassing reminders of common nationalism's association with racial conflict and domination. At this phases, they are more like civic as they follow inclusion of members who are feel depress of domination. But such civic nature of nationalism ends with the successful dismissal of the colonial dominant power, paving the way for ethnic nationalism. Today, such ethnic nationalism is also found in the civic nation. France for instance, Bretons, Basque, Catalans, Quebecois, etc. ethnic movements signify the beginning of ethnic nationalism. Thus, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is flawed. We need qualification in the distinction. For the fact is that the distinction because the so-called Arab nationalism did not include the Berbers, Copts, Druse, Alamites, Assyrians, Kurds, and so on. The so-called Chinese nationalism was in fact Han nationalism which failed to involve the Tibetans, Turks, Mongols, Manchus and Muslims (Hui). The so-called Indian nationalism was essentially Hindu nationalism which failed to unite the Muslims, Nagas, Mizos, Adivasis, Santhals, Gurkhas, and so on. The so called British nationalism or social imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century excluded the Welsh, Irish and the Scots; its ethnic basis was Anglo-Saxon.[45]

A close analysis to this distinction reveals that the third world nationalism is irrational and illiberal in a sense as it involves direct actions and outright conflict towards domination with no mutual understanding towards nation-states, its exclusionary nature, i.e. after independence when ethnic elements came into play, has made their nationalism as ethnic nations or nationalism. Whereas, the western or European nationalism, though identities are primarily cultural and traditional, setup a

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[44]Maiken Umbach, "Nation and Region", in Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson. *What is a nation?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.65

[45]Dawa Norbu, 1992, p. 183

mutually reinforced nation-state due to either high moral standard or by the force of the majority group who have a power or through compromise without conflict are liberal and rational thus becoming a civic nation. In other words, the modernist or to say civic notion of 'nation' is identified with 'nation-state. This identification of nation-state made civic nationalism as if there is no ethnic element. As Norbu argues, the civic nationalism, which he use as multinational state, not only has far greater military capability to suppress any counter nationalist movement launched by tiny minorities, but ideologically refuses to recognize even the democratic legitimacy of any ethnic nationalist demand because of the myth that even non-dominant ethnic groups form part of the 'nation-state', not an empire.[46]

If one follows clearly the trajectory of nation building in civic nations, whose nations they referred to? Is the majority not a driving force to build such a civic nation-state? For instance, in France, diversity has characterizes the country even when the focus is on its indigenous, ethnic, and linguistic territorial minorities. Absorbed early into the state, these minorities persist despite more than two centuries of political efforts to marginalize, assimilate, and/or dissolve them. However, Paris had little interest in the culture of the periphery and no national integration policy toward the 'backward,' non-French speaking peoples inhabiting these areas. Thus, French regions were primarily agrarian and often traditionalist units were forcefully modernized by a centralizing nation-state.[47] Therefore, what is seen the result of the outcome in France and England today is that the regional identities are primarily culturally (at times linguistically) based, and modern regionalism was more about creating a momentum towards devolution than preserving already existing civic frameworks.[48]

In most cases, the major problem in civic nationalism which is seen as liberal, precisely arises from its homogenizing tendency—to reduce all differences to individuals, and to focus exclusively on building a core standards of common institutions and thereby a common culture. Socio-cultural groups increasingly

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[46]Ibid, p. 185

[47]Ibid, p.70 Also see in Joseph Rudolph, *Politics and Ethnicity*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

[48]Ibid

question the liberal practice of universal citizenship. Citizenship rights are not aimed at meeting certain needs in the abstract, but rather to create a common sense of citizenship, based on common entitlements and common experiences in the exercise of those entitlements, be it in the form of a national language, cultural symbols, content of education, public holidays etc. It creates a common national culture which is reproduced with the preferences and in the image of the majority. It renders minority groups, which exhibits 'difference', endemically vulnerable to some form of disadvantages, or are prejudiced and disrespected for their culture and social identity. This has given rise to, what is variously called, 'the politics of difference', 'politics of recognition', 'politics of identity', or generically multiculturalism.

In liberal western societies, the case of civic nation had seemed to work reasonably well, until the advent of sizeable minorities from alien cultures, because the distinction between the claim to common collective identity and the claim to individual free choice could easily be blurred. The coagulation of that religious identity was intricately bound together with the historical moments that accompanied the process of asserting the individual identity of the self, taking place in a given social, political, and conceptual context meeting the challenge of conflicts and difference within itself.

Indeed liberal neutrality is not a universal idea but a result of a historical process through long periods of dealing with conflicts and difference. Now that assumptions do not hold because the context has changed, and the original context with which it had to deal is now presented in the form of different cultures dissimilar to the one that had gone through the western experience of historical development. If it could enforce its neutrality after a long period of violent conflict with the Church, liberals themselves rule out the possibility of a violent coercion today.[49]

Similarly, what is considered as good and bad nationalism is difficult to draw. For what is bad to one society may be good for the others. For instance, if the struggle for nationalism is 'to lift oneself to psychological blessing of dignity and self respect,

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[49]Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, "Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration" in *Political Theory*, November 1993,21, 4, p. 589

liberating discrimination, of elimination of inferior grades of citizenship', there is a good thing for them in the struggle. But on the other hand it is considered as bad for the common people because it create divisions in the society. One may argue that if it is for the upliftment of their status, there is also other ways to demand, a certain degree of autonomy,[50] instead of being to nationalism. But one may also argue that living under majority domination cannot easily be compromised with its temporary arrangements.[51]

Individuals are born into and raised in particular cultures and do not necessarily choose them. Long years of socialization and internalization of the group's way of life, its habits, mores, norms and symbols forge a sense of belongingness which gives them a sense of dignity and self-worth. Even if a culture, traditions, religion, etc. can be construed as conception of the good, a person, most often does not come to hold such a conception of the good after a certain amount of reflections of weighing contrasting values and so on.[52] Thus, it is unjust to coerce an individual or group to abandon their culture, tradition, religion, etc. in favour of the majority's culture. Even if it is conceded that individuals are indeed capable of revising their conceptions of the good, it is only the individual who exercises such a capacity and not the entire group. Therefore, to coerce whole groups into conforming to the dominant culture is not justifiable, and it is different from providing the right to the individual member to exit from the group. By imposing a 'national' culture which the majority takes as its own, what is involved, for the minorities is an alienation from one's culture and assimilation into a purportedly 'impersonal' public culture, which is largely the mirror of the majority's culture.

Two cases can be made out here. Firstly, it can be argued that the affected individual didn't choose to be born into a culture. It constitutes an *unchosen circumstance* which he may have resigned to, and takes pride in. Thus, in so far his identity creates disadvantages in the existing framework of the public culture, they are

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[50]Partha Chatterjee, 1986, p. 4

[51]Since those groups had already cultivate a sense of insecurity under majority domination, they fear even their future which made them difficult to settle with autonomy or other measures and what they wanted is to part away to form their own state.

[52]Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, "Citizenship and Equality: The Place for Toleration" in *Political Theory*, November 1993,21, 4, p, 590

undeserved, and therefore needs to be corrected by recognizing the special claims that such an identity demands. Secondly, the fact that he or others like him are the only one to make a sacrifice in foregoing their identity which constitutes a distinct mark of their self-identity, without a corresponding sacrifice on the part of the majority imposes an unfair cost. It should be qualified through a gradation of how a recognition of such an identity in the public sphere can be adjusted with the demands it makes on public costs.

Many people have therefore questioned the concept of liberal neutrality. Charles Taylor has suggested that the idea of the 'neutral state' be abandoned and that a 'common way of life' be promoted.[53] He argues that a neutral state cannot adequately protect the social environment necessary for self-determination. The conception of the good can be exercised in a particular sort of community, and this sort of community can only be sustained by a 'politics of the common good.' Taylor is arguing from the viewpoint of cultural communities and urging the need for recognition of cultural differences as a basis for differential treatment within the framework of the larger political community.

On the other hand, my argument shows that liberal states have always been pursuing the politics of the 'common way of life' based on the social and ethical values of the dominant majority at the national level, though cloaked in the principle of neutrality. This has created significant injustice to minorities by disallowing their identity into the public culture. The need for differentiated citizenship comes in because of the disjunction between what is professed and the actual effect it has had on society and public culture. A liberal state governed by the principle of formal equality within a supposedly national culture itself pursues a 'politics of the common good' unmediated by any recognition of difference that underlies the assumptions of multicultural politics.

For if individuals are rooted in cultures, not necessarily and most often not chosen by themselves, they have political and moral predilections and convictions that

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[53]Will Kymlicka, *contemporary Political Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 245

are carried into the political sphere. A formal democracy that is based on formal equality doesn't guarantee that everyone will have an equal chance of influencing the policy of the state. Since people do not enter this sphere empty-handed, but armed with their commitments and convictions imbued by association with their social and cultural environment, more or less influential depending on the social and cultural support it can command not through personal capacity but through the pre-existing background of social and institutional support, the majority defined by culture is always in a position to dominate. In an extended process of pursuing the politics of formal equality, 'differences' may simply be shut out of the political, as properly belonging to the private sphere and a matter of personal choice.

However, individual rooted in culture does not necessarily mean that there is always a coherent society that exists in forming a nation or nationalism.[54] We must also add that it is not only the traditional component of nationalism (ethnicity) alone that creates an ethnic based nationalism –found mostly in the third World nationalism. Ethnic nationalists tend to pick up certain new ideas and values that enhance or reinforce ethnic nationalism, and substantiate or support their claims to ethnic nationhood. Thus, the perspective and approach both civic and ethnic nationalism is different and varied, and though theoretically they represent two separate ideals of nationalism, neither is complete on its own. In their pure forms both ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are mutually exclusive concepts stemming from the disagreement between the two as to what constitutes the essence or primary focal point of nationalism. As mutually exclusive concepts both are destined to terminally fail to satisfy a successfully functioning nationalism that achieves what it espouses towards. In practice, as intermingling concepts, they are not opposing and are not at polar ends of a spectrum. Rather they are intermeshing concepts that borrow from one another in order to see each individual movement of nationalism achieve its goal.

Whether observing the civic nationalism in Britain, France, USA, Spain, or territorial/ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America they all belong to the one ideal type of nations and nationalism. Their difference is how

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[54]Unlike Walker Connor's own position which highlight the primacy of 'the people who believe they are ancestrally related' as the basis of both 'groupness' and political action.

one group (civic nation) tackles the problem in spite of the existing ethnic communities and the other group (ethnic nation) reacts to differences. The classifications merely serve to restrict each nationalism to being backward or progressive, positive or negative, liberal or illiberal, good or bad without the opportunity of being both and developing toward their ultimate goal of a nation-state.

Today, no nations could be found as purely a homogeneous society, thereby the notions of majority and minority set as the identification of ethnicity as a silent feature of identity. This relational dimensional of ethnicity made it necessary to situate minority status in relation to majority status. It implies that the presence of the educational rights of minorities, or the presence of personal laws are not in themselves anomalies of the secular democratic state, but a recognition that such rights enable their communities to serve the interests of their members. But when the members are denied the right of exit, then it becomes an instrument of oppression for those who don't agree with the rules or prescriptions of the community. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti provides four variables for the determination of justifiable claims: (1) the history of the group (which should be an oppressed or excluded group); vis-a-vis other social groups and their expectations (2) the cultural tradition, which constrains the viable options and their public justifiability; (3) the historical moment, which makes some issues more relevant than others; and (4) economic considerations, balancing off costs with expected results.[55]

Seen against this background, defending personal laws from the viewpoint of culture is, in a sense, ineffective as the laws even shield unjust practices that affect individual members. If these laws enable them to retain their identity, and serve to promote their self-dignity, they are morally desirable. Scrapping personal laws altogether may not even be politically feasible, but they cannot be deemed as outside the scope of state intervention, whenever they become an instrument of oppression for members of communities.

Criticising the liberals and the Marxist, George Schopfling argues that like the Marxist, the liberal view though not as extreme, is similarly uncomfortably with

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[55]Galeotti, *Citizenship and Equality*; p. 598

nationalism. Because the ultimate assumptions of liberalism are too closely bound to material interest, this interest is unable to cope adequately with a set of ideas that regularly places non-material interest above the material.[56] Therefore, what is important is that one should know that people are not suppressing only from the differences but injustices can be done even in the non-material interest.

In other words, the injustice incurred on non-material interest is difficult to deal with, for material interest can be solve by the politics of distribution, whereas non-material interest cannot be distributed. This non-material interest when violated under conditions of modernity, a community which relies on culture as it storehouse of moral perceptions or a set of rules got threatened or challenged, thereby protecting their external boundaries by whatever means are they available.[57] One can say that the very denial of their own state can also a source of conflict to the society, but it is also equally not feasible to give away every demand for the state. If that is so, the world will be divided into tiny small state which will hamper development, and not conducive for their living as well. Then, is differences always something that we should try and avoid? I think, it will not be wise to try and avoid the differences, but rather live in co-existence, recognise and preserve the differences, respect and live with it, and above all learned not only one culture but to every culture within the nation-state so as not to hurt other's sentiment (live by reason) for being living under one nation-state.

That seems to be a more realistic option in case of radical difference. However, it should be noted that a rational dialogue for a compromise always presupposes reasonableness on the part of different parties. Reasonableness is the only ground for fair terms of co-operation based on reciprocity. Where it fails, the alternative will be instability, or worse, conflict. But to build on some uncertain principles runs the risk of becoming a modus vivendi arrangement. Therefore, in cases where differences can be accommodated within a political conception of justice, our preference will always be an overlapping consensus within some acceptable, priory understood notions of justice.

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[56]George Schoflin, "Nationalism and National Minorities in East and Central Europe", *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1991, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 51.
[57]Ibid, p. 53

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Although a great deal of discussion on nation and ethnic has been done in the preceding chapters, a theory-building requires considerable simplification and clarifications which need to be stated in the conclusion of how those ideas are related to each other. As I mention in the introduction, the work is based on the critical assessment of the modernist and the primordialist approaches to nationalism. We have case of the debates between the two scholars. Indeed, my response has been to deal with the criticisms of the two theories, with my objectives in the background, through a unified perspective. In doing so, I have had to problematize the rigid assumptions of mainstream Liberalism and Marxism. They allow me to both locate the appropriate understanding of nationalism within the liberal conceptual framework, and, to ground minority right in the principles of differentiated citizenship. I think is a part of the conception of nationalism to deal with various differences. In the concept of democracy and civic difference may also mean discrimination of a minority.

I began this work by defining the concepts of nation, race and ethnic arguing that though they are not the same, thus share some commonness in their concepts. The difference between them lies not in some inherent or essential quality but in the kind of relationship they have, or claim to have to the state. Territory is an additional element of a nation and thus lays claims to a state. However, ethnic group in long standing conflicts are not only about identity. It is followed with the demand of their

own political unit which in the issue forth into seeking to fulfil the conditions of a nation.

In the later part of the second chapter, I bring out the primordialist and the modernist debates which I think are inadequate or incomplete in the understanding of nation and nationalism discourse. Though the modernist and the primordialist appear to represent two opposing camps in explaining nationalism, the core of nationalism seek to have pre-modern claims. That is though there has been a definite change in the perception and role of culture with the onset of modernity, as espoused by modernists such as Gellner, Hobsbawn, Anderson the ethnic rationale is still very important to the motivations and perpetuation of nationalism, as emphasised for example by Smith. This serves my arguments that nationalism is not the ultimate product of modernity but it goes beyond modernity. It is the cultural and political reaffirmation of a group within modernity. Perhaps this implies post-modernity. If we separate nation from the state, it is not less then an ethnic group. If we conceive ethnic as given or real, than nation also has their real element. Territory always is not a necessary element of nation (*chapter IV, Nations and territory*). Thus, nations may or may not have a separate state of their own. So I think, what is ethnic in the pre-modern periods become nations with the assertion of territory as its elements in the modern nation-state.

Now coming to domination, insecurity and the politics of identity, I attempted a clear understand of how and why nations and nationalist consciousness develop among groups, how domination plays an important role in mobilising group identity in nationalist movements. It serves my arguments in two ways. One is that there are inadequacies of liberal notion of distributive justice as the remedy to group conflicts and the mobilisations of identity politics in the society. The primary focus of the liberals concern here tends to be the relationship between citizenship and economic inequality, requiring a minimum level of redistribution to overcome the pressures of social exclusion. However, this notion of distributive justice is prescribed for historically oppressed communities or sections of society and we are not sure as to how it works in the case of ethnic communities, who do not stand out as historically oppressed communities. In either case, it is more appropriate to begin with the study

of domination and insecurity. We further move on to the 'redistribution' of rights of the liberals that may under certain regimes cause insecurity.

The other reason for which I attempted is that injustice can be done not only by social and political exclusion, but also through force inclusion or assimilation. Those who interpret nationalism as a kind of civic unity and commonality associated with democratic citizenship regard ethnic based nationalism as distorting myth, tradition and culture, illiberal and exclusive that harbour and promote particular group interest, thereby those majority group sometimes force to include them as belonging to the same nation. But this interpretation of nationalism can, I have argued, be interpreted rather differently. The very denial of freedom to groups in the name of the greater interest may sometimes lead to majority domination. Its manifestations generate important question about how far the content of common citizenship should encroach upon the social identities that individuals inhabit, and whether the more inclusive basis for the common culture undergirding citizenship can be generated. The anti-national bias which draws on the universalist ideas of citizenship of the Liberals and Marxist, as I argued, are not capable of meeting the challenges of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, the Liberals and the Marxist theory has gone to the extreme to demand the expulsion of all conceptions of separation which is attribute to them as the elite or bourgeoisie creation for their own material interest.

The new assertion of state neutrality, and the boundaries of the political sphere being defined to keep out conceptions of the good, began with a perceived threat to the western tradition of 'liberal' culture. Just as it sought to universalize its liberal culture, its universality would have been possible only by stamping out 'difference', a fact which became more pronounced as more and more people from vastly different cultures came to live within the boundaries of the same political territory. With the idea of universal citizenship, liberal states actively sought to 'assimilate' the difference, and to keep away from the political sphere those that refused to assimilate into its majority culture. So, I think the new liberal reassertion in the latter half of the twentieth century was both a response to, and a cause for further alienating, those that are different from the majority.

Beginning with the nationalist movements in the nineteenth and the twentieth century, but becoming more pronounced and more diverse in the present society, the 'politics of difference' is the response to the liberal drive for universalism, and its normative demands of procedural neutrality and formal equality. The assertion of difference gained legitimacy because liberal practice tends to produce a one-sided result of what its theory preaches. In this work, I have approached the issue of difference in chapter III and also in Chapter 4. Without going further into the argument, I now want to list out these three standpoints: (a) the false impartiality/neutrality argument that mainstream liberal theory tends to expel difference through its language of universalism; (b) the liberal nation-building argument that liberal universalism is a hegemonizing ideology for furthering the material and cultural interests of the majority; and (c) the idea that the bourgeoisie or the elites can only imagined the nation which neglect the real cultural elements that are not matter of choice, but a given identity, whether it is employed by elites or the masses.

In the fourth Chapter, I brings out the debate that when nationalism is taken to mean the European import to the Third World society, and contrasted with a context that looks not so hospitable to such an idea, it seems to pose a problem in this assertion. In fact, I argue that it is not the European import but is rather the result of how the Third World and the European act on the differences. European nationalism is created with the principles of equality and freedom wiping away the existing differences and thus forms a common nation-state. On the other hand, the Third World nationalism reacts to the differences, instead of being together as one nation, trying to have its own homogeneous state. What is made as the reference point to European is that the Western influence has made to create more awareness to identity to these Third World societies, thus is a strong agent of social mobilisation. Differences are there even before the western came into picture, but that differences which remain latent became significant with the coming of the western society. The fear of the domination and insecurity since the bitter experience of the long colonial subjugation made them to preserve the differences for further domination of one group by the other, thus nationalist movement multiplied in the third World countries.

This aspect of nationalism is also found today in the most civic nation of the Western countries (*Chapter IV*). Thus, faced on the other side is a militant, chauvinistic and unbridled majoritarianism that will stop at nothing except the fear of its own annihilation, credibly only through state power. It has cultivated social and cultural bases well and threatens to overwhelm political space. It can be crafty, being reasonable-in-your-face, and motivated and acting in another to completely subdue or eliminate what it considers the 'other'. So, the predicament of the state is to whether refrain from eroding the autonomy of groups to protect them from majoritarian decisions and perpetuate some unjust practices within groups, or to proceed with its political morality and open the interests of these communities to political bargaining. Perhaps that's posing the options too sharply.

I have argued that minority rights that seek to support the enjoyment of citizenship rights should be secure and not disturbed. However, those aspects of minority rights, such as those present in personal laws, that are not justifiable through public reason would have to undergo change, either on the initiative of the communities themselves or through the state. A more prudent approach would be to deal with them case by case involving the opinions of those whom it would affect. Differentiated rights in a framework of a liberal democracy can only allow such rights as would promote the interests and dignity of members who are also citizens of the state. They are not rights of groups for subjugating or oppressing their members.

It's better to have a certain conception of political morality to appeal to, rather than to negotiate on developing some principles from disparate background the conceptions of the good each time different groups disagree. Justice as fairness, in my view, is a fair model of public justice. The reason that Rawls conceives the working of overlapping consensus within the framework of such a political conception of justice is because a free-wheeling overlapping consensus with no prior conception of justice tends towards modus vivendi and that the stability issue itself limits the possibility of overlapping consensus to within a range of public values. Perhaps, in the last resort, every conception of justice may have to be negotiated if radical difference cannot be contained through the argument of public morality.

On the face of it liberalism at peace with the principle of democracy as equality and freedom with one man- one vote for it has nothing to lose in this; it favours universal citizenship with no special safeguards for any section of citizens so that it can mould and shape public culture unhindered in its image. While using the language of universalism, it obviously doesn't believe that there needs to be check on its powers of organized political communities. Its nationalism is for the 'fatherland' which excludes all others which do not fall within its definition of the 'nation'. Any other that it defines as outside 'the pale of nationhood' must agree to its term of membership in the 'nation' or be marginalized and live as third-class half citizens since women would presumably occupy the second class.

It is here that we see the other function of cultural differentiation: to map the cultural perimeters of political rationalization, namely state formation within a specific culture—area. If and when the cultural and political units are congruent to each other, then an ideal nation-state is formed. The members of any complex society tend to have multiple identities, which must be differentiated from an over-arching national identity. In this context it is possible to speak of two different types of differentiation, external and internal. Internal differentiation occurs in order to establish multiple secondary identities based on professional roles, generational traits, social ties which signify membership of associations, subcultures, or local communities. Such secondary identities are generally used in order to differentiate the members of an ingroup among themselves, and as such become effective only in the context of intragroup relations and 'domestic conflicts'. Culturally they are the still persisting residue of particularistic, little, local traditions that make up complex, historical societies.

External differentiation occurs in order to establish a pan-ethnic or nationwide identity that differentiates the said ingroup from generalized others around it. As such, a national identity gains salience over multiple, secondary identities typically in the context of international conflict or societal encounter engendering sometimes identity crisis. Historical or ethnic elements are thus important while tracing commonness in the formation of a national identity. External differentiation in most cases goes along with the demand for territory, either demand for autonomy or for complete

independence from the existing nation-state. There I conclude with a note of my arguments stated in the introduction that most modern nations owe their origin to the ethnic roots, making the two categories inseparable in an analysis which attempt to explain nationalism in the contemporary world. This is to assert atavistic theory of nationalism with all its modernist context, contour and conflicts with difference.

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