

**LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 1992-96**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Leadership in International Organizations: A Study of the United Nations Secretary-General, 1992-96**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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In the loving memory of my Mother

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Abbreviations

ACABAQ	: Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AoA	: Articles of Agreement
CEO	: Chief Executive Officer
DPA	: Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	: Department of Peacekeeping Organization
ECOSOC	: Economic and Social Council
EU	: European Union
FTA	: Free Trade Area
GNP	: Gross National Product
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICS	: International Civil Services / Servants
IDA	: International Development Association
IGO	: International Governmental Organization
ILO	: International Labour Organization
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
MDGs	: Millennium Development Goals
NAM	: Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organizations
NSS	: National Security Strategy
OAU	: Organization of African Unity
OIOS	: Office of Internal Oversight Services
ORCI	: Office for Research and the Collection of Information
P-5	: Permanent 5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council)
PPBS	: Planning, Programme and Budgeting System
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UN Doc.	: United Nations Document

UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO : United Nations Education and Social Council
UNGA : United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF : United Nations Children's Fund
UNPROFOR : United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia
UNTAC : United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USA : United States of America
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WFP : World Food Programme
WHO : World Health Organization
WTO : World Trade Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Background

The twentieth century can be regarded as the most violent and conflict-ridden century in human history, which witnessed two World Wars, the use of the nuclear weapons and a long spell of Cold War. At the same time, this century will be remembered for producing history's most commendable instances of international cooperation. The nations of the world created doctrines, systems and institutions to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts. The concept of collective security, treaties, conventions, international law, decolonization, democratization, the importance of social and economic development and a continuity of conferences and summits on pressing global issues, were salient features of this century.

The role of individual leaders in changing the course of action of world politics during the twentieth century is remarkable. Leaders who were 'actors' or 'catalysts', such as Woodrow Wilson, Hitler, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, etc. either changed history or became the 'change' themselves. The phenomenon of 'leadership' and its contribution to the shaping of politics has been researched extensively.

The origins of leadership theories can be traced back to the later nineteenth century, spanning across the fields of sociology, psychology, administration and later, management. The classical scholars like Max Weber (1947: 324-407) provides systematic and scientific classification of leaders on the basis of 'legal-institutional', 'charismatic personality', and 'ethical-normative' factors. Later, Bass (1981) and Fiedler (1967) deal with the theories of leadership in general and their development from various perspectives whereas, Yukl (1989) deals extensively with the evolution of the leadership theories.

Leadership is a complex and multifaceted phenomena, which requires intensive research from varying perspectives of different disciplines. There is a lack of consensus associated with the operation of the theory of leadership. This is not due to the scarcity of resources; rather the amount of resources is so large that sometimes it appears to be contradictory. In addition, many authors have radically modified their theories in the course of their writing. Bennis contends, "Of all the unclear and puzzling areas in social psychology, leadership theory undoubtedly contends for top nomination. And, probably more has been written and less is known about leadership than about any other topic in the behavioural sciences" (Bennis 1959: 259-260). But, leadership has been researched more in the context of organizational or national level leadership.

The post-World War II era saw a prolific emergence of international organizations as new entities in international relations. Relatively speaking, not so much research has been devoted to the phenomenon of leadership of international organizations. An international organization is not just collectivity of members; it also has its own definite identity and personality. The view of an international organization may be different from that of its individual members. International organizations are meant to be neutral, impartial and depoliticised platforms to address the major concerns of their members. Since the characteristics of international organizations are different from those of states, the nature of leadership also varies at the two levels. The leadership of an international organization is a great political task of a special kind, as it requires a particular kind of knowledge and aptitude. Cox (1969) argues that an effective leadership can transform the organization into a more autonomous actor, having formal regulatory potential. The present research focuses upon leadership in international institutions - its nature and characteristics, its evolution, its constraints and challenges, and its prospects in the future.

In the present world order, the United Nations (UN) is the closest example of a 'universal' organization, both in terms of membership as well as in the broad sweep and complexity of its mandate. It, therefore, constitutes a challenging case study from the perspective of leadership. In the last six decades of its functioning, it has undergone *adaptation* as well as *change* in response to its internal and external environment. The

UN strives for an inclusive vision in a world that is deeply divided by many diverse interests. Created in the aftermath of the Second World War to help establish peace and security in the world, the UN has evolved through various phases of world politics. During the period of the Cold War, the UN played a key role in resolving major disputes. Internally, it witnessed a demographic change due to the waves of decolonization across Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The mandate of the UN expanded with the end of the Cold War as the new issues and crises came to the fore. Apart from peace and security, eradication of diseases, improvement of nutritional standards, promotion of agricultural development, literacy, advocacy of rights etc. are areas, where the UN has played an important role. It has also been active in issues relating to terrorism, drug trafficking, environment, social development etc.

A multiplicity of new international actors like - multilateral institutions, businesses, nongovernmental organizations - complicate the United Nations' search for a fitting role in a new era of globalization. There is an ongoing struggle to bring some sort of order to a more interdependent, but still very chaotic, world. Globalization has made governance more complex, both at the national as well as at the international level. Global governance is still inconceivable without an active role of the UN. However, it is also to be remembered that international organizations can only be as strong as their members allow them to be. Leadership has a crucial task to play in maintaining the fine balance that an international organization must operate from. The role of leadership is especially crucial at defining ~~of~~ turning points in world politics, where the role of the organization itself is undergoing a transformation. For instance, it would be interesting to study the changes in the UN as an organization during the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar system of world politics at the end of the Cold War and the role of leadership in this transformation.

In the twenty-first century, the long-standing debate on the nature of the office of the UN Secretary-General is still alive: is the incumbent of this office to be a 'Secretary' or a 'General'? Has the end of Cold War led to the emergence of the Secretary-General as

an important actor in world affairs or is he merely the 'chief administrative officer' of the UN (as envisaged in the Charter)? The constitutional position of Secretary-General is defined in Article 99 of the UN Charter (1945) as the 'chief administrative officer' of the UN. He is also granted significant institutional and personal independence and the power to bring to the attention of the Security Council, 'any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'. Thus, the Charter anticipates two distinct roles for him - one *administrative* and another *political*. The Secretary-General's functions may be primarily characterised as diplomatic, public relations and moral leadership; but he also directs political, economic, social, humanitarian and scientific studies. He has to deal with all the governmental representatives of the member states and with countless Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), public relations media and private citizens. He is appointed by 192 governments but cannot take independent decisions for almost seven billion people, who embrace the phrase 'We, the people of United Nations.' Thus, the study of the office of UN Secretary-General will provide a rich case-study to test some of the theoretical aspects of leadership.

The last six decades have witnessed the influence of politics as well as personality on the fulfilment of this job. The Cold War constrained the spheres of influence and actions of the UN, but also created independent space for leaders like Dag Hammarskjöld (Urquhart 1987). The end of superpower rivalry and the emergence of new issues led to a crisis in the political role of the UN, which provided both opportunities and hurdles for Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His single tenure (1992-96) dealt with the problems of peace and development in the newly emerged unipolar world. His tenure witnessed a strained relationship between United States (US), the sole superpower and the UN, culminating in the vetoing of the proposal for his reappointment by the US.

The existing research on leadership is limited to national leaders, while the purpose of the present study is to analyse the major aspects peculiar to leadership in international organizations. It also seeks to assess the importance of leadership in the growth and development of international organizations. The office of UN Secretary-General has been described as the most important as well as most 'impossible'

(Hammarskjöld, UN Doc. SG/299, 1953) public service job in the world. At present, it deals with 192 governments and a huge set of civil servants, which makes it a relevant case to study. Knight (1970: 594) argues that the “examination of the literature on the influence of the Secretary-General forcefully suggests two conclusions about that literature: It is large and growing rapidly, yet there is little in the way of systematic explanation of the behaviour of the Secretary-General”.

In theoretical terms, UN operates at a level of international system in which states are the actors. Thus, there can be a relevant question about the role of an individual in an international environment, where states are the actors. Therefore, it can be an interesting enquiry that is the Secretary-General equivalent to a state? Is he primarily a symbol as the head of an international organization or has some influence in the international political system?

Boutros-Ghali's term as Secretary-General of the UN (1992-1996) makes for an interesting study as he led the organization through a very significant transitional phase - when the bipolar world of the Cold War years transformed into the unipolar post-Cold War world. His single tenure was, thus, full of contradictions and challenges in the newly emerged environment. Undoubtedly, the transition of the organization necessitated a strong leadership and it is interesting to study to what extent Boutros-Ghali lived up to this demand of the time. This study will focus on the theory of leadership in international organizations and will assess the tenure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the UN Secretary General in the perspective of constraints and challenges of the world environment and his responses to them.

2. A Survey of Literature

Max Weber was the first scholar, who studied the problem of authority and leadership in a scientific and systematic way and provides^d major approaches towards leadership (Weber 1947: 324-407). Bass (1981) and Fiedler (1967) deal~~s~~ with the theories of leadership in general and their development from various perspectives whereas, Yukl (1989); and Seters and Field (1990) deal extensively with the evolution of leadership theories. Martin Chemers (2000) provides an historical overview of leadership

theories and argues that the commonalities are an opportunity for integration. He reflects on the cultural differences and outstanding leadership with universally effective characteristics.

Burns (1978) is an authoritative work on leadership which studies the transforming situations and identifies morality as an important variable. Inis Claude (1964) refers to the problem of allegiance of international civil servants, pointing out that international loyalty, which is indispensable for international civil servants, is an incongruity in a nationalistic world. The UN Secretary-General has a constitutional license to be a man as big as he can. Zaccaro (2001) emphasises the role of followers and the social conditions in effective leadership. Dixon (1997) examines the interrelationships between the relative importance of individual leadership and structural power in regime building. Meyer (1975) discusses the effects of leadership on the stability and causal relationship of the structure of organizations. Hogan et al. (1994) discuss leadership from a psychological perspective and focus on the problems of practical decisions of leadership, such as evaluation of the leader. Goleman (1998 and 2000) provides a psychological perspective of leadership in terms of emotional intelligence and concludes that it should be studied scientifically.

The leadership role of an executive head plays a key role in converting an international organization from a framework of multilateral diplomacy to an autonomous actor in the international system. Cox (1969) attempts to analyse leadership on the basis of comparative study of International Labour Organization (ILO), League of Nations and the UN. Bob Reinalda (2001) deals extensively with decision making within international organizations, with special emphasis on conference diplomacy. Hoole (1976) studies the leadership of UN treaty-based organizations between 1945 and 1970 and concludes that the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations. Young (1991) presents a holistic approach towards the role of leadership in the formation of regimes in international society and concludes that other variables are as important as leadership in the success or failure of the organization. Haas (1968) holds the world environment as a 'system' and extends an explanation based on demands and expectations of the system and the environment. He contends that to resolve

conflicts, a leader can go beyond the initial mandates and thus, can give a new life and effectiveness to the organization.

James Barros (1977) gives an interesting account of the politics of the selection of the UN Secretary-General in the post-World War scenario, where peace and security was of paramount concern. He highlights the difference in opinions of the different member-countries in the newly started Cold War. Stephen M. Schwebel (1952) analyzes the role of the office of the Secretary-General in comparison with that of the League of Nations and addresses the question of nature of functioning - 'secretary' or 'general'? Maurice Waters (1967) provides an interesting account of the interchange between Khrushchev and Hammar-skjöld in 1961, which provides important insights about the position of UN Secretary-General during the Cold War era.

Simon Chesterman (2007) brings together the experiences of senior UN staff, diplomats, and scholars to examine the factors that shape the office of the Secretary-General. He analyses the tensions between the roles of 'secretary' and 'general' in terms practice. He examines the manner in which the position of Secretary-General was initially conceptualised and how that job description has changed over time. Kent J. Kille (2003) studies six UN Secretaries-General and concludes that executive heads with expansionist leadership style display greater willingness to try to enhance the status of their organization. The office of the Secretary-General underwent a major change after the end of Cold War. Edward Newman (1998) tries to outline the principles and history of international civil servants and the evolution of the office especially in the context of the post-Cold War period.

The end of the Cold War led to significant changes in the international settings and the UN. C. S. R. Murthy (1995) traces the development of the office during the Cold War and analyses the role of Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the changed environment in the unipolar world on the basis of his *Agendas* and his performance as a peacemaker. He concludes by suggesting proposals for changes in the office of the Secretary-General. Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1992) focuses on the coordinative functions of the Secretary-

General and concludes that the coordination has to be redefined and should be given priority over centralization.

Kent J. Kille (2006) explains how the personal qualities of Secretaries-General guide their political behaviour. He empirically studies the actions of past incumbents and tries to quantify their personal characteristics. He concludes with the comparative study of Hammarskjöld, Waldheim and Annan; and labels them as visionary, manager and strategist respectively. In another influential work, 'The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership' (2007), Kille employs a broader term 'ethical framework' in the comparative study of past incumbents.

The personal accounts of the Secretaries-General provide a useful insight into the challenges and opportunities of the leadership. U Thant (1977) in his autobiography interestingly discusses the constraints and opportunities for the Secretary-General. He deals at length with the challenges he faced during his tenure and how he dealt with the situations. He also discloses about the impact of his religious values upon his decision-making. Boutros-Ghali in his memoirs (1999), recounts his experiences as a Secretary-General, and narrates the relationship between the office and the lone superpower, the US. The US was critical of his reform agendas and wanted him in the role of a mere 'secretary'. Brian Urquhart (1987), who was one of Dag Hammarskjöld's close collaborators during his entire time in office, recollects the legacy of Dag and labels him as a 'man of vision' as he is considered the most successful and innovative incumbent who gave the office a new meaning. Even the Security Council members decided on several occasions 'let Dag do it'.

Stanley Meisler (2001) narrates the life of Kofi Annan, starting from Ghana to the 38th floor of the UN Secretariat and provides an account of the transition of office from Boutros-Ghali to Kofi Annan. Thomas G. Weiss et al. (2005) is a classic work, based on oral history, under the United Nations Intellectual History Project. The book gives the stories of seventy-three individuals, all of whom have spent a substantial part of their professional lives in UN affairs and who have helped in shaping the organization's thinking about development over the last six decades. These personal accounts reflect

despair and hope, tragedy and triumph, blindness and insight throughout the history of UN at different occasions.

Tapio Kanninen (1995), former assistant to Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, discusses the leadership role of the UN Secretary-General in retrenchment and reorganization after the financial crises of the 1980s. Beigbeder (2000) evaluates the reform process of the Secretariat by Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, keeping in view aspects of human resource management, budgets and finances and civil society groups.

The address by Dag Hammarskjöld to the Oxford University, titled '*The International Civil Services in Law and in Fact*' (1961) is considered as a milestone in the development of the international civil services, which clearly distinguished it from the traditional role of mediator and redefined the concept and practice of 'neutrality'. Howard Lentner (1965) exclusively studies the diplomacy of the Secretary-General as a process of consensus-building. Kjell Skjelsbaik (1991) studies the role of the Secretary-General in the post-Cold War era and critically examines its relationship with the Security Council. Jorge E. Viñuales (2005 & 2006) explores the extent to which the Secretary-General can uphold his or her own views when confronted with adverse stances from powerful states. He also offers an account of the complex interactions between law and politics underlying the 'good offices' role of the UN Secretary-General.

The legal aspects of the Secretary-General of the UN was studied by Kunz (1958) who compared it with the League of Nations and tries to locate the vision of the founders of the UN to make this office more effective. Ian Johnstone (2003) views the role of Secretary-General from the legal viewpoint especially after the Cold War in the context of peace and security; non-governmental organizations; and in the wider framework of global governance.

Reviewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reforms (A/51/950) provides a thematic overview of the main reform elements of the UN. It highlights the new leadership and the management structure instituted by the Secretary-General and summarises the key sectoral measures taken and proposed to member-states.

Boutros-Ghali was highly ambitious of the reforms and changes in the post-Cold War situation. His *An Agenda for Peace* (A/47/277, 1992) provides comprehensive methods, tools and techniques to tackle the world situation after the collapse of USSR, where intra-state conflicts emerged as a new challenge for the international community, giving new dimensions to peacekeeping operations. He outlines new hopes for strengthening the world body and analyses the reforms from the perspective of peacekeeping, development, financial constraints and changed view of sovereignty in the globalised world. Boutros-Ghali termed 'development' as a fundamental human right and as the most secure basis for peace in his report, *Agenda for Development* (A/48/935, 6 May 1994), where he sets out both the dimensions of the development; process and the actors, involved in it. He asserts that while national governments bear the major responsibility for development, the UN has been entrusted with important mandates for assisting in this task. Boutros-Ghali in another report, *Agenda for Democratization* (A/51/761, 1996) concludes that peace and development cannot be regarded as separate undertakings. Democratization must take place at all levels of human society - local, national, regional and global and the individual person should be the logical source of democratization. Boutros-Ghali (SG/SM/5870/Rev.1, 1996) views the 21st century as opposing forces of globalization and fragmentation and emphasised a need for a more just and equal world. Boutros-Ghali (in Barry Holden 2000) emphasises the need for democratization at international level and the role of NGOs, regional organizations, parliamentarians, local authorities, media and academia.

In September 2002, the 'National Security Strategy of the United States' declared that 'no nation can build a safer, better world alone'. This document provides a useful approach in the US policy after the 9/11 attack in New York. This strategy commits the US towards enhancing multilateralism in a new and changed environment. The Report, 'Selecting the Next UN Secretary-General' (UNA-USA 2006), discusses the reforms in the selection process, current issues, changing nature of the roles and responsibilities and agendas and priorities of the Secretary-General. Thomas G. Weiss and Peter J. Hoffman (2006) identify, evaluate, and rank challenges in terms of priorities and feasibilities for the next Secretary-General on the substantive issues of development and environment; human rights and humanitarian action; and peace and security. Adare Manor (1999)

summarises the thirty-fourth annual conference on the 'United Nations of the Next Decade' by the Stanley Foundation and tries to sketch out the emerging climate for global governance and to turn their attention to the tasks of global governance and the UN leadership.

Thus, a wealth of literature exists on different aspects of the office of the Secretary-General and on the significance of individual Secretaries-General. This study will aim to bring together in an overview the theoretical aspects of leadership, the evolution of the office of UN Secretary General and a detailed case study of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's tenure.

3. Objectives, Scope and Structure of the Study

In the light of the existing literature, the present study attempts to address the following questions: what is the importance of personality as a factor in leadership of international organizations?; what is the role of the political background of the executive head of an international organization?; how definitive a role has leadership played in the direction of development and growth of the UN?; are the powers given to the UN Secretary General in resonance with the responsibilities entrusted to him?; how has the office of Secretary General evolved from the framework provided in Article 99 of the UN Charter?; what are the changes in the nature of leadership of UN after the Cold War?; what is the level of autonomy that the UN Secretary General enjoys in his administrative as well as political functions?; what are the issues of power politics at play within the UN that have an impact on leadership?

The study tests the hypotheses that (a) the office of UN Secretary-General has tended to be exercised within the 'legal-institutional' constraints, leaving very little space for individual Secretaries-General to exercise autonomy and allow personal charisma and ethical-normative factors to influence his leadership and (b) the UN Secretaries-General have been more active in their *administrative* role, wielding only a limited influence in their *political* role.

The study is divided into five chapters. A ~~brief~~ introductory chapter introduces the brief background of the area of the study. It establishes the relevance of 'leadership' in international organization, role of international organizations and lay out the structure and scope and relevance of the tenure of the Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Chapter 2 discusses the conceptual and theoretical aspects of 'leadership' from an inter-disciplinary perspective. Special focus is laid on the peculiar characteristics, limitations and the theoretical aspects of leadership of international organizations. Chapter 3 traces the evolution of the office of the Secretary-General and his role in world politics, with special emphasis on issues like, selection, neutrality, powers and limitations of the Secretary-General. Chapter 4 contains the detailed case study of the tenure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and seeks to draw larger lessons from the concept of 'leadership' in general. The last chapter contains the findings based on the case-study of the tenure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and draws conclusions relating to the leadership of international organizations.

The nature of the study is descriptive as well as analytical and uses books, journals, research papers etc. to understand the complex and multifaceted aspects of leadership. The autobiographies and memoirs of Secretaries-General and the official records of the UN have been used as the primary sources. The study also relies upon the working papers of projects, seminars and symposia. The resources available on the website of various think tanks, foundations also have been used. The case-study method is employed to analyse the larger theoretical issues in leadership; the leadership qualities of the Secretaries-General have been analysed in terms of their responses to the major crises, through historical accounts, records etc.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Aspects of 'Leadership'
in International Organizations

Chapter 2
CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF 'LEADERSHIP' IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A theory must be able to explain the relationships, behaviours and outcomes pertaining to any social phenomenon. Such an explanation does not exist in nature rather it depends upon the reasoning faculty of an individual and therefore, it may vary from person to person. 'Leadership' is an essentially contested concept existing since ages, with multiple interpretations, being both logically possible and expected. There is an abundance of concepts used to explain it such as power, status, authority, rank, prestige, influence, control, manipulation, domination, and so forth, but the concept is still not sufficiently defined. Fiedler (1967: 260) attributes this not to the lack of consensus in the area of leadership but the mountain of contradictory evidences available.

The study of leadership raises the fundamental issues that every group, organization, nation, and group of nations has to resolve or at least struggle with: Why do people subordinate themselves? What are the sources of power? How and why do leaders arise? Why do leaders lead? What is the function of the leader? Can all the various kinds of leaders be accounted under one frame of reference? These are some of the questions raised by leadership theorists and students of organizational behaviour. These questions, because of their complexity and value-laden inclination, resist a final conclusion.

Leadership, by its very nature is interdisciplinary. Therefore, it requires a comprehensive outlook, either to understand or to apply it. The present chapter aims to study the concept of 'leadership' from a general perspective and tries to trace its course of evolution and its present form. Then leadership is analysed from the perspective of international organization and leadership of different international organizations is compared in different conditions, at different points of time.

1. Conceptual Aspects of Leadership

Plato speculates about the proper education and training of political leaders or the 'philosopher kings', ^{is} one of the earliest recorded attempts at dealing with the problems of leadership. He contended that only philosophers should be the kings as the philosophy, spirit or reason is the highest virtue. He gave the theory of functional specialization, and divided his ideal state as rulers, soldiers and peasants. The men of reason should be the leaders and thus he places emphasis on providing good education to the ruler class, which is only concerned with the statesmanship.

Plato was particularly concerned about democracies, which by definition, cannot rely upon birth as a factor for recruitment of leaders. In absence of hereditary aristocracy, every man is potentially a leader, and society has to give thought to identification and proper training of men who will be able to guide the institutions. Aristotle regards leadership as an inherent attribute and put it as, 'men are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled.'

The ancient Indian scholar, Kautilya wrote in *Arthashastra* that the qualities of leadership (which attracts followers) are: birth in a noble family, good fortune, intellect & prowess, association with elders, being righteous, truthful, resolute, enthusiastic & disciplined, not breaking his promises, showing gratitude (to those who help him), having lofty aims, being stronger than neighbouring kings & having ministers of high quality. An ideal king (leader) is one who has the highest qualities of leadership, intellect, energy & personal attributes. The king (leader) must be well versed in discretion and wise in judgment and should have the innate capacity to judge and reason.

The earliest study of leadership as a distinctively psychological study has been attributed to Niccolò Machiavelli who has seen power as a sole power of leadership which is contrary to Kantian theory of leadership, based on moral principles in order to create an egalitarian society.

In the recent decades, there is a shift towards *democratic* ideals, based on assumption that capacity to lead is intrinsic in human nature. It has to be nurtured and trained to flourish as an effective leader. Leadership is a function of the relationship between leaders and followers, rather than simply focussed on the person as the leader. It is one of the most observed but least understood phenomena.

Different scholars defined the leadership from varied perspectives. Fiedler (1967:8) defined leader as “the individual in the given group given the task of directing and coordinating task-relevant group activities or who, in the absence of a designated leader, carries the primary responsibility for performing these functions in the group.” Bennis (1959: 295) defined leadership from an administrative perspective as a process by which “an agent induces a subordinate to behave in a desired manner.” Oran Young (1991: 281) defines leadership as “a critical determinant of success or failure in the processes of institutional bargaining that dominates efforts to form international regimes, or more generally, institutional arrangements in international society.” Some other working definitions of leadership are as follows:

The leader is the man who comes closest to realizing the norms the group values highest; this conformity gives him the high rank, which attracts people and implies the right to assume control of the group. (Homans in Fiedler 1967: 8)

Leadership is a process of social influence, in which one person is able to enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task. (Chemers 2000: 27)

Leadership involves persuading other people to set aside for a period of time their individual concerns and to pursue a common goal that is important for the responsibilities and welfare of a group.” (Hogan et al. 1994: 3)

Leadership is the process of influencing group activities towards goal setting and goal achievement. (Stogdill in Fiedler 1967:8)

Power, according to Bennis (1959: 296), is the ‘perceived ability to control appropriate rewards.’ A leader is an agent who in fact wields these rewards or punishments; and influence results from an agent exercising control over the subordinate’s satisfaction. Thus, leadership is viewed as a ‘tripartite’ concept involving

control over rewards (power), an agent who manipulates these rewards, and an influence process. Power residing in an agent leads to influence. Thus, influence is viewed as a 'consequent variable dependent on the ability of the agent to manipulate the appropriate rewards.' Hogan (1994: 3) states that leadership is persuasion, not domination. Leadership only occurs when others willingly adopt, for a period, the goals of a group as their own. Thus, leadership concerns building cohesive and goal-oriented teams.

In his classic work, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Max Weber (1947: 324-392) provides three approaches towards leadership. First is the 'legal-institutional' approach (also called as bureaucratic approach), which stresses the formal constitutional powers of the executive head and how they have been curtailed or enlarged by practice and interpretation. Bureaucracy is the 'exercise of control on the basis of knowledge.' It envisages the role and the extent of autonomy that the leader can enjoy. It is also linked with the use of such constitutional powers, in order to expand his *de facto* sphere of influence and independent initiatives. The bureaucratic leader rests on the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of authorities to issue commands and thus, enjoys legal authority entrusted to him. The bureaucratic leader is free of transactions, negotiations and bargaining for resources and power. Such a leader is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office. He enjoys the obedience, based upon rational values and rules, established by the agreement or sometimes even, imposed. The office holder is restricted to 'impersonal' official obligations and commands. So, it is the office, not the individual, which exercises authority and each office is defined by spheres of competence and responsibility. Officials do not owe obedience to the individual but to the impersonal order. It also provides for a clear hierarchy and rules and regulations conduct the office. Weber also emphasizes that there is complete separation of property, belonging to personal and organization (Weber 1947: 329). This approach studies the formal constitutional powers of the executive head and how these can be enlarged by the practice and interpretation.

The second major approach, called 'traditional approach', focuses on the 'ethical-normative' factors, which relate to the impact of environment, the perception of challenges by the leader and the initiatives taken by him, based upon his ethical norms

and values. It rests on an established belief in the sanctity of traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority. Traditionally, an arbitrary exercise of power is bound to loyalty, favouritism, and politics, which plays a significant role in leader-follower relationship. Thus, the legitimacy and power to control, has a historical genesis. The offices are held by virtue of traditional status, recruiting favourites or by patrimony. Here, the obligations are not towards the office, but it is the personal loyalty to the 'chief'. It can be a personal loyalty, by dependents or kins. The functions are defined and distributed in terms of competition among the interest of those seeking favours, income, and other advantages. It lacks regular system of appointment and promotion based on free contract and technical training. Weber proposes that there is an irrational division of official functions. The promotion to the higher office is the arbitrary grace of the chief and no technical training of skill is required, as practiced in feudal kingdoms and nobilities. Weber further argues that there may be gradual transitions or overlapping between these types (Weber 1947: 341).

The third is the 'charismatic approach', which focuses on the personality of the head of the organization to explain the origin, background and style of leadership. Here, the personality of an individual makes him distinct from ordinary people and is endowed with supernatural, heroic or charismatic leadership qualities. The person is treated as a leader because the charisma is regarded as of divine origin. This approach rests on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person. There are neither established administrative organs nor system of formal rules or legal principles. This approach is radically opposed to both rational and particularly bureaucratic authority. The leader may have an impression of a superhero or superwoman (Weber 1947: 359).

From the Weberian point of view, charismatic leadership is of minor importance, simply because the faith in 'divine' or 'inspirational being' is not sufficiently strong to provide an adequate basis for legitimizing any political leadership. In fact, charisma is only an aspect of power, leadership and rule, which was an important aspect of leadership due to the omnipresence of religion and monarchy since ages. But, in the developing societies, where rationality and reason still have to find their importance, charisma is an

important factor in drawing huge following. The charismatic leaders generally are helpful in overcoming a crisis.

There are certain fundamental effects of charismatic leaders on followers, which are produced by leadership actions. Shamir et al. (1993: 584) propose that charismatic leadership is more likely to emerge when performance goals cannot be easily specified and measured. Theories of charismatic leadership highlight such effects as emotional and motivational arousal, self-esteem, trust, confidence in the leader, values of the followers and their intrinsic motivation. These intervening variables and processes have a strong positive impact on the leadership. Meyer (1975: 539) describes three variables for autonomous leadership: turnover or output, subordinate's dependence on higher authority, and insularity within the organization. He argues that the presence of these variables is closely related to the stability of the organization. He suggests that the focus should be on the leadership *positions*, rather than the people who are the leaders.

2. Leadership Eras in terms of theorization

Seters and Field (1990: 29-45) classify the evolutionary process of the development of leadership theory, which started mainly in the twentieth century. Many of them arose simultaneously and thus, cannot be recognised in their relative order. It is important to note that these eras have diverse theories which are combined in specific categories. Each leadership era represents a higher stage of development in the leadership thought process, which is clearly apparent in the following categorization. Seters and Field further argue that this categorization is restricted to the varying changes in the relationships between the superior-subordinate relationships. So, no attempts have been made by the authors to demarcate the dates and periods precisely.

Table 2.1: The evolutionary stages of leadership theories¹

	<i>Leadership Eras</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
1	Personality Era	<p><i>Great Man Theory:</i> emphasised on imitation of personalities and behaviour of great men</p> <p><i>Trait Theory:</i> assumes that people inherit certain qualities and traits that make them a better leader</p>
2	Influence Era	<p><i>Power Relations Period:</i> explains leadership effectiveness in terms of sources, amount and use of power</p> <p><i>Persuasion Period:</i> reaction to the earlier approach; removed element of coercion; still part of managerial theory</p>
3	Behaviour Era	<p><i>Early Behaviour Period:</i> extension of 'traits period' but emphasises upon developing behaviour traits</p> <p><i>Late Behaviour Period:</i> related with managerial application of behaviour</p>
4	Situation Era	<p><i>Environment Period:</i> leaders arise only in the right place, at the right time and the right circumstances</p> <p><i>Social Status Period:</i> leader's and subordinate's roles are defined by mutually confirmed expectations that each individual will act in congruence with his or her previous behaviour</p>
5	Contingency Era	<p><i>Contingency Theory:</i> emphasises the need to place leaders in situations most suited to them or to train leaders to change the situation to suit his/her style. 'No leadership style is best in all situations'</p> <p><i>Path-Goal Theory:</i> focuses more on enabling conditions of subordinate's success.</p>

¹ Based on David A. Van Seters and Richard H. G. Field (1990), "The Evolution of Leadership Theories", *Journal of Organizational Change Management*, 3 (3): 29-45.

6	Transactional or Management Era	<p><i>Exchange Period:</i> new concept of 'Emergent Leadership' evolved in this era where leadership requires consent and acknowledgement of subordinates.</p> <p><i>Role Development Period:</i> group conveys esteem and status to the leader for the achievement of the goal leading to an equitable relationship</p>
7	Anti-Leadership Era	<p><i>Ambiguity Period:</i> leadership is only a <i>perpetual phenomenon</i> in the mind of the observer.</p> <p><i>Substitute Period:</i> more constructive than the previous phase; suggests that the task and characteristics of leader can prevent leadership from affecting subordinates performance</p>
8	Culture Era	<p>extension of Substitute Period; as it suggests that leader can create a strong culture in an organization. Leadership is not the phenomena of the individual or a group but it is present in the culture of the entire organization</p>
9	Transformational Era	<p>latest in development of leadership theory; blends many aspects of previous eras and hence is very optimistic</p> <p><i>Charisma Period:</i> stresses that leadership is a process of collective action and the leader must be visionary</p> <p><i>Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Period</i> deals with the transformation in leadership as a result of interactions between leaders and subordinates by raising positive expectations among subordinates</p>

In sum, leadership began as a one-dimensional and individualistic process in which only leader's personality, traits and behaviours were considered. Thereafter, the roles of followers were also taken into consideration and subsequently situation was added as an important variable. Advancement again took place, when leadership changed its approach from top-down to bottom-up. The culture period emphasized the interaction in the whole organization. This evolution of leadership provides some insights for the future of leadership. Seters and Field (1990: 39) state that the leader in the present age

should have qualities as he must be visionary, willing to take risks and adaptable to change. He should be willing to delegate authority, build and represent the organizational culture and environment. The skills and the confidence of the subordinates must be built. He should inspire people to act, develop followers into tomorrow's leaders and become the agent of change.

The 'social exchange approach', propounded by Zaccaro (2001) deals with the relationship between the leader and his or her followers as the leaders provide direction, guidance, and activity structuring to a group and the members of the collectivity and in turn, grant the leader permission to influence them (therefore, conferring legitimacy, reverence and respect). All organizational leaders engage in direction setting (such as goal setting, planning, strategy making, and envisioning) for their constituent units.

Morality has always been an element in evaluating leaders from Plato to the present day. The evolution of leadership theory has seen much debate about the integrity, authenticity, ethics and psychological health of modern leaders. The problems of identifying 'good' and 'bad' leaders have a moral dimension. The leaders must be visible through the organisation. Their presence provides sense of stability and confidence in the affairs. They must take calculated risk for the organisation or may lose opportunities.

Burns (1978: 22) is first to put forward the concept of 'transforming leadership' as a "relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may convert leaders into moral agents". He identifies morality as an important variable in leadership and suggests that only the leaders with higher moral purpose can be transactional leader, who can transform the organization. A transactional leader applies moral *means* to lead or in other words, the means prevail over the ends. Such means may include honesty, responsibility or fairness. The dominant values for such leaders are transcendental such as equality, liberty or justice. A moral leader emerges from the fundamental wants, needs, aspirations, and values of the followers and also tries to fulfil them. Followers are not passive and they possess adequate knowledge of alternatives and the capacity to choose among those alternatives. They believe that a comprehensive vision can transform society by raising social consciousness.

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Goleman (2000: 82) suggests that there are certain sets of interpersonal and intrapersonal skills. These skills include self-awareness (having a deep understanding of one's emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs and drives); self-regulation (an ability to adapt to changes, a tendency for reflection, the power to say no to impulsive urges); motivation (being driven to achieve, being passionate over profession, enjoying challenges); empathy (thoughtfully considering someone's activities while interacting) and social skills (moving people in direction you desire due to your ability to interact effectively). They all contribute to the factor called Emotional Intelligence (EQ)², which is more necessary than the Intelligence Quotient (IQ), for successful leadership. He further points out that the most effective leaders switch between the authoritative, affiliative, democratic and coaching styles, as desired by the situation. Another type of leadership is 'inspirational leadership', where the leaders, who are not perfect, expose their weakness so that people can learn better. They rely upon intuition to act and use their uniqueness (e.g. personality, expertise or something as simple as greeting) as a way to distinguish themselves in a leading role.

Willcoxson (2000: 30) provides for strategic leadership, which occurs when the leader is able to integrate insights into the strategic choices available to him in an organization. Strategic leaders are keenly aware of the internal and external context. They observe and interpret the actual and potential environment within which the organization operates to maximise the effectiveness and future adaptability of the organization. Kanninen (1995: 160) also suggests that for the success of international leadership, the leader has to be strategic, to provide new initiatives to strike a balance between an international organization and its staff on one hand and its main external constituencies on the other. In a serious organizational crisis, direct participation of top leadership in any reform planning, coordination and implementation increases the likelihood that the reform will be successful and that the whole reduction of expenditure and reorganizational strategy would be based upon rational³ considerations.

² Goleman is accredited with the contribution of the concept called 'emotional intelligence'.

³ Rationality for a leader of international organization can be understood as "effectiveness in achieving the results intended, without the loss of constituency support" (Kanninen, 1995: p. 161).

Lustick and Liatin (1974: 90) subscribe to the Karl Deutsch model of learning⁴ and term leadership as an elite learning. They analyse leadership independent of particular resources and constraints by conceptualizing *skill* as an ability to learn productively as long-range goals. A skilful leader of a country can enter into a successful negotiation with an enemy country if he feels that the fear is baseless. Such a negotiation is a product of the learning by the leadership. The policy of *Détente* and less hostile diplomacy can be understood in this context. These scholars provide⁴ five overlapping dimensions of the skill, necessary for effective leadership; scope, accuracy, adaptiveness, imagination and energy. To elaborate further, *Scope* describes the extent to which an actor perceives the variety of factors relevant to his purpose. *Accuracy* is the extent to which these factors conform to objective reality. *Adaptiveness* is the extent to which actor efficiently changes his opinion in response to new actions, strategies, goals, stimuli or purpose. *Imagination* is his ability to creative responses that involves redefinition of political arena and changes in the resources or constrains in the environment. *Energy* is the extent to which he applies personal resources in the learning cycle. Lustick and Liatin (1974: 108) also focus on 'energy' as a factor and hold that 'leadership focusing on high accuracy will be low in energy'. In addition, highly energetic leadership is usually considered to be counterproductive, upsets the process and therefore, likely to fail. The formation of United Arab Republic in 1958 and its disintegration in 1968 was partially, the result of the high imagination and energy in actors but had low scope, accuracy and adaptiveness.

The above-mentioned theoretical and conceptual aspects of leadership in general can also be said to apply in the context of leadership of international organizations. However, leadership of international organizations entails certain distinguishing characteristics that set it apart from leadership in general.

⁴ Karl Deutsche defined learning as "the development of new sets of attitudes and actions with respect to some motivating purpose" (*The Nerves of Government*, 1966, New York: Free Press p. 167).

3. Leadership in international organizations

Leadership has been studied mainly in the national context. Personality, characteristics, traits and reasons for massive support have been studied in the context of how they were able to influence international politics, but their powers were seen to be based on national resources; either tangible or intangible. Leadership in the international system has been analysed in terms of the leadership by a nation (such as US), by theories like hegemonic stability, but literature on the role of individual leadership at the international level is limited.

The real beginning of the international organization can be described as the invention of the international secretariat. This is an innovation, which transformed a series of conferences into an organization. Claude (1964: 174) terms it as the multilateralization and regularization of diplomacy. The executive head of the Secretariat is necessarily an important determinant in the success and failure of the organization.

A national bureaucracy fits comfortably into a governmental context; but at the international level, this context is missing. They may be considered both as the staff and as an executive. Howard-Ellis (in Claude 1964: 175) comments, that the Secretary-General of the League of Nations had to try to get his budget 'voted by a Parliament where everyone belonged to the opposition.'

Young (1991) holds that leadership is a critical determinant in the success or failure of the process of institutional bargaining that dominates the efforts to form regimes or institutional arrangements in international society. On the question of complexity of the subject of leadership in international organization, he opines:

...Yet, leadership is also a complex phenomenon, ill-defined, poorly understood and subject to recurrent controversy, among students of international affairs (Young 1991: 281).

Leadership is a *necessary* condition but not a *sufficient* condition for the success or failure of an organization. Young (1991: 302-307) argues that it is wrong to infer from a successful institutional bargaining that it is due to the successful leadership alone and

this should not be taken as an approach to formulating and testing theories for failure or success of leadership of international organization. Instead, the stress should be laid upon a conception of leadership, focused on well-defined forms of behaviour that can be identified without reference to the outcomes flowing from institutional bargaining. Elizabeth Dixon (1997: 260) examines the interrelationship between and the importance of individual leadership and structural power in international regime building and institutional development. Dixon (1997) concludes that hegemonic stability theory highlights 'structural power'⁵ as a variable. Hegemonic stability theory fails to establish causal links and it ignores other important variables, such as the constraints imposed by changes in the domestic environments of leading states as well as in the international environment.

Haas views an international organization as a structure within the world environment. As the system analysis, the inputs to the structure of the international organization come from demands and expectations made by the states and the other variables of the environment. The elements of potential conflict and the consensus to resolve it, provides opportunities for the organization to take actions. Here, the position of executive head is important to maximise these opportunities. He can interpret the input pressures in such a way that it can enhance the task and authority of the organization. In a conflicting situation, the executive head can propose such actions, which were not part of the original intentions of the contestants but they can be persuaded for the same, as they are less harmful than the continuance of the conflict. For example, the two major extension areas of International Labour Organization (ILO) in the post-War era were *human rights* and *manpower*, which grew out of the interpretation by the leadership of ILO in the face of Cold War pressure (Haas 1968: 119).

Haas believes that the conflicting parties are trying to 'redefine their conflict so as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the initial mandate or task.' This leads to a higher level of cooperation. Cox (1969: 206) agrees to his conception and supplements it by proposing that the executive head may be an explanatory key to the emergence of a new kind of autonomous actor in the

⁵ Here the term "structure" is used to refer to the distribution of power in the international system.


international system. He questions, "Are the international organizations the instruments of national foreign policies or do they interfere the world politics in their own right?" He provides two-fold analysis having *nominalistic* and *systemic* implications. As the realists take the nominalist stand, for them the United Nations is more than just a name covering multitude of 'exogenously determined activities', so it is unable to act because of big power's veto.

Haas (1968: 120-122) provides three important variables for executive head to maximise the opportunities for task expansion. First, the executive head must define an ideology, which gives clear goals to the organization and prescribes methods for attaining these goals. This ideology must respond to a wide range of demands and expectations from the constituents. Second, he must build a bureaucracy committed to this ideology, having a sense of its independent role in international system. Third, he must build *implicit* and *formalized* coalitions and alliances to ensure support from sufficient portions of constituents. However, this is a tough task to accomplish, as the very basis of formation of international organization is the separation of the issues. Even on the same issue, there can be differences in opinions or groupings. The executive head should concentrate on the major issues, which are related to the ideology of the organization or the major goals, which he has defined.

The role of executive head becomes more important when the organization is undergoing adaptation or change. Thus, the real essence of international organizations is not about performing the specific task but bringing about a new and more integrated world order. This can be tested by observing the changes in the national policies or legislations of the major member-states in consonance with the organizational ideology. It can also be said that the patterns and alignments of the international conflicts are 'independent variables' due to the nature of the international system and the institutional development of an international organization is dependent on these patterns and alignments.

The following systemic implication describes 'how an international system is transformed in the direction of greater integration'.

Figure 2.2 Systemic transformation of international organization⁶



⁶ Source: Robert W. Cox (1969), "The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization", *International Organization*, 23 (2): 207.

It is important to note here that among the highest possible conversion variable is the executive head (represented by 'X' and 'Y'), who can be a crucial factor in the development of the mandate and activities of the organization. It implies that, through his leadership skills, the international organizations, which were the forum of multilateral diplomacy can be more than the sum of the inputs. Leadership can play a pivotal role at these stages in transforming the organization. It can transform from an anarchic inter-state system to some common regulatory power. The emergence of new and more integrated world order can be a result of the dialectical process, where the states join to resolve the common interests and, in the process discover the higher and common interests and a common regulatory agency to promote and regulate them (Cox 1969: 207-209).

Cox (1969) supplemented Haas's model of leadership by analyzing the key relationships of executive head and overcoming the inherent constraints in its functioning. He classifies relationships into following three sets:

a) Leadership and international bureaucracy:

The staffs of an international organization are considered to have an 'international viewpoint' and should not have any links with the constituting national administration. In other words, there should be a 'detachment' from the politics. In order to achieve this, the international civil service must be a career service and should be able to avoid outside pressures and arbitrary interventions. The significant principle, which is generally enshrined in the regulations of an international organization, is that no international official should seek or accept any instructions from any authority external to the organization. However, the political reality is different. Different nationalities, geographical areas and sectional groups are considered important in appointments at all levels of administration. Each member country and sometimes, the group interests as well consider themselves entitled for the appointment. It has significance as well as it results in diversified staffs that contribute national, regional and sectional viewpoints for better decision-making (Cox 1969: 214).

b) Leadership and member-states:

The second set relates to the executive head's relationship with the member states, which determines the political support from national constituents and sets his limits. These relations demand great political and diplomatic skills. Cox proposes that the issues which are important to the executive head seldom have the same level of importance for the national governments. The pressure groups or the local factors affect the national governments, but they cannot influence the head of an international organization in the same manner. The executive head shall advance in the direction of the ideology of the organization using the favourable domestic opinions of the member states. The executive head must not limit him to the external arena but also strengthen his position by making alliances with the domestic pressure groups. But, he should be cautious that he should not be close to any such groups, which may become a hurdle in consensus building at the organizational level and lose the confidence of the member states. He should be able to manipulate the international policies in such a way that these groups can perceive the policies related with their interests.

c) Leadership and the international system:

The head should be able to assess the existing international political situation and take decisions accordingly. The political situation will decide the role of the head - to take initiatives independently or to act as a negotiator in 'quiet diplomacy'. To accomplish such a task, he must enjoy the confidence of all sections of opinions. He should work on the definite as well as flexible ideology of the organization. These are mutually contradictory as maintaining confidence of major *powers* and asserting the organizational ideology are conflicting. An effective intelligence is also required for successful negotiations, for which he can rely upon the sources outside the organization, be it the major powers or other sources. This may again pose questions on the partiality of the head for one or the other conflicting states.

The executive head, who had a background in local politics may not have the capacity for leadership in a larger arena with varied dimensions. Thus, Cox (1969: 210) points out that the leadership of an international organization is a special kind of political

task which requires particular aptitude and knowledge. In addition, those leaders having experience in technical fields have not been very successful. He rejects that the personality or the legal-institutional form is the independent variable. Edinger (1990: 520) views leadership as a *residual variable* and an important factor that could possibly account for events that cannot be entirely explained by other variables in an analytic framework. The behaviours and actions of international organizations with a well-developed leadership are a compromise between the organization and the member states' wishes (Reinalda 2001: 11).

Cox further modifies his earlier theory in '*Leadership: A Comment*' (1974) and proposes that leadership can be thought as 'directly proportional to skills and inversely proportional to constraints.' The leadership of an international organization and the international political activity are linked with two variables: information and mobilization. All international organizations have much information but they lack levels of mobilization. Some are under governmental pressures, while some respond to specific scientific or specific community network.

Hoole (1976) studies the appointment of forty-seven executive heads appointed during the period 1945-70 in international organizations from a policy-making perspective. He views appointment of an executive head as a function of three factors; organizational, national, and personal. An analysis is used to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals as executive heads in UN treaty-based organizations. He concluded statistically, that the emphasis on the factors involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations (Hoole 1976: 93).

Thus, leadership is an important factor in the success or failure of an international organization. Its role becomes more crucial when the organization is undergoing a change or adaptation. Along with leadership, the secretariat staff and the international setting also play an important role in the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. An able leadership is able to create consensus among the states over important issues and can be

an important factor in shaping it into an international law or help it find a place in the domestic laws of the member-states.

4. Leadership in Specific International Organizations in Practice

For any concrete application, the theory has to be placed in historical context as history provides the basis to empirically study and analyse the phenomenon for future generalizations. The history of international organizations provides the traces of evolution of the theory of leadership. The League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO) were established at the same time period, but ILO succeeded and is fully functional today whereas the League died in the late thirties. If its success and failure are seen in the contexts of the head of the organizations, Albert Thomas⁷ was seen as an effective and dynamic leader whereas Eric Drummond, who was the Secretary-General of the League, could not help it to last long (Cox 1969: 205). Although, there are various other important factors, it can be an interesting enquiry that if the executive heads were interchanged, what would have been the fate of these two organizations?

The legal-institutional approach, which provides for the formal constitutional powers of the executive head, reflects that whether the provisions provide some opportunities for independent initiatives as well. Drummond's Annual Reports were submissive administrative account of League activities whereas Thomas used the opportunity of laying the Annual Reports before the International League Conference to express his views on major issues of social and economic policies - an opportunity for initiatives, which his successors always utilised (Michael Virally in Cox 1969: 208). It is surprising to note that the League Secretary-General, unlike the United Nations Secretary-General, never addressed the Assembly of the League, and in the Council, he tended to speak more hardly than a secretary of the committee. Eric Drummond played roles behind the scene, acting as a confidential channel of communication to governments engaged in a dispute. But, the role was never extended to take action in apolitically

⁷ The International Labor Organization, particularly under the leadership of its first Director-General, Albert Thomas, has been held up as a model of dynamic leadership in international organization. Refer to Robert W. Cox (1969), "The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization", *International Organization*, 23 (2): 205-223.

controversial case that was deemed objectionable by one of the party (Stein 1962: 12). Claude (1964: 178) points out that Trygve Lje began his work on the basis of structural plans carefully elaborated by the Preparatory Commission of the UN, whereas Eric Drummond had had to start from scratch.

Albert Thomas was seen as a charismatic leader after the demise of the League during the interwar period. He infused a sense of devotion in his staff. He widely travelled not only to interact with the political officials and the diplomatic representatives, but also contacted the trade union leaders and the common people. Cox (1969: 210) argues that the charismatic style seems out of fashion in international organizations in the post-War period. This is because of a more heterogeneous world, where the executive heads have to operate. This has encouraged 'quiet diplomacy' and discouraged a policy of self-assertion.

Schechter (1987) investigated the factors which contributed to different organizational settings and in significantly different systemic situations and tried to demonstrate the *personal*, *organizational* and *systemic* sources of successful and unsuccessful executive head leaderships in the 1970s and 1980s. This particular period marked significant institutional expansion; increase in budgets and the organizational ideologies were replaced, reshaped or on many occasions, supplemented. In such a situation, the executive head required to be an activist having a bold plan and a moral vision to respond to these changes. He chose three organizations; United Nations Education and Social Council (UNESCO), an organization in eclipse or crisis; the World Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation), which was on peak during this period and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which recovered during this period.

The Articles of Agreement (AoA) of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) provide that the World Bank President is not limited by geographical quotas as in the case of many UN agencies. Also, the Bank's sources of funds are from capital markets, not from the member-states. So, the President is more

independent and autonomous compared to executive heads of other organizations. Schechter contends that Robert McNamara was an appropriate and effective leader of the World Bank in the 1970s. He was analysed in the backdrop of his previous professional experience as a Professor of Business Administration at Harvard and later President of Ford in the 1960s. From 1960-68, he was US Secretary of Defense where he introduced Planning, Programme and Budgeting System (PPBS). His knowledge of the American system was an added advantage in the relationship of the Bank with its largest donor. He had his own vision of the Bank, which he regarded as something more than a bank, as 'a development agency', and made the reputation of the Bank as an agent of social reform rather than a complex banking organization. Schechter adds:

Though, clearly aware of the sensitivity involved, McNamara felt a strong responsibility to use the presidency of the World Bank as a unique podium from which to say candidly to the world those things which he felt needed saying on the subject of development (Maddux in Schechter 1987: 203).

McNamara changed the systemic conditions by declaring boldly to double the Bank's lending, having special emphasis on Latin America and Africa. He focused more on rural poverty and added a new area of population control. Schechter (1987: 205) further argues that McNamara's use of his organizational ideology cultivated the support of the rich as he was concerned about growing protectionism in the developed countries as well as the poor members. So, he fulfils the criteria made by Cox for making coalitions and alliances - to ensure support from a sufficient proportion of the organization's constituents. He also met with the challenge posed by Haas to develop the means for periodic re-evaluation, resulting in expansion and strength of organizations power.

The case of UNESCO, during this period was contrary to the World Bank as it was a period of economic crisis and the rise of conservatism in US. Amadou-Mahter M'Bow was an African historian and geographer and later, Minister for Education of Senegal, joined UNESCO's Executive Board. The African voting bloc helped him become Director-General of UNESCO in 1974. This was an era of superpower détente and Third World assertiveness. His skills as an executive head were tested when he had to deal with the series of anti-Israeli resolutions. He was critical of America and never believed that it would ever really leave the organization. The US withdrawal due to 'aid

fatigue', led to the great financial crisis. He failed to establish the priorities among the multiple wishes of the member countries and lacked priorities, vision and pragmatism for the organization. The management style of M'Bow was also questioned as the staff was recruited on patronage rather than professional efficiency.

Bradford Morse was selected as UN Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs in 1972 and took over as the head of UNDP in 1976. He adapted effectively to the changing systemic circumstances and tried to remove UNESCO from the 'patronage' of the UN. He was able to enhance the reputation of his organization, even during the time of financial crisis as he recruited an effective and loyal management team. He convinced organizations such as IBRD, International Labour Organization and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and countries like Switzerland, Canada, Sweden and Netherlands to advance funds from their own resources to maintain some UNDP projects. This reflects the balanced approach between the donor and recipient constituents. Morse had a feeling of team-work, which was evident from the fact that he maintained good relations with the organization's representatives based in more than 120 countries. His approach of 'basic needs' focused on the technical cooperation and strengthening human resources in the developing nations. He emphasised on '*fairness and need*' in place of '*supply and demand*'. Schechter (1987: 214) concludes that even if the intergovernmental objectives remain quite similar, the study of executive heads of the 1970s and 80s indicates requirement of different sets of skills. The recession acted as an important variable to see the capability of the leaders in establishment of priorities, internal management and the organizational efficiency.

Doxey (1979: 82) studied the Secretaries-General of the Commonwealth and concludes that the other international organizations are more purposeful actors but ideological divisions and opposed political and economic interests reduced them to the level of Commonwealth. They are not *solving* the political problems but are merely assisting in reducing strains and tensions or trying to provide the framework for reconciliation. Commonwealth is of manageable size and, is modest in resources and has efficient and well-organised staff. The role of the Secretary-General of Commonwealth

is conventional in nature due to the British legacy of administration and the nature of tasks assigned are simpler compared to other international organizations.

Kille and Scully (2003) studied six UN Secretaries-General and four European Union Commission Presidents through content analysis of their responses to questions. Their behaviours in office were measured through historical accounts and analyses. He concludes that executive heads with expansionist leadership style display greater willingness to try to enhance the status of their organization (Kille 2003: 190-95).

Stein (1962: 19-20) held that the post of the UN Secretary-General is analogous to that of a national executive under a parliamentary regime. But, requiring majority in case of an international organization is tougher than in the national government due to the various conflicting interests. If the member-states feel that it will be a futile exercise to reach a solution, then the Secretary-General is left to solve the problem at 'his own risk'. The guiding principles would be the faithful interpretations of the instructions, rights and obligation of the organization, in the light of international laws and decisions already taken. He advises that the leader must reduce the elements of political judgments but should seek to obtain what is regarded as representative opinion of the organization.

Urquhart (1987: 6) observes that in the present crowded, strife-torn world, there is a desperate need for a leadership which can balance national interests with those of the world community as a whole, a leadership which can agree on what needs to be managed and what cannot be left to chance, regardless of political or ideological differences. He provides an ambitious view of the leadership, which will put well-tried principles into practice in dealing with international conflicts and disputes, especially those in the Third World, where regrettably, most wars now take place, fought with weapons from the First and Second Worlds. He further adds that there is a need of a leadership which can bring out the best and most creative in humanity and inspire the 'practical idealism' without which no great historical objective can be attained.

Thus, in conclusion, it can be said that leadership is an important variable in the success and efficiency of an organization, irrespective of its size, scope and nature of task. It is independent of time and space, which may provide different sets of interpretations for the success or failure of an organization but its role cannot be denied. 'Cross-cultural' sophistication and high-level diplomatic skills are essential requirements for leading an international organization in the contemporary era. The leader of an international organization for its success must look towards the opportunities to partner with other entities. He should act as a '*catalyst*'. In the present world, it is practical to accept Karl Popper's dictum of 'infallibility' and the need to recognise that leaders are not perfect. There may be errors in what is said or done. This should be duly acknowledged, so that it can be put aside or reformed and the leader can move towards more vital issues through democratic processes.

The special requirements that a leader of an international organization must display in order to optimally maximise the role of the organization are best highlighted in the context of the leader of the central universal organizational system, viz. the United Nations. The next chapter explores the role of the UN Secretary General in the light of the above-mentioned conceptual aspects of leadership in general.

Chapter 3: Leadership of the United Nations:

The Secretary-General

Chapter 3

LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

When the first UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie received his successor Dag Hammarskjöld at New York's Idlewild Airport on 9 April 1953, he described the job as "the most impossible job on this earth."⁸ It is evident from the history that the further six decades have not made the role of the Secretary-General any easier for the seven men, who have held the office and have exercised their functions in widely different global political environments.

The nature of leadership of an international organization differs widely from that in the national context. The constituency of the national leaders is their population, to whom they are directly responsible; but in case of the leadership of international organization, the member-states provide both constraints and opportunities to the executive head. Here, neutrality is the most important characteristics of the executive head as he has to take decisions for global problems by rising above the national concerns. His guiding principle is the Charter. This is also evident by the statement of Trachtenberg (1982: 615) that, "traditional power politics models of leadership are simply not applicable to the United Nations Secretary-General".

Urquhart and Childers call the leadership of the UN Secretary-General in the new era as an '*intellectual leadership*'. Gordenker defines leadership as it pertains to the UN Secretary-General thus:

Leadership by the Secretary-General consists of projecting values, policies, and procedural approaches on defined issues related to acknowledged organizational functions. Further, it includes stimulating, overseeing, and sometimes directing the execution of adopted policies (Gordenker 1993: 268).

⁸ Quoted in Dag Hammarskjöld's Speech to the Staff, UN Press Release SG/299 (1 May, 1953).

The evolution of the institution of permanent international civil services represents an important progress beyond the traditional diplomatic conferences, which were attended by the national representatives seconded by their governments. The League of Nations provided for a permanent Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General to be appointed by the Council with the approval of the Assembly. According to Stein (1962: 13), Eric Drummond, the first Secretary-General of the League, is credited with the evolution of the concept of the 'truly international civil services', based upon two basic principles; the principle of international composition (the best qualified men, selected with due regard to the geographical representation); and the principle of international independence and responsibility. Drummond also emphasised the need for an international secretariat as an administrative rather than of a political organ, which was inspired by the idea of the British civil services.

The UN Secretary-General is an important part of the institution, not only as its chief executive, but also as both symbol and guardian of the original vision of the organization. He is the only person who can provide a unifying influence throughout the entire structure. The Secretary-General is the public face of the world organization. He holds a unique position in mediating conflicts. The latest international threats - ranging from armed conflicts to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, underdevelopment and migration - all of which require a collective response of the world community and thus, makes the contribution of the Secretary-General more important. Whereas the Secretary-General's contribution to peaceful settlement is crucial more than ever, unfortunately, criticisms of UN's performance have increased for failing to act in the crises like Iraq war. Therefore, it is significant to assess the effectiveness of the Secretary-General's leadership role in world politics. In the absence of an effective centre of authority, multiple centres of decision-making will lead to confusion and inefficiency instead of coordination. Finkelstein (1992: 7) argues:

The central explanation is that the United Nations was created plural, deliberately. Moreover, despite the deliberations to centralize over the years, decentralization has dominated and in a pluralizing world, the UN and UN systems are more plural now than at the start.

The role of Secretary-General as envisaged by the founding fathers of the UN was one of coordination and cooperation, rather than that of centralization and direction. So, the role is of a 'uniting figure', which is of vital importance and complexity. There was a disagreement over the nature of the office; should it be more of a political initiator or work behind the scenes. Schwebel (1952: 18) describes the conflict as illustrated by different titles that were discussed as alternatives to 'Secretary-General'; "'Director-General' did not go far enough for most, whereas 'World's Moderator' (proposed by Roosevelt, who was said to have been interested in the office after his presidency) went too far."

The position of UN Secretary-General implies a kind of paradox (Tharoor in Chesterman 2007: 34). He is elected to the office as an individual, not as a representative of a government. He bears personal responsibilities for his actions and of his subordinates. He is the only individual acting on personal responsibility, who has the explicit charge to concern himself with the maintenance of peace and security among states. But UN is not an organization of individuals or of citizens. It is an organization of states represented by governments. The representative roles of the government officials have minimum discretion. In theoretical terms, the UN operates at a level of international system in which states are the actors. Thus, there can be a relevant question about the role of an individual in an international environment, where states are actors. Tharoor (in Chesterman 2007: 41) asks that, is the Secretary-General equivalent to a state? If not, then, what is his status or means of action and its relevance? Is he primarily a symbol or does he have some influence?

The Secretary-General cannot be compared with the executives at national level and to make a reasonable assessment, a framework based on sovereignty of member-states is required. The trans-boundary issues of security require acting above the national considerations, in order to be effective. Thus, in order to perform his or her duty effectively, the Secretary-General must overcome many dilemmas resulting from the gap between the consent of states and efficient working. Consent of states is needed to reach a peaceful settlement where state parties to a dispute wish to retain their positions as intact and refrain from making concessions for that settlement.

According to Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-General performs functions entrusted to him by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Trusteeship Council. Besides using the authority granted by the representative organs, under Article 99, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter, which in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. This provision establishes the foundation of his peacemaking efforts. The right of political initiative also forms the legal basis to extend beyond the limits of traditional mediation. Whereas proposals put forward by any other mediator have no binding effect, the Secretary-General may activate a process at the end of which the Security Council is entitled to adopt binding resolutions.

The *sui generis* position of office of the Secretary-General helps him in shaping creative practices. Also, the interpretation of Article 99 of the UN Charter provides the discretionary powers to the Secretary-General. During the Cold War, whenever the organization faced a stalemate, it was considered more appropriate to charge the Secretary-General with mediation efforts rather than establishing an *ad hoc* organ to deal with the specific dispute. The UN was used as a platform, which manifested many confrontations of the two power blocks. Such confrontations provided both the independence (in a deadlock situation) and standstill positions on conflicting issues.

1. The Report of the Preparatory Commission of the UN⁹

The Report of the Preparatory Commission of the UN (1945a: 86-87, Para 8-17) states that the Secretary-General “more than anyone else, will stand for the UN as a whole. In the eyes of the world, he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter to which this organization gives effect.” It guarantees the independence and international character of the Secretary-General and his staff. The principal functions assigned to the Secretary-General may be grouped under six headings: general administrative and executive functions; technical functions; financial functions; the organization and

⁹ Refer to annexure 2 for the provisions related to the Secretary-General.

administration of the international secretariat; political functions and representational functions.

The Preparatory Commission conceived the role of Secretary-General as a 'mediator and as an informal advisor to many governments.' Such a job was a first of its kind, so the Commission concluded that, 'the Secretary-General will require the highest qualities of political judgment, tact and integrity'.

The Secretary-General is conceived as the head of the Secretariat. He appoints all staff under regulations established by the General Assembly (Article 101, paragraphs 1 and 5), and assigns appropriate staff to the various organs of the UN (Article 101, paragraph 2). He is primarily responsible to the other principal organs for the Secretariat's work; his choice of staff - more particularly of higher staff - and his leadership largely determines the character and the efficiency of the Secretariat as a whole. He is also responsible for creating and maintaining a team spirit in a body of officials recruited from many countries.

From the early days of the conception of the role of the UN Secretary-General, it was clear that he should be given more important political role than his predecessor in the League. He was conceived as a 'permanent non-voting member' of the Council with independent authority to summon it, bring before it, any threat to peace, and appeal directly to the parties concerned. This was contrary to the League system, which has allowed only a member-state to bring a suspected threat before the Council (Johnstone 2003: 442).

On August 23 1945, Edward R. Stettinius, the American representative on the United Nations Preparatory Commission, proposed that the "Secretary-General should, if possible, not be a national" of any of the Security Council's permanent members. Furthermore, he should be selected 'because of his qualifications' (Barros 1977: 67). This led to a convention of selecting the Secretary-General from the non-permanent members of the Security Council. In September 1945, the US Representative on the Preparatory Commission, Adlai Stevenson told Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius:

We favor the choice of an outstandingly qualified individual, preferably a figure who has attained some international position and preferably a national of a small or middle power (in Urquhart 1995: 23).

Murthy (1985: 181) also points out that the Charter is silent on the qualification of the candidate:

...for the most important job in the organization, the Charter does not provide the qualification of the candidate. The appointment of an aspirant is to be made as a climax of a complicated political, electoral process involving both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General's functions may be primarily characterised as public relations and diplomatic; but he also directs political, social, humanitarian and scientific activities. Given the range of tasks for which the Secretary-General is responsible, it is quite impossible to look for the specific qualifications an individual would need to do the job well. The Secretary-General is such a multifaceted position that it essentially reflects "10 full-time jobs in one" (UNA-USA Report 2006) and, as such, a selection based on specific qualifications may prove to be a difficult exercise. Indeed, it would be difficult to describe his position and even more difficult to find a person who can match such a qualification.

A useful approach for evaluating the Secretary-general would be, not to focus on qualifications but to evaluate candidates based on the qualities such as outstanding diplomatic skills and strong leadership capabilities. He should have a broad understanding of global issues, commitment to carry out needed reforms, a strong vision with an outlook toward issues of the future and the ability to translate ideas into concrete action. Lentner (1965b: 532-533) points out that the incumbent must have a patient attitude, not expecting immediate results or clear and simple solutions to the problems. The Secretary-General does not command economic or physical power, but has to rely on the moral status emanating from the principles of the Charter, and on reputed impartiality. His impact is not negligible, but neither is it enough to change the world very much.

2. The Secretary-General and the UN Charter¹⁰

Chapter XV of the Charter of the UN is titled, 'Secretariat', which refers to it, as one of its principal organs. According to Fröhlich (2008: 17), "*De jure*, the Secretary-General is not a principal organ of the United Nations; *de facto*, though, his position as the chief administrative officer and personification of the UN, lends his actions considerable legitimacy."

Article 97 talks about 'appointment' instead of 'election', indicating the administrative, rather than political role of the Secretary-General. For most of the United Nation's history, however, the role of the General Assembly in appointing the Secretary-General has been limited to the formal act of appointment. In practice, the Security Council has done the real decision-making (this is one of the major issue-areas in the debate over the reform of the UN).

Article 12(2) of UN Charter requires that the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session, of any matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council. Article 20 provides that the special sessions of the General Assembly shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the members of the United Nations.

The UN Charter, in Article 97, does not specify a term of office for the Secretary-General. By Resolution 11(I), the General Assembly decided in 1946 that the first Secretary-General should have a term of five years, renewable for a further five years.¹¹ The resolution specifically provided that the 'General Assembly and the Security Council are free to modify the term of office of future Secretaries-General in the light of experience.' As a result, the term of five years has become customary. But this is entirely discretionary as the power of modification has been used when Trygve Lie was reappointed in 1950 for three years and U Thant was appointed for only four years after

¹⁰ Refer to the annexure 1 for the provisions of the UN Charter related with the Secretary-General.

¹¹ Refer to annexure 3.

he served for one year as Acting Secretary-General. In October 1966, U Thant's term was briefly extended by two months pending a final decision on whether he would be granted a second full term.

~~The~~ Article 97 of the UN Charter provides no guidance regarding rotation of the post of Secretary-General. However, General Assembly Resolution 51/241 (United Nations 1997)¹² states that "due regard" should be given to regional rotation, which is viewed as a way to ensure an element of equity by representing the developing world. The actual history of the terms allocated as between the regional groups does not establish anything that might be called a clear practice. Following is the regional allocation of the previous Secretaries-General:

Table 3.1 Regional rotation of the post of Secretary-General¹³

<i>Geographical Regions</i>	<i>Number of terms</i>
Western Europe	6 terms
Africa	3 terms
Asia	2 terms
Latin America	2 terms
Eastern Europe	No term

According to Article 98, the Secretary-General performs 'such other functions as are entrusted to him by these (other) organs (of the UN)'. According to Fröhlich (2008: 20), a glance at UN practice shows that these are not limited to administrative and supporting functions, but can, include highly political tasks and authority with broad latitude for the Secretary-General. This was expressed in the 1950 '*Uniting for Peace*'

¹² Refer annexure 6.

¹³ Source: Simon Chesterman (2007), *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary General in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 59

resolution, where the General Assembly recommended action to solve threats to peace when the Security Council was not in a position to do so. The General Assembly, however, is a collective actor and thus able to execute and implement its decisions only up to a point. Hence, in a second shift of functions, the General Assembly transferred mandates to the Secretary-General (Stein 1962: 22).

Article 99 of the Charter provides for *political initiative*, based on his limited discretion. The discretion embodied in the notion that he *may* (not must) bring *any matter* (not only disputes) which in his opinion may threaten peace requires the Secretary-General to exercise independent political judgment. This provides him the opportunities to engage in informal diplomatic activity with regard to matters which may threaten international peace and security. It is generally accepted that his role should be more active than that of an 'analyst' (i.e. more of a 'general' than 'secretary'). The 'ambiguity' reflected in the Charter leaves the flexibility for the office to change according to the need of the time. This can be seen in the context of his role during the Cold War and after it. In fact, influence exercised by the Secretary-General has been one of the significant developments within the UN. He has undisputed authority to place any item he considers necessary on the General Assembly's provisional agenda.

Article 99 provides the independence to the Secretary-General to carry out fact-finding missions and to employ the good offices of the Secretary-General. Thomas Franck (1995: 144) believes that the exercise of good offices 'has always been the most crucial indicator of the Secretary-General's evolving constitutional role within the UN system'.

Article 100 deals with the neutrality of the Secretary-General and the staff. Article 100(1) provides that the Secretary-General and the secretariat staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. (Ubut the practice is different as evident in the case (Qui vs. Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1990, UN Doc. AT/DEC/482), where the Chinese government refused to extend their national's secondment at the UN for becoming the career civil servant. The Secretary-General, who had earlier granted the extension,

withdrew it after China's refusal. Applicants alleged that the Secretary-General refused the extension according to the wishes of the Chinese government. Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations recalled the Article 100 of the UN Charter and held "the Secretary-general cannot legally invoke a decision of the government to justify his own action with regard to the employment of a staff-member", as he 'cannot receive any instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization'.

Article 100(2) provides that each Member of the UN must respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. He and his staff are the truly international elements in the UN and hence, they should provide a broader perspective, above the sectional interests of the individual members.

Confidentiality provisions are inserted in the *Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly* (United Nations 2007: Rule 141) and the *Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council* (United Nations 1983: Rule 48).¹⁴ Both sets of rules require that both voting and discussion be held in private, but the General Assembly has traditionally made an important modification to this provision. Since 1946, it has become the custom on the occasion of each appointment, for the General Assembly, on the proposal of the President, to make the appointment in an open session rather than in a closed session as required in Resolution 11 (I) and rule 141.

The Secretary-General has wider responsibilities in the financial administration. He is primarily responsible for preparing the budget, allocating funds, controlling expenditure, administering such budgetary arrangements as the General Assembly may enter into with specialised agencies, for collecting contributions from the members and collecting all funds. He is the head of the Secretariat and appoints all staff.

¹⁴ Refer to the annexure 5.

Process of Appointment

Article 97 provides that, 'the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly under the recommendation of the Security Council', subject to veto by the five permanent members for renewable five-year terms. The General Assembly had the theoretical power to override the Council's selection by declining to give the recommended candidate the necessary majority vote. However, till date, the General Assembly has never rejected a candidate referred by the Security Council. There are no clear criteria or qualifications for the post of the Secretary-General, including term limits or country of origin. No Secretary-General has served more than two terms. Generally, names are submitted to the Security Council, which then meets to discuss candidates and may use 'straw polls' to determine where the support lies, through votes that either *encouraged* or *discouraged* a candidature.

There is currently no concrete process, timeline or formal candidate criteria of selection, although traditionally the Secretary-General has been selected on the basis of an informal system of regional rotation. There is a sharp disagreement as to whether geographical representation should, dominate over considerations of merit in recruitment. Jordan (1981: 242) emphasises more on efficiency, competence, and integrity than the geographical representation in case of the selection of the UN officials. It is generally recognised that the task of arriving at a uniform concept of efficiency and productivity has become much more difficult since the international civil service has become more multicultural and global in character. The appointment process is now governed more by convention than by the Charter with principles such as regional rotation and two five-year term limits emerged overtime (Chesterman 2002: 7). There is also an evolved convention in the practice of preference for a candidate, having command over English and French languages.

As mentioned earlier, any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting. Thus, an open election campaign in the Assembly is an improvement in transparency, if the desire for consensus is among 192 rather than 5. The history of

selecting the ‘world’s diplomat’ is characterised by four distinct phases (Keating in Chesterman 2007: 47). In the initial phase, the Assembly played a leading role in establishing a process for making an appointment (GA Res. 11(1)). The second and longest phase was almost complete dominance of the process by the Council. The third phase came in the period of 1996-97, when Assembly tried to revitalise its role during the tenure of Boutros-Ghali. The fourth phase began in early 2006, when Assembly took a number of decisions in the appointment of Ban Ki Moon. As a result, a more transparent process was provided by ‘Wisnumurti Guidelines’ (12 November, 1996)¹⁵ and ‘Canadian Non-Paper on the Process of the Selection of the Next Secretary-General’ (15 February 2006), which are considered as a major developments towards transparency and inclusiveness in the selection process.

The most significant changes that have occurred since 1946 have been in the practice of the Council. These changes in process have taken place in closed and informal consultations and seem not to have been recorded as Council decisions. As a result, their status is unclear. These changes include (Security Council Report 2006: 4):

- In 1981, the Council began the practice of conducting “straw polls”¹⁶ under which members would indicate either “encouragement” or “discouragement”.
- In 1991, the practice of colour-coded ballots emerged.
- In 1996, colour coding was used again and indicated the origin of the vote, i.e. “red” for permanent member and “white” for elected member.

Following are the UN Secretaries-General and their tenure:

¹⁵ For details, refer to Annexure 4.

¹⁶ In general, straw is used to see in what direction wind blows. Straw polls provide important interactive dialogue among movements within large groups to ascertain the chances of victory of a candidate. In United Nations, straw poll came into effect in 1981, when Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim presented his candidacy for the third term and was vetoed 16 times by a permanent Council member. In order to select a suitable candidate, Council President Olara Otunnu, Ambassador of Uganda to the UN, decided to conduct a “straw poll”, in which two types of ballots of different colours, each correspondingly marked either “encouraged” or “discouraged”, were distributed to Council members to know the trends for election of the Secretary-General.

Table 3.2 Secretaries-General of the United Nations, 1946-2009¹⁷

<i>Secretary-General</i>	<i>Period</i>
Trygve Lie (Norway)	February 1946 - April 1953
Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden)	April 1953 - September 1961
U Thant (Burma, now Myanmar) ¹⁸	November 1961 - December 1971
Kurt Waldheim (Austria)	January 1972 - December 1981
Javier Perez De Cuéllar (Peru)	January 1982 - December 1991
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt)	January 1992 - December 1996
Kofi Annan (Ghana)	January 1997 - December 2006
Ban Ki Moon (South Korea)	January 2007 - till date

There are demands for the ‘full use of the power of appointment enshrined in the Charter’ and also interpretation of Resolution 51/241 (see annexure 6), that the process should begin at both ends of the organization with the President of the General Assembly consulting regional groups to identify candidates, at the same time as consultations to be carried out in the Security Council. It also implies a demand for the General Assembly to have a larger role in identifying specific candidates that reflects the priorities of the membership and submit them to the Security Council. In fact, the process of choosing the Secretary-General should *originate* in the General Assembly. This increase in the role of the General Assembly in the process may enhance the legitimacy of the ultimate selection (UNA-USA Report 2006: 15). However, in practice, it may lead to a confrontation between the Assembly and the Council as the Council is more decisive in the election of the Secretary-General.

¹⁷ Source: UN website.

¹⁸ U Thant was an Acting Secretary-General until November 1962.

Functions and powers of the UN Secretary-General

When the allied powers met to discuss about a future international organization at Dumbarton Oaks, they strongly opposed a Secretary-General being directly elected by the General Assembly at Dumbarton Oaks and they defended the veto held by the Security Council's permanent members; Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United States over the selection process Urquhart (1995: 21). In fact, the permanent members have always controlled the appointment of the Secretary-General. The founding fathers of the UN intended that the Secretary-General should be free to appoint all the officials of the organization, including his most senior aides, without the need to submit such appointments to the General Assembly. Being a chief administrative officer, he should be free to transfer or give assignments to the secretariat officials. However, Trygve Lie in 1946 accepted an understanding among the 'big five' countries regarding the distribution of their nationals for the post of Assistant Secretary-General and thus, paved the way for the future erosion of powers provided by the Charter to the Secretary-General (Meron 1977: 85).

Finkelstein (1992: 1) highlights the coordinative function of the Secretary-General as there has been both too much and too little 'coordination' in the UN system. Too much, because the energy invested in the efforts has been excessive and too little, as the achievements so far, have been insufficient. The UN system is basically inter-governmental in character, where the Secretary-General has no independent political authority and little independent effect.

To discharge the responsibilities entrusted to him, Article 99 provides that each Secretary-General has to be well-informed of the day-to-day developments, occurring in different parts of the world and to measure the perception held by major countries. For this function, Murthy (1995: 184) states that the Secretary-General must keep himself in contact with his political constituency at three levels; the permanent members of the Security Council; the membership of organization at large; and the wider community of people. He cannot compromise with one constituency at the cost of other. Cuéllar (in

Roberts and Kingsbury 1988: 72) contends that the Secretaries-General are willing to coordinate for effective decision-making, but the experience is different. He states:

...the Secretary-general has a constituency unlike other. It is a two-tier constituency. On the one hand, he is elected by the governments... and it is to them that he is answerable...everyone of those governments is attached to its own perceptions of its national interests, which means that the Secretary-General could not perform his duties under the Charter if he did not sometimes act above and beyond national positions...he sometimes has to think of his second-tier constituency, namely the people for whom those government act-all the peoples of the world who together form a single constituency for peace.

The demands of these constituencies create an environment of 'conflicting aspirations' and require a balance between the *administrative* and *political* role. Cox (1969: 226-299) holds that the environmental factors strongly influence the Secretary-General's role and sometimes, the incumbent provides an active political role by filling the space left by state inaction.

Neutrality of the UN Secretary-General

In a very significant sense, the identity of an international organization is not the members who control it, but its professional staff. In international organizations, the member-states are *organized* but staff is the *international* component (Claude 1964: 174-75). Their civil servants have the major quality of being 'neutral' in their approach and functions. The question of 'allegiance' constitutes a major ethical and normative problem for the international civil servants.

Thus, the major asset or resource of the Secretary-General is his *neutrality*, which provides him acceptability and legitimacy in the competing powers. It should not be seen as a middle position between two antagonists but standing by the Charter principles. The other resource is *political information*, with the help of Secretariat for data gathering and evaluation. But, the most valuable asset is the diplomatic skills of communication, interest articulation, aggregation and legitimization of his policies. The resource of reputation has gained importance in the recent times (Rovine 1970: 415-463).

The office of the Secretary-General of the UN is the most prestigious in the world, which is considered as the 'conscience keeper' of the international community. Hammarskjöld held the opinion (in Stein 1962: 21):

[T]he international Civil Servant cannot be accused of lack of neutrality simply for taking a stand on controversial issues when this is his duty and cannot be avoided. But there remains a serious intellectual and moral problem as we move within the area inside which personal judgment must come into play. Finally, we have to deal here with a question of integrity or... a question of conscience.

David Kennedy (in Chesterman 2007: 170) questions the existence of any 'international community' as such and suggests that as a rule of thumb, the Secretary-General should speak for the Secretariat.

The Secretary-General is supposed to develop the ideals of the Charter in his public statements and diplomatic activities and to conform to the highest moral standards. But, the problem is that many member-states seriously violate the principles of the Charter and react negatively when their policies are exposed and criticised by other governments or by the Secretary-General. In situations like these, the Secretary-General has different options. He may take course of the principles of the Charter; or he may abstain from public political statements and remain impartial. The Secretary-General's freedom of choice is largely determined by the international climate and the sensitivity of the governments involved (Skjelsb[ae]k 1991: 99-115). For instance, Trygve Lie met this fate when he declared the North Korean attack on South Korea (1950) as a violation of the Charter in the Security Council. His successor, Hammarskjöld faced a similar situation when France and Britain intervened militarily in Egypt to gain control of the Suez Canal (1956).

The Secretary-General as a diplomat has a role with unique characteristics. Lentner (1965b: 549) provides three characteristics peculiar to the Secretary-General, which differentiate his diplomatic role from that of governmental delegates. The first is that there is no definite distinction between policy-making and diplomacy as the Secretary-General and his assistants are not responsible to any electoral constituency or

to a foreign office; nor do they pursue any national interests. Absence of constituency sometimes, provides freedom in taking decisions. Further, he has the flexibility of dealing with heads of states and governments, with ambassadors and delegates to the United Nations, as well as with private firms and individuals. The second characteristic is related with his lack of power, as he has neither military nor arms nor population to back up his positions in diplomatic negotiations. However 'diplomacy is not concerned solely by the material power of the state concerned but personal pre-dominance, reputation and skills are important assets of the Secretary-General, (Virally in Lentner 1965a: 533). The third characteristic peculiar to the Secretary-General is his 'embodiment in international politics of the equivalent of a public interest concept.' As predicted by the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission, he embodies "the principles and ideals of the Charter to which the organization seeks to give effect." The Secretary-General expounds a 'doctrine' of the United Nations in his public addresses and in the 'introductions' to his Annual Reports. He is in a position, by virtue of his administrative duties to consult regularly with governments. These regular contacts result from his responsibility for such activities as receiving and recording treaties, accepting the credentials of delegates, and so forth.

The Secretary-General can contribute greatly toward resolving problems, working for reconciliations and building consensus. The Secretary-General stands as a willing listener to the delegates, who are confronted by political problems. He has an advantage that the knowledge gained from widespread consultation keeps him in a privileged position than the knowledge possessed by delegates, who are confined for the furtherance of their national interests. The lack of advocacy for a national interest of the Secretary-General, nevertheless, puts him in a position where governments might be more likely to confide in him than in other national delegates. The Secretary-General should 'be objective - not impartial, for that is a kind of rather sterile and neutral world.' Annan clarifies the term impartiality as:

The end of the Cold War transformed the moral promise of the role of the Secretary-General. It allowed him to place the UN at the service of the universal values of the Charter, without constraints of ideology or particular interests... Impartiality does not—and must not—mean neutrality in the face of evil. It means

strict and unbiased adherence to the principles of the Charter. (cited in Johnstone 2003: 443)

The Secretary-General, by his analysis of problems, may simplify matters by clearly perceiving what areas of agreement exist between conflicting parties. The explanation of all 'viewpoints' of an issue is very important because there are often no established procedures for finding solutions to conflicts. The problem is further complicated when the issue is insufficiently understood. It can be of tremendous benefit simply to clarify issues and to present all viewpoints to all parties concerned. As a catalyst, the Secretary-General acts to establish links between parties who have lost contacts and build trust between them.

3. Limitations of the UN Secretary-General

The job of Secretary-General is complex and contradictory due to the fact that the Secretary-General is asked *both to follow the states and to lead them.*¹⁹ This problem is further compounded when a person to be chosen with such extraordinary capabilities should be a least objectionable candidate (Chesterman 2007: 10).

To ensure the independence of the Secretary-General as provided in Article 99, a strong analytical support is required for the Secretary-General to form his opinion, which was explicitly resisted in the UN bureaucracy, as it could question the foreign policy of the many powerful member-states. For instance, The Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI) was closed in 1992 and the idea of Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat could not materialise in 2000. Thus, it can be clearly seen that the accountability of the Secretary-General does not correspond to the responsibility.

According to Finkelstein (1992: 13), there is no real 'coordination' between the Secretary-General and the behaviour of the leadership of the major countries in terms of the adherence of states to their verbal and material commitment. This can be seen in the context of the peacekeeping missions of the UN. When the relevant powers have agreed

¹⁹ These two contradictory functions correspond to the role of 'Secretary' and 'General' respectively.

the Secretary-General becomes the executor of their will. For example, in the Kuwait War, the Security Council agreed that the UN should organise and lead the 'coalition' war in the gulf. The Secretary-General was cut out of this part of the affairs. However, he did play a crucial role in the post-War regime dealing with refugees, relief and protection of Kurdish minority, disarmament etc. Saddam Hussein, thus, perceived Perez de Cuéllar as a mere "letter carrier" (Johnstone 2003: 441).

The important test of the abilities of the Secretary-General has been whether he has been able to say 'no' to the member-states that direct him; or whether in the face of an international crisis, he can sometimes persuade them into saying 'yes'. States agree only when their national interests lie with the decisions of Secretary-General. Annan (in Introduction to Chesterman 2003: 3) joked that the abbreviation used within the UN for his position - 'SG'- stood for "scapegoat", for the failure of member-states. The most problematic relationship to be managed, for a Secretary-General, is between New York and Washington (Luck in Chesterman 2007: 147). Luck asserts that the global hegemon simply cannot like a strong and independent Secretary-General, as it was evident in the case of reappointment of Boutros-Ghali.

4. UN Secretaries-General: From Trygve Lie to Ban Ki Moon

For the first selection of a Secretary-General of the UN, many eminent names were floated, including those of US President Dwight Eisenhower and the United Kingdom's Winston Churchill, but the political dynamic quickly moved the selection process toward a 'lowest common denominator' due to the conflicting interests of US and USSR. The US supported Lester Pearson, the Canadian ambassador to the US but the then Soviet Union refused to support a North American. They argued that the post should go to someone whose country had suffered Nazi occupation during the Second World War. The Soviets suggested the little-known Norwegian foreign minister and one-time labour leader Trygve Lie. The Security Council recommended Lie on January 29, 1946. Trachtenberg (1982: 635) regarded Lie as 'a great delegator of responsibilities in all areas of activities, 'indeed to such a degree that he lost touch with the realities of the UN.'

In 1950, the Soviet Union became hostile to Lie because of his support of the North Korean intervention in South Korea and soon ceased all dealings with him. It vetoed his nomination and proposed four other candidates from developing countries (India, Lebanon, Mexico and the Philippines) as a long-term Soviet strategy for making alliance with the developing world in order to reduce Western influence at the UN. Western nations rallied to Lie's side and refused to support any alternative candidate. As the Security Council came to a deadlock, the General Assembly decided by a majority vote to extend the term of Trygve Lie, without a recommendation from the Council.²⁰ The Assembly passed the extension 46 to 5, with eight abstentions. Lie, however, faced continuing Soviet opposition during his extended term and announced his resignation late in 1952.

Lie was never comfortable with the press and media. His personality was overshadowed by the protocols and deliberations (Gordenker 2005: 97). Lie had to shape and fill the role of ambiguously defined roles of the Secretary-General under the constraints of Cold War. The Secretariat also had to be recruited from the beginning. His notable contribution was the foundation, construction and finance of the UN headquarters (Urquhart in Chesterman 2007: 18).

In 1953, the Soviets vetoed the European favourite, Lester Pearson, establishing the principle that "NATO nationale" need not apply. Instead, the Soviet Union nominated a woman from India, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who was vetoed by China (then represented by the nationalist government in Taipei). The Security Council's Western members privately offered the Soviets four new names. Three of these were promptly rejected, but the Soviet Union had no objection to the fourth; a relatively less-known Swedish deputy foreign minister, Dag Hammarskjöld. Believing they had found a non-political technocrat (Urquhart 1996: 13) who would not inspire strong position in either power bloc, Council members voted to recommend Hammarskjöld, and he was quickly approved by the General Assembly by fifty-seven to one. He was again nominated in

²⁰ General Assembly Resolution 492(V), 1 November, 1950.

1957 by the Security Council and reappointed by the General Assembly in a single day without a dissenting vote.

Trachtenberg (1982: 613) held the view that the leadership of Hammarskjöld had a 'problem of definition' as he was a leader beyond his constitutionally defined role. He derived his powers from the moral and philosophical foundations of the UN, thus having a positive vision of the organization. He was an exception rather than a rule and he achieved, whatever he could, in that period. The inaction of the powerful states and the political rivalries among them allowed him to assume an effective leadership role. Annan considered him as an ideal to be followed by each incumbent:

There can be no better rule of thumb for a Secretary-General, as he approaches each new challenge or crisis, than to ask himself, "how would Hammarskjöld have handled this?" (Annan 2001: 2)

Hammarskjöld demonstrated the development and practice of 'peacekeeping', having no formal place in the Charter and also developed the notion of 'good offices'²¹ of the Secretary-General. His successors redefined and to some degree, extended this tool in tackling conflict situations (Whitfield in Chesterman 2007: 42).

Hammarskjöld had his own concept of *legal-institutional* framework (Lash 1972: 548) within which, he performed in this high office. He was the first Secretary-General, who performed as an independent actor in world politics and while maintaining the general support of superpowers and the states concerned with the conflicts during his tenure (Rovine 1970: 339). He was of the view that Secretary-General can carry out his task in controversial political situations with full regard to his exclusively international obligations under the Charter and without subservience to a particular national or ideological attitude (Eric Stein 1962: 20). Hammarskjöld is considered the originator and formulator of a *sui generis* UN multilateral diplomacy (Alexandrowicz 1962: 1118). It is

²¹ This mechanism is not included in the UN Charter, but is a heavily used technique by the UN Secretary-General and his special envoys. Good offices are offered when the parties involved in the conflict do not speak to each other directly. The Secretary-General or his representatives serve as a communication between them to get discussions started.

his merit to have combined public with private or traditional diplomacy within the framework of the UN.

Displeased by Hammarskjöld's activity in the Congo crisis, the Soviets claimed that the Hammarskjöld was functioning outside the mandate of the organization, which requires him to be the chief *administrative* officer. Thus, Soviet began pushing the idea of a three person's executive, Troika²² to replace him which would represent 'the three main groups of states (capitalists, socialists and non-aligned). But in the face of Western resistance, they abandoned the idea following Hammarskjöld's death in a plane crash in Congo in 1961. After his death, the two powers eventually agreed to support Burma's permanent representative to the UN, U. Thant and accommodated the demands of the developing world for a non-European candidate. Because of objections from the French and Arab states,²³ the Council could only agree to recommend his appointment with the caveat that he only serve out the duration of Hammarskjöld's term. A year later, Thant was unanimously reappointed to serve a four-year term, effectively giving him the same five-year mandate enjoyed by his predecessors. In 1966, Thant was unanimously re-elected to a second five-year term.

U Thant, a former Burmese school teacher and a dedicated Buddhist, applied the middle-path theory to the office, cited Art. 1(4) of the Charter and maintained that 'the most important duty of the Secretary-General is to concentrate on the harmonizing functions of the United Nations.' He observed, "the organization lacks the attribute of sovereignty, and its Secretary-General has to work by persuasion, argument, negotiation and a persistent search for consensus" (Thant 1978: 31-32). He projected the least sharp public image. His background included resistance to British colonial regime in his native Burma, where he became one of the founders of the independent state. This particular inclination gave him the familiarity and deep interest in decolonization.

Kille (2007: 2-15) has emphasised the importance of the religious values of Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant by asserting that religion should be an important

²² *Troika* literally means, 'a Russian sledge, drawn by three horses.'

²³ The French were unhappy that Thant had chaired an Afro-Asian committee on Algerian independence, and the Arabs that Burma had diplomatic relations with Israel (UNA-USA Report 2006).

consideration for understanding the actions of all of the Secretaries-General. The analysis of Thant's decisions is built around key ethical dilemmas he faced as Secretary-General, concerning the use of force, intervention versus non-intervention, impartiality versus neutrality, dependent versus independent office, private versus professional interests, idealism versus realism, and the sacred versus secular divide.

The cultural factors also shape the moral-ethical framework. For example, Hammar skjöld's commitment to neutrality can be linked with his Swedish upbringing. At the same time, growing up within a particular country and culture did not guide the development of all the Secretaries-General. Notable in this respect is Perez de Cuéllar, who was oriented toward French culture, regardless of his South American roots in Peru. The impact of family upbringing was clear for most of the Secretaries-General. Boutros-Ghali's name demonstrated the lasting legacy of his family and Hammar skjöld gave the emphasis on work to the extreme, remaining a lifelong bachelor and focusing solely on his professional duties. From academic point of view, five of the seven incumbents possessed law degrees. Factors of experiences also played a part in shaping the ethical-moral frameworks of the different Secretaries-General (Kille 2007: 352).

In 1971, Finland's permanent representative, Max Jakobson, and Austria's foreign minister, Kurt Waldheim, both launched campaigns to line up support, which was a significant new development in the election process since the previous candidates had not presented themselves or campaigned openly. Soviets supported Waldheim, but China (now represented by Beijing) vetoed him, as did the United Kingdom. Waldheim pressed on and with a Chinese abstention in a third round of voting, won the Council's recommendation and was unanimously appointed by the General Assembly. A decade and a half later, it was revealed that the post-War UN War Crimes Commission had branded Waldheim a suspected war criminal for his activities in the German Army (Kandell 2007). In 1976, China again withdrew its veto and the Council nominated Waldheim for a second term, which was approved by the General Assembly.

Waldheim avoided alienation with one or other superpower. He was cautious and reasonably efficient, a fact that the P-5 probably preferred. In 1981, the US, Soviet Union

and United Kingdom, all supported Waldheim's re-election to an unprecedented third term, but were discouraged by a Chinese veto. China supported Salim Salim of Tanzania whom the US repeatedly vetoed for having thwarted US efforts to preserve a UN seat for Taipei earlier (Cockayne and Malone in Chesterman 2007: 76). The six-week deadlock in the Security Council was finally broken and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, a Peruvian diplomat, won recommendation as a candidate. In 1986, Pérez de Cuéllar won unanimous re-election to a second term.

One of Perez de Cuéllar's greatest innovations was the incorporation of human rights concerns into peacekeeping. He reinforced the notion that the promotion and protection of human rights is properly within the Council's competence by demonstrating that peace and justice are compatible (Johnstone 2003: 447-448). Cuéllar interpreted the legal discourse of Security Council Resolution 688 (April 1991), which called the consequences of Iraq's repression of its Kurd and Shiite population as a threat to international peace and security, but did not explicitly cite Chapter VII of the UN Charter. When asked by a journalist how he interpreted Resolution 688, the Secretary-General said it was not 'put in the framework of Chapter VII' and therefore a UN military and police presence could not be deployed in northern Iraq without a new resolution or the consent of the Iraqi government. He also played a useful role in mediating the Falkland Island War, the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan. He kept distance from the media and had almost completely been forgotten (Urquhart in Chesterman 2007: 26).

In 1991, when Pérez de Cuéllar was to retire, African countries insisted it was 'Africa's turn' to claim the office of the Secretary-General. They lined up commitments from the 102 members of the Non-Aligned Movement to vote against any non-African candidate in the General Assembly and a pledge from China to do the same in the Security Council. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) proposed six Africans for consideration - one from Egypt and five from sub-Saharan Africa. For the first time in history, the Security Council conducted five anonymous "straw polls" among its members before proceeding to a formal ballot, during which only Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian, drew a sizable number of votes. The Council then took a formal vote that

unanimously recommended him to the General Assembly, which approved his appointment. In 1996, the US vetoed the re-election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali after accusing him of neglecting to carry out the necessary reforms of the UN bureaucracy. In his departing remarks, Boutros-Ghali said that inadequate resources, namely large debts owed to the UN, of which the US held the largest, had prevented him from achieving successful reforms.

Kofi Annan became the first career UN official to rise to the organization's top position. In 2001, after a successful first term of significant changes, including a more fiscally responsible budget and the strengthening of human rights and field missions, Kofi Annan was unanimously re-elected to a second term. Annan put the relationship between the people of the world and the UN as a primary priority in his future agenda. He also reaffirmed his continued commitment to the reform efforts of the organization. Annan expanded the vision of the role of the Secretary-General as a 'vehicle for the promotion of the values of tolerance, democracy, human rights and good governance' that he believed are universal (Annan 1999). He also argued that the Charter entrust moral authority to him. He put his views on the role of the Secretary-General as:

I sometimes say things in my speeches and statements, knowing that it will help those without voice. They can quote the Secretary-General, 'As the Secretary-General said'- and they will not go to jail.... I give them voice by putting my thoughts and ideas in a way that they can quote.... I have not hesitated to speak out. I know not everybody likes it, but it is something that has to be done.... (cited in Weiss et al. 2005: 357).

Kofi Annan's ten years term can be viewed as the hallmark in the process of modernizing the institution. Therefore, the selection of next Secretary-General was of a great debate in the international community. In 2006, Asian countries firmly held the view, based on their position that there was an applicable principle of rotation, that it was now Asia's turn for the post of Secretary-General. Washington expressed strong opposition to the principle of regional rotation, a view that is shared by the UK. Both of them placed an emphasis on qualification over geographical origin. There was also disagreement as to whether there was any requirement for rotation. The US called

attention to the fact that Eastern Europe²⁴ was never elected to the office of the Secretary-General. Vaike Vike-Freiberga (2006), the President of Latvia, was nominated jointly by three countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Following her nomination, she asserted, “We do not accept the principle of regional rotation as the principal and sole factor in the selection of a candidate.” She also cited General Assembly Resolution 51/241 (see annexure 6) calling for *gender equity* in the consideration of candidates. Both China and Russia stated their preferences for a candidate from Asia and both of which held veto power in Security Council votes. But, any candidate from Eastern Europe was not unacceptable to Russia (Keating in Chesterman 2007: 65-67).

The current Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon is a South Korean diplomat, who won the 2006 elections. He has much experience with - decolonization, war, economic development, liberalization, and democratization. So, it was assessed that he might lend credibility and his voice might carry on the world stage. Moon has been involved in deliberations regarding the six-party arrangements (among the United States, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) to avert a crisis between North and South Korea. Furthermore, he has played a key role in defining an independent South Korean foreign policy, especially as an active and vocal proponent of nuclear disarmament as a long-term solution to peace and security on the peninsula. Moon also firmly believes that “promises are for keeping,” which suggests that he may promise less but deliver more. He claims that he is modest in style but not in ambition and will “seek excellence with humility” (Moon 2006).

Ban Ki-Moon’s personal style is modest, preferring to negotiate quietly and building consensus behind closed doors. However, he is also an active world traveller, not only visiting important capitals but also places to which he wants to draw the world’s attention. He was the first Secretary-General, for instance, to visit Antarctica to highlight global warming’s devastating impact there (Kahn 2008: 60). He is positioned to fill “the vacuum of ideas and the vacuum of leadership”.

²⁴ Eastern Europe is acknowledged as a regional group in Security Council elections and has recently been allocated six seats as a region on the newly established Human Rights Council.

As far as the Secretariat and its management are concerned, the Secretary-General's leadership role is as an "indispensable cog" in international peace and security, development and environment, human rights and humanitarian affairs. The Secretary-General is often considered as mere coordinator or functionary of member states. The greatest strength of the UN is its legitimising power - using its moral stature to persuade states to abide by international norms, which must be enhanced and be used in a way to maintain peace.²⁵

5. Role of UN Secretaries-General in World Politics

The founding fathers of the UN agreed that the Secretary-General should be given more important role than the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that the Secretary-General, besides the secretarial roles, should report annually on the work of the organization and empowered to bring before the Security Council, on his own initiative, any matter, which in his judgment threaten peace and security. The last provision was adopted as a result of the dissatisfaction with the operation of League Covenant provision, which permitted only member-states to bring the matter to the Council. Also, the Secretariat is declared as one of the principal organs; equivalent to the Council and Assembly, rather than inferior to them, which is headed by the Secretary-General as the chief executive officer (CEO) of the organization. Goodrich (1962: 721) argues that as in the British tradition, the civil servant is protected against criticism by the assumption of his original responsibility by his superior; the Secretary-General is also protected by the backing of the agreement of the governments.

The role of the Secretary-General can be understood or explained by a variety of factors, which include the UN Charter provisions; the nature of the organization itself; interpretation of charter provisions in different circumstances; the political environment and finally, the personality of the Secretary-General or the level of confidence he enjoys of the member-states. The role of Secretary-General has evolved in the dynamic

²⁵ Thomas Weiss and Peter Hoffman in "A Priority Agenda for Next UN Secretary-General" Occasional Paper No.28, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, New York (Dec. 2006) have summarized the major issue-areas into *actionable*, *achievable* and *untenable* and thus it indicates the level of institutional development of the UN to tackle the issues and also the permeability of the national sovereignty and the supranationalism.

circumstances from the 'Cold War' to the 'War on Terror' and the socio-economic challenges in the era of globalization, which is largely shaped by the North vs. South tension. The role of maintenance of peace and security provides him the role as a *world constable* (Gordenker 2005: 35). The Secretary-General has the right to place any dispute on the provisional agenda of the Security Council. However, he works mostly behind the scenes if the members of the Council are unwilling to discuss a dispute. Most of his time is spent on good offices missions and mediation, sometimes at the request of deliberative organs of the UN. One of the Secretary-General's most important roles involves the ability to use his 'good offices' to serve as a mediator in conflict situations. While the Security Council authorises the peacekeeping missions and the General Assembly approves funds, the Secretary-General often plays the essential role of engaging and mediating between the conflicting parties.²⁶

Nikita Khrushchev dismissed the very idea of a truly international civil servant and once stated that:²⁷

While there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men. There can be no such thing as an impartial civil servant in this deeply divided world, and that the kind of political celibacy which the British theory of the civil servant calls for, is in international affairs, a fiction (Waters 1967: 160-165).

Hammar skjöld articulated his vision of an ideal international civil servant in his historic address to the Oxford University where he illustrated that, "It is possible to be politically celibate, without being politically virgin." To act in a neutral way, he considered himself bound by simply two laws - "the UN Charter and the law of possibility" (Hammar skjöld 1967).

Various descriptions of the Secretary-General's role have been provided by various incumbents. Lie referred to it as "the most impossible job on this earth." Dag

²⁶ Refer to the official website of the UN for the role of the Secretary-General; <http://www.un.org/sg/sgrole.shtml>.

²⁷ The interchange between Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of the Ministers of the USSR and Dag Hammar skjöld on the neutrality of Secretary-General (in General Assembly Plenary Meetings 15th Session, September 23- October 03, 1960).

Hammarskjold said that the Secretary-General was “a sort of secular pope, and, for much of the time, a pope without a church.” U Thant, a courageous and modest man, said that the Secretary-Generalship was “the most varied, most interesting, and most challenging political job on earth.” To Kurt Waldheim it was “at the same time one of the most fascinating and one of the most frustrating jobs in the world, encompassing as it does the height of human aspiration and the depth of human frailty” (Urquhart 1995: 22).

Secretary-Generalship is indeed an impossible job. There are idealistic public expectations, large responsibilities without significant power or resources and the contrary attitudes of the governments. The job comprises an unmanageable number of major functions. These include managing a worldwide Secretariat and a global organization having limited economic resources, a sizable part of which is usually overdue (the UN is not allowed to borrow). The Secretary-General must implement the decisions of the Security Council and other organs of the UN and run peacekeeping and other highly sensitive field operations. He is the world’s mediator in an endless series of “good offices” missions involving quiet diplomacy all over the world involving human rights and humanitarian crises. He coordinates the UN system of specialised agencies and major economic and social programs and maintains an observation on major developments of all kinds and alert governments to them. He also generates ideas and strategies on global problems (Urquhart 1995: 23). For instance, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the *We the Peoples*, by Kofi Annan play a major role in defining the global problems and provide strategies to overcome them.

The Secretary-General is given both the ‘platform and straitjacket’: how he or she uses the platform and responds to those constraints will determine his or her legacy (Tharoor in Chesterman 2002: 40). His guiding principle the Charter and he can be the last hope in ^a the crisis. He must be prepared to act without regard to political reputation. According to Saksena (1975: 346), Lie got involved in major conflict situations, not as a negotiator or a non-partisan umpire or as a chief executant of a UN resolution, but as a political leader supporting a particular stand and committing himself to one side. He was wholly engaged in political activities and delegated his administrative powers to his Assistant Secretary-Generals. Barros (1946: 92) views Lie’s greatest drawback as a lack

of experience in running a large organization, as well as his lack of a wide educational and cultural background and training.

Tharoor (in Chesterman 2002: 44) holds the same views as of Cox (1969: 209) that the personalities of the incumbent Secretaries-General; and the political environment are the two major determinants in the development of the office of the Secretary-general. In 1946, governments were extremely reluctant to delegate political responsibilities to the Secretary-General. Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, a British national, never made a public statement or addressed a public meeting of the league in his entire time as Secretary-General. The sad history of the League of Nations indicated the potential importance of a strong chief executive for the new world organization, to the UN founders. The paralysis of the Cold War soon made a more active political role necessary. For instance, Dag Hammarskjöld was successful in the release of 17 US airmen from China, who were prisoners of the Korean War (1954). This incident had the potential to escalate the tension where neither superpower wanted to make concessions. Hammarskjöld took independent initiatives and was successful in release of the US airmen from Chinese captivity with no loss of face. This was termed as the "Peking Formula", which stipulated that 'the Secretary-General has an affirmative obligation and not merely a right, to act when peace and security were threatened' (Viñuales 2006:10-17). The formula codified Hammarskjöld's conception of the *spirit*, rather than *text* of the Charter. He subsequently developed the Secretary-General's negotiating role, as well as the concept of fielding UN peacekeeping forces, first deployed on a large scale in the Suez crisis in 1956. He, through skilful diplomacy, was successful in gaining the support of both US and Soviet Union for different reasons, as well as the other members. Thus, Hammarskjöld established a new role for the Secretary-General as negotiator, crisis manager, and director of active peace keeping operations.

Hammarskjöld was reluctant to delegate his authorities. His meetings with his deputies were not for consultation but for obtaining information. The Indians complained that nothing was given to C. V. Narsimhan to do. The same complaints were also from the USSR, Britain and Canada (Saksena 1975: 347). According to Urquhart (1987: 13), Hammarskjöld was a political realist, who knew very well the limitations of the

Secretary-General's powers. He saw an especially important role in international affairs for the medium and small powers or the 'Third World' in the confrontation of the Cold War. In his last years, he was particularly fascinated by the continent of Africa, where the process of decolonization had started.

In U Thant's view, moral issues prevail over the political ones. He was a person of great honesty and courage, and was not always appreciated in the cynical world of international politics. He brought the UN involvement in the Congo to an end but he could not do so for Vietnam War. On his own initiative, he made a prolonged and spirited effort to end the Vietnam War. For his role in Vietnam War, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked him, "Who do you think you are, a country?" (Traub in Chesterman: 189). This clearly reflects the dichotomy of the post of the Secretary-General, where he is heading the organization, where members are the sovereign states. In theoretical terms, the UN operates at a level of international system in which states are the actors. Thus, there can be a relevant question about the role of an individual in an international environment, where states are the actors.

Thant played an important role in resolving the Cuban missile crisis and was also instrumental in securing a cease-fire in the threatening war between India and Pakistan in 1965. He was the only world leader to go to Cairo and tried to persuade Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to reconsider his fatal demand for the withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers. Saksena (1975: 359) portrays U Thant as 'a model international civil servant':

U Thant showed that a good Secretary-General need not necessarily be an intellectual-giant or a diplomat par excellence. Of the several qualities listed by the founding fathers of the world organization as essential for the Secretary-General, the most far-reaching, and humanly speaking the rarest, is integrity (the others are political judgment, tact etc.) : U Thant radiated it.

Waldheim's successor, Javier Perez de Cuéllar, was a quiet and experienced diplomat who skilfully supervised the transition of UN into the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. He kept on good terms with all governments but he was not a striking

international figure. His strongest quality was 'quiet diplomacy', which by definition does not gain public acclaim or recognition for its practitioners. He enjoyed considerable success in the short-lived and illusory renaissance of the UN in the early 1990s (Urquhart 1995: 25).

The Cold War provided room for manoeuvring for Secretary-General between the two irreconcilables, but its end led to a dominance of a single member dubbed by some as the 'permanent one' (Tharoor in Chesterman 2007: 39). Like his predecessors, Boutros-Ghali is criticised for being both too activist and ~~too passive~~. He compounded his difficulties by initiating the reorganization of the Secretariat when the organization was heavily involved in field operations. His *Agenda for Peace* was a ambitious blueprint for a greater UN role in peace and security. He put neutrality among the top characteristics of a Secretary-General and concluded in the 'global leadership after the end of the Cold War' in *Foreign Affairs* (1996: 98):

If one word above all is to characterize the role of the Secretary-General, it is independence. The holder of this office must never be seen as acting out of fear of, or in an attempt to curry favor with, one state or group of states ... Article 100 [no staff member of the UN should take instructions from any government] is Psalm 100 to the secretary-general.

Secretaries-General have led to normative changes, such as the development of legal basis for peacekeeping to the 'responsibility to protection' of the vulnerable populations. Two incumbents have been awarded Nobel Prizes for their immense contribution to bringing peace; Hammarskjold in 1961 and Kofi Annan in 2001. Annan has been credited with restoring dignity and moral authority to the office of Secretary-General, despite 'shrinking resources and expanding agenda' (Smith 2007: 99).

During his first term in office in 1997, Annan was considered a political entrepreneur *par excellence*. He had difficult moments, such as questions about the United Nation's role in Bosnia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, when he was in charge of peacekeeping; the Iraq invasion by US in 2003 and investigations into the Oil-for Food Programme in 2004-05. He tried to tread cautiously and balanced with the West and the

developing countries and soon became a celebrity in the Western media. He proposed a series of targets to be achieved in 2015, in various fields, which came to known as the MDGs and achieved the pledge by the donor-states to spend 0.7 percent of their Gross National Product (GNP) on developmental assistance in order to help make the MDGs achievable. (Traub in Chesterman 2007: 193).

The election of George W. Bush as President in 2000 and the terrorists attack on 11 September, 2001 on New York changed the political environment in Washington. This event charged the Americans with anger and a year later, a new National Security Strategy put the legitimacy of the UN on the backfoot. It stated:

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our rights of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (United States 2002: 12).

The case for war in Iraq was brought to the Security Council, but there were deep divisions for approving the war. The UN was marginalised by the Bush Administration and its allies went to war in Iraq without Security Council's approval. Kofi Annan responded to the US-led invasion of Iraq as:

I have indicated (the war in Iraq) is not in conformity with the UN Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view, it was illegal (Bennett-Jones 2004)

This comment generated a severe reaction from the US and allies, clearly manifested in the comment of James Phillips and Nile Gardiner (2004):

The UN Secretary-General's gratuitous comments were an extraordinarily undiplomatic and inappropriate intervention from a world figure who is supposed to be a neutral servant of the international community.

These reactions illustrate the risks related with the public statements of the Secretary-General on crucial issues. The Report of the Secretary-General, *We, the peoples* (2000) and *In Larger Freedom* (2005) can be seen in this context of institutional reforms of the UN. He also appointed a *High-Level Panel* (2004) to recommend major changes in the doctrine and structure of the UN. The conferring of an agent capacity on the Secretary-General through a resolution often leads to 'quiet diplomacy' in carrying out his mission.

There have been various demands for reforming the institution of the Secretary-General. People are always talking about strengthening this office, but experience leads one to wonder whether governments, especially the more powerful ones, really want a strong and independent Secretary-General. The evidences shows that they do not. Also, there should be a proper search procedure worldwide, including for women. The UN Secretary-General should be the world's 'principal sage' (Haas 1990: 20-21) having independent sources of information and analytical advice if he has to anticipate emergent issues. Similarly, there can be an international council of sages, representing the world's best qualified authorities in specialised areas and to evolve understanding and debates in international problem-setting (Filkenstein 1992: 14).

There has been an institutional change in the UN since 1945, when, it was only as the avenue for the meetings and deliberations of world leaders. The expanding global economy, media, technology and communication has transformed the diplomatic relations. The end of the Cold War and the onset of globalization calls for a multilateral diplomacy, where the Secretary-General can have an enhanced role. A clearer description of the office and a transparent selection process rather than satisfying the whims of the five countries with vetoes, are the need of the hour. It requires a Secretary-General that will tell the Security Council what he/she needs to know, rather than what he wants to hear. He should have sufficient independence and power to be held accountable for how that power is exercised. So far, the manner in which the assigned responsibilities have been fulfilled over the past six decades has depended as much on politics as on personality (Chesterman 2007: 1).

The most important lesson learnt regarding the role of Secretary-General is that he must be able to say, "No". Saying 'no' bears some cost. The proposal of Soviet Russia for 'Troika' in the period of Hammarskjold; the veto of the US for second term of Boutros-Ghali; and Amman's initial discomfort on the US attack on Iraq are some examples of these costs. It can be said in the light of Khrushchev's contention, that 'in the present world, there are no neutral countries, but there are neutral men', as every country is involved in the process of making world more egalitarian, just and developed by multilateral approaches, which marks a significant development in the action and neutrality of the international civil services at large.

Article 99 of the Charter provides for *political initiative*, which provides the opportunities to Secretary-General to engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to matters which may threaten international peace and security. The 'ambiguity' reflected in the Charter leaves the flexibility for the office to change according to the need of the time. This can be seen in the context of his role during the Cold War and after it. Article 99 provides the independence of Secretary-General to carry out 'fact-finding missions' and to employ the 'good offices' of the Secretary-General.

Each era found a Secretary-General appropriate to the times or in other words, each incumbent gave an imprint on the office according to the environment and his personality. In the twenty-first century, the Secretary-General commands greater diplomatic legitimacy and more media visibility. The Secretary-General, appointed by 192 governments should get the mandate to take decisions for the almost seven billion people embraced by the phrase, "We, the people of United Nations."

The evolution of the office of the Secretary-General and the changing role of different Secretaries-General in world politics can be better understood through a detailed study of the persons who have occupied this office. This will also help understand the larger issues of leadership discussed in the previous chapter. Of the terms served by the Secretaries-General of the UN, a particularly interesting term is that served by Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He was at the helm of affairs at the crucial time when the UN was

adjusting to a major shift in world politics, viz. the change from a bipolar to a unipolar world, with the coming to an end of the Cold War. In the context of the challenges of this significantly transformative period, it is interesting to assess the leadership provided by Boutros-Ghali. The next chapter presents a case study of the office of the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in order to further understand issues of leadership.

Chapter 4. United Nations Secretary-General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Chapter 4

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS

BOUTROS-GHALI

During the Cold War, the superpowers controlled decision-making within the UN and the ideological contest between them left a limited role for the Secretary-General. With the end of the Cold War, the international system underwent immense change - international trade and commerce expanded and communication increased as the processes of globalization swept across the world. The role of actors in the international system also changed as power relations transformed from bipolar to unipolar. Also, the emergence and proliferation of NGOs affected the weight of decision-making in new ways.

The end of the East-West conflict led to a hopeful rediscovery of the UN in a new era of multilateralism. The end of the rivalry between political systems for pre-eminence in international politics appeared to clear the way for a factual and problem-oriented approach to major global challenges. Ideological debates ended and a fresh perspective on the obligations, possibilities and limits of responsibilities shaping world politics, emerged. The nature of international politics has undergone a change in the post-Cold War era with the geopolitical shift in focus from North to South in all issue-areas such as humanitarian assistance, terrorism, environment, sustainable development, post-conflict peace building etc.

Thus, these changes were reflected in attitudes towards the office of the Secretary-General. An illustration of this changed attitude was the allotment of responsibility to the Secretary-General by the permanent members of the Security Council of drawing up an *Agenda for Peace* with a view to strengthening the UN's role in maintaining peace in the post-Cold War international system.

Urquhart and Childers, in their study on the UN leadership capacity emphasise the special role of the UN Secretary-General:

Developing an active consensus about the world agenda and the UN system's part in it should be a central task for the Secretary-General and his or her colleagues in the UN system. Without the Secretary-General's leadership, such a consensus is unlikely to emerge (Urquhart and Childers 1996: 13).

The office of the Secretary-General after the Cold War faced a number of challenges as well as opportunities. The UN of the 1960s, which was labelled as 'tyranny of the majority', became an instrument of the activist states, under the leadership of the US in the new era. The conflicting nature of the world order was highlighted as the US aimed at establishing hegemony while other powers strove to promote multilateralism. The UN had to face a redefinition and expansion of its role and also had to cope with the financial crisis in the face of its overloaded mandate.

Boutros-Ghali's term as Secretary-General, which began in 1992, gave him the reigns of leadership of the UN in this time of extreme transition. Thus, the expectations from him of capable leadership were very high in the backdrop of the significance of this era of change in international relations.

1. Personal background of Boutros Boutros-Ghali²⁸

Born as a minority in Egypt, Boutros-Ghali believed that the international community should help in the protection of minorities, which led him to realise the importance of tolerance. His childhood was very religious but later in France, he was heavily influenced by Louis Massignon, an influential French Catholic theologian, who wrote on Islamic mysticism (Kille 2007: 268). This led to instilling of values like tolerance, forgiveness, reconciliation. Here, it is important to note that Cox (1969: 210) held that background in national politics may be an advantage for a successful leader. At the same time, the individual's *cross-cultural sophistication* and his access to the highest level of diplomacy and government are the relevant criteria to assess his role as executive head of the international organization.

²⁸ Refer to the annexure 7 for the personal biography of Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

The study of international law and politics led Boutros-Ghali to a belief in the importance of law, rights, and democracy. Boutros-Ghali, being an expert in international law, urged the Council that the Secretary-General should be authorised by the General Assembly, pursuant to Article 96 of the Charter, for advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which can provide a legal dimension to his diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes. Jean-Marc Coicaud, one of his speechwriters, describes his approach to international law as focused mainly on the UN Charter, which is open to interpretations according to conditions (cited in Kille 2007: 283). According to James Jonah (an Assistant in Office of Research and Collection of Information, ORCI, established under the administration of Cuéllar but later dismantled by Boutros-Ghali), Boutros-Ghali judged a product on his ideas. She writes (Weiss 2005: 355):

You could not go to Boutros-Ghali and say, 'We cannot do it because the African group is going to oppose.' He said, 'Don't tell me about the African group. Why are they against it? Do they have a rational reason? What matters to me is what they're saying, is it tenable in terms of the Charter and our mandate?' That's what Hammarskjöld used to ask to the UN staff.

Anthony F. Lang Jr. (in Kille 2007: 276) describes Boutros-Ghali as a 'realist' in a 'utopian city' (the international society) and tries to analyse how Boutros Boutros-Ghali's ethical framework grew out of his background in a prominent Coptic Christian family in Egypt and his international legal training. Lang highlights five core values that underlie Boutros-Ghali's ethical framework: tolerance; forgiveness or reconciliation; liberal emphasis on human rights; the moral importance and centrality of the sovereign state; and democracy. Lang explores the importance of these values in relation to Boutros-Ghali's involvement with UN intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, UN efforts in Cambodian post-conflict peace building, and the administrative reporting mechanism illustrated by his *Agendas*.

Boutros-Ghali took over as Secretary-General in an era where the world was looking towards UN 'to transform a period of hope in to an era of fulfilment.' A renaissance had to be brought in to create a UN for a new 'international' era. He was 'provocative' in his writings and interactions; intellectually trained to 'absorb the data

and order it into alternatives with breath-taking ease'. He was known to analyse a problem with many angles and displayed a consistency in pursuing a path once chosen (Murthy 1995: 187).

Boutros-Ghali perceived the role of Secretary-General more as a catalyst, to accelerate the pace of change. He carried an impression of being an activist, which was necessary and unavoidable in the changing scenario. He was outspoken in the area of peace and security and believed in the office's inherent 'charismatic capacity' (Newman 1998: 112). He told an interviewer:

You must be an activist because we are living in an acceleration of history and there is a daily revolution. And if you will be able to cope with this daily revolution... [you] must be an activist. You cannot be neutral. You cannot be passive, waiting what will be the direction of member-states. You have to push everybody. (cited in Meisler 1995b: 186-187)

The performance of Boutros-Ghali can be assessed in the context of the constraints and opportunities, which exist within the political framework. Meisler (1995b: 188) contends that Boutros-Ghali has been the 'most stubbornly independent' Secretary-General and that he made the office an international player in a way that has not been seen since the Congo crisis.

Goulding (in Malone 2004: 271-272) refers to Boutros-Ghali as a novice in the UN system. He writes:

During his long years as a minister in Cairo, his main responsibility had been Egypt's bilateral relations with the third world, especially those in Africa. He shares much of the third world's dissatisfaction with the existing international architecture, and as soon as he became Secretary-General he threw his energy into series of world conferences on economic and social issues in an effort to restore a balance between peace and development in the UN's work.

In the post-Cold War world, the Secretary-General is perhaps less essential as a political intermediary than earlier (as the nature of job was like a mediator in the conflicts, which were always influenced by the rivalry of superpowers). As the operational director of the UN, however, he (or in the future, let us hope, she) will

undoubtedly have a huge and expanding task with inadequate resources and often, with inappropriate mandates. In an age when the media has a powerful position in international life, the Secretary-General is also increasingly in demand as a spokesman for UN and the emergent 'international community'.

Within the UN system there are three levels at which coordination is required: within the UN Secretariat; between UN Headquarters and the head offices of other funds, programmes, offices and agencies of the UN system; with the member-states and with the international system (See Cox 1969: 214-219 and Murthy 1995: 184). Improved coordination is equally necessary within the UN system as a whole. Short-term programmes are needed for cease-fires, demobilization, humanitarian relief and refugee return; but it is the long-term programmes that help rebuild societies and put them back on the path of development. Short-term and long-term programmes need to be planned and implemented in a coordinated way if they are to contribute to the consolidation of peace and development. Such coordination till date, proved difficult to achieve as each of the agencies concerned has its own intergovernmental legislative body and its own mandate. Thus, the effectiveness of the leadership is reduced due to these environmental constraints.

2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Views

Boutros-Ghali started his tenure as UN Secretary-General in 1991 with a clear vision to turn around the world body to a more relevant and strategic position. He observed that the organization had not changed with the times; it had bureaucratic hierarchical structures, was largely controlled by US, had excess staff, displayed no financial discipline and was highly selective in its operations. He saw a distinctive role for the Secretary-General in 'the quiet practice of preventive diplomacy'. A Secretary-General could do a great deal behind the scenes to help parties find a way to settle their differences before their confrontation become public. He saw himself as 'an impartial figure with a global mandate, relatively unencumbered by political or bureaucratic pressures.' He further noted that the mandates given to a Secretary-General must be

backed by the human and material resources required to complete the assigned task successfully and emphasised the demands for decentralization and delegation, including to regional organizations, NGOs and *ad hoc* arrangements (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

Boutros-Ghali's vision for the future of the UN can be captured by his optimistic observation:

The nations and peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations were not. We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they were denied. With the Cold War ended we have drawn back from the brink of confrontation that threatened the world and, too often, paralyzed our Organization (Boutros-Ghali in *Agenda for Peace*, Para 75).

This ~~optimism~~ held by Boutros-Ghali was based on the emerging world order in a time of hope and change and of rising expectations from the UN. When the Security Council met in 1992 for the first time after the end of the Cold War, the President of the Security Council, John Major asked Boutros-Ghali to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (UN Doc. S/23500 31 January, 1992). Ideas of New World Order, universalism, democratization, justice and international society were discussed without the full realization of the cost or practical problems involved. In response, Boutros-Ghali offered an *Agenda for Peace*, which called for a more proactive, assertive approach to peacekeeping and declared that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed" (UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, Para 17).

Ghali was the only Secretary-General to receive two historical mandates from the Security Council and the General Assembly to suggest strategies of strengthening the UN in areas of *peace* and *development*. This clearly reflects the trust of the member-states in the office and the hope for a new international system.

An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111) remains an indispensable guide to the tools and techniques employed by the UN in managing post-Cold War conflicts. In addition to elaborating the techniques of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace keeping, Boutros-Ghali made a distinctive contribution by elaborating upon the concept of 'post-conflict peace-building'. In this *Agenda for Peace*, peacekeeping and other conflict management tools were discussed naturally, but equally interesting was an emphasis on the 'non-military aspects' of international peace and security. Boutros-Ghali emphasises that "he was discussing development as the best way to prevent war" (quoted in Weiss et al 2005: 323). Thus, he recommended that a 'reinvigorated and restructured' ECOSOC provide report on development, which might threaten international security (paragraph 64). He also suggested for the UN presence to remove the likelihood of conflicts in two conflicting countries through 'preventive deployment' (paragraphs 31). In the areas of post-conflict peace building, the secretary-General urged that concrete cooperative projects and economic, social and rehabilitation programmes be promoted (paragraph 56, 58, 59)

The major consequence of the *Agenda for Peace* was the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which affirmed the authority of Secretary-General in the coordination and innovation. Boutros-Ghali's *Chef de Cabinet*, Jean Claude Aime insists that the DPA has 'political' and DPKO has 'operational' functions (Myint-U 2007: 85). Thus, it was instrumental in initiating discussions and to some extent, in institutional developments.

Boutros-Ghali introduced the new mechanism of establishing informal groups of Member States, created on an *ad hoc* basis to support the Secretary-General in the discharge of the peacemaking and peace-keeping mandates entrusted to him. These are normally referred to as "Friends of the Secretary-General for ..." (Supplement to Agenda for Peace: 1995 Para 83). They have no formal mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council and comprise states with a particular interest in the conflict. They have material and diplomatic resources that can be used to support the Secretary-General's efforts. These 'friends' apply diplomatic influences to resolve the disputes

among conflicting parties. This approach was instrumental in bringing together several nearby states to help resolve the conflict in El Salvador.

In May 1994, Boutros-Ghali responded to the request of the General Assembly to submit a similar report on development under the agenda item “Development and International Economic Cooperation”, known as an Agenda for Development, which declared that development was not only a fundamental human right, but also the most secure basis for peace. It introduces two concepts of development; preventive development and curative development as complements to the concept of preventive deployment, and post-conflict peace building. Murthy (1995: 191) comments that it was hardly an agenda and can be regarded as a document of reflection, rather than action.

These developments can be seen in the context of the *legal-institutional* approach, which relies upon the practice and interpretation of constitutional powers. Boutros-Ghali tried to expand his own *de facto* sphere of initiative and influence. In the era of global transition, Boutros-Ghali’s *Agendas* were ambitious and futuristic, which were aimed to make the world more peaceful and democratic.

His ideas about democracy developed throughout his tenure as Secretary-General and he was instrumental in making elections the central focus of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and in promoting reconciliation among the warring parties in Cambodia and later in El Salvador and Mozambique. He helped push the institution towards a greater focus on the promotion of and support for democracy as part of its mandate. Chinmaya Gharekhan, the UN Under Secretary-General and special representative of Boutros-Ghali to the Security Council, states about Boutros-Ghali that, ‘he was a politician and not a diplomat’ (2006: 290).

In the post-Cold War period, where the political dynamics of the P-5 largely determine the how and when of the organization the classical role of mediation by the Secretary-General changed to an active one. Boutros-Ghali charged Council as *Euro-centric*, due to their obsession with the former Yugoslavian states and neglect of Somalia and other African states.

Boutros-Ghali emphasised more on the role of 'democracy' than 'efficiency' in the post-Cold War era. Fragmentation led to the rise in civil strife and conflicts, which Boutros-Ghali named orphan conflicts (Boutros-Ghali 1996: 89). The forces of fragmentation can cause the poor and underdeveloped states to fail, leaving the people without a government to protect them from chaos. These conflicts are deprived of international attention, concern and effort. This process of fragmentation is accompanied by the opposing forces of globalization.

Ajami (1996) branded the above remarks of Boutros-Ghali as 'self-congratulatory' and alleges that the above-mentioned initiatives were for the cause of an international civil service and an independent Secretary-General. He blamed Boutros-Ghali that just by mere 'labelling' the Bosnian conflict as 'a rich people's war', he cannot escape his responsibilities. He reminds that on 31 December 1992, Boutros-Ghali visited Sarajevo, for six hours, where he addressed public gathering, "You have a situation which is better than ten other places all over the world. I can give you a list of ten places where you have more problems than Sarajevo." LeBor (2006: 29) claims that his audience was so shocked that nobody thought to ask him to list the other ten places.

Democratization, for Boutros-Ghali, was an all-inclusive agenda, ranging from states to private corporations and other NGOs to become a more active part of the international decision-making process for promotion of essential global values. For such a purpose, he presented another influential report, Agenda for Democratization, which was opposed within the UN bureaucracy as it was argued that the UN had no authority to do anything in the field of democratization and this area falls exclusively under the member-states (during Cold War, it was exclusively an 'American' subject).

Boutros-Ghali was a strong advocate for comprehensive democratization. Boutros-Ghali (in Barry Holden 2000: 105) emphasises that 'democratization is necessary internationally on three interrelated fronts: democratization of the United Nations itself, the provision for more participation on the international scene by actors 'other than states', and the achievement of a 'culture of democracy' internationally. This culture of democracy does not only require a society of states committed to democratic

principles and processes but it also demands an enlarged international civil society to be deeply involved in democratic institutions, whether states, or private entities, which are committed to political pluralism. He highlights that, although UN is an intergovernmental organization, the UN needs to be open to “forces from civil society,” primarily NGOs, which should play a greater role in forums like the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (*Agenda for Democratization*, Para. 121).

Boutros-Ghali argued that ‘international democracy’ is a valid idea despite the fact that there are ‘substantial differences between democratization at the international level and democratization within States (in Barry Holden 2000: 104). He had an overarching concept of democracy as he noted in an interview to Barbara Crossette (1997), the UN bureau Chief of *New York Times*:

Democracy will not succeed if it is limited to within member states. We need democracy among member states. If global problems are solved by authoritarian means and national problems are solved by democracy, it will not work.

Globalization is largely an economic phenomenon, which is failing to reach all people and sometimes not compatible with many societies. Also, the ‘neo-liberal’ globalization paradigm has also invaded the UN and is progressively depriving the organization of its development mission. Boutros-Ghali characterised the vast differences between the North and the South as a “new Berlin Wall,” and he asked rhetorically how it was going to be possible to reduce the digital divide “if in 50% of the villages there is no electricity, if 50% of the population is illiterate?” (Weiss et al 2005: 425). Boutros-Ghali further argues in his memoir:

Any secretary-general, from whatever region of the world, must advocate the cause of the developing countries. In a world of many big and wealthy powers, it is the United Nations’ job to look out for those marginalized because of ethnicity, gender, religion, health, poverty, or whatever other reasons ... For as far ahead as we can see, the United Nations must continue to be the main voice for the weakest and least regarded people, to defend them from the detrimental effects of globalization, and to help them find ways to succeed in a global economy (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 337-338).

According to Boutros-Ghali, in the post-Cold War era, some states are “more equal” than others due to the impact of globalization. This means decline in the importance of the UN General Assembly and a shift towards ‘easier to manage’ entities such as the Security Council and the executive boards of the Bretton Woods institutions. The ideal approach is the “level playing field” at the international level, but the power and action have shifted to the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO), where democratic values do not count much in decision and policy-making. Their underlying objective is to support the status quo and their Secretariats are tightly controlled and steered by few developed countries (Boutros-Ghali 2005).

3. Initiatives for institutional changes in UN by Boutros-Ghali

When Boutros-Ghali took over as the UN’s sixth Secretary-General, he was ambitious for major reforms in the UN system. Boutros-Ghali’s reorganization was the most sweeping reforms since Hammarskjöld (Myint-U 2007: 86). In the first year of his office, he sent 75 missions of fact-finding and good offices. In 1993, he visited 27 countries as a peacemaker. By way of strengthening democracy, he provided electoral assistance to 47 member-states in Africa, Eastern Europe and Central or Southern America; and this assistance ranged from supervision of elections, preparation or verification of electoral rolls to technical assistance (Murthy 1995: 187-192).

According to Beigbeder (2000: 208), ‘reform is a process and not an event’. He cites the first serious reform and successful innovation, carried out by Boutros-Ghali was the introduction of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), by General Assembly Res. 48/218 B of 29th July 1994. This office was given monitoring, internal audit, inspection and evaluation functions, integrating the pre-existing units in charge of these activities. Moreover, a *Lesson Learnt Unit* was created in DPKO in April 1995. The rising dimensions of peacekeeping taught a lesson that each new operation needed to reinvent policies, guidelines and procedures from scratch, as no two of them were similar

in nature. For attempting to make remarkable changes in the UN structure, Meisler (1995a: 180) called Boutros-Ghali as 'a new Hammarskjöld'.

Boutros-Ghali initiated major reforms by downsizing the UN bureaucracy. In an interview to the *Washington Post* (Borchgrave 1996), he elaborated on changes made - departments and offices were cut from 20 to 12; high-level posts in the Secretariat were reduced from 48 to 37 (40 percent less than 10 years ago); some 1,000 positions were phased out (a staff reduction of 20 percent since 1986); a new budget that was \$117 million lower was worked out and included additional cuts of \$154 million mandated by the General Assembly. Boutros-Ghali's major aim was to eliminate duplication, redundancy and excessive layering of offices and duties at headquarters. He stressed that each element of the UN system needed to be re-examined and its mission and the human and financial resources justified (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 101). For example, the ECOSOC, despite its pre-eminence in the Charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence to the work of the specialized agencies like the Bretton Woods institutions, the regional economic commissions and other UN programs. Instead of coordination, there is duplication leading to inefficiency.

Boutros-Ghali also aimed at creating a 'new management culture' in the Secretariat, but could not achieve desirable results due to bureaucratic resistance, vested interests and scepticism. A new 'Human Resource Strategy' (General Assembly Res. 49/222) was aimed at modernizing and re-energizing human resources based on assessment of needs, global mobility, and innovative recruitment system and performance assessments. He created an 'Efficiency Board' to carry out efficiency reviews through reduction in number of staff and increase in their productivity. He also proposed 'ombudsman mediation panels' with optional binding awards. The Chairman of Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) termed the proposed panel as 'radical and controversial' and concluded that the time was not ripe to implement such changes (Beigbeder 2000: 209-212). He also set up the UN interim offices in six countries of former USSR in order to help them in smooth management of transitional problems. Although Boutros-Ghali tried to provide dynamic internal leadership, the health of the organization also depended on adequate funding. In the

absence of fully paid dues, other attempts at rejuvenating the organization remain only academic.

4. Political actions taken by the UN during tenure of Boutros-Ghali

The post-Cold War office of the Secretary-General has reflected a number of constraints and opportunities to adjust with the systemic changes and the emerging challenges of international relations. There was a chance for a new model of the office defined by the personality of the incumbent. The confrontational and activist style of Boutros-Ghali certainly helped the office to be more vibrant. Newman (1998: 115) claims that Boutros-Ghali began his tenure on false premises as during the period of 1988-92, UN settled many regional conflicts where superpowers had been involved. The euphoria of the mandates of the Security Council and the General Assembly soon vanished when the new realities started unfolding in 1993. After failure in Somalia in 1993, Boutros-Ghali was both defensive and optimistic. In his *'Supplement to An agenda for Peace'* (1993: paragraph 41), he emphasised on adequate training and supply of equipments and wrote about an 'expanded peace-keeping'.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali was the first post-Cold War Secretary-General. He took office at the height of what might be called the UN's 'Era of Good Feelings' (Traub in Chesterman 2007: 190). By the time Boutros-Ghali's first and only term came to an end, his space for maneuver had been reduced almost to nil. The institution, as also its most visible public figure, had fallen victim to the euphoria and expectations of the post-Cold War moment.

The new era brought different political situations as peacekeeping was intra-state. Here the parties were factions and not states, whose perception about UN might change in an unexpected way (Newman 1998: 128). Now, the peacekeeping was more by the 'blue helmets' rather than the UN authorised forces of different states. Boutros-Ghali saw multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations launched in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti.

In Somalia, the political background of Boutros-Ghali linked him to former Somali ruler Siad Barre, so the opponent faction of Mohamed Farah Aideed considered him biased against him. This led to compounding of the crisis (Myint-U 2007: 93). The UN operation was undertaken under Resolution 751 of the Security Council to monitor the ceasefire and provide security for personnel and humanitarian supplies. The Somalian crisis was unique in this way as fifty percent of the food went to the warlords (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 57). The crisis worsened as by the end of the 1992, 3000 deaths were reported as the result of starvation and lawlessness. US casualties in October 1993 led to US withdrawal from the operation.

When Boutros-Ghali pressed the Council to intervene in Rwanda just a few months after the Somalia crisis, the United States resisted strongly, largely because of the negative domestic impact of the Mogadishu incident (Cockayne and Malone in Chesterman 2007: 80). He was made a scapegoat for the Somali debacle in 1993, a disaster that had been entirely planned and directed by the US.

According to Goulding (2002: 18), UN peacekeeping was at its peak in 1994, when UN deployed 75,000 peacekeepers to seventeen trouble spots at an annual cost of \$3.6 billion. During the previous four decades, the United Nations had deployed only thirteen peacekeeping missions.

In Bosnia, the UN passed many resolutions which had little practicality and led to a credibility gap. Boutros-Ghali argued for mediation rather than intervention and blamed the Security Council for being obsessed with a 'rich man's war' (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 43). In May 1995, he reported that the current role of United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) has to be changed.

Boutros-Ghali's tenure saw a rise and fall in the practice of UN peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Haiti, Liberia, Iraq, Cyprus, Rwanda, and Somalia. The good offices and the preventive roles also developed in the post-Cold War era. Afghanistan, Burundi, Georgia, Tajikistan, Guatemala, Korea, East Timor and Myanmar are the few examples of these. Thus, it can be said that the agenda-setting and the

developmental roles were given to the Secretary-General whereas the hardcore political issues were still at the behest of the powerful states.

5. Boutros-Ghali and the United States

During the Cold War years, the United States generally favoured extending the tenure of an incumbent Secretary-General. In case of Kurt Waldheim, US favoured, even an unprecedented third term. It was Moscow, not Washington, which objected to maintaining Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld in office.

The overwhelming influence of the US results from the distribution of power in the post-Cold War international system and from the unique historical role of the US in pushing for the establishment of the organization and in shaping the Charter. Further its financial contribution to the UN provides it a position like ‘an elephant in the tent’ (comment of Andrew B. Denison in Manor 1999: 17).

As a chief sponsor of UN and the remaining superpower after the Cold War, US under the influence of Bush, projected an image of leadership through the UN, as it was ‘bound to lead’. The US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright gave the logic of ‘assertive multilateralism’ that “our triumph in the Gulf is testament to the UN mission, that security is a shared responsibility” (Chesterman 2007:116).

Beigbeder opines that Boutros-Ghali was not against US *in toto* as he appointed three Americans at the level of Under-Secretary-General and selected an American nominee for the post of Director of UNICEF (Carol Bellamy) in preference to European candidates, to the annoyance of European governments. Americans already held the posts of executive head in both UNDP and WFP (Beigbeder 2000: 209).

Boutros-Ghali was the only Secretary-General, who was delivered *coup de grace* (LeBor 2006: 158) by the US veto on his re-election to the office. There were several proposals for extension of the tenure for one year but Boutros-Ghali refused to accept any such offer. Although Boutros-Ghali came to office promising to serve one term, it was obvious by 1995 that he wanted to serve another five years. “I believe that only stupid

people don't change their mind," he said. Albright and her confidant dubbed their secret plan to oust Boutros-Ghali as 'Operation Orient Express'. (Meisler 2007: 129-131). There were tremendous pressures on Washington, particularly from Jacques Chirac and Nelson Mandela, who called the US President on many occasions to lobby for Boutros-Ghali. Albright kept offering inducements to Boutros-Ghali to give up. African governments insisted that Boutros-Ghali was their candidate while Albright threatened that the US would look for a candidate outside Africa if their stubborn support for the Secretary-General persisted. She said:

That's not a threat. It's just a statement of fact.... He could become Secretary-General emeritus with an office and ceremonial duties or the United States could support him for a seat on the International Court of Justice in The Hague (in Meisler 2007: 136).

Boutros-Ghali dismissed this proposal as this seemed as a baksheesh to him. The US seemed to want a 'secretary' rather than a 'general'. Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Armitage blamed Boutros-Ghali to be positioning himself to be "chief executive of the world" and "the world's commander-in-chief" (Meisler 1995a: 193).

From October 1993, the US Congress began to cut back its support to the UN. When the Republicans took the Congress, a mixture of unilateralism and 'America First' came into vogue. Republican Bob Dole promised that, "when we recapture the White House, no American boys are going to be serving under the command of Field Marshal Boutros-Boutros-Ghali.' He was instrumental in the introduction of the 'Prohibition of United Nations Taxation Act' in January, 1996. The starkest example of this was the Presidential Policy Directive of 1994, which imposed that the use of US soldiers in UN operations 'must be tied to the national interest.' United States unilaterally insisted on lowering its obligations to the UN from 31 percent of peacekeeping costs to 25 percent and from 25 percent of the general budget to 20 percent. This is one of the conditions of the 'Helms-Biden' package designed to pay US arrears in turn for the UN meeting specific US demands on reform (Adare 1999: 17). Boutros-Ghali criticised US as it was refusing to pay its \$1.3 billion debt to the UN, when the UN had deployed 70000

peacekeepers in 17 troubled zones globally. In the early 1996, Boutros-Ghali announced that the organization was on the 'edge of insolvency' (Newman 1998: 117).

The debate thus, went far beyond Boutros-Ghali's management or personality. Post-Cold War America was tempted to take control of the world organization as an instrument of power. It was no accident that a large number of countries, including important ones, announced their support for Boutros-Ghali's candidature. Several west European states, including France and Germany, African countries (through the OAU), China, Russia, Japan and Canada, for example, announced that Boutros-Ghali enjoyed their highest esteem and support.

The US claimed that it obstructed Boutros-Ghali's reappointment because he had failed to make enough progress in reforming the UN. Also, it highlights that initially, Boutros-Ghali had committed himself to a single term of office only, while all his predecessors served two terms.

Serious differences with the US started in his first year in office. America's politicians and media blamed him for the deaths of their peacekeepers in Somalia and for failure to protect 'safe heavens' in Bosnia. Boutros-Ghali refuted these blames by the US and argued that he had reduced the UN bureaucracy from 12000 to 9000 and that the Americans went to Somalia (where 18 US rangers lost their lives in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 resulting in US withdrawal from future peacekeeping operations) without the mandate of the UN. So, his activism proved to be a liability rather than an asset on many occasions.

In his memoir *Unvanquished*, Boutros-Ghali describes the personal animosity with the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright, which resulted in his downfall. He complains:

I was puzzled... by what seemed her desires to strike attitudes rather than address substantive issues. She seemed to have little interest in the difficult diplomatic work of persuading her foreign counterparts to go along with the positions of her government, preferring to lecture or speak in declarative sentences, or simply read verbatim from her briefing books. She seemed to assume that her mere assertion

of a US foreign policy should be sufficient to achieve the support of other nations,” (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 68).

6. Personal Characteristics of ~~the~~ Boutros-Ghali

Kent J. Kille (2007) systematically studies the leadership in international organizations, providing a concise presentation of the personal characteristics that interrelate to create a Secretary-General’s leadership style, which he further uses to empirically describe and compare the personal characteristics of the Secretaries-General in the following table:

Table 4.1 Description of the personal characteristics of the Secretaries-General²⁹

<i>Characteristic</i>	<i>Description</i>
Responsivity	Sensitivity to context and analytical capability
Belief That Can Influence	Perceive self as capable of influencing events
Need for Recognition	Unwilling to relinquish control and work behind the scenes without credit
Need for Relationships	Desire to maintain good personal relationships
Supranationalism	Strong attachment to and desire to defend the UN and the organization’s values
Problem-Solving Emphasis	Emphasize completing tasks over interpersonal concerns

²⁹ Source: Kent J. Kille (2006), *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of United Nations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan p. 17.

These personal characteristics can be considered as the building blocks of a leadership style. The way that the characteristics interrelate establishes a certain mindset, which creates a tendency for a Secretary-General to act in a particular manner. In order to capture a Secretary-General's leadership style, Kille empirically measures the individual personal characteristics and then constructed an overarching leadership style outline.³⁰

Drawing these six characteristics together, Kille (2006: 18-20) suggests that the Secretaries-General should be supra-nationalists who are willing to strongly defend the UN and who believe that they may be influential and responsive to particular situational requirements in an effective manner. In addition, Secretaries-General should have a strong need for relationships, but a low need for recognition. This composite leadership style reflects a willingness to pro-actively support the UN and solve problems with an understanding of the requirements of situations and relationships. Kille's analysis, based on a study of press conferences, transcripts, official records of the UN etc., provides important insight into the differences among the personality characteristics of the incumbents.³¹

³⁰ Kille borrowed a detailed analysis scheme, referred to as 'leadership trait analyses from Margaret G. Hermann, a political psychologist, to measure leaders' personal characteristics and their corresponding leadership styles, which was developed by her for studying the leadership styles of national leaders. (*Handbook for Assessing Personal Characteristics and Foreign Policy Orientations of Political Leaders* (1987), Mershon Occasional Paper, Mershon Center for International Security Studies. Columbus: Ohio State University).

³¹ When interpreting the scores presented in table 4.2, it should be remembered (as indicated in the footnote) that these standardized scores were computed in comparison of seven Secretaries-General as a whole, using a mean score for the group of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. A score of 50 represents the mid-range for a characteristic while a score above 60 or below 40 is considered *high* and *low* respectively. Scores that are within five points of these high and low marks mean that the Secretaries-General lean toward these tendencies and are labelled medium high and medium low in order to better differentiate the office-holders.

Table 4.2 Personal Characteristic Results: Standardized Scores³²

<i>Secretary-General</i>	<i>Responsivity</i>	<i>Belief that can influence</i>	<i>Need for recognition</i>	<i>Needs for relationships</i>	<i>Supra-Nationalism</i>	<i>Problem-Solving Emphasis</i>
<i>Trygve Lie</i>	31.23	47.92	47.83	45.14	65.99	35.52
<i>Hammar skjöld</i>	51.54	51.38	61.75	36.53	48.90	67.16
<i>U Thant</i>	40.83	32.74	37.05	42.02	41.13	58.80
<i>Waldheim</i>	57.71	47.27	63.30	65.53	36.95	44.31
<i>De Cuéllar</i>	56.89	45.00	39.77	53.79	45.88	49.64
<i>Boutros-Ghali</i>	<u>49.39</u>	<u>58.91</u>	<u>57.50</u>	<u>44.80</u>	<u>63.26</u>	<u>53.28</u>
<i>Kofi Annan</i>	62.41	66.85	42.80	62.19	48.87	41.33

The above analysis clearly demonstrates that the Secretaries-General differ widely in their personal characteristics. The personal characteristics of Boutros-Ghali are tending from mean (50) towards the stronger characteristics. His *need for relationships* is below average, which is reflected in his relationships with the US and also with the secretarial staff, who called him obstinate and arrogant. This trend is manifested in the previous sections of the chapter. He was confident of his own decision-making and did not rely on relationships. Boutros-Ghali, who headed the UN after the Cold War and was the first African in office, has a medium score in *responding to global issues*. On the issue of *problem solving*, he is above average, as he was successful in resolving conflicts in

³² Source: Kent J. Kille (2006), *From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of United Nations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan p. 32.

Note: Standardized personal characteristic scores are calculated based on the comparison group of all 7 Secretaries-General using a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Higher scores indicate that a characteristic is stronger for a Secretary-General.

The bold letters indicates the highest and lowest score in each category.

Cambodia, Israel-Egypt and El Salvador. As far as *need for recognition* is concerned, Boutros-Ghali sometimes displayed an assertive and activist nature. He was highly confident of being *influential* as he was hopeful of re-election, even after getting a 'thumbs down' from Washington in the last six months of his tenure. Boutros-Ghali had great faith in *supranationalism* as he had to deal with intra-national conflicts, human security issues and developmental issues in the globalised world soon after the Cold War.

Lustick and Liatin (1974: 108) focus on the 'energy' as a factor and hold that 'leadership focusing on high accuracy will be low in energy'. Also, highly energetic leadership is usually considered to be counterproductive, upsets the process and therefore, likely to fail. This apparently looks true in case of Boutros-Ghali as he entered the office with high ambitions and conviction to bring out major reforms in the world body.

In sum, Boutros Boutros-Ghali served as Secretary-General of the UN at a moment that was both full of promise and common with danger. He attempted to rethink peacekeeping, development, and democracy, while also accommodating the most powerful state in the system (Lang Jr. in Kille 2007: 292-300).

Burns (1978: 22) suggests that a higher moral purpose is essential for transforming the organization. A transformational leader like Boutros-Ghali had a moral end and transcendental values such as equality, liberty and justice (which were reflected through his ambitious *Agendas*). He was a leader ahead of his time and believed that the society could be transformed by raising consciousness. His background, personality and the ethical-moral values he upheld, all had an impact on the functioning of the organization. In the framework proposed by Willcoxson (2000: 30), Boutros-Ghali can be viewed as a strategic leader who integrated insights into the functioning of an organization. As suggested by Kanninen (1995: 160), in a serious organizational crisis, the top leadership has to participate in any reform planning, coordination and implementation. In order to be successful, the reform strategy should be based upon rational considerations. Boutros-Ghali successfully carried out major reforms in the Secretariat concerning reduction of expenditure and removal of deadwood.

The efforts of Boutros-Ghali concerning participation of the UN in more pressing issue-areas provided the UN with some amount of 'autonomy', lending it the character of 'the sum being more than its parts'. As Cox suggests, the 'real essence of an international organization is not about performing a special task but bringing about a new and a more integrated world order.' This can be tested by measuring the changes in national policies of major member-states in consonance with the organizational ideology', it is evident that major issues like human rights, environment, women development, genocide, landmine treaties, etc. were incorporated in the national policies of the majority of states.

Boutros-Ghali in his memoirs, accuses the US for vetoing his re-election. However, his own relations with other powers were questioned. For instance, he did not take on France (he is French-educated intellectual, and currently heading the prestigious, *Francophonie*) which trained and armed the Hutu tribes against Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide, where nearly half a million people were exterminated in four weeks in 1994. Boutros-Ghali's actions - or lack of action - were criticised as an abdication of responsibility.³³

As the Chief Administrative Officer of the UN, Boutros-Ghali tried to reform the staff but was paralysed by the budgetary problems. Myint-U (2007) concludes that his tenure can be seen as one of the trial and error. It is too simplistic to assume that the world after the end of the Cold War was conducive for the Secretary-General in discharging his duties. Boutros-Ghali never did get an opportunity to exercise the Article 99 power - the symbol of his political autonomy - and the 'good offices' or mediation missions were specifically on behalf of the Security Council. According to Murthy (1995: 195), Boutros-Ghali seemed to suffer from the habit of magnifying problems rather than isolating them and making them manageable. However, Boutros-Ghali showed intellectual capability to break the worn-out traditions and precedents but he wanted to achieve too much too soon, without realizing that the world was not ready to accept those changes. He emerged as the most active peacemaker in the history of the UN.

³³ Kofi Annan commissioned a report soon after assuming the office of secretary-General that placed the blame on a wide range of actors, including the UN system and the office that Annan himself headed, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

International organizations are results of the growing complexities of international relations. Complex inter-relationships and interactions led to the growth of conflicts in a more complex system. To deal with such issues, international conferences were convened, which gave birth to the international secretariat and finally to international organizations. This led to a change in diplomacy and means of mediation. With the change in the nature of international organizations, the role of leadership has also evolved. The role of the executive head of an organization has become a critical determinant in the success or failure of an organization, especially when it is undergoing a change or adaptation.

The nature of leadership of an international organization differs widely from that, in the national context. The constituency of the national leaders is their population to whom they are directly responsible; but in case of leadership in international organizations, the member-states provide both constraints and opportunities to the executive head. Thus, neutrality is the most important characteristic of the executive head as he has to take decisions for global problems by rising above national concerns. 'Cross-cultural' sophistication and high-level diplomatic skills are essential requirements for leading an international organization in the contemporary era.

The founding fathers of the UN agreed that the Secretary-General should be given a more important role than the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. It was agreed that the Secretary-General, besides the secretarial roles, should report annually on the work of the organization and should be empowered to bring before the Security Council, *on his own initiative*, any matter which in his judgment threatens peace and security (Article 99). The UN Secretary-General, since the beginning, has been an important part of the institution, not only as its chief executive, but also as both symbol and guardian of the original vision of the organization. He is the only person who can provide a unifying

influence throughout the entire structure. He holds a unique position in mediating conflicts.

International organizations are characterised by the membership of states. In a sense, the member states own the organization, but the everyday functioning and responsibility of running the organization rests with the secretarial staff. This poses a dichotomy of control and ownership, often leading to differences between the member states and the international staff. A very active or assertive Secretary-General often faces opposition from the member-states, especially the more powerful member states, as the Secretariat is viewed by them in a narrow fashion as merely a forum for servicing their needs.

The major asset or resource of the Secretary-General and his staff is neutrality; this is what provides them with acceptability and legitimacy in the eyes of competing powers among the membership of the organization. Neutrality does not imply always taking the middle position between two adversaries; rather it means standing by and upholding the Charter principles. The Secretary-General is supposed to develop the ideals of the Charter in his public statements and diplomatic activities and to conform to high moral standards.

During the Cold War, there were many roadblocks in the way of the functioning of the UN. The role of the Secretary-General was primarily that of a 'mediator'. However, no incumbent lost an opportunity to interpret his powers under the Charter to expand the scope of his activities according to the needs of the changing times and the expectations of the member-states. The Secretariat remained a source of advice and assistance to the members. The power of autonomy under Article 99, on many occasions, provided space for manoeuvring for the Secretary-General in the bipolar world. With the end of Cold War, ideological debates ended and a fresh perspective on the obligations, possibilities and limits of responsibilities shaping world politics, emerged. This was visible in the context of the *Agendas* of Boutros-Ghali.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent globalization called for multilateral diplomacy, where the Secretary-General can have an enhanced role. There is a geopolitical shift in the international arena from South to North which led to major changes in the issue-areas. The international system is getting more complex due to the emerging knowledge and scientific advancement. The advent of new areas and meanings of development, terrorism, environment, sustainable development, post-conflict peace building requires a holistic approach to address them. The post-Cold War Secretary-General office has developed beyond the traditional model diplomacy, which was based upon mediation and arbitration.

In the present complex world, the role of leadership is more important than ever. The emerging global problems require both 'global' as well as 'local' solutions. The unequal distribution of power in the international system resists uniform cooperation to achieve universal ideals of equality, liberty, justice, development and human rights. Thus, there is a need for a successful leader at the international institutional level who would rise above national considerations and would work towards achieving these global ideals.

The office still reflects the use of UN as an instrument of certain states or on the whims of the permanent members of the Security Council. The lack of definition of the role and responsibilities of the office with the costs and constraints of multifunctional peace operations has been reflected in the volatility of the support of the member-states. The other major limitation is the financial constraints, which is necessary for impartial and effective functioning of the UN. Neither leadership nor ambitious plans are enough to rejuvenate the organization; sound financial stability is of utmost importance.

Each era has found a Secretary-General appropriate to the times. In other words, each incumbent gave an imprint on the office according to the environment and his personality. The mandate given by the Charter to the UN was to maintain peace and security and the incumbents of this office have acted as mediators to avoid conflicts. During the Cold War, the process of decolonization began, which had an overarching impact, not only on the UN, but on international relations in general. This led to the increase in the membership of the General Assembly and started influencing the decision-

making processes. So, there began a shift from the North to the South; and from peace and security to democratization and development. In the areas of peace and security, the approach was more punitive, contentious and restricted to the ambit of the major powers whereas the issues of development and, to a large extent, democratization constitute a more universal agenda, which requires a constructive and positive approach to meet these ends. Here, the role of the Secretary-General is important and the recent incumbents have tried to focus more on such 'positive' agendas.

Hammaraskjöld aptly commented that the 'Secretary-General' is an "impossible job". There are idealistic public expectations, large responsibilities without significant power or resources and contrary attitudes of governments. As a 'chief administrative officer' of the organization, the UN Secretary-General must ensure that the policies and directives of the member-states are translated into action in an efficient and effective manner. He is expected to furnish guidance on major issues that confront the international community. There can be various factors that influence the role of the Secretary-General, which include the UN Charter provisions; their interpretation in different circumstances; the nature of the organization itself; the political environment; the personality of the Secretary-General and finally, the level of confidence he enjoys of the member-states.

Boutros-Ghali entered office in 1992, with an ambition to make the world body more accountable and relevant in the light of newly emerging challenges. He tried to make significant changes in relations at three levels - within the international bureaucracy; with the member-states; and with the international system as such. As stated in the previous chapter, he attempted major bureaucratic reforms in the UN bodies, also attracting criticism from many quarters. His *Agendas for Peace* (1992), *Development* (1994) and *Democratization* (1996) drew praise as well as criticism but were undoubtedly influential. Unlike previous incumbents like Hammaraskjöld, who was sometimes successful in influencing the decisions of the superpowers, Boutros-Ghali was not successful in acting independently in the post-Cold War era. His office experienced the new opportunities and constraints^x which were reflections of a volatile and transitory political culture. The power of autonomy under Article 99, on many occasions, had provided the space for manoeuvring for the Secretary-General in the bipolar world. With

the end of Cold War, ideological debates ended and a fresh perspective on the obligations, possibilities and limits of responsibilities shaping world politics emerged.

The UN Secretary-General enjoys considerable autonomy at the administrative level but at the political level, he is less autonomous as the decisions are taken either in the Security Council or the General Assembly and his role is merely to execute and supervise. Here, 'neutrality' plays an important role in the interpretation of decisions and execution of policies.

As argued in the second chapter, the charismatic style seems out of fashion in international organization in the post Cold War period. A more heterogeneous world has encouraged 'quiet diplomacy' and discouraged a policy of self-assertion. So, personality plays an important role in the successful leadership of international organizations, which is supported by the studies of Cox (1969), Haas (1968) and Kille (2006 and 2007). The human qualities or will determines the influence of the incumbent on the office. The political background of the executive head of an international organization plays an important role in the leadership of the organization. Boutros-Ghali's grandfather was Prime Minister of Egypt; so his ancestral political affiliation groomed his insights and perceptions of world realities. His political initiatives were challenging and visionary but his administrative actions were not so effective (for efficiency, he cut down the significant number of offices, which later had to be restarted again). His background in national politics may have also had negative impacts on his leadership. As Goulding alleges that being a minister in the Egyptian government, Boutros-Ghali was obsessed with development and social issues. However, this allegation seems excessive as focusing on these issues was the demand of the time.

As shown by the study in the previous chapter, Boutros-Ghali was more concerned with *need for recognition* and *supra-nationalism* and compares unfavourably with Kofi Annan, who had high scores for *responsivity* and *need for relationships*. This comparison also indicates the impact of background; Boutros-Ghali was the first person of African origin to rise to the office of executive head of the world body. Annan, on the other hand, was a career international civil servant, whose job was to deal with UN

member-states in different capacities. It can be inferred that Boutros-Ghali did not build *implicit* and *formalized* coalitions and alliances to ensure support from sufficient portions of constituents, or the subsidiary organs of the UN, as suggested by Haas (1968). It is difficult to conclude that Boutros-Ghali went 'too far' in attempting to elevate the office in its policy-making or commanding roles; it is important to note that the major powers will not allow the office overstepping its mark.

Cox explains that the issues that are important to the executive head seldom have the same order of importance to national governments. The Secretary-General has the difficult task of maintaining the confidence of the major powers and asserting the organizational ideology, which might sometimes be conflicting.

The present study supports the hypothesis that ethical-moral values and personal factors do influence the role of the Secretary-General in the conduct of his office. While all individuals, and therefore all leaders, have an ethical framework of some kind, this framework can vary in terms of the personal values that each person brings to a position and how those values evolve over time. The question of how a Secretary-General can or cannot influence events must take into account the constraints placed upon him by the international system. Using different leadership styles in different conditions can pay more in the performance of the leader and enhance the effectiveness of the organization.

It is easy to talk about what the Secretary-General should do and the initiatives he should take without recognizing that the organization can do only what its members will allow and support. The Secretary-General should be given enough autonomy in order to also ensure accountability. The UN Secretary-General's leadership role, in essence, revolves around identifying the interests of its various constituents and harnessing them to an overarching set of common objectives.

There is a sizeable gap between the aspirations and the accomplishments of the UN. Therefore, a major reform is needed to narrow this gap. This requires a new leadership culture and management structure at the UN for greater unity of purpose, coherence of efforts and agility in responding to the pressing needs of the international community. Unless the world community is clear about what it wants the United Nations

to do, the United Nations will be able to do very little. And unless the United States can resolve its own internal ambivalence about its relationship with the United Nations, the world body will be able to do even less.

In conclusion, it can be said that the UN does not reflect the present reality and a comprehensive reform is needed to make it more active, efficient, independent and impartial. The office of Secretary-General should act as a 'catalyst' in this reform towards strengthening of multilateralism. The UN Secretary-General, appointed by 192 governments, should get a strengthened mandate to take decisions for the almost seven billion people embraced by the phrase, "We, the people of United Nations."

Annexures: Selected Documents on the UN

Secretary-General

Annexure 1

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 26 JUNE 1945

Article 12 (2)

The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Chapter XV - The Secretariat

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

Annexure 2

Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations

(Related with the Secretary-General)

23 December 1945

8. The principal functions assigned to the Secretary-General, explicitly or by inference, by the Charter, may be grouped under six headings: general administrative and executive functions, technical functions, financial functions, the organization and administration of the International Secretariat, political functions and representational functions.

9. Many of the Secretary-General's duties will naturally be delegated, in greater or lesser degree, to members of his staff and particularly to his higher officials. But the execution of these duties must be subject to his supervision and control; the ultimate responsibility remains his alone.

10. The Secretary-General is the "chief administrative officer of the Organization" (Article 97) and Secretary-General of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council (Article 93). Certain specific duties of a more narrowly administrative character derived from these provisions are indicated in the Charter (for example, in Articles 12 and 20, and in Article 98, the last sentence of which requires the Secretary-General to present an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization) and in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Articles 5 and 15).

11. Further specific duties falling under this head, many of which will no doubt be defined in the Rules of Procedure of the various principal organs concerned and their subsidiary bodies, relate to the preparation of the agenda and the convocation of sessions, the provision of the necessary staff, and the preparation of the minutes and other documents.

12. The Secretary-General also has administrative and executive duties of a wider character. He is the channel of all communication with the United Nations or any of its organs. He must endeavour, within the scope of his functions, to integrate the activity of the whole complex of United Nations organs and see that the machine runs smoothly and efficiently. He is responsible, moreover, for the preparation of the work of the various organs and for the execution of their decisions, in cooperation with the Members.

13. The last-mentioned functions of the Secretary-General have technical as well as administrative aspects. More particularly as regards the work of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, the expert technical assistance which the Secretary-General is able to provide, and which he himself must control, will clearly affect the degree in which these organs can achieve their purposes.

14. Under the Charter, the Secretary-General has wide responsibilities in connection with the financial administration of the United Nations; and it may be assumed that, under the financial regulations which will be established by the General Assembly, he will be made primarily responsible for preparing the budget, for allocating funds, for controlling expenditure, for administering such financial and budgetary arrangements as the General Assembly may enter into with specialized agencies, for collecting contributions from Members and for the custodianship of all funds.

15. The Secretary-General is the head of the Secretariat. He appoints all staff under regulations established by the General Assembly (Article 101, paragraphs 1 and 5), and assigns appropriate staff to the various organs of the United Nations (Article 101, paragraph 2). He alone is responsible to the other principal organs for the Secretariat's work; his choice of staff – more particularly of higher staff – and his leadership will largely determine the character and the efficiency of the Secretariat as a whole. It is on him that will mainly fall the duty of creating and maintaining a team spirit in a body of officials recruited from many countries. His moral authority within the Secretariat will depend at once upon the example he gives of the qualities prescribed in Article 100, and upon the confidence shown in him by the Members of the United Nations.

16. The Secretary-General may have an important role to play as a mediator and as an informal adviser of many governments, and will undoubtedly be called upon from time to time, in the exercise of his administrative duties, to take decisions which may justly be called political. Under Article 99 of the Charter, moreover, he has been given a quite special right which goes beyond any power previously accorded to the head of an international organization, viz. to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter (not merely any dispute or situation) which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. It is impossible to foresee how this Article will be applied; but the responsibility it confers upon the Secretary-General will require the exercise of the highest qualities of political judgment, tact and integrity.

17. The United Nations cannot prosper, nor can its aims be realised, without the active and steadfast support of the peoples of the world. The aims and activities of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council will, no doubt, be represented before the public primarily by the Chairmen of these organs. But the Secretary-General, more than anyone else, will stand for the United Nations as a whole. In the eyes of the world, no less than in the eyes of his own staff, he must embody the principles and ideals of the Charter to which the Organization seeks to give effect.

Annexure 3

General Assembly Resolution 11(I),

24 January 1946³⁴

Terms of Appointment of the Secretary-General:

The General Assembly resolves that, in view of the heavy responsibilities which rest upon the Secretary-General in fulfilling his obligations under the Charter:

1. The terms of the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be such as to enable a man of eminence and high attainment to accept and maintain the position.

2. The Secretary-General shall receive a salary of an amount sufficient to bring him in a net sum of \$20,000 (US), together with representation allowance of \$20,000 (US), per annum. In addition, he shall be provided with a furnished residence, the repairs and maintenance of which, excluding provision of household staff, shall be borne by the Organization.

3. The first Secretary-General shall be appointed for five years, the appointment being open at the end of that period for a further five-year term.

4. The following observations contained in paragraphs 18–21 of section 2, chapter VIII of the Preparatory Commission's Report be noted and approved:

(a) There being no stipulation on the subject in the Charter, the General Assembly and the Security Council are free to modify the term of office of future Secretaries-General in the light of experience.

(b) Because a Secretary-General is a confidant of many governments, it is desirable that no Member should offer him, at any rate immediately on retirement, any governmental

³⁴ Seventeenth Plenary Meeting, 24 January 1946.

position in which his confidential information might be a source of embarrassment to other Members, and on his part a Secretary-General should refrain from accepting any such position.

(c) From the provisions of Articles 18 and 27 of the Charter, it is clear that, for the nomination of the Secretary-General by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of 1 members, including the concurring votes of the permanent Members, is required; and that for his appointment by the General Assembly, a simple majority of the members of that body present and voting is sufficient, unless the General Assembly itself decides that a two-thirds majority is called for. The same rules apply to a renewal of appointment as to an original appointment; this should be made clear when the original appointment is made.

(d) It would be desirable for the Security Council to proffer one candidate only for the consideration of the General Assembly, and for debate on the nomination in the General Assembly to be avoided. Both nomination and appointment should be discussed at private meetings, and a vote in either the Security Council or the General Assembly, if taken, should be by secret ballot.

Annexure 4

The “Wisnumurti Guidelines” for Selecting a Candidate for Secretary-General,

12 November 1996

1. General principles:

- a) The selection of a candidate for a Secretary-General shall proceed in an atmosphere of harmony among the Members of the Security Council. This will ensure not only the smooth functioning of the Council but also the effectiveness of the Secretary-General.
- b) Throughout the selection process, Members of the Council shall respect and honour the dignity of the candidate or candidates.
- c) While the decision of the Security Council to select a candidate for Secretary-General shall be taken by vote, efforts should none-the-less be exerted toward the reaching of a consensus. However, these efforts shall not unduly delay the decision-making process.
- d) The deliberations to reach agreement on a candidate for Secretary-General may be conducted in consultations of the whole of the Security Council in the absence of the representatives of the Secretary-General and members of the Secretariat.
- e) To facilitate the selection process, the consultations of the whole should only be attended by Heads of Delegation accompanied by one or two of their respective officers, or only by Heads of Delegation as appropriate.

2. Legal basis

- a) Article 97 of the Charter;
- b) Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council;
- c) Rule 141 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

3. Submission of candidate(s):

- a) Any Member of the Security Council or any other Member of the United Nations may submit a candidate or candidates to the President of the Security Council.
- b) Member States may submit a candidate or candidates other than its candidate or candidates other than its own national.
- c) Members of the Security Council may submit the name(s) of candidate or candidates formally or informally as appropriate.
- d) Members States submitting a candidate or candidates may provide brief curriculum vitae of the candidate or candidates.

4. List of candidate(s):

- a) The President of the Security Council shall draw up a list of the name(s) of the candidate or candidates on the basis of the submission of Member States.
- b) The list may be up-dated as and when necessary.

5. Decision-making process:

- a) The list of name(s) of the candidate or candidates drawn up by the President of the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 3 shall immediately be distributed to the members of the Security Council.
- b) Unless it is decided otherwise by the Members of the Security Council, the process for selecting a candidate for Secretary-General may commence within 48 hours after the distribution of the list of name(s) of candidate or candidates.
- c) The viability of each candidate may be assessed by means of a “straw poll(s)” to be conducted in accordance with the following procedure:
 - i. Two types of papers will be distributed to the members of the Security Council: White papers for non-permanent members and red papers for permanent members. Each paper will contain a column listing the name of

candidate or candidates, and the two columns, the first marked “encouraged” and the second “discouraged.”

- ii. Each member of the Security Council may indicate on the appropriate paper the candidate or candidates who it wants to appropriate paper the candidate or candidates who it wants to encourage or discourage.
- d) The Security Council may hold informal consultations on the result of the straw poll. The purpose of these informal consultations is to review the situation and to determine the next step in the process.
- e) Following the consultations, the Security Council may enter into further round(s) of “straw poll(s)” on the basis of the existing list or an up-dated list which will be drawn by the President of the Council which may include new names of candidates submitted by Members States.
- f) Process (a) to (c) may be repeated as needed in order to arrive at a consensus decision. However, these efforts should not unduly delay the decision-making process.

6. Decision of the Security Council:

Agreement reached by members of the Security Council at the consultations of the whole on a candidate for Secretary-General to be recommended to the General Assembly shall be formalized at a private meeting of the Council.

7. Consultation with the President of the General Assembly:

The President of the Security Council may, as and when necessary inform and consult with the President of the General Assembly.

Annexure 5

Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council ³⁵

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 141 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly ³⁶

When the Security Council has submitted its recommendation on the appointment of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly shall consider the recommendation and vote upon by secret ballot in private meeting.

³⁵ Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, 1983, UN Doc. S/96/Rev.7

³⁶ Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, 2007, UN Doc. A/520/Rev.17

Annexure 6

General Assembly Resolution, 51/241,

22 August 1997

“Strengthening of the United Nations System”

XIX. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

56. The process of selection of the Secretary-General shall be made more transparent.

57. The General Assembly shall make full use of the power of appointment enshrined in the Charter in the process of the appointment of the Secretary-General and the agenda item entitled “Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”

58. The duration of the term or terms of appointment, including the option of a single term, shall be considered before the appointment of the next Secretary-General.

59. In the course of the identification and appointment of the best candidate for the post of Secretary-General, due regard shall continue to be given to regional rotation and shall also be given to gender equality.

60. Without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly may consult with Member States to identify potential candidates endorsed by a Member State and, upon informing all Member States of the results, may forward those results to the Security Council.

61. In order to ensure a smooth and efficient transition, the Secretary-General should be appointed as early as possible, preferably no later than one month before the date on which the term of the incumbent expires.

Annexure 7

Biography of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali³⁷



Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 January 1992, when he began a five-year term. At the time of his appointment by the General Assembly on 3 December 1991, Mr. Boutros-Ghali had been Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt since May 1991 and had served as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1977 until 1991. Mr. Boutros-Ghali has had a long association with international affairs as a diplomat, jurist, scholar and widely published author.

He became a member of the Egyptian Parliament in 1987 and was part of the Secretariat of the National Democratic Party from 1980. Until assuming the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations, he was also Vice-President of the Socialist International.

He was a member of the International Law Commission from 1979 until 1991, and is a former member of the International Commission of Jurists. He has many professional and academic associations related to his background in law, international affairs and political science, among them, his membership in the Institute of International Law, the International Institute of Human Rights, the African Society of Political Studies and the *Académie des sciences morales et politique (Académie française, Paris)*.

Over four decades, Mr. Boutros-Ghali participated in numerous meetings dealing with international law, human rights, economic and social development, decolonization, the Middle East question, international humanitarian law, the rights of ethnic and other

³⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt): Sixth United Nations Secretary-General, UN Website: <http://www.un.org/sg/ghali.shtml>

minorities, non-alignment, development in the Mediterranean region and Afro-Arab cooperation.

In September 1978, Mr. Boutros-Ghali attended the Camp David Summit Conference and had a role in negotiating the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which were signed in 1979. He led many delegations of his country to meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as to the Summit Conference of the French and African Heads of State. He also headed Egypt's delegation to the General Assembly sessions in 1979, 1982 and 1990.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali received a Ph.D. in international law from Paris University in 1949. His thesis was on the study of regional organizations. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also holds a Bachelor of Laws degree, received from Cairo University in 1946, as well as separate diplomas in political science, economics and public law from Paris University.

Between 1949 and 1977, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was Professor of International Law and International Relations at Cairo University. From 1974 to 1977, he was a member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union.

Among his other professional and academic activities, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was a Fulbright Research Scholar at Columbia University (1954-1955); Director of the Centre of Research of The Hague Academy of International Law (1963-1964); and Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, Paris University (1967-1968). He has lectured on international law and international relations at universities in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was President of the Egyptian Society of International Law from 1965; President of the Centre of Political and Strategic Studies (Al-Ahram) from 1975; member of the Curatorium Administrative Council of The Hague Academy of International Law from 1978; member of the Scientific Committee of the *Académie mondiale pour la paix* (Menton, France) from 1978; and associate member of the Institute Affari Internazionali (Rome) from 1979. He served as a member of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour

Organisation from 1971 until 1979. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also founded the publication *Alahram Iqtisadi*, which he edited from 1960 to 1975, and the quarterly *Al-Seyassa Al-Dawlia*, which he edited until December 1991.

The more than 100 publications and numerous articles that Mr. Boutros-Ghali has written deal with regional and international affairs, law and diplomacy, and political science.

During the course of his career, Mr. Boutros-Ghali has received awards and honours from 24 countries, which, besides Egypt, include Belgium, Italy, Colombia, Guatemala, France, Ecuador, Argentina, Nepal, Luxembourg, Portugal, Niger, Mali, Mexico, Greece, Chile, Brunei Darussalam, Germany, Peru, Côrcte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Central African Republic, Sweden and the Republic of Korea. He has also been decorated with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.

He was awarded a doctorate of law *honoris causa* from the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (September 1992); a doctorate *honoris causa* from *l'Institut d'études politiques* de Paris (January 1993); the Christian A. Herter Memorial Award from the World Affairs Council, Boston (March 1993); a doctorate *honoris causa* from The Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (April 1993); the "Man of Peace" award, sponsored by the Italian-based 'Together for Peace Foundation' (July 1993); an honorary doctorate degree from the University of Laval, Quebec (August 1993); and the Arthur A. Houghton Jr. Star Crystal Award for Excellence from the African-American Institute, New York (November 1993).

In addition, he was given an honorary membership of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Minsk, (April 1994); an honorary doctorate from the University Carlos III of Madrid (April 1994); an honorary degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (May 1994); a doctorate in international law *honoris causa* from the University of Moncton, New Brunswick,

Canada (August 1994); honorary doctorates from the University of Bucharest (October 1994), University of Baku (October 1994), University of Yerevan (November 1994), University of Haifa (February 1995), University of Vienna (February 1995), and University of Melbourne (April 1995); and a doctorate of law honoris causa from Carleton University, Canada (November 1995). He was made a Fellow of Berkeley College, Yale University (March 1995) and is the recipient of the Onassis Award for International Understanding and Social Achievement (July 1995). He was awarded an honorary doctorate of law by the University Montesquien of Bordeaux, France (March 1996), and he received an honorary doctorate from Koryo University, Seoul, Republic of Korea (April 1996).

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was born in Cairo on 14 November 1922. He is married to Leia Maria Boutros-Ghali.

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