

**US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF GEORGE W. BUSH: FROM
ENGAGEMENT TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

SHAILZA SINGH



American Studies Division
CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2008



CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI - 110067

Date: 10-07- 2008

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “US Policy Towards India During the Administration of George W. Bush: From Engagement to Strategic Partnership” submitted by me for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.



Shailza Singh

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.



Prof. Abdul Nafey
(Chairperson)



Prof. Christopher S. Raj
(Supervisor)



CHAIRPERSON
Centre for Canadian, US &
Latin American Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

CONTENTS

	Page No.
Acknowledgements	
Acronyms	
Preface	1-7
 CHAPTER 1:	
Introduction	8-30
 CHAPTER 2:	
Domestic Aspects of the US Policy towards India During the Administration of George W. Bush	31-48
 CHAPTER 3:	
Evolution of the US-India Strategic Partnership: Major Developments of the US Policy towards India in the Area of Defence and Economy	49-72
 CHAPTER 4:	
The US-India Strategic Partnership and the Nuclear Question	73-106
 CHAPTER 5:	
Conclusion	107-112
Table 1	113
Table 2	114
Annexure- I	115-118
Annexure- II	119-123
Annexure- III	124-129
References	130-150

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


I am grateful to my Supervisor, Prof. Christopher S. Raj for his erudite guidance, incisive remarks, constructive criticism, his tolerance for my limitations and his eye for subtle details. I would always remain grateful to him for giving me ample space to nurture my thoughts, and for his constant advice and encouragement.

I am also thankful to Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, Dr. K.P. Vijayalakshmi, Prof. Abdul Nafey, Dr. Saleem Kidwai for their thought provoking lectures in the classroom and for helping in broadening my horizons.

The dissertation would not have seen the light of the day without the cooperation of the staff of the JNU Library, the American Information Resource Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, the United Services Institute and the Teen Murthi Library and I remain thankful to them for providing me with the required materials for this study.

I am thankful to Ritambhara, Sudhir, and Shambhu Nath Nandi for the guidance they provided me as seniors as well as for their sincere help and support as friends. I am also thankful to my friends Madhulika, Popy, Esha, Shivani and Abhinay for their moral support, and for standing by me through thick and thin.

Any number of words would be insufficient to express my gratitude towards my parents who have always been a source of strength to me and who gave me love and hope always and when I needed them most.



Shailza Singh

ACRONYMS

ABM	Anti- Ballistic Missile
CENTCOM	Central Command
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPG	Defense Policy Group
DPPG	Defense Policy and Procurement Group
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
HTCG	High Technology Cooperation Group
IACPA	India Abroad Centre for Political Awareness
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Association
IAPFE	Indian American Forum for Political Education
IR	International Relations
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulation
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
NNPA	Nuclear Non Proliferation Act
NNPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NNWS	Non Nuclear Weapons States
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NSSP	Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
PACOM	Pacific Command
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USINPAC	United States India Political Action Committee
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

PREFACE

It is common to the level of cliché to talk of the changed nature of the International System in the twenty first century. With the onset of the twenty first century, one of the bilateral relationships which has improved dramatically is that of United States and India. Since the end of the Cold War, with the United States occupying the position of the sole superpower in an increasingly changing international system after the withering away of the erstwhile Soviet Union coupled with India's move towards becoming an open economy, the two countries have drawn closer. The United States policy toward India during the administration of George W. Bush constitutes one of the significant cases where a paradigm shift in policy posture accompanying the change in the international system is quite evident, crystallizing into the United States –India Strategic Partnership declared in July 2005.

Much of the existing scholarship views the change from estrangement to strategic partnership as an unprecedented qualitative transformation for both the countries. However it would be naïve to view this policy shift as a consequence of some sudden turn of events. Many factors have worked in concert over a considerable period of time before such an alteration in the character of relationship could become a reality. In this backdrop it is imperative to study the dynamics of the relationship in a changed yet charged environment of the international system.

The United States-India bilateral relationship has always attracted not only the enthusiastic interest of the diplomatic and policy communities but also rigorous scholarship. There have been efforts to explain the dynamics of the bilateral relationship from various theoretical perspectives as well as policy approaches leading to a number of theoretical as well as empirical studies by social scientists, diplomats and security policy analysts. Many books have attempted to look into the nature of the United States-India bilateral relationship and its changing nature after the end of the cold war and put forward certain general trends in the relationship which serve as important sources for understanding the United States policy toward India. A vast number of academic journals

and periodicals also provide profound insight in this area. A broad overview of the history of US-India relations since Independence is covered in works such as *American Geopolitics in India* by Baldev Raj Nayar (1976) which highlights the fundamental strategic conflict that has determined the nature of the bilateral relationship during the cold war. Also the work *India and the US: Estranged Democracies* by Dennis Kux (1993) traces the bilateral relationship from 1941 to 1991 and argues that the differences between the two countries emanated not from the lack of dialogue but from fundamental disagreements over basic national security policies like the non aligned policy of India in the 1940s, US support for Pakistan in 1954 and also close political-security relationship with the latter in 1971. Another important source material that presents the historical overview is the book by M. Srinivas Chary (1995) which emphasizes the Indian side of the picture and through a lucid account of series of presidential administration offers a useful and well considered explanation.

The origins of engagement and change in the dimensions of US-India bilateral relationship is comprehensively captured in the work of Bertsch et al (1999) that puts together a wide array of scholarship and analysis on several crucial aspects of the relationship between India and the United States. A well informed group of authors provide broad insight into India's relations with the US and the rest of the world in the shadow of the 1998 nuclear tests. Stephen Philip Cohen (1987) in his book on South Asian security, examines the political and military importance of the region in the context of the age of the nuclear weapons and combining with views of the American strategists draws out policy implications. A later work by Nayar (2001) explains the changing dynamics of the US-India relationship after the nuclear tests of 1998 by India describing the United States policy towards India as containment through engagement. Arthur G. Rubinoff (2001) has come up with an analysis of the changing American attitudes towards India. His article attempts to bring out the factors that were responsible for estrangement between the United States and India and also the changes and developments that led the two countries to come closer. These works serve an important source material for theoretical formulation of understanding US-India relations.

Relevant scholarship that provides a nuanced understanding of the systemic factors having an impact on the bilateral relationship includes the work of Baldev Raj Nayar (1976) who explains the bilateral relationship between the United States and India within the structuralist framework of their respective positions in the international system during the cold war. Barry Buzan's book (2004) forms an important source material for an understanding of the role and policy posture of the United States towards the international system in the twenty first century. In his book, Barry Buzan explores the behavior of the United States in a unipolar but interdependent international system, its attitude towards other major powers and how the behavior of other powers impact the policy of the United States more so after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He argues that the existence of great powers alongside an American superpower plays a crucial role in creating both opportunities and responsibilities which will shape the way in which world politics unfolds in the coming decades. Buzan also brings out the point that in the changed international scenario the United States is focusing more on bilateral relationships. This book provides a useful insight into the larger context in which the U.S.-India relations are taking shape. In another work Buzan (2002), analyses the emergence of India as a great power and its impact on the United States policy toward the former. Dennis Kux (2002) argues in the aftermath of September 11 the Indian government under Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee acted decisively to support the US led war on terrorism and put pressure on arch rival Pakistan. It also says that the turning point in Indo-US relations originated when Clinton intervened to persuade Pakistan to withdraw forces it had sent across the Line of Control. However, when George W. Bush took office in January 2001 he revealed his interest in continuing and intensifying the rapprochement and India reciprocated. The work of Ivon Dalder and Lindsay James (2005) is also an important source for understanding the foreign policy dynamics of George W. Bush administration. Another important source providing a ring side view is the book by J.N. Dixit (2002) which serves as a work of contemporaneous relevance focusing the momentous events in which India responded to the challenge of international terrorism with an account of international politics and regional developments since 2001, the terrorist attacks in the US and on the Indian Parliament. While Ashley J. Tellis (2002) has explored the strategic implications of

nuclear India, V.R. Raghavan (2004) in his article puts forward the view how the US presence in South Asia after 9/11 has given an unexpected opportunity in its war against terrorism.

There is also considerable amount of literature that throws light on the minute details of the diplomatic engagement between the two countries which forms important source material for comprehending the change and developments in the United States-India bilateral relationship. This includes: Strobe Talbott (2005) in his book provides a revealing account of the intensive talks that the United States conducted on parallel tracks with the South Asian nuclear powers. It covers the most extensive engagement ever between the US and India from June 1998 through September 2000. It provides not only a ring side perspective on a fascinating episode in the diplomatic history, but also a vital background for understanding the developments that took shape later. C. Rajamohan (2006) explores the origins and evolution of the Indo-US entente in the Bush years .He also examines the prospects for New Delhi and Washington building an alliance for peace and stability amidst the return of Asia to the centre stage of world affairs after two centuries. Offering a ring side view of the Indo-US negotiations that led to the nuclear pact, Rajamohan examines the difficulties that cropped up in both the countries and between them in implementing the nuclear pact, the objective factors that are driving India and the United States together and the historic memories that hold them back. It forms an important source of understanding the origins of this unprecedented transformation with a detailed description of the tremendous amount of diplomacy that went into bringing the transformation.

Various scholars have attempted to analyse the nature, scope, challenges and limitations of the US-India Strategic Partnership. Mavara Inayat (2006) examines the nature of the US-India strategic partnership explores the nature and contours of the relationship as well as its impact on different countries in Asia. This, in turn, leads to an understanding of the challenges the bilateral relationship is likely to face from the systemic/structural factors. Vasabjit Banerjee & Dipanjan Roy Chaudhary (2006) explicate the areas of convergence and divergence between the United States and India and also present a basic outline of

the strategic concerns between the two. The article provides an understanding of some of the factors that can lead to an analysis of the problems and prospects in the relationship. Sumit Ganguly & Andrew Scobell (2001) examine the possibility of forging a viable strategic partnership between India and the United States and the limitations to such a partnership in their article. It explains the factors that have limited the U.S.-India bilateral relationship in the past and also the factors that are likely to present obstacles to the strategic partnership in future with suggestions to overcome the challenges. Amit Gupta (2005) examines the U.S.-India security relationship and argues that significant differences in their worldviews preclude the development of a strong strategic relationship. However, India's continued economic and military growth, as well as its ongoing commitment towards secularism and democracy, makes it a future ally towards establishing strategic stability in Asia and in assisting future nation-building efforts across the globe. In the short run, therefore, the relationship should be based on securing complementary interests: ensuring stability in the Indian Ocean; democracy across the world; and getting the Indian government to work proactively to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated systems.

ORGANISATION OF THE DISSERTATION

This research attempts to capture the essence of the much studied qualitative transformation in the US-India relations through an analysis of the nature of the United States policy toward India during the administration of George W. Bush because it is during this administration the change actually manifested and has been most visible. The effort has been to understand the factors prompting such a change both at the macroanalytical level and the microanalytical level. The macroanalytical level would involve an analysis of the position of the United States and India in the international system respectively as well as the international context within which the two countries are interacting. The microanalytical level would deal with the institutional behavior of the United States political system and the shaping of policy toward India during the period under consideration. This would also turn the spotlight on the impact of factors like lobbying and influence of Indian diaspora. Another important factor which has been

taken into consideration in this case is the impact of the persisting legacy of the past environment of mistrust between the two countries.

The objective of the research is to make a systematic analysis of factors responsible for the developments in the bilateral relationship under the administration of George .W. Bush., study the characteristics of the US policy towards India including the decision – making aspect, explore the extent to which the US-India relation has been realized in terms of political and economic achievements i.e. the effectiveness and net impact of the US policy and toward India, and figure out the challenges that the US policy is facing or likely to face in future. To fulfill the objective the following research questions are examined:

- Does the US policy towards India under the George W. Bush administration mark a departure from the past and if so, in what ways?
- What is the rationale of the strategic partnership and what is the nature of the cooperation?
- What is the significance of the nuclear deal, has it facilitated or accelerated the cooperation?
- What are the major obstructions to the cooperation?
- How enduring the transformed relationship is or what can be the extent of cooperation and what are the limits?

The methodology of the study would be descriptive and analytical. The study is based on both primary sources and secondary sources of information and data. The primary sources include available reports of the US government, security statements of the various US executive department officials, policy statements and congressional reports. While the theoretical framework to understand the changed nature of United States policy toward India has been structured by condensing the existing scholarship and drawing insights from these sources, this dissertation relies considerably on primary sources to capture the essence of the United States policy as well as the elements of change, to demonstrate that facts square with the theoretical formulation.

The analysis of the nature of United States policy toward India is complex task. The first chapter is a modest attempt to provide a conceptual framework of understanding the contours of United States policy toward India in general and during the administration of George W. Bush in particular.

The second chapter takes up the issue of domestic aspects of the United States policy toward India during the Bush administration. It would deal with dynamics of the United States decision-making leading to the evolution of the US –India entente in the Bush years, the diplomatic rigor shown by the Bush administration particularly developments in the relations post 9/11.

The third chapter looks into the United States defense and economic policy toward India, two areas that have witnessed substantive progress during the administration of George W. Bush. The chapter attempts to provide an explanation of the major developments in the bilateral defence and economic cooperation as well as an assessment of the progress in these areas so far.

The fourth chapter would deal with an analysis of the United States nuclear policy toward India. This would look into the symbolic centerpiece of the US-India strategic partnership that is the United States-India civilian nuclear deal, the negotiations that led to the nuclear pact, the difficulties that have been cropping up in both the countries and between them in implementing the deal as well as an assessment of the relevance of the nuclear deal to the strategic partnership.

This study hence argues that the event of September 11 and the subsequent launch of a global war on terrorism served to accelerate the momentum of a qualitative transformation in the United States-India bilateral relationship which had changed since the Kargil War under a new formulation that Indo-US bilateral relations can be pursued independent of the United States-Pak bilateral relationship. The study asserts that problems emanating from different sources such as historical, institutional, party politics and leadership entail limitations to the US- India strategic partnership.

CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION

The United States and India remained what has been best described by Dennis Kux (1993) as “estranged democracies” during much of the Cold War, having a largely discordant relationship intermittent with some periods of “highs”. However, during the Cold War, the United States was unable to construct a political partnership with India despite the latter’s commitment to democratic values. The end of the Cold War after the withering away of the erstwhile Soviet Union also brought an end to the Indo- Soviet alignment that was widely perceived in the United States as an irritant to closer ties with India. Further, India’s move towards opening up its economy, stimulated a change in the United States policy outlook towards the world’s largest democracy. To this, the terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11) and the subsequently launched ‘global war on terror’ led by the United States, added rigor and greater momentum.

This chapter is a modest attempt to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the contours of the United States policy toward India in general and the nature of the policy during the administration of George W. Bush in particular. The framework draws heavily from the theoretical pluralism of Barry Buzan and attempts to fit in this theoretical formulation the approach of the United States policy towards India during the Bush administration. The effort is to understand the nature of the United States policy in the light of factors working at the systemic level through an analysis of the international context, the position of the United States and India in the international system, nature of interaction between the two countries, and the changes that were propelled by these factors in the United States policy toward India during the Bush administration.

1.1. THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The major theories of International Relations (IR) confronted difficulties in adequately explaining the dynamics of the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union in general terms. Attempts are being made to present an understanding of the new world by merging concepts of IR, even those hitherto considered contradictory, in various permutations. The policy of the United States towards India also needs to be comprehended within a

theoretical framework because it is difficult to understand any set of connected events without some general idea. (Buzan 2004: 7)

The structuralist concept which corresponds to materialist approach assumes that the change in the distribution of power in the international system also leads to a change in the behavior and foreign policy of the states. In order to understand the behavior of a state towards other which is manifested in the foreign policy of a state, it is essential to understand its position in the international system and as well as its power capabilities. Understanding the behavior of the United States towards India within the framework of this approach would require an analysis of their respective positions in the International System (IS). Also with the end of Cold War, the major change in the IS was the change in polarity of the system. Therefore the analysis should consider the context of transition to unipolarity and the attendant change in the dynamics of the system.

The current international order, though witnessing fluidity, still comprises of sovereign and equal states in legal terms, however, there exists a hierarchy in terms of power. The United States occupies the topmost position in the international power hierarchy and its power is truly multidimensional and enveloping, be it military, political, economic or cultural realm automatically assigning it the status of a superpower. Barry Buzan who attempts to make sense of the present international system by employing a theoretical pluralism, defines a superpowers as those that *“require broad spectrum capabilities exercised across the whole of the international system. They must be capable of, and also exercise , global military and political reach, .must be active players in processes of securitization and desecuritization in all, or nearly all, of the regions in the system, whether as threats guarantors ,allies or interveners,.. must be fountainheads of universal values necessary to underpin international society. Their legitimacy as superpowers will depend substantially on establishing the legitimacy of such values.”* (Buzan 2004: 69). Accordingly, the United States being the only superpower in the world must operate in all the regions. Therefore its is global in its presence and impact and commensurate to this global-level status, its interests and objectives, too, are global in nature and are so asserted in its foreign policy.

The end of the Cold War ushered United States into an era of unrivalled supremacy where the main thrust of the policy of US was , as Robert Jervis describes tracing the 1992 draft Defense Guidance prepared under Paul Wolfowitz, “to maintain the trajectory of world politics”.(Jervis 2006: 8). However during the Clinton administration this ‘system-shaping’ role was pursued in a more moderate manner favouring multilateralism, as Steven Hoffman presenting an analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997 puts it, “not merely as a policy choice but as a matter of realism, in a world in which no one nation can defeat the threats to its security alone”(Hoffman in Kapur et al 2002: 229) It was Clinton administration’s policy of ‘democratic enlargement’ where the attempts of the superpower to impress value-based agenda on the post cold war international system really germinated.

When George W. Bush took over in January 2001, in his inaugural address itself he stated that, “The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.”¹

However, it took the superimposed context of the events of 9/11 during the administration of George W. Bush to assert this role more explicitly. Bush administration dominated by the influence of Republican internationalists seized the “historic opportunity” provided by 9/11 to further the neo-con agenda of active internationalism² in the form of the “war on terror”. Discarding the policies of Clinton era as soft headed

¹ President Bush’s Inaugural Address 20 January, 2001 available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>

² Neo conservatism as an ideology in American politics stands for active internationalism and a belief that American predominance is crucial to international security and stability. It attaches a sense of pride with the American culture. The Project for New American Century (PNAC), a neo-conservative think tank based in Washington D.C. stated its goal to promote American global leadership because it is both good for America and good for the world. George W. Bush, since his presidential campaign , was aided and advised by influential neocons like Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney etc. The PNAC and its neo conservatism therefore increasingly influenced Bush’s military and foreign policy agenda.

multilateralism and no longer serving the US interests, need was felt in the policy-making circles of the Bush administration of a more realistic approach for a transformed world. (Kagan & Kristol: 1999 cited in Behuria 2003: 19). Crafted under the influence of the neo-cons like Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and more in line with Paul Wolfowitz's 1992 draft Defense Guidance³, the Bush administration's National Security Policy emphasized on the application of military force and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States speaks of the "unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence" of the United States in the world and further asserts the "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" attendant to such a status. Therefore it says that "the U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests". It says that the global war on terrorism is unprecedented in the history of the United States with "an elusive enemy over an extended period of time". But at the same time it has provided an opportunity to the United States work with great powers of the world—"united by the common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos" building on the common interests in order to promote global security.⁴ The entire strategy conforms to what Kagan puts as the conviction that the US power is "the sole pillar upholding a liberal world order that is conducive to the principles the United States believes in". (Kagan 2003).

1.2. INDIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Since its independence India's position in the international system has been that of a regional/middle power, occupying a dominant position in South Asia owing to its size and population. Here it is important to note that there is lesser consensus as regards the terminologies of international power hierarchies particularly after the cold war regarding the two categories - regional powers and middle powers. According to C.E. Moore

³ The 1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), crafted by then-Defense Department staffers Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad, is widely regarded as an early formulation of the neoconservatives' post-Cold War agenda. The excerpts of the Draft are available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>

⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2002/index.html

'middle power' is a static concept in realist approaches which is deployed to denote states of intermediate geographical location between great powers and ranking in international hierarchies of military capability.(Moore 2007: 4). The agency of middle powers is also limited to the space provided by relations further up in the hierarchy of states (Holbraad: 1984 cited in Moore 2007: 4). Moore says that during the Cold War, middle powers were those who, in spite of adopting positions within the fold of capitalism and not yet great powers, sought to distance themselves from superpower rivalry in order to pursue independent foreign policies. Hence India fell into the category of middle power during the cold war. But Buzan says that the classification of regional power is much more important overall than the traditional classifications such as middle powers, particularly in the context of unipolarity after the end of cold war. Middle powers play regularly play international roles beyond their home regions (eg. Western states like Canada, Sweden and Australia), on the other hand, regional powers have capabilities looming large in their regions but do not register much at the global level. Higher level powers respond to them in a manner which is relevant to the securitization processes of a particular region. (Buzan 2004: 71-72). Further, he says that until Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, the classification of India in the United States was that of a regional power like Brazil.(Buzan 2002: 18). Thus reference to India as a middle power should not lead to the conclusion that India affected the global-level calculations of United States' policy until then.

1.3. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD INDIA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

During the cold war, India's foreign policy posture always reflected a quest for greater autonomy and independence which was expressed more explicitly in the policy of non-alignment. However, an important factor that has operated in case of India is the gap between its own assessment or what is generally referred to as "self perception" of its ranking in the international system and the treatment by the United states which in its South Asia policy always treated India at par with Pakistan. Baldev Raj Nayar argues that India, owing to its subcontinental size, greater population than that of both the superpowers combined, its strategic location and having been a seat of historic

civilization, always aspired to play a major role in the international system. Whereas in the US policy assessment the regional polarity of South Asia has always been bipolar, India and Pakistan being the poles. Buzan states that regional powers are, “excluded from the higher level calculations of system polarity whether or not they think of themselves as deserving higher ranking (as India most obviously does).” (Buzan 2004: p72) This was the case during much of the cold war.

The structuralist explanation attributes the largely estranged and at times adversarial nature of the United States’ policy towards India to logic of confrontation between a global power and a middle power attempting to expand its influence and aspiring to play major role in the international system. Drawing mostly from George Liska’s work *The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order*, Nayar argued that three kinds of policies are open to the superpower to relate to the middle powers, namely *containment*, *satellization* and *accommodation* where the three are not mutually exclusive categories. When the superpower/s “treats individual middle powers as regional rivals and be led to help lesser states under the pretense of restraining ,unilaterally or cooperatively all Third World conflict,” it is containment, satellization is when the middle powers are treated as, “regional allies in contest with other great powers and proceed to reinforce them competitively” and accommodation is one where great powers “proceed unilaterally or jointly progressively to devolve regional responsibilities to apparently constructively disposed middle powers.” (Nayar 1976: 5). From these theoretical propositions Nayar derives that during the cold war the enormous power of the United States led it to follow the twin policies of containment and satellisation of middle powers “where satellization was resisted, containment has been pursued ,and in the name of containment of some middle powers the U.S. has pursued the satellization of others”. India’s policy of non-alignment, resisting satellisation subjected it to containment while Pakistan was satellised by the United States.

It implies that during the Cold War bipolar context of the international system, the United States policy was to create regional balance of power favourable to its interest and this is how the grand policy of containment was operationalised at the regional level. The

“locking-in” of the United States into India and Pakistan and its attempt to frustrate India’s efforts to enhance its power by forming alliance with Pakistan are soundly explained within this framework. Flowing from this, Nayar drew the conclusion that the adversarial attitudes and policies of the United States towards India are just the manifestation of the, “basic strategic conflict built into their respective positions in the international power hierarchy.” (Nayar 1976: 226).

Nayar’s framework provides an understanding of the policy posture of the United States towards India in the past and consequently one of the factors having a profound impact on the foreign policy behavior in the changed environment too. But what insight does this explanation provide in the post cold war context of unipolarity in understanding the United States policy towards India, the international power hierarchy remaining the same? Nayar, in his later work argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union liberated India from the psychological dependence on it for protection against possible nuclear threats, compelling it to make its own autonomous decisions and the Pokharan II tests were a manifestation of this phenomenon, signifying India’s claim to major power status. Proceeding with his ‘strategic conflict’ approach, he opined that the United States does not want to see a strong India that can play a larger role in the world. Therefore it has resorted to a policy of containment through engagement. (Nayar 2001: 36-37).

Political climate of international system matters and with the change in political climate strategic significance of countries also changes. After the end of cold war, though in the international power hierarchy, the United States occupies the status of a superpower and as mentioned above India still remained a middle/regional power, the context changed from bipolarity to unipolarity and therefore any assessment of policy should be made in the light of this changed polarity and the geopolitical realities.

Explanation of the dynamics of post cold war international system and a serious analysis of United States’ foreign policy behaviour in such a system has been attempted by Buzan in a framework that incorporates theoretical pluralism. (Buzan 2004). For the analysis of United States policy approach towards India in the context of changed geopolitical

realities, Buzan's analysis to investigate structural questions of how superpowers, great powers and regional powers relate to each other might prove useful. He says that while in order to capture the essential dynamics of the post cold war international system, the neo realist/structuralist approach is a powerful place to start but it is by itself too narrowly based to explain much about the condition of unipolarity. Therefore he tries to explain this by employing a theoretical pluralism which incorporates the English school thinking of the managerial role of the great powers, the Wendtian version of constructivism and also branches of International Political Economy (IPE) which make hegemony or its absence as their focus. Such an approach can be useful to make sense of the policy posture of the United towards India too. Also as Buzan acknowledges that systems shove and shape but they do not determine, the policy analysis also needs to take into account the intra-state/domestic forces at work.

After the end of cold war, the United States' policy of involvement in all the regions in order to "maintain the trajectory of the world", was pursued rather moderately in South Asia during the Clinton administration. This was largely the end of cold war did not bring about any dramatic transformation in the security dynamics of South Asia (Buzan 2002: 5). Also there existed this perception in the policy-making circles in the United States (where non-proliferation has always been one of the main policy objectives) that the dualistically structured policy orientation towards India and Pakistan was a success in slowing down the nuclear arms build up in South Asia.(Levi and Ferguson 2006: 7). Though there were continued apprehensions about the weapons program in the region as the excerpts of the 1992 draft Defense guide made evident. (cited in Kux 1993: 16)

Nevertheless, the region slowly moved towards radical transformation and it took the conduct of nuclear tests by India followed by Pakistan in May 1998 to drive home the realization of inability of the policy of the United States to control nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This was expressed in much of the academic opinion, as Harold Gould in one of his works argued that the infusion of the containment policy into a region "marred by ethno-religious and intra-regional rivalry" was a major wrong committed by the United States policy and the "hyphenated relationship left no room for maneuver". (Gould in

Kapur et al 2002: 146). The emergence of South Asian region as a 'nuclear flashpoint' consequently increased the strategic significance of the region to the superpower for which non-proliferation has been one of the important policy objectives because security threat in any of the region is perceived as a direct threat to the superpower itself. Though a regional power, the implications of India's policy now gained a trans-regional significance for the United States.

Also owing to having the second largest population, enhanced economic performance and with the growing political clout of the Indian-American community in the United States, the strong potential of India as a market was recognized. Buzan says that the institutional framework of separation of powers allows the more general anti-statist and economic liberal sentiments to play and create opportunities for the many strong lobbying groups to operate effectively. (Buzan 2004: 77). Also Buzan looks at the post cold war international system from a Wendtian perspective, as composed of friends, enemies and rivals unlike the neo-realist perspective which sees the composition as only consisting of rivals and friends. India fits in the definition of friends.⁵ All these factors were cumulatively and gradually contributing to a desire in the United States to work on broader level with India. However this does not amount to assigning of a great power status. (Buzan 2004: 18)

It was now evident to the United States that denuclearization of India is unachievable but at the same time there was recognition that the policy of 'nuclear apartheid' towards India, which failed to prevent the nuclearisation of the region, was no longer a workable option. Further, India and Pakistan spurred their nuclear competition with ballistic missile tests in mid-April 1999. The Kargil episode led to the recognition in the United States that India and Pakistan are not equitable in policy terms. Commenting on the foreign policy of United States John Gershman says that after the coup de'etat in Pakistan in

⁵ Buzan quotes Wendt's scheme of three types of social relationship: enemy, rival and friend: 'the posture of enemies is one of threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence toward each other; that of rivals is one of competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other; and that of friends is one of allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats.

Although working as a team in case of India is less imaginable for the United States but the Indian response in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and support extended hinted at the possibility of such a scenario.

October 1999 the perception in the United States was that with Pakistan's political future uncertain, encouraging bilateral talks with India would be a useful step towards reducing tension.(Gershman in Honey and Barry 2000: 289). Consequently there came the Joint US-India Statement on Working Group on Counter-terrorism in February 2000 and then during President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs in his speech on 9 March 2000 formally expressed the administration's intent to transform the US-India relations from "estranged democracies" to "engaged democracies" seeking "constructive engagement on broadly conceived U.S. interests". In a briefing on 15 September, 2000, Inderfurth formally declared the administration's decision to move ahead with both India and Pakistan on their own merits and the belief that "the hyphenated relationship of always referring these two countries is no longer appropriate."(Jain 2007: 117)

Such dehyphenation makes the cold war time twin policies of containment and satellization, followed by the United States towards India and Pakistan, less suited to the requirement of new geopolitical realities. However, regarding the third policy option of the superpower to relate to the middle power suggested by Liska i.e. accommodation, Nayar argued that, "Where a middle power genuinely seeks to follow an independent course in foreign policy, the super power is unlikely to follow a policy of accommodation unless the middle power has acquired such a plentitude of nuclear weaponry as to have the capability to inflict unacceptable damage". (Nayar 1976: 22). The fears in the United States about the escalation of full scale war in the South Asian region with two states possessing nuclear capabilities made accommodation the most likely policy option available. But this accommodation should be seen as entailing not just systemic compulsions but also domestic propellants in the context of a unipolar yet globalizing international system.

As a result, the Clinton administration engaged in extensive dialogue with New Delhi, and sought to achieve Indian actions short of denuclearization, mainly accession to the CTBT and agreement to end production of fissile material for nuclear arms, offering civilian nuclear cooperation in the bargain. But India was determined on its rejection of

capping of its nuclear arsenal. However, the Clinton era marked the period of experimentation as to what change was possible to give a new dimension to the US-India relations within the limits of existing framework with its consistently haunting disagreement over nuclear issues and after the end of cold war the only formal bilateral agreement between the United States and India was the Indo-US Defense cooperation agreement in 1995.

The process of engagement initiated during Clinton administration was spurred by certain domestic developments in both countries-the promising growth in the private sector in India since the economic reforms of 1991 attracting interest of the big business in the United States , growing trade, the 1.2 million Indian-Americans constituting one of the wealthiest and most educated immigrant community constituting a funding source in the various Senate and House elections, this in turn increasing the strength of the India Caucus in the Congress to 160 members-the largest of its kind. Thus India fulfilled what is seen as the “necessity for a foreign country to have a strong domestic base of support in the American political system if it intends to be influential in Washington”. (Malik and Kapur in Kapur et al 2002: 37)

All this is supposed to have contributed to an understanding what Ashley Tellis puts as ‘engaging India was desirable’. But still the limited success during the Clinton era was be attributed to-

- a) inability of the Clinton Administration to explicitly state the strategic objective owing to which engaging India was necessary, and
- b) the persistent proliferation issues that created friction in the smoothening of relations as improved relations were still contingent upon the resolution of issue of nuclear proliferation.(Tellis 2002).

Even in the Presidential campaign 2000 the Republicans showed their enthusiasm towards India and its importance was recognized as ‘a new centre of stability and knowledge economy’ by Condoleezza Rice, foreign policy advisor to presidential

candidate George W. Bush, in her interview with the *International Economy*. But at the same time India still was addressed as a regional power. (Rice 2000).

1.4. POLICY UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH

When Bush took over the office of the President, he too confronted the same challenging situations that so troubled his predecessor. In an analytical piece Stephen Cohen the South Asia expert said that, “Despite the Bush team's emphasis on India as a rising power, the new administration is unlikely to announce dramatic departures from President Bill Clinton's approach to the country.”⁶ Rightly so after his inauguration in January 2001, Bush and his major players in his team which included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice did not speak much about South Asia in their speeches regarding the policy outlook as major areas requiring immediate concern then were Russia, Israel Palestine, China and North Korea.

However a NIC Report Global trends 2015 apart from identifying India-Pakistan as one of the areas in Asia having the potential for serious conflict, also identified India (also other states like China, Russia, Mexico and Brazil) as having the potential to ‘challenge and check- as well as reinforce-US leadership’. The report also identified the need to accelerate economic reforms in India as crucial to not only its own economy but to the global economy as a whole. This if taken care of, given the size of India's population, which it estimated to be 1.6 billion by 2015, as well as its technology driven growth ‘will dictate that India will be a rising regional power’. It also said that India will expand its nuclear capable force, the strategic and economic gap between India and Pakistan will widen, a number of factors like large English speaking population, technological edge as well as growing business minded middle class will give India competitive advantage. Also despite strengthened ties with the Persian Gulf states for oil requirements, India will look to the West being ‘wary of China’. (NIC 2000).

⁶ Stephen P.Cohen, “US-South Asia: Relations under Bushes”, The Brookings Institution, available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/04southasia_cohen.aspx

However, the desirable policy course towards India was outlined in a policy analysis work for the neo-con patronised Cato Institute, by Victor M. Gobarev, a security policy analyst, in September 2000 where he pointed that Clinton administration's policy towards India embodied serious lacunae which include overinsistence on proliferation, Kashmir and human rights issues, that are bound to prevent improved relations between the two countries (he also mentioned that the Democratic party's continued insistence on these issues is bound to avert successful strategic partnership with India). He underscored the necessity of accommodating India and its importance to the interests of the United States which include, "to prevent a dramatic adverse change in the current global geopolitical situation, which currently favors the United States. An assertive India could help stabilize the Persian Gulf and Central Asian regions. Even more important, India could become a strategic counterweight to China and a crucial part of a stable balance of power in both East Asia and South Asia". He suggested a change in the approach of the overall strategy of the United States towards India if the goal of a strategic partnership with India in the 21st century was to be achieved. This, he said, would require a genuine recognition of India's world power status, accepting India into the club of nuclear weapons state and careful attitude towards the Kashmir issue. This approach would bring success was based on the analysis that for many people in India including the then India's government, becoming a great power is "not only a widespread desire and national goal-but a sacred mission". He also pointed out that the foreign policy community of the United States needs to understand that the "non-Western culture" of India should not be considered a factor impeding greater cooperation rather significance of India for the long-term interests of the United States is even more than the latter's Western allies. He also stated that, "Having India, a global power with democratic values, as a U.S. de facto strategic partner, is in America's best interests". Therefore "respect for and understanding of (India's) legitimate security concerns" is what India would demand and must be a part of United States policy towards India. Such a policy would win for the United States a "strategic partner of the highest caliber" and would "dramatically shift the global geopolitical and geo strategic balance in favor of the United States" and greatly benefit the national security interests of the United States on the global scale. Thus Gobarev

suggested a global approach towards India and a different approach from that adopted by the Clinton administration for attaining the same objective i.e. strategic partnership with India. (Gobarev 2000).

Also since the Presidential elections 2000, Bush was aided by a group of foreign policy advisors popularly referred to as the 'Vulcans' which included Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Robert Blackwill and Robert Zoellic. All of them recognized the strategic significance and economic potential of India in some or the other manner. Later all of them held important offices in the Bush White House and hence had their influence on the policy. In his lecture before the Trilateral Commission in 1999, Zoellic, mentioned five strategic objectives of the United States for the 21st century of which the third was, the need of adjusting India, the world's largest democracy, to the global economy and to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbours through developing a "cooperative partnership" with it.⁷ Blackwill, too in his article 'Seizing Opportunity with India' in August 2001, emphasized the importance of cooperation with India owing to its economic performance. Similarly five days before 9/11 attacks Robert Blackwill in his first address as the Ambassador to India expressed the Bush administration's intent to enhance cooperation with India not just on bilateral and regional fronts but also on the whole range of international issues and thus has a "global approach to U.S.-India relations consistent with the rise of India as a world power." (Blackwill 2000).

1.5. ACCELERATED PACE OF THE POLICY AFTER 9/11

As mentioned earlier, it was the administration of George W. Bush that grabbed the "historic opportunity" provided by the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) to pursue the neo-con agenda of assertive internationalism to remake the world through active involvement in all the regions. The Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, even before 9/11 identified Asia emerging as a "region susceptible to large scale military competition" and hence "maintaining stable balance in Asia a complex task". (Department of Defense QDR 2001: 4). As security policy analyst Llyod Macuaely Richardson pointed out, "In the

⁷ <http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/tr/gtxts/153/zoe.html>

TH-15791



long term, our strategic interest in the region is plain: India is a major Asian democratic power with the potential economic and military strength to counter the adverse effects of China's rise as a regional and world power. In other words, it is indeed time to "play the India card. A strong India would also send the message that democracy in a developing country is not incompatible with rapid growth and wealth." (Richardson 2002). With these considerations already in the pipeline, the incident of 9/11 led to what may be expressed aptly through Morton Kaplan's terminology of "equilibrium change" in the policy of the United States.⁸ This finally got expression in the Bush Doctrine and the National Security Strategy 2002 as the policy of the United States.

Thus 9/11 gave a new momentum to the policy direction of the United States which could not take a concrete shape during the Clinton administration. Buzan expresses this as following, "Unipolarity and September 11 have acted as successive lenses in a two stage process of selecting and intensifying particular aspects of American exceptionalism." (Buzan 2004: 174).

The equilibrium change in the policy also applied in case of India. With the need for active involvement in Asia already recognized and the Taliban in Afghanistan the main targets of "preemptive elimination of terrorist havens" of the war on terror, the strategic significance of India to the United States multiplied. In one of his speeches Nicholas Burns mentions that since 9/11, South Asia was seen as a region of vital importance in the United States and India as a "stabilizing force in the often violent and unstable" region.⁹ To this context, the more than willing support to the United States led war on terrorism by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, led to the declaration by President Bush of his commitment to a "fundamentally different relationship with India, one based

⁸This term is used by Morton Kaplan in his work *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957) p 6-8 referring to a movement contributing towards attainment of a new operating level in an otherwise stable political system as different from systems change referring to the complete change of the system of action itself. (Ashley Tellis uses the concept to explain the change that the nuclear tests in May 1998 brought about in the regional strategic environment in South Asia).

⁹R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "America's Strategic Opportunity With India", *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007, available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86609/r-nicholas-burns/america-s-strategic-opportunity-with-india.html>

upon trust, upon mutual values.” in his remarks on November 9, 2001 speech at the White House. (Jain 2007: 127). A research report of RAND, federally funded by the United States Air Force mentions that though formally not being a part of the global war on terror¹⁰, India’s key indirect support and contribution to the fight against terror has become a significant dimension of bilateral engagement. Also both Pakistan and India are important actors in the global coalition against terrorism but for ‘varying reasons and in different capacities’. While Pakistan’s support has been most strong in terms of access (basing, sea and air access), intelligence support, logistics etc., India’s contribution was not military but that of an important strategic and diplomatic partner. Also the report, based on conversations in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian Integrated Defense Staff, September 2002; with the Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, South Asia Branch, July 2002; PACOM J-5, February and April 2002; and U.S. Department of State, Office of Analysis for South Asia, July 2002, mentions that the United States and India bilateral engagement shares a similar threat perception. Likewise the stated policy of de-hyphenation of aims at pursuing the United States relations with India and Pakistan in accordance with the power, significance, capacity, and capabilities of each state and independent of the other in a non- zero sum manner. Nevertheless, in the longer term, India may have substantially more value as a counterterrorism partner than does Pakistan, for reasons that are essentially the converse of Islamabad’s weaknesses which include stable civilian institutions, the macroeconomic outlook and the stock of human capital. The report also mentions that India and the United States are both stable democracies sharing broadly similar worldviews, including the belief that instability and transnational threats represent major threats to their security. Also it says that India’s security perspectives are much broader than worries about Pakistan, and an energized strategic relationship with the United States is seen as very valuable indeed, essential to New Delhi’s achieving its “great power” objectives.(Fair 2004).

For the Bush administration’s strategic vision, the significance of India was not confined only to South Asia, rather it was crucial for the wider Asian security and as such United

¹⁰ For details about the countries that are formally participating, see <http://www.centcom.mil/operations/Coalition/joint.htm> (last accessed September 7, 2003).

States had a “preeminent strategic objective to collaborate with India,” to ensure that events in Asia proceed according to the objectives of the United States’ grand strategy , thus putting forward a “strategic mission for India”.¹¹

To support this grand strategy, shared values of democracy and experience with terrorism became the pillars. Bush’s policy focused on promoting democracy and hence deepening cooperation with the world’s largest democracy was imperative. One of the important component of the policy, as expressed in *NSSUS 2002*, is the promotion of the values and interests of the United States and in case of India-a mature democracy with predictable behavior, both these converge. Hence the desirability of a strategic partnership was firmly embedded in the Bush administration. It is seen that the attacks of September 11 and the consequent “equilibrium change” in the United States policy made it possible for the Bush administration to explicitly state the strategic objectives as to why improved relations with India were important which the Clinton administration was unable to do. As Richard Haass pointed out that, “September 11 did not alter the trajectory of U.S.-Indian relations. But it quickened the pace of change by underscoring the commonalities between our democracies and cementing our mutual commitment to work more closely together.”¹² However a sense of urgency to this quicker pace was added in the second Bush administration. In 2004, the National Intelligence Council’s report *Mapping the Global Future* was published. The report identified likely emergence of China and India as the global players and the 21st century as the Asian century led by China and India. Also it said that the “role of the United States will be an important variable in how the world is shaped”. (NIC 2004). To secure and sustain the influential position of the United States in Asia the policy makers wanted to ensure that friendly centers of power (which of course China is not) should not be lost rather won over on its side. India stood meritorious on all these counts. The NIC Chairman Robert L. Hutchings visited India in

¹¹Robert D. Blackwill, Ambassador to India speaking on “The United States ,India and Asian Security” at Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference, New Delhi, India January 27, 2003, available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill2.htm>

¹² Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff ,The United States and India: A transformed Relationship. Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, India, January 7, 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16399.htm>

November 2004. Rajamohan stated that, “his interactions in Delhi had made it quite clear that the U.S. would like to reduce the uncertainties vis-à-vis India by making it a solid partner.” (Rajamohan 2006: 76). So now the task at hand was to remove the obstacles to a strategic partnership with India. As Robert Blackwill pointed out in one of his articles that India leads the list of countries that share United States’ all vital security interests which include: a) prosecuting the global war on terror and reducing the staying power and effectiveness of the jihadi killers, b) preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, c) dealing with the rise of Chinese power, d) ensuring the reliable supply of energy from the Persian Gulf, and e) keeping the global economy on track. Regarding the war on terror he spoke of India as a more conscious partner than even the European allies.¹³

This was the assumption with which the top officials in the Bush administration like crafted their policy towards India and made efforts to convince the Congress about the desirability of a strategic partnership with India. A Michael Levi and Charles Ferguson point out, “A more robust U.S.-Indian relationship, it rightly reasoned, would lessen the chances that China could dominate the future of Asia.” (Levi and Ferguson 2006: 8). In the Congress too a broad and bipartisan support existed for the strategic partnership but with doubts over the aspect of non-proliferation owing to the sensitivity of the South Asian region and the likeliness of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Therefore, Bush’s second term witnessed a gearing up of efforts to evolve a policy that would accommodate the concerns of the Congress as well as move ahead with the strategic partnership. This resulted in a policy that:

- Offered India a unique civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement that attempted to reconcile many of the non-proliferation related concerns of the Congress with the Indian demand which insisted for such a cooperation as a litmus test for the strategic partnership.
- Manifested the hitherto declared intent of “de-hyphenation” by not making a similar offer to Pakistan.

¹³ A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill , “The India Imperative”, *National Interest*, Summer 2005.

Buzan's scheme of shape of the international system, that is likely to prevail over considerably long period of time, suggests a matrix where United States exists as the sole superpower along with four great powers –the EU, Japan, Russia and China. India does not qualify as a great power but only a regional power (as mentioned earlier) –the criteria of definition being the material capabilities and recognition by the international community. At the same time he does not deny the possibility of Russia climbing down the ladder while India moving up to the position of a great power. However, Buzan's approach incorporates the English school explanation which lays emphasis on international society and hence the social construction of roles in the International system. He points at Hedley Bull's definition of great powers¹⁴ which emphasizes that "great power identity is a reciprocal construction composed of the interplay between a state's view of itself and the view held by the other members of the international society".(Buzan 2004: 61). In case of India, pointing out the interplay of self conception and acceptance by others, he says that the latter was never accorded to India by others. Also he acknowledges the necessity of "substantial material base" as well as "something more than that" if the term great power is to mean anything. The "something more than that" constitutes the choice to take up a great power role as well as the recognition by others to do so i.e. the social construction of identity and roles. He says that sometimes states not possessing the substantial material base are recognized by others as great powers to "gain an ally and frustrate the rival". He says that both, the materialist and recognition approaches, are not convincing and a common sense approach guided by framework of indicators is required.(Buzan 2004: 63). India has the potential of a "substantial material base" but it actually does not possess it. However, in the context of unipolarity, as mentioned earlier, India has acquired a trans-regional significance. This is what has prompted the Bush administration towards a social construction of the role of a great power for India (which has always identified itself as a great power). Why? Buzan says that in case of unipolarity, great powers do matter in making the social structure and therefore important for the superpower which wants the international system favourable

¹⁴ Hedley Bull's definition stipulates that apart from possession of first rank military capability a great power must be so recognized by others as well as its leaders and people "to have certain special rights and duties. Great powers for example, assert the right and accorded the right to play in determining issues that effect the peace and security of the international system as a whole. They accept the duty and are thought by others to have the duty, of modifying their policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they bear.

to its national interests at the same time wants other powers to share responsibilities in a manner that is not inimical to its interests. More so because, as mentioned earlier, India does not fit into the category of rivals and China is seen as a peer competitor. This more or less finds expression in the report *Mapping the Global Future*. (NIC 2004). This mitigates the fundamental strategic conflict that governed the United States policy towards India in the past, that Nayar emphasizes.

It was the decision of the policy makers of the Bush administration (US domestic decision making is explained in chapter 2) to formally recognize the great power potential of India as well encourage its rise in order to facilitate the shaping of the international system favourable to the interests of the United States.

- Since the political will and constant efforts of the leadership i.e. President Bush and the team of advisors which included Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Philip Zelikow and Robert Zoellic, made the strategic partnership a reality, the behavior the next leadership will be an important variable determining the further course of this partnership and consequently the future policy of the United States toward India, the nature of the international system remaining the same. This is so because the strategic partnership itself is not based on any binding treaty commitments that both parties must follow.
- The strategic partnership also assumes a convergence of interests of “like-minded democracies”. As Ashok Kapur and M.L. Sondhi point out that as regards the analysis of convergence of interests of nations, it is important to make a substantial distinction between a “common perception of interest” and “perception of common interest.” The former relates to a perception of what is “worthy in terms of enduring moral merit” while the latter to perception of what is “worthwhile in terms of transient political pragmatism and short-term political expediency.” A commonality of the former type holds the promise of a closer and more lasting relationship than does the latter. (Kapur and Sondhi 2002: 32). Therefore India as a great power would constitute what Buzan’s theoretical framework identifies- a favourable social structure, when it will share a ‘common perception of interest’ with the United States. The nature of convergence of

interests will be another variable determining the nature of the policy of the United States toward India.

- The RAND report finding suggests that “While all three states (United States, India and Pakistan) opine that a completely “de-hyphenated” relationship is optimal, both India and Pakistan episodically re-insert this hyphen when it is convenient or in their interests to do so”, consequently the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan will be a impediment to a truly de-hyphenating policy and frustrate and complicate the efforts of the United States to pursue relations with both states independent of each other. (Fair 2004: 6)

1.6. CONCLUSION

While engaging India started towards the end of Clinton administration, since its inception, the Bush administration emphasized the recognition of India’s potential as a friendly great power, which many of the statements of important officials quoted earlier reflect. The policies consistent with such a posture began to take shape and accelerate after the 9/11 episode. President Bush’s 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* (NSSUS) stated that “U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India”. In his second inaugural address he outlined the policy of the United States “to seek and support the growth of democratic movements in every nation and culture” and to this recognizing the need of transformation of relationships with many nations, including India. While the accommodative structure was seen as a welcome sign in the Indian governing-elite, where there always have been consistent efforts in the past towards attaining great power status in the international system, a number of factors at the micro-level, like the history of mistrust rooted in the United States closeness to Pakistan, refusal to grant a nuclear power status, resistance to unilateralism and American-imposed solutions to regional and domestic problems combined with India’s diplomatic strength as a mature democracy to bargain on its own terms, led to slow progress in the process. Domestic politics in the United States too hindered the process – which mainly included resistance from the non-proliferation lobby in the Congress.

However, in view of the geopolitical significance of India, despite persistent differences, the Bush administration did not let the momentum diminish and showed willingness to accommodate India in the global non proliferation regime as a friendly nuclear weapons state. After a prolonged and painful process of tough negotiations on both sides involving intermediate steps like the conclusion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the United States finally entered into a Strategic Partnership with India in July 2005 which became possible only after offering civilian nuclear cooperation.

As the subsequent chapters will make it clear, the policies of President Bush were aimed at achieving a sustained level of engagement with India. Not only this, the policy also sought to downplay (which does not mean total agreement with the stand taken by India) such the hitherto contentious issues that plagued the bilateral relations in the past which included the nuclear issue, Kashmir and Pakistan. The policy was aimed at strategic accommodation and therefore sought a departure from the 'fundamental strategic conflict' approach that determined the policy during the cold war. The war on terrorism boosted the shift in the policy but it is not confined to this particular aspect only. The policy was, in fact, guided by the consideration that a strong India is in United States best interest over the long term hence the geopolitical opportunity to win over India should not be lost, which in turn would mean the loss for the United States of "like-minded" country in Asia. The 2006 version of the NSSUS says that, "India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States befitting a major power."(NSSUS 2006).

India as of now is not a great power yet. In the context of unipolarity and charged international environment after 9/11 combined with the policy of the United States of shaping the trajectory of the international system in its favour, the policy toward India witnessed a shift. Occupying a strategically important location, possessing an impressive economic potential in a globalizing world economy, being democracy hence a source of stability at the macroeconomic level and the much increased significance of Indian-American community in the political life of the United State making it to institutional

support all contributed to the recognition of importance of India to the United States policy. The Bush team realized the need to grab the geopolitical opportunity to accommodate India in its favor timely enough i.e. when it is not strong enough to reject the offer for cooperation, rather than waiting till such time as Tellis says when India had truly become a great power and in less need of concessions by the United States. This realization led to the recognition of India's great power status and a global approach towards it by the Bush administration and the fundamental strategic conflict between a superpower and a middle power at the structural level which Nayer talks about, were down played.

Therefore the policy shift rests on the assumption that strategic relations with a powerful India will contribute in advancing American democratic values and vital US national interests in the long term, and supporting efforts for ensuring Asian security and democracy; curb the spread of WMDs and fighting international terrorism. These all are the objectives of the National Security Strategy of the United States and India fits into this larger strategy better than it had ever in the past. Hence the "global approach" towards India is much more in the interests of the United States unlike the past where it had difficulty in integrating the regional policy with the global one. The conceptual framework will be substantiated by factual analysis as well as the prospects of the policy and the challenges to it will be discussed in the successive chapters.

CHAPTER- 2
DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF THE US POLICY
TOWARDS INDIA DURING THE
ADMINISTRATION OF
GEORGE W. BUSH

The framework for analysis of the United States foreign policy proposed by James N. Rosenan includes the influence of domestic sources. (Rosenan1980). Hence, as mentioned in the introduction, nature of the change in United States policy towards India need to be analysed by identifying factors working at the domestic level . The context of post cold war changes in the international system and the superimposed context of 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a redefining of the global policy agenda by the United States. This in turn stimulated parallel changes in the United States domestic decision-making towards specific issues arising out of the redefined global policy agenda.

In the United States, being the world's oldest constitutional democracy, for a decision to translate into concrete policy a definite institutional mechanism is followed. Though, like all the other nations, the primacy of the Executive in matters of foreign policy is a fact of American polity as well, the presidents share with the Congress the responsibility of shaping the foreign policy. However, this sharing of power with the Congress requires that the foreign policy should be channelised through the same institutional and constitutional structures as the domestic policy. This means that the framework of analysis of any foreign policy must incorporate all the significant elements including the Congress, the special interest groups, political parties concerned diaspora that together affect the politics of foreign policy making. This chapter would examine the United States policy toward India in the light of mainly domestic factors.

2.1. THE EXECUTIVE

The major force shaping foreign policy is the President and his principal foreign policy advisor is the Secretary of State. Also at times the other advisors like the National Security Advisor or Vice President and other cabinet secretaries are a equally influential. Today owing to the increased interdependence of foreign, economic and domestic policies, the president seeks the advise of a number of civilian and economic advisors apart from the Secretary of State. The executive plays the leadership role in the arena of foreign policy. (Macgregor Burns 2002: 428)

The rapid change in pace of the United States policy toward India can be attributed to the proactive role of the leadership in the Bush administration. In 2000, George W. Bush, the Republican presidential candidate, and his advisers determined that their Asia policy would include a greater role for a dynamic and democratic India in shaping the Asian balance and tackling global challenges. (Twining 2007: 81).

George Perkovich sums up the approach of the Bush and his advisers as such, “what the Clinton administration tried to do from '92 to 2000 was really do its damndest to create a new relationship with India while quarantining the disagreement over nuclear issues...And by the end of the Clinton term, I think both people who supported the administration and the people who opposed the administration basically agreed on one fact: that the long-standing U.S. strategy of attempting to improve the relationship while quarantining the nuclear disagreement was not going to work, and therefore a new approach was possible”¹ which in effect mean that the leadership concluded that change was not possible within the existing framework. In fact Robert Blackwill, in one of his speeches, mentioned that even before Bush took up the presidency, there was a team of advisors to Bush, and was aiming at a foreign policy transition. The team which included Condoleezza Rice, Steve Hadley and himself, in the month before President Bush's inauguration continually discussed how they could help the new President quickly implement his ‘big idea’ of transforming the US-India relationship on the enduring foundation of shared democratic values and congruent vital national interests.

In March 2001, President Bush appointed Robert D. Blackwill, who was one among his group of advisors, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of India. He said, “Bob Blackwill understands the important place India holds in my foreign policy agenda, and he will be an outstanding

¹ George Perkovich in the Seminar on “US-India Relations : The Global Partnership”, May 16 2006, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/gp_remarks.pdf, p.2.

American Ambassador to India. He will bring a wealth of expertise to the position".² Blackwill had also worked in the administration of George H.W. Bush and advised George W. Bush on international affairs when he was running for Presidency. He has a domineering personality and being one of the most trusted architects of Bush's foreign policy was famous as the surrogate National Security Advisor.³ His appointment as the Ambassador to India shows the importance attached to India by the Bush administration. Later Ashley Tellis called him the 'efficient cause' of the transformation of US-India relations and addressed him as the 'father of the new US-India global partnership'.⁴

The proactiveness of the executive during Bush's first term was also reflected in the administration's resort to 'personal diplomacy' with frequent visits of members of the Bush Cabinet between September 1, 2001 and November 2002 that included Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, and Director of the Environmental Protection Agency Christie Todd Whitman. This was accompanied by the visit of nearly 100 US officials to India at the rank of Assistant Secretary of State or higher, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Director of the FBI Robert Mueller. These policy-makers along with their Indian counterparts actively discussed issues such as diplomatic collaboration, counter-terrorism, defense and military-to-military teamwork, intelligence exchange, law enforcement, development assistance, joint scientific and health projects including on HIV/AIDS, and the global environment.

² President Announces Robert D. Blackwill to be the Ambassador to India, Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary March 21, 2001, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010321-5.html>

³ Blackwill, began his career in the Foreign Service, where he served for 22 years. At the State Department, he worked for Secretaries Kissinger, Haig, and Schultz, and was U.S. ambassador and chief negotiator at the Warsaw Pact talks on conventional forces in Europe from 1985-1987. From 1989-1990, he served as special assistant to President George H.W. Bush, where he advised on European and Soviet affairs, and where Condi Rice was one of his subordinates. He then began an academic career at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, where he taught international security policy and wrote on Russia, arms control, transatlantic relations, and U.S.-South Asian relations.

⁴ Aziz Haniffa, Bush's Commitment to India Runs Deep: Blackwill, Washington D.C., available at <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jul/05aziz.htm>

On November 9, 2001, a summit was held between President Bush and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Washington about US-India relationship and was most substantive in the history of this bilateral relationship as eight areas of vital interests were discussed by both the parties. Defense cooperation topped the list of issues discussed and emphasis was laid on a conclusive acceleration in the US-India defense cooperation. The second major issue was counter-terrorism. A joint cyber terrorism initiative was launched about which ambassador Blackwill, in a press conference, remarked, "The US is doing this with no other country in a bilateral sense, and of course it should be obvious why India is our partner given the extraordinary hi tech visibility and information technology capability in India".⁵ The third issue was the future of Afghanistan i.e. reconstruction after the end of Taliban regime. Here, as Blackwill mentioned, the Americans regarded India as the 'central player in the international effort to assist the people of Afghanistan to produce a peaceful non-terrorist regime'. The fourth issue dealt with strengthening of the new strategic framework which included discussions on the US missile defense plans, on how to reduce dangers of weapons of mass destruction, to expand cooperation on export controls and to further accelerate bilateral high technology commerce. The fifth issue involved agreement by both parties to resume civilian nuclear safety cooperation and the sixth related to cooperation with respect to peaceful use of space. The seventh was the setting up of a structure on the economic side consisting of five ministerial channels- trade, finance, commerce, energy and environment. A private sector component was also included within this dialogue. Finally, acceleration and intensification of intelligence cooperation was also agreed upon in the summit.

This robust engagement and activism is indicative of what has been explained as the 'equilibrium change' in the bilateral relationship that brought about by the Bush administration. The external environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 and the positive response of the Indian government to President Bush's 'war on terrorism' gave impetus to for this kind of active engagement. The political executive, comprising of the 'Vulcans', grabbed the opportunity to put in place the 'big idea' of President Bush to take

⁵ Robert D.Blackwill, Press Conference , Foreign Correspondents Club , New Delhi, India, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/blackwill_001.htm

the bilateral relationship altogether to a different operating level and giving it strategic dimension as well.

Further with the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on 13 December, 2001 and the consequent mobilization of troops to the border by the Vajpayee government, the United States adopted a crisis management mode in its effort to avert the possibility of war between India and Pakistan. This, in turn, resulted in a flurry of visits which included Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as well as phone calls by the United States officials to India and Pakistan to defuse the crisis which could otherwise escalate into a nuclear war. The United States pressurized Pakistan to lower the level of infiltration across the border. Meanwhile the Defense Policy Group dead since the 1998 nuclear tests by India was revived in December 2001. However it took June 2002 for the situation to normalize. At a press conference in New Delhi on July 28,2002, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed his administrations intent when he said, "it is important that the leadership of India and the United States remain in close and frequent contact." On behalf of his administration he urged that India and Pakistan should take further de-escalatory actions as well as steps that could bring peace and stability in the region. He emphasized that much more importance should be given to the economic aspect of United States-India bilateral relationship, "the two greatest, largest democracies in the world the United States and India, should be doing much more with each other, to talk to one another to get to know one another, to increase the level of trade between the two nations. As large as India is and as large as America is with its large economy, there isn't enough trade, there isn't enough commerce between the two nations. And so I think that ought be one of our highest priorities". (Powell 2002). Later the Bush administration's seriousness regarding the emphasis on economy was reflected in the decision to appoint David Mulford as the ambassador to India, who is a finance expert and had also served in the Treasury Department. Upon taking office he emphasized the significance of reforms, infrastructure development and private sector for sustained growth and closer economic interaction between the two countries. (Mulford 2004).

The momentum provided by the November 2001 summit that opened up the new strategic dialogue to transform the bilateral relationship was sustained and thereafter several rounds of intensive diplomatic exchanges took place on a regular basis in the years ahead. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited in August, Assistant Secretary John Wolf in early September and Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs in late September. Also Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Mark Grossman continued the dialogue on security, while Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Under Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster also visited India in November 2002.

However, ever since 2001 the Indian government insisted on the easing of restrictions by the United States on the export to India of dual-use technology goods (those with military applications), as well as increased civilian nuclear and civilian space cooperation. Together these were termed as 'trinity' issues and the Indian government's stand was that a progress on these issues would be the test of a meaningful transformation in the United States-India bilateral relationship. Later, the 'trinity' was turned into the 'quartet' when the issue of missile defense was included in it which was declared by the US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Hadley when he visited India in September 2003. This was in response to the Vajpayee government's proposals on how cooperation in space, nuclear and high technology areas could be enhanced between the two countries, that were communicated to the Bush administration in June 2003.

On January 13, 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee issued a joint statement indicating that the U.S.-India "strategic partnership" included expanding cooperation in the "trinity" areas, as well as expanding dialogue on missile defense. This was referred to as the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) involving a series of reciprocal steps.⁶ The NSSP was a phased programme that intended to progressively remove sanctions paving the way for high technology cooperation in strategic technologies within the limits of the domestic laws and international obligations of the United States. Rajamohan commented that despite the limitations, the NSSP was "about

⁶ K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-US Relations", CRS Report Order Code RL33529, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>, pp-24.

India and United States unshackling themselves from their old thinking and increasing mutual confidence on issues relating to high technology cooperation and non-proliferation".(Rajamohan2006: 29)

When suspicions arose regarding the future of the US-India relations with the change of government after the presidential elections of November 2004, the executive again came up with confident assurances of the change of government having no impact on the bilateral relationship. As Robert O. Blake, Jr,Chargi d'Affaires, Army -War College remarked , "Let there be no doubt - the U.S. commitment to this bilateral relationship is bipartisan, deep and growing - and this is true no matter what the outcome of the Presidential elections this fall. Whether our country's elected leader is a Republican or a Democrat, the U.S. commitment to our bilateral relationship will remain strong. The relationship between our two countries transcends domestic politics, just as it did during the Clinton-Bush transition in 2001 and the BJP-Congress transition earlier this year". (Blake 2004).

President Bush won his re-election in November 2004 and the Bush administration during its second term displayed even more enthusiasm to enter into a strategic partnership with India. When Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran visited Washington in late November 2004, he communicated to the new Bush team the Indian government's desire for civilian nuclear cooperation.⁷ The non-proliferation orthodoxy in the Congress has been firmly against any such cooperation with India- a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) and performed nuclear tests twice. However, the Bush team particularly 'Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley persisted with the implementation of President Bush's commitment to end the nuclear dispute with India'. (Rajamohan2006: 56) (The nuclear question in the United States policy toward India has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4)

⁷ Press Conference of the Foreign Secretary at the conclusion of his visit to the US for HTCG meeting in Washington, Washington DC, November 19, 2004, transcript available at <http://www.mea.gov.in/pbhome.htm>

Shortly after swearing in as the Secretary of State of the United States, Condoleezza Rice visited India in mid- March 2005 and the visit clearly indicated the Bush administration's intent of giving final touch to a new strategic policy toward India. She conveyed to Prime Minister Singh that the United States was determined to alter its long-held framework that tied and balanced its relations with 'India-Pakistan.' She said, "We would effectively 'de-hyphenate' our South Asia policy by seeking highly individual relations with both India and Pakistan. That meant an entirely new and comprehensive engagement between the United States and India." Secretary Rice also told Prime Minister Singh that the United States would break with long-standing nonproliferation orthodoxy and work to establish full civil nuclear cooperation with energy-starved India.⁸

In June 2005, the US-India Defense Framework Agreement was signed while in July 18, 2005 President Bush and Prime Minister issued the US-India Joint Statement committed to transforming the relationship between the two countries and establish a global partnership and ensuring cooperation in the area of- economy, energy and environment, democracy and development, non-proliferation and security, as well as high technology and space, thus declaring the US- India Strategic Partnership. Also in July 2005, the State Department announced the successful completion of the NSSP, with expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation, removal/revision of some US export license requirements and some dual use and civil nuclear items. This along with the June 2005 Defense Agreement and the July 18 Joint Statement include provisions for progress in all four NSSP issue areas. A paradigm shift in the stated official policy of the United States was reflected when the July 18 Agreement asserted that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states" also President Bush promised to work on achieving "full civilian nuclear cooperation with India". George Perkovich mentions that the nuclear deal was the brainchild of a handful of top officials from both the governments. The officials in the United States included Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Undersecretary Nicholas

⁸Condoleezza Rice, Interview with *India Today*, March 16, 2005 available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43626.htm> and "Our Opportunity With India", *Washington Post*, March 13, available at 2006, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63008.htm>

Burns, and counselor Philip Zelikow. The plan involved minimum interagency review, congressional briefings and international consultations. They made up their mind to make a strong departure from the long-standing policy toward India as well as give effect to it quickly as delay would deprive the bold strategy of its energy. He says, "They wanted to move quickly to herald their new initiative during Singh's state visit to Washington and to enable implementation to begin in time for President Bush's expected visit to India in early 2006." (Perkovich 2005: 1-2).

On 2 March, 2006, the successful completion of India's (nuclear facility) separation plan that required India to place 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors under international safeguards, in a Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the Bush's visit to India. The full civilian nuclear cooperation with India required changes in the domestic law of the United States and reversal of its non-proliferation policy. This drew sharp opposition from the 'non-proliferation ayatollahs' in the Congress. However the Bush Cabinet was determined to materialize the 'big idea' and therefore made vigorous efforts in order to convince the Congress and get a legislation passed to this effect.(For details see Chapter IV).Condoleezza Rice appeared before key House and Senate Committees to persuade the Congressmen. Finally the administration succeeded in getting the legislation passed and on 18 December,2006, President Bush signed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act into law (P.L.109-401) calling it a "historic agreement that would help the United States and India meet the energy and security challenges of the 21st century.

The Bush Cabinet made rigorous efforts to implement its approach towards a strategic partnership with India and materialize the big idea of transforming United States-India relations by facilitating India's rise as a global power underlining the relevance of building India's power capabilities and reached this far. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,Deputy Secretay Robert Zoellick and Counselor Philip Zelikow at the State Department along with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have been the principal architects behind this new strategic

vision. However, with fate of the United States India civilian nuclear deal in a limbo, the limitations to this approach have come to the fore.

2.2. THE CONGRESS

In the political system of the United States, Congress seldom makes foreign policy though it can block the president's policy and undermine the chief executive's decision. In case of the United States-India relations though a positive bipartisan consensus existed on the Capitol Hill, because of the history of mistrust between the two countries some of the issues related to India like the economic reforms, non-proliferation and Kashmir have been the cause of concern in the Congress. Under the United States system of government, the Congress is a separate branch of government and in order to regularise or normalise the relationship with India changes were needed to be made in the legislation. This in turn required serious campaign to be made in the Congress in order to mobilise support from both Republican and Democrat side of the Congress. This, not being an easy task, demanded rigorous efforts by not only the executive but also investment of the support of the Indian-American community for example, which supports both Democrats and Republicans and their lobbying both groups. American business, which has an interest in this area, was also mobilised.

The Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans was formed in the House Of Representatives The Caucus was founded in 1993 by Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Bill McCollum (R-FL), who served as a Cochairmen until October 1998. They were succeeded by Gary Ackerman (D-NY) and James Greenwood (R-PA).It is the largest country caucus in the United States Congress. The Congressional Caucus on India and Indian-Americans serves as forum in which the members of Congress may address the concerns vital to the Indian American community. However apart from encouraging dialogue on issues of interest to Indian American community, the Caucus also played a substantive role in consolidating bilateral relations between the United States and India, promote trade with India and enhance economic development in India as well that of the Indian American community.

2.2.1 The 107th Congress

In December 2000, Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.) and Rep. Jim McDermott (D-Wash) who were to take over as co-chairs of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans in the 107th Congress in January 2001, outlined their goals for the next two years. The top priority for Royce was to work on building support for a Free Trade Agreement between the United States and India, toward lifting sanctions as a precursor to the former and to place India on the map of US trade and investment moving the focus of US businesses away from China. He said, "Our engagement with India should be a mature relationship ...[It should] include security issues, joint military exercises...and cooperation on combating terrorism", while McDermott said that, "I start with the theory that people are ignorant about India, not against it". (Parekh 2000).

Following the devastating earthquake in Gujarat in January 2001, Congressman Joseph Crowley met with Indian-American community leaders in Queens and lobbied in Congress for emergency U.S. assistance to help disaster relief efforts. He was a co-sponsor of two House Concurrent Resolutions, 15 and 151, both expressing sympathy for the victims of the devastating Gujarat earthquake that urged the President to use U.S. influence with multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to expedite disaster relief and economic assistance to help rebuilt Gujarat.

At the conclusion of the 107th Congress Royce wrote a letter to President Bush which read, "As you know, I attach high importance to the relationship between the United States and India. To this end, I urge you to continue your well-appreciated efforts to achieve a true transformation in our relationship with India, 'a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests,' as rightly described in your National Security Strategy of the United States. U.S.-India relations continue to grow and prosper in the areas of trade and investment, space exploration, security cooperation and counter-terrorism. I appreciate the leadership that your administration has taken in promoting this upward trend in our relations with India". (Royce 2002).

2.2.2. The 108th Congress

For the 108th Congress, the policy issue with respect to India was how to improve U.S.-Indian relations as the 'war on terror' replaced the Cold War in framing the relationship. The Congress recognized that President Bush's waiver of nuclear weapons-related restrictions on U.S. aid to India in September 2001 and New Delhi's full support for U.S. anti-terror operations marked the beginning of ongoing security cooperation with the United States and has led to joint military exercises and the resumption of defense trade. It welcomed the state elections in Jammu and Kashmir in October 2002 and the ouster of the long-ruling National Conference Party and the incoming of a seemingly more moderate state government which in its sense raised hopes for peace in the region. Yet it remained concerned about India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir that continued to cost lives and keep tensions high, as well as other factors like the nuclear dimension that raises the stakes for regional stability and U.S. interests, human rights and religious freedom in India, along with bilateral trade and the continuation of reforms in the Indian economy, especially those related to foreign investment.(Kapp and Lum 2003: 43). In the 108th Congress (2002-2004), the Co- Chairs were Joe Crowley (D-NY) and Joe Wilson (R-SC). Congressman Crowley is an outspoken supporter of the nuclear cooperation deal. He also helped in the passage of H.R. 5682, the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, in the House of Representatives by a vote of 359-68. He also led a Congressional sign-on letter with Rep. McDermott to former Indian PM Vajpayee to support Air India's desire to buy Boeing aircraft. Air India decided to buy 18 Boeing 737-800s, bringing more jobs to America and creating a critical opportunity for an American company to export to India.

March 2004 witnessed the setting up of a bipartisan organization called the 'Friends of India' in the United States Senate. For the first time in the history of the Senate a country-centric caucus was set up and the man behind this step was John Cornyn, a Republican Senator from Texas who had visited India in January 2004. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton served as the co-chair of the caucus.

During the launch of the caucus Cornyn said he “undertook the job of creating an India Caucus in the US Senate, because of the incredible experience I had in India and because of the importance of US-India relations”, and also some of the most powerful and influential lawmakers like Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Charles Grassley, head of the Finance Committee, Thad Cochran, chairman of the Appropriations Committee - all Republicans - and leading Democrats like Senators Paul Sarbanes, Joe Lieberman, and Edward M Kennedy have all enthusiastically agreed to be part of the 'Friends of India' Caucus⁹

2.2.3. The 109th Congress

The 109th Congress appreciated the positive interaction between the United States and India which had become a norm in pursuit of the ‘strategic partnership’. However, it voiced the concern that India’s status as a de facto nuclear power and a non-signatory to the NNPT was a constraint in expansion of cooperation in the civilian nuclear area as well as other three areas included in the NSSP. Some Congresspersons expressed concern that civil nuclear cooperation with India might allow it to advance its military nuclear projects and be harmful to broader U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Besides, the Congress also continued to express concerns about abuses of human rights and religious freedoms in India, along with bilateral trade and the continuation of reforms in the still relatively closed Indian economy. Moreover, the spread of HIV/AIDS in India attracted congressional attention as a serious development.¹⁰

The agreement on United States-India civilian nuclear cooperation announced by President Bush in March 2006 that required adjustment of the domestic laws of the United States could not sail through the Congress easily. After months of consideration and tremendous efforts on part of the executive to convince the Congress, the House

⁹ Aziz Haniffa, “The US Senate and the India Caucus”, Washington D.C., available at <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/senatecaucus/senatecaucus.htm>

¹⁰ Sharon Squassoni (2006), “US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL33016 <http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/India/crs/RL330162.pdf>

International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee both took action on relevant legislation in June 2006 and passed modified versions of the Administration's proposals by wide margins. Not only this, the new House and Senate bills (H.R.5682 and S. 3709) made significant procedural changes to the Administration's original proposal, changes that sought to retain congressional oversight of the negotiation process, in part by requiring the Administration to gain future congressional approval of a completed peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India.¹¹

However later the 109th Congress expressed widespread bipartisan support for the Administration's policy initiative by passing enabling legislation rejecting the various 'Killer Amendments' in July 2006 and finally, in December 2006 the 'lame duck' Congressional conferences presented a 30-page explanatory statement (H.Rept.109-721) reconciling the House and Senate versions of the legislation.

2.2.4. 110th Congress

The Democrats gained majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives in the 110th Congress thus leading to a divided government in the United States. 23 House Members signed and sent letter to President George W. Bush in July 2007, stressing that any civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India is required to conform to "the legal boundaries set by Congress." In October, House Resolution 711, expressing the sense of the House concerning the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, was referred to House committee. The bill sought Bush Administration clarifications on the 123 Agreement's compliance with the United States law.

¹¹ K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-US Relations", CRS Report Order Code RL33529, 17 February 2007, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>, pp 17-18

2.3. LOBBYING

Lobbying means activities of associations aimed at influencing the policies of public officials, especially legislators. Lobbying is legal in the United States' political system and various interest groups seek to influence public policy through lobbying. It is said that lobbying is what makes things happen in the Congress. In a democracy it is very important that a decision should secure the support of those involved in the process of decision making in order to be effectively implemented. Political Action Committees (PACs) is one of the important means by which interest groups seek to influence the Congressmen in the United States.

The Indian – American community is one of the richest ethnic group in the United States with tremendously increasing political clout and one of the measures that was institutionalized as well as lent leverage to the United States policy toward India considerate of Indian interests was the registration of the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC).

The increasing number and success of Indian Diaspora in the United States is one of the important factors contributing to positive influence on the US-India relations. According to the United States 2000 census the Indian American populations ranks third among the Asian American Group after the Chinese and the Filipinos, the population of Indian Americans being 1,678,765 which constitutes 0.6% of the total population of the United States and 16.4% of the Asian American population. Definitely, these numbers have greatly increased in the past seven years. They comprise a sizeable voting force which is growing, also they form a very productive segment of the United States population owing to higher level of education. They contributed substantially to the economic boom of the 1990s. The community is also recognized as one of the most influential ethnic communities and referred to as the 'model minority'. Their higher educational qualification, technical expertise, knowledge of English, democratic experience and economic success have all contributed to their greater acceptance in the United States. This, in turn, has translated into direct political involvement and considerable political

influence of the Indian Americans in the United States political system. They actively engage in campaign contributions and the 'quintessential American practice of fundraising' for political candidates at the federal, state and local levels hence drawing considerable attention of the politicians to their concerns which includes improvement of US-India relations as well. The largest concentration of Indian Americans is found in California, followed by New York, New Jersey, Texas and Illinois. Sizeable Indian American population is also present in Florida, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C. Several Indian-Americans have held the position of mayor for example Bala K. Srinivas in Hollywood Park, Texas, John Abraham in Teaneck, New Jersey, and Arun Jhaveri in Burien, Washington. Also Kumar Barve, a US born Indian American, was Delegate for several terms in the Maryland assembly. The community has been instrumental in voicing its concerns by creating from time to time, a number of political forums like the IAFPE (Indian American Forum for Political Education), IACPA (India Abroad Centre for Political Awareness) and US-India Business Council. The major concerns have included issues that effect India-their country of origin.¹²

As a significant and concrete step forward, the USINPAC was formally registered as a lobby group in September 2002 and since then gained enormous attention on the Capitol Hill. It has acquired political access by 'buying power breakfasts' with Senators like Richard Lugar (R-Ind) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and throws 'power luncheons' for Senate and House Committee staffers. Critics, however, accuse it for its pro neo-con bias and not of any benefit to US-India relations. (Farees 2004). Sanjay Puri, the Executive Director of USINPAC stated one of its objectives as strengthening US- India bilateral relations in defense, trade, and business and a strictly bipartisan approach. The USINPAC lauds the following achievements in improvement of United States-India bilateral relations:¹³

¹² "United States", Report of the High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, available at <http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/diasporapdf/chapter13.pdf>

¹³ USINPAC: Representing Indian Americans in US Polity, available at <http://sumeet-chhibber.sulekha.com/blog/post/2003/05/usinpac-representing-indian-americans-in-us-polity.htm> and The LOBBY Politics available at <http://www.sepiamutiny.com/sepia/archives/003195.html>

- It has organized events with prominent US Congressional leaders like Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee; Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Finance Committee; Sen. Richard Lugar, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Sen. Joe Biden, Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sam Brownback, Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a good friend of India, and the Co-Chairs of the India Caucus in the US House of Representatives.
- Prevented the elevation of known India-baiter Dan Burton (R-IL) to a powerful committee position in the US House of Representatives. By helping ensure that Burton was not appointed, USINPAC promoted the cause of US-India relations.
- Despite the backing of the Bush administration, the smooth passage of the deal was a difficult possibility due to deeply entrenched actors within the State Department and the non-proliferation lobby that opposed the US decision to make India an exception to nuclear restrictions. These included non-proliferation activists like David Albright, Republican Dan Burton of Indiana and California's Dana Rohrabacher. (Sharma 2006). Therefore the USINPAC lobbied almost as hard as the government of India in support of the nuclear deal. It aggressively worked to get the key members of the Congress on board and Senators George Allen of Virginia, Sam Brownback of Kansas, John Cornyn of Texas, Michael D. Crapo of Idaho, Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas and Ted Stevens of Alaska brought a wide range of influence to the effort to win congressional approval of the agreement signed by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Also the United States Chamber of Commerce along with the United States-India Business Council lobbied vigorously for President Bush's initiative of civilian nuclear cooperation with India. They estimated that the cooperation could generate contracts for American businesses worth up to \$100 billion, as well as generate up to 27,000 new American jobs each year for a decade. (Krishnaswami 2006).

2.4. CONCLUSION

The process of 'engaging India' that was started during the Clinton administration was carried forward by the Bush administration as well. However, the Bush team, since its inception to power, had a different policy orientation and a global approach towards India. The events of 9/11 provided an opportunity to take the bilateral relationship to a different operating level by initiating a strategic dialogue with India. The positive response by the Indian government boosted rigorous efforts by executive during first term of President Bush which culminated in the United States-India strategic partnership during his second term, largely due to the active role and political will of the leadership in both the governments. The strategic dialogue as also the subsequent strategic partnership enjoyed widespread support in the United States Congress as well. However, some of the contentious issues that have been a source of friction to the bilateral relationship in the past, the major one being the issue of non-proliferation has been constantly haunting the progress. With the United States announcement of civil nuclear cooperation with India, the non-proliferation protagonists voiced their opposition loud and clear. On account of strong and persistent backing of the Bush Cabinet and rigorous lobbying, the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was able to make its way through the Congress in the form of the Hyde Act. Though the institutional impediment was overcome to a great extent; the historical one i.e. the history of mistrust again resurfaced in the form domestic opposition to the nuclear deal in India. This, in turn, has led to slowdown in the enthusiasm of the Bush administration thus pointing to the limitation of its approach.

CHAPTER-3

EVOLUTION OF THE US-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OF THE US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA IN THE AREA OF DEFENCE AND ECONOMY

The bilateral defense and economic relationship comprise two of the major pillars on which the United States-India strategic partnership rests. This chapter, therefore, will focus on the United States policy toward India in these two areas during the Bush administration and the major developments thereof.

Defence is the realm where the US-India bilateral relationship has made tremendous strides under the George W. Bush administration. Looking at the level that the defence cooperation climbed and the expansive range of activities covered by it despite a very dismal past record, among several areas of United States-India bilateral cooperation, the priority accorded by the Bush administration's policy to defense cooperation becomes quite evident. This section will focus on the various aspects and developments of the United States policy toward India in the field of defence.

3.1. BACKGROUND OF US DEFENCE POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

After the end of cold war closer defence cooperation with India was sought by the Clinton administration which was visible in attempts like the one made by Lieutenant General Claude M. Kicklighter, what later came to be known as "**Kicklighter Proposals**" of 1992. Also the two countries signed in 1995 "**Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation**" that was designed to promote mutual understanding, familiarisation and confidence-building through joint exercises, exchange of doctrines, high-level visits, courses, seminars and a focus on areas of mutual interest. The Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs for the year 1996-97 described the bilateral defence relations with the United States as satisfactory. In the second meeting of the Defence Policy Group (DPG), which was set up in 1995, both parties agreed to cooperate on 'high priority areas as well as additional areas for future joint ventures'. The joint US-India Naval exercise Flash Iroquoise/Sangam'96 was held in September 1996. (Jain 2007: 324).

However, the 1998 nuclear tests by India led to coldness in bilateral relationship. On May 13, 1998 President Clinton subjected India, a non-nuclear weapons state detonating

nuclear explosive devices, to sanctions pursuant to Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (22U.S.C. 2779aa-1) (Glenn Amendment). The relevant US government agencies were directed to take necessary actions to impose the sanctions described in section 102(b)(2) of the Act.¹ The United States Department of State also revoked all licenses and other approvals of the permanent and temporary exports and imports of defense articles and services to and from India. Also in accordance with Section 123.21 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), licenses were to be immediately returned to the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls. (Jain 2007: 324)

At the same time, as mentioned in Chapter I, this was the period when the United States sought closer ties and strategic partnership with India. Also according to a CRS report the later years of 1990s marked a period when the arms market had become intensely competitive and the United States ranked second with 19.5% (\$6 billion in current dollars) next to Russia which ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements with Asia. During this period while there were fewer large weapons purchases being made by developing nations in the Near East, a relatively larger increase in purchases were being made by developing nations in Asia, lead principally by China and India. India was the leading developing world arms purchaser from 1997-2004, making arms transfer agreements totaling \$15.7 billion during these years (in current dollars). (Grimmet 2005: 23). However, Russia continued to be the main arms supplier to India.

The sanctions, however, did not result in the abandoning of the nuclear program by India as intended by the United States. In 1999, the United States Senate voted to reject the ratification of the CTBT which weakened the US tack on India on that count. In October 1999, the Prime Minister of India wrote to the US Congressman Gary Ackerman that the government of India perceived the economical and technical restrictions against India as 'counterproductive' leading to 'unnecessary complication in the development of mutually beneficial bilateral relations'.(Jain 2007: 326).

¹ That provision of the law provides for the determination to India of the sales of defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act, and the termination of the licenses for the Export of any item on the United States Munitions List (USML).

3.2. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY APPROACH

Bush administration had a different approach to security which was expressed by Robert D. Blackwill, the then ambassador to India, when he quoted Henry Kissinger in one of his speeches as, “the management of a balance of power is a permanent undertaking, not an exertion that has a foreseeable end”. He mentioned the administration’s firm belief that Asia is poised to become the new strategic center of gravity in international politics. During the last century, the political environment conducive to the growth of economic prosperity was underpinned by the United States security presence in Asia and peace within Asia that would perpetuate Asian prosperity “requires the United States to particularly strengthen political, economic, and military-to-military relations with those Asian states that share our democratic values and national interests. That spells India”.²

When George W. Bush took over the presidency of the United States, the bilateral defense relationship was feeble with virtually no military to military interaction and zero defense sales. While an initial improvement in the US-India relations had begun during the last year of Clinton administration, his benchmark framework to put in place a nuclear restraint regime (explained in detail in chapter 4) met with little success and hindered any further progress in the bilateral relationship. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Blackwill also pointed out that the White House foreign policy transition team which included Condoleezza Rice, Steve Hadley and himself, in the month before President Bush's inauguration continually discussed how they could help the new President quickly implement his big idea of transforming the US-India relationship on the enduring foundation of shared democratic values and congruent vital national interests.³ Accordingly, one of the CRS report analysis mentions that “upon taking office, the Bush Administration, made no reference to the benchmark framework and set out substantively to build upon an initial improvement in U.S. relations with New Delhi begun by President Clinton, while also shifting U.S. nonproliferation policy from seeking to prevent South

² Robert D. Blackwill, “The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship”, Kolkata, November 27, 2002, available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill.htm>

³ Robert D. Blackwill, “No Longer Does the US Fixate on India’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Program” Speech before the Confederation of Indian Industry, July 17, 2003, available at <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc11.htm>

Asian nuclearization to encouraging India and Pakistan to be 'more responsible nuclear powers'. (Feickert and Kronstadt 2003: 3).

In September 2001, under the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the lifting of sanctions against the Indian companies that related to the Defense Department while those related to the nuclear and missile technology were to be discussed by the State Department and the Government of India. President Bush and his team's approach to the policy toward India also found support in the 107th Congress when Congressmen Tom Lantos, Garry Ackerman (who was also the chair of the India Caucus in the House of Representatives) and Jim McDermott introduced the Bill H.R.2889, which was referred to the House Committee on International Relations, during its first session on September 14, 2001 to lift the sanctions against India. The Bill expressed the sense of the Congress as, "the sanctions against India are ineffective and counter-productive to both the nonproliferation goals of the United States and the national interests of the United States...further the sense of the Congress is that the United States should immediately expand its nonproliferation, counterterrorism, counter-drug trafficking, and security cooperation activities with India at all levels." The Bill was cited as the 'U.S.-India Security Cooperation Act of 2001' and its purpose was to "lift sanctions imposed upon India as a result of its nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998, in order to foster closer security, nonproliferation, and political relationships with India". (Congressional Record 2001).

In late 2001, the Defense Policy Group (DPG), moribund since the 1998 tests was revived and in its third meeting held at New Delhi between 3-4 December 2001, agreed to substantially increase the pace of the high level policy dialogue, military-military exchanges and other joint activities.⁴

⁴ The Defense Policy Group (DPG) is the highest body for determining the defense relationship between the the United States and India and is also the forum for discussions on issues of mutual interest. It sets the policy, gives directions for the military relationship, and approves events and other recommendations brought to its notice by sub-groups such as the Military Cooperation Group (MCG); the Security Cooperation Group, responsible for all aspects of weapon and equipment; the Senior Technology Security Group responsible for technology security and transfer; the Security Technology Group, responsible for research and development; and the recently constituted Defense Procurement & Production Group. On behalf of the U.S., Pacific Command (PACOM) is the executive agent for coordination of service-specific

The major concerns as well as the functionalities that impacted the defense relationship, the addressing of which, the Indian side voiced, was essential for a greater and mature defense cooperation between the two governments were (Chait 2006):

- A relationship based on equality and reciprocity (diffused rather than specific).
- Mutual sharing of objectives (doctrinal, technological and communication) for advantages of reciprocal nature.
- Building joint capabilities of both militaries.
- Rapid deployment operations, both strategic as well as tactical
- More flexible crisis response operations
- The strategic rationale of the United States dealing with India via The Pacific Command (PACOM) is less conducive to the latter's strategic concerns as many of its pressing strategic concerns- cross-border terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, stability in Central Asia and protecting energy flows from the Persian Gulf region- lie within the Central Command (CENTCOM) by which the United States handles the neighbouring Pakistan.
- Lack of overall coherence and common vision in the military relationship.
- The difference in the decision-making process of both the governments- with a decentralized and delegated-downward process in the United States while that of India being highly centralized.
- Also India has been perceived as being less capable of supporting a broad based relationship by the United States, owing to its newer status in the arena of military relationship
- Lack of institutionalized structures for real time exchange of information relating to terrorism, nuclear and bio-related terrorist activities, arms smuggling, piracy, counter-narcotics, and disaster related capabilities, and
- Lack of sustained regional and sub-regional exchanges and interactions.

agenda. On the Indian side these responsibilities are handled by the Army HQ and Integrated Defense Head Quarters.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the active Indian support to the US-led war on terror after the September 11 attacks, led to qualitative leap of India in the policy agenda of President Bush. As the then Secretary of State Colin Powell during his remarks with the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh of India, put it, “As you have noted we are natural allies. Two great democracies who believe in a common set of values that have served both of our nations well. President Bush has made it absolutely clear that transforming a relationship with India and to putting it on a higher plane is one of his highest priorities. The United States and India have a responsibility as the world’s largest, multi-ethnic democracies to work in close partnership with each other. President Bush asked me to come here to discuss the global coalition against terrorism, and how the United States and India can continue our efforts over the long haul. We have stood shoulder to shoulder in this fight against terrorism”⁵

The bilateral defense relationship also derives the same rationale which perceived India as a reliable country (as different from China whom the United States constantly warns to maintain a transparent military programme) that had shared interests in advancing policy objectives such as fighting the challenge of terrorism, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction as well as promote peace, stability and security in Asia. While the strategic location of India is such that it could help control and police the Indian Ocean sea lanes from the Suez to Singapore, being a democracy was seen as an advantage that could ease the working of the military forces of both countries together what has been termed as ‘interoperability.’ Therefore the Pentagon, under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, emphasized development of closer and expansive defense relations with India.

Consequently, the Bush administration’s intent to put in place a stable and long term defense relationship with India was visible in the 2001 meeting of the DPG which sought to address the above mentioned concerns through:

- Training for combined humanitarian airlift.

⁵Secretary Colin L. Powell, Remarks with External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh of India, New Delhi, India, October 17, 2001, Available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5408.htm>

- Combined special operations training.
- Small unit ground/air exercises
- Naval joint personal exchange and familiarization.
- Combined training exercises between U.S. marines and corresponding Indian forces.

Also the United States agreed with India over the significance of a stable and long term defense supply relationship as a part of overall strategic cooperation between the two countries.

3.2.1. Major Developments in Defence Cooperation

In February 2002, the US Navy conducted five port calls and a search and rescue exercise. A contingent of distinguished Indian leaders went aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. The two armies agreed to increase cooperation in areas like counter terrorism, IMET exchanges and to extend participation in national, bilateral and multilateral exercises. The air force also agreed on a similar schedule of increased joint exercises, technical cooperation in matters of combined operations and professional subject matter exchanges.

In the field of Defense supply, the US received applications for 81 items on the Munitions list by India, of which 20 were already approved that included components for the Agni satellite launch, helicopter spare parts, micro detonators, specialized electric motors, and the AN/TPQ-37 artillery locating radar. These were deployed in India in July 2003.

On April 17, 2002 the Pentagon signed with India the first major arms sale deal worth approximately \$146 million to sell eight advanced radars (the AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars⁶). Also during Operation Enduring Freedom, in April of 2002, the Indian Navy

⁶ These are ground based radars designed by ThalesRaytheon Systems-a transatlantic, US, French and British venture-to detect and trace the exact site of an enemy's artillery and rocket system.

ships *Sharda* and *Sukanya* relieved the *USS Cowpens* and escorted ships in the Straits of Malacca and protected them against terrorist attacks and pirates on the high seas.

In the National Security Strategy 2002, President Bush specifically mentioned that, “We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia... we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests.”⁷ Pointing out the significance of interoperability the United States Ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill mentioned that, “An Indian military that is capable of operating effectively alongside its American counter parts remains an important goal of our bilateral defence relationship”.⁸

Since 2002, United States and India have held regular and substantive joint military exercises involving all the military services. These include the “Malabar” joint naval and the “Cope India” joint air exercises. At the Cope India mock air combat in Gwalior in 2004, Indian pilots performed well and held off the American counterparts with Indian Su-30Ks winning 9 of 10 engagements with US Air Force National Guard F-15Cs. Also India made the largest strategic deployment of its combat aircraft outside its territory the same summer when they participated in the multinational Cope Thunder 2004 exercise in Alaska.

The ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ (NSSP), issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in January, 2004 calling for expanded cooperation in the areas dual-use high technology goods (those with military applications), civilian nuclear and civilian space as well as expanding dialogue on missile defense, was seen as a major positive transformation in the United States strategic posture toward India. This further paved way for a more expanded defense cooperation.

⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: President of the United States), 30 September 2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

⁸ Robert D. Blackwill, “U.S.-India Defence Cooperation”, *The Hindu*, May 13, 2003. Available at <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/05/13/stories/2003051301101000.htm>

The dialogue attained a new pace when the Bush administration announced that it would offer India co-production rights for both the F-16 and F-18E/F to compete for that requirement, while offering Pakistan the option to purchase F-16s in March 2005. An article in the *Air and Space Power* journal mentioned that “By offering India the option to co-produce F-16s or F-18E/Fs, the United States implicitly acknowledges that India has made strides in its ability to guarantee the end use of technology it receives”, also, “the US arms-control apparatus has put aside past concerns about providing India capabilities that could enhance its ability to deliver nuclear weapons and that the US president and his administration intend to continue expending efforts to shake up bureaucratic inertia.(Thyagraj 2006).

In an interview in March 2005 during her visit to India Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice again reiterated the significance of strategic dialogue to the transformation of United States India relations. She said “Military-to-military contacts are very good. But we can now take that and make it into a more strategic dialogue to understand better how India and United States cooperate to make this a peaceful region, indeed, to make Asia –to make the world more peaceful.” (Rice 2005). This signified the greater importance of the strategic partnership.

On June 28 , 2005 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld along with the Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a ten-year framework outlining expansive defence engagement that would include(Annexure 1):

- Planned collaboration in multilateral operations,
- Expanded two-way defense trade,
- Increasing opportunity for technology transfers and co-production,
- Expanded collaboration related to missile defense, and
- Setting up of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group.

Commenting on the significance of the United States India defence framework, Rajamohan says that “on its own the document was hardly revolutionary; but in the

context of the history of Indo-US relations and in terms of India's own foreign policy , it was indeed a rare piece of paper".(Rajamohan 2006: 118)

The negative response of China and Pakistan as well as the views that the framework is intended to 'hedge' or 'counterbalance the growing influence of China in Asia' were rejected by the Bush administration and its official position was that the defense framework is not directed against any country. Again in early 2006, a the two countries signed a Maritime Security Cooperation Agreement to facilitate 'comprehensive cooperation' in protecting the free flow of commerce as well as addressing the various threats to maritime security, including piracy and illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. In April 2007, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Tim Keating, told a Senate panel that the Pentagon intends to "aggressively" pursue expanding military-to-military relations with India.⁹

The latest of the Malabar series exercise took place in September 2007. For the first time the exercise took place in the Bay of Bengal, involved 27 warships. This time the bilateral exercise was expanded to include Japan, Singapore and Australia as well. The exercises extended up to the Strait of Malacca, the busiest waterway of the world and drew skepticism from China about its military implications.

Besides the military-to-military ties defense supply and commercial military sales have taken a fairly high priority in the Bush administration's policy. A March 2006 Department of Defense release mentioned that defense technology cooperation will contribute to strengthened military capabilities and will also result in economic benefits through expanded trade.¹⁰ There has been a significant increase in the United States export of dual use materials to India since 2001 with the present approval rate of license applications being above 90%. The commercial military sales made a tremendous leap from \$5.6 million in 2003 to \$64 million in 2005. (Thyagraj 2006).

⁹K. Alan Kronstadt (2007), "India-US Relations", CRS Report Order Code RL33529, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> , p. 6

¹⁰ Department of Defense (2006), "US-India: Strengthening a Global Partnership", March, available at http://us-info.state.gov/sa/south_asia/india_summit.html

In 2006, \$44 million purchase of the *USS Trenton*, a decommissioned American amphibious transport dock was authorized by the Congress and approved by New Delhi. The *USS Trenton*, commissioned in India as the *INS Jalashwa* in June 2007, has become the second largest in the Indian navy. Also it carried six surplus Sikorsky UH-3H Sea King helicopters purchased for another \$39 million.

The major military firms of the United States are also competing to tap in the lucrative Indian market on account of India's decision of military modernization and diversification of its sources of defense supply. The Maryland based Lockheed Martin concluded a deal worth \$1.059 billion to sell six C-130J Hercules transport aircrafts to India in May 2007.

In August 2007, India invited tenders for the purchase of 126 multirole combat aircrafts, the deal would amount about \$10-12 billion and Lockheed Martin and Boeing Co. are competing for it. They are followed by other US firms like Northrop Grumman Corp, General Dynamics Corp and Raytheon Co. looking for similar deals. The United States officials have stated that this deal getting through would be a remarkable leap in the bilateral defense ties and also signify commitment to military partnership.¹¹ The Indian government is also desirous of purchasing United States made weapons, including PAC-3 missile systems, electronic warfare systems and possibly combat aircraft.¹²

Some of the irritants faced by the defence policy of Bush administration can be outlined as such (Haté and Schaffer 2007):

- India is less comfortable and therefore desirous of change in the United States strategic policy of dealing with New Delhi via the Pacific Command (PACOM) while Pakistan is dealt via Central Command (CENTCOM). Indian officials

¹¹ Nicholas R. Burns (2007), Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "America's Strategic Opportunity With India", *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007 available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86609/r-nicholas-burns/america-s-strategic-opportunity-with-india.html>

¹² K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-US Relations", CRS Report Order Code RL33529, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>, p.36.

complain that PACOM's priorities focus on China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula and undergoes 'strategic fatigue' when it comes to dealing with India. Also India's pressing strategic concerns like cross-border terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, stability in Central Asia and protection of energy flows from the Persian Gulf region lie outside PACOM.

- As pointed out by Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee in 2005, though there is enormous opportunity for business and commerce in India's defense sector, what India is looking forward to is not a purely 'buyer-seller' relationship rather a strategic one with long-term commitment for-transfer of technology, co-development, co-production, mutual outsourcing and joint marketing.¹³
- The 126 multirole fighter aircraft deal is also a cause of concern for the Indian Air Force because it would involve fleet diversification the attendant requirement of additional support infrastructure as the IAF operates aircrafts from Russia, UK and France and has depo facilities to service them.
- The policy was confronted with bureaucratic resistance due to lesser compatibility in decision-making of the two governments. The application of complicated and extensive laws of the Congress by the United States faces lot of resistance in India. On the other hand the officials express discomfort over the long, tedious and rather opaque defense procurement process of the Indian bureaucracy. Though gradually this is being overcome.

3.3. CONCLUSION

The words of Robert Blake that 'military cooperation remains one of the most vibrant, visible, and proactive legs powering the transformation of US-India relations' are extremely apt to describe the bilateral defense relationship. The United States' defense policy toward India during the Bush administration made dramatic improvements in the nature and frequency training exercises, personnel exchanges, organizational relationships, defense sales and to some extent technology cooperation, ending the

¹³ Speech by Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the US-India Business Council, Washington D.C., 27 June, 2005, (Jain 2007: 342).

political disconnect that had obstructed the smooth bilateral defense relationship in the past, in a relatively shorter span of time. Though there exist certain divergences that can hamper the smooth operation of the policy in future, political will of both the governments was the driver of Bush administration's policy and would be required to make the necessary adjustments in future as well.

3.4. THE US ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY TOWARD INDIA DURING BUSH ADMINISTRATION

The United States-India strategic partnership that came into being under the administration of George W. Bush is stated to have convergence of interests, shared values and improved economic and trade relations as its foundation. Economy is one of the major factors linking the two countries. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellik, one of the architects of Bush's policy of strategic partnership with India, in as early as 1999, while stating the strategic objectives of the United States for the 21st emphasized the need of adjusting India, the world's largest democracy, to the global economy and to lower the risk of conflict with its neighbours through developing a "cooperative partnership" with it. (Zoellik 1999). The importance of cooperation with India owing to the potential of its booming economy was also emphasized by Robert Blackwill, the then ambassador to India, in 2001. (Blackwill 2001). This signifies that the United States strategic partnership with India entails economy as one of its important pillars.

The expansion in economic ties started since the economic reforms undertaken by India in 1991 and a number of important steps were taken by the United States during the Clinton administration, for instance, the decision to institutionalize bilateral economic dialogue with plans of setting up a Coordinating Group, US-India Financial and Economic Forum, US-India Commercial Dialogue and US-India Working Group on Trade, US-India Science and Technology Forum, US-India Agreement on Energy and Environment, which formed a part of the Vision Statement of March 2000. However, the

'strategic economic dimension US-India Relationship' began to be emphasized only with the start of Bush administration. Explaining the significance of economic ties in the bilateral relationship, Ambassador Blackwill, in January 2003, said that the *National Security Strategy 2002* of the United States that set forth its diplomatic and security approach to the present international system, describes India as one of the "great democratic powers of the 21st century." Also he said, "national economic strength is a prerequisite for sustained diplomatic influence and military muscle. The close US-India partnership...would be made more wide reaching and successful by a fundamentally reformed and globalized Indian economy. I openly admit, therefore, that there is a certain amount of American self-interest as we hope for the best for India's economic performance in the years ahead."¹⁴ The assumption in the United States had been that closer economic ties with India, entering into the full fledged series of economic reforms and poised to play an influential rôle in the international system, would be beneficial for the United States.

Since the inception of the Bush administration, the United States resorted to a number of initiatives to improve commercial ties with India. In March 2000, a framework for bilateral economic cooperation was created through several working groups as a new focuses on economic opportunity, energy and the environment, health and education.

On 9 August, 2001, the USTR Robert Zoellic announced that the United States will totally free India's trade for 42 products encompassing about \$543 million of exports under the United States Generalised System of preferences for developing countries as a tangible step in enhanced trade relationship.(Jain 2007:254). In early 2002, India decided to permit commercial cultivation of Bt cotton, the early results of which were appreciated by the United States government as promising. The vision behind this was biotechnology improves farmers' livelihoods and can become a new growth industry for India, much like IT in the 1990s. However, a 2002 statement of Ambassador Blackwill addressed US-

¹⁴ Robert D. Blackwill, "The United States, India and Asian Security", Presented to the Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference New Delhi, India , January 27, 2003, available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill2.htm>

India economic interaction as the 'missing piece of the bilateral interaction'.¹⁵ The United States government expressed concern about the slow progress of India's economic, subsequently pushing forward for more active economic reforms.

July 2003 witnessed the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group; and, in January 2004, the "trinity" issues of dual-use high-technology trade, and civilian nuclear and civilian space cooperation became subsumed under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative. However, immediately after the elections in India in May 2004 resulting in the United Progressive Alliance(UPA) government coming to power with the Left Front supporting it from outside, the investor fears that a coalition government including communists might bring to an end India's economic reform and liberalization process apparently led to huge losses in the country's stock markets. Market recovery began when the government quickly offered assurances that the new government would be "pro-growth, pro-savings, and pro-investment." The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budgeted at \$ 90 million for the year 2005, concentrating in five areas that included economic growth, health, disaster management, environmental protection and education. (Krosntadt 2005).

In 2004, the Bush administration appointed David C. Mulford as the ambassador to India. Mulford who had served in the United States Treasury Department, is a finance expert. Dr. Mulford was nominated by President Bush to be the United States Ambassador to India on November 13, 2003. He was confirmed by the Senate on December 9 and was officially sworn in on January 23, 2004. From 1992 to 2003, Mulford was Chairman International of Credit Suisse First Boston, London and was responsible for leading its worldwide, large-scale privatisation business and other corporate and government advisory assignments. In one of his speeches after assuming the office he elaborated on the necessity and importance of reforms, infrastructure development for sustained growth

¹⁵ Robert D. Blackwill (2002), "The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship", Kolkata, November 27, available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill.htm>

in the Indian economy and also significant role that the private sector should play for closer economic interaction between the two countries.¹⁶

In 2005, before the July 18 Agreement a number of new initiatives aiming to enhance trade and investment ties were launched. In mid-January, a U.S.-India “Open Skies” agreement to remove restrictions and provide lower fares on airline service between the two countries was announced by Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and his Indian counterpart. The objective of the agreement is to promote commerce. The Transportation Secretary also expressed the administration’s commitment to help India in fully developing its transportation infrastructure. In June, President Bush issued a proclamation determining “that India has made progress in providing adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights” and terminated “the suspension of India’s duty-free treatment for certain articles under the GSP [Generalized System of Preferences].”¹⁷ This measure in response to India’s strengthening of intellectual property protections, is expected to increase bilateral trade and investment.

The July 18 US-India Joint Statement outlined the following objectives of bilateral economic cooperation (Annexure II):

- To revitalize the US-India Economic Dialogue and launch a CEO Forum in order to harness private sector energy and ideas to deepen bilateral relationship.
- To support and accelerate economic growth in both countries through increased, trade investment and technology collaboration,
- To promote modernization of India’s infrastructure, and
- Launch a US-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture to focus on promoting teaching, research, services and commercial linkages.

Accordingly, the forum to promote teaching, research, and commercial linkages in agriculture between India and the United States was launched.

¹⁶ David C. Mulford, “US and India: Building Global Partnership”, April 21,2004, available at <http://www.ficci.com/media-room/speeches-presentations/2004/apr/apr21-us-mumbai-david.htm>

¹⁷ The United States had suspended certain GSP benefits to India due to concerns about the protection of intellectual property.

The Joint Statement paved way for the promotion of non-governmental element of the bilateral institutional framework for economic relations which comprises of the CEO's Forum which was set up during Prime Minister Singh's visit to Washington in July, as well as a Financial and Economic Forum, a Working Group on Trade, a Commercial Dialogue, and the Information and Communications Technology Working Group.

The US Secretary of Treasury John Snow visited India in early November. Snow pushed for additional liberalization of the Indian banking, insurance, pension, and fund management sectors during his meetings on financial, trade and investment issues with Indian Finance Minister, Central Bank Governor, and other senior government and business leaders. The U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum was inaugurated during the visit of the United States Trade Representative Rob Portman in mid-November to New Delhi. Portman sought "ambitious" cuts in India's trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. The March 2, 2006 Joint Statement further reaffirmed commitment to expand even further the growing ties between the two countries and highlighted the efforts made by the leadership in both countries in this direction. (Annexure III).

3.5. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FRICTION IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Despite all the optimism and enthusiasm attached to the economic cooperation with India by the Bush administration, it perceives that a wide range of factors act as friction in the consolidation of closer economic cooperation. These can be listed as such (Kronstadt 2005 and Martin & Kronstadt 2007):

- The United States government officials and business leaders continue to criticize the various barriers to trade and investment in India. In September 2004, Alan Larson, the US Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, complained about the low level of trade and investment flows between the two countries than required. He also said that the American exports to India "have not fared well" and "the picture for U.S. investment is also lackluster", blaming it to the slow pace of economic reforms in India.

- Various interest groups in the United States have voiced their concern that closer U.S.-India economic ties could accelerate the practice by some U.S. firms of outsourcing IT and customer service jobs to India. This, in turn, led to various proposals in Congress and various State governments to restrict outsourcing work overseas.¹⁸ Though such restrictions on outsourcing were opposed by the Bush Administration officials however they communicated to the Indian officials that the best way to counter such “protectionist” pressures in the United States is to further liberalize its markets. Another concern of the US interest groups was linked to the transmission of private information of the consumers in the United States due to outsourcing of financial services(such as call centers) to India. This led to the launching of the U.S.-India Cyberterrorism Initiative in 2001 to discuss a number of cybersecurity issues and urge India to put in place privacy and cybersecurity laws.
- In addition to maintaining high tariff rates on imports (especially on products that compete with domestic products), India also assesses high surcharges and taxes on a variety of imports.
- There are a number of inefficient structural policies in India which adversely affect its trade. These include price controls for many “essential” commodities, extensive government regulation over many sectors of the economy, and extensive public ownership of businesses, many of which are poorly run.
- Despite India’s attempt to develop internationally competitive IT industries (such as software), U.S. government complain about India’s poor record in protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), especially for patents and copyrights. The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated United States losses of \$420 million due to trade piracy in 2003 — nearly three quarters of this in the categories of business and entertainment software — and noted “very little progress in combating piracy.”
- One of the major concerns of the Congress is that the resolution of some of the key economic and trade issues with India may involve alterations in current

¹⁸ The 108th Congress passed H.R. 2673 (P.L. 108-199), which limits certain federal government contractors from outsourcing work overseas

federal law. In particular, changes in laws pertaining to agricultural goods, pharmaceuticals, nuclear and dual-use technology, and immigration may be considered as part of an effort to foster closer trade relations with India.

- Also the United States government officials complain that India's complex and entrenched bureaucracy frequently creates a barrier to implementing new economic policies and programs.

3.6. THE US-INDIA TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONS

According to official U.S. trade statistics, bilateral merchandise trade with India has grown from under \$10 billion in 1996 to nearly \$31 billion in 2006 — a trebling in a decade. In 1996, India was the 32nd largest market for U.S. exports and the 25th largest source of imports. By 2006, India had risen to be 21st biggest export market for the United States and the 18th biggest supplier of imports. The United States has become India's leading trading partner, mostly due to the growth in India's exports to the United States. (Table 1) The value of such exports more than doubled from \$9.3 billion in 2000 to \$18.7 billion in 2005. The United States' total trade with India in 2006 exceeded that with Israel, Nigeria, and Thailand. (Martin and Kronstadt 2007: 34). Also trade in services grew considerably during the period 2000-2005. (Table 2).

The United States is an important source of foreign direct investment for India. According to Indian statistics, the United States had \$4.913 billion in investments in India as of December 2005, making the United States the second biggest investor in India and representing 16.1% of all foreign direct investment in India. The recent growth in U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI) in India parallels the growth in bilateral trade. The growth during the 1990 was steady and modest, but U.S. investments in India rose dramatically between 2001 and 2005, according to official U.S. data. Between 1990 and 2000, U.S. investments in India rose from \$372 million to \$2.4 billion — an increase of over \$2 billion over 10 years. Over the next five years, U.S. FDI in India increased by over \$6 billion to \$8.5 billion. Over the 15 year period, the total value of U.S. FDI in India increased 22-fold.

The statistics also showed that India remains a relatively smaller destination for the United States overseas investors. As of 2005, less than one-half of one percent of United States direct investment overseas was located in India which amounted to half the size of its investments in China, less than a quarter of the size of investments in Hong Kong, and nearly a sixth the size of investments in Singapore. Overall, India ranked 31st in 2005 for locations for overseas United States direct investments. (Kronstadt 2006: 30).

However, speaking in New Delhi in September 2006, the United States Ambassador to India David Mulford drew attention to the slowdown in the reform process and stopping of privatization in India despite an environment favorable to trade and investment and also warned of its negative impact by saying, "It is important to bear in mind there are serious economic costs to any loss of momentum on the reform front. ... The solution to attracting much greater private sector investment in energy and infrastructure development is a blend of policies that includes better governance, market sensitive regulatory regimes, continued liberalization of the financial sector that enables foreign and domestic private capital to finance major projects, and the timely resolution of investor-state disputes"¹⁹

Since United States and India have not signed any bilateral trade agreement or bilateral investment treaty, the terms of multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) govern the trade relations between the two countries. According to the analysis of the CRS report on United States-India economic and trade relations, four specific bilateral agreements had an impact as well as are likely to affect in future the trade relationships between the United States and India. (Martin and Kronstadt 2007: 40-43). These are:

1. *The Civil Nuclear Cooperation*: President Bush's step to achieve full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India reversing the three decades old non-proliferation policy of the United States, if implemented is believed to generate contracts for American businesses worth up to \$100 billion, as well as generate up

¹⁹ <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/72175.htm>

to 27,000 new American jobs each year for a decade.²⁰ Also a number of firms dealing with nuclear materials will gain access to the Indian market.

2. ***Verified End User Program (VEU)***: The VEU program was announced to be created by President Bush in March 2006. It is also called the ‘Trusted Customer’ program and would facilitate the license-free sale of otherwise controlled U.S. exports to approved Indian end users. The US Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez said in February 2007 speech to the Department of Commerce that the VEU program would provide qualified Indian companies “access to U.S. technology products in a faster, more efficient, and more transparent manner” will be operational within a “few months.” The United States is pressing India to strengthen its export control systems and meet the standards specified in the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group, however, strengthening of its export controls is not a precondition for the VEU program the United States has expressed the intention of removing certain chemicals and Wassenaar items from the program in the absence of stringent export controls. While the Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral agreement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and military technology, the Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation.
3. ***The United States Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)***: The GSP provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing countries. In 2006, India received GSP preferential treatment for \$5.7 billion of its exports to the United States, of which \$2.4 billion, or 42%, was jewelry or jewelry-related products. However, there was opposition in the 109th Congress on the inclusion of India in the GSP program. The CRS report mentions that the then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman questioned the renewal of the GSP Program in May 2006, blaming India for holding up the Doha negotiations. In September 2006, the then-Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman called for

²⁰ The figures are based on the speculations of US Chamber of Commerce and US-India Business Council that lobbied in favour of the civilian nuclear cooperation initiative.

U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab to consider revising the GSP Program to exclude advanced developing countries such as Brazil and India. However, no such action was taken by the Bush Administration.

4. *The United States-India Economic Dialogue:* The Economic Dialogue comprising of four main fora — the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum, the Financial and Economic Forum, the Environmental Dialogue, and the Commercial Dialogue- the objective of which is to seek ways to resolve outstanding economic and trade issues, develop administrative capacity, and provide technical assistance is also very important regarding the bilateral trade between the United States and India.

3.6.1 High Technology Trade

The officials of the United States have rejected the “trade-deterring myths” about limits on dual-use trade by noting that only about 1% of total United States trade value with India is subject to licensing requirements and that the great majority of dual-use licensing applications for India are approved (more than 90% in FY2006). The United States-India High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) was inaugurated in July 2003 to provide a forum where officials discussed a wide range of issues relevant to creating the conditions for more robust bilateral high technology commerce. The fifth HTCG meeting was held in Washington in February 2007, when the United States Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez unveiled a new “Trusted Customer” program designed to facilitate greater high-tech trade with India. In 2005, the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Defense Working Group was held under HTCG auspices. Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security formally designated India as an eligible country under its “Validated End-User” program in October 2007 which will allow certain trusted Indian buyers to purchase high-technology goods without an individual license. The officials of the United States have rejected the “trade-deterring myths” about limits on dual-use trade by noting that only about 1% of total United States trade value with India is subject to licensing requirements and that the great majority of dual-use licensing applications for India are approved (more than 90% in FY2006).(Kronstadt RL 33529 2006: 32).

3.6.2. Civil Space Cooperation

The enhancement of the bilateral United States.-India cooperation on the peaceful uses of space technology is one of issues of the NSSP quartet. Also the July 2005 Joint Statement called for closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena. Major conferences on India-US space science and commerce were held at the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organisation in Bangalore in both 2004 and 2005. During President Bush's March 2006 visit to India, the two countries committed to move forward with agreements that will permit the launch of United States satellites and satellites containing U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles. Later it was agreed that two scientific instruments of the United States would be used on India's planned Chandrayaan lunar mission. In February 2007, a meeting of the United States.-India Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation was held in Washington, where officials expressed satisfaction with growing bilateral ties in the aerospace field. (Kronstadt RL 33529 2006: 33).

3.7. CONCLUSION

The above analysis brings out that during the Bush administration, the United States economic policy toward India has been based on the assumption that an economically stronger India would be in the best interest of the United States policy in Asia. Also being a democracy an economically strong would be favorable to United States global policy as well. Economy has been one of the important pillars on which the strategic partnership rests. Therefore the policy orientation of the Bush administration has been to facilitate and promote the development of India through easing of restrictions and promotion of trade and commerce. However, the prerequisite for this was increasing economic reforms by India. The various officials in the Bush government have been constantly pushing for the active and speedy reform process and the slowdown of which became serious cause of concern. However, owing to the welfare commitments of the Indian government, the

reform process is most likely to have certain limitations. This in turn will have impact on the pace of the strategic partnership and points to the limitations that the policy approach followed by the Bush administration.

CHAPTER-4
THE US-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND
THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

The second term of Bush administration demonstrated the most visible political will to resolve one of the most contentious issues haunting US-India relations and conditioning the policy of the United States towards India, that is, the nuclear question. The declaration in July 2005 US-India Joint Statement had been that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such countries” and President Bush vowed to work on achieving “full civilian nuclear cooperation with India”. All these affirmative statements were perceived as a major change in the direction of the United States’ (non-proliferation) policy towards India regarding the nuclear issue. March 2006 witnessed the completion of India’s nuclear facility Separation Plan requiring India to move 14 out of its 22 reactors into permanent international oversight by the year 2014 and place all future civilian nuclear reactors under permanent safeguards.

The perception of key Congressmen, both Democrat and Republican, who support the global NPT regime was that the deal would amount to reversal of the decades old non-proliferation policy of the United States, thus sacrificing the non-proliferation interests for better relationship with India.¹ The passage of the Hyde Act by a lame duck Congress in the United States in December 2006 and then the conclusion of the “**Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy**” popularly referred to as the 123 Agreement demonstrated the Bush administration’s will to operationalise the controversial policy. However the operationalisation of the deal has not yet been realised but this is largely due to the domestic debate in India voicing disagreement with certain provisions of the deal. However, the absence of substantial opposition to the deal that could have prevented its passage by the Congress, reflects the support behind the deal in the United States. This chapter would deal with an analysis of the symbolic centerpiece of the US-India strategic partnership that is the US-India Civilian Nuclear deal, the negotiations that led to the nuclear pact, the difficulties that

¹K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-US Relations”, CRS Report Order Code RL33529, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>, p 25.

have been cropping up in both the countries and between them in implementing the deal as well as an assessment of the relevance of the nuclear deal in the overall policy of the United States aiming at a strategic partnership with India.

4.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Non proliferation has been a major policy objective of the United States national security, stated time and again in major public policy documents as well as in the speeches of the officials. One of the CRS reports states that “for three decades Indian nuclear weapons have confounded American policymakers”.(Levi and Ferguson 2006: 7). Being a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), when India conducted its first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974, it was subjected to a “nuclear apartheid” by the United States. Another CRS report mentions that the PNE stimulated the United States-led creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the international export control regime for nuclear related trade and also by the passage of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act 1978 which tightened the United States export laws.² All the successive Democratic and Republican administrations excluded it from the community of responsible nuclear states and denied nuclear commerce unless India gave up its nuclear arms. After the end of the cold war, though the United States perceived lesser threats yet the nuclear concerns in South Asia troubled the policy-makers. As Dennis Kux pointed out that the 1992 draft Defense Planning Guide for the post cold war era published by the *New York Times* declared that the United States sought to prevent the development of a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent and wanted to ensure that both, India and Pakistan, conform to the NPT norms as well as place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy safeguards.(Kux:1992,p.16).The period in the aftermath, too, was marked with concerns about India’s nuclear program. However the overall policy was perceived as a success in slowing down the nuclear arms build up in South Asia. (Levi and Ferguson 2006: 8)

²K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-US Relations”, CRS Report Order Code RL33529, at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf> p 25.

4.1.1. The 1998 Tests and the Policy of the Clinton Administration

The conduct of a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and the subsequent declaration of being a “nuclear weapons power” by India signified what Ashley Tellis describes as “a dramatic change, not in New Delhi’s strategic capabilities, but in its strategic directions” and it became evident to the United States government that the policy of nuclear apartheid which was exercised towards India till now cannot succeed in achieving denuclearization of India. (Tellis 2002: 14). President Clinton in his statement at Potsdam on 13 May 1998 said that the tests created dangerous new instability in the region and imposed sanctions on India through Presidential determination No.98-22 in accordance with the section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (Glenn Amendment).

The aftermath of 1998 tests led to a re-examination of the existing United States’ policy towards India and gave way to active diplomatic engagement that manifested in extensive dialogue between the then United States Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh, the Indian External Affairs Minister. The talks began in June 1998, revolved around the resolution of the non-proliferation issues and considered improved bilateral relations contingent primarily upon the resolution of these concerns. (Talbott 2002)

The Clinton administration decided to put in place a “nuclear restraint regime” in South Asia, urging both India and Pakistan to a) sign and ratify the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) without delay or conditions, b) halt production of fissile material and support the FMCT (Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty), c) accept IAEA safe guards on all nuclear facilities d) agree not to deploy or test missile systems, e)institutionalize strict export control on the diffusion of strategic material³.

The CTBT prohibits the carrying out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and urges each party to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control and refrain from causing, encouraging or in any

³ As put forward before the Senate CFR Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian affairs by Karl Inderfurth Asst Secretary of State for South Asian affairs, 3 June 1998, Rashmi Jain p.412.

way participating in carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other explosion. It was opened for signature at New York on 24 September 1996 and is not in force as of now. (SIPRI Yearbook 2006). On the basis of President Clinton's proposal made to the United Nations in September 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution UNGA 48/75L IN December 1993 that recommended the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. This came to be known as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The Indian position until the 1998 tests was that a cut-off level should include fissile material already produced and stockpiled. Since the tests India has argued for placing a ban on the future production of fissile material.⁴

However, the components of the nuclear restraint regime were largely unacceptable in India and in fact regarding weaponisation and missile development the views in Indian policy-making establishment were opposite to that of the United States. (Sondhi 2000). When this was well recognized by the United States after the missile tests by India in April 1999, the Clinton administration sought to ensure a curbing of future testing by India as well as a more transparent account of India's nuclear capabilities and limits to its missile ambitions. Some analysts have argued that the FMCT had been designed to bring India, Pakistan and Israel into the global nuclear non-proliferation regime in some form by freezing their nuclear capabilities at the then levels. (Feldman 1999). Joseph Cirincione pointed out that the current international scenario denied the possibility that the NPT would be signed by India, Pakistan and Israel, also "the NPT cannot be amended to welcome them as nuclear weapons states with any special status without jeopardising the entire regime", the FMCT, however is a possible measure to engage the three states in the global regime. At the same time it would be helpful avoiding arms race in southern Asia providing "triple reassurances within the China-India-Pakistan triangle". (Cirincione 2000: 239). Later efforts to accommodate India in the global regime with a special status formed a part of Bush administration's approach.

⁴ URL: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/fmct.html>

The realization in the United States of India's strategic importance owing to its being a rising economic power, the largest democracy (it was Clinton who started emphasis on "democratic enlargement" as his policy agenda) and occupying a strategically significant location, emerged during the Clinton administration itself. In 1997, the report of a Task Force concluded that "The time is ripe, in particular, for the United States to propose a closer strategic relationship with India, which has the potential to emerge as a full-fledged major power". (Haass 1997: 3). Tellis also mentions about the administration's perception that an expansion of ties with India entails profitable strategic relationship on a much wider strategic spectrum. (Tellis 2002: 42). After the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, another report of the Task Force concluded, "the United States has important interests in improving relations with India and Pakistan, in promoting regional stability, and in preventing further nuclear proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere". (Haass 1998: 5). Despite wide condemnation of the tests in the Congress many important figures voiced their opposition for a policy having adverse effects on the United States relationship with India. Frank Pallone, the New Jersey Democrat and founder member of the India caucus in the Congress, voiced his concern that the tests should not derail US-India relationship. Richard Lugar, the Republican Senator attributed the tests to be the consequence of the administration's failure to engage India seriously. Connie Mack (R-Fla) was vocal in pointing out the responsible behaviour of India regarding proliferation in contrast to China. (Rubinoff in Kapur et al 2002: 444-45). In the light of increasing commercial ties between the two countries, R. Roger Majak, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration mentioned that the sanctions should not hamper peaceful business relations with the United States. (Jain 2007: 243). Immediately thereafter, Karl Inderfurth, the then Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, announced the beginning of an earnest process of re-engagement with both India and Pakistan. Consequently, sanctions were eased and legislation calling for exemptions introduced.

At the same time the evaluation of the alternative of leaving India to itself suggested that even the most modest of India's strategic programs, in the face of external pressures, could give rise to domestic decisions threatening the United States interests and thus led

to the conclusion that the option would be inimical to the interests of the United States. (Tellis 2002: 42). In his statement on “US Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report”, Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State on 12 November 1998 stated the goals of engagement as - prevention of escalation of nuclear competition in the region, strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime and promoting dialogue between India and Pakistan. He denied the possibility of acceptance of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons state under NPT. He admitted as well that it is clear to the administration that the two countries will not alter their defense program according to direction given by the United States. (Jain 2007: 423-24).

However, even after thirteen rounds of Talbott-Singh talks the United States expressed disagreement with India’s policy of deploying a nuclear deterrent acknowledging the complexity of managing the nuclear issue but at the same time showing the desire to move ahead owing to the need of harmonization.⁵ The test of an extended range version of Agni ballistic missile by India in April 1999 was seen as inimical to the interests of the United States and raised concerns about further missile tests by the two countries. But the United States continued to urge India to follow the nuclear restraint regime.

When the CTBT failed to get ratification of the Senate in 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson appreciated Indian plans and efforts to build consensus around the CTBT.⁶ In the meantime the US Department of Commerce removed 51 Indian entities from the sanctions list in December 1999. A Parliamentary Research paper mentions that the joint statement on bilateral relations titled *US-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century*, released on 21 May 2000, among other things also said, “The United States believes India should forego nuclear weapons. India believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs. Nonetheless, India and the U.S. are prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation

⁵ Remarks by the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the India International Center, New Delhi, 30 January 1999, Jain 2007: 429.

⁶Remarks by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson in a press conference at the Foreign Press Center, 22 October 1999. Jain 2007: 433-34.

of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. To this end, we will persist with and build upon the productive bilateral dialogue already underway.”⁷

However among the few tough stands of the Clinton administration, the major reasons that hampered progress were- a) opposition to accommodate India as nuclear weapons state under NPT (one of the messages that India conveyed through the tests was to assert its position as a nuclear weapons power in the international system), b) realization of the vast potential of US-India relations was contingent upon the resolution of non-proliferation concerns.⁸ The Clinton administrations effort did not meet much success as Ashley Tellis observes, “the strategic objective of improving U.S.-Indian relations has still not been cogently articulated by the United States”. (Tellis 2002: 39).

At the same time, as mentioned in the first chapter, the need to give effect to a strategic partnership with India was increasingly recognized in the later years of the Clinton administration as well as by George W. Bush and his team of advisors while he was still campaigning for the presidential elections in 2000 in the United States .But the issue of proliferation was still not only haunting as a roadblock but was most difficult to deal with and its resolution was essential for the process to reach an higher level. In September 2000, security policy analyst Victor M. Gobarev in a policy analysis paper commented that among Indians still a persistent feeling of distrust against the United States exists. He noted, “Thus, at its core, India’s determination to keep its nuclear weapons until universal nuclear disarmament has little to do with Pakistan, much to do with China, and everything to do with America.” Therefore the policy aimed at a dramatic improvement of relationship with India needs to incorporate measures to remove such fears. This would require recognition of India as a nuclear weapons power by the United States. He further said that for the United States this would win “India’s acceptance of U.S. proposals on nonproliferation of WMD technology and fissile materials. India would join international talks on ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and would install effective controls for nuclear-related materials”. (Gobarev 2000).

⁷ *Washington File*, 21 May 2000 cited in “India-US Relations in a Changing Environment”, Parliamentary Research Paper No.20,2000-01, Department of Parliamentary Library (2002).

⁸ Statements by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the UN NPT Review Conference 24, April 2000, and to the Asia Society, Washington D.C. 14 March 2000, Jain 2007: 436.

4.2. THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

When President Bush took office in January 2001, from the beginning he and his policy advisors in the White House including National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Robert Blackwill, Stephen Hadley, Robert Zoellic and Philip Zelikow perceived the strategic significance of India and were hence in the process of developing a “strategy to invigorate U.S.-India ties”.⁹(Context already explained in Chapter 1). In January 2001, the then Secretary of State designate Colin Powell in his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that, “India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to help them in this endeavor”.¹⁰

But the non-proliferation concerns still haunted. In February 2001, the State department deeply regretted the Russian shipment of uranium fuel to Tarapur reactors in India seeing it as violation of non-proliferation commitments of Russia.¹¹ The priority attached to non-proliferation issue by the Bush administration is also reflected in its nomination of Mrs. Christina Rocca as the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, who was then serving as the foreign policy advisor to Senator Sam Brownback (Rep-Kansas). Brownback, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, played a key role in emphasizing the fact that South Asia being the most dangerous nuclear flash point should not be ignored. He adopted a balanced approach toward both India and Pakistan. Mrs. Rocca’s views on counter proliferation are reflected in the report of the Steering Group on Middle East created in January 2001, to which she was an aide. According to it, WMD proliferation is the gravest security threat to the United States and its prevention should be the highest priority of the administration.¹² However, Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review

⁹ A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill , “The India Imperative”, *National Interest*, Summer 2005.

¹⁰ *Washington File*, 17 January 2001.

¹¹ Statement of Philip T. Tecker, Deputy Spokesman of the Department of State deeply regretting Russian shipment of uranium fuel to India, 16 February, 2001, Jain 2007: 439-40.

¹² B. Raman, “Mrs. Christina Rocca : *Her Past, Present & Future*”, South Asia Analysis Group, available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper3/paper230.html>

(NPR) released in December 2001 did not mention India and Pakistan as threats rather as issues. Also a significant feature of the NPR was a change in the approach of President Bush towards the issue of non-proliferation itself. Jean Du Preez¹³ in an analysis of the NPR stated that it was charged by the critics that the NPR marks a radical departure from the past nuclear policies of the United States repudiating key nonproliferation commitments made in 1995 and 2000 NPT reviews and its obligations as a signatory of the CTBT. According to his analysis, the NPR emphasizes that the reduction of nuclear weapons will be pursued without necessarily relying on the 'requirement for Cold War treaties' and its stated objective is 'to give United States maximum flexibility'. He also mentions that the NPR made no reference to the NPT and the United States' obligations under its terms. (Preez 2002: 67-69). Also the Bush administration opposed the CTBT and later withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002.

The 9/11 episode provided a new pace and focused direction favorable to translate the strategy into specific policy. In a Presidential Determination signed on 22 September, President George W. Bush waived all nuclear related sanctions on India (and Pakistan) also cut short the "Entity List" preventing the American companies to do business with India from 150 entities to 20. (Jain 2007: 255). Also engagement accelerated after a meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee in November 2001, agreeing to expand cooperation on a number of issues which included civilian nuclear safety, the other issues being regional security, space and scientific collaboration and broadened economic ties committing the two countries to strategic partnership.¹⁴ But the momentum of expansion of bilateral ties slowed down due to the crisis that erupted between India and Pakistan after the attack on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. A CSR Report identified two nuclear risks in South Asia: first that the terrorists will acquire nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and second, that nuclear war will erupt through miscalculation, through preemption, or through sudden escalation. India and Pakistan are attractive sites to the two risks because of weapons grade material on their

¹³ Jean Du Preez is the director of the International Organisation and Non-Proliferation Program at James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS). He serves on the International Panel on Fissile Material. He focuses on the future of the NPT and related regimes and participated in the NPT review conferences.

¹⁴ <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/6057.htm>

soil. (Squassoni 2005: 2). Therefore nuclear threat reduction was an important policy goal for the United States and viewed the presence of Indian and Pakistani troops on the international borders and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir since December 2001 as a source of tension with risk of war quite imminent. In a speech in December of 2001, Senator Lugar noted that concerns had been raised immediately following September 11, 2001 about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and that "similar questions will be raised about India's."¹⁵ However, he further said that the closer ties with both countries since 9/11 provided opportunity to the United States to develop programs that respect their sovereignty and help to ensure nuclear security, safe storage and accountability.

In 2002, in his National Strategy to Combat WMD, President Bush stated that the long-term objective of the United States is to create a web of counter-proliferation partnerships which would make it difficult for proliferators to carry out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. The President announced Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May of 2003 and the stated goal of which is 'to create the basis for practical cooperation among states to interdict WMD-related shipments'. The PSI is a voluntary initiative where the participating countries are required to use existing national and international authorities to intercept shipments of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as related materials and delivery vehicles, at sea, on land, and in the air. The then United States Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker viewed it as a useful reinforcement to the nuclear nonproliferation provisions of the NPT and said that the United Nations Resolution 1540, passed on April 28, 2004 requiring all the member states to put in place "appropriate" and "effective" provisions to deny the access to biological, chemical, nuclear weapons and related materials and delivery vehicles to the terrorists and other non-state actors, is an endorsement of the PSI.¹⁶

¹⁵ Sen. Lugar, Richard, "The Lugar Doctrine," December 6, 2001, available at http://lugar.senate.gov/lugar_doctrine.html

¹⁶ The U.S. Approach to the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: An *ACT* Interview With Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050419_Rademakers.asp, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, "The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy For Nonproliferation" Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, IL, October 19, 2004

In May 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Christina B. Rocca at a meeting organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries in New Delhi, while stating the significance of non-proliferation in the bilateral agenda also acknowledged the potential of expansion of cooperation and mutual understanding especially over the issue of export controls, through dialogue and information-sharing. Along with working to invigorate bilateral high technology commerce and expansion of civilian space cooperation, the United States agreed to the resumption of three nuclear safety-related projects. The United States consistently insisted that both the countries should take steps to deescalate the crisis situation and on June 5, 2002 President Bush telephoned the leaders of both the countries for the same purpose. In September 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States too, mentioned the differences regarding the development of India's nuclear and missile programs but at the same time stated the dominant character of common strategic interests and also the intent to address the issues with a policy perception that gives priority to the commonality of interests and building a strong partnership.¹⁷

4.2.1 The Policy Dilemma

Bush administration perceived and upheld the logic that improved relationship with India was important for a greatly improved position of the United States in Asia, and removal of barriers to nuclear cooperation was essential to bring about an improvement in the bilateral relationship. The latter was not possible with a country possessing nuclear weapons and not a signatory to the NPT. The existing policies made the United States to wrestle between two almost contradictory objectives: improved bilateral relations with India and non-proliferation.

Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf remarked in 2002: "South Asia is a special case. They have weapons. We won't be successful in pressing them to beat them into plowshares, but we need to be more inventive in getting them to

¹⁷ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2002/index.html

understand much better how to manage the dangers that the weapons pose. There is a variety of confidence building measures they could take bilaterally and unilaterally.” (Wolf 2002). But this inventive approach was not easy to figure out. Lloyd Macaulay Richardson of the Hoover Institution pointed out that developing the United States policy for India’s nuclear future confronted two levels of obstacles- a) current treaty i.e. the NPT and multilateral obligations, and b) U.S. domestic law — all related to nuclear nonproliferation. He said that domestic law has hampered the United States’ policy toward South Asia.¹⁸ But at the same time he pointed out that the war on terrorism provided an opportunity for the President to, “to seek rescission of these legislative obstacles, putting discretion for these matters back where they belong — in the executive branch rather than in Congress. India’s many friends in Congress should be willing to assist in this effort.” Referring to the two policy options available to the United States i.e either accepting India into the NPT regime as a nuclear state or ignoring India’s nuclear program, he rejected the feasibility of the former option as amendment to the treaty is hard to materialize. So he stated that, “If we were starting from a clean slate, we would want to give careful consideration to assisting India’s nuclear development, not just to advance U.S. strategic interests in Asia but also to keep tabs on what India is actually up to. Since that is unlikely, calculated ambiguity toward the India program may be the best policy option we have.” (Richardson 2002).

However, despite the systemic compulsions in place and the White House pushing through a strategy to bring about a transformation, it did not result in any compelling manifestation in Bush’s first term. Robert Blackwill observed that “in American policymaking the White House can say what it wishes conceptually, but this must be translated to specific policies,” which obviously requires taking the Congress along and nuclear cooperation with India was not acceptable to the non-proliferation “ayatollahs” or the “nagging nannies” in the Congress.¹⁹ Therefore improving relations with India was acceptable but not at the peril of the goal of non-proliferation.

¹⁸ Lloyd Macaulay Richardson, “Now Play The India card: Securing U.S. strategic interests in Asia” October/ November 2002 available at <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3459266.html>

¹⁹ Blackwill, Robert D. (2005), “The India Imperative”, *National Interest*, Summer, p.10.

Elizabeth Shafer, Board Member of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, expressed concern over the growing sentiment within India as stated by Bharat Karnad, a senior fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, "would the Americans protest the Indians doing to Pakistan precisely what Americans are doing in Afghanistan to root out terrorism?" (Celia Dugger cited in Schaffer) and also over the linking of U.S. led war on terror in Afghanistan to increasing nuclear tensions in South Asia by Admiral L. Ramdas, Former Chief of the Indian Navy. She drew attention to the increasing failure of the nuclear policy of the United States in defusing nuclear tensions in South Asia. (Shafer 2002). The policy wrestled between ensuring nuclear threat reduction and non-proliferation measures by the Congress on the one hand, and efforts for improvement of bilateral relationship by the Bush White House. However latter required progress in the area of civilian nuclear cooperation which was not an easy task with countries which are legally non-nuclear weapon states but possess nuclear weapons capability-India and Pakistan being the same.

The Kargil crisis was finally defused in June 2002. It was during this crisis where the policy of United States was in India's favour than Pakistan and de-hyphenation actually began to reflect in the policy. There was a realization in the administration, as expressed by the Secretary of State Colin Powell at a press conference in New Delhi on July 28, that U.S.-India relations are measured by the conditions on the line of control. Therefore the conditions there should be under control keeping the broader relationship in consideration. When Vajpayee again visited New York in September 2002, the talk on nuclear cooperation resumed and a High Technology Cooperation Group (HTGC) was started in November 2002 to discuss strategic trade and security issues as well as trade facilitation measures. The area of strategic trade involved working to strengthen national export control systems while also reviewing United States, export licensing processes and policies, so as to grant India expanded access to sophisticated United States technologies, consistent with its domestic laws and international commitments. Kenneth Juster, the Under Secretary of Commerce, assigned the function of oversight of the Bureau of Industry and Security dealing with issues where business and security interests intersect, said that the principle driving the HTGC is - security as the foundation of trade. Juster,

who is perceived as the leading architect of the NSSP, said that the HTGC is a measure of building confidence between the two countries for increased trade in dual-use goods and technology while working towards enhancing security.²⁰

India became a member of the Convention on the Physical Protection of the Nuclear Material in 2002, (Pakistan became a member in 2000)²¹. According to CRS Report RL31589, the 107th Congress specifically addressed nonproliferation issues of Indian and Pakistan in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228), containing a provision on nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia which stated that it will be the policy of the United States to encourage India and Pakistan to “establish a modern, effective system to protect and secure nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, accidental employment, or theft.” P.L. 107-228 stipulated that any assistance must be consistent with U.S. obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Section 1601 in Title XVI states that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with India and Pakistan to achieve the following by September 2003:

- nuclear test moratorium
- commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges and types of missiles developed or deployed
- agreement by both countries to align their export controls with international nonproliferation regimes

²⁰ Keynote Address by Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce, United States Government “Cybersecurity: A Key to U.S.-India Trade” India-U.S. Information Security Summit 2004, New Delhi, India October 12, 2004, <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr10124a.htm>.

²¹ This Convention, which entered into force in 1987, was designed to protect nuclear material in transit between countries. The CPPNM defines a range of nuclear terrorist activities and requires parties to criminalize those activities. It does not cover physical protection of domestic nuclear material in storage or use, nor does it cover byproduct material.¹³ The United States and other members of the Convention have been working for several years to expand the scope of the agreement, and agreed in September 2002 to extend physical protection to domestic use and storage. Source: Squassoni 2005

- establishment of export control system for sensitive dual-use items, technology, technical information and material used in the design, development , or production of WMD and ballistic missiles
- bilateral meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani officials to discuss security issues and establish confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear policies and programs.

Also the report said that a separate subsection stated that it shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its NPT obligations, to encourage, and where appropriate, work with the governments of India and Pakistan to achieve not later than September 30, 2003, the establishment of “modern, effective systems to protect and secure nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, accidental employment, or theft.” But it was observed that “any such dialogue with India or Pakistan would not be represented or considered, nor would it be intended, as granting any recognition to India or Pakistan, as appropriate, as a nuclear weapon state.” The Report also expressed concern over the fact that most of the nuclear material and facilities in India (and Pakistan) are not subject to international i.e. the IAEA safeguards.²²

C. Rajamohan mentions in his book that in his talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in May 2003, Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Advisor, emphasized the fact that cooperation on the trinity of issues has the potential to place the US-India relation to a “qualitatively new level of partnership” and keeping India’s responsible behaviour in consideration, the United States must remove the irritants to “civilian application of (our) nuclear program and developmental processes of (our) space program” ,also these areas can provide huge benefits to American companies. He further

²² The report observed that in India, there are safeguards on 6 reactors (Tarapur 1 & 2, LEU-fueled power reactors; Rajasthan RAPS-1 and -2, which use natural uranium;and Koodankulam-1 and -2, LEU-fueled power reactors). In addition, the Tarapur plutonium reprocessing facility (Prefre) is safeguarded when safeguarded fuel is used in the facility and the Tarapur MOX fuel fabrication plant has safeguards when it runs safeguarded material through it. The Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant haspartial safeguards. Key nuclear weapons-related facilities in India that are not subject to IAEA inspections include the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Trombay, which houses the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors for plutonium production, plutonium reprocessing plants and a pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant. These sites, as well as storage sites for weapons-grade material or for weapons themselves could be highly attractive to terrorists because they may contain weapons-usable nuclear material.

said that, “We have of course undertaken that we would put all nuclear power projects of foreign collaboration under safeguards. I am aware that some United States regulations and laws are constraining factors, but rules and legislation can be amended to respond to changed situations.”(Mishra 2003). Rajamohan stated that a similar offer was made by Mishra during his talks with Colin Powell in July 2002 but then it was not taken up. This time Mishra also emphasized the environmental perspective of the nuclear energy issue pointing out the disastrous effect of the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels on the global environment. (Rajamohan 2006: 23-24). Raja Mohan pointed out that Mishra’s urgency had to still wait, till a new inter-agency process started by the Bush administration could come up with an outcome. Now the factors that were most likely kept under consideration by this inter-agency process can be summed up as such:

- mounting pressure from the Congress to ensure nuclear threat reduction measures in South Asia
- continued attention of the United States on de-escalatory efforts to stop violence in Kashmir and pushing for dialogue and restraint between India and Pakistan.²³
- Consideration of Mishra’s offer in a context where energy policy assumed national security significance after 9/11 with security aspect emphasized more.

Also Ashley Tellis, advisor to Blackwill summed up the considerations of the Bush administration as such :²⁴

- Realisation that denuclearization of India was not possible,
- Realisation of importance of India to larger geopolitical interests of the United States and the administration’s own antipathy to the CTBT,
- More than a threat to American security, the leakage of India’s nuclear material and technology was a matter of concern and therefore “tightening the Indian export control regime was far more important from the viewpoint of increasing U.S. security than leading on the Indian state to cap or roll back its strategic programs.

²³ Testimony of Assisntent Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs,Christina Rocca ,before the House Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific, March 20,2003, (Jain 2007: 142)

²⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, “ India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States”, Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005,p.7

Despite persistent efforts on the part of the United States, when the Indian Establishment refused to send troops to Afghanistan in July 2003, the fear of loss of India led the United States to keep up the sustained engagement with India. In September 2003 Stephen Hadley, the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor and Kenneth Juster, Under Secretary for Commerce visited New Delhi and came up with what Rajamohan calls the “Hadley Plan in response to specific ideas on promoting high technology cooperation made by India few months earlier. The Plan added missile defence to the agenda and made the discussions on the trinity of subjects-nuclear, space and high technology- into a quartet” which later became the basis of the NSSP. (Rajamohan 2006: 28). However Rajamohan stated that still the objectives of both the parties differed that of the United States’ being more stringent export controls through legislative and administrative changes while that of India complete removal of proliferation related constraints that persisted since 1998 as well as full scope cooperation in high technology.

In January 2004 a Joint Statement was issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee declaring that the US-India “strategic partnership” included expanding cooperation in the “trinity” areas including expanding dialogue on missile defence. This was named as the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) involving a series of reciprocal steps consistent with the need to address a broader strategic partnership between the United States and India.²⁵ However the NSSP text specifies that “cooperation efforts will be undertaken in accordance with our respective national laws and international obligations”²⁶ and hence was not perceived as being ‘revolutionary’ Ken Juster said that, “It responds to India’s desire for increased access to U.S. technology for peaceful purposes by liberalizing trade in such technology in a manner that is consistent with U.S. nonproliferation laws and obligations, and does not contribute to India’s programs for nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The NSSP is grounded in the realization that what unites us is stronger than what divides us. It acknowledges

²⁵ The first phase of the NSSP led to the removal of ISRO headquarters from the Department of Commerce Entity List and easing of licensing requirements for low-level dual use items exported to ISRO subordinate entities. It granted a presumption of approval to all dual use items not controlled by the NSG for use in nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards.

²⁶ Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.htm>

India's role as a major power, while appreciating that it takes time to build a lasting strategic partnership. It sets up a process to create and build upon successes, while establishing habits of cooperation that extend deep into the governmental fabric in both countries." (Juster 2004).

Rajamohan observes that the nuclear energy component was limited to regulatory and safety issues.(Rajamohan 2006:36). However Ashley Tellis emphasized the revolutionary nature of NSSP saying that "the Bush administration turned this approach on its head. Viewing India as part of the solution to proliferation, the president embarked on a course of action that would permit India greater — not lesser — access to controlled technologies despite the fact that New Delhi would not surrender its nuclear weapons program and would continue to formally remain outside the global non-proliferation regime... a change in the US strategic orientation towards India that in time will be far more consequential than any of the minutiae encoded in the current agreement. That the administration has consented to such a unique covenant speaks volumes for New Delhi's importance in the president's geopolitical calculations."²⁷

Hence this measure was reflective of the desire in the Bush administration to sustain the engagement but the much lauded goal of strategic partnership still could not become a living reality, the cause being persistent obstacles to civilian nuclear cooperation which India was pressing hard for and the Bush administration was unable to provide due to domestic laws and international obligations. The Indian negotiators insisted on cooperation on the nuclear energy front, owing to their growing energy needs, as being crucial to further progress. While the considerations mentioned earlier were driving the Bush administration's inter-agency process, according to George Perkovich the administration was trying to enter into a strategic partnership with India guided by three compelling strategic assumptions: "that the top priority should be balancing Chinese power, that strengthening U.S.–India relations is a promising way to do this, and that both of these objectives are more important than maintaining a rule-based nonproliferation

²⁷ Ashley J.Tellis, "Lost Tango in Washington", Indian Express, November 15, 2004, Available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16152>

regime.”(Perkovich 2005:) In December 2004 the National Intelligence Council’s report *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020* - a major public policy document mentioned that “China, India, and other developing countries’ growing energy needs suggest a growing preoccupation with energy, shaping their foreign policies.”²⁸ The Chairman of NIC, Robert L .Hutchings had earlier paid a visit to India in November 2004. Rajamohan observes that, “the NIC report had a significant influence on the decisions that the Bush administration would make on India”. (Rajamohan 2006:76). Also he mentions that President Bush himself brought up the subject of nuclear energy cooperation when he met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at Moscow during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory in the World War II. (Rajamohan 2006:131) In fact since the visit of Condoleezza Rice in March nuclear energy cooperation was on the agenda of dialogue during the to and fro visits of the officials both the countries. In May energy dialogue was set up with Sam Bodman, the Secretary of the Energy Department of the United States and Montek Singh Ahluwalia, India’s top economic planner, being the in charge. The dialogue set up five working groups dealing with areas like oil and gas, coal and clean technology, electric power, energy efficiency, renewable energy, new technologies such as hydrogen, and civil nuclear power.²⁹ The Bush administration being aware of the domestic and international obstacles to civil nuclear cooperation with India, realized that “while domestic laws can be changed, or provisions can be waived, international treaties are more difficult to amend.”(Levi and Ferguson 2006: 13).

On February 11, 2004 President Bush gave an address at National Defense University outlining a new nonproliferation strategy. A significant element of his proposal was to mend a perceived loophole in Article IV of the NPT that enables non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to acquire all forms of nuclear technology, including sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, so far they are under IAEA safeguards and are used only for peaceful purposes. Also he called on the Nuclear Suppliers Group

²⁸ *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project* available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html

²⁹ “ U.S.-India Energy Dialogue Joint Statement”, Washington DC, May 31,2005 available at <http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/IndiaUSEnergyDialogueJointStatement.pdf>

to tighten its export control guidelines by prohibiting the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to countries that do not already operate enrichment and reprocessing plants. The initiative was propelled, in particular, by Iran's pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability, and 'appeared to attach increasing importance to the NSG as a primary anti-proliferation mechanism that might compensate in part for deficiencies in the less flexible NPT.'³⁰

As the manifestation of the major policy shift that was long under way came the declaration of the U.S.-India Joint Statement on July 18, 2005, which asserted that, "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states" also President Bush promised to work on achieving "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India" and for this purpose agreed to work toward making the required changes in the domestic laws of the United States as well as in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG).

In exchange, the Indian government made a political promise to:

- identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs;
- declare its civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- voluntarily place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- sign an Additional Protocol for civilian facilities;
- continue its unilateral nuclear test moratorium;
- work with the United States to conclude a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT);
- refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them, as well as support international efforts to limit their spread;
- secure its nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and NSG guidelines.

On March 2, 2006, during President Bush's visit to India, he along with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a Joint Statement announcing the "successful completion of

³⁰ URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/2004011-4.html>

India's (nuclear facility) separation plan" requiring India to move 14 of its 22 reactors into permanent international safeguards by 2014 and place all future civilian reactors under permanent safeguards. Subsequently the Bush administration introduced a legislation in the Congress to waive the application of certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, at the President's request.

4.2.2. Arguments of the Administration

While the July 18 Agreement (2005) and March 2 Separation Plan (2006) spurred controversy inviting widespread criticism and apprehensions from the Congress about the policy being violative of non-proliferations of the United States, the Bush administration repeatedly asserted that such a measure would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security stated in his remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We must recognize that there is today no viable cookie-cutter approach to nonproliferation; we need tailored approaches that solve real-world problems. We need to be creative and adjust our approaches to take into account the conditions that exist, so that we can achieve our nonproliferation objectives. This has been a premise of Administration policy since the outset of President Bush's first term, in which he established non- and counter proliferation as top national security priorities."³¹

Further the administration insisted on making India an exceptional case to the United States' non-proliferation policy by agreeing to civilian nuclear cooperation with the status of a *de facto* nuclear weapons power instead of a *de jure* one keeping under consideration the restraint demonstrated by India towards nuclear proliferation. Speaking at a conference on the impact of the deal on the non-proliferation policy of the United States, Andrew Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non Proliferation said that the deal will enhance non-proliferation as India will now take on new security efforts without formally signing onto the NPT. He rejected the claim that other states will now undercut

³¹ Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Hearing on US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Prepared remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, November 2, 2005. Available at <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/55968.htm>

the NPT. He said that the NPT is under stress through North Korea and Iran's non-compliance, not the India deal.³²

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns in his remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee³³ tried to convince the Congress by stating that the nuclear deal offered to India was the product of a careful and deliberate assessment by the administration of the situation at hand, which involved the following considerations:

- The administration was determined that India could not be recognized as a nuclear weapons state outside NPT at the same time was also aware that India would not join NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.
- Materialising a strategic partnership with India required addressing of the difficult and complex issue of full civilian nuclear cooperation because "India had made this the central issue in the new partnership". The previous administrations decided to forgo this option because of India's nuclear weapons status.

He pointed out that the assessment led to the conclusion that the policy pursued by the previous administrations towards India actually did not strengthen non-proliferation, "because India developed nuclear weapons outside the regime, we had no existing cooperation between our civil nuclear energy industries and, as such, no real influence on India's adherence to the critical international nonproliferation standards that are the bedrock of our efforts to limit the spread of nuclear technology." Therefore it was decided that American interest which demanded compliance with the norms of the non proliferation, would be best served by incorporating India into that regime by engaging it thus ending its isolation. Therefore the agreement.

³² http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005/conference/presentations/india_deal.pdf

³³ Remarks by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R.Nicholas Burns on the U.S.and India Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation, November 2,2005 available at <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2005/hr051102p.html>

He said that, “Without such an agreement, India, with its large and sophisticated nuclear capabilities, would continue to remain outside the international export control regimes governing commerce in sensitive nuclear and nuclear-related technologies. With this agreement, given India’s solid record in stemming and preventing the proliferation of its nuclear technology over the past 30 years, the U.S. and the international community will benefit by asking India to open up its system, to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, and to submit to international inspections and safeguards on its civil facilities, thus allowing it to bring its civil nuclear program into effective conformity with international standards.” Also he made it clear that such an agreement was not intended for any other country.

In order to press the case for civil nuclear cooperation with India, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appeared before the key Senate and House committees in April 2006.³⁴ Also the administration’s five main justifications to facilitate change in the domestic laws of the United States allowing such cooperation with India (Department of Defence 2006):

- This would benefit U.S. security as it would bring India into the “non-proliferation mainstream”
- Would benefit U.S. consumers by reducing pressures on global energy markets, especially carbon based fuels,
- Would benefit the environment by reducing carbon emissions
- Would benefit U.S. business interests through sales to India of nuclear reactors, fuels and support services, and
- Would benefit progress of the broader U.S.-India global partnership.

4.2.3. Apprehensions of the Congress

Broad support existed in the Congress for the strategic partnership but not for the civil nuclear cooperation. David Fite of the House International Relations Committee expressed the frustration of the Congress over the July 18 Agreement being declared

³⁴ Condoleezza Rice, “Our Opportunity With India”, *Washington Post*, March 13,2006 available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63008.htm>

without any congressional consultation. In a House International Relations Committee hearing on September 8, 2005, Congressman Jim Leach stated, "I don't know any member of Congress that doesn't want to have a warming of relations with the government of India.... I also don't know many members of Congress who are pushing for the precise commitment that the administration has made."³⁵ The CRS Report summed up the main concerns of the Congress as such:

- The deal poses a fundamental danger to the global non-proliferation regime and it would contribute to India's nuclear arsenal.
- The deal would loosen export control legislation of the United States while Bush had advocated stringent domestic export control laws and tighter multilateral controls in the NPT Review Conference in March 2005.
- India has made a political promise to refrain from testing nuclear weapons as long as other nations are similarly restrained, but it has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would legally bind it to that obligation. Nor has India excluded the possibility of testing its own weapons should other states test theirs first.
- India has agreed to submit 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to international inspections, but it has kept the remaining eight potentially available for producing nuclear weapons material, has made no definite commitments whether future reactors will be inspected or used for weapons production, and has made no promises to end its production of nuclear weapons material.

At the same time, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-India Business Council took to strong lobbying in favor of the initiative hinting that such cooperation would generate contracts worth upto \$100 billion for the American Business and upto 27,000 new American jobs per year.³⁶

³⁵ "The US-India Global Partnership: Impact on Non-Proliferation", Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, Session I, Serial No,109-135, (online web) <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/joe102605.pdf>

³⁶ K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-US Relations", CRS Report Order Code 33529 p.16.

George Perkovich noted that the nuclear deal was artifact of a handful of top officials in both the governments. In the United States the officials involved- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Undersecretary Nicholas Burns, and counselor Philip Zelikow—minimized interagency review, congressional briefings and international consultations. Rice, Burns, Zelikow, and, ultimately, President Bush had made up their minds to lead a bold departure from long-standing policies toward India and toward U.S. and international rules governing nuclear technology commerce and they wanted to give effect to this initiative quickly. (Perkovich 2005: 1). However, despite all the hurry the Separation Plan was finally declared in March 2006.

While Michael Levi and Charles Ferguson pointed out that the announcement of the deal in March 2006 limited the options for the policy makers in the United States, because blocking the cooperation would mean damaging the bilateral relationship (for which a bipartisan support existed this is reflective of the fact that desirability of strategic partnership with India commanded strong political will) and “reinforcing unfortunate Indian perceptions of the United States not only as anti-Indian but also as an unreliable partner. They accept that they cannot fix every flaw in the deal without effectively undermining the prospect of U.S.-India nuclear cooperation”. They further suggested that “Congress should issue a set of bottom-line requirements for the formal U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, for India’s inspection agreement with the IAEA, and for new NSG rules that would allow nuclear commerce with India, and enforce those requirements....which while not mandating the future shape of the Indian nuclear complex, should provide incentives to steer India in the right direction.” (Levi and Ferguson 2006: 16)

Ashley Tellis also through a detailed analytical work concluded that the US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation does not in any way contribute to India’s nuclear arsenal and its rejection by the Congress would fail to advance some of the non-proliferation goals held high by the critics of the deal as well as contribute to the “deterioration of the planet’s environment”. Calling it a geopolitical opportunity that comes in a lifetime, he said that nuclear cooperation with India when it is a “relatively weak state” would be

more beneficial to the United States than at a time when India would become a true great power and hence in less need of such cooperation. “It would indeed be unfortunate, therefore, if the prospect now confronting Washington regarding a new global partnership with New Delhi were to be sacrificed because of some petty canard regarding the effect of imported natural uranium on India’s nuclear weapons program.”³⁷

4.2.3 Congressional Action

The Administration’s proposals were modified by the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and passed by an overwhelming 359-68 in the House on July 26 and by 85-12 in the Senate on November 16. The House International Relations Committee extensively reviewed the agreement giving it five hearings. The Congressional record shows that in the Congress the fact that India has nuclear weapons, will never give up those weapons, and will probably never sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was accepted. Also it was recognised that the previous two administrations have consistently tried to improve relations with India and ‘overcome the chilly relations’ as well as ‘India is a frontline state in the struggle against Islamist terrorism’. Hoyer, the Democratic whip from Maryland said, “I believe a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India will serve America’s strategic interests and strengthen global nonproliferation regimes by bringing the majority of India’s nuclear reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency oversight for the first time”, further on the status of India as a non-signatory to NNPT, he said, “NPT is an international accord that I strongly support. But it is also true that India has honored the spirit of that treaty and has been a responsible nuclear nation for the past 32 years, unlike Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, I might observe House bill represents a policy that recognizes our Indian allies’ responsible actions over more than three decades and our two nations’ strong and deepening relationship.”(Congressional Record 2006).

³⁷ Ashley J Tellis, “Atoms For War?: US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf>

The House Passed its version of the bill necessary to authorize the changes in the United States domestic law necessary to allow the United States to complete a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, the Henry J. Hyde United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006, H.R. 5682, on July 26, 2006 by a vote of 359-68. The Senate passed its version of the bill S.3709, United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation & United States Additional Protocol Implementation Act, on November 16, 2006 by a vote of 85-12-3. The House version of the Bill (H.R.5682) and the Senate version (S.3709) were reconciled with a House vote of 330-59 on December 8 and a Senate voice vote on December 9. The 109th Congress showed widespread bipartisan support to the President's policy initiative, rejecting a number of Killer Amendments. The bill passed with broad bipartisan support, including favorable votes from Democratic heavyweights such as Senator Joseph Biden (from Delaware), Representative Tom Lantos (from California), Senator John Kerry (from Massachusetts), Senator Hillary Clinton (from New York), and Senator Christopher Dodd (from Connecticut). Finally the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act became a law (Public Law 109-401) when President Bush signed it on December 18, 2006. Section 102 of the Act expresses the sense of the Congress that pursuant to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and WMDs, it is in the interest of the United States to:

- ensure that those countries that are not States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear technology they develop;
- it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT if—
 - (A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
 - (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to nonproliferation;

- (C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and implement substantially improved protections against the proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
- (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons.³⁸

The Act mentions that strong bilateral relations with India are in the interest of the United States (Clause 8). However Clause 13 of Section 102 also mentions that the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if such exports are terminated under United States law. Section 103 of the Act sets out a number of United States policy principles including, with respect to South Asia that: a moratorium is achieved on the production of fissile material for nuclear purposes by India, Pakistan, and China and India's commitment to "dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary sanction, and contain Iraq" for its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons should be obtained.

Section 104 of the Act allows the President to waive a number of requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). It also requires the President to submit a report requesting Congressional approval before such waivers are put into effect. Congressional approval would be required to waive the requirements in section 123a(2) of the AEA that non-nuclear weapons states have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities in a state under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere ("full-

³⁸ http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf

scope safeguards”) as a pre-condition of ongoing U.S. nuclear supply. It would be required to waive the requirement of section 128 of the AEA that non-nuclear weapons states possess full-scope safeguards to receive nuclear exports from the U.S. Waiver would also be required of section 129 of the AEA which requires the U.S. to end nuclear exports if a non-nuclear weapon state has tested nuclear weapons after 1978.

Section 104 of the Act imposes restrictions on transfers of nuclear material, and in subsection 104(d)(2), no items subject to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines may be transferred to India if such transport would be incongruous with the NSG guidelines on the day it occurred.

The State Department Fact Sheet mentioned that the legislation affirms the importance of having India as a strategic partner of the United States, recognises India 's strong nuclear nonproliferation record, states that civil nuclear cooperation with India is in the long-term interests of the United States, enhances the authority of the President to waive the full-scope safeguards requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with a non-Nuclear Weapon State under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as well other key provisions of that act, reaffirms United States policy to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, and reiterates the commitment of the United States to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty expresses the desire of the United States to work with India to bolster nonproliferation efforts around the world.³⁹

4.3. MAJOR CONCERNS IN INDIA

Serious objections and apprehensions arose in India pertaining to several clauses of the Hyde Act by the Left Parties and other Parties, organizations and the scientific community. The major concerns voiced in the Indian opposition to the deal are:

³⁹US Department of State Fact Sheet *US- India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative*, December 18, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/77944.htm>

- It would turn India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral obligation allowing the United States to reclaim its supplies in the event of a nuclear test. This will impact the Indian strategic defense program.
- Denies access to reprocessing technology to India
- Absence of prior authorization to reprocess spent fuel
- Lack of assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply
- The United States retains the right of 'intrusive' end-use verifications
- It would lead to erosion of India's foreign policy independence as suggested by the clause that calls for Indian assistance to the efforts of United States aimed at curbing Iran from acquiring WMDs.⁴⁰

Some of major objectionable sections being Section 102 (13) mentioned above relating to the termination of exports, Section 103 (a)(6) which says that the US policy shall "seek to prevent the transfer to a country (India, in this case) nuclear equipment, materials or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear transfers to that country (India, in this case) are suspended or terminated pursuant to this title (Hyde Act), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any other US law, Section 104 g(2)E(i) regarding annual certification and congruence of foreign policy, Section 104g(2) K relating to India's support for the PSI, Section 104c E,F,G relating to India conforming to various bilateral/multilateral agreements to which it is not currently a signatory such as the US' (MTCR), the Australia Group etc., and Section 106, which seeks to ensure that the nuclear exemption for India will cease to be effective if "the president determines that India has detonated an explosive device."⁴¹ However, President Bush, in his signing statement, stated that he views the statements of U.S. foreign policy contained in sections 103 and 104(d)(2) as advisory only.⁴²

⁴⁰ Siddharth Varadarajan, "Major Obstacles Persist in Nuclear Deal," *TheHindu* , April 25, 2007

⁴¹ An Open Letter to Members of Parliament by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, September 18, 2007 at <http://www.cpim.org/statement/2007/09072007-open%20letter%20to%20mps%20--%20nuclear%20issue.htm> and Dhruva Jaishankar, "Hiding Behind Hyde", at <http://www.indianexpress.com/story/277801.html>

⁴² <http://www.coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/Statements/SShr5682.pdf>

4.4. THE 123 AGREEMENT

After the completion of the legislation, the United States and India announced having concluded negotiations on the U.S.-India agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation as required under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 on July 27, 2007. **The Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy** generally referred to as the 123 Agreement was declared as a “historic milestone” in the bilateral strategic partnership. Article 2 (1) of the 123 Agreement mentions that “each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.⁴³ This binds the 123 to the Hyde Act and consequently to the latter’s provisions objectionable to those who oppose the deal in India. While the Hyde Act is a United States law and nothing can be supported by its government that contradicts the Act, only 123 is binding on India. Several analysts opined that there are certain sections where the two documents contradict one another. Michael Krepon and Alex Stolar worked out a comparison of the Hyde Act with the 123 and expressed that the 123 Agreement seeks to pass over the “legislative intent” behind several important provisions of the Hyde Act like those on fuel assurances, technology transfers and IAEA safeguards. Also they mentioned that the key provisions of the agreement are interpreted differently by the Bush and Manmohan Singh governments to make it acceptable in their respective domestic domains. (Krepon and Stolar 2007).

The remaining necessary steps to fully implement the initiative and enable civil nuclear cooperation with include:

- Completing negotiations on a and approval of that agreement by Congress;
- Negotiation of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency applicable to India 's separated civil nuclear sector; and

⁴³ <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/71vkAgHGNw1MuPVNCo520g/123text080307.pdf>

- The achievement of a consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make an India-specific exception to the full-scope safeguards requirement of the Group's export guideline.

The operationalisation of the United States-India civilian nuclear cooperation could not commence due to the domestic opposition owing to the above mentioned concerns in India. While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made efforts to push the deal through as parliamentary approval of international agreements is not required in India, the Indian Left Front that supports the ruling coalition, United Progressive Alliance (UPA) from outside and has a total of 62 MPs in the Lok Sabha i.e. the Lower House of the Parliament, threatened to withdraw support to the government. The provisions of the text of the 123 Agreement objectionable to the Left are still under consideration of the UPA-Left panel created in late August 2007. This has led to a slowdown in the Bush administration's enthusiasm for the nuclear deal while it is still insisting the Indian government to be quick in taking the decision so that the deal can be implemented before the end of his term in 2008.

Though the 123 agreement claims to have redressed the majority of these issues the first and the last still remain contentious and the Left continues to oppose the larger issue of strategic partnership with the United States as well. Its important stand is that the 123 Agreement is bound by the Hyde Act which conforms to the domestic non-proliferation laws of the United States. Also the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the major opposition party insists the renegotiation of the deal.

In view of these domestic developments in India the concerns in the United States Congress, with the Democrats in majority in both the Houses, again resurfaced. A letter signed by 23 House members to President George W. Bush in July 2007, stressed that any civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India is required to conform to "the legal boundaries set by Congress." In October, House Resolution 711, expressing the sense of the House concerning the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, was referred to

House committee. It sought Bush Administration clarifications on the 123 Agreement's compliance with the United States law.

As of now the operationalisation of the deal has been put on hold.

4.5. CONCLUSION

The fact that civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was concluded between the United States and India is reflective of a change in approach to the more than three decades old policy of the former towards the latter. The policy of civilian nuclear cooperation was the part of the larger policy of the United States the objective of which was strategic partnership with India. While the Indian side insisted that strategic partnership was contingent upon cooperation in the arena of civilian nuclear energy cooperation, for the United States it was not possible unless either the international non-proliferation norms were changed or domestic laws amended. The Bush administration realized that while it is almost impossible to change the international rules, domestic laws can be amended and tried to convince the Congress for the same. Also Bush administration's approach to non-proliferation itself was different from the previous administrations. In the Congress while large support existed for the strategic partnership, tampering with the non-proliferation was not acceptable. The policy process thus wrestled between nuclear threat reduction and non-proliferation concerns on one hand and the objective of strategic partnership with India on the other. However, the Bush Administration succeeded in convincing and gaining the support of the Congress secured in the passage of the Hyde Act by an overwhelming majority. The conclusion of the bilateral 123 Agreement with India was the product of a prolonged and tough process through an innovative approach that sought to reconcile the fulfillment of the demands of the non-proliferation "ayatollahs" of the U.S. Congress with the Indian administration's demand for full civilian nuclear energy cooperation. However the analysis of the provisions of the Hyde Act, the 123 Agreement and concerns raised by the Indian opposition to the civilian nuclear deal shows that non-proliferation concerns have not taken the back seat in the United States policy towards India. Nevertheless, certain flexibility for the strategic accommodation of India is demonstrated, which is unprecedented in the US policy. It is observed that the policy shift

does not reflect that geo-strategic considerations gained priority over non proliferation rather the approach to non-proliferation policy was moulded in a manner so as to complement and not hinder the geo-strategic interests. The new policy aims to ensure that India conforms to the non proliferation standards while proceeding with the friendly strategic partnership with the United States.

CHAPTER-5
CONCLUSION

Strategic partnership between two countries that at best remained estranged democracies during much of history is an event of great significance in IR. The United States and India were not able to enter into a political partnership in the past despite being the world's oldest and largest democracies respectively. This has been largely attributed by much of the existing scholarship to the compulsions of the cold war that gave rise to strategic incompatibility between the two countries leading to serious disagreement over issues relevant to bilateral cooperation as well as to international relations.

The end of cold war left no room for the United States policy perception of India as a Soviet ally. Also India embarked on the path of a more assertive autonomous decision making. It was the Clinton administration during which the importance of India to the United States policy was recognized. After the withering away of the erstwhile Soviet Union, when India stepped on the path of liberalization of its economy, the unease that characterized US-India relations and reflected in the United States policy toward India gradually began to melt down. The policy became considerate of the economic and military potential of India and its significance to United States.

American interests coupled with non-proliferation concerns after the May 1998 nuclear weapons test by India followed by Pakistan. The perception that United States has significant interest in positive relations with both India and Pakistan in order to ensure regional stability and prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia consolidated during the Clinton administration. Further it was also recognized that the time is appropriate to propose a closer strategic partnership with India which is an emerging major power. However there was no significant breakthrough during the Clinton administration because of the issue of non-proliferation being high on his policy agenda. The overemphasis of Clinton administration's arms control and policy advisors on non-proliferation issue and insistence on the signing of the CTBT by India resulted in the failure of the policy to break the ice in the bilateral relationship. But the policy laid the foundation on which the Bush administration later attempted to build upon. It was the Clinton administration's policy to have a balanced approach toward both India and Pakistan during the Kargil crisis in 1999, which was later officially declared as the policy

of de-hyphenation. Also the Clinton administration policy initiated the dialogue process with India after the 1998 nuclear tests marked the beginning of engaging India. But the thorny issue of accommodating India in the global nuclear system during the Clinton administration.

George W. Bush, right from the days of his campaign for presidency of the United States was aided and advised by group which had a different approach toward India. The Bush team including Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, Philip Zelikow and Robert Zoellic, all of whom held important positions in the Bush cabinet later, viewed India more as a strategic opportunity and less as a proliferation problem. India fitted well into the larger global policy of the United States, the sole superpower, operating in all the regions and encouraging friendly relations with states whose vital security interests converged with that of its own. Bush administration perceived India, a democracy with promising economic and military potential, as a friendly centre of power that should be won over on its side. Upon entering into office, this was explicitly stated in the official statements of President Bush and others in the higher rung in his administration.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequently launched global war on terror played into the hands of the Bush administration's neo-conservative policy agenda of assertive internationalism and active engagement reflecting in the redefined policy posture of the Bush Doctrine and subsequent National Security Strategies of United States. The attacks of September 11 not only provided an equilibrium change to the United States policy but also made it possible for the Bush administration to explicitly state the strategic objectives as to why improved relations with India were important which the Clinton administration was unable to do. The positive response of the Indian government to the United States war on terror quickened the pace of strategic engagement of India during the Bush administration. The administration's policy approach was to emphasize the commonality of interests between the two democracies and underscore the need for a mutual commitment to work together. It was aimed at the strategic accommodation of India in the light of new geopolitical realities. India was perceived as leading the list of countries that share vital security interests with the United

States which include fighting against global terrorism, prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, managing the rise of China, ensuring reliable energy supply from the Persian Gulf and smooth functioning of the global economy. The fundamental strategic conflict that characterized the policy in the past was sought to be replaced by strategic cooperation emphasizing the larger interests of both countries.

The desirability of a strategic partnership was deeply entrenched in the policy agenda of the top officials in the Bush administration and they consistently made efforts to materialize the policy and convince the Congress. In the Congress too a broad and bipartisan support existed for the strategic partnership, however, apprehensions over the issue of non-proliferation owing to the sensitivity of the South Asian region and the possibility of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan were also equally strong. The issue that surfaced time and again was that the NPT does not permit and could not be amended to recognize “new” nuclear weapons states and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act (1978) does not allow United States nuclear cooperation or commerce with countries like India that do not have IAEA safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

At the same time, the United States-India defense cooperation during the Bush administration made tremendous strides in the nature and frequency of training exercises, personnel exchanges, organizational relationships, defense sales and to some extent technology cooperation putting aside the political disconnect that had obstructed the smooth bilateral defense relationship in the past, in a relatively shorter span of time. Also there was substantial expansion in the bilateral economic ties. The Bush administration’s policy put greater emphasis on the strategic economic dimension of US-India relationship that underscored the importance of national economic strength as the prerequisite for sustained diplomatic and military influence. The policy approach was formulated on the assumption that an economically strong democracy like India would be in the best interest of the United States unlike China which is not a democracy. Therefore, the policy emphasized the need of greater reforms and a more globalised Indian economy.

To forge closer ties Bush team persistently made efforts to quickly implement the 'big idea' of transforming the US-India relationship on the enduring foundation of shared democratic values and congruent vital national interests. January 2004 saw the emergence of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) that symbolized a paradigm shift from mutual mistrust to mutual confidence building with promises to expand cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, high technology trade and nuclear and missile defense. However, the Indian government's continued insistence that greater cooperation was contingent on full civilian nuclear cooperation led to a gearing up of efforts during Bush's second term to evolve a policy that would accommodate the concerns of the Congress as well as move ahead with the strategic partnership. This resulted in a policy that offered India a unique civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement that attempted to reconcile many of the non-proliferation related concerns of the Congress with the Indian demand which insisted for such cooperation as a litmus test for the strategic partnership. But this move came up only after extensive engagement in military and strategic cooperation. However, this was widely perceived as the reversal of the more than three decades old policy of the United States toward India. The Bush administration sought to refract the United States policy approach to non-proliferation for the strategic accommodation of India. It also manifested the till now declared intent of "de-hyphenation" of India-Pakistan relations as a similar offer was not made to Pakistan.

It is observed that the United States policy toward India during the Bush administration was crafted in consonance with its grand strategy and global policy objective that requires the United States to particularly strengthen political, economic, and military-to-military relations with those Asian states that share the democratic values and national interests. The administration perceived that long term relationship with India is in the interest of the United States, therefore, the policy sought to put in place a comprehensive and long term economic, political and military-strategic relationship with India. The 9/11 episode provided a new pace and focused direction favorable to translate the strategy into specific policy. The charged international environment after 9/11 propelled a redefining of the policy agenda by the decision making actors during the Bush administration and

boosted diplomatic rigor to implement the transformation in the policy that was overdue since the Clinton administration.

The policy has been considerably successful in bringing India closer to the United States with progress in bilateral relationship in economic, political military strategic arenas. However, it is observed that factors emanating from historical, institutional, party politics and leadership entail limitations to the policy and consequently to the US-India strategic partnership. The lingering legacy of history of strategic conflict and the consequent mistrust, appears time and again as a cause of friction to greater cooperation in significant but sensitive areas like - civilian nuclear cooperation where detachment from non-proliferation issue seems quite arduous, defense where despite dramatic progress, the lack of decision making compatibility and bureaucratic resistance raise apprehensions about technology transfer, co-development, co-production, mutual outsourcing and joint marketing. Also the United States policy tends to associate greater economic cooperation with the pace of reforms in the Indian economy, which has its own limitations on account of India being a mixed economy and having welfare commitments. Thus it is observed that the nature of convergence of interests is an important determinant of the success of the policy in future. International and domestic factors worked in tandem to bring about the transformation in the bilateral relationship, therefore, problems in the domestic realm will have repercussion on the foreign policy and hence on the bilateral relationship.

Further, the policy of de-hyphenation and pursuing relations with India independent of US-Pakistan relations might also face problems if the Indo-Pak relations become confrontationalist over the Kashmir dispute.

Most importantly the political will and constant efforts of the leadership in the Bush administration were instrumental in making the strategic partnership a reality, the behavior of the next leadership will be an important variable determining the further course of this partnership and consequently the future policy of the United States toward India, the nature of the international system remaining the same. The policy of the Bush administration toward India has set up a number of institutionalised structures and

mechanisms for bilateral interaction as well as encouraged and enhanced people to people contact which indicates that the strategic partnership has gathered a momentum of its own and the process is not reversible. However there might be a slow down in the process owing to lack of political will and rigor of the leadership, if a Democratic President with the contentious issue of non-proliferation high on the policy agenda comes to power.

Table 2. Indo-US Trade in Services, 2000-2005
(US\$ Billions)

YEAR	U.S. Exports	U.S. Imports	Total Trade	Trade Balance
2001	2.539	1.898	4.437	640
2002	3.003	1.815	4.418	1.189
2003	3.255	1.809	5.064	1.445
2004	3.760	1.972	5.732	1.788
2005	4.461	2.889	7.350	1.572
2006	5.193	5.018	10.211	174

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis cited in “India-US Economic and Trade Relations”, CRS Report for the Congress RL34161.

Table 1. US Trade Balance with India, 2000-2006

YEAR	US Trade Balance with India (US\$ Billions)	Year-on-Year Growth
2000	-7.381	
2001	-6.527	11.6%
2002	-8.352	28.0%
2003	-8.766	5.0%
2004	-10.342	18.0%
2005	-11.917	15.2%
2006	-11.735	-1.5%

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis cited in “India-US Economic and Trade Relations”, CRS Report for the Congress RL34161.

ANNEXURES

ANNEXURE -I

THE DEFENSE FRAMEWORK

New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, Signed on June 28, 2005 in Washington DC by Minister of Defense of India, Pranab Mukherjee & Secretary of Defense of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld

28 June 2005

1. The United States and India have entered a new era. We are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests. As the world's two largest democracies, the United States and India agree on the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security, and opportunity around the world. The leaders of our two countries are building a U.S.-India strategic partnership in pursuit of these principles and interests.
2. Ten years ago, in January 1995, the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations between the United States and India was signed. Since then, changes in the international security environment have challenged our countries in ways unforeseen ten years ago. The U.S.-India defense relationship has advanced in a short time to unprecedented levels of cooperation unimaginable in 1995. Today, we agree on a new Framework that builds on past successes, seizes new opportunities, and charts a course for the U.S.-India defense relationship for the next ten years. This defense relationship will support, and will be an element of, the broader U.S.-India strategic partnership.
3. The U.S.-India defense relationship derives from a common belief in freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and seeks to advance shared security interests. These interests include:
 - maintaining security and stability;
 - defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism;
 - preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data, and technologies; and

- protecting the free flow of commerce via land, air and sea lanes.

4. In pursuit of this shared vision of an expanded and deeper U.S.-India strategic relationship, our defense establishments shall:

A. conduct joint and combined exercises and exchanges;

B. collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest;

C. strengthen the capabilities of our militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism;

D. expand interaction with other nations in ways that promote regional and global peace and stability;

E. enhance capabilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

F. in the context of our strategic relationship, expand two-way defense trade between our countries. The United States and India will work to conclude defense transactions, not solely as ends in and of themselves, but as a means to strengthen our countries' security, reinforce our strategic partnership, achieve greater interaction between our armed forces, and build greater understanding between our defense establishments;

G. in the context of defense trade and a framework of technology security safeguards, increase opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, and research and development;

H. expand collaboration relating to missile defense;

I. strengthen the abilities of our militaries to respond quickly to disaster situations, including in combined operations;

J. assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations, with a focus on enabling other countries to field trained, capable forces for these operations;

K. conduct exchanges on defense strategy and defense transformation;

L. increase exchanges of intelligence; and

M. continue strategic-level discussions by senior leadership from the U.S. Department of Defense and India's Ministry of Defence, in which the two sides exchange perspectives on international security issues of common interest, with the aim of increasing mutual understanding, promoting shared objectives, and developing common approaches.

5. The Defense Policy Group shall continue to serve as the primary mechanism to guide the U.S.-India strategic defense relationship. The Defense Policy Group will make appropriate adjustments to the structure and frequency of its meetings and of its subgroups, when agreed to by the Defense Policy Group co-chairs, to ensure that it remains an effective mechanism to advance U.S.-India defense cooperation.

6. In recognition of the growing breadth and depth of the U.S.-India strategic defense relationship, we hereby establish the Defense Procurement and Production Group and institute a Joint Working Group for mid-year review of work overseen by the Defense Policy Group.

-- The Defense Procurement and Production Group will oversee defense trade, as well as prospects for co-production and technology collaboration, broadening the scope of its predecessor subgroup the Security Cooperation Group.

-- The Defense Joint Working Group will be subordinate to the Defense Policy Group and will meet at least once per year to perform a midyear review of work overseen by the Defense Policy Group and its subgroups (the Defense Procurement and Production

Group, the Joint Technical Group, the Military Cooperation Group, and the Senior Technology Security Group), and to prepare issues for the annual meeting of the Defense Policy Group.

7. The Defense Policy Group and its subgroups will rely upon this Framework for guidance on the principles and objectives of the U.S.-India strategic relationship, and will strive to achieve those objectives.

Signed in Arlington, Virginia, USA, on June 28, 2005.

ANNEXURE- II

Following is the text of the joint statement:

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

July 18, 2005

JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush today declare their resolve to transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership. As leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new relationship between India and the United States will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world. It will enhance our ability to work together to provide global leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest.

Building on their common values and interests, the two leaders resolve:

- To create an international environment conducive to promotion of democratic values, and to strengthen democratic practices in societies which wish to become more open and pluralistic.
- To combat terrorism relentlessly. They applaud the active and vigorous counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries and support more international efforts in this direction. Terrorism is a global scourge and the one we will fight everywhere. The two leaders strongly affirm their commitment to the conclusion by September of a UN comprehensive convention against international terrorism.

The Prime Minister's visit coincides with the completion of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative, launched in January 2004. The two leaders agree that this

provides the basis for expanding bilateral activities and commerce in space, civil nuclear energy and dual-use technology.

Drawing on their mutual vision for the U.S.-India relationship, and our joint objectives as strong long-standing democracies, the two leaders agree on the following:

FOR THE ECONOMY

- Revitalize the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue and launch a CEO Forum to harness private sector energy and ideas to deepen the bilateral economic relationship.
- Support and accelerate economic growth in both countries through greater trade, investment, and technology collaboration.
- Promote modernization of India's infrastructure as a prerequisite for the continued growth of the Indian economy. As India enhances its investment climate, opportunities for investment will increase.
- Launch a U.S.-India Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture focused on promoting teaching, research, service and commercial linkages.

FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

- Strengthen energy security and promote the development of stable and efficient energy markets in India with a view to ensuring adequate, affordable energy supplies and conscious of the need for sustainable development. These issues will be addressed through the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue.
- Agree on the need to promote the imperatives of development and safeguarding the environment, commit to developing and deploying cleaner, more efficient, affordable, and diversified energy technologies.

FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

- Develop and support, through the new U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative in countries that seek such assistance, institutions and resources that strengthen the

foundations that make democracies credible and effective. India and the U.S. will work together to strengthen democratic practices and capacities and contribute to the new U.N. Democracy Fund.

- Commit to strengthen cooperation and combat HIV/AIDS at a global level through an initiative that mobilizes private sector and government resources, knowledge, and expertise.

FOR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SECURITY

- Express satisfaction at the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship as a basis for future cooperation, including in the field of defense technology.
- Commit to play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The U.S. welcomed the adoption by India of legislation on WMD (Prevention of Unlawful Activities Bill).
- Launch a new U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami Core Group, to strengthen cooperation to prepare for and conduct disaster relief operations.

FOR HIGH-TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE

- Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.
- Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such as the U.S.-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.
- Building on the strengthened nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's Entity List.

Recognizing the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner, the two leaders discussed India's plans to develop its civilian nuclear energy program.

President Bush conveyed his appreciation to the Prime Minister over India's strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation and stated that as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states. The President told the Prime Minister that he will work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security. The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also consider this request expeditiously. India has expressed its interest in ITER and a willingness to contribute. The United States will consult with its partners considering India's participation. The United States will consult with the other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a view toward India's inclusion.

The Prime Minister conveyed that for his part, India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not

have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

The President welcomed the Prime Minister's assurance. The two leaders agreed to establish a working group to undertake on a phased basis in the months ahead the necessary actions mentioned above to fulfill these commitments. The President and Prime Minister also agreed that they would review this progress when the President visits India in 2006.

The two leaders also reiterated their commitment that their countries would play a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

In light of this closer relationship, and the recognition of India's growing role in enhancing regional and global security, the Prime Minister and the President agree that international institutions must fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The President reiterated his view that international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India's central and growing role. The two leaders state their expectations that India and the United States will strengthen their cooperation in global forums.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh thanks President Bush for the warmth of his reception and the generosity of his hospitality. He extends an invitation to President Bush to visit India at his convenience and the President accepts that invitation.

(end text)

ANNEXURE- III

Released on March 2, 2006

White House Press Release

Office of the Press Secretary

New Delhi, India

March 2, 2006

U.S.-India Joint Statement

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States and India have made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The successful transformation of the U.S.-India relationship will have a decisive and positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in this new century.

Reviewing the progress made in deepening the global partnership between the United States and India since their Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirm their commitment to expand even further the growing ties between their two countries. Consistent with this objective, the two leaders wish to highlight efforts the United States and India are making together in the following areas, where they have:

FOR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND TRADE

(1) Agreed to intensify efforts to develop a bilateral business climate supportive of trade and investment by:

1. Welcoming the report of the U.S.-India CEO Forum, agreeing to consider its recommendations aimed at substantially broadening our bilateral economic relations, and directing the Chairs of the Indo-U.S. Economic Dialogue to follow up expeditiously with the CEO Forum;

2. Endorsing the efforts of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum to reduce barriers to trade and investment with the goal of doubling bilateral trade in three years;

3. Agreeing to advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment flows by holding a high-level public-private investment summit in 2006, continuing efforts to facilitate and promote foreign direct investment and eliminate impediments to it, and enhancing bilateral consultations on various issues including tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, and preventing the illicit use of the financial system.

(2) Sought to expand cooperation in agriculture by:

1. Launching the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture with a three-year financial commitment to link our universities, technical institutions, and businesses to support agriculture education, joint research, and capacity building projects including in the area of biotechnology.

2. Endorsing an agreed workplan to promote bilateral trade in agriculture through agreements that: lay out a path to open the U.S. market to Indian mangoes, recognize India as having the authority to certify that shipments of Indian products to the United States meet USDA organic standards, and provide for discussions on current regulations affecting trade in fresh fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy, and almonds.

(3) Reaffirmed their shared commitment to completing the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) before the end of 2006, and agreed to work together to help achieve this outcome.

FOR ENERGY SECURITY AND A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT

(1) Welcomed the successful completion of discussions on India's separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. This historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States and between India and the international community as a whole.

(2) Welcomed the participation of India in the ITER initiative on fusion energy as an important further step towards the common goal of full nuclear energy cooperation.

(3) Agreed on India's participation in FutureGen, an international public-private partnership to develop new, commercially viable technology for a clean coal near-zero emission power project. India will contribute funding to the project and participate in the Government Steering Committee of this initiative.

(4) Welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, which will enable India and the U.S. to work together with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable development and meet increased energy needs while addressing concerns of energy security and climate change. The Partnership will collaborate to promote the development, diffusion, deployment and transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient technologies and practices.

(5) Welcomed India's interest in the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, an international marine research endeavor that will contribute to long-term energy solutions such as gas hydrates.

(6) Noting the positive cooperation under the Indo-U.S. Energy Dialogue, highlighted plans to hold joint conferences on topics such as energy efficiency and natural gas, to conduct study missions on renewable energy, to establish a clearing house in India for coal-bed methane/coal-mine methane, and to exchange energy market information.

FOR INNOVATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY

(1) Emphasizing the importance of knowledge partnerships, announced the establishment of a Bi-National Science and Technology Commission which the U.S. and India will co-fund. It will generate collaborative partnerships in science and technology and promote industrial research and development.

(2) Agreed that the United States and India would work together to promote innovation, creativity and technological advancement by providing a vibrant intellectual property rights regime, and to cooperate in the field of intellectual property rights to include capacity building activities, human resource development and public awareness programs.

(3) Agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space, including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth science. The United States and India committed to move forward with agreements that will permit the launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles, opening up new opportunities for commercial space cooperation between the two countries.

(4) Welcomed the inclusion of two U.S. instruments in the Indian lunar mission Chandrayaan-1. They noted that memoranda of understanding to be signed by ISRO and NASA would be significant steps forward in this area.

(5) Welcomed the U.S. Department of Commerce's plan to create a license exception for items that would otherwise require an export license to end-users in India engaged solely in civilian activities.

FOR GLOBAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

(1) Noted the enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and rooted out in every part of the world.

(2) Welcomed the increased cooperation between the United States and India in the defense area, since the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship was

signed on June 28, 2005, as evidenced by successful joint exercises, expanded defence cooperation and information sharing, and greater opportunities to jointly develop technologies and address security and humanitarian issues.

(3) Reaffirmed their commitment to the protection of the free flow of commerce and to the safety of navigation, and agreed to the conclusion of a Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security in the maritime domain, to prevent piracy and other transnational crimes at sea, carry out search and rescue operations, combat marine pollution, respond to natural disasters, address emergent threats and enhance cooperative capabilities, including through logistics support. Both sides are working to finalize a Logistics Support Agreement at the earliest.

(4) Welcomed India's intention to join the Container Security Initiative aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure more secure and reducing the risk of shipping containers being used to conceal weapons of mass destruction.

(5) Reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(6) Building on the July 2005 Disaster Relief Initiative, noted the important disaster management cooperation and their improved capabilities to respond to disaster situations.

(7) Recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security and greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic interdependencies, including to protect electronic transactions and critical infrastructure from cybercrime, terrorism and other malicious threats.

DEEPENING DEMOCRACY AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES

(1) Recalled their joint launch of the UN Democracy Fund in September 2005 and offered the experience and expertise of both Governments for capacity building, training

and exchanges to third countries that request such assistance to strengthen democratic institutions.

(2) Welcomed the decision of India and the United States to designate a representative to the Government Advisory Board of the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) located in Budapest to facilitate cooperative activities with ICDT.

(3) Agreed that the Virtual Coordination and Information Centres set up in September 2005 should be further strengthened and a bilateral meeting aimed at developing a practical programme for utilization of its services be held soon.

(4) Expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at the global level and encourage greater corporate participation to meet this challenge, including the establishment of the Indo-U.S. Corporate Fund for HIV/AIDS.

(5) Agreed to expand bilateral efforts and continue cooperation in the area of medical research and strengthen technical capacity in food and drug regulation in India as well as address the concern on avian influenza, including agreement to reach out to the private sector, develop regional communications strategies, and plan an in-region containment and response exercise. The President welcomed India's offer to host the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza meeting in 2007.

(6) Welcomed India's membership in the Coalition Against Wildlife Trafficking, a partnership through which we will collaborate in the fight against illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts; we also welcome the opportunity to strengthen longstanding work together on the conservation of wildlife through cooperation on park management and ecotourism.

President Bush thanked Prime Minister Singh and the people of India for the warmth of their reception and the generosity of their hospitality.

REFERENCES

(* indicates a primary source)

Aiyar, Swaminathan and S. Anklesaria (2006), "U.S. and India: Partners, Not Allies", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 26 February 2006.

*Armitage, Richard (2002), Interview on CNNI's Q&A with Zain Verjee, Washington D.C., June 3, [online web] Accessed 14 December 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/2002/10655.htm>.

*Armitage, Richard (2002), Transcript of Interview on CNN's American Morning with Paula Zahn, Washington D.C., June 3, [online web] Accessed 23 November 2007, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/2002/india-020603-usia03b.htm>

Azam, Kausar J. (1999) (ed.), *Discourse in Trust: US-South Asia Relations*, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.

Balachandran, G. (2005), "Indo-US Relations: Perception and Reality," *Strategic Analysis*, 29(2): 201-221.

Balachandran, G. (2006) "Separation is not Rocket Science" *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 27 January 2006.

Banerjee, Vasabjit and Chaudhary Dipanjan Roy (2006), "India and the US: Convergence and Divergence", *Journal of Peace Studies*, 13(3): 25-33.

Baruah, Amit (2006), "Unequal Partners?" *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 March 2006.

Bertsch, Garry K; Seema Gahlaut; Anupam Srivastava, (eds) (1999), *Engaging India: US Strategic Relations With the World's Largest Democracy*, London: Routledge.

*Blackwill, Robert D. (2001), "Seizing Opportunity with India", August, [online web] Accessed 13 November 2007, URL: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill.htm>

*Blackwill, Robert D.(2001), Transcript of Press Conference , Foreign Correspondents Club, New Delhi, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/blackwill_001.htm

*Blackwill, Robert D. (2002), “The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship”, Kolkata, November 27, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill.htm>

*Blackwill, Robert D.(2003), “The United States ,India and Asian Security” Speech delivered at Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference, New Delhi, January 27, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/blackwill2.htm>

*Blackwill, Robert D. (2003), “ No Longer Does the US Fixate on India’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Program”, Speech before the Confederation of Indian Industry, July 17, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc11.htm>

*Blackwill, Robert D. (2003), “U.S.-India Defence Cooperation”, *The Hindu*, May 13, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/05/13/stories/2003051301101000.htm>

*Blackwill, Robert D. (2005), “The India Imperative”, *National Interest*, Summer, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/blackwill5.htm>

*Blake, Robert O. (2004), “US-India Relations: The Making of a Comprehensive Relationship”, Indore, India, August 23, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr82304.html>

Blank, Stephen J. (2005), “Natural Allies: Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation”, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB626.pdf>

*Boese, Wade and Pomper, Miles (2005), “The U.S. Approach to the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: An *ACT* Interview with Assistant

Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker”, [online web] Accessed 15 November 2007, URL: http://www.armscontrol.org/interviews/20050419_Rademaker.asp

*Bolton John R. (2004), “The Bush Administration’s Forward Strategy For Nonproliferation”, Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, IL, October 19, [online web] Accessed 5 November 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37251pf.htm>

Borman, Matthew S. (2004) “NSSP: U.S., India Interests in Action”, *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 October, 2004.

*Boucher, Richard A. (2006), “US Policy towards South Asia: An Expanding Agenda”, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, May 17, 2006 [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/66374.htm>

Bowles, Chester (1974), *Mission to India: Alternatives in Asia*, New Delhi: B.I. Publications.

Brands, H.W. (1990), *India and the US: The Cold Peace*, Boston: Twayne Publishers.

*Burns, Nicholas R (2005), “The U.S. and India: The New Strategic Partnership” Speech at the Asia Society, New York, 18 October, [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/burns05.html>

*Burns, Nicholas R.(2005), Remarks on the U.S. and India Relations prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 2, [online web] Accessed 22 November 2007 URL: <http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2005/hrq051102p.html>

*Burns, Nicholas and Menon, Shiv Shankar (2007), “US-India Relations in the Global Context”, February, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, [online web] Accessed 5 November 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/81207.htm>

*Burns, Nicholas R. (2007), Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “America’s Strategic Opportunity With India”, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2008, URL:

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20071101faessay86609/r-nicholas-burns/america-s-strategic-opportunity-with-india.html>

Buzan, Barry (2002), "South Asia Moving towards Transformation: Emergence of India as a Great Power", *International Studies*, January-March, 39(1), 5-32.

Buzan, Barry, (2004), *The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty First Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Carter, Ashton B., (2005), "The India Deal: Looking at the Big Picture", remarks before the U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C. November 2, [online web] Accessed 5 March 2008, URL: <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/CarterTestimony051102.pdf>

Carter, Ashton B. (2007), "How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love India's Bomb", January 10, [online web] Accessed 5 March 2008, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070110faupdate86175/ashton-b-carter/how-washington-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-india-s-bomb.html>

Chait, Anil (2006), "From Estrangement to Engagement: Threats and Opportunities in Indo-US Relations and the Roles of their armed Forces", USAWC Research Project, February 3, [online web] Accessed 10 February 2008, URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/ksil303.pdf>

Chari, P.R., Cheema, Pervez Iqbal and Cohen Stephen, (2003), *The Compound Crisis of 1990*, London: Routledge.

Chary, M. Srinivas (1995), *The Eagle and the Peacock: US Policy Towards India since Independence*, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Chellaney, Brahma (2000), "New Delhi's Dilemma", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, 23(3): 145-153.

Cirincione, Joseph (2000), *Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass*, London: Routledge.

Cohen, Stephen Philip (2001), *India: Emerging Power*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, Stephen Philip (2001), "US-South Asia: Relations under Bush", The Brookings, [online web] Accessed 17 October 2007, URL: http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/04southasia_cohen.aspx

Cohen, Stephen Philip (2006), "A Deal Too Far", *ORF-Brookings Paper*, March 2, [online web] Accessed 15 March 2008, URL: http://orfonline.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/ib060302_1162634681500.pdf

Cohen, Stephen Philip (ed.) (1987), *The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

*Congressional Record (2001) H.R.2889 "To lift the Nuclear Sanctions against India", US 107th Congress, Session I, House Committee on International Relations, September 14 (US Government Printing Office: Washington D.C.)

*Congressional Hearing (2005), "The US-India Global Partnership: Impact on Non-Proliferation", House of Representatives, US 109th Congress, Session I, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, 26 October, Serial No.109-135, [online web] Accessed 6 December 2007 URL: <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/joe102605.pdf>

*Congressional Hearing (2006), "The US-India 'Global Partnership': Legislative Options", Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, US 109th Congress, Session II, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations 11 May, Serial No.109-240, [online web] Accessed 6 December 2007, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/27481.pdf>

* Congressional Record (2006), House Bill H05905, US 110th Congress Session II, House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, July 26 (US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.)

Cooper, Matthew (2006), "The President's Passage to India", *Time Magazine*, New York, 23 February, 2006.

Daalder, Ivon H. and James M. Lindsay (2005), *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

*Department of Defense (2001), The United States Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, [online web] Accessed 28 August 2007, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>

*Department of Defense (2002), Excerpts of the United States Nuclear Posture Review, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>

*Department of Defense (2006), "US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Fact Sheet", [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/62904.htm>

*Department of Defense (2006), "US-India Defense Relationship" Fact Sheet, March, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/d20060302us-ndiadefenserelationship.pdf>

*Department of Defense (2006), "US-India: Strengthening a Global Partnership", March, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: http://us-info.state.gov/sa/south_asia/india_summit.html

Dillon, Dana R. and Spring Baker (2006), "Nuclear India and Non-Proliferation Treaty", May 18 2006 [online web] Accessed 22 November 2007, URL: <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/bg1935.cfm>

Dixit, J.N. (2002), *India's Foreign policy: Challenge of Terrorism – Fashioning New Inter-State Equations*, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.

Donnelly, Thomas and Melissa Wisner (2005), "A Global Partnership between the U.S. and India", *AEI*, August-September, Washington D.C. [online web] Accessed 16 December 2007, URL: http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050907_18933AOAug_Sept_g.pdf

Farees, Zeeshan (2004), "USINPAC: Buying Zionist influence, Selling Indian Interests", [online web] Accessed 15 March 2008, URL: <http://ghadar.insaf.net/June2004/pdf/USINPAC.pdf>

Fair, C. Christine (2004), "The Counter-terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India", RAND Project Air Force, [online web] Accessed 16 September 2007, URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG141.pdf

Feickert, Andrew and Kronstadt, K. Alan (2003), "Missile Proliferation and Strategic Balance in South Asia" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RL32115, 17 October [online web] Accessed 18 November 2007, URL: <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf>

Feinstein, Lee et al (2002), "A New Equation: U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan After September 11". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2002, [online web] Accessed 22 November 2007, URL: <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/usindianuclearCBR.pdf>

Feldman, Shai (1999), "Israel and the Cut-Off Treaty", *Strategic Assessment*, 1(4) January [online web] Accessed 14 October 2007, URL: <http://www.tav.ac.il/jcss/sa/v/n4p2n.html>

Flournoy, Michele A. (2006), "Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring, 29(2): 67-84

Frankel, Francine R. (2005), "India's Potential Importance for Vital U.S. Geopolitical Objectives in Asia: A Hedge against Rising China", Testimony before the U.S. Congress, House International Relations Committee, Washington D.C., November 16, [online web] Accessed 16 November 2007, URL: http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/fra111605.pdf

Ganguly, Sumit & Scobell Andrew (2005), "India and the United States: Forging a Security Partnership?", *World Policy Journal*, 22(2): 37-41

Gobarev, Victor M. (2000), "India as a World Power: Changing Washington's Myopic Policy", *Policy Analysis*, No.381, September 11, [online web] Accessed 18 October 2007, URL: <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/html/pa381/pa38100001.html>

*Government of India (2001), "Joint Statement between the United States and the Republic of India", Washington D.C., 9 November, [online web] Accessed 7 October 2007, URL: http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/2001/ind_us_js_nov_9_01.htm

*Government of India (2007), "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [online web] Accessed 14 January 2008 URL: <http://mcindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2007/08/03pro1.pdf>

Gershman, John N. (2000), "Still the Pacific Century? U.S. Policy in Asia and the Pacific" in Honey, Martha and Barry Tom (2000), *Global Focus US Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millenium*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Grimmet, Richard F. (2005), "Conventional Arms transfer to the Developing Nations", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RL33051, 29 August 2005 [online web] Accessed 24 October 2007, URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33051.pdf>

Gupta, Amit (2005), "The U.S.-India Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests?" Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February, [online web] Accessed 15 September 2007, URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB596.pdf>

Haniffa, Aziz (2007), "The US Senate and the India Caucus", Washington D.C., [online web] Accessed 5 December 2007, URL: <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/senatecaucus/senatecaucus.htm>

Haniffa, Aziz (2007), "Bush's Commitment to India Runs Deep: Blackwill", Washington D.C., [online web] Accessed 14 December 2007 URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jul/05aziz.htm>

Haass, Richard N. (1997), "A New US Policy Towards India and Pakistan", Report of Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.

Haass, Richard N. (1998), "After the tests: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan", Report of Independent Task Force sponsored by Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

Haass, Richard N. (2003), "New Priorities in South Asia: US Policy towards India, Pakistan and Afghanistan", Report of Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.

Haass, Richard N. (2003), "The United States and India: A Transformed Relationship", Remarks to the Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, India, January 7, [online web] Accessed 13 September 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16399.htm>

Haté, Vibhuti N. and Schaffer Teresita C. (2007), "US-India Defense Relations: Strategic Perspectives", *South Asia Monitor*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, No.105, [online web] Accessed 24 March 2008, URL: <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam105.pdf>

Holt, Pat M. (2005), "US Shift on India Nuclear Policy Tilts Regional Balance", [online web] Accessed 15 March 2008, URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0804/p09s02-coop.html>

*Hyde, Henry J (2005), "U.S.-India: Global Partnership: How Significant for American Interests?", Opening remarks before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, November 16, [online web] Accessed 4 January 2008, URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/24598.pdf>

*"Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act", 18 December 2006 [online web] Accessed 7 July 2007 URL: <http://www.coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/PublicLaws/HR5682PL109-401.pdf>

Inayat, Mavara (2006) "US-Indian Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond", *Regional Studies*, 24 (2):3-64.

Jaffrelot, Christophe (2005), "India, United States' New Ally in Asia", CERI/ CNRS, July [online web] Accessed 17 November 2007 URL: <http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/july05/jaffrelot.pdf>

Jain, Rashmi (ed.) (2007), *The US and India 1947-2006: A Documentary Study*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers.

Jervis, Robert (2006), "The Remaking of a Unipolar World", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, 29(3): 7-19.

*Joseph, Robert G.(2005), Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Washington D.C., November 2, [online web] Accessed 17 January 2008 URL: <http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/55968.htm>

*Juster, Kenneth (2004), "Cybersecurity: A Key to U.S.-India Trade", Keynote address at India-U.S. Information Security Summit 2004, New Delhi, October 12, [online web] Accessed 17 January 2008, URL: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr10124a.html>

Kagan, Robert (2003), "American as a Global Hegemon" [online web] Accessed 17 January 2008, URL: <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue29/Vol2Issue29Kagan.html>

Kagan, Robert and Kristol, William (1999), "A Distinctly American Internationalism", *Weekly Standard*, 9 November. Cited in Behuria, Ashok (2003), "Understanding American Neoconservatism", *Journal of Peace Studies*, 10(2): 19-37.

Kapila, Subhash (2006), "United States Congress at Critical Crossroads with India", 12 April [online web] Accessed 15 March 2007, URL: <http://www.boloji.com/plainspeak/026.htm>

Kapur, Ashok et al (2002), *India and the United States in a Changing World*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Kapp, Lawrence and Lum, Thomas (2003), "Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 108th Congress", January 3, 2003, CRS Report for The Congress Order Code RL31688, [online web] Accessed 15 March 2008, URL: <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31688.pdf>

Krepon, Michael and Stolar, Alex (2007), "The US-India 123 Agreement: From Bad to Worse", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 23 August, 2007.

Krishnaswami, Sridhar (2006), "Indo-US N-deal a Historic Opportunity," *India Abroad*, March 22, [online web] Accessed 13 April 2008, URL: <http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/22nddeal.htm>

Kronstadt, Alan K. (2005), "India-US Relations" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code IB93097, [online web] Accessed 13 April 2008, URL: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib93097.pdf>

Kronstadt, Alan K. (2006), "US-India Bilateral Agreements and 'Global Partnership'", Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RL33072, March 10, [online web] Accessed 14 December 2007, URL: <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8674:1>

Kronstadt, Alan K. (2006), "India-US Relations" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Order Code RL33529, updated in February 2, 2007, [online web] Accessed 13 April 2008, URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf>

Kunhi Krishnan, T.V. (1974), *The Unfriendly Friends: India and America*, New Delhi: Indian Book Company.

Kux, Dennis (1993), *India and the US: Estranged Democracies*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press.

Kux, Dennis (2002), "India's Fine Balance", *Foreign Affairs*, February-March. [online web] Accessed URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501faessay8060/dennis-kux/india-s-fine-balance.html>

Levi, Michael A. and Ferguson, Charles D. (2006), "US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward", Congressional Research Service Report No.16, June, Council on Foreign Relations. [online web] Accessed 15 October 2007, URL: <http://www.cfr.org/contentpublications/attachments/USIndiaNuclearCSR.pdf>

Limaye, Satu P. (2006), "US-India Relations: The Best is Yet to Come", *Comparative Connections*, January, 7(4):143-156, [online web] Accessed 14 November 2007, URL: [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=211570540Q-US_India\[1\].pdf](http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=211570540Q-US_India[1].pdf)

Liska, George (1973), "The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order" in Robert E. Osgood et al (1973), *Retreat From Empire*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Cited in Baldev Raj Nayar (1976), *American Geopolitics in India*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications.

*Long, Laurinda Keys (2005), "The Dynamic US-India Relationship", Interview with Ambassador David C. Mulford, *Span*, May/June [online web] Accessed 22 November 2007, URL: <http://span.state.gov/wwwhspmayjune2.html>

*Lugar, Richard (2001), "The Lugar Doctrine," December 6, [online web] Accessed 17 September 2007, URL: http://lugar.senate.gov/lugar_doctrine.html

Malhotra, Vinay Kumar (1995), *Indo-US Relations in 1990s*, New Delhi: Anmol Publications.

Macgregor, Burns; J.W. Peltason; Thomas E. Cronin; David B. Magleby; David M. O'Brien, (2002), *Government by the People*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publication.

Martin, Michael F. and Kronstadt, K. Alan (2007), "India-US Economic and Trade Relations", CRS Report for the Congress, Order Code RL34161, August, [online web] Accessed 15 March 2008, URL: <http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34161.pdf>

*Ministry of External Affairs (2004), Press Conference of the Foreign Secretary at the conclusion of his visit to the US for HTCG meeting in Washington, Washington D.C., November 19, [online web] Accessed 22 November 2007, URL: <http://www.mea.gov.in/pbhome.htm>

Mishra, Bhabani (2005), "India-U.S. Relations: A Paradigm Shift", *Strategic Analysis*, January-March [online web] Accessed 16 November 2007, URL: <http://www.idsa.in/publications/strategicanalysis/2005/jan/Mishra>

*Mishra, Brajesh (2003), "India and the United States and the New World Order: Prospects for Cooperation," Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 7, [online web] Accessed 17 February 2008, URL: http://www.Indianembassy.org/indusrel/2003/nsa_cfr_may_7_03.htm

Mitra, Pramit and Ryan, John (2006), "Gathering Steam: India and the United States Extend Military Ties," *South Asia Monitor*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam99.pdf>

Moore, C.E (2007), "The New Middle Powers, Vision and Order in International Politics: triumph of liberalism or opportunity missed" [online web] Accessed 17 September 2007, URL: <http://www.sam.sdu.dk/politics/nisa/papers/CEMOORE.pdf>

*Mulford, David C. (2004), "US and India: Building Global Partnership", April 21, [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://www.ficci.com/media-room/speeches-presentations/2004/apr/apr21-us-mumbai-david.htm>

*Mulford, David C. (2005), "The US and India: Reaching New Heights", [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ambjul182005.html>.

*Mulford, David C. (2007), "The United States and India-Reaching the Skies Together", [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/amfeb52007.html>.

Narayanan, Ram (2005), "Is a Solid and Comprehensive U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Inevitable?" Presentation made to Security and Political Risk Analysis at the India International Center, New Delhi, January 17, [online web] Accessed 19 November 2007, URL: <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/ram2.htm>

Nayar, Baldev Raj (1976), *American Geopolitics in India*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications.

Nayar, Baldev Raj (2001), *India and the Major Powers after Pokharan II*, New Delhi: Har Anand Publications.

NIC (2000), "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Non-government -Experts", available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2015.html#link13b

*NIC (2004), "Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project" [online web] Accessed 28 August 2007, URL: http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html

*NSSUS (2002), National Security Strategy of the United States of America, [online web] Accessed 28 April 2007, URL: www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2002/index.html

*NSSUS (2006), National Security Strategy of the United States of America, [online web] Accessed 28 April 2007, URL: www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2006/index.html

Parekh, Neil (2000), "India Caucus: Goals for Next Two Years", 15 December, [online web] Accessed 10 February 2008, URL: <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/housecaucus/caucus-goals.htm>

Perkovich, George (1999), *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*, Berkley: University of California Press.

Perkovich, George (2005), "Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., September 2005, [online web] Accessed 10 October 2007, URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf>

Perkovich, George (2006), "US-India Relations: The Global Partnership", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., [online web] Accessed 10 October 2007, URL: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/gp_remarks.pdf

Potter, William C. (2005), "India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy", *Non-Proliferation Review*, 12(2): 343-354. [online web] Accessed 10 March 2008 URL <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050825.htm>

*Powell, Colin L. (2001), Remarks with External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh of India, New Delhi, India, October 17, [online web] Accessed 10 October 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5408.htm>

*Powell, Colin L. (2002), Speech Delivered at the Press Conference in Maurya Sheraton, New Delhi, July 28, [online web] Accessed 10 October 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/12228.htm>

Preez, Jean Du (2002), "The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the International Non-Proliferation Regime", *The Nonproliferation Review*, Fall Winter: 67-81. <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/93/93dupreez.pdf>

Raghavan, V.R. (2004), "The Double-edged Effect in South Asia", *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn, 27(4): 147-155.

Rajamohan, C. (2002-03), "A Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, 26(1): 141-155.

Rajamohan, C. (2005), "N Deal: India's Five who Made Mission Possible" *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 22 July, 2005.

Rajamohan, C. (2005), "IAEA Terms under U.S. Pact won't Tie Indian Hands", *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 28 July, 2005.

Rajamohan, C. (2005), "Deal only if India caps: NPT Lobby", *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 27 October, 2005.

Rajamohan, C. (2006), *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order*, New Delhi: India Research Press.

*Rice, Condoleezza (2000), "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February [online web] Accessed 17 September 2007, URL: http://ens-web3.ens-lsh.fr/amrieu/IMG/pdf/C._Rice_Our_National_Interest_2000-2.pdf

*Rice, Condoleezza (2000), "Rice Talk- Interview with Condoleezza Rice, primary foreign policy advisor to George W. Bush", [online web] Accessed 14 October 2007, URL: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2633/is_5_14/ai_66155082/pg_4?tag=artBody;coll

*Rice, Condoleezza (2005), Interview with *India Today*, March 16, [online web] Accessed 17 November 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43626.htm>

*Rice, Condoleezza (2006), "Our Opportunity with India", *Washington Post*, March 13, [online web] Accessed 12 September 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63008.htm>

*Rice, Condoleezza (2006), "The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom is the Only Realistic Path to Security", December 11, [online web] Accessed 10 January 2007 URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901711.html>

Richardson, Lloyd Macauley (2002), "Now Play The India Card: Securing U.S. Strategic Interests in Asia", October/November 2002, [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3459266.html>

*Rocca, Christina (2001), Transcript of Remarks to the Foreign Press Center, Washington D.C., July 19, [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/4649.htm>

*Rocca, Christina (2002), Transcript of Remarks to the Press on US-India Relationship, New Delhi, April 10, [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/9433.htm>

*Rocca, Christina (2002), "Transforming US-India Relations", Transcript of Remarks to Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, May 14, [online web] Accessed 10 December 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/10173.htm>

*Royce, Edward (2002), "US-India Relations at the Conclusion of the 107th Congress", Letter to President George W. Bush, October 28, 2002, (online web) <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/royce/royce5.htm>

Rubinoff, Arther G. (2001), "Changing Perceptions of India in the U.S. Congress", *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 28(1): 37-61 [online web] Accessed 14 February 2008, URL http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3302/is_200103/ai_n7999213

Sardesai, D.R. and Thomas Raju G.C. (eds.) (2002), *Nuclear India in the Twenty - First Century*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Schaffer, Howard B. (2001), "Reconsidering the U.S. Role",. *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2001, [online web] Accessed 10 October 2007, URL: <http://www.twq.com/01spring/schaffer.pdf>

Schaffer, Teresita C.(2007), "Dialogue of the Giant Democracies: India and the United States in the 21st Century", Lecture at Bryn Mawr College, 22 March, 2007, [online web] Accessed 24 April 2008, URL www.brynmawr.edu/news/2007-03-22/schaffer.shtml

*Sen, Ronen (2005), "Indo-U.S. Relations: Where Are They Headed?", Text of lecture sponsored by the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, October 26, 2005, [online web] Accessed 13 April 2008, URL http://casi.ssc.upenn.edu/research/papers/sen_2005.pdf

Sepiamutiny Politics (2006), "The LOBBY", March 24, [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: <http://www.sepiamutiny.com/sepia/archives/003195.html>

Seth, Pravin (1999), *Post Pokharan Nuclear Politics: Fresh Perspectives on Indo-US Relations*, New Delhi: Rawat Publications.

Shafer, Elizabeth J. (2002), "Inciting Impediments: The Harm of US Nuclear Policies to Prospects for Peace in India and Pakistan", August, [online web] Accessed 15 December 2007, URL: <http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/policypractice/indiapakistan.htm>

Sharma, Ashok (2006), "The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Intense Lobbying", [online web] Accessed 22 June 2008 URL: http://www.ipcs.org/India_articles2.jsp?portal=india&keyWords=DOMESTIC&action=showView&kValue=2063&country=1014&status=article&mod=a&keyArticle=1014

SIPRI Yearbook (2006).

Singh, Jasjit (ed.) (1998), *Nuclear India*, New Delhi: Knowledge World.

Singh, Jaswant (2005), "India-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Perceptions, Potential, and Problems", Speech delivered at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, May 31, 2005, [online web] Accessed 22 June 2008, URL (online web) <http://www.brookings.edu/comm./events/20050531.pdf>

Sondhi, M.L. and Kapur, Ashok (2002), *US and India: Changing Strategic Parameters*, New Delhi: Manak Publication.

*Sokolski, Henry (2005), "The India Syndrome: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Melts Down", *The Weekly Standard*, August 1, 2005 [online web] Accessed 15 September 2007, URL <http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=Article050610%20India%20Syndrome%20Weekly%20Standard&PDFFolder=Articles>

*Sokolski, Henry (ed.) (2007), "Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation", March, [online web] Accessed 21 October 2007, URL: <http://www.npec-web.org/Books/20070300-NPEC-GaugingUS-IndiaStratCoop.pdf>

Span (2005), "Defense Relations", March/April 2005 [online web] Accessed 15 February 2007, URL: http://webpages.csus.edu/~sac53022/defense_relations.htm

Squassoni, Sharon, (2005) "Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan" Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL31589. February 17, [online web] Accessed 12 September 2007, URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31589.pdf>

Squassoni, Sharon, (2006), "US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL33016, [online web] Accessed 12 September 2007, URL: <http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/India/crs/RL330162.pdf>

Squassoni, Sharon (2006), "India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views". Congressional Research Service Report, updated 22 December, [online web] Accessed 12 September 2007, URL: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/28421.pdf>

Squassoni, Sharon & Parillo, Jill Marie (2006), "US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-by-Side Comparison of Current Legislation", Congressional Research Service Report, Order Code RL33561, 22 November, [online web] Accessed 12 September 2007, URL: http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/crs/20061222CRSSide_by_side_rpt.pdf

Subramaniam, T.S. (2005), "Identifying a Civilian Facility is an Indian Decision", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 12 August, 2005.

*Talbott, Strobe (2004), *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb*, United States: Brookings Institution Press.

Talbott, Strobe (2005), "Good Day for India, Bad Day for Non-Proliferation" *International Herald Tribune*, 21 July, 2005.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2000), *Stability in South Asia – Prospects of Indo-Pak Nuclear Conflict*, New Delhi: Rand Publication.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2002), "Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India", *ORBIS*, Vol. 46. NO. 1: 13-47.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2004), "Lost Tango in Washington", *Indian Express*, November 15, [online web] Accessed 29 September 2007, URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16152>

Tellis, Ashley J., (2005), "The U.S.-India Global Partnership: How Significant for American Interests", Remarks before the U.S. Congress, House International Relations Committee, November 16, 2005, Washington D.C., [online web] Accessed 29 September 2007, URL: http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/tell111605.pdf.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2005), "India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington D.C., [online web] Accessed 29 September 2007, URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis.India.Power.FINAL4.pdf>

Tellis, Ashley J. (2006), "Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship", *International Security*, Spring, 30(4): 113-151.

Tellis, Ashley J. (2005), "South Asian See-Saw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent", [online web] Accessed 15 November 2007, URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PB38.pdf>

Tellis, Ashley J. (2007), "Atoms For War?: US-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [online web] Accessed 15 November 2007, URL: <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf>

The Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of India and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy(2007), July, [online web] Accessed 19 September 2007, URL: <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/71vkAgHGNwIMuPVNCo520g/123text080307.pdf>

Thomas, Raju G.C. and Gupta, Amit (2000), *India's Nuclear Security*, New Delhi: Vistar Publications

Thyagraj, Manohar (2006), "Fighter Diplomacy: A Passage to India", *Air and Space Power Journal*, Spring, [online web] Accessed 23 February 2008, URL: <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/thyagaraj.html>

Twining, Daniel Twining (2007), "America's Grand Design in Asia" *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, [online web] Accessed 12 December 2007, URL: http://www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer_twining.pdf

Varadarajan, Siddharth (2005), "America, India and the Outsourcing of Imperial Overreach", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, July 13, 2005.

Varadarajan, Siddharth (2006), "Perils of Three-Way Security Cooperation", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, February 14, 2006.

Varadarajan, Siddharth (2007), "Major Obstacles Persist in Nuclear Deal," *The Hindu*, April 25, 2007.

*United States Department of Defense (2006), "US-India Defense Relationship", Fact Sheet, 16 March [online web] Accessed 7 October 2007 URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/d20060302us-indiaderelationship.pdf>

*"USINPAC (2008), "US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement", Status Report from a USINPAC Fact Finding Mission to India, [online web] Accessed 14 April 2008, URL: <http://www.usinpac.com>

*White House Press Release (2006), "US-India Joint Statement", White House Press Release, March 2, [online web] Accessed 7 October 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2006/62418.html>.

*Wolf, John S. (2002), "U.S. Approaches to Nonproliferation," Monterey Institute Meeting, Stockholm, Sweden, September 6, 2002, [online web] Accessed 12 January 2008, URL: <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/13449.htm>

Zakaria, Fareed (2006), "Nixon to China, Bush to India", *Newsweek*, February 27, 2006.

*Zoellic, Robert (1999), "The United States Strategic Objectives for the 21st Century", Speech before the Trilateral Commission, [online web] Accessed 15 December 2007, URL: <http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/tr/gtxts/153/zoe.html>