


**UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN COMBATING  
TERRORISM: POST 9/11**

*Dissertation submitted to  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the award of the Degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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**2007**



Date: 9<sup>th</sup> July 2007

**DECLARATION**

I declared that the dissertation entitled "UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN COMBATING TERRORISM: POST: 9/11" submitted by me for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree to this university or any other university.

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**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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*Date: 9<sup>th</sup> July 2007  
JNU, New Delhi*

*Sibasis  
Sibasis Suryakanta Sahoo*

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DEDICATED

TO MY

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ASSP:	Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba of Pakistan
ATA:	Anti Terrorist Act
ATC:	Anti Terrorist Court
BMENA:	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
CBRN:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
CENTO:	Central Treaty Organization
CIA:	Central Investigation Agency
CID:	Crime Intelligence Department
CPN-M:	Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist
DCG:	Defense Cooperation Group
DHS:	Department of Homeland Security
ECNEC:	Economic Committee of the National Council
FATA:	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTO:	Foreign Terrorist Organization
HuJI:	Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
H-ul-M:	Harakat-ul-Mujahideen
H-u-M:	Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HuMA:	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Aalami
ISI:	Inter Service Intelligence
ISPR:	Inter Service Public Relation
J-e-I:	Jaish-e-Islami
J-e-M:	Jaish-e-Mohammed
JUI:	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam
JWG:	Joint Working Group
L-e-A:	Lashkar-e-Ansar



L-e-T:	Lashkar-e-Toiba
L-e-U:	Lashkar-e-Umer
LFO:	Legal Framework Order
L-i-J:	Lashkar-i-Jahangvi
LoC :	Line of Control
LTTE:	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MAAG:	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MEDO:	Middle East Treaty Organization
MMA:	Muttahida Majilis-e-Amal
MNNA:	Major non-NATO Ally
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC:	National Counterterrorism Center
NDFB:	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NID:	National Intelligence Director
NLFT:	National Liberation Front of Tripura
NPT:	Non- Proliferation Treaty
NWPF:	North West Frontier Province
OIC:	Organization of Islamic Conference
PML-Q:	Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid-e-Azam
PoK:	Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PPP:	Pakistan Peoples Party
PRC:	People's Republic of China
PSI:	Proliferation Security Initiative
PWG:	People's War Group
RSO:	Rohingya Solidarity Organization
SAARC:	South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO:	South East Asia Treaty Organization

SMP:	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan
SSP:	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TJP:	Tehrik Jafria Pakistan
TNS:	Tehrik Nifaz Shariat
UAE:	United Arab Emirates
ULFA:	United Liberation Front of Assam
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UPF:	United Peoples Front
USA PARTIOT Act:	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC:	World Trade Centre

## PREFACE

In our age, terrorism is a major problem and a core security threat to each individual state as well as to the whole global community. It needs a constant and visible strategy for all states and the international institution to suppress the odd elements from the peaceful environment. So the lone super power made alliances and policies to fight the menace. The US sought international cooperation to eradicate terrorism, which could clearly be visible in the aftermath of the terrorists' attack in its homeland on September 11, 2001. The 9/11 events changed the world with the change of policies and objectives of Washington and Islamabad. The US declared the war on terrorism that could be seen in Afghanistan in the name of Operation Enduring Freedom and then it extended to other parts of the world. In the war against terrorism Pakistan played a significant role as a frontline state of the US.

Chapter-I analyses the historical view of the United States and Pakistan relations. The first engagement had begun from the early stage of the Cold War. On the one hand, the US was interested in containing international communism in Asia and on the other Pakistan was looking for a strong ally to establish military parity with its neighbour India. Thus the interest of the two countries coincided. Then Islamabad played a significant role in establishing contact between Washington and Beijing. Pakistan became a major ally of the US during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the late 70s. But this does not mean that all was well between the two states during all the years. The relationship passed through ups and downs. On the negative side, Pakistan's growing friendship with China, the US' role during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and finally Pakistan's move to acquire nuclear weapons created problems. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the

end of the Cold War, Pakistan lost its significance in the eyes of the US policy makers.

Chapter-II discusses the United States counterterrorism policy towards South Asia after 9/11. It came to the limelight due to the terrorists attack on its homeland in 2001. Washington thought that a firm guideline is needed to curb the terrorist menace and ensure security for their citizens in any part of the world. The Bush Administration identified Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden as the principal threat. So allying with foreign states, particularly with Pakistan in the South Asian region was the best strategy option for the US. So the US chosen Pakistan as the frontline state in its fight against terrorism and extended all possible helps and supports. This engagement marks both the positive and negative aspects. Washington should address Islamabad's concern in order to achieve its own objectives. The future success depends upon long-term physical engagement of the US in this region as well as with Pakistan.

Chapter-III examines the course of action of Pakistan in this field. For the first time in its history, Islamabad took a stringent action against terrorism through their existing laws as well as with enacting of new acts. In the wake of 9/11 incident, Pakistan was much more pressurized by the US because of its affiliation to the terrorists groups and their leaders. Allying with the US led war, it got the same status like the first Afghan crisis-frontline state and later on received the major non-NATO ally status. President Musharraf made lot of efforts to fight against terrorism by putting his life and regime under threat. The major dilemma faced by him is the domestic predicament and hostility. His government tried to apprehend Al-Qaeda activists and root out the extremist elements. To achieve this objective, it needs a constant execution of policies with civilizing the society and establishing democracy. The question comes how much the president will score the goals in this challenging game?

Chapter-IV elaborates the cooperation and consequences of the US-Pakistan's meeting in the field of terrorism. The cooperation is marked in the areas of military-defense, political-diplomatic, law enforcement-intelligence, and economic-financial collaborations. The most important is in the field of military and intelligence. In this respect the most significant point is the physical presence of the US agencies in this area. The consequences arose with Musharraf's decision to unite with the war and providing logistic support to the US. It can be spotted with the domestic reactions in Pakistan and the anti- Musharraf and anti-Americanism in Pakistan. So it is for both the states to decide their future cooperation.

Chapter-V concludes this research work marking with the constraints and prospects of Washington-Islamabad tie up in post-9/11 period, which is based on terrorism. Basically the constraints come from the violent behavior inside Pakistan and the Muslim world's reaction to this as well as in the US. But the prospects of curbing terrorism depend upon the cooperation among Islamabad- Kabul- New Delhi -Washington. Still today terrorism stands as a major aspect of the US policy outlines. Pakistan is also implementing anti-terror strategy carefully. So it needs for both the countries to engage themselves in a long run course individually and mutually.

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**CHAPTER - I**

**HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE US-PAKISTAN  
RELATIONS**

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The Washington-Islamabad relationship had begun with divergence of perceptions and interests with the emergence of Pakistan as a new independent and sovereign state. For the United States policy makers, the importance of Pakistan in early 1950s derived from the fear of Communism and perceived the threat of a shift in the global *Balance of Power* in favour of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The strategic location of Pakistan, on both the borders of the Soviet Union and the PRC attracted to the US for use of its *Containment Policy*.<sup>1</sup> The US global power equation was naturally seen with Pakistan because of its military capability in this region. Thus, in the right location at the right time, Pakistan emerged to have utility for the US policy. It was an urgent requirement for the US - because of its policies and concerns, and for Pakistan- because of the military support after 1948 war with India over Kashmir. American policy makers did not see at that time that Pakistan as a factor of significance for the promotion of major US interests. They tended at this point to devote greater attention in the South Asian region in terms of global security requirement of the US.<sup>2</sup> Against this, each country needed the other, although for its own reasons, and the development of close relations was seen as natural and inevitable.

In 1953, the aim of President Eisenhower was to reduce US involvement in other Korea type operations and build up instead the indigenous fighting capability of countries including Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq- the 'frontline states'. The US policy towards Pakistan became even closer and positive in its tone as the establishment of a *Northern Tier*<sup>3</sup> of defense became an early goal of the Eisenhower Administration, which was more concerned about the Soviet threat.

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<sup>1</sup> Bilal Hashmi, "The Beginnings of U.S.-Pakistan Alliance", *Pakistan Forum*, 3(6/7), 1973, pp.3-5.

<sup>2</sup> M.S. Venkataramani, *American Role in Pakistan, 1947-58*, New Delhi: Radiant, 1982, p.5.

<sup>3</sup> Denis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001, pp.72-73.

Whatever the case, President Eisenhower announced in February 1954 that the US would provide military assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan President Ayub pressed the points that: "US aid would have to be substantial enough to underwrite the costs of economic development. The future relations can be traced through a discussion of two key issues, namely, US military assistance and the Kashmir question".<sup>4</sup> John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, was very much impressed by Pakistan on the ground that, "the strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people of Pakistan would make them a dependable safeguard against communism".<sup>5</sup>

## **US AND PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR**

### **Security Engagement and Economic Assistance**

The paramount reason for the US-Pakistan relationship was the arms and economic support for Pakistan and alliance for the US. The US announced its decision to accept Pakistan's request for military assistance under the Mutual Defense Agreement, which concluded on 15 May 1954, and soon followed by Pakistan joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 08, 1954, before that Islamabad was also a member of the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) in 1953. With this, the US considered that the only way Pakistan could play the proxy role against Communist expansion was, if Washington guaranteed Pakistan's security against India. The US put pressure for Pakistan membership for the Baghdad Pact came in September 1955 and renamed it in 1959 as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but Washington did not join the pact.<sup>6</sup> Its absence meant that US-Pakistan relations were kept largely on a bilateral

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew F. Westwood, *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1966, p.20.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p.22.

<sup>6</sup> Shirin Tahir- Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan*, New York: Praeger Publications, 1982, p.6.



basis that resulted in the continued absence of any multilateral institutional basis for relationship.

In early 1960s, the US wanted to launch the U-2 Surveillance plane through Pakistan military base against the Soviet Union. Pakistan Government demanded a very heavy cost including the use of its armed force. It was the Sino- Indian conflict of 1962, which brought about a domestic change in Pakistan's sense of commitment to the alliance. The US alliance with Pakistan was considerably weakened with the American assistance to India over the war with China in 1962, which was in the context of global strategic power and ideological confrontation. Islamabad concluded that "as between Pakistan and India, the US choose to India", on the contrary, the US felt that it had neither neglected Pakistan nor it embraced India.<sup>7</sup> During this period, the US was irked over Pakistan's growing friendship with communist China for improving its security interests. President John F. Kennedy said Pakistan that its relationship with China was not impressed. President Kennedy observed in 1962 that allowance must be made for special circumstances to Pakistan but his successor Lyndon Johnson made no such. The widen gulf between the US and Pakistan marked in their divergence policies towards China, Islamabad's risk policy in Kashmir and 1965 aggregation in Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>8</sup> When the temper cooled down in Washington, the policy makers recognized Pakistan's potential for contributing to better understanding between the US and China. In April 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto for their help to arrange a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister for the discussion on the Vietnam crisis. In 1967 the US announced termination of military assistance to Islamabad because of the future possible role of Islamabad in this sector. But after

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<sup>7</sup> Kux, 2001, p.131.

<sup>8</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.108.

President Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he considered Pakistan as “an asset for opening communications with Beijing”<sup>9</sup> unlike his previous administration. But in later he used Islamabad’s links with China to start a secret diplomacy with China. The improved relations between the US and Pakistan could be marked with the newly successful established relation of Washington with Beijing via Islamabad.

The US military aid to Pakistan was \$ 672 millions in direct transfer of defense material and services and almost \$ 700 millions in security supporting assistance in early 1970s. The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) gave training to Pakistani military officers and also sent to US for training with US equipment and techniques.<sup>10</sup> The US decided to sell arms to Pakistan, included Jet B-57 Canberra bombers, F-104 jet fighters and armed personnel carrier with the total estimate of \$ 40 billions. In 1973, the US suddenly announced to resume supply to Islamabad after 1971 ban, where President Nixon made a statement that, “Washington was not giving but selling arms to Pakistan assumes significance”.<sup>11</sup> It implied that the US was not going to give up its option of selling arms. In 1974, the Pentagon had provided aid to Islamabad for modification of HH-43-B to HH-43-F valued at \$ 47,509 millions.<sup>12</sup>

The US agreed to strengthen Pakistan’s military position and even willing to build atomic reactors with under the international supervision to prevent the secret production of nuclear devices after the Indian explosion of an atomic bomb in May 1974. In 1976, Kissinger paid visit to Islamabad and made an offer to sell 100 A-7 jet fighters. Pakistan purchased self propelled

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ataur Rahman, *Pakistan and America: Dependency Relations*, New Delhi: Young India Publications, 1982, pp.57-59.

<sup>11</sup> “The Arms Dealers: Guns for All”, *Time*, URL: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,9129227,00.html>, accessed on 28 February 2007.

<sup>12</sup> *Times of India*, New Delhi, 16 March 1973.

howitzers and spent \$ 16 millions to restore the two destroy of the US shipyards. Pakistani crews came to the US for 15 months of training in 1977 and get F-5. The offer of A-7 and its denial affected on US – Pakistan relations because of Pakistan's nuclear issue<sup>13</sup>.

### **Kashmir: The Two Wars and After**

When the US needed Pakistan for playing a key role against Communism, at that time Pakistan wanted such diplomatic pressure and intervention over India to solve the Kashmir problem. Kashmir was an important issue to Pakistan from 1947-1965 and over Kashmir- the two wars were fought between India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1965. To balance with India's military position and win over Kashmir, Islamabad went to Washington and had established such an alliance with different attitudes and perceptions.<sup>14</sup>

In the wake of the demand from Pakistan that the US should diplomatically force the Indians to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, the Secretary of States, John F. Dulles visited the sub-continent in 1953, where he agreed with Nehru that partition might be a better way to solve the problem than a plebiscite. But in Karachi he took up the Kashmir question with dropping the plebiscite and said partitioning the state as a way to settle the dispute.<sup>15</sup> The Pakistan Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan viewed that "no alternative ideas against plebiscite" in this region.<sup>16</sup> However, the US and Pakistan wanted to have an American representative Chester Nimitz as plebiscite administrator, which was opposed fully by New Delhi. Frustrated over the lack of progress toward Kashmir settlement, in 1957 the Pakistan

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<sup>13</sup> Kux, 2001, p.223.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.51.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, pp.51-54.

<sup>16</sup> Kux, 2001, p.65

Prime Minister warned the US that, "anything less than prevent reaffirmation of support for plebiscite would be shattered the relations".<sup>17</sup>

In early 1962, the Kennedy Administration for the first time had to deal with the Kashmir problem. President Ayub accepted the US proposal of the former World Bank President Eugene Black as the mediator in this issue, while Nehru rejected the proposal. When the mediation failed, the US was seen as having failed the test of reliable friendship and effective leadership, and aid to Pakistan was also cancelled. But this sort of economic and political pressure did not alter Pakistan's behavior. Instead, Pakistan viewed that dependence on a single country was no longer desirable and looked for other options.

In Washington, President Johnson and Ayub met in December 1965, where Ayub viewed, "how could I have got Kashmir of the diplomatic table when it was not won the battlefield"?<sup>18</sup> In return the US President said that, "to do his best on Kashmir at Tashkent, if failed, the US would try to help not under any illusion that US could force a settlement".<sup>19</sup> Through the US pressure, Pakistan went to Tashkent in January 1966 and signed a declaration with India to formally end the war.

## **Emergence of Bangladesh and the US**

In 1970, in East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won a landslide victory on the slogan for full regional autonomy, while in West Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) emerged as a winner. In March 1971, the Pakistani army cracked down in the East and Mujib demanded for provincial autonomy of East Pakistan. President Yahya on 25 March 1971 announced its implementation of army's plan in East Pakistan. The State Department and the Nixon administration had

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 86.

<sup>18</sup> Tahir- Kheli, 1982, pp.22-24.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

condemned the Pakistani action because of the harrowing tales of army killing of Bengali civilians.<sup>20</sup>

The Senate Foreign Relation Committee voted unanimously for an immediate and complete cutoff of arms transfers because of Islamabad's use of Washington's military equipment in the suppression of the Bengalis. During this time, India got involved in East Pakistan crisis to solve the pattern of refugees who entered into India of a large number. India had planned to send troops to East Pakistan on 4<sup>th</sup> December 1971 and the US warned India for the pullback of forces from East Pakistan. Kissinger urged Yahya to hold on in the East a while longer, while the US Seventh Fleet was on the move and stayed on Bay of Bengal, if possible it would take action against the Indian move. On 10 December 1971, Kissinger declared that, "US to give emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan".<sup>21</sup> Addressing this move on 13 December 1971, Nixon said, "the US policy was to protest events in East Pakistan but to prevent the destruction of West Pakistan".<sup>22</sup> After the surrender of Pakistan General Niazi in Dacca on 15 December 1971 to India, Prime Minister Bhutto met Nixon in the White House on 18 December and stressed that Pakistan now wanted good relations and military and humanitarian assistance. Both the US – Pakistan argued for cordial relations and the US gave \$ 115 millions assistance to Islamabad as military equipment.<sup>23</sup>

## **Nuclear Issue and US Concerns**

On 8 May 1974, India shook the global scene by exploding an underground nuclear device at the Pokharan test site in the Rajasthan desert. The US

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Kux, 2001, pp.201-203.

<sup>22</sup> "The tilt: the US and the South Asian Crisis of 1971", *National Security Archive Electronic Briefing*, Book No.79, 16 December 2002, URL: [gwu.edu/~nsarhiv/NSAE/BB/79](http://gwu.edu/~nsarhiv/NSAE/BB/79), accessed on 29 February 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

viewed with concern about New Delhi's tests and feared of Pakistan may follow the suit. Washington was worried about Bhutto's remark that, "Pakistan would eat grass if necessary to match any nuclear capability that India developed. Islamabad will not blackmail on this issue with the US diplomacy".<sup>24</sup> Once the US became aware that Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were not mere expression, uneasy Islamabad's attempt to match India would become a policy goal. Pakistan was one of those states whose nuclear policy based on the concept of nuclear deterrence. During that time, there was a strong belief that the bomb would elevate Islamabad's image among the Muslim countries. President of Pakistan said our national enthusiasm finds a rallying point-'build the bomb, the bomb means power'.<sup>25</sup>

In October 1974, the Secretary of State, Kissinger made a visit to Pakistan when Islamabad remained preoccupied with the continuing of US embargo against weapons transfer to his country, stated in public that US would enhance its security. To encourage a positive US response, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto implied that sufficient conventional forces might deter him seeking nuclear weapons. The US officials were becoming concerned about Pakistan's discussions and contracts with France and West Germany for nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.<sup>26</sup> The relations became troubled when the US ceased such agreement with successful diplomacy and policy. After the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force and Islamabad's move towards acquiring nuclear, Washington pressurized Pakistan to sign the NPT in 1976, which was opposed by Islamabad strongly.

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<sup>24</sup> Sartaj Aziz, "Nuclear South Asia and US-Pakistan Relations", *Asia Society*, October 1998, URL: [http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/asoc\\_spch98/a2501.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/asoc_spch98/a2501.html), accessed on 24 February 2007.

<sup>25</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Nuclear Myths and realities" in Zia Mian, eds., *Pakistan's Atomic Bomb And The Search For Security*, Lahore: Gautam publication, pp. 3-7.

<sup>26</sup> Jamshed Nazar, "A History of US-Pakistan Relations", 12 December 2003, URL: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr145.html>, accessed on 4 July 2006.

However, Kissinger's strategy was a combination of both carrot and sticks.<sup>27</sup> The carrots came in an offer of 110 A-7 attack bombers, which the Pakistan Air Force wanted to improve its strike against India. The sticks were not any direct threat would adopt a tougher non-proliferation approach and might make an example of Pakistan. As part of the US process of tightening up nuclear policy, Congress had adopted amendment to Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act proposed by Senator John Glenn and Stuart Symington to bar assistance to non-NPT states that imported uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing technology. Warning that Pakistan might face an economic aid cut off under new legislation, if Islamabad would not accept the Kissinger's proposal of conventional arms package with the potent A-7s and if not abstain from its nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.<sup>28</sup>

Washington was unaware about Islamabad's secret embark on a parallel and technically more difficult route toward a nuclear explosive capability with A.Q. Khan's detailed knowledge about uranium enrichment process during 1975. By this time, US- Pakistan relations were sliding downward because of the Islamabad's nuclear policy and President Jimmy Carter's statement that, "South Asia means India, not Pakistan".<sup>29</sup> By the May 1979, the US became conscious that, Pakistan was pursuing covertly the enriched uranium path toward a nuclear capability after the US intelligence concluded. The Carter Administration found President Zia-ul-Haque's response was inadequate to rule out a peaceful test and suspended economic aid for a second time. Foreign Affairs advisor of Pakistan, Agha Shahi

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<sup>27</sup> Teresita C. Schaffer, "US Influence on Pakistan: Can partners have Divergent priorities?", *Washington Quarterly*, 26(1),2002-03, pp.170-71.

<sup>28</sup> Lewis W. Simons, "U.S Seen Weighing Arms for Pakistan", *Washington Post*, September 25, 1974.

<sup>29</sup> Cohen, 2005, pp.80-81.

labeled press reports that Libya and other Arab countries were founding the program to make an "Islamic bomb" as "purely fancy".<sup>30</sup>

## **US-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS IN NEW COLD WAR (1979-1991)**

The new Cold War started between the two Super Powers with the Soviet army's intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979 with disturbing détente. Unlike the ups and downs of relations between the US and Pakistan during the Cold War period, the relationship transformed in the new era, where Pakistan played a major role for the US and Islamabad was declared as a "frontline state".<sup>31</sup>

### **Afghan Crisis: Mujahideen, ISI and the CIA**

The Soviet army's intervention in Afghanistan shocked the globe on 24 December 1979 and supported communists' leader Barak Karmal to be the country's president with ousting Hafizullah Amin. To counter this, the US attitude towards Pakistan changed dramatically in the tense atmosphere. Washington approached Islamabad for cooperation and Pakistan had played a major role due to her geo-strategic position. On 1 January 1980 the Kabul regime said, "it invited Soviet troops, which will leave when foreign threat ends".<sup>32</sup> In the Carter Administration response, Pakistan's security was an important element. On 4 January 1980, the US announced its action against Soviet move and provided military equipment and other assistance to help Pakistan for its national security and involved role in Afghanistan. According to the US report, it offered Pakistan \$400 millions for two years as economic and military aid package. President Zia rejected the offer on the

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<sup>30</sup> Tahir- Kheli, 1982 pp.72-76.

<sup>31</sup> "Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State", *The Library of Congress*, URL:

[http://www.photius.com/countries/Pakistan/national\\_security/Pakistan-national-security-pakistan-becomees-a-f-10437.html](http://www.photius.com/countries/Pakistan/national_security/Pakistan-national-security-pakistan-becomees-a-f-10437.html), accessed on 17 April 2007.

<sup>32</sup> Elaine Adam, "Chronology- 1980", *Foreign Affairs*, 59(3), 1981, p.732.



ground that "this amount will buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union which is now much more influential in this region than the US", in return he wanted country's security.<sup>33</sup>

The Secretary of States, Cyrus Vance, went before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee to talk about the immediate danger and urged the need to join with Pakistan's security needs. It signaled the US desire to counter Soviet Union's expansion by helping Pakistan. Washington prepared what to give to Pakistan, called it a "wishful shopping list"; costing \$ 11 billion included radar, air craft, anti-tank missiles, armed helicopters, light field artillery and self propelled guns, and economic and military aid package of approximately \$ 3.2 billion extending for next five years.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the lack of agreement on aid package, intelligence cooperation on Afghanistan between the CIA and the ISI started. After the Soviet intervention, President Jimmy Carter approved a broader Covert action program that instructed the CIA to provide military weapons and ammunitions. The US support to the Afghan anti-communist fighters, who became known as Mujahideen or freedom fighters and provided all levels of support. The CIA funneled all aid through the ISI, which handed over the Mujahideen and limited the distribution of arms and aid to recognized resistance groups.<sup>35</sup> Further Islamabad insisted that the CIA not to deal directly with the mujahideen, but only through the ISI in order to improve their control and prevent the CIA's presence in Pakistan.

During this time, in Afghanistan, there existed six effective groups of Mujahideens who cooperated with the CIA through the ISI against the Soviet action. They were Hizbi-Islami, Jamiat-I-Islami, Younus Khalis Group, Harakat-i-Islami, Milli Islami Mahaz-I-Afghanistan, and Jabha Nijat-

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<sup>33</sup> William Borders, "Pakistani Dismisses \$400 millions in Aid offered by US as 'Peanuts' ", *New York Times*, 19 January 1980.

<sup>34</sup> Congressional Research Service, *Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy*, Washington, DC: US Library of Congress, 1977, p.11.

<sup>35</sup> Kux, 2001, p.252.

i-Milli Afghanistan. Above these, the total fighting men in war were more than 150,000.<sup>36</sup> Beside these organized resistance, there existed a large number of unorganized resistance divided into as many as 200 small groups within their country where they faced a common enemy. During the final year in office of the President Jimmy Carter, Washington continued to seek a broader security relationship with Pakistan to support Covert CIA-ISI ties. Ronald Reagan after assuming office of the President in January 1981 continued putting to support Mujahideen. Again the new problem came with Pakistan's demand of F-16 fighters, which viewed it as an "unnecessary luxury".<sup>37</sup> Washington desire to increase the pressure on the Soviet in late 1981 and assigned Islamabad to do everything possible to expanded the war. The CIA officers urged Lt. General Akhtar Rahaman Khan, the ISI Director General, to agree to increase the amount of arms and aid supplied to the Mujahideen. Akhtar Khan sought President Zia's approval and President responded that he wanted to keep with the US.<sup>38</sup>

The Covert program grew gradually as the Afghan Mujahideen's ability to absorb weapons increased and their operational capability developed. At the time of 1981, the CIA spent about \$30 millions annually on the program. Most of the supplies came by seaport of Karachi where the ISI took possession from the CIA and distributed it among the recognized guerrilla groups. Originally, the number was about 40 but in 1982 ISI forced the Mujahideen to consolidate into seven resistance groups headquartered in Peshawar.<sup>39</sup>

The CIA did not maintain a large permanent staff in Pakistan for the Afghan program. Specialists were assigned to instruct Pakistani trainers

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<sup>36</sup> Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran, and Pakistan*, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1987, pp.110-117.

<sup>37</sup> Kux, 2001, p.259.

<sup>38</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "Inside the Afghan Talks", *Foreign Policy*, 72, Autumn 1988, p.33.

<sup>39</sup> Steve Coll, "The Anatomy of a victory: CIA's Covert War in Afghanistan", *Washington Post*, 20 July 1992.

in the use of equipment and to provide intelligence to help the ISI in planning Mujahideen operations inside Afghanistan. The US and Pakistan were largely successful in keeping the Covert program out of the public domain. By late 1982, the US and Pakistan appeared to have evolved a new partnership. The US was providing \$600 millions a year in military and economic aid to Pakistan. The US asked Zia to provide home to several millions Afghan refugees despite the considerable burden and danger. On 21 November 1982, Zia said that at least 2.8 millions Afghani refugees have been driven into Pakistan.<sup>40</sup>

About the prospects for the Afghan peace talks in 1983, Zia informed to Washington that Moscow might be willing to withdraw Soviet forces and to install a government in Kabul with less Pakistan objection and to the Afghan resistance.<sup>41</sup> US Secretary of State George Shultz told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gramyko to endorse for Geneva talks with an agreement. By mid 1984, it had become evident that a standoff was developing in Afghanistan. To know about the prospects in Afghanistan, CIA Director Casey was eager to know the withdrawal date of Soviet army from Pakistan. The CIA believed that it was not wise to depend on ISI to wage the insurgency and Mujahideens, after knowing the details about the US aid corruption in Pakistan.<sup>42</sup>

The Mujahideens lacked an adequate defense against Soviet helicopters and were suffering as the Soviet pressed gunship attacks. They sought to obtain the US made stinger missile, anti-aircraft weapons for resistance. In September 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze advised Secretary of State George Shultz privately that the Soviet troops

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<sup>40</sup> Janis Kreslins, "Chronology: 1982", *Foreign Affairs*, 61(3), 1983, p.732.

<sup>41</sup> Bernard Weinraub, "Pakistanis Tell of Soviet hint on Afghanistan", *New York Times*, 27 May 1983.

<sup>42</sup> Kux, 2001, pp.272-74.

would leave Afghanistan within a year.<sup>43</sup> And in December 1987, US-Soviet summit in Washington, President Gorbachev publicly announced that Soviet troops would leave after the agreement was reached.<sup>44</sup> And finally, the Soviet troops pull out of Afghanistan in 1989.

### **Continuing Nuclear Trouble**

The impact of Afghan crisis has much impact on the US non-proliferation policy. The anti-Soviet policy of the US had ignored Pakistan's secret nuclear weapons activities. Senator Capitol Hill raised this in the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, which approved a six-year waiver for the sanctions that banned assistance to Pakistan in May 1981. On 6 December 1982, Zia met with Secretary of State, George Shultz where he warned Pakistan's President that the issue could seriously undermine the relationship, Zia replied that the two states were a "union of unequal" even though they had strong common interests.<sup>45</sup> In April 1984, A.Q.Khan claiming that Pakistan succeeded in enriching uranium to weapons grade encouraged further concern to Washington.<sup>46</sup>

The White House arranged for Senator Larry Presseler to sponsor the amendment on Pakistan's nuclear question, featured as a way to avoid more damaging legislation, not as a device for cutting off assistance. The fact that the amendment was country specific and thus discriminatory was not at the time deemed to be a problem for the Pakistanis, although Islamabad complained about the imposition of sanctions. Unlike the Presseler amendment, the Solarz amendment included a presidential waiver- barred

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<sup>43</sup> Charles Dunbar, "Afghanistan in 1987: A Year of Decision?", *Asian Survey*, 28(2), 1988, p.152.

<sup>44</sup> Richard P. Cronin, "Afghanistan in 1988: Year of Decision", *Asian Survey*, 29(2), 1989, p.207.

<sup>45</sup> James Buckley, "Nuclear Issue and Pakistan", *New York Times*, 5 August 1981.

<sup>46</sup> "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons- A Chronology", *The Global Security*, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke--chro.htm>, accessed on 22 May 2007.

aid to any country who illegally imported nuclear from the US, because three Pakistani nationals were accused in Texas in July 1984 for trying to export equipment useful for a weapons program.<sup>47</sup> In October 1986, Reagan certified for the first time the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan would acquire nuclear device. His successor and President Bush met Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Tokyo and expressed the desire to continue close security ties with Pakistan, provided Pakistan freezed its nuclear program. The US maked it clear that, the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the winding down the Cold War, the policy on the nuclear issue had changed.<sup>48</sup> The reason for this was not imposing sanctions on Pakistan but the growing pressure from non-proliferation supporters in Congress.

By May 1990, US intelligence analysts had concluded that Pakistan had taken the final step toward possession of a nuclear weapons and Washington no longer had any doubts that Pakistan had crossed the line. The US viewed that Pakistan was committing suicide, so far as relations with US were concerned unless it agreed to roll back its nuclear capability. By the growing of the new era, the US-Pakistan relations got deteriorated.

## **US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN POST- COLD WAR PERIOD** **(1991-2001)**

With the Soviet decision to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan (1989) and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1990) have marked the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the US-Pakistan relations would have weakened and there would not have been such a sudden and near total

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<sup>47</sup>Jamshed Nazar, "A History of US-Pakistan Relations", *United States Institute of Peace*, 12 December 2003, URL: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr145.html>, accessed on 6 April 2006.

<sup>48</sup> Kux, 2001, pp.305-06.

break. The Bush Administration wanted to maintain a good relationship and perceived that Pakistan could play a helpful role in support of US interests in the Persian Gulf and regarded as a force for Moderation in the Muslim World. The power shift in the US brought little cheer to Islamabad. But the bilateral relations began to improve despite the continuing stand off on the nuclear issue. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphael, pleased Islamabad in 1993 saying that the US had never accepted the accession of Kashmir to India, and thought that Pakistan remained a potentially useful friend for us, and force for Moderation in the Islamic World.<sup>49</sup> The Clinton Administration's emphasis on non-proliferation policy, human rights, terrorism and democracy had marked in the US-Pakistan relationship.

### **Afghanistan: the Taliban and Bin Laden**

The US and Pakistan interest converged over Afghanistan. The US Government's initial reaction to capture Kabul by the Taliban (mainly Pushtan refugees who had been educated in religious schools- Madrassas in Pakistan's Balochistan province) was positive. The US through Pakistani's ISI could achieve its goal and the State Department declared, that "the US could see nothing objectionable in the step the Taliban had taken to impose Islamic law in the areas under their control and called on the Taliban to move quickly to restore order and to a representative interim government".<sup>50</sup> In August 1998, Washington policy maker's attention turned once more to Afghanistan. The Taliban already controlled most of the country and their regime was reorganized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But later on the US opposed the Taliban because of their

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<sup>49</sup> Cohen, 2001, p.71.

<sup>50</sup> Michale Dobbs, "Analysts Feel Militia Could End Anarchy", *Washington Post*, 28 September 1996.

harsh treatment of women, and their willingness to provide a haven for Islamic extremists and terrorists.<sup>51</sup>

Pakistan's ISI support for the Taliban became a significant source of friction with the US. There was also growing concern of US policy makers that a Taliban like movement supported by Pro-Islamic political parties and fundamentalist's elements in the ISI and the military would create security problems in this region as well as for the whole world. Further the US pressure on Pakistan to stop ISI role in Afghanistan and highlighted Osama bin Laden because, Afghanistan looked even larger on the US radar screen after the intelligence community concluded that terrorist attacks on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania were organized by Bin Laden and also found ISI links.<sup>52</sup>

After the Taliban gained power, they allowed Bin Laden to use their territory as a base for organizing activities. The US Navy Warships launched cruise missiles against Bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan in 1998. Although Washington did not inform Pakistan before the attacks, General Joseph Ralston, Vice- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was visiting Islamabad, was able to assure General Karmat that the missiles flying through Pakistani airspace were Americans, not Indians, and were aimed at Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup> Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told President Clinton that the US action in the mistaken had struck a Pakistani village, where eleven Pakistani were killed- who were being trained for guerrilla warfare run by a Pakistani group active in the Kashmir insurgency that was on the US list of terrorist organizations.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup>Kux, 2001, pp.348-349.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Pamela Constable, "US Strike is blow to Pakistan's Rulers", *Washington Post*, August 26, 1998.

<sup>54</sup> Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Cracking Open Pakistan's Jihadi Core", *The Asia Times*, 12 August 2004, URL: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/FH12Df03.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH12Df03.html), accessed on 23 April 2007.

The US urged Pakistan to press the Taliban to handover Bin Laden. Islamabad claimed that fiercely held Afghan customs regarding hospitality would render its efforts fruits. Much as the Pakistanis would have liked to gain favour in Washington by arriving for the capture of Bin Laden.

### **Kashmir: Insurgency and Kargil Conflict**

United States under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Arnold Kanter, warned Islamabad that, "if Pakistan continued its covert help for Kashmir insurgency, it ran the risk of being declared a country officially supporting terrorism".<sup>55</sup> The US reported that the ISI was continuing to provide direct assistance to the anti-Indian insurgents and enabling mujahideen veterans of the Afghan struggle to join the uprising against Indian rule in Kashmir. The Pakistan Foreign Office stressed the consequences of failing to hold US warning, the ISI favored continuing direct support for the Kashmir insurgents and expressed doubts that Washington would actually designate Pakistan a "terrorist state".<sup>56</sup>

In May 1999, the Kargil issue arose with a large number of insurgents with Pakistani support had crossed the Line of Control (LoC) in north Kashmir. New Delhi reacted forcefully, employing air power in Kashmir and mounting substantial counterattacks. The conflict broadened by striking across the LoC worried Washington that the fight could widen and possibly spin out of control, raising the nightmare scenario of war between two states armed with nuclear weapons. President Clinton sent messages to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf to accept a pullback. Nawaz Sharif met Clinton in July 1999 and it was agreed that, Islamabad would urge the Mujahideen to withdraw across the LoC and

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<sup>55</sup> Kux, 2001, p.316.

<sup>56</sup> Douglas Jehl, "Pakistan Is Facing Terrorist Listing", *New York Times*, 25 April 1993.



restart the delayed Lahore process with India. In turn, Clinton promised that he would take active interest and efforts to address the Kashmir problem.<sup>57</sup>

On 25 March 2000, President Clinton arrived in Islamabad with a warm welcome and high expectation. By this time, the US officials had strongly reacted to the murder of 35 Sikhs in Kashmir and stressed that violence was not the only way to solve the dispute, called for respect for the LoC, and alleged that some elements in Pakistani government were supporting the insurgency. Clinton made it clear that the US prepared to help, but could not mediate and that Pakistan had to deal directly with India.<sup>58</sup> Clinton was not happy with Musharaf's response on democracy and the US officials said that Clinton came to Islamabad to discuss US concerns about Pakistan's future, whether it would be preoccupied with a nuclear weapons program and conflict over Kashmir.

### **US Arms and Military Assistance to Islamabad**

After the Cold War, on the bilateral front, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hoped that somehow patched up with Washington and would receive military and economic aid. For the first time, the US decided to allow Islamabad to purchase military equipment on a commercial basis and approved \$ 120 million worth of arms sale for the F-16 aircraft in 1992. The Clinton administration launched an ill-fated nuclear non-proliferation policy initiative, announcing its willingness to seek Congressional approval to deliver the embargoed F-16s if Pakistan agreed to cap its nuclear program. The Pakistan General Abdul Waheed declared that, "the military aid would not bargain away Pakistan's nuclear programme for F-16 or anything else".<sup>59</sup>

Although the Brown Amendment removed the bar to economic assistance, the Clinton administration chose not to reestablish a bilateral aid

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<sup>57</sup> Amit Baruchah, "US ask Pakistan to pull out intruders", *The Hindu*, 25 June 1999.

<sup>58</sup> Anatol Liven, "Pressures on Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, 81(1), January-February 2002, p.107.

<sup>59</sup> Jeffrey Smith, "US Proposes Sales of F-16s to Pakistan", *Washington Post*, March 23, 1994.

program and gave only modest grants to Pakistan's Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) amounting to \$ 2 million a year. In April 1998 bilateral relations became more troubled with Pakistan's missile technology imported from North Korea, to develop a medium range missile. Pakistan claimed that it was their home production and named it Ghauri.<sup>60</sup> During this time, again the sanctions imposed over Pakistan to ban all types of aid and assistance due to the Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998.

## CONCLUSION

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship began during the Cold War. The heightened security concerns and need for economic development compelled Pakistan to reach out to the United States, which was then trying to promote a strategic alliance of Asian states to check the expanding lines of Soviet influence. With the viability of the state at issue, Pakistan opted to become "*the most allied ally*" of the United States in the region. But, as became evident, U.S.-Pakistan relations were not based on shared perspectives. Pakistan's opening to China in the early 1960s and the shift in U.S. interest toward India to balance China's growing power are cases in point of negative marking. Eventually, the United States lost strategic interest in Pakistan and would not become reengaged with the country until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Pakistan's help was so critical to the success of U.S.-led efforts to expel the Soviets that it preempted any other concerns that the United States had toward Pakistan, such as those related to democracy and nuclear proliferation. The United States found in Pakistan an eager ally as the country's isolated military regime was willing to renounce some of its own larger interests in exchange for international legitimacy. The CIA and the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, collaborated in mounting an insurgency

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<sup>60</sup> Kux, 2001, pp.344-47.

against the Soviet military, calls for jihad added substance to this struggle. The engagement between the United States and Pakistan in this period made a historic contribution to the end of the Cold War. The United States walked away from the region as soon as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. In fact, the United States suddenly hit the country, its close ally of ten years in the struggle for Afghanistan's freedom, with sanctions.

During the 1990s, three sets of sanctions were placed on Pakistan. The first came in 1990 under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment; the second came in 1998 after Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests; and the third came in 1999 after the military takeover of the country. Collectively, however, these sanctions would come to affect more than this relationship. This period witnessed the rise of the Taliban, the Kashmir jihad, the Kargil operation, and the A.Q. Khan affairs. The United States faced a great balancing act in its relations with Pakistan. The relationship was purely a temporary marriage of convenience and between them there is always a third issue to cement and to weaken the relations through out the history.

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## CHAPTER-II

### US POLICY ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

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Now terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat for all states. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New York and Pennsylvania have dramatically revitalized the United States focus and resolve on terrorism. The 9/11 incidents in the United States have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest. The US' counterterrorism policy options were diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. This relates to whether U.S policy and organizational mechanisms are adequate to deal with both state-sponsored or supported terrorism and that undertaken by independent groups.

The U.S policy toward international terrorism contains a significant military component, reflected in current U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Bush has expressed a willingness to provide military aid to governments everywhere in the fight against terrorism.<sup>1</sup> Another trend is the apparent growth of religious and ideologically motivated terrorist, cross national links among different terrorist organizations, which may involve combinations of military training, funding, technology transfer or political advice. The indications have surfaced that the Al- Qaeda organization attempted to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> As a result, stakes in the war against international terrorism are increasing and margins for error in selecting appropriate policy instruments or combinations of them to prevent terrorist attacks are diminishing also.

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<sup>1</sup> "The National Security Strategy of the United States", *US Department of State*, September 2002, URL: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, accessed on 2 February 2007.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

The Administration's response to the September 11 events was swift, wide-ranging and decisive, and attributed responsibility for the attack to Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization. A full-scale campaign was launched, using all elements of national and international power, to go after Al Qaeda and its affiliates and support structures. The campaign involved rallying the international community, especially law enforcement and intelligence components, to shut down Al Qaeda cells and financial networks. A U.S. military operation, "*Operation Enduring Freedom*",<sup>3</sup> was launched in early October 2001 against the Taliban regime, which had harbored Al Qaeda since 1996 – and against Al- Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. As a result of this operation, the Taliban was removed from power, all known Al Qaeda training sites were destroyed, and a number of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders were killed or detained.

In the context of this campaign, the United States has stepped up intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation with other governments to root out terrorist cells. According to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping to identify and detain extremists, and deploying tens of thousands of its own security forces to secure the Pakistan- Afghanistan border.<sup>4</sup>

### **TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA: A GENERAL VIEW**

The terrorist environment in South Asia is concentrated on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The existence of

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<sup>3</sup>"Operation Enduring Freedom", *The Global Security*, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>, accessed on 10 December 2006.

<sup>4</sup>Christana Rocca, "Assistance Plans for South Asia," *The Global Security*, March 2, 2004, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/crs/30422.pdf>, accessed on 12 December 2006.

international terrorist groups and their supporters in South Asia is identified as a threat to both regional stability and to the attainment of central U.S. policy goals. In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush launched major military operations in South and Southwest Asia as part of the global U.S.-led antiterrorism effort.<sup>5</sup> In March 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the top U.S. policy goal in the region is “combating terror and the conditions that breed terror in the frontline states of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”<sup>6</sup>

### **Indigenous Pakistani Terrorist Groups and the Al Qaeda-Taliban Nexus**

Pakistan is known to be a base for numerous indigenous terrorist organizations including Lashkar-e-Toiba (L-e-T), Jaish-e-Mohammed (J-e-M), and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The United States designates L-e-T and J-e-M as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)<sup>7</sup>; SSP appears on the State Department’s list of “other terrorist groups.”<sup>8</sup> Following Al-Qaeda’s 2001-2002 expulsion from Afghanistan and ensuing relocation of some core elements to Pakistani cities such as Karachi and Peshawar, some Al-Qaeda activists are known to have joined forces with indigenous Pakistani Sunni militant groups, including L-e-T, J-e-M, SSP, and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (L-i-J), an FTO-designated offshoot of the SSP that has close ties to Al Qaeda.<sup>9</sup> Some analysts believe that, by redirecting Pakistan’s internal security resources, an

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<sup>5</sup> “The National Security Strategy of the United States”, *US State Department*, September 2002, URL: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, accessed on 2 February 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Rocca, *The Global Security*, March 2, 2004.

<sup>7</sup> “Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)”, *US Office of Counter-terrorism*, Washington, DC, October 11, 2005, URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>, accessed on 17 December 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Bob Drogin, “Al Qaeda Gathering Strength in Pakistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 16, 2002

<sup>9</sup> *US Office of Counter-terrorism*, October 11, 2005.

increase in Pakistan's sectarian violence may ease pressure on Al-Qaeda and so allow that group to operate more freely there.

The Taliban movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools (Madrassa). Among these, Madrassa trained children in Pakistan are a small percentage that have been implicated in teaching militant, anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values.<sup>10</sup> Former Secretary of State Powell identified these as "programs that do nothing but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists."<sup>11</sup> Many of these Madrassas are financed and operated by Pakistani Islamist political parties such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI, closely linked to the Taliban), as well as by multiple unknown foreign entities, many in Saudi Arabia.<sup>12</sup>

## **Terrorism in Kashmir and Indigenous Terrorist Groups in India**

Violence in India's Jammu and Kashmir state has continued unabated since 1989. New Delhi has long blamed Pakistan based militant groups for lethal attacks on Indian civilians, as well as on government security forces, in both Kashmir and in major Indian cities. Many also are said to maintain ties with international jihad organizations, including Al-Qaeda: Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (H-ul-M) based in Muzaffarabad (Pakistan occupied Kashmir-PoK) and Rawalpindi is aligned with the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam led by Fazlur Rehman party (JUI-F); Hizbul Mujahideen based in both Peshawar and Muzaffarabad is also aligned with JUI-F; and L-e-T based in Muzaffarabad.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Raphael Perl, "Terrorism, the future, and the United States Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Issue Brief for Congress, *Library of Congress*, Congressional Research Service (CRS), April 11, 2003, p.11.

<sup>11</sup> Philip Smucker, "Al Qaeda Thriving in Kashmir," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 2, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> Perl, 2003, CRS, p.11.

<sup>13</sup> United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2002*, April 30, 2003, p. 23.



In May 2003, the Indian Defense Minister claimed that about 3,000 “terrorists” were being trained in camps on the Pakistani side of the LoC and Some Indian officials suggested that Al-Qaeda may be active in Kashmir.<sup>14</sup>

The terrorist organizations that continue violent separatist struggles in India’s northeastern states have been implicated in lethal attacks on civilians and have been designated as terrorist groups by New Delhi under the 2002 Prevention of Terrorist Act.<sup>15</sup> Among the dozens of insurgent groups active in the northeast are: the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB); the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT); the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); and the United National Liberation Front (seeking an independent Manipur).<sup>16</sup> Also operating in India are Naxalites — communist insurgents engaged in violent struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribal. These groups, most active in inland areas of east-central India, claim to be battling oppression and exploitation in order to create a classless society. Their opponents call them terrorists and extortionists. Most notable are the People’s War Group (PWG), mainly active in the southern Andhra Pradesh state, and the Maoist Communist Center of West Bengal, Orissa, Chhatishgarh and Bihar.<sup>17</sup>

## **Terrorist Groups in Bangladesh**

There is increasing concern among analysts that Bangladesh might serve as a base from which both South and Southeast Asian terrorists could regroup. There have been reports that up to 150 Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters fled to

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<sup>14</sup> George Fernandes, “3000 terrorists being trained in PoK”, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 30 July 2003.

<sup>15</sup> “The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002”, *Indian Ministry of Home Affairs*. URL: <http://mha.nic.in/poto-02.htm>, accessed on 07, January 2007.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

<sup>17</sup> Prakash Singh, “Naxalite Movement in India”, *Yojana*, New Delhi, February 2007, pp.23-25.

Bangladesh from Afghanistan in December 2001 aboard, which reportedly flowed from Karachi to Chittagong. Al -Qaeda had reportedly recruited Burmese Muslims, known as the Rohingya, from refugee camps in southeastern Bangladesh to fight in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Chechnya.<sup>18</sup>

An Al-Qaeda affiliate, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) was founded by Osama bin Laden with the objective of establishing Islamic rule in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh National Party coalition government includes the small Islamic Oikya Jote party, which has connections to HuJI. The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) is the largest organization representing the over 120,000 Rohingyas in Bangladesh and it has reportedly received support from the Jamial-e-Islami in Bangladesh.<sup>19</sup> It has also been reported that the Bangladesh Rifles and police have captured weapons during anti-terrorist operations in the southeastern border region with Myanmar in August and September 2003.

### **Terrorists in Nepal**

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) or United Peoples Front (UPF) has been identified as another terrorist group by the U.S Department of State.<sup>20</sup> The security situation in Nepal has deteriorated since the collapse of the cease-fire between the Maoists and the government on August 27, 2003. By some estimates, the number of Nepalese killed since August has risen significantly. Rebel leader Prachanda is reported to have stated that groups funded by "American imperialists" would not be allowed to operate

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<sup>18</sup> Bertil Lintner, "Bangladesh: Breeding Ground for Muslim Terror," URL: <http://www.atimes.com>, accessed on January 15 2007.

<sup>19</sup> "Terrorists in Bangladesh", URL: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/Huj.htm>, accessed on 18 January 2007.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Bell, "Maoist Army Wins Hearts and Minds in West Nepal," *The Globe and Mail*, September 18, 2003.

in Nepal.<sup>21</sup> After the cease-fire, the Maoists appeared to be shifting from large-scale attacks on police and army headquarters to adopting new tactics that focused on attacks by smaller cells conducting widespread assassinations of military, police and party officials.

### **Terrorists in Sri Lanka**

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka has been identified as a FTO by the United States Department of State.<sup>22</sup> The LTTE is reportedly responsible for more suicide attacks than any other terrorist organization worldwide. Hopes for a peace agreement with the LTTE, that would grant the Tamils a degree of autonomy in the northeast, have been put into doubt by recent moves by President Kumaratunga. The Norwegian government has played an active role in trying to broker a lasting peace between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. Others feel that the LTTE will be hesitant to do so because it would thereby lose the political legitimacy that they have been gaining. The United States has recognized that the LTTE is engaged in a peace process and holds the hope that the LTTE would renounce terrorism and cease terrorist acts.<sup>23</sup>

## **UNITED STATES POLICY ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA BEFORE -9/11**

The patterns of global terrorism during the year 2000 released by Gen. Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, at Washington on April 30, 2001, was initially drafted by the officials of the outgoing Clinton Administration.<sup>24</sup> But

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<sup>21</sup> Binaj Gurubacharya, "Nepal Rebels Threaten U.S-Funded Groups," *Associated Press*, October 22, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> Adurey K. Cronin, "Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)", *CRS*, 6 February 2004, URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf>, accessed on 23 January 2007.

<sup>23</sup> "Sri Lanka's Crisis," *International Herald Tribune*, November 13, 2003.

<sup>24</sup> "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000", *US State Department*, URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/>, accessed on 17 January 2007.

it was revised and finalized by the officials of the new Bush Administration and hence was the first important indicator of the Bush Administration's counter-terrorism policy. It may be recalled that the first report of the Clinton Administration, released in April 1993, had seen a matching down of the recommendation made by the preceding Bush Administration officials, in their draft of December 1992, for declaring Pakistan a State-sponsor of international terrorism and many terrorists organization have been working in South Asia.<sup>25</sup>

The report for 2000 of the new Bush Administration refers to the role of Pakistan namely; the Taliban, the H-ul-M, J-e-M and L-e-T in much greater detail than any past reports of the previous US Administrations. Though it has not declared Pakistan a state-sponsor of international terrorism, it also discussed the role of Pakistan on terrorism in South Asia.<sup>26</sup> The US report specified that the H-ul-M is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel and had signed his fatwa of February 1998, calling for attacks against US and Israeli national interests. Such a specific finding was not there in past reports.

The report have two annexures-one on terrorist organizations, which have already been declared as international terrorist organizations by the US and the other on terrorist organizations, which were active in 2000, but against which evidence was not adequate to warrant such a declaration. The H-ul-M figures in the first list and the J-e-M and the L-e-T in the second. The US did not ban the L-e-T and the J-e-M under the new Terrorism Act of 2000.<sup>27</sup> Even though the H-u-M does not operate from US territory, it was

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<sup>25</sup> Paul P. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 3-7.

<sup>26</sup> "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000", *US Department of State*, URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/>, accessed on 17 January 2007.

<sup>27</sup> B.Raman, "USA, Pakistan and Terrorism", *South Asia Analysis*, URL: <http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper236.html>, accessed on 30 October 2006.

declared an international terrorist organization because it had targeted American nationals in Pakistan and India; and is a member of bin Laden's International Front.

The Clinton Administration repeatedly asked Islamabad to end support to elements that conduct terrorist training in Afghanistan, to bar travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistic support to camps in Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup> In addition, the US has urged Islamabad to close certain Madrassa (religious schools) that actually serve as conduits for terrorism.<sup>29</sup> But significantly, it was silent on any demarche made by it with Islamabad regarding action against Pakistan based terrorists operating against India.

### **President Bush Report in 2000**

The salient points in the report for 2000 released by the Bush Administration are as follows:<sup>30</sup>

- (1) South Asia remained a focal point for terrorism directed against the United States, further confirming the trend of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to South Asia. The Taliban continued to provide safe haven for international terrorists, particularly Osama bin Laden and his network.
- (2) Islamic extremists from around the world-including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South,

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<sup>28</sup> "President Clinton Administration's Report on Terrorism in 2000", *The White House*, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2000/02/20030214-7.html>, accessed on 22 August 2006.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>30</sup> "President Bush Report on Terrorism in 2000", *The White House*, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20030214-7.html>, accessed on 22 August 2006.

and Southeast Asia-continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their worldwide terrorist activities. The Taliban government permitted the operation of training and programming facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistics support to members of various terrorist organizations and Mujahideen, including those waging jihads (holy wars) in Central Asia, Chechnya, and Kashmir.

- (3) Despite UN sanctions and international pressure, the United States repeatedly made clear to the Taliban that it would be held responsible for any terrorist attacks undertaken by Bin Laden while he is in its territory.
- (4) Massacres of civilians in Kashmir were attributed to L-e-T and other militant groups.
- (5) Pakistan's military government, headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, continued its support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri militant groups continued to operate in Pakistan. Several of these groups were responsible for attacks against civilians in Indian Kashmir.
- (6) In addition, H-ul-M designated a FTO, continues to be active in Pakistan without discouragement by the Government of Pakistan.
- (7) The United States remains concerned about reports of continued Pakistani support for the Taliban's military operations in Afghanistan.
- (8) US policy seeks to pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for crimes.

## **Comments and Recommendations to the Policy**

In a paper prepared by the Conservative Heritage Foundation of Washington D.C. in July, 2000, it was said: "Washington's neglect of Afghanistan's festering problems has allowed the Taliban to dominate Afghanistan and export terrorism, revolution, and opium. Through disengagement, America wasted its influence in the region and left itself with few options besides launching cruise missiles at Osama bin Laden's easily replaceable training camps and bracing for further terrorist attacks."<sup>31</sup> Rather than focusing narrowly on Bin Laden, the United States should focus on uprooting the Taliban regime that sustains him and others like. Washington should develop a regional strategy to halt Pakistan's support of the Taliban, build up Afghan opposition to the Taliban, and encourage defections from its ranks. The ultimate U.S. goal should be a stable, tolerant, inclusive Afghan Government that poses no threats to its neighbours or to its own ethnic and religious minorities. To accomplish this, Washington should cooperate with the broad anti-Taliban coalition that surrounds Afghanistan and help to forge a broad anti-Taliban coalition inside Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup>

It was criticized and made the following recommendations: " specifically, the United States should: maximize international pressure on the Taliban to halt its support of terrorism; pressure Pakistan to end its support of the Taliban; provide military, diplomatic, and economic support to the anti-Taliban opposition; forge a regional coalition to support the anti-Taliban opposition and support an Afghan peace settlement; build an internal Afghan consensus for peace; designate the Taliban as a terrorist organization to set the stage for declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of

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<sup>31</sup> Pillar, 2001, pp. 45-47.

<sup>32</sup> "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000", *US Department of State*, URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/>, accessed on 17 January 2007.

terrorism if it continues to support the Taliban; U.S. government coordinate its policy with other governments."<sup>33</sup> Christina Rocca, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia viewed in a report on West and South Asia has submitted on January 16, 2001, advised the Bush Administration on terrorism as follows:<sup>34</sup>

- I. State sponsorship of terrorism has become less prominent and increased threat from non-state actors. The new President should lend high-level encouragement to counter-terrorism cooperation among U.S. allies and friends in order to deal with threats.
- II. Enhance efforts to promote international cooperation against violent Islamist extremist networks. Take an active role in organizing intelligence cooperation.
- III. Make more effective use of existing U.S. policy instruments. At the same time, be prepared to use military force against countries that provide safe haven to terrorists.
- IV. The process of determining the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism has become inflexible, and orders a policy review to seek ways to make the list more effective against governments that do little to prosecute terrorists.

## **POST- 9/11 UNITED STATES COUNTER TERRORISM**

### **POLICY**

Immediate reaction to the terrorists attack in 2001 led to form the 9/11 Commission by the Bush Administration to know about the root cause of the attack, who involved, why it happened in United States homeland and to draw policies to curb terrorism. Moreover, terrorism perceived as a threat, is perhaps better featured as a tactic or a process. An important point made by

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<sup>33</sup> Pillar, 2001, p.51.

<sup>34</sup> Fraser Cameron, *United States Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegmon or Reluctant Sherief?*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 137-141.



the 9/11 Commission is that the strategic threat faced by the United States and its allies from an enemy consisting of certain groups and with a specific ideology and with stated objectives. In the words of the Commission: "the enemy goes beyond Al- Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the Al- Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism."<sup>35</sup>

A comprehensive national anti-terror policy must address many issues. Included are the appropriate roles for military force, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, economic development, education, promotion of social and political equality, and nation and institution building within the context of policies promoting national security.<sup>36</sup> Tactically, in the short term, the wide portfolios of tools are available to policymakers to reduce pressing and immediate threats. Strategically, in the long term, it needs to one win "hearts and minds".<sup>37</sup> In addition, a strategy ideally attracts allies to work with the United States.

### **US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: A Framework**

On February 14, 2003, the White House released the National Strategy for combating terrorism. The intent of the strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters. The strategy emphasizes that

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<sup>35</sup> "Responses to Al-Qaeda's Initial Assaults", *The 9/11 Commission*, URL: [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report\\_Ch4.pdf](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.pdf), accessed on 27 December 2006.

<sup>36</sup> "United States Anti-terror Strategy", *The White House*, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>, accessed on 7 January 2007.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

all instruments of U.S power — diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military — are to be called upon in combating international terrorism.<sup>38</sup> The strategy fits into the wider strategic concept of “*defense-in-depth*,” which projects four concentric rings of defense against terrorist attacks against the United States.<sup>39</sup> The National Strategy for combating terrorism is designed to complement other elements of the National Security Strategy including sub-strategies for homeland security, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, and drug control.<sup>40</sup>

While the Strategy for Homeland Security focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the Strategy for combating terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach U.S borders. Incorporated in the National Strategy for combating terrorism is a strong preemptive component, a strong focus on reducing proliferation of WMD, and a defense-in-depth framework. While pre-emption and military force remain important components, the strategy recognizes that the war on terror will not be won on the military battlefield and gives policy emphasis to strategic long-term policy components.<sup>41</sup>

The strategy details a desired end state where the scope and capabilities of global terrorist organizations are down scaled to such an extent that they become localized, unorganized, unsponsored, and rare enough that they can be almost exclusively dealt with by criminal law enforcement. To accomplish this mission, emphasis is placed on

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<sup>38</sup> “Strategy and Instrument of United States Policy Against Terrorists”, URL: <http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html>, accessed on 16 January 2007.

<sup>39</sup> “US Military- Defense Depth”, URL: <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/glossarytermsd/g/did.htm>, accessed on 13 January 2007.

<sup>40</sup> “Strategy and Instrument of United States Policy Against Terrorists”, URL: <http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html>, accessed on 16 January 2007.

<sup>41</sup> “*United States Anti-terror Strategy*”, *The White House*, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>

international action by “working with the willing, enabling the weak, persuading the reluctant, and compelling the unwilling.” One aspect of the strategy is that economic development is formally enumerated as an important factor in reducing conditions that terrorists exploit. The strategy also raises the priority of using information programs to de-legitimize terrorism.

The Office of the Counterterrorism, headed by Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, has outlined policies to improve counterterrorism efforts. Those are marked in:<sup>42</sup>

First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.

Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.

Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and

Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries that work with the US and require assistance.

The US Government makes no concessions to terrorists holding office or private US citizen’s hostage. It will not pay ransom, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, Washington will use every appropriate resource to save its citizens, and against terrorism. The US has developed physical and personal security programs for US personnel and has established cooperative arrangements with the US sector. It has also established bilateral counterterrorism assistance programs and close intelligence and law enforcement relationships with many nations to help prevent terrorist incidents. The US also seeks effective judicial prosecution and punishment for terrorists and criminal victimizing the people. Its

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<sup>42</sup> “International terrorism: American Hostages”, *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, Office of the International Information Programs (IIP): US State Department, November 2001, pp. 28-29.

policies and goals are actively pursued them alone and in cooperation with other government.

## United States Policy Elements

Given the potential access by terrorists to WMD, designing effective responses to terrorism may be the greatest challenge facing the government today. For the policy makers, it is how to combat effectively this growing global phenomenon with sufficient intelligence support and at a sustainable level of economic, social, and political cost. The 9/11 Commission, as its first recommendation, suggests identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. In another recommendation, it suggests that enthusiastic efforts to track terrorist financing remain front and center. A number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamist extremism and both the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report to a large degree equate the terrorist threat with Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups.<sup>43</sup>

The Administration's 2003 National policy for combating terrorism is founded on four pillars or 4Ds— *defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending*.<sup>44</sup>

- (1) To join with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. Components include (a) identifying and locating terrorists by making finest use of all intelligence sources, foreign and U.S. as well; and (b) destroying terrorists and their organizations by capture and detention, use of military power,

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<sup>43</sup>"United States Anti-terror Strategy", *The White House*, URL:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>, accessed on 20 September 2006.

<sup>44</sup>Raphael Perl, *U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report*, Report for Congress, CRS, Library of Congress, Updated February 4, 2005, pp.6-8.

and through employment of specialized intelligence resources, as well as international cooperation to curb terrorist funding.

- (2) Denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and Sanctuary and safe havens. A central policy objective is to ensure that other states should take action against such elements within their sovereign territory. Elements include (a) tailoring strategies to make individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; (b) promoting international standards for combating terrorism; (c) eliminating sanctuaries; and (d) interdicting terrorist ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities.
- (3) Diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, by fostering economic, social, and political development, market based economies, good governance and the rule of law. Emphasis includes (a) partnering with the international community to improve conditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism; and (b) using public information initiatives to de-legitimize terrorism.
- (4) Defending U.S citizens and interests at home and abroad to include protection of physical and cyber infrastructures.

Inherent in these four pillars, there are other components, which outlined a global campaign of unprecedented amount and along with multiple fronts. It reflects in the words of President George W. Bush that, "how will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command- every means of diplomacy, every tools of intelligence, every instruments of law, every financial influence, and every necessary weapons

of war- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network".<sup>45</sup> These components are:<sup>46</sup>

First component is *Diplomacy*. It is critical to combating modern international terrorism, which in many respects knows no boundaries. Terrorists group has rising spread their reach around the globe. Combating a terrorist network like the one that includes Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda group requires the cooperative efforts of many states because its network operates in many states. State department immediately began working with foreign states around the world to forge a coalition to support our response. It has been address by President Bush as having resulted in the "greatest world wide coalition in history".<sup>47</sup> It strengthens our global partners in defeating terrorism. European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), G-7, G-8, United Nations (UN), Pakistan, India, and China have taken border security and combat terrorism.

Second is an *Intelligence Component*. The collection of intelligence is the most vital Counterterrorism tool, and is rightly thought of as the "first line of defense" against terrorism. Sharing of intelligence about terrorists, their movements, and their planned attacks is an absolute prerequisite for successful interdiction. Government in every region of the world has been able to use of its information to expose terror network. The US military campaign in Afghanistan as well as enforcement and intelligence operations by coalition members have yields a wealth of actions. Such information will be extremely valuable in identifying and interdicting other terrorist's cells around the world.

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<sup>45</sup> Anna Sabasteanski, *Patterns of Global Terrorism (1985-2005)*, US Department of State, Vol.-1, Massachusetts: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2005, p.5.

<sup>46</sup> Paul P. Pillar, "The Instruments of Counterterrorism" in *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, IIP: US DoS, November 2001, pp.9-12.

<sup>47</sup> Sabasteanski, 2005, p.6.

Third is *Law Enforcement Component*. It requires restricting the activities of terrorists and bringing them justice through the courts. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has worked with their US and foreign law enforcement partners to unravel the planning leading to the execution of the 9/11 operation, as well as to interdict other Al-Qaeda cells and operatives in US and around the world. During 2002, Secretary of State, Collin Powell designated 33 groups as foreign terrorist organizations under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>48</sup> The US Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act),<sup>49</sup> which significantly expands the ability of US law enforcement to investigate and prosecute persons who engage in terrorist acts. On May 31, 2003, President Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at keeping WMD materials out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations.<sup>50</sup> So, central to Government approach to combating terrorism is globalizing threat reduction and counter-proliferation of WMD and its delivery systems. Since September 11, 2001, the FBI has initiated cooperative programs with India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other nations aimed at apprehending suspected terrorists and have shared expertise and technology with the law enforcement agencies of these nations.

The fourth one is *Economic Component*. The US uses two types of financial controls to combat terrorism: the freezing of assets belonging to individual terrorists, terrorists group, and state sponsors; and the prohibition of material support to terrorists. The Bush Administration has launched the first offensive in the war on terrorism on 23 September, 2001,

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<sup>48</sup> URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2004/04/fr042904.html>, accessed on 22 January 2007.

<sup>49</sup> "US PATRIOT Act", URL: <http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html>, accessed on 22 January 2007.

<sup>50</sup> "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", CRS, URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf>, accessed on 24 January 2007.

by signing Executive Order 13224, freezing the US based assets of those people and organizations involved with terrorism and blocked more than \$34 millions in assets.<sup>51</sup>

The last one is *Military Component*. A military strike is most forceful possible counterterrorist action and the determination of defeat terrorists. This is reflected in the war in Iraq; U.S operations in Afghanistan; deployment of United States forces in Pakistan and around the world. Washington got military supports from many countries, like, NATO and allies in Europe, 136 states offered a range of military assistance, 89 states granted over flight authority to US, 76 granted landing rights to US military aircrafts, and 23 states agreed to host US and coalition forces involved in military operation in Afghanistan.<sup>52</sup>

## **THE FINAL 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: A POLICY OUTLINE**

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist attacks upon the United States, "9/11 Commission" issued its final report. Included are forty-one recommendations for changing the way the government is organized to combat terrorism and how it prioritizes its efforts. Many of the Commission's recommendations are consistent with elements of the Administration's February 14, 2003 National Strategy for combating terrorism, such as diplomacy and counter- proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information fusion, winning hearts and minds – including not only public diplomacy, but also policies that encourage development and more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, and defending the

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<sup>51</sup> Sabasteanski, 2005, p. 7.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid



homeland. The 9/11 Commission's recommendations generally fall into the categories of:<sup>53</sup>

- (a) Preemption, attacking terrorists and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism;
- (b) Protecting against and preparing for attacks;
- (c) Coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information;
- (d) Enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations;
- (e) Centralizing congressional oversight and review of homeland security activities; and
- (f) Increasing FBI, Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) capacity to assess terrorist threats and their associated response strategies and capabilities.

Prominent in the report are specific recommendations calling for:<sup>54</sup>

- (1) Creation of a more unified Congressional Committee structure for oversight, authorization, and appropriations involving intelligence and counterterrorism (a joint committee or separate committees in each chamber — possibly combining authorizing and appropriating authorities);
- (2) Creation of a single principal point of Congressional oversight and review for homeland security;

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<sup>53</sup> Raphael Perl, "National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress", *The White House*, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040802-2.html>, accessed on 20 September 2006.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

- (3) Creation of a position of National Intelligence Director (NID) in the Office of the President; and
- (4) Creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCC).

The NID, as envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, would exercise some degree of control of intelligence agencies across the federal government, propose and execute a unified intelligence budget, and serve as principal intelligence adviser to the President. The NCC, in the view of the Commission, should be the central office for intelligence gathering, analysis, and overall counterterrorism operations. On the Commission recommendations, on August 2, 2004, President Bush urged Congress to create the position of NID— a position separate from that of CIA Director — to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director would serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence community. The President also announced plans to establish a NCC— a move envisioned as building on the analytical work of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The new center is envisioned as serving as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and would be charged with coordinating and monitoring counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies, and preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President and senior officials.

### **AN ASSESSMENT**

The report also recommends sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are perceived to be vital geo-strategic allies in the global war on terror. Pakistan remained a focal point to the US policy as both of the problem and solution to the threat. So it was for Washington to remain with

Islamabad for achieving its goals.<sup>55</sup> In short-term, it was to remove the Taliban Government from Afghanistan, hunt Al-Qaeda groups, ejecting nuclear technology for some time and terrorists in every direction. But the long-term objectives- remain to root out terrorist organizations and Al-Qaeda from Pakistan, to save its nuclear assets from terrorists, and to solve internal situation with establishing democracy.

The Commission identified President Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended that US should make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of "*Enlightened Moderation*".<sup>56</sup> In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Congress endorsed this recommendation by calling for US aid to Pakistan to be sustained and requiring the president to enact a long term US strategy to engage with and support Islamabad.<sup>57</sup>

India and Pakistan have both decisively sided with the United States in its war against terrorism, offering military and intelligence support that have been vital in routing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In return, Washington has showered New Delhi and Islamabad with military, economic and diplomatic *qui pro quos* to a degree that was inconceivable prior to Sept. 11. The result has been a break in the unceasing relational pattern whereby improved US ties with one of the two countries came at the

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<sup>55</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.307.

<sup>56</sup> President Pervez Musharraf, "*Enlightened Moderation*", *Office of The President of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, URL: <http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/EnlightenedModeration.aspx>, accessed on February 21, 2007.

<sup>57</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt, "*Pakistan – US Relations*", *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, updated on 28 January 2005, URL: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisations/16176.pdf>, accessed on 17 December 2006.

expense of ties with the other.<sup>58</sup> Remarkably, since the onset of the war on terror, Washington's relations with both India and Pakistan have improved simultaneously. Since September 11, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has been persistently supportive of the United States despite the equally persistent menaces to his rule from radical anti-American segments of society. Islamabad has stood at the forefront of the U.S. coalition by providing a range of assistance, including the use of military bases, to U.S. operations against its former friends in Afghanistan. It has allowed the FBI and CIA to take part in raids against Al-Qaeda members who have escaped to Pakistan, leading to the capture of hundreds of suspects, including one of Osama bin Laden's top lieutenants.

The cooperation between the US and Pakistan in the war on terrorism has mixed results. Washington's policy on eliminating extremism in the South Asia generally and in Pakistan particularly can not be understood without taking into account both the success and failure fully. The success has arrived in the field of ousting the Taliban rule in Kabul immediately, got more support from Islamabad what Washington has expected, arresting more than 600 terrorists in Pakistan and eliminating its organizations, President Musharraf's consistent support and war effort, Pakistan's support in the US engagement in Afghanistan and international community's joining in the war. But on the other hand, the issues like complete washing out of terrorists and its organization in the South Asia generally and in the world particularly, arresting Bin Laden, end anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and Pakistan, building the state of Pakistan and Afghanistan, helping Pakistan to solve its domestic problems speak of failure. So the success and failure are intimately connected. It is

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<sup>58</sup> URL: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/southasia.cfm>, accessed on 22 February 2007.

marked in safeguarding nuclear weapons from terrorists, establishing democracy, and Pakistan's continuing home crisis. However, all can be avoidable and ultimate achievement can be seen in one point- establishing the state of Pakistan into a success story. It needs the US to engage and make something different for achieving its global strategy.

Till today the war on terrorism remains the principal foreign policy priority of the US. Washington considered that Islamabad is both part of the problem and solution in the areas of terrorism, because of Pakistan's nexus with Al-Qaeda and Taliban since 1979. Allying with Islamabad in this war is a good policy option for the US as "killed two birds in a single stone". So it is Pakistan only which can decide its fate with solving the menace and reforming the society. But the external actors should not abstain from this rather to extend their support to Islamabad, as they need. As President Bush has repeatedly said, "the war will be a long and difficult struggle from which the US will not disappear".<sup>59</sup> In the region, building a network of partnerships – based on national interests and shared values – to achieve goals of spreading freedom and democracy, development and human dignity is need of hour. Meeting these goals in South Asia is not incidental to U.S. foreign policy, which is essential for the free and prosperous world. It can be seen eliminating terrorists fully, reforming and establishing Pakistan and Afghanistan, and solving other problems in this region. The future success will be held on the US' long-term engagement with Pakistan unlike the first Afghan crisis with addressing its concerns and not to hurt Pakistan's domestic sentiment even after the change of its government.

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<sup>59</sup> Remarks by the President George Bush on the Global War on Terror, *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary April 20, 2007, URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/83362.htm>, accessed on May 17, 2007.

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**CHAPTER-III**

**PAKISTAN'S POLICY ON COMBATING  
TERRORISM**

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Pakistan is identified to be a stand for various native terrorist society together with Lashkar-e-Toiba (L-e-T), Jaish-e-Mohammed (J-e-M), and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Omar (L-e-O), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (L-e-J), Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP), and others. Some Al-Qaeda activists are known to have joined forces with indigenous Pakistani Sunni militant groups, including L-e-T, J-e-M, SSP, and L-e-J. The Taliban movement itself began among students attending Pakistani religious schools (Madrassa). Among these, some Madrassa trained children in Pakistan are a small percentage that has been implicated in teaching militant- anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Hindu, and even anti-Shia values.

To the attacks on 11 September 2001, on the United States, Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf stated that, "I concluded to the statements both from the US President George W. Bush –"*US is at war... either you are with us or with our enemy*"<sup>1</sup>, from the Secretary of State Collin Powell- "*Pakistan had to make a choice: either to cast his lot with the US or have Pakistan remain an isolated, pariah state*"<sup>2</sup>, that, America was sure to react violently, like a wounded bear. If the performer turned out to be Al-Qaeda, then that wounded bear would come charging straight towards us".<sup>3</sup> With the advice from Foreign Office, Pakistan President viewed that, "Islamabad was against all forms of terrorism, stood with America and international efforts to combat terrorism, and that we will assist it in any way we can".<sup>4</sup> No doubt it was made clear that; Pakistan was at war against terrorism, and itself made policies against terrorism openly.

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<sup>1</sup> *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 November 2001, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011107-6.html>, accessed on 5 April 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick H. Gareau, *State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism*, Atlanta, Georgia: Clarity Press, 2004, p.198.

<sup>3</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In The Line of Fire*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, pp.200-02.

<sup>4</sup> *Public Opinion Trend (POT)*, New Delhi, 15 September 2001, p.3798.

After joining the war on terrorism, Pakistan made its policies on terrorists for the first time in its history, though it was law but not enacted. Pakistan had been victim of terrorism by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and their associated groups for years. The Government has always been a moderate Muslim ideology, never comfortable with the rhetoric or the ways of the extremist.<sup>5</sup> It was a chance for Musharraf to confront them more courageously and decisively. After the decision, the domestic reaction was very strong and people came out into the streets. There was an adverse reaction in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) bordering with Afghanistan, and also in Karachi, Sindh, and Balochistan.<sup>6</sup>

Beside the protests, the Pakistan Government did not alter its anti-terrorist policies. In an interview with *The CNN* on 23 October 2001, President Musharraf admitted that, "As the environment changed, the policies should be changed. I took a right decision because I know a vast majority of the country was supported whatever decision I took. I assured you and the international community that Pakistan would eliminate all type of terrorist in its form and give all possible of its efforts".<sup>7</sup>

## **PAKISTAN'S POLICY ON TERRORISM**

After the 9/11, Musharraf vowed that his intension was to eliminate terrorist organizations and to eradicate extremism from Pakistan soil, but his Government's response to terrorism remains far from adequate.<sup>8</sup> On 27 December 2001, he again said that, "our troops are deployed everywhere to

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> "Terrorist Outfits in Pakistan",

URL: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits.htm>, accessed on 4 April 2007.

<sup>7</sup> President Musharraf Address to CNN, URL: <http://www.infopak.gov.pk/President-Addresses-President-CNN.htm>, accessed on 10 April 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Samina Ahmed, "Responding to Terrorism: The Pakistani Response", in S. D. Muni (eds.), *Responding to Terrorism in South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 2006. p.117



meet any challenges at anytime with force, if anybody attacks Pakistan, the country will be defended at all cost".<sup>9</sup> Pakistan Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, referred to terrorism, said, "We need a much deeper study of the subject to understand what effective measures need to be taken to curb and eliminate the phenomena".<sup>10</sup> From above the statements, it became clear that Islamabad formulated and executed its policy on terrorism that was clearly visible in the following heads.

### **Formulation of Anti-terror Laws**

Pakistan has one voice with the world community in condemning terrorism and supporting international cooperation to eradicate terrorism in all its form and manifestations. The Government enacted laws to ban extremist and militant groups that organized or participated in acts of violence within and outside the country. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, said, "the Government enacted the Maintenance of Public Order which was a part of measures against terrorist and included preventing display of arms, disallowing inflammatory speeches, elimination of illegal weapons".<sup>11</sup> Under this order the Government arrested L-e-T leader Hafiz Saeed. He said the law enforcing agencies were constantly reviewing the situation and particular action of individual and organizations that were taken whatever need arose. Musharraf's address to the nation on 6 January 2002 was on internal situation, law and order and sectarian violence, and establishment of military courts for speedy justice of terrorism related cases, sectarian violence and other cases of heinous crimes.<sup>12</sup>

The Government decided to recompose the existing single judge Anti Terrorist Court (ATC) to rapidly dispose of terrorism cases by

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<sup>9</sup> *POT*, 01 January 2002, p.2.

<sup>10</sup> "Root Cause of Terrorism to be Studied: Sattar", *The Dawn*, Karachi, 06 February 2002.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>12</sup> *POT*, 14 January 2002, p.226

including armed forces officers to the ranks of colonel and a magistrate in every such judicial body. It would amend the Anti Terrorist Act (ATA) of 1997 to give effect to the reconstitution of ATC. The apex court had reviewed the ATC and given comprehensive guidelines in the light of which the law was amended and terrorist would be prosecuted through the ATC. In the famous case Sheikh Omar; prime accused of the Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl kidnapping and murder case was prosecuted.<sup>13</sup> The Government decided to set up 35 ATCs in the country; operated in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Lahore, Multan, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Karachi (two courts), and Quetta. Among these ten would work 3 times in a week and the army would involve in this court up to November 2002.<sup>14</sup> Taking to disturbance in NWFP, the Home and Tribal Affairs Department issued the order under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, stating it was harmful to public peace and tranquility.<sup>15</sup> Addressing the Durbar of the Punjab Police at District Police Lines, President said, the Police Act of 1861 was being rewritten and the new *Police Act of 2002* would come soon with three separate different duties – watch and ward, investigation, and prosecution.<sup>16</sup>

The Federal Government has delegated its power under Anti Terrorist Act of 1997 to the provinces directing them to set up ATC of their own choice.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider, said Government planned to set up *Immigration and Naturalization Agency* to check the anti human trafficking.<sup>18</sup> President Musharraf on 16<sup>th</sup> November

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<sup>13</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 18 January 2002.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 20 January 2002.

<sup>15</sup> "Government Orders Maintenance of Public Order: Islamabad", *The Dawn*, 27 January 2002.

<sup>16</sup> *POT*, 6 February 2002, pp.593-94.

<sup>17</sup> "Provinces to set up ATC", *The News*, 30 April 2002.

<sup>18</sup> "Campaign to Eliminate Militant Groups Geared up", *The Daily Times*, Islamabad, 3 July 2002.

2002 promulgated the Anti Terrorist (Amendment) Ordinance of 2002, which came into force immediately after amending to Anti Terrorist Act of 1997. Insertion of new section 11 EE in the Anti Terrorist Act of 1997 (XXVII of 1997) was security for good behavior. In the said Act, after the new section 11EE, it read, power to arrest and detain any suspected persons.<sup>19</sup> In 2003, Parliamentary Secretary for Interior, Sanah Ullah Khan Masti Khail introduced the *Anti Terrorist (Amendment) Bill- 2003* to amend again the Anti Terrorist Act of 1997, after 2002. The *Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill of 2003* to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, the *Code of Criminal Procedure (2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment) Bill 2003* to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 again and the *Adulteration Offences (special courts) Bill 2003* to control, curve and eradicate the menace of adulteration.<sup>20</sup>

Islamabad made laws to Prevent Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related technologies in 2004. The bill passed as “ the export control on goods, technologies, material and equipment related nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery system act of 2004” was important to regulate and control export and re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods and technologies, material, equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons.<sup>21</sup> Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Act in 2004 passed in National Assembly of Pakistan to amend section 25 of AT Act of 1997 (XXVII of 1997) to provide a right of appeal to complain against the order passed by the special courts as

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<sup>19</sup> *The Anti Terrorist (Amendment) Ordinance of 2002*, URL:

[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinances/anti-terrorism\\_ordin\\_2002.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/actsandordinances/anti-terrorism_ordin_2002.htm), accessed on 23 March 2007.

<sup>20</sup> “Anti-Terrorist Bill to be introduced in the National Assembly”, *The News*, 11 November 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Ministry of Parliament Affairs, *Pakistan Year Book 2004-05*, Government of Pakistan: Islamabad, URL:

<http://www.pakistan.gov.pak/divisions/parliamentarydivision/media/yearbook-2004-2005.pdf>, accessed on 25 March 2007.

it is a fundamental right and the citizen cannot be deprived of such right.<sup>22</sup> The Pakistan Government strengthened the anti-terror law again to amend it in 2005. During 2005, 1039 terrorist cases in ATC, 121 cases in High court, and 16 cases in Supreme Court were registered.<sup>23</sup>

### **Actions Taken by the Government**

On 27 December 2001, President Musharraf said that, "Pakistan armed forces were deployed everywhere to meet any challenge anywhere at anytime, and these troops were ready to give a matching response to any aggressive move from anybody".<sup>24</sup> Pakistan Military Spokesman, Rashid Qureshi, informed to the media that, "Pakistan police arrested the head of J-e-M Masood Azhar on 25 December 2001 and the L-e-T leader Hafiz Saeed arrested under the maintenance of public order. Talking about Osama bin Laden, he said action would be taken whenever he is in Pakistan, we are part of coalition and we will cooperate."<sup>25</sup>

The police rounded up 200 militants across the country early January of 2002 after raiding in mosques, houses, and militant bases. Mostly 200 SSP were detained in overnight raid in Sindh and Punjab, and picked up 45 activists of J-e-M and L-e-T in a raid on 6 January 2002.<sup>26</sup> On 12 January, Musharraf declared in his address to the nation that the Government had banned L-i-J and Sipah Mohammad. He said action against militant groups has already started with the arrest of Maulana Masood Azhar of JM and Hafiz Saeed Ahmad of L-e-T and now their parent parties were disbanded. The Government blamed the J-e-M, L-e-T, SSP, Tehrik Jafria Pakistan (TJP), and Tehrik Nifaz Shariat (TNS) in terrorist's activities in Pakistan and said

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> *POT*, 6 January 2005.

<sup>24</sup> "President vows to end Extremism", *POT*, 1 January 2002, p.2.

<sup>25</sup> "Action would take on Laden: Qureshi", *POT*, 5 January 2002, pp.84-85.

<sup>26</sup> *POT*, 11 January 2002.

no organization is allowed to form the Laskar, the Sipah or the Jaish; the Government has banned the JM, and L-e-T.<sup>27</sup> The Pakistan Government arrested 1000 activities in Punjab, 220 in Sindh, 18 in Islamabad, and 200 in NWFP's Malakand division. The Government also sealed 300 offices in Punjab and 40 offices in Karachi. Among those arrested person and sealed offices belonged to the TJP, SSP, JM, LJ, TNS, and H-ul-M.<sup>28</sup> The West District Police Chief, Tariq Khakhar said, the Government arrested about 65 activists, and sealed 8 offices of LJ, JM, SSP, Al-Badar organization. In Hyderabad and Doda district, police cracked down on militant and extremist groups, banned 5 outfits there were sealed and 90 men were arrested.<sup>29</sup>

In Daniel Pearl's kidnapping case, the police identified key link Muhammad Hashim Qadeer, but later the Rawalpindi police arrested Arab national Hannan Ahmad, who was directly involved in the case. The Lahore City Police arrested Sheikh Omar, the prime accused of Pearl case.<sup>30</sup> The media and Omar himself said before the court in Karachi, that Pearl was dead; while President Musharraf dismissed the murder plea. The police found the dead body of Pearl on 16 May 2002 and suddenly 3 people were arrested.<sup>31</sup> Pakistan troops were patrolling in remote areas of the tribal regions of frontier province for the first time in the hunt of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters crossing from Afghanistan.<sup>32</sup> The Government denounced on 30 June, Bin Laden and his top assistants as dangerous religious extremist and called for public help to hunting them down. In Pakistan's rugged

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<sup>27</sup> "President Musharraf Address to the Nation", *The BBC News*, 12 January 2002, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1757251.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1757251.stm), accessed on 27 March 2007.

<sup>28</sup> "Over 1400 Activities were Arrested and About 400 Offices Sealed", *The News*, 14 January 2002.

<sup>29</sup> "Terrorists are Arrested and Outfits are Banned: Official Sources", *POT*, 17 January 2002, pp.296-97.

<sup>30</sup> "Pearl is dead: Omar, Pearl is not dead: Musharraf", *The Daily Times*, 15 February 2002.

<sup>31</sup> "Police found Pearl's Dead body", *The News*, 17 May 2002.

<sup>32</sup> *The News*, 27 June 2002.

NWFP, more than 3000 Pakistan troops pressed ahead with door-to-door searches and vehicle checkpoint on 30 June, looking about 40 Al-Qaeda suspects who escaped the 26 June clash near Wana village near Islamabad where 20 have been detained.<sup>33</sup> About 70,000 security forces of Pakistan were deployed along its tribal belt bordering Afghanistan-Iran to support US war against terrorism. The Government of Pakistan concentrated country's wide campaign to uproot and eliminate the banned religious terrorist groups that have been proven to be a major threat to peace in the country.

The Government ordered Bin Laden and all Al-Qaeda members to leave Pakistan immediately. The City Police arrested 5 suspects—Mohammad Iqbal, Wasim Haider, Mohammad Vakeel, Abdul Zaheer, Arsalan Massod, alleged of US Consulate General suicide bomb attacks, raided and arrested by the Crime Intelligence Department (CID) and Investigation Wing of Karachi Police.<sup>34</sup> Pakistan police arrested five Islamic militants over an alleged plot to assassinate President Musharraf on 27 April 2002.<sup>35</sup> The Pakistan Official Spokesman, Aziz Khan told to *The BBC World* that, Pakistan's support to the anti terror drive was not merely on official line rather it was a principled stand having peoples support.<sup>36</sup> Pakistan Information Minister, Nisar Menno, told in October 2002 that, Pakistan armed forces would keep their nuclear weapons out of the reach of the extremists.<sup>37</sup> *The News* reported on 12 December 2002 that, Masood Azhar, Chief of J-e-M was under house arrest by police.

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<sup>33</sup> "Government Seeks Public help to Arrest Osama", *The Observer*, 1 July 2002.

<sup>34</sup> "Police Arrests Five Militants on charges of Suicide Bombing in US Consulate General in Karachi", *The Daily Times*, 22 September 2002.

<sup>35</sup> *The Nation*, 11 September 2002.

<sup>36</sup> "Anti- terror Drive is Principle and it needs Peoples Support: Aziz Khan", *The Dawn*, 3 October 2002.

<sup>37</sup> *The News*, 20 October 2002.

In early January 2003, two Al-Qaeda operatives—Abu Hamaz and Abu Omar were arrested. A major operation was reported to conduct in Noshik near Balochistan to apprehend top Al-Qaeda terrorists' hiding there. Interior minister Faisal Hayat said, the Government of Pakistan had officially declared the Al-Qaeda a terrorist organization.<sup>38</sup> The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) frozen 24-bank accounts on terrorist to stop financing, said SBP Governor, Ishrat Husain.<sup>39</sup> The ATC charged against five men accused of an alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Musharraf. The paramilitary forces arrested eleven Al-Qaeda activists and arms recovered from them included A-47, gun power and others harmful weapons. On Laden, President Musharraf said, he was alive and might be hiding the tribal territory on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.<sup>40</sup>

In the Pearl murder case, the Sher Sultan Police captured most wanted LJ terrorist and head of Quasi Asad Group, Qari Abdul Hayee in a raid conducted at Basti Allah Buksh in Sher Sultan in Muzaffargarh district on 29 August 2003. The ATC awarded him death sentence for Sher Sultan terrorist attack.<sup>41</sup> The law enforcement agencies have arrested Tariq Mohammad from Rawalpindi having links with Al-Qaeda group. The Government declared that, "nobody would allow crossing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan without necessary travel documents, and the law enforcement agency could stop the movement of suspected elements of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda."<sup>42</sup> Prime Minister Jamali said in November 2003, that, the campaign against extremism and terrorism would determinedly continue. The Government has implemented a clear solid

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<sup>38</sup> "Government to Declare Al-Qaeda a Terrorist Group", *The Daily Times*, 1 April 2003.

<sup>39</sup> "SBP Freezes 24 Bank Accounts on Terrorists", *The Daily Times*, 8 April 2003.

<sup>40</sup> "Osama may be in Tribal Area: Musharraf", *The News*, 2 May 2003.

<sup>41</sup> "The ATC Awarded Death Sentence", *POT*, 24 August 2003.

<sup>42</sup> *POT*, 7 November 2003.

policy in this connection.<sup>43</sup> He further said bans on more parties and groups allegedly involved in sectarian violence and terrorism but clarified that such actions were proposed and executed under the ATC of 1997.<sup>44</sup>

The Government watched Wana operation in tribal areas to search for terrorists, where 20 activists were arrested. Pakistan troops have detained Al-Qaeda leader Ayuman al-Zawahri in an operation near the Afghanistan border. The operation in South Waziristan agency continued where troops were trapped 400 activities and in Wana operation Al-Qaeda chief Abdullah was killed, said Inter Service Public Relation (ISPR) Director General Major Gen. Shaukat Sultan.<sup>45</sup> The Daily Times reported on 29 March 2004, that, the law enforcing agencies were arrested Ghulam Murtaza, Ghulam Rasool, and Ghulam Saad, accused of the attack on Musharraf in December 2003.

Prime Minister Jamali spoke to *The Star TV* that, "our commitment to uproot terrorist is evident from the recently conducted Wana operation where we have lost precious lives of our army and paramilitary forces".<sup>46</sup> The police arrested Mohammad Imran and Qari Mohammad Noor alleged for suicide attack on Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz. NWFP Governor, Hussain Shah, said terrorism would be lacked and confronted with full courage and force urging the tribal elders to cooperate with the Government in this regard.<sup>47</sup> Balochistan Chief Minister, Mohammad Yousaf, said that his Government would not allow re-establishment in the province of training camps for subversive activities that had been eliminated by law enforcing agencies.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> "Anti Terror Drive Continue: Jamali", *The News*, 15 November 2003.

<sup>44</sup> "Ban on Parties: Jamali", *The News*, 18 November 2003

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 20 March 2004.

<sup>46</sup> *POT*, 30 April 2004.

<sup>47</sup> "Terrorism to be Tackled with full force: NWFP Governor", *The News*, 22 August 2004.

<sup>48</sup> "Terrorists Camps Eliminated", *The Dawn*, 1 September 2004.



The police claimed the arrests of four Al-Qaeda members including top Abu Froj, belonged to L-I-J and Harkat Al Jihad Islami who had been working for the Al-Qaeda network for sometime. About 152 men were arrested in Punjab for offering help to Al-Qaeda and some have been allegedly offered information about fatal attack on Musharraf in Rawalpindi, and about suicidal attacks in Multan and Lahore, and bomb blast in Sialkot. More than 300 were arrested in Punjab under the anti-terrorist campaign while the number of arrest in Sindh was 75.<sup>49</sup>

Intelligence agencies picked up a terrorist in Peshawar in connection with an attempt on President in December 2003 in Rawalpindi and involvement in the assassination attempt on Prime Minister.<sup>50</sup> The CID announced in April 2005, the arrest of Muzaffer Ali, Mustafa Kirmani, Asghar Ali, Shujaat Ali and Raza Ali, activists of a sectarian organization, an offshoot of the banned Tehrik-i-Jaffaria Pakistan and seized a huge quantity of weapons. The police arrested four alleged terrorists who were involved in Fatepur blast on March 19.<sup>51</sup> Interior Minister, Aftab Ahmed Kahn Sherpao, said on May 4, the arrest of Abu Faraj Al-Libbi, wanted in two attempts on the life of President. On 13 May, Foreign Minister, Kasuri said that, "Pakistan had done much to smash the Al-Qaeda network and destroy other militant groups; end to the war on terror was not in sight. As a frontline state in the war on terrorism, for us the most challenging threat is the threat of terrorism".<sup>52</sup>

The CID arrested two L-I-J activists for their alleged involvement in suicidal attacks on a mosque. The security forces arrested two men for alleged association with Al-Qaeda and recovered a huge quantity of modern and sophisticated weapons from their houses during a search operation in a

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<sup>49</sup> "Over 152 Activists were Arrested", *POT*, 11 January 2005.

<sup>50</sup> "Intelligence Agencies Arrested Terrorist", *The Dawn*, 20 February 2005.

<sup>51</sup> "Sectarian Group Activists Held: Official", *The Dawn*, 4 April 2005.

<sup>52</sup> "No End to Terrorism in Sight: Kasuri", *The Daily Times*, 5 May 2005.

far-flung area of North Waziristan. Musharraf asked Punjab Chief Minister, Pervaiz Elahi to take strict action against extremist and those creating disturbances in the province.<sup>53</sup> In a raid in terrorists' camp, 114 militant held and some killed in Quetta.<sup>54</sup> The police arrested Jamil Ahmed, Mohammad Anwar and Mohammad Ramzan on accused that killed two men of law enforcing agency in Khuzdar on 30 December 2005.<sup>55</sup>

The Balochistan Cabinet ordered the law enforcement agencies to ensure firm and result oriented action against terrorists and anti-social elements in the province.<sup>56</sup> The Rangers said on 4 January 2006, that they had arrested three militants of LJ who were involved in sectarian killing, were Maqsood Ahmed Qureshi, Azhar-ul-Haq and Hawaz Khan. The police killed two senior Al-Qaeda men in Bajapur raid. Eight thousands Pakistan troops were fighting against Al-Qaeda and Taliban on the border with Afghanistan, and ISPR claimed that anti extremism and terrorism drive were successful in Pakistan.<sup>57</sup>

## **Measures on Religious Extremist, Madrassa and Sectarian**

### **Violence**

President Musharraf in his nation address on 12 January 2002,<sup>58</sup> talk people into confidence about the growing tension in the region and the proposed measures aimed at discouraging religious extremism and tolerance in society. The focus of the speech was on internal situation, law and order, and sectarian violence. The Government also banned two religious organizations—L-I-J and Sipaha Muhammad, and Sunni Tehrik, Sipaha

<sup>53</sup> "Musharraf to Punjab CM, Take a Strict Action against Terrorism", *The News*, 18 July 2005.

<sup>54</sup> "Militants held in Quetta", *The Dawn*, 29 July 2005.

<sup>55</sup> "Police Arrested Three Terrorists", *The Daily Times*, 1 January 2006.

<sup>56</sup> *POT*, 1 January 2006.

<sup>57</sup> *The Dawn*, 11 February 2006.

<sup>58</sup> President Musharraf's Address to the Nation, *The BBC News*, 12 January 2002, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1757251.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1757251.stm), accessed on 6 April 2007.

Sahaba and TJP would be kept under observation. To the sectarian violence, he further said, "It was because of this that we banned the LJ and Sipah Muhammad" and "no man, no organization, and no party would be allowed to break the law of the land. Terrorist and sectarian violence must come to an end. No organization would be allowed to form the Laskhar, the Sipah or the Jaish. If there would be any political activity, inciting of sectarian disgust or propaganda of extremism in any mosque, the management would be responsible and proceeded according to law".<sup>59</sup>

The Government launched a major crackdown on religious extremist and activities of outlawed organizations and 300 were arrested in Karachi. The Government arrested over 1000 extremist belonged to TJP, SSP, and L-I-J because of their violent movement. The Jaranwal Police of Pakistan accused Hafiz Abdul Latif, Asim and Zubair Usman, including Imam of a mosque who issued a decree-fatwa, against an US engineer.<sup>60</sup> There were some elements that were misled by some politico-religious extremists and they have taken off from the Madrassa, which they themselves run and they were sent across. Iftikhar Hussain, the Governor of NWFP termed sectarianism a menace that has dismantled the Islamic values. He said the Government has taken remedial steps to eliminate sectarianism and sectarian related violence.<sup>61</sup> The President said that, "he wanted to eliminate extremism from Pakistan with an iron hand. Pakistan has religious extremists but they are in minority, the majority was religious but not fanatical. Most of them had enough of the extremist acts of violence".<sup>62</sup>

The Government appeared increasing concerned about the emerging nexus between Al-Qaeda and Pakistan Islamic radical groups. Pakistan Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider, said, "those who killed innocent

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<sup>59</sup>*The Dawn*, 13 January 2002.

<sup>60</sup>*POT*, 17 January 2002.

<sup>61</sup>*The Frontier Post*, 19 January 2002.

<sup>62</sup>*The News*, 7 May 2002.

Pakistan people were the enemy of peace and the country. Their religion was only terrorism and government will strike out them from the society".<sup>63</sup> Apparently, Pakistan Government was against all forms of extremism and claimed success in countering religious extremism in the country. President Musharraf said after eliminating this thing; Pakistan would be a modern, tolerant, progressive and enlightened Islamic state.<sup>64</sup> Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Rashid Ahmad lauded the role of Madrassa in the promotion of Islam. Through the religious institution, students would get a new course structure in the modern world. Both the Federal and Provincial governments wanted to eliminate terrorism, extremism and sectarianism from the society as well as its links to the Madrassa.<sup>65</sup>

The most sensitive institution has succeeded in locating an organized network of the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist, included students of Dini Madrassa and Khatibs of the mosques, where the police arrested more than 1000 activists of Al-Qaeda group.<sup>66</sup> President Musharraf in Karachi in Still Mills Gate Inauguration on 27 May spoke that, "the Government vowed to eradicate terrorism and extremism from society. In the presence of Pakistan army, the entity of any Laskhar or the Jaish will not be tolerated. We are committed to stamp out this from the country and this will not be allowed any more to play their dirty game on our soil, and also the government is committed to diminish the relation of extremism from the education institution- Madrassa."<sup>67</sup> President Musharraf on 1 December 2005 promulgated an ordinance to amend the Societies Registration Act 1866. The

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<sup>63</sup> Saleem Samad, "Government to Consult with Religious Parties on Madrassa Ordinance", *The Daily Times*, 21 July 2002.

<sup>64</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea For Enlightened Moderation", June 1, 2004, *The Washington Post*, URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html>, accessed on 11 April 2007.

<sup>65</sup> *The News*, 8 September 2004.

<sup>66</sup> *POT*, 22 April 2005.

<sup>67</sup> *POT*, 31 May 2005, p.4699.

ordinance may be called the Societies Registration (2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment) Ordinance 2005; this would register all Madrassa within the guidelines of the Government.

### **Join With Foreign Countries**

After the terrorists attack in 2001, President Musharraf decided to join with the US campaign against terrorism being a frontline state. He said, "Pakistan is against all forms of terrorism, stood with America and the international efforts to combat terrorism, and that we would assist it in any way that we can".<sup>68</sup> By joining with the Northern alliance, Islamabad cooperated with giving airbase, intelligence support, and all logistic supports against all forms of terrorists. President Musharraf promised to the international community to close the terrorist outfits in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and declared that he would not permit any territory to be used to support terrorism.<sup>69</sup>

In January 2002, Musharraf told to the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations at the summit that, he was determined to crush out the terrorism from Pakistan and it needs for all member states to join hands against the evil action of terrorism.<sup>70</sup> In an interview with *The CNN* on 18 January 2002, he said, "Pakistan and Afghanistan became friends because of the ground reality and I think nobody can solve the problem in border areas. So it needs to be with Afghanistan to solve the problem in hands".<sup>71</sup> On a joint meeting of both Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed on security cooperation to fight terrorism, hunt down suspected terrorism and wage a battle on drugs.

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<sup>68</sup> *POT*, 15 September 2001, p.3798.

<sup>69</sup> Teresita C. Schaffer, "US Influence on Pakistan: can Partners have Divergent Interest?", *The Washington Quarterly*, 26(1), 2002-03, pp.173-74.

<sup>70</sup> *POT*, 11 January 2002, p.201.

<sup>71</sup> *The News*, 20 January 2002.

Hence, Pakistan Foreign Minister said, "we have agreed that we must work jointly in war on terrorism as in our view unless the terrorism is not eliminated from our countries, stability and peace can not be guaranteed".<sup>72</sup> Pakistan-US-Afghanistan, a tripartite agreed on 18 April 2005 to improve coordination and information sharing to enhance the effectiveness of counter terrorism operation.<sup>73</sup>

In the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, the issue of terrorism always marked as a critical point. The two countries "agreed that specific information will be exchanged" through the joint panel on counter terrorism to help investigations into terrorism, said a joint statement released in Islamabad.<sup>74</sup> Both the countries agreed to collaborate in fighting terrorism, and described as "joint mechanisms" to fight terrorism. The New Delhi-based Institute of Conflict Management said that, "Pakistan has little interest in stopping terrorism".<sup>75</sup>

On the issue of terrorism, President Musharraf said, it needed cooperation with Dhaka in curbing jihad and infiltration into Kashmir.<sup>76</sup> Musharraf told Himagatid Din, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, at army house in Rawalpindi on 19 August 2005, that, "Pakistan made more efforts against terrorism, but it was imperative that the root causes of terrorism should be addressed, and Dacca should respond it effectively."<sup>77</sup> Pakistan's willingness to end terrorism in a bilateral and multilateral front was seen with the formation of alliance with Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, East Asia, China, and Uzbekistan.

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<sup>72</sup> "Afghanistan - Pakistan agreed to jointly fight on Terrorism", *The Dawn*, 22 August 2002.

<sup>73</sup> *POT*, 20 April 2005, pp.3649-50.

<sup>74</sup> "India, Pakistan to Cooperate in Fight against Terrorism", URL: <http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/NewsStory.aspx>, accessed on 24 March 2007.

<sup>75</sup> Patricia Nunan, "India, Pakistan Agree to Join Forces Against Terror", URL: <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2006-09/2006-09-18-voa16.cfm>, accessed on 23 March 2007.

<sup>76</sup> *POT*, 25 July 2005.

<sup>77</sup> "Musharraf calls for joint efforts to curb Terrorism", *The Daily Times*, 28 August 2005.

## OUTCOMES OF ISLAMABAD'S POLICY ON EXTREMISM

While the anti-terror policies formulated and implemented in Pakistan, there were very high opposition and anti-Pakistan sentiment played in street by the terrorists and extremists groups. In their strategy they reacted violently with bombing and suicide bombings, killings of the Government Officers, and attacks on the life of VIPs, etc. In return the Government also took steps to stop these, and took measures on the extremists and Madrassa.

### **Reaction of the Terrorists and Extremists**

In response to the to the ban on the terrorist outfits by the Government of Pakistan, the banned organizations and their allies reacted sharply against the government and civilians through bombing, suicide attacks, etc. It was the first time after the 9/11 incidents, on October 28, 2001 terrorist attacked a church in Bahawalapur where a policeman and 18 people were killed. After few days, some unidentified gunmen fired in Quetta; 5 persons including a former District Council Chairman was killed and some injured. A group of organizations blasted a bomb in residential area in Karachi, in that 19 civilians were injured, and after two days they murdered Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider's brother in Karachi.<sup>78</sup>

After the ban imposed on radical religious outfits, a new jihad organization, Al-Saiqa emerged, which declared Pakistan as the home of war and threatened to carry out attacks on the law enforcing agencies. It said that, "the guerilla war in Pakistan will continue till the Islamic revolution, bullet will not stop, every Muslim should know that it is for their future welfare action."<sup>79</sup> In October 2002, seven were injured in a bomb blast

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<sup>78</sup> URL:<http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristsoutfites.htm>, accessed on 27 March 2007.

<sup>79</sup> *The News*, 31 January 2002.

in Rawalpindi and three parcel bomb explosions caused injury to 8 policemen and a civilian in Karachi.<sup>80</sup> In December, three men were killed in a bomb blast at the Macedonian Honorary Consul General's Office in Karachi; two security forces and 2 other persons were killed in bomb explosions inside a bus in Hyderabad, and 11 were killed in bomb blast at Peerwadahi bus stand in Rawalpindi. On 3 January 2003, Al- Badar Mujahideen claimed to form a suicide squad to target the police and security personnel in Pakistan. An explosive-laden motorcycle blown up in the Clifton area in Karachi in which a man was killed and three other were injured.

Terrorists groups reacted violently against the Christian community in Pakistan and claimed that the community is against the Islam. They exploded a bomb near Christian hospital in Peshawar, and 5 men were injured during a serial bomb blast at 21 British and US gas stations in Karachi in May 2003. At least 53 persons were killed and 57 were injured in a suicide bomber attack on Shiite Muslim mosque in Quetta, and two people were killed in a bomb explosion in Karachi. Arabic television *Al Jazeera* issued a new tape by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman ai Zawahri in which he called on Pakistanis to overthrow President Musharraf's regime, and also called, "I called on Muslims in Pakistan to target to get liberate of their government which is working for the US government".<sup>81</sup> On 25 May, a bomb exploded in Quetta which killed 14 security personnel and a civilian, and a man was killed and some other were injured in a parcel bomb exploded at the Karachi Port Trust.

Some of the extremist outfits were more active in the NWFP, Waziristan, Quetta and the Balochistan province. These groups declared that

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> "Al Jazeera issued a New Tape", 25 March 2004, URL:

<http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristsoutfites.htm>



they would not permit any government forces to work in this area.<sup>82</sup> On 3 June, paramilitary forces were killed and some others were injured when a bomb blew up their vehicle in North Waziristan near the Afghanistan border. The terrorist destroyed a terminal of the Sui Airport of Balochistan through bombing, and 7 police personnel were wounded with at least two rockets and eight hand grenades. As planned by the terrorists, two soldiers died in a bomb blast in the Lawarki area of South Waziristan, and three intelligence officers were killed and 15 sustained injured in bomb blast in South Quetta on 31 August. On 27 September, terrorist attacked a military convoy in South Waziristan with three remote-controlled explosive devices, which killed five soldiers. On 4 November, eight soldiers were killed and 6 others were injured when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by militants near Kanigoram in South Waziristan. On 15 January 2005, unidentified assailants fired six rockets targeting a checkpoint of the paramilitary forces in Koho district in Balochistan province.

*The BBC Urdu* service reported on 3 February 2005, the bomb explosion cut electricity to Balochistan, and a telephone tower and a railway track in the Balochistan province also.<sup>83</sup> On 18 March, at least 50 people were killed and 100 injured during a bomb explosion at a public place near a Shia Shrine at Fatehpur village of Balochistan province. In April, terrorists were blown up four power supply towers of 33-KV near Hun Lake in the Barkhan district of the Balochistan. On 27 May, 25 people were killed and over 100 were injured during a bomb blast in Islamabad. In early September, a soldier and a tribal leader were killed in two separate bomb explosions in the remote Shaaki valley in South Waziristan. In late September, six persons were killed and over 36 injured in bomb blasts in Lahore, a home made time

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> *POT*, 5 February 2005.

device strapped to a bicycle.<sup>84</sup> In November 3 men were killed and 20 others were injured in a powerful car bomb explosion in Karachi.

Eight security men were killed on 7 January 2006. And on 30 January, two frontier corps were killed when terrorists armed with heavy weapons attacked a new frontier forces checkpoint in North Waziristan. At least 14 men were killed and 29 were injured when a powerful bomb exploded on a passenger bus in the Mastung district of Balochistan province. Thirty-one people were killed and 50 others were injured in a suicide attack in the Hangu town on NWFP. On 2 March, US diplomat identified, as David Fyfe, and a ranger official was killed and 54 persons were wounded in a suicide car bombing near the US consulate in Karachi.<sup>85</sup>

### **Anti-Musharraf Movement**

President Musharraf vowed to the international community that he would give his full effort to curb terrorism and extremism from Pakistan. So it was for him to form laws and execute it. After the ban and restrictions on some of their activities, the terrorists decided to start an anti-Musharraf slogan, as "Musharraf was an anti-state element and anti-Islam".<sup>86</sup> So they initiated a radical movement against the top government officials and as well as law enforcing agencies. For the first time five terrorists of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Aalami (HuMA) were tried for a conspiracy to kill Musharraf on 26 April 2002.<sup>87</sup> On 14 December, another attack on the life of the President occurred when a high intensity bomb wrecked the bridge near 10-Corps Headquarters moments after President Musharraf's motorcade crossed it on its way to

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 28 May 2005.

<sup>85</sup> URL: <http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristsoutfites.htm>, accessed on 21 March 2007.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> *The BBC News*, 7 June 2003, URL:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/2972216.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2972216.stm), accessed on 24 March 2007.

Army House from Chaklala airport.<sup>88</sup> The SSP and J-e-M planned to attack on life of the President on 25 December 2003 in Rawalpindi where two suicide bombers tried to crash their explosive-laden vehicles. It happened when the president was returning to his residence, Army House Rawalpindi, after attending the ministerial meeting of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).<sup>89</sup>

A suicide bomb attacked the car of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz on 30 July 2004 after he addressed a public meeting at Jaffar village in connection with his election campaign for NA-59.<sup>90</sup> When the Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Mohammed Yousuf was returning on 2 August to the provincial capital from Khuzdar after attending a meeting held in connection with the previous incident in which six people were killed.<sup>91</sup> On 17 November 2004, Osama Nazir attempted on the lives of the President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz in Faisalabad.<sup>92</sup> On 29 May 2005, former Federal Minister and Senator Malik Faridullah Khan were assassinated along with two persons in terrorists attack in the Jandola area of South Waziristan.

### **Reorganization of Terrorists Groups**

Most groups that have actively participated in street violence and acts of terrorism are also active in the political landscape of Pakistan. There was some compulsion for them to change their name because of President Musahrraf's policy and strict execution of the policies. After renaming they remained engaged in the same activities as before. These political cum terrorist outfits can broadly be classified into two groups ethnic and

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<sup>88</sup> "Musharraf's convoy escapes bomb blast", *The Dawn*, 15 December 2003.

<sup>89</sup> "President Escapes Attempt on Life", *The BBC News*, 27 December 2003, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3351207.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3351207.stm), accessed on 3 April 2007.

<sup>90</sup> Arshad Sharif and Yaqoob Malik, "Aziz Survives Attempt on Life; 7 dead; 70 hurt after Fatehjang Rally Attack", *The Dawn*, July 31, 2004.

<sup>91</sup> Amanullah Kasi, "Balochistan CM's convoy Attacked", *The Dawn*, August 3, 2004.

<sup>92</sup> "The Threat of Pakistan's Suicide Bombers", *The BBC News*, 19 November 2004, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/4025021.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4025021.stm), accessed on 8 April 2007.

sectarian. Sectarian violence originated in a Shia-Sunni struggle for political space within the Pakistani State. A Deobandi (a sub-sect within the Sunni sect) cleric, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi founded the Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba of Pakistan (ASSP), later renamed as SSP in Jhang, a district of Pakistani Punjab. This outfit evolved into a dubious political organization, which reportedly had a terrorist arm, too while its offshoot; the L-i-J is a dedicated terrorist outfit.<sup>93</sup>

On December 12 2001, J-e-M renamed itself as Al-Furqan. While banning six leading Jihad and sectarian groups in two phases - on January 12, 2002, and November 15, 2003 - General Musharraf had declared that no organization or person would be allowed to indulge in terrorism to further its cause. However, after the initial crackdown, the four major Jihad outfits operating from Pakistan – L-e-T, J-e-M, H-ul-M and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (H-u-M), resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before under different names.<sup>94</sup> H-ul-M) Led by Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil till 2005 regrouped and worked in a low-key manner under the name of the Jamiatul Ansar, but insisted that it had a non-militant agenda. One of the most feared jihad groups, the L-e-T, and its parent organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, are keeping their fingers crossed. Earlier, in October 2001, Azhar had renamed Jaish as Tehrikul Furqaan. On 21 June 2006, H-ul-JI and Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar (J-ul-A) joined hands and formed a new group named Lashkar-e-Umer (L-e-U) or Jaish-e-Islami (J-e-I).<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup>“Terrorists Outfits in Pakistan”, URL:

<http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristsoutfites.htm>, accessed on 21 March 2007.

<sup>94</sup>“Rename of Terrorists Group”, URL:

[www.jammukashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20050311c.html](http://www.jammukashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20050311c.html), accessed on 7 April 2007.

<sup>95</sup> Amir Mir, “The jihad lives on”, *The Asia Times*, Mar 11, 2005, URL: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/GC11Df07.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC11Df07.html), accessed on 1 April 2007.

## Madrassa Reform and Registration

For long considered a playgroup for the global jihad, the *Madrassa* system has been closely linked to Pakistan's foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and Afghanistan, which have dominated the country's historiography since its creation. When U.S. forces entered Afghanistan and found thousands of Pakistani students from religious schools carrying guns to fight them. The US pressurized Pakistan to take step to reform and modify its education system, so that terrorism could not grow. Later, Pakistan President proclaimed it a top priority to modernize the schools, which usually teach few subjects beyond Islamic scripture. Pakistan Government made an effort to clean up its *Madrassa*, and to relieve them of extremism and hatred, claiming that this would strike at the base and root of Islamist terror. This reform policy was termed by Musharraf as 'Enlightened Moderation'.<sup>96</sup> The Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002, was introduced to control the enrollment of foreigners and to monitor them.

In his address to the nation on January 12, 2002, President Musharraf had declared, "...*Madaris* will be governed by same rules and regulations applicable to other schools, colleges and universities. All *Madaris* will be registered by 23rd March 2002 and no new *Madrassa* will be opened without permission of the Government. If any *Madrassa* is found indulging in extremism, subversion, militant activity or possessing any types of weapons, it will be closed."<sup>97</sup>

The Federal Government had formulated the scheme in 2002 to teach subjects such as English, Pakistan Studies, Mathematics, General Science, Computers and Economics in the *Madrassa*, and the Economic Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) had approved it on January 7,

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<sup>96</sup> Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation", *The Washington Post*, 1 June 2004.

<sup>97</sup> President Musharraf Address to the Nation on 12 January 2002, *POT*, 15 January 2002, p.246.

2004.<sup>98</sup> In June 2004, Islamabad asked the provinces to continue registration the Madrassa under the Law of the Societies Act –XXI of 1860. Following the instruction from the centre, the Punjab government made it obligatory for all religious institutions across the province to get them registered as a society with the register. For this purpose, the Punjab Governor, Muhammad Afzal Sahi, promulgated an ordinance that come into effect on 25 August 2005. A new section-21 inserted in the said Act that, “a Deeni Madrassa by whatsoever name called shall not be established or operated without being registered as a society under the said act”, and the NWFP Governor, Khalilur Rehman signed Societies Registration (Amendment) Ordinance 2005 on 17 August, that made the registration of Denni Madrassa compulsory.<sup>99</sup>

As many as 732 Madrassa registered with the Punjab Auqaf and Religious Affairs Ministry under the amended registration of Societies Act 1860 till 27 September 2005, while 92 applications were pending with the ministry. The convener of special monitoring committee on Registration in Punjab said that, 8 Madrassa were registered in Rawalpindi, 26 in Jehlum, 14 in Sargadha, 1 in Bhakkar, 3 each in Gujrawala, Bahawalnagar and Sahiwal, 18 in Gujrat, 4 each in Mandi Bahauddin, Kasur and Khanewal, 12 each in Hafizabad and Narowal, 29 in Lahore, 20 in Sheikhpura, 40 in Faisalabad, 10 in Toba Tek Singh, 14 in Jhang, 15 in Lodhran, 38 in Muzaffargarh and 5 each in Vehari, layyah, Mianwali and Bahawalpur. And still no Madrassa was registered in Rahimyar khan, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakpattan, Multan, Sialkot, Okara, Khushab, Attock, Chackwal and Nankana Sahib Districts.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>Kanchan Lakshman, “Madrassa Reform: A Habit of Deception”, *South Asia Intelligence Review*, Volume. 4(9), 12 September 2005, URL: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/4\\_9.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/4_9.htm), accessed on 7 April 2007.

<sup>99</sup> *POT*, August 2005, p. 7042.

<sup>100</sup> “Madrassa Register with Punjab Government”, *The Daily Times*, 29 September 2005.

## ESTIMATION

After the 9/11 incidents, Islamabad made policies on terrorism and joined hands with the international community to eradicate it in all its form. By then Pakistan did not offer long-term solutions because of its domestic politics and concerns. The arrest of Al-Qaeda operators and banned terrorist outfits marked that Islamabad was on the way to fulfill its words to the international community. By joining in the war, the pro-Taliban elements in Pakistan built a strong pressure on the Government to avoid its nexus with the US. However, the Pakistan Government faced a serious dilemma in reviewing its relations with the extremist Islamic groups involved in such kind of activities. The government also faced another problem when the decision was taken to move the army in the Tribal areas in 2003. Another point was that when Musharraf vowed to eliminate terrorists from Pakistan soil, the extremist's groups tried to assassinate the President. However, the counter terrorism policy of the Musharraf Government conflicted with its desire to sustain power while the mainstream political parties in Pakistan were opposed to the idea of *Enlightened Moderation*. They made statements like "Musharraf is an agent of the US and worked for them, and also he is anti-Islamist and as well as anti-Pakistan".<sup>101</sup>

Every incident has two facets of a same coin. So terrorism individually and terrorism in Pakistan cannot be free from this and it faces two things- negative and positive aspects, and success and failure. Here in the case, Islamabad got all success like its 20<sup>th</sup> century engagement- attracted US to remain with Pakistan, being a strategic partner for her in this region, acquire maximum number of economic and military assistance, and so on. But success to Pakistan home ground in this war came in arresting and

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<sup>101</sup> "Pakistan: Islamists Protest Musharraf's Bid to Remain as Army Chief", 20 December 2004, URL: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/12/c1f998bd-c7b6-4c0e-9af1-7a2f9e4377c8.html>, accessed on 27 May 2007.

eliminating terrorists' organization, reforming society including education and political platforms. It also marked another positive point in its improved relation with India in respect to Kashmir. The failure lies in its domestic problems. Some section of people and political parties are opposing Musharraf's anti-terror policy and its alliance with the US. So for President Musharraf, it needs to solve this problem with holding discussion with political parties. It was observed that there was some double standard in President's approach. When President Musharraf at a point told that terrorist in Jammu and Kashmir is not the terrorist activity rather it is a freedom struggle,<sup>102</sup> while at another time he said that some indigenous Pakistan extremists are working in and it needs to work with India to eradicate this element. So it may be marked that Islamabad's strategy on terrorism is not same in Kashmir as in its home ground. After joining the war, the President had said that the Pakistan army would not join the war, while Islamabad would give all its logistic facilities to the US. The critics pointed out that, if Pakistan joins in war, why the army was not included with the Northern Alliance army.

Today domestic reaction in Pakistan is high because of President Musharraf's suspension of the Pakistan's Chief Justice on March 9, 2007- Iftakar Muhammad Choudhary on charges of misconduct and misuse of authority. The society divided in two groups- supporters of the Chief Justice and the supporters of the President. President faced problem including his uniform designation. It indicated that the Pakistani civil society is not with the President. How far Musharraf can reform the society and legitimate his authority without civil society's cooperation is a question mark? The civil society can be reformed through the political parties, scholars, media campaign, leaders' good relations, and self-consciousness of public. Former

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<sup>102</sup> Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism*, Burlington: Ashgate, 2005, p.118.



Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said to *The NDTV* that if the parliamentary government will come with his lead, he would not accept the Kashmir policy of President Musharraf.<sup>103</sup> Kashmir is the hot spot between India and Pakistan, and terrorism in Kashmir is still a focal point for the US, Pakistan and India.

No doubt, after 9/11 Islamabad took steps against terrorism for the first time of its history. President Musharraf made lot of efforts to stop and fulfill his commitment to the world community. It needs long-term policies and efforts with the foreign states to eliminate this from the societies. Actually, Musharraf has done many things that resulted the four life attempts on him, two life attempts on the Prime Minister, attacks on the provincial Chief Ministers sometime, and attacks also on the Law Enforcing Agencies. The issue of the problem of terrorism cannot be handled individually in a short-term strategy. So it needs a long-term policy to eliminate this evil subject with the governments, positive response from the civil society including the foreign actor's assistance.

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<sup>103</sup> Text of the Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawab Sharif's interview to the NDTV 24x7 in Walk the Talk, *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), 18 June 2007.

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**CHAPTER- IV**

**US-PAKISTAN RAPPROACHMENT:  
COOPERATION AND CONSEQUENSES**

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Generally rapprochement in international relation comes with the reestablishment or renewal of cordial relations between the two countries. It can be visible in two forms- equal footing or equal interests between the two states, which is a spontaneous process; and secondly dominated by one state to address its interests, which is an artificial one. In case of the United States and Pakistan rapprochement, it began in 1979 when the Soviet army intervened into Afghanistan. It came under equal footing point, because both the states had same number of interest approximately.<sup>1</sup> Washington thought to start proxy war against the Soviet army's move with the help of Islamabad because of the latter's geo-political position in this region. After the Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the relation declined between the US and Pakistan. During the period between 1991 and 2001, several issues contributed to the worsening of relations. These included weapons proliferations, human rights, democracy, terrorism, and the Taliban.<sup>2</sup>

The second rapprochement started with the terrorist's attacks on 11 September 2001 on US. It was marked by the domination of one single power. This was evident from the statements of US President George W. Bush. For instance he told Pakistan that, "US is at war, Pakistan has to choose to be a part of US or with our enemy",<sup>3</sup> the then Deputy Secretary of States, Richard Armitage said on 13 September 2001 to the Director General of ISI in Washington that, "Pakistan had to decide whether they are with America or with the terrorists, if they chose the terrorists, then they should

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<sup>1</sup>Touqir Hussain, "U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond", *United States Institute of Peace*, July 2005, URL:

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr145.html>, accessed on 7 April 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>*The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, 7 November 2001, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011107-6.html>, accessed on 5 April 2007.

be prepared to be boomed back to the Stone Age.”<sup>4</sup> Reacting to such statements Pakistan President General Musharraf said, “if Islamabad will not cooperate, then the US could react violently. So it became a natural choice to be a part of US war on terrorism”.<sup>5</sup> The difference between the two rapprochements was- the first one in 1979, the US was not present but engaged in proxy war with the Soviet Union with the help of Pakistan; but in the second one Washington was physically present in Afghanistan against the terrorists and Pakistan was also a part of this war. With the war the relationships between the US and Pakistan warmed up and were agreed to eliminate terrorists from this region and as well as from the world. Though the anti-Pakistan and anti-American sentiment was high during that time, both the head of the states vowed to curb the odd element from society and started cooperation in every sphere.

### **US DEMANDS, PAKISTAN’S BARGAIN AND THE DECISION TO JOIN WAR**

On 13 September 2001, then US Deputy Secretary of States, Richard Armitage, called the ambassador of Pakistan for a meeting to convey the list of seven steps demand of the US to Pakistan. Armitage reported that, “the situation was black or white. Islamabad had a choice to make. Either it was with the US or not. There were no half measures. There was no room for maneuver. The future starts today.”<sup>6</sup> The seven steps were:<sup>7</sup>

- Stop Al-Qaeda operatives in borders, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistic for Bin Laden.

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<sup>4</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In The Line Of Fire*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p.201.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2005: A Concise History*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, Pp. 244-46.

<sup>7</sup> Musharraf, 2006, pp. 204-05.

- Provide the US with blanket over flight and landing rights to conduct all necessary and intelligence and military cooperation.
- Provide territorial access to the US and allied military intelligence as needed and other personnel to conduct all necessary operations against the perpetrators of terrorism and those that harbor them, including the use of Pakistan's naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.
- Provide the US immediately with intelligence, immigration information and databases, and internal security information, to help prevent and respond terrorists acts perpetrated against the US, its friends, or its allies.
- Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist's acts of September 11 and any other terrorist acts against the US or its allies, and curb all domestic expressions of support against the US, its friends, or its allies.
- Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and any other items and recruits, including volunteers en route to Afghanistan, who can be used in a military offensive capacity or to abet a terrorist threat.
- Should the evidence strongly implicate Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbor him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, end support to the Taliban, and assist the US in the aforementioned ways to destroy Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.

Apart from these demands from the US, Islamabad agreed to join the war on terrorism. But prior to join the war, Pakistan bargained that the US should address its concerns. It included economic and military assistance, strengthen the country's external security, build up infrastructures, alliance

armies not to present inside Pakistan, Pakistan's own army will fight against terrorism on its soil- not on foreign soil including Afghanistan, training Pakistan's army personnel, not to hurt religious sentiment, establishment of democratic government, and other domestic issues.<sup>8</sup> The US agreed with Islamabad to rebuild the country and in return it wanted Islamabad's full cooperation in war. So it is clear that both the countries interests had not converged at this point, but they worked for a common cause to address each other's concerns.

### **US- PAKISTAN COOPERATION IN FIGHTING TERRORISM**

The 9/11 events dramatically changed the nature of the US-Pakistan relations. The immediate declaration of the US war on terrorism pushed Pakistan to take a U-turn against the Taliban regime and extended its supports to the war in Afghanistan. Once again Islamabad became a "frontline State"<sup>9</sup> and acquired significance in the US strategic calculations. The relationship is normally bound by the geo-strategic realities and compulsions, which tend to bring the two states together with divergence of perceptions and policies. The US needed Islamabad's full cooperation in rooting out terrorist outfits and ousting the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Pakistan fell in the line with its usual bargain for military assistance and funds.

However, in March 2003, the Bush Administration announced that it had "carefully reviewed the facts relating to Pakistan, a key front-line ally in the US led anti-terrorism coalition, and expressed satisfaction with ongoing cooperation in an area of terrorism. The US praised Pakistan for its fine

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<sup>8</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "U.S Strategy: assisting Pakistan's Transformation", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28:1, 2004-05, Pp.107-09.

<sup>9</sup> Ras Siddiqui, "Pakistan as a Frontline State in the Terror War", 20 December 2003, URL: [http://www.chowk.com/show\\_article.cgi?aid=00002926&channel=civic%20center&start=0&end=9&chapter=1&page=1](http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00002926&channel=civic%20center&start=0&end=9&chapter=1&page=1), accessed on 17 April 2007.

efforts in joint counterterrorism operations with the capture of suspected Al Qaeda leaders and executing laws.”<sup>10</sup> The US– Pakistan counter- terrorism effort started in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence, military operations, economic, political and diplomatic spheres. The cooperation also included US arms transfers and security cooperation with Pakistan and the domestic consequences of Washington- Islamabad counterterrorism efforts.

### **Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation**

Historically Islamabad has demonstrated inconsistently in its efforts to control Islamic militants operating inside its soil. The United States has long been aware of the existence of banned groups both in Pakistan-held Kashmir and within Pakistani soil. Under the US pressure, President Musharraf’s comprehensive policy altered away from Islamic extremism. It began with the severing of all official ties with the Taliban in September 2001 and culminated in a landmark January 2002 speech in which he vowed to end Pakistan’s use as a base for terrorism of any kind, criticized religious extremism and intolerance in the country, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Toiba (L-e-T) and Jaish-e -Muhammad (J-e-M).<sup>11</sup>

The Pakistan Government instituted comprehensive police reforms, upgraded its immigration control system, and began work on new anti-terrorist finance laws. In the wake of the speech, about 3,300 extremists were arrested and detained, though at least one-third of these have since been

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<sup>10</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan- US Anti- Terrorism Cooperation”, *Congressional Research service*, Library of Congress, report for Congress, Order Code- RL31624, 28 March 2003, URL: <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31624.pdf>, accessed on 25 April 2007.

<sup>11</sup> President Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, 12 January 2002, *The BBC News*, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1757251.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1757251.stm), accessed on 17 April 2007.

released, including the founders of both L-e-T and J-e-M.<sup>12</sup> In early-2003, President Musharraf shifted his previous stance and opined that Osama bin Laden himself may be in Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> In response, US law enforcement agencies, led by the F.B.I., began in 2002 to provide active assistance to Pakistan in its effort to hunt terrorists and their allies. The number US counterterrorism agents in Pakistan reported at between “several dozen” and “the low hundreds.”<sup>14</sup> While the US claimed that the involvement of American agents in field operations and raids was quite limited, the Pakistani officials indicated that F.B.I. agents participated in numerous raids, where they “carry guns” and “help us break down doors.”<sup>15</sup> The spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office stated in April 2002 that there exists “no independent F.B.I. offices in Pakistan,” and Pakistan’s Interior minister repeatedly claimed that F.B.I. operatives were not involved in hunting Al - Qaeda supporters in Pakistan.<sup>16</sup>

The Director of Central Intelligence reported to have made at least one trip to Pakistan after September 2001, and the Pakistan Government said to be cooperating with the C.I.A. in the ongoing hunt for Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and other top-level Islamic militant fugitives.<sup>17</sup> The February 2002 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was believed to have intensified US focus on law enforcement in Pakistan and efforts to assist local security forces in tracking and capturing Islamic militants.

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<sup>12</sup> Paul Watson, “Revolving Doors for Pakistan’s Militants,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 17 November 2002.

<sup>13</sup> David Rohde, “Qaeda Uses Teeming Karachi as New Base, Pakistanis Say,” *The New York Times*, 1 November 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Watson and Josh Meyer, “Pakistanis See FBI in Shadows,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 25 August 2002.

<sup>15</sup> Dexter Filkins, “F.B.I. and Military Unite in Pakistan to Hunt Al Qaeda,” *The New York Times*, 14 July 2002.

<sup>16</sup> “FBI Not Involved in Raids: Faisal,” *The Dawn*, 31 December 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Peter Baker and Kamran Khan, “Pakistan to Forgo Charges Against 2 Nuclear Scientists; Ties to Bin Laden Suspected,” *The Washington Post*, 30 January 2002.



On May 8, 2002, the US Government agencies hosted the first meeting of the US-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement. Pakistan's Minister of Interior, Moin Haider, led the Pakistan delegation. The two Governments discussed a broad range of bilateral law enforcement issues, including counter narcotics, counterterrorism, extradition, money laundering, trafficking in persons, demand reduction and drug abuse control, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal system reform, and issues related to the repatriation of Pakistan nationals detained in the United States in connection with immigration proceedings.<sup>18</sup>

The two Governments agreed to strengthen their cooperation in each of these areas, and subsequent trips to Pakistan by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Taylor marked a continuation of this process. The Department of State and Justice discussed with Pakistan counterparts in Islamabad in September 2002. In November 2002, then US Treasury Secretary O'Neill met with top officials in Islamabad to discuss Pakistan's ongoing efforts to halt terrorist financing. He stated that Pakistan was "leading the world" in the fight to eradicate money laundering, but some officials are more pessimistic.<sup>19</sup> Another full meeting of the Joint Working Group on Counter terrorism and Law Enforcement took place in Washington in April 2003.<sup>20</sup>

Islamabad had taken action against at least 185 of the 247 US-designated entities operating on Pakistan territory, and taken its own initiative to detain operatives and designate active groups suspected of

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<sup>18</sup> "US-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counter terrorism and Law Enforcement", *US Department of State*, URL; <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=April&x=20030415183644namfuaks0.1897852>, accessed on 22 April 2007.

<sup>19</sup> "Pakistan Leading the World in Tackling Money-Laundering: US Treasury Chief", URL: <http://www.khaleejtimes.co.ae/ktarchive/191102/subcont.htm>, accessed on 17 April 2007.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

financing terrorist activities. The Pakistan's legal and regulatory structures remained insufficient for a fully effective anti-terrorism financing regime, especially with an inability to monitor the activities of foreign charities, and the newly seated Assembly has yet to enact a proposed money-laundering bill. The US continued to encourage stricter oversight and regulation, and the United States agreed to provide technical assistance and training to Pakistani customs and finance officials as part of this effort.<sup>21</sup>

It was through the provision of intelligence that American agents were reported to be making their best contributions to such operations. The interception and tracing of satellite telephone transmissions was a key tool in joint US-Pakistan efforts to capture fugitive Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Pakistan. The American agents also closely monitored email and other Internet traffic for signs of terrorist communications. The F.B.I. reported to have trained and equipped a number of former Pakistan army officers and others in what was known as the "*Spider Group*,"<sup>22</sup> an informal intelligence-gathering unit that is especially focused on monitoring the activities of Pakistani Islamist groups. The White House called the capture of militants a "joint operation" between Pakistan and US authorities, which marked success landmarks.

### **Cooperation in Military and Defense Operations**

Islamabad served as a vital basing and transit point for "*Operation Enduring Freedom*"<sup>23</sup> in the US led anti-terror mission in Afghanistan. According to the Department of Defense, Pakistan provided basing and over flight permission for all United States and coalition forces engaged in

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<sup>21</sup> Carlotta Gall, "US to Train Pakistanis to Help Bar Terrorist Funds," *The New York Times*, 22 November 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Aamir Latif, "FBI Puts 'Spiders' to Work in Pakistan," *The Washington Times*, 27 November 2002.

<sup>23</sup> Stephen Zunes, "Operation Enduring Freedom: A Retrospective", *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 18, 2006, URL: <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3616>, accessed on 23 April 2007.

Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> The airbase near Jacobabad was vital to US military operations in the region, and the airport of Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, was a key forward operational base. More than 57,000 US military raids originated on Pakistani territory. The US military personnel reportedly installed extensive radar facilities at three Pakistan airfields, allowing for coverage of the entire Pakistan airspace.<sup>25</sup> Islamabad also deployed more than 115,000 regular and paramilitary troops along the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of Washington led efforts to capture Taliban and Al -Qaeda fugitives. Some 45,000 Pakistani troops were reported to be actively supporting Operation Enduring Freedom as of October 2002.<sup>26</sup>

The presence and activities of US military personnel in Pakistan was a subject of great sensitivity in both countries. There were only a handful of US troops operating on Pakistan territory. In July 2002, the media stated that more than 3,500 Al-Qaeda operatives crossed into Pakistan while fleeing US military operations in neighboring Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup> The US military assessment estimated the presence of up to 1,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan. The US military operation in Afghanistan was close to the Pakistan border and employing thousands of troops have also been ongoing. Pakistan Government officials issued contradictory statements on the issue of Al-Qaeda's presence in their country, but many denied that Al-Qaeda forces have entered Pakistan.

In September 2002, a senior Pakistani security official claimed that his forces had "broken the back" of Al-Qaeda in the country, but more recent

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> "International Contributions to the War on Terrorism: Pakistan." *US Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs*, 14 June 2002, URL: [http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive\\_Index/Contributions\\_to\\_War.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Contributions_to_War.html), accessed on 23 April 2007.

<sup>27</sup> Tim Mc Girk, "Al-Qaeda's New Hideouts," *Time*, 29 July 2002.

pronouncements has been less assured: after acknowledging that Al-Qaeda members are in hiding throughout the country. In October 2002, the first joint US military exercise took place after nearly five years, with approximately 120 soldiers from each country coming together in Pakistan for “*Inspired Gambit- III.*”<sup>28</sup> The chief of Karachi’s police investigation department stated in December 2002 that Al-Qaeda is “down, but not out” in Pakistan.<sup>29</sup>

In January 2003, Pakistan Foreign Minister Kasuri urged the United States to “take steps to reduce the conventional weapons disparity” between Pakistan and India as a means of halting a nuclear arms race in South Asia.<sup>30</sup> Islamabad secured deals for the purchase of major US weapons platforms, including F-16s fighter jets, P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.<sup>31</sup> In late March 2003, the Bush Administration gave seven C-130E transport aircraft spare parts, and six Aerostats – sophisticated, balloon-mounted surveillance radars. These marked the first noteworthy arms sales to Pakistan in more than a decade and reportedly intended to support Islamabad’s ability in counter-terror operations.

## **Strategic and Security Cooperation**

A joint statement issued by the Defense Co-operation Group (DCG) reported that, “served the purpose of providing a forum to exchange views on security matters and, in Pakistan’s case, share with the United States, its

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<sup>28</sup>“Joint US-Pakistan Military Exercise,” *Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst*, 18 October 2002, URL: [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view\\_article.php?articleid=745](http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=745), accessed on 25 April 2007.

<sup>29</sup>“US Says Al -Qaeda Failing to Regroup,” *The Daily Times*, March 18, 2003.

<sup>30</sup> Owais Tohid, “F-16 deal: South Asia’s new arms race?”, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 July 2005, URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0328/p06s01-wosc.html>, accessed on 27 April 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

views of its security environment."<sup>32</sup> The US assistance to Pakistan under security-related programs includes \$396.5 million distributed in FY2002, \$56.5 million allocated for FY2003, and \$120 million requested for FY2004.<sup>33</sup> President Bush and President Musharraf have affirmed the long-term, strategic partnership between two countries. In 2004, the United States acknowledged its aspirations for closer bilateral ties with Pakistan by designating Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).<sup>34</sup> The U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership was based on the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe.<sup>35</sup>

Both the countries were committed to work together with Afghanistan to make Pakistan and Afghanistan a land bridge linking the economic potentials of South Asia and Central Asia. President Bush praised President Musharraf's for his strong and vital support in the war on terror, and said it needs for a comprehensive strategy for addressing the threat of terrorism and extremism. Both the states resolve to maintain their close counterterrorism cooperation and to increase their efforts to reduce the threat of terrorism regionally and internationally, including President Musharraf's concept of '*Enlightened Moderation*'.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Joint Statement: US-Pakistan Defense Cooperation Group (DCG), *U.S. Department of Defense*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 24 September 2003, URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5667>, accessed on 5 May 2007.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> "Pakistan: Security Assistance", *US Department of State*, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Washington, DC, URL: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64479.htm>, accessed on 13 April 2007.

<sup>35</sup>"U.S.-Pakistan Joint Statement", *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, Islamabad, 4 March 2006, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2006/62590.htm>, accessed on 15 April 2007.

<sup>36</sup>"Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership", *The White House*, 4 March 2006, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-1.html>, accessed on 15 May 2007.

Washington and Islamabad share concern about the threat to global stability posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and the threat of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons, and committed to play leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related technology and expertise. In implementation of the strategic partnership, President Bush and President Musharraf committed both countries to undertake the steps in the areas of economic growth and prosperity, energy, peace and security, social sector development, science and technology, democracy, and non-proliferation.<sup>37</sup> In the joint statement issued by the US President and the President of Pakistan on March 4, 2004, on security and strategic partnership, both leaders promised to:<sup>38</sup>

Build a healthy defense relationship that advances shared security goals, promotes regional stability, and contributes to international security; continue healthy U.S. security assistance to meet Pakistan's legitimate defense needs and bolster its capabilities in the war on terror; deepen bilateral collaboration in the fields of defense training, joint exercises, defense procurement, technology transfers, and international peacekeeping; decide to increase the frequency of defense policy discussions to strengthen collaboration in the identified sectors; work together to ensure the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the South Asia region and beyond; and cooperate closely in international institutions, including bodies of the United Nations, on matters of mutual concern.

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<sup>37</sup>"U.S.-Pakistan Joint Statement", *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, Islamabad, 4 March 2006, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2006/62590.htm>, accessed on 15 April 2007.

<sup>38</sup>"Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership", *The White House*, 4 March 2006, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-1.html>, accessed on 15 May 2007.

## **Economic and Financial Co-operations**

Rewarding Pakistan for cooperating with the U.S. campaign against terrorism, President George W. Bush signed a bill on October 27, 2001 that granted him the authority to waive for two years prohibitions on major military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan. Passed by the Senate on October 4, the law gives the President the power to waive sanctions if a waiver would help facilitate Pakistan's transition to democracy and assist U.S. efforts to "respond to, deter, or prevent" acts of international terrorism.<sup>39</sup> Specifically, the law granted exemptions to sanctions imposed for Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 and in October 1999 military coup.<sup>40</sup> In September, commending Pakistan for making the difficult choice of aligning itself with Washington, the Senate emphasized that the law "provides President Bush with the tools he needs to encourage Pakistan's continued participation in United States' efforts to combat terrorism."<sup>41</sup>

The U.S. and Pakistan signed two agreements to help Pakistan's economy increase its dynamism. The first agreement is part of a five-year assistance package from the U.S. to Pakistan worth more than \$70 million. The package includes funding for over one-hundred-thirty thousand loans for small businesses, support for new industries, and aid for more than fifty thousand farmers in drought-stricken areas of Pakistan. The second agreement establishes the Competitive Support Fund, which would promote links between higher education and industry for knowledge-based enterprise development.<sup>42</sup> The highlighted areas include economic trade and investment cooperation, health, democracy and human rights, education,

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<sup>39</sup>Alex Wagner, "Bush Authorized to Lift Sanctions on Pakistan", *Arms Control Today*, November 2001, URL: [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001\\_11/paksancnov01.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_11/paksancnov01.asp), accessed on 22 April 2007.

<sup>40</sup>"Sanctions boost for Pakistan economy", *The BBC News*, 23 September 2001, URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1559419.stm>, accessed on 22 April 2007.

<sup>41</sup>Wagner, *Arms Control Today*, November 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

science and technology, defense and law enforcement. The Bush administration was working with the U.S. Congress to provide \$3 billion in five yearly \$600 million installments for development and security assistance to Pakistan. In FY 2001 the US assistance was \$91 million, \$1,151.8 million in FY 2002, \$513.3 million in FY 2003, \$408.6 million in FY 2004 and \$700.1 million in FY 2005 approximately for the areas and other concerns.<sup>43</sup>

In the joint statement on Strategic cooperation in March 2006,<sup>44</sup> President Bush and President Musharraf agreed on economic growth and prosperity which includes: establish and implement strong financial sector controls that can defend against illicit finance; facilitate Pakistan's economic growth through increased trade and investment links with the United States and within the region and the global economy, including through an enhanced economic dialogue encompassing bilateral cooperation for Pakistan's economic development, regional economic cooperation, and the global economy; the United States will provide financial support for the establishment of a Center for Entrepreneurship in Pakistan under the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative. The Center would promote entrepreneurial training and skills development to young women and men to launch business initiatives that would generate employment opportunities.

Besides all the above cooperation between the US-Pakistan, the political and diplomatic co-operations warmly started from the 9/11 events. There were regular visits of delegations and meetings between the two

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<sup>43</sup>K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations", Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, *Congressional Research Service (CRS)*, Issue Brief for Congress, order Code IB94041, The Library of Congress, 28 January 2005, URL: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisations/16176.pdf>, accessed on 16 March 2006.

<sup>44</sup>"Joint Statement on United States-Pakistan Strategic Partnership", *The White House*, 4 March 2006, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060304-1.html>, accessed on 15 April 2007.



countries. In a joint statement in 2006, both countries vowed themselves and to the international community to curb the extremists from society and remain in one voice on all issues and decisions in world. In case of Afghanistan, both extended support to build the country and fighting terrorism with the new government of Afghanistan. President Bush and General Musharraf welcomed the agreement reached in Bonn in 2001 for the establishment of a broad-based interim administration in Afghanistan headed by Hamid Karzai.<sup>45</sup> "Pakistan and Iran would work together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to facilitate rebuilding of this ravaged country," announced the president, who expressed satisfaction that the events followed the course, which Pakistan had been advocating all along since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US.

### **CONSEQUENCES ON THE US-PAKISTAN RAPPROACHMA**

The US and Pakistan relation got revived after the terrorist attack on the WTC in 2001. Islamabad aligned itself with the Northern Alliance in war against terrorism. Both the states were co-operated and worked to curb extremists at all levels. The co-operation resulted in commenting partnership. However, this led to serious repercussions within Pakistan. The major consequences are:

#### **Domestic Reaction in Pakistan**

After the ban imposed by President Musharraf on radical religious outfits, terrorists' organizations and newly formed jihad organizations declared Pakistan as the home of war and threatened to carry out attacks on the law enforcing agencies. They said that, "the guerilla war in Pakistan will continue till the Islamic revolution, bullet will not stop, every Muslim

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<sup>45</sup> "Musharraf Hails Bonn Agreement", December 06, 2001, URL: [http://english.people.com.cn/200112/06/eng20011206\\_86051.shtml](http://english.people.com.cn/200112/06/eng20011206_86051.shtml), accessed on 27 April 2007.

should know that it is for their future welfare action."<sup>46</sup> After 9/11, the violence took place between the Sunni and Shia extremists, because of the expulsion of the Taliban from Afghanistan. Most groups that actively participated in street violence and acts of terrorism are also active in the political landscape of Pakistan.

As the worsen violence between these two sets, there have been got worsen a number of casualties in Pakistan increased from 2001.<sup>47</sup> The disturbing element was to create violence in every spheres of life through bombing, kidnapping and murder, attacks on life of the VIP's. A suicide bomb attacked on the car of Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz on 30 July 2004 after he addressed a public meeting at Jaffar.<sup>48</sup> On 17 November 2004, Osama Nazir attempted on the lives of the President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz in Faisalabad.<sup>49</sup> On 29 May 2005, former Federal Minister and Senator Malik Faridullah Khan were assassinated along with two persons who were killed in terrorists attack in the Jandola area of South Waziristan.<sup>50</sup>

### **Islamabad's Sovereignty Concerns**

The boom of US military involvement in anti-terrorism operations in western Pakistan apparently has raised doubts and suspicions about Pakistan's sovereign status. A negative political reaction within Pakistan fueled anti-government and anti-American sentiments. An apparent breakdown of the long-standing autonomy of Pakistan's tribal zone along the border with Afghanistan, combined with an unprecedented US military

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<sup>46</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 31 January 2002.

<sup>47</sup> "Pakistan's Shia-Sunni Divide" 1 June 2004, *The BBC News*, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3045122.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3045122.stm), accessed on 28 May 2007.

<sup>48</sup> Arshad Sharif and Yaqoob Malik, "Aziz Survives Attempt on Life; 7 dead; 70 hurt after Fatehjang Rally Attack", *The Dawn*, 31 July 2004.

<sup>49</sup> "The Threat of Pakistan's Suicide Bombers", *The BBC News*, 19 November 2004, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/4025021.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4025021.stm), accessed on 8 April 2007.

<sup>50</sup> The details of causalities in Pakistan from 2001 to 2006 in the violence in the terrorists and extremists' attacks are discussed in the Chapter-3.

presence in the country, caused increasing anger and resentment among the ethnic Pashtun majority there.<sup>51</sup> The presence of US law enforcement and military personnel in Pakistan, and the arrest and extradition of several Pakistani nationals, spurred frequent expressions of sovereignty concerns, especially by leaders of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). In late-2002 and early- 2003, the President of the Peshawar Bar Association described Pakistan as having become “a US colony”; senior legal figures in Balochistan complained that F.B.I. operations in that region are “clear violations of the Pakistan Constitution;” MMA Secretary-General Maulana Rehman made a declaration of “jihad against America that has stationed its forces in Pakistan to do away with our sovereignty.”<sup>52</sup>

So, according to a school of thought in Pakistan felt that Pakistan was not a sovereign state rather a colony of the US. They viewed that Washington’s physical presence in Afghanistan and its active cooperation with Islamabad was a matter a concern. They argued that they have no right and freedom, and viewed that what their Government did was not an independent body and could not take any decision with out the direction of the US.

### **Anti-American Sentiments in Pakistan**

Pakistan expressed three kinds of reasons for negative feelings about the US.<sup>53</sup> One involves U.S. policies toward Pakistan such as failure to come to Pakistan’s aid during the Bangladesh crisis, using Pakistan for its own

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<sup>51</sup>Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Waziristan: Bin Laden’s hiding place?”, *The BBC News*, 4 March 2004, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/3532841.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3532841.stm), accessed on 21 May 2007.

<sup>52</sup>Sarath Kumara, “US military insists on right of ‘hot pursuit’ inside Pakistan”, *World Socialist Web*, 22 January 2003, URL: <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jan2003/paki-j22.shtml>, accessed on 27 May 2007.

<sup>53</sup>Hamid H. Kizilbash, “Anti-Americanism in Pakistan”, URL: <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/497/1/58>, accessed on 1 June 2007.

interests, and opposition to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program. The second deals with American global policy, including support of Israel, opposition to Iran's present government, and use of force against small Third World nations. The third includes American involvement in Pakistan—for example, support for the military regime, obstructing a settlement of the Afghan issue, and responsibility for the decline in the value of the local currency. Most Pakistanis were uneasy about the relationship with America as opposed to being hostile.

The anti-Americanism as expressed through support for Islamic parties were not limited to the satellite cities, but it also affected to the rural regions. The religious candidates won parliamentary seats in Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi, and bitterness of perceived US support for what they called President Musharraf as anti- Pakistan and anti-Islamic.<sup>54</sup> MMA Parliamentary leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed threatened that, if Musharraf supported any U.S. military action against Iraq, “the MMA will make the government unmanageable.”<sup>55</sup>

During the prayers on the floor of the Pakistan Parliament, a senior MMA member stated that, “America is the biggest terrorist state.”<sup>56</sup> In January 2003, the chief of Jamat al-Daawa asserted his belief that “all anti-Muslim forces including the United States are trying to paralyze the Muslims economically, socially, and politically all over the world.”<sup>57</sup> MMA leader Maulana Mahmood stated later in the month that Pkaistan’s opposition groups would “break America into pieces like Russia” and “erase

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<sup>54</sup>David Rohde, “Pakistan’s Elite Show Anti-Americanism in Elections,” *The New York Times*, 13 October 2002.

<sup>55</sup>“Political Parties anti-American Attitude”, *The Global Security*, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/mma.htm>, accessed on 23 May 2007.

<sup>56</sup>David Rohde, “Pakistan’s Elite Show Anti-Americanism in Elections”, *The New York Times*, 13 October 2002.

<sup>57</sup>“US Trying to Destroy Muslims”, *The Dawn*, 9 January 2003.

America from the world.”<sup>58</sup> Along with Islamist expressions of anger at the United States and the Musharraf - Jamali Government’s current alliance with it, there was a plentiful signs of efforts underway to “re-Talibanize” Pashtun- majority areas near the Afghani- Pakistani border.<sup>59</sup>

### **International Reactions and Image of Pakistan**

The 9/11 attack had major global political ramifications. Under the immense pressure from Washington, Pakistan agreed to join the war and provided the U.S. a number of military airports and bases for its attack on the Taliban regime and arrested over 600 supposed Al-Qaeda members. Top Muslim organizations in the United States were swift to condemn the attacks on 9/11 and called “upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families”.<sup>60</sup> After the 9/11 event, the image of Islamabad suffered a setback in international environment because of its diplomatic relations with the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and its relations with some terrorist organizations. International leaders were highly critical of Pakistan’s link with terrorists, and there were convinced of terrorist camps presence in Pakistan and called Pakistan a ‘terrorist state’.<sup>61</sup> Some of the most important world views are as follows:<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>Zahid Hussain, “Pakistani MP Brands America a ‘Terrorist’ ”, *Times*, 20 November 2002.

<sup>59</sup>“Have We Been Betrayed By Pakistan?”, May 21, 2007, URL: [http://news.yahoo.com/s/ibd/20070521/bs\\_ibd\\_ibd/2007521issues01](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ibd/20070521/bs_ibd_ibd/2007521issues01), accessed on May 21, 2007.

<sup>60</sup>“International Reactions to the Terrorists Attack on the United States”, URL: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September\\_11,\\_2001\\_attacks#Reactions](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,_2001_attacks#Reactions), accessed on May 12, 2007.

<sup>61</sup>Wilson John, “Declare Pakistan a terrorist state”, *The Pioneer*, May 29, 2002, URL: <http://meaindia.nic.in/opinion/2002/05/29o02.htm>, accessed on 23 May 2007.

<sup>62</sup>“Comments and Images of the World’s Leaders Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks”, URL: <http://www.september11news.com/InternationalReaction.htm>, accessed on May 13, 2007.

## U.S Concerns

In March 2003 the US viewed that, the anti-terrorism cooperation with Islamabad was both “significantly broadened”, and noted “Pakistan has apprehended close to 500 suspected Al-Qaeda operatives and affiliates.”<sup>63</sup> Specific issues were raised regarding the continuation of Islamist militant infiltration into Indian Kashmir, the continued presence in Pakistan of wanted terrorists and terrorist groups, and the extent to which Pakistan’s Government and its intelligence apparatus committed to Islamabad’s stated anti-terrorism policies.

The US military commanders overseeing ‘*Operation Enduring Freedom*’ complained that betrayer Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters were able to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan then escape across the Pakistan frontier. They have expressed dismay at the “slow pace of progress” in capturing wanted fugitives, especially Taliban leaders in Pakistan and urged Pakistan to co-operate fully and whole heartedly.<sup>64</sup> The US Special Envoy to Afghanistan Khalilzad stated that, “There are some key Taliban figures in Pakistan... some Al-Qaeda people in the border areas of the Pakistan-Afghanistan.”<sup>65</sup> The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed “deep concern” that “elements of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency might be helping members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate into Afghanistan.”<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>Christina Rocca, “United States Relations with South Asia”, *US State Department*, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee On Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, March 20, 2003, URL: <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/18893.htm>, accessed on May 27, 2007.

<sup>64</sup>“US Seeks Greater Military Cooperation,” *The Dawn*, January 29, 2003.

<sup>65</sup>Carlotta Gall, “US Won’t Accept Refuge in Pakistan for Al Qaeda and Taliban,” *The New York Times*, February 10, 2003.

<sup>66</sup>James Dao, “Terror Aid From Pakistan Concerns Senators,” *The New York Times*, February 13, 2003.

## **New Afghanistan**

Before the September 2001 tragedy, Kabul was known for its Taliban Government, terrorist organization and sanctuaries, human rights violence, etc. But after the historic 9/11 dealings, the US policies were changed in the international political sphere. Immediately after the 9/11, President Bush declared *War on Terrorism*,<sup>67</sup> in which Islamabad played a major role. With the active support and fully cooperation by Pakistan, Washington ousted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. On 7 October 2001, the US officially declared the war in Afghanistan was "Operation Enduring Freedom".<sup>68</sup> The country became fully devastated in this war. With the US pressure Islamabad played a constructive role in Afghanistan, and decided to form a new government in Afghanistan.

The *Bonn Agreement*<sup>69</sup> was the initial series of agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The country was renamed 'Islamic Republic of Afghanistan'.<sup>70</sup> The major players in this agreement were Washington, Islamabad, India, and UN and some of other countries. Through this the state went to hold election for civilian government by universal franchisee in 2002, and Hamid Karzai formed the new government with the help of the US. The Karzai Government began its new relationships with Pakistan and the US through diplomatic means. President Mushsrraf welcomed the new government and said that the new

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<sup>67</sup> The CDI Terrorism report, "Lessons from History: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan, 1978-2001", URL: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history-pr.cfm>, accessed on April 17, 2007.

<sup>68</sup> "Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan", *The Global Security*, URL: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>, accessed on April 17, 2007.

<sup>69</sup> "Bonn Agreement- Afghanistan", URL: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn\\_Agreement\\_%28Afghanistan%29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_Agreement_%28Afghanistan%29), accessed on April 23, 2007.

<sup>70</sup> "Afghanistan", URL: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan>, accessed on April 24, 2007.

beginning of relations with President Karzai will be go with an unprecedented level including strategic, security, economic, and curbing terrorism. The US president also congratulated the new Afghanistan leader and told that the US would reconstruct the country with giving all possible aid and assistance.<sup>71</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

The US-Pakistan anti-terrorism teamwork has been wide in both scale and scope, and apprehended substantial successes since October 2001. Yet the wide range of the US concerns about relations with Pakistan indicates that such joint venture between the two countries may be undermined. A reduction of the Washington cooperative efforts could result from increased indications of most favorable levels of Pakistan commitment. Differences over weapons proliferation and human rights violations could trigger far-reaching restrictions on future US aid to Pakistan. The Pakistan Government, for its part, may come under increasing pressure to adjust its foreign policy to more accurately reflect the sentiments of Pakistan's opposition parties, especially the actively anti-Western Islamists. This could erode Pakistan cooperative efforts and made even more likely as domestic violence and public disturbances in Pakistan continue.

The strategic dialogue started for military cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US forces, known as the '*Tripartite Commission*'.<sup>72</sup> Essentially a coordinating mechanism that brings together officials from Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States to discuss all issues they confront in their battle against terrorism and establish and

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<sup>71</sup> "Rebuilding Afghanistan", URL: [http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/rebuilding\\_afghanistan.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/rebuilding_afghanistan.html), accessed on April 27, 2007.

<sup>72</sup> Mahmud Durrani, "Pakistan-US Relations", *Los Angeles World Affairs Council*, February 22, 2007, URL: [http://www.embassyofpakistanusa.org/news247\\_b.php](http://www.embassyofpakistanusa.org/news247_b.php), accessed on May 23, 2007.



promote democracy in this region. The new government came to form in the Bonn Agreement where the US and Pakistan played a major role to form the new Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai. All the three countries decided to eliminate the terrorist from this region through the long-term policies and interests.

In spite of criticism in the US, there is no denying the fact that Pakistan played a pivotal role in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and arrested some of the most Al-Qaeda leaders and rooted out Taliban strongholds from the tribal areas. Pakistan has also taken some of the heaviest hits in the war against terrorism. A strategic partnership requires mutual trust and confidence. To inspire confidence the tripartite cooperation should avoid public criticism to strengthen the future relations. However placing all the blame on an individual country for the resurgence of the Taliban was incorrect and more importantly it would not solve the problem. The cross border movement of terrorist, out of and into Afghanistan, was not because of one but of all.

However, despite every effort by Pakistan, Afghanistan would not be able to prevail over the Taliban unless it resolves to improve governance, reduce the hold of the warlords, eliminate corruption, and uproot the drug mafia. To acknowledge these problems, the commitment of the US became important and to help Afghanistan in these areas to address the core issue. Pakistan Prime minister Shaukat Aziz told, "Pakistan has established structural arrangements with the US for its effective participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted to make its substantial contribution to the reconstruction work in Afghanistan as well as to enhance their bilateral trade and the tripartite-level talks will help to achieve the desired objectives."<sup>73</sup> Besides the criticism and up and down

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<sup>73</sup>"Pakistan, Afghanistan, US to hold Talks", *The Daily Times*, May 16, 2004.

relationships the two or three countries, all of them agreed to curb terrorist from their environment as well as from international sphere. They also viewed that to establish democracy, good governance in Pakistan and Afghanistan in recent days. Their relations particularly in areas of terrorism were very clear and stronger than any other. It would be marked that there was the presence of negative points and double standards attitudes, but they came to forward to address their interests. Further it would be said that, all the cooperation began and managed through out the last five years because of the US pressure or to address each other's concerns.

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**CHAPTER- V**

**CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINTS AND PROSPECTS**

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The most significant implication of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was the change of the Taliban regime in Kabul immediately and the Saddam Hussein reign in Baghdad later by the US. Under the slogan of *Operation Enduring Freedom* and *War on Terrorism* the US made it clear that it would strike with full resources against all such groups and states that promote and protect terrorism and terrorists in any part of the world. In post-9/11, the Bush Administration formed a coalition of states and made war efforts in the South Asian region being physically available. Taking into account, it considered that Islamabad could play a leading role in this war because of its long-run nexus and diplomatic relations with the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. So Washington pressurized and pressed Islamabad to join in war with a 'frontline state' status. In the aftermath of the attacks of 2001, the US foreign policy has changed towards the world in general and the states those harboring with terrorists in particular. Washington suddenly declared the war against terrorists unilaterally. The challenges were enormous for both Pakistan and the US in their revived relationships in particular.

### **Challenges for the International Community**

As far as the challenges to the world was concerned, it tended to be influenced by the presence of numerous individuals, organizations and the states who wanted to dismantle terrorism by the use of force. The only change which has taken place since 9/11 was the mobilization of significant power of the US and its allies to fight against some of the groups and states that wanted to use violence as a weapon for the achievement of their goals. Therefore, the biggest challenge was to stop the dangerous trend of instability and disorder as a result of war against terrorism, and as well as with the emergence of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that may

be used by the terrorist groups.<sup>1</sup> The world was also divided with the US unilateral war effort and avoiding the consensus of the UN. Combating terrorism needed unity of the world states. But it was marked by the lack of common interest among them.

For the Muslim world, the biggest dilemma was the distracted of image that emerged about the role and influence of terrorist groups in the name of religion. The leading opinion in the non-Muslim world was that the expansion of radicalism and militancy of various religious groups might cause severe damage to the global peace. With the rise of Muslim militancy in some of the Muslim countries, the moderate elements in the Muslim world considered that the image of Islam would be shattered because militancy would remain a hostage to the forces of religious extremism. Fighting a media campaign that involved Islam and Muslims and preventing extremist Muslim elements from exploiting religion for political purposes were perceived to be core challenges faced by the Muslim world after the 9/11 incidents.

### **Challenges for the South Asian States**

In this region, the status derived after 9/11 tended to boost internal contradictions and cleavages between the two major states of South Asia-India and Pakistan. Instead of taking a joint stand on dealing with the issue of terrorism, both followed divergent paths and miserably failed to understand the danger that threatened their region after the *Northern Alliance* attack against Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan began the worst type of cold War resulting into the mobilization of their troops along the borders, worsening their diplomatic ties, and set back to the peace process

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<sup>1</sup> James Hoge, "Nuclear Terrorism: Counting Down to the New Armageddon", *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*, September 5, 2004, URL: [http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/09/05\\_hoge\\_nuclear-terrorism.htm](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/09/05_hoge_nuclear-terrorism.htm), accessed on May 22, 2007.

due to the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament.<sup>2</sup> During the period January-May 2002, both India and Pakistan had seen the threat of possible nuclear war. The highest challenge after 9/11 was the worsening of relations between them and the failure of SAARC to provide a leadership role so as to deal with the challenge of terrorism.

After the war came out, the SAARC members were unable to formulate a practical strategy to cope with economic, political, security and strategic challenges originating because of the prevailing tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. For instance, the SAARC summit of 2002, held in Kathmandu, had decided to look into the issue of terrorism and come up with a joint strategy. But it failed to implement it. After the easing of tension, both the countries got engaged in the peace process as earlier. Terrorism and infiltration into Kashmir became a vital problematic issue between them. Besides these, another problem area was the arm race between them and Pakistan's efforts to acquire to F-16 and to dominate India.<sup>3</sup>

### **Domestic Problems in Pakistan**

The episode of September 2001 resulted in multiple challenges for Islamabad. The question arose, how the Military Government would address and handle the internal situations with the help of Washington? Options to deal with terrorism after 9/11 were limited for Pakistan. The U-turn taken by Pakistan on its Afghan policy resulted in domestic opposition but the Government had decided to continue its policy to support Washington in order to save itself from predictable American action. The

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<sup>2</sup> Moonis Ahamr, "Terrorism: Challenge or an Opportunity?", in his eds., *The World After September 11: Challenges and Opportunities*, Karachi: Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, 2003, pp.29-30.

<sup>3</sup> "Arms race dangers lurk as India, Pakistan meet", *The Daily Times*, February 16, 2004.

important challenges for Islamabad after 9/11 were:<sup>4</sup> domestic repercussion resulting from hold to war against the Taliban regime; New Delhi's attempt to compel the US and the international community to declare Pakistan a terrorist state after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001; the threat of war to Pakistan by the Indian Government due to the December attack; and negative impact on Islamabad's economy as a result of huge economic crash in the US.

Another challenge came with the anti-American and anti-Musharraf movement that posed a threat to the regime of President Musharraf. Pakistan planned to introduce a new strategy to deal with the problems coming within its society. To the support against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, a significant section of people and also a part of ruling establishment were against such policy of their government and also against giving facilities to the US to conduct its military operations in Afghanistan. During the first quarter of 2002, Islamabad faced fresh trouble with India's continuing allegations to support to cross border terrorism in Kashmir and deployment of troops along the borders.

The vital challenges for Islamabad were rested on its domestic political and sectarian violence to destabilize the incumbent authority. It was not new to Pakistan and the political groups employed terrorist violence to influence the domestic political development. Some of the religious political parties have a very efficient organizational network and threatened to the Musharraf regime for its support to the US. They got engaged in various street agitation and demonstrations against President of Pakistan and the US. The political unrest also divided Pakistan into two groups- one supported President Musharraf and the other was the supporter of the opposing political parties. During 2002, Muthida Majlis Amal (MMA), a

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<sup>4</sup> Amir Ahmed Khan, "Domestic Dimensions after September 11", in Moonis Ahmar, 2003, p. 58.

religious political party of Pakistan effectively capitalized and articulated the rising anti-American sentiment for their election purposes. Basically these parties were against the existing government and created violence in Pakistan because of their nexus with the terrorist organizations. It created more trouble for President Musharraf to successful implementation of government's policy against terrorism. Musharraf faced more problems when the government had taken steps to modify the education system under the US pressure, because of the parties-extremist linkage with the Madrassa.<sup>5</sup>

Though President Musharraf promised to the nation and to the world community on his Address to the Nation on January 12, 2002, that,<sup>6</sup> "to end the terrorist link to Mosques and Madrassa, if any Madrassa found indulging in extremism, subversion, military or possessions weapons would face closure; to the sectarian violence, he said, no man, no organization, and no party would be allowed to break the law of the land. Terrorist and sectarian violence must come to an end. No organization would be allowed to form the Laskhar, the Sipah or the Jaish". Obviously it made clear that, President was committed to curb all menace within the Pakistani society. But the problem lies with the domestic sentiment. The political parties and media were highly critical of the government policies and they also created civilian casualties in Pakistan through various violent means.

The political problem came after the national election of 2002 that the opposition parties had refused to accept the legitimacy of Musharraf's authority, though a pro-Musharraf party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) formed Government. The opposition parties and the public were against the Musharraf's decision to hold dual office. With this violence the Pakistani Muslim society clearly got divided into two

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<sup>5</sup> Sheikh Mutahir Ahmed, "Linkage between Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges for the Muslim World", in Moonis Ahmar, eds., 2003, pp. 83-4.

<sup>6</sup> President Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, *The BBC News*, January 12, 2002, URL: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/1757251.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1757251.stm), accessed on February 23, 2007.



groups- Shia and Sunni. Both groups were engaged in violence and created another fresh problem for the Government. With these, President himself faced three assassination attempt on him and while the Prime Minister faced two. The political and public reactions highly intensified after President Musharraf's decision to join in the war on terrorism, though it started after the military coup in 1999. The MMA, an acknowledged adversary of secularization, progress and *Enlightened Moderation*,<sup>7</sup> is a minor party that became powerful with winning more seats in Pakistan's National Assembly. Further to this, President Musharraf has always relied on evidence of domestic Islamic fundamentalism, agitation and terrorism to legitimize his military dictatorship, especially in Western world. Pakistan society fractured violently along political, sectarian and ethnic lines; even the military is showing signs of political and ethnic fracture. President Musharraf still struggling to solve the country's problem and save his position.

Under the United States pressure, the Pakistan military had targeted the suspected Al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban groups in the tribal belt in operations since March 2004. The Government of Pakistan faced more problem in tribal areas because of its linkage with the terrorists organization, and popular reaction against the US military operation in Afghanistan. It became a challenge for President Musharraf to show his clean image, because some countries believed that the remains of Al-Qaeda took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas. The tribesmen were annoyed and launched anti-American and anti-Musharraf agitation because of the Pakistan military troops were stationed in the tribal belt.<sup>8</sup> The Pakistan Federal Government deployed more than 60,000 troops in tribal belt to repeal the situation. Despite this, the militants had gone to open offices in North and South

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<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth Kendal, "Pakistan in Crisis: Situation critical", *Anglican Mainstream*, May 22, 2007, URL: <http://www.anglican-mainstream.net/?p=1720>, accessed on May 25, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Ayaz Amir, "Tribal Reaction in Pakistan", *The Dawn*, February 24, 2006.

Waziristan to employ fighters for their "jihad" against the Pakistan Army and US forces in Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup> In September 2006, Pakistan Government signed agreements ending military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and effectively ceded power to local tribal leaders closely allied with the Taliban in the border region of Waziristan. But still now the problem continues in the tribal areas.

## Challenges for the United States

The September 11 and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond – have dramatically affected the Muslim world and their attitudes toward Washington. As a result, it was important to develop a strategy to improve the conditions that produce religious and political extremism and anti-U.S. attitudes. The US-Pakistan relations were narrowly based on counter terrorism and somewhat troubled, despite increasingly effective tactical cooperation against militants. It could be interrupted by domestic political opposition inside Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

In post-9/11 era, President Bush became more unpopular. The world has seen the strong anti-Americanism throughout the Muslim countries. Washington's policy in post-9/11 was to win heart and minds, and end hostility towards America largely failed. The reasons for the flow of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world were:<sup>11</sup> first, the past and present US policies towards the Muslim world that included the support to Israel. The Muslim countries were perceived that the US is directly responsible for Israel occupation of Palestine; second, the Muslim countries did not favour the US policies on adopting democracy in the Muslim states; third, they viewed that the American media projected, the Muslim are against the

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<sup>9</sup> Gretchen Peters, "Violence Grows in Pakistan's Tribal zone, despite Army presence: Taliban, Al Qaeda said to be rallying in Waziristan", *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 12, 2005, URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1212/p04s01-wosc.html>, accessed on April 24, 2007.

American people and the media continued to antagonize the Muslim world. The reasons for negative feelings against the US in Pakistan have been discussed in previous chapter.

Besides, Washington faced more challenges in the area of proliferation of weapons, terrorism, and establishing democracy. Pakistan populated by a variety of Islamist group that possess both the desire and the capability to mount ruinous attacks on US interests. Another challenge came to the question on A.Q.Khan's nuclear knowledge move to North Korea, Libya and Iran hopefully, known as the '*rouge states*'. Washington urged a details linkage of Khan on this area from the Musharraf regime and made its effort to face the challenges. Eagerly, the news from the media and later on declared by the terrorists groups that they desire to develop and plan to employ WMDs against the United States, and against all its allies.<sup>12</sup> Washington thought that, if it would be in the hands of the odd men, then the world will face the threat and peace in the world will be danger. The US declared to the international community to make their efforts to face the challenge and curb terrorists globally with safeguarding their nuclear arsenals safely.

## **OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS**

As the challenges faced by the multiple actors, opportunities moved to strengthen the US-Pakistan relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Washington perceived that in order to achieve success in this war, it is Pakistan who could play a major role in this area. So the US tried to make Pakistan a stable

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<sup>10</sup> Polly Nayak, "U.S Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11 - Challenges and Implications for the Future", February 2005, URL; <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA445096>, accessed on May 21, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> M. Saleem Kidwai, *Islam, America and South Asia*, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2005, pp.81-83.

<sup>12</sup> "Challenges Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction", *US Department of State*, URL: [www.state.gov/documents/organization/72027.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/72027.pdf), accessed on April 23, 2007.

and successful state. The global war has given a number of prospects to the world.

### **The Global War on Terrorism and Washington – Islamabad Relationship**

The September 2001 events considerably altered the character of the interaction between the US and Pakistan. The instant limit to Islamabad and the declaration of the US global war on terrorism pressed Pakistan to take a U-turn against its partner, the Taliban establishment in Afghanistan. Once again Pakistan acquired significant position in the US strategic calculations in South Asia. Washington ensured support from Islamabad in curbing terrorism and in spin agreed to restore the state of Pakistan. The regained relationship went to an unprecedented level even if the anti- Musharraf and anti-Americanism attitudes were high in Pakistan.

Combating terrorism is a global challenge today. In this war, success came at a quantity of numbers that marked with the detention of more than 600 militants, banned and eliminated a numbers of terrorist organization, continually formulation and execution of laws on terrorism, long term strategy to eradicate terrorism, and so on. The future relations should not fully estimate with Pakistan's domestic troubles and external affairs.<sup>13</sup> To address the national security and national interests, they should avoid any sort of difficulty in environment and help each other. The US should apply its long-term plan to strike out terrorism with addressing Pakistan's concern. The US is spending much time these days to promote better ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan and between Pakistan and India because of its concerns. Taking consideration of historical facts, the future course of

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<sup>13</sup> Tariq Gilani, "US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward", *Parameters*, winter 2006-07, pp. 97-99, URL: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/06winter/gilani.htm>, accessed on May 17, 2007.

relationship would be better marked with these following questions. How far the US will engage itself in South Asia and engaging Pakistan in a long run? Will the US leave Pakistan alone when it get a remarkable result like the first afghan crisis? How far the ultimate success will come out after dominating the problem in this field? How far both the countries will engage themselves after change in their home administration?

### **Building Democracy and Reforming Society in Pakistan**

For the US, the top priority areas to construct Pakistan are building economic, social and political institutions, and democratic progress. In terms of advancing democracy and human rights, America wants to see strong democratic foundation and practices in Pakistan, including a National Assembly that plays a dynamic and positive role in governance, and a free judiciary that promotes the rule of law. Some of US aid directed to acquire these goals.

With the successful US efforts and pressures, Islamabad made its domestic reform and efforts to eliminate extremist from its society. The 2002 National Election of Pakistan raised an expectation that it would reverse its unstable governance and military dominance. The pro-military Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam formed government with President Musharraf's hand picked, M.Z.Jamali. The Government pronounced sweeping changes in the Pakistan constitution under a "Legal Framework Order" (LFO)<sup>14</sup> that provides the office of the President and the Armed Forces powers in the new constitution with provisions for Presidential dissolution of the National Assembly. Under the continuing Washington pressure, President Musharraf made an agreement in 2003 with the

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<sup>14</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-US Relations", Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 28, 2005, URL: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organisation/16176.pdf>, accessed on April 22, 2006.

opposition, that to develop a strong civilian government and to step down himself as the military chief by 2005, but still, he is in that position. Washington viewed that success ultimately requires the empowerment of civil society in the form of political parties, NGO's, the media, and other associations. The US has already begun to help by expanding and realizing its assistance to aid the development of these institutions. Though Musharraf took the step to reform the education and institutions registrations, the US should also pressure Islamabad to keep its eye on the Madrassa and reform the curriculum.<sup>15</sup>

The present scenario of the establishing democracy in Pakistan can be seen with the maturity of public opinion. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the charter of democracy in London on 15 May 2006. This was a politically significant step as it signaled the coming together of the two principal parties had agreed to establish civilian government. She claimed that to come to Pakistan for political deal with President Musharraf. Washington noted that, today Pakistan stands poised at crucial crossroads where a vast spectrum of the Pakistani public encompassing the political parties, civil rights groups, NGO's, students and women have been demanding for restoration of democracy and exit of Musharraf and Pakistan Army from the governing the country. US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte and Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher met on 16 June 2007 to President Musharraf in Islamabad on the matter of future Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> The US officials urged the blue print for the presidential pools and the general election in the later of this year. They issued ultimatum to Musharraf, asking him to quit the uniform post before getting re-elected as president. Again Boucher recommended Musharraf to

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<sup>15</sup> Reforms on the Madrassa are fully covered and discussed in the Third Chapter.

<sup>16</sup> "US officials back Pakistan's Musharraf", *The Dawn*, June 16, 2007.

ensure free and fair election that the US believes it's the time for Pakistan to move back to democratic elections and civilian rule. To an interview to *The NDTV 24x7*, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said Pakistan needs democracy with free and fair election with respect and act in accordance with constitution.<sup>17</sup> He praised Indian democracy and constitution, saying that Pakistan should follow this successful model. He also viewed that our president should remove the uniform dress and respect the constitution and the oath that he will never indulge in politics.

The popular sentiment favours restoration of the Pakistani constitution and establishment of rule of law under civilian leadership. Now a days, Pakistan's public opinion appears to have matured and strong. The military intervention is not the solution to Pakistan's political problems. Only continued constitutional rule and an uninterrupted political process will bring stability to Pakistan. For this President Musharraf is relying on support from the army and the US to ride through the current crisis. The army needs the US and the US needs the army, the argument goes and both need President Musharraf.<sup>18</sup>

### **Rebuilding Afghanistan and the Future Foreign Relations**

Washington led attack and occupation over Kabul in the aftermath of the September 2001 resulted into the dismantling of Taliban regime and the supposed neutralization of Al-Qaeda elements in the country. For the US, it was a short-term response to the perceived and alleged threat of terrorism network masterminded by Osama bin Laden. In its long-term objective covered multiple strategic and security interests in this region, and rebuild

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<sup>17</sup> Text of the interview of the Former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the NDTV 24x7, *The Indian Express*, June 18, 2007.

<sup>18</sup> Husani Haqqani, "That Magical Force", *The Indian Express*, June 20, 2007.

Afghanistan into a stable and democratic state. After 9/11, Afghanistan underwent huge transformation at all levels.

Rebuilding and construction of Afghanistan is a gigantic task including the key organs of the Afghan state. After the induction of pro-American regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul, the leading challenge faced by the US was the conversion of the state from a tribal and authoritarian to modern and democratic. Through the Bonn Agreement (December 2001), the representative national election was held in 2004, in which the new Constitution and the new Government of President Hamid Karzai came into being.<sup>19</sup> Still the state of Afghanistan is in transition in areas of judiciary, bureaucracy and women rights. It was expected after the national election that it would put the country on the tracks of progress and development. But this has not happened and the country is still faced with serious problems.

The Joint Statement on January 28, 2002 by President Bush and President Karzai started a 'New Partnership' to build a lasting partnership for the 21st century, determined to fight terrorism, and ensure security, stability and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and foster representative and accountable government for all Afghan people. The February 27, 2003 joint statement issued with the US promise to build Afghanistan a prosperous and democratic, market friendly and respectfully human rights. Washington aid included economic assistance for its war against terrorism, building infrastructure, developing education curriculum, etc. In Washington, the joint statement signed by President Bush and President Karzai on March 21, 2006 that they reviewed their earlier relations and partnerships in every

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<sup>19</sup> Moonis Ahamr, "The impact of 9/11 on Afghanistan", in his eds., *The Challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan*, Karachi: Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, 2005, p.22.



field.<sup>20</sup> In 2005, President Musharraf and President Karzai met and assured to start a broad based relation in the field of economic, trade, rooting out terrorism, to begin a goodwill relation with India, sustainable development, peace and stability in the region.<sup>21</sup> Washington-Islamabad-Kabul, known as *Tripartite*, started a new relationship between them in all the above areas. Islamabad began its relationship with its neighbor Afghanistan and played a major role in building the state of Afghan with the help of the US. The future relations would be marked in the promise of their leaders, smoothly carry on positive issues and avoiding difficulties, and also based on the commitment of the US to rebuild the state of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

### **Improving of India - Pakistan Relations and US Factor**

The US made its effort to develop its strong relations with the subcontinent because of its larger interest in South Asia. It includes minimizing risk of Indo-Pakistan war, transformation of Indo-US relationship in order to lasting balance of power in Asia, stop proliferation of weapons, promoting democracy, and eliminating extremism, etc. As between India and Pakistan, Kashmir remained a problematic point through out the history. Though Islamabad is the key ally in war on terrorism, the clash in interest came between them in respect to Kashmir issue while the role of US in a balancing act. Washington worried about the possibility of New Delhi-Islamabad war because of the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. The US made its highest-level efforts to eliminate the danger and pressurized both countries to hold on the talk. Successfully it marked in April 2003 peace initiative and improvement in bilateral relationship

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<sup>20</sup> "Joint Statement: United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership", *US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC*, (January 28, 2002, February 27, 2003 and March 21, 2006), URL: <http://www.state.gov>, accessed on May 14, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> M. D. Malik, "Musharraf-Karzai Meet: Pakistan, Afghanistan Leaders Vow to Eliminate Terror", *The Pakistan Times*, March 23, 2005.

including a January 2004 summit that produced a joint agreement to launch a composite dialogue to bring about settlement of all bilateral issues including the Kashmir cause. Still today, both the countries are better engaged than before by the means of various track diplomacies.

The 9/11 issues gave prospect to the US to put stress on both India and Pakistan in a different ways. Reacting to India's frequent allegation that Pakistan supporting terrorism, President Musharraf assured both India and the US that, "he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism, and insist that his government is doing everything possible to stop infiltration to Kashmir and shut down militant base camps in Pakistan controlled territory".<sup>22</sup> President Musharraf has taken steps to encourage the peace initiative in December 2005, proposed a 'four point' resolution of Kashmir. It closely reflected by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's calling for making the LoC "irrelevant" and for a "joint mechanism" between the two parts of Kashmir, demonstrating that the gap between the two sides is narrowing.<sup>23</sup>

The peace process was adversely affected by the terrorist attacks in 2006 in Mumbai. The US condemned and advised Pakistan to end such activities, and to both states to carry on the peace process. In a remarkable demonstration of their commitment to the peace process, Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf agreed to implement a "joint mechanism on terrorism" in January 2007. The future relation is rested on both the countries promises in the peace process. Pakistan should commit itself to strike out terrorism fully and not to allow cross border terrorism in Kashmir. For

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<sup>22</sup> "Pakistan Country Analysis", *The Spero News*, February 23, 2006, URL:

<http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=2645>, accessed on May25, 2007.

<sup>23</sup> Lisa Curtis, "India and Pakistan Poised to Make Progress on Kashmir", *The Heritage Foundation*, January 12, 2007, URL:

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1997.cfm>, accessed on May25, 2007.

Islamabad, it is a daunting challenge to do this because of its domestic problem and low economic growth. It needs a huge source of resources and knowledge to achieve the landmark. So to this, it is the US alone which can assist Pakistan to keep the ball in the goal post and can put reasonable pressure on Islamabad to continue its fight against terrorism and remain engaged with New Delhi for a peaceful relation.

### **Safeguarding Islamabad's Nuclear Assets**

The foremost vital issue on which the US should focus is preventing the diffusion of Pakistan's nuclear know-how and the failure of control over its nuclear weapons. It affects the US directly and also the global community openly. It is an area in which the US assistance can make an imperative difference. This came with an urgent need of global policy to avoid and look the challenge with the extremist groups' declaration to make their effort to acquire and link with the nuclear weapons,<sup>24</sup> and the A.Q.Khan's nuclear knowledge propagation to Iran, North Korea, and Libya- "rouge states". Both terrorism and proliferation of WMDs became a vital challenge for the international environment. But in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it has been seen with a new challenge together with terrorism and WMDs - "Nuclear Terrorism" - nuclear in the hands of the terrorist groups. It denotes the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons (CBRN). The possibilities that Al-Qaeda might acquire the materials and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons or "dirty bombs" or might attack commercial nuclear-power facilities to produce a nuclear reduce are of particular concern.<sup>25</sup> So,

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<sup>24</sup> Dr. Mohamed El Baradei "Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime", *The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy*, Karlsruhe, Germany, March 25, 2006 URL: <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0603/doc06.htm>, accessed May 29, 2007.

<sup>25</sup> Robin M. Frost, *Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11*, New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 55-58.

here it is the US particularly and the globe generally can deal with the concern with its various term policies.

In the short-term policies, Washington should secure a full accounting of the A.Q.Khan's network regarding nuclear proliferation from the Pakistan Government including details of what was transferred and to whom. But on the medium term interest, the US should help Pakistan to improve its physical safety and the supervision of its critical materials at strategic sites. This effort demands providing assistance to develop reproduction and exercises; transferring appropriate material from military guide on nuclear weapons security; providing technology for more sophisticated crucial, access doors, entry control equipment, surveillance mechanism, and advanced instrumentation for materials accounting; helping Pakistan's strategic plans divisions; and helping to develop procedures to reduce the like hood of sensitive information discloses.<sup>26</sup> Over the long-term goals, the US should work with Islamabad to develop plans for cooperative action in case of a Security of nuclear stockpile, and nuclear emergency. Such plan covers a variety of contingencies including attempts to steal fissile material; theft of sensitive items; and the discovery of weaknesses in material accounting, control, and protection system at particular facilities.

In addition to improving passive protection, the US should help Pakistan to eliminate the threat of unauthorized use of its nuclear weapons. To the maximum degree of possible, US security interests demands reducing the prospect of these threats materializing, consistent with Islamabad's own requirement for stable deterrence. The only possible solution that satisfies

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<sup>26</sup> David Albright, "Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex", *Strategies for Regional Security* (South Asia Working Groups), Warrenton, Virginia, October 25-27, 2001, URL: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html>, accessed on June 01, 2007.

both the goals is incorporating technical controls and the US efforts. As a result, the US should also plan for dealing with such emergency multilaterally rather than unilaterally.

## AN ASSESSMENT

The United States- Pakistan relationship has seen several up and downs. From the beginning of the Cold War to the incidents of the September 11, 2001, the positive outlines of the nature of the relationship were marked in matter of Islamabad's membership in the western backed defense pacts, economic and military support to Pakistan through out the years, Islamabad's secret role in arranging Kissinger's visit to Beijing, and the most significant subject during 1979- the Afghan crisis. Where as the negative pictures had marked with the focus of Pakistan's constantly hostile attitude towards India, US' growing relations with India, Islamabad use of Washington's military equipments against New Delhi, somehow Islamabad's move to China, Pakistan's support of terrorism in Kashmir, Islamabad's attempts to get a nuclear identity, ISI backed role in Afghanistan, poor record of human rights of Pakistan, and so on.

Analyzing these, the dealings between them can be said in the expressions of - a *Northern Tier* and *Frontline State* status, when Pakistan played a major role and acquired significant position in the US strategic policy; and a *Terrorist Haven Country* and *Failed State* status, when Islamabad was no longer needed to the US policy considerations. Theoretically it can be viewed in terms of *influential* and *dependency* relationships between the US and Pakistan. Justifying these relations it would be better marked that the US' global interest influenced and dominated Pakistan's regional interests, but in case of other both sides needed each other for achieving their respective interests- *mutual dependency*. That means each one desired the cooperation of other to address for its self-goals. In case of the first Afghan

crisis both the nations came much closer in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But in this aspect, it may be marked that Pakistan needed US more than Washington needed Islamabad. It was imperative to conclude the history in substance of the US' engagement in this region to address its international strategy, and for Pakistan to attain its national interests.

The new millennium is manifested with the new variety of threat that gives a chance to form the new kind of relations between the successful oldest democratic country and the failed democratic establishing country, or between the terrorists' free nation and the terrorists' haven nation. This type of fresh menace marked with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on the US' homeland. The present pattern of US-Pakistan relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century revitalized through terrorism. Immediately after the incident, Washington said Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden became responsible for this and declared the *War on Terrorism*. Justifying this war, the US called the international community to align together against the evil forces and make the world terror free and spread freedom to other parts. The war against terrorism first operated in Afghanistan in the name of *Operation Enduring Freedom* and then extended through *Evil States* to other parts of the globe.

The current Washington engagement with Islamabad focused on the war on terrorism. But it is not confined to it only, it also address to several other areas of concern to the US- national and global security, nuclear proliferation, economic and strategic opportunities in South Asia, democracy, anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. To this war, the US policy makers perceived that to remove the Taliban rule in Afghanistan as far as possible, and eliminate the remnants of Taliban organization. So far this reason it was a natural policy option for the US being aligned with Pakistan because of its historical links to that organization. President George Bush's response to the 9/11 incident was a threatening that, "US is at war.

Either you are with us or against us".<sup>27</sup> This became much debated in President Musharraf's kitchen cabinet and decided to be a partner in US led war in Afghanistan. Islamabad viewed that if they would not support to the super power or to give a negative response to the US' ultimatum, then it would face the wounded bear reaction.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, giving deadline and joining at war was marked with the theory of influential relation. Pakistan thought that it would not survive more before the US' economic and military superiority. So it became an automatic footway of Islamabad to support the US rather than to face devastation. But the other theory, dependency relations, may not be suitable here because of the presence of other power in South Asia and their interest to being a member of US led coalition- India. If Pakistan would not give its hands to the US, then the other option was India- a major power in this region. Here in case, both Washington and Islamabad are not dependent on each other rather it would be better to say that the presence of former one- the dominant feature of Washington influenced the failed state to extend it's willing. For this purpose, the US should not allow Pakistan to feel that Washington needs Islamabad more than Islamabad need Washington.

The aggressive steps of Washington pressed Islamabad for its U-turn moment against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the war against terrorism, once again Pakistan has acquired a significant position due to its geo-strategic location in this region. This position of Pakistan plays a major driving force because of its allying borders with Afghanistan. Pakistan is one of the major concerns of US policy on fighting terrorism in South Asia due to its detailed knowledge about the Al-Qaeda organizations and its strong

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<sup>27</sup> President George W. Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, *The White House*, Office of the Press Secretary, September 20, 2001, URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, accessed on May 24, 2005.

<sup>28</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In The Line of Fire*, New York: Simon& Schuster, 2006, p.200.

diplomatic relations with the ousted government of Kabul. To the reaction of 9/11, the US acknowledged Pakistan as a *Frontline State* in 2001 and a *Major Non-NATO Ally* (MNNA) in 2004 in war on terrorism. In return to Pakistan's cooperation in rooting out terrorist outfits, Washington assisted economic and military aids to build the state of Pakistan rather being declared Pakistan a *Failed State* and *Terrorist State*. Though the relationship is normally bound by the geo-strategic realities and compulsions, it tends to bring the two nations together with divergence of perceptions and policies.

Terrorism has been a major factor of debate in US-Pakistan affairs in the post-9/11. Washington policy architects were concerned and critical about Pakistan's Afghan connection, ISI role in Jammu and Kashmir, and the alleged contribution of Pakistani Madrassa in fueling Islamic radicalism in the region and elsewhere. The post-9/11 US strategy to curb terrorism was marked with- formulation of allies and to defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, provides economic and military assistance to foreign poor countries to struggle against this, and cooperation in the field of law enforcement, intelligence, financial, military, and diplomatic fields. But to the policy on combating terrorism of Pakistan, President Musharraf extended and assisted same kind of cooperation with the US and also joined in international alliance. Though the worldwide criticism came at the warm level against US' grand strategy on eliminating terrorism, avoiding these it engaged in its homeland security as well as in every part of world as a responsible global power. But in case of Pakistan, it not only got criticism from the world opinion but also faced serious problems and challenges within its own territory. Some times Islamabad received criticism from its neighbors. For instance, New Delhi termed Islamabad a "*terrorist state*".<sup>29</sup> To this, President Musharraf promised to end extremism from its society and it

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<sup>29</sup> *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, December 17, 2001, URL:  
<http://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20011217/j&k.htm#3>, accessed on May 21, 2007.



got remarkable support from the US. Though President Musharraf made an effort to end terrorism from Pakistan, the global body including the individual states stated that, "there are some of the terrorist groups active in Pakistan and still President Musharraf has to do lot of home work".<sup>30</sup>

However, the US-Pakistan collaboration to fight against extremism has been marked with success and failure. Both the countries individually and jointly should give extra support for making a goal after rejecting the unwarranted problems. The most common problem against President Musharraf and America for their alleged anti-Islamic activities related to Pakistan's domestic reaction and the Muslim world reaction. So the US considered that Pakistan should play a role model for the Muslim countries and as well as to solve its internal problem. There is a simple story line: Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has abused his authority. He faces massive street protests and should be pushed out in favor of a civilian government. Musharraf is a dictator, and his regime has not been wholly committed to fighting Islamic radicals. The Taliban has reconstituted itself in Pakistan's tribal areas, and Al -Qaeda's top leaders appear to be nestled along its border. If there is a central front in the war on terror, it is not in Iraq but in Pakistan.

On the whole, President Musharraf has been a modernizing force in Pakistan. When he took power in 1999, the country was racing toward ruin with economic stagnation, corruption, religious extremism and political chaos. It had become a failed and rogue state, allied to the Taliban and addicted to a large-scale terror operation against neighboring India. Musharraf restored order, broke with the Islamists and put in place the most

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<sup>30</sup> Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage speaks to Pakistan Television, "U.S. Hails Pakistan's Efforts to Fight Terror, Build Democracy", 01 October 2004, URL: <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2004&m=October&x=20041001180334ndyblehs0.1558344>, accessed on May25, 2007.

modern and secular regime and the boomed economy. After all, President Musharraf has not completely renounced terrorism as an instrument of national policy. Ultimate success will require Pakistan to make difficult choice with handling domestic crisis successfully. So most of the changes necessary to convert Pakistan into a success story have to undertake and led by Pakistani themselves. External actors like the US can only play a supporting role in revive to a stable and threaten free state. In this case the US should give up its key short-term goals to realize long-term benefits. Thus the transformation of Pakistan as a state requires not only strategic, economic, and political reforms but also the recovery of Pakistani society, which breed the extremist.

President Musharraf's recent actions—dismissing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Iftakar Muhammad Choudhary on March 9, 2007 and attempting to change the Constitution, so he could remain president and still run the Army—were mistaken and unwise. But Musharraf failed to recognize that the ordinary Pakistanis were becoming less comfortable with military rule in its history and also present. So, it would be wiser to give up his uniform and run as a civilian in a free and fair election, which he would have won. But the real problem in Pakistan is dysfunction. Today, the only institution that works in Pakistan is the military. Still the military has the link to the extremists. The question comes, why the military has retained some ties with the Taliban? It is because that they want to keep a "post-American" option to constrain what they see as a pro-Indian government in Kabul. If Washington were to dump Musharraf, the Pakistani military could easily disrupt American policy against Al -Qaeda and throughout the region.<sup>31</sup> Musharraf may be doomed—though were he to choose between the presidency and his Army post, and reach out to the mainstream opposition,

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<sup>31</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "The Real Problem With Pakistan", *Newsweek*, June 25, 2007, URL: <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html>, accessed on June 19, 2007.

he might well survive. Still, it does the United States no good to be seen forcing him out. Washington cannot achieve its goals—or help Pakistan gain stability—by turning their back on the military. So it is with Pakistan to decide their fate.

Fulfilling conflicting objectives without sacrificing any of concerned objective is a central policy dilemma for the US. Both President Bush and Musharraf need each other to address the complexity of this challenge. Washington should not rely on Musharraf alone. But it cannot assume that Musharraf's departure would advance Washington's main objectives of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy. In order to achieve long-term success, the US needs to build trust with the Pakistan army as it works to expand the capacity of civilian institutions. But the problem lies in the army's role in politics. Common people would not accept the army as an institution. So the US should play a balancing act with not to disturb the popular sentiments and impose pressure on the army. Then the US could see the success in this war. To the war on terrorism, it may be assumed that only public speaking has changed in Pakistan, not the reality on the ground. So to this, changes in substance may not be far behind. It needs for President Musharraf to do his best in the field. As a result, the US-Pakistan relationship will increasingly meet issues that go far beyond the war on terrorism. There is, therefore, a convincing rationale for the US to remain engaged in this region. And given its geo-political environment and dependence on borrowed power, as well as its constant domestic weakness that may take time to cure, Pakistan could remain a friend and possibly even an ally.

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