

**EMERGING SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND DEMOCRACY
IN POST-COLONIAL SENEGAL**

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "EMERGING SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN POST-COLONIAL SENEGAL" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY has not been previously submitted for the award of any other degree of this university or of any other university and is my original work.


Signature of Student

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Awadh Raj

Preface

Senegal is situated in the western part of Africa and is one of the underdeveloped countries of the world . There are the certain groups, classes clans and ethnic groups, which furnishes the foundation for knowledge of the entire process and of the separate successive phases of social development. Since colonial times, social formation of the country has been subjected to different kinds of changes. According to materialism every society is determined by its economic basis and superstructure culture and ideas. Though the research has taken care to highlight the central arguments around which these explanations revolve. It has mainly focused upon the involvement of the state in transforming the social formation in the post- colonial period.

Three hypotheses have been taken into consideration while conducting the research: -

The social formation is the product of colonial legacies and the socio-economic policy of post-colonial Senegal.

Social formation has the determinative role in the democratic process of post-colonial Senegal.

The higher the process of social formation, the higher is the complex process of democratic formation in Senegal.

The present study also looks at the socio-economic progress of ethnic groups and communities on the basis of such perspectives. The method has been used in this study is mainly historical and analytical. The study is based on the

secondary sources. It includes books, text books, journals, magazines, newspapers and other relevant documents such as census reports and statistical hand books.

The dissertation has been divided into five chapters. Chapter one contains the introduction, which introduces the proposed research in the context of historical background of Senegal. Chapter two focuses on the changes that have been brought about in the social structure and understanding of social formation during colonial period. It also analyses implications for the post-colonial period. Chapter three concentrates on the social groups and its role in the social formation. Chapter four deals with the changing problems and prospects of democracy of the country for the past few years with reference to global context. Chapter five analyses the whole research work leads to final conclusion.

Last but not least, the research work discusses the various approaches that lead to the objective reflections of the topic. Although, it is difficult to trace out the entire situation of the country, however, it gives certainty a new direction to the research.

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
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MAP OF SENEGAL

CHAPTER – 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER – 1

Historical Background

Senegal located on the Atlantic coast of West Africa is bounded on the north by Mauritania, on the east by Mali and the south by the Republic of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Except for a short coastline Senegal completely surrounds the Gambia, a country that stretched inland for about 320 km. on either side of the Gambia River. Senegal may be so called after the name 'sounougall', (our boat) to the Berbers who lived in Mauritania in ancient times. Or after the expression 'Sunugal',¹ which means 'our pirogue' in Wolof language. Senegal's geography has brought its peoples into close contact with north Africa and the west and made Senegal a crossroad where black African Islamic and European civilizations have met merged and clashed.²

Senegal is an ancient country with a long and varied history when Islam came in existence eventually the Senegambian region was partitioned in to the French colony of Senegal and the British colony of the Gambia. The growing imperialist rive between France and Britain also coincided with a militant Islamic revival in Senegal. During the mid-19th century Tukolor clerics from Futo Toro led many of the jihads. Which sought to overturn pagan rulers and create Muslim theoretic state in the region. In many areas particularly in the Wolof states. Islam became a catalyst for armed resistance.

Colonial rules in Senegal as elsewhere in Africa, was essentially a system of political, economic and cultural domination forcibly imposed by a

¹ Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between the Islam and West*. (London, Wester View Press, 1972) pp. 5-8

² Ibid pp. 5-8

technologically advanced foreign minority or an indigenous majority. As a system colonialism justified itself largely through ideologies. That asserted the superiority of the colonizers and the inferiority of the colonized. France defended its acquisition of colonies on the ground of a 'Civilizing mission' that would bring peace, prosperity and the benefits of French civilization to the 'Backward and primitives' people's fortunate enough to come under French rule. Senegal was the only colony in black Africa. In which France attempted to apply assimilationist ideals. The location of the federal capital of French West Africa in Senegal was a sign of that colony privileged status. Dakar special status as the administrative and commercial capital of French West Africa was a major factor shaping colonial Senegal's economic development.³

Since 1848, Senegal has been represented as the French national assembly by a deputy who was a Senegalese in the beginning. The first African deputy Blaise Diagne was elected in 1914 and continued for twenty years without interruption. In 1946, Senegal officially becomes an overseas province within the French union. While he was a deputy [1945-1951], Lamine Gueye was one of the most influential Africans in the French Parliament in 1948, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's second deputy, a protégé of Gueye, broke away from the socialist and formed a new political party, the Senegalese démocratique bloc [BDS]. In 1957, following the approval of the 'Loi-Cadre', Senegal and other territories of the French West Africa obtained half autonomy. The first territorial assembly was established in Saint Louis and all the seats were occupied by the

³ No. 1 pp. 5-8.

two African parties. Bloc Progressive Senegalais [BPS] led by Leopold Seder Senghor and the socialist action party [PAS] led by Lamine Gueye. After its entry in the French community on November 15, 1958. The territorial assembly proclaimed the Republic of Senegal. When Senegal was part of the Mali federation for a short time, and then dropped out to proclaim its independence on August 20, 1960.

Post-colonial era

Leopold Seder Senghor led country during the first two decades of its independence. In January 1981, Senghor became the first African Head of State voluntarily relinquish office before the end of his term. His successor Abdou Diouf, assumed office after a remarkably smooth and peaceful transition. Two decades later, in March 2000, Abdoulaye Wade of the opposition Democratic Party of Senegal [PDS] assumed power in yet another and peaceful political transition. This is the first time since independence that the ruling socialist party [PS] candidate has been defeated in the presidential election. Some of which he has already introduced. The present constitution dates from 1963 and has been revised several times as recently as January 2001 to reduce the term of presidential form of government and the executive President as directly elected by the voter for a term of seven years. Prior to 1993 the presidential term was five year. The President appointed the Prime Minister who appoints the council of ministers. In march 2001 president Wade sacked his Prime Minister, Moustapha Niasse, along with all Niasse's ministerial colleagues. The minister of Justice Madior Boye was appointed Senegal's first woman Prime Minister. In

1995 five leaders of the opposition parties were appointed to the council of ministers.⁴

The legislature is bicameral. The membership of the national assembly elected for five year terms, was increased from 120 to 140 from the May 1998 election. The term of the new Senate, created in 1998, is also of five years. Of the 60 members, 45 are to be indirectly elected by the 10 regional assemblies and some more 320 local councils. Twelve Senators are appointed by the president and three represent Senegalese people living abroad. The Senate was abolished by the new Constitution in January 2001. The post colonial political developments in Senegal can be clearly divided into three periods representing the three Presidents, Leopold Sedar Senghor [1960-1980], Abdou Diouf [1981-2000] and Abdoulaye Wade [2000]. The first three years 1960-1963 were characterized by fiercely competitive electoral politics, the consolidation of the ruling UPSs hold over the country and the emergence of Senghor as Senegal's undisputed national leader. During this period the ruling UPS went through its gravest internal crisis as a result of a power struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. As the left-leaning Dia tended to obstruct Senghor's pro-western [in particular pro-French] policies, aimed at attracting investment and financial assistance, relations between the two leaders soon became strained. The army intervened to support Senghor and Prime minister was tried for attempting a coup de'etat, found guilty and sentenced to life

⁴ Irving Leopold Markovitz, *Leopold Sedar Senghor, and the Politics of Negritude* (London: Westview Press, 1962) p. 161.

imprisonment. In March 1963, the country approved a new constitution that established a strong presidential regime.⁵

From 1964 to 1975, Senegal was for all practical purposes, transformed into a one-party state. Throughout this period the ruling [UPS] later [PS] held all seats in the national assembly and faced no formal political opposition in national local election. In 1970 Senghor began to move the office of the prime ministers and appointed Abdou Diouf, a young technocrat, to the office. With political opposition rendered impotent, Senghor began to move cautiously to liberalize the regime and to restore the semblance of multi party democracy. In April 1974 Mamadou Dia and other prominent political prisoners were released and the government formally recognized the party-démocratique Sénégalais [PDS], led by Abdoulaye Wade [now president], as the country's first legal party

The last four years of the Senghor era [1960-1980] was marked by movement towards a competitive multi-party system and preparations for Senghor's departure from the political scene. Revision of the constitution in April 1976. Permitted a three party system in which each of the 'Ideological Currents' designed in the constitution, namely ; social democratic, liberal democratic and Marxist –Leninist / communist. The Senegalese constitution was again revised in 1979 to make room for a fourth political party to carry the banner of the right. President Senghor resigned at the end of 1980. His successor, Abdou Diouf, who had been prime minister since 1970. He assumed power on New Year's Day

⁵ Issue Abeku Burk, *Renaming Society in Emerging Sub-Saharan African Democracy* (Bolder, Kegan Paul, 1972) p.79

1981, which marked the beginning of a post-Senghor era in the post independence politics of Senegal.⁶

President Diouf further opened up the electoral system by allowing all political parties to register and a large number of parties contested the 1993 and subsequent election. The president and the ruling party were nevertheless returned to office at each election till March 2000. The may 1993 election particularly were followed by serious public unrest as well as violent disturbances, following the announcement of government austerity measures and the drastic French devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. In March 1995 Wade and four leaders were appointed to the council of ministers. The 1996 local election paved the way for the creation of a second chamber of the legislature [Senate] which came in to existence in 1998; the U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Senegal. In August 1998 the national assembly voted to revise the constitution to remove the clause restricting the president to a maximum of two terms of office. In which the 45 of 60 Senators were to be elected by members of the national assembly, together with local, municipal and regional councilors. The ruling PS won all 45 seats contested. In March 1999, left wing alliances of opposition parties agreed to nominate Abdoulaye Wade as their joint candidate in the presidential election scheduled for March 2000 which he won.

On March 16, 2001 to end of the 20 years of war with secessionist in the Casamance province in the south. He has also emerged as an African continental leader advocating new recovery strategies for the developments of Africa. He is

⁶ Gromyko, Antony, *African Progress Problem and Prospectus* (Moscow: Progress Publication, 1989), p. 51.

now well known for his 'OMEGA plan' for Senegal and Africa. He has also cosponsored the new partnership for Africa's developments [NEPAD] adopted in Abuja Nigeria., in October 2001. The OMEGA plan and the NEPAD, seek to confront the question as to how can Africa's lingering problems of developments, democracy and stability can be solved. The object of the Omega plan, according to Wade is, 'on the one hand to bridge the structural gap between the developed countries and Africa and to raise the level of education and, on the other hand, to solved the debt problem. In seeking to achieve these aims, he emphasized, Africans fully accept the facts of globalization, liberalization and privatization all over the world. But Africa want to go for globalization as a united entity and Africans realize that 'because of the weakness of their structures and the level of education of their masses, they cannot follow the pace of progress of the developed countries. The victory of Wade in Senegal can be seen as an important episode in the democratic 'revolution' that has spread over Africa in the past ten years. These developments will have a bearing on the economy of the country.⁷ A social group is the only intermediate stage between the unreflective emotions of the family and the universal logic of the state. [Hegelian] John Kean says his view on society melodies market economy, social classes, corporations and institutions concerned with the administration of welfare and civil law. From Lock to Hegel, society simply meant to establishment of diversification by a constitutional democratic state that could guard and enlarge the principle of liberty. Social formation is a sphere of plural

⁷ Gaye, M. *Personnel Communication Institute of the Development et.de Society* (Dakar, Routledge, 2000) p.71.

organization which brings individual together in common concern. It's also concerned with such as debates, discussion and freedom of press, speech, association analytically. It's meant the social formation and democracy emerges of the social and the cultural dimensions in states. Which allow for the formation of association and any organization .values and institutions without which democratic public life can not exist? The social formation and organization play a very significant role in the analysis of welfare state today.

The ethnic groups and their percentage:

In the Senegal the percentage of the ethnic groups are Wolof 42.67, Serere 14.91, Peul 14.44, Toucouleur 9.33, Diola 5.28, Mandingue 3.63, Rural – Rurale 1.67, Bambara 1.34, Maure 1.00, Manjaag 0.98 and others 4.74 and total is 100 percentages.⁸ Firstly, Social groups an integral part of a unitary social order. But what the social group order implied was not simply that they stood between the capitalist and the worker. There were two other important factor, first, they found a composite intermediate larger consisting of a wide range of occupation interests but bond together by a common style of links and behaviour pattern. Secondly, they stood for certain liberal, democratic values, which they expressed in this social and political conduct. Ideologically, the new order stood for intellectual freedom and social mobility, liberal individualism and political democracy. A social formation thus became identified with the signified social

⁸ "Africa South of Sahara 2004, Regional Survey of the World", (32nd edition) Source: UN, Demographic Year Book (London, Europe Publications, 2003), p.939.

order representing a new standard of values which its member of groups imposed upon the entire societies in which they lived.⁹

As groups in Senegal are concerned there are basically four major ethnic groups contributed to the urban population of the four communes. The Wolof, Lebou. Peoples were the most important but the Serer and Toucouleur peoples were present in significant numbers. These four groups were related in language and social customs. And they have maintained close political and religious ties. Each group at one time produced one or more nations-states in Senegal. These are worthy or closer examination, for they indicate the political capacity that rural Africans brought with them when they migrated to the communes. Specialist in oral tradition is only now bringing detailed information on Senegal traditional state to light. And ethno history. But the written record from Arabic and European travelers suggests that the Senegal area has been a centre of organized political activity since at least A D 1000.¹⁰

Still it was not the purpose to establish achieved link between traditional politics and the politics of the communes. But the readers should be aware that each ethnic major groups involved in communal politics had their own political traditions. Africans in the communes were no stronger to organized politics, although they needed a certain degree of acculturation to understand the peculiarities of western political institutions. It is doubtful that traditional politics provided an adequate grand for urban politics. Traditional political roles were ascribed. Where as those in the urban areas were achieved by personal

⁹ Ibid. p.7.

¹⁰ George Wesley, Johnson, *The Emergence of Black Politics in Senegal*. (London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1900), p.7

merit. However, the concept of the political process one form of a struggle for power was familiar to every African.¹¹

And the most notable Toucouleur leader in the 19th century was Al Hajj Umar Tall, who made his pilgrimage to Mecca. In the 1820s. Joined the militant's tijannya brotherhood. And returned to act as that Sects Khalifa, in the western Sudan, Umar wanted to revive the ancient glory of tekroul by creating an empire similar to the Hausa-Fulani states in northern Nigeria. Which he had visited, and gathering a host of enthusiastic followers, he declared a Jihad against both pagans. Muslims, He hoped to make the Fauta Toro his base of operations, but the Toucouleur marabouts had no intentions of giving up their theoretic rule in that the area. Although many young Toucouleurs joined Umar, the major leaders allied themselves with the French, and Umars, westward advance was stopped at fort medine on the Senegal in 1957. Umar and his legions turned east, conquest a vast area on the upper Niger, and founded a large theocratic state.

The Fauta Toro remained independent for the moment. But it was isolated between Umar and the French, and Lovis Faithrbe and his successors soon conceived the ambitious scheme of conquering the native West African hinterland. French annexation proceeded slowly, but by 1891 the entire homeland of the Toucouleur people was under French rule.¹²

It was only after the advent of the French rule it Senegal that the ideas and institutions of a social group order were imported in to Senegal. "The French

¹¹ Irvin Leonard Markovitz, *Leopold Seder Senghor, and the Politics of Negritude*, (New York, Wester View Press, 1972), pp. 61-62.

¹² *ibid.* pp. 156-157

attempted as part of this education policy to create a group comparable to their own, so that it may assist them in the administration of the century".¹³ The French aimed at creating a social group which was to be a group of uniters and not be originators of new values and methods. The educated group in Senegal which emerged as result of French educational policy are more for position and influence in the white colour jobs and then for mass education and economic development.

But its component parts of interesting not only in their behavior pattern and style of life, but also in this mode of thinking and social value, thus, from the circumstances of their origin and growth, the number of the educated group, such as government servants, lawyers, university teachers and other constituted bulk of the Senegal social group. The social group are social category emerged among the ethnic only after independence and that too due to implementation of the Proactive Discrimination Policy. In Pre-independence period, the French had also adopted various welfare and development numbers in favour of Toucouleur and Ethnic group. Besides, they had also created new opportunities like jobs in the Army, Industrialization, advent of means of communication, etc. All these had created a better – off section are new group among Toucouleur. But in real sense, more comparison measures were adopted by government of Senegal, after independence. For the welfare and development of the Wolofs or ethnics

The discussion on social classes and democracy in the Senegal started

¹³ ibid. p. 10

much earlier even from the day, since theorist has distinguished between public and private sphere of life. Social class frequently used the term in civilized persons. It involves unlimited power to the sovereign to protect civil society from its demonic impulses. For the things, how can the uncivil passion of greed and avaric are restrained and sociotical conflict be earned if the staff shed some of its followers. In the late 17th century John Lock, set forth the idea on society. Civil society exist on emerges only when law guarantees the civilizing right to life, liberty and prosperity at the general level. Lock maintained that civil society comes in to existence. When man poses the natural right to life liberty and estate come together, sign a contract and constitute a common public authority. As well as democracy is concerned that the democracy is the only an intermediate stage between the unreflective emotions of the family and the universal logic of the state. It is a stage in the formation of, the state explaining (Hegelian) view. John Kean says his views on society melodious market economy, social classes, corporation and institution concerned with the administration of welfare and civil law, from Lock to Hegel, society simply meant to establishment of institution by a constitutional democratic state that could guard and enlarge the principle of liberty. Social formation is a sphere of plural organization which brings individual together in common concern. Social formation is also concerned with value such as debates, discussion and freedom of press, speech association analytically. It mean the social formation and democracy emerges of the social and the cultural dimension in state, which allow for the formation of association and any organization , value and institutional without which a

democratic public life cooped not exist. The social formation organization plays a very significant role in the analysis of welfare state today.¹⁴

As democracy is concerned that is very important for each country. Gathering renewed momentum in recent year since 1960. A decade that the marked in the end of communism. The decline of an authoritarian is party region in various third world countries, were especially in African continents. Democratization is a process that is characterized by multi party system of governed based on regular free and for election. With legally and consciously, recognized opposition parties. As Leopord Seder Senghor argued that any regime. Which does not permit the articulation of free political ideas is not worry the level democracy. The nation behind this assumption is that if the Social security provided by the formal sector and social services supplied by State institutions cannot be secured any more due to the crisis of the development State and present transformation processes engendering conflicts. It is interesting to study the changes going on in traditional social solidarity and the coming into existence of new, partly informal patterns of self-organization. This social security is to a large extent is carried by women. It is important to relate these processes to the present discussion in development politics with regard to the social formation in Senegal of adjustment and development, poverty as well as the formation of social policy.¹⁵

Transformation processes such as democratization, liberalization of markets - of traditional cash crops as well as foodstuffs - are analyzed with

¹⁴ Khilnani, Sunil and Sudipta Kaviraj, (ed). *Civil Society: History and Possibilities* (New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 116.

¹⁵ No. 12 p.17

regard to policy measures such as structural adjustment program's, as well as a general retreat of the State from development politics. The central focus of interest are newly emerging social forces such as peasant organizations, women's groups etc. with regard to their capacity of structuring society and definition of development concepts as well as their potential to overcome the fundamental crisis of society. Fieldwork, together with a student study group has been executed in summer 1994 in rural areas in Senegal as well as in two areas in Ghana,. In Senegal, with a longstanding peasant movement, it has been found that professionalization and institutionalization are taking place, including political influence on the central level, and in the villages especially women can secure their livelihoods through these organizations. As well as the relationship between Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal and peasant organizations democratization process is to culminate into a viable multi party system of government the essential ingredient, that constitute society spontaneously and freely created social organization, such as voluntary association, free press, religion, economic and other social institutions, interest groups, trades, which profiles, have to the birth of indigenous social formations in sub-Saharan African. who proclaimed post world war. The discussion on social classes and democracy in the Senegal started much earlier even from the day. Social formation frequently used the term its process, it's in values unlimited power to the sovereign to protect civil society from its demonic impulses. John lock; set forth the idea on society. Civil society exists an emergence only when law guarantees the civilizing right to life, liberty and prosperity at the general level

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Islamic revival in Senegal. During the mid-19th century Tukolor clerics from Futo Toro led many of the jihads. Or holly was which sought to overturn

pagan rulers and create Muslim theoretic state in the region. In many areas particularly in the Wolof states. Islam became a catalyst for armed resistance. Colonial rules in Senegal as elsewhere in Africa, was essentially a system of political, economic and cultural domination forcibly imposed by a technologically advanced foreign minority an indigenous majority? As a system colonialism justified itself largely through ideologies. That asserted the superiority of the colonizers and the inferiority of the colonized. France defended its acquisition of colonies on the ground of a 'Civilizing mission' that would bring peace, prosperity and the benefits of French civilization to the 'Backward and primitives'. People's fortunate enough to come under French rule. Senegal was the only colony in black Africa in which France attempted to apply assimilationist ideals. The location of the federal capital of French West Africa [since 1895] in Senegal [Dakar since 1902] was a sign of that colony-privileged status. Dakar special status as the administrative and commercial capital of French West Africa was a major factor shaping colonial Senegal's economic development. Since 1848, Senegal has been represented in the French national assembly by a deputy who was a Senegalese in the beginning. The first African Deputy Blaise Diagne was elected in 1914 and continued for twenty years without interruption. In 1946, Senegal officially becomes an overseas province within the French Union. While Lamine Gueye was one of the most influential Africans in the French parliament in 1948, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's second deputy, a protégé of Gueye, broke away from the socialist and formed a new political party, the Senegalese democratique bloc [BDS]. In 1957,

following the approval of the 'Loi-Cadre', Senegal and other territories of the French West Africa obtained half autonomy. The first territorial assembly was established in Saint Louis and all the seats were occupied by the two African parties, Bloc Progressive Senegalais [BPS] led by Leopold Seder Senghor and the Socialist Action party [PAS] led by Lamine Gueye. After its entry in the French community on November 15, 1958. The territorial assembly proclaimed the Republic of Senegal. When Senegal was part of the Mali federation for a short time, and then dropped out to proclaim its independence on August 20, 1960.¹⁶

Leopold Seder Senghor -1909-2001 led the country during the first two decades of its independence. In January 1981, Senghor became the first African Head of State to voluntarily relinquish office before the end of his term. His successor Abdou Diouf, assumed office after a remarkably smooth and peaceful transition. Two decades later, in March 2000, Abdoulaye Wade of the opposition Democratic Party of Senegal [PDS] assumed power in yet another and peaceful political transition. This is the first time since independence that the ruling socialist party [PS] candidate has been defeated in the Presidential election. Some of which he has already introduced. The present constitution dates from 1963 and has been revised several times as recently as January 2001 to reduce the term of presidential form of government and the executive President as directly elected by the voter for a term of seven years [five year from 2000] renewable once. Prior to 1993 the presidential term was five year. The president

¹⁶ Irving Leopold, Markovitz, *Leopold Seder Senghor and Negritude*, (New York, Westview Press, 1972), pp. 61.

appoint the prime minister who appoints the council of ministers in march 2001 president Wade sacked his Prime ministers, Moustapha Niasse, along with all Niasse's ministerial colleagues. The minister of Justice Madior Boye was appointed Senegal's first woman prime minister. In 1995 five leaders of the opposition parties were appointed to the council of ministers.¹⁷

The legislature is bicameral. The membership of the national assemblies. elected for five year terms, was increased from 120 to 140 election. The term of the new Senate, created in 1998, is also five years. Of the 60 members, 45 are to be indirectly elected by the 10 regional assemblies and some more 320 local Councils. The President appoints twelve Senators and three represent Senegalese people living abroad. The Senate was abolished by the new constitution in January

2001. The post colonial political developments in Senegal can be clearly divided in to three periods representing the three Presidents, Leopold Seder Senghor [1960-1980], Abdou Diouf [1981-2000] and Abdoulaye Wade [2000] The first three years 1960-1963 were characterized by fiercely competitive electoral politics, the consolidation of the ruling UPSs hold over the country and the emergence of Senghor as Senegal's undisputed national leader. During this period the ruling UPS went through its gravest internal crisis as a result of a power struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. As the left-leaning Dia tented to obstruct Senghors pro-western [in particular pro-French] policies, aimed at attracting investment and financial assistance,

¹⁷ John Mukum Mboku, *Preparing Africa for the 21st Century: Strategic for Peaceful Existence and Sustainable Development*, (English, Asghate Publication Limited, 1999), p.23.

relations between the two leaders soon become strained. The army intervened to support Senghor and Prime minister was tried for attempting a coup d'état, found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. In March 1963, the country approved a new constitution that established a strong presidential regime.¹⁸

From 1964 to 1975, Senegal was for all practical purposes, transformed into a one-party state. Throughout this period the ruling [UPS] later [PS] held all seats in the national assembly and faced no formal political opposition in national local election. In 1970 Senghor began to move the office of the Prime Ministers and appointed Abdou Diouf, a young technocrat, to the office. With political opposition rendered impotent, Senghor began to move cautiously to liberalize the regime and to restore the semblance of multi party democracy. In April 1974 Mamadou Dia and other prominent political prisoners were released and the government formally recognized the party-démocratique sénégalais [PDS], led by Abdoulaye Wade [now president], as the country's first legal party.¹⁹

The last four years of the Senghor era [1960-1980] was marked by movement towards a competitive multi party system and preparations for Senghor's departure from the political scene. Revision of the constitution in April 1976 permitted a three party system in which each of the 'Ideological Currents' designed in the constitution, namely; social democratic, liberal democratic and Marxist –Leninist / communist. The Senegalese constitution was again revised in 1979 to make room for a forth-political party to carry the banner of the right. In

¹⁸ Peter Robb, ed., *Concepts of Peace in South Africa* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1995), p.45.
¹⁹ No.3 pp. 161-167

seeking to achieve these aims, he emphasized, Africans fully accept the facts of globalization, liberalization and privatization all over the world. But Africa wants to go for globalization as a united entity and Africans realize that 'because of the weakness of their structures and the level of education of their masses, they cannot follow the pace of progress of the developed countries. These developments will have a bearing on the economy of the country. They try to make social empowerment and the social problem to solve; Social formation trains peoples in the value of the collection activeness. Where social entries on them with in to social relationship with each others, in term social association pay the way for political association, today grass root measurement have arisen in nearly every sub-Saharan country to reclaim control over the political and social destinies, the pressure have forced African government to take care of national interest. Political reform agenda, there are multi party system which come in to existence in full extent, multi party election has not been able to being suggested and sustainable democracy as the other aspects that are great interface has been replaced not to do the democracy and the prelist transition for state dominated to market, who necessarily coexistent once national party, took power in 1966s. Ethnic interest, military insurgency and elusive economic development derailed their progress towards the proclaimed goals of political liberation and socio-economic empowerment, multi party election only provided the governing elites under forces powered, wealth to consolidate their domestic and social legacy.

CHAPTER - 2

UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL FORMATION

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
CHAPTER-2

Understanding of Social Formation

In the Marxist-Leninist view the history of mankind passes through five social formations: primitive society, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism with communism as its highest stage. In primitive society the production relations are determined by social ownership of the means of production. In the period of slavery they are determined by the slaveholder's ownership both of the means of production and of the producers. Feudal society is marked by ownership of the means of production -and to a limited extent of the producers-by the feudal lord. Ownership of the means of production, but not of the producers, characterizes capitalism. Under socialism, finally, there is only social property and no longer is there any exploitation. Revolutionary events may be decisive for the transition from one social formation to the next. As one social formation succeeds another, the political structure changes as well. The slave -holding, feudal and bourgeois states are exploitative. In the socialist state, on the other hand, power is wielded by the workers. In its highest form the socialist state is the state of the entire people: "capitalism, and with it all the remnants of past economic social formations, is approaching its law-bound suppression"¹

Soviet theorists maintain that the socialist social formation is already to be found in the USSR. A distinction is made between the two

¹ Marx, k. *Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist*, (New York, Helder, 1973), pp.421-3



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phases of this formation. According to official interpretation socialism, the first phase has been successfully established; the USSR is now passing through the stage of transition to the highest phase.²

Marx could not complete his theory of class [due to his sudden death], as the last [52nd] chapter of the third [and last] volume of his 'Das capital' wearing the title 'the class' is the uncompleted one. But later, the Marxist scholar interpreted and analyzed the social- class theory according to their own understanding and propagated it as Marx's view on class theory. Thus according to Marxian perspective, the class is not only reality but the great social reality and constitutes the greater moving force in history.³

The Marxist holds that in social development, each period is marked by the predominance of a particular class, which constitutes itself as ruling class. Each subsequent period give birth to new class as the chief claimant to take over power or ruler ship from existing ruling class. Further the Marxists define class in terms of individuals or groups position in the given economic structure to control and make use of the powers of production.⁴

So, the term class for the Marxists is a group of people who stand in a common relationship to the means of production - the means by which they

² no.2,p.65

³ Marx. K, *A Note on Classes: In Class status, Power and Social Stratification in Conceptual Perspective*, (Bombay, Sage Publication, 1953), p.13.

⁴ Cole, G. D. H, *Studies in Class Structure*, (London, Routledge and Kegen Paul., 1955) p.10.

gain a livelihood⁵ in all the stratified societies there are two social groups namely ruling class and subject class, thus, in the pre-industrial societies, there were two classes those like aristocrats, feudal lords and land lords. Who owned land and those like Serfs, slaves and land laborers who worked for the former's class and actively participated in the production process, even in the modern industrial societies, there are again two classes- one of those who holds or owns new means of production like factories, office machinery, wealth or capital, we call it capitalist or industrialist class.

We call it working class. In the Marxist terminology, the former is Bourgeoisie and the latter is proletariat. Further, according to the Marxists, the relationship between Bourgeoisie and proletarians between ruling classes and working class is always exploitative and oppressive one.

Although the Marxist has regarded there are two major classes in the society but in reality class system is much more complex one. There have always been a number of intermediately classes between capitalist and bourgeoisie and proletariat classes. For example. In the feudal societies there were peasantry classes between feudal landlords and landless laborers or serfs. Similarly, in the modern societies there are intermediary classes like supervisor, manager between capitalist or industrialist and laborers. As technical progress has increased manifold. Larger unity of business enterprises including banking and finance enterprises has also developed.

⁵ Giddens, A, *Sociology*, (Third Edition), (UK Publication Press, 1997) p.244.

These large-scale enterprises have also created a class of professionals and the managerial classes these are the intermediate classes placed above the manual and clerical workers. Though they use to draw good profit out of their services but they have no independent voice in the control of production. These intermediate groups in proffering appear to be engaged in following. If not directly then at least indirectly, the order and mustering to the demands of the proletariat class because of their lack of control over means of production and for providing services to the capitalist class.⁶

This Marx's analysis of class is Uni. -Dimensional with style criteria. Like ones position in the stratification system unlike Marx, Webers analysis of class is multidimensional. In other word while analyzing class he has indented several different and distinct hierarchies. He has also recognized that stratification consists of several possibly independent dimensions like class status group and party. This is regarded his major contribution to the study of social classes.⁷

In contrast, Weber has defined class in the market situation where- Weber has discussed three major dimensions of stratification system class, status and power. Although be agree with Marx a class as an economic term but his understanding and analysis of class is entirely different.

For him, class is sturdily an objective dimension of social stratification and is determined by ones life chances in the market place as maintained

⁶ Ibid. p.14

⁷ Blomberg, P, *The Impact of Social Class*, (New Delhi, Thomson Y. Crowell Company, 1972), p.21.

above, in fact, it is the market where one possesses skills, source of income and the different type of property. [ibid.].⁸

Weber argues that classes developed in the market economy in which individuals compete for economic gain. More precisely, he defines 'class' as a group of individuals, who share similar economic position in market economy and due to this economic position, they receive similar economic rewards, thus according to him, individuals' economic position or class situation is a market situation and those who share similar class situation also share similar life chances. He further argues that those who would be having better economic position would receive the highest economic rewards and enjoy superior life chances. Compare to those who are having few economic position.⁹

Then owning property and lack of property, according to Weber, are therefore the basic categories of class situation. There are specific resources like skills and educational or qualification which create economic differences in the society. These further decide the individual value in the market, in other words, a skilled labor or craftsman certainly earn higher wages than the same and unskilled labor. Similarly, the white color works like managers, administrative and professionals receive relatively higher salaries or emoluments as compared to blue color workers. Their qualifications such as degree, diploma and the specialized professional knowledge make them more marketable than others who do not have such qualifications. In Weber,

⁸ ibid, p.5

⁹ Chhibber, Y.P, *From Caste to Class*, (New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1968), p.14

understanding the ownership and non-ownership of property are the significant factors in the creation of classes. Simultaneously, skills of individuals in society vary which result in their differing market value and economic return. That is why; there exist different social classes in to society.¹⁰

While talking about the other two dimensions of stratification system, Weber argues that class is closely related to status and power. According to him, status differ from social groups in the social honor of prestige, class refers to unique distribution of economic rewards, whereas status refers to the unequal distribution of social honors.

An individual status is based on his/her mode of living, a formal education level and the acquisition, ethnic origin. [Birth], And occupation. All these factors of status accord to the individual a deferring degree of prestige or esteem in the society. Thus, in Webers opinion, a status group is constituted of the individuals having similar amount of social honor or prestige. And therefore, sharing the similar status situation, they also share common life style. Recognize each other as equals. Visit in each other's house keep coenobium or commensarality they often put restriction on the outsides if he later try to interact with them.

While giving example of the Indian caste system, Weber argues that in Indian society castes and sub-castes are systematically formed and largely distinguished in view of social honors. The members of caste and sub-caste

¹⁰ Weber, M, *Class Status and Party in Social Stratification* (Delhi Oxford University Press, 1991), p,21

have specific life style and prestige. Along with this, a number of restriction in terms of interlining, inter caste marriage, etc. have been set on social interaction and social relation among the different status groups. The relation between class and status has clear link in many societies; status may be based class. But it is not necessary that class always determines it alone because those who share the attributes of higher class may not necessary belong to the high status groups. For example, many rich people are not easily accepted by member of the traditionally rich peoples and are occasionally excluded from the status group of the latter because their manner, tastes, life style, dress pattern, etc. may different.¹¹

Similarly, the low class position of a person is not a disqualification for his been regarded as a member of the high status group through ones class position does influence once social status. The status group also cuts actors class position, the status of a person remain the same inspite of his higher birth, prestige or race.

Thus Webers understanding of status group suggests that in the society status rather than class position provides the basis for the formation of social groups. It develop common interest and groups identity among its members, similarly, he also argue that the different status groups within single class solidarity and class-consciousness.

While discussing about the third dimension of stratification system, Weber argues that parties concerned with the equitation of social power can

¹¹ Ibid. p.15

influence stratification independent of class and status. Weber defines party as a group of individuals who have common background; aims are interests and who work together in the interests of their membership. Such party has close relation with class and status, and often represents the interests of class and status groups.¹²

According to Marx, both class influences status group and party, both can in turn influence the economic circumstances of individuals and groups. He also suggests that though there is class relationship between class, status and power, party can divide and cut across classes and status groups. Thus, Weber's analysis of class, status and party indicates that apart from classes there are other dimensions, which strongly influence people's lives.

In fact, Weber does not entirely disagree with Marx a centrality of the ownership of means of production which creates stratification in the society, but he argues that a class is conceptually wider than merely of an economic sort. The classes are not only restricted by ownership of means of production but are also driven by the individual's market position such as consumers, ownership of different kind of wealth, [financial capital, land etc,] owners of or renters of a house, employees in the public sector or in a private industry, and so on.¹³ . Along with this, Weber also argues that stratification in the society is not only economic but also social. The social status of an individual also a both his possession of wealth and property and his inherited or social honor and prestige in the society.

¹² Gellner Sheldon, *An African Nation Between Islam and West* (Boulder Colorado Westview Press 1979), p. 61.

¹³ Worsley, P, *The Modern Sociological Reading*; (England, Penguin, 1991), p.426

It may be than said that those who have inherited social honors and prestige will enjoy higher status in spite of low status will not enjoy higher social status in spite of their higher-class position.

Finally, taking about party and its relation with class and status group, Weber argues that party is a group of individuals who always work in the interests of class and status group but is neither based simply on possession of wealth nor an the established position in the society.¹⁴

Thus, Weber has considered all three dimensions, which give more flexible and sophisticated analysis of social stratification than that provided by Marx. In Marx's scheme of thought, other dimensions [super structures] of social status are dependent on the economically determined class position [structure]. But in Webers analysis, all that matter independently determine this status in the society though they have close relationship among them and are also complementary to one other.

But without stretching the argument further, have we will see how some of the Africans scholars having allegiance to both the Marxian and Weberian frames of analysis of class or social status have viewed the social reality in the Indian society. While discussing about the concept of class in the African context to one has necessary to look at the caste which has remained not only a dominant institution but also as part of life of people for century. Hence, analysis of class without taking note of caste in African

¹⁴ *ibid.* pp. 5

situation would be increased and irrelevant, in India both class and caste go hand in hand.

But what these scholars undermine is that these people also belong to the specific caste categories to which they do demonstrate their allegiance in more than one ways. Due to advantage of the traditional superior social status, the certain communities in Indian society have hold over mode of production and resources. All opportunity needed for upward mobility have remained available only to certain society-privileged groups of people. The peoples of the lower social strata could not reach up to the status of the privileged once due to the traditional social and religious restriction imposed on them.also, all the opportunity needed for the upward social mobility were closed for them due to their low birth.

However, the Marxist scholars in Senegal have conventionally accepted the economic dimension of class where in the section of people having central over the means of production constitute the bourgeoisie class and those who work as labors for than constitute the proletariat class. For extance, while describing the class in African situation. Nkrumah [1948] has used the typical orthodox Marxian frame of analysis. He has analyzed agriculture, trade, and business, means of transport, modern education, political parties, state administrative, and role of press. Reform movement.etc. From the class perspective he has clearly demanscreate the two classes of bourgeoisie or capitalist and labors or proletariat in African society.

Thus according to him, there are certain privileged groups in Africa who always maintain their hegemony in every sphere like ritual and religion, education, industry, agriculture and politics. They have been able to do so on the basis of their privileged birth status and controlled over the modes of production. But it is also fact that they have achieved and retained their higher status though exploiting the preliterate masses and maintaining hierarchy in the society.

Desai has further subscribed to the view that the African society has been transformed from a feudal to the view that the African society has been transformed from a feudal to the capitalist or the semi-capitalist one. It is now stratified in to new classes like capitalists [commercial, industrial and financial]. Professional [like lawyers, doctors, and engineers] a fairly large sized middle class employees.¹⁵

And the labors and workers in the urban areas. In rural areas, we find the society regrouped in to classes of landlords' peasant's proprietor's tenants and agricultural laborers along with the status of the ruined artisan and group of money Landers and traders. Thus, the present day society in Africa both in rural and urban areas is highly complex unlike that existed in the past.

Even Gough, though an anthropologist of non-Marxist disposition, appears to have used Marxian approaches in his study. Considering the agrarian mode of production as a social formation she finds. Interconnection of castes kingship, family, marriage and even ritual with the forces of

¹⁵ Desai, A.R., *Social background of Indian Nationalism*, (Popular Prakashan, 1998), p.113

production and production relations, in her study, she argues that the historical transformation of mode of production has led the emergence of a new class of bourgeoisie, the polarization of peasantry and the peneprisation of the working class.¹⁶

The nature of social groups

The rev. Thomas Gibson had first employed the term social groups 1985. He has used it largely to refer to the propertied and entrepreneurial class located in between the landowners on the one hand, and urban industrial workers time, use of the term middle class views considerably though in general the term refers to the various types of white collars workers razing from higher professional to relatively routine derived workers . The concept of social groups has also been describing by the founding father of sociology. For extance, Marx's in his theory of social stratification has described various classes. According to him, there are two main antagonistic classes of the have and the have not to whom he calls the bourgeoisie¹⁷

And the proletariat, Marx recognizes presence of a number of segments of people who are not actually engaged in the production unit, distribution of products, etc. Marx calls them petty bourgeoisie or middle classes are very interesting. In fact, he treats them not as independent classes because of their no independent standing, for Marx, these classes are bound to take side either of the bourgeoisie or proletariat in their antagonist relation ultimately resulting in to class conflict. Hence, they disappear sooner as later,

¹⁶ No.2 pp. 214-215.

¹⁷ *ibid.* p.7

these are also because they are neither in a position to revolt against the bourgeoisie class nor they can voluntarily become members of the proletariat class.

Unlike Marx, Weber while defining social class speaks of social class structure consisting of plurality of class structures. According to him, there are positively privileged and negatively privilege classes' dominants the market with the help of its property and economic activity. Member of their class passes all things and recourses, which these require and become positively, privileged status group.¹⁸

Contrarily, the members of the negatively privileged class are vulnerable in the market situation due to their inability to hold property and other economic activities; in fact they themselves become the objects of ownership. In this way, the negatively privileged class becomes negatively privilege groups' status due to lack of property. But in between these two extreme groups there are other groups whom Weber calls as middle class or social groups. Thus middle class in, Webers opinion, have all asserts of property or notable abilities though formal education and training, Chhibber writes, 'according to Marx Weber, the middle class ' however magnetism classes and social classes. If once sells him labor, he belongs to the proletarian class but if he sells his ability in the form of labor commodity acquired through training. Vocational or otherwise he belongs to the middle class structure. In other word, they may be described as consisting of various

¹⁸ Dohrem Dolf. Ralf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (California: Standord University Press, 1967), p. 41.

occupational and economic groups which are associated with the dependent on the marketable ability of the human being received through training .

Weber has listed a member of occupational and other groups in the middle classes. These groups are; a –entrepreneur .b- executive and managers, intelligentsia d- man from liberal professional e- small businessmen. And f- skilled and semi-skilled workers, but these must be viewed in the light of 1- marketable ability. 2- income and .3- status as determined by income and occupations.¹⁹

Besides the Marxian and Weberian explanation, a few other scholars have analyzed the term middle class as ethnic groups in Senegal also. For extance, according to Gould,' middle class donates broadly that deemed intermediate between the upper class' and the ethnic groups; the line of ranging and ambiguous criteria. The most frequent adopted criteria relate occupations. Development within the occupational structure of advanced societies created draw clear boundaries for the ethnic groups, the core of class membership is being more reality located in occupational terms. It should be noted also, that a shift in occupational status does not itself create more than the condition for shift in occupational. Article, interest of royalties.²⁰

There are several other concrete reasons for the emergence of the classes besides those states earlier. According to Cloude Alvere, in the middle of sixteenth century the population of Europe had begun to increase

¹⁹ Chibber, Y.P., *From Class to Caste*, (New Delhi, Sage Publications 1962), pp.13-14
²⁰ Omvedt, G. land, *Caste and Politics in India*, (New Delhi, Athens Gould Publication, , 1962), pp. 426-27

which ultimately led increase in food price and land values. It means, those who could offer to bear the increased prices were the wealthy class and other who failed were deprived and destitute population. These later that had earlier survived on land migrated later to urban areas in search of work and their survival. In the urban areas these destitute and deprived masses got engaged in varieties of work and become factory workers, artisans, craftman.etc. They also ventured in to commercial pursuits like local marabouts, shopkeepers, etc. and also contractor ship in making canals. Docks and railways. In this way, they ventured in to commercial and trading activities in urban areas and gave birth to middle class²¹.

As in Indian society, middle class could not grow in the same fashion as it had grown and developed in the European society. This was so due to the caste/ethnic groups. Ridden and hierarchical social system in India, here, every individual belongs to a certain caste or community, the occupations of each community has also traditionally been fixed and nobody is allowed to change his/her occupation in the past, there were strict caste restriction on the individuals occupational and social mobility that is why, middle class as a social category emerged only among the traditional higher people who had possession and central over means of production both in rural and urban areas.

Nevertheless, middle class as a concept emerged and developed during the French rule in Senegal, then French brought with them the

²¹ Ossawskie, S., '*Different conception of social class*' in *class status and Power; Social stratification in perspective*, (ed) by Bendix, R. and Lipset S.M., (Britain, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), p.20

capitalist mode of system like new civil and state administration system, new property and land laws, new judiciary and revenue system, new economic system and new modern education this capitalist mode of system reshuffled the traditional African society in to new social classes.²²

Here are main, concern is to discuss the origin and nature of the Senegal urban social groups. As mentioned earlier, the social groups in Senegal had emerged in Senegal during the French rule and was mere visible in urban areas. Since all the activities of trade. Business and commerce of the French were concentrated in the coastal cities. Like Europe, Ghana. More population was attracted towards these cities. Those who migrated to these and many other cities. And states got the first opportunities to enjoy the fruits of the new types of occupations and modern education, similarly, these modern occupations and the French administrative services helped them to raise their status in the society.

²² Desai, A.R., *Social background of Indian nationalism* (Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1946), pp.26-27

CHAPTER – 3
SOCIAL GROUPS IN SENEGAL AND ITS ROLE IN
SOCIAL FORMATION

CHAPTER 3

Social groups in Senegal and its role in social formation

As the groups in Senegal are concerned that there are basically four major ethnic groups contributed to the urban population of the four communes. The Wolof, Lebou. Peoples were the most important but the Serer and Toucouleur peoples were present in significant numbers. These four groups were related in language and social customs. And they have maintained close political and religious ties. Each group at one time produced one or more nations-states in Senegal. These are worthy or closer examination, for they indicate the political capacity that rural Africans brought with them when they migrated to the communes. Specialist in oral tradition is only now bringing detailed information on Senegal traditional state to light. And ethno history. But the written record from Arabic and European travelers suggests that the Senegal area has been a centre of organized political activity since at least A D 1000¹.

Still it was not the purpose to establish achieved link between traditional politics and the politics of the communes. But the readers should be aware that each ethnic major groups involved in communal politics had their own political traditions. Africans in the communes were no stronger to organized politics, although they needed a certain degree of acculturation to understand the peculiarities of western political institutions. It is doubtful that traditional politics provided an adequate grand for urban politics.

¹ G, Wesley, Johnson.Jr, *The Emergence of black Politics in Senegal*. (London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1920), pp.7

Traditional political roles were ascribed. Where as those in the urban areas were achieved by personal merit. However, the concept of the political process one form of a struggle for power was familiar to every African.²

And the most notable Toucouleur leader in the 19th century was Al Hajj Umar Tall, who made his pilgrimage to Mecca. In the 1820s. Joined the militant's tijannya brotherhood. And returned to act as that Sects Khalifa, in the western Sudan, Umar wanted to revive the ancient glory of Tekrour by creating an empire similar to the Hausa-Fulani states in northern Nigeria. Which he had visited, and gathering a host of enthusiastic followers, he declared a Jihad against both pagans. Lapped' Muslims. He hoped to make the Fauta Toro his base of operations, but the Toucouleur marabouts had no intentions of giving up their theoretic rule in that the area. Although many young Toucouleurs joined Umar, the major leaders allied themselves with the French, and Umars, westward advance was stopped at fort medine on the Senegal in 1957. Umar and his legions turned east, conquest a vast area on the upper Niger, and founded a large theocratic state. The Fauta Toro remained independent for the moment. But it was isolated between Umar and the French, and Lovis Faithrbe and his successors soon conceived the ambitious scheme of conquering the native West African hinterland. French annexation proceeded slowly, but by 1891 the entire homeland of the Toucouleur people was under French rule.³

² Ibid. p.7

³ Markovitz, I.L., *Leopold Seder Senghor and the Politics of Negritude, Developments and Socialism*, (New York, Routledge 1966), pp.156-157

Moreover the recorded history of the Wolof peoples does not extend as far back as that of the Toucouleur. Some observers believe that the Wolof once lived in Tekrou; others that they originated in Mauritania and later moved south. There is also evidence that the Wolof may have descended from the Toucouleur or Serere, the modern Wolof historian Chiekh Anta Diop has speculated that the Wolof originated on the upper Nile, basing his hypothesis on certain similarities in language and culture. Oral tradition simply states that the Djolof Empire of the Wolof peoples was founded in the 13th century or 14th century. By Ndiadine N; Diaye, who may possibly have been the son of a Toucouleur cleric. D. Diaye's reputation for bravery and supernatural power led to his salvation as the first Barba of Djolof. Soon Tekrou and the southern Serere kingdom of Shine and Seldom became subject to the Wolof state, which also controlled Fule lands to the east and Malinke villages to the south east at the beginning of the 15th century, after the demise of the Mali empires. Djolof embarrassed all of modern Senegal's heartland, creating a precedent for the French. To build on four centuries later. Wolof culture and language slowly spread to the vanquished peoples. Especially in the upper classes, and diverse people assimilated. This process has continued to the present, in part because the Djolof Empire, though vanished, still lends its prestige to today's Wolofs.⁴

However, its height, Djolof was divided into provinces, each with a governor appointed by the Bourba. Provincial governors collected taxes for the empire from all classes and supported themselves by collecting tribute

⁴ Ibid. p. 7

from the great regional chieftains. They also stood ready to furnish the Bourba with troops for his armies, and especially with the services of their mounted cavalries [tiedos], an aristocratic classes of professional warriors. Which was not certain whether Islam penetrated the Tiedo class or the Djolof nobility. A veneer of Islam spread by Moonish or Toucouleur marabouts may have covered certain northern areas of the empire; but Djolof, unlike Tekrou, was basically an oministic state whose traditions were purely African in origin, recently, a few Wolof genealogists have claimed that Ndiadiane Ndiaye was directly descended from Abu-Bakr Ibn Umar, the almaravid conquer of Ghana. However, this seems to be non-more than an attempt to claim greater Islamic legitimacy.⁵

The structure of traditional Senegalese society;

The traditional social structures of the major peoples can be examined together, since they are rooted into the common past and have many similarities. And there were basically four social strata, or status groups, each divided into several sub-groups. A person's status was fixed at birth, and little mobility outside a given class was possible. Marriage to a member of another tribe or ethnic group was considered normal and even with a lower class espouses were generally a social taboo. The four primary strata in this system were nobles, freemen, artisan, and the slaves.

Senegalese state structures and social pattern were comparatively stable by the end of the 16th century. Most of the Senegalese peoples lived

⁵ Leopold Seder Senghor, "Leopold Seder Senghor and Negritude" *African socialism; declaration of ideological independence*, (Africa report, 1963), may.pp.63

in highly stratified societies based primary on blood relationship. Proclaimed Senegal where society was divided in it three main social categories; Freeman, Servile, Artisan, Caste and slaves. Some scholar estimated that as much as one half two-third of the population were slaves, less than 10% of population were artisans, where the main characteristic shared by Freeman, including royalty and the poorest commoner, was their agricultural vacation and strong attachment to the land. Members of the lineage were at the top of the social hierarchy of Freeman only men with royal blood could aspire to the succession.

Although there were sharp differences in social status, between Freeman's and the servile castes. Artisans constituted the majority of pre-colonial Senegal casted population and supplied most of the goods and services required by a pre-independent agrarian society, where the most prominent caste occupations, indiscendy order of status, were jeweler's, blacksmiths, weavers, leather workers and [GRIOTS]. Who were the magicians? Praise singers and guerillas of oral traditions. Occupations were listed. And in term manages rarely took place outside of the caste. Casted women's shared the status of their espouses and often practiced similar occupations. Despite their inferiors social status, casted Afrikaans frequently higher status of the living, than the average free, peasant king out hard existence from soil.⁶

⁶ Ibid. p.8

Slaves occupied the bottom of society where they were considerable differences in status and treatment among the various categories of slaves, domestic slaves is; these born in to slavery in the household of their mature generally could not be said. Unbilled Chattel slaves in the New World. Domestic slaves in Senegal authority obliged to work for their masters were usually given some land of their owner to form. And were permitted to and raise families. Trade slaves on the other hand had no right, who were usually captured in war and sold before they could form any permanent ties with the local committee [CROWN], who constituted a third category of slaves. The less fortunate has performed the most grating and dangerous terms of manual labor. Other severed in the rulers, household and many were regrailed in to the army.⁷

Senghor holds that socialism is increasingly a movement valued with economic development whose final goals is the creation of freemen, physically, intellectually and ignorance, they integrated, triumphing over sickness, misery and ignorance, the socialism is only a method, not a dogma, to achieve this final objective; socialism provided a framework, an outline that must be files in; at requires constant rethink of specific, according to the historical conditions of the peoples concerned. Socialism requires more than political powers; it calls for a new organized in the means of production and distribution. Senghor asserted that the peoples of Senegal are now in process of accomplishing this.because he regards socialism as a

⁷ Claude, Ake, *Feasibility of democracy in Africa*, (London, Sage Publication, 1986),pp65

method, not a dogma, Senghors free to discard the traditional techniques of socialism nationalization. For example.

Above all; socialism is essentially politics, that is, an art of governing men of a given society by organizing their relations harmoniously; socialist must be capable not only of projecting an image of man for the future, but of dealing politics with men and now. socialism is the only way capable of combining the imperatives of development and those of democracy, who centralized social justice through an ignitable division of produce before dividing up.

African socialism therefore requires a social state that will give primary to low, work and justice. Thus Senghors has a number of times reaffirmed his adherence to the principle of democratic socialism and warned against the; 'deviation of bureaucratism, totalitarianism, opportunism, and the expansionism. Where social justice requires intellectual and moral vigor, lucidity and courage, an objective analysis of the facts and austerity. This is what socialism is; socialism is simple honesty. One can not have the optimum development of the production of goods and to equitable divisions of these goods without an implacable battle against waste and embezzling. There is 'no major formula including socialism that centerpiece work and national unity.' But the work will not be forthcoming and there will be no 'unity of hearts and spirits in a renovated democracy. If corruption cannot be stopped. This is why socialism also requires and is a mental tension. A central struggle for

improvement rested in human laws. Amenable to human control, the process of development will be taken in hand by socialist masses to contrast the new society.⁸

Need for an inventory of cultures and resources;

Foremost among these concrete measures is drafting a plan. In the past Senghor maintained that before this could be done, that the nation must take inventory of its cultural, political and economic resources.

‘On a threefold level, we must prepare. An inventory of our traditional civilization. An inventory of the impact of colonialism and French Civilization on our traditional civilization and, An inventory of our economic resources, our needs. And potentialities. Our development plan must be Solely economic, it must be social in the broadest sense of world.’

Now, however, Senghor thinks more in terms of specific requirements of developments. Increasingly, the emphasized concrete work. Material progress, he paid out, requires immediate hard labor. Now Senegal is not a poor country. But development requires tremendous effort.

Senghor says ‘we are’, in the third day of creation, the rest of the seventh day is still for.

He sites a long list of the faults of colonialism the legacy of monocultures, the arbitrary delineation of boundaries and the taste for and tremendous imposts of consumer’s goods, which the country can’t afford. But foremost among these faults he places the failure to inculcate an ethic of work.

⁸ Ibid. pp.64-65

Thus the main objective in planning must be the production of a new type of man motivated by a new ethic. This calls for zeal and emotion development is; the work of man, but of men animated by a promethean will to transform the real and render it docile, where the needs is ' the new Senegal's, a man prepared for action, turn towards action. However, to be effective, any action must be united action made by and for the whole of the nation. This presupposes; the communion of intelligues and hearts. which can only be achieved through education. It is in this sense that Senghor now maintain that culture important, for each man must begin from a understanding of his own situation in particular.

However the Senghor constraint the meaning of democracy narrowly, he insist upon two paints. Democracy requires, first of all, free election, and secondly, something approaching a universal suffrage, these requirements create equality, in the sense of enabling participation in the political community. At the same time, he has emphasized the need for a strong state. He sees the state as the expression of the nation. ' Political history teaches that the lack of state organization is a weakness that brings on the fatal disintegration of the nation, the history of the fourth French Republic illustrate this; as Senghor emphasized that the public powers of the federal state and of the federated states to provide a structure to guarantee their authority and permanence, only after achieving this stability and unity can the nation go in to the second phase-that of development, where the culture are raised, must grow as his standards of living and culture are raised,

It is bordered by Guinea, Bissau, the other Guinea, Mali and Mauritania. Centrally to other African areas. Senegal is rarely in the news since the political situation is stable [elections are to be held this month] and people of different ethnic groups and religions usually live in harmony. The majority of the populations are Muslims, 90%, the rest being made up of 5% Christian, and 5% animists.

Pan-Africanism

It is a definition of African peoples who says that Africa is for African. Self-determination, like all major groups are trying to do in favour of the Africa only for African. At the root of these mainly transatlantic ideas about pan-Africanism or pan-negronism. They lay the dual nation of black rights and of 'Africa for Africans'. How completely this was to may be seen in the first pan-African congress ever held. Organized in 1900 by a Trinidad barrister, H Sylvester Williams. It gave a platform to another figure who would become much better known, W.B.B DuBois, these men's looks across to Africa with a bitter awareness of their own unity in disfranchisement. Mali have in the New World all Africans had lost their separate ethnic loyalties, languages, cultures, sense of differences from one other.⁹

During this first pan-African congress that DuBois threw down his famous challenge, the problem of the twentieth century; he declared in the year of its birth, and with colonial conquests in full assault,' is the problem

⁹ Senegal Cultured thirsty.blackdeek,www/blackseek.co

of the collar line- the relations of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa in Americans and the island of the Sea.¹⁰

Where the pan-Africanists were naturally ignored by the busy imperialist world. They were few, and they seemed to have no influence, but they went on harmonizing at their theme. Where American black missionaries began exporting their ideas in to the heart of Africa. Where the political journalists began reflecting and developing them on the West Coast. In 1919 a second congress met, this time in Paris where the victorious powers of the First World War were deciding how they should settle the peace.

Where the delegates boldly addressed themselves to the powers. They called on them to; establish a code of law of the international protection of the natives of Africa, similar to the prepared international code for labor; and aid down a list of principles by which the natives of Africa and the peoples of African decent should henceforth be governed.

The land and its natural resources should be held in trust for the natives, the investment and granting of concessions should be so regulated as to prevent the spoliation of the natives, and the extension of national wealth. Slavery and corporal punishment should be abolished and forced labor except in punishment of Crime.

¹⁰ Irving ,L.M, "American society of African culture",(ed) *Pan Africannism Reconsidered*, (California, University of California,1960),pp167

It should be right of every native child to learn and write his own language, and the language of the trustee. Nation, at public expense. And the natives of Africa should have the right to participate in government as fast as their development might permit.

Here for the first time new men from the continent itself flanked the old Guard from over the ocean. Obscure young men, for the most part, whom few in England had ever heard of-among them Kenyatta from Kenya, Nkrumah from the gold Coast. Akintola from Kenya, Johnson from Sierra Leone. The old nation of European trusteeship, went neck and crop out of the window in to the Manchester log.

Where now they are determined to be free; they said; but it the Western world is still determined to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom, the ideas of Pan-Africanism, through budded outside Africa. Were not allowed to wither with the coming of independence. So little were these ideas forgotten indeed, that they may even be said to have presided over the 'great year of independence.1960, when no fewer than sixteen African colonies won at least a measure of political sovereignty.

The historical facts are that a multitude of colonies became independent states. That constitutional declarations in favor of federal union went for little or nothing; that the one coherent effects at searing such a union-between the former colonies of Senegal and Sudan- fell apart almost at once, and the unity movements soon took merely diplomatic and tactical

form of ' Bloc alliances' named after the capitals where they were formed such as Casablanca, Movovia, and Brazzaville.¹¹

It is also true that the idea of continental unity was instilled during this formative period as one of the guarantees, perhaps the fundamental guarantees, of true development and progress with a starting impact on large number of men and women, there suddenly appeared the prospects of an African civilization in to which all the many different streams of African thought.

Experience and resource should flow, fortifying the belief that these peoples could thus achieve a place and weight in the world. Commensurate with their constant, yet the ideas of unity stable only remained, and even now remain, near the center of the picture. The vision still glitters. Still beckons.

Interest-group politics

Interest group politics is another major dimension of the Senegalese political system and takes place at two levels. At the one level. Different political actors and parties strive to win the support of or capture the organizations of key groups within the Senegalese society. At the second level, interest groups attempt to unrest concession from the government while the government pressures the interest groups to go along with its policies. Where during the post-war era, four groups plugged key roles in Senegalese politics; students, labor, African businessmen, and Muslim

¹¹ Alferd, Robert.R, "*Party and Society, the Anglo American Democracies*" (USA,Longman,1960),p.60

leaders. University and High School students were the most radical elements in Senegalese society, and they led the nationalist opposition to colonial rule, labor consisted to there people waking in the modern sectors of the economy that joined trade unions to seek highways, better working conditions, and the end of discriminatory employment practices like the students.¹²

They tended to be more militants and less integrated into the competitive party politics of the day. Africans businessmen went into politics in the hopes of imparting their economic status vis-à-vis. The French and Lebanese business comments and played an important role as political organizers in both the towns and in the country side

Finally, Muslim leaders defended the interest of Senegal's Islamic brotherhood and delivered the map supported a party needed to win national elections. Both the radicals like students' trade men in Senegal now doing each and every thing in to the rational empowerment in succesing the legitimacy. To prescribe social groups who are in touch of the nation making.

As in most African countries, the presidency in Senegal is the main locus of political power. The 1960 Senegalese Constitution provided for a so-called bicephotous, or two headed, regime that gave broad powers to both the president and the prime minister conducted foreign policy; the prime minister was Chief executive and ran the day -to day affairs of

¹² Roseberg, Carl.Jr, and William H “, *African Socialism*”, (Standford , California,1964),p54

government, this vision of labor satisfied neither Senghor, who resented his lack of control over governmental activities, nor Dia, who sought greater recognition as a national leader, this mutual dissatisfaction was one of the major underlying cause of the breakup of the Senghor Dia tandem in 1962.¹³

The 1963 constitution transferred the functions previously carried out by the Prime Minister to the President the right to exercise 'Executive powers' and declared a state of siege under certain critical circumstances that he alone would determine. Senghor involved these powers during the May-June 1968 crisis, when students' strikes trade union agitation and urban rioting shook the foundation of the regimes. In time, it became evident that the extreme concentration of power in Senegal's hands stifled government initiative, as ministers were reluctant to take action, before obtaining the personal approval of the President. In 1969 several Senegalese intellectuals and civil servants closely associated with the President began to call for constitutional reforms to increase the responsibility of cabinet ministers and expand opportunities for political participation with Senghor approval, these demands were translated into reality with the February 1970, revision of the 1963 constitution. The office of the Prime Minister was reestablished and the right of the national assembly to dismiss the Prime Minister and his government through a motion of censure was restored.

¹³ Nkrumah, Kwame, "African Socialism Revisited"; (African forum, winter, 1966), pp9

Post-colonial administrative reforms and local government

Those who took power at independence gained control of the administrative structures, legal system, and police powers of the French colonial state, reformers rather than revolutionaries Senegal's national leaders did not wish to dismantle the state structures they had inherited. Instead, they sought to Africanize them and to make the post-colonial state an instrument for promoting national rather than metropolitan goals and priorities, this task required some modification of the inherited colonial administrative structure and the creation of new ones.

The first major reform took place in January 1960 when the Dia government reorganized Senegal's field administration and Andrew administrative districts to bring the post-colonial state closer to the rural population; as a result the country was divided into seven regions¹⁵. 28 circles, and 85 arrondissements, which replace the 13th circles. 27 subdivisions and 135 cantons established under colonial rule. At this time, the government abolished the unpopular Chiefries and Africanize all echelons of the territorial administration by replacing the remaining French officials with Senegalese. Thus in 1964 the circle became the department and that of perfect replaced the old colonial title of commandant.

In addition to restructuring the territorial field administration, the 1960 administrative reforms also provided for the creation of new representative institutions in the countryside, to democratize Senegalese

politics. Thus, the elevation of all departmental capitals to the status of full communes made it possible for the peoples in Senegal's smaller towns in the interior to elect their own mayors and municipal councils, at the same time the Dia government established regional assemblies to present the rural population living in Senegal's 13,000 villages. Urban dwellers were not eligible to vote and Capvert did not have its own regional assembly because it was a predominantly urban area.

These new institutions became highly politicized and the major battleground of local class politics. Central over jobs, honorifics offices, and commercial resources became the spoils of victory for successful party leaders at the level and the main source of intraparty squabbling and contrary to the government's original intention, urban-based [UPS] politicians and powerful rural notables rather than representatives of grassroots rural communities determined the composition of the regional assemblies.

After the political demise of Mamadou Dia Senghor took steps to reinforce the central government's control over local government institutions. First, alarmed by the intense and often violent factional intraparty strife touched off by the battle for control over communal resources, Senghor moved to depoliticize local government by tightening the interior minister's control over the administration of communal budgets, which now had to be approved by the interior minister before being executed. Second, Senghor drastically reduced the flow of resources from the central government to

the communes to prevent the waste of scarce national resources on expansive city halls, race tracks, and other nonproductive investments and to lower the stocks of local politics, third, Senghor strengthen the powers of the regional governor and expanded the scope of the territorial administrations, while the regional assemblies survived as little more than rubber stamps for approving government-initiatives programs. The subordination of local government to administration central coupled with the democratization of Senegalese politics that was not reversed until the mid 1970s.¹⁴

¹⁴ Crouder, Micheal, *A Study in French Assimilation Policy*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1962),p.346

CHAPTER - 4

**PROBLEM AND PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY
IN SENEGAL**

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PROBLEM AND PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY IN SENEGAL

The rapid and often chaotic transitions to democratic governance and free market economies has swept an apparent increase in violent intra-state conflicts, 'Civil' or 'internal' wars terms are contested by those who argue that the international dimension is a crucial feature of most 'internal' conflict. Many of structured around have competing identity claims based on religion, race, nationality, tribe, clan and so on. Is the simultaneous spread of democracy and conflict, an accident of history, or Are they connected processes does democracy exacerbate violent conflict, or does it help to resolve it, there are to approaches.¹

The first views democratization as a major cause, or at the very least precipitant, of the rising tide of violent conflicts, contending that “the opening of democratic space throws up many groups pulling in different directions, which overload causes demands systematic breakdown and even violent conflict.

Democratization in Senegal is organized around non-negotiable identity claims. It is argued that these pose a particular problem for democracy; indeed by helping politicize these claims, democracy may even make them worse. The argument that democracy can be destabilizing dates back to earlier theorists of political order, but has been revived by more recent analysts of the developmental state. It has also proved popular

¹ John Mukum Mboku, *Preparing Africa for the 21st Century Strategic for Peaceful Co-Existence and Sustainable Development* (England , Ashgate Publication, 1999), p. 31.

with many Third World leaders, both the Older and post-independence generation, argued that only one-party systems or 'guided' democracies were needed to contain the social tensions in multiethnic post-colonial states. More than three-quarters of all warfare since World War II has been of an internal nature, and most of the latter has been 'identity-based', although Cold War perceptions and priorities have long clouded this reality. Their principal focus was not democracy per se, but the tendency of political participation to overwhelm weak political institutions in developing countries; an academic position which was readily adopted to legitimize.²

Western support for institution building by authoritarian governments. Because is subtly different from the theorists of political order in that democratic governance is taken as the starting point, and the issue for consideration is what forms of democratic rule with what restrictions on democratic politics are most likely to produce a stable political environment for development.

Generation have claimed that unrestrained multi-party competition and too much emphasis on political and civil rights tend to destabilize democracy in Senegal. But it is argued although "democratic states suffer from conflicts just as others do, and the presence of democracy is no guarantee of a society without political violence. Democratic societies tend to develop the institutions resources and flexibility. Neither

² David Bloomfield, *IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict; Option for Negotiators* (London, Stockholm: 1998), p.13

democracy nor democratisation is without contradictions. They entail the redistribution of power they do indeed have an inherent potential for conflict, as those in power will usually resist redistribution. But democracy can also be understood as a system for the peaceful management of conflicts. It provides a non-violent method for selecting rulers, a forum through which conflicts over resources or other issues can be debated and through which different viewpoints can be represented, and an opportunity for inclusive participation. In making the argument, we put the emphasis as much on democratic politics as on institutions, as much on substantive democratization as on formal democratic rules, and even more on bottom-up integrative social processes than on institutional agreements artificially imposed from above.

The conduct of democratic politics can be characterized in terms of the reversal of Clausewitz's dictum, that is: "Politics is the prosecution of war by other means". Such a characterization suggests that the resolution of conflict is best sought on an "oratorical battleground" in peaceful, non-violent procedures such as covenants, parliaments, and courts -- unlike the warlike approach to politics through which "force monitors persuasion, light establishes right, and conflict resolution is sought in the defeat of the enemy."³

Thus democratic institutions should in principle be capable of handling identity-based conflicts, even when they are characterized by

³ Francis David . J. *The Economic Community of West African States* (London, Routledge, 1999), p. 4.

extreme violence. As Horowitz argues, “there is no case to be made for the futility of democracy or the inevitability of uncontrolled conflict. Even in the most severely divided society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood.” Similarly, Bose suggests that to endorse the claim that plural societies are incompatible with democratic values: “seems to imply that ‘plural societies’ the world over are condemned to an undemocratic future simply because of their plural composition. If this is correct, it would appear that democratic aspirations are a futile fantasy for the vast majority of humankind.”⁴

It is unrealistic to expect democracy to resolve all such conflicts. But it should be able to transform enemies into adversaries and violent struggle into debate, contestation and competition. Democracy can make a virtue of plural systems by providing a framework through which crosscutting social and ethnic cleavages can balance each other and through which grievances and discontents can be expressed and sometimes rectified in Senegal.

India could be said to be to be a living example of this point; although identity based politics have grown in importance in recent years, the survival of democracy in a very poor country can be explained both by an active civil society and by the myriad of cross-cutting social, religious, regional, caste, and linguistic loyalties. But one should not therefore assume that democracies are immune to violent in Senegal.

⁴ Magassauba. M., *Islam and Senegal: Domainless Mollahs*, (Paris, Edition Karthala, 1985), p. 61.

The democratization, especially when mismanaged, cannot itself trigger such conflict, two of the countries in which political violence has been most systematic, protracted and resistant to settlement in Senegal to be long-standing democracies, where there are multiparty elections, vocal legislatures and constitutional and legal protections for human rights. Senegal, which has smoldered since the mid-1980s. with a substantial military presence and curbs on civil and political rights. Moreover, the global spread of democracy has proved more confliction than anyone could have imagined when it began. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and of patrimonial dictatorships in Africa opened the way to the establishment of fledgling democracies in some countries.

But in many others it merely introduced more decentralized forms of oppression and armed conflict. Moreover, misconceived efforts by Western powers to force the pace of economic and political liberalization in Senegal, have frequently been blamed as in Rwanda for the escalation of political violence. the problem may not be with democracy as such, but with how it has been introduced, including the failure to anticipate the spoiling tactics of former beneficiaries of non-democratic governance.⁵

"Democratization" may be said to have some conflict potential, since it entails redistribution of power which is invariably resisted by those in power. But, why should the burden of conflict lie on those who

⁵ Leonard. A. Vellolen, and Philip A. Huxalle, *The African State at a Critical Juncture between Disintegration and Recognition*, (London, Hoover Press, 1972), p.7

are engaged in emancipatory struggles for participation and a just order. Why should it not rather lie on those who aggressively, and often violently, deny others their entitlements?" Nevertheless, the relationship between problem and prospects is clearly far from simple. Hence, there is little point continuing polemical disputes about whether democracy promotes conflict or resolves it. Rather, concentrate on identifying the conditions for realizing democracy's potential as a system for the peaceful management of conflicts, and in particular identity-based conflicts.⁶

Above all under "incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic needs". To be sure, strong authoritarian governments may be able to suppress, or even accommodate, incipient conflicts over long periods of time. But our argument is that it is at moments of transition when non-democratic regimes begin to falter - often as a result of their internal fractures as well as external pressures for change - that the probability of violence increases in Senegal.⁷

In the best of circumstances democratization may succeed in occupying the political space opened up by the retreat of authoritarian elites. But that space may instead be re-occupied by violence: either that of those who fear their loss of power, or that of their opponents who turn to

⁶ Peter Rebb, *Concept of Peace in West Africa* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 41.

⁷ *Ibid.* p.10

violence because they lack more legitimate means of expressing their political demands it may do so when such institutions fail to address the fears of politically excluded groups, as in Senegal.

In sum, the conditions, which pave the way to democracy sometimes also, increase the risk of violent political conflict. Hence the political and institutional choices that are made during periods of transition are crucial and can make all the difference between the consolidation of democracy and regression to non-democratic rule and conflict.⁸

Failures of Democratic Institutions

Themselves in the real world of politics, democracies do not always fulfill the expectation that they should be better at resolving conflict. Sometimes they may even aggravate it. Yet this need not discredit democracy as such, if it is the lack of democratic politics within formal or façade democracies that is the root of the problem their governments may fail to respond to the demands of excluded and potentially violent groups, or to protect their citizens from violence. Or they may be in pawn to special interests with no interest in political compromise, such as the ex-communist nomenclature in parts of Eastern Europe, or the military-business mafias that have 'captured' democratic institutions in some African and Latin American states. Thus, there might still be a strong prima facie case for democratic reform to give all citizens including

⁸ Showeb, M, *Ethnic Stratification in West Africa* (New York, Macmillian 1986), pp. 61-62

minorities a stake in political outcomes, and to ensure that elected governments have the legitimacy and capacity to govern, maintain order and regulate conflict.

However, more troubling questions arise about the relevance of democracy to the Senegalese management of conflict where established democracies have failed to prevent the escalation of conflict or seem incapable of bringing it to an end as in Senegal. In these cases it is often argued that the main problem is with particular forms of democratic contestation, notably majoritarian 'winner-takes-all' institutions. These are allegedly open to abuse by populist politicians in plural societies, encourage ethno-national politics and give minorities little stake in democratic institutions.

Others, however, have contended that the problems with democracy are even more fundamental for instance. They argue that Senegal post-independence history not only refutes the simple proposition that democracy abates conflict; it starkly illustrates the limits of constitutional engineering. Constitutional reforms introduced to blur the edges of majoritarian politics and encourage political alliances across ethnic boundaries merely created new recipes for conflict. Hence, they argue, constitutional engineering by itself is not enough.

It must be supported by more inclusive politics and by government policies, which directly address the role of differential rates of

economic advancement between communities and regions in shaping inter-ethnic hostilities.⁹

A major reason why constitutional reform per se seems to have had so little impact in conflict-torn societies like Uganda, is that political violence as such often brings about fundamental transformations in the rules and practices of politics: normalizing violence itself as a way of allocating power and resources; increasing the political weight of those who control the means of violence be they military men, securocrats, guerrillas or warlords; sharpening polarization between politically opposed groups; reducing the legitimacy and effectiveness both of the state and of democratic institutions.¹⁰

These legacies do not usually disappear when conflicts are 'terminated', and indeed tend to re-ignite conflicts again and again.

The circumstances in which conflicts are brought to an end also make a difference. If conflicts are terminated through negotiation, some onus is placed on both sides to scale down their initial political demands and engages in some form of power sharing, whether or not the latter is written into the final constitutional settlement. But outright victory by one of the contending parties gives more latitude to the victor to rewrite the

In either situation peace building requires compromise among the warring parties and the restoration of the state's authority and capacity to provide basic services including physical security. Thus, Faustian bargains

⁹ ibid, pp.20-27

¹⁰ No.7, p.7.

are often entered into under which ex-dictators, warlords or liberation fighters secure immunity from prosecution democratizing remains crucial to institutionalize such compromises, re-legitimise the state, and prevent further recourse to violence. The central dilemma of such situations remains that the concessions made to the men and women of violence may give them an effective veto over the future of democracy, both of which have used their continued control of the means of violence to intimidate opponents and thus prevent any real democratic contestation despite the establishment of the formal multiparty democratic institutions in Senegal.¹¹

For long periods of its history Europe answered the question of state formation through the nation-state paradigm; i.e. a nation is a cultural community living on a common territory, and its self-determination requires that it create its own state. However, discussions on African conflicts forget that "in the making of nation-states, Europe went through an entire history of ethnic cleansing. Where it did not, it branded cultural minorities as permanent 'national minorities' alongside the cultural majority as the 'nation'. [But] our reality is of multi- and not uni-cultural communities... if we are to adopt the paradigm of a nation creating state, are we prepared to follow Europe into a future of ethnic cleansing, or one of ethnic apartheid?"¹²

¹¹ Ekeh Peter. P, "Colonialism and the two Publics in Africa, A Theoretical Statement", *Comparative Study in Society and History* (London, January 1975) pp. 91-117.

¹² No. 9, pp.10-11.

Many academic and policy studies stress the immense difficulty of building states, let alone democracies, in multi-ethnic states in the East and South. States, it is argued, are in jeopardy from armed conflicts whose "structural root causes" are to be found. Except when they themselves have had a real commitment to more inclusive forms of politics, like the liberation movements in South Africa or much more arguably in Senegal between "different identity groups". Ethnic groups etc. in plural societies really so deep that democracy cannot bridge them, are they more flexible than commonly supposed, so that democratic politics can foster reconciliation and democratic institutions can create incentives for inter-group cooperation in Senegal.

The roots and dynamics of identity conflicts are an enormously complex and disputed topic, and we explore them in another paper. Here we confine ourselves a series of brief propositions to guide the analysis of democratic design that follows.

First, to recognize the role and significance of different identities in protracted conflicts is not to suggest that such conflicts can be understood and addressed solely in terms of 'identity politics'. As Renner notes, the focus on 'identity' often addresses "the symptom instead of the root of the problem" where conflicts are in addition propelled by rivalries

among political elites, global economic dislocations, uneven development, competition for scarce resources, or international intervention¹³.

One should distinguish carefully between identity politics as a potential cause of violent conflict and as a widely used technique for mobilizing groups and individuals for conflict. Many contemporary conflicts have been identity conflicts only in the latter (mobilisational) sense; though of course once ethnic and other identities are mobilized, they can become powerful determinants of political violence in their own right.

The stereotypical distinction between analyses stressing the "Primordial" roots of identity politics and conflicts in the "givens" of kinship, community, tribe, religion and nation etc., and those emphasizing their constructed and contingent character, is overdrawn. Even social scientists strongly identified with a "primordialist" position.

There are many empirical studies, which suggest that social pluralism correlates positively with democracy and negatively with democracy. Yet the underlying relationships are complex and open to considerable variation. Identity-based social cleavages as such are neither a sufficient condition of violent conflict nor do they necessarily prevent its resolution, nor are they an absolute barrier to this raises epistemological and practical issues about what are or are not to be considered. 'Causes' of

¹³ Renner, Micheal, *the global divide: socio-economic disparities and industrial society* in Michael Clare and Yogesh Chandani:(eds) world security challenge for a new century, (London, St. Martin Press, 1998), pp.243

conflicts. Some recent analyses indeed argue that attempting to isolate the 'root causes' of conflict is pointless, as, once begun, conflicts have their own dynamics, which transform the political, economic and social realities of the societies in which they take hold.

However, we still believe the distinction between causes of and techniques of mobilization for conflict remains worth making democracy. Indeed, democracy has co-existed with social pluralism.¹⁴

Moreover, when ethnic constituencies have been mobilized behind conflicts, it has not necessarily been in order to advance exclusive cultural claims upon the state. Sometimes the goal has been the more limited one of securing better access to state distributed jobs, patronage and resources. In other cases ethnic constituencies have been manipulated in order to advance the ambitions and interests of warlords and emergent state elites in Senegal.¹⁵

Terminology, are used "inter-communal", or identity conflicts necessarily "between" different ethnic groups, religious confessions, clans, nationalities etc. Such groups tend to be internally differentiated, and their members to have varying goals and degrees of commitment to violent as opposed to non-violent methods.¹⁶

¹⁴ Boone, C, *Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 61.

¹⁵ Caulom, S, *Le Marabout Et. Le Mance: Islam Et Pauvriour in Senegal* (Paris, A. Pedone, 1981), p. 11.

¹⁶ Diamond J. *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s. Actors and Instruments. Issues and Imperatives* (New York, Carperium 1995), p. 17.

Moreover, as it is observed, ethnic identities are widely used by government bureaucracies as a tool of state policy, or they are manipulated by political elites to stay in power insofar as democratic institutions cannot be considered separately from the ensemble of state institutions, they too cannot be assumed to be neutral areas for conflict management. This does not mean they cannot help to resolve or transform conflicts. But the legitimacy of existing democratic structures may be precisely one of the things that armed opposition movement's challenge, as in Senegal.¹⁷

Hence, reform in democratic institutions may well be a goal as well as a means of conflict resolution. It is worth stressing that violence itself is one of the principal catalysts of ethnic polarization, and is not simply the product of the latter. Ignatieff has talked eloquently of the 'narcissism of minor difference': the fratricidal obsession with the markers of identity that tends to develop in conflicts among groups with relatively little to separate them culturally and linguistically. Once created, these divisive legacies of fratricide cannot be wished away. But the issue is how best to handle them: is it on the one hand by recognizing and perhaps entrenching the divisions between communities in political and constitutional settlements in Senegal to the internationalization of conflict which we have already noted, identity politics too tends to cross national frontiers, which often correspond badly, if at all, with the boundaries between different nationalities and ethnic groups. Hence, there is a growing

¹⁷ Crook, Richard C, *No Party Politics and Local Democracy in Africa* (Boulder. Kegan Paul, 1999), p.85.

tendency of neighboring states and Diaspora communities to support and fund armed conflict and also sometimes to broker peace. This internationalization raises fundamental questions about the feasibility of building peace and constructing democracy inside states which conflict has made so porous and vulnerable to different forms of external intervention.¹⁸

In sum, much of the writing on conflict has emphasized the "uncivil" potential of identity politics and the latter's tendency to spill over into ethnic violence. However, in our view this incivility is by no means inherent, but arises from how ethnic and other identities tend to be mobilized in situations of unrestrained competition for power in a fast changing international environment. The best antidote may be to make use of the same social relationships to strengthen more co-operative forms of identity politics; allowing public debate of grievance and finding ways of channeling it into less extreme forms.¹⁹

Reservations are partly about the sequencing of democratization and partly about the content of democracy itself. During any transition to democracy there are complex trade-offs to be made between the compromises needed to bring the entire major political and military players on board, and the long term requirements of building a sustainable

¹⁸ No. 15, p.82.

¹⁹ Gellar S, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and The West* (Boulder Colorado, Wester View Press, 1982) p. 81.

and popularly-based democracy. The potentially divisive impact of democratization is often counteracted through powersharing during a period of transition, as under the Government of National Unity in South Africa.²⁰

It is often argued that majoritarian systems of democratic government tend to exacerbate identity-based conflict. For example, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict states: "In many multiethnic societies, the procedures of majoritarian democracy have proven effective for managing group relations and maintaining social cohesion. However, in societies with deep ethnic divisions and little experience with democratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian democracy can be self-defeating. Where ethnic identities are strong and national and identity weak, populations may vote largely on ethnic lines. Domination by one ethnic group can lead to a tyranny of the majority."²¹

Majoritarian Democracy

Majoritarian democracy refers to those forms of democratic government which concentrate power in the hands of executives elected by a majority of the popular vote. It heavily emphasizes political competition over the other three functions of democracy. The institutional forms that most often favor majoritarianism include strong Presidential

²⁰ Ibid. p. 81

²¹ Saul John S, *Liberal democracy Vs popular democracy southern Africa*, Review of African political economy (USA, Longman.1997), p.100.

rule or alternatively parliamentary systems in which the Prime Ministers control strong parliamentary majorities; first past the post-electoral systems, which tend to produce such majorities; unicameral legislatures or bicameral legislatures with weak second chambers; relatively weak constitutional divisions of powers between the branches of government; and unitary, centralized state and administrative structures.²²

Qualified Majoritarianism

But if majoritarianism is often problematic, what are the alternatives? ‘Democratic counter-majoritarianism’ can take different forms. Qualified majoritarianism is the least radical: accepting the principle of majority rule, but modifying it to assure political representation of minorities and more plurals, decentralized centers of power. There is no single recipe for constitutional engineering that would best achieve these goals. Much depends on the political history of the country in question, its socioeconomic structure and the extent of inter-group political polarization and violence.

Strong, constitutionally guaranteed human rights protections that would allay the fears of minority groups they would be discriminated against by the majority or be persecuted by the state. These might or might not include group rights, since the latter can sometimes undermine individual rights and freedoms and contribute to the isolation of minority communities. Affirmative action measures to reverse previous legacies of

²² No. 15, p.10.

discrimination or to assure inter-communal 'balance' as under the 'federal character principle supposed to govern the allocation' of political and administrative appointments in Senegal.²³

This has been proposed by the International Crisis group in elections for the Senegal. The tendency of Presidents or Prime Ministers to resort to populist electoral appeals and to disregard the rights and interests of minorities can be restrained through 'horizontal accountability' - i.e. an executive which can be held to account by the legislature and is obliged to respect the constitution by an independent judiciary.

However parliamentary systems are by no means immune to the tyranny of majority. Will reveal that there is a whole range of legislative and judicial constraints by which executives can be held in check; though whether they are always effective is less certain and partly depends on other political factors, notably the party system, that may not be easily influenced through constitutional engineering.

Another important protection against the arbitrary use of power by majoritarian governments, is the embedded autonomy of state bureaucracies. On the one hand these bureaucracies should have an inbuilt capacity to resist attempts by governments to impose discriminatory policies and practices, construct patronage systems and engage in corruption. But on the other hand they should operate within the constitution and the rule of law and be accountable not just toward

²³ Irving Leopold Markovitz, *Leopold Seder Senghor and Negritude* (London, Westview Press, 1972), pp. 61-62.

governments and legislature, but also in the broader court of public opinion. In societies that are prone to political violence, democratic control over the armed forces and police is particularly crucial. Governments should not be able to use them as partisan political instruments since this almost invariably encourages human rights abuses and fans the flames of conflict. But nor should the armed forces be allowed to constitute themselves as self-proclaimed guardians of the national interest, an ideological claim widely abused to justify intervention in politics. Indeed, one of the most crucial issues for most new democracies is how to roll back the political and professional prerogatives appropriated by military establishments and warlords during protracted authoritarian rule and/or armed conflict - without precipitating military re-intervention or return to war by disgruntled ex-combatants in Senegal.²⁴

Consociationalism in essence aims to restructure the entire political system around the principle of corporate decentralization. Its central premise is that cleavages between communities in plural societies run so deep that constitutional tinkering with majoritarian democracy is not enough. Hence, political institutions need to be explicitly redesigned so as to bridge these cleavages, all the more so in societies coping with the legacies of protracted armed conflict.

However, while accommodation of identities needs to be the starting point, the point of the political process must not be to reproduce

²⁴ *ibid.* p. 53.

dualities or differences, but to transcend them. The problem with power-sharing arrangements is that identities become permanent artifacts institutionalized in the structures of the state and confirmed by the political process set in motion by that state. If such agreements, which are essentially truces not peace agreements, are to succeed in transforming truces into peace, this will be for political reasons. In other words, peace can be built in such circumstances, not because of the agreement and indeed perhaps despite the agreement.

There are other 'faultiness' in Senegal society, which cut across ethnic forms of political identity and mobilization. A more useful approach is one, which emphasizes the incorporation, not of minorities, but of the majority of citizens: not only politically, but economically.²⁵ This entails the democratization of participation by ordinary citizens, and democratization of access to resources." An integrative powersharing still to be added] although, arguably, there are aspects of India's constitutional and legal arrangements – such as the recognition of separate family law - which are convocational. Although none of these are the inevitable result of Consociationalism and there are important exceptions as Reynolds argues.²⁶

The process of democratization is not just a process of implanting formal institutions of liberal democracy, but a project of norm creation and

²⁵ Reynold, Andrew, *Electoral system and democratization in southern Africa*, (Oxford,Oxford University Press,1991),p.15.

²⁶ Reynold, Andrew, *Electoral systems and democratization in southern Africa*,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),chapter.4.

cultural change to facilitate a democratic politics which accommodates diversity, opposition, and which aims at building social consensus around national projects. We have chosen to address dilemmas of unequal citizenship rights, poverty, and conflict because contemporary governance debates are burdened with normative expectations about the positive contribution of democracy to civil and political equality, socio-economic equity, and conflict resolution, in spite of the inconclusiveness of the empirical evidence regarding these relationships.²⁷ The conceptual starting point is the 'deep politics of society' rather than the high politics of the state. From the vantage point of social relations and conflict, a range of democratic deficits are illuminated, deficits which are not always immediately apparent in governance debates which focus upon the formal institutions of democracy. In a formal sense, liberal democracies sustain expectations of social equity because of liberal civil and political rights which the poor can use to promote their interests, and also because political ambitions for re-election encourage parties to embrace broad interests. Democracies raise expectations about policy effectiveness because their accountability systems promote hopes for public sector probity, and political competition allows for rational debate and the introduction of new ideas, needs and interests. And democracies are expected to provide avenues for the peaceful resolution of conflict because plural systems allow for the expression and electoral success of

²⁷ No. 15, p.64

oppositional interests – and for compromise and balance between contesting interests through systems for the redressal of grievances and discontent. Actually existing democracies rarely meet these expectations because of the inherent elite bias to the institutions of democracy and to political competition in democracies. But as we have seen in this paper, there is enormous potential for constructive institutional design, policy choice, and changes to the culture of politics which can make democracy responsive to problems of inequality and conflict.

In particular will focus on two central paradoxes of institutional design (a) that institutions are seldom chosen purely on their merits, but rather upon the calculus of political advantage, reflecting the ability of different political interests to determine the outcome of constitutional settlements to their own advantage the literature on the politics of institutional choice; (b) Institutions don't always produce the results they were intended to: the law of perverse or unanticipated consequences.

CHAPTER – 5
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The Social formation as a concept emerged and developed in Senegal during the French rule and due to their capitalist modes of system like new civil and state administration system, new property and land laws, new judiciary and revenue system, new economic system and new educational policies. In Senegal, the upper class as phenomena or social groups first emerged among the higher social people. This was SOS the traditionally learned high caste Muslim was the first to avail of the modern education. It is they who dominated the higher level of posts in the French administrative services.

In fact, the higher group people due to their traditionally privileged position occupied all the white-collar jobs including professional ones. Though a few of the lower group people also got educated and became employed in new occupation but compare to the higher groups. They were very menagerie in size. Thus, the social group emerged in Senegal and primarily constituted the traditionally dominant higher group people. The lower caste and other deprived communities could not emerge as social groups due to the traditional groups administration and hegemony of higher group people in socio-economic and educational spheres.

Yet some of the people among their section emerged as social class much later, in the African context, some scholars have considered the emergence of better of section or elite among the deprived community as the emergence of a new social group. This is so because their new achieved socio-

economic status is quantitatively differ from their traditionally ascribed status. Their social origin as a social and classes for that matter is also different from the old social groups minority constituted of the higher social groups.

Similarly their origin as a member of social groups is a recent development in comparison to the member of old social group;

Moreover, they have achieved that better socio-economic status with the help of protective and welfare measures of the protective discrimination policy of the country. But such benefits have not been available to the member of the old upper class.

In the light of this, the present study has focused on the formation of the social groups among ethnic specially Toucouleur of Senegal, in the first chapter, we have discussed the historical origin of social groups in the Senegal and a tiny new groups among woof. Besides, the chapter identifies research problem and objectives and methodology, in addition to providing conceptual explanation of various terms like, Wolofs, Toucouleur, and Ethnic groups. etc. Social groups and sub-groups. etc. It also pointout some limitations and importance of the study.

A number of theoretical perspectives on social, ethnic and natives, classes have been explained in the second chapter. In the chapter third, we have seen the various factors and forces of the pre and past independence period, which have helped Toucouleur to emerge as old social group in the society. The French government policy towards education and employment brought some positive changes among the servile specially Toucouleur in

Senegal. We have also discussed in this chapter how the their educated and employed Toucouleur contributed both directly and indirectly to generate awareness and consciousness among the Toucouleur masses. The Toucouleurs leadership of both the pre and past independence supplemented this.

The leadership under Leopold Seder Senghor mobilized Toucouleur to fight against the various forms of injustice and strive for their rights.

Finally, this chapter analyzed how the protective discrimination policy adopted after independence has contributed to socio-economic progress of groups. All these together have played a significant role in emergence of social groups among the Toucouleur especially in Senegal.

Though the newly emerged social groups is smaller in size, it is somewhat uniform in the case of Senegal as discussed in chapter three, it is true that the social group is not homogeneous or unified social category, like social groups or class per se. either at the level of retain among its members. For extance, this groups is constituted of Wolofs, Serer, Toucouleur, etc. in Senegal though its largest segment is from Toucouleur. It is in that sense these seems to be uniform or homogeneous, but we have already stated that the Wolofs are much ahead in educational achievements employment and power position as compare to Toucouleur artisans.etc. The structuration of their social status as a new group or social groups is also since relatively longer period, as a consequence, they have assimilated to enjoy their superiority over other social groups in the state, hence a considerable degree of hostility and

antagonism has crept in the relationship between the Wolofs and other social groups and member of that group.

Moreover, member of these groups do retain their group identity and promote, in same ways, the interest of own groups people though contextually they exhibit their allegiance to the social group or the ethnic group per se.

We have also discussed, in this chapter issues pertaining to the Wolofs among the Toucouleur in Senegal, though small section of Toucouleur in Senegal achieved better social-economic status and became member of a social groups, member of this group still suffer from the problem of status identification their low class status often abstracts them to get assimilated in top the social group dominate by the upper class people. Their both ascribed and achieves statuses have created dilemma in their status identification. But in spite of personal problem, the members of social groups are well aware about their social responsibility and they have been playing significant roles in the ailment of Wolof masses in particular and social transformation in general.

The fourth chapter main emphasis on role of problem and prospects in social transformation in the chapter, we have seen that the contributing to the cause of upliftment of the Wolofs, though these social groups is small and its members are placed a various positions for the purpose of jobs, they have close contact with their community member and they keeps their bother in achieving social- cultural progress. Similarly, the Wolof writers who are also member of the social groups have been depicting, though their writings, the actual deprived condition of the Wolof masses. Other have been trying to

impress upon the government of safeguard the interest of Wolofs though properly implementing a member of welfare and development choices and measures in their favour, they have also organized movement for the emancipation of Wolof masses.

In general, the social groups writers led the Wolof panther movement, in the early 1960, for the cause of emancipation of Wolof masses and also for social transformation, they along with other have established a number of formal organization though which they have been spreading awareness about achieving education, eradicating superstitions and provides credits loans facility to the Wolofs.

Similarly, doctors, lawyers, social workers being member of this class have been providing important services to the needy and disadvantaged section of the society. Thus, in spite of their personal problems they have been playing significant roles in the uplift of Wolof masses in particular and social transformation in Senegal.

As a conclusion, a small West African nation with a rich political and cultural heritage, Senegal is one of the most active third world countries on the world scene, despite its size and weak economic base. Where Senegal history has been profoundly affected by its strategic location; its status as sehelian and maritime country brought its peoples in to early contact with Islam and the west and made the country a crossroads where traditional Islamic and European culture met and blended. Where the Dr.Gellar expressing the impact of Islam, western imperialism, and French colonial rule in shaping the modern

country and traces Senegal's political, economic and social evaluation since independence, and also discussed Senegal efforts to maintain political stability and a semblance of democracy in the face of recurrent political and economic crisis and using social tensions, and describes the difficulties Senegal faces in overcoming underdevelopment and economic independency.

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