

**THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES AND
EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL** /

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DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL
FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ORGANISATION
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
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1983

Dedicated to my

PARENTS

C O N T E N T S

	Pages
PREFACE 	1 - vi
Chapter s:	
I INTRODUCTION	1 - 23
II THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES - CONTROVERSY	24 - 53
III A CRITIQUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE	54 - 78
IV TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL	79 - 114
V CONCLUSION	115-127
APPENDICES 	128-132
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 	133-141

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"The splitting of atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking", so states Albert Einstein who split the atom for the first time. As the world has so much changed since the time of Einstein, even the mode of thinking has also been changed. Instead of using atomic power for peaceful purposes, it is increasingly being used for destructive purposes. The scientific and technical development has made it possible to produce deadly weapons to satisfy the economic and political power hunger of man.

① ? Man as a political animal competes with his fellow human beings for power. In such a competition, the nuclear and biological weapons are produced and deployed at various places considered to be strategic in order to establish each other's supremacy. This has initiated the process of arms race which in a nuclear age is a perilous phenomenon affecting human development in all conceivable ways. It has created an atmosphere of global tension and insecurity let alone the magnitude of financial and human resources it swallows which could possibly be used for social and economic development of the teeming millions of the poverty ridden people. Thus, arms race has distorted not only Man's attitude towards peace and security but also the use of global resources.

At the end of the Second World War both the US and USSR emerged as super powers with completely different ideology ies

but with the common desire to acquire world supremacy. Since then, in their anxiety to achieve ideological and political supremacy over the world, constantly try to outwit each other by means of military strength. The arms race started with the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe due to its strategic position. For, (the) Europe, holds the boundary line of the sphere of influence of the two super powers decided at the end of the Second World War. Through the deployment of nuclear weapons in an effort to limit the advance of each other beyond their sphere, Europe has been virtually turned by the super powers into a theatre to stage their military might and threat. In this process, emerged the issues of the Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) and the regional security of Europe.

The Europeans were repeatedly told that the deployment of TNF is for safeguarding their political security through the process of achieving military balance. Various strategic concepts and doctrines were developed by the US to convince its West European allies. The Europeans both East and West accepted the deployment of TNF used for both tactical and strategic purposes as they were made to believe that any military imbalance may affect the political equilibrium [already] prevailed. However, competitive deployment by the super powers has ignited a process of escalation of arms in the theatre. Due to such an escalation of arms done

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under the coverage of theatre balance and European security has resulted in the massive accumulation of theatre nuclear forces. The magnitude of TNF in Europe has gone beyond the level necessary for maintaining the security of Europe. It clearly indicates the extraneous motives of the super powers to use Europe as a theatre to execute their global strategy of reaching political terms with each other through military means. The realisation of the possibility of the nuclear terror by error and the security implications behind the idea of limited war together with their conception of the super powers' tactics and strategy, have all combined to induce the Europeans to have an independent perception of their own security.

They called for arms control negotiations between the two super powers. But, the super powers with the mutual interest of maintaining their monopoly of detente through the maintenance of an 'entrenched system' not only to exclude the Europeans in the arms control talks but also to keep their main understanding out of the knowledge of the Europeans. In the TNF negotiations between the super powers there emerged various controversies over the specific issues of limiting TNF arms. As a matter of fact, the TNF controversy has been tactfully used by the super powers to protract the negotiation without any perceptible and immediate results. Moreover, given the super powers' tactical attachment to

Europe, it is difficult to hope for the guarantee to the European interests. For, any arms reduction will mean a reduced grip over the theatre. Thus, arms control through bilateral negotiation is destined to be a failure especially from the point of view of European security.

Therefore, to assure European security there should be multilateral negotiations in which Europeans should be the legitimate participants with equal rights. The distinction of TNF and SNF (Strategic Nuclear Forces), the tactics adopted by the tacit understanding of super powers to exclude the Europeans in arms control negotiations, should not be allowed to continue. Since such an isolation of TNF issue ignores its functional relationship with SNF, the problem will be further complicated. For, the European security is equally affected by both the TNF and SNF deployed by the super powers. To get adequate bargaining strength in the multilateral talks, there should be an increasing co-operation and mutual trust between European nations. More importantly, they should not behave as members of NATO or WIO but as members of the larger European community to safeguard their common security. To expose the foul designs of the super powers the Europeans should also insist in keeping the arms control negotiations open to the world public. The vigilance of the public is a powerful force for an effective arms control in Europe. In this respect the Europeans should realize the significance of peace movements.

Moreover, it is important to augment their effort for arms control and detente in Europe with the support from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Such an alliance can be formalised in international forums like UNO. Both Europe and the Third World countries represented by NAM have tented to realize the refutable fact that the issue of European arms control should be dealt within the framework of world arms control and detente. Moreover, regional security through arms control is logically interrelated with the world security as such. Therefore, the NAM and other peace-loving forces aiming at global detente and disarmament will play a significant role in the European arms control.

Against this background, the first chapter aiming at introducing the subject highlights the trends and magnitude of TNF deployment in Europe. It also tries to give the meaning and types of TNF. The second chapter, after having surveyed the evolution of strategic concepts and doctrines developed by the US to tuide its nuclear strategy in Europe, tries to give an account of the TNF controversy both between the super powers as well as between the USA and West Europe. Third chapter shed light on the process of arms control negotiations in Europe. The super powers' tactics in such negotiations and their implications to the European security is also indicated. Fourth chapter focuses on the future of arms control in Europe which is followed by the concluding

chapter which emphasizes the need for a new perspective of European arms control and underlines the role of NAM and peace movements.

With all ^{ty ?} humiliation, it should be acknowledged, at the very outset, that the present study is only a modest attempt to describe the TNF controversy and its implications to the European arms control. Highly technical aspects of the TNF issues have been deliberately excluded from the study and only a descriptive account of the issues are given.

I express my deepest sense of gratitude to my guide Dr T.T. Poulouse, Professor, Disarmament Studies Division, whose help and co-operation exceed far beyond the academic bounds. I also thank Professor Zuberi, Chairman of the International Politics and Organization, for his encouragement and valuable suggestions.

I owe special gratitude to my friends Dr Raja Mohan, Maria Saleth, Sunil Adam and Pramod Kumar Singh who helped me in various stages of this work.

And finally I thank Mr Pahwa for his nice typing.



New Delhi,
Date: 26.12.1983.

(P. Moorthy)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the most potential threat hanging over the mankind as the proverbial Democles Sword today is that of nuclear war. Human existence has increasingly become vulnerable to this perilous phenomenon especially in the context of new Cold War. In fact, the arms race and the consequent nuclear madness are the offshoots of the burgeoning competition between the two super powers viz. the United States of America and the Soviet Union, for acquiring political domination over the world. Thus, arms race is the most serious manifestation of the ongoing ideological Cold War which is a never ending process given the intransigence of the two power contenders. Each one tries to emulate the other in getting military supremacy through massive accumulation of nuclear weapons.

In this race for power, they try to internationalise the regional conflicts for their strategic and military advance and many nations and regions become pitiable victims of the Cold War. Therefore, to preserve peace and avert nuclear war which can inflict irreparable damage on the

planets civilization remains the most urgent task facing mankind. To halt the arms race and save the world from the brink of destruction caused by the possible nuclear catastrophe are the items figuring foremost on the world agenda. In this respect, it should be noted that the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament held in June-July 1982 gave priority to arms limitation among the major nuclear-weapon powers especially the US and USSR, regional security arrangements, disarmament and international security, negotiating machinery for disarmament and disarmament education. These are the areas where the future of international relations is going to be decided and where the struggle is especially acute between two diametrically opposed political courses with ideological underpinnings. In order to assure peace and security on a permanent basis, arms control and disarmament are the logical first steps.

As a matter of fact, the arms race started with the first US atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the end of World War II, ironically after having signed the United Nations Charter for International Peace and Security. Such a calculated demonstration of US nuclear might, immediately instigated the Soviet effort to produce its own atomic weapons which resulted in the successful explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb by the late 1940s. The

new military parity, in terms of nuclear capabilities, have sharpened the conflict between the two super powers. In order to have an edge over the Soviet Union, the US started deploying nuclear missiles in Europe. With this, arms deployment started on a competitive scale both in Europe and elsewhere in the world. It is obvious that the deployment of nuclear weapons has started originally from Europe which expanded to other strategic areas of the world. Naturally, any effort to achieve peace and stability through arms control and disarmament should logically start with European arms control. Hence is the significance and indispensability of European arms control negotiation for achieving disarmament at global level indicating thereby the interdependence between regional security and international security.

To be real, arms control, however, cannot be achieved with a single strident step. It is a gradual process requiring step by step advancement. Since the strategic arms limitation and reduction is of special significance for the efforts to curb arms race, defuse war danger and maintain universal peace, it has been taken as the starting point for arms control negotiations. In terms of regional priority, the main focus of arms control talks is on Europe as arms build up is more intense here and, in an important sense, arms in other strategic

regions have been deployed as if to reinforce and augment the European weapon systems. European arms control necessitates efforts at reducing the Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) deployed in Europe by both the US and Soviet Union at the first instance and subsequently, the TNF deployed by the European countries themselves. Therefore, TNF negotiation is of prime significance in achieving regional disarmament and to pave the way for global disarmament.

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TNF, though precludes a clear-cut definition, it can roughly be said as nuclear weapons with short-range speed deployed in a particular region either for specific tactical purpose or for both tactical and strategic purposes. TNF is called with different names depending upon the context and purpose. For instance, they are known as 'grey area weapons', or in the European context, 'ero-^{Eu80 ?} strategic weapons'¹ and as intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) for the purpose of current Geneva negotiations.² They are classified into three categories in accordance with their range as: Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), Medium-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (MRTNF) and Short-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (SRTNF). LRTNF is having a range of

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1 See: United Nations (UN), Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1981), pp. 14-15.

2 See: Carnegie Panel, Challenges for US National Security, Reprinted in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), vol. 12, no. 10-11, October-November 1982, p. 660.

more than 1,000 km, but less than 5,500 km. MRTNF is covering a range of 200 to 1,000 km. And SRTNF is with a range up to 200 km.³

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 To understand TNF more clearly it is useful to distinguish it from strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF). The strategic weapons are designed to be used for striking long distance targets, whereas TNF are designed to strike at immediate targets with limited impact.⁴ Since the TNF is used for both tactical and strategic purposes, it is, however, very difficult to distinguish it from SNF. In this context, Jonathan Alford has rightly pointed out that one cannot simply isolate TNF from SNF as they are distinctly interactive.⁵ However, in terms of its functions, TNF acquires different characteristic, but the difference is one of degree not of kind. But, it should also be admitted that TNF is functionally related with SNF as the former is designed to support the latter. Broadly, TNF is intended by the US to perform four somewhat related functions. Firstly, it can help to fill the gap in the conventional and

3 See: Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), Year Book, Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (London: Taylor and Francis, 1982), pp. 3-49.

4 Department of Defence, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 328-9.

5 Jonathan Alford, "The Balance of Forces", in Karl E. Birnbaum, ed., Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects (Vienna: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980), p. 3.

strategic forces of the US and its allies. It is necessitated by the significant burden that the rough parity in nuclear forces achieved by the Soviets with the US has supposedly resulted. Secondly, it can help to deter and, if necessary, to defeat attacks by the Soviet Union and by such countries as China or North Korea in key regions outside the United States. Thirdly, it can serve the objectives of US foreign policy based on deterrence rather than disarmament. Fourthly, TNF plays the important political and psychological role of representing the tangible commitment to the allies that the US remains involved in European defence. It is because of these very functions of TNF, the Soviet has not accepted the existence of TNF as such. It is this basic difference which has necessitated the US to describe the TNF as INF, for the purpose of Geneva negotiations for arms control.

Verbiage For a clear conception of the speed and magnitude of TNF deployment in Europe and the strategic motives behind that, it is essential, as a background, to have a brief history of TNF deployment itself. What follows subsequently is an attempt in that direction.

For the first time in the history of nuclear deployment, the US had started TNF deployment in the late 1940s. Initially, thirty-two B-29 bombers were deployed in Europe. B-29, the so-called 'super fortress' had a radius of

operation of about 2,500 km and therefore, depended on forward bases for strikes against the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of the Theatre Nuclear, and Forward Based Systems (FBS) in Europe. Throughout the 1950s, a variety of other nuclear-capable aircrafts--both land-and carrier-based--were also deployed in Europe and in Europe^{AM} waters, some of them were capable of striking against the Soviet Union. In addition to US deployment, there were the Jupiter in Italy and in Turkey, and Ihor in the United Kingdom.⁶ Thor

In December 1957, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries met in Washington to reassess their military position. At that meeting, the US convinced its allies of the need for the deployment of long-range missiles in Europe by indicating the Soviet Union's land superiority. The December meeting used to be held every year to reassess NATO military position is having a significant place in the history of TNF deployment as most of the crucial decisions for further accumulation of TNF in Europe, have been taken in those meetings. In the 1957 meeting it was decided, as a diplomatic move, to withdraw some theatre nuclear weapons which are land-based, while Polaris submarines were already patrolling the Mediterranean

6 See SIPRI, n. 3, pp. 6-7.

and the Norwegian seas.⁷ The strategy is that the continuity of Soviet deployment in land would be broken by "putting the deterrence at sea" or by eliminating the weapon systems on grounds.⁸

Moreover, as long as no gap in this continuity of deterrence is created, there is nothing wrong with modernizing military postures by eliminating costly, militarily useless and vulnerable systems. Such a strategy has been aptly described by Bernard Brodie as the "de-escalating effect of the threat of escalation".⁹ In brief, the outlook of the December meeting is that, to counter Soviet land-based missiles, the NATO countries have to go for sea and air-based weapon systems, as the land-based weapon systems are very expensive. Concealing the cost consideration for the shift of emphasis, all the December meetings of the NATO purport to secure wide currency for their thesis of supremacy of Soviet land-based weapon systems and the consequent need for the expansion of sea and air-based weapon systems of NATO as a counterweight.¹⁰

7 Ibid., p. 7.

8 R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 36.

9 Quoted in *ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

In response to the Western move in European Theatre, the Soviet Union, with the intention of closing the gap in strategic means, has developed and deployed similar weapon systems (TNF) to counter-balance the US forward-based weapon systems. Since the late 1950s till the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union deployed SS-3 and SS-4, the Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) and SS-5, the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) around its periphery. More importantly, so as to counter the US sea-based weapon systems comprised of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) such as Polaris and Posidon, and the air-based weapon systems like the proposed B-52 intercontinental aircrafts, Soviet Union has decided to deploy SS-20, the three warheaded mobile missiles.¹¹ To pave the way for the smooth deployment of SS-20, Soviet Union decided, inter alia, not to require the US for limiting its Forward-Based Systems (FBS) such as the Polaris, Posidon submarine bases at Holy Loch (Scotland) and Rota (Spain) and forward-based nuclear delivery aircrafts such as the F-111s in Britain and France. Therefore, in the Vladivostok meeting between Soviet Union and United States, both the parties with tacit understanding, did not mention the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) or FBS.¹²

11 See: Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision", Survival (London), vol. 25, no. 3, May-June 1983, pp. 110-19.

12 Ibid.

Subsequently, the SS-20 often described as "a leap forward in counterforce capability" was deployed since 1976-77, which has been taken by the US to justify LRINF modernization in the European theatre.¹³ Subsequently, when the NATO meeting held in December 1979, they decided to replace the existing American Pershing-IA missiles deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with 108 new, longer-range Pershing-II launchers. In addition, it was also agreed that 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) with a range of 2,500 km would also be deployed on the territory of a number of the European allies. Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium agreed in principle to host the deployment of these missiles. However, the Dutch and Belgians expressed certain reservations which led them to delay their final decisions on accepting deployment on their territory.¹⁴ In toto,^{all} 572 Pershing-II and Cruise missiles have to be deployed by the end of the 1980s.

The following Table I shows the list of hosting countries, location, number and the probable dates for the deployment of weapons in accordance with NATO decision of December 1979.¹⁵

13 See SIPRI, n. 3, p. 8.

14 See Joseph Fitchett, "NATO Will Deploy New Nuclear Force, Dutch Reject Missiles", International Herald Tribune (Paris), December 13, 1979.

15 Times of India (New Delhi), 25 November 1983.

Table I

Deployment of Weapons

<u>S. No.</u>	<u>Countries</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Date of Deployment</u>
1	Britain	Greenham Common	96 Cruise Missiles	December 1983
2	West Germany	Mutlangen	36 Pershing-IIs	December 1983
3	Italy	Comiso	112 Cruise Missiles	March 1984
4	West Germany	Heilboronn	36 Pershing IIs	mid or late 1984
5	West Germany	Neu Vlm	36 Pershing IIs	mid or late 1984
6	Belgium	Florennes	48 Cruise missiles	Possibly in 1985
7	Netherlands	Woensdrecht	48 Cruise missiles	mid-1986
8	West Germany	Bitburg	96 Cruise missiles	1986
9	Britain	Molesworth	64 Cruise missiles	1988

It is all too obvious that the competitive tendency between the super-powers to acquire military supremacy in Europe for underpinning their global strategy, has resulted in the massive accumulation of TNF. The following tables (Table II-a, b and c) indicate the startling magnitude of TNF deployments by both the US and Soviet Union as well as the West European countries. For the most recent picture of the developments in TNF deployment, refer the Appendix tables.

Table II-a

U.S. Nuclear Forces For Europe

Particulars	Number	Warheads/ Bombs	Range in Miles (km)	Basing
<u>Long-Range INF</u>				
Poseidon C-3 missiles [©] (total of 400 warheads)			2810 (4500)	Poseidon Submarines
F-III fighter-bombers	156	2	1190 (1900)	Britain
<u>Tactical Nuclear Weapons</u>				
A-6E attack aircraft	20	2	625 (1000)	2 aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean
A-7E attack aircraft	40	2	560 (900)	
F-4 fighter-bombers	324 (265) [£]	1	470 (750)	US/Europe
Pershing IA missiles	108	1	450 (720)	Germany
Lance missiles	36	1	70 (110)	Europe
8" howitzers	56	N.A.	18 (29)	Europe
155 mm howitzers	252	N.A.	9 (14)	Europe
Atomic demolition munitions	?	1	0 (0)	Europe

© Strategic warheads on Poseidon submarines that are administratively assigned to SACEUR by the United States.

£ According to US Department of State figures, 225 US F-4 fighter-bombers are stationed in Europe.

Source: The Military Balance, 1981-1982 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

Table II-b

Soviet Nuclear Forces for Europe

Particulars	Number	Warheads/ Bombs	Range in miles (km)	
<u>Long-Range INF</u>				
SS-20 missiles	175(300)*	3	3130	(5000)
SS-5 missiles	40	1	2560	(4100)
SS-4 missiles	340	1	1190	(1900)
TU-22 M/26 Backfire B bombers	65	4	2520	(4025)
TU-22 Blinder bombers	125	2	1940	(3100)
TU-16 Badger bombers	310	2	1750	(2800)
<u>Tactical Nuclear Weapons</u>				
SU-24 (SU-19) Fencer fighter-bombers	480	2	1000	(1600)
MiG-27 Flogger D fighter-bombers	500	1	450	(720)
SU-17 Fitter C/D fighter-bombers	700	1	375	(600)
SU-7 Fitter A fighter-bombers	165	1	375	(600)
MiG-21 Fishbed J-N fighter bombers	750	1	250	(400)
SS-N-5 sub-launched missiles	75	1	700	(1120)
SS-12 Scaleboard missiles	65	1	560	(900)
SS-1 Scud A/B missiles	410	1	90/190(150/300)	
FROG-7 missiles	482	1	40	(70)
180 mm howitzers	168	N.A.	19	(30)

* The United States estimates that there are 300 Soviet SS-20 launchers deployed, plus 50 more under construction: refire missiles are not counted in the 300.

Source: The Military Balance, 1981-1982 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), and The Economist, 17 October 1981, for SS-20 figures.

Table II-c

Allied Nuclear Forces For Europe

<u>Particulars</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Warheads/ Bombs</u>	<u>Range in Miles (km)</u>	<u>Countries Equipped</u>
<u>Long-Range TNF</u>				
Polaris A 3 sub-launched missiles	64	3	2875 (4600)	Britain
MSBS M-20 sub-launched missiles	80	1	1875 (3000)	France
SSBS S-203 missiles	16	1	1875 (3000)	France
Vulcan B-2 bombers	57	2	1750 (2800)	Britain
Mirage IVA bombers	33		1000 (1600)	France
<u>Tactical Nuclear Weapons</u>				
Buccaneer attack aircraft	60	2	590 (950)	Britain
F-104 fighter-bombers*	318	1	500 (800)	Belgium, Germany, Greece Italy, Turkey, Netherlands
F-4 fighter bombers*	40	1	470 (750)	Turkey
Jaguar fighter bombers	80	1	450 (720)	Britain, France
Mirage IIE fighter bombers	30	1	375 (600)	France
Super Etendard fighter bombers**	12	2	350 (560)	France
Pershing IA missiles*	72	1	450 (720)	Germany
Pluton missiles	42	1	75 (120)	France
Lance missiles*	61	1	70 (110)	Belgium, Britain, Canada Italy, Germany, Netherlands
Honest John missiles*	42	1	25 (40)	Greece, Turkey
8" howitzer*	202	N.A.	10 (16)	Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece
155 mm howitzers*	1402	N.A.	10 (16)	Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey

* Two-key arrangements, However no US warheads are stored in Denmark or Norway.

** Carrier-based.

Source: The Military Balance, 1981-82 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).

Although casual reference has been made about certain aspects of the strategic motives in the preceding brief history of TNF deployment, a more detailed account of the strategic evolution is indispensable to facilitate a clear understanding of TNF controversy to be dealt subsequently. At the outset, ^{it should be noted that as the Soviet union} staunchly believes in total war behaviour rather than of a particular theatrical war, it does not have a special strategy as TNF or SNF to maintain its forces and, in fact, it denounces the very conception of TNF as such. TNF strategy is, therefore, a special creation of American nuclear strategy to defend the West European security which, in the US view, is inseparable from its own security. However, the guiding principle of US nuclear strategy of deterrence has undergone continuous change in accordance with the prevailing military balance, Soviet move and their own tactical motives as well as to accommodate the European views. At each phase of its change, some doctrine or other have been developed to justify the persistence of TNF in Europe. Concurrent with such change, varying emphasis has been accorded to conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces.¹⁶

In 1953, early and massive use of nuclear weapons was emphasized by US as well as its NATO allies as the main

16 See Carnegie Panel, n. 2, pp. 660-93.

component of deterrence. Given clear US superiority in nuclear weapons, such a strategy known as massive retaliation seemed to possess sufficient credibility. But, in the mid-1950s, when the Soviet Union deployed ICBMs capable of striking the US, West Europeans started questioning the credibility of the strategy. Even some of the US nuclear experts have also called for an urgent review of the massive retaliation strategy. As for instance, General Taylor is of the view that "Massive retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs."¹⁷ However, the US tried to reassure Western Europe by deploying more tactical and theatre nuclear forces capable of striking Soviet conventional forces. Such a threat to strike at Soviet divisions appeared more credible than a threat to destroy Soviet cities in a nuclear first strike.

Moreover, in the late 1950s, the US introduced long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe and thereby linked the strategic nuclear weapons with tactical ones. It was to convince the Soviets that nuclear attack is more likely from Europe rather than from the US.¹⁸ Critics

¹⁷ Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Maxwell Publication, 1960), p. 4.

¹⁸ Carnegie Panel, n. 2, pp. 660-93.

like President de Gaulle of France continued to challenge the US strategy as suicidal. Meanwhile the US, in the early 1960s, desired a shifting of emphasis to conventional defences. It fomented an acrimonious debate within NATO as the Europeans feared that the reliability of extended nuclear deterrence would be seriously undermined by such a shifting emphasis. Consequently, since 1967 the doctrine of flexible response became the guiding principle in which the West Europeans conceded to the need for conventional response to Soviet threat and the US, on its part, conceded to retain strong nuclear first use option.

As a matter of fact, the flexible response doctrine was already developed in the early 1960s and has been the main plank of US nuclear policy during President Kennedy's Administration. Under this policy, the number of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was dramatically increased to about 7,000 which is still its number today.¹⁹ The tactics involved in this doctrine was that any attack or threat from the East would be met not by maximum counterblow but at the lowest appropriate level. Thus, the flexible response doctrine adopted by NATO in 1967 derives its roots from the early US doctrine. It is

¹⁹ See Wallace Irwin, ed., Great Decisions '79 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1980), pp. 24-33.

to be noted that in the quest for a suitable doctrine to guide the US nuclear strategy particularly in Europe, various strategic concepts and doctrines have been developed by the US nuclear strategists particularly during 1960-67, i.e. the period between the adoption of flexible response strategy by the US and its later application to NATO. In fact, only out of the interaction between the multiplicity of doctrines, the flexible response strategy has taken its full shape to be applied finally to NATO in 1967. Nevertheless, the process of strategic evolution has also given rise to some new concepts slightly different from that of flexible response.²⁰

In the search for a suitable strategy to accommodate its tactical interests and the view points of its allies, US came out with the strategy known as "Limited War Strategy". It is based on the assumption that no one would attack first because the attacker could not escape destruction.²¹ According to Norden, a limited war strategy emphasizing the policy of employment and use of theatre force is a "modern warfare which is still fought on a

20 See Aaron L. Frieberg, "A History of the US Strategic Doctrine - 1945 to 1980", Survival, vol. 19, no. 2, March-April 1977, pp. 37-66.

21 C.E. Norden, "The Debate on Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Limited Nuclear War - And the Future", The Army Quarterly (Tavistock, Devon), vol. 108, no. 4, pp. 391-403.

theoretical level".²² As a matter of fact, the strategy has had its roots in the Eisenhower Administration's policy for equipping theatre forces in the 1950s and more particularly in the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's "controlled response doctrine" of 1962. The author of this doctrine has explained its logic as: "Principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his civilian population."²³ It is obvious that the controlled response doctrine has led the emergence of limited war strategy.

Since then, the limited war strategy has been implied in different but interrelated terms like "limited strategic retaliation", "limited option", "limited counterforce retaliation", and "counter value strategy". The limited strategic retaliation was basically emphasized as an alternative to the strategy of "Massive Retaliation". The same strategy of limited retaliation used in the context of a particular theatre, is known as limited option strategy which aims at deterring the enemy in the European theatre. And, the counterforce strategy has evolved out of the need for a strategy to justify the striking of the

22 Ibid., p. 391.

23 McNamara, R.S., Address Before the Fellow of the American Bar Foundation (Chicago: Office of Public Affairs, 1962), pp. 6-7.

opponent's nuclear and general military positions. But the adoption of such a strategy needs large numbers of extremely accurate nuclear weapons. The counter value strategy, on the other hand, has evolved out of the need for targeting nuclear weapons on the opponent's cities and industrial areas. When compared with a counterforce strategy, this strategy requires fewer and less accurate nuclear weapons.²⁴ (of higher yield?)

Limited war strategy, in turn, gave place to the flexible response doctrine. It is so because the flexible response was considered much more convenient than the doctrine of controlled response. The change is justified by the argument that since one cannot assume what the enemy will do, it is better to be flexible in accordance with the enemy's action, instead of controlling our doctrinal posture. Despite the theoretical justification, the reason for the formulation and adoption of flexible response doctrine was that it will serve better the US strategic endeavour in European theatre.²⁵ Consequently, the flexible response doctrine was adopted as the permanent strategy by both the US and NATO countries.

24 See John Cox, Overkill. The Story of Modern Weapons (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1981), pp. 242-4.

25 Ibid.



However, in the late 1970s, the limited war strategy was retained by the US administration by virtue of the Presidential Directive, 59. The Directive envisages to develop the capability to fight a protracted but limited nuclear war from the European theatre which is considered to serve better the US tactical interest with maximum advantages. In this context, the New York Times, reflecting the American mood, writes: "The best way to prevent a major conflict with Moscow is to be capable of waging a prolonged but limited nuclear war."²⁶ It is not to be missed that all the doctrinal changes related with the US nuclear strategy are basically motivated by the need to justify the maintenance and deployment of TNF for assuring European security. It is precisely because of this reason that some Western nuclear strategists have described the changing US nuclear strategy as different "labels...glued to an old bottle with old wine" supplied to the West Europeans.²⁷ Despite changes in the composition, the TNF have played roughly the same role in Europe since the beginning viz. as a compensation for the Soviet advantages in conventional forces, and as a deterrent against any Soviet attack, whether conventional or

26 New York Times, 22 August 1980.

27 Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen, NATO and the Atlantic Defence: Perception and Illusions (London: Praeger, 1982), p. 4.



nuclear. But views as to how TNF might be used have changed time and again.

As noted earlier, in addition to the American TNF system, the Soviet Union has also maintained and deployed large number of weapons, considered as TNF, both in its territory and Eastern Europe. Since TNF is the short-range weapon systems, it will invariably jeopardise the security of the countries in which it is actually deployed. Hence the competitive deployment of TNF, as tactical weapon in the European theatre by both the US and Soviet Union, has made Europe more vulnerable to nuclear threat than any other area of the world. The International Herald Tribune has bluntly described the situation as "these bombs are weapons that will supposedly be used against NATO and Warsaw Pact countries with the exception of the United States and Soviet Union. In other words these forces are designed to wipe away Europe."²⁸

The European countries, though they themselves were involved in the TNF deployment for the reason of military pact and other security considerations, nevertheless, did not fail to perceive the new situation and its implication. Many of the European countries have felt that TNF system deployed in their soil is not for their own

28 International Herald Tribune, 10 March 1978.

defence, but for the theoretically motivated nuclear war of the so-called super powers.²⁹ It is to be emphasized that even some of the US nuclear strategists are not particularly satisfied with TNF deployment in Europe. For instance, many analyses carried out in the US Department of Defence (MacNamara, Clifford, Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger) have clearly shown the unnecessary development in theatre nuclear system of Europe.³⁰ Notwithstanding these dissensions, the US Government is still going for TNF deployment. However, the different perception of the US, Soviet Union and Western Europe has given rise to the TNF controversy between the US and Western Europe on the one hand and between the US and Soviet Union on the other hand. The subsequent chapter aims to shed light on the TNF controversy.

29 See SIPRI, Tactical Nuclear Weapons : European Perspectives (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), pp. 125-36.

30 Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES - CONTROVERSY

The TNF controversy is not only a controversy between the East and West but is also within the West itself, i.e. between the US and its West European partners. While the first aspect is understandable in the context of the cold war politics of the super powers, the latter is an unexpected but significant development much to the embarrassment of the US policy-makers who constantly tried to convince and hoodwink the West Europeans of the inevitable political and strategic need for TNF deployment by means of various concepts and doctrines. Even though the intra-alliance controversy within the NATO members is unexpected, nevertheless it is not an entirely new one.

It seems that in the TNF controversy, there lies a common interest between the East and West viz. of achieving political balance through military means. The TNF controversy particularly as a strategic tool having a war fighting capability both for deterrence and as an integral element in defensive operation in any conflict in Europe, is based on the tactics of 'escalation'. The

tactics of escalation is done by trading the so-called 'bargaining chip' by each side which provides grounds for both to go for further development to maintain military balance and hence political balance. In such a system, both sides have acknowledged TNF as a tangible link between the conventional and strategic weapons. The escalation tactics appears to be a never ending process as it is assumed that the opponent will ever reach the level of its rivalry in pursuing the same tactics of escalation.¹ Thus, when it seems that the US is deploying forces to have an edge over the USSR, the latter will try to reach the level of its rival by following the tactics of escalation. The US, in turn, will go for 'escalation matching' which will place further burden of escalation on the enemy.² It is to be noted that both the tactical, conventional and strategic as well as Eurostrategic forces, are involved in such an escalatory process. Here lies the real threat of escalation to the security of Europe.

From the point of view of the US, the escalatory process is essential to assure credibility of their strategy. It is also to be noted that if the USSR reached a strategic parity as stipulated in the SALT agreement, the US strategy

1 See Lord Zuckerman, Defeat is Indivisible in Apocalypse Now (London: Nottingham, 1980), p. 27.

2 Bernard W. Roger, "Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response", Strategic Review (Washington), vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 1983, p. 12.

in the theatre is unworkable. Therefore, the US has to involve also the Soviet Union in the process of escalation which can be easily done by raising the nuclear threshold of Western Europe and thereby force the latter to catch up the level of US strategic means.³ The major aim of this policy (also implied in the phraseology, in the specific context of Europe, as 'extended deterrence') is to deter Soviet Union outside the territory of USA which means indirectly to keep the Soviet Union within Europe itself.⁴ The ultimate result is that the European theatre becomes more tense with multiple deployment of nuclear forces, ironically with the aim of maintaining European security.

The tacit understanding between the super powers, in protecting the TNF controversy as a tool of maintaining a strategic control over Europe is all too apparent. Despite the convergence of tactical interest of the super powers in maintaining the TNF controversy, there are glaring differences at the technical and practical levels of TNF negotiations. The points of difference are related with two basic aspects namely, (i) the definition or classification of TNF, (ii) the question of LRTNF modernization. It is to be mentioned here that the controversy revolving around the two aspects

3 See Herman Kahn, On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Hudson Institute, 1965), p. 89.

4 Ibid.

has also been utilized to prolong the TNF controversy itself and postpone the possible agreements of arms control.

Before describing the particulars of TNF controversy, it is useful to have an idea of generally how a controversy is emerging in a normal situation. Arthur Schopenhauer has explained this as:

A and B engaged thinking in common...
and A perceives that B's thoughts on the
same subjects are not the same of his own;
he does not begin by revising his own process
of thinking, so as to discover any mistakes
which he may have made, but he assumes that
the mistake has occurred in B's. 5

(AS)?

And B^o also thinks in the way misunderstanding A's intention. Thus, from the above definition it follows that a controversy in its true sense, emerges out of mutual misunderstanding or miscalculation of the each other's intentions and motives. But, the TNF controversy between super powers cannot come under the purview of such an explanation of controversy due to its strange nature. It appears as a controversy not based on mutual misunderstanding but on the tacit and, in a sense, secret collaboration between the parties engaged in it. There is a mutual understanding to protect^{ya} a particular negotiation which may possibly limit their global designs for power. It is also

5 Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy (London: Swan, 1806), p. 20.

evident from the moves of both the super powers that, for keeping Europe as a buffer between their own territories through constant deployment of forces under the garb of security, they are using TNF negotiation as a means to achieve the end of TNF controversy. Against this background, let us deal with the so-called TNF controversy both in its technical and practical aspects.

As the Guardian has observed, the fundamental task in TNF negotiation "is to decide which missile rank as theatre weapons, then to see whether a balance already exists or not, and then to achieve balance at a lower level".⁶ Let alone the aspect of TNF balance in which both the super powers fears threat from each other implying the imbalance, the principal step viz. the classification of the TNF weapons runs into difficulty. This is due to the fact that these TNF weapons of the US and Soviet Union are differing in their technicalities, though classified as TNF on the basis of their range and speed. The controversy revolving around the definition and classification of TNF weapons which stifles efforts to go for other subsequent steps, represent the major stumbling block in TNF negotiations.

6 The Guardian Weekly (London), 13 December 1981.

However, an apparent way out to this controversy was emerged from SALT-II negotiation. According to the Article IV-8 of the SALT-II treaty, the 'accepted definition of TNF' to both the super powers is as follows:⁷

- (i) a narrow definition that covers only American and Soviet Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) with a range beyond 100 km, especially the Soviet SS-20, the Backfire and American SLBMs, Forward Based Systems (FBS) and future ground-launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM);
- (ii) a medium definition that includes the TNF of third countries - France, Great Britain;
- (iii) a wide definition that comprises all sub-strategic systems presently deployed in the geographic boundaries of Europe or targeted against Europe.

The first narrow-definition precisely has been intended to point out the differences in force composition, capability and mission. Most of the Soviet LRTNFs, NATO's, SRTNFs or battle field nuclear forces, and the American Poseidon Submarine Based Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) allocated to the SACEUR are, in the view of Soviets, to be included in the TNF-categories. Moreover, all NATO's

7 Quoted in Syed Jafar Raza Bilgrami, SALT-II : A Balance of Ambivalences (New Delhi: Intellectual Books, 1981), p. 46.

aircraft and missiles have variable ranges and many may carry either nuclear or conventional warheads which permit them to be used for tactical, theatre, or strategic missions.⁸ These forces (systems) with multiple function, cut across the distinctions which have long been maintained by the US and NATO nuclear doctrines. And they have been labeled as 'grey area' weapon systems in which the ambiguities pose the problems both for negotiating the level of forces and its verification. Cruise Missiles present special difficulties, because they are small, easily concealed, can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads from variety of platforms.⁹

Under such a definition, both the US and Soviet Union have had the convenient position to go with their own acquisition against each other. The Soviet Union argues that the new barren phrase viz. TNF, in accordance with the 'narrow definition', appears to have concealed the miracle weapons which existed already at the triad system -- land, sea, and air based -- of the United States in and around the NATO countries. They argue further that because of concealing of all other weapons assigned to use as theatre forces, the

8 See John Barry, "Just who is Deterred by Deterrence?" The Times (London), August 1981, p. 12.

9 Richard K. Betts, ed., Cruise Missiles, Technology, Strategy, Politics (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 127.

new drive has been reportedly started in naming all existing forces as TNF. But, so far as the American strategists are concerned, they do not accept this view. For, according to them, these weapons are said to have been there with a range of 1,000 km, agreed in the first definition and therefore, they cannot be included in the TNF categories as also the weapons that could attack Moscow from Europe, as the Soviets are demanding.¹⁰

So far as the second definition is concerned the Soviet Union has been asking for the inclusion of the intermediate range nuclear forces (INF) deployed in China, France and Great Britain, in addition to that of the US. Moreover, they reject the US notion of branding all the SS-20s as TNF.¹¹ However, as if they generously act in accordance with the medium definition, the Soviet Union has reportedly accepted to remove some SS-20s equivalent to the numbers deployed by France and Britain. But, what the US has been arguing is seriously to be the case of geo-strategic position. According to them, these forces are separate and cannot be included in US-Soviet TNF agreement because the British and French are not officially participating

10 See *ibid.*, pp. 124-7.

11 See Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control", *Survival*, vol. 3, no. 1, September-October 1981, pp. 2-10.

in the TNF negotiation.¹²

Thirdly, the wide definition was accepted by both the Soviets and most of the Europeans agree that all the forces which are deployed and targeted at Europe both East and West are TNF. And, therefore, the Soviet Union has stressed that all sub-strategic systems or Euro-strategic systems both the US forward based missiles as well as SS-20s together with the British and French TNF which are assigned for the use as battle field forces should be accepted as TNF. However, the US has pointed out that the forces which are presently deployed in the geographic boundaries of Europe should only have to be added. Therefore, according to the reasoning of the American analysts, there are no American TNF in Europe.¹³ The Americans used to hold such a tactical view. For instance, Richard Burt professing ignorance writes: "if a decision is made later this year to base a new American missile in Europe, it would be the first time the United States deployed a weapon in Europe with the specific aim of attacking the Soviet Union".¹⁴ It can only be said that such reports are only a part of the false

12 Ibid., p. 6.

13 Richard Burt, "The SS-20 and the Eurostrategic Balance" World Today, vol. 33, no. 2, February 1977, pp. 43-51.

14 Richard Burt, "West is Considering Missiles for Europe to Hit Soviet", New York Times, 20 January 1978.

propaganda or misrepresentation of facts - a common strategy followed meticulously by both the super powers. The report is wrong as it omits the present NATO aircraft-delivered LRINFs, the medium ranged missiles like Thor and Jupiter based in Europe during 1950-1960, and the B-47 based in Europe in the past as well as the deactivated mace missiles.¹⁵

Be that as it may, the differences between the super powers even on the so-called 'accepted definitions' indicate the magnitude of technical difficulties involved in the very first step for arms control. Moreover, they also show the strategic significance attached by the super powers over different types of weapons which, in fact, induce them to exclude or conceal certain categories of TNF. Naturally, those definitions are turned out to be nothing but mere reference points for further efforts for searching acceptable definitions for both the sides which has to be only a compromise. As it is obvious, even such a compromise is workable only when the super powers find it as advantageous for their own strategy which may sacrifice the interests of the third party viz. the Europe.¹⁶ However, the controversy over the definition and classification is continuing still today.

15 Ibid.

16 See Syed Jafar Raza Bilgrami, n. 7, pp. 46-102.

Even assuming that the controversy over the definition of TNF can be resolved the possibility of achieving the next step viz. the seeing of actual balance of weapons deployed by both the super powers and deciding on the appropriate balance at the lowest level, is rather bleak. It is because of the contrary assessment of both the US and Soviet Union in which they try to underestimate their own nuclear build-up but overestimate the other. In fact, this is a controversy somewhat related with the first controversy. The contrary assessment of each other's nuclear capability which tends to confuse the world public regarding the real magnitude of arms build-up is indicated by the following Table-III. It is discernible from the table that the US has not included the forces deployed by its allies whereas the Soviet Union has included in its assessment. Besides, the numbers of forces deployed by both of them differs from the estimation of each other.

The new phase of the TNF controversy arose after the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting of 1979 which decided for a Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNFs) Modernization for West Europe. Although this controversy is basically between the US and Soviet Union, later it emerged as a controversy not only between the NATO and WTO, but also within the NATO itself. To understand the controversy over the US modernisation proposals, it is

Table III

US and Soviet Perspectives on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Balance

US Assessment		Soviet Assessment				
United States	Soviet Union	Western	Soviet			
Missiles	0	SS-20s	340	US	Land-based missiles	
F-III fighter bombers	164	SS-4s and SS-5s	250	Fighter-bombers	SS-20s, SS-5s, SS-4s	496
F-4s	265	SS-12s and SS-22s	100	F-III	Sub-missiles	18
A-6s and A-7s	68	SS-N-5s	30	FB-III	Medium-range bombers (Backfire, Badger, blinder)	461
F-B IIIs (stationed in US for Europe)	63	TU-26 Backfire bombers	45	F-4		
		TU-16 Badgers and TU-22 Blinders	350	A-6, A-7		
		SU-17, SU-24, and MIG-27 fighter bombers	2700	UK		
				Polaris missiles		
				Vulcan bombers		
				France		
				Land-based missiles		
				Submarine missiles		
				Mirage-4 bombers		
Total	560		3815	Total	986	975

Cited in Robert C. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control : Challenges for US Policy", Headline Service, no. 261, Foreign Policy Association, Washington, 1983, p. 14.

useful to list the main planks of the modernization programme. They are as follows:¹⁷

- Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles would be deployed in Europe.
- The total number deployed would be dependent on whether the USSR agreed for the limitation of its European LRTNFs.
- As many as 1,000 older TNWs would be withdrawn from the US-NATO TNW stockpile, primarily short-range systems designed for use on NATO territory.
- The tactical aircraft component of US Forward Based Systems in Europe might also be eliminated.

In brief, the NATO decided force modernization to replace existing American Pershing-IA missiles deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany with 108 new, longer range Pershing-II launchers. In addition, it was agreed that 464 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with a range of 2,500 kilometers would also be deployed on the territory of a number of NATO countries -- West Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherland and Belgium (See the Table I in Chapter I). All the new missiles will have single war-heads and together will replace 572 warheads already deployed. Besides, 1,000 theatre nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as part of the modernization package.

17 US Congress, Long Range Theatre Nuclear Missiles Program, Fiscal Year 1980 : Arms Control Impact Statements (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 133.

The Soviet's response to NATO decision though cool in nature, is nevertheless threatening in its effect. In a communique following a two-day meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in East Berlin on 5-6 December 1979, it was said: "The acceptance of a proposal for the production and deployment of new types of American-made missiles would destroy the basis for negotiations."¹⁸ Referring to the tactical motive as well as the weak point in the American move Corteviev, a SPD spokesman, notes that the attempt to explore substantive position and negotiating possibilities of NATO decision seem to have made US to emphasise "on the military approach which is a poor substitute for diplomacy".¹⁹ As a part of this initiative, the West made a commitment to negotiate with the Soviet Union in Intermediate Nuclear Forces. In this respect, the American strategy of bargaining from strength in accordance with their dual-track strategy, is evident. The dual or two-track strategy, in simple terms, means that further deployment on the pretext of modernization proceeds simultaneously with negotiations for arms control. The US threat of deployment which is said to have emerged

18 See Pravda (Moscow), 6 December 1979.

19 Corteviev, "What Can President Reagan And The Europeans Expect From One Another", Atlantic Institute for International Affairs (Paris), 4 February 1981, p. 2.

from its perceived threat to European security due to the SS-20s, is used to underpin the bargaining power of US in INF negotiations. The diplomatic and tactical necessity for the dual-track decision has emerged because of the commitment made by the NATO to seek arms control negotiations and interest of the US to seek a military balance in Europe.²⁰ More importantly, under this decision, the US proposed for negotiation in the reduction of intermediate land-based missiles at the first instance and subsequent discussions for other types of missiles.²¹

The dual-track decision, in recent years, gave birth to what is known as 'zero option'. Zero option means that there is no other option for the Soviet except to dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles in order to stop the US deployment of Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and conversely, the US is having no other option except to go forward with its deployment proposal if the Soviet Union is not accepting for dismantling all their land-based missiles. President Reagan in a speech to the Press Club, Washington, on 18 November 1981, explains the fundamental element of 'zero option' as: "The United States is prepared to cancel

20 International Herald Tribune, 19 October 1979.

21 International Communication Agency, America's Programme for Peace (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 3-11.

its deployment of Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles if the Soviet will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.²²

But the Soviet Union views the US 'zero option' as a proposal for only a unilateral Soviet disarmament, as 80 per cent of their missiles are land-based. According to the Soviet, the so-called 'zero option' does not include both the sea and air-based missiles of the US as well as the intermediate nuclear forces of Britain and France. Under such circumstances, if the Soviet Union reduces or dismantles its land-based system, its strategic balance will be seriously affected which will naturally put their security at stake.²³ Moreover, the Soviet strategists argued that the Pershing-IIs should be considered as strategic weapons as it is capable of hitting Moscow. Therefore, the Soviet Union refused to accept the US proposal. However, the door was not yet closed for negotiation. In response to US 'zero option', President Yuri Andropov explains the Soviet's position in this regard:

We prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France - and not a single one more.... This would be a really honest zero option, as regards medium range missiles. ²⁴

22 Ibid., p. 8.

23 New York Times, 12 December 1979.

24 International Herald Tribune, 22 December 1982.

Due to these discrepancies, later the US came out with a draft treaty known as "walk in the woods". This proposal was worked out in July 1982 by Paul Nitze, who led the US negotiations at Geneva talks. 'Walk in the Woods' proposal envisaged seeking equal ceilings for both sides' medium-range nuclear weapons in the European theatre. The package included the following proposals:²⁵

- Each party would have 225 such nuclear weapons systems consisting of 75 missiles, launchers and 150 nuclear-capable aircraft.
- The United States would have 300 nuclear warheads on cruise missiles in Europe, while the Soviet Union would have 225 warheads, all on SS-20s, which meant 75 missiles.
- There would be a ceiling of 90 Soviet missiles in Asia.
- British and French missiles would not be counted.

Although the package was rejected by both the Kremlin and the US Defence Department, a new draft treaty for interim solution emerged out of the controversial 'walk in the woods' proposals. While responding to the interim treaty, the Soviet negotiator, Yuri Kristinsky

25 O.N. Mehrotra, "Reconsideration of Nitze's Euro-missile Package", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. 7, no. 6, September 1983, p. 468.

again insisted US to consider only the existing forces and its reduction in Europe. But, the American negotiator, Paul Nitze, refused to accept Soviets position, as commenting that the Soviet side continued to insist on their one-sided proposal without considering either zero, or low or equal limits of their proposals.²⁶

However, it is difficult to ignore the fact that both sides seem to be one-sided in their proposals keeping each other's interest as infallible. While the US wants to include the land-based missiles for negotiations by its deployment threat but fails to include the British and French missiles as also its sea and air-based weapons systems, the Soviet Union with most of its missiles on land does not concede to the proposal as it will not only weaken its military balance but also weaken its position in future arms control talks particularly on the sea and air-based weapons.²⁷ Despite the fact that they have had controversy over many issues related with INF, efforts were made continuously to go for negotiations. The Geneva talks began in 1983 with the hope of resolving at least some differences. By 26 October 1983, that is in between Geneva talks, Soviet Union offered to reduce its intermediate-

26 See *ibid.*, pp. 468-71.

27 Guardian Weekly, 29 October 1983.

range nuclear forces facing Europe from 450 to about 140 modern SS-28s. Also, the Soviet Union agreed not to deploy their SS-20s in Asia, if there were no American deployments in December 1983.²⁸ But the US rejected this offer, and has started deploying cruise missiles in UK on 15 December 1983. As a result the Soviet Union walked out of the INF negotiation at Geneva. Regarding the implications of the current situation of INF negotiations in particular and arms control in general, Raymond L. Garthoff has noted that -

the political hallabaloo that can be expected to attend the end of the negotiations on medium-range missiles and the start first of American and then of new Soviet missile deployments will no doubt contribute to the further deterioration of American-Soviet relations, and possibly to American-European relations, and possibly to American-European relations as well. There seems little doubt that we can expect a period of still higher tensions, in which unexpected crises will be still more dangerous. 29

The various controversies between the two super powers and each other's unyielding nature has finally culminated in the impasse in INF negotiations. The history of INF negotiations leaves the impression that the arms build up has increased rather than decreased after each such

28 See Raymond L. Garthoff, "US-Soviet Relations", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), vol. 13, no. 12, December 1983, pp. 788-90.

29 Ibid., p. 788.

negotiation. Since the US has already gone for deployment on a graduated pace, the Soviet Union will also follow suit in further deployment. All these amounts to the inevitable tension in the European theatre. Ironically enough, the competitive spirit of arms build between the super powers is growing under the veil of arms control negotiations. However, they tried for compromise type of arms control in TNF negotiation veering thereby from the European perspective on arms control.³⁰ The TNF controversy is nothing but a 'simple linkage' between the US and Soviet Union which can further their aim of reaching political terms with each other.³¹ In this respect, Thomas Costock has rightly observed: "Europe and arms control were among the highest priorities of the super powers at the time" not because of any genuine interest but they provide opportunities for a "temporary confluence of priority interests in reaching agreements through compromise."³²

According to the West Europeans the TNF controversy posed by super powers has been assuming ever-increasing

30 See Alva Myrdal, The Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Nottingham, 1981).

31 Ori Even-Tov, "The NATO conventional Defense: Back to Reality", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 23, no. 1, spring 1979, pp. 35-49.

32 Quoted in Alexander L. George, Managing US-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (New York: Westview Press, 1983), p. 26.

fundamental significance. It has to be resolved for creating a conducive climate for arms control negotiations. But, technically they cannot participate in the INF negotiations as arms deployment decisions are out of their control even though they are a party to the NATO decisions. However, they differ and even criticize certain policies of crucial importance from the point of view of European security.³³

Before dealing with the West-West controversy emerging primarily from the differing perspectives of US and NATO Europeans, it is necessary to note certain important implications of the controversy itself. Even though they were party to many decisions of deployment from the beginning, they have disputed with the US on crucial points of such decisions, and were successful in making US to compromise with their own views. The glaring instance is the flexible response strategy of 1967 in which US was made to accept the significance of strategic weapons. More importantly, both US and USSR tried to misled the Europeans both the East and West with false propaganda and misrepresentation of facts which has been mentioned earlier. Europeans are misled by various techniques of the super powers like discrepancies in language, discrepancies in perceptions of threats, discrepancies between the declared policies and real practice.³⁴

33 SIPRI, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives (London: Taylor and Francis, 1978), pp. 125-36.

34 See Gwyn Prins, Defended to Death (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 23-35.

Lord Chalfont says in this context:

People have been inoculated by the use of language, almost narcotic in its... complexity, against the appalling realization of what lies behind such concepts as selective strike, collateral damage and flexible response. 35

The differing assessment of each other's nuclear capabilities aims not only to confuse themselves but also the Europeans. For an instance, while President Brezhnev asserted that the Soviet Union had 975 medium-range systems compared with NATO's 986, two weeks later, President Reagan claimed that the Soviet Union had a six-to-one lead.³⁶ As a matter of fact, the various estimates of nuclear weapons in Europe have to be taken with a pinch of salt as they are only rough estimates and sometimes turn out to be mere guesstimates. But, the irrefutable fact remains that the arms build up of both super powers is dangerously high and it appears that they do not have any intention of reducing it. Finally, it is to be emphasized that the West Europeans do not have identical views and they are differing in their criticism.

35 Lord Chalfont, "New Dimensions of Nuclear Madness", The Times (London), 25 July 1977.

36 International Herald Tribune, 22 December 1982.

Even though West Europeans become subject to misinformation and political coercion due to their membership in NATO, they started understanding, after long years of their experience, the tactics of the two super powers to keep Europe under a virtual strategic control.³⁷ There is a growing realisation that Europe has been used by the two super powers as a stage for their show of might, and thereby insulating their own territories from any immediate effect of war. According to them, the whole INF controversy between the super powers centres round the issues of 'superiority or parity', 'vulnerability', 'verifiability', and 'Euro-strategy'. The very issues precludes a common meeting ground unless the super powers work to their conscience to establish peace by sacrificing their mania for power.³⁸

As a matter of fact, the origin of the West-West controversy can be traced to the 1950s when the West Europeans started questioning the credibility of the US doctrine of 'Massive Retaliation' in the face of Soviets' equality with US in nuclear capabilities. Again, when US planned a shift of emphasis to conventional weapons, NATO members again disputed. As it is noted already, US nuclear strategists

37 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia run the Arms Race (New York: Nottingham, 1976), pp. 73-74.

38 Ibid., p. 74.

✓ were hectic in inventing and innovating various concepts essentially to revive the credibility of US strategy and assuage the Europeans. This has culminated in the adoption of 'Flexible Response Doctrine' by the NATO members which is nothing but compromise between the US and European views. Under this doctrine, a strategic option has emphasized by US which allowed the "unnecessary and unwanted weapons" in Europe.³⁹ However France unsatisfied with this policy as well as the American tactics of extended deterrence in Europe, decided to withdraw from all military decision of NATO, though it still retains its NATO membership. This is the first ever tangible evidence of the contradiction within NATO. It is because of the vested interests of the power contenders. The common interest is based on their mutual desire to come to term politically. To achieve such a political balance, it seems advantageous to protect^{vg} the INF controversy and thereby sacrificing the European interest. The West Europeans did not miss to convince this tactics of the super powers. Recently, even other members of NATO began to question and criticise the validity of flexible response doctrine. More importantly, Europeans are not seeing eye to eye with the US in the

Arguable

39 See Walter Pincus, "A Needless Crisis in Europe", Guardian Weekly, 5 June 1983, p. 16.

question of LRINF modernization. The noteworthy feature of this recent controversy is that it has emerged out of a clear understanding of the full implication of such a policy for the whole European security both in the short-run and long-run. Even a casual observer of the European theatre cannot miss the fact that the intra-alliance controversy within NATO is increasingly magnified as a direct outcome of the deceptiveness of INF controversy between the two super powers with their tacit understanding based on escalatory tactics. Therefore, in order to conceive the West-West controversy in its totality, it is indispensable to keep in mind the tacit understanding between the two super powers in protecting the INF negotiation and its manifestation in the course of their INF controversy itself.

The nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled for last so many years in Europe, though never been used so far, their very presence increase the tension in the theatre thereby jeopardizing severely the European security. INF does not seem to improve the security of Europe in any real sense as its deployment is an ever increasing phenomenon which mars the possibility of arms control. In this context, Alain Enthoven, a former key person in the American Department of Defence has categorically stated: "Tactical

nuclear weapons cannot defend Europe; they can only destroy it."⁴⁰ But why the super powers are still insisting on TNF deployment in Europe?

Despite the fact that the West Europeans have long been brain-washed by the US through the use of various doctrines of the need for TNF deployment in Europe for assuring its security, allied concerns about the credibility of deterrence and the reliability of the United States have revived differences over specific deployment and over defence doctrine in general. These differences have contributed to the intra-alliance tensions between the US and some European members of NATO.⁴¹ The controversy over the December 1979 decision to deploy new long-range theatre nuclear weapons reflects a crisis of popular confidence in the consequences of continuing a strategy of first use of nuclear weapons by NATO. Many in West Europe see the new theatre weapons as making the use of nuclear weapons on European soil more than less likely.

More important and significant is the debate over the validity of "flexible response", the official NATO strategy concerning the use of theatre or tactical nuclear

40 Quoted in Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusions and Reality (London: Collins, 1982), p. 70.

41 See Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 15-18.

weapons against a Soviet conventional attack. Some argue that the purposeful ambiguity of flexible response is in fact its principal strength both as a doctrine of deterrence and as a doctrine for actual combat.⁴² Others stress its declining credibility, and urge greater concentration on conventional defence to raise the nuclear threshold. Others would stress new theatre nuclear forces to restore a sense of nuclear balance in Europe. Still others fear that tinkering with declaratory policy would be a dangerous procedure, reopening old debates on strategy successfully papered over by the ambiguity of flexible response. In any case, the debate has been joined: the United States seems inclined to re-examine some aspects of strategy.

A recent example of this inclination within the United States is the call for a study on the merits of a NATO declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons. European members of NATO, on the other hand, are more inclined to forego any significant reexamination. This debate has produced in the United States, for the first time in a decade, some resurgence of the view that US ground forces in Europe should be withdrawn or reduced. West Europeans cite this as further argument against a renewed debate on nuclear strategy. This warrants a close look at the strategy.

⁴² Ibid., p. 16.

The major aims of the flexible response strategy both from the tactical and military point of view are as follows:⁴³

- preventing the enemy from achieving any meaningful advantages
- inflicting higher costs on him than the value he might expect to gain from partial or full-scale attacks on the US and its allies; and
- leaving open the possibility of ending on exchange before the worst escalation and damage had occurred, even if avoiding escalation to mutual destruction is not likely.

The very aims implies the escalation of arms race and importantly the immediate danger to Europe rather than USSR. The following passage will shed much light on these points:

Central to the strategy is the concept of escalation, which serves multiple purposes. It links the US inter-continental nuclear forces to the defense of Europe through a series of escalatory steps, demonstrating to the USSR the potential engagement of inter-continental forces and reassuring Europe that America does not plan for an extended war limited to Europe. At the same time it holds out the possibility that war might be terminated before escalating into an all-out global nuclear war

⁴³ See Solly Zuckerman, n. 40, p. 70.

reassuring the US that her leaders do not plan to invite Soviet nuclear attack in the United States at the outset of conflicts in Europe. ⁴⁴

It is clear from the above that the US is tactfully using the policy to further its own interest at the cost of West Europe. The limited war feasible under the strategy though save the US and USSR nevertheless inflict incalculable damage upon Europe. Studies on war games done in the 1960s showed repeatedly that even under the most favourable assumptions about restraint and limitations in yields and targets, between 2 to 20 million Europeans would be killed in a limited tactical war with widespread damage to the economy of the affected area, and a high risk of 100 million deaths if the war escalated to attacks on cities. Thus, the flexible response strategy aiming to assure European security is having, at the same time, potential insecurity. ⁴⁵

Thus, it seems that the West Europeans' reservations and demand for the right to re-examine the nuclear strategy, is correct and justifiable. However, it has to be admitted that the West Europeans despite their

⁴⁴ James A. Thomson, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe : Planning for NATO's Nuclear Deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s", Survival, vol. 25, no. 3, May-June 1983, p. 99.

⁴⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 98-109.

justifiable misgiving cannot confront US directly due to their NATO association. Thus the West-West controversy being basically an intra-alliance controversy, cannot be taken to mean a direct conflict between the US and its Western partners. However, such disputes have already made enough impact upon the US policy makers to reconsider some important aspects of the NATO nuclear strategy in Europe. Moreover, the controversy is also having the potentiality for creating an atmosphere for European arms control negotiations. The UN has asked the Europeans to participate in the arms control negotiations as without their representation European security interest cannot be taken full care of.

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CHAPTER III

A CRITIQUE OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

The INF controversy outlined in the preceding Chapter have provided the Europeans with a clear understanding of their position vis-a-vis the super powers. As against the propagated notion that their security depends upon the nuclear arms deployed by the super powers, they came to know the strategic and political dependence of the super powers on them to pursue their global strategy. This is evident in the continued deployment of arms in their territory by the super powers and thereby making Europe as a theatre to show their military might with little or no concern for the European security. Moreover, due to the military alliances, they could not have an independent arms policy and as such they became subservient to the military designs of the super powers. Triggered by the recent US modernization effort implying further deployment and deterioration of security, the Europeans started devising mechanism to reduce tension in their region arising out of accelerated arms race and its future course. Since INF issues are basically linked with the nuclear strategy

*elaboration
needed.*

of the US and USSR, the Europeans have taken the initiative to find a solution through genuine arms control negotiations.¹ It is to be intermitted here that the Europeans have been disputing the modernization efforts ever since 1969, as it escalates arms build-up in the theatre.² The European strategy is to participate in a multilateral negotiations for European security as well as to mount pressure on the super powers for genuine arms control both in strategic and tactical weapons. In this chapter it is attempted to have a critical view of the actual process of arms control negotiations between the super powers and the role of Europeans as a group in this regard.

Before dealing with arms control negotiation in recent years, it is useful to have an idea of the political unification effort of the Europeans in the 1960s, and the super powers' reaction to such an effort. It calls for political unification among the European countries to favour an agreement on arms control. Konrad Adenauer, the then Chancellor of West Germany has continuously asked all the NATO countries to consider the political goal of unification. Having realised the need for political unification in the light of arms control negotiation with East, the US Secretary

1 See Karl E. Birnbaum, ed., Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects (Vienna: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1980), pp. 3-9.

2 See Robert Levgold, "The Problem of European Security", Problems of Communism, January-February 1974, pp. 21-35.

of State John Foster Dulles, encouraged the tendency of West Europeans towards political unification. But, later the US strategists supposed that the Western move for political unification may lead NATO countries to accept the Eastern approach of nuclear freeze.³ Then the US turned cold to the European move. This undermines the Western idea of maintaining their military detente with East for political security. In this particular issues of military detente, the Europeans have reportedly disputed among themselves. Following these differences, the strategy of "crisis management" among NATO countries is emerged. Commenting such a strategy, Thomas Schelling said that it led to West to a "complex of strategic-political manœuvres in a competition of risk taking".⁴

other possible consequences?

In this process, the United States have, among other things, assured the NATO for the political security by maintaining theatre forces in a competition of risk taking with East. Unlike the US, the East along with Soviet Union responded this sort of Western move by indirectly showing their interest for the political easement, playing thereby the Western cards as in the early 1960s. In

Soviet motivations for this?

3 Ibid., p. 26.

4 Thomas C. Schelling, "Nuclear NATO and the 'New Strategy'" in Henry A. Kissinger, ed., Problems of National Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 173.

addition, they have also stressed the need for a European security conference. But, the United States denied the Eastern demand for the security conference. Instead it wanted to go by the NATO proposal of a reciprocal force reductions - talk for the arms control negotiation with East, which was a 'hot line' approach balanced in scope and timing.⁵ The East along with Soviet Union have assumed that the Western move may risk the Europeans' tendency of arms control due to its hot line approach. Commenting the US move Vidyesova noted that it "distract attention, lull the vigilance of socialist countries, and create a political climate favouring subversion activity".⁶ Therefore, the hot line approach, in the opinion of the Soviets, may mislead the Europeans, especially the East. And what their fear, above all, is that the Western strategy may work in the European theatre, which will equally affect the Eastern notion for political easement with NATO countries. It is to be noted that both the super powers ignored the political unification strategy due to its potentiality to limit their activities of arms race in Europe.

Events of the last few years have reawakend an old concern in the NATO alliance: the role of nuclear

5 Ibid., p. 174.

6 See Robert Levgold, n. 2, p. 29.

weapons in Europe, especially those with range enough to reach the Soviet Union, now called LRINF or INF, terms used interchangeably here. The issue is as old as the alliance, running back to the debate in the 1950s over the role of what were then called medium (or intermediate) range ballistic missiles (M/IR BMs) in Europe.

In this process faced with differences between US and Soviet Union, the needless crisis that centred in Europe for the first time, seem to have sincerely considered at the twenty fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1968. Much more attention has been paid to the question of bilateral arms control talks -- SALT -- between USA and Soviet Union, primarily stressing the problems of 'escalation' in European theatre. A preliminary discussion, as UN General Assembly advised the United States and Soviet Union to start, have been held in Helsinki from 17 November to 22 December 1969. The second phase of bilateral negotiations resumed on 16 April 1970, has held on discussing an important issue of European theatre. There a complete secrecy was reported to have been maintained in particularly during the discussion on these issues. However, both the powers among all other things, reached an agreement on 25 May 1972.⁷

7 See Foreign Policy Association, SALT II (New York, 1979), p. 5.

As a result, they have agreed to ratify the SALT-II, and seek a solution to European theatre. Negotiation began in 1974 at Vladivostok to start with this process of ratifying SALT II. Subsequently an agreement was reached on the 'general guidelines' for a SALT-II treaty that would guide INF negotiations till 1985.⁸ In effect, they have accepted indirectly for the causes that disturbed arms control agreements in Europe. Therefore, they appear to have interested on certain issues so as to encourage Europeans' confidence for further development.⁹ However, while stressing this important move UN report notes the fact that brought Europeans together in the 1970s viz. their fortunes are tied up together in the field of arms control.¹⁰

*clumsy
construction*

Against this background, the new relationship in promoting Europeans detente and ensuring security and co-operation by joint international efforts have intended to make multilateral conferences and negotiations especially important. However, the transformation of European

8 Ibid.

9 See Warner J. Feld, and John K. Wildgen, NATO and the Atlantic Defence: Perception and Illusions (London: Praeger, 1982), pp. 4-15.

10 UN, The Relationship between Disarmament and Development (New York, 1982), paras 28-30.

tendency that brought the East and West together in the mid 1970s, have reportedly seen delayed, for some obvious reasons, to get into the track of European detente in the early 1970s. Nevertheless, the Europeans Conference on security and co-operation (ECSC) among thirty three European countries along with the United States and Canada has held in 1975 at Helsinki. On 1 August 1975, the last day of the conference, the leaders of the participating states have signed the 'Final Act', which covers a broad spectrum of the most urgent problems confronting the Europeans as well as the world. The result of the negotiations gave great scope for European security. Regarding the result of the Conference, President Brezhnev said that "there are neither victors nor vanquished, winners or losers", and therefore, "it is gain for all who cherish peace and security. Its results may be beneficial beyond Europe as well."¹¹

In the conference, it was planned to cover all negotiations comprised of great diversity of types. Mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks have also been included among the multilateral negotiations.¹² It is

11 US, Department of State, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Washington, D.C., August 1975).

12 Ibid.

encouraging to note that subsequently President Brezhnev and Carter signed SALT II (Interim agreement) in which they have agreed to "give a powerful fillip" to European concerns for arms control negotiation between 12 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact countries.¹³ However, the United States and Soviet Union have reportedly played a diplomatic role in this process of encouraging MBFR-talks between European nations. As a result, the Europeans--both East and West--have got formidably a confusion in putting forward their independent proposals. This was precisely in accordance with the expectation of the two powers. Although, Europeans were faced with the controversy on arms control issues, nevertheless as Admiral John M. Lee has noted, this event turned out to be "an opening window for arms control" in Europe.¹⁴ It is because of the obvious reason that the big powers got the common ground to demonstrate their own strategic thinking on negotiations without even crossing others.¹⁵

Therefore, having common interest in maintaining the escalatory strategy as it was accepted, at regular

13 See Financial Times (London), 9 May 1979; and International Herald Tribune, 10 May 1979.

14 See John M. Lee, "An Opening Window for Arms Control", Foreign Affairs (New York), Fall 1979, p. 121.

15 Ibid.

intervals, for the deterrent policy of nuclear deployment, they seem to have delayed the bilateral negotiations (SALT) insisting on the so-called technical issues of European theatre. Especially, the United States appear to have as the Europeans think, much more convenience for extending and modernising the nuclear forces while going hand-in-hand with Soviet nuclear strategy. On the part of Soviet Union, it is said to have welcomed the common strategy as it provides the permanent sources of politics to utilise all the complexities of Western strategy.¹⁶

Moreover, they have been convinced by their own reason that if the Europeans go ahead with their programmes for arm control in Europe, they themselves could not reach to possible solution as the bilateral talks--SALT or START--plays vital role in all levels of European concerns. And therefore, according to them, the theatre conflict has to be dealt in accordance with their interest of arms control agreement. An instance in this respect is the INF negotiation done under the coverage of START--in Europe. Even though they have got differences of opinion at all levels of negotiation related with the theatre, the bilateral talks have been accepted by both US and Soviet

16 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command : A Military, Political History, 1918-1941 (New York: St. Martin, 1979), p. 667.

Union for the obvious reasons. This strategic coverage, as the Europeans think, is said to be a common ground for negotiating European interest of arms control in Europe. In other words, by using the nuclear language the super power tactics can be explained as: that the nuclear threshold of Europe should be raised so as to jeopardise the European interest and thereby get the theatre as a front line for their strategic play of political option.¹⁷

Although the United Nations request for giving importance to the European concerns have been under played by both the US and Soviet Union for a while, nevertheless the European interest in arms control negotiation have acquired its legitimacy in recent years. And also, it is said that the strategic coverage is expected to consider the balance of national, regional and common interests of the Europeans. In this context, the Western authors, David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, recommend the notion in finding the common interest of regional feeling on general agreement for the real freeze of nuclear arms. They argue whether the fact that different states in Europe belong to two opposing blocs enhances their sense of security or not,

17 See Fred Charles Ikle, "What is Negotiation?" in Bruce L. Sanders and Alen C. Durbin, eds., Contemporary International Politics: Introductory Readings (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1971), p. 386.

as a practical measure, there was general agreement that a freeze would very quickly result.¹⁸ The practical measure for arms control in Europe seems to reside with the Vienna negotiations which focus upon their common interest. To date, these negotiations have dealt almost entirely with military manpower in central Europe with some additional consideration for the most threatening armaments on each side, namely Soviet tanks and American tactical nuclear weapons.

Prior to the opening of the NATO ministerial meeting in December 1979, more than six years of negotiation in Vienna had led to a significant narrowing of the differences between the positions of NATO and the WARSAW pact. Agreement, at least in principle, had been achieved on four broad issues:¹⁹

(1) There would be a common ceiling of 900,000 soldiers for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in an area composed, on the Western side, of West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, and on the Eastern side of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Furthermore, no more than 700,000 of these troops could be ground

18 David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, The Arms Race in the 1980s (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), p. 2.

19 Birnbaum, n. 1, p. 43.

units, with the remainder assigned to support air missions.

(2) The US and USSR could reduce, according to agreement their armaments in the region along the lines proposed by NATO in December 1975, in its so-called "option three" offer regarding arms reductions. Under this provision the Soviet Union has withdrawn 1,700 main battle tanks in exchange for US withdrawal of 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 and nuclear-capable aircraft, and 36 Pershing I ballistic missile launchers.

(3) The ceiling would be collective for each alliance with each alliance deciding precisely how many troops would be reduced by each country within the region.

(4) The reduction would take place in two phases. The first phase would require the Soviet Union and the United States to withdraw ground and air manpower from the region plus their armaments which were to be reduced. Initially the Soviet Union would return 68,000 soldiers, while the United States would withdraw 30,000 troops. In phase two, the other participants would reduce the size of their armies to reach the level of the common ceiling.

The review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act since then focussed largely to the military action between East-West, while the real spirit of

confidence to bind the relation and thereby feeling the sense of security was put aside. However, it left certain impression among the participants to think about the confidence building measures (CBM) and its future endeavour to reduce the arms and to reduce the tension of war.

It is in this spirit, the emerged European arms control initiatives moved the CBM issue to centre stage as critical to future arms control negotiations. Moreover, CBM also becomes a major issue for the neutral and non-aligned nations. As a result of its growing significance, several CBM proposals followed the Belgrade Conference.²⁰ The second Review Conference of CSCE, met in Madrid and ensured that particular importance will be given for the attempt to gain acceptance of further CBM. In this conference, there have been direct participants among the Benelux countries, West Germany, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia and those of geographically located in the potential treaty area, plus countries having military forces based in that region, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.²¹

20 See excerpts from the Communique of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Member States, Survival, March-April 1979, pp. 80-87.

21 Ibid., p. 86.

Indirectly, other participants include the remaining NATO and Warsaw Pact members except Portugal, Iceland and France. Whereas, CSCE addresses each participant separately as MBFR is the primary bloc-to-bloc forum.²² The parallel approach thought by two presidents in their meeting at Moscow enhanced the importance of the CSCE and MBFR in the late 1970s.

However, in the later part of the 1970s, they met the stalemate and ultimately given their concern for 'asymmetry': force reductions with a balance in offensive-defensive capabilities between the blocs. One of the most basic yet difficult tasks has been to define various categories of weapons systems and military personnel and to determine how many of each type every country maintains in the guidelines area (the geographic region defined as Theatre). Because of this drawback in conducting the effective talks between the East and West, the United States series of proposals for CBM was also included within MBFR agreement. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union questioned the fundamental relations of the forces stationed in Europe.²³

22 Christopher Bertram, "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction", Strategic Survey (London), 1978, pp. 121-3.

23 Richard Burt, "Allies said to alert Troop - Talks Offer", New York Times, 15 August 1979.

In the course of developments on limiting the nuclear weapons in Europe, the French Government also proposed a general conference on disarmament during the Belgrade Conference in 1977.²⁴ However, all the efforts in trying for a general move, has repeatedly faced the dilemma over the issues of how to agree on strengths, that is, data concerning the opposing forces and their arms. As a result, the East and West tried accordingly to their concerns, as it was expected by both the US and USSR. In this course of MBFR, the NATO countries repeatedly proposed that US would, at the first instance, reduce 29,000 men if the Soviets reduce 68,000 men including a tank army of 1,700 tanks. And in the second stage, that both sides should accept a common ceiling of 700,000 troops for the ground forces. To make the proposal more acceptable to Warsaw Pact, USA agreed that in addition it would withdraw from Europe 4,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing I MRBMs (medium Range Ballistic Missiles).²⁵

In responding to the NATO's proposal along with its allies US 's tactical move, the Warsaw Pact countries

24 See excerpts from the speech by Jean Francois-Poncet, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the National Assembly, 3 May 1979, Press and Information Division (New Delhi: French Embassy, 1979).

25 Christopher Bertram, n. 22, pp. 121-3.

have proposed a symbolic reduction in the initial stage of MBFR. According to the 'symbolic reduction', both sides should reduce 20,000 men followed by equal percentage reduction of ground and air forces and nuclear delivery system by 15 per cent (initially 5 per cent followed by 10 per cent). And the proposal also have called for national sub-ceiling and have got limits for moderation of forces inside the reduction area.²⁶ Having denied the provisions suggested by NATO in its "option three" proposals of 1975, the Soviet Union, in 1979, moved for a "unilateral withdrawal" of 20,000 men and 1,000 main battle tanks from East Germany into USSR. Meanwhile, NATO ministerial meeting for modernization of new theatre nuclear weapons despite the Soviet's protest announced its intention to go with its decision in December 1979. Thus actual deployment of new American missiles started from 15 December 1979. Therefore, any further discussion of armaments reduction is not likely to take place in the immediate future.²⁸

26 See John Borawski, "Mutual Force Reduction in Europe from a Soviet Perspective", Orbis (Philadelphia), Winter 1979, p. 848.

27 See International Herald Tribune, 8 October 1979, and Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), 19 October 1979.

28 Joseph Fitchett, "NATO Will Deploy New Nuclear Force, Dutch Reject Missiles", International Herald Tribune (Paris), 13 December 1979.

Since the super powers along with their allies repeatedly met with controversy of varying types over the strategic options in European theatre, the ultimate result is escalation of arms build up in Europe which puts the arms control talks at stake. In this process of MBFR, it is obvious that both the super powers have mostly concerned with strategic options or their interest of keeping their own status in the world, not only ignored the views of the European officials but also that of the public. Lieutenant General K.P. Candeth commenting on cause for the declining importance of MBFR, has stated that "the complexity of the BMFR negotiations which have so far been overshadowed by SALT and so have not received the attention they merit from the public".²⁹

In the course of MBFR talks, the East and West have met again the profound crisis from which they cannot but emerge in a vastly different form of detente. Moreover, the European public seem to have emerged a significant force to oppose the European leaders to move under the coverage of US and USSR strategy.³⁰ The recently held European Security Conference at Madrid in November 1980 has clearly appreciated the risks posed by

29 K.P. Candeth (retd.) "Arms Limitation - II, Meeting of MBFR Negotiations", Indian Express (Bangalore), 20 April 1979,

30 Ibid.

the frightened arms race to detente in Europe. As a result, the Madrid Conference, after two and a half years, seems to have acknowledged the significance of some desperate initiative for detente in Europe taken by the neutrals and non-aligned countries represented among 35 participants in the conference.

In this process of going for regional consideration, the Europeans, both East and West, appear to have begun a new search for arms control negotiation in Europe. However, regional arms control is really a complicated and time-consuming process as it has to deal with the technical and political antagonism between the East-West. Moreover, as Thomas C. Schelling says, "the complexity of arms control must not be narrowly considered in isolation from other facets of nation's or the world's search for security."³¹ Therefore, the national, regional and global securities are inter-connected and involve in a simultaneous process. In the same way, military and political policies are also related with arms control move. According to him, the state or states~~s~~ may seek to enhance its security by a variety of means - including armaments, alliances, arms control and disarmament. Arms control then describes only one of several types of move which may be adopted in the pursuit of

Cruz
of the
matter?

31 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 2.

greater security. In this process, the integral relationship of arms control policies and overall military and political policies should be self-evident.³²

In effect to this, for instance, especially NATO countries have adopted the arms control tactics along with security policy in their aim to further political security. And, to that extent, they have been collectively taking decision, as a right of defending themselves.³³ Manfred Worner notes that collective decision implies that "whoever attacks us should not have the illusion of starting a war limited and preserving his own territory".³⁴ After all, the decision undepended on any particular country but the product of collectivity appears to have turned out to be a NATO's strategy of arms control and security - what Worner, in turn, is likely to have admitted.³⁵

verbiage

Preferably having denied the Western notion of arms control and security policy, the East appears to have adopted the strategy contrary to the West with their

32 Ibid.

33 Jeremy Richardson, "The Concept of Policy Style", in Jeremy Richardson, ed., Policy Style in Western Europe (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 5.

34 Manfred Worner, "NATO Defense and Tactical Nuclear Weapons", Strategic Review, vol. 5, fall 1977, p. 17.

35 Ibid.

understanding that disarmament is inseparable from world security.³⁶ Although they have differed basically from the Western arms control component of national or allies policy, it has been a principle partner to the arms control negotiation since the primary condition for progress in disarmament started from early 1940 and late 1950s. And therefore, it would be better to understand, as Alexander Dallin and others pointed out, the Eastern attitude of arms control, that "any arms control measure may be used as a come-one for a political easement of tension".³⁷ It is, thus, obvious that the East considers arms control as a conducive step for political easement. Logically, this view is correct as arms race is only a means to reach political terms for both the super powers.

obvious?
since there
can be no
negotiations
unless there
are at least
two parties?

In this process of assuming their own right or freedom to coincide the policy of national security and thereby convincing the need for common security, the Europeans both the NATO and WTO, seem to have reached the important juncture for negotiating with each other for arms control in Europe.³⁸ However, to promote arms control

clumsy

36 Schelling, n. 31, p. 2.

37 Alexander Dallin, et al., The Soviet Union, Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 108.

38 The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York, 1982), p. 1.

so as to feel the guarantee in common (including the US), the former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in the Prologue of a book, writes that "to guarantee our own security in this nuclear age, we must, therefore, face these realities and 'work together' with other nations to achieve common security. For security in the nuclear age means common security".³⁹ But, it should be admitted that the common strategy which Vance is referring will only divide Europe again into blocs. Therefore, the common strategy pertinent to European security from the point of view of Europe, should aim at excluding the super powers' rivalry. If the Europeans both East and West have come out with one understanding of maintaining peace in the theatre, the influence of the so-called super powers should have been minimised. Such influence is maintained not through political relationship but through the military relationship of arms deployment. And therefore, the strategic means with longer range -- capabilities threatening not only Europe but also the whole world, which is noted even by Cyrus Vance -- can accordingly be reduced. For political security, there should be a common body or UN committee in certain principle to take care off the security policy of any theatre.⁴⁰

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

Admittedly, President Ronald Reagan's recent message to the Congress says "we will work for agreements that truly enhance stability" and he continues ensuring that "arms control must be an instrument of a coherent security policy".⁴¹ According to him, the 'common threat' could be removed by 'working together' or collective security. But, the policy of working together needs a clarification viz. 'working together' only among the Western countries to remove the common Soviet threat or 'working together' of both East and West in removing the common threat of nuclear catastrophe. If the latter is the real implication of such statement the arms build up is unnecessary to ensure security and stability.

and in fact may be counter-productive.

The American scholar, Steven Rosefields, categorically states in this context that underestimating the 'continued build-up of strategic arms will be a futile exercise of security policy that cannot reach the agreements for arms control whether in regional or international.⁴² Therefore, building up of arms or threat of further deployment so as to secure favourable bargaining position in

41 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Department of State Bulletin (Washington), vol. 83, no. 2073, April 1983, p. 60.

42 Steven Rosefield, False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup (New Brunswick, USA: Translation Book, 1982), p. 31.

arms control talks, is escalatory in its effect and furthers arms race. Such tactics followed by the super powers defeats the very purpose of arms control talks.

The new tactics for arms control in Europe, purely as an European initiative has emerged out of the prolonged process of East-West controversy. For the first time, the security issue has brought the Europeans together in early 1980s. A growing sense of optimism in expecting a considerable reduction of nuclear arms, obviously seems to have pervaded various analyses of Europeans' option in arms control approach.⁴³ The sentiment has founded on the conviction that security must rest upon the perfection of controls over the exercise of power. This overriding feeling in the region both of East and West Europe, long awaited expectation in limiting the arms deployed in their soil and inefficient result from the super powers attempts have well authorised the Europeans together respectively.⁴⁴ Although both NATO and WFO stick to their military point of view, they have been in the tendency of reducing arms both nuclear and conventional already deployed

43 See Kelly Gurke, "Arms Control in the Real World", Armed Force Journal (Chicago), vol. 120, no. 3, November 1982, pp. 106-8; D. Kenreth, "Ensuring Security in the Nuclear Age", Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 83, no. 2073, April 1983, pp. 57-60.

44 Ibid.

in Europe. Perhaps, the most significant consideration to this sense of concern is the awareness that political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are in decline. Probably to this line of thought, of course among other reasons, Europe turned to have found some causes that led to the regional consideration of arms control. It is noteworthy to list the factors which have effectively contributed to the emergence of European arms control:⁴⁵

- Continued escalation in European Theatre since 1950s.
- The failure in limiting the theatre forces through the bilateral negotiation between super powers, USA-USSR.
- The discrepancies in defining the forces both theatre and strategic.
- The fear of war or the disappointment in technicalities on limiting the war.
- The tendency to identify European security as a 'central element' of international security.
- Continued modernisation of conventional and theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

45 Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's (New York: National Strategy Information Centre, Inc., 1982), p. 54.

Examine the problem
from Europe's point of view
What are Europe's interests
& what are the threats to their security? 78
And are the nature of these threats changing?

- The Soviet's unilateralism and the US' interest of limited approach.
- Increased doubts about the credibility of the US commitment in Europe.
- Desire to preserve the benefits of detente.

The above listed reasons explain clearly why the regional tendency has developed in arms control negotiations in Europe. Lawrence Freedman has summed up the reasons as:

There is a real danger, that whatever the motives in reassuring domestic opinion or preserving a modicum of detente, the result will be more prolonged and acrimonious negotiations followed by disappointment and recriminations. This, in turn, could lead to the discrediting of even limited forms of East-West discussions on military issues. 46

He, then has warned the Europeans regarding the super powers' reassurance for regional level arms control without ever sacrificing their European attachment as a tactic in their global design. Naturally, bilateral negotiations could not assure regional security. Therefore, regional arms control talks should essentially be multilateral in which the Europeans should participate not as members of NATO or WTO but as members of a large European community requiring peace.

46 Lawrence Freedman, "Time for a Reappraisal", Survival, September-October 1970, p. 188.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL

The Super Powers acting in connivance with each other, thus obstructs the European efforts for arms control. Despite the efforts of the two powers to keep the Europeans away from the matter of arms build-up decision and its real motive, the latter became aware of the tactics and designs, and started including much pressure on many decisions. They tried to bring the giants to the negotiating table. But the intransigence of the two resulted in delay and finally virtual standstill in arms control talks. Given the failure of TNP negotiation so far, the possibility for a meaningful arms control in Europe seems to be a question mark. This will continue to be so if the super powers are allowed to monopolise detente by obstructing the entry of Europeans and other groups in arms control negotiation. Therefore, it looks that the immediate task is to dismantle such monopoly structure. This, i.e., however, cannot be accomplished without a clear understanding of the mechanism by which the monopoly is maintained by the Super Powers, their weak points as well as the reasons behind the weak position of the Europeans. Then, measures

exerting?
some of
them?

discuss
the
dimensions
of detente.

to counter them should be devised and implemented. In this chapter, an attempt is made to highlight the said points.

US-Soviet
doctrinal
differences
per se
need not
be a
threat
to others?

Facing with the appalling-threat of doctrinal differences between US and Soviet Union that seems to be forbidding Europeans to frame their own doctrine, the European efforts for arms control started taking practical shape since from the beginning of 'detente' endeavours to resolve the TNF controversy which has become an 'essential mechanism' for super power manoeuvres in Europe.¹

Especially, the TNF system which has, for the last thirty years, widened the gap in arms control negotiations for the real move of nuclear force reduction in Europe. As a result, the United States and Soviet Union have actually jeopardized the Europeans interest for arms control. Contrary to the expectations of the Europeans, the US doctrines of "protracted", "winnable", "controlled", and "limited" nuclear wars and the counter-strategies of Soviet Union have been really generating "hair trigger" environment, more so in the name of TNF negotiation in Geneva. Until recently, although its doctrine is not

1 R.S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perception and Misperception", Foreign Affairs, vol. 62, no. 1, fall 1983, pp. 59-80.

seemed to be clear unlike US, the Soviet Union also appears to have followed the same Western tactics in its theatre negotiation in Europe.²

Ever since the doctrinal differences of United States and Soviet Union started, they are reportedly co-operating in theatre issues of Europe. It is implied in their so-called "contract detente" under which both powers have proposed a renewed interest in "limited" nuclear war. More importantly, they have been maintaining the European theatre, under their strategic control through the policy of escalation closely related with deterrent endeavour. Indicating such a tactical collaboration, Glenn H. Sayder said that "the 'new look' military policy of the United States was much more the policy of business-oriented" and the Soviet Union is obviously a partner to it.³ Therefore, so far as the doctrinal difference of both United States and Soviet Union are concerned, they have been posed for convincing the Europeans, both East and West, for facilitating their 'escalatory move' in theatre. Under the surface of apparent inconsistencies between the bedeviling nuclear doctrines of both the Super Powers, there lies a common

2 See C. Raja Mohan, "Human Error and Nuclear War", Strategic Analysis, vol. 7, no. 6, September 1983, pp. 471-8.

3 Glenn H. Sayder, "The 'New Look' of 1953", in Warner R. Schilling, et al., ed., Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962), pp. 379-524.

strategy for mutual benefit. To understand this, it is pertinent to quote Jonathan Schell who says:

When one great power adopts a strategic theory, it becomes a doctrine; when two rival great powers adopt it, it becomes a system; and when those rivals more or less abide by the rules of the system, and even hold negotiations aimed at strengthening it (I am thinking of SALT), and are prepared to see new nations enter it as they develop the necessary technical equipment; the system can be described as entrenched. This is the point at which the system of deterrence has arrived today. ⁴

What Jonathan Schell expresses in context is that both the United States and Soviet Union want to maintain the system despite their doctrinal differences. They also try to exclude others particularly the Europeans by deceiving them with multiplicity of doctrines and misinformation. The resultant monopoly over detente helps to maintain the entrenched system. Therefore, this entrenched-system seriously undermines the Europeans interest of arms control among other things. If the super powers extend such a system without deciding about the high level problems of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which will also jeopardize the regional move for

⁴ Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (London: Picador, 1982), p. 214.

MBFR in Europe, the overkill strategy of their monopolized deterrence will certainly be a dangerous element to European arms control.⁵ Undoubtedly, they have been doing it with lot of technicalities intended not only to confuse Europeans but the whole world as well. The mechanism viz. the entrenched system for the monopoly of detente, has been continuously maintained by various factors both tactical, technical and political.

Among the factors which help to maintain the entrenched system, the most important one is the flexible response doctrine itself as it provides both tactical and technical conditions which excludes the European from direct arms control talks. In this context, the doctrine has to be viewed from three specific points pertinent to the perpetuation of the system.

Firstly, it has been devised as if to defend directly the European. But, in reality, it is for the tactical convenience of both the US and Soviet Union for maintaining the system continuously through the escalatory process. Further, since they have decided to cover up the escalation in the name of 'replacing the burden' arms control talk between them turns out to be an instrument for achieving military balance rather than for reducing

5 Ibid.

arms. Thus, substantial amount of truth is inherent in claims like: "Ever since the escalatory process started under the coverage of the flexible response doctrine, the TNF crisis has, been an inseparable element of European theatre."⁶ Obviously, both the super powers are heightening the tension in the European theatre and are interested in the perpetuation of the crisis. Therefore, such a crisis through the escalatory business appears to be an 'inescapable need for a global strategy' of so-called super powers.⁷

Secondly, the mutual fear of danger from the other side helps to hoodwink the Europeans particularly the West and instill in their mind that the deployment of nuclear arms as a deterrent is essential to secure political and military security.

However, under the garb of military confrontation in which the Europeans are also engaged, there lies the non-military aspects of global policy of common interest for the negotiation to reach a political balance. It

6 See James R. Huntly, "Extending the Atlantic Systems : An Island of Success in a Sea of Troubles", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4, winter 1975-76, pp. 473-6.

7 See Edward Heath, "The Widening Atlantic - The Inescapable Need for a Global Strategy", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, fall 1980, p. 280.

seems to emphasize the use of nuclear weapons so as to get the West European secured at the doctrinal level, but keeping the real security at the whims of the two super powers. The East has been conveniently raising the point that it is not going to attack West because it has already declared the 'no-first-use' policy. Even though the 'no-first-use' is a declared doctrine of the East, nevertheless it claims the right of using their weapons, if the West uses it. Thus, the East has shifted the responsibility for the real danger to the West which has neither declared nor intended to declare the policy of 'no-first-use'. Therefore the complication which purposely involved in the flexible response of super powers appear to jeopardise the Europeans interest of going for real arms control talks.⁸ It is obvious, that the flexible response doctrine is used to justify such gimmicks through military confrontation and, thereby, hide the non-military aspects of the global strategy of the super powers.

Finally, the important aspect of the flexible response doctrine is the general nuclear response of both the powers as a tactic of deterrence. It provides the technical condition for the monopoly detente. In effect to this, the United States and Soviet Union are producing

⁸ Ibid.

* What are the factors that contribute to the maintenance of detente?
 * balance of forces? possible costs/consequences of a war?
 Surely the so-called flexible response doctrine is only one factor contributing to the uncertainties associated with the outcome of such wars?
 * uncertainties

and deploying long-range missiles so as to control and prevent the Europeans from going to solve their security problems independently. It is so because, the long-range missiles are not considered to be a threat to Europe unlike the short range missiles. Consequently, Europeans do not technically have the access for negotiations for the long range missiles. Thus they appear to escalate the theatre making their long-range strategy of deterrence only a way out whereby they only could move ahead with the same tactics of arms control negotiation in Europe.⁹

From these three viewpoints, the flexible response helps both the United States and Soviet Union to mislead the theatre and thereby pose themselves as the 'champions of deterrence'. In this context, Moscow has also been speaking about 'equality and equal security', that is United States move in all levels - deployment and arms control - will be responded equally so as to keep security against US and its allies. Moreover, Moscow likes to apply the concept of 'equal security' only to the direct relationship between the two powers. This

⁹ See James A. Thomson, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe : Planning for NATO's Nuclear Deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s", Survival, vol. 25, no. 3, May-June 1983, pp. 98-109.

became all too apparent in the autumn of 1972, when, as Henry Kissinger writes it that "the two Super Powers enter into a secret understanding that, in the event of an East-West conflict in Europe, the use of nuclear weapons be limited to the territories of their allies."¹⁰

Therefore the flexible response appears to justify the use of nuclear weapons limited to Europe insulating thereby the territories of the Super Powers. Given such a tacit understanding at the doctrinal level between the two powers, according to him, there could always be a dramatic negotiations which might be for raising nuclear threshold and thereby make European theatre helpless. More importantly, if any one of the European countries in the East and West make a severe conflict the big powers, utilising such a situation, may play very closely in a secret collaboration to find certain causes for using the theatre nuclear weapons but not the long-range (strategic) missiles.¹¹

The United States and Soviet Union are correct in so far as the flexible response doctrine has been accepted by the Europeans as members of NATO and WTO which

¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Leidenfeld Nicolson, 1982), pp. 276-9.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 278.

permits these all developments at the theoretical level. If something happened or perceived to happen in a tense situation of Europe, the flexible response will undoubtedly give the right of what the Soviets and Americans equally accept in different forms but with same "meaning" to conduct a practical war at the Euro-strategic level. And if a conflict among the Europeans expected by the big powers will not come up, they then will linger the escalatory strategy in the theatre possibly till the time that Europe also follows them. Also, they seem to have the understanding that the first experience of the theatre will not be leaked out so as to avoid the theatre crisis, as they have vital interest of searching for new theatres especially in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.¹²

Since the big powers fear that European theatre may go out of their hand, they convince and induce the Europeans both East and West to observe the policy of deterrence. In this process, the Europeans are caught in the web of arms race and hence they are made powerless to press for arms control particularly in the field of ✓ TNF. Therefore, their membership in the NATO and WTO

12 See Gerhard Wetting, East West Security Relations at the Eurostrategic Level : Soviet Foreign Policy and East West Relations (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 57-62.

✓ seriously hampers their efforts for peace. In this respect, the European Institute for International Relations has noted in 1978 that for the advancement of the long-term security objectives it is necessary to replace the NATO and WTO by a collective security system.¹³ Otherwise, they will have to suffer by the 'double vision' of European security and bloc security which are clearly incompatible with each other. However, the fact remains that if there is mutual trust among the Europeans, the European security as a regional concept will assure the security of all nations, no matter of their bloc affiliation.

Although the Europeans are caught up in the web of complex military and political factors carefully made by the super powers to keep them and their region under strategic control, they started realising that their conception of European security through arms control negotiation is not the same as that of super powers. Both the US and USSR have so far successfully played their tactics at escalation through arms control negotiations under the cover of the flexible response doctrine. Moreover the European effort for arms control negotiation has deliberately been complicated by the super powers

13 Cited in SIPRI, 1978, p. 407.

through their tactical inclusion of long-range missiles.¹⁴ Also, the legitimacy of European participation in arms control talks, though recommended by the UN, is being evaded tactfully and systematically by both the super powers.

Against this situation, and more so, the recent break down of Geneva talks, the achievement of European security through a genuine arms control negotiation remains problematic. The only way out to such an impasse is to dismantle the 'entrenched-system' so meticulously maintained by the super powers. Then only, it is possible to give the right direction to the arms control talks in which the concern for European security in its real sense will get its due priority. It is not so difficult as it appears to be, for, the very operation of the system depends greatly upon the will of the Europeans as members of NATO and WTO. Even though the super powers maintain various technical and political blockades against the European entry into their 'system', it cannot be ignored that the super powers depend heavily upon the Europeans both technically and strategically for their theatre operation. Also, the 'entrenched-system' has already shown signs of cleavages due to the West-West controversy noted already

14 Ibid., pp. 125-6.

and the emerging tide of public protest against the arms race. What follows subsequently is an attempt to highlight the steps to be taken to paralyse the 'system' and to ensure European security through an effective arms control talk with European participation.¹⁵

The primary task to weaken the system is that the Europeans should deny the responsibility of defending the weapon system deployed by the super powers. This technical dependence of the super powers can tactfully be utilised by the Europeans. In this respect, Schell has categorically pointed out that "the only way to escape from the trap is to change the system, and take away from nuclear weapons, the responsibility for defending them".¹⁶ For changing this system, therefore, the Europeans should consider carefully the responsibility of assuring their own security without underestimating the TNF issues.¹⁷ The European security issues to be dealt through arms control is entirely different from what America and Soviet Union feel to be so.

It is apparent that the European membership in NATO and WTO pose a difficulty in going ahead with the task,

15 Ibid.

16 Schell, n. 4, p. 214.

17 Ibid.

as their perception is influenced by the decisions of the super powers. Therefore, it is essential that the Europeans should co-operate with each other as a single community for assuring security through arms control negotiations. Although it appears difficult, it is not, however, an impossible task given their increasing realisation of the impending threat. For, the super powers' negotiation for arms control is like 'dinosaurs fight' causing danger to Europe.¹⁸ They may resort to war i.e. limited war in Europe as, in their view "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means".¹⁹ This is particularly so when they feel their present policies do not work in their favour. Therefore, it is of utmost necessity for the Europeans to work for mutual trust to realise the objectives of regional disarmament.

Moreover, it is to be realised that the course for European arms control negotiations should not be considered separately as TNF, conventional and strategic in view of the considerable linkages between them. For that reason, the negotiations for theatre issues should consider, among other things, the main object of reducing arms, both

18 Robert Neild, "What Can be Done?" BPP, vol. 4, 1981, pp. 34-35.

19 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 1-23.

conventional and nuclear. And also this should be in the light that there must be felt 'mutual trust balanced by an agreement'.²⁰ At the same time, it is not that the central strategic forces should not be completely considered by the Europeans as Helmut Schmidt in his Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture said.²¹ According to him, for dealing the new development in European arms control, the European "must maintain the full range deterrence" for theatre nuclear arms control which includes all types of weapons. Such an approach to remove the main actors from the arms control scenario is necessarily an important task of the 1980s.²²

It is true that the Europeans have understood that in maintaining their individual need of both arms and arms control for their own security lies separately from that of the Super Powers. But, they should fully free themselves from their former illusion that security can be achieved through arms build up. However, ever since

20 Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Richard A. Falk, "World Demilitarized: A Basic Human Need", Alternative (New Delhi), vol. 6, no. 1, 1980, pp. 1-16.

21 Helmut Schmidt, "Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture", Survival, vol. 20, no. 1, 1978, p. 4.

22 Ibid.

they started arms control talks, they could clearly distinguish between the real security and its nominal counterpart. The misunderstanding of 'detente' with 'entente' to mean "peace through strength",²³ is in part due to the propaganda of the super powers. Such a notion propagated by the super powers helped well to further their cause by deluding the Europeans. This approach has been used by the super powers to stimulate the security problems of European nations which provided legitimacy for the conduct of arms race - via the 'bargaining chip' negotiation.²⁴

In this context, the recent trends of development needs attention. Even though the Europeans have not initially accepted the 1979 decision for the LRINE deployment under the cover of modernisation, on the ground that such a move will result in further escalation, nevertheless, they have been subsequently convinced by the US that the deployment of Pershing-II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) starting from 1983 will not exactly in the spirit of 'deployment' but to persuade the USSR for possible arms control agreement. If the arms control

23 Noam Chomsky, et. al., Super Powers in Collisions. The Cold War Now (London: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 26.

24 See Francesco Calogero, "Arms Control in Europe", BPP, vol. 4, 1981, pp. 40-42.

agreement fails, the Europeans were told, the deployment should be entertained in Europe.²⁵ Thus, the Europeans have accepted the 1979 decision and started to host the weapons already deployed and to be deployed subsequently with the hope that this will help to gain the acceptance of the Soviet to ban all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.²⁶

But, what is happening now, is exactly against the wish of the Europeans. However, the US has succeeded in instigating its friendly rival to go for escalation matching. The Soviet Union now reacts to the escalation by saying that it will be met not by new weapons but new system. Consequently, the arms control talk in Geneva is at a stand still. As a whole, the complexity in the deployment of arms control may continue in the future too. Therefore, before any kind of diplomatic move for arms control agreement proposed by the big powers - like the Zero Option or Cutback, it is said that the Europeans may decide to ask the big powers to get away from the confrontation position.²⁷ It is to be learned by the

25 Ibid., p. 41.

26 David Fairhall, "NATO Puts the Bomb Behind the Lines", The Guardian Weekly, vol. 129, no. 15, 9 October 1983, p. 9.

27 See Jane O. Sharp, "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race : Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear Freeze", BPP, vol. 4, 1981, pp. 46-50.

Europeans that, at least, in future, they should not continue to the view that peace can be brought by force.

level the possibility of

surprise attack would exist if offensive forces and weapons are in position of capability of launching such attacks)

Moreover, Europeans should clearly understand the policies of both the US and USSR as that of the super powers not as their allies, lest they become victim of their tactics. Deployment is taking place not only as a means for arms control but also to counteract the policies of 'surprise attack' propagated equally by both the super powers. It appears that the Europeans are caught up in this trick. The super powers continued their propaganda to seek European co-operation for the process of escalation implied in their 'surprise attack' concept.²⁸ Moreover, it is held by the US that arms control agreement is essential to seek military balance at a lower level and minimise the possibility of surprise attack. Viewing arms control agreement in the context of surprise attack and military balance President Reagan said: "While the agreement would not eliminate the threat...it could [however] lead to military stability at lower levels and lessen the danger of miscalculation and a surprise attack."²⁹ The same view is more or less expressed by the

28 Marilyn Bechtel, "US-USSR Arms Talks: Exploring the Common Ground", New World Review (New York), vol. 51, no. 3, May-June 1983, pp. 24-30.

29 The United States International Communication Agency, America's Program for Peace (New Delhi: American Centre, 1982), p. 28.

USSR also though in different forms and worlds.

It is obvious that the super powers are viewing arms control as a means to seek military balance, if necessary, with deployment and, they are not interested, though they could, to remove the threat from Europe for the obvious reason of keeping the theatre under their control. Besides, the hallowness of the aim of achieving the military balance at lower level is so apparent especially in the face of Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) which jeopardise the very aim. More importantly, whether there is conflict at lower or higher level, it means nuclear holocaust.³⁰ Given the total war behaviour of the Soviet Union which agrees with the 'limited war' concept as a mere tactics, the danger is much more and vast. Understanding these tactics of the super powers and learning their implication and the lessons therein will greatly facilitate the future arms control efforts of the Europeans.

Another challenge to the Europeans commitment to peace has recently emerged from President Reagan's willingness to include in the possible arms control talks the British and French theatre nuclear forces what the Soviets previously asked for in the context of Geneva

30 See SIPRI, n. 13, p. 407.

negotiations. It is not difficult to understand that this dramatic change in US position is only in accordance with the pre-planned policy of both US and USSR.³¹ If the Europeans, especially the West including France, accept such a move these will undoubtedly be an another escalation process till the end of second cold war which may take thirty years - or more than that.³² The Soviet Union, on its part, has found the obvious reason to go further deployment as indicating the danger posed by the Mx Missiles to the central strategic balance and its probable implication also to the theatre balance. Thus, Robert Neild is fully justified when he says that the flexible response which, allow both sides for these unfortunate development of escalation in the theatre should be considered as 'suicidal policy'.³³ According to him, the Europeans should use the flexible response doctrine only in the context of arms control but not in the context of deployment. Though Europeans failed to stop the modernisation decision today, they have opportunity to

31 The Times (London), 26 September 1983.

32 See Noam Chomsky, n. 23, p. 26.

33 Robert Neild, "What can be Done?", BPP, vol. 4, 1981, pp. 34-35.

stop the super powers from their recent preparation for an another process of escalation. Otherwise, the situation will go out of their hand as in the past and they have to wait impatiently "for another fifteen years with a method which does not work".³⁴ For the success of future arms control talks, the Europeans should raise as a single force to weaken the influence of the super powers in Europe. It is hoped that the Europeans will not miss this situation.

It should be noted that removing the escalatory tactics of the super powers certainly cannot be done immediately. However, it can be done gradually by the Europeans. The aggressive policy of escalation followed by the big powers has to be met only "through selective and gradual steps of escalation" which, in the long -run means that the big powers monopoly of deterrent policy on arms control issue related with Europe will go away from theatre.³⁵ Precisely, therefore, the military decisions emerging from both the sides should not be considered under the mere coverage of security. For, the web of deterrent is concealed beneath the surface of such military proposals with the apparent aim of maintaining

34 Lord Kennet, "Europe and Arms Control", Survival, vol. 10, no. 3, May-June 1977, pp. 125-7.

35 Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy", International Security, spring 1981, pp. 18-27.

peace through national and international security. In this context, there should be an arms control agreement for European security through negotiation among the Europeans themselves.³⁶ It is for this reason only that the UN is encouraging the process of independent European involvement in arms control issues. Unless and until the European nations free themselves from the doctrinal and organisational web of the super powers, the initiation of such a process could not be effective in achieving the desirable results. Therefore, it is needless to repeat that mutual trust and co-operation to prevent the common threat the Europeans should join together, at least, in the question of arms control.

For assuring their success in future arms control endeavours, the Europeans can follow the strategy of "collaborative competition" to replace the "confrontative competition" which is instrumental in the process of escalation under various doctrines. It could be a genuine contribution to European strategy, as it can give a great deal of relief to a variety of urgent problems in

36 Klaus Bloemer, "Freedom for Europe, East and West", Foreign Policy, no. 50, Spring 1983, pp. 23-38.

the theatre. It cannot, by its very nature be compared or equated with the strategies like deterrence, crisis management, escalation, coercive diplomacy, arms control, war terminations and miscalculations, which the Europeans have actually tried for, at historically varying levels of arms control development in Europe. For, unlike the said strategies it aims to remove the confrontative attitude prevailed in the theatre. The new strategy seeks a practical solution to the problem of "how the United States and Soviet Union might moderate their global rivalry in order to avoid dangerous confrontation".³⁷

Alexander L. George has pinpointed the need for a clear-cut definition of the objectives to be achieved through such a strategy. For, the strategy, according to him, "cannot be articulated without being linked to a long-range goal that is considered desirable or at least acceptable...".³⁸ In this regard, the Europeans, though the long-run objective of achieving regional negotiations, have still to define the most acceptable objectives more clearly through consultations among themselves. Moreover, their former strategy of arms control through negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral cannot be workable in an

37 Alexander L. George, Managing US-Soviet Rivalry : Problems of Crisis Preventions (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1983), p. 4.

38 Ibid., p. 19.

atmosphere of confrontative competition in which they themselves are unwittingly involved. Therefore, for furthering their security interest they have to resort to the collaborative competition to replace the confrontative competition of the cold war. It is to be recognised that the strategy articulated by a clear cut goal and to be implemented by means of collaborative competition is, however, fully finalised. As a new and evolving strategy alternative, it needs further development and refinement. For instance, "important aspects of the collaborative competition, including what has been called as the rules of detente, remained to be worked out".³⁹

The most important feature of this potentially advantageous policy is its identification of the 'double dimension' of detente. The arms control negotiations of the US and Soviet from their perspective of global strategy represent only a single dimension of detente which seems to run the risk of failing to identify the interest of the Europeans. However, their relationship in such negotiations is said to be the sort of 'confrontative competition' and more importantly, the big powers knowingly accept such confrontative doctrine for maintaining their aggressive system

³⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

under the garb of negotiation with the main purpose of prolongation and extension of the cold war.⁴⁰ For an instance of the perilous implication of the attitude of confrontative competition on European arms control talk, both the US and USSR have continued to deploy weapons to create the technical difficulty. Thus, the so-called 'Gray Area' or 'Eurostrategic Weapons' consisting of Pershing II and Cruise missiles and the Soviet long-range missiles of SS-20 which, by virtue of their long-range nature, are far falling outside the framework of both SALT and MBFR, are reported to be deployed to prolong the controversy of defining nuclear forces.⁴¹

These kinds of move deliberately ignore the other but most pertinent dimension of detente from the European point of view. Therefore, to focus on this dimension of detente, the central strategic deterrence of both US and Soviet Union should be brought under the purview of SALT and MBFR. The confrontative competition should necessarily be replaced by the 'collaborative competition' of the Europeans with the super powers through the articulated deterrence. More importantly, the Europeans have to develop various rules of detente so as

40 See Jonathan Schell, n. 4, p. 214.

41 UNO, n. , para 46.

to regulate their competition without exacting the big powers' involvement in theatre issues, particularly in arms control matter.⁴² For this, the Europeans' and the Soviet-American relations have to be formalized in the manner whereby their involvement in the theatre will be less than that in the past.⁴³ Through such a strategy, the Europeans should free both the super powers to realise the necessity of assuring the 'moratorium' on weapons deployment and 'no first use' policy as they lost their diplomatic, public and psychological influence in Europe. Once, the super powers are made to assure for 'no first use' then other nuclear powers can be easily persuaded to give the same assurance. According to Brodie, this is a crucial factor to give strength to the policy of detente.⁴⁴

The achievement of arms control in Europe through an effective negotiation process not only needs a realistic and clear-cut strategy but also the political, technical

42 See Hedly Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 54-57.

43 Ibid.

44 Brodie B., "War in the Nuclear Age", in B. Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapons (New York: Harcourt Bruce, 1946), p. 26.

and even moral force to underpin such a strategy. It is not a secret that they do face certain difficulties in their effort like their military alliance, the technical difficulties created by the inclusion of long-range missiles and the political differences between members. However, these difficulties could be overcome if attention is given to the need for four-fold linkages which will reinforce each other to give the Europeans the much needed political and moral support for carrying forward the task of assuring European security. These linkages will not only weaken the attitude of confrontative competition between the super powers but also instil dynamism to what Radovan Vukadinovic described "the blocked SALT the paralysed MBFR".⁴⁵

The first linkage already created but needs to be strengthened in the already noted point of greater co-operation among the European nations. They have to link up their security issues and perception free from the distortive influence of the super powers which try and succeed, to some extent, to externalise their internal problems. Such a linkage of security policy is essential to minimise tension. Of course, all security policies

⁴⁵ Radovan Vukadinovic, "Changes in the Content of Detente", The Non-Aligned World (New Delhi), vol. 1, no. 2, April-June 1983, pp. 249-54.

involve risk and that of Europe is not exception to that. Therefore the vital question, inter alia is the achievement of the balance of risk which could reduce the risk itself. The present alliance system of NATO and WTO presents the familiar case of risk. The military decisions of these alliances stands in the way of achieving the balance of risk. It is to be admitted that the success of the super power strategy of escalation depends very much on a condition of imbalanced risk, since that can alone justify further deployment to achieve the balance. Thus, it is crystal clear that the balance cannot be achieved through military solution. David Fairhall opines in this regard that a new strategy for arms control relies on non-nuclear factors.⁴⁶

Therefore, to reduce tension by bringing about the balance of theatre forces needs the negotiation among the European themselves based on their own strength of security feeling and mutual trust.⁴⁷ If one of them feels insecure, it should be free to deal their security need by opening negotiation with neighbour countries. Once

46 David Fairhall, "NATO puts the Bomb behind the Lines", The Guardian Weekly, vol. 129, no. 15, 9 October 1983, p. 9.

47 See Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence in US-Soviet Relations (Boulder: West View Press, 1982), pp. 237 and 241.

such an atmosphere of mutual trust and co-operation is achieved, the Europeans could be in a strong position to avert further escalation of nuclear weapons conveying both the super powers that the forces already deployed in Europe is enough to secure both sides as the general detente among themselves could maintain peace.⁴⁸

The second linkage to be brought about for the purpose of providing a technical ground for the Europeans to participate effectively in the arms control talks is that of linking up of the SALT and MBFR. For a "logical link-up between SALT and MBFR...would make comprehensive negotiating structure easier to achieve", European arms control.⁴⁹ Such a link up could remove the major technical blockade made deliberately by the super powers to deny the European entry into arms control talks. More importantly, the Europeans do have the plausible justification for their interest in limiting the strategic arms for the simple reason that they have been deployed in their territories and waters and their implications to

48 Ibid., p. 237.

49 Lord Kennet, "Europe and Arms Control", Survival vol. 20, no. 3, May-June 1977, pp. 125-7.

European security is obvious. However there is a problem in the process of integrating both SALT and MBFR between the West and East European which is, needless to say, engineered by the super powers themselves while the West called it as MBFR, the East named it as Mutual Reduction of Forces and armaments (MRFA). In the same way, problems may emerge in decisions related with the method of reduction; types of forces to be reduced measures which may be adopted.⁵⁰ However if the mutual trust and co-operation among the Europeans once granted those problems will be only apparent than real. Moreover, these problems and differences can be sorted out for the greater benefit of achieving the balance of risk and detente.

The third linkage related somewhat with the preceding one is to link-up the security problems of Europe with arms control.⁵¹ This, in fact, is just the opposite of what the super powers are doing viz. equating security with arms build up. Naturally, when the security issues are linked up with arms control, the escalation process gets weakened. It is not out of place to note here that the super powers tactics of escalation in the European theatre depends clearly upon the will of

50 See SIPRI, 1974, p. 33.

51 Karl E. Birnbaum, ed., Arms Control in Europe: Problems and Prospects (Vienna: Luxemburg Papers, 1980), pp.3-4.

the Europeans to entertain the arms deployment. But, once they see their security related more with arms control rather than deployment, they can very well reject any military solutions to their security problems. The theatre problem of Europe should be linked up with the general problem of arms control at the global level. Such a perspective will also reinforce the efforts of relating SALT and MBFR by providing a logical justification. In this context, certain experts have warned that the tendency in isolating theatre issues from the overall nuclear confrontation of long-range (strategic) issues or international issues will not help.⁵² Stimson who is more explicit on this point noted that unless and until the European consider their theatre problem relative to the prevailing international tension, their efforts will be jeopardized.⁵³ Therefore, to be realistic the TNF issues should be viewed with in the global perspectives of arms control.

The fourth linkage is of immense significance to mobilise a world wide support for the European arms

52 Karl E. Birnbaum and Hanspeter Neuhold, ed., Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe (Vienna: Luxemburg Papers, 1982), p. 202.

53 Cited in Michael Amrine, "The Current Decision : The Secret of the Atomic Bomb", DSB

control in particular and world security in general. The European effort for arms control has to be linked up with the efforts of the non-aligned countries, international bodies, religious, political groups and the peace movements. It is to be emphasized that forging such an alliance is not an unworkable programme or illusory hope but will be moulded in the natural process of world history due to the existence of strong and logical interrelationship between these forces.

The increasing tendency of the Europeans to view their security issues relative to the international tension and world security will naturally enhance their confidence in neutrality and non-alignment.⁵⁴ In the same way, given the fact that arms build-up -- both tactical and strategic weapons -- in Europe is not only a threat to Europe but also for the world as a whole, a serious search to provide an alternative model to European arms control depends equally upon the third world and hence its political force viz. the non-aligned movement (NAM).⁵⁵ Obviously, both the Europeans as well as the non-aligned group do have an irrefutable meeting ground to safeguard their mutual interest for security. In a more important sense, such an alliance will also have potentiality of

54 See Karl E. Birnbaum, n. 42, p. 202.

55 Ibid.

meeting certain technical problems posed by the super powers. The exclusion of Europeans from strategic arms control on the ground that such arms are of long-range, can no longer be justified if the Europeans go along with the third world countries which might be well affected by those strategic nuclear weapons. Recently, the Europeans have also started to insist on the strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate Nuclear Forces Talks (INF) being merged together and other nuclear powers being brought in.⁵⁶ Therefore, the alliance under consideration will bound to emerge in the course of time and already there are encouraging trends for hope.

The political and moral pressure such as alliance could produce, can be formalised and directed through international organisations like the UN. Hence, the Europeans should create a good rapport with the UN and other international bodies seriously concerned with world peace and security. The UN has repeatedly expressed its intention and commitment to co-operate with regions in matters of arms control. In this respect UN Secretary General has assured:

56 See K. Subramanyam, "The Euromissile Crisis", Strategic Analysis, vol. 7, no. 9, December 1983, pp. 718-30.

Once there is an initiative from a region, the countries and regional organization concerned should be able, upon their request and in the manner they wish, to draw to the fullest extent on the resources and possibilities of the United Nations system. 57

As noted elsewhere, the UN is already playing an important role in providing information on the question of arms race alongwith the policy direction for arms control. Moreover, it has continued to insist for an independent European arms control talks for assuring a durable solution to their security problems.

Fundamental to the success of arms control in general and European arms control in particular is the need to mobilise the public opinion against the dangers of nuclear war. Already peace movements all over the world has started channelising the popular dissent against the nuclear madness. The resurgent peace movements has acquired the quality of mass movement. Today, increasing number of people are taking part in these movements in Europe and in spreading throughout the world. With increasing effort on disarmament education and peace campaign the peace movements will prove to be powerful force to augment the European efforts for arms control and

57 UN, General and Complete Disarmament : Study on all the Aspects of Regional Disarmament (New York, 1980), p. 64.

disarmament. These movements are so intense in Europe, Australia and United States of America. It appears that it would not be a mistake to view these peace movements as grass roots level counterpart of non-aligned movement especially in the context of arms control and disarmament.

Due to the fact that absolute power resides with people of the world, the peace movement as a popular force is having the capability of forcing the super powers to reduce their craze for arms deployment. Helen Caldicott has correctly noted as: "The power of an aroused public is unfeatable....This is no cause for pessimism, for already I have seen great obstacles surmounted. Nor need we be afraid, for I have seen democracy work."⁵⁸ Thus if the world public is aroused against the false designs of the super powers, they have to bow down before the will of the inhabitants of their planet. It is in this respect Lord Kennet says that if the whole topic of arms control is moved into open and negotiations are conducted "with light of the day, in the bright of all, the super powers could not justify their stand".⁵⁹ Thus exposing the nuclear strategies and tactics of both the US and USSR

58 Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Madness (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), p. 93.

59 Lord Kennet, n. 49, p. 125.

to the world public and the resultant consciousness and the vigilance of the public can become the "Pandora's Box"⁶⁰ which will provide solution to the present problem of arms build-up in Europe and elsewhere.

There is no cause for pessimism with regard to the European security notwithstanding the continued failures of arms control negotiations including TNF and even the European inability to forestall the recent decision of deployment. No matter of their past ignorance and subservience to the foul designs of the two super powers, the Europeans, today, have a clear-cut perception of the motives and tactics of the arms deployment in Europe and its consequence to the security. Moreover, as noted above, there is a workable strategy and great amount of political and moral support from other peace loving forces of the world, the judicious and sincere utilisation of which by the Europeans both East and West will determine their success in future arms control attempts.

60 Ibid.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER V

The ongoing arms race rooted in the Cold War between the US and USSR with diametrically opposite ideological moorings has resulted in the theatre crisis of Europe. It is evident from the foregoing chapters that continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe is the basic strategy necessitated by the mutual desire of (both) the super powers to reach political terms with each other through military means. In such an attempt they have started using Europe as a theatre to stage their military might. Despite the apparent controversies and competition, they do have a common understanding of keeping Europe under their strategic control. Threat of ?

A pertinent point to be noted is that the Europeans both the East and West were repeatedly told and convinced that such deployment is only for securing Europe both militarily and politically thereby the super powers have so far been successful in concealing their self interest of keeping Europe as a theatre for their global strategy. In their schema of global strategy, arms deployment in Europe obviously remains as a tactical necessity for blocking each other's expansion either politically or ideologically and more importantly insulating each other's

territory from the immediate effects of nuclear war. It is in this context only, the Limited War Strategy of US adopted in Presidential ~~Directive~~ (PD) 59 has to be viewed. Therefore, both the super powers have resorted a competitive accumulation of nuclear weapons with the declared aim of protecting the security of each other's European allies but with the tacit aim of keeping the European theatre under their strategic control which is considered by both as a tactical necessity for pursuing their global strategy.

Basically correct perhaps

The United States in its effort to convince the West Europeans of the need for INF deployment has come out with various strategic doctrines. These doctrinal changes were made by US to make their strategy workable in Europe and acceptable to the European by incorporating the views of the Europeans without fundamentally altering its tactical goals. Thus, the deployment of INF under various doctrinal coverage has the explicit objective of providing security to Europe both psychologically and militarily. Besides, both the super powers have systematically and relentlessly tried the policy of false propaganda and misinformation so as to keep the Europeans in the dark so far as the actual magnitude of deployment and the real motive behind it.

This is no truer in this context than in the general context

A disseminating information by great and not so great powers.

The idea of surprise attack is meticulously nurtured by both the super powers so as to instill the

feeling of insecurity in Europe and to project their deployment as an inevitable necessity to safeguard Europe. Both the super powers have succeeded to a greater extent on persuading the Europeans to accept most of their military decision in the name of assuring security. But such a trend could not last long as the Europeans having observed over years the tactics of the super powers and the actual functions of TNF and other weapons have started developing their own perspectives.

The emergence of independent European perspectives on theatre issues of Europe and increasingly identical view among the Europeans could be explained by their perception of a common threat posed by the Theatre Nuclear Weapons (TNW) accumulated in their territory. The very presence of TNF and other weapons stockpiled in Europe, though never used, represents a source of threat not to their security but their very existence. Moreover, the ideas like limited war and mutual assured destruction (MAD) etc. has tended to prove beyond doubt that, in an event of nuclear war, the first victims will be the Europeans themselves while the territories of the super powers will be insulated. Such a view is bolstered further by their realisation of the possibility of the nuclear terror by error even if no nuclear war is deliberately engineered. Moreover, the extraneous motives of the super powers in the accumulation

is more than clear by the negotiation tactics of the super powers who concerned with the military balance continued to foment the process of escalation through the general policy of 'catching up and overtaking'. Since flexible response strategy of the US provides USSR with convenient grounds for excuse for further deployment, the latter appears to have tacitly contributed to that very strategy though it denounces it in public.

Thus the present magnitude of TNF deployment has actually increased the tension and endangered the European security. For, the deployment has gone far beyond the level essential for assuring European security. This can be taken as a clear proof that the super powers are not interested in the European security per se but something else. Moreover, due to the military alliance, the European countries do not have an independent military policy and have realized, of late, of their subservient military position and the subsequent military dependence which may equally endanger their security. Thus, in the name of security they have been virtually choked by the policies of both the super powers. It is only under these circumstances, the Europeans have come out with conclusion that arms deployment cannot increase their security but only endangers it.

The role of junior partners in an alliance ought to have been discussed

To free Europe from the strategic clutches of the two super powers and the grip of increasing nuclear danger,

the Europeans have found it as essential to halt the process of escalation and tension in the theatre. They, with genuine aspiration for detente, have started persuading the super powers to go for arms control negotiations. They believed that such an effort will help limiting the tendency for arms build-up and the resultant tension in the theatre. Consequently, they have shown much interest in the SALT and MBFR negotiations and hoped that such negotiation will solve, at least, certain of the immediate problems of the theatre. But, things have gone contrary to their expectations. For, the super powers used these very negotiation as an instrument to serve their interest of achieving military balance and thereby reaching the ultimate goal of political terms with each other.

These negotiations for arms control have themselves been into a source for further deployment of nuclear arms. Ironically enough, the process of escalation has continued side by side with the negotiations aiming at reducing arms in the theatre. Moreover, the super powers have recognized the significance of such negotiations to protect the period of cold war essential to pursue their global strategy. Thus the TNF controversy has been continued basically on their common acceptance of the delaying tactics. Given these internal agenda of the super powers for the so-called

* Theory overstretched.
 (as evident from what is stated in the next page)

'negotiations', the resurgent interest of the Europeans over arms control with an independent perspective of their security is not to the liking of the super powers. This is particularly so for the US which needs the support of the West Europeans to place the crisis near the territory of its opponent. Even though the USSR does not like any independent view from its European partners, it attaches tactical significance to the independent European move for arms control. More importantly it hopes that such a move may weaken the political influence of US in Europe. However to show its loyalty to the tacit understanding, the USSR, does not come open in supporting such a move.

It is vital to note that the Europeans are deliberately excluded by the super powers from the arms control negotiations with the tactical inclusion of the issues related with long-range missiles in the SALT negotiations. But when United Nations (UN) called upon the super powers to reduce the tension in Europe and to consider the independent move from Europeans for arms control in their region, they subsequently organized the MBFR talks which has rooted from their tacit understanding. More importantly, the super powers have carefully separated the strategic and tactical weapons without considering the dangerous implication of both the weapons to European security. It appears that the INF issue is a deliberate creation of the US in order to divert the attention of

* This has been a recurrent theme in this paper. Consider the fact that Britain and West Germany have permitted the deployment of new theatre weapons on their soil. France too has supported US moves. The smaller W. European powers are not reconciled, as yet, to US move. Hence the point is West Europe has not so far been able to evolve a coherent strategy of its own. W. Europe may

Europeans' from the strategic forces. Thus, both the super powers have tried their best to exclude to Europeans

tactically from the arms control talks. Therefore, the

* || Europeans security has been ignored by both the super powers. In other words they have deliberately done this for maintaining their strategic superiority thereby pose themselves as the only champions of the detente. Moreover, while the question of real arms control comes, they have blamed each other of failing to reduce the arms in Europe. The US has gone to the extent of even exploiting the very fervour of the Europeans for arms control talks to implement their desire for further deployment under the garb of modernising theatre nuclear forces, by telling them that such deployment of modernized nuclear forces is aimed only as a threat to bring USSR to negotiating terms for arms control in Europe. The recent deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) is an ample evidence for this fact. But, the Europeans particularly the West, have again been decided, because the deployment of first strike missile is going to initiate another process of escalation given the hotline approach of the USSR which has disclosed its determination.

More importantly, the recent interest of US to include the missiles kept by England and France for the purpose of arms control talks, which was originally asked

* does not necessarily follow. US move in agreeing to count British & French forces under JNF would ultimately result in the two countries surrendering such a thing as they face 122 obliged to retain in military matters.

by the USSR but the US refused, cannot be interrupted in any way except as a bargaining chip capable of

* initiating a further escalation in the European theatre.

These sinister moves of both the super powers has virtually left the issue of European security by mixing and complicating the TNF issue with others. Above all, the future of arms control in Europe also bleak as the Geneva negotiation has broken down by the US deployment of Cruise Missiles in UK. Thus both the super powers have so far been successful in keeping their monopoly of detente through the maintenance of the 'entrenched system' which excludes the entry of others. Posed as the only champions of detente, the super powers have used the very arms control negotiations to further their own interest so as to keep their strategic control over European theatre. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the issue of European security, in its true sense, was sacrificed, though they are interested in it as to suit their own theatrical needs. Under these circumstances it is tantamount for the Europeans to have a serious reconsiderations of their strategy, if they are really committed to save their interests in security matters. The strategy followed so far by the Europeans viz the bilateral arms control negotiations between the super powers with themselves being not as direct participants but only as a pressure group,

has been a great failure in so far as the achievement of their major objective is concerned. Such a strategy naturally needs a restatement with primary emphasis on multilateral negotiations in which the Europeans should get their legitimacy of full and equal participation in arms control negotiation in their region. It will help to reduce the tendency of competitive confrontation and create in its place a tendency for collaborative competition. Moreover, the Europeans' entry with the arena of negotiations will break the entrenched system which eventually will diffuse the super powers' monopoly of detente. Achievement of such a condition can alone pave the way for a successful arms control negotiation and detente in Europe.

However the difficulties involved in their respect can hardly be ignored. The prestige and ideological underpinnings of the super powers would not permit them to go for arms control. In particular the tactical and strategic nature of Europe in their scheme of global domination would not allow them to reduce TNF as that will inevitably weaken their grip over the theatre. Therefore, it is highly imaginative that they will voluntarily reduce their arms build-up in Europe first by widening pressure. Given the existing military alliance system and the European membership in them, greatly weakens their

military as well as political independence. Therefore, their pressure, despite its magnitude, loses much of its effectiveness and significance. Moreover, the military alliances by dividing the Europeans also provides the super powers with an instrument to increase theatrical tension on a competitive scale through military decision. Therefore, the surmounting of the fundamental problem having implication to Europe's independence as well as security viz. the military and political subserviency of Europe is of crucial significance. Thus, the Europeans should not behave as members of NATO or WTO but as members of European country re-ensuring for a real sense of security from nuclear catastrophe. When there is greater understanding among Europeans based on mutual trust and co-operation, their bargaining position in a multilateral dimension of negotiations will effectively check the military ambitions of the super powers going beyond their own territory. Above all, there should not be any secrecy over the outcome of such negotiations and it is highly beneficial for detente and disarmament policy of Europe to have those negotiations in the limelight of the day. This will make the world public to be vigilant and such vigilant public will provide the Europe and other peace loving forces a 'pandora box' capable of supplying all the need to secure a new International Security Order.

In order to acquire the much needed political and moral support, the Europeans should not only strengthen ties between themselves but also with other countries of the world particularly the third world countries which are naturally partners of any efforts for arms control either in Europe or at the world level. For, they have been affected much due to the rearmament policy of the super powers. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the political and moral expression of the third world countries, is a natural ally of not only the Europeans but any group aspiring for peace and security. The political system of NAM can be judged by the fact that the President of the UN General Assembly, Mr Jorge Illucea, has extended the invitation recently to the NAM Chairperson Mrs Gandhi to convince both the super powers, ^{on the need} for genuine arms control negotiation and detente. Although disarmament is the ultimate goal of NAM, nevertheless it is much interested to work for arms control and detente as it will eventually pave the way for general disarmament.

Therefore the European nations can augment their efforts by increasing their co-operation with NAM. Such alliance can be formalized with a powerful force on the flows of UN. Such an alliance can be justified on the grounds: firstly, the unnecessary distinction between TNF and SNF by the super powers to exclude the Europeans

from strategic arms control negotiations will get blurred. For the TNF and SNF having functional relationship with each other remains as a potential threat to both Europe as well as the third world countries which are now in an alliance for genuine arms control and international security. Secondly, since the international security and the regional security are logically interlinked with each other, the efforts to achieve arms control and detente in Europe will naturally reduce tension at the global level. Moreover, the resurgent peace movements spreading throughout the world can be useful vehicle to mobilise the world public opinion against the arms race. In assuring awareness of the public will greatly weaken the moral and psychological influence of the super powers on which they depend heavily.

Obviously, the solution to TNF issue is linked-up with the general solution for arms control in Europe. The isolation of the TNF issue, as the experience reveals, has actually complicated the problem. In the same way, arms control in Europe is a logical first step for general arms control aimed at the objective of regional disarmament. As a result, the European move for regional disarmament will be an essential example to the general move for disarmament at the global level. Therefore the NAM and other peace-loving forces should increasingly

co-operate with the Europeans in this attempt for a genuine arms control negotiation in Europe. However, the ultimate success depends upon the Europeans themselves both the East and West since in their territory only the super powers have deployed their arms. If they, along with the support of the NAM and other peace loving forces, succeed in reducing the theatre and strategic weapons in their territory, arms control at the global level will undoubtedly proceed more smoothly and quickly by having the enduring support of UN.

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APPENDICES

Table 1

Long-range theatre nuclear missiles

Country	Missile designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	CEP (m)	Warheads(s)	Inventory		Programme status
						A	B	
USSR	SS-4 Sandal	1959	1,800	2,400	1 Mt	350	253	Phasing out
	SS-3 Skean	1961	3,500	1,200	1x1 Mt	300	10	Phasing out
	SS-20	1976-77	5,000	400	3x150-kt MIRV	250	243	Production rate approximately 5 per cent
	SS-N.5 Serf	1963	1,200	n.a.	1x? 1x1 Mt	30	18	3 each on Golf II submarines 6 of which have been deployed in the Baltic since 1976.
USA	Pershing II	1983	1,800	40	1x?(low-kt)	0		108 launchers to be deployed by 1983
	GLCM	1983	2,500	50	1x?*	0		464 missiles to be deployed by 1985
UK	Polaris A-3	1967	4,000	800	3x200-kt MRV	64		On 4 SSBNs, being replaced by the 'Chevaline' system, probably with 6 warheads (MRV), each of 50 kt
	Trident II D-5	1990	10,000	250	1 x335-kt MIRV	0		Replacing the 'Polaris' Chevaline system from the 1990s probably with 64 launchers on 4 submarines
France	SSBS S-1	1980	3,000	n.a.	1x 1 Mt	18		Conversion from S-2 to be completed by 1983
	MSBS M-20	1977	3,000	n.a.	1x1-Mt	80		On 5 SSBNs
	MSBS M-4	1985	4,000	n.a.	6x150-kt MRV	0		On the 6th SSBN; retrofit to be completed by 1989; tot

Table
Air to surface missiles

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Range (km) (high-level launch)	Warhead	Speed (Mach)	Inventory	Notes, programme status
USSR	AS-2 Kipper	1961	210	1xkt-range	HE 1.2	n.a.	1 x Tu-16
	AS-4 Kitchen	1962	720	1xkt-range	2.5	135	1 x Tu-22 2 x Tu-22M
	AS-6 Kingfish	1977	700	1 x 200-kt	3	65	1 x Tu-16 2 x Tu-22M
USA	AGM-69A SRAM	1972	160	1 x 170-kt	3	378	6 x FB-111A
France	ASMP	1985	300	1 x 150-kt	3	0	1 x Mirage IVA (1985) 1 x Mirage2000N (1986) 1 x Super Etendard (1987) Total programme: 100

Table

Naval long-range theatre nuclear aircraft

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Combat radius (km)	Inventory		Programme status
				Total	European	
USSR	TU-22M Backfire	1974	3000	75	60	Naval aviation has received half the number of Backfires
	TU-16 Badger	1955	2000	250	190	
	TU-22 Blinder	1962	1200	50	35	
USA	A-G Intruder	1963	1500	250	20	Total progms: 1377 incl TR-18 Intruder Being replaced by F-18 Excl. 200 non-nuclear Marine Corps F-4s being replaced by F-18s Total programme: 322
	F-18 Hornet	1982	1100	0	0	
	A-7 Corsair II	1966	1200	260	48	
	F-4 Phantom II	1961	1100	200	0	
	AV-8B Harrier II	1985	900	0	0	
UK	Buccancer	1962	1400	20	20	Approx. number dedicated to CINCLANI; will continue for some time after the rest of the Buccancers are replaced by Tornado IDS
France	Super Etendard	1979	700	60	60	The 300-km range of the ASMP will give it marginal long-range theatre nuclear capability; total programme 71
FR Germany	Tornado IDS	1982	1400	0	0	Total programme: 112 (including 10 dual-control trainers)
	F-104G Starfighter	1958	1000	95	95	Excl. 10 TF-104G and 24 RF-104G; being replaced by Tornado

Table 4
Primary long-range theatre nuclear aircraft

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Combat radius (km)	Inventory		Programme status
				Total	European	
USSR	Tu 22M Backfire	1974	1,000	75	60	Production rate: up to 30 per year, half of them assigned to naval aviation
	Tu-16 Badger	1955	2,000	300	225	
	Tu-22 Blinder	1962	1,200	130	100	
	Su-24 Fencer	1974	1,700	500	375	Production rate: approx. 60 per year
USA	FB-111A	1969	1,800	63	0	
	F-111A/D/E/F	1967	2,000	300	156	
UK	Valean B2	1957	2,700	55	55	Being replaced by Tornado
	Tornado GR.1 (IDS)	1982	1,400	0	0	220 programmed (incl. 68 dual-control trainers); last 20 may be converted to F.2 (ADV)
France	Mirage IVA	1964	1,600	35	35	More than 15 will continue in service after 1985
	Mirage 2000N	1980	1,400	0	0	Up to 200 may be acquired
Rest of NATO	Tornado IDS	1982	1,400	0	0	FR Germany plans 212 (incl. 47 dual-control trainers) Italy plans 100 (incl. 12 trainers)

Table
Marginal long-range theatre nuclear aircraft

Country	Designation	First deployed	Combat radius (km)	Inventory		Programme status
				Total	European	
USSR	MiG-23/27 Flogger	1971	900	2000	1,500	Production continues at 500 per year
Rest of World	MiG-23 Flogger	1971	900	200	200	
USA	F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979	1300	300	0	Total programme: 1,388 (incl. 204 more than 200 will be deployed in Europe.
	F-4 Phantom II	1961	1100	1400	250	Being phased out of active duty and transformed to the Reserve Force
	A-7 Corsair II	1966	1200	370	0	Reserve Force
UK	Buccaneer S.2	1962	1400	60	50	Excl. 20 in maritime strike role (of table 1.6)
	Jaguar GR.1	1973	1200	140	140	Excl. 30 Jaguar T.2 trainers
	Harrier GR.4(AV.8B)	1966	900	0	0	Total programme: 60
France	Jaguar A	1973	1200	160	160	Total number procured (losses unknown; excl. 40 Jaguar trainers)
	Mirage IIIIE	1961	1000	135	135	Being phased out: excl. 14 Mirage IIIIBE trainers
Rest of NATO	F-16 Fighting Falcon	1979	1300	64	64	Excl. 8F-16B trainers: total programme: 194 F-16A (of which 4 have been lost) and 46 F-16B (2 lost)
	A-7H/P Corsair II	1966	1100	63	63	Excl. 6 TA-7H trainers: 11A-7P on order for Portugal
	F-4E Phantom II	1961	1100	134	134	Incl. 10 West German F-4E in USA for training excl. 96 RF-4E and 168 F-4F
	F CF-104G Starfighter	1958	1000	555	525	Incl. 30 West German F-104G in USA for training; excl 145 TF-104G and RF-104F; being phased out
	F-104S(Acritalia)	1969	1000	196	196	

Table

Planned Deployment of ground-launched cruise
missiles in Europe

Country	Base	Number	Year of initial operational capability
United Kingdom	Greenham Comenor Berkshire	96	1984
	Molesworth, Combridgeshire	64	1988
FR Germany	Probably Ramstein Hahn Spangdahlem, Bruggen and Laarbruch	96	1984
Italy	Vicenzo Maghliocco, Comiso Sicily	112	1984
Netherlands		48	
Belgium		48	

Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Missiles

Country	Missile designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	CEF (m)	Warhead(s)	Inventory		Programme Status
						A	B	
USSR	SS-4 Sandal	1959	1800	2400	1 x Mt	232	..	Phasing out
	SS-5 Skean	1961	3500	1200	1 x Mt	16	..	Phasing out
	SS-20	1976/77	5000	400	3 x ?	333	..	Deployment rate approximately 50 per year
	SS-N-5 Serb	1963	1200	n.a.	1 x Mt	30	18	3 each on Gulf II submarines, 6 of which have been deployed in the Baltic since 1976
USA	Pershing II	1983	1800	40	1 x ? (low-kt)	0		108 launchers to be deployed by 1985
	GLGM	1983	2500	50	1 x ?	0		464 missiles to be deployed by 1988
UK	Polaris A-3	1967	4600	800	3x200-kt MRV	64		On 4 SS BNs, being replaced by the Chevaline system
	Trident II(D-5)	1990s	10000	250	8x355-kt MIRV	0		Replacing the Polaris/Chevaline system from the 1990s, with 64 launchers on 4 submarines
France	SSBS S-3	1980	3000	n.a.	1x1 Mt	18		
	MSBS M-20	1977	3000	n.a.	1x1 Mt	80		On 5 SSBNs
	MSBS M-4	(1985)	4000	n.a.	6x150 kt MRV	0		On the 6th SSBN; total programme, including retrofits: 96 (by 1992)

Source: SIPRI, 1983, p. 6.

133

Table: British, French, US and Soviet Nuclear Warhead Count

	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Warheads</u>		<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
British Polaris SLBMs	64	64	Soviet		
French SLBMs	96	96	SS-20 IRBMs	178	534
French IRBMs	18	18	Soviet		
			SS-N-5 SLBMs	30	30
US Poseidon SLBMs	40	400			
Totals	218	578		208	564

Source: SIPRI, 1983, p. 21.

British and French Nuclear-Capable Aircraft

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Combat radius (km)	IFR	Inventory		Programme Status
					UE	Total	
UK	Tornado GR.1	1982	1400	Yes	24	100	220 programmed (incl. 68 dual control trainers)
	Buccaneer	1962	1400	Yes	36	80	Being replaced by Tornado, incl. 20 in Maritime strike role
	Jaguar S GR.1	1973	1200	Yes	48	100	Excl. Jaguar BT.2 trainers (30 delivered)
	Harrier GR.5 (AV-8B)	(1986)	900	Yes	0	0	Total Programme: 60
	Sea Harrier FRS.1	1979	600	Yes	15	26	14 on order
France	Mirage IVA	1964	1600	Yes	24	33	Plus 14 for training, reconnaissance and reserves
	Mirage 2000 N	(1988)	1400	Yes	0	0	First 15 will be operational programme may reach 200
	Jaguar A	1973	1200	Yes	45	118	Excl. 22 Jaguar E trainers
	Mirage IIIE	1961	1000	No	30	105	Excl. 14 Mirage IIIBE trainers; being replaced by Mirage 2000 N
	Super Etendard	1979	700	Yes	36	64	Total Programme: 80

Source: SIPRI, 1983, p. 38.

British and French Submarines - launched ballistic
Missiles

Country	Designation	Year first deployed	Range (km)	Warhead(s)	Inventory	Programme Status
UK	Polaris A-3	1967	4600	3x200-Kt MRV	64	On 4 SSBNs, being replaced by Chevaline system
	Trident II (D-5)	(1990)	10000	10x335-Kt MIRV	0	Replacing the Polaris/Chevaline system from the 1990s, with 64 launchers on 4 submarines
France	SSBS S-3	1980	3000	1 x 1 - Mt		
	MSBS M-20	1977	3000	1 x 1 - Mt		On 5 SSBNs
	MSBS M-4	(1985)	4000	6 x 150 - Kt MRV		On the 6th SSBN; total programme, including retrofits: 96 (by 1992)

Source: SIPRI, 1983, p. 36.

British and French Ballistic Missile-armed nuclear-powered Submarines
(SSBNs)

Country	Designation	Pennant number	Laid down	Launched	Operational	Main armament (SLBM)
UK	Resolution	SS22	1964	1966	1967	16 x Polaris A - 3
	Repulse	S 23	1965	1967	1968	16 x Polaris A - 3
	Renown	S 26	1964	1967	1968	16 x Polaris A - 3
	Revenge	S 27	1965	1968	1969	16 x Polaris A - 3
France	le Redoutable	S 611	1964	1967	1971	16 x MSBS M - 20
	le Terrible	S 612	1967	1969	1973	16 x MSBS M - 20
	le Foudroyant	S 610	1969	1971	1979	16 x MSBS M - 20
	l' Indomptable	S 613	1971	1974	1976	16 x MSBS M - 20
	le Tonnant	S 614	1974	1977	1980	16 x MSBS M - 20
	l' Inflexible	-	1980	1982	(1985)	16 x MSBS M - 4

Source: SIPRI, 1983, p. 36.

RANGES OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES



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