

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Challenges and Options

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of**

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

MRIGANKA ACHAL



**CENTRE FOR WEST ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA
2006**



Date:


DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled "**IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS**" submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university is my original work. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University

Mriganka Achal.
MRIGANKA ACHAL

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Girijesh Pant
(Chairperson)


Dr. Aswini K. Mohapatra
(Supervisor)

Dedicated to

Papa, Ma, Khush and Ayushman

Acknowledgement

I am gratefully indebted to Dr. B. Aswani Mohapatra, my Supervisor for his timely guidance and valuable suggestions. This work was conceived under the spur of his encouragement and it was shaped by the commentary that he provided at every stage of planning. Without whose help, it would have been exceedingly difficult to complete this dissertation.

Here I must acknowledge the great help provided by the faculty of West Asian and African Studies. Their advice and criticism was both constructive and insightful, and undoubtedly improved the work at a number of points.

I benefited a lot with innumerable discussions and invaluable comments from a number of colleagues and friends, particularly, Basir Ahmed, Kannan, Marshal Gao, Sarvesh, and Rajeev. Discussion with them helped to sharpen the ideas and many arguments developed here.

The patience and willful cooperation extended by staffs of Iranian Embassy, especially Mr. Moqqaddam and Dr. Mohammad Kaifi helped me a lot.

Here I must express my sincere thanks to the library staff of Jawaharlal University and IDSA, for their continuous encouragement in this pursuit.

My thanks are due to my Brother, Sister, Bhabhi, and Jiju, for their emotional accompaniment that uphold all my ventures. They have been a constant source of support and encouragement, leavened, I am glad to say, by patience when necessary.

I owe all the responsibility for any error, or irregularities that may be found in this work. None other than me should be held accountable for that.

NEW DELHI

Date 28 JULY 2006

Mriganka Achal.
Mriganka Achal

CONTENTS

	<i>Page no</i>
<i>Acknowledgement</i>	i
<i>Contents</i>	ii-iii
<i>List of Tables & List of Maps</i>	iv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	v-vi
Introduction	1-18
<i>Chapter I</i>	19-60
History of Iran's Nuclear Programme	
Phase I: Iran's Nuclear Programme under Shah	
Motivations behind the Beginning of Nuclear Programme	
Threat Perception	
Phase II: Khomeini Period	
Phase III: Resumption of the Programme	
Evolution of the Iranian Nuclear Doctrine	
Phase IV: The Standoff	
Causes of Concern For West	
Nuclear Cooperation with other Countries	
An Overview of Iran's Nuclear Facility	
Delivery System	

Chapter II 61-86

External Response

U.S.A Opposition

European Union Responses

Russia and China's Ambivalent Response

Reaction in West Asia

Israeli Stance

Third World's Responses

Chapter III 87-117

Challenges and Options before Iran

Challenges before Iran

Domestic Political Challenges

Economic Challenges

Nuclear Safety

External Challenges

Options Before Iran

Chapter IV 118-130

Conclusion

Bibliography 131-143

List of Tables & Maps

	<i>Page no.</i>
TABLE 1:1: IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES	46
TABLE 1:2: IRAN'S DEFENCE SYSTEM	56
TABLE 1:3: IRANIAN WARSHIPS	58
TABLE3.1 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF IRAN 1980-2001	98
TABLE3.2 ESTIMATED ENERGY RESERVES	99
TABLE3.3 ENERGY STATISTICS	100
TABLE3.4 POPULATION INFORMATION	100
TABLE3.5 NATIONAL ENERGY STATISTICS	101
FIGURE3.1 ORANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NNSD	104
MAP1.1: ESTIMATED RANGES OF CURRENT AND POTENTIAL IRANIAN BALLISTIC MISSILES	57

Abbreviations

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
ANJUS	Australia Newzeland United States Treaty Organization
TNRC	Tehran Nuclear Research Centre
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
AEOI	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
INRA	Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
PWRs	Pressurised Water Reactors
MINATOM	Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation
BNPP	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant unit
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
HEU	High Enriched Uranium
U.N.S.C.	United Nations Security Council
LWSCR	Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor
HWZPR	Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor
MNSR	Miniature Neutron Source reactor
FFL	Fuel Fabrication Laboratory
UCL	Uranium Chemistry Laboratory
UCF	Uranium Conversion Facility
GSCR	Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor, decommissioned
FMP	Fuel Manufacturing Plant
UCF	Uranium Conversion Facility
KWT	kilowatt thermal
PFEP	Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

TRR	Tehran Research Reactor
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
EU	European Union
SCIRI	Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
TCA	Trade and Cooperative Agreement
WTO	World Trade Organization
MKO	Mujahidin-e-khalq
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
UAE	United Arab Emirates
NAM.	Non-Alignment Movement
IRNA	Iran News Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
NNSD	National Nuclear Safety Department
NCRI	National Council of Resistance of Iran



INTRODUCTION

The literature on Iranian nuclear programme has been remarkably critical and guided by existing power relation in international politics. There is little, sustained intellectual give and take in the field of analytical studies as regards the Iranian nuclear programme. Given the immense practical importance of the subject and the interest shown by the analysts, and in light of the potential intellectual payoffs, the quality of the theoretical literature on the subject is meager at best. The atheoretical nature of the nuclear field makes it extremely difficult to measure the genuine intellectual progress beyond the accumulation of more and more statistics. The existing theories in international relational have not advanced beyond studying particular phenomena in the context of physical characteristics, strategic location, its geography, the timing of its entry into the world system, and the general political environment. While discussing about the Western expansion in the Persian Gulf region, Mikhin, stated that, “No arm of the sea has been of greater interest, alike to the geologist and the archeologist, the historian and the geographers, the merchant, the statesman and the strategist, than the body of water known as Persian Gulf. The nations of that region have paid an enormous price indeed for that interest.”¹

The truth behind the idea lies in the succeeding years when imperial powers like Britain and France divided the borders of a homogeneous region according to their own geo-strategic convenience. More so, to perpetuate their domination they did not hesitate to encourage the conservative forces to seize state power in much of West Asia in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. History of west Asia is full of the external powers interference. Whether it was the creation of Israel, the Gulf war of 1991, or the recent crisis in Iraq, and more recently the Iranian nuclear conundrum, the soil of West Asia has always been a witness to the play of

¹ V. Mikhin, *Western expansion in the Persian Gulf* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1988).

extra regional power game. The motives range from the super power bloc rivalry in the cold war period, and the rush for strategic opening in the region to the oil interest and protection of Israel. In many respects, the current Iranian crisis is a new episode in the series.

Two developments appear to have guided the events since the late 2003: first, the opening up of a second negotiating track through the European Union foreign ministers (known as the EU-3) of Germany, UK, and France; second, inability of the IAEA to establish conclusively about the undeclared Iranian activities to make nuclear weapons. Throughout 2003, Iran cooperated with the IAEA in providing all information regarding its nuclear activities.² However, in 2004, Iran continued certain activities that called into question its professed peaceful objectives of the programme. In June 2004, for instance, foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi announced, "We won't accept any new obligations. Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognised by the international community as a member of the nuclear club. This is an irreversible path."³ On July 27, 2004, Iran broke seals placed upon uranium centrifuges by the IAEA and resumed construction of the centrifuges at Natanz.

According to IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei, "Iran tried to cover up many of their activities, and they learned the hard way."⁴ The same source of information also reported that only in January 2005 did Iranian officials share a copy of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's 1987 offer of centrifuge enrichment "starter kit."⁵ In November 2005, Iran finally admitted that the Khan network supplied it with information on casting and

² As reported by the BBC on October 31, 2003, the IAEA declared that Iran had submitted a "comprehensive" declaration of its nuclear program. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/middle_east-3210412.stm.

³ As reported on June 13, 2004. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main>.

⁴ "Iran Was Offered Nuclear Parts," *Washington Post*, Feb. 27, 2005.

⁵ Ibid.

machining parts of nuclear weapons.⁶ Besides, Iran in 2003 also admitted that it had conducted “bench scale” uranium conversion experiments way back in the 1990s without reporting to the IAEA.⁷ In February 2004, the IAEA concluded that “given the size and capacity of the equipment used, the possibility cannot be excluded that larger quantities of nuclear material could have been involved than those declared.”⁸ The IAEA has deemed credible Iran’s explanation that it needed to convert uranium into metal for its laser uranium enrichment program (revealed only in October 2003). Conversion of uranium into metal is a step in producing nuclear weapons.

In April 2005, Iran said that unless negotiations progressed, it would start up its uranium conversion plant, which it did in August 2005.⁹ Following Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory remarks at the September 2005 United Nations Summit, the IAEA Board voted on Resolution GOV/2005/77, which found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. The September 24, 2005, Board resolution is notable for at least two reasons: it did not enjoy a consensus, nor did it immediately refer the issue to the Security Council.¹⁰ All the same, Iran failed to get support of countries like India, which voted against Iran. The IAEA Statute requires that once the Board has made a finding of noncompliance, it must report it to the Security Council.

⁶ "Iran Hands Over Nuclear Cookbook," Aljazeera.net, November 18, 2005. <http://aljejeera.com-asp>

⁷ See Congressional Research Service Report (cited hereafter as CRS) through Library of Congress, RL32048, *Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses*, by Kenneth Katzman.

⁸ Report by the Director General, “Iran” GOV/2004/11, Feb. 24, 2004.

⁹ INFCIRC/648, *Communication*, 1 August 2005 at <http://www.iaea.org>

¹⁰ “International Consensus against Iran Fails,” *Tehran Times*, Sept. 25, 2005.

For several months, Iran provided limited details on outstanding issues and negotiated an offer to conduct uranium enrichment on Russian soil as an alternative to indigenous production. In January 2006, Iran abandoned its voluntary suspension of enrichment-related activities, negotiations, as well as the interim application of the Additional Protocol, prompting an emergency Board meeting. An IAEA report prepared for the meeting linked, for the first time, a Khan Network document in Iran's possession on uranium casting and machining to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.¹¹

Iran has stated that the Khan network provided the document on its own initiative. However, the full report of Khan network assistance to Iran is not clear so far. Even though, Article II of the NPT obligates Iran not to receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear explosives, so the question of whose initiative prompted transfer of the document is unresolved. The February Board passed a Resolution (GOV/2006/14, upon a vote with no consensus) to report Iran to the Security Council¹². The U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement on March 29, 2006, which called for Iran's compliance with its voluntary suspension and interim application of the Additional Protocol, as well as for Iran to resolve outstanding issues.¹³

Despite the mounting international pressures, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on April 11, 2006 announced that the Iranian scientists working at the pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164 gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city of Mashhad he said, "I am officially announcing that Iran has joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology."¹⁴ Iran declared it had

¹¹ <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf>

¹² See, *IAEA report, (GOV/2006/14)*, adopted on 4 February 2006.

¹³ For full text, see <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.html>

¹⁴ Mike Shuster, "Iran Enriches Uranium, Plans New Expansion." (2006) at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/php?story_id=5336802

enriched uranium at the Natanz plant, which some observers termed” regrettable.”¹⁵ Following this, the United States, with Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany met to discuss the response to Iran’s latest action in the coming months. In the absence of a consensus as regards the nature of the UNSC response, the US is facing great difficulties in securing approval for its forceful methods. Some states have supported sanctions, while others, like Russia and China, have not. Potential sanctions could include bans on Iranian oil, trade, or international investment in Iran’s energy sector and on arms sales to Iran, limiting travel by certain Iranian officials, or limiting international lending. Since May 2006, Iran has been taking hard steps and openly coming up with statements to this effect. United States, Britain, France, and Germany have again offered incentives and compromise formula to Iran but Iran has shown no full and unconditional cooperation to EU-led initiatives.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Iran’s nuclear programme has been a debatable issue in international politics since August 2002. It set off different reactions from different parts of the world. The outright opposition by the United States demanding complete and permanent suspension of Iran’s nuclear programme has started direct conflict between both countries. The USA alleges that Iran is secretly developing weapons of mass destruction, and believes that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil reserves and more importantly, nuclear power is more expensive for the Iranians to generate than oil-fired power. Accordingly, the US insisted in 2003 that Tehran was accountable for allegedly seeking to build nuclear arms in violation of its agreements. Since then, Iran’s nuclear development programme has overshadowed all other developments and assumed global significance.

A potential reason behind US resistance lies in West Asian geopolitics. A nuclear-armed Iran in the region would mean strengthening of the revisionist powers that

¹⁵ “EU says Iran Nuclear Announcement ‘Regrettable,’ *Reuters*, April 12, 2006.

would disturb the existing power balance. A nuclear Iran could also potentially act as a catalyst for other West Asia nations to develop weapons of their own to defend against it, which, in turn, could lead to a dangerous proliferation. Although the EU shares the concerns of the US and its stand on the issue, it differs in methods to resolve the crisis. . It has come up with conditional engagement formula and economic incentives for Iran. The EU-Iran negotiations started in October 2004 was halted in August 2005 when Iran resumed its nuclear activity at its Isfahan facility. Recently, EU has resumed negotiations with Iran with a new package with the support of United States. Though EU is not in favour of adopting forceful methods like sanctions against Iran, there is likelihood of EU supporting USA strategy in case Iran continues its defiance.

Countries like Russia and China are however, against adopting forceful measures though they want Iran to abide by the safeguards agreements and IAEA procedures. These countries have intense economic relations with Iran and they have also provided nuclear equipments and technology to Iran. They have adopted flexible approach to the crisis and come up with some individual proposals like enrichment of uranium on its own soil, which Iran has rejected. Among the NAM (Non Alignment Movement) countries Cuba, Venezuela and Syria have supported Iran's right to have nuclear technology. They consider it is an American propaganda to capture the oil resources of West Asia and denial of genuine right to developing countries. Recently the final declaration adopted at the Non-Alignment movement (NAM) foreign ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur on May 30, 2006 reaffirmed Tehran's right to have nuclear technology. The declaration underlined that the choices and decisions made by states "in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected" and that "any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities constitutes a grave violation of international law."¹⁶ In the face of growing international concerns against any military option in view of its dreadful consequences in the region, the chances of pre-emptive strike on Iran in near future seem less likely

¹⁶ John Cherian, "Towards Talks" *Frontline*, June 30, 2006, p.57.

even though US continues to harp on the military option to pressurise Teheran to renounce its ambitious nuclear programme.

IRANIAN POSITION

Despite the mounting international pressures including the threat of sanction and even the pre-emptive military strike on its nuclear installations, Iran remains firm in its position asserting that the purpose of its nuclear program is the generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the NPT, of which it is a signatory. Making nuclear weapons, it holds is against the religious principles, the very basis of the post-revolution clerical regime in Teheran. Justifying its nuclear programme, Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population in a rapidly industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it should not be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil fields eventually being depleted. It continues to argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. Iran also raises financial questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it \$40 billion, let alone pay for the power plants. Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore.

The fundamental argument being that, if Iran uses all its oil for domestic consumption, which has grown up due to steep rise in population, there will not be any surplus oil left for it to sell. Therefore, the whole economy would be at stake. Hence, Iran must look for alternate sources of energy for its domestic consumption. It chooses to develop that alternate source in nuclear capacity building. However, the danger associated with this argument is, that if a nation builds nuclear power plants and goes for enrichment of Uranium, it can very easily go for nuclear weapon programme. In other words, Uranium enrichment

technology for power can be easily extended to build nuclear weapons. There is indeed a very thin boundary separating the two.

Topping them all, Tehran argues that it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT. It describes the Western position as hypocritical, claiming that the original purpose was universal nuclear disarmament. Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not ratified the NPT. Each of these nations have developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968, India by 1974, and Pakistan by 1998. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 19 September 2005 speech to the U.N. General Assembly said "We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition".¹⁷ In the same speech, he mentioned that west is following 'nuclear apartheid' policy to keep nuclear technology only with western control.

On 6 August 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal intended to help Iran build "a safe, economically viable, and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research program." The Europeans, with US agreement, hoped to entice Iran into a binding commitment not to build atomic arms by offering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal saying, "We had already announced that any plan has to recognise Iran's right to enrich uranium."¹⁸ Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in January 2006, prompting the IAEA to refer the issue to the UN Security Council.

¹⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/4257278> September 19, 2005.

¹⁸ "Iran rejects "unacceptable" EU nuclear proposals." *Al Jazeera Magazine Online Edition*: 2005. <http://aljejeera.com-asp>

On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iranian scientists working at the pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164 gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city of Mashhad he said, "I am officially announcing that Iran has joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology."¹⁹ In May 2006, some members of the Iranian legislature sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan threatening to withdraw from the NPT if Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology under the treaty was not protected.²⁰ In the light of these developments, it becomes analytically useful to discuss the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its clauses through which Iran is asserting its right and USA is opposing the same right.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Nuclear non-proliferation treaty was the result of several systematic conditions that deem necessary for the emergence of security regime for the particular period. As defined by Robert Jervis, security regime refers to those principles, rules, and norms that aim at stabilising strategic relations between adversaries to reduce the danger of armed confrontation. It involves a setting in which major powers share the value of 'mutual security' and cooperation, and realise that expansion no longer as the best option to provide security and that 'war and individualistic' pursuit of security would be costly.²¹

International attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation are usually dated from the Baruch plan of 1946, which was based on the two assumptions that the uses of the atom were inherently military not peaceful and secondly, all nuclear energy

¹⁹Shuster, Mike (2006). "Iran Enriches Uranium, Plans New Expansion." accessed on 2006-05-20 <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/php?storyId=5336802>

²⁰ "Iran lawmakers threaten withdrawal from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" at <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/05>

²¹ Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", *International Organisation*, Vol. 36 (Spring 1982), p. 357. Also, see Efraim Inbar (ed.), *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and its Neighbours* (New York: Sate University of New York Press, 1995), pp272-276.

activities had some military potential, and only way to prevent misuse was international ownership and management of all nuclear facilities and materials.²² Since McMahan Act, 1946, one of the key elements in the nuclear proliferation regime has been a system for denying the capabilities to make nuclear weapons to potentials proliferators especially on the other side of East-West divide.²³ However, nuclear activities in some states in the 1950s demonstrated others, particularly those, could also prepare that nuclear explosive not under umbrella of superpowers, increasing thereby the possibility of proliferation to additional states. Moreover, until the 1960s attempts were made only to slow down the proliferation by technical refutation strategies rather than preventing it by political provisions.

The nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises a set of norms, principles and procedures through which countries pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or help in their acquisition by other states. International and bilateral safeguards verify these pledges and there by prevent defection and cheating. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which administers the safeguard system, are the chief legal and institutional component of regime. On the subject of NPT, which is the most important and critical component of non-proliferation regime was a major initiative of USA and USSR during cold war era, which also received the support of several small and medium states. Critics, however, believe that through such initiative the great powers tried to manage bilateral competition and preserve the existing global power structure. Interestingly, the NPT was initially opposed by even system- influencing states including France and China, which joined it in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Many Third World states opposed it on the ground that it was unequal in nature and divided the world in nuclear weapon states and non nuclear weapon states. Some of them also wanted to keep option open in the name of nuclear energy. Given its controversial background, the NPT continues to face challenges like (a) the 1998 nuclear test by India and

²² For further insight see, John Simpson, "Nuclear Non Proliferation in the Post Cold War Era" *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, January 1994, pp.17-39.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 17-39.

Pakistan (b) the continued efforts by three official members of the NPT (Saddam's Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) to acquire nuclear technology, and (c) the changing policies of USA towards arms control regime in general.²⁴ All the same, the NPT is not dead, and efforts to renew it by continuous review conferences have kept it alive.

One of the major flaws of the NPT regime is that the transfer of technology to the non-nuclear States by the nuclear States is generally denied to some countries in the name of its dual use and level of uranium enrichment. There is always a possibility of Article IV being manipulated by the nuclear powers, and the non nuclear powers are forced to sign certain safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which may not be of their liking. Sometimes states may feel that, these safeguards are compromising their sovereignty. Another dilemma confronting the NPT regime is the post proliferation problem. Given the dangers of nuclear weapons being used in an unauthorised fashion or falling into the hands of terrorists, it might seem appropriate to provide technical assistance to new weapons states to improve their command and control systems. Yet doing so might appear to reward the proliferators and thus weaken the deterrent effect of the regime on other sates.²⁵ This goes against the very concept of nuclear non-proliferation regime. An illustrative example of this is Pakistan, whose nuclear pursuit has been covertly or overtly supported by the major powers like China and USA.

There are some basic problems before nuclear non-proliferation. Despite certain non-proliferation mechanisms like NPT, for example the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries such as Iran, North Korea remains unabated. Second issue revolves around; the question as to what to do after proliferation has taken place in regions such as South Asia and West Asia. Another problem relates

²⁴ For details see, T.V Paul, "Systematic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Régime", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol.16, no. 1, 2003.

²⁵ Joseph Nye, p.1295.

to the spread of nuclear weapons knowledge and nuclear black marketing. In this context, the A.Q. Khan controversy acquires enormous implication for black marketing of nuclear technology.²⁶ A policy to slow the spread of nuclear weapons is costly because of the frictions it can create with other countries. Some analysts even argue that if nuclear weapon produced prudence between the Superpowers during the cold war, could they not do the for other pair of nations, such as Argentina and Brazil, India and Pakistan and Israel and its Arab and *non-Arab* neighbours?²⁷

West Asia as a region is always peculiar in a sense that it remains conflictual partly because of the availability of the oil, the so called 'strategic resource' and presence of the settler state of Israel, and its greater part, the inter and intra-state violence spawned by contested legitimacy and dispute over borders and waters. In view of the multiple sources of conflict and the resultant instability and regime vulnerability, it seems more likely that further nuclear proliferation might occur. As an observer has pointed out, 'Nonproliferation measures may delay this process, but cannot ultimately prevent it. For this reason, the primary challenge before the international community will be the management of national conflict in a nuclear environment'.²⁸

IRAN AND NPT

Iran signed the treaty in 1968 and ratified it in February 1970. It was the period when Shah of Iran had close relations with USA as evident in its cohesion with the security organisations like Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). In accordance with the Article 3 of the NPT, Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the international atomic energy agency. Ratifying the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons before its entry in force and

²⁶For A.Q. Khan controversy see, Rajesh Kr. Mishra, "Iranian Nuclear Programme and Pakistan: Implication of the Linkages", *Strategic Analysis*, vol.28, no.3, July-September 2004.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "New approaches to nuclear proliferation policy", *Science*, vol.256, 29 May 1992, p. 1293.

²⁸ Shyam Bhatia, *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East*, (London: Routledge, 1988), p.119.

early conclusion of the safeguard agreements, as well as signing the additional protocol, clearly demonstrate Iran's long-standing support and commitment as a non nuclear weapon state to this fundamental instrument. In 1974 Iran became the first country in the West Asia region that initiated the idea of the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone, which was followed by the United Nations General Assembly.

According to Iran, Article IV has a critical role to play in full and indiscriminate implementation of the NPT. Its goal is to strike a balance between the security concerns and the socio economic requirements for development especially for the developing countries. By establishing a framework to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through enhancing international cooperation among State's, it provides the main incentive set forth in the treaty. Considering the experience with Iraq concerning its circumvention of the rules of the NPT and IAEA safeguards, it is widely recognised that keeping such balance would be problematic.²⁹

During 1970s, if the Shah of Iran was keen to receive nuclear technology from the Western world, it was largely meant to modernise the country and expedite the pace of progress in this field. The period was also significant for the region as the 1970's saw a sharp escalation of the conventional arms race partly because of the 1973 war fueled by the subsequent boom in oil revenues and external assistance, and partly, the leading powers' search for strategic advantage by expanding their conventional power. They soon started to reach the limits of their technological and financial capabilities, prompting greater interest in non-conventional arms as indicated by Israeli nuclear cooperation with South Africa and beginning of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme³⁰. Clearly, the case of Iran was different in the 1970's. Iran's interest in becoming nuclear power was widely seen in terms of

²⁹ Statement by H.E Mr.Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran in Forty Seventh Regular Session of General Conference of IAEA September 2003.

³⁰Yezid Sayigh, "Reversing the Middle East Nuclear Race", *Middle East Report*, no.177, Arm Race or Arms Control in the Middle East? July-Aug 1992, pp.14-19.

prestige and status rather than possession of nuclear weapon. The infrastructure, which was laid down in this period, might have attracted the Shah in terms of potential grandeur but it, is widely believed that this infrastructure appealed to his successors as a means towards independence from both East and West³¹.

NPT AFTER REVOLUTION

NPT entered into force in Iran in 1974. The comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/214 based on the model agreement INFCIRC/153) followed it. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the late Supreme Leader and the Founder of Islamic Revolution deplored the nuclear weapons in different occasions in his public addresses. However, Iran could have left NPT and justified time for withdrawal was immediately after the victory of the revolution. As an overall critical review of all multilateral or bilateral agreements and treaties concluded during last regime was terminated, Iran decided to sustain its membership and compliance with NPT safeguards and the IAEA Statute.

After the 1979 Revolution, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to restart its nuclear programme using indigenously made nuclear fuel, and in 1983, the IAEA even planned to assist to Iran under its Technical Assistance Programme to produce enriched uranium. An IAEA report stated clearly that its aim was to “contribute to the formation of local expertise and manpower needed to sustain an ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology.” However, the IAEA was forced to terminate the programme under U.S. pressure.³² The revolution was a

³¹ Roger F.Pajak, “Nuclear Status and Policies of the Middle East Countries,” *International Affairs*, vol.59, no.4, 1983, pp.587-607.

³² Mohammad Shahimi, “Iran Nuclear Programme”, at <http://www.Weikipedia.org>

turning point in terms of foreign cooperation to get nuclear technology as Iran was lacking allies in international politics. Post revolution Iran started to pursue foreign assistance for its nuclear programme, which was not limited to national actors, but went up to, seeking help from the institutions. Iran's quest for nuclear power can be traced in the concluding years of Iran-Iraq war. It was the period when Iran started to see various options other than United States and its allies.

THE ISSUE OF COMPLIANCE

NPT compliance fundamentally means that compliance with safeguards agreement, which is the legal document between the IAEA and a member state. Assessing compliance is rarely black and white; there are countless opportunities for technical inconsistency that mostly do not rise to the level of noncompliance. Often, a state's willingness to take corrective action weighs heavily in its favor.³³ In the case of Iran, there have been many technical violations, but Iran has corrected lapses in reporting and made significant concessions, such as signing the Additional Protocol, and agreeing to a voluntary suspension of enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. The problem is complicated by the fact that nuclear proliferation has already occurred in West Asia, where two tiers of states are emerging one with advanced, non-conventional capability, and one without. Israel fits squarely in the former category and is likely to be joined in the wider regional context by Iran.³⁴

Iranian nuclear power has become a political discussion of significance within both Iran and Western countries. A considerable disjunction emerges between the political views of Iranians and that of the West. The Iranian sees nuclear power as a way to modernise and diversify energy-sources. Nearly all political groups including the ruling party as well as its opponents are unified on this point that

³³See CRS Report RS22125, *NPT Compliance Issues*, by Sharon Squassoni.

³⁴ Yezid Sayigh, "Reversing the Middle East Nuclear Race", *Middle East Report*, no.177, Arm Race or Arms Control in the Middle East? July-Aug; 1992, p15.

Iran should be developing its peaceful nuclear industry. By contrast, Western countries feel that the peaceful nuclear program has hidden intentions, including the possible production of nuclear weapons. However, on the question of compliance to the NPT regime, Iran has put forth following arguments justifying its stance:

1. nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty;
2. All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon State-parties to the Treaty with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

The present controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear programme consists of many dynamics, as different actors perceive it differently. Some states in international circle see it as a constructed propaganda by the USA and its allies in order to serve their political, economic, and strategic interests. Proliferation is a problem, but the manner in which it has been handled is turning it into a question of developed countries vis-à-vis the third world countries, and nuclear versus non-nuclear states. Countries belonging to the NAM have strongly reacted by asserting that it is a multilateral issue to be resolved within the IAEA purview peacefully. In essence, the issue of Iran's nuclear programme has come of late to be closely associated with the twin issue of energy development and security requirement.

Iran claims that it wants nuclear technology to fulfill the demands of growing population but at the same time the fact that it may have different motives other than energy demand cannot be overlooked. Iran's regional surrounding and its hostility with neighbours have complicated the issue. If the US has stood foursquare against Iran's nuclear programme, it has much to do with the implications in the region in the wake of a revisionist power armed with nuclear weapons. Lately, USA disturbance is also by North Korea's nuclear policy and its withdrawal from NPT. Countries like Libya, Venezuela, and Cuba hostile to the United States have increasingly asserted that to have nuclear power is the inalienable right of every state. It is difficult for them to agree that nuclear option is the exclusive right of Western countries. Sharing their position, many analyst have argued that it is the 'selective enforcement' of the NPT and dual treatment of countries violating NPT regime that have encouraged malpractices in nuclear technology, and hence, Iran is no exception.

Changing security paradigm has an influence on the nuclear non-proliferation issue. The nuclear policy of Iran has often been propelled by the regional configurations of power. The threat perceptions are emanating from Israel. For Iran possessing nuclear weapon means the gaining of leverage over Israel, the US, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. However, Iranian politicians have started to respond positively to various IAEA proposals. With the unfolding of all these episodes, one thing becomes clear, that is the inability of NPT to address main problem of proliferation. Its inefficaciousness could be seen from the fact that, the signatory States have taken advantage of the various loopholes in it and continued to pursue a nuclear weapons programme. The case of Iran can be one such example. Mistrust and misperception continues to exist in the nuclear diplomacy of stakeholder states. In this connection, it is pertinent to conclude with the statement of the IAEA director, which highlights measures to cope with proliferation question and Iran's nuclear crisis:

"Firstly, our implementation of obligations under the NPT and comparable instruments needs to be very conspicuous. The non-proliferation regime has

changed in the past ten years and the world has become more sensitized to non-proliferation issues. We therefore need to have robust implementation of the verification component of the regime — in Iran and everywhere else. *Secondly*, there is a need to encourage Iran to co-operate fully and demonstrate full transparency. The objective is not to cling to legalities; it is to build confidence through transparency. *Thirdly*, we need to resolve this issue as soon as we can. We will continue to work diligently over the next few months to ensure that the verification system is effective and comprehensive and creates the necessary confidence. For that, we need full transparency. I have often referred — not only in the context of Iran but also more generally, and in particular with regard to countries with significant nuclear activities — to the importance of additional protocols. I have made it clear that without these protocols our hands are tied, particularly with regard to the verification of the absence of undeclared activities. In addition to the protocols, I would like to see as much transparency as possible. The point was made during this meeting that if a country has nothing to hide, there is no reason not to provide access. It is really in the interest of each country to be as transparent as possible, because that is the way to create confidence. The greater the transparency, the greater the confidence.”³⁵

The following chapters will discuss at length the issues thrown up by the recent controversy, and elaborate Iran’s options and challenges in the backdrop of a brief historical overview of its nuclear programme. It will also examine the role of external actors in the Iranian nuclear episode. The present always is a derivative from the past, and hence, the study will focus on the various forces and factors that have contributed to the making of Iranian nuclear crisis. In all, the study goes beyond the current nuclear standoff by bringing to the fore the broader issue of proliferation and the region-wide implications in case Iran chooses to remain defiant.

³⁵ Director General’s Statement on Iran during the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting 18 June 2003. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf>

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Historically, Iran's nuclear programme can be traced in the backdrop of international developments after the World War II. The West Asia in general and the Persian Gulf in particular has been an old contested area among the major powers. The region was the site of the discovery of the world's largest reserves of oil, which of course became one of the major sources of the European and American second industrial revolution. Its geographical location provides trade route between west and east and serves the strategic interest of imperial powers.³⁶ Although the end of World War II led to end of European imperialism in the West Asia, it did not mean the end of external influence and intervention. Two major post-World War developments facilitated the external power's domination of the West Asian politics. One was the onset of the cold war in the Near East with the two great powers of the day, the Soviet Union and the USA seeking to carve out their respective spheres of influence through building up of alliances and counter-alliances. The second was the creation of the settlers-state of Israel in the mandated territory of Palestine in 1948. The Israeli state, formed in 1948 is a Euro-American expression and from Arab point of view, the Jewish homeland imposed upon the region as a solution to an essentially European problem and relieving of the European conscience.³⁷ Consequently, the post- world War II West Asia in international system was viewed as a region to fulfill Western interests and aspirations. At the beginning of the Cold War, Iran looked more like

³⁶ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict, and International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p, 13.

³⁷ *Ibid*, p,15.

a regional chessboard with the external contenders vying one another for influence while turning the internal actors into their own pawns.

It was also the era of military alliance signified by collective security to help against other superpower, which motivated the newly emerged states to get into security organisations like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and Australia New Zealand United States Treaty Organization (ANZUS). This phase of world politics was also marked by the initiation of non-conventional weapons or atomic era. Use of atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave rise the idea that conventional weapons were on the decline. As the world politics became the battleground of ideological and military supremacy, West Asia emerged as an arena of superpower struggle for control and domination. A single most important cause for being apple of discord between the two great powers was its tremendous reserve of hydrocarbons, which, like the magnet, attracted extra regional powers, particularly and more frequently, the USA. The possibility thus turned up of in large-scale conflict in the West Asia, with the consequent implications for both catastrophe in the area and the confrontation between superpowers³⁸. That the external penetration of West Asia contributed to the exacerbation of intra-regional conflicts with catastrophic consequences is a different story. What is relevant to this study is the clientelistic relationship that developed in the course of the Superpower rivalry in the area between the US and Iran under the Shah.

Both superpower adopted different measures to establish their sphere of influence in the region. It was easy to penetrate the weak states like Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, smaller Gulf States that were inherently weak, lacking strong political and social

³⁸ For more on nuclear quest and its role in region, see, Pajakt Roger, "Nuclear Status and Policies of the Middle East Countries", *International Affairs*, vol.59, no.4, 1983, p.587.

DISS
327.17470955

Ac42 Ir



TH13085

institutions and prone to external pressures.³⁹ There were other states like Turkey, Iran and Iraq, which were relatively homogenous in construction and not easy to control. Predictably, different policies were adopted by the superpowers to bring these states into the Cold War stream. "Atom for peace" Programme was one of such policy- measure to dissuade Third World countries not to go for weapon capability to perpetuate the hegemonic order in post world war global politics. The Anglo-American struggle for oil after World War-II was even fiercer in the Persian Gulf than West Asia as a whole.

As far as Iran was concerned, the prime objective of the US was to overshadow British influence, which became evident in the following observation. "The tragic events in which the CIA of United States played the main role were preceded by quite a long period of 'peaceful' U.S.A penetration into Iran aimed at ousting the British."⁴⁰ At the beginning, Iran was not considered vital from the American strategic perspectives, as proved by the fact that under the original legislation on the US military assistance programme, Iran was lumped together with the Philippines and Korea under title 3 status, to share a total of \$27 billion, while Greece and Turkey were to receive more than \$211 million under title 2 status.⁴¹ Prior to 1953, the US had not committed itself wholeheartedly to the Shah as the most propitious leader for Iran. The Shah needed to achieve certain goals; he had to establish the importance of Iran to the United States and the importance to Iranian security in terms of number of armed forces personnel and the quality of their equipment. To achieve this goal, he took every opportunity to stress the instability of Iran in relation to external threat. He visited Washington in 1949 and signed an agreement of mutual assistance for defense purposes as well as technical aid to Iran for the development of agriculture and industry⁴².

³⁹ In post second world war era of decolonisation, when virtually all of the territories gained independence in one form or other these West Asian entities could be seen as 'fabrication' manufactured by European states and released into a world, an international system.

⁴⁰ V. Mikhin, *Western Expansion in Persian Gulf*, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1988), p.52.

⁴¹ For details see, C.D. Carr, "United States -Iranian Relationship 1948-78: A Study in Reverse Influence", Pp.57-84, cited in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed, *The Security of the Persian Gulf* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1981).

⁴² Ibid;

TH-13085



The US attracted towards Iran only when Soviet Union looked towards the Persian Gulf for influence and expansion in the late 1950s. During World War II the most disturbing fact for West including United States was achievement of defense and military parity by Soviet Union on the level of West. An acknowledgement of USSR's role as super power increased the prospect of conflict in West Asia. For the USSR, it is an area contiguous to it. The growth of Soviet military power, the attainment of strategic parity, and a global reach interact with both the fact of western vulnerability and the instability of politics in various regions including West Asia prompted the United States to turn its attention towards the Persian Gulf.⁴³ It played a crucial role in the reinstatement of Shah in 1953 following the overthrow of the Mossadaq regime that had nationalised the oil industry. Until the 1979 Iranian revolution, the US considered Iran along with Saudi Arabia as the twin pillars of US policy of containing the possible Soviet influence in the area and maintaining secure access to the Gulf for the supply of oil.⁴⁴ Militarily and politically backed by the US, the Shah identified himself with the Western interest by joining the security organizations like the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and began to behave, as the latter's policeman in the region.⁴⁵ Ironically, it was Iran's close proximity with the US during those initial years of the Cold War that paved the way for its quest for the nuclear research and development.

PHASE I: IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME UNDER SHAH

For analytical convenience, Iran's nuclear programme is divided into four phases. The first phase started with the signing of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement

⁴³ For detail discussion of Soviet entrance see, Shahram Chubin, "Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf" in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., pp 43-56

⁴⁴ Lenore G. Martin, "Patterns of Regional Conflict and US Gulf Policy", cited in, WM. J. Olson, ed, *US Strategic Interest in the Gulf Region* (London: West View Press inc. 1987).

⁴⁵ For a detail analysis of US-Iran relations See, Kenneth M. Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004).

between the US and Iran in 1957 as part of the Atoms for peace Programme.⁴⁶ Then President Eisenhower initiated this Programme for helping West Asian countries in the field of nuclear energy for civilian use. During the 1960's America sold hot cells and a five-megawatt research reactor to Iran. The first significant nuclear facility built by the Shah was the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). It had a safeguarded 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor that was supplied by the US in 1967. The reactor can produce up to 600gm of plutonium per year in its spent fuel.⁴⁷

Iran signed the NPT on July 1, 1968 and the treaty was ratified by the majlis; which went into effect on March 5, 1970. The event of the early 1970 has been however, instrumental in shaping and accelerating the developments of Iran's nuclear programme. The 1973 war between the Arab countries and Israel and the subsequent huge increase in oil prices, provided the Shah regime with considerable resources for Iran's development. Meanwhile one of the impacts of the Iranian nuclear programme has been establishment of the atomic energy organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, which was emerged subsequently in negotiation for nuclear power plant. The Iranian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA) of AEOI is an independent national body authorized for issuing rules and regulations and conducting the licensing and supervisory processes for issuing licenses and thereby regulating nuclear and radiation safety for sitting, design, manufacturing, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the nuclear industry facilities or specific aspects thereof. The INRA is also responsible for national radiation protection and national system of accountancy and control of nuclear materials (safeguards).

⁴⁶ "Atom for Peace Agreement with Iran" *Department of State Bulletin*, no.36, April 15, 1957: Cited in Muhammad Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Energy Program. Part V: From the United States Offering Iran Uranium Enrichment Technology to suggestions for Creating Catastrophic Industrial Failure," *Payvand's Iran News*, December 22, 2004, p.2, <<http://www.payvand.com>>

⁴⁷ Mohammed Sahimi "Iran's Nuclear Programme" see Part II, History of Iran's nuclear programme, <http://en.wikipedia.org>

Iran concluded an extendable 10-year nuclear fuel contract with the United States in 1974, with Germany in 1976, and with France in 1977. In 1975, Iran purchased a 10% share in a Eurodiff uranium enrichment plant being built at Tricastin in France that was part of a French, Belgium, Spanish, and Italian consortium. Under the agreement that the Shah signed, Iran was to have full access to the enrichment technology Eurodiff had developed, and agreed to buy a quota of enriched uranium from the new plant.⁴⁸

The Shah created an ambitious plan calling for a network of 23 power reactors throughout Iran that was to be operating by the mid-1990 and sought to buy nuclear power plants from Germany and France. In March 1974, interestingly, the Shah envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out, and declared, "Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn... We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants."⁴⁹

A significant step in building Iran's nuclear capability was the signing of an agreement with two German firms Siemens and Kraftwerk Union to build two nuclear 1200-megawatt nuclear reactors in Bushehr, a port city along the Persian Gulf. The work for doing so began in 1974. In 1975, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology signed a contract with the AEOI for providing training for the first cadre of Iranian nuclear engineers.

In addition, the nuclear technology Centre at Isfahan was founded in the mid 1970s with the French assistance in order to provide training for the personnel that would be working with the Bushehr reactors. In 1975, the Bonn based firm Kraftwerk Union A.G., a joint venture of Siemens AG and A.E.G Telefunken

⁴⁸ Anthony H. Cordeesman, *Iran's Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (London: Pagers Publishers, Westport Connecticut 1987), p.237.

⁴⁹ "Iran Profile - Nuclear Chronology 1957-1985." Nuclear Threat Initiative. accessed from <<http://www.nti.org/e-research/propfiles/1825-1826.html>>

signed a contract worth \$4 to \$6 billion to build the nuclear power plant. Construction of the two nuclear generating units was subcontracted to Thyssenkrupp AG, and was to be completed in 1981. As spokesperson of the firm, Joachim Hospe was eager to work with the Iranian government because "To fully exploit, nuclear power plant capacity, they had to land at least three contracts a year for delivery abroad. The market here was about saturated, and the United States had cornered most of the rest of Europe, so they had to concentrate on the third world."⁵⁰

By 1975, The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had signed *National Security Decision Memorandum 292*, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," which laid out the details of the sale of nuclear energy equipment to Iran designed to bring U.S. corporations more than \$6 billion in revenue. At that time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels (950,000 m³) of oil a day, compared to about 4 million barrels (640,000 m³) daily today.

President Gerald R. Ford even signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete "nuclear fuel cycle". The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."⁵¹ One reason for Iran's interest in procuring US assistance, apart from the general superiority of American nuclear technology, was that up to now the United States has enjoyed a unique reputation for being able to ensure fuel enrichment and reprocessing arrangements (under

⁵⁰Retrieved from, Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran's_nuclear_program.

⁵¹ Cyrus Safdari, *Le Monde Diplomatique Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons*, November 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran's_nuclear_program

US control, of to preclude the diversion of any fissionable materials to nuclear weapons purposes)⁵².

The two principal American companies principally interested in providing nuclear power plants to Iran in the 1970's were Westinghouse and General Electric. Framatome and Siemens, the French and German firms that have contracted to supply nuclear power plants to Iran, used Westinghouse technology in the past but those companies no longer have formal contractual or ownership ties with Westinghouse.

Ayatollah Khomeini froze construction of these reactors after the 1979 revolution even though over 80 per cent of it had already been completed. Besides, the new regime also decided to abandon the nuclear pursuit and canceled billions of dollar contract signed by the Shah on the ground that nuclear power was immoral.

MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE BEGINNING OF NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

There are different views regarding motivations of Iran's nuclear programme. Some analyst believes that Iranian nuclear programme as the most ambitious programme during Shah period building on the nuclear infrastructure of the early 1970's, which consisted solely of the operation of a small research reactor. The availability of only a limited pool of trained Iranian nuclear technicians, engineers, and physicist. Iranian plans had called for a rapid and ambitious development of an indigenous civilian nuclear industry⁵³. The Shah's diplomacy⁵⁴ was ashore on the U.S. commitment to counter any external threat while facil-

⁵² Cited in Cottrell, Dougherty E. James, *Iran's Quest for Security: US Arms Transfers and the Nuclear Option*, (Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), p.25.

⁵³ Lewis A. Dunn, "Persian Gulf Nuclearisation: Prospects and Implications", cited in Hossein Amirsadeghi., pp.86-99.

⁵⁴ For further insight see, Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik", *Foreign Policy*, no. 70,1988, pp. 109-128. To discuss Khomeini's Policies author went through Shah's diplomacy in detail.

itating the building of a stronger Iran. Iran was one of the strongest pillars of United States in West Asia to fulfill its general strategic interests.

Some other principles also shaped the Shah's policies. First was the vital need to protect Iran's external and internal security. Hostility among the neighbouring countries, external threats to oil reserves and regime instability in the region prompted Iran towards searching assistance from outside the region. Thus protections of internal and external security were also cause of concern. Money, autocracy, and close proximity to the US seemed to have made Iran safe.

Iran was highly concerned of its status and reputation in the region. The achievement of security allowed the pursuit of a second principle, the projection of Iranian prestige. The Shah aimed beyond forcing the development pace of a backward country. He wanted to show his country and the world that Iran now counted. But when the oil balloon deflated in the late 1970s, the Shah fell because he had no ideological safety net. This prompted Iran to achieve nuclear capability so that it could achieve a standing in the area, and keep itself immune from the fluctuating oil prices. One author viewed while discussing 'why states go nuclear' in 1977, that prestige can be a potential cause to go for nuclear he predicted "Brazil and Iran, which regard themselves as potential great powers, may very well be attracted to going nuclear by the larger voice they would receive not only in regional but also in world affairs."⁵⁵

Finally came the principle of the availability of nuclear cooperation and equipments, which eased the difficulties of being a nuclear state in that period. There is a widely held opinion in certain quarters that Shah's nuclear initiative aimed at winning the popular support in domestic politics. Since Shah regime was autocratic and authoritarian in nature it was quite possible that Shah wanted to

⁵⁵ William Epstein, "why States go and Don't go for Nuclear", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 430, March 1977, pp. 16-28.

secure his pro-Western regime through populist measures such as launching the ambitious nuclear programme.

THREAT PERCEPTION

It was not clear, whether Iran was oriented towards acquiring weapons, but a group of scholars holds that, the Shah of Iran might have nuclear weapons in mind. As quoted speaking in September 1974, the Shah remarked, in September 1977, “The present world is confronted with a problem of some countries possessing nuclear weapons and some not. We are among those who do not possess nuclear weapons, so friendship of a country such as the United States with its arsenal of nuclear weapons...is absolutely vital.”⁵⁶

This statement indicates that, the threat perception of Iran, which existed, had induced Iran to opt for nuclear programme embedded with military intonation. Initially Iran’s nuclear programme was not overtly mean to threaten Israel. However it cannot be ignored that Tehran saw Israel then and now as a potential rival in the West Asia whose strength needed to be counterbalanced.⁵⁷ This threat perception was reinforced by Israeli victory in 1967 and 1973 war. It was also a coincidence that major establishment of Iran’s nuclear development took place in these years. Such as the establishment of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and signing of agreement with Germany for two Bushehr reactor.

Secondly, Soviet Union was another cause of concern for Iran, although she received development assistance from the Soviet Union, Tehran remained a strong ally of United States. As part of its obligation as a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Iranian nuclear programme was at least partly geared

⁵⁶ As quoted in Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *Iran’s quest for security: US Arms transfers and the nuclear option*,” Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977 p 3.

⁵⁷ Chris Quillen, “Iranian Nuclear Weapon Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.6, no. 2, 2002, p. 18.

towards preventing Soviet Union intervention in the West Asia.⁵⁸ One report argued that the Iranian program was designed specifically and solely to fight the Soviet expansion.⁵⁹ At the time, Iran shared a long northern border with the Soviet Union and feared Soviet invasion of its oilfield.

There is also a belief in certain quarters that Soviet Union was not a cause for going nuclear rather other regional powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially Iraq. Iran and Iraq was two contestants for regional hegemony and often clashed on border dispute. In 1973 when Iraqi forces attempted to claim Kuwaiti island in the Persian Gulf, Iran offered military support to Kuwait, which was turned down. Iraq also provided “diplomatic, financial and military support to a number of subversive revolutionary, nationalist and secessionist movements” opposing the Iranian regime.⁶⁰

In 1976, Iraq also purchased Osiraq research reactor from France. In the words of an Iraqi government official, “if Israel owns the atom bomb, then the Arabs must get an atom bomb. The Arab countries should possess whatever is necessary to defend themselves.”⁶¹ Implications of these events also affected Iran’s threat perception in the region.

PHASE II: KHOMEINI PERIOD

The revolution caused a dramatic change in Iran’s disposition in the world political arena vis-à-vis foreign and security policy matters. The fundamental guiding principle of revolutionary Iran’s foreign policy was Imam Khomeini’s slogan “*Na Sharq, Na Garab, Faqat Jumhari-Ye Islami*.” Neither East, nor West,

⁵⁸ Ibid; p 18

⁵⁹ Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *Iran’s quest for security: US Arms transfers and the nuclear option*,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977 pp. 5 and 8.

⁶⁰ Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, *Iran’s Quest for Security: US Arms Transfers and the Nuclear Option*,” (Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977), p. 10.

⁶¹ J.P. Smith “Iraq’s Nuclear Arms Option”, *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1978, p.14.

only the Islamic republic of Iran.⁶² Foremost among the Khomeini regime's guiding principles was its rigid insistence on independence—above all, on the complete end of any dependence on the United States. In good part that stood at the heart of the revolution was the strive for pursuing of Islam that was believed to protect the country, and independence. Implementing this principle meant virtually eliminating foreign debt and earnestly seeking economic self-sufficiency. Iran would not borrow and fall into the "abyss of dependence," as Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi told the Tehran Trade Fair in August 1986⁶³. Since revolution was anti Western and anti modernisation plan of Shah regime the new regime stressed ending of all pacts done by Shah in the name of anti religion and anti Islam. In the early years of revolution, almost anything even remotely linked to the West was rejected, and the nuclear project was no exception.

Ayatollah Khomeini froze construction of many reactors including Bushehr after the 1979 revolution even though over 80 per cent of it had already been completed. Alongside this, new regime decided to abandon the nuclear pursuit and canceled billions of dollar contract signed by the Shah on the ground that nuclear power was immoral. Virtually all projects associated with the Shah were deemed inappropriate and scrapped including most of the contracts for nuclear reactors, though a small research reactor at Amirabad under international inspection was retained. All arms deals with the United States and other foreign powers were cancelled as well as at least \$34 billion worth of major civilian development projects including four nuclear power stations.⁶⁴

Where many analysts held that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini considered nuclear weapon (as well chemical and biological weapon) as immoral and did not seek them. Other insist his government sought to continue the nuclear programme, but

⁶² Haleh Vaziri "Iran's Nuclear Quest: Motivations and Consequences", in Raju G.C. Thomas, ed., *The Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime* (Princeton, N.J.Princeton University Press, 1986), P.314

⁶³Henry Precht, "Ayatollah Realpolitik", *Foreign Policy*, no. 70, 1988, pp. 109-128.

⁶⁴ Cited in Chris Quillen, "Iranian Nuclear Weapon Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.6, no. 2, 2002, p. 19.

on a less grandiose scale.⁶⁵ The new Iranian regime ended the Shah's alliance with the United States and actively sought to define itself as enemy of America.

Iran's nuclear Programme lay frozen until the closing years of Iran –Iraq war. In the middle of the Iran-Iraq war, Teheran sought to revive its nuclear Programme with the completion of the construction of the Bushehr reactors. In 1984, Kraftwerk-Union did a preliminary assessment to see if it could resume work on the project, but declined to do so while the Iran-Iraq war continued. In April of that year, the US State Department said, "We believe it would take at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr." The spokesperson also said that the light water power reactors at Bushehr "are not particularly well-suited for a weapons program." The spokesperson went on to say, "In addition, we have no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel."⁶⁶

In 1984 Iranian radio announced that negotiations with Niger on the purchase of uranium were nearing conclusion. In 1985, Iranian radio programme openly discussed the significance of the discovery of uranium deposits in Iran with the director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation. The reactors were then damaged by multiple Iraqi air strikes during March 24, 1984 to 1988. Shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear program was stopped. During its war with Iran, Iraq bombed the Bushehr site six times (in March 1984, February 1985, March 1985, July 1986, and twice in November 1987), which destroyed the entire core area of both reactors.⁶⁷

During 1980's Iranian officials announced that they planned to build a reactor powered by their own uranium at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre. In 1983 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors inspected Iranian nuclear

⁶⁵ David Segal, "Atomic Ayatollah: Just What The Mideast Needs ---An Iranian Bomb", *The Washington Post*, April 12, 1987, p. D1.

⁶⁶ Dafna Linzer, "Past Arguments Don't Square With Current Iran Policy", *The Washington Post*, Sunday, March 27, 2005, P. A15.

⁶⁷ Mohammed Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Part IHistory", retrieved from www.wikipedia.com

facilities, and reported on proposed cooperation agreement to help Iran manufacture enriched uranium fuel as part of Iran's "ambitious Programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology." The assistance program was later terminated under U.S. pressure.

By 1986 Iran's largest arms suppliers were reportedly China and North Korea. China, for example, is believed to have supplied Iran with military equipment in sales funneled through North Korea. According to an unconfirmed report in the *Washington Post*, one particular deal in the spring of 1983 netted Beijing close to US\$1.3 billion for fighters, T-59 tanks, 130mm artillery, and light arms. China also delivered a number of Silkworm HY-2 surface-to-surface missiles, presumably for use in defending the Strait of Hormuz⁶⁸. As of early 1987, China denied all reported sales, possibly to enhance its diminishing position in the Arab world. North Korea agreed to sell arms and medical supplies to Iran as early as the summer of 1980. Using military cargo versions of the Boeing 747, Tehran ferried ammunition, medical supplies, and other equipment that it purchased from the North Korean government. According to unverified estimates, total sales by 1986 may have reached US\$3 billion.

Other countries directly or indirectly involved over the years in supplying weapons to Iran were Syria (transferring some Soviet-made weapons), France, Italy, Libya (Scud missiles), Brazil, Algeria, Switzerland, Argentina, and the Soviet Union. Direct foreign influence, however, was minimal because most purchases were arranged in international arms markets. Moreover, the influence of the major arms suppliers was balanced by other international relationships. Many West European States in 1988 had arms embargoes against shipments to Iran, but some material slipped through. West European States often wished to keep communication channels open, no matter how difficult political relations might have become. Despite strong protests from the United States, the British government, in 1985 for example, transferred to Iran a fleet-refueling ship and two landing ships without their armament. The British also allowed the repair of

⁶⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/intro.htm>

two Iranian BH-7 Hovercrafts. In 1982, Tehran began negotiations with Bonn for the sale of submarines. Iran also approached the Netherlands and, in 1985, purchased two landing craft, each sixty-five meters long and having a capacity exceeding 1,000 tons. The influence of the Asian arms-supplying countries was further minimized because purchases were made in cash upon delivery with no strings attached. Foreign influence was less pronounced in 1987 than at any time since 1925 because a defiant Tehran espoused "independent" foreign and military policies, based on a strong sense of Islamic and nationalistic values.

During this period, Iran saw the freezing of maximum nuclear pact and refusal of cooperation from various countries like France's refusal to give any enriched uranium to Iran after 1979. Iran also did not get back its investment from Eurodif.⁶⁹ The U.S. was also paid to deliver new fuel and upgrade its power in accordance with a contract signed before the revolution. The U.S.A neither delivered the fuel nor returned the billions of dollars payment it had received. Germany was paid for in full, billions of dollars for the two nuclear facilities in Bushehr, but after three decades, Germany also refused to export any equipment or refund the money.⁷⁰

Following the "Islamic revolution" and the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran was in conflict with the United States and, more generally, with the West. During the war between Iraq and Iran, which started in 1980, the Western countries provided arms to Iraq's Saddam Hussein while enforcing an embargo on arms and technology trade with Iran. Ever since, Iran has been isolated by the international community, under trade and economic sanctions introduced by the United States, and supported to a certain extent by developed countries.

⁶⁹France, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden formed the joint stock company Eurodif in 1973. In 1975, Sweden's 10% share in Eurodif went to Iran as a result of an arrangement between France and Iran.

⁷⁰Gordon Prather, "ElBaradei Isn't Perfect." December 27, 2005

<http://www.Antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=8308>

As a result, it has been denied access to international markets where it could legally acquire modern technologies, and nuclear cooperation from various countries. Kraftwerk Union, the joint venture of Siemens AG and AEG Telefunken who had signed a contract with Iran in 1975, fully withdrew from the Bushehr nuclear project in July 1979, after work stopped in January 1979, with one reactor 50% complete, and the other reactor 85% complete. They said they based their action on Iran's non-payment of \$450 million in overdue payments. The company had received \$2.5 billion of the total contract. Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West. The French company Framatome, a subsidiary of Areva, also withdrew itself. In this decade, Iran was so engrossed with Iraq war that it had also financial crisis to start with nuclear programme. Iran turned to other potential suppliers such as Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, china, and the Soviet Union. In 1987, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan, according to the agreement, 39 Iranian nuclear scientists and technicians would advance their skills in Pakistani nuclear facilities, reactors, and laboratories. However, this period was a watershed but it is also true that in same period Iran again started pondering over reviving its nuclear programme perhaps with some military orientations.

PHASE III: RESUMPTION OF THE PROGRAMME

The war with Iraq was the primary platform for expression of the three Iranian principles of independence, security of the state, and promotion of Islam. Tehran's stated aim of avoiding harm to Iraqi civilians derived from its limited capabilities and its hope that the Shiite majority in Iraq will not rebel against the "irreligious" Baghdad regime.

The most pressing reason for restarting the nuclear programme was the realisation of Iran's limited capability to fight with regional contender, Iraq. The Iran-Iraq war shocked the clerics into realising the value of modern military technology.

From the clerics perspective the Reagan administration not only had opposed their hegemonic aspirations but also allied with Iraqi Ba'th in an effort to defeat Iran. Some even went also went on to argue that had the Islamic Republic possessed nuclear weapons, the U.S. would have thought twice about interjecting its Navy into the Persian gulf and engaging Iranians.⁷¹

As noted, during the early 1980's Iran had not only suspended its nuclear programme but also faced sanctions on its economy. During Iran- Iraq war, a vast amount of Iran's budget had gone to building up its defence, which triggered popular resentment in domestic arena. The eight year long war had made it clear to the Ayatollahs that in any future conflict Iran would stand alone without support from other nations and needed to be self sufficient in both conventional forces and non conventional weapons.

Besides the reports about the Israeli and Iraqi nuclear programs spurred Iranian apprehensions, it also sought nuclear related technology from China, India, Argentina, Pakistan, and Germany.⁷² Even the death of Khomeini himself in June 1989 did not slow down Iran's efforts. Some reports suggest it may have even accelerated them.⁷³

According to Chris Quillen⁷⁴, in the early 1990's two significant international events also affected Iranian national security. First of the two was fall of Soviet Union which led to weakened of security around Soviet weapons and increased the perceived threat from the United States, since the Washington would not be as likely to be deterred from intervening in Iran by its superpower rival's presence in the region. The second event was the Iraqi invasion of the Kuwait, which demonstrated the continued belligerence, and military strength of the Baghdad regime. However, Iraq was defeated by the US led coalition but its aftermath

⁷¹ Cited in Vaziri, "Iran's Nuclear Quest," and p. 315.

⁷² Elaine Sciolino, "Report Says Iran Seeks Atomic Arms," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1991, p.7.

⁷³ Cited in, Chris Quillen, "Iranian Nuclear Weapon Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.6, no. 2, June 2002 p.20.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p.20.

marked by the onset of the Pax-Americana in terms of huge military infrastructure in the region. As a result of unilateral security agreement with the Gulf States and building up of military infrastructure in the area for the 'containment' of the so called the 'rogue States'. This development particularly stirred Iranian fear of insecurity and strategic vulnerability. The severe energy crisis in the post revolutionary period was also a reason for the top Iranian clergy to change their attitude towards nuclear projects. The clergy "realised that they had killed the goose which laid the golden egg" by destroying the AEOI.⁷⁵

One of the causes behind its resumption may be traced from the events in the South Asia. The emergence in the mid 1980's of nuclear arms racing between India and Pakistan would have generated both security and status related pressures in Iran to resume earlier nuclear activities and to move to acquire a nuclear capability. To Iranian, Pakistan is a culturally and historically inferior neighbour⁷⁶ Iran might thought once Pakistan had even a rudimentary nuclear capability Iran would have to match it. Some analyst also focused on this aspect which says that, though Iran no longer committed to becoming the 'fifth great power' as was the Shah, a future Iranian government might still be reluctant to see India, let alone Pakistan and not itself among the ranks of the nuclear powers⁷⁷.

These events might have persuaded Iran to revive its nuclear programme and go for nuclear capability.

EVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Increase in defense spending in the 1990s stemmed from internal evaluations of the *Pasdaran* and regular Iranian armed forces during the Iran-Iraq war in 1988-89 after the conflict the National Security Council and the Iranian High Command called for a number of improvements. Recommendations focused on four areas:

⁷⁵ Akber Etemad, "Iran", in Harald Muller, ed., *A European Non Proliferation Policy: Prospect and Problems* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 214.

⁷⁶ George Perkovich, "Dealing with Iran's Nuclear Challenge", (Washington, D.C, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2003), p.4.

⁷⁷ Lewis A. Dunn, "Persian Gulf Nuclearisation", cited in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed, p.93.

modernisation and rationalisation of the command structures of the republic's armed forces (including the Pasdaran), the creation of a single chain of command, rearmament, and the development of the country's defense industries. The outgoing Prime Minister (Moussavi) summarised the government's thinking on this in September 1988 when he said, "The fundamental duty was to strengthen the defence forces."⁷⁸ This era was signified by Iran's effort to make new friends in international arena, while managing own resources, which it lost in her war with Iraq to retrieve its regional power status.

In 1990, Iran began to look outwards in search of the partners for its nuclear program; however, due to a radically different political climate and punitive U.S. economic sanctions, few candidates existed. In 1990, Iran started negotiations with Russia regarding the re-construction of the Bushehr power plant but due to its internal weaknesses and USA influence, the negotiations could not proceed. China in 1991, provided Iran uranium hexafluoride (a uranium compound which is gaseous state, and used for enriching uranium), which was, however under IAEA safeguard. The opening of Iran's first nuclear engineering center in 1992 marked the beginning of Iran's renewed efforts to obtain nuclear knowledge. Following the German firms' refusal under the US pressures to resume work on the projects, Iran looked for assistance from other sources including china, India, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The threat of U.S sanctions, however, blocked the help of some these potential partners in its nuclear programme

Iran made a second attempt to acquire a nuclear power plant at Darkhovin, contracting China to build two 300 MW PWRs for a project the Chinese called Esteghlal. On 10 September 1992, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani announced that China's Qinshan Nuclear Power Company and the Shanghai Nuclear Research and Design Institute agreed to build the reactors as part of a nuclear cooperation agreement. Chinese officials said it could take up to 10 years

⁷⁸ "Military Iranian Warship" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/intro.htm>

to complete the two reactors.⁷⁹ In 1992, Iran signed an agreement with China for the building of two 950-watt reactors in Darkhovin (Western Iran). To date, construction has not yet begun. Western analysts at the time predicted the plant would never be finished because China was not technically capable of building a 300 MW reactor without importing key components from abroad.⁸⁰ These arguments had been disproved by China's apparently successful attempt to build the Chashma-I reactor in Pakistan, which was nearing completion.

The agreement was confirmed in 1993 (but never realized). In 1994, the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (MINATOM) and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) agreed on the scope of work for completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant unit 1 (BNPP-1) with a 1000 MW (e) PWR unit of WWER-1000 type. The contract was signed in 1995. The Russian designed reactor was to be constructed using mostly the infrastructure already in place. In January 1995, Iran signed an USD \$800 million contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) to complete reactors at Bushehr under IAEA safeguards. In 1996, China and Iran informed the IAEA of plans to construct a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, but China withdraws from the contract under US pressure.

In 1997, there was a change in Iranian regime although not as violent and dramatic as in 1979, but the landslide election victory of Mohammed Khatmi as president of Iran in May 1997 was surely a noticeable event in Iranian history. Khatmi was viewed as being more moderate, more liberal, and more open to the West. His re-election victory in June 2001 reinforced his international, if not domestic stature.⁸¹ A pragmatic and moderate Rafsanjani policy was based on three considerations: first, Iran cannot alter the region's political establishment; second, Iran must try to adapt to a new balance of power in the region, in which

⁷⁹ "China Sells Reactor to Iran," *Med News*, 14 September 1992, p. 2.

⁸⁰ R. Jeffrey Smith, "China-Iran Talks Spark U.S. Worry Nuclear Transfer Could Be Used for Arms," *The Washington Post*, 17 April 1995, pp. A1, A12.

⁸¹ Chris Quillen, "Iranian Nuclear Weapon Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.6, no.2, 2002, p.20.

US had played a major role in creating this new balance of power; and third, to initiate relations with Saudi Arabia because it is a major country in the GCC fold.⁸² Rafsanjani prime aim in pursuing such policies was to regain ground lost during the eight-years Iran-Iraq war, and consequently to reassert Iran's influence in the region. Khatami's policy was a continuation of the policy of Rafsanjani with a more open and conciliatory approach.

Foreign policy including nuclear cooperation was quite different considerably from earlier regime. His attempts to move Iran from 'confrontation' to 'conciliation' and advocacy of the 'dialogue of civilizations' than 'clash of civilizations' placed him different from his predecessors. At the external level, pro-active foreign policy had been adopted by the Khatami administration. The former President Hashemi Rafsanjani also adopted the policy of rapprochement, but it is much more securely assumed and implemented by the Khatami administration. Now the detente policy had become the cornerstone of the Iranian foreign policy⁸³.

Soon after President Khatami came into power, he appointed Oil Minister Gholamreza Aghazadeh to head the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Upon taking his new job, Aghazadeh announced that he intended to continue Iran's civilian nuclear program, with the purchase of several new reactors upon the completion of the one currently under construction at Bushehr.⁸⁴ Iran's current plans to construct seven nuclear power plants (1000 MW each) by 2025 are still ambitious, particularly for a state with considerable oil and gas Iran argues, as it did in the 1970s, that nuclear power is necessary for rising domestic energy consumption, while oil and gas are needed to generate foreign currency.

⁸² For a deeper analysis of Khatmi Policies, see Shah Alam "The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy Under Khatmi" *Strategic Analysis*, vol.24, no.9, 2000.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Michael Eisenstadt "Iran Under Khatami: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Statement before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs May 14, 1998

Few observers believe that such an ambitious program is necessary or economic for Iran.⁸⁵

PHASE IV: THE STAND OFF

In late 2002, the world learned from the Iranian opposition groups that Iran had concealed from the IAEA for 18 years the existence of facilities at Natanz and Arak engaged in work on the nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA Board of Governors reached the conclusion in a Resolution passed November 26, 2003 that, due to this concealment and to other reporting omissions, Iran had “in a number of instances” failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which it is obligated to maintain pursuant to Article III of the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁸⁶

However, Iran has maintained that all of its work with fissile materials and related technologies, including work at these hidden sites, has been aimed at furthering its capacity to produce nuclear energy. Therefore, the Iranian argues, notwithstanding these procedural-reporting requirements they have always been in fundamental compliance with their substantive obligations under the NPT.

Iranian position is based on the Article IV (1) of the NPT which provides the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...the Article IV (2) further adds that all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

⁸⁵ See statement by Iran’s former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi at [http://www.pbs.org/Newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec04/iran_9-27.html].

⁸⁶ IAEA Report, by the Governor general GOV/2003/40. <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/2006/heinonen31012006.pdf>

All the same, suspicions have become widespread particularly among Western countries, that Iran indeed has nuclear weapons ambitions, and that particularly the uranium enrichment work, which Iran has carried out, is intended not solely for its peaceful use. The 2005 election of a hardliner, conservative government in Iran has had a negative effect on international perceptions of the Iranian nuclear programme. The inflammatory rhetoric of the new Iranian president, together with Iran's withdrawal from the Paris Accord and resumption of conversion and, ultimately, enrichment activities have heightened international concern even among Iran's traditional friends. Many key figures in the new Iranian government, such as President Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, are former members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*). These key government officials are also veterans of the Iran-Iraq war, during which the international community was demonstrably indifferent towards Iraqi atrocities against the Iranians (such as chemical attacks). It may be argued that the experiences of President Ahmadinejad and his allies during the Iran-Iraq war shaped their strategic outlook and added to their suspicion in dealing with the West in peaceful energy production, but for the creation of nuclear weapons.⁸⁷

In order to quell Western fears related to the use of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities, particularly Natanz, in November 2005 Russia proposed that it would develop a joint enterprise with Iran to convert UF₆ gas into enriched uranium on Russian territory. The low enriched uranium (LEU) that results would be returned to Iran for use in nuclear power plants. According to French foreign ministry spokesperson Jean-Baptiste Mattei, the Russian proposal was a response "to the worries of the international community in terms of proliferation and, at the same time, gives Iran the means to develop a pacific nuclear program."⁸⁸ Iran rejected the initial Russian proposal and suggested an "improvement" to a December 24, 2005, proposal because it did not consider the plan to be "complementary and

⁸⁷Ray Takeyh, "Diplomacy will not end Iran's Nuclear Program," Council on Foreign Relations, December 21, 2005

⁸⁸ "EU Opposes Iranian Move on Nuclear Research," *Deutsche-Welle*, January 5, 2006.

workable," according to Hamid Reza Asefi, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson.⁸⁹

Iran has further alarmed the international community by resuming nuclear research at its Natanz facility on January 10, 2006. In an act of defiance, Iranian officials apart from turning down the IAEA seals on the uranium enrichment equipment they also rejected the Russian offer in March 2006.⁹⁰ IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei reported in December 2005 "there is lots of speculation" about Iran's nuclear-related activities, but says "we (IAEA) try to work on the basis of facts. We haven't seen a smoking gun in Iran."⁹¹

CAUSES OF CONCERN FOR WEST

The main western concern behind Iran's motivations for establishing its nuclear programme, are nuclear advances that would inevitably make Iran a bigger player on the regional scene. That is a matter of concern because Iran is not a status quo power, Iranians are proud nationalists, intensely aware of their ancient glories; they remember that a mere two hundred years ago, Iran was twice its present size⁹².

Following a series of visits and consultations with Iran in 2003, the director general issued reports to the IAEA board of Governors June and September meetings that indicated a number of Iranian failures and troubling evidence of undeclared nuclear activities. These included failure to declare the import, processing, and use of 3,960 pound of natural uranium obtained from China, as well as the facilities where the material was stored and processed, and the production of Uranium metal, which because of its complex and advanced

⁸⁹ "Iran asks for improvement on Russian nuclear proposal," *Xinhua*, January 3, 2006.

⁹⁰ "Iran flexible on nuclear crisis: Mottaki", *Daily Times*, March 2, 2006.

⁹¹ David Horowitz, "ElBaradei to 'Post': No 'Smoking Gun' in Iran," *Jerusalem Post*, December 6, 2005.

⁹² Patrick Clawson, "Iran the Least bad Option for Limiting the Growing Threats" Paper presented at Washington Institute of Near East Policy, March 2, 2006.

technology, is considered more likely to be used for a nuclear weapon programme than for a nuclear energy programme.⁹³

Environmental samples taken at the Natanz pilot enrichment facility and the Kalaye electric company in Tehran also revealed traces of highly enriched Uranium (HEU), which Iran claimed had come from contaminated parts that were bought on the black market and for which sources would not be identified. In response to these reports, the board at its September meeting adopted without a vote a resolution setting an October 31, 2003 deadline for Iran to demonstrate full and transparent cooperation with the agency and to rectify all failures identified by the IAEA.

One of the more disturbing points included in the report detailed undeclared Iranian efforts over the past two decades to develop a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme and a laser enrichment programme and Iranian success in producing small amount of low enriched uranium and plutonium. The report also included the Iranian failures to report and in fact, intentional efforts to conceal – a large number of conversion, fabrication, and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, as well as facilities where those activities were conducted. These included failures to report testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002, the import of natural uranium in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments (which included the production of enriched Uranium), and the production and irradiation of Uranium targets⁹⁴. Since 2003 United States, European Union, and IAEA have been indulged in resolving the crisis through different means. Until date IAEA has, however, not come up with any conclusive report of WMD programme of Iran. Despite lack of evidence of a weapons program, the IAEA Board of Governors took the decision on February 4 to refer Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council.

⁹³ IAEA report, September 2003, <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaecairan>

⁹⁴ IAEA Report in June and August GOV/2003/40 AND GOV/2003/63.

Prior to this decision Iranian side had insisted that it would cease all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA if it were referred to the Security Council. This had reference to a cessation of compliance with its commitments under the IAEA Additional Protocol, which allows for unscheduled inspections of nuclear facilities and more comprehensive surveillance of facilities. Since February 4 2006, Iran has taken concrete steps toward this end, asking the IAEA in a letter to remove all of its surveillance equipment from Iran's nuclear facilities by mid-February, and stating that all IAEA inspections must be scheduled, per the general Safeguards Agreement standards.

On February 14, 2006, it was reported that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment. Also worryingly, Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that if compulsory measures against Iran were pursued, a revision of Iran's commitment to the NPT itself would be considered, Iran has also warned that if sanctions are imposed by that the Council, Iran will take steps to significantly increase world oil prices. Now that the matter has been referred to the U.N. Security Council, next steps are unclear. If the Security Council decides that measures authorised under Article 41 of Chapter VII are "inadequate" to restore international peace and security, it may under Article 42 of Chapter VII⁹⁵ authorise U.N. members to take collective military action. However, it seems less likely to happen in near future because of strong opposition of its two permanent member Russia and china. The new Iranian government is more likely to view current actions being taken against it as Western conspiracy rather than as repercussions for its own violations of the NPT or international norms.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

United States was the major supplier of nuclear technology, equipments and fissile material to Iran in early period. Accordingly, Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense a number of declassified documents were found on the website of the

⁹⁵ Chapter VII of United Nations deals with settlements of international dispute through various means including peaceful and forceful.

President Ford Library and Museum⁹⁶ Two documents in particular, dated April 22, 1975 and April 20, 1976, show that the United States and Iran held negotiations for cooperation in the use of nuclear energy and the United States was willing to help Iran by setting up uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities.⁹⁷ Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz were all involved in backing Iran's Nuclear Programme designed to extract plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel.⁹⁸ The other countries, which helped Iran's nuclear programme, were from Western Europe namely France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. Besides, countries like India also provided training to Iranian scientist. Even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rumoured to have told the Shah about India has planned peaceful nuclear experiment in May 1974.⁹⁹ With assistance from these countries Iran succeeded in establishing some nuclear sites like in 1959, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established, run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The TNRC was equipped with a U.S.-supplied 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor, operational from 1967 and fuelled with highly enriched uranium. Bushehr project was also initiated in 1974-75 in the city of Shiraz.

The Shah government also obtained uranium materials from south Africa in the 1970's. According to Dr. Akber Etemad, who was the founder and first president of Atomic energy organization of Iran from 1974 to 1978, the TNRC carried out experiment in which plutonium was extracted from spent fuel using chemical agents.¹⁰⁰ Briefly stated the foundation of Iran's nuclear programme was built in 1950's under the auspices of non other than several Western powers. Reactors

⁹⁶ Ford library museum Retrieve from <http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov> .

⁹⁷ Ford Administration National Security Study Memoranda retrieve from <http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm.htm> .

⁹⁸ Ed Haas "U.S. Endorsed Iranian Plans to Build Massive Nuclear Energy Industry." The Centre for Research on Globalisation (March 6, 2006). <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php>

⁹⁹ Chris Quillen, "Iranian Nuclear Weapon Policy: Past, Present and Possible Future", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol.6, no. 2, 2002, p 18.

¹⁰⁰ See, A. Etemad, "Iran" in, H. Mueller, ed, *European Non Proliferation Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p.9.

were purchased from the United States, France, and West Germany. Iranian nuclear scientists were trained in those countries as well as in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Canada. Argentina, an aspiring nuclear power at that time, also provided advisers.

Besides that, Russia, China, Israel, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan also provided their help to Iran's nuclear programme. In the time of Mohammed Shah Reza Pahlavi, Israel was one of Iran's principal arms suppliers, and an important part of the Shah's military expansion programme. Iran bought about \$500 million per year in arms from Israel at that time. Israeli ties to the Shah extended well beyond arms sales, however, and included an ambitious \$1 billion project to develop jointly a surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Israel was also an important supplier of arms and nuclear equipments to Iran during the Khomeini regime. The Israelis were interested in restoring an important market for their arms industry, and in the fate of Iran's 50,000 Jews. To do so they sought to maintain ties with whatever Iranian military contacts had survived the massive purges by Khomeini's revolutionary guards¹⁰¹

In this way we can say that throughout the history since 1950's to till nuclear standoff Iran was supported by number of countries to build its nuclear infrastructure irrespective of its orientation.

Table 1:1 IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Facility	Purpose	Location	Status	Supplier
Uranium mine	Extracting uranium ore	Saghnad	Possibly operational by the end of 2004	China
Uranium hexafluoride	Uranium conversion	Isfahan and kashan	Under construction	China supplied

¹⁰¹ "The Israel- Iran Connection", *The Washington report on Middle East Affairs*, Published in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 16, no. 3, 1987, pp. 210-212.

conversion plant				blue prints
Gas centrifuge pilot plant	Uranium enrichment	Natanz	Pilot plant scheduled for completion by the end of 2003	unknown
Heavy water production plant	Produces heavy water, used as a moderator in nuclear reactors	Arak	Under construction	Russia helped with know-how
Light water power reactor (1000mwe)	Electricity production	Bushehr	Projected completion in 2005	Russia
Tehran reaserch reactor(5,000kwt)	Radioisotope production	Tehran	complete	United states
Miniature neutron source reactor 30kwt	Reportedly for isotope production	Isfahan	Complete	china
Heavy water zero power reactor	Research	Isfahan	Complete	China
Graphite sub critical reactor	Research	Isfahan	Decommissioned	China
Light water sub critical reactor	Research	Isfahan	complete	china

Source: "Iran Nuclear Update", *The Risk Report*, vol.9, no.5, Sept-Oct 2003.

An Overview of Iran's Nuclear Facility¹⁰²

Bushehr: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Location: Southern Iran (Port City)

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Facility is located 17 kilometers south of the city of Bushehr (also known as Bushire), between the fishing villages of Halileh and

¹⁰² For better understanding see Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: a Profile" (Center for nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California, 1998), Author has discussed all nuclear related sites of Iran with a complete information and assessment.

Bandargeh along the Persian Gulf. The facility was the idea of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who envisioned a time when the world's oil supply would run out. The \$800 million contract, signed in January 1995 by Minatom chief Viktor Mikhailov and then Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Reza Amrollahi, called for Russia to complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years. The Russian-Iranian contract entered into force on January 12, 1996, and called for the reactor to be completed within 55 months.

In February 1998, Mikhailov reaffirmed that timetable, announcing that he expected the power plant to be finished “less than a year from now.”¹⁰³ The light water research reactor deal has also been canceled, but Russia is providing limited uranium mining assistance to Iran. Russia’s ability to complete the 1,000 MW Bushehr-1 reactors will have a great impact on Iran’s civilian nuclear program. The large amount of materiel and technicians moving between Russia and Iran as part of the Bushehr deal could not be seen as a fair and transparent act by the United States. Recently Iran is planning to resume its Bushehr project very soon.

Bonab

The area 80 km south of Tabriz is home to the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, which conducts research on nuclear technology for agricultural uses¹⁰⁴ The facility, run by the AEOI and headed by Hussein Afarideh, is not under IAEA safeguards but was visited by IAEA Director General Hans Blix in July 1997. Although Blix found no prohibited activities, the facility has not generally been the subject of allegations; one report claimed that a nuclear reactor housed in a

¹⁰³ “Russia Takes Over Construction of Iranian Nuclear Plant,” *AFP*, 18 February 1998.

¹⁰⁴ “International Atom Chief Inspecting Iran Research Facilities,” *Associated Press*, July 20 1997, (http://www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/072097/world11_21458.html); “Economy and Business: Nuclear Technology,” *Iran Focus*, December 1995, p. 8.

reinforced-concrete bunker was under construction with Chinese assistance there.¹⁰⁵

Darkhovin (also called Ahvaz, Esteghlal, and Karun)

Located on the Karun River south of the city of Ahvaz, Darkhovin was the proposed location for a nuclear power plant to be built by either French or Chinese firms. The first proposal was for France to build two nuclear reactors there in the late 1970s. In 1974, Iran signed a contract with the French company Framatome to build two 950 MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) at the site they called Karun. Although Framatome surveyed the area and site preparations had begun, construction had not yet started when Iran canceled the contract following the Islamic revolution in 1979.¹⁰⁶ Though Iran signed an agreement to start this project with Chinese assistance, it has not begun yet.

Isfahan facility Nuclear Technology Center

Location: Central Iran

The Isfahan facility is a Nuclear Technology/Research Center facility that contains the following reactors and facilities: Miniature Neutron Source reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL); Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL); Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF); Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor, decommissioned (GSCR); and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). This facility was constructed in terms of separate agreements with France (nuclear research) and China (construction of a 27 MW plutonium production reactor). The IAEA raised questions concerning the UO₂, UF₄, and UF₆ production at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in February of 2003. The Nuclear Technology Center at Isfahan was founded in the mid-1970s with French

¹⁰⁵ Stephen Green, "Nuclear Helping Hand for Iran," *The Washington Times*, 13 December 1995, p. A18

¹⁰⁶ "China Sells Reactor to Iran," *Mednews*, 14 September 1992, p. 2.

assistance in order to provide training for Bushehr reactor personnel.¹⁰⁷ Located at the University of Isfahan and directed by Kazem Rassouly, the center houses four small research reactors. The first, a Chinese-supplied 27 kilowatt thermal (KWT) miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), went critical in March 1994. The MNSR is used to produce isotopes and burns 900 g of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel supplied by the CNNC.¹⁰⁸

The center also has a Chinese-supplied heavy water, zero power, reactor which went critical in 1995, and two Chinese-supplied sub critical reactors which were completed in 1992 (an open tank facility fueled by uranium metal pins and a graphite-moderated facility). Isfahan, the proposed reactor deal raised concerns that the center may be conducting research on nuclear technology with military applications; a worry exacerbated by the fact that part of the center is apparently built underground.¹⁰⁹

Iran does not have a declared uranium enrichment facility, the country's lone commercial reactor, at Bushehr, will use nuclear fuel imported from Russia. Due to the absence of commercial nuclear power plants and the high investment costs associated with building nuclear facilities, the development of fuel cycle Facilities such as the UF₆ plant suggests that Tehran may wish to use them for non-peaceful purposes. In August 2005, resumption at Isfahan nuclear center was restarted with a controversial intonation.

Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

¹⁰⁷ Iran's Nuclear Program *Risk Report 1* (September 1995), pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁸ Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Warned Not to Try Using IAEA to Isolate or Destabilize Iran," *Nucleonic Week*, 8 October 1992, p. 10; Nuclear Engineering International, *World Nuclear Handbook*, p. 105; "Research Reactors," *Nuclear Review*, April 1996, p. 17

¹⁰⁹ "Chinese Help Iran Join the Nuke Club," *The Washington Times*, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.

Natanz is a pilot plant located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran that is under construction and hosts about 200 operational gas centrifuges. A gas centrifuge is one of the primary methods used in the process of uranium enrichment. The plant has two facilities, a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) and a large-scale commercial scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP). This is a uranium enrichment facility for converting uranium ore into a form usable by power plants by means of a system of a centrifuge cascade. First exposed in 2002 by Iran's leading critic, Alireza Jafarzadeh, currently it is thought to have a few hundred working centrifuges, and would require the installation and continual operation of many thousands of centrifuges in order to enrich uranium for bomb use (HEU) within the time span of many years. However, Iran has declared that it intends to install some 3,000 centrifuges in 2006, which could produce enough fissile material for one bomb every nine months.¹¹⁰

Yazd Province

Iran's attempts to mill uranium ore and mine have largely been conducted in the Saghand region of Yazd province. In 1985, AEOI specialists located over 5,000 (metric tons) of uranium in the desert region of eastern Yazd province, making it one of the biggest deposits in the West Asia.¹¹¹ They also found 4,000 tons of molybdenum, a mineral that is mixed with steel to make hardened alloys that have nuclear applications. Although numerous allegations claim there is operational uranium, mine and mill nearby, IAEA inspectors visited Saghand in 1992 but found only a small uranium ore-drilling rig that was at least five years from production.¹¹² There is Anarak waste storage site, near Yazd province.

¹¹⁰Ford Administration National Security Study Memoranda
<http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/nsdmnssm/nssm.htm> .

¹¹¹ "Over 5,000 Tons of Uranium Reserves Discovered," *Ettela'at*, 12 January 1985, p. 4.

¹¹²"Iran's Phantom Bomb," *The Risk Report* 1 (September 1995), p. 4.

Arak

Location: Central Iran

The Arak facility is a heavy water production plant located 150 miles south of Tehran. As of mid-August 2002, this site was 85% complete. Heavy water production plants are not covered by comprehensive IAEA safeguard agreements. The Arak facility also contains a 40 MW IR-40, construction of which is planned to start in 2004. First exposed in 2002 by Iran's leading dissident, Alireza Jafarzadeh, that Arak hosts a heavy water production facility. Iran is constructing a heavy water moderated reactor at this location, which may be ready for commissioning in 2014.

Saghand

It is Iran's first uranium ore mines, expected to become operational by March 2005. The deposit is estimated to contain 3,000 to 5,000 tons of uranium oxide at a density of about 500 ppm over an area of 100 to 150 square kilometers.

Tehran facility

Location: North Central Iran in Tehran

The Tehran facility holds the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility), and the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL). The previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan laboratory "now stores UF₆ (1000 kg), UF₄ (400 kg) and UO₂ (400 kg)."¹¹³ Iran also informed the IAEA "it had converted most of the UF₄ into uranium metal in 2000 at JHL. This information was subsequently confirmed by Iran in a separate letter to the Agency dated 26 February 2003."¹¹⁴ Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Hashtgerd, Karaj: Established in 1991 and run by the AEOI.

¹¹³ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General. IAEA Gov/2003/40. 6 June 2003.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

These were some important nuclear sites of Iran. Now the question arises why west has so much of concern of its sites and nuclear capabilities, which are in nascent stage. Whether Iran has the delivery system or adequate payload capacity to deliver nuclear weapons? Following discussions will enlighten Iranian military and defence system to speculate its nuclear ambitions.

DELIVERY SYSTEM

Any discussion of the Iranian nuclear ambition and its ability to achieve this would be incomplete without a critical evaluation of its hard power potential, particularly its ballistic missile capability. For a state to acquire the nuclear status, it needs to have the nuclear delivery system. In this context, what stirs the western anxiety is Iran missile programme in the past two decades.

Iranian defence system particularly, conventional weapon of Iran is quite strong and well built. Since Shah regime, it is known for modernity and advancement. In 1980's, though revolutionary regime tried to maintain a distance from modernisation of military and armament as they consider it against Islamic principles. However, after 8 years of war with comparatively strong military of Iraq compelled Iran to rethink its decision.

Iran's military capabilities are kept largely secret. In recent years, official announcements have highlighted the development of weapons such as Fajr-3 MIRV missile, Hoot, Kosar, Fateh-110, Shahab-3, and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles.¹¹⁵ Iran's drive towards military self-sufficiency and pursuit of nuclear technologies under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has drawn Western allegations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. The United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency, in its February 2006 report on Iran's nuclear program, said it had no evidence of this. Iran now develops frigates, submarines, tanks, jet fighters, ballistic missiles, and other arms and military gear.

¹¹⁵ "Military Iranian Warship" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/intro.htm>

Soviet-designed Scud-B guided missiles form the core of Iran's ballistic missile forces. Tehran first acquired these missiles from Libya and North Korea during the Iran-Iraq war and used them against Iraq in 1988 in the "War of the Cities." According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran can manufacture almost all of the Scud-B, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated components of its guidance system and rocket motors. He estimates that by 1998, Iran had more than 60 of the longer-range (310 miles or 500 kilometers) North Korean missiles and 5 to 10 Scud-C launchers with missiles. These missiles have a warhead with a high explosive capability of 700 kilograms, and they are relatively accurate and reliable. The most recent Iranian advance in missile technology is the Sha-hab-3, a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) acquired from North Korea. In July 2000, Iran announced that it had successfully test-fired an upgraded version of the Shahab-3.¹¹⁶ Iran is believed to have a current inventory of 25 to 100 Shahab-3 missiles which have a range of 1300km and are capable of being armed with conventional high explosive, submunition, chemical, biological, radiological dispersion and potentially nuclear warheads. A Shahab-4 with a range of 2000 km and a payload of 1000kg is believed to be under development.

Iran has stated the Shahab-3 is the last of its war missiles and the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the capability of launching communication and surveillance satellites. The Iranian minister did however speak well of the Shahab-4 missile, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers, enough to reach Israel and American bases in the West Asia.¹¹⁷ A Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000km range, is also believed to be under development.¹¹⁸ Iran has 12 X-55 long-range cruise missiles purchased without nuclear warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X-55 has a range of 2500 to 3000 kilometers.¹¹⁹ An investigation of Iran's known nuclear capabilities reveals that Tehran still faces

¹¹⁶See Cordesman, n. 12, pp.228-29.

¹¹⁷ <http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=5165,16> January 2006.

¹¹⁸ "NTI: Country Overviews: Iran: Missile Capabilities." Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://nti.org/e_research/iran/missiles/profiles

¹¹⁹ John pike, "x-55 Long Range Cruise Missile." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/worldiran/x-55.htm>

several substantial hurdles to the construction of a nuclear explosive device. Uranium mining is the first step in any nuclear program, whether it is for energy or military purposes. In 1990, uranium deposits were found in Iran's Yazd province southeast of Tehran.¹²⁰ This discovery was critical because it gave Iran the potential to acquire an indigenous nuclear program if technologies for conversion and enrichment could be mastered. States lacking natural uranium deposits rely on imported uranium that is transported under strict export control systems. Lack of access to fissile material is often the largest obstacle to achieving a nuclear weapon capability.

Iran clearly has proven uranium deposits within its borders, but limited uranium mining capabilities demonstrate an impediment to Iran's ability to have a nuclear program. Therefore, it can be said that still Iran is not fully capable to deliver nuclear arsenal by its own. In many areas, still Iran needed foreign assistance to develop its nuclear industry, which seems difficult to get in near future because of the crisis surrounding over its nuclear programme. A US Central Intelligence Agency report dated January 2001 alleges Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons - including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. It further claims that during the first half of 2001 Iran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of having an indigenous nerve agent production capability.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Joseph Cirincione, *Deadly Arsenals* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 269.


¹²¹ Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001." Central Intelligence Agency (USA). Retrieve from <http://web.archive.org/web/200220601133717/http://www.cia.gov/cia/publication/bian/bian-jan-2002.htm>.

Table 1:2 Iran's defence system

AIRCRAFT			
Fighter	Transport	Rotary	Others
			<i>Ababil</i> <i>Mohajer</i>
<i>Azarakhsh</i> <i>Saeqeh</i> <i>Shafaq</i>	<i>Iran-140</i> <i>Tu-334</i>	<i>Shahed 274</i> <i>Shavabiz 2-75</i> <i>Shabaviz 206-1</i> <i>Shabaviz 209-1</i>	<i>Fadzahir</i> <i>Parastu</i> <i>Simorgh</i> <i>Dorna</i> <i>Tazarv</i> <i>Tondar</i>
MISSILES			
Air to surface	Air to Air	Surface to Surface	Surface to
Air			
		<i>Arash</i> <i>Fajr</i> <i>Hadid</i> <i>Haseb</i> <i>Nazeat</i> <i>Noor</i> <i>Oghab</i> <i>Shahin</i>	<i>Sayyad-1</i> <i>Shahab Thaqeb</i>
<i>GBU-67/9A Qadr</i> <i>AGM-379/20 Zoobin</i>		<i>Kosar</i> <i>Nafez</i> <i>Ra'ad</i> <i>Saghegh</i>	
GROUND COMBAT			
Tanks	Arms Vehicles	Artillery	Anti
aircraft			
<i>T-72Z Safir-74</i> <i>TosanZulfiqar</i>	<i>Boragh</i> <i>Cobra BMT-2</i>	<i>Thunder-1</i> <i>Thunder-2</i>	<i>23mm AAA</i>

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_Iran

Map 1.1 Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles



Source: McNair paper 64, Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defence University, Washington DC.

Table 1:3 IRANIAN WARSHIPS

SYSTEM		Inventory						
Class	Source	1990	1995	2000	2002	2005	2010	2015
SUBMARINES		-	4	5	6	6	6	6
SSK KILO	Type 877	-	2	3	3	3	3	3
SSI		-	2	2	3	3	3	3
DESTROYERS		3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Damavand	Battle [UK]	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Babr	Allen M. Sumner [USA]	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
FRIGATES		3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Alvand	Vosper Mk 5 [UK]	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
CORVETTES		2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Bayandor	PF-103 [USA]	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
MISSILE CRAFT		10	10	20	23	25	30	30
	Cat-14	-	-	-	3	5	10	10
Houdong	Houdong	-	-	10	10	10	10	10
Kaman	Combattante II [Fr]	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
PATROL, COASTAL			6	3	3	3	3	3
Kaivan		3	3	-	-	-	-	-
Parvin		3	3	3	3	3	3	3
PATROL, INSHORE			13	38	41	41	41	41
Chaho	ex-Iraqi	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bogomol	ex-Iraqi	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Zafar		-	-	3	3	3	3	3
China Cat		-	-	-	3	3	3	3
PFI	-		10	35	35	35	35	35
Hovercraft		10	9	14	14	14	14	14
Misc. Small Craft				200+	200+	200+	200+	200+
MINE LAYERS		1	1	2	2	2	2	2
Hejaz LST		-	-	2	2	2	2	2
Iran Ajr		1	1	-	-	-	-	-
MINE COUNTERMEASURES		3	2	5	5	5	5	5
Shahrokh MSC		2	1	1	1	1	1	1
292 MSC		-	-	2	2	2	2	2
Riazi	Cape [USA]	-	1	2	2	2	2	2
Harischi		1	-	-	-	-	-	-

AMPHIBIOUS	11	11	18	18	19	19	19	
Hengam LST		4	4	4	4	4	4	
Iran Hormuz 24 LSM [ROK]	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	
Fouque LSL	-	-	2	2	3	3	3	
LCT	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	
ACV	-	-	6	6	6	6		
SUPPORT	8	18	20	30	25	25	25	6
Kharg AO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Bandar Abbas AO		2	2	2	2	2	2	
AWT	2	4	4	-	-	-	2	
Delvar	-	2	7	3	5	5	-	
Hendijan	-	8	13	12	12	12	5	
AT	-	1	1	1	1	1	12	
Training Craft	-	-	2	2	2	2	1	
							2	
Repair ship	1	-	-	-	-	-		
Accommodation vessels	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Source: globalsecurity.org/sitemap maintained by John pike

CONCLUSION

These historic experiences have left a lasting imprint and will continue to shape Iran's incentives and disincentives for moving towards a nuclear capability. Iran's desire to develop a full-fledged nuclear fuel cycle is not new. Since the mid-1960's under the leadership of both the Shah and subsequent government, Iran has been developing considerable technological infrastructure and accumulating scientific expertise in the nuclear field.

However for the time being Iran seems to be seriously pursuing the nuclear programme at high risk but in past, countries like china, France Britain, and many others including USA and Russia who helped Iran in many ways in pursuing its ambitious nuclear programme. Presently Iran is facing difficulty in pursuing its

nuclear programme; it is a contradiction in a sense that in a time when Iran was having a tremendous amount of reserves these countries were ready to sign various pacts to provide nuclear technology, equipments, and training assistance. Now when Iran is sounding out need of nuclear energy for their booming population, as they cannot rely on the reserves, which are depleting source of energy, it has become a question of crossing through the fire to Iran. To conclude, in past U.S and its allies had many opportunities to participate in Iran's nuclear programme (in mid 1980's and in 1990's) to cooperate its nuclear plants, which they avoided for various grounds. Now as discussed in phase 4 the question of Iran's nuclear programme has turned a critical issue. A number of external actors including international organization has been involve resolving the crisis, which may take a new shape in near future. In light of these developments, following discussion would cover role and response of external actor in Iran's nuclear programme.

CHAPTER II

EXTERNAL RESPONSES

The controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear programme since the disclosure by the leading Iranian dissident faction in Aug 2002 has evoked diverse external responses. While the West has been rightly opposed to Iran's nuclear pursuit despite its declared peaceful intent, some third world nations have maintained supportive stance. Tehran's close allies, notably Russia and China have chosen a middle position. Although they support Iran's right to develop nuclear energy, they expect Tehran to abide by its commitments to IAEA and fulfill its obligations as a member of NPT. In West Asia, there is, however, a mixed reaction to the ongoing nuclear standoff. This chapter examines the various external responses and attempts to explain the underlined concerns of the international community. At the core of the debate of issue is the practicability of the NPT in dealing with the menace of nuclear proliferation.

According to the IAEA report in November 2003, Iran acknowledged that it has been developing uranium centrifuge enrichment programme for 18 years, a laser enrichment programme for 12 years. It also produced small amount of low enriched uranium and that it failed to report to the IAEA a number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium¹²². Iran was also unable to produce source of import of p-1 and p-2 centrifuge, which was a major issue of contention between the IAEA and Iran. The controversy over the findings on the origin of centrifuge designs, and nuclear material in the Natanz cascade point to 'foreign assistance.' More so, the western media and intelligence report indicate that Iran has also received some assistance from A.Q. Khan Network, which though the Iranian government has repeatedly refuted.¹²³

¹²² Rajesh Kumar Mishra "Iranian Nuclear Programme and Pakistan: Implications of the Linkages", *strategic Analysis*, vol 28, no.3, July-September 2004, p .442.

¹²³ The above article by Rajesh Kumar discussed in detail about this linkages.

Iran efforts to build an elaborate nuclear infrastructure raise a crucial question: Does Iran intend to build nuclear weapons, if so why and when?¹²⁴ These questions are quite disturbing for the lonely superpower, the US, which regards Iran as a revisionist power bent on disrupting the West Asian power balance and a “rouge state” out to export its brand of clerics-led revolution in the Islamic world to counteract the Western influence, both politically and culturally as well. Additionally, Iran’s nuclear programme has generated a debate on the practicality of NPT, in dealing with proliferation issue. It has brought to the fore the concern that, whether NPT regime can be used as a tool to serve the stake of few nations. It also raises the question whether a non-nuclear state can use its legitimate right to have nuclear technology. Doubtless, these questions have caused great concern among nations.

However, Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrializing nation. It points to the fact that Iran’s population has more than doubled in 20 years the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran environment drastically.¹²⁵

Other than that Iran, also question why it should not be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears of its oil field eventually being depleted. It further argues that its valuable oil should be used for high value products, not simple electricity generation. Iran also raises financial concern, claiming that developing the excess the capacity in its oil industry would cost it more than harnessing nuclear power as Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium ore.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran’s Quest for Nuclear Power”, *Middle East Journal*, vol.60, no.2, spring 2006.

¹²⁵ Questions Surround Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Arms Control Association
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iran-IAEA-issue.asp>

¹²⁶ “Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels.” Ecosystems.
<http://www.hubberpeak.com/hubbert/1956/1956.pdf>

Iranian nuclear power has become a political discussion of significance in both Iran and Western countries. A considerable disjuncture emerges between the political views of Iranians and that of the West. Western government feel the peaceful nuclear program has hidden intentions, including the possible production of nuclear weapons.

U.S.A OPPOSITION

The main concern for US is the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons programme. However, beyond that, it is widely believed that, Iran is clandestinely pursuing nuclear weapons programme. Iran was first accused of clandestine development of nuclear programme in 1991, despite its status as a signatory of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The complex nuclear enrichment facility and its stated purpose are to produce low enriched uranium. Uranium can be used to power nuclear reactors, but if its quality is improved, or enriched to a sufficient level, it may produce in nuclear explosive. The development of a nuclear energy generation scheme is not prohibited by the NPT. However, US fears are enhanced due to Iran's access to any nuclear facility, as civil nuclear reactors are capable of producing material that is suitable for use in nuclear weaponry. The US Department of Energy has stated, "reactor grade plutonium could be used to construct primitive and advanced, modern and reliable nuclear weapons."¹²⁷

American concern exhibits that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability even if presently she is not developing nuclear weapons. USA believes that Iran's quest is for WMD, which Iran denied completely. America has taken a hard line stand that seems inflexible. The United States perceives its allies policy of 'critical dialogue' as one of appealing or 'pursuing a policy of appeasement'¹²⁸. American officials believe appeasement provides no political incentives for Iran

¹²⁷ USDOE, "final nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives," 1997, p190.

¹²⁸ Lt.Commander Paul Kerstanski, US Policy and the Iranian Threat (Newport RI: Naval war College, 1995), p.10.

to resolve its problems with the United States¹²⁹. Thus, they have ruled out the possibility of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

Much of current US non-proliferation policy toward Iran is to present obstruction to acquisition of nuclear technology. The United States has pushed for a universal imposition of exports controls to prevent the consignment of nuclear technology to Iran and promoted various and repeated IAEA inspection of Iran. However, since August 2002 USA openly asking for blockade of trade and imposing sanction to Iran but its hostility towards Iran goes back to 1979 revolution, when the conservatives came into power. American concern that Iran is about to achieve nuclear weapons capability stems largely from intelligence information. The current emphasis upon Iranian capabilities appears to originate with intelligence supplied to United States by Israel in early 1995¹³⁰. The focus on Iran became stiff due to nuclear cooperation deal with Iran by in Russia and china in 1990's. In 1990, china signed a cooperation deals ten-year scientific cooperation agreement with Iran¹³¹.

In 1995, Russia also agreed to participate in a joint project to complete the Bushehr reactor site, a project abandoned by Germany in 1979 and bombed by Iraq in 1987.¹³² United States strongly reacted with the agreement to build a centrifuge plant and pushed Russia to abandon the deal. USA secretary of state warren Christopher warned Russia it would rue the day it sold reactors to Iran.¹³³

¹²⁹ Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified to the Senate Banking Committee 11 Oct. 1995: We do not believe that engagement with Iran, as advocated by some of our friends, will alter Iran's objectionable behavior. That is why we choose to intensify US leadership by unilaterally imposing new sanctions. Found in Jacqueline Simon "US Non-proliferation policy and Iran: constraint and opportunities" publish in *contemporary security policy*, vol.17, no.3 (December 1996), pp.365-394

¹³⁰ Voke petrosian, "US has a serious problem with Iran" *MEED*, 5 may 1995.

¹³¹ Ahmed Hashim, 'Iran's Military Solution' in Patrick Clawson (ed), *Iran's strategic intension and capabilities* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994), p.205.

¹³² According to the agreement reached between Russia and Iranian officials, Russia received approximately \$800 million in compensation for completion of the Bushehr power stations. In addition, Russia agreed to train Iranians in reactor operation and to provide enriched uranium fuel. See, David Albright, "AN Iranian Bomb?" *Bulletin of Atomic scientists*, vol.51, no.4 (July/August 1995), p.22.

¹³³ Michael Mihalka, "The Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal: diplomacy of several doors", *Transition*, 17 November 1995.

In May 1995, Russia agreed not to provide the centrifuge plant, but the rest of the deal remains intact. This was in spite of the fact that the United States supplied Moscow with a secret intelligence report on the scope of the Iranian nuclear programme¹³⁴. Actually, USA was fearful of Russia's agreement because Russia has the largest uranium enrichment programme in the world and at that time economic situation of Russia was not good. On May 1 1995 USA secretary of state Warren Christopher gave the clearest statement of the US position on Iran's nuclear ambition:

“Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid 1980's Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons...in terms of organization, programmes, procurement and a covert activity Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons.”¹³⁵

Throughout the 1990's USA's policy makers tried to stop Iran getting fissile material and obstructed trade of various countries with Iran. The current emphasis upon Iran as a proliferation threat began in this decade only when then CIA director Robert Gates asserted that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons in a five-year drive to become a pre-eminent power in Middle East.¹³⁶ It asked USA to urgently address the Iranian threat. It also declared that Iran would hardly take 8 to 10 years to have a nuclear bomb and if this foreign assistance continues then years ahead to produce fissile material by its own.¹³⁷

It may be remembered that Clinton administration and its intelligence agency were so indulged in stopping Iran to get nuclear technology they even failed to trace two perennial enemy of South Asia that is India and Pakistan going nuclear. Clinton administration also introduced a total trade embargo against Iran. On April 30, 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton imposed a total ban on trade with Iran

¹³⁴ Ibid: p 42.

¹³⁵ Albright, “An Iranian Bomb”, p.23.

¹³⁶ R.Jeffery Smith, “Washington Turns Down the Volume on Iran”, *Washington Post*, 27 November 1995.

¹³⁷ Jacqueline Simon “US Non-proliferation policy and Iran: constraint and opportunities published in *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol.17, no.3 (December 1996), pp.382-383.

to compel the government to abandon its nuclear programme and its alleged sponsorship of international terrorism. In early 1996, the EU warned Iran that it would also impose sanctions unless Iran condemned international terrorism. Even this comprehensive embargo would be insufficient in the eyes of congress, which was then considering a bill, which would impose sanctions against foreign companies, which deal with Iran.¹³⁸

Why U.S.A has so much of concern of Iran's nuclear programme, needs a comprehensive analysis of motives behind it. A potential reason behind US resistance lies in West Asia geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons capability. Some nuclear technology is dual-use i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy generation, but the same technology, can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran in the region would severely change the balance of power away from the West and into the hands of a known sponsor of terror. A nuclear Iran could also potentially act as a catalyst for other West Asian nations to develop weapons of their own to defend against it.

The second concern of United States is Israel. A common belief in the West is that Israel is far less likely to initiate a war with Iran than Iran is with Israel. Iran does not formally recognize Israel's right to exist, and Iranian authorities have openly called for Israel's destruction. Iran is also thought to constitute more of a proliferation risk. Israel has been considered a strategic pillar of West in West Asia therefore any threat to Israel becomes a threat to Western interest in the region. Third accusation that Iran supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad, organizations which many Western countries categorize as terrorist, have been common in the US, and there are accordingly fears that Iranian nuclear weapons could eventually find their way into the hands of Islamic militants.

¹³⁸ Ibid: p383

There are also some areas of concern, which United States believes to address as soon as possible¹³⁹. One of them is that potential influence of Iranian clerics in the new Iraqi regime. The threat USA perceives is destabilization in Iraq by Iranian clergy. Iraq might be disturbed by Iran's influences of Shia majority. Many Shia clerics sought refuge in Iran during the reign of Saddam, and have returned to emerge as a considerable political force in post Saddam Iraq. The most notable political element is the supreme council of the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), whom the US fears already, has extensive influence. The West has alleged that Iran has supported Iraqi insurgent groups in southern Iraq that have attacked UK armored military convoys. Specifically, the British allege that Iranian Revolutionary Guards have supplied Iraqi insurgent groups with shaped bombs.¹⁴⁰ Since the release of the Bush administration's "National Strategy to combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" in December 2002, US foreign policy has been focused on Iraq. When Bush spoke of the war on terror, he labeled Iran as part of "an axis of evil" and asserted that Iran has become a threat to the world peace.

US has also declared that any attempt by Iran to intervene in Iraq would be "*aggressively put down*" by the USA.¹⁴¹

The other concern is the alleged sanctuary given to al-Qaeda operatives in Iran. Recent statements by some U.S. officials contend that Iran and al-Qa'ida currently share a relationship that is strengthening despite mutual, deep-rooted enmity between Sunnis and Shi'a. It is reported that some U.S. officials had said that Iranian

¹³⁹ Lynne O'Sullivan and Ian Davis, "US foreign policy: From Baghdad to Tehran", Basic Publication, 16 June 2003.

¹⁴⁰ Sammy Salama and Elizabeth Salch, "Iran's Nuclear Impasse: Give Negotiations A Chance", CNS research story, June 2 2006, <http://cns.miils.edu/cns/staff/salana.htm>.

¹⁴¹ Dinmore, Guy and Khalaq, Roula, "Rumsfeld warns Tehran on Iraq Regime", *Financial Times*, 27 May 2003 <http://www.ft.com>

President Ahmadinejad might be forming an alliance with al-Qa'ida agents or at least tacitly allowing them to conduct operations out of Iran¹⁴².

It is estimated that Iran possesses one tenth of the world's oil reserves, approximately ninety billion barrels, and has the world's second largest supply of natural gas reserves. Iran's strategic and economic position is enhanced due to the fact that, Iran is located in the Caspian region having vast amount of untapped oil and gas reserves. The fuel reserves within this region far exceed those of the US and Europe combined and with oil fields in the North Sea nearing exhaustion. Due to this strategic location, Iran has always been high on U.S agenda. The U.S has signed many bilateral pacts with smaller Gulf States including defence pacts except Iran. As Iran is comparatively large and inherently strong country and not joined US protective shield, might upset U.S. These reasons might affect US strategic interest in West Asia therefore it is speculated US has strongly opposed Iran's nuclear pursuit.

One of the reason of out right opposition of the United states is Iran is the real prize in the current war on West Asia. Since countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordon are already in the American pocket, with Syria greatly weakened and Iraq vanquished, Iran is the only remaining obstacle in the way of unchallenged and unchallengeable US-Israeli hegemony in the region¹⁴³.

EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES

In this section, we intend to say the various initiatives taken by E.U as an actor in Iran's nuclear crisis. However, it accepts Iran's civilian nuclear programme though reluctantly. The European Union accepts that Iran has a right to go for civilian nuclear programme but strictly under IAEA supervision and additional protocols. They are critical towards Iran's non-compliance to IAEA guidelines

¹⁴² Josh Meyer, "Some U.S. Officials Fear Iran is helping al-Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, March 21, 2006.

¹⁴³ Aijaz Ahmed, "The Imperial Nuclear Order," *Frontline*, May 19, 2006.

and NPT provisions. They emphasize on multilateral cooperation and mutual accommodations.

The European Union agrees with the United States that a nuclear Iran would pose a threat to regional peace and a challenge to non-proliferation regime. The Europeans, however, are less convinced than the Americans (and Israeli) that Tehran is trying to acquire nuclear weapon. Furthermore, they do not see sanctions and threats of military strikes the best way to address Iran's nuclear ambition.¹⁴⁴ Instead, European power favours what may be described as 'conditional engagement'.

However after IAEA report in June 2003 which stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligation under its safeguards agreement with the respect of reporting of nuclear material and the declaration of facilities where the materials are stored and processed.¹⁴⁵ Following the issuance of IAEA report in June and show of strong international, including European, concern regarding Iran's nuclear intentions Tehran took some steps to rectify some IAEA safeguards. The basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of Mass destruction and action plan, announced in June 2003, was one of the first tangible signs of efforts to regroup. Under the broader goal of preventing WMD proliferation, the EU principles declared, *Inter alia*, that efforts would be made to "promote measures" to ensure that any possible misuse of civilian nuclear programs for military purposes will be effectively excluded. They further define a policy to reinforce treaty compliance through "enhancing the detect ability of significant violations and strengthening enforcement of the treaty norms, and to make best

¹⁴⁴ Gawdat Bahgat "Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel", *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol.26, no.1, (April 2005), p 33.

¹⁴⁵ Implementation of the "NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic republic of Iran" report of the Director General of the IAEA to the Board of Governors, IAEA Report, GOV/2003/40, 6 JUNE 2003, p 7

use of existing verification mechanisms and systems, in deterring and detecting cases of non-compliance.¹⁴⁶

In line with conditional engagement in Oct 2003 the foreign ministers of three EU member states France, Germany and UK, traveled to Tehran to convince the Iranian authorities to accept signing the additional protocol, and more importantly, to “voluntary,” suspend all Uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.¹⁴⁷ They reached an agreement with Iran in October 2003. Despite this agreement and Iran’s signing of the protocol, mutual suspicion and accusation of not following through have emerged. On 11 Nov 2003, IAEA declared that there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to build an atomic bomb. After many vicissitudes it was only in Oct 2004, Iran stated that it was willing to negotiate with UK, Germany, and France regarding the suspension of its Uranium enrichment activities. On Oct 24, 2004, European Union made a proposal to provide civilian nuclear technology to Iran in exchange for Iran terminating its Uranium enrichment programme permanently. However, Iran rejected this out rightly saying that it will not renounce its right to enrichment technologies. On Nov 15, 2004, talks between Iran and three European members resulted in a compromise. In addition, Iran agreed to suspend its active Uranium enrichment programme for the duration of the second Round of talks, during which attempt was to make at arriving at a permanent and mutually beneficial solution.

Thus, EU and Iran negotiated another agreement in late 2004. the Europeans offered to support the building of light water reactor systems, which are less suited to developing fissile material for NW, but only if Iran agrees to scrap plans to build a heavy water research reactor. Other incentives in the Europeans offer

¹⁴⁶ Jean Du Preez, “Iran and the IAEA: A troubling past with a hopeful future?”, International Organization and Non proliferation Programme, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, December 2003,p9

¹⁴⁷ Amin Tarzi, “The Role of WMD in Iranian Security calculations: Dangers to Europe”, MERIA, vol 8, no 3, Sept 2008, p93-94.

include resumption of talks on the Trade and cooperative Agreement (TCA)¹⁴⁸, support, of Iran's applications to join the WTO, and guarantees of Russian nuclear fuel. The European Union also promised assurance on a range of political and security issues such as maintaining the designation of Mujahidine-O-khalq, Iran's main opposition group, as a terrorist organization.¹⁴⁹ Further Iran declared that it would voluntarily suspend its Uranium enrichment programme to enter negotiations with the European Union. The EU sought to have the suspension made permanent and it is willing to provide economic and political incentives. However, these negotiations were halted when Iran resumed conversion of Uranium at the Isfahan facility in August 2005.

This European change of policy was first hinted at the G-8 Summit held in Evian in early June, prior to (but with knowledge of) the contents of El-Baradai's report. The final declaration of the G-8 stated that members of the group "will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program, and stressed that Iran should comply with its obligations as a signatory of the NPT."¹⁵⁰

However, an examination of European countries says that European states have shared American concerns over the years and have had same attitude towards arms control, but have been more flexible in their political and commercial dealings. Unlike the USA, they had a diplomatic mission in Iran, of and on since the revolution they sought to keeps lines of communication open.¹⁵¹ Unlike the United States, the EU has never totally withdrawn its presence from Iran. EU-Iran relations reached a higher level with the launch of negotiations between European commission and Iran on a trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) in December 2001. In general, the EU has been more interested in keeping Iranian market open

¹⁴⁸ EU- Iran relations reached a higher level with the launch of negotiations between the European commission and Iran on a trade and cooperation agreement in December 2001.

¹⁴⁹ 'Iran to look at EU offer on Uranium Enrichment', *International Herald Tribune*, 22 October 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Amin Tarzi, "The role of WMD in Iranian Security calculations: Dangers to Europe", *MERIA*, vol. 8, no 3, Sept 2008, pp.93-94.

¹⁵¹ Sean McKnight, Neil Patrick and Francis Toase, A Whitehall Paper Edited, "Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Generation", (*The Royal united Services Institute for Defence Studies and The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst*, 2000), p.33.

to European products and oil from Iran flowing to its member than pursuing policies aimed at altering Iran's WMD, terrorist sponsoring, or human rights policies. Even with the political linkages the EU has attached to concluding a TCA with Iran, there may be economic pressure groups that will try to minimize the linkage to keep the Iranian market open to European goods and services¹⁵². The EU is Iran's largest trading partner with bilateral exchanges exceeding 13 billion Euros in 2001¹⁵³.

The EU has more political and economic stakes involved than the United States, and stands to lose more than Washington did, if the crises deepen further. Therefore, it is in the interest of the EU to use its influence and advantage in roping in Iran to the discussion table and try to find out just, equitable and mutually beneficial solution. Hitherto, EU has shown a greater degree of flexibility and understanding but the changing circumstances call for more hearted commitment. It is never in the interest of EU or any other European member if Iran signs out of the NPT, or if military force through Security Council to settle the matter. In any of the circumstances, EU interest is affected. Recently EU with Russia, China, and United States restarted the diplomacy by launching another package of incentives to Iran. The offer not made to public however; Iran is considering the proposal to sort out the difficulties of its nuclear programme.

RUSSIA AND CHINA AMBIVALENT RESPONSE

Both Russia and China played substantial and successful roles in discomforting Western attempts to bring Iran before the Security Council in September 2005. Until Iran resumed uranium enrichment at the Natanz facility, Russia and China had used their political powers to protect Iran vis-à-vis the West and the IAEA. China has declared its support for using the IAEA diplomatic framework to

¹⁵² Amin Tarzi, "The Role of WMD in Iranian Security calculations: Dangers to Europe", MERIA, vol .8, no. 3, Sept 2008,p .93.

¹⁵³ "EU-Iran: Launch of Negotiations on New Agreement with Iran "IP/02/1862,December 11,2002, EU official website <http://europa.eu.int>

resolve outstanding nuclear issues while insisting, "Iran's legitimate concerns should be treated fairly and objectively."¹⁵⁴

Despite Western opposition, Russia continued to cooperate with Iran, providing aid to Iranian nuclear and military programs. Russia is currently helping Iran to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant and in December 2005 agreed to sell Iran a Tor-M1 surface to Air missile defence system.¹⁵⁵ Russia has further cooperated on nuclear issues with Iran through its proposal to enrich uranium on Russian territory in an attempt to placate both Iranian and Western powers. Iran has turned down previous Russian proposals to regarding uranium enrichment, but Russia has pledged to continue negotiations and "develop dialogue" with its "Iranian partners," according to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin¹⁵⁶

While recognizing that Iran is an important geopolitical ally, Russian politicians tend to weigh carefully the costs of any moves regarding ties with Tehran.¹⁵⁷ Moscow's nuclear cooperation with Iran, which Russian officials pledge was exclusively confined to civilian nuclear plant construction, had emerged as the most conspicuous issue in which the Russian leadership attempts to establish its own foreign and strategic policy.¹⁵⁸ During a 2002 visit to Iran, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov said, "Russia does not accept President George W. Bush's view that Iran is part of 'an axis of evil.'"¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ "Chinese ambassador expounds China's position on Iran nuke issues," *Xinhua*, September 22, 2005.

¹⁵⁵ "Tehran gives first praise for Russian nuclear plan," *Khaleej Times*, December 14, 2005.

¹⁵⁶ "IAEA can solve Iran's nuclear row with West: Putin," *Reuters*, December 7, 2005

¹⁵⁷ On Russian-Iranian geostrategic squabbles in the Caspian area, see Andrey Piontkovsky, "Russky Patriot kak Lobbist Irana," (Russian) Politcom.ru, June 14, 2002, <http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?>

¹⁵⁸ A good factual piece on the initial phase of the bilateral cooperation is Ivan Safranchuk, "The Nuclear and Missile Programs of Iran and Russian Security," *Scientific Papers*, no. 8, PIR Center, May 1999.

¹⁵⁹ "Russia, EU Oppose Inclusion of Iran on 'Axis of Evil' List," *Tehran Times*, July 21, 2002 <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/719601/posts> also available at http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news_en.pl?l=en&y=2002&m=7&d=21&a=13

Recent revelations of extensive Iranian nuclear program facilities point to Tehran's strong efforts toward the appropriation of a full-fledged nuclear cycle program that could allow the indigenous manufacturing of nuclear weapons, in contravention of Russian allegations to the contrary. According to the U.S. position, these enrichment facilities and the full-cycle are unjustified for Iranian needs. Additionally, the known resources of indigenous uranium in Iran are limited and cannot provide enough fuel for the projected NPP program. While Iran and Russia claim to be following international agreements on their nuclear activities, much of Iran's current revelations are even in contravention with its original agreement with Moscow on the handling of spent fuel.¹⁶⁰

Russia relations with Iran seem motivated by different factors for instance some have speculated that Russia main motivation for cooperating in the completion of the Bushehr reactor is financial.¹⁶¹ Russia, as well, has strong financial incentives to maintain good relations with Iran as these two countries are working in cooperation in the Caspian Sea in the exploration of oil and gas resources.¹⁶²

Since the initiation of Iran's nuclear crisis Russia has been in opposition to impose sanction against Iran. Russia has been Iran's main nuclear supplier, selling Iran the \$800 million Bushehr reactor, which scheduled to complete in 2005. Russia expected to start sending fuel for the first loading mid 2004, after it has obtained an agreement from Iran to send spent fuel back to Russia. Nevertheless, after revelation of Iran's some secret activities Russia urged Iran to be more transparent and sign additional protocols. Russia, which is one of the good allies of Iran, has very good trade ties with selling to non-conventional weapons to Iran. Iran is also very much aware of the fact that its two allies cannot go against Iran for United Nations sanctions, as it would also counter productive. Russia has certain reservation in relation to its policies towards Iran because as Iran is

¹⁶⁰ Paul Kerr, "Iran Mining Uranium, Greatly Expanding Nuclear Facilities," *Arms Control Today*, March 2003 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/iran_mar03.asp?print

¹⁶¹ Jacqueline Simon "US Non-proliferation policy and Iran: constraint and opportunities publish in *contemporary security policy*, vol.17, no.3, 1996,p. 379.

¹⁶² Mihalka, 'The Russia Iran nuclear deal: Diplomacy of Several Door's, p.40.

situated in strategic location and it has a control over Caspian Sea, secondly, Russia is having majority of Muslim population, which may be affected by its anti-Iranian policy.

Third, both countries have tremendous reserves of hydrocarbons, which dominate the world price; therefore, policy of cooperation will be more viable than policy of conflict.

Fourthly, after Soviet disintegration Russia had lost its advantage in West Asia region now it wanted to increase its influence throughout the region. However, due to huge presence of military bases in almost all countries except few, and by controlling the market of the region, influence of the United States is widely prevalent. Therefore, to minimize the USA hegemony in the west Asia Iran can be a good option.

China's Response

The economics of trade and commerce between the two countries is a major determinant of relations. China's insatiable energy needs and Iran's increasing hunger for consumer goods, as the economies of both countries continue to expand. "The bilateral trade between China and Iran has increased fast in recent years, with trade volume reaching some 3.3 billion U.S. dollars last year, several times higher than that some 10 years ago. China's energy needs have climbed nearly 40 percent in the first months of 2004. Meanwhile, Iran whose population has doubled since the 1979 revolution is increasing meeting those needs in exchange for access to China's burgeoning low-cost manufacturing industry. Therefore, one can understand when china reacts with caution over Iran's nuclear issue, and its full commitment and support to Iran. Besides economics, there are geopolitical compulsions involved too. It is never in the interest of china if US grows stronger in the West Asian region. The energy compulsion of china is counter to a heavy US presence in the Gulf region.

Since the 1980s, when the Americans and many Europeans halted nuclear cooperation with Iran, China has been Iran's primary supplier. They have supplied three sub critical, zero power reactors, and a small electromagnetic

Isotopes separation machine.¹⁶³ They are also providing a thirty-kilowatt thermal research reactor. The Chinese signed a contract in 1992 to provide two 300-megawatt light water reactors to Iran, but economic and technical difficulties have prevented completion to this deal. All of the above transactions are consistent with the NPT and thus very difficult for the United States to prevent.¹⁶⁴ China has made significant economic investments in Iran, worth approximately \$70-100 billion. Chinese investment in Iran includes a 50 percent stake in the Yadavaran oil fields and a contract for 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas.¹⁶⁵

However if Iran remains defiant, and fails to respond to calls by the IAEA and UN Security Council to suspend its enrichment activities, Russia and China are increasingly likely to abandon their Iranian ally to face harsh international pressure. A March 29, 2006, Security Council Presidential Statement called upon Iran to begin a full and sustained suspension of all uranium-related activities within 30 days.¹⁶⁶ Iran did not take note of the call of the UNSC. As the United States and EU-3 put increasing pressure on Iran after January 10, 2006, Russian and Chinese relationship with Iran appeared less friendly. Recently, Russia and China demonstrated a significant shift in their attitude towards Iran, as well as their impatience with Iran, by demanding that it halt uranium conversion as the United States and EU-3 prepared to bring Iran to the Security Council to face possible sanctions. Russian and Chinese votes on February 4, 2006, in favor of bringing Iran before the Security Council were a decisive sign of a marked change in the Iranian allies' attitudes. This change in attitude was a direct result of a perception that Iran has been unduly obstinate in the face of broad international resolve to settle the issues revolving around Iran's nuclear problem through diplomatic means.

¹⁶³ Already discussed in first chapter "History of Iran's Nuclear Programme."

¹⁶⁴ Jacqueline Simon, "United States Non Proliferation Policy and Iran: Constraints and Opportunities", publish in *contemporary security policy*, vol.17, no.3, 1996,p 372

¹⁶⁵ George Jahn, "Dealing with Iran a Conundrum for West," *Associated Press*, January 13, 2006.

¹⁶⁶"Security Council, In Presidential Statement, Underlines Importance of Iran's Re-Established Full, Sustained Suspensions of Uranium-Enrichment Activities, Security Council document SC/8679," United Nations, March 29, 2006.

Furthermore, it appears that Russia and China felt blindsided by some recent Iranian actions, including the re-start of uranium enrichment activities at the Natanz facility on January 10, 2006. While Russia and particularly China are likely to continue to provide diplomatic and symbolic support to Iran's position, it is unlikely that in the long term they will continue to do so at the expense of their relationship with the West. Especially if Iran continues to ignore calls to suspend its conversion and enrichment activities by the IAEA and the UN Security Council. These Iran's allies are likely to check imposing sanctions, but will find it difficult to block any such moves by the United States and Europe if Iran continues not to accede to UN Security Council demands.¹⁶⁷

REACTION IN WEST ASIA

In West Asia country or a group of countries are not oppose to Iran's nuclear programme in principle but they have contentions regarding nuclear safety and security. Formally, they say that Iran should have the nuclear capability but they are reluctant towards its realization. The informal opposition to Iran's nuclear programme is the result of combination of factors. It includes economic interest, geopolitical compulsions, strategic advantage, and national interest.

The regional response to Iran's nuclear programme has been guided by the following chief considerations:

(a) The neighbouring countries have everything to gain from regional stability. Spreading conflict among the countries involving United States, Israel, and Iran in the region will certainly be a troubling affair for the neighboring states of Iran. The biggest concern among Arab leaders is that a military conflict pitting either Israel or the United States against Iran could spiral outward, threaten their own grip on power, or disrupt energy markets. They might be forced to support United States, as its influence is widely prevalent in the region. It would only shoot up the instability of the West Asia.

¹⁶⁷ Nikolai Sokov, "The Prospects of Russian Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis," *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, February 17, 2006, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060217.htm/>.

(b) Rising Shiites influence is another cause of concern for the region. There are growing concerns among Arab leaders of Iran's influence over the Arab world's Shiites minority populations, particularly those living in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. They believe that most of the Shiites [in this region] are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries, they are living in. A nuclear Iran would be more efficient to influence the Shia minority in the region.

(c) There is tremendous economic interest involve in the region. Some countries are having very good trade relations with Iran. Iran also provides cheap oil to non-oil countries. Some of the more cash-strapped Arab states have economic concerns, particularly if new sanctions are imposed on Iran. Syria depends on Iran for trade and cheap energy. In addition, the threat of sanctions or a military strike might disrupt Arab states' energy markets.

(d) Iranian hegemony another concern of some Arab leaders is that a nuclear program might embolden Iran to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the region. With or without nuclear weapons, Arabs are not happy with a rising Iran because it changes the region's balance of power that has been in place for the past two decades. A nuclear Iran is not an immediate military threat but it confirms its regional supremacy and that is a political, economic, and cultural threat to Arabs.

(d) The strong desire for peace, which is often manifested in the demand of making West Asia as nuclear free zone, nuclear safety issues are major concern for the West Asian countries. Some analysts from the Gulf countries indicates to the threat posed by a Chernobyl-like nuclear meltdown at Iran's Bushehr reactor, built by Russians with what some critics say is outdated, accident-prone equipment. Iranian leaders respond that Bushehr, unlike Israel's Dimona reactor, is located on firm soil near no fault lines and follows international safety standards.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Lionel Beehner "Arab Views of a Nuclear Iran", 20 April 2006 accessed on

UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nayhan, whose country currently holds the rotating presidency of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council, said "GCC countries are deeply concerned by developments" in Iran's nuclear programme considerable fear". He said that it was the potential for an "enormous ecological catastrophe" -- referring to Iran's first nuclear power station, which is being built with Russian help at the port city of Bushehr¹⁶⁹. The desert countries on the Arabian Peninsula suffer from insufficient natural water supplies and rely heavily on desalination plants to make up the shortfall.

Iran dismissed concerns voiced by Arab states in the Gulf over a possible "radioactive leak from an Iranian nuclear power plant "It is surprising that countries are worried about a power station that has not yet entered into service and has not yet been fueled," Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told official media.¹⁷⁰ But Asefi said that Iran has given leaders of the region every assurance over the security of the Bushehr plant, its high standard and the extra expenses made to assure its security. Regional response to the Iranian nuclear programme is also shaped by strategic considerations. GCC states falls under the shorts range missiles Iran possess, and for this reason, the GCC military planners naturally focus on Iranian offensive capabilities rather than intentions. The GCC countries are under the threat of Iranian strikes, even if those missiles are aimed at Israel or even if, Iran fully cooperates with IAEA and forego nuclear programme. Compounding the fact Iran has various controversies with individual GCC states. For instance, Iran has dispute with UAE over the three gulf islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs. Contrary to Iran's assertion that it intends to make West Asia a WMD free zone, the regional response has been one of noncommittal. The regional states refuse to take this statement at its face value.

The Arab world has mixed estimation about a nuclear-capable Iran. Iran's relations with a number of Arab states are already strained, and could further

<http://www.copyright.com/ccc/do>.

¹⁶⁹ Tehran News (AFP), 5 June 2006.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid:

deteriorate if Iran were to acquire nuclear-weapons capabilities. Some Arab leaders fear that, a nuclear Iran might disrupt the balance of power in the West Asia, bolster the minority Shiite populations present throughout the region, or, worse, set off a regional nuclear-arms race. However, Arabs on some level sympathize with their fellow Muslims' defiance of the United States; they see Washington's democracy-building policies in the region, not to mention its support for Israel and a Shiite-led Iraq, as a greater threat to regional stability than a nuclear-capable Iran. Arab leaders, in general, favour an Iran free of nuclear weapons, but publicly say they support a diplomatic solution to the current standoff with Tehran.

As far as support of Arab nations is concerned, Arabs outside the Gulf are not as anti-Iranian as their government. There are radical Islamists, including Hezbollah and Hamas, who very much welcome a more assertive Iran, at least in the short run¹⁷¹. Syria is openly supportive of Iran's nuclear program, while some Arabs Iran's nuclear program would provide a counterbalance to Israel's covert programme. After Lebanon crisis, when former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri assassinated, Syria had not very good relations with West. Syria also voted against the resolution in IAEA.¹⁷² Many accuse the United States of applying a double standard by denouncing Iran's nuclear program but turning a blind eye to Israel's. Some countries do not believe that Iranians are pursuing nuclear technology for offensive purposes, but even if they were, that such a programme would not pose a direct military threat to the Arab world. After all, as experts say, Iran has not attacked another country in over two hundred years.¹⁷³ Countries like Syria that openly supported Iran nuclear programme by saying that:

¹⁷¹ Abbas Milani, <http://www.hoover.org/bios/milani.html>. A research fellow at the Hoover Institution

¹⁷² Gov/2006/14,4 February, 2006 IAEA Resolution.

¹⁷³ Lionel Beehner "Arab Views of a Nuclear Iran," April 20 2006 accessed on <http://www.copyright.com/ccc/do>.

"We support Iran regarding its right to peaceful nuclear technology' clearing the region from mass destruction weapons should first start from Israel because it is the only country in the Middle East which owns nuclear weapons. It is the right of Iran and any other state to own nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Countries that object to that have not provided a convincing or logical reason... [There exists a] selective and double-standard policy practiced by some international powers in this regard."¹⁷⁴

Whereas country like Saudi Arabia made a statement that Iran, should comply with NPT regime as well as respect international community concern, with taking consideration of GCC security and nuclear free West Asia. According to the Times of London, Prince Saud said that the problem stemmed from Israel, being allowed to build nuclear warheads "Nobody mentions that Israel has 100 nuclear weapons in stock, even though it is an open secret."¹⁷⁵

In January 2006, Muqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shiite cleric in Iraq, said his militia would defend Iran if that country were ever attacked; he sent an apparent message to the West that Tehran has allies who could make things difficult for US forces in the region. One former Kuwaiti lawmaker, Ahmed al-Rubei, also held that Iran is our neighbors, "Their safety is our safety."¹⁷⁶ These views openly support Iranian stand, but it is not necessary that Iran will get support while still following the hard line position, in future.

If United States use force to destroy Iranian nuclear facility it is widely believe

¹⁷⁴ Statements by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at a joint press conference with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, *Islamic Republic News Agency* (Iran), 20 January 2006.

¹⁷⁵ Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia speaking at a conference in London January 16, 2006 *The Times of London* (United Kingdom) www.timesonline.com

¹⁷⁶ "Iran's Nukes concern some Arab countries" March 23 2006, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news>.

that such a move would receive private but not public support. Though political analyst in United States predict that no country in the Arab world will shed any tears over Tehran has spilled nuclear facilities. However, it is less unlikely because United States cannot get an overt support of another military campaign in the region. It would be an immature action for them, especially given America's current unpopularity in the region. Instead, they must continue, "to oppose the rise of a nuclear Iran but not do so in an overtly provocative way".¹⁷⁷

ISRAELI STANCE

Israel claims that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program and will use nuclear weapons against Israel. Despite possessing nuclear weapons of its own, Israel rejects the legitimacy of Iran possessing nuclear weapons in the present or the future. Israel claims that the anti-Zionist bias, such as Anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial, demonstrated by some Iranian leadership figures is dangerous enough to justify harsher standards on any Iranian nuclear program. However, Israel itself not as clean when it comes to the various atrocities committed on the Palestinian and the Arabs.

Israel is concerned that Iran has developed missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads between the two countries. Test of Sahab-3 in August 2003, which has capacity of carrying warhead up to 2000 km and beyond. The concern intensified when Iran publicly paraded some of the missiles under anti-Israeli banners, such as "Israel should be wiped off the map" and "Death to Israel."¹⁷⁸ Major Israeli think tanks and government sources claim that Israel cannot effectively deter Iran from attacking it with nuclear weapons because of geographic (1 to 70 ratio) and demographic (1 to 10 ratio) disparities, and Iran's

¹⁷⁷ Ibid:p3

¹⁷⁸ "24 Iran Parades Missiles." *News Archive: Chinese Missile Defenses*. The Claremont Institute: 2005.

perceived unpredictability and hostility toward Israel. Reasons for Israeli concern can be sum up in these following points¹⁷⁹:

1. Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and other Iranian leaders deny Israel's right to exist.
2. Iran develops its nuclear energy technology in clandestine facilities.¹⁸⁰
3. The distance from Iran to Israel is within the range of missile systems possessed by both countries.
4. Iran alleged to maintain a close relationship with the Hezbollah, considered being terrorist organization, which has attacked Israel in the past.
5. Israel has very few options to deter an Iranian nuclear attack,

On December 11, 2005 the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon put the Israeli Defense Forces on high alert for the possibility of ordering air strikes against Iran's nuclear installations.¹⁸¹

However, Israel and Iran are having not good relations since its establishment in the region. Therefore, stand of Israel is not a surprise to Iran. However, Israel has been a strong ally of USA and known to be a pillar of USA strategy in West Asia. There are also prospects of regional stability as Iran's access to nuclear weapons may increase the projection of peace.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_-_weapons_-_of_-_mass_-_destruction.

¹⁸⁰ Report on Iran Nuclear Safeguards Sent to Agency's Board." IAEA: 2006-02-28. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran." IAEA: 2006-02-04.

¹⁸¹ Mahnaimi, Uzi (2005). "Israel readies forces for strike on nuclear Iran." *The Times*. Accessed on 2006-05-07.

¹⁸² To know Israel and Iran nuclear capability and its impact on each other see, Ehsaneh I. Sadr, "The impact of Iran's Nuclearisation on Israel," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 12, no.2. Summer 2005, pp, 58-70.

THIRD WORLD'S RESPONSES

Iran's decision to resume nuclear research prompts another referral to IAEA, and the third world countries once again faces the dilemma whether to support its longstanding diplomatic partner or capitulate U.S pressure.

After informing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran removed the United Nations inspector's seals at the pilot uranium enrichment plant in Natanz on January 10 2006. Iran said it took the decision so that research could be resumed on its small-scale uranium enrichment programme to test centrifuge, full scale uranium enrichment continues to remain frozen, it explained. The Iranian leadership has been consistent in its stand that the country has the right to engage in nuclear research.¹⁸³ However, this decision has thrown; open a complex situation before the Third World countries. As they have to decide whether to support Iran's nuclear enrichment venture or oppose it.

The majority of the countries representing the Non-Align movement at the IAEA board did not blindly offer their support to Washington's position. Malaysia chaired the meeting of the IAEA meeting at Vienna The majority of NAM countries either sided with Iran or abstained in the vote¹⁸⁴.

Egypt had the long-standing demand to link Iran's referral to Security Council with that of declaring the whole of West Asia as a nuclear free zone. In this venture, Egypt roped in the support of NAM. Egypt's this demand of implicitly tantamount to convey that Israel should also get rid of its nuclear arsenal. In other words, Egypt tended to link Iran's nuclear disarmament with Israel's renunciation of nuclear weapons. Egypt also comes out as defender of international concern by saying:

¹⁸³ John Cherian, "Nuclear Pressures," *Frontline*, February 10, 2006.

¹⁸⁴ John Cherian, "Indian Betrayal", *Frontline*, February 24, 2006.

"All countries should adhere to their commitments in a way to allow the international community to be sure of the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, as we do not accept the emergence of a nuclear military power."¹⁸⁵

The NAM countries have been pointing at double standard involved in the current exercise to blackmail Tehran into giving up its right to engage in peaceful nuclear activities.

However countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Malaysia openly supported Iran on the nuclear issue irrespective of USA pressure, some countries like Japan, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan distance itself from direct linking the question with developed verses developing issue. India's vote against Iran in the IAEA also was the result of shrewd diplomacy of United States against Iran. This step of one of the founding member of NAM is certainly a blow to this movement. USA also did not forget to derive benefit out of it to falsify Iranian claim that it was not the debate between developed verses developing countries rather exclusively with a rogue states, Iran. Not only this, U.S officials are putting pressure on Japan not to go ahead with the \$2 billion Azadegan oilfield deal signed with Iran in 2004¹⁸⁶. It also told India and Pakistan to desist from participating in the gas pipeline project with Iran.¹⁸⁷

The mode of conduct of India and Pakistan in IAEA meetings, besides proving several things substantiated the fact that both of the countries are nearing to join the bandwagon. It shows that the NAM was also not unified over the issue. India, for instance, voted against Iran contrary to NAM's stand. However, another member of NAM, Pakistan reaction was more topsy-turvy. Even though Pakistan abstained from voting against Iran in September 2005, it is well-established hypothesis that in the near future it is going to stand with USA over the issue. Moreover, it is not surprising owing to Pakistan's deep economic, political, and military relations with USA. There fore we can see that Iran is loosing friends day

¹⁸⁵ Statement by Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, January 17, 2006
<http://www.Haaretz.com>. (Israel)

¹⁸⁶ John Cherian, "plotting a war", *Frontline*, April 7, 2006.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*: p 52.

by day as the crisis deepens. Iran is taking with concern, incentives offered by the West (not made public) is might be result of changing mood of its allies like Russia and china.

Foreign policy chief of the European Union Javier Solana recently visited Teheran. There has been speculation that Iran was being offered an advanced light water nuclear reactor along with assured supply of fuel as a part of package. Iran in return would have to suspend all enrichment work which the US and its European allies fear would allow Tehran to acquire the know how to produce an atomic weapon. According to Iran, “the halt of enrichment activities is impossible from the technical point of view. Europeans have unofficially accepted the impossibility for the suspension of our enrichment activities, and the United States too has no way out but to consider Iran’s suspension of nuclear enrichment impossibility.”¹⁸⁸

CONCLUSION

The unfolding event in international politics foretells that conflict and hostility over the issue is both unnecessary and wasteful. It is a loss of time, energy, and resources, which could have been used for other constructive purposes. Cooperation and negotiations must form the basis of rapprochement. Conciliatory measures should be made as part of nuclear diplomacy. Any attempt of forceful resolution dispute through war, as some actors are inclined to do, should be opposed and condemned unequivocally. Military action through a group of nations or through united nation will not resolved the crisis.

War and force has never been a solution of any international crisis. The negotiations become more crucial in Iranian case. First, due to fact that, there is no consensus on the use of force to resolve the crisis in international community. Secondly, the world today is a changed world with multipolarity and the emerging centers of power. In the light of these responses, the following chapter discusses that what measures Iran may opt. as a sequel to the challenges and options.

¹⁸⁸ “Solana in Iran with the deal”, *The Hindu*, 6 June 2006

CHAPTER III

CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS BEFORE IRAN

The standoff between Iran and the international community over Tehran's nuclear plans and intentions is reaching a critical point. On 4 February 2006, the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution asking the IAEA secretary-general, Mohamed El Baradei, to "report" the Iranian nuclear portfolio to the United Nations Security Council. The surprisingly emphatic vote twenty-seven to three, with five abstentions put a ceiling on a period of furious diplomacy sparked by the informal agreement on 16 January 2006, among the five permanent members of council to report Iran. This development represents a significant breakthrough for United States efforts to increase multilateral pressure on Iran to accede to Western demands for greater transparency and candidness about its nuclear ambitions. In the past two and a half years, the United States administration has departed from the "Bush doctrine" in relation to Iran by largely allowing the IAEA and three European Union states (Britain, France, and Germany – the "EU-3") to take the lead on negotiating with Tehran.¹⁸⁹

Iran's nuclear programme has become a highly controversial issue in international politics since August 2002 when a secret opposition group Mujahiddin O'Khalq (MKO) working outside Iran informed IAEA that Iran was secretly developing nuclear facilities for enrichment of uranium in Natanz and the about heavy water production plant in Arak. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA general conference, Vice President of Iran and president of AEOI, H.E Mr. Aghadeh stated, "Iran was embarking on a long term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000MW within two decades" he also stated

¹⁸⁹ Bahram Rajaei, "Iran's Nuclear Challenge", dated 14 -2-2006 <www.open-democracy.htm>

that such a sizable project entailed “an all out planning well in advance, in various field of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management.”¹⁹⁰

During this meeting director general of IAEA asked Iran to confirm whether media report of August 2002 was true and asked to provide information about both nuclear facilities. His visit of Iran in February 2003, these two facilities declared to the agency for the first time. Iran confirmed that a large commercial scale fuel enrichment plant also under construction with heavy water production plant in Arak¹⁹¹. Agency in her report said that Iran has failed to meet some of its obligations under its safeguard agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear materials, the subsequent processing, and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the materials was stored and processed. This led to a great concern to Western powers in general and United States in particular, even though it is not yet clear what nuclear programme of Iran is all about or what its intentions are?

Since the accession of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency in June 2005, which replaced reformist and moderate government by the conservative and hardliners, Iran's negotiating posture and disposition has become more bellicose and inflexible. This development is also due to hostile relations between Iran and USA. This has condensed western influence on the negotiation process that had been in place and noticeably battered international support for Iran paving the way for the closing of ranks among Western powers and, now, the IAEA.

In fact, with Iran announcing on 6 February 2006, that it will fully resume enrichment activities at a future date (specified to the IAEA secretary-general, but not made public) and to stop abiding by the intrusive inspections called for in the IAEA additional protocol, Iran's hard-line position has effectively terminated the pre-existing negotiation process. Given these changing events and the unraveling of the past two years of negotiations, what Iran can do to break the deadlock

¹⁹⁰ IAEA report, GOV/2003/40, 6 June 2003, p. 1-2.

¹⁹¹ Heavy water production facilities are not nuclear facilities under comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements, and are thus, not required to be declared to the Agency there under.

remains to be seen? Iran's room for manoeuvre in its negotiations with the IAEA and the EU-3 has rested until now on four dimensions:

First, legally Iran has argued that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1970 it is legally entitled to control the full nuclear-fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. According to this argument, Iran's signing of the IAEA additional protocol providing for more intrusive spot inspections above and beyond the safeguards agreed by the NPT – does not invalidate this right. Similarly, Iran asserts that its voluntary suspension of nuclear-fuel enrichment was not binding and intended as an indication of goodwill in the now-defunct negotiations with the EU-3. Iran has not breached any international law or treaty by starting to feed uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at its uranium conversion facility in Isfahan. Tehran made a pledge of sustained transparency by signing the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in December 2003, and the UN nuclear agency's surveillance cameras are in place in Isfahan¹⁹².

Iran further argues that its resumption of enrichment activities in January, which provoked the current round of tensions, also does not invalidate its rights under the NPT. Thus, Iran does not consider itself bound to either mechanism as it does to the NPT itself. Indeed, the West is hard pressed to make the case that Iran is legally bound to them above and beyond the claim that Iran is not negotiating in good faith. However, the resonance of Iran's legal argument is becoming weak significantly as a result of the Ahmadinejad's strong presidency and his inflammatory rhetoric regarding Israel and the holocaust, as well as Iran's intransigence regarding the EU-3 and Russia's offers to end the negotiating standoff.

Second, strategically Iran has relied on its relatively good relations with Western Europe and growing ties with non-Western major powers namely Russia, China,

¹⁹² Pirouz Mojtahedzadeh and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "A crisis of choice, not necessity", *International Herald Tribune*, Friday, August 12, 2005, <<http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/08/11/opinion/edkaveh.php>>

and India to balance its poor relations with the United States. Signing of the Paris agreement in 2004 was an effort in this direction. The use of the EU-3 to blunt US pressure for Security Council involvement, however, appears to have run its course for now. For its part, the US has smartly allowed Iran's hard-line turn under President Ahmadinejad to push the EU-3 closer to its own position, in effect making the American position more appealing simply due to the pretentious approach of Iran's resurgent radicals. For Iran if anything had provided the Iranians with some comfort, it was the expectation that Russia and China would extend support to Iran should its nuclear case end up in the Security Council. It appears now that this assumption is not a safe bet for Iran. That is, while Russia and China could still do so, there is simply no guarantee that these two states will wield their veto power in the Security Council on Iran's behalf.

Indeed, the agreement of these two powers to the permanent five's statesmen could well be a decision aimed at increasing pressure on Iran in the short term to yield to a negotiated solution while building up credibility with the US and EU-3 in the long term. This positioning would provide them with even greater leverage should the Iranian nuclear portfolio actually be referred for meaningful action to the Security Council at some point in the future.

Third, economically, Iran believes that western countries have a consistent fear of higher oil prices that will somehow prevent firmer action against Iran. Oil prices have climbed dramatically over the past eighteen months affected strong economic growth in the various countries including United States. These events give Iran a strong base against western allegation. But this argument does not have a ground that could provide long-term comfort to Iran because its economy also depends upon export of oil revenue that is very much depended on others countries import.

Moreover, the global oil market is a very tight one, and most projections expect that it will remain so for the foreseeable future. That is, prices will likely to rise anyway and some continued increase is not unexpected. At some point, regardless

of the economic implications, the West and the US may decide that the immediate threat posed by Iran's progress toward a militarized nuclear programme outweighs the cost imposed by higher oil prices. This calculation is simply not subject to Iranian control.¹⁹³

Fourth, militarily, Iran's negotiating stance has rested in part on military considerations including its capacity to escalate the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, spark turmoil in Lebanon and the Palestinian occupied territories, and perhaps even to support Al-Qaeda in its desperation to strike at US interests. Iran's security policy and doctrine has, after all, long been geared toward deterring the US via asymmetrical warfare. That is, while it remains a strong conventional military power in the region, for the past fifteen years, Iran has devoted a considerable amount of resources toward developing its unconventional military capabilities. However, it will be too early to predict that how far Iranian military will be able to compete with US led military confrontation.

However irrespective of Iranian stance the IAEA Board of Governors indicated, and the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement endorsed, that Iran should:¹⁹⁴

- Suspend uranium processing and enrichment (a continuum which starts with uranium and ends with enriched uranium that, enriched to one level, provides reactor fuel and, enriched to a higher level, can provide weapons-grade uranium suitable for a nuclear warhead);
- Reconsider the construction of a heavy-water reactor, which also can be used to produce weapons-grade material, in the form of plutonium;
- Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, providing somewhat more extensive inspections than traditional IAEA safeguards agreements, and in the meantime act as if the Additional Protocol is already in force; and

¹⁹³ Bahram Rajaei, "Iran's nuclear challenge", <http://www.opendemocracy.com>

¹⁹⁴ Steven C. Welsh, "Iran Nuclear Challenge: UN Security Council-IAEA Partnership Looked to Serve as Robust Multilateral Alternative to Preemptive Unilateralism", <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-iaea-030306.cfm>

- Essentially provide the IAEA whatever access and assistance it deems necessary:

As the Iran is now called for direct action like implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67¹⁹⁵, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations Iran is in multifarious situation to cope with present crisis.

CHALLENGES BEFORE IRAN

Apart from the pre-emptive military strike and tighter economic sanctions, Iran's nuclear programme encounters various challenges on two fronts:

- Internal challenges
- External challenges

Primarily, Iran is a bi-polar society. Part of society identifies with the Islamic norms and standards while the other part of the society prefers the values and the life style before Islam. Some Iranians take pride on their pre-Islamic history and it serves as a source of inspiration for them. Some section of society views the domination of Islam in Iran as a victory of their self-determination and the own identity.¹⁹⁶ In light of these divisions, one may speculate the internal debate on the crucial issue i.e. nuclear programme of the country.

While dealing with internal challenges the first problem Iran confronts are within its domestic politics. International pressure on the Islamic Republic over its

¹⁹⁵ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Director General," GOV/2006/27, International Atomic Energy Agency, April 28, 2006, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport28Apr06.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ David Ramezani, "Road to Recovery: Challenges For Iran", www.Iranian.com February 18, 2004.

nuclear program, especially serious UN involvement in the crisis, could exacerbate the tension among Iranian leaders and may encourage political groups outside the regime to use the fragility of the government to accelerate their efforts for democratic change.¹⁹⁷

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Iran's bold August 7, 2005 decision to resume uranium conversion previously frozen under an agreement with Britain, France, and Germany came only four days after new president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office. This confrontational step suggests that the new administration may take strong actions to advance its hard-line agenda. Iran argued that country's civilian nuclear program is a matter of national pride and claim widespread public support for continuing research and development. According to a poll published in October by Iran's semi-official Mehr news agency, around 80 percent of respondents said they were opposed to halting nuclear activities. More than 65 percent said Iran should continue its nuclear pursuits under any circumstances. Moreover, 80 percent believe the United States and other Western countries are pressuring the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to crack down on Iran¹⁹⁸. Some political analyst argues that the new government may not be as unified as it appears. Signs of serious division have emerged among the ruling elite, and these differences could preoccupy Iranian politicians for some time to come.¹⁹⁹

As the Iranian nuclear issue reaches crisis proportions and the country faces international isolation, some voices in Iran are suggesting that it is time to engage directly with the United States. Such prodding is in direct contrast with leading state officials open hostility toward the United States and hint at possible

¹⁹⁷ Mehdi khalaji, "Iran: International Pressure And Internal Conflict", *Policy Watch*, no. 1106, May 24, 2006.

¹⁹⁸ Golnaz Esfandiari, "Iranian Public Offers Mixed Feelings on Nuclear issue", December 23, 2004, <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/rferl/perspex-rferl-series.htm>

¹⁹⁹ Mehdi khalaji and Mohsen Sazegara, "Challenges Facing Iran's New Government" *Policy Watch*, no.1022, August 11 2005. Wahington Institute For Near East Policy.

divisions. Indeed, contact with Washington has always been a sensitive issue in Iranian politics and has been used as a weapon in domestic power struggles. Khomeini's death in 1989 ultimately led to the waning of what was perhaps the Islamic revolution's most profound achievement, the unification of religious and state authority in the person of the Supreme Leader. In a clear deviation from the philosophy of the revolution, the clerical regime gave Iranian national interests primacy over Islamic doctrine, and power gradually moved from theologians to revolutionary "religio-politicians."²⁰⁰ Once the political clergy were firmly in control, a fierce power struggle emerged among three factions: pragmatists, radicals, and conservatives. The pragmatists, who generally hold executive power and run the state, believe that Iran's primary task is to resurrect its economy in the aftermath of the war with Iraq. They advocate improving ties with the West and "reactionary" Muslim states, and draw their support from Iran's modern middle class, including government employees, technocrats, professionals, and elements of the business community.²⁰¹

By contrast, the radicals are mostly outside of the government and derive their support from younger, more militant clerics and student associations. They advocate strict adherence to revolutionary dogma and view emphasis on the economy as a pretext for pragmatism. The radicals have thus tried to block many of the government's economic and reconstruction initiatives. Their own economic goals stress improving the lives of the dispossessed and promoting Iran's economic independence. The radicals reject the government's bid to improve ties with the West (particularly the United States), and instead advocate increased efforts to expand revolutionary Islam beyond Iran's borders.

Though less vocal than the other two factions, the conservatives are nonetheless influential, deriving their strength from the conservative clergy, bazaar circles, and the traditional middle class. Conservatives side with the pragmatists on some

²⁰⁰ See in details, David Menashri, *Revolution At The Crossroads: Iran's Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions*, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997)

²⁰¹ Mehdi Khalaji and Moshen Sazegara, "challenges facing Iran's new government," *policy watch* #1022, August 11 2005. available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>.

issues (such as the economy) but with the radicals on others (such as culture). Thus, they advocate both the strict application of Islamic legal, social, and cultural norms, and the sanctity of private property, freedom for private enterprise, and increased economic interaction with the outside world.²⁰²

Generally, we can distinguish between four factions in Iran: the Conservative Traditionalist Right of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei; the Conservative Modern Right of former President Rafsanjani; the Traditionalist left of current President Mohammad Khatami; and the Revolutionary Left or Hezbollah. These distinctions refer to respective position on social, economic issues in the Islamic context of contemporary Iran and foreign policies.

The nuclear problem in Iran might resolve itself if reformers of the Iranian political elite triumph. However, in the short term this is rather unlikely. The US has to be aware that a military intervention in Iran could easily backfire on Iranian domestic policies undermining or forestalling the prospects for a 'velvet revolution' in Iran. In such circumstances, Iranian conservatives possessing nuclear weapons will make this worst-case scenario even more likely.²⁰³ The return of hardliners in June 2005 elections has further heightened the nuclear crisis. They have identified nuclear capability building as a key national objective, in pursuance of which they are ready to go for a direct confrontation with IAEA and USA.

Reformist politicians on the sidelines of power agree that Iran has nuclear rights, but say these are better served with wit and diligence, not provocation. The rising middle class symbolized by Khatami faction have assumed a less confrontationist stand on nuclear issue. They support the nuclear programme and believe that it is the Sovereign right of Iran. However, they disagree on the modalities of implementation. They do not agree with the conservative's hard line position. They consider that Iran should certainly go nuclear, but with a cooperative and

²⁰² Ibid: David Minashri

²⁰³ The Bulletin, 'Iran: Scaring the Ayatollahs', *Newsweek*, June 4, 2003.

accommodative attitude. They stand for cooperation with the multilateral institutions like IAEA and UNO. While describing the Western reaction as 'unfair' former President Mohammad Khatami pointed out "because there are three nuclear powers in the region and Israel has nuclear bombs, but they are pressuring Iran. This discrimination...is...generally the result of American pressure."²⁰⁴

Radicalizing the Islamic Republic's nuclear policy, which was Ahmadinejad's approach from the beginning, and increasing the strain on Western countries (especially the United States, Britain, France, and Germany), has generated many internal doubts about his policies. Some political conservatives, especially those close to Rafsanjani, are actively and publicly criticizing Ahmadinejad's confrontational policies towards the West.

Rafsanjani, in his recent meeting with Qatari ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifeh al-Thani, said that one of the ways to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis is for both sides to refrain from "any provocative statements."²⁰⁵ On May 1, 2005 Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and the former commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, said in an interview with journalists, "There is evidence that Iran and the United States are going at each others' throats. To break the impasse, we should be involved in serious negotiations and diplomacy." Rezai, who was a candidate for president in 2005 before dropping out of the race, added, "If I were president, I would change the model of Iranian simplistic diplomacy; we need cooperation in our diplomacy. In our struggling situation, negotiation is a kind of revolutionary diplomacy."²⁰⁶ These statements indicate that any hard option opted by the current government would not be appreciative in context of nuclear debate.

²⁰⁴ Vahid Sepehri, "Iran: Consensus That Russia And The West Are No Friends of Tehran" www.rferal.com, February 28, 2006. (*Radio Free Europe/ Radio Library*)

²⁰⁵ Mehdi khalaji, "Iran: International Pressure and Internal Conflict", *Policy Watch*, no. 1106, 24 May 2006, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Also available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p4

Some political analyst also views it as an opportunity for Washington to take advantage of the regime's reformist challenges. The West should use its economic influence to strengthen the hands of Iranian pragmatist, who could then argue for slowing, limiting, or shelving Tehran's nuclear programme.²⁰⁷ Although the Iranian leaders agree on the strategic value of strong nuclear programme, they are divided over just how strong it should be. Conservative ideologues press for a nuclear breakout in defiance of international opinion private property, whereas conservative realists argue that restraint based serves Iran's interest the ideologues, who view conflict with the US as inevitable, believe that the only way to ensure the survival of Islamic Republic amidst ideals is to equip it with an independent nuclear capability. It is easy to feel the degree of public support in Iran for the ongoing nuclear programme, which is very much associated with national pride. Iranian people consider nuclear technology to be the most advanced technology, and they see Iran's nuclear capabilities as an indication of their place in the world.²⁰⁸ As long as the debate over Iran's nuclear programme will continue in international fora it is less likely that domestic discussion shall cease to be silent.

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

The cumulative legacy of the Shah, the regimes own policies, structural changes in global markets led to a serious decline in the Iranian economy, and this remains the Islamic regime's most pressing challenge. The revolution led to the departure of the professional class (and with it domestic capital) and a sharp drop in foreign investment. The eight-year war with Iraq required costly expenditures, destroyed vital infrastructure, and created growing numbers of refugees.

These pressures were exacerbated by rapid population growth and urbanization, which hampered efforts to provide essential public services such as education,

²⁰⁷ For a discussion on domestic debate see, Kenneth Pollack and ray Takeyhal, "Taking On Tehran", *foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005.

²⁰⁸ Mustafa kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power", *Middle East Journal*, vol.60, no.2, Spring 2006.

housing, and healthcare, basic utilities such as drinking water and electricity, and employment. Iran's reliance on oil revenues to finance post-war reconstruction made it vulnerable to the decline in world oil prices. As imports increased, Tehran fell behind on its debt payments. Inflation put many commodities beyond the reach of ordinary people, while the black market boomed and speculators prospered. Overall, the affluent became wealthier and the gap between rich and poor remains as wide as before the revolution.²⁰⁹

Table 3:1 Economic performance of Iran 1980-2001

						Growth rate (%)
	1970	1980	1980	2000	2001	1980 To 2001
GDP (millions of current US\$)		93,923	92,959			-100.0
GDP (millions of constant 1990 US\$)	54,272	81,274	92,960	136,537	140,547	3
GDP per capita (current US\$/capita)		2,402	1,591			-100.0

Source: Ministry of power, Islamic Republic of Iran, 1999²¹⁰

The above data reveals Iran's dismal performance on the economic front. The economic hardship is further aggravated by diversion of the scarce state revenue to its nuclear pursuit. Besides, it is also created difficulty for Iran. Iran's bilateral trade with foreign countries leading to a drastic falls in its foreign exchange earning. Since the international trade is largely dominated by the USA the nuclear

²⁰⁹ David Menashri, "Revolution at a Crossroads: Iran's Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions", Policy Papers #43, Washington Institute for near East Policy (ISBN, Washington D.C 1997)

²¹⁰ Available at www.iranmania.com

crisis is likely to affect Iran's international trade performance. Iran is one of the major oil producers in the world. More than 98% of primary energy is derived from oil and gas resources and only less than 2% is in form of hydro, coal, and non-commercial energies.

Table 3:2 ESTIMATED ENERGY RESERVES

	Solid	Liquid	Gas	Uranium ⁽¹⁾	Hydro ⁽²⁾	Total
Total amount in place	5.9	616.3	893.9	1.5	17.0	1,534.6
Total amount in place (3)	6.0	1,105.6	1,626.6	1.5	17.0	2,756.7

Source: Ministry of power Islamic republic of Iran, 1999.

According to the latest statistics issued by Ministry of Power, the proven and exploitable reserves of oil are about 89.7 billion barrels. Despite of the rapid expansion of the gas sector, in recent years, oil still plays a very important role in energy system as well as economy of the country. Petroleum products constitute more than 55% of the Iran's primary energy supply. The share of oil sector in GDP is about 20% and more than 80% of the country's foreign exchange earnings come from export of this commodity. The basic economic challenge before the country is to secure its growing domestic energy demand Vis a Vis depleting natural resources. Not only that, in a context where more than 80% of its foreign exchange earnings comes from the sale of oil and gas, the growing nuclear crisis which may entail economic sanctions, and import/export restrictions in foreign countries, the economic hardship of the country is likely to increase.

TABLE 3:3 ENERGY STATISTICS

	1960	1970	1980	1970	2000	2001	Average annual Growth (%)	
							1960 To 1980	1980 To 2001
Energy consumption								
- Total (1)	0.35	0.90	1.50	3.00	4.98	5.25	7.57	6.15
- Solids (2)	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.06	10.65	0.36
- Liquids	0.30	0.43	1.12	1.98	2.07	2.07	6.75	2.95
- Gases	0.04	0.42	0.27	0.88	2.85	3.12	10.39	12.37
- Primary electricity		0.02	0.05	0.06				
Energy production								
- Total	2.28	8.54	3.46	7.80	10.59	11.59	2.10	5.93
- Solids	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	10.45	-0.53
- Liquids	2.24	8.04	3.08	6.74	7.76	8.47	1.60	4.94
- Gases	0.04	0.45	0.28	0.94	2.78	3.08	10.56	12.12
- Primary electricity		0.02	0.05	0.06				
Net import (Import -								
- Total	-1.85	-7.41	-1.86	-4.46	-5.99	-9.14	0.02	7.89
- Solids		0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01		9.90
- Liquids	-1.85	-7.37	-1.85	-4.42	-6.25	-9.87	0.01	8.30
- Gases		-0.03	-0.01	-0.06	0.24	0.71		-23.43

Source: IAEA ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DATABASE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

2001.

The above-mentioned energy statistics shows that, while energy consumption has grown manifold, production has not increased comparatively. In other words, while the size of population is nearly doubled, the final energy consumption is quadrupled without subsequent rise in states revenues. Furthermore the Nuclear Programme is quiet expensive so Iran economic crisis is less likely to deteriorate.

Table 3:4 POPULATION INFORMATION

	1960	1970	1980	1970	2000	2001	Growth rate (%)
							1980 To 2001
Population (millions)	21.7	28.8	39.1	58.4	70.3	71.4	2.9
Population density (inhabitants/km²)	13.2	17.5	23.7	35.5	42.7	43.3	
Predicted population growth rate (%)			13.1				
Area (1000 km²)			1648.0				
Urban population in 2001 as percent of total							

SOURCE: IAEA ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DATABASE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

1999

Table 3:5 NATIONAL ENERGY STATISTICS

	1996	1998	1999	Average annual Growth rate (%)	
				1960 to 1980	1980 to 1999
Energy consumption					
- Total ⁽¹⁾	3.97	5.06	5.43	7.6	10.0
- Solids ⁽²⁾	0.07	0.07	0.08	10.7	2.1
- Liquids	2.25	2.56	2.66	6.8	4.7
- Gases	1.58	2.36	2.64	10.4	12.7
- Primary	0.07	0.06	0.06	-	0.4
Energy production					
- Total	9.49	10.57	10.94	2.1	6.3
- Solids	0.06	0.06	0.06	10.5	1.4
- Liquids	7.78	8.10	8.20	1.6	5.3
- Gases	1.58	2.34	2.61	10.6	12.5
- Primary	0.07	0.06	0.06	-	0.4
Net import (import-)					
- Total	-5.45	-5.22	-4.88	0.0	5.2
- Solid	N/A	0.05	0.31	-	31.0
- Liquids	-5.45	-5.26	-5.19	0.0	5.6
- Gases	N/A	0	0	-	-9.0

SOURCE: Ministry of power ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 1999

In his presidential campaign, Ahmadinejad promised the Iranian people that he would bring oil revenues to each citizen's dining table.²¹¹ When Ahmadinejad's term began in August 2005, the price of crude oil was just above \$55 per barrel. That price has risen rapidly since then, partially because of the Iranian nuclear crisis, and now exceeds \$70 per barrel.²¹² Rising oil prices have increased the pressure on Ahmadinejad to deliver, and the public perception is growing that rising state oil revenues have not improved the lives of average citizens. In the face of rising pressure, it seems difficult to pursue its firm stand on Iran nuclear issue. As this crisis, is more escalating the problem of large majority of population rather reducing it? The rising oil prices have a direct impact on demand shortfall, which has further reduced the incurring revenue. Therefore,

²¹¹ Ramin Mostaghim, "Internal Tussle Plays out amid U.S. Threats" June 2 2006, available at <http://www.ipsnews.net>.

²¹² Mehdi khalaji, "Iran: International Pressure and Internal Conflict", *Policy Watch* # 1106, 24 May 2006, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

while the rising oil prices have been able to generate more revenue from less oil sale, the overall revenue has gone down which has further added to the economic hardship of the president. Nuclear programme has increased the hardship in another way also. As we already know that, nuclear generation programme needs massive investment, which is again making a dent on the state treasury. Hence due to shortage of funds, the state is bound to cut short revenue allocation from other sectors dealing with public goods, which again raises public anger towards the government.

As some sections of the society also believe that economic problems of the Ahmadinejad government are due overwhelmingly to the poor policies his government is following and to the appointment of incompetent people to important economic posts. At the same time, international pressure has made the President's problems worse. The continuing fall in prices on the Tehran stock market, the continuing stagnation in the real estate market, the record demand for gold (the traditional refuge in unsettled times), and the rumors of massive capital flight are all signs of uneasiness over the fallout from the nuclear issue.²¹³ There is much probability that this economic discontent will lead to mistrust of Ahmadinejad's government among people who voted for him hoping that he would fulfill his promises to fight corruption and improve the lives of common citizens. International pressure on the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program, especially serious UN involvement in the crisis, could exacerbate the tension among Iranian leaders and encourage political groups outside the regime to use the fragility of the government to accelerate their efforts for change in government's stand on nuclear issue.

The whole nuclear programme was started to reduce its dependence on oil. The justification was to produce energy instead, the economic vulnerability of Tehran increased. The nuclear programme started to impinge hard on the state revenues. As one of report says "Teheran's declared nuclear policy is inconsistent with its energy needs: Iran's one nuclear power plant under construction will be powered

²¹³ Ibid, p3


by Russian fuel. Even if Teheran builds many more, it could obtain more than sufficient nuclear fuel on the international market at considerably lower costs than enriching it in the country. It is doubtful that Iran has large enough deposits of natural uranium to ever be self-sufficient in civil nuclear power. The deposits are certainly sufficient, however, to enrich into weapons-grade material for a sizeable stockpile of nuclear weapons.”²¹⁴ Without sufficient amount of Uranium reserve, it would be quiet difficult for Iran to continue it Nuclear reactors to fulfill its energy needs, as it claims for a long period. International pressure on the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program are increasing day by day so it may be hard to get fissile materials and other necessary support to pursue its nuclear programme for Iran in near future.

NUCLEAR SAFETY

Following is the pictorial representation of Iran’s nuclear safety department. It includes the various measures meant for nuclear safety. The National Nuclear Safety Department (NNSD) accomplishes the regulatory tasks of nuclear facilities in Iran. The up-dated organisational chart of NNSD is shown in Figure 2:1

²¹⁴ NATO Committee Report Annual Session 2005, “Iran: A Challenge For Transatlantic Cooperation” retrieve from <<http://www.nato-pa.int/default/shortcut=i6>>

Figure: 2.1, Organizational Structure of NNSD



Source: *Projects Descriptions For The Agency's Proposed 2001-2002 Technical Co-operation Programme, region: West Asia, IAEA, November 2000.*
<http://www.sedona.net/pahlavi/atomic.html>

Performance of the unit commissioning (initial fuel loading, initial criticality, low power tests; power generating start up; and trial operation) and performance of the training of the AEOI's personnel to such an extent that they will be able to operate the unit safely, properly, efficiently, reliably and economically, is a highly challenging task. According to its nuclear safety chart, while it seems that its nuclear installations are secure for peacetime, there is quiet less focus on the installations safety at the time of war. Besides, it does not also seem to be adequately prepared to cope with accidents or terrorist attack.

The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) is a complex for production of some stages of nuclear fuel materials, which can be utilized for nuclear power and research reactors. At present, the facility is under construction. The transfer of spent fuel to Russia or storage at the unit site is also not quiet clear. The Waste management services are under the responsibility of the AEOI. The international practice is envisaged for supply of such services. Relevant measures for storage of wastes and its management are to be considered in the unit design. There are no technical barriers to the safe transport of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste but challenges remains.²¹⁵ Transporting spent fuel, itself associated with high risk and needs managed with caution.

Whereas Iran has ratified IAEA statute, NPT, Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident, NPT related agreement INFCIRC No: 214, etc. however it has not signed all other important agreements essential for nuclear safety and stability. The given list of agreements below mentions that Iran has either not signed important agreements or no information is available on all those²¹⁶. Like, Paris convention on third party liability, Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage, Convention on nuclear safety Joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste

²¹⁵ For technicalities of waste management system and difficulties associated with spent fuel transport see, National Academies Report, "waste management: Transporting Spent Fuel is safe, but challenges remain", *Nuclear News*, April 2006.

²¹⁶ See Appendix I and II to know status of various agreement signed by Iran related with nuclear safety and further information.

management, Nuclear Export Guidelines, Acceptance of NUSS Codes, (status No reply), Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage (status, Not signed), etc. Iran is also a non party of physical protection of nuclear material which increases the possibility of suspicion over its nuclear programme. Overall Iran seems to have inadequate nuclear safety system, which poses a serious challenge in maintaining its nuclear sites with proper management system.

EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

Externally, Iran's challenges are manifold. First, the most important challenge is how to restore the confidence of the international community in pursuit of its nuclear programme, which is peaceful, or not. Since beginning of last decade, Iran is facing challenges over its nuclear ambitions. The USA succeeded in generating the international concern towards Iran's gaining nuclear potentiality. In 2002 when IRNA revealed Iran's two secret facilities at Natanz and Arak, consistently Iran is under international pressure and has been asked to sign the additional protocols to the NPT, which would grant IAEA officials open access to all nuclear sites, regardless of whether they have been officially declared by the government.²¹⁷

The IAEA vote on the Iran's nuclear issue in recent weeks shows that Iran does not have much support of international community. The vote was 22-1, with 12 abstention including Russia and china. Only Venezuela voted against the IAEA resolution²¹⁸. The USA Which backed the resolution drafted by the Britain France and Germany expressed satisfaction, saying that it clearly raised doubts about Iran's nuclear programme²¹⁹ It was the first resolution by the IAEA called for

²¹⁷ Lynne O'sullivan and Ian Davis, "US foreign policy: from Baghdad to Tehran, US fears of nuclear proliferation may lead to anticipatory defence measures against Iran."

www.basicdocument.com

²¹⁸ See *The Hindu*, 25 September 2005.

²¹⁹ Ibid ;

Iran's referral to UN security council which was culmination of two and a half years of confrontation between Iran and the IAEA.

Before 25th September when resolution was about to table in the IAEA, Iran foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki said "we insist on our sovereign rights and will use all diplomatic channels to defend these rights"²²⁰ however after the voting was over it had become starkly clear that now Iran did not hold much influence which it enjoyed earlier. The voting has also proved that Iran may not be able to use its diplomatic channels to manoeuvre global response in its favour.

The fact that Peru, Singapore, Ghana, India and Ecuador voted to support this resolution undercuts Iran's argument that this is purely western political pressure²²¹. The EU initiative, supported by Iran's friendly nations like China, Japan, Russia and India, yielded results in brokering, for instance, a deal in October 2003. Accordingly, Iran submitted additional information to the IAEA on past nuclear activities acknowledging for the first time that it had carried out undeclared enrichment and processing activities since the early 1990. In return for Iranian promises for full cooperation with the IAEA, the EU-3 blocked the US efforts to refer the issue to the UN Security Council. The dialogue process finally resulted in the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in November 2004, which set out the framework for the long-term settlement of the issue. In return for the Iranian commitment to suspend all enrichment related and processing activities, the troika offered a package of incentives including trade concessions and membership of the WTO, and cooperation on political and security issues. The agreement, however, did not hold for long, as Iran termed its decision on suspension as a temporary confidence-building measure. In other words, Iran is unwilling to permanently freeze its uranium enrichment and related activities and has openly come out with statements to this effect. Besides, Iran has also considered the EU package vague in incentives and heavy in demands, designed

²²⁰ *Iran News*, 23 September 2005.

²²¹ *New York Times*, 25 September 2005.

to fit closely with the US requirements. Claiming that it has as much a right as any other country to carry out uranium conversion programme, it now evokes the Article IV of the NPT, which refers to the development of nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.”

A legally binding UN Security Council resolution of any kind would be the next step in what has been a gradual, incremental process aimed at building greater synergy between the UNSC and IAEA. The UNSC and IAEA are partners within the UN system, and the UNSC has the authority to bolster and augment the IAEA’s capacity to address the challenge posed by Iran.

Third and a related challenge before Iran is how to balance its national interest with external relations, especially extrinsic economic ties with the European countries given their impeccable opportunities Tehran’s bid to acquire the nuclear power status. Tensions between Iran and the West were on the rise following Teheran’s decision to revive uranium conversion at its plants in Esfahan in August 2005 and change of its key nuclear negotiator, the moderate Hussan Rohani with Ali Larijani, a loyalist of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Alarmed by the resumption of conversion activities, the EU Council decided to link the continuation of trade and co-operation agreement with Iran to the nuclear issue describing the two as interdependent. Emboldened by the popular support at home, the newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the UN General Assembly session attacked the Western demands to halt uranium activities, which he pointed out would come under “dual use technology”, meaning it could be used for both producing fuel for nuclear power reactors and raw materials for atom bomb as well. As the EU efforts come to a naught with Iran unwilling to make compromises, the IAEA is left with no options but to refer the issue to the UN Security Council for deciding the future course of action. Even the two major powers, China and Russia have assisted Iran in its nuclear programme and abstained during the voting in the IAEA, they are unlikely to approve of a direct breach of Iran’s commitment to the NPT. Under the mounting

international pressures, the question as to whether Iran can stick to its position risking further isolation.

As discussed above Iran has already escalated so many problems for its economy by denying other exploration in the country. Iran is saying repeatedly that it can stop exporting oil if the crisis continues but as one of the authors estimated that by doing this, it is only Iran who will be debilitated²²².

Finally, Iran's ambitious nuclear programme has triggered apprehensions in its neighbourhood partly because of its strenuous relations and partly due to the threat that its nuclear programme inheres to the balance of power in the chronically instable region. In addition, it would provoke Israel to expedite its efforts to acquire the nuclear edge over its potential rivals. So does Turkey, which despite being assured of the US protective shield appears to be perturbed by the developments because of Tehran's proclivity to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs and its competition for leadership role in greater West Asia (West Asia and Central Asia). The concern likewise in the Gulf region about Iranian nuclear status stems from combinations of experiences and fear of destabilization.

Along its southern border, Iran shares the Persian Gulf with Arab monarchies. Despite GCC- Iranian rapprochement in 1990s, there are several unresolved issues like the territorial dispute with the U.A.E., Teheran's covert support to the forces opposed to the monarchical regime in Bahrain and its concern for Shi'a minorities who have not been completely assimilated in most of the Gulf States including Saudi Arabia and Iraq. These states though, do not maintain conflictual relations with Iran but are fearful of nuclear Iran who will destabilize the region and increase the arm race. Yet Iran is not succeeded to pacify these growing voices. Moreover USA has a considerable influence over the region and military alliances more or less with every country except Iran. This shapes the view of these countries regarding Iran's nuclear programme. As far as Gulf countries are

²²² Bahram Rajaei, "Iran's Nuclear Challenge", dated 14 -2-2006. www.open-democracy.htm

concern growing significance of the Gulf in Iran foreign policy is directly related to several features of political, economic and strategic interest which foreign policy seek to promote and protect.²²³ Certainly, apprehensions of these countries will aggravate its problem economically strategically and politically.

Tehran has long sought to portray international concern over its nuclear program as a Western effort to retard the country's development. That argument is constantly repeated to domestic audiences and employed for foreign audiences in the context of "Third Worldism" and Islamism; which is an effort to win support from developing countries and the Islamic world, but it does not seem to have met with much success. When the International Atomic Energy Agency's 35-member governing board voted in early February to report Iran to the UN Security Council, only Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela voted against the resolution, while Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa abstained²²⁴. The vote against the resolution by three countries has other dimension also. It may be said that these votes were against the USA stand rather than in favor of Iran. Since these countries are always opposed of USA policies in world politics so it is, difficult to say whether they are in favor of Iran current nuclear stand.

OPTIONS BEFORE IRAN

As the Iranian nuclear issue reaches crisis proportions and the country faces international isolation, some voices in Iran are suggesting that it should be resolved as soon as possible because its repercussion reaching far and wide increasing tensions in different areas.

²²³ To know in detail about Iran foreign policy including its strategic, economic interest in gulf see Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's policy towards Persian Gulf", *International Journal of Middle East*, vol. 7, no.3, 1976, pp.345-358.

²²⁴ Bill Samii, "Iran: As Nuclear Crisis Escalates, Are Direct U.S. Contacts Becoming An Option"? www.rferl.org . March 6, 2006.

The list of options available before Iran ranges from economic incentives, to military aid and assistance, WTO membership, fuel supply, technological assistance in civilian nuclear programme etc.

One of the option before Iran is to have better confidence building with IAEA through the compromise formula proposed by the European Union's negotiator and supported by the United States. As already noted, Iran had accepted the October 2003 EU-3 proposal to suspend its nuclear programme in return of western economic incentives. After Iran breached off on the agreement and West planned to refer the issue to Security Council.

After this unsuccessful attempt, West was ready to sent Iran question to Security Council for possible action but due to Russia and china denial it was decided to give more time for diplomacy. It was only December 2005 when again a process of negotiation was on the table. According to one news report Iran expresses its view like²²⁵

“If Europeans respect our right, we are optimistic about Iran-Europe talks,” adding that Iran was entering the talks without any prejudgment. “Important talks could be held and important results could be gained.”

The United States and its European negotiating partners have offered repackaged of economic incentives aimed to persuade Tehran to cooperate in eliminating its suspected nuclear weapons program, and it added some "new ideas" for Iran to consider.²²⁶ A senior State Department official said the "new ideas" would not substantially change the package of economic incentives offered to Iran last August, when the Europeans told the Iranians they could achieve a full political and economic relationship with the West if Iran ended its nuclear activities, which were suspected to be part of a weapons program. He said that, contrary to some reports circulating the new package would not include security guarantees for Iran

²²⁵ *Daily Times*, December 05, 2005.

²²⁶ “U.S. and Europe Plan New Offer to Entice Iran Away From Arms”, *The New York times* Steven R. weisman, May 10, 2006, published by United Nations. Retrieve from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/world/europe/10nukes.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

and would not allow it to continue enriching uranium, an activity that Iran defends as part of a nuclear energy program but that the United States views as a cover for a weapons program.²²⁷

At the United Nations in New York, European Union publicly stated its willingness to work with Iran in political, economic, scientific, and technological areas and readiness to explore ways to continue negotiations. According to EU, “we went out of our ways to avoid public comment which might raise tensions, despite Iran’s breach of the Paris agreement. However, in his speech to the General Assembly on September 17 2005, President Ahmadinejad gave no hint of flexibility, taking of a nuclear apartheid and insisting that Iran would exercise its right to develop fuel cycle technology, regardless of the concerns of the international community.²²⁸ In an unyielding address before the U.N General Assembly on 16 September afternoon, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran rebuffed attempts to rein in his country’s nuclear programme, railing against the United States as an aggressor and restating a compromise proposal that had already been rejected. Mr. Ahmadinejad repeatedly stressed that Iran would not relinquish its “right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy” and accused the U.S of bullying others and attempting to divide the world into “light and dark countries”,²²⁹ By denying economic incentives from the west Iran has almost closed this option and its nuclear programme remain a controversy around the international community.

Second option Iran is having is to follow Russia’s compromise formula, which consist of fuel supply, technical and financial assistance for its Bushehr project, enabling Iran to develop nuclear power without acquiring the enrichment

²²⁷ *ibid*

²²⁸ “Iran must work to rebuild confidence”, *The Hindu*, Philippe Douste – Blazy, Joschka Fischer, Javier Solana, and Jack Straw.

²²⁹ Iranian President alleges “nuclear apartheid,” *The Hindu* 19 September 2005.

technology(Iranian uranium would be processed into fuel in Russia and re-exported to Iran)²³⁰.

Mohammad Mehdi Akhonzadeh, the head of the Iranian delegation that had been conducting talks with British, German, and French negotiators, said that Iran had told the Europeans to "act on the proposition that enrichment will be conducted inside Iran". He said that any other option was "unacceptable" and "an insult." Iran has on other occasions stated that it has the right to develop the technology to create nuclear fuel on its own territory.²³¹

To see the deadlock and criticism by Russia regarding Iranian President who called for 'wiping of Israel' from the map and 'Europe should provide a Jewish home' for Israel Iran decided to reverse the previous statements, seriously and enthusiastically" and ready to study a Russian proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock in international efforts to block Iranian nuclear development.

The very different tone taken by Iran could well be aimed at persuading the Europeans to resume the negotiations and to forestall support for sanctions by Russia and China.²³²

After a long conversation finally Larijani dismisses the Russian proposal as problematic and declared Tehran has prepared scenarios and cannot be 'checkmated' easily saying it would only consider such a deal if it acknowledged the Islamic republic's right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil²³³.

Third option before Iran is to remain under NPT and resolve the contentious issues with the IAEA. This option sounds very pragmatic and right path to stop all controversy regarding its nuclear programme. However, it is not easy to follow.

²³⁰ The conversion of uranium into gas is a major step in producing nuclear fuel. The next step would be the enrichment of the gas into material that can be used either to generate electricity or to build a bomb; that is the stage of the process that Russia has offered to conduct on its soil.

²³¹ Richard Bernstein, "Iran Hints at Warmer Reception to Russian Nuclear Proposal", *The New York Times*, 28 Dec 2005.

²³² Ibid,

²³³ Daily Times, 3 January 2006.

Under IAEA, safeguards and various protocols, which Iran signed after agreement to IAEA, IRAN, will have to open its all-nuclear sites for inspection and follow various norms. Iran does not consider this option as 'just' and believes it as denial of its sovereign right to have nuclear technology. In the United Nations general assembly session, President Ahmadinejad declared this policy of West as 'nuclear apartheid' and asserted not to be trapped by USA strategy based on evil intentions.²³⁴ In the same session, Iran proposed an eight-point plan to resolve the stand off over its nuclear programme to engage in a serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment programme of Iran. Since August 2002 IAEA chief, Mohammed El Baredi has come up of many considerable proposals but unfortunately failed to resolve the issue under IAEA purview.²³⁵

Fourth option Iran can go for is to block UN inspections of its nuclear facilities, which will be hard enough to leave any room for diplomacy and maneuver the crisis on the line of peaceful means of dispute settlement. Iran had threatened to block UN inspections of its nuclear facilities and to end all voluntary cooperation if it is referred to the U.N. Security Council as the long confrontation over Iran's nuclear program escalated²³⁶

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, quoted by the state-run news agency Iran News Agency (IRNA) "The Iranian government will have to stop all its voluntary cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog" if the case is referred to the United Nations Security Council. Mottaki insisted that Iran's "right to access nuclear technology is not associated with the will of any particular country." Last year (2004), Iran's parliament passed a law mandating that

²³⁴ *The Hindu*, 19 September 2005.

²³⁵ To know in details see IAEA reports and proposal.

<http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/board/2005/government-2005-64.pdf>.

²³⁶ John ward Anderson and Daniela Deane, *Washington Post*, January 13,2006.

cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, be terminated if it was sent to the Security Council²³⁷.

Iran's latest threats came one day after the foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and France called for Tehran to be referred to the Security Council for violating its nuclear treaty obligations, saying that their long negotiations reached a dead end this week when the Iranians resumed enriching uranium.²³⁸ Since January, Iran has taken steps, which are negative in response of international community effort to end the controversy.

After coming across various options, some conciliatory in nature and some strong Iran has last but not the least option is withdrawal from NPT and openly invite sanctions at the door. Ignoring strong international protests, Iran has resumed work on its uranium enrichment program after a two-year suspension. This move sharply reduced chances of containing the country's nuclear ambitions through negotiation.²³⁹ After the resumption, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said "There was no good reason why Iran should have taken this step if its intentions are truly peaceful and it wanted to resolve long-standing international concerns,"²⁴⁰

The strong reaction Iran has received is certainly not a good sign for present scenario. Iran is consistently saying that its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes, which are a genuine demand for its blooming population. If it is so then its peaceful programme which is for generate electricity is going to be a blow to its economy as well as create domestic disturbances. Iran is already facing sanctions since 1980's it will further aggravate its problem. Withdrawal from NPT will also lead to escalation of its regional hostility. Third world countries,

²³⁷ Ibid ;

²³⁸ The issue came to a top when Iran, under the supervision of inspectors from the IAEA, broke the agency's seals on a nuclear plant in Natanz to resume uranium enrichment research, January 6, 2006.

²³⁹ *Washington Post*, January 11, 2006.

²⁴⁰ Ibid;

which were henceforth, supported Iran's stand on its inalienable right to develop civilian nuclear programme, will start opposing Iran. Russia and china has criticized this move of Iran and called for an early suspension of its nuclear activity but at the same time also refuted UN Security Council sanctions proposal.

Russia and China that have certain economic interest in Iran are a big hurdle in imposing sanctions as they are coming forward with some proposals after breakdown of Iran-West negotiation. The issue of Iran's nuclear options will be on the table for many years. Present crisis before international community is how to handle the Iranian nuclear program when it is in most critical phase. It also poses a non-proliferation test to existing regime. Iran has invested many economic resources into nuclear-related facilities since a long time. Asking Iran to dismantle them without providing reasonable compensation is not fair to many Iranians. What is necessary is to acknowledge Iran's access to nuclear knowledge, technology, and energy and that should be facilitated and acknowledged openly and publicly by the international community. Once the Security Council has made the determination that a threat to international peace and security exists under Article 39, it may authorize non-forceful action by U.N. member states under Article 41, most notably including economic sanctions.

CONCLUSION

It is unclear whether there will be sufficient political will among members of the Security Council to take this step, however Russia and China particularly have in their official statements, been reluctant to discuss the possibility of sanctions, The prospect of U.N. authorized military action against Iran does seem quite remote at this stage. The configuration and dynamics of the next phase are gradually emerging, but the ultimate outcome remains far from a certainty despite growing sentiment in some quarters that a military option is near or the only remaining solution. The most likely path remains one of difficult diplomacy regardless of whether or not the Security Council takes up the case directly which the IAEA does not yet require. This crisis, therefore, at the end of the beginning phase of

negotiations and not the end. Those who expect a clear resolution of the Iranian nuclear impasse in the near future such as a strong Security Council resolution requiring compliance while threatening sanctions or military action will likely continue to wait for a lengthy period of time.

The United States, meanwhile, appears to have elicited a negative response with the adoption of a more active approach toward Iran. The developments reveal the difficulties the two sides will have in establishing direct relations and reaching a modus vivendi²⁴¹. In any case, for any deal to be successful both, Iran and those oppose to its nuclear programme need to appreciate each other concerns and concentrating their effort on a compromise solution base on give and take. As of now Iran's option are not many, and the cost of pursuing its nuclear programme seems to have outstripped the expected benefits. Sooner Iran realises this better are the prospects of survival of the post- revolution Iranian regime.

²⁴¹ Bill Samii, Iran: As Nuclear Crisis Escalates, Are Direct U.S. Contacts Becoming An Option? www.rferl.org

Chapter IV

CONCLUSION

Even before the crisis in post-Saddam Iraq is resolved, attention of the international community appears to have shifted to the possibility of a confrontation with Iran over its controversial nuclear programme. At the heart of the controversy is the Western campaign that Iran has been building secret installations to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, which would enable it to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Iran, however, vehemently denies the charge, reiterating that its nuclear programme is only intends for peaceful civilian purposes by virtue of being a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1970. While the United States of America and its allies press Iran hard to restrain its nuclear ambitions to the parameters set out in the NPT, Iran's clerical regime seems reluctant to suspend the covert enrichment activities that could eventually equip it with an independent nuclear capability.

The current crisis dates back to the summer of 2002, when an Iranian opposition group disclosed the existence of an extensive uranium enrichment complex at Natanz in central Iran and construction of heavy water production plant in Arak. These revelations prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to undertake various inspections and subsequently presented a series of reports, which, among others, raised questions about Iran's professedly civilian nuclear programme and its desire to create its own fuel cycle that could be used to produce bombs. The IAEA discoveries ranging from advanced clandestine nuclear development to the presence of trace weapons-grade uranium convinced even doubtful European Union (EU) members about the extent of Iran's clandestine nuclear endeavor. Worried about the proliferation risks in world's most volatile region, the EU-3 comprising France, Germany, and Great Britain have tried to settle the issue diplomatically through constructive engagement with Iran. However, as the European initiative fails in persuading Iran to halt its

uranium conversion and enrichment plans permanently, it seems certain that the issue would be referred to the United Nations Security Council for a decision on collective action against Iran for its non-compliance with the NPT obligations.

Since August 2002, international community has been confronting with Iran's nuclear programme as the formidable threat to global peace. The diplomatic talk over the Iranian nuclear issue conducted under the framework of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has thus far yielded no breakthrough. The United States is bent on referring this issue to the U.N Security Council. The present offer made by P 5 +1, consisting Britain, France, China, Russia, America, and Germany was rejected by Iran repeatedly. According to Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, "A deadline is not an issue. We think such statements are not constructive and they will not help resolving the problem. We will respond next month." Iran insists its nuclear dossier is a matter of international "law," technicalities, and "rights."²⁴² The five permanent UN Security Council members – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – plus Germany have offered Iran a package of incentives that includes multilateral talks if it agrees to halt uranium enrichment temporarily. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has promised Iran would continue sensitive nuclear fuel cycle work and not back down "one iota."²⁴³ The Iranian nation is determined to obtain all of its rights, including full nuclear rights and the complete exploitation of the nuclear fuel cycle."

However, due to the unrelenting stand of Iran and its repeatedly rejection of the deadline for nuclear response, the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany they agreed to the referral at a meeting in Paris. French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste Blazy was categorically, in his statement said that they had no choice but to return to the Security Council and continue the

²⁴² *The Hindu*, July 16, 2006

²⁴³ *The Hindu*, July 18, 2006.

process suspended two months ago, as the Iranians gave no indication suggesting their willingness to engage seriously on the substance of their proposals.²⁴⁴

In a quick response to the six- national proposal, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reiterated his country's determination not give up its right to nuclear technology despite the global pressure. He also warned that Iran would "revise" the cooperation with international authorities after the decision of the six world powers to send its nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. The Iranian strategy now is to play by the rules and vilify Washington for trying to change them. Tehran presses the IAEA to certify its compliance with nonproliferation standards, and therefore allow it to resume uranium enrichment and plutonium programmes without sanction. Iranian officials hint that they will accept any European-suggested verification measures, in order to prove Iran's 'peaceful intentions. Before appears to have Iran will do anything but give up its "right" to enrich uranium.

Meanwhile, Russia and China who had stood by Iran earlier has lately backed off. While indicating, their support to western countries moves to refer Tehran to the U.N. Security council. The requirements of full Iranian compliance have been spelled out with a great deal of specificity, which include the following:

- I. to fully co-operate with the IAEA;
- ii. To strictly abide by the NPT and Safeguards Agreement hereto;
- iii. To ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT which provides a more efficient verification framework and to continue to comply with its provisions pending ratification;

²⁴⁴ *The Hindu*, July 14 2006.

iv. To take further steps towards meeting the international community's concerns over its nuclear programme and re-building a lasting confidence in its peaceful nature and inter alia to:

A. provide full and accurate information to IAEA on its past and current nuclear programme;

B. allow free and unimpeded access to its nuclear sites and research facilities, as well as to other sites if necessary, whether or not they fall under the NPT regime;

C. take voluntary action going beyond the NPT requirements, including in particular a sustained suspension and eventually the end of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

By agreeing to these steps may satisfy the international community and thus avoid further isolation. It may bring significant diplomatic and economic benefits. The economic benefits include, among others the opening up of trade and cooperation agreement with the EU countries which was suspended after the crisis and of Iran's entry into World Trade Organisation. Diplomatically, Iran would gain advantage in dealing with its regional competitors and possibly playing a larger role in the regional affairs. For instance, it would act as a mediator in bringing an end to the current Lebanese impasse and contributing effectively to the Israeli-Palestine peace-making process. Besides, it would have a greater involvement in the rebuilding of post Saddam Iraqi polity and the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan as well.

On the flip side, if the Iranians continue to repulse international efforts to resolve the crisis and instead opt to move forward with their nuclear programme, the consequences might turn pernicious to Iran and threat to global and regional stability. First of all, Iran may face comprehensive sanctions which are already re-imposed on Iran due to its concern of funding terrorist organisations in Lebanon and various other west Asian countries including its allegedly WMD

proliferation agenda. Iran is facing sanctions since 1979 revolution so definitely further sanctions will increase its economic vulnerability and may damage its growing monetary infrastructure. Due to increasing financial burden, there is possibility of economic breakdown, which may result in domestic resentment. Given the relative economic weight of Germany, France, and Britain, and given Iran's desperate need for further European foreign and direct investment to deal with its population explosion, the potential effect of this economic stick should not be underestimated.

While Iran holds the world's second-largest reserves of oil and gas and is the fourth-largest oil producer, it is in fact a net importer of refined oil products, including gasoline. In addition, internal consumption of oil products in Iran is growing by 5.2 percent a year, far faster than its ability to increase refining capacity. This means that the levels of imports necessary to make the Iranian economy function will only increase over time. Thus, sanctions that prevented Iran from importing, say, refined oil products, including gasoline, could bring its economy to a grinding halt. Perhaps more important, the subsequent shortages would disproportionately affect President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad political base, the urban underclass and lower-middle class, as well as the military.

No doubt, the Western countries will also pay a huge cost for isolating Iran. Since many of them are hugely dependent on Oil and Gas, whose unhindered production is essential for the survival of their economies. However, Iran would be unlikely to halt oil production for long, because under sanctions, its dependence on oil revenue would grow to maintain its hold on power. As the economic situation in Iran begins to deteriorate in the face of sanctions, the government would have to rely on disbursement of state revenue and support from the army and ordinary citizen. An international ban on the import of Iranian oil, denying loans to Iran, barring foreign investment, and favorable trade deals disallow Iran to secure loans from international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary fund and to deny Iran loans like for a

proposed natural gas pipeline to India via Pakistan are possible measures through which Iran can be sanctioned.

Secondly, if Iran decides to defy the international obligations it is likely to experience further isolation. As it is its “shuttle diplomacy” to Moscow, Peking, Brussels, and Vienna has come as a cropper in terms of mustering support for its position on the nuclear issue. Beyond the rhetoric’s and verbal expression of sympathy the Third World countries have done precious little in helping Iran overcome the diplomatic logjam. Since the world has become interdependent, wherein the needs of each other are taken care of with cooperation and mutual understanding. Iranian national interest would be better served by avoiding confrontation that would inevitably cost its exclusion.

So far, Iran’s approach has been quiet mature and reasonable. Its declared faith in the legal procedure in dispute resolution and evident in the statement of Mr. Larijani, that Iran would offer a formal response to the package of incentives and its continuing adherence to the NPT amidst pressures and tensions, to undermine symbolic of its growing maturity and extraordinary diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, recent reports from Iran are not indicative of the moderation and maturity it had shown at the beginning of the crisis in 2003. In a statement the Iranian nuclear negotiator Mr. Larijani said, “His country would not give up its right to nuclear technology despite the mounting pressures for a quick response to the six nation proposal,” He further added that the West must understand if Iran believes they are not in earnest, they will revise the current policies.if the West wants to create tensions, they must be responsible for the possible consequences”

Iran’s bellicose statements and uncompromising position also spurred concerns in the region, especially in the gulf. For gulf region is likely to suffer the most in case of open confrontation. Pre-emptive strike by the U.S on Iran’s suspected

nuclear site would further deepen the U.S involvement in the area by enhancing its military presence.

After overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, removal of Saddam Hussein from Iraq the U.S led attack on Iran would exacerbate the anti-U.S sentiments in the region. Exercise of military option would likely to increase the risk of plunging the region into the vortex of violence and instability. Iran has been considered as the leader of Islamic world since the revolution and allegedly providing shelter, facility, and fund to variety of terrorist organisations and fundamentalist groups. Encouraging the terrorist organization and Islamic group to act of terror in the region and beyond, all this, in long run would undermine America's political, economic, and strategic interest.

From the Iranian perspective however, its nuclear status, i.e its ability to make nuclear weapon would act as deterrence against its regional rivals and extra-regional hegemonic powers. Iraq aside, Iranians live in a threatening strategic environment. Across the Gulf, to the Southwest of Iran, Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the NPT and a strong advocate of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the West Asia However, it possesses Chinese CSS-2 missiles with a range of 2,600 kilometers and, since the end of the Gulf War, and the Saudi government has invested heavily in upgrading its military. (Military expenditures accounted for 13% of the Saudi GDP in fiscal year 2000, some \$18.3 billion. Besides that, Saudi Arabia has signed many defence pacts with United States and U.S forces are widespread in the country.

Though Israel does not border on the Gulf, its policies and armaments are viewed as a major threat by many in the region and are often a standard against which others' military programs are designed. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, though it has not signed the NPT. Indeed, Gulf States such as Iran and Iraq cite Israel's nuclear capability as justifying their own need for nuclear weapons, though this is but one of the motives behind their programs. In addition, Israel has maintained

medium range ballistic missiles (1000-3000 kilometer) and believed to have pre-emptive strike capability. Iran has been steadfastly opposed to external penetration of the region especially the domineering position of the U.S during the post cold war decade.

Given the above considerations, even the end to Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq and a clear termination of Iraq's WMD programs would not entirely mitigate Iran's security concerns. Iranian leaders see their country as the natural leader in the Gulf region and continue to wish to ensure that they have the military as well as other sources of power to play this role. Not only does Iran see United States as challenging its position, but also feel threatened by its regional overwhelming influence and geo-strategic aspiration in central Asia and Caucasus region.

These arguments have been refuted by the Western powers who continue to believe that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the whole West Asian region and upset the regional balance of power. In this context, it should be noted that, Iran has been arguing that, a nuclear capable Iran would stabilize the region and to ensure a balance of power Vis a Vis Israel. However, smaller Arab states fear that Iran might try to dominate the region once it acquires a nuclear capability. In addition to historical rivalries and a legacy of distrust between Arabs and Persians, there are several other reasons why Arab governments are keen to deter Iranian hegemony in the region. Firstly, Sunni Arab leaders are apprehensive about the increased Iranian influence in post-war Iraq and the rise of Shi'a power in the region.. They fear that the increased tensions caused by the Iranian program may eventually lead to an additional military confrontation in the region that would further increase instability, heighten tensions, and instigate terrorism. A military exchange between Iran and Israel may also result in increased escalation of tension and instability in the region.

There have been some allegations from the US and its allies UK that, Iran has been supporting insurgents in the Southern Iraq that have attacked UK military

convoys and US. Specifically the British have alleged that Iranian Revolutionary Guards have supplied Iraqi insurgent groups with shaped bombs. The improvised explosive devices used by the Iraqi insurgency groups were similar to those used by Lebanon based Hezbollah, which was supported by Iran. There are also allegations that Iranian President Ahmadinejad is seeking to form an alliance with the Al Qaeda groups and is willing to allow Al Qaeda training camps in Iran.

Iran refuted all these allegations and states that it is a western propaganda to vilify Iran. The Iranian objection to the Western interference to its nuclear programme is that Iran perceives Europe and United states as playing “Global Cop”, in the international system. According to the Iran government, the United States and Europe are applying double standards, one for Iran and another for official weapon states. Even in the west Asian region, Iran alleges, that, US has double standards of judgment. It encourages Israeli nuclear weapons programme while discouraging others. It is Iranian patriotism, which has been guiding the nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad government believes, acquisition of nuclear capability to be the sovereign right of Iran, they says that Iran needs nuclear capability to protect itself from the “perceived” regional and extra regional threats to its sovereignty.

In the context of the emergence of Iranian nuclear programme as an hyper issue of debate in the international fora, there is a view in certain quarters that the US might be trying to rake up the issue to extricate itself from the quagmire of Iraq and divert others attention. The victory of Ahmadinejad considered being hardliner and along with it the victory of HAMAS in direct Palestinian election, with an overwhelming majority has motivated the USA about its strategic aim in the region. Out of its own strategic interest USA; stand for depriving Iran, DPRK and others of their right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. USA is bent on referring the Iranian nuclear issue to U.N. Security council in order to force Iran to withdraw from the Iran- Europe talks and shift the blame the Iranian side for

the breakdown of the diplomatic talks²⁴⁵. One cannot pursue the peaceful settlement of international dispute through both the means simultaneously. On the one hand, United States is engaged in multilateral talks with the P 5 +1 offering peaceful solution, and on the other hand, as a global policeman with hard sticks. Coercion and persuasion cannot go together.

By insisting on taking the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN the USA is in reality trying at killing two birds with one stones-disrupting Iran-Europe negotiation, isolating and hitting Iran and containing EU countries. Sometimes critiques also argue that North Korea nuclear issue should not be seen as Iranian nuclear issue because it is an attempt to push its strategy to achieve global hegemony.

In the opinion of US policy makers Iran is entitled to all such evil labels as “rogue states,” “axis of evil”, “frontline tyranny”-included in the list of countries, which deserve the US pre-emptive nuclear strike. The new US policy of ‘regime change’ also cannot be seen in vacuum. Since Iranian revolution US strategic target was to topple revolutionary regime of Iran because of its perpetual hostility with own strategic interest.

In Iran, anti U.S feeling is so strong that it is possible that a significant section of population, which is not supportive of Iran’s controversial nuclear programme but is not articulate due to its anti-US sentiments and issue has turned as a question of national pride.

The U.S.A’s prestige has suffered a lot due to Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction scandal. Now without any concrete evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, the US will find it difficult to agree the international community for military option.

²⁴⁵ Ding Yuan Hong, “US CALCULATION ABOUT IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE”, *Foreign Affairs*, no.79, March 2006.

The government of Iran is very much aware of US's constrain of its military option. United States may not get support from the American civil society if it goes for any pre-emptive strike. As voices of dissents against Iraqi invasion is still stronger.

The Iranian policy makers are further emboldened due to US involvement in Iraq. There is a palpating feeling that the USA would not be able to carry out the preemptive strike because it is involved in the Iraqi conundrum. They further opinionated that United States is already preoccupied in Iraq and is militarily, financially and politically exhausted. Besides that, two permanent members of Security Council, Russia and China are also not in favour of any pre-emptive strike or comprehensive attack on Iran as they are maintaining favourable trade relations with Iran. In addition, majority of Iranians believes that the brewing crisis over Iran's nuclear program is a crisis of choice, not necessity. The Europeans have chosen to complete disregard alternative, non-confrontational courses of action toward Iran, offering instead pseudo-incentives in hope of making a grand nuclear bargain.

A more prudent Western policy would be to encourage Iran to continue cooperating with the nuclear agency, while exploring with the agency methods of monitoring closely the Iranian nuclear fuel program to ensure that there is no diversion of enriched uranium for the purposes of making nuclear weapons.

Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi recently said that while she, too, opposes nuclear weapons, the West would do more good by focusing not on Tehran's nuclear program but on promoting democracy in the Islamic Republic. "In a country or a society where people supervise decisions and everything else, like a democratic country, the existence of an atomic bomb cannot be dangerous," Ebadi said.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁶ Cited in, Golnaz Esfandiari, "Iranian Public Offers Mixed Feelings on Nuclear issue", December 23, 2004, <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/rferl/perspex-rferl-series.htm>

As far as the future prospects for the solution of Iranian nuclear programme is concerned, they are multiple in nature. The first prospect, which emerges, is that Iran and the other involved parties should try to seek a way out from the crisis within IAEA's framework. Iran on its part should sign additional protocol, open up all its nuclear sites for IAEA's inspection, work under the nuclear safeguard provided by IAEA and other international institutions, follow NPT norms, desist from making nuclear bombs. There is also internal dissent exerting pressure on the present government to be accommodative and avoid confrontationist approach, for the larger interest of the country moderation, on the part of Iran would ensure the continuation of present regime in Tehran, whereas confrontation would increase the risk of destabilization of Post revolution Iranian regime.

USA and the western allies must realize that, cooperation and coercion cannot go together. If Iran agrees for complete cooperation with the multilateral agencies, USA and West should discard the use of coercion as an option. Coercion and the use of military in the settlement of disputes have little place in any civilized society. Efforts should be made to find a middle way solution that satisfies both the parties. Secondly, the clauses and provisions of any multilateral treaty should be made more clear and articulate. It should not be unclear or silent on certain issues. For instance, there is a lot of confusion over the Clause IV of Non proliferation treaty. The article permits uranium enrichment for energy purposes. There is also a hidden fear that Iran might use Uranium enrichment knowledge for other purposes like making Nuclear weapons because uranium enrichment beyond the limit can produce fissile material for weapon also which is against Non Proliferation Treaty. One long-term question relevant not just to Iran, but the vitality of the UN system and its capacity to promote international peace and security, is the degree to which the UNSC helps the IAEA be more of a proactive nuclear watchdog, not just an auditor of a limited range of known nuclear materials and activities that sometimes follows additional leads. IAEA should be

given every opportunity to work with the parties involved and to facilitate them in a comfortable environment to build the confidence in international institutions.

Nuclear weapons are the most deadly weapons ever invented. This is why they are often described as the “great equalizer” in the sense that their possession diminishes the gap in conventional military power between strong and weak nations. Nuclear capability can be a good servant, if used with tact and caution. It should be used to serve humanity and not to jeopardize its existence. Nuclear weapons are dangerous not because of the massive loss of lives and property they entail, but also because they need a lot of attention for their maintenance. A single mistake at any point can put at risk the whole of humanity and wipe it out of existence. The sooner the interested parties realize this and agree to a mutual climb down on their positions, the better are the prospects for turning West Asia into a nuclear free zone.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Aghazadeh, Reza, *Statement to the Forty-Ninth Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, September 2005, at <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Statements/iran.pdf>.

Aghazadeh, Reza, *Statement to the Forty-Seventh Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency*, September 2003, at <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/Statements/iran.pdf>.

Clawson, Patrick, “The least ‘bad option’ for limiting the growing threats”, March 2, 2006, statement made by Clawson, Deputy Director, *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington D.C, at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.template>.

Comments by IAEA Director General on “IAEA and Safeguards in Iran”, August 2003, at <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/Statements/iran.pdf>.

Director General Mohamed El-Baradei press briefing, “Safeguards in Iran: Need for More Transparency”, March 2, 2005, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>.

Director General’s Board Statement Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme Sent to UN Security Council”, Staff Report March 8, 2006, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei talks to reporters at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/Iran/ma_iran_2310.html.

Director-General for International Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran Amir H. Zamaninia *Statement on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran IAEA Board of Governors*, March 13, 2004, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf>.

International Atomic Energy Agency, *Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris*, on November 15, 2004, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf>.

International Atomic Energy Agency, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, March 13, 2004, at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-21.pdf.

International Atomic Energy Agency, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board* September 12, 2003, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-79.pdf>

International Atomic Energy Agency, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, September 18, 2004, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2004-77.pdf>

International Atomic Energy Agency, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, September 24, 2005, at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>.

Iran's Nuclear Program on the Security Council's Agenda, Remarks By Ambassador Gregory Schulte, the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, May 9, 2006 at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>.

Iran's nuclear programme: need for international response, *Report Political Affairs Committee* by Rapporteur Mr Abdülkadir Ates, Turkey, Socialist Group Doc. 10496 April 8, 2005, at <http://assembly.coe.int/documents>.

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami talks with IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei in Tehran on February 22, 2003. IAEA Director General Report to IAEA Board of Governors, Press Release PR 2006/01 <http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/board/2005/government-2005-64.pdf>.

Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran Under Khatami: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, *Statement before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs*, May 14, 1998, at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/PDF/2002/Documents/Documents/Islamic%20Republic%20of%20Iran%202002.pdf

Mohammad El-Baradei *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, on November

18, 2005, Report by the Director General GOV/2005/81, at
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>

Mohammad El-Baradei, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General GOV/2006/15*, February 27, 2006, at
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>.

Mohammad El-Baradei, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, February 4, 2006, Report by the Director General GOV/2006/13, at
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>.

Mohammad El-Baradei, *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board*, June 4, 2003, Report by the Director General GOV/2003/32, at
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf>.

President George W. Bush, "President Bush Nominates Rob Portman as OMB Director and Susan Schwab for USTR," *News conference*, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2006, at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060418-1.html>.

President Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad correspondence to President George W. Bush, May 8, 2006), at
http://medias.lemonde.fr/mmpub/edt/doc/20060509/769629_lettre.pdf.

Report of the Director General IAEA, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", GOV/2006/27, April 28, 2006, at <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport28Apr06.pdf>.

Statement by IAEA Director General on Iran on May 31, 2006, at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/Iran/ma_iran_2310.html.

The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Interview with the Associated Press Editorial Board, State Department transcript, May 9, 2006, at
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/65975.htm#iran>.

The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns Opening Statement before the House International Relations Committee, "*United States Policy Toward Iran*", March 8, 2006, at
<http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/62779.htm>.

The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert

Joseph, *Briefing on the Iran Nuclear Issue*, April 21, 2006, at <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/64945.htm>.

UN Security Council news release (including text of Presidential Statement),
“Security Council, in Presidential Statement, Underlines Important of Iran’s
Re-Establishing Fully, Sustained Suspension of Uranium-Enrichment
Activities: Calls on Iran to

Take Steps Required by IAEA Board Of Governors; Requests Report from IAEA
Director General in 30 Days,” March 29, 2006, at
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm>.

United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, at
<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm>.

Secondary Sources

Books

Al-Swaidi, S. Jamal, ed. (1996), *Iran and Gulf: Search for Stability*, Abu Dhabi:
Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research.

Anthony H. Cordeesman (1987), *Iran’s Military Forces in Transition:
Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, London: Pagers
Publishers.

Cain C. Anthonng (2002), *Iran’s Strategic Culture & WMD, Implications for US
Policy*, U.S.A.: Air War College, Maxwell paper, No. 26.
Casemate publications.

Cimbala, J. Stephen, ed. (2002), *Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the
Twenty First Century*, USA: Pager Publishers.

Clawson, Patrick, ed. (1994), *Iran’s strategic intension and capabilities*
Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Clawson, Patrick, et.al. (1998), *Iran under Khatami: A Political, Economic and
Military Assessment*, U.S.A.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Daniel, L. Elton (2001), *The History of Iran*, London: Greenwood Press.

Feldman, Shai (1997), *Nuclear weapons & Arms control in the Middle East*,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The MIT Press).

- Howard, Roger (2004), *Iran in crisis: Nuclear Ambitions & the American Response*, London: Zed publishers.
- Jackson, Robert and George Sqrson (2003), *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, London: Oxford University Press.
- James A. Bill, ed, (1988), *Mussaddiq, Iranian nationalism and oil*, London: IB Tauris and co. ltd
- Keddie, R. Nikki and Rudi Mattee, eds. (2002), *Iran and the Surrounding World Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, New York: New York University Press.
- Kenneth M. Pollack (2004), *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America*, New York: Random House.
- Keddie, R. Nikki, (1995), *Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance and Revolution*, New York: University press.
- Lt. Commander Paul Kerstanski (1995), *US Policy and the Iranian Threat*, Newport RI: Naval war College.
- Martin, Vanissa, (1988), *CREATING AN ISLAMIC STATE: KHOMEINI AND THE MAKING OF NEW IRAN*, London: IB Tauras co. ltd.
- Mehdi Khalaji and Mohsen Sazegara, (August 2005), *Challenges Facing Iran's New Government*, Policy Watch # 1022, U.S.A.: Washington Institute For Near East Policy.
- Menashri, David (1997), *Revolution at the Crossroads: Iran's Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions*, USA: Washington institute for near east policy.
- Mueller, H., ed. (1987), *European Non Proliferation Policy*, London: Oxford University press.
- Patrick Clawson and Michel Rubin, (2005), *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos* Washington D.C: Palgrave Press, Washington institute for Near East Policy.
- Perkovich, George (2005), *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*, New Delhi: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and India Research Press.
- Rahnema, Saeed and Sahrab, Behdad, eds. (1996), *Iran after the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State*, New York: I. B. Tauris.

- Raju, G.C. Thomas, ed. (1986), *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime*, Princeton: N.J. Princeton University Press.
- Rezun, Miron (1990), *Iran at the Crossroads: Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade*, USA: West View Press.
- Rubin, Barry (2002), *Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf*, London: Frank Cass & Portland, Oregon.
- Schake, N. kori & Judith S. Yaphe, eds. (2001), *The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran*, Washington D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies.
- Sean McKnight, Neil Patrick and Francis Toase, ed. (2000), *Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Generation*, U.S.A.: The Royal united Services Institute for Defence Studies and The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
- Shyam Bhatia (1988), *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East*, London: Routledge.
- Sick, Gary,(1985), *All Fall Down: America's Fateful Encounter with Iran*, London: Tauras and co. Ltd.
- Spector, Leonard S. (1998), *Going Nuclear*, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.
- Venter, J. AL (2005), *Iran's nuclear option: Tehran's Quest for Atom Bomb*, U.K: Casemate publication.
- W. M. J. Olson, ed. (1987), *US strategic Interest in the Gulf region* London: West View Press Inc.
- Walsh, E. Lawrence (1997), *FIREWALL: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover Up*, New York: W.W Norton & Company.
- Zak, Chen (2002), *Iran's nuclear policy & the IAEA: An evaluation of programme 93+2*, U.S.A.: Palgrave, Washington institute for Near East Policy.

Articles

- Alimov, Anatoly (spring, 2001), "Iran: Are WMD out of Reach?", *Nuclear Control*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 26-30.
- "Atom for Peace Agreement with Iran", *Department of State Bulletin*, April 15, 1957, No.36, p. 2, at www.payvand.com.
- Alam, Shah (December 2000), "The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatmi", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIV, No. 9.
- Albright, David (2003), "Iran: Player or rogue", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 52-58.
- Ansari, Ali (Nov 2003), "Iran: Nuclear Stand Off", *World Today*, Vol. 59, No. 11, pp.7-8.
- Barun, Chaim and Chyba F. Christopher (fall, 2004), "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," *International Security*, Vol.29, No.2, pp.5-59.
- Bahgat, Gawdat (April 2005), "Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East: Iran and Israel", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.25-43.
- Beehner, Lionel (2006), "Arab views of a nuclear Iran", April 20, 2006, at <http://www.cfr.org/publication>.
- Bill A. James (Autumn 1999), "Iran and United States: A Clash of Hegemonies", *Middle East Report*, No. 212.
- Brenda, Shaffer (Nov.2003), "Iran at the nuclear threshold," *Arms Control Today*
- Cyrus Safdari, *Le Monde Diplomatique* (2005), "Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons" November 2005, at, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran's_nuclear_program.
- Chubin, Sharam (Winter 1978), "Iran's security in the 1980's," *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 3.
- Chahram, Chubin and Robert Litwark, (Summer 2003), "Debating Iran's Nuclear Aspirations," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 43.
- David Ramezani (2004), "The challenges for Iran", February 18, 2004 <http://www.iranian.com/opinion.html>.

- Dedwal, Sebonti Ray (May 1998), "Iran sets out to win friends in the Arab world," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 263-79.
- Dennis Ross, "A New Strategy on Iran", May 1 2006, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com>.
- Dr. Dawood Hermidas Bavand, "Territorial challenge and Iranian identity in the course of history", at <http://www.iranchamber.com/index>
- Ecovich, Steven (Winter 2004), "Iran and New Threats in the Persian Gulf and Middle East", *Orbis*, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 71-87.
- Fairbanks C. Stephen (Spring, 2001), "Iran: No easy Answers", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 448-64.
- Fred, Wehling, (Winter, 1999), "Russian Nuclear and Missile Export to Iran", *The Non Proliferation Review*, Monetary Institute of International Studies, Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 134-143.
- Hollis, Rosemary, (July 2003), "Iran: Bemused and Worried" *World Today*, Vol. 59, No.7, pp. 4-5.
- Jacqueline Simon (December 1996), "US Non-proliferation policy and Iran: constraint and opportunities", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 365-394.
- Epstein, William, "Why states go and don't go for nuclear", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 430..
- Jasinski, Michael, "Russia's nuclear and missile technology assistance to Iran", at <http://cns.miis.pubs/weeks/index.htm>.
- Gheissari, Ali and Vali Nasr (Summer 2005), "Whither Iran? The conservative consolidation in Iran," *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175-190.
- Henriksen H.Thomas, (Spring, 2001), "The Rise and Decline of Rouge States", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 349-73.
- "Iran's nuclear challenge", January 12, 2006, Editorial, *Washington Post*, <http://ww.iranfocus.com>.
- Jahanpour, Farhang, " The politics behind the Iranian 'Nuclear threat'", July 4, 2006, at <http://www.antiwar.org>.
- John Simpson, (Jan 1994), "Nuclear Non Proliferation in the Post Cold War Era" *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 17-39.

- Kerr, Paul, "Security council mulls Response to Iran", May 2006, at <http://www.armscontrol.org>.
- Kemp, Geoffrey (Summer 2003), "How to stop Iranian bomb", *The National Interest*, No. 72.
- Kraig, Michael and Riad Kahwaji (2004), "Assessing Alternative Frameworks For Gulf Security", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 1-39.
- Henry Precht (Spring, 1988), "Ayatollah Realpolitik", *Foreign Policy*, No. 70.
- Larrabee F. Stephen and Peter A. Wilson (2006), "Outside View: Averting War with Iran" May 3, 2006, at <http://www.postchronicle.com/>.
- Lynne O'sullivan and Ian Davis (2003), "US foreign policy: From Baghdad to Tehran", *Basic Publication*, June 16, 2003, at <http://www.csis.org>.
- Michael Mihalka (1995), "The Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal: diplomacy of several doors", *Transition*, November 17, 1995.
- Mohammed Sahimi, "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Part II, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran's_nuclear_program
- Mishra, Rajesh Kumar (2004), "Iranian Nuclear Programme and Pakistan: Implications of the linkages" *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 3, July-Sept, pp. 440-450.
- Mustafa Kibaroglu (Spring 2006), "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 2.
- Michael Eisenstadt, "Iran's nuclear ambitions & U.S. options", March 16, 2005, MEF Wires, at <http://www.meforum.org/article/699>.
- Mizin, Victor (March, 2004), "The Russian-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S Policy Option" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 71-84.
- Mehdi khalaji (2006), "Iran: International Pressure and Internal Conflict", *Policy Watch*, No. 1106, May 24, 2006, U.S.A.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Nikolai Sokov (2006), "The Prospects of Russian Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis," *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, February 17, 2006.
- Owe Greene (April 1993), "Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons: The past and the prospect", *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 2.

- Percovitch, George, (Autumn 1998), "Nuclear proliferation", *Foreign Policy*, No. 112.
- Percovitch, George, "For Tehran nuclear programme is a matter of national pride" Yale Global, March 21, 2005, at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/expert>.
- Pollack, Kenneth and Ray Takeyh (March- April 2005), "Taking on Tehran", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 20-34.
- Preez, Du. Jean (December 2003) "Iran and the IAEA: A troubling past with a hopeful future?" *International Organization and Non-proliferation Programme, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies*, <http://cns.mijs.edu/pubs/week/03050.htm>.
- Phillips, James, John C. Hulsman, and James Jay Carafano, "Countering Iran's Nuclear Challenge", Backgrounder No. 1903, December 14, 2005, at <http://www.heritage.org/>
- Paul, T.V. (2003), "Systemic conditions and security cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 135-154.
- Pajakt F. Roger (Autumn, 1983), "Nuclear status and Policies of the Middle East Countries", *International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 587.
- Percovich, George (2003), "Dealing with Iran's Nuclear challenge", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 28, 2003, pp.1-16, at www.ceip.org.
- Quillen, Chris (June 2002), "Iranian Nuclear Weapons Policy: Past Present and Possible Future", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 17-24.
- Richard K. Bett (November 1979), "Incentive for nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran", *Asian Survey*, P. 1065.
- Richard, Beeston, "Don't treat Iran like a child, angry president tells Europe," *London Times Online*, May 18, 2006, at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2185495,00.html>.
- Roshandel, Dr. Jalil, (OCT 2005), "Is Iran the Next Nuclear State", *Rusi Journal*, Vol. 147, No. 5, pp. 52-58.
- Roshandel, Jalil (March 1996), "Iran Nuclear Technology and International Security", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 12.
- Russell A. James (Fall 2004), "Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle East" *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 23-45.
- Shirley, G. Edward (Autumn 1994), "Iran Policy Trap", *Foreign Policy*, No.96.

- Salama ,Sammy and Elizabeth salch, "Iran Nuclear Impasse: Give Negotiation a Chance" June 2, 2006, <http://cns.miis.pubs/weeks/index.htm>.
- S., Rahnema 'Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of "Democracy" in Iran', *Monthly Review*, March 2001.
- Schwarz Bach, A. David (1997), "Iran's Nuclear Puzzle", *Scientific American*, Vol. 276, No. 6, June, pp. 62-65.
- Sadr, I.Ehsaneh (2005), "The Impact of Iran's Nuclearisation on Israel", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2, summer, pp. 58-71.
- Steven C. Welsh (2006), "Newest IAEA report on Iran cites continued concerns in anticipation of full UNSC consideration," *Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project*, March 3, 2006, at <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-iaea-030306.cfm>.
- Steven C. Welsh, "Preemptive War, International Law & the 2006 National Security Strategy," *Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project*, March 16, 2006, <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war-031606.cfm>.
- Steven C. Welsh, "Preemptive War and International Law," *Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project*, Dec. 5, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm>.
- Steven C. Welsh, "Iranian Nuclear Activities: IAEA Board of Governors Considers UN Security Council Notification," *Center for Defense Information, International Security Law Project*, Sept. 23, 2005, <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-nuclear-0905.cfm>.
- Samii Bill, "Iran: As Nuclear Crisis Escalates, Are Direct U.S Contacts Becoming An Option", March 6, 2006 at <http://www.rferl.org/reports>.
- Sepehr Zabih (July 1976), "Iran's policy towards Persian Gulf," *International Journal of Middle East*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 345-358.
- Seth, W.carus (Sept.2000), "Iran and WMD" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 3.
- Simon, Jacqueline (December 1996), "United States Non Proliferation Policy and Iran: Constraints and Opportunities", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 365-394.

- Tarock, Adam, "Iran- Western Relations On the Mend", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.26, No.1, May 1999.
- Tarzi, Amin (Sept. 2004), "The Role of WMD in Iranian Security Calculations: Dangers to Europe", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 91-111.
- Venter J.AL (September 1997), "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion or Ominous Truth", *International Defense Review*, Vol. 30, No. 9 pp. 29-31.
- Vick, Karl, "Ayatollah moves hint Iran wants to engage: Supreme leader sets to course for WTO membership", *Washington Post Foreign Service*, July 5, 2006, at <http://projects.washingtonpost.com>.
- Vora, Batuk (2003), "Why is the US zeroing- in on Iran after Iraq" *Mainstream*, Vol. 41, No. 25, June 7, 2003, pp. 5-7.
- Washington Post News Report on Middle East Affairs", (Spring 1987), "The Israel-Iran connection" Published in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.26 No. 3.
- Welsh, C. Stephen, "Iran Nuclear Challenge: UN Security Council - IAEA partnership looked to serve as robust multilateral alternative to pre-emptive unilateralism" at <http://www.cdi.org/program/document>.
- Yaalon, Moshe, "Confronting Iran", March 7, 2006, Washington Institute For Near East Policy at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>.

Conference report

CSR report for Congress, "Iran Nuclear Programme: Recent Developments" by Sharon Squassoni, *National Defence Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade Division*, April 12, 2006, at <http://www.csr.com>.

Soltanieh, Asghar Ali, "Facts And Figures On Iran's Nuclear Policy", *The Conference paper of Mr. Soltanieh at "Forum On Iran's Nuclear Program And The Evaluation Of Recent Developments October 16, 2005" Organized by International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO)*, at <http://www.turkishweekly.net/articletype>.

Newspapers/websites

http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/world/middle_east/296944.stm.

<http://www.ceip.rog/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?newsId=1392>.

<http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/iran/rusnuc.htm>.

<http://www.csis.org>.

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html#oil>.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/world/library/report/2005>.

<http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/board/2005/government-2005-64.pdf>.

<http://www.ipsnews.com>.

http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2946644.stm.

<http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/iran/1825-4968.html>.

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/articletype>.

<http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=2686>.

<http://www.csr.com>.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org>.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran's_nuclear_program.

<http://projects.washingtonpost.com>.

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2185495,00.html>.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/expert>.

<http://www.meforum.org/article/699>.

<http://www.armscontrol.org>.

<http://www.iranian.com/opinion.html>.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication>.

<http://www.iranfocus.com>.

<http://www.rferl.org/reports>.

<http://www.iranchamber.com/index> .

