NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CASE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENT AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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2006

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CASE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENT AND DRUG TRAFFICKING"** submitted by me for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work. This dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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TO

Badi Mummy,Papa and Maa

For what they have been to me .....

knowledge and research skills. I would also like to thank all the members of the faculty and staff of my Centre for their cooperation and suggestion in carrying this work. My special thanks also to the JNU and IDSA library staff that I always found helpful and cooperative.

I shall always be obliged to Satyajit Bhayia and Bhabhi for their enormous contribution in the study. My utmost thanks are due to them for their full cooperation and critical reflections.

In finalizing this work, I have received all possible help from my friend Leyaqat A. Aafaqui, who provided immense help, motivation and guidance. I owe my greatest debt to him for his endless patience, when mine had started showing signs of drying up.

My utmost thanks are due to my brothers Pravesh, Sonu, sister Gargi, friends Pawan, Susmita Di, Noor Ji and Appu for giving constant support and motivation. My sincere thanks to Monam Khan for his painstaking efforts in typing and bringing this work in time.

Of course, it is impossible to forget Badi Mummy, and my parents for without their blessings, love, care and support I would not be what I am today. This work is in fact, a product of their constant love. Finally, needless to say the shortcomings are my own.

Dhanika Sharma

PREFACE

There is a great diversity in the range of perspectives on how we should think about and analyse security, reflecting the lack of agreement within the discipline of International Relations about the notion of security. The dominant perspective on security focuses on the state as the unit to be secured and on issues relating to the threat, use and management of force and coercion in world politics. However, increasingly, non- traditional security challenges are becoming a focus of attention for policymakers and analysts. Hence, it is argued that any attempt to rethink security in the post Cold War era must move beyond the traditional focus on the state as the referent object for security discourse.

The study of security may be fragmented, but the opening of its agenda makes it very innovative and vibrant area of International Relations. Moreover, while it is possible to focus on purely abstract aspects, the study of security is more about than just concepts. It is about the actual grass-roots application of different concepts.

Non-traditional security paradigm begins with the basic question – How safe and free are we as individuals? It is a conception of security that is centered above all on the sanctity of individual. This dissertation is structured to analyse and show how non-traditional security issues like environment and drug trafficking has emerged as threats to peace with its potential for generating conflicts, and finally leading to more insecure world.

The chapter scheme attempts to be thematic and sequential in approach.

Chapter One gives a brief introduction to the concept of security. It outlines the meaning and ambit of non-traditional security. The chief argument in the chapter has been that restricting security discourse only to military issues solves little purpose.

Chapter Two and Three deal with two important issues on the non-traditional international relations agenda: Environmental Degradation and Drug Trafficking.

Chapter Two outlines the extent of environmental degradation and its impact in the Southeast Asian region. The chapter shows that there is much utility in establishing a

causal link between environmental degradation and (in)security. The chapter focuses on how environmental degradation serves to undermine drastically the quality of life for the people in the region, with concomitant repercussions on security, stability and peace in the Southeast Asian countries.

Chapter Three outlines the dynamics of drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. The deleterious effects of illicit drug trade e.g. weakening of regimes, corruption, money laundering, health hazard etc. are explained in detail. Emphasis has been placed on the non-traditional security implications of drug trafficking in Southeast Asia.

Chapter Four outlines the national, regional and global structures and programmes that the states have built to root out environmental degradation and drug trafficking. It examines the evolution of multilateral cooperation in environmental protection and drug control.

The Concluding Chapter endeavors to weave the results of the entire work in the form of some final thoughts and recommendations. While clearly not the last word on the topic, this work will hopefully serve to stimulate broader exercises of this nature.

The descriptive and analytical method characterizes the present study. Patterns and problems have been described and then analyzed. A list of select bibliography appears as part of the dissertation.

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Chapter-I

INTRODUCTION

Security is freedom from threats. What makes something a security issue in international politics? The answer lies in an inter-subjective understanding of what constitutes an existential threat to a referent object. Conventionally, the answer can be sought in the traditional military political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. Here the referent object is the state.

In defining what constitutes 'security', certain questions need to be answered? First, what values are being threatened? Second, what is threatening those values? Third, what means are available to counter the threat? Fourth, who is expected to provide the protection or security against the threat? Fifth and finally, who will pay for the cost of protection or security? From the perspective of national security policymakers, the national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the state are the fundamental values which are to be protected. Often, challenges to national security are seen as emanating from outside the national society.

Of particular concern, are the challenges posed by the use of force or threat of the use of force by another state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of a state. This is the traditional view of national security as most elaborately developed within the realist approach to international relations. The realist concern is focused primarily on threats of military nature against the state from external sources. Domestic developments may be sufficiently threatening to the viability or stability of the state but the realist obsession with 'parsimony' leads them to focus primarily on the external threats.

Realism in its many forms has dominated European and by extension Western thinking about security since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which is generally accepted as having laid down the foundations of the contemporary state system. Acquisition and protection of territory dominated the national security agenda. The Cold War also reinforced the realist bias towards the

military aspects of national security, giving little space for alternative approaches or interpretations. Power is the central notion that informs realist thought. Neo-Realists focus on system structure, defined by the arrangement or ordering of the parts of the system. Kenneth Waltz argued that focusing on the structure of the system was the most fruitful basis for constructing theory.[1]

Thus, the traditional paradigm is unifocal in its emphasis on the centre of power (state), perception of threat (military). In its view, power is a zero–sum game having competition and strife as the rules of the game. In the realist world, the possibility of violence is pervasive. Realists consider anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system and independent sovereign states as the principal actors, engaged in an unending and brutal struggle for survival.

In the realist conception of the modern state system security has been construed as the conditions that make use of force more likely, the ways the use of force affect individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to mitigate military force. Since states abrogate to themselves the legitimate use of force this conception necessarily limits security to the study of war and diplomacy within an essentially state centric paradigm.

Stephen Walt gives probably the strongest statement of the traditionalist position. He argues that security studies are about 'the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force'. Against those who widen the agenda outside this strictly military domain, he argues that this:

> *runs the risk of expanding 'Security Studies' excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recessions could all be viewed as threats to 'security'. Defining the field this*

[1] Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics,* (Reading: Mass Addisson, Weseley, 1979)

way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems[2].

As the 17th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes observed in a passage often cited but endlessly worth recalling:

There is no place for Industry , because the fruit thereof is uncertain : and consequently no culture of the earth ,no navigation nor use of the commodities that maybe imported by sea ; no commodious building ; no Instruments of moving and removing things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth ; no account of time ; no Arts ; no Letters ; no Society and which is worst of all, continuall , fears ,and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary , poore ,nasty, brutish , and short.[3]

For Hobbes it did not much matter, whether threats to security came from within or outside one's own nation. A victim is just as dead if the bullet that kills him is fired by a neighbor attempting to seize his property as if it comes from an invading army. A citizen looks to the state, therefore, for protection against both types of threat.[4]

Here we are suggesting not the Hobbesian view of security, where security is seen as an absolute value; but the example is citied to portray that the debate between the "narrow" and "widening" security have puzzled even the great philosophers.

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[2] Walt, Stephen, M. 'The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*. 35 (2), 1991, pp. 211-39.
[3] Hobbes, Thomas, *The Leviathan* (Re-printed Touchstone, 1997)
[4] Ullman , H, Richard , "Redefining Security," *International Security*, Summer, vol. 83 ,no.1, 1983, p.16

THE ISSUE OF SECURITIZATION

Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as more extreme version of politicization. Security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. The definition of security revolves around the realm of social construction of subject. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.

The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize special powers, to handle existential threats. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military but to count as security issue they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. This criteria would help to counter and somehow correct the traditionalists criticism that wideners risk intellectual coherence.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

The debate about levels of analysis has been central to much International Theory. Levels also run through all types of security analysis in context of preferred referent objects for security (individuals versus states).[5] It might still be objected that the whole level of analysis scheme locates things as domestic, state or international and thereby makes some transnational problems difficult to slot in. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the general mapping to look for non-territorial security and to ask separately whether there are trans-national, global or sub-systemic non territorial securitizations that have been

[5] Buzan [et. al], *Security,* (Lynne Rienner. Publishers, 1994) .p.5

ignored. One strength of securitization approach is that it will certainly pick up non-traditional threats. It should be pointed that diverse referent-objects testifies to the post-sovereign trends. If a multisectoral approach to security was to be fully meaningful, referent objects other than the state has to be allowed into the picture.

With the end of the Cold War and the military standoff between the superpowers, scholars have challenged the assumptions underlying security studies. Indeed, many expect that the non-traditional challenges would become the dominant security paradigm.

The political-social upheaval following the Cold War has dramatically altered the global security environment. Traditional threats, particularly those related to superpower competition, have been reduced or eliminated. The end of the Cold War did not, however, make the world safe/easier to understand. As a consequence, two views of security studies are now on the table, the new one of the wideners and the old military and state-centered view of traditionalists.

The "wide" versus "narrow" debate grew out of dissatisfaction with the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. This dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during 1990s. The alternative security paradigm that is emerging has its intellectual roots in liberal institutional school of International Relations, which sees world as increasingly shaped by order and cooperation rather than anarchy and conflict.

Security in the increasingly globalized world cannot be restricted to mere survival of the state. Defining security merely (or even primarily) military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality. That false image is doubly misleading and therefore, doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore even more harmful dangers. Thus,

it reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of International Relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity.[6]

For Buzan, strategic studies should concern itself with the study of the military aspect of the security agenda, and specifically with the impact of military technology on international relations. What he terms international security studies, on the other hand, should concern itself with more broadly defined threats to the 'security of human collectivities'.[7] Buzan suggests that 'the security of the human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental, 'with threats of each sort (military, political etc) having to be confronted.[8]

Developing this theme, Richard Ullman defined threats as follows: A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that:

- Threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of the state, or
- Threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state[9].

This certainly broadens the notion of security. There is a range of possible threats once we move beyond the military sphere. Caroline Thomas, for example, suggests that when examining Third World security one must consider 'nation-building, the search for secure systems of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for security through nuclear weapons'.[10] This gives us poverty, poor health care and lack of education as security issues. This

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4. Ibid, no.4, p.15
[7] Buzan Barry, *People ,States And Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold war Era* (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1983) p.19
[8] Ibid.
[9] ibid, no.4
[10] Thomas, Caroline, *In search of Security the 3rd World in International Relations,* (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1997)

was part of Brandt Report: - 'while hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty'.[11]

In addition to the broadening and deepening of security, the field has also been challenged on one of its key assumptions: power and stability equates to security. In keeping with the normative turn in international relations theory, the assumptions of Realism that had underpinned the national security debates of the Cold War have been subjected to revaluation. One such approach is known as critical security studies (CSS). CSS rejects the assumption that security is achieved through accumulation of power and instead argues that because states with similar notions of social justice and economic wealth do not go to war against one another, here lies the basis of security[12]. Thus, for CSS, (in) security comes from poverty (want) and political oppression (fear), not by achieving stability or maintaining an order that reinforces constraints placed on the people.

THE EROSION OF THE TRADITIONALIST AGENDA

Historically speaking, many factors have cumulatively built up a strong attack against the unilateralist focus on state and use of military force. During the Cold War the primary national and international security threat indisputably was nuclear war between United States and Soviet Union. With the fall of Berlin Wall in 1990 and the dissolution of Warsaw Pact, this threat had suddenly disappeared.

However, rather than leading to a period of unprecedented security, it has been replaced in the minds of decision makers and the general public by a host of new security threats. These security threats target not just the states, but individuals. Transnational threats are particularly unsettling because they do not fit into the analytical framework that had been developed during the Cold War. Cold War predominance with bloc rivalries was naive in the extreme, it

[11] Independent Commission on International Developmental Issues, *Brandt Report*, 1980.
[12] Krause, K. & Williams, M. C., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: University College Of London Press,1997)

neglected the fact that most of the worlds' problems, particularly those in the Third World, were hardly affected at all by East -West hostility and would not be much affected by its removal. It also reflected a singularly unhistorical and obsessive perspective on the Cold War. Consequently, security studies during the Cold War focused almost exclusively on military defense and deterrence, particularly the East – West conflict. A clear compartmentalization between "high and "low" politics had begun to take shape.

Hence David Baldwin's statement that:

> *Security has not been an important analytical concept for most security studies scholars. During the Cold War, security studies was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue, and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics ..... [P]uzzelement as to how a central concept like security could so be ignored disappears with the realization that military force, not security has been the central concern for security studies*[13].

With the end of Cold War and the military standoff between the superpowers, scholars have challenged the assumptions of traditional- security paradigm.

Of equal importance in changing threat perceptions has been the accelerating pace of what is loosely termed "globalization". Driven largely by advances in communications and transportation technology, the world is

[13] Baldwin David, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies* 23/ 1, Jan 1997,p. 9

inexorably becoming a smaller, more interconnected place, socially, politically and above all, economically. Although this phenomenon is presenting opportunities and benefits to many, it has also brought new risks and costs. Some problems, notably drug trafficking, illicit migration, and money laundering, are widely perceived to be expanding primarily because the effects of globalization in lowering trade barriers and making borders more porous help facilitate illicit commerce as much as they do the licit kind. More generally, globalization has engendered a growing sense of exposure or vulnerabilities to what had previously seemed distant or inconsequential.

Non-traditional security paradigm begins with the basic question – How safe and free are we as individuals? It is a conception of security that is centered above all on the sanctity of individual variously labeled as human security, non-traditional security, new security, cooperative security etc. The genealogy of the idea of human security can be related to if not traced back to the growing dissatisfaction with prevailing notions of development and security in the 1960s ,1970s and 1980s.

In 1980, Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by William Brandt issued the so – called "North – South Report". It argued for the necessity of a North – South engagement for development, it noted that the heart of the matter was the "will to overcome dangerous tensions and to produce significant and useful results for nations and regions – but, first and foremost, for human beings – in all parts of the world."[14]

An another commission of the 1980s – Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues (chaired by Olof Palme) authored the famous "common security" report which also drew attention to alternative ways of thinking about peace and security. With the end of Cold War, calls for new thinking in security matters grew rapidly. In 1991, the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance issued a call for "Common Responsibility in

[14] ibid., no.11

the 1990s" which referred to "challenges to security other than political rivalry and armaments" and to a wider concept of security, which deals also with threats that stems from the failures in development, environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, and lack of progress towards democracy". Four years later, the Commission on Global Governance's report, Our Global Neighborhood, echoed the Stockholm Initiative's words on security: "The concept of global security must be broadened from the traditional focus on security of the state to include the security of the people and the security of the planet". In the early 1990s Mahabub ul Haq and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched Human Development Index (HDI). It explicitly put at the center of its formulation the notion that development and thinking policies must take as their focus the welfare of individuals rather than simply macro- economy.

In the case of environment, securitization process can be traced back to the 1960s, when books such as Carsen's Silent Spring first began to make people seriously aware that the growing impact of humankind was transforming the natural environment from being a background constant into a foreground variable. Starting from a concern about pesticides, this grew steadily into a wide range of interconnected issues, including climate change, biodiversity, resource depletion, pollution, and the threat from meteorites. There was also a growing awareness that nature itself could still deliver huge blows against human kind. Broadly speaking, recent notions of environmental security hold that human-induced environmental degradation and scarcity pose fundamental threats. However there exists no agreed conception as to precisely what this entails.

Hence, it is argued that any attempt to rethink security in the post Cold War era must move beyond the traditional focus on the state as the referent object for security discourse.

The objective of this work is to show how non-traditional security issues like environment and drug trafficking has emerged as threats to peace with its potential for generating conflicts, and finally leading to more insecure world. The chapter on environmental concerns in Southeast Asia shows that environmental degradation should be incorporated in the discussion on security, as ignorance would only lead to deeper problems for the humankind in general and for the region in particular. Environmental issues have become part of the new international agenda in Southeast Asia.

In the final analysis, all human life depends on functioning, balanced and ecologically stable global biosphere. While the Earth has yet to reach an environmental crisis of apocalyptic proportions, significant changes are underway. Already in many parts of the world especially, Southeast Asian region; issues such as deforestation, pollution, water and food shortages and climate change have had significant and profound impacts. Similarly, the potentially destabilizing, multi-faceted and world-wide effects of drug have led to violence, criminality, over burdening of criminal justice system, rise in drug-related mortality cases, corruption, money laundering, serious clinical and social problems, road and on-the-job accidents, family disruption, lower productivity, rising unemployment and economic and political dislocation. The ramifications of these effects for national, regional and international security should not be underestimated.

One of the most interesting features of the conflicts which now confront us do not fit the traditional pattern of inter-state war which had hitherto dominated international politics. This work emphasizes the multi-dimensional nature of security where the state-centric position is a possible but not a predetermined outcome. Policies that seek security primarily by military means but fail to address underlying factors of instability will likely to trigger a downward spiral of violence and instability and quite possibly a collapse of

international rules and norms. Policies derived from a new understanding of global security can avoid these dangers and promote constructive alternatives. A roboust and comprehensive approach to creating a more stable world entails measures designed to stop environmental degradation, drug trafficking, trans-national terrorism, reverse the trend towards growing inequity etc. A fundamental shift in priorities is essential to accomplish these tasks. Ultimately, security must be universal.

Chapter-II

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ENVIRONEMTNAL SECURITY

Broadening security to encompass sectors additional to that of the military raises important conceptual questions: what is being secured? From where does the threat emanate? What makes something a security issue? And in this particular sector, is environmental degradation security issue? Is it states, people, or the globe itself that is being threatened? Are environmental problems security issues in Southeast Asia, and if they are, what are those problems?

Environmental problems range vastly in scope from the local (soil erosion) to the regional (acid rain) to the global (global warming) and include issues as diverse as resource scarcity and urbanization. Not all of these are likely to be security issues, though, which beg the question: what makes some of them matters of security? The first step in finding object - the thing to be secured - but instead it is human civilization. The threat is from human activity, which it is feared will have such a detrimental impact on the environment that our ecosystem or biosphere will be incapable of sustaining civilization. Hence, Barry Buzan's statement that environmental security "concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend."[1] This also points to the next step in determining what makes an environment problem a security issue.

The second step is to appreciate; it is not the cause of environmental degradation, but rather its impact or effect that makes it a security issue.

The lack of state capacity within developing states ensures that their response to environmental problems will require extraordinary actions. Since Southeast Asia is dominated by developing states with limited capacity to respond to environmental degradation, securitization rather than politicization can be expected to occur. As shown below, the region has environment security problems.

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[1] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp.19-20.

Returning to causes and effects, in responding to the causes of environmental problems a considerable range of policies have been pursued to change how we live so as to limit and then reverse the damage of human activity on the environment. Although environmentalists urge us to act before it is too late, the general view is that the danger will occur in some unspecified and relatively remote future and that the problem is not an urgent one requiring an immediate response and extraordinary measures, but rather one that can be resolved through legislation. For example, air quality, waste management, and water protection all are important issues, but they are regarded not as security matters but as issues to be dealt with through political means.

When analysis focuses on the effects of environmental degradation, however, security issues are raised, because such degradation could lead to interstate wars, ethnic conflict, and political disintegration. For example, soil infertility, which could be caused by desertification, deforestation, or over-cultivation, can lead to such severe economic deprivation that existing state institutions would be unable to cope with. Although noting that links between environmental degradation and unregulated population movements (UPMs) are not well established, Alan Dupont argues, "It is becoming more and more apparent that human-induced environmental degradation is stimulating UPMs by reducing incomes, especially in rural regions, or by rendering the environment so unhealthy and unpleasant that people feel compelled to move".[2] These problems may not simply be contained within a state. Since pollution does not recognize state borders, one state's economic activity can have a direct impact upon its neighbors' welfare.

The broadening of security to encompass environmental concerns, however, has not been without its critics, foolish or otherwise. In general, three criticisms are leveled, all of which can be countered by thinking of the environment as a secondary cause of insecurity. The first criticism is that

[2] Dupont, Alan, *East Asia Imperilled: Transitional Challenges to Security,* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.165

security is concerned with organized violence, which has little to do with environmental degradation. If environmental issues should be regarded as security issues because people die, then the critics state, what of disease, crime, and natural disasters that routinely destroy life? If security relates to everything, then it loses its clarity and means nothing. The term *security* is sufficiently contested itself without the "environment" muddying the waters even more. This though, is not the argument; while environmental degradation may itself not be responsible for organized violence, it can aggravate tensions by interacting with other causes that in turn lead to it.

The second criticism concerns resource scarcity. Here the criticism is that the availability of substitutes for raw materials, plus a world trading system that has lessened resource vulnerability, coupled with changing state norms that make acquiring resources through military conquest unattractive, have weakened the nexus between resource scarcity and conflict. The problem with this criticism is that the resources in question have changed; environmental security is less about non-renewable resources like oil and gas and more about the pressures on renewable resources such as food stocks and water resources. Hence Alan Dupont's claim that what "differentiates the resource scarcity of this era from the past", is the assault on the planet's primary renewable resources.[3] Although, pressures on renewable resources might not lead directly to conflict, they are prompting governments to protect their resources from exploitation by others. Thereby, increasing the likelihood of clashes.

The final criticism is that the evidence linking environmental degradation and conflict is anecdotal and at best inconclusive. It is certainly true that conflict arising directly form environmental factors is rare, but the issue here is determining whether environmental factors, as secondary causes have led to conflict. Although environmental decay has not so far caused inter-state war, Homer-Dixon, for one, believes this will change as the demands on regional and global resources become unsustainable. In his view environmental

[3]Ibid, p.17

scarcities are already leading to violent confrontations and there are unmistakable early signs of increasing conflict in the coming decade, either induced or aggravated by ecological scarcities.[4] Although military security has not vanished as a key element of national security, it has certainly declined relative to the issues of economic energy and environmental security. The environment in short, is very much on the security agenda.[5] If, after all, the functioning integrity of the earth is jeopardized, the search for other securities becomes futile. The security of man cannot be achieved if the security of the earth is destroyed.

Security based on the sovereignty of states and on the system of states, therefore on exclusion, cannot be sustainable because an interconnected planetary biosphere cannot be protected or rationally managed within a fragmented and uncoordinated social order. Juridical sovereignty, and the pursuit of narrow self-interest in its name, is incompatible with global ecological interdependence. The competitive state system is in fact the primary cause of insecurity. The modern world political structure and economic practices have been, and are, increasingly out of step with nature, but the conclusion of the Cold War offers an apposite moment in world history to begin the fundamental reconceptualization of transnational relations.[6] Not only is a global perspective vital for real personal and national security, but ecology, if given its proper place, will be a means to bring about that necessary transformation in perspective and priorities. It is, in the current jargon, a win-win outcome.

Not all environmental change can usefully be categorized as a security issue, determining what is, and is not, a threat is therefore, judgmental, but since one criticism of much of the current debate is its failure to locate insecurity in the particular circumstances of time and place, a rough and ready

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[4] Brown E. Michael, (et al.) (ed.), *New Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security,* (The MIT Press, 2004), pp.299-300

[5] Ibid, no. 1, p.258

[6] Davis Jane M., *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World,* (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996).

empiricism is not without merit. Rule of thumb criteria suggest that environmental change becomes a security issue if:

- It is extensive, rapid and sustained;
- There is a high degree of real incompatibility between the attainment of ecological and other important values;
- The real and monetary costs of attaining an acceptable trade-off between the conflicting objectives are large and/or increasing;
- It interacts in negative way with other structural or political weaknesses within states which lead to social turbulences.[7]

Most analysts are now willing to admit non military issues on to the security agenda. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and David E. Miller argue that the end of East-West confrontation has:

> *Revealed in its wake .... a different set of dangers, not really new but previously overshadowed by Cold War preoccupations... no longer will the field of international security be overwhelmingly fixated on how to deter the Soviet Union or how to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the superpowers. The newly revealed agenda is broader in it its focus, given much greater attention to previously neglected sources of conflict.*[8]

The 'previously neglected sources of conflict' focused on in this chapter are environmental threats.

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[7] Dalby, Simon, *Environmental Security,* (London: University of Minnestoa Press, 2002), pp.16-17
[8] Lynn-Jones and Miller, (ed.), *Global Dangers: Changing Dimension of International Security,* (MIT Press, 1995), p.52

The intention in broadening of the concept of security to encompass non-traditional issues is not to trigger a traditional security – type response to them[9]. Rather, it is to focus on the way in which security discourse is used to identify some threats as being 'existential'- part of the 'drama of survival' . Thus, 'Issues [become] phrased as "no way back": after we have lost our sovereignty/identity/the sustainability of the eco-system, it will be too late; therefore, it is legitimate that we take extraordinary measures'.[10]

These non-traditional threats to security are diverse, but have some features in common. First, for the most part they are not state-centered. Instead, they emanate form factors or actors which are sub-state or trans-state in character. As a consequence, they do not conform easily to state-centered theories and analyses. Second, these challenges have no particular geographic locus. The past focus on the danger posed by the military power of other states provided a location for efforts to contain the threat. The sine qua non of security was the construction and maintenance of military balances in strategic regions. Non-traditional challenges, however, represent dangers which are diffuse, multidimensional and multidirectional. Increasingly, they have to be viewed generally or sectorially, as well as territorially. Third, these challenges cannot be managed by traditional defence policies alone. Defence or military organizations may have a role; especially where violent conflict is involved, but effective management require a range of non-military approaches. Finally, the analyses delineating or elaborating these new concerns suggest that individuals as well as states are endangered. This chapter examines the linkage between environmental change and security. Some of the more pertinent problems: haze, deforestation, access to fresh water and marine pollution, impact of urbanization and population which has bearings on security are discussed.

[9] Buzan (et al.) *Security:* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p.19,
[10] ibid, p.101

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S FOREST FIRES

The "haze" is the ASEAN euphemism for airborne smoke pollution caused by uncontrolled forest fires. The principal source of the haze is in Indonesia's Kalimantan (Borneo) provinces and Sumatra. The haze is the single most important trans boundary environmental issue in Southeast Asia.[11] Forest fire-generated smoky air is a regular occurrence. In 1997, it was an economic and human disaster. Smoke from the fires blanketed nearly two million square miles for seven months, covering Singapore, parts of Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and of course, the country of origin, Indonesia.

Pollution's egregious security effect was dramatically illustrated by the choking smog that enveloped large areas of Southeast Asia in the latter half of 1997 and early 1998. The result of unusually severe forest fires on the Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan, the smog was an environmental disaster for the region with few modern parallels in terms of its scale and political impact. It affected the health of at least 20 million Indonesians, impeded navigation through the region's busy sea-lanes and strained relations between Jakarta and its ASEAN neighbors.[12] The smog also had significant political, health and economic repercussions for Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.

Fire is an intrinsic part of the life cycle of Indonesia's forests, but the 1997-98 blazes were an act of man, not nature. The destruction of forests in Kalimantan, Sumatra and, to a lesser extent, Irian Jaya and Sulawesi began in earnest in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s following the Indonesian Government's decision to significantly increase palm-oil production. Since 1985, the area of land given over to palm-oil plantations has grown from 600, 000 hectares to around 5 million hectares. Jakarta earns hugely from these plantations and aims to make Indonesia the world's largest producer. Forest-

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[11] Weatherbee, E. Donald, (et al.), *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy,* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p.272

[12] ibid, no.2, p.52

burning in Indonesia is the cheapest and quickest method of clearing land for palm oil plantations. Fires lit by plantation-owners on Kalimantan in 1994 created one of the worst smog in Indonesia before 1997, forcing airports and other facilities on Kalimantan and nearby Sulawesi to close for several weeks. Pollution in Singapore reached unprecedented levels, Malaysia declared a public alert and both countries sought urgent talks with Indonesia on cross-border atmospheric pollution.

Two factors - a severe drought caused by the EI Nino weather system and the presence of carcinogenic particles in the smog conspired to increase the environmental impact of the 1997 fires. The fires spread out of control, and prevailing winds carried a dense cloud of pollution as far as Northern Australia, Thailand and Philippines. The political costs for Indonesia were equally high. Although, initially blaming the fires on natural causes, principally El Nino, President Suharto was forced to issue two unprecedented apologies to neighboring states.

The 1997 forest fires were caused by large landholders controlled by business conglomerates with close ties to the Suharto family which coupled to the EI Nino weather phenomenon, resulted in the worst smog in Southeast Asia to date.

The fires burned out of control and prevailing winds spread the smog as far as Thailand and the Philippines, while neighboring Singapore and Malaysia recorded their highest ever levels of atmospheric pollution. The Wildlife Fund for Nature estimated that the health costs to Singapore were $8.8 million, while the impact on Singapore's tourist trade was some $8.4 million. In Kalimantan and Sumatra, factories, schools, air and seaports, and government offices were closed, and on September 19, Sarawak declared a state of emergency. The cost of increased health-care provision and loss of tourism for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were immense.[13]

[13] Ibid, no.11, p.273

In Southeast Asia, the haze that choked much of the region's inhabitants reinforced the close association between biomass burning, greenhouse gases, habitat destruction, and loss of biodiversity, air pollution, and public health. Moreover, it clearly linked that state of the environment, the rate of resource extraction and the frequency of hazard with adverse effects on industry, agriculture, forestry, and tourism, making such matters into issues of national and increasingly, international politics. Although the haze did not initiate a conflict. It was a source of health insecurity for the people and economic insecurity for the state of Southeast Asia. Thus, while environmental factors may be secondary causes of insecurity they clearly deserve to be part of the regions security calculus.

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DEFORESTATION

The environmental issue in Southeast Asia that has the greatest global impact is the loss of forest cover with its implications in terms of climate change and loss of biodiversity. This has been described as "the fundamental problem of environmental degradation facing Southeast Asia today."[14] Forests disappear because of logging, the spread of settled agricultural cultivation including plantation agriculture, and the perpetuation of shifting cultivation. To this can be added fire, accidental or deliberate. It is intensive logging that has attracted the greatest international concern. The introduction of tracked vehicles and chain saws, replacing oxen and axes, has accelerated the clear-cutting of millions of acres of Southeast Asia's tropical forests. James Clad and Aurora Medina Siy remark that no topic evokes more outrage nor prompts more resentment than the loss of Southeast Asia's tropical hardwoods.[15]

In Southeast Asia, fragile ecosystems already have been destroyed. Thailand and the Philippines have lost their productive forests. In order to meet domestic demand, Thailand has to import wood from Myanmar, Laos, and

[14] Mark A. McDowell, "Development and the Environment in Southeast Asia", *Pacific Affairs 62*, No.3 Fall 1998: 310

[15] ibid, no.11, p.259

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Cambodia. T t thing that logging operators in those countries are concerned ab environmental damage and sustainability. Only Thailand has had a higl)restation rate than the Philippines. Vietnam and Cambodia will be next. nt logging to satisfy Thai, Taiwanese, and Japanese markets have strij ımbodia of half of its forest cover since 1970. In 1999, the London-basec Global Witness, with international donor funding, was named "independent monitor" of the Cambodian government's forestry programs. In January 2003, Prime Minister Hun Sen terminated its work, angry over Global Witness reports of corruption and intimidation. Forests in Laos and Myanmar are equally endangered. The largest remaining tropical forests are in Malaysia's Sabah and Sarawak states and Indonesia's outer islands, including Papua. These, however, are also threatened.[16]

Although the export of logs is banned in Malaysia, its booming building and construction industry has an insatiable thirst for wood. Forest loss in East Malaysia is proceeding steadily despite reforestation. Logging in Malaysia's forests became a high-visibility international political issue in the 1980s and 1990s when international rights groups and governments adopted the cause of Penan tribesmen in their conflict with Malaysian logging interests in the East Malaysia Sarawak state. The Penan is an indigenous tribal group whose traditional forest habitats were being logged over. Penan customary rights were overridden by Malaysian facilitation of clear-cut logging. Foreign and domestic defenders of the Penan were no match for the Malaysian government-logging-industry juggernaut. The plight of the Penan has been echoed in all of the remote margins of developing Southeast Asia-Myanmar's border regions and Indonesia's Papua are cases in point, where the rights of indigenous minorities are trumped by the imperative of resource exploitation. An enhanced legal and political status for indigenous minorities in the international order was tentatively addressed in a 1993 UN "Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People." Part VI, Articles 25-30, essentially made indigenous peoples the legal

[16] Gaduah A. & Roesad K., "Economic Adjustment and the Forestry Sector in Indonesia," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, vol.xxxi, no.2, 2003, pp.241-255

stewards over their traditional lands, including ownership, exploitation, and environment. It is little wonder that the draft remained a draft, never to be accepted, since it limited the sovereign rights of national governments by giving internationally sanctioned special rights to particular domestic population groups.[17]

It is not just indigenous traditional people who are at risk. As forests are cleared for plantation agriculture the habitats of endangered species are reduced. Malaysia is a target of conservationist NGOs like the WWF that condemn the encroachment of oil-palm plantations into the rain forest habitats of tigers and orangutans. With peninsular Malaysia about planted over, plantations are being cleared in Sabah and Sarawak. International criticisms of Malaysia's practices are rebuffed in Kuala Lumpur as protectionist efforts to defend Western edible oil against palm oil competition.

According to the NGO Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), Indonesia, with the largest tropical forests in the world outside of Brazil, is losing more than nine million acres a year, the largest rate of deforestation in the world, which if continued would result in the loss of productive forests within two decades.[18] Since 1970, Indonesian forest cover has been reduced by one-third. The FWI figure is higher than the official projection of up to five million acres lost per year, but even that only stretches the depletion over another decade or so. The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), Indonesia's consultative donor's group, has singled out illegal logging as a critical issue in Indonesia's recovery and path to good governance. The CGI has made saving Indonesian forests a condition of aid, but like other conditions, even though few achievements can be pointed to, the aid is disbursed anyway.

A number of factors contribute to rate of forest loss. First, there is an unabated domestic and foreign demand for the wood. Logging concessions

[17] ibid, no.11, p.260
[18] ibid, no.16

continue to be given. The military and the police are in the logging business.[19] Illegal logging is uncontrolled, with more logs cut illegally than legally. The breakdown in central authority, the decentralization of enforcement, and corruption leave even national park forests open to plunder. An effort in 2004 to put in place an emergency government regulation to address illegal logging was put aside as too politically sensitive until at least after the presidential elections. One analysis argues that decentralization of Indonesia's timber regime has led to increased logging, both legal and illegal, without consideration of social and environmental consequences. Indonesia's porous borders with the East Malaysia states are regularly violated by illegal loggers. Indonesia's forest ministry claims that up to one thousand truckloads of illegal logs a week move from Indonesian Borneo across the border to Malaysia for use in Malaysia's plywood industry.[20] Yet, Malaysia refuses to address illegal logging in ASEAN official economic meetings. Other major destinations for Indonesian illegal logs are China, South Korea, and Japan.

The remnants of the great forests that once covered more than 40 per cent of the earth's land surface are receding apace as a result of land clearance for agriculture and grazing, commercial logging, urbanization and population. Population growth is a root cause along with the vastly increased per capita consumption of forest products such as paper and industrial round-wood.

Over time, deforestation reduces the fertility of the land, causing crop failures, food shortages and population movements. Aside from timber, forests contain a great diversity of products that both enrich and sustain life. Deforestation also threatens biodiversity. Although covering only 6 per cent of the earth's land surface, the tropical forests of Southeast Asia are estimated to contain between 70 and 90 per cent of the planet's animal and plant species.[21] Forests play a crucial role in binding the ecology of the planet and protecting

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[19] Dupont, Alan, *East Asia Imperilled: Transitional Challenges to Security,* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.47

[20] ibid.

[21] Heenan P., & Lamontagne M. *The Southeast Asia Handbook,* (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), p.182

fragile soils from temperature and rainfall extremes and in creating their own microclimates within their canopies. Removing trees often triggers a cycle of flooding and drought that ends in substantial soil erosion and sometimes desertification. In East Asia deforestation is a major cause of soil erosion, farmland loss and poor water quality. Southeast Asia tropical forests are the most seriously affected. Four main processes are responsible:

1. Slash-and-burn agricultural practices;
2. Commercial timber extraction, both legal and illegal;
3. Government-sponsored transmigration schemes which accelerate the rate of deforestation in the remaining areas of virgin forest land;
4. Large-scale development projects, such as mining operations and dam building, which frequently require extensive forest clearance.

Unfortunately, the devastation of the Indonesia's primary forest has worsened since Suharto departure because of Indonesia's still parlous economic situation and the wood industries crucial role as a major employer and supplier of foreign exchange. In recent years, Thailand has been plagued by related problems of water shortages and flooding. Similarly, in the Philippines it is estimated that soil erosion is occurring at about ten to twenty times the sustainable rate.[22]

Most countries in the region have taken steps to preserve their remaining forest cover by adopting partial or full prohibitions of domestic logging. The net result, however, has only been to increase illegal logging activities in the region. The 1989 logging ban in Thailand, for example, prompted Thai logging companies to move their operations, legally or otherwise, into Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. It has resulted in periodic conflicts. Timber was at the heart of a border war between Thailand and Laos in the late 1980s. Similarly, a protracted conflict between Thai military factions with logging interests and the Myanmar

[22]Maddock, "Environmental in East Asia," *Contemporary Southeast* Asia, vol.17, no.1, June 1995, p.28

regime is still being fought. The issue has also given rise to tensions between Thailand and Cambodia; the Thai logging industry was blamed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia for appalling flooding in Cambodia.[23]

ACCESS TO FRESH WATER AND MARINE POLLUTION

The next set of environmental problems arises from access to fresh water and marine pollution. In interstate relations there are two particular areas where water access can exacerbate tensions: Singapore Malaysia and the Mekong River Basin. Singapore is forced to meet its demands by importing water from neighboring Malaysian state of Jalore. In addition to these two particular cases, there is also general concern over the availability of water for the entire region's population. This might seem odd given that the region experiences frequent flooding during the wet season. Pollution's ability to damage the food chain and diminish the capacity of states to provide food and water for the people has direct implications for both national and human security.

However, the combination of increasing population, degradation of existing reserves of fresh water, and destruction of water table because of deforestation, urbanization and agricultural policies has resulted in the decline of the availability of fresh water. This has already led to domestic problems in Malaysia.

In recent years, the need for freshwater resource management has also become increasingly apparent. Hydroelectric dam projects have resulted in open confrontation between area governments and local communities. Meanwhile, poor resource management at the national level has also given rise to tensions between neighboring countries. Vietnam is concerned, for example, that Thailand's excessive use of Mekong River water during the dry season will

[23] Beeson M., *Contemporary Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.183

eventually destroy its main rice-growing area as salt water intrudes into the Mekong delta region.[24]

With the exception of landlocked Laos, all of the Southeast Asian states have maritime zones that include their territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and beneath the seas, their continental shelves. Myanmar is bordered by the Andaman Sea. The other shores of Southeast Asia are washed in part by the gulfs, straits, and expanse of the South China Sea, a semi enclosed sea with 90 percent of its circumference rimmed by land.

In the sea more than 2,500 species of fish and invertebrates are found, constituting 14 percent of global marine resources. The fisheries, a major source of protein in Southeast Asian diets, are being depleted by uncontrolled over fishing. Poaching in another country's EEZ is common as flagged, falsely flagged, and unflagged vessels venture farther from their national waters in search of catch. Coral reefs are being destroyed by illegal blasting. On the margins of the sea, spreading urbanization and industrialization have produced a flood of toxic and polluting effluent runoff.

In the tidal zones, the coastal mangrove forests whose rich biodiversity is important for the marine food, are being converted to fish and prawn farms at a rapid rate. Many countries in Southeast Asia have lost substantial percentage of their mangrove forests. Oil sludge and ballast discharge foul the water's surface. The South China Sea has been described as "a sink for regional environmental pollution".[25] One of the focuses of ASEAN's Plan of Action on the Environment is on the coastal and maritime environment. An ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment, reporting to the ASOEN, is the institutional base for ASEAN's efforts to protect and manage coastal and marine zones from land- and sea-based activities. The actual implementing agencies are at the individual country level. The working group's priority areas

[24]ibid., no.22, 1995, p.27

[25] Steinberg David, "Environmental Pollution around the South China Sea: Developing a Regional Response", *Contemporary Southeast Asia 21,* no.1, April 1999. p.142

are coral reef, sea grass, and mangroves; tanker sludge and ballast water; solid, liquid, and hazardous waste management, coastal erosion, ecotourism, coastal wetlands and clean technology. There are no ASEAN agreements mandating regional coordination or integrated programs in any of these areas of concern. Outside of the ASEAN framework, the Indonesia-led South China Sea workshop process identified resource management, environment, and ecology as functional areas in which China and the other claimant states to South China Sea jurisdictions could cooperate. While there has been some measure of scientific and technical exchange and inquiry, there are no operational programmatic results.

The dramatic decline in the extent of the regions fisheries and tropical forest has also been paralleled by a drastic loss in biodiversity, as both sylvan and marine habitats have come under increased pressure. In late 1998 and again in early 1999, disputes over fish threatened to escalate into serious military confrontation between Thailand and Burma following two fatal naval clashes which resulted in the deaths of several Thai and Burmese sailors. Both incidents occurred when Thai naval vessels intervened during Burmese attempts to intercept Thai fishing vessels. It made it clear that the protection of marine resources was closely linked with national security and defence. Thus, access to fresh water and increasing marine pollution can have adverse impact on the security environment of the region.

IMPACT OF URBANIZATION

No overview of the environment is complete without some consideration of the impact of urbanization on the region. As human activity increasingly become a prime agent of climatic and geomorphologic change, the rapid growth of urban populations is having an increasingly detrimental effect on the forests, waters and wildlife of Southeast Asia. Much of this growth has been in the nations capitals, giving rise to the emergence of primate cities, three of

which – Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok – each now have a metropolitan population greater than ten million.[26]

Increasingly the rapidity and the forms of this urbanization is having an impact on the physical environment: encroaching on agricultural land and forest, depleting the ground water table, thus causing subsidence and salt water intrusion, releasing huge quantities of untreated waste into coastal waters and filling the air with chocking fumes and greenhouse gases.

Most of the regions large cities have serious atmospheric pollution problems. A concomitant feature of the economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization of recent decades has been the increase in energy consumption and the proliferation of car ownership. Acid rain has already become a significant factor in Cambodia, southeastern Thailand, and southern Vietnam.

Uneven development in the ASEAN region has resulted in significant population shifts from rural to urban areas over the past few decades. Most cities in Southeast Asia are ill-prepared to accommodate this influx. Recent population shifts have already given rise to some of the world's most polluted and overcrowded urban areas-Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila among them. There is a long list of problems associated with the region's overcrowded cities e.g. a lack of proper sanitation, slum dwellings safe drinking water etc.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Air pollution from industrial emissions, automobile exhausts, the burning of carbon-based fuels, change in land use and the large-scale destruction of forest cover has resulted in the build-up of greenhouse gases in the earth's troposphere, or lower atmosphere. These gases mainly, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used as propellants in aerosols and refrigerants have grown significantly since pre-industrial times, mainly because of human activities. The Indonesian fires of

[26] Dewitt B. D., & Hernandez G. C., (et al.), *Development and Security in Southeast Asia,* vol. I, The Environment, (Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p.216

1997-98, for example, are estimated to have released 1 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.[27]

Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change (IPCC) has identified five likely climate outcomes for East Asia;

- More intense summer monsoons, increasing the degree and frequency of destructive floods and soil;
- Sea-level rise which will submerge low-lying coastal plains and river deltas, placing at risk already endangered coastal ecosystems;
- Changes in precipitation, which could alter river flows and affect hydro-electric power;
- Decreasing fresh-water availability resulting from higher rates of evaporation and salinisation;
- Greater uncertainty associated with water management and supply.

Virtually all East Asian states will experience flooding from rising sea levels and will be severely affected. The areas most at risk include the Yellow and Yangtze River deltas in China, Manila Bay in the Philippines, the low-lying coastal areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Java in Indonesia, and the Mekong, Chao Phraya and Irrawaddy deltas in Vietnam, Thailand and Burma. In most cases, the deltas and river mouths are also crucial sources of food. More ominous still are the possible effects of global warming on the regions' weather patterns, especially the ENSO and its influence on monsoon rains. Changes in temperature and ocean currents affect the frequency of ENSO events and affect the future occurrence and magnitude of floods and droughts.[28] Also closely

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[27] ibid, no.26, p.209

[28] Nicholls, N., "ENSO, Drought, and Flooding Rain in Southeast Asia," in Brookfield H. & Byrone Y. (ed.), *Southeast Asia's Environmental Future:The Search for Sustainability,* United Nations University Press, 1993.

related to the ENSO phenomenon and likely to be affected by global warming are the number and severity of typhoons and storm surges.

The frequent incursion of saltwater would completely submerge low-lying farms. As rainfall patterns change, heavier falls may improve irrigation in some areas but may also greatly exacerbate erosion and leaching of soils, and increase the likelihood of landslides. Other areas may simply become too dry to support existing agriculture. Southeast Asia is especially vulnerable in this respect, as it has the highest projected absolute increases in water demand of any region in the world.[29]

Forest fires, too, will probably become more common as species distribution is affected by climate changes and ENSO-induced droughts increase the incidence of major conflagrations. Moreover, the biological activity and geographical distribution of the malarial parasite and its vector are sensitive to changes in temperature and precipitation. A global mean rise of several degrees Celsius would increase the epidemic potential of the mosquito population and have serious consequences for human health in the region. The direct and indirect effects of all these climatic changes on the region's agriculture are potentially very disquieting. In particular, rice yields are projected to decrease at lower latitudes but increase at higher ones, indicating a possible shift of rice-growing away from equatorial regions.[30] The incalculable social, economic and political consequences of this shift are suggested by a study of climate change in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, conducted on behalf of the UN Environment Program, which estimates that farmers may well lose income amounting to between US$100 and US$130 a year.[31] Nor would these changes solely be felt on land areas. Higher water temperatures would cause weather patterns to change, which, in turn, would alter sea currents and marine resources. Many of the region's coral reefs - among the planet's most

[29] Anrell, Nigel, "Climate Change and Global Water Resources," in *Global Environmental Change*, no.9, p.33, 1999
[30] ibid, no. 20, p.18.
[31] Rosari P., A. Chong, & Panich S., (ed.), "Socioeconomic Impacts of Climate Change in Southeast Asia," Nairobi: UN Environment Programme, 1992.

productive ecosystems, providing a substantial proportion of the total fish catch are already being "bleached," a process involving the mass expulsion of the symbiotic algae known as zooxan thellae that are responsible for the coral's distinctive colour, health, and growth rate.

Recent trends suggest that the sheer magnitude and frequency of all these factors are already having an increasing impact on the lives and property of the people of Southeast Asia. Moreover, the absolute cost of these and other hazards is not shared by society as a whole but falls disproportionately on those least able to bear them. The poor suffer most, and the poverty of their subsequent conditions often drives them to actions that further degrade their environment and further increase their vulnerability to such events. This is the cycle of poverty and hazard that afflicts many societies in the region. Just as there is a relationship between disasters and class inequalities at the national level, so there is also a relationship at the international level between meteorological and seismic conditions, on the one hand, and low per-capita income and "third world" status, on the other. If global warming continues unabated many Island countries would submerge and in coming years there would be large exodus of migrants popularly known as 'Environmental Refugees'. Hence, the seemingly distant threat of climate change can play havoc with peoples' life especially in Southeast Asia.

POPULATION

The key to many of Southeast Asia's environmental pressures is the increase of the region's population. This rising population places increasing pressures on the region's energy, food, and water resources which has the potential to generate domestic and international strife. Some of the internal security problems of Indonesia which has the region's largest population arise from the migration of people from the overcrowded islands of Java, Bali, and Madura to the Outer Islands. With increasing population to feed, the issue of fishing has come to the forefront. States have enacted legislation to protect their

marine resources from foreign poachers.

High levels of economic and population growth and unparalleled pressure on the country's urban and rural environments are eroding the country's economic gains and undermining state capacity. Like Beijing, Jakarta remains sensitive to the security implications of large numbers of newly sacked workers joining the ranks of the terminally unemployed and socially disenfranchised urban poors.[32]

The distribution, rather than absolute size, of the population is the key issue. Over half of Indonesia's total population lives on Java, the smallest of Indonesia's five major islands and one of the most densely populated areas of land in the world. A large percentage of the island's population is concentrated in a 160 km. corridor running between Jakarta and Bandung.

An examination of environmental factors reveals that Southeast Asia is likely to suffer from resource scarcity because of a growing population. Where the resource is fresh water, this has the potential to cause conflict, especially between Singapore and Malaysia, whose relationship is beset with suspicion. Weapons fire has also been exchanged in fishing disputes, and with an increasing strain on water resources and improved weapon capabilities, such outbreaks of violence could get worse. However, while the level of command and control is rudimentary, a naval engagement as serious as the Thailand-Burma border clash is unlikely. Nevertheless, environmental concerns can be secondary causes of conflict, and in the Mekong River Basin, they can have a devastating impact on human security.

It is asserted that the regions expanding population will create new resource scarcities and contribute to environmental degradation which has the potential to generate significant conflict and instability. Forest loss, worsening pollution and the rise in greenhouse gases all have potentially serious long-term implications for security, although not necessarily in the way that traditionalists

[32] Pollunin, N., *Population and Global Security,* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

conceive. Deforestation and security are linked in two ways. Logging and land-clearance practices that alienate indigenous communities who rely on the forests for their livelihood may lead to violent confrontation and deaths. But the real impact of deforestation is best measured in terms of population displacement, increases in greenhouse gases and crop damage resulting from the exposure of the soil to drought and flood-induced erosion. Floods that occur primarily as a result of human actions are a mounting cause of death and destruction, sometimes on a massive scale. Worsening pollution is the unwanted legacy of East Asia's rapid economic development and is already a major environmental policy issue for the region's governments.

The Indonesian fires highlight the political difficulties of dealing with transnational pollution issues and are a reminder of the dangers of ignoring the lessons of sustainable economic development. Further fires in Indonesia on the scale of those in 1997-98 and intensified acid rain in Northeast Asia - both of which are probable - are the two air-pollution issues most likely to have direct implications for national security and foreign policy because of their high visibility and potentially widespread impact. State capacity in Indonesia has been weakened by the combined effect of the economic crisis and political turmoil in the post-Suharto era. Lack of resources and Jakarta's preoccupation with political and economic survival do not augur well for the prospect of effective government action in the event of another serious outbreak of forest fires in Kalimantan or Sumatra. Should that occur tensions with neighboring countries could once again escalate.

Climate change will further complicate future security environment because weather extremes and greater fluctuations in rainfall and temperature have the capacity to refashion the region's productive landscape and exacerbate food, water and resource scarcity in a relatively short time-span. If repetitive floods, or prolonged droughts, were to create even short-term food and water shortages during times of rising social and political tensions, regional governments might find themselves hard pressed to deal with these exigencies.

Sea-level rise is of particular concern because of the density of coastal population and the potential for large-scale displacement of people. It will be extremely difficult to carry out forced evacuations or relocations without conflict. The economic costs of managing the effects of climate change are likely to be substantial, which includes reduced economic growth and depressed incomes, which, in turn, would circumscribe the ability of developing countries to meet the rising aspiration of their people.

Non-traditional security challenges, however, naive and benign in appearance need vigilant and rational policy-making. Threats such as environmental degradation, economic well-being, trans-state criminal organizations and drug trafficking are of a different character from the past. The heightened salience of these new issues invites not only a rethinking of what constitutes threat to security but a re-conception of security.

Chapter–III

DRUG TRAFFICKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The nature of threat posed by the illicit trade in drugs is examined, particularly, in relation to its impact on social, economic and political stability. Having said the dimensions and impact of global trade, the chapter would also analyze the growing nexus between drug trafficking and threats to international stability and security.

The Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia lies at the heart of the global heroin trade, accounting for roughly 60% of all illicit opium production. Narcotics from this part of the world have had insidious, corrosive, far-reaching and at times, highly egregious impact. In particular, they have been linked to explosion of AIDS, social instability, lack of performance, official corruption and the growing menace of organized crime. One needs to analyze the impact of drug trafficking on socio-cultural fabric of the society as human existence can not be isolated from the social, cultural and environmental reality. The challenge is not only to the security of the state in military terms but to the value system, norms, social behavior and the very basis of civil society. In an era of comprehensive and cooperative security it's pertinent to include the non-military threats posed by drug trafficking. This chapter will study in detail the impact of drug trafficking on the whole socio-cultural milieu, like increasing number of HIV positives, drug abuse, devastating impact on the youth, diversion of resources and the growing synergy of narcotics trade with terrorism and insurgency. It intends to highlight the fact of deepening linkage of illicit drug trade with the insecurity the people in large face.

The threat posed by global trade in illicit drugs covers many dimensions. First, and most visibly, it contributes to social instability by fuelling high rates of crime. The police have to confront with a network of organized criminals who have tremendous capacity and access to weapons and financial resources that in some cases are greater than that of the police. The addiction to drugs is having a devastating effect on the youth. Instead of living

productive lives that benefit social and economic development these young people are contributing to crime and increasing financial burden on the state. In addition, the drug trade has led to overcrowding of prisons and cohabitation of first time offenders with hardened criminals. This has resulted in prisons becoming a breeding ground for criminals. Drug Trafficking and the production of illegal narcotics are a security problem as well as a hazard to the foundations of civil society and to the sovereignty of the state. Drug Trafficking generates and aggravates ordinary crime promotes substance dependency and divert national funds. Valuable resources divert from infrastructure, education, and health care to fight the illegal drug trade.[1]

To fund drug consumption many users commit petty crimes, such as theft. Many have resorted to selling drugs in order to back roll their own habit. The outcome is to multiply sources of supply at the retail level, thereby increasing the chances that more people will be addicted, and resort to crime and peddling to fund their habit. The threat emanates both from users struggling to finance their habit as well as traffickers and distributors striving to gain control of a greater share of the narcotics markets. It fuels street level violence, property crime and serious other social threats. Intravenous heroin and cocaine use is fostering the spread of the most lethal disease – AIDS. According to the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) in Bangkok, Thailand currently has to administer at least 50,000 confirmed heroin addicts, the majority of whom are also HIV positive as a result of the habit. Similarly, Myanmar currently has an estimated 200,000 people carrying the HIIV virus, 74 per cent of whom are tested intravenous drug users. It should also be noted that the cost associated trying to control the global illicit trade is contributing to a lack of economic performance in source/transit countries.[2] As production and trafficking increase, so more and more resources have to be diverted to treat addicts through detoxification, health and rehabilitation programs, as well

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[1] Chalk, Peter, "Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade : Threat and Response," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* no. 23, 2000, pp. 89-106,

[2] Chalk, Peter, *Non-military Security and Global Order,* (Macmillan Press, 2000),

as to finance the clinic to treat those afflicted with AIDS on account of their habit. Moreover, the violence, crime and organized illicit activities that have come to surround drug addiction and (especially) trafficking means that public resources have come to be channeled into law enforcement, further reducing the availability of funds to stimulate economic productivity. Moreover, drug money from the illicit drug trade is playing a key role in weakening and undermining already weak and vulnerable regimes by encouraging corruption in government circles. The money and profit margin involved in the sale of illicit narcotics are truly colossal, and all the more so because they are not taxed. Drug induced corruption has been especially serious in Thailand and Myanmar.

The illicit trade in narcotics constitutes a global shadow economy, rivaling the legitimate economy of many nations. Not only it is the principal generator of money laundering, but it also brings in its wake warfare, murder and every other conceivable criminality.

A nation infested with drug addicts can never be secure. Drug abuse not only undermines health security but also causes a great waste of human resources. Particularly, it is detrimental to the health of the young and a threat to the existence of future generations. Drug addiction with alcohol has ruined many families. Once addicted the first time user, would carve for it psychologically and pshyologically. This changes an average person into a slavish addict whose existence centers round his daily dose. Once a person becomes an addict, he/she will resort to any action or crime for money to buy their drugs.[3]

In global terms, the Golden Triangle presently accounts for approximately 66 per cent of all known illicit opium production, fueling an underground industry that is now thought to be worth at least US$ 160 billion.[4]

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[3] Shah R. Giri, *Encyclopaedia of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,* vol.I, (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998), p.198

[4] ibid, vol.II, p.409

The problem of transnational crime in Southeast Asia is severe. Drug trafficking is perhaps the most serious transnational criminal problem faced by the Southeast Asian states. Some of the largest and most dangerous criminal organizations operating in the region are the Chinese triads, the Japanese yakuza and Vietnamese gangs. Smaller networks have also flourished in most regional states and have set up transnational criminal activities. All these groups take advantage of corrupt officials and politicians as well as weak governmental institutions and law enforcement agencies to broaden their actions and increase their profits. By doing so, they undermine new democracies and developing countries in Southeast Asia.

TRAFFICKING OF ILLICIT DRUGS

Several Southeast Asian countries are major producers of narcotics and/or serve as transit for illicit drugs exported to North America, Europe and other parts of Asia. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates Northern Thailand, Eastern Myanmar and Western Laos, is one of the leading producing regions of narcotics in the world. Myanmar and Laos are respectively the first and third largest cultivators of opium poppies, which are later transformed into heroin. As a result, it is estimated that two-thirds of the world's opium is cultivated in Southeast Asia. [5] In supplement to the heroin trade, the manufacturing of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), commonly known as "shabu" or "ice" in Southeast Asia, has dramatically increased in the Golden Triangle since the early 1990s and specifically in Myanmar where relatively inexpensive forms of the drug are being produced in massive quantities. Synthetically produced narcotics, like ecstasy and crystal methamphetamine are in increasing demand, overshadowing the more traditional plant based narcotics like marijuana, cocaine and heroin.[6] The characteristics of designer drugs are also appealing to many violent political groups. Designer drugs are

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[5] Dupont, "Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia," *Asian Survey*, vol.34, no. 3 (May-June, 1999), pp. 433-455.
[6] 'UN Office on Drugs and Crime,' *Ecstasy and Amphetamines Global Report 2003*, (New York: United Nations, Sept.2003)

not agricultural, and can be manufactured, instead of grown and harvested, in almost any environment. This allows them to be produced even more clandestinely than plant based drugs that require large crop space and a hospitable climate. The switch to designer drugs offers a hedge against detection since they are very difficult to destroy at source and confound interdiction efforts.

The central importance of Myanmar in the Golden Triangle heroin trade partly results from the activities of the former Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and its breaking-up into separate factions in 1989.[7] The BCP started to traffic drugs in the 1970s to fund its fight against the military regime of General Ne Win and gradually became a central player in the production and distribution of heroin. In September 1988, the military government in Rangoon transformed itself into the State and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) after having violently suppressed a popular rebellion. This was followed a year later by the splitting up of the BCP into four groups; namely, the United Wa State Army, the Shan State Army, the National Democratic Alliance Army and the New Democratic Army. SLORC reached agreements with some of these separatist militias that permitted them to trade heroin in exchange for not attacking government troops or entering areas under its control.

The production of narcotics in the Golden Triangle rapidly increased in the 1990s due to the drug trafficking activities of these groups and the rampant level of corruption among Burmese government officials. Olson explains that it is not clear whether these ethnic rebel armies are "drug trafficking organizations that use a cover of nationalism to give their activities a patina of legitimacy or whether they are national liberation movements that turned to drug trafficking as a means to raise money."[8] Due to the growing evidence of complicity between the military government and the drug traffickers, Dupont

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[7] ibid.
[8] Olson, W., "Illegal Narcotics in Southeast Asia," in Carpenter M. W., & Wiencek G. D., (eds.), *Asian Security Outlook 2000* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 102.

writes that Myanmar is "the most egregious example of a drug-tainted regime in East Asia." [9] To improve its international image and indicate its determination to fight the drug trade, the military regime has organized bonfires of opium, heroin and amphetamines. For instance, the authorities burnt some US$1billion of illicit drugs during a ceremony in June 2002. Yet, most of the opium poppies are cultivated in areas that are not controlled by Yangon. An effective distribution network enables the drug traffickers to transport the refined heroin and amphetamines from the Golden Triangle into Thailand, which is still one of the major routes of the illicit drug trade. Narcotics are also smuggled from the Golden Triangle into China's Yunnan Province and then overland to Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh City, Manila and Phnom Penh have become important hubs in the global drug distribution. All these different destinations are used as transit points to supply domestic and international markets. The Chinese triads trade most of Asia's narcotics and collaborate with other transnational criminal organizations, such as the Japanese yakuza, Vietnamese gangs, Nigerian groups and Colombian cartels, to distribute illicit drugs worldwide. The drug trade has provided these mafias with exceptional financial resources. These funds enable the criminal syndicates to dispose over modern military equipment and to corrupt politicians, judges and police authorities. Thus, referring these mafias as mere criminal groups would only minimize the threat that they pose to the political, economic and societal stability of regional states. Instead, it may be more appropriate to deal with them in context of transnational criminal powers. These are the kind of non-state actors that the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will have to combat jointly in the coming years.[10]

Narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle used to be primarily exported to non-Asian countries. This has changed since the late 1980s due to a

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[9] Dupont, A., "Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia," *Asian Security,* vol.34, no.3, May-June, 1999. p. 445.
[10] ibid.

dramatic increase in drugs consumption in East Asia. The consumption of ATS, which are smuggled from Northeast Myanmar and to a lesser extent Laos and Cambodia, has become the prime drug problem in the region, larger than opium or heroin addiction. Its consistent abuse leads to violent behaviour, deep forms of paranoia and hallucinations, and suicidal depression during withdrawal. This problem has reached epidemic proportions in Thailand. The average age of users continues to decline rapidly. Thailand regards the drug activities of the UWSA as an immediate threat to its society and national security.[11] Yet, the Thai authorities are poorly equipped to deal with the narcotics problem and their activities are severely restrained by the illicit drug trade. The production and transit of illegal narcotics and psychotropics is the single biggest criminal activity in the region in terms of cash flow. The greatest growth in terms of production and consumption is exhibited by methamphetamine, reflecting the susceptibility of the drug trade to changing fashions in consumer markets.

SOUTH EAST ASIA: THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

The Golden Triangle is one of Asia's two main illicit opium-producing areas. It is an area of around 350,000 square kilometers that overlaps the mountains of three countries of mainland Southeast Asia: Burma (Myanmar), Laos, and Thailand. Along with Afghanistan in the Golden Crescent (together with Iran and Pakistan), it has been one of the most important opium-producing area of Asia and of the world since the 1950s.[12]

The term first appeared in 1971, referring to the shape of Burma, Laos, and Thailand when taken together. The gold of the triangle is most probably that which the first opium merchants of the region used in exchange for the crops. Although the opium production that exists in the Golden Triangle is frequently and erroneously thought to be an old traditional activity, in fact,

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[11] Davis, A., "Thai Drugs Smuggling Networks Reform," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol.16, no.12, December, 2004, pp.22-27

[12] Shah R. Giri, *Encyclopaedia of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, vol.II, (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 1998), p.407

opium production is an altogether recent phenomenon.[13] At the end of the twentieth century, the Golden Triangle was clearly dominated by Burmese production Thailand had suppressed almost all its poppies, and Laos is still fighting the battle. But a new scourge had arrived in the region: an explosion in methamphetamine production in Burma and a large population of addicts in Thailand. Ethnic minorities living in the remote mountainous areas of Myanmar depend on opium poppy cultivation to survive and are generally under the power of insurgent groups. The government is progressively gaining control of the area leading to a drop in opium cultivation, however, the sustainability of this decline is subject to the government's ability to continue with eradication programs and also develop alternative sources of income for the communities. Already, the production and sale of amphetamine-type stimulants is emerging and could surpass opium trade.

Unlike Myanmar, Thailand is no longer a significant producer of opium. Thailand does however face the problem of importation of opium, heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants from neighboring Laos and Myanmar. In February, 2003 the Thai government launched an all-out war on drugs.[14] The Thai government has established a new national policy focused on stimulant supply reduction strategies. There is evidence to suggest that drug trafficking, injecting drug use, and HIV infection are woven closely together and that HIV follows drug trafficking routes. Thailand is one of the worst affected countries. The first wave of HIV infection in Thailand occurred amongst injecting drug users, followed by the sex trade and finally the sexually active adult population and their children. This is a pattern observed throughout Southeast Asian countries and it is predicted that unless immediate action is taken, HIV will spread rapidly affecting all states.

A new threat has appeared in the form of amphetamine type stimulants (ATS). The scourge of methamphetamine, locally known as "ya ba" (crazy

[13] Christensen K. L. (eds.) *Encyclopaedia of Modern Asia,* (Chicago: Scribners,2002), p.290
[14] ibid, no.12.

medicine), is exploding among the nation's youth, truck drivers, and commercial sex workers. Thailand is a victim of drug trafficking as much as it is a transit country/transshipment point, as use of methamphetamine tablets, locally known as "Ya Ba" (crazy drug), permeates Thai society. Methamphetamine remains, by far, the most commonly used illicit drug in Thailand.

Burma's opium poppy is grown predominantly in the "Golden Triangle" border region of Shan State in areas near the borders of China, Laos, and Thailand that are controlled by former insurgent groups (less than one percent of Burma's poppy crop is grown outside of Shan State). Cultivation by ethnic Wa hill tribesmen along the Chinese border accounts for 40 percent of Burma's total poppy crop, down from 55 percent in 2004. The decline in that area was accompanied by resurgence in poppy cultivation in southern and eastern Shan State. Nonetheless, major Wa traffickers continue to operate with impunity and the government has been unable or unwilling to curb drug activities conducted by the United Wa State Political Leadership (UWSP) a criminal group controlling the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which is primarily responsible for criminal activities such as heroin/ATS production in Wa territories. The UWSA announced in June 2005 a total ban on poppy cultivation and opium production and trafficking, but UWSA noncompliance with that announced ban and involvement in methamphetamine production and trafficking remain serious concerns. Declining poppy cultivation over the last ten years has been matched by a sharp increase in the production and export of synthetic drugs. Burma plays a leading role in the regional traffic of ATS. Drug gangs, many of which are ethnic Chinese, based in the Burma/China and Burma/Thailand border areas annually produce several hundred million methamphetamine tablets for markets in Thailand, China, and India using precursors imported from China and India.

Opium, heroin, and ATS are produced predominantly in the border regions of Shan State, areas controlled by former insurgent groups. Between

1989 and 1997, the Burmese government negotiated a series of individual cease-fire agreements, allowing each of several ethnically distinct people limited autonomy and continued narcotics production and trafficking activities in return for peace.

Since the mid-1990s, however, the Burmese government has elicited "opium-free" pledges from each cease-fire group and as these pledges has come due, has stepped up law-enforcement activities against opium/heroin in the respective cease-fire territories. In June, the UWSA announced implementation of a long delayed ban on opium production and trafficking in Wa territory. The Wa tribal group, however, remain the country's leading poppy growers and opium producers. According to many reports, the UWSP leadership facilitates the manufacture and trafficking of ATS pills in Wa territory, predominantly by ethnic Chinese criminal gangs. Although the government has not succeeded in convincing the UWSA to stop illicit drug production or trafficking, Burmese law enforcement entities stepped up pressure against Wa traffickers in 2005.[15]

Cambodia has experienced a significant increase in recent years in the amount of ATS transiting from the Golden Triangle. The UNODC estimates that as many as 100,000 methamphetamine tablets enter Cambodia each day[16]. Many of these are consumed domestically, though some are also thought to be re-exported to Thailand and Vietnam. In addition, Cambodian authorities believe that foreign crime syndicates, working in concert with Cambodian nationals, have set up mobile laboratories within Cambodia that produce ATS for local distribution and export to Thailand. Cambodia is not a producer of opiates, however, it serves as a transit route for heroin from Burma and Laos to international drug markets such as Vietnam, mainland China, Taiwan, and Australia. Cannabis cultivation continues despite a government campaign to

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[15] Stares B. Paul, *The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey,* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), pp.250-252

[16] World Drug Report, (Oxford University Press, 1997) p.38

eradicate it. There have been reports of continued military and/or police involvement in large-scale cultivations in remote areas.

Although, Indonesia is not a major drug producing, consuming, or drug transit country, it continues to have a growing problem in all the three areas. Marijuana production for the domestic market is large, because marijuana is widely abused among Indonesia's large population. In addition, recent large seizures point to ecstasy production in Indonesia, as well. All major groups of illegal drugs are readily available in Indonesia: methamphetamine, in its crystalline and tablet forms, MDMA (ecstasy), heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the domestic large scale production of methamphetamine and MDMA in Indonesia. Indonesian authorities report that the domestic production of methamphetamine and MDMA in Indonesia is controlled by Indonesian and Chinese syndicates, utilizing precursor chemical sources. Marijuana is cultivated throughout Indonesia, especially the Aceh Province of Northern Sumatra, where large scale cultivation occurs. Although, cocaine seizures continue to occur in major Indonesian airports, the market for cocaine in Indonesia is very small. Cocaine seizures made by the government are believed to be associated with the transshipment of the drug to more lucrative markets, specifically Australia.

Philippines continues to be a producer of crystal methamphetamine. Evidence indicates some links between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking activities in the Philippines. The country produces, consumes, and exports marijuana. Philippine authorities continue to encounter difficulties stemming the production. Marijuana cultivation is generally in areas inaccessible to vehicles and/or controlled by insurgent groups. Corruption and inefficiency among government officials also complicate eradication efforts. Most of the marijuana produced in the Philippines is for local consumption, with the remainder smuggled to Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING

Illicit drug trade is highly lucrative and shortcut route to acquire wealth and affluence overnight. It was easy to make money but difficult to move the funds to their destination. The drug traffickers had to face major problems in transaction of the drug proceeds. There were few banks to take risk, though there are instances of banks involvement in monetary transactions of drug money. The dealers had to explore some ways for the movement of the cash. Therefore, innumerable channels were explored and created by drugs syndicates. Their unorganized but systematic method of monetary transaction is popularly known as money laundering. Money Laundering is defined as use of money derived from illegal activities by concealing the identity of the individuals who obtained money and converts it to assets that appear to have come from legitimate source.[17] The large sum generated from narcotic drugs has become part of the international monetary system. It plays an important role in the corporate sector and international monetary market. The black money is used to influence politics and economy. This money buys politicians, funds elections, topples elected government, takeover business enterprises and destabilizes politico-economic system.

Money laundering stems from numerous sources, and occurs in a variety of different forms. With respect to the sources of money laundering in the Asia Pacific, it may of course take the traditional form of criminally derived profits (for instance, from the drug trade) which the criminal then seeks to dispose of or re-invest with impunity. In this form, money laundering is a problem that pits the resources and ingenuity of the state against the methods of criminal actors'.[18]. This origin of money laundering is widespread in the region, particularly with respect to the profits from the production and trading of heroin and Methamphetamine.

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[17] Powis, R. *The Money Launder*, (Chicago, Probus Publishing, 1992) pp- 191-236
[18] Castle, A. *Working Paper No. 2: Asia Pacific money Laundering Flows and Trends* International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, March, 1999.

The Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reported in 1990 that 'as much as 85 billion U.S. dollars a year in proceeds from drug trafficking in the US and Europe alone could be available for laundering and investment'. One analyst has observed that 'if these estimates are accurate, money laundering alone has clearly reached such proportions that it is capable of affecting the economies and governments of some countries'. [19] In its relationship with the state and other institutions, the mafia or organized crime is 'two-faced'. It is 'outside and against the state' as it does not recognize the state's monopoly on violence and naturally resorts to murder'. It demands 'from the entire population the refusal to collaborate with law enforcement: an actual submission to the power of the mafia'. But it is also 'inside and with the state'. It indulges in a series of the activities 'connected with the use of public finances (for example, contracts of public works) and participation in public life (elections, control of functioning of institutions).[20] The mafia and politics have a relationship of co-habitation that allows them to infiltrate government organs, magistrate, police, and local authorities. According to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 'these criminal elements command vast sums of money, which they use to suborn state officials. Some criminal's empires are richer than poorer states'.[21]

The routes and methods employed in the laundering of funds vary considerably. One can note both continuity and change in the region. There is continuity in the continued significance of the region's largest financial centers – particularly those in Southeast Asia – as hubs for money laundering. These centers retain their attraction for money launderers due to the variety, size and complexity of their financial institutions, as well as their proximity to key shipping, drug production and/or transit corridors.

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[19] Das K. Dilip, "Organized Crime: A World Perspective," *Trans-national Organized Crime*, vol.3, no.3, Autumn 1997, p.132
[20] ibid, p.133
[21] www.unodc.org

Along with this continuity, there is change in the exploitation of new opportunities, methods and jurisdictions. A number of small states have become an increasingly preferred destination for criminal money due to their recent development of 'tax haven' status. New communications and encryption technologies have allowed for a burgeoning 'virtual' financial industry, which appeals to foreign criminals as well as legal funds, through offshore banking services and internet gambling.

It should be noted that drug trafficking is not the behavior of a daring, secretive, and clever operator, it is a complex international business system, deeply touching the life of peasant farmers, political leaders in the nation's capital, or the highly competent business men and women who make the system go, and reap enormous profits from it.

DEFINING MONEY LAUNDERING

Most organized crime activity is economic activity. The goal of the criminal is to use the proceeds of crime in the same manner as legal earnings, and this is possible as long as the source of the funds remains concealed. The task of the money launderer, therefore, is to make the proceeds of crime appear to be of legal origin, or of sufficiently obscure origin that any attempt to link those assets to criminal behavior would be futile.

The transnational effects of these changes in the drug trade are thus, not limited to the increased movement of drugs over borders, but to the increasing exploitation of international financial markets. These changes in the drug economy are augmented by the same set of technological innovations that have reduced transaction costs associated with commercial activity in most industries, legal or illegal.[22] The scale and complexity of these transactions have made it difficult for governments to regulate and control monetary movements across boundaries. Money, the most fungible of commodities, can be transmitted and exchanged instantaneously and traced only with great effort.

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[22] Powis, R. *The Money Launder*, (Chicago, Probus Publishing, 1992) pp- 191-236

The global financial network operates according to the logic of the market and is not readily amenable to national preferences or efforts of central or even coordinated management. The sheer volumes of money in the financial system and the ease with which it can be moved electronically have made it much easier to move and launder profits of illicit activities. There are so many points of access to the global financial system that making access in some areas more difficult does not eliminate laundering, it simply encourages its relocation or 'displacement'.

Rapid advances in transportation and communication have also contributed to the increase in the volume of trade. The use of container shipments has grown as international trade expanded. It has enabled criminals to smuggle large volumes of illicit products across borders. Money laundering poses a major problem for the global polity. Not only does this form of 'white collar' crime directly enhance the economic and political power of the drug syndicates, it also undermines the stability of local and international financial systems.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM

Trafficking and terrorism are linked in some parts of the world. Terrorists use the transportation networks of smugglers and traffickers to move operatives. In many parts of the world, the huge profits of the illicit drug trade provide the funds for terrorism. Trafficking is a large and significant component of the illicit economy. In Southeast Asia, where trafficking is a significant part of the illicit economy, potential terrorists can move their money easily through the channels of the illicit economy.

There has been a growing concern on the development of the so called narco-terrorist phenomena. In several parts of the world, drug lords have been prepared to employ terrorist-type tactics for specific political purposes, generally in the context of trying to force advantageous (or curtail disadvantageous) changes in the law. A number of analysts believe that a spate

of terrorist attacks carried out in the southern Thai border districts between August and December 1997 (which collectively led to death of 20 people), were the work of drug racketeers beginning to feel the pressures of increased government narcotics suppression efforts. Since 1995, Cambodia has also seen a spate of terrorist attempts and grenade attempts as local heroin syndicates have attempted to derail plans to introduce more effective narcotics and money laundering measures.[23] However, it is in Myanmar where the real danger of Southeast Asian narco-terrorism lies. Virtually all of the Golden Triangle's heroin production takes place in this country. Moreover, the various syndicates that exists in the region (such as the Wa) have all been able to build up fairly substantial private militias over the years on the back of lucrative drug running operations. Given these factors, any move by the government to crack down on opium production activities would almost certainly be met with a violent reaction.

Another aspect of narco–terrorist phenomenon is the use of the drug trade by terrorist organizations as a way of financing their activities. Given the enormous profits involved in the drugs trade, it is hardly surprising that terrorist groups have become involved in narco-activities. Moreover, when one considers the overall compound growth of drug money, an increasingly intimate relationship between terrorism and narcotics has to be expected. Drug profits and immense margins in the illicit trade, creates a tendency of funding the terrorist activities through it.[24]

Narcotic Trafficking, the phenomenon which started as an organized crime has now emerged as a threat to nation states because of diabolic alliance with terrorist groups. Sponsoring terrorism is an expensive affair and money for killing, kidnapping and sabotage does not come through proper channels. It comes through illegal and unofficial channels. The market value of narcotics is much higher than any consumer products in the world. It fetches voluminous

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[23] ibid, no.3

[24] Shriniwas. T. Sreedhar, "The Illegal Drug Trade: Asian Experience" Strategic Analysis. IDSA, New Delhi. Vol.xx no.2, May 1997. pp19-20.

amounts of money and that too in hard cash. It is because of the enormous money involved in the illicit drug trade that terrorists have established links with drug trafficking, smugglers and underworld dons to meet the expenses for 'Operation Terrorism'.[25]

Prohibition of the drug trade opened new avenues for funding organized violence. The end of the Cold War gave a boost to the international drug trade Without super power supporters, the funding for insurgent groups and embattled governments has dwindled; drugs have made up for that deficit. This trend towards greater narcotization of insurgencies is likely to continue in the wake of the Cold War's demise.[26] As designer drugs challenge plant-based narcotics for market share and as Western governments' crackdown on drug crops, insurgent group may turn to this segment of the drug market to earn money. The global drug trade has a far-reaching, corrosive and insidious impact on national and international security in the post Cold War era.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND HIV AIDS

There is a strong link between injecting drug use (IDU) and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Injecting drug use is also an important vector for the spread of HIV. From high-risk groups the virus is now spreading to the so-called "general" population through sexual transmission. This is one of the main routes by which the HIV epidemic in the region is becoming "feminized".[27] Prejudice, stigma and discrimination reinforce the sense of exclusion felt by HIV-infected people and further distance them from the few available drug treatment programmes. Denial of the seriousness of the epidemic is still evident, and recent data shows a very low level of HIV awareness and risk perception, especially among women.

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[25] Vinod M. J "Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and Money-laundering," *Mainstream,* February 23, 2002, pp.18-20

[26] Kan R. Paul, "Webs of Smoke: Drugs and Small Wars," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol.17, no.2, June, 2006, pp.148-162

[27] The Economic and Social Transformations connected with the International Drugs Problem: http://www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/drugs-the-project

There has been a growing shift away from opium smoking towards injecting heroin, a habit that is more addictive and that poses a greater public health risk. The trend towards injecting narcotics is a significant concern. The government maintains that there are only about 70,000 registered addicts in Burma, but surveys conducted by UNODC, among others, suggest that the addict population could be as high as 300,000[28]. NGOs and community leaders report increasing use of heroin and synthetic drugs, particularly among disaffected youth in urban areas and workers in ethnic minority mining communities. There is a growing HIV/AIDS epidemic, linked in part to intravenous drug use. According to a UNODC regional center, an estimated 26 to 30 percent of officially reported HIV cases are attributed to intravenous drug use, one of the highest rates in the world.[29] Infection rates are highest in Burma's ethnic regions, and specifically among mining communities in those areas, where opium, heroin, and ATS are readily available, i.e., along Burma's northern and eastern borders. Thus, keeping a stern check on drug abuse is must, if the global fight against AIDS has to succeed.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AND CORRUPTION

A recent study dealing with approaches to corruption from an international perspective notes that it is difficult to treat the issues of corruption and organised criminality as separate problems, as corruption often provides the necessary cover for other criminal activities. This is particularly, true in cases where those perpetrating criminal acts are individuals or groups with a high degree of integration into the legal economy and legitimate society.[30]

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[28] Aronld, G., *The International Drugs Trade,* (Routledge, 2005), p.151
[29] www.unodc.org
[30] Beare, M. "Corruption and organized Crime: Lessons from history," *Crime, Law & Social Change,* vol. 28, 1997, pp. 155-72

The state institutions are weakened by the corrupting influence of the drug traffickers. The gains in the drug trade are very high so the underworld dons spare no efforts to bribe the administration or use the political influence to bully the officials into submission. The political influence of criminal networks threaten the whole legitimacy of state institutions. Perhaps, the greatest concern to policy makers and to regional stability is inherent in situations where the state has become an active participant in criminal activity. While this may also be characterized as corruption, the complicity of state actors and the state itself is in these instances far more overt. In a limited number of cases this situation has progressed to the point where the lines between legitimate state enterprise and money laundering have become sufficiently blurred as to render traditional prescriptions for the control of money laundering inadequate in the absence of significant national institutional reform. Most commonly, this situation obtains where drug production and/or transit operations form a significant component of the national or regional economy.

Systemic corruption takes on a different hue where the cloak or pretence of legality is practically abandoned in favour of widespread state involvement in activity which would by any reasonable international standard be considered criminal. Individual governments in Southeast Asia, have often overtly or covertly indulged in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. In conjunction with, mitigating circumstances of underdevelopment, Government's involvement in the illicit drug trade leads to weakening of the states. A further example of state involvement in criminal activities can occur through the involvement of the armed forces, sometimes generating massive profits that can be effectively masked. In several of the largest and most populous states of the region, direct armed forces corruption, whether through extortion, involvement in the drug trade, or trafficking of contraband, is a source of large amounts of criminal proceeds. [31] In several cases, the

[31] ibid.

constitutional ability of the armed forces to engage in commercial activity serves as the starting point for involvement in criminal activity.[32]

Drugs have become the most fungible form of commodity in some of the most persistent and on going conflicts.[33] Some insurgent groups and governments have not merely turned a blind eye to drug cartels, but have actually produced and distributed narcotics as a large source of funding. The narcotization of insurgencies has moved drugs more fully into the national security domain.

The potential for collusion between the security forces and drug traffickers is particularly strong in the case of Myanmar's nearly autonomous regional military commanders. Their tactical units are often deployed in locations where drug trafficking insurgents are often better armed and military stronger than the Government forces. Such circumstances make cooperation rather than confrontation even more attractive. Yangon clearly tolerates the drug trade in order to maintain an uneasy peace with armed drug- trafficking insurgent groups. The Government also welcomes financial investment from those same organizations, with few questions asked about the origin of the money. Clearly, the General's cease-fire agreements with drug trafficking warlords are obstacles to solving the drug problems in Myanmar.[34] Army and police personnel posted in border areas, are widely believed to be involved in facilitating the drug trade. The opportunity for personal profit from drug-related corruption is great and many soldiers and policemen undoubtedly take advantage of it. Similar situations are seen on the Thai side of the border all too often. Myanmar officials have no monopoly on drug-related corruption.

Corruption remains pervasive in Cambodia, making Cambodia highly vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers and foreign crime syndicates.

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[32] Asia Pulse, November 23, 1998: Nationwide Financial News: Newspaper Summary
[33] ibid, no.26
[34] Gibson M.R. & Haseman B. John, "Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and Trafficking in Myanmar," *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* vol.25, no.1, April 2003,pp.1-19

Senior Cambodian government officials assert that they want to combat trafficking and production, however, corruption, abysmally low salaries for civil servants, and an acute shortage of trained personnel severely limit sustained advances in effective law enforcement. The judicial system is weak, and there have been numerous cases of defendants in important criminal cases having charges against them dropped after paying relatively small fines.[35]

Corruption in Indonesia is endemic, despite laws against it, and seriously limits the effectiveness of all law enforcement, including narcotics law enforcement. Corruption among the police, judiciary, and elected officials continues to be a significant impediment to Philippine law enforcement efforts. The Philippine's Government has criminalized public corruption in narcotics law enforcement through its Dangerous Drug Act (DDA), which clearly prohibits senior officials from engaging in, encouraging, or facilitating the illicit production or distribution of such drugs or substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug actions. Public corruption is recognized by Thai society as a serious problem. Low public sector salaries, a cultural acquiescence in the culture of bribery, and a historical deference to elites combine to confound anticorruption efforts in Thai society. In 2005, the Thai Government continued its "war against corruption" that was announced by the Prime Minister in September 2004. Despite, often ample evidence of complicity, corrupt officials are rarely actually charged with criminal violations cases.[36]

Increasing volumes of international trafficking in goods, people and services create new opportunity for drug trafficking and make the task of drug law enforcement a great deal harder.[37] Furthermore, deregulation of traffic movement may make legitimate cargo an increasingly attractive cover for illicit drugs. The creation of free trade zones, growth triangles and bilateral

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[35] Davis A., "Cambodia Struggles with Drug Smuggling Escalation," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June, 2005, pp.24-27
[36] ibid, no.12
[37] Bhaskar U.C., (et al.), *United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security*, (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005).

visa agreements is bound to be exploited by the traffickers, and regions involved in such developments would prove to be a magnet for activities. Vietnam for example, which recently relaxed travel control, is beginning to develop a potential significant role as a drug conduit.

It is important to recognize that profits from the production of and sale of drugs do not revert directly to the producer. Like any other commodity which requires secondary processing and distribution, as well as financial manipulation and re-investment, the trade in illicit drugs produces income at each stage of the business. Rather than accepting the stereotype of a number of monolithic 'cartels' to whom all profits revert, it may be more useful to consider the likelihood that the proceeds of drug-related crime, like the proceeds from other trafficking crimes are increasingly dispersed with the growing globalization of the drug market.

Organized Crime in its global dimension is powerful, enmeshed in intricate external and internal networks of ties, dangerous, violent, and thoroughly corrupting[38]. It poses a formidable threat to societies of all kinds, rich and poor, large and small, stable and unstable. It can adapt itself to drastic socio-political changes, sophisticated technological developments, and diverse cultural environments.[39]

The most profitable and formidable features of the organized crime are drug trafficking and money laundering, 'but the most devastating is probably the connection between politics and crime'.[40] The symbiotic relationship between mafia and the public administration thrives within the framework of this 'devastating' connection. Globally, drug trafficking is an important and lucrative criminal activity and is generally regarded as, 'the economic mainstay of organized crime'.[41] The problem of organized crime can be better understood at the level of societal structures and systemic influences than at the

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[38] Nicaso, A. & Lamothe, L. *Global Mafia* (Toronto, Macmillan Canada, 1995)
[39] ibid, no.20, p.126
[40] ibid, p.131
[41] ibid, p.132

individual level. Therefore, in order to understand them and to perceive their broader meaning, they must be studied as a systemic behavior, in the full context of their economic, political and cultural aspects. There is a symbiotic relationship between drug trafficking and non-traditional threats which emanate as a result of it. It has been noted that one factor which facilitates drug trafficking perhaps more than any other is corruption. Weak legal systems, under-resourced law enforcement and corrupt or acquiescent public officials assist traffickers to the extent that their activities may not be possible without these conditions. Official facilitation of trafficking supplants the need for secrecy and reduces the (otherwise high) risks that exist without it, all for a relatively small price. In return for their support the facilitators often receive a financial reward. In some cases, political leverage is the reward for co-operation. For instance, Myanmar ruling junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to an agreement with Lin Mingxian, key person in the Golden Triangle's heroin trade, which allowed Lin and his rebels to engage in any kind of trade they wished provided they remained politically neutrals.[42] By preventing Lin's forces from the uniting with other insurgent groups, the SLORC managed to avoid the escalation of strong (and armed) opposition which could have further jeopardized its legitimacy as the ruling government of the Burma.

Narcotic drugs make the users reckless and violent, resulting in serious crimes 'that hold up men: murderers, rapists and other violent criminals take drugs to give courage or stamina to go through with acts which they might not commit when not drugged. [43]

Narcotic drugs which yield 'kick' are taken sometimes to prepare the individual for some act he would not feel bold enough to without the lift of the drug. According to Dr. Quaiser Hayat, "A feeling of omnipotence usually

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[42] Linter, B. & Mingxian L., "New Menace in the Golden Triangle" *Readers' Digest*, January, 1996

[43] Shah, G.R., Encyclopaedia of Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, vol. I – Ecstasy and Agony, (Gyan Publishing House, 1998), p.198

accompanies the taking of these drugs and when under their influence the person may be tempted to assert himself in a manner of which he would not think when his perspective is compared".[44]

Over the past many decades, international drugs syndicates have threatened our values as well as the democratic institution of social wellbeing of the nations. The international commitment to the rule of law, to human rights, and to democracy is under attack from drug trafficking organization that respect none of these values. Criminal organizations use threats, intimidation and murder against journalists, law enforcement officials, elected officeholders, judges, and everyday citizens. Worldwide violence and corruption emanating from serious crimes remain at level corrosive to democratic institutions and the rule of law. In virtually every society, illegal drugs kill and sicken people, sap productivity, drain economies, and undermine governing institutions. Threats emanating from illicit drug trade can be ignored only at our peril.

It can thus, be pointed out that, production and trafficking of narcotic substances have undermined individual and collective well being, reduced economic performance, fuelled political violence, encouraged official corruption, contributed to social breakdown and exacerbated human misery, suffering and death. In short, they have negatively affected nearly every dimension of viable human and state existence in a geographic arc that spans virtually the entire international system. Of all the grey area phenomena, the illicit drug trade is one that very much can be viewed as a threat to security in its widest possible sense.

[44] ibid.

Chapter-IV

RESPONSES TO NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

In recent years, there has been a growing academic debate, both within and outside of the region encompassing the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, over whether the concept of security should be expanded to include a broad range of non-traditional issues - environmental problems, resource scarcity and illicit drug trafficking, to name but a few. Non-traditional issues such as illicit drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental problems can generate potential threats. Hence, such issues should be judged in right context and factored into public policy, so that international security environment is not undermined in future.

Issues relating to environmental degradation, natural hazards and resource use are increasingly becoming matters of local, national and international politics, for ecosystems operate regardless of any political borders. Environmental questions have become prominent in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's effort in dealing with forest fire and the effect of haze represent the most daunting task in ensuring environmental security. The smoke haze caused unprecedented pollution, economic loss and considerable health impacts.

Drug Trafficking also poses serious security threat. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates northern Thailand, eastern Myanmar, and western Laos, is one of the leading narcotics-producing regions in the world. Illicit drug trade imposes enormous societal, economic and political costs. It contributes to growing social instability by fuelling high rates of crime. It also leads to the spread of AIDS. The growing linkage between drug trafficking and terrorism, results in acute security threat even to the classic security-provider i.e. the state. Thus, the issue demands avid corrective measures.

It should be kept in mind that these non-traditional threats sans borders and effect common man. The chapter will focus on the measures undertaken to counter such of the two non-traditional threats: environmental degradation and drug trafficking. Both of these are trans-sovereign problems and hence require cooperation at various levels. The chapter aims to illuminate the reader on the

steps taken at various levels to tackle these threats, with special focus on Southeast Asian region.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Measures at International Level: Treaties and Conventions

UNITED NATIONS RESPONSES TO NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS: ENVIRONMENT

Acknowledging the threat emanating from environmental degradation, the UNGCA on 20th December 1987 passed the resolution 44/228. The resolution recognized that the members of the international community must act together to address global environmental challenges and to prevent the occurrence and escalation of international environmental conflicts. It asserted that environmental degradation has emerged as a threat to peace with its potential for generating intra and inter state conflicts.[1]

At the forty-second session of the United Nations in 1988, a group of East European nations introduced the concept of environmental security which they defined as 'a state of affairs in international relations within which a system of norm setting, organizational and material measures adopted within a framework of broad cooperation on the basis of international law will safeguard preservation of the environment in its quality with a view to creating appropriate conditions for life worthy of human beings and securing sustainable and safe development for all states'.[2]

There were discussions on how to transform the existing United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) into an environmental council capable of taking effective decisions to ensure ecological security. It was insisted that the possibility of regional and global ecological collapse was as great a threat to international security as was the nuclear arms race. A final proposal was the

[1] Michael G. Schechter "*United Nations Global Conferences*", (Routledge (UK) 2005), p.117
[2] www.un.org

establishment of a so-called green UN police force or green cross which might for instance have the task of preventing illegal dumping at sea or monitoring compliance with international obligations.[3]

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM

The United Nations' signature structure for environmental concerns is the UN Environment Program (UNEP), bureaucratically lodged under the Economic and Social Council. In addition to being an information clearing-house, the UNEP provides technical support for programmatic implementation.[4] UNEP maintains six regional offices. The UNEP Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific is headquartered in Bangkok. In its "Strategy for UNEP Asia and Pacific 2003-2005," priority is given to land and coastal degradation, deforestation, atmospheric pollution, biodiversity loss, urbanization, and freshwater availability.

RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Like human rights, safeguarding the environment is no longer viewed as a matter of sovereign jurisdiction. The normative framework in which international environmental concerns are embedded is epitomized in the twenty-seven principles enunciated in the "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development," adopted by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, better known as the "Earth Summit". The starting point is the recognition of the integral and interdependent nature of the earth, "our home."[5] Since the Stockholm Conference the concern for environmental security has rapidly grown and is now considered an important issue of global agenda for peace and security. The Rio Declaration accepts the traditional rule that states have the sovereign right to exploit their

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[3] Weatherbee, E. Donald, (et al.), *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy,* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).

[4] ibid., p.254

[5] Halpern, S., "United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Process and documentation", Providence, (Academic Council for the United Nations System (ACUNS), 1992).

own resources for environmental and developmental policies. However, it asserts that states also have the responsibility to ensure that their activities do not cause damage to the environments of areas beyond their national jurisdictions. It demands that environmental protection should not be considered in isolation from the economic development process. Further, it specifies the kinds of policies, structures, and agencies states need to have in place to prevent environmental degradation.

At Rio, an action program called Agenda 21 was promulgated to achieve the goals set forth by the Earth Summit.[6] A special session of the UN General Assembly was held in 1997 to evaluate progress toward the global policy goals. The review was based on national reports. All of the reporting Southeast Asian states claimed bureaucratic progress in meeting the standard of environmentally responsible development policies and practices. The states of Southeast Asia have established ministries, departments in ministries, or agencies with responsibility to protect the environment, in response to environmental challenges. Other national ministries such as forestry, fisheries, and mining have also assumed a higher degree of environmental concern.

The policy commitment, however, is uncertain. The bureaucratic existence of governmental structures with environmental oversight should not obscure the fact that the legislative and legal frameworks as well as enforcement mechanisms are weak and in many cases are embedded in patterns of corruption that foster environmental degradation. In Indonesia, for example, the environmentalist NGO community was deeply disturbed when the independent Environmental Impact Control Agency (BAPEDAL) was dissolved in 2002 by presidential decree and its functions assumed by the politicized Office of the State Minister of the Environment.[7]

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[6] Dodds, Felix (eds.) *Earth Summit 2002: A New Deal,* (Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2000), p.21
[7] ibid, no.3, p.254

WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (WSSD)

At "Rio + 10," the UN General Assembly authorized the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) that took place from 26 August to 4 September 2002.[8] The purpose was to evaluate progress since Rio and especially to energize international and national efforts to implement the Rio principles and Agenda 21. This was against a background of little progress, with growing poverty and greater environmental degradation in the world. In their regional preparatory work for the WSSD, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and UNEP prepared analyses showing that the environment of the Asia-Pacific region had seriously degraded in the decade between Rio and Johannesburg. The WSSD produced no new declarations or principles but it did set priorities and targets.[9] It is hoped that the parallel dialogue among governments, civil society and the private sector will lead, to greater support for the implementation of government commitments. All member states of ASEAN have been fully represented as sovereign participants at the international summitry level.

In the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) deals with international environment and conservation matters. To address trans-boundary environmental issues, OES has established regional environmental hubs. The Southeast Asia-Pacific Hub is located in the U.S. embassy in Thailand. It focuses on sustainable management of forests, water, and biodiversity resources.

ASEAN RESPONSES TO NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS: ENVIRONMENT

Southeast Asia faces major environmental challenges at the dawn of the 21st century. In this, of course, it is not alone: the region shares many of the

[8] Gautam, P.K. *Environmental Security,* (Knowledge World, 2003), p.6
[9] ibid, no.3

problems caused by population growth, resource depletion, and global warming in other major regions of the world. Globalization, too, is increasingly emerging as an important factor: in particular, the environmental consequences of trade liberalization are uncertain at best.[10] The current precarious political stability of some states in contemporary Southeast Asia is also a reflection of their deteriorating physical environments. ASEAN is implementing the following key initiatives to address these drivers of change:

- The ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity has been established in the Philippines as ASEAN's recognition that cooperative efforts must be enhanced to promote conservation and sustainable use of resources, and to ensure that benefits arising from such use are shared fairly.

- Under the ASEAN Heritage Park Programme, Member Countries have selected and designated a total of 27 national protected areas as ASEAN Heritage Parks. The Programme aims to ensure that future generations will continue to enjoy the ecological and other benefits that such parks provide.

- The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, which entered into force in 2003, takes a three-prong approach to addressing haze pollution, namely prevention, mitigation and monitoring.

- Through the ASEAN Marine Water Quality Criteria Project, ASEAN promotes the adoption of minimum standards for coastal and marine waters.

- The newly adopted ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action on Water Resources Management aims to tackle issues relating to demand and supply allocation, water quality and sanitation, extreme events, and

[10] Heenan P., & Lamontagne M. *The Southeast Asia Handbook*, (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001). , p.189

governance and understanding or positions and capacity-building to meet the obligations of relevant international conventions.

- ASEAN aims to create an environmentally conscious ASEAN community by focusing its actions on formal and non-formal education, capacity-building and networking.

- ASEAN promotes the adoption of cleaner production processes and technologies, and has recently established the ASEAN Network on Environmentally Sound Technologies (ASEAN-NEST) as forum to share experiences and information.[11]

It is hoped that, by these concerted efforts, ASEAN will be able to contribute to mitigate the environmental challenges that increasingly do not recognize borders. Without these efforts, ASEAN will face continued environmental degradation which may result in more frequent occurrence of environmental disasters that will be far costlier to address in the long-run. The December 2004 tsunami showed that ASEAN, as a region, was unprepared in addressing such large-scale calamities collectively. It demonstrated that how regional response could not be deployed rapidly and effectively not so much because of lack of resources, but more of a lack of a regional system to identify and mobilize available resources into an effective response system.

As a platform to jointly address natural disasters, ASEAN Member Countries have signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response in July 2005 following the December 2004 tsunami. The Agreement provides mechanisms to reduce disaster losses in the region through joint efforts and cooperation. It is comprehensive as it covers all cycles of disaster management; addresses both natural and human-induced hazards; encourages integrated approach involving all stakeholders, linking national initiatives with regional and international cooperation; put in place regional structures, including a coordinating centre on humanitarian assistance on

[11] www.aseansec.org

disaster management (AHA Centre), to facilitate cooperation and perform some operational coordinating functions, as well as a regional standby arrangements requiring countries to earmark assets and capacities.[12] It also requires Member Countries to designate a network of entry points to speed up movement of relief items across borders, and to conduct simulation exercises on a regular basis. From the experience of the last tsunami, the Agreement recognizes the need to utilize both military and civilian assets in disaster relief operations.

Recognizing the nature of transnational crime that transcends national boundaries, ASEAN seeks to fight its menace not only on the national level, but also on bilateral and multi-lateral levels. In this regard, ASEAN continues to strengthen its cooperation with its Dialogue Partners and international organizations in combating all forms of international crime. Although, at the ASEAN regional level, significant progress has been achieved through previous regional endeavors, there are still the needs for closer coordination among various ASEAN bodies responsible for combating transnational crime, for an effective regional mechanism to facilitate exchange of information and intelligence-sharing among concerned law-enforcement agencies, and for the development of concrete measures and action programmes to implement ASEAN cooperation with Dialogue Partners.

ASEAN POLICY ON ENVIRONMENT

Southeast Asia has one of the richest and most varied natural environments in the world, and the use of natural resources has a big part in the well-being of its people and nations. Along with the rich and varied resource mix comes the challenge of caring and nurture. The region is home to some 500 million people who depend on these resources for both consumption and production. It is vulnerable to droughts and floods, which are made more devastating by the destruction of watersheds and forests.

[12] "From Poverty to Pandemic": ASEAN Secretariat's Information Paper, (OSCE-Thailand Conference on Challenges to Global Security), pp.25-26 April 2006, Bangkok.

The leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) view the protection of the environment and the sustainable use and management of natural resources as essential to the long-term economic growth of their countries and the region. This commitment has strengthened over the years as environmental problems have become more complex, pervading almost every aspect of socio-economic activity in the region.

ASEAN's earliest initiative on environmental cooperation was the ASEAN Sub Regional Environment Programme of 1977. This set the framework for regional cooperation in terms of priorities, specific projects and day-to-day activities. At the ASEAN Summit Meeting of 1992 in Singapore, the link between environmental issues and sustainable development gained explicit recognition. At the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment of 1992 in Singapore, the ASEAN members argued that the industrial countries should channel environmental aid and expertise to developing nations in their pursuit of ecologically sound development. Through the Singapore Declaration, ASEAN pledged "to play an active part in protecting the environment by continuing to cooperate by promoting the principle of sustainable development and integrating it into all aspects of development."[13]

Six years later, in the wake of forest fires and the transboundary haze that threatened parts of the region-the ASEAN leaders declared, at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Viet Nam in December 1998: "So as to ensure the sustainability of our nations' development, the protection of the environment shall be an essential part of our economic activities. We shall consolidate and expand our gains in the control and prevention of transboundary pollution, especially the haze arising from land and forest fires."[14]

[13] Chakraborti, Tridib, "Haze Sans Frontiers: The Environmental Calamity and ASEAN Response", (IDSA: New Delhi).
[14] www.aseansec.org (Sixth ASEAN Summit, 1998)

The Declaration gave rise to 15 objectives for environment cooperation enunciated in the Ha Noi Plan of Action issued at the Summit. This in turn, led to the adoption of the Strategic Plan of Action for the Environment, 1999-2004.

***Strategic Plan of Action*:** The 15 objectives of the Plan are:

- Carry out the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution with emphasis on the Regional Haze Action Plan by the year 2001;
- Strengthen the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre with emphasis on its ability to monitor forest and land fires and provide early warning of transboundary haze by the year 2001;
- Establish the ASEAN Regional Research and Training Centre for Land and Forest Fire Management by the year 2004;
- Strengthen the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation by setting up networks of relevant institutions and carry out collaborative training and research by the year 2001;
- Promote regional coordination to protect the ASEAN Heritage Parks and reserves;
- Develop a framework and improve regional coordination for the integrated protection and management of coastal zones by the year 2001;
- Strengthen institutional and legal capacities to carry out Agenda 21 and other international environmental agreements by the year 2001;
- Harmonise the environmental databases of member countries by the year 2001;
- Carry out a regional water conservation programme by the year 2001;

- Establish a regional centre or network to promote environmentally sound technologies by the year 2004;
- Draw up and adopt an ASEAN Protocol on access to genetic resources by the year 2004;
- Develop a regional Action Plan for the protection of the marine environment from land-based and sea-based activities by the year 2004;
- Carry out the Framework to achieve the long-term environmental goals for ambient air and river water qualities for ASEAN countries;
- Enhance regional efforts in dealing with climate change; and
- Enhance public information and awareness of and participation in issues on the environment and sustainable development.

The Plan has measurable benchmarks based on set time frames and targets. Since environmental issues are inter-disciplinary and cross-sectoral, member countries must coordinate with other sectoral bodies in ASEAN in carrying out the Plan. Similarly, the other sectors are asked to incorporate environmental considerations into their development plans. The ASEAN Secretariat plays a vital role in integrating pro-environmental action into the development activities of the member countries.

TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE

ASEAN's effort in dealing with forest fire and the effect of haze represent the most daunting task in ensuring environmental security. The main thrust of ASEAN cooperative effort in this area is the development of the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP).[15] In 1995, the ministers endorsed an

[15] Roberts, W. Guy, *An Asia-Pacific Security Crisis? New Challenges to Regional Stability,* (New Zealand: Center for Strategic Studies, Wellington, 1999), p.152

"ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution."[16] The ASOEN leads an ASEAN Regional Haze Action Program which is administered by the ASEAN Haze Technical Task Force. The action plan has three components: prevention, monitoring, and mitigation.

The plan sets out cooperative measures needed amongst ASEAN member countries to address the problem of smoke haze in the region arising from land and forest fires. The objectives of this plan are to:

- Prevent land and forest fires through better management policies and enforcement. This preventive measure will also involve the development of National Plans that encapsulate their policies and strategies to prevent and mitigate land and forest fires, including the enactment of certain laws against open burning.

- Establish operational mechanisms to monitor land and forest fires. This will strengthen the region's early warning and monitoring system, an assessment of meteorological conditions, a prediction of the spread of smoke haze, a systematic tracking of the control and spread of fires and haze, and the necessary data to support enforcement action. As part of their effort, the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) will be further streamlined and strengthened to act as a regional information centre for compiling, analysing and disseminating information derived from satellite imagery and meteorological data necessary to detect and monitor land and forest fires and the occurrence of smoke haze.

- Strengthen regional land and forest fire fighting capability and other mitigating measures. This is an important part of the action plan where the member countries will list out the fire fighting capabilities of each country (such as agencies, manpower and equipment) and identify resources that can be made available for regional fire fighting efforts and

[16] Rosenberg D., "Environmental Pollution Around the South China Sea: Developing a Regional Response," *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* vol.21, no.1, April, 1999, p.137

the sources of technical co-operation for this purpose within and outside' ASEAN, which may include aircraft such as water bombers, high tech equipment and experts for command post operations. ASEAN has also invited potential donors and international organisations, such as the Asian Development Bank and the UN, to help and they have contributed significantly co the success of this endeavour.[17]

Implicit in the ASEAN approach is an assumption that Indonesia will improve its domestic capabilities in these three areas. The ASEAN ministers announced in 1999 their consensus on a region wide zero burn policy.- The ASEAN ministers struggled for a number of years to frame a regional legal basis for their collaborative efforts to solve the haze problem. Finally, in June 2002, an ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed. The agreement has provisions on monitoring, assessment, prevention, technical and scientific cooperation, mechanisms for coordination, lines of communication, and simplified customs and immigration procedures for disaster relief. It called for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control. The new agreement may put some gentle pressure on Indonesia to do more. It came into force in November 2003 with its sixth ratification and was hailed by UNEP as a potential model for tackling trans boundary issues worldwide.

NATURE CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY

Overexploitation of Southeast Asia's diverse and rich ecosystems is another problem now widely recognized by ASEAN countries. Local communities have been using products from these resources for generations. This places pressure on the ecosystems, degrading biological resources and weakening biodiversity. The loss of biodiversity usually originates locally, but its impact is eventually felt regionally. ASEAN is, therefore, mobilising its

[17] Weatherbee, E. Donald, (et al.), *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy,* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp.152-153

member countries to pursue policies that balance use with the conservation of biological resources.

In February 1999, ASEAN established the Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation with financial support from the European Union. Housed in Los Banos, Philippines, the Centre aims to intensify regional cooperation on biodiversity conservation. It also serves as a focal point for networking and institutional linkage among the member countries and between ASEAN and EU from the more developed countries. These prospectors then register and patent the results.

The proposed framework agreement on access strives to remedy this situation and to protect biodiversity in Southeast Asia.

COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENT

The coastal and marine environment of Southeast Asia consists of vast mangroves, coral reefs and sea grasses, which are hatching grounds and nurseries for many species of marine organisms. These habitats serve as coastal barriers and pollution filters. The coral reefs also trap sediment and slow down erosion. Mangroves, sea grasses and coral reefs are now threatened by pollution, exploitation and overdevelopment of coastal areas in the region.

The Centre undertakes networking and institutional building; training and extension; research and development; and management of database and information systems. Through the Centre, ASEAN has so far established National Biodiversity Reference Units in seven member countries- Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam to coordinate and carry out national activities on biodiversity. ASEAN is drafting a Framework Agreement on Access to Genetic and Biological Resources that would regulate access to biological and genetic resources and ensure that the benefits from their exploitation are fairly shared. The main challenge for ASEAN today is how to maintain an optimal balance

between development and conservation of natural resources in the region for present and future generations. That balance is possible through an integrated coastal and marine management system.

The ASEAN Working Group on Coastal and Marine Environment has identified the following areas in its cooperation framework for the integrated protection and management of coastal zones: coral reef, sea grass and mangrove; oil sludge from tankers and ballast water; management of solid and liquid waste; coastal erosion; ecotourism; and coastal wetlands, including protected marine areas. ASEAN is considering a regional action plan for coastal and marine surveillance of illegal discharges, using a region wide community-based surveillance mechanism.

MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENTS

Sustainable development is both a regional and global concern for ASEAN today. Most ASEAN countries took part in the 1992 UN Conference on Environmental and Development, popularly known as the Earth Summit. Many member countries are parties to international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. ASEAN countries also subscribed to the Declaration of the Principles of the Summit and contributed to Agenda 21, and have their national plans to carry out the Agenda.

ASEAN members are pursuing other environmental concerns at the international level. At the moment, ASEAN is concentrating on the following multilateral environmental agreements which are of regional importance and under negotiation: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and its Disposal; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Funding, appropriate environment policies, human resources and technological capacity are some of the main challenges faced by the ASEAN signatories.

To face these challenges, ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment have assigned the Working Group on Multilateral Environmental Agreements to seek a common ASEAN approach to negotiating and carrying out these agreements. ASEAN now takes part in conferences of parties and helps member countries assert the association's common points.

PUBLIC AWARENESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION

ASEAN has acted to increase popular and expert knowledge of the environment and to improve its protection, conservation and sustainable use and management. It is in keeping with ASEAN's conviction that public and community involvement in the conservation of the environment holds great value.

ASEAN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION ACTION PLAN

The ASEAN Environmental Ministers have adopted an ASEAN Environmental Education Action Plan (AEEAP) in October 2000, which covers formal and non-formal education, manpower capacity building, networking, collaboration and communication. This initiative was made possible by financial support from the Hanns Seidel Foundation with the United Nations Environment Programme. Implementation will require commitment and resources both from within ASEAN and from external funding agencies.[18]

HARMONISING LAWS AND STANDARDS

ASEAN also recognizes the role harmonisation of environmental laws and standards can play in the region. ASEAN countries have individually drafted comprehensive laws to provide the national policy framework for environmental objectives and actions towards sustainable development. There are certain common elements in the environmental legislation of ASEAN countries. The first element recognises market-based instruments as a potent tool for advancing environmental protection through incentives for the private

[18] www.aseansec.org

sector. This idea provides the basis for innovative policies that allow business firms and governments to work together to reduce pollution more efficiently and cost effectively.

The second element in most national legislation is the centralisation of responsibility for the environment in a single government body. These central bodies are vested with a broad range of functions that covers policy-setting, planning, implementation, monitoring and follow-up actions. To control water pollution, ASEAN has resorted to command-and-control laws that regulate the conduct of specific activities to protect the environment and ensure public safety. These measures generally define limits on the quality of allowable wastewater discharges expressed in standard compositions of selected pollutants. Violations are of course subject to sanctions. In most of these regulations, standard values depend on the types or intended general uses of the receiving body of water defined in the enabling legislation.

Finally, ASEAN countries have passed laws and regulations governing forest protection and preservation, soil management, fisheries conservation, land management, wildlife protection and conservation, and management of marine resources, among others. These provide the legal basis for conservation measures throughout the region.[19]

ASEAN's record of economic dynamism in the last two decades has heightened concern for sustainable development. The member countries have moved to protect the environment and to control the rate of exploitation of natural resources. There is region wide consensus that member countries should adopt an integrated approach to development planning, taking into account environmental considerations.

ASEAN success in the last many years could well be attributed to its ability to adapt, respond and effectively manage the changing environment. But recent events have shown that ASEAN is faced with even more difficult challenges in the 21st century that put at stake its credibility, unity and international role. These events are the ominous sign that ASEAN must do more to strengthen its collaborative order to face the global challenges and challenges of the 21st century.

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[19] ibid, no.17

DRUG TRAFFICKING

UN TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS

THE THREE UN DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS

The three major international drug control treaties are mutually supportive and complementary. An important object of the first two treaties is to codify internationally applicable control measures in order to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. They also include the general provisions on illicit trafficking and drug abuse.

SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961

This convention aims to combat drug abuse by coordinated international action. There are two forms of intervention and control that work together. First, it seeks to limit the possession, use, and trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Second, it combats drug trafficking through international cooperation to deter and discourage drug traffickers.[20]

CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1971

The convention establishes an international control system for psychotropic substances. It responded to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drug abuse and introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs according to their abuse potential on the one hand and their therapeutic value on the other. [21]

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[20] Mehanathan, M.C., *International Legal Control On Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances,* (Lex Publishing House 2002) p.78.
[21] ibid. p. 117

CONVENTION AGAINST THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES, 1988

This convention provides comprehensive measure against drug trafficking, including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor chemicals. It provides for international cooperation through, for example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled deliveries and transfer of proceedings.[22]

SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DRUGS, 1998

The special session of the UN is devoted to considering the battle against illicit production, increasing demand but temptingly lucrative traffic and extensive distribution of narcotic and psychotropic substances.[23]

TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVENTION, 2000

Apart from these conventions since 1946, the UN General Assembly, its Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) has passed many resolutions and decisions related to International Drug Control.[24]

UNITED NATIONS DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME

The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) established in 1991 to promote the application of international drug control treaties and the development of drug control strategies, is a catalyst in stimulating action at the national, regional and international levels. UNDCP continues to provide technical assistance for the development of crop monitoring system in countries affected by illicit crop cultivation. The UNDCP programme on scientific and technical support continues to develop, set and provide scientific and

[22] ibid p., 136
[23] www.usdoj.gov, "Drug Intelligence Brief, India Country Brief," May 2002,
[24] ibid

procedural standards in support of international dug control. It also observes June 26, as International Narcotic Day every year to aware the world public opinion on this matter. It also works closely with organizations, including the International Monetary Fund on money laundering issues.[25]

INTERNATIONAL DAY AGAINST DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

United Nation Office On Drug Control has selected "drugs are not child's play" as the theme of its 2006 international campaign , in an effort to increase public awareness about the destructive power of drugs and society's responsibility to care for the well-being of children.[26]

FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF)

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in July 1989, largely in reaction to the growing concern of the G7 States that international money laundering had reached such proportions that it was capable of affecting national, regional and even international economic system. It reviews national and international strategies to counter money laundering and make recommendation for further improvement. Twenty-six member countries currently participate in FATF, mostly drawn from the OECD States. FATF operates an Asia secretariat that specifically concentrates on money laundering in the Asia Pacific region.[27]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION (INTERPOL)

Primarily, its objective is to seek international cooperation among the world's police forces. In context of the illicit drug trade, it aims to enhance cooperation among national drug law enforcement agencies, particularly, by

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[25] *Yearbook of the United Nations,* vol.55, (United Nations Publications, 2001).
[26] UN News, June, 2006, vol.61, no.6 (Jan Vikas Press, New Delhi)
[27] Chalk, Peter, "Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade: Threat and Responses", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23; 2000, p.100

facilitating the exchange and coordination of information on identifying dug traffickers and requests for tactical and strategic drug intelligence. In 1993, INTERPOL established an Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit specifically dedicated to the fight against transnational organized crime, particularly in relation to illicit dug production and trafficking. It currently runs a project titled "East Wind" that is aimed at drug trafficking and other related transnational crime in the Asia Pacific.[28]

ASEAN RESPONSES TO NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS: DRUG TRAFFICKING

Since the early 1970s, a number of non-traditional security issues have been raised and discussed in ASEAN forums, albeit under the broader heading of social problems. Notwithstanding, international mechanisms at place to handle these threats, there is a need to undertake region–specific measures, so that micro-level particularities are not ignored.

ASEAN resolve to fight transnational crime can be traced to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 24 February 1976. The declaration signed by the Heads of Government/State of the founding member countries of ASEAN, called for the intensification of cooperation among member countries and with relevant international bodies to prevent and eradicate narcotics abuse and the illegal trafficking of drugs. It also called for the study on developing judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN extradition treaty. With transnational crime expanding in scope and becoming more organised, the ASEAN Heads of Government/State have stressed the need for comprehensive and coordinated approaches to tackle the crime at the regional level. Subsequently, cooperation on these areas has gone forward and a host of new issues has been raised.

[28] ibid p.101

THE ASEAN SENIOR OFFICIALS ON DRUG MATTERS (ASOD) PLAN OF ACTION:-

In 1994, the 17th ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters on drug Matters (ASOD) adopted a Plan of Action in Drug Abuse Control for cooperation in:

- *Preventive Drug Education*: The main aim was to create an awareness of the cause and effect of drug abuse in order to eliminate the illicit demand for narcotic substances.
- *Treatment and Rehabilitation*: It aimed at treatment of drug abuse and assist in social reintegration of recovering drug depends.
- *Law enforcement*: To reduce the supply of illicit narcotic substances and make sale, procurement and consumption very difficult.
- *Research*: The goal was to appraise, evaluate and enhance the effectiveness of drug abuse prevention and control programmes of the Member States.[29]

At the December 1995, ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Philippine President Fiedel Ramos stated that there was a need to "broaden. . . and. . address the new trans-national problems that challenge ASEAN's capacity for cooperation phenomena such as the large-scale migration of labor; the trafficking in women and children; and the growing menace of international terrorism".[30]

In the Second Informal Session of the 1995 summit, it was also noted that "in the past, as members of the UN, ASEAN countries had taken positions on such issues as terrorism and drug trafficking. Such issues should be taken up within ASEAN as they do have an impact on us" [31]

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[29] Chhibber B., *Regional Security and Regional Cooperation*, (New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2004).
[30] www.aseansec.org *(Fifth ASEAN Summit* 1995, 4)
[31] ibid, (Fifth ASEAN Summit 1995, 9).

Subsequently, member states declared at the Bangkok summit of 1995 that ASEAN would "take into account the existence of new challenges to the peace, economic growth and stability of the region and the implications of these challenges".[32]

Among other things, such new challenges were said to include HIV/ AIDS, illicit drug trafficking, and the environment. All were classified as "social issues" to be handled by the ASEAN Standing Committee. This classification aside, however, a number of issues have been treated at the regional level as problems that have the potential to affect the well-being of the region's peoples and the security of its countries.[33]

At the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1996 in Jakarta, the Foreign Ministers shared the view that the management of transnational crime was urgent so that it would not affect the long-term viability of ASEAN and the individual member nations. At the 1st Informal ASEAN Summit in November 1996 in Jakarta, they called upon the relevant ASEAN bodies to study the possibility of regional cooperation on criminal matters, including extradition. They resolved to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children as well as other transnational crimes. At the 30th AMM in July 1997 in Subang Jaya, Malaysia stressed the need for sustained cooperation in addressing transnational concerns including the fight against transnational crime. At their 2nd Informal ASEAN Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, they also adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 document, which sets out a broad vision for ASEAN in the year 2020. Among the goals forecasted was the creation of a drug-free Southeast Asia and a region of agreed rules of behaviour and cooperative measures to deal with problems that can only be met on a regional scale including transnational crime.

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[32] ibid.

[33] National Security Policy of Selected ASEAN Countries (www.aseansec.org)

At the 6th ASEAN Summit in December 1998 in Hanoi, the ASEAN Heads of State/Government reiterated their calls for strengthening and promoting regional linkages among ASEAN institutional mechanisms in fighting drug abuse and trafficking, and in intensifying individual and collective efforts to address transnational crime. They adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), the first in a series of action plans to realise the ASEAN Vision 2020 which, among others, called for a strengthened regional capacity to address transnational crime.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers, at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1998 in Manila, reiterated the need for enhancing regional efforts against transnational crime. They signed the Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN affirming ASEAN's commitment to eradicate the production, processing, traffic and use of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia by the year 2020.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers also acknowledge the need for closer cooperation and coordinated actions among ASEAN member countries to fight transnational crime. At the 32nd AMM in Singapore in July 1999, the Foreign Ministers stressed the urgent need to strengthen ASEAN's regional capacity to combat transnational crime and to implement drug control programmes with the assistance of the international community.

In October 2000, ASEAN organized in Bangkok the International Congress in Pursuit of a Drug Free ASEAN 2015 in association with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP).[34] It led to the formulation of the Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 and to the adoption of a plan of action, the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD). The latter seeks to eradicate or at least seriously reduce the production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics in Southeast Asia by 2015. It created a Plan of Action that relies on four central pillars:

[34] ibid, no.29

- Proactively advocating civic awareness on dangers of drugs and social response.

- Building consensus and sharing best practices on demand reduction.

- Strengthening the rule of law by an enhanced network of control measures and improved law enforcement co-operation and legislative review.

- Eliminating the supply of illicit drugs by boosting alternative development programmes and community participation in the eradication of illicit crops.[35]

ASEAN has targeted to realize the region as drug-free by the year 2015. This target has been advanced from the original target of 2020 due to a growing concern over the repercussions of drug abuse and illicit trafficking on ASEAN's goal towards peace and prosperity. Under the ASEAN-China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), satisfactory actions have been undertaken to reduce the production of natural drugs such as opium and cannabis, especially in the Golden Triangle area, as well as synthetic drugs such as ATS and ecstasy. Several training to enhance the capacity of enforcement personnel in dealing with various aspects of drug production and trafficking have been held in collaboration with China and Australia.

ACCORD seeks to address some key issues. First, it regionalizes cooperation against narcotics by including China. The regional production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics should be viewed as an East Asian problem rather than just a Southeast Asian one. It needs therefore, to be addressed through broader cooperative structures. Second, the ACCORD aims to tackle the issue of supervision by establishing a monitoring mechanism and

[35] Chhibber B., "Regional Approaches to Transitional Organized Crime", *World Affairs*, July-Sept.2004, vol.8, no. 3, pp. 80-96

introducing target dates. If implemented, this could be an important step in a cooperative process.

Besides the ACCORD, an ASEAN 2002 work program to combat transnational crime introduced a set of action lines to fight illicit drug trafficking. The program asks member states to disseminate relevant laws, regulations, and bilateral agreements as well as international treaties to enhance the exchange of information. It seeks to increase legal cooperation by requesting all member countries to criminalize drug trafficking and sign treaties to ease the prosecution and extradition of dealers, the exchange of witnesses and other matters. The document suggests the appointment of drug liaison officers and the organization of conferences and training programs and to improve law enforcement and training. The success of the ASEAN work program will depend on the actual implementation of the action lines rather than on their endorsement at a diplomatic level. The narcotics problem has also been discussed at the periphery of ASEAN meetings. For instance, the foreign ministers of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and China met in November 2001 on the sidelines of the seventh ASEAN summit. They decided in principle to organize a summit to discuss the issue. However, the drug summit has yet to take place. With respect to the transnational crime issue of drug trafficking, the Southeast Asian nations have created an institutional structure to enhance regional cooperation and reduce narcotics demand and supply. Still, little progress has been made on the implementation of recommended programs. More time has been spent appealing for collaboration than on the adoption of real policy responses.[36]

MONEY LAUNDERING

ASEAN is working closely with the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APGML) in anti-money laundering efforts. ASEAN and APGML are currently coordinating for Technical Assistance and Training (TA&T) to

[36] Weatherbee, D., *International Relations In Southeast Asia,* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers ,Inc.,2005)

combat money laundering and terrorist financing for ASEAN member countries.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been fostering cooperation to combat transnational crime for more than two decades. ASEAN was initially concerned with the abuse of narcotics and trafficking in illegal drugs. However, with the expansion and diversification of transnational crime to include terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, illegal migration, and piracy, and the highly organized nature of such crimes, ASEAN has intensified its efforts to fight these crimes.[37]

Thus, the above mentioned efforts in the region have the potentiality to make possible a near security environment. It should be kept in mind that non-traditional threats such as environmental degradation and drug trafficking are by their very nature diffuse, trans-national, separated in time and space, have long term implications and their resolution require commitment and cooperation from a wide range of actors.

[37] Pushpanathan, S., "Combating Transnational Crime in ASEAN" (7th ACPF World Conference on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, November 1999, New Delhi)

Chapter-V

CONCLUSION

Conclusions imply closure but the deeper aim of this work has been to open up the study of non-traditional threats in the security discourse. It is necessary to contest singular representation of words like security, as it is through such contestations that malignant discourses can be critiqued and alternatives proposed. There should be a conceptual proclivity to broaden threats to security beyond traditional military ones. Want of space implied taking only two such threats - environment and drug trafficking. Both issues are dealt in detail, with their wider implications on security highlighted.

The basic aim has been to open up thinking space and to generate alternatives. The emphasis on new approaches is both relevant and interesting, for clearly the old models, which were framed in the bipolar Cold War environment do not fit in with the new security environment. Security should be liberated somewhat from the clutches of the state, so that its meaning and practice can become more useful. Non-traditional security discourse engages in a conception of politics that transcends the states, understanding security not so much in the negative sense of protecting the status quo, but as the positive task of establishing and then maintaining basic human rights, justice and sustainable development.

Non-traditional threats like environmental degradation and drug trafficking defy traditional notions of sovereignty. These are issues which should not be the victims of prisoned state-centric view. Thus, governments' need to recognize that restricting the scope of multilateral action for the sake of protecting their sovereignty is often counterproductive. Their sovereignty is compromised daily, not by nation-states but by stateless non-traditional threats that transcends borders. Analysts need to rethink the concept of war "fronts" defined by geography. Hence, the response should be multilayered. International, regional and NGOs along with national governments and local communities should coordinate to deal with issues like environmental degradation and drug trafficking.

A new security policy above all must be preventive, transformative, cross-cutting and integrative in nature, strengthening the civilian institutions that can address the roots of the insecurity. Understanding the root causes of security implies a far broader, proactive applicability and not merely a reactive effort to address symptoms. The global nature of these issues means no government, regardless of its economic, political, or military power, will make much progress acting alone. Progress will only be made if the governments' unite behind stronger and more effective multilateral organizations.

These non-traditional threats stretch and even render obsolete many of the existing institutions, legal frameworks, military doctrines, weapons system, and law enforcement techniques on which governments have relied for years. Thus, at global, regional, and national level such mechanisms should be devised which cater to all aspects of the problem. It should be recognized that we have no chance of winning over these non-traditional issues unless wrong ideas and false assumptions of security are dropped in favour of an all encompassing paradigm.

"New challenges", issues such as environmental problems, illicit drug trafficking, black market activities and even terrorism, could generate uncomfortable questions about the level of good governance, accountability, and transparency in the political system in question. In short, to really tackle these problems may require that the status quo in national politics be openly challenged. Thus, to the extent that policymakers are part of the problem, solutions are likely to remain elusive. In this context, it is clear that the areas which need more research in the region are those focusing on linkages between non-traditional security issues and the security of individuals and countries, as well as the causes of and solutions to these issues.

It is the contention of this work that environmental degradation is clearly a problem both in terms of inherent worth of planetary eco-system and in terms of the ecological support system on which human activity both present and

future generations, is based. States, peoples, economies can not be secured unless the eco-system is secure. Unfortunately, little thought has been given to impact of environmental degradation on conflict at the policy levels around the world and this has resulted in proliferation of cases where environmental issues have provoked serious conflicts. Until and unless such issues are judged in right context and factored into public policy, they will continue to undermine international security environment in future. It is time to recognize the links between environment and conflict and give due consideration to the issue while framing public policy both at internal and external levels.

Issues relating to environmental degradation, natural hazards and resource use are increasingly becoming matters of local, national and international politics, for ecosystems operate regardless of any political borders. Environmental questions have become prominent in Southeast Asia. The pursuit of rapid economic growth in Southeast Asia, with its resource and infrastructure demands, has been carried out with little regard for environmental degradation and resource sustainability. It has also had social and cultural costs for population effected by the exploitative ravaging of their lands and the polluting and toxic wastes of industrialization. Irresponsible drive towards one-sided development results in dire consequences not just for local environments, but for regional and global environmental interests as well.

For many years, little consideration was given to the environmental costs of these activities, despite demonstrable evidence of those costs, indicating how questions of access to, use of, and control over natural resources closely reflect the social relations and power structures within each country. Gradually, environmental issues are becoming part of the new international relations agenda in Southeast Asia. This work avidly asserts that environmental degradation has emerged as a threat to peace with its potential for generating intra and inter-state conflicts. To substantiate the arguments, case by case examples of transboundary haze, deforestation, threats to biodiversity, marine pollution, urbanization and climate change, with special focus on Southeast

Asian region are analyzed. Successful management of potentially conflictual resources may thus be seen both as symbol and effective manifestation of cooperation. The willing suspension of sovereignty over ecological space at the state level, though necessary, is not in itself sufficient; it must be supplemented by the participation of the people who live in, and on the edge of, the protected areas.

Environmental security should be part of comprehensive approach to security, one that moves away from a narrow military and defensive meaning of security to one which is integrative and focuses on human security. Security strategies based on protecting borders, and on them/us, zero sum games are obsolete when it comes to dealing with environmental security. Non-military threats should be addressed with non-military responses. Environmental factors are interacting with the territorial sovereignty and other jurisdictional issues in a way which transcends and challenges conventional notions of conflict formation.

Environmental degradation is beginning to seriously retard economic and social progress as well as to exacerbate existing divisions and tensions, which national governments may be hard pressed to contain and ameliorate, if not dealt seriously. It has to be accepted that competing priorities (preserving nature versus exploiting it), environmental damage unknown (damage to ozone layer was long unknown), externalities (e.g. polluters don't pay), free rider problem, overuse of resources, no concern for future generations, apathy in the face of known ecological disasters, lack of technologies for pollution abatement and sustainable development are some of the grey areas.

Cross-border environmental cooperation can yield tangible environmental, economic and political gains. If properly designed, environmental issues can also reduce tensions and the likelihood of violent conflict between countries and communities.

Initiatives at global (UN) and regional (ASEAN) are already in place, but further steps should be taken to bolster their ability to address these threats in the wake of ever increasing globalized world. In conjunction of global and regional efforts, national governments must also marshal the domestic political will and resources needed to make that vision a reality and of ensuring that their priorities are in line with today's burgeoning new global security threats.

It is imperative that environmental legislation within every state in Southeast Asia be strengthened and regional environmental treaties be also improved. Regional capacities to manage disputes and promote cooperative behaviour and collaborative strategies must be encouraged. Also, the process of democratization should be nurtured, so that tendencies to solve disputes militarily are reduced.

The problems of environmental degradation and their concomitant consequences - such as poverty, hunger, disease, social violence, refugee flows and conflict over scarce resources easily flows across international frontiers. It is impossible to think in terms of a conventional unilateral approach being successful in countering any of these transnational problems. An appropriate effort to counter the causes and consequences of contemporary non-traditional threats must include a relevant multinational component for effective coordination and cooperation. For most countries, environmental issues take a back seat compared with more pressing developmental issues such as poverty alleviation. Thus, linking long term environmental issues with developmental issues is crucial.

Notwithstanding, the existing cooperative mechanisms in the South-east Asian region, it should be pointed out that still much is to be done. Undoubtedly, there are certain barriers to overcome. First, corruption makes all law enforcement measures seem meek and ineffective. Second, economic considerations lead to activities such as unrestricted environmental exploitation and illicit drug trade. Next, is the vexed issue of sovereignty. Non-traditional

threats such as environment degradation and drug trafficking have amply portrayed their transnational character. Hence, states should agree for a little dilution of their sovereignty aspect, if the very exercise proves to be a more secure and all satisfying experience.

Clearly, there are realistic limitations to the progress, but at least barriers to cognitive process of widening security must be dropped. Security in the usual sense of defense of sovereignty, territory and population is an important interest, realists would argue fundamental. As the chapters in the work show, other vital interests are equally at play. A traditional balance of power analytical framework with its fixation of security gives only a partial glimpse of the interest agenda that informs international relations in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia is affected by the ever-growing problem of narcotics production, trafficking, and consumption. Several Southeast Asian countries are major producers of narcotics and/or serve as transit for illicit drugs exported to North America, Europe, and other parts of Asia. The Golden Triangle, which incorporates northern Thailand, eastern Myanmar, and western Laos, is one of the leading narcotics-producing regions in the world. Illicit drug trade results in far-reaching, corrosive and insidious impact on national, regional and international security in the post Cold War era. It represents a growing threat to the political stability, social harmony and economic development in the region. We must begin by completely revising the way we approach the drug control challenge. We must coordinate drug control programmes into a response that simultaneously targets all facets of the drug market.

International conventions and treaties to combat drug trafficking play a vital role but are not sufficient by itself. Since the process of illicit drug production, transport and reloading takes place in different countries, international cooperation among the producing countries, transit countries and final destined ones should be a very significant component of the international anti-drug policy.

Measures such as eradication, substitution would prove to be futile, if undertaken coercively. Effectiveness of the drug control policy would depend on the international community's ability to address a few other linked up issues of development like overpopulation, poverty, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and ethnic conflict. There is crucial relationship between these issues and drug trafficking. Unless, decisions to tackle these problems are taken, the great menace of drug trafficking would continue.

Genuine attempts must be made to initiate both supply disruption and demand reduction measures, cracking down international criminal organizations and strengthening of democratic institutions. Similarly, individual is both a candidate and a beneficiary in a more secure world. Also, community-based approaches to drug free world would immensely help. There is also the need for the international community to honour various drug control commitments.

Thus, the ultimate answer to this big menace is for all countries to cooperate as it involves not just one country but several countries in the multi process of production, trafficking and ultimate consumption. International cooperation is extremely essential in order to find a solution. Drug trafficking, money laundering or environmental degradation require international cooperation and cannot be effectively addressed by individual governments. Indeed, transnational security threats require transnational response. Still, cooperation tends to be limited, as governments prefer to react to these problems at a national level. Inter-state cooperation is complicated by the fact that its touches on sensitive questions such as national sovereignty and jurisdiction, the sharing of information, extradition laws and problems of corruption. These different issues have restricted the response to non-traditional threats in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there is no need for undue pessimism, as at least barriers to cognitive process of narrowing security, to include non-traditional issues have begun to crumble.

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