

**THE MEANING OF DIPLOMACY: *£*  
KAUTILYA, MACHIAVELLI AND  
THE NUCLEAR AGE**

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## P\_R\_E\_F\_A\_C\_E

The present study has been designed to conduct a comparative analysis between the Kautilyan and the Machiavellian conceptions of diplomacy. Though some research has been done in quite different perspective and the possibility of a study like the present one has often been talked of, the proposed point remains practically unexamined.

But, no efforts have been made to resurrect the Kautilyan-Machiavellian scheme. The study has been pursued in such a way that might facilitate a poignant analysis to illuminate the relevance or irrelevance of their theories and for extracting a new meaning of diplomacy and statesmanship out of them suited to modern norms.

Efforts have also been made to resolve the controversy whether some of their concerns and concepts are valid or not and to inquire into the possibility of the emergence of a method out of those concerns and concepts.

The proposed method has embodied certain additional determinants of diplomacy so necessary to cope with the conditions in our nuclear age. The functions of these determinants are to enlarge the areas of peace, order and stability of the international system.

Though the Kautilyan-Machiavellian dictums of thought assume multi-dimensional proportions, the scope of this study is rather limited. It has dealt with the diplomacy as enunciated by Kautilya and Machiavelli with *Reference to* only four specific issues :

(a) an attempt to inquire into their approach to diplomatic behaviour and to construct a new methodological scaffolding out of theirs;

(b) to compare and contrast the internal factors Vs. external factors in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian setting viz-a-viz the contemporary international system.

(c) to study the nature of statesmanship as formulated by Kautilya and Machiavelli and whether that is valid in our time or not; and, lastly -

(d) the Kautilya-Machiavellian views on the need of intelligence in making diplomatic decisions. It may be mentioned that Machiavelli has not talked clearly or elaborately about the need of intelligence in furtherance of diplomatic goals. But, it has been included in the study with the purpose that almost all the Kautilyan views on the need of intelligence for the purposes of diplomacy have provided the same skeleton to shape the same peculiar polity which has been advocated by Machiavelli too.

Of course, an introductory chapter (the first chapter) provides the basis of analysis of all these issues. The last part of the dissertation evaluates the entire study in the light of order and stability of both the internal system and the international system which is the urgent need for a statesman in the nuclear age.

The author would like to place on record his deep sense of gratitude to Dr. Satish Kumar and Dr. Pushpesh Pant for their affectionate encouragement, cooperation, assistance and guidance. The author would also like to thank Mr. V.K.H. Jambholkar and Mr. Uday Shankar for their helpful attitudes.

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Due to obvious limitations of space, it is not possible to list all the friends, teachers and also the officials of both the Government of India and the Government of Bangladesh for their company, sympathy and cooperation. To thank them would be a pointless formality. I only hope that I have been worthy of their affection and concern. However, there should be no need to add that I alone am responsible for the imperfection that remains.

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**PART ONE : THE BACKGROUND**

## Chapter I

### DIPLOMACY : THE MEANING OF AN ART

History is a progressive process. The progenitors of the process have moulded and remoulded ideas in modeling a better world order and civilization. The contagion of these ideas has occasioned newer vistas for descendants to help channelize actions and attitudes of the mankind towards furtherance of the process. Thus the shadow of history<sup>1</sup> has been a constant guide to realise the serendipity of the past for measuring the fundity of knowledge of the present. Now, diplomacy being fecund layer of the soil of history is no exception. It is interesting to till the layers of diplomacy to cull pedagogical underpinnings and dovetail them with ours so as to fertilize new ones and to invigorate the existing ones. The history of diplomacy is spattered with views

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1. For penetrating analysis on how history helps understanding generational values see Luard, Evan : "Types of International Society", The Free Press, New York, 1976; Espl. p.33; and Dickson, Peter W.O. "Kissinger and the Meaning of History", Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp.85-115; and also Gordon, Paul Lauren, Ed.; "Diplomacy: New approaches in History, Theory and Policy", The Free Press, New York, 1979.



ranging from dizzying variety of theories to ingenious strategies. But on the whole, the indubitable merit of diplomacy remains more or less same. From the Greek history to the present, diplomacy purports the principles of a formidable method of international intercourse.

### Diplomacy Defined

From historical millenia, diplomacy has always been considered and construed as an effective tool of statecraft to measure and cure the 'diseases' in the international order arising out of conflicts among sovereign territorial entities. The subtle instrument of diplomacy has emerged as an astorian purveying prodigious postulates to a debt operator of international haggling. But, though every historical situation illuminates some sort of uniqueness and a typical treatment needed, the techniques and methods employed by different statesmen found different expressions in different situations and at different times. Because, similarity in situational context may not entail the same role of the same units and the same operational psychology. Yet an incisive analysis of the historical parallalism might remove earlier vapidness and provide enormous insight into the possibility of building up of an edifice of the theory of the betterment. Anyway, like most other concepts, diplomacy too has received a lot of attention from a lot of flamboyant figures. From Greek Demosthenes to

the modern 'demon' Henry Kissinger, diplomacy has become the protian instrument to the proselytizing personality for the practical solution of any inter-state eventuality. Harold Nicholson<sup>2</sup>, Sir Earnest Satow<sup>3</sup>, and a host of others refer to diplomacy as to pave the pace of slickness between multinational actors operating to fish out multiferious interests. To Morgenthau, diplomacy points to the "international situation which concerns the national interest most directly."<sup>4</sup> Anatoliev<sup>5</sup> crystalizes that diplomacy is to be an element that keeps humanity from "floundering in the whirlpools of intermittent international crises and, in the final analysis, from being drawn into a nuclear - rocket war".

The doctrines of Kautilya<sup>6</sup> and Machiavelli<sup>7</sup> Opitomize diplomacy as the wisdom of statecraft which eschews idealism

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2. Nicholson, Harold: "Diplomacy", Oxford University Press, New York, 2nd ed., 1958.
  3. Satow, Earnest Sir: "A Guide to Diplomatic Practice", ed. by Sir Vevile Bland, Longman Green and Co., London, 1962.
  4. Morgenthau, Hans J. : "Politics among Nations", Alfred A. Knoff, New York, 3rd ed., 1960, p.139.
  5. Anatoliev, K. : "Modern Diplomacy Principles, Documents, People", Moscow, Novosti Press Agency, 1972, p.287.
  6. Kautilya: "Arthasastra" Translated by Shamasastri, R. Mysore Printing and Publishing House, Mysore, 8th ed., 1967.
  7. Machiavelli, N. : "The Prince" Tr. by George Bull. Harmonds Worth; Penguin, 1977.

and establishes the supreme sovereign-self. The projection of the supereme sovereign-self is necessary to feed the acquisitive tendency of the power complex. For them, the power-prestige combination symbolizes bigness, and smallness can be treated according to its definition.

Some modern writers opine that diplomacy is a science and can be explained in statistical terms. Hence, they talk of diplomatrix, diplograph, diplometry<sup>8</sup> and so on. Call it science or art or the scientific art or the science of art, diplomacy remains the same dynamic force of problem-solving. Though the notion of 'problem-solving' can be referred even to the family feuds and other conflict-conditions, in diplomacy it has generally come to be associated with the art of crisis-management in international relations.

Because of its very nature, the concept of diplomacy cannot be ostracized and put into an anemic theory. Diplomacy defies dogmatism and delineates dynamism. Diplomacy denotes an elaborate design of the statecraft to emend the embittered, to embosom the embattled and to embark upon a persuasive strategy that ensures harmony and stability in international interaction. Diplomacy designates it as the womb of peace, the yardstick of conflict-resolution and the

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8. Singh, I.P. : "Diplomentry", Somaiya Publications PVT. LTD., Bombay, 1970.

bridge of human understanding.<sup>9</sup>

But, diplomacy is not self-operative. It is to be guided by men who are held as diplomats. Since diplomacy involves tactics, the diplomat is inevitably a tactician.

#### Traits and techniques of a tactician

In the strategy of statecraft the deployment of tactic guarantees much more return than the deployment of arms. While the force of arms poses a threat of animosity among the interacting units, tactic presupposes the role of getting it narrowed down. Tactic tends to highlight the art of astuteness of the statesman who trades in words not in war, dickering rather than bickering with a view to scoring maximum of advantage over the adversary from a situation which turns the latter into a meek spectator of the on-going phenomena. But the art of tactic is not a magic wand. It is a policy of convenience. It emphasises on expediency, not the extinction of opponents. Tactic embodies the tools of the game where the contending players can get maximum only out of maximum skillness and minimum means the defeat. The vanquished can over-turn the board only by its atavistic dexterity to handle events. And, the game goes on without any blare-up among the units of international relations.

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9. Johnson, E.A.J. ed. : "Dimensions of Diplomacy", Delhi, National, 1967, p.ix.

So, tactic is the greatest arm of the diplomatist. Tactic and diplomacy are the two sides of the same coin. Diplomacy without tactic is fish without water and tactic without diplomacy is bird without feathers. The togetherness of tactic and diplomacy makes the matrix of peace and stability.

But, the statesman-tactician has a long way to travel from problem to peace.<sup>10</sup> In fact, he can hardly realise the state of perfect peace. Hence, the accent is on stability. To achieve stability, he is to undergo the arduous process of problem-solution cycle where the solution itself produces certain other problems. Sometimes, he is to think of foisting a counter-problem to curb the problem at hand.

Under the circumstances, the tactician will have to chalk out rigorous methodological strategy to reach the goal. A hypothetical problem-solution panorama can be

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10. Peace is a very abstract phenomenon for the tactician. Though his main thrust is to establish peace, he remains satisfied if he can achieve at least the stability at the initial stage of his efforts.

depicted through diagram as in the following:

E N V I R O N M E N T

First Phase

E					E
N	<u>Problem + Scheme of the Statesman</u>	=			N
	Solution				

Second Phase

V					V
I	<u>Solutional problem + Scheme of the Statesman</u>	=			I
R	Transitional environment				

Third Phase

O					O
N	<u>Counter problem + Scheme of the Statesman</u>	=			N
M	Stability				M

Fourth Phase

E					E
N	<u>Sanctioned stability + Scheme of the Statesman</u>	=			N
	Suspicious interaction				


Final Phase

T					T
	<u>Sacramental stability + Scheme of the Statesman</u>	=			
	Peace				

E N V I R O N M E N T

E N V I R O N M E N T


The pyramid of peace



E N V I R O N M E N T

Now, a panoptic view of the diplomatic panoply (i.e. scheme of the statesman) of the tactician is being given below :

The diplograph of the traits and techniques of the tactician:





The detailed description of the traits  
and techniques of the tactician

1. Identification of the problem :

The first technique which the tactician should adopt is to identify the nature of the problem. The problem may be unilateral or bilateral or multilateral and various approaches be needed.

2. Planning :

Identification of the problem follows planning to solve it. Planning involves initiative. Because good or bad, nothing can happen in a vacuum. Initiative involves calculated risks. Risks determine the perfect timing of the initiative. And, perfect timing yields preferred results.

3. Patience :

Patience pays. Because patience is power. Patience and pragmatism go together. The tactician must nurse steel nerves and be a man of mettle. He cannot afford to be oblivious or yielding to obfuscation or being overpowered by berserk episodes of international relations. Emotion - he should kick out. Diplomacy is not a game of love. In the power game, the tactician should expect the unexpected and wait like a kingstork to hit the adversary with perfect aplomb. He can strike the iron only when it is hot.

#### 4. Self-discipline :

The diplomat must disgorge slipshod style and curb his nebulous tendency and circumlocution. The propensity towards ribaldry and simulacrum might inhibit him in projecting a pleasant personality and mellowness so necessary to serve his interests through affable understanding with other inveterate actors in the international arena. Being an agile observer of the international phenomena, he should apply his own intuition and intelligence to accommodate various other views and shrug off the fudging facts. He must not be overwhelmed by success nor overpowered by defeat. His victory depends on being frugal to keep a cool and calculated mind.

#### 5. Adaptability and flexibility :

The diplomat is to adapt with any kind of environment, favourable or unfavourable. He should give up obduracy and not to fob off with the promise. He is an indefatigable moderator of multiferious interests without sacrificing his own. But on occasions, he will have to part with parts of his interests for a greater cause. While fishing out interests, it is better if he does not need to touch the water. In the odyssey of diplomacy, he is a sentinel against himself being exposed to odious manners. Having armed with arcadian nobility and intellectual prudery,

he must not indulge in posing an areane and swaggering personality. Neither must he flirt with hackneyed expression nor hyperbolic and half-spoken statement. He should be crystal clear in whatever he utters from his mouth. Shrilly exeoriation of the foe and frilly adornment of the friend might amount to a profligate waste of flavour and fragrance of his personality. Speaking the sonorous language, he can earn respect from the ally and the adversary alike. At times, an exemplary character and consumate skill of the statesman might purloin the show and even convince the opponent that only the former can manage the situation.

Chalking out the strategy of quiet diplomacy, the tactician can neutralize the ignoramus and irrational opponent through continuous campaigning of his point of view. But he should neither overestimate nor underestimate the adversary and sport a reasonable response to his moves and counter moves. Again, he should be extremely cautions so that his own position does not always become a reaction to whatever his adversary does. Even overreaction does not reap the expected result. If he considers that the ideas of the opponent pose serious threats to his interests and healthy growth of multinational understanding, he just cannot bomb them out of existence. Ideas can be successfully combatted only with better ideas, effectively

communicated.<sup>11</sup>

6. Friendship but not intimacy :

In international relations friendship matters. The tactician needs sympathisers in support of a particular course of action planned and propagated by him. But he should bear in mind that self-interest is the only cement of mutual understanding. When self-interest dissolves, friendship disintegrates. Of course, emergencies make strange friends in conformity with the adage, "Any port in a storm".<sup>12</sup>

Under no circumstances the diplomat should try to develop intimate relationship with any other actors of the international system. Because, the closer the contact the greater the friction. Friendship is desirable but intimacy is not feasible. Among nations of fundamentally varying interests and policies trouble ordinarily results. Friction and resentment are most likely to develop when the strength of various partners are grossly disproportionate. Generally, partnership is a "poor ship to sail in, and he travels fastest who travels alone."<sup>13</sup> The fewer the friends the decisive the decision and action. Besides this, if one fails to support his friend when

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11. Bailey, T.A. : "The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience"; Appleton - centrug - crafts, New York, 1968, p.207.

12. Bailey, T.A. : Ibid, p.174.

13. Bailey, T.A. : Ibid, p.176.

inconvenient, he can hardly expect support from him when inconvenient.

In the art of diplomatic aerobatics, the tactician should cultivate friendship mostly with the powerful - morally, politically, economically and militarily. Because, a combination of weak friends is of limited value. The wolf is never frightened by the number of sheep. Anyway he should never share the misdeeds of his allies and never twisting their arms that goes against building up of goodwill and constancy.

Apart from being allied with some of the selected units, he should generally treat all nations fairly for he may one day need them as friends. The friends of today are not all good, and the enemies of today are not all bad. The ties that bind can easily unwind. Of course, as a policy of convenience, the statesman might seek friendship with the enemy of his enemy.

Again, he must remember that friendship cannot be bought. Neither should he expect gratitude from the recipients of his help. Gratitude is a word which can be found in the dictionary, but not in the human heart. Gratitude, like friendship, is not only perishable but non purchaseable. On the whole, neither fear nor love nor lavish handout but mutual respect is the most solid founda-

tion for any international relationship.

7. Give-and-Take :

The state of international society is an interest bazar. Nations are operating and bargaining with each other in this bazar to realise more and more interests. The role of the tactician in this game is giving less and taking more through negotiation and persuasion. But the rapacious and dodgy nature of the interest seekers is bound to be trouble some. So, the diplomat should not always give emphasis on the maxim: "No parmanent enemy no permanent friend but permanent interests". It might threaten the balance and stability of the system. The spirit of give-and-take (i.e. live and let live) would work.

8. Realism :

It is axiomatic that the diplomat is a realist. He cannot hobnob with the idea of what ought to be but what it is. He has to be parsimonious in evaluating the extent of a particular problem without any orejudice and predilection to achieve the preplanned output. Only perspicacity coupled with practicability would lead him towards objectively.

While himself obeying the norms of international behaviour, if he finds others violating it, he is free to

take refuge in purposeful fuzziness and ambiguity. It might invite a tremendous bearing upon the opponent's giddiness and infringement of power. Even sometimes an agreement in principle may mean disagreement in practice to hamstring the opponent's backsliding. Because idealism and avangelism are not satisfactory substitutes for realism. "Never stand so high upon principle", remarked Winston Churchill in 1902, "That you cannot lower it to suit the circumstances."<sup>14</sup> That is, expediency is sometimes better than consistency. Principle frequently bows to expediency. Nations like individuals, seldom can in the luxury of avoiding all compromise with the evil. Even may be that a temporary but tactical communion with the spotted culprit is necessary to hasten its destruction. Realism is right as power is might.

#### 9. Neutrality :

Neutrality is often the best and sound policy. Not getting involved in others' quarrels unnecessarily is a desirable rule. But neutrality does not necessarily mean that one should be a meek spectator of the world phenomena. Neither does it envisage a sneaky response or a complete

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14. Kay, Halle, ed. "Irrepressible Churchill", 1966, p. 50.

withdrawal from the scene. Rather, it may be convenient policy not to meddle with a conflict situation which cannot match his ability to tidy up muddles. Even may be that he does not have any interest to extract from the developing situation. May be he does not want to divert the national attention from development to disaster. Or, may be that he is allied with all the warring nations or not, or with only one side, but wants them to fight and put himself to the respected position of the peace maker. Or may be that neutrality is the reality for him.

But, walking the tight rope of neutrality is a delicate task. Both sets of belligerents desire and often demand un-neutral neutrality in their favour, if not open participation in the war on their side. All too often they feel that if the neutral country is not for them, it is against them. More so, if it is allied with one side with whom he had entered into certain agreements earlier, it will have to honour all those commitments. Of course, he may do it from behind the scene which is again very very risky. And when it is allied with the both and feels difficult to satisfy everyone, he has no other alternative left except accepting the inevitable, or playing off one belligerent against the other and converting itself into a potential power at the expense of their disaster.



Anyway, neutrality ceases to be a sound policy when events which a strong neutral has the power to control are developing in such an ominous fashion as to create a more disasterous situation than would result from armed intervention.

To the tactician, neutrality is not less ability but a typical tool of pragmatic utility.

#### 10. Gradualism :

The tactician follows a step by step approach to reach the goal. He will have to judge the merits and demerits of each decision in aid of his carefully thought-out action. To him, the highway from decision to action is to be bridged by gradualism. Hasty handling of the convoluted events of international relations might engender pitfalls which is difficult for him to accomodate. He can take a decision - apply it and observe its overall impact and the likely response from the adversary. If the impact is not satisfactory he can part with that and try for an effective one. In scheming a diplomatic demarche, gradualism is the trusted guide of the tactician in shaping a graduated response to the constantly changing scenario of international politics for achieving the result he likes most.

A brick upon a brick makes a big building and there is hardly any exception to this process.

## 11. Maneuverability :

The mechanism of maneuverability is a time honoured tool of the tactician. It is generally portrayed as to embody the ingredients of ingrained unscrupulousness of the seasoned manager of international affairs. Manipulation is something which actually happens invisibly. Successful political manipulation is successful deception. The concept of manipulation is intimately bound up with "power exercised deceptively against the putative will of its objects."<sup>15</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary defines the relevant sense of "to manipulate" as meaning "to manage by dexterous contrivance or influence." Dahl<sup>16</sup> and Merton<sup>17</sup> suggest that manipulation is influence accomplished by distorting or withholding information.

But whatever may be the notion of manipulation, the tactician makes use of "manipulative persuasion" only when "rational persuasion" fails to deliver the goods. The rill of events that lead to flagrant exercises of power by other members of the system makes the application of manipulation inevitable. It is a planned but somewhat

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15. Goodin, R.E. : "Manipulatory Politics", New Haven; Yale University Press, 1980, p.8.

16. Dahl, R. : "Modern Political Analysis", 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976, pp.45-46.

17. Marton, R.K. : "Mass Persuasion", New York, Harper, 1946, p.186.

desperate bid by the diplomat to set the system in order before taking recourse to force. It involves a quiet warning to the opponents that manipulation can be effectively matched by manipulation. That efforts to hoodwink others amount to a sneaky approach which is incongruous with the agreed and established norms of international behaviour. Hence, the diplomat will have to make reasons realistic and pretexts plausible in adopting the art of manipulation so that it does not affect his prestige and position while it comes to light.

At times, deliberate manipulation of events becomes an utmost necessity. It can be done only by a heavy weight statesman who can command respect and successfully convince the world that his scheme does not serve his interests only but simultaneously and essentially linked with world peace too. In the process, he can assuage the impression that certain unpalatable but ancillary elements cannot be driven asunder from the manipulatory tactics.

The elements of manipulation :

Lying: Lying is deliberate dissemination of untrue information. It is a spurious attempt to cajole public opinion in one's favour and to sully the notorious opponents so as to get an upper hand over the circumstances. It can be done through spreading of biased information (i.e. whispering campaigns, rumours, rhetorics, eloquence etc.) and

information overloaded which throw public sentiments into the abyss of confusion and thereby relying on the interpretation given by the tactician himself. It is said that the big lie is often the eradible lie. While doing so he should be on guard to counter others. The "properest contradiction to a lie is another lie."<sup>18</sup> In this connection, it can be rightly said that sometimes diplomacy is what to say to not to do and what to do to not to say. An ancient proverb goes like this: if a diplomat says 'yes', it means perhaps; if he says 'perhaps', it means 'no' if he says 'no' he is no diplomat.

Besides this, success seems to sanctify falsehood which bank upon the short memory and the frenzied behaviour of the public.

Anyway, the statesman should see that truth applies most forcefully in peacetime. But during an emergency or war even an honest man feels freer to deceive his opponent by every possible ruse. At the end of the Tehran conference of 1943 with Stalin and Roosevelt, Winston Churchill remarked "In war time truth is so precious that she should always be attended by bodyguard of lies."<sup>19</sup>

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18. Swift, Jonathan; : "The Art of Political Lying"; works, ed. Thomas Roscoe, London, pp. 402-3.

19. Quoted in Bailey, T. A., "Ibid", p.123.



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But, the diplomat cannot afford to be known as the chronic purveyor of lies. While occasional lies may pay off, the manipulation of information as a sustained strategy of political rule is a tricky business. There is danger of being exposed and a more daunting prospect is that his credibility will be compromised which would reduce his stature and future capacity to influence others. Whether his reports are true or false, they will always be suspect. This might happen even if there is no incontrovertible proof of falsehood. Doubts are enough to undermine one's credibility. Lying is good as long as it remains a hood.

Secrecy :

Whereas lying works by disseminating falsehoods, the strategy of secrecy distorts the informational base of decisions by withholding true and relevant data. It also encourages the tactician to adopt fraudulent practices in tapping adversary's secrets furtively and thereby taking advantage of his problems. Situational necessity makes him amoral. If moral scruples fail to cope with the incorrigible opponents, the tactician could rescind all contractual obligations of international behaviour and operate with the most stringent and seductive means shrouded in mystery. Henry Kissinger, the staunchest propagator of mysterious operation holds that diplomacy flourishes through

secrecy. But getting into a huff and thereby adopting secretive approach by shunning the veracity all together would tell seriously upon the tactician. He will have to get eveready to justify his position if the secrets come to light at any point of time. Secrecy is the best policy if one can avoid to get caught, but the worst bloomer when ends in naught.

Bluff :

Bluff is camouflaged duplicity. It is generally associated with treachery, trickery and the acts of guile. The tactician can toy with this idea in tailoring a thunderous and equivocal response to the performances of a naughty and perfidious oppinent. That is, bluff counters the bluff.

Usually, honesty is the best policy. But the diplomat can always try to engineer a bluff if situation warrants it. Yet, it is costly to bluff.<sup>20</sup> A decision to bluff should be based on an impeccable judgement of the situation and adroit reasoning. A deliberate bluff blunts diplomatic effectiveness and bears the blunder only.

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20. Fisher, Roger; : "Basic negotiating strategy: International conflict for beginners"; London; Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1971, p.109.

Threats :

If lies, secrecy and bluff can not produce the result, threats can be placed in the queue to take care of the opposition onslaught. Threat is warning to make others feel the influence of somebody in manipulating events. Threats can be (a) insidious; and, the (b) open vituperative trap. The former follows the latter according to the degrees of necessity and convenience. But having failed to determine the actual interplay and polarization of forces and the exact timing of the exact threat might prove fatal and boomerang on the employer himself.

Hence, the process of exerting influence through offers is "far more conducive to international peace than the process of exerting influence through threat".<sup>21</sup> In such a case, offers and threats intermingle with each other in the net of manipulatory tactics.

12. Force when necessary :

The use of force is the final course of action of the tactician. Since the peaceful preservation of correlative interests needs to be based on systemic values, threats or challenges to them must be met with stringent and ultimately the violent means. The adoption of violent

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21. Ibid; p.94.

means appear logical when all other normal methods have failed to work. Force is power and military, economic, and psychological power are the teeth of diplomacy. But force should not find out its outlet in bullying and brow-beating others. The punishment should fit the crime. Otherwise, the abuse of overweening power generates uneasiness and outright fear if the diplomat keeps on aggrandizing himself at the expense of other partners of the system. Rather, he may try to win over the weak while applying force against the culprit, i.e. make allowances for the strength of weakness. The greater the power the greater the responsibility to use it responsibly.<sup>22</sup>

Normally, force should not be allowed to take an unpredictable course. It should be set on motion to achieve the limited objective and avoid massive retaliation which chokes off alternatives. Ideally, the diplomat should not back his opponent into corner. Even a rat will fight when cornered, and burglars seldom become murders if they are given a chance to flee. After the initial strike he even may encourage the opponent to realise his mistakes and revise his decisions to fallback soon for the greater cause of international stability. Because, destroying all prospects of a balance of power is like destroying the

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22. Bailey, T.A.; Ibid, p.197.



balance of nature.

But, if the opponent misinterpretes the tactician's eagerness to talk peace as self-defeating, the latter should organize world opinion and prove that there is no other alternative left but to fight the former out to set the system in order.

During the post war period, the victor should not relax rather discover newer avenues of cooperation with the vanquished. Because the concept of dictated peace will make the latter resentful and tempt him to evolve the strategy of vengeance. The vexation of victory are really onerous. The establishment of new horizons of relations through persuasive techniques over the graveyard of unwanted past would probably usher in a new era of mutual understanding and stability. It, too, might embody the ways and means of airing the grievances through institutional apparatuses of the system without yielding to abnormal methods of operation and causing mutual destruction.

The proposed relaxed atmosphere is expected to convince the vanquished that he is not being squeezed but being asked to be a responsible and honourable partner of a system based on mutual trust, respect and equality.

Source is the foundation of force and force must follow its logical course.

Thus, the tactician is a safety valve in the comity of nations who has to make the impossible possible. He is the bridge between different types of thoughts, events and people. He is the judge of judgements who extirpates noxious values and establishes noble ways of international understanding. But designing and applying the process of understanding is an uphill task which needs unflinching efforts and unswerving devotion. While various forces are at work, at times, he adopts shrewdness and inscrutable means to guard his invulnerable position aided by his invincible will. He emerges as the symbol of exquisite workmanship and erudition. Being well verse in creative skill, the art of organizing tools for managing events, perceptiveness becomes his trusted guide to take a leading position in the international arena. The tactician statesman-diplomat makes use of all these qualities to solve the multi-dimensional problems arising out of interaction among multinational actors of the international system.

Because, his chief concern is to sustain the systemic balance through mending the ruptured relations of nations. To him, the very meaning of diplomacy is to establish stability. In other way round, to achieve stability diplomacy is the first, though not the only, line of defence for him. Diplomacy is cheaper than fighting, for the cost of a war

in one day is far greater than that of entire diplomatic service for one year.

Most probably, both Kautilya and Machiavelli have talked of the emergence of this type of a tactician in their schema. This can be ascertained through a poignant analysis of their strategies of the statecraft in the chapters which have been placed next in order of their importance.

**PART TWO : THE ISSUES**

## Chapter II

### THE CONCERNS - CONCEPTS SYNDROME AND A NEW METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY

In the preceding chapter, efforts were made to sketch the idol of a statesman with pragmatic pigmentation of his integuments and intentions. It was gathered that historical chronicling of past experiences and ploughing the interstices of civilization would arm the pungent and perfervid diplomatist with recondite allusions to brood the blueprint of a bold and brave mechanism of political action.

But he was not sacrificed on the alter of history in toto. Since each generation reinterprets history in the light of its own experience, he could calibrate the pristime and pettifogging nature of details to escape burlesque acting and skim the cream thoughts precociously. He could still land in vacuous vacuum and show tangential tendencies lest he lacks the lascivious volition to filter the puerile and piddling ideas of his time from his actual line of action.

Thus, the statesman becomes a gyroscope who is constantly moving around ideas - past and present, in search of raw materials for the production of a practical policy

to deal with ever changing human instincts and conflicts. But in this spade and shovel operation, he gets lost into nothingness easily and fails to prove his wanted sagacity and adroitness if he analyses and handles events desultorily. He needs to be thrifty to play this game and have his own basic and solid standing, i.e. a conceptual and methodological foci in aid of his carefully thought-out results.

Kautilya, Machiavelli and the methodological dilemma :

Method is the mantle of the political man. Method makes the statesman. The study of methods is of practical perforce to the master manager of conflicts and inter-societal hullaballo.

Kautilya and Machiavelli too, spared no efforts to sermonize on the importance of the methodological knowledge of the statesman to create an edge between temerity and pusillanimity. The premises and postulates as enunciated by them can be examined seriatim as in the following:

History :

Both Kautilya and Machiavelli advocated history as a formidable hypothesis to arrive at pragmatic decisions for reasonable actions. It can be described with accurate relish that the methods followed by other writers on polity before and during Kautilya's time was "primarily empirical

including observation, analysis and deduction. Kautilya having a quite modern outlook supplemented it by a historical method - a method which has been recognized even by Karl Marx as the best."<sup>1</sup>

And, Machiavelli's preference for the historical data in order to construct the power complex is amply clear from his arguments. He observes, "..... as far intellectual training, the Prince should read history, studying the actions of eminent men to see how they conducted themselves during war and to discover the reasons for their victories or their defeats, so that he can avoid the latter and imitate the former. Above all, he should read history so that he can do what the eminent men have done before him: taken as their model some historical figure who has been praised and honoured."<sup>2</sup>

Machiavelli looked back to the "past for inspiration, but his method of arriving at what he thought universally valid generalizations governing political behaviour entailed a comparison of the past with the present... He loved antithesis and generalization, he was intuitive rather than

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1. Mukherjee, Bharati: "Kautilya's concept of Diplomacy - A New Interpretation"; Minerva Associates (Publications) Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1976, p.17.
  2. Machiavelli, N. : "The Prince". Tr. By George Bull; Harmonds Worth; Penguin, 1977, pp.89-90.

logical ..... He would base his conclusions about the way Princes should govern not on abstract consideration but on analysis of historical fact."<sup>3</sup>

Human nature :

Human nature, it seems, remains the quintessence of the Kautilyan - Mechiavellian schema. Historians argue that Kautilya was shamelessly slighted by the Nanda dynasty of the Magadhan empire. Kautilya, the begrudged brahmin of strong determination and encyclopaedic knowledge, vowed to avenge the revenge without paying slightest attention to the modes or means of political mannerism. The treatment meted out to him by the Nandas probably convinced him about the horrors of the human nature.

Hence, his whole treatise on the statecraft echoes a promethean urge on the statesman to guard constantly against the dangerous intrusion of the pernicious human elements in the vicinity of power. To him, the observation and analysis of the human nature through spies is a regular phenomenon of the art of ruling. It is this regular checking of the human nature that guarantees the "existence" of the "king". The "better elements" are to be streamlined in consolidating his position. The "evil ones" are to be packed for perdition.

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3. Ibid, Introduction by George Bull, pp.22-23.



Turning to Machiavelli, he too, after mining the treasures of history on the subject and after acute observation and profound analysis of the general traits of the human nature, treated it on the same plane.

Most men, Machiavelli observed and thought, put self interest first, "Everyone", he says in prologue to his play Clizia, "but most of all the young, benefits from watching an old man's cupidity; a lover's frenzy; the tricks of a servant; the greed of a sponger; the misery of a poor man; the ambition of a rich one; the wiles of a harlot and what little trust can be put in anyone."<sup>4</sup>

He continues, : "One can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours. They would shed their blood for you, risk their property, their lives, their children, so long as .... danger is remote. The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective."<sup>5</sup>

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4. Quoted in Hale, H.R. : "Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy"; The English Universities Press Ltd., London, 1961, p.15.

5. George Bull: Ibid, pp.96-97.

Putting together the totality of the human nature of an organized political unit, Machiavelli advises the statesman to make the people subservient to his clandestine but calculated strategy, to keep them united and faithful for the aggrandizement of his power. He views: "When things are quiet, everyone dances attendance, everyone makes promises, and everybody would die for him so long ✓ as death is far off. But in times of adversity, when the state has need of its citizens, there are few to be found and this test of loyalty is all the more dangerous since it can be made only once. Therefore, a wise Prince must devise ways by which his citizens are always and in all circumstances dependent on him and his authority; and then they will always be faithful to him."<sup>6</sup>

But, this is not enough. He further cautions the tactician not to be over enthusiastic to bring about political, economic and social reforms in his country. It, as visualised, might not usher in a new era of glory for him. Rather, it might well become the cause of large scale disgruntlement and make him the prey of public fury. Added to it, it might carry the germs of total extinction of the power structure which only gives him the name and fame. Because the innovator makes enemies of all those

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6. Ibid, p.71.

who prospered previously and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new programme. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their adversaries ... and partly because "men are generally incredulous, never rally trusting new things unless they have tested them by experience."<sup>7</sup>

Machiavelli even talks of the use of force and forgetting all sorts of infatuation for the populace, if necessary, to tame the frenzied and unpredictable human behaviour in achieving the targeted goal.

He exhorts that the "populace is by nature fickle; it is easy to persuade them of something, but difficult to confirm them in that persuasion. Therefore, one should rightly arrange matters so that when they no longer believe they can be made to believe by force."<sup>8</sup>

The Means-Ends phenomenon:

The 'Arthashastra' of Kautilya and the 'prince' of Machiavelli illuminate more or less same views on how to recruit what means to realise which ends and why? They have prescribed the most pragmatic programme for using means and achieving ends. To them, one should proceed in degrees: if good means yields good ends, there is no need

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7. Ibid, p. 51.

8. Ibid, p. 52.

to resort to abnormal manipulation of events. But in case of a reverse, they ask the statesman to be in his element - the man who knows how to play the political match. The means - fair or foul, depends on the exigency of the situation, not on the personal will of the statesman.

Their concept of power implies that the office of the rulers is an aggregate of the people whose welfare is an end in itself. Political power is the means to attain such an end. The Kautilyan maxim: in the welfare of the people lies the king's welfare, is indicative of his emphasis in the equation of welfare Vs. power.

Machiavelli too insists that a good ruler is one who achieves the good of the people. According to him, it cannot be called prowess to "kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, irreligious. These ways can win a Prince power but not glory."<sup>9</sup>

#### Morality :

The expression 'morality' is very ambiguous and open to numerous and some times contradictory interpretations. To the moral philosopher it may denote a "standard of right conduct which he believes to be the ultimate validity and on the basis of which he makes moral judgements of human behaviour. To the political or social scientist

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9. Ibid., p.63.

it might cannot a code of rules, or a set of norms or assumptions concerning right conduct which obtain in the society .... For the man in the street, morality generally means the sort of behaviour which conforms to the mores of the society with which he identifies himself or perhaps the kind of behaviour which his conscience enjoins."<sup>10</sup>

Morality, it would seem, concerns the supposed existence of certain kind of obligations and rights which are extra - legal. "International morality", therefore, refers to certain sorts of "extra - legal obligations thought to be incumbent upon the state in respect of its international dealings and to the supposed legitimacy of certain sorts of extra - legal claims made by the state upon other states."<sup>11</sup>

Coming back to Kautilya and Machiavelli, morality or high values based on theological or meral standard had no appeal to them. For them, values can come within the range of politics only as data without posing any question about 'ought' or 'ought not'. Both Kautilya and Machiavelli are of the opinion that each political or social millieu

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10. Stern, Geofferey: "Morality and international order", in James Alan ed. "The Bases of International order"; Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p.134.

11. Ibid, p.134.

demand its own appropriate mode of behaviour. They are apt to pin-point the subtle difference between the individual morality and the state morality. As far as the state morality is concerned, they approve to cloak the essentially self interested policies in the language of moral rectitude. This subordination of ethics to politics for the realization of national interests can be described as unmoral or amoral. While in individual cases, it might be called an immoral act.

#### Religion :

Like morality, religion too, was considered by Kautilya and Machiavelli as an exploitative tool of political gains. Religion as such was not criticized by them. But religion and statecraft were found to be incompatible. To them, religions were to be judged in terms of their social effects. That is why, they did not hesitate to advocate "shameless" methods and unscrupulous devices for using popular superstitions and religious beliefs. They have asked the statesman to be secular and unreligious, not anti-religious or irreligious.

Kautilya and Machiavelli also advise the tactician to use the services of astrologers, soothsayers, horologists, rumour-mongers and spies as effective method to reach the goal.

Kautilya, Machiavelli and the contemporary methodologists :

The mechanisms or methods as developed, propagated and practised by Kautilya and Machiavelli have not received so much benignant treatment from the contemporary writers. Rather, the present fabric of international relations has been deluged with the constellation of theories of multi-purpose variety. These Maverick theoreticians put forward the idea that the world in the nuclear age has taken the shape of a "global village" because of tremendous scientific, industrial and technological advancements and thereby reducing the communication gap between the interacting units of the international system. It, they argue, has occasioned a new era in the tapestry of diverse relationships which needs to be analysed and tackled by a new methodology.

The mushrooming concepts on methodology have been described under the rubric of various names. The philosophy of neorealism in international relations is being ascribed to Morgenthau.<sup>12</sup> The Morgenthau model is basically an embodiment of the realist tradition with some new jargons. The names like Quincy Wright<sup>13</sup>, George Liska<sup>14</sup>,

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12. Morgenthau, Hans J. : Politics Among Nations; Alfred A. New York, 3rd ed., 1960.
  13. Wright, Quincy : "The study of International Relations; New York, 1955.
  14. Liska, George : "International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security; Cambridge, Mass, 1957.

Morton A. Kaplan<sup>15</sup> are being identified with the "Equilibrium and the System Theory." There are others who have repudiated this Theory. There are a lot of other theories of the recent origin: the "Decision - making Theory"; the "Game Theory"; the "Bargaining Theory"; the "Behavioural Approach to powers"; the theory of "Balance of power in International Politics"; the theory of "National Interest"; the theory of "Non-alignment"; the theory of "collective Security"; the theory of "Disarmament and Arms Control" etc. etc.

These plethora of theories are said to have been designed to order the disorder and to ensure the survival of the systemic behaviour in international politics. But in reality, most of these theories are considered to be the representatives of the rigorous rigmarole and the sources of supine energy. Many of the arguments enshrined in these theories are assumed to be based on modish abracadabra and brusque gobbledeygook. They are too abstract to come out their theoretical confinement. In fact, a host of contemporary concepts on international interaction are fighting with each other for their own survival, not to talk of contributing to the survival of the global order. Critics

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15. Kaplan, Morton A. : "System and Process in International Politics", New York, 1957.



argue that many of these new theories are nothing new but the recollection of the historical past under the garb of a new terminology. These drab definitions of methodology and quackery have inaugurated a new age of terminological revolution but not theoretical innovation. Of course, quite a few of them have created tremendous impact in terms of their applicability and to serve the situational necessity.

The concerns - concepts syndrome and the methodological choice:

It has been pointed out earlier that the methods of Kautilya and Machiavelli are considered to be "moribund" in our nuclear age. In their characteristic banter, the nuclear age writers leave no stone unturned to throw unpalatable innuendos against them and use their name in pejorative parlance. Some<sup>16</sup> even do not entertain the idea of a comparative study between Kautilya and Machiavelli. They refer to time lag of about 2000 years (Kautilya: 4th century B.C. and Machiavelli: 1500 A.D.) and enormous historical diversity between the two. They wonder, is it not futile to draw a strange linkage between the "crooked" and "conservative" Kautilya and the "secular" and "reformist"

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16. Shankhdhar, M.M. : "Kautilya and Machiavelli: A brief study of superficial similarities and profound differences", Organizer, New Delhi, June 29, 1980.

Machiavelli of modern Europe ? The various pillars of their methods have also been treated serdonically. Their concepts on human nature have been the target of fulmination and harsh terms of opprobrium in the language of the later writers. It is argued that they have painted a very "frustrating picture" of the human nature.

Kautilya and Machiavelli have also been lampooned as fusty and fuddy-duddy because of their "orthodoxical interpretations" of morality and religion. The 'dangerous doctrines' on these two postulates are considered to have shunned all considerations for sanctity and human values. Critics are peeved to see the difference between the "ruling morality" and the "public morality" which gives the people a factotum status in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian framework.

The "shameless" use of religion and popular superstitions for political purposes while asking the people to be religious is seemed to be treacherous. This double-standard, it is held, closes all avenues of reformation and modernization of the society.

The adoption of the "vulger means" of incidiary approach and Wanton cruelty to ensure "success" at any cost is spurned as the bug-bear of repression. The application of large-scale espionage both internally and externally is viewed as the worst infringement of and encroach-

ment upon the human freedom. It converts the human-will to the prisoner of the state-will.

It is also maintained that both Kautilya and Machiavelli have talked of "forced peace" where the smaller partners or a coalition of them must follow the modalities of behaviour chalked out by the bigger-ones or a coalition of them to ensure a peaceful operation of the inter-state system. But this bigger-smaller notion of national sovereignty is alien to modern traditions and cultures. Hence, these critics think, the framework of diplomatic operation constructed by Kautilya and Machiavelli remains as an embodiment of "historical conjectures" to the modern mind.

But, some of the historians, political theoreticians, academicians, politicians, statesmen and diplomats sometimes make some causal remarks on the "validity" of their certain "concerns" and are apt to segregate the "invalid ones" from their concepts. While there are others who would like to take some of their "concepts" as "relevant" leaving the "concerns" as "irrelevant". Of course, this "valid-invalid" or the "relevant-irrelevant" notion of the "concerns-concepts" conundrums have never been analysed by anyone in a theoretical structure.

Anyway, whatever may be the criticisms against the Kautilyan-Machiavellian methods, perfunctory analysis or

just a chaffing note against them is bound to be misleading. It is not just the "timelag" or the "crooked-conservative:" nature of Kautilya and the "secular-reformist" character of Machiavelli that can be considered enough to cancel a comparative study between the two. There are still the remnants of their thoughts which have bearing upon our nuclear-age conceptions. There are still enough reasons to indulge in historical parallelism between the two. There are still operations who have pursued and are pursuing the "dangerous doctrines of power politics" and the "double-standard" with the mask of lip-service criticism of their methods. Because, it is convenient to follow the methods by criticising the men behind their creation.

So, without being emotionally attached with the Kautilyan-Machiavellian designs of diplomacy, one has to judge them in a proper and pragmatic perspective. There is no denying the fact that both Kautilya and Machiavelli had a lot of bad experiences from the prevailing social conditions of their times. Kautilya was harassed by the Nanda dynasty and Machiavelli was banished by the Medici. Both of them saw their dear motherland plunged in a calamitous inbroglio that precipitated cataclysmic upheavals. Thereby shattering the social, political and economic stratas of the systemic make-up. It attracted the avaricious foreigners and conquistadors to loot their country

and put them under their subjugation. Thus, Kautilya was "faced with the same need for political unification in India after Alexander's invasion that confronted Machiavelli in Italy after Renaissance."<sup>17</sup>

All these ineluctably disturbing events provided tremendous fillip to their jingoistic attitudes and convinced them for the construction of an operational system of diplomacy on the ashes of the appalling turmoil. The systemic performance would be to restore order, strength, stability and prosperity. Both of them supported monarchical regimes, advocated expansionism, which means perpetual conflict and subordination of the weaker. They also believed that the state must expand or perish. The absolutist monarchical systems propagated by them in those days can be described as "strong governments" in our nuclear age. Since they were concerned with order, stability and prosperity, so the concepts were designed in a manner that satisfies the concerns most. For them, the concerns--concepts phenomenon was not merely an academic exercise. The progressive identification of theory and practice was just the practical necessity. Hence, the necessity for a "strong government." Because only a politically, economically and militarily strong government can ensure success. Success means independence, independence means confidence and confidence is power. The powerful statesman, according to

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17. Mukherjee, Bharati: Ibid, p.97.

Kautilya and Machiavelli, can sacrifice morality, religion and adopt any means, if needs be, for the greater sake of national interests and the preservation of the political power. Because, power gives strength, strength gives order, order gives stability and stability gives prosperity.


So, we have seen that both Kautilya and Machiavelli are extremely pragmatic concerning relations of nations. We have also learnt that they developed their postulates out of sheer necessity to suit the needs of the time. After all, one has to be a "realist" while operating in the interplay of multi-national forces representing multifarious interests. Since the peaceful preservation of co-relational interests needs to be based on systemic values, threats or challenges to them must be met with stringent and ultimately the violent means. The adoption of violent means appears logical when all other normal methods have failed to work. This point of view epitomizes that even after a lot of outcry for the so-called democratization of the international system the present global set-up is dominated by the two super powers with their surrogates or allies or friends constituting various sub-systems throughout the world. That is, the peaceful operation of the system would necessitate the leading partners on the one side and the consenting ones on the other.

And, the reality of the situation is that the economically, politically and militarily viable partners will have a bigger say in the system than less viable or "abnormally viable" units.

Anyway, now an attempt can be made to devise an updated version of the Kautilyan-Machiavellian dictums of diplomacy in a hypothetical framework. By "updated version", we mean the time-tested tools of their thoughts on diplomacy. The search is for a new methodological scaffolding out of theirs which can be more operational in exploring a better and workable world order in this tension-ridden nuclear civilization. In so doing, greater emphasis would be given on the modes of diplomacy expounded by Kautilya in his "Arthashastra". Of course, almost all the components of "chatur upayas" (modes of expediency) of Kautilya have also been described by Machiavelli in his "Prince" though in a different and scattered manner.

Here is that analytical-graphical exposition of the hypothetical system of order, stability and prosperity.

## THE SYSTEM



## THE SYSTEM

The whole diagram has been considered as an international system. For the benefit of analysis, it has been divided into four sub-systems (e.g. Sub-system 1; Sub-system 2; Sub-system 3; and Sub-system 4). The sub-systems are constituted with various political units. The actors and



operators of these units may vary in their approach but their goal is same. They want to enhance their national power and prestige by acquiring more and more political, economic, military and technological strength. While everybody is trying to realise the same goal, conflicts generally occur. But if the system fails to absorb these conflicts through its management mechanisms, they may blow out of proportions and there remains the threat of the destruction of the system itself.

Now, let us discuss the system in proper. (A) has been placed at the centre of the system. The potentials of political, economic, military and technological power of (A) allow it complete independence in dealing with other units and actors of the various sub-systems. But this should not be misunderstood as an "A-centric" system. And here we depart from the core thoughts of Kautilya and Machiavelli who have talked of the necessity of a "vigishu" (Aggressor) or a ruthless "Prince" based on force. While (A) can resort to force only when the conflicts between two units or two groups of units threaten the systemic survival and order. Because, you cannot use force so easily if you have enough stock of it. Enormous power symbolizes enormous responsibility.

Anyway, sub-system-1 is consisted of the units: (B), (C) and (D). Sub-system-2 has four units: (E), (F),

(G), and (H). Sub-system-3 includes (I), (J), (K), (L), and (M), and, sub-system-4 has been constituted with (N), (O), (P), and (Q). In the sub-system-1, (B), and (C) are small powers, but (D) is neutral. In the sub-system-2 (E) equals with (A) in strength of all variety, while (F) and (G) are weak powers and (H) is neutral. In the sub-system-3, (I) is middle power; (J), (K), (L) play the role of surrogates and (M) is neutral. In the sub-system-4, (N) is equivalent to (A) and (E); while (O) and (P) acts as allies and (Q) is neutral.

So we have got a system where there are strong powers, Small powers, weak powers, middle powers, sattelites, allies and the neutral powers.

The operation of the system :

It has been noted earlier that the goal of all the actors is self-aggrandizement in terms of power and prestige on the one hand and political, economic and military gains on the other. But (A) is concerned with order and expects responsible behaviour from other partners of the system.

(A) thinks that only the peaceful preservation of co-relational interests would guarantee good returns for all the units. But (E) and (N) being equal to (A) think it otherwise. They consider (A)'s concern for order and

stability is a smokescreen for establishing its hegemony over the system. Hence, they start intriguing against (A) separately. Because both (E) and (N) are jealous of each other. (E) thinks that sub-system-2 is its own sphere of influence and only it can take care of its order and stability. At a certain point of time, (F) and (G) complain about (E)'s gross interference in their internal affairs and make fervent appeal to the other units to come to their succour. The criticisms of others go unheeded by (E) and in the meantime (E) replaces the actors within (F) and (G) by the elements who are sympathetic towards it. These measures of (E) are considered to be against the systemic norms and values by other actors of the system.

Being encouraged (N) too starts to play the same game. (N) with the help of (O) and (P) tries to influence the policies of small powers like (B) and (C). First (B) and (C) do not accept (N)'s behaviour. But (C) being a smaller power than (B) finds it difficult to cope with the situation and succumbs to (N).

(B) having shared a common border with (C) feels its interests are threatened by (N). At the moment, (E) convinces (B) to join its camp and save itself from foreign aggression. B does it.

Now, (E) being more confident goes out - captures the little powers like (J), (K) and (L) and forces them to play the role of its satellites. (I) being a middle power thinks it dangerous and seeks (A)'s help to fight out (E). (N) takes the advantage of the developing situation and makes alliance with (I). A warlike atmosphere and tensions prevail throughout the system. All the neutral units like (D), (H), (M) and (Q) criticise the irresponsible acts of (E), (I) and (N). (A) feels seriously that the system might break up and prepares to take up measures to set the system in order.

The yardsticks of order :

Sama : Sama is a general attitude of friendliness and persuasion; the way of polite argument, of approach based on reason and interest. Kautilya recommended the application of this policy towards the weak powers in order to obtain their loyalty and the strong power should observe this policy of conciliation by promise of protection of interests of the weak powers. In the same way, (A) warns both (E) and (N) to behave responsibly and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other powers. On the other hand, (A) tries to wean away (B), (C) and other small powers from the evil influence of (E) and (N) through persuasive arguments. Neutrals like (D), (H), (M) and (Q) declare their full support for (A). But only lukewarm response

is available from (E), (N), (I) and other conflicting parties. Because, while some of them can understand (A)'s sincerity, many hesitate to take (A) in full confidence. Small and weak powers fear the replacement of domination of (E) and (N) by the domination of (A). Yet, (A)'s initiatives at least minimize the chances of various parties getting involved into actual conflict for the time being. It provides (A) the opportunity of trying the next tool.

Dana :

So, if the policy of Sama is successful but cannot produce the desired effect in full then Kautilya's advice is to follow the policy of dana. Nothing for nothing is the rule in diplomacy and for gaining an important object one should be prepared to pay something.<sup>18</sup> The word dana means gifts awarded in the shape of wealth to avert the fear caused by the enemy. It includes agreements involving loss, limitation of interest, withdrawal, something advantageous to other parties in exchange for gaining one's objects.

(A) follows the same policy. (A) promises protection of and help to (C) and advises (B) to come out of (E)'s influence. In the meantime, (A) gives all sorts of

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18. Ibid, p. 37.

moral, political, economic and military assistance to (I). All these measures make (E) desperate and being intrigued by the situation captures the neutral power (H). It provokes the neutral powers like (D), (M) and (Q) to rally around (A). But (N), though having believed the validity of (A)'s approach to a certain extent, feels (E)'s increasing power is grossly improporionate to his and forcibly occupies the neutral power (Q). It makes the situation more and more complex. And, (A) goes ahead to apply the third strategy.

Bhēda :

If neither persuasion nor compromise succeeds then bhēda is recommended. Bhēda signifies the policy of divide and rule. It is an important adjunct of diplomacy through which even a strong power can be brought under control. Kautilya points out that there are different means of showing needs of dissensions, e.g. by instigating anyone of the neighbouring powers, a wild tribe, a scion of enemy's family or the imprisoned or disgruntled elements.

Bhēda was an important instrument for an ancient conqueror and even to this day, it has not lost its vigour. The British Government was able to subjugate India for more than two hundred years mainly by applying this policy of

bheda among different communities.<sup>19</sup>

(A) does the something. (A) alongwith (I) help the dissenting forces within (E), (G), (O), and (P). (D) and (M) also join hands with (A), and (I). The joint front of (A), (I), (D) and (M) make use of large-scale espionage to create division among various pockets of population and inciting revolt against the central authority. They also create disorder in the internal administrations of (E), (N) and their respective spheres of influence by resorting to all sorts of abnormal methods. These tactics yield some positive results. The actors within (G) gets replaced by another set of actors hostile to (E). (O) goes out of (N)'s control. This trend encourages (J), (K) and (L) to become free from (E)'s domination. But if these things do not draw good sense on (E) and (N), (A) and the front find no alternative but choose to adopt the fourth strategy, which according to Kautilya, is the last one.

Danda :

Danda means the show of force. Normal diplomacy includes a judicious mixture of the first three methods. But if they fail, danda is to be applied. In all ages the application of physical force was undoubtedly regarded as the most effective means to bring the desired results

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19. Ibid, p. 38.

relating to inter-state relations.

Danda actually is a diplomatic war, not an armed contest, rather a last resort before the actual commencement of fighting. Different modes of danda have been mentioned by Kautilya. One is to capture the enemy in open fight, the second is to subdue him by treacherous warfare, the third is to strike him by planning a secret conspiracy and the last is to capture him during the confusion caused by the danger of imminent fall.

Thus, it is not necessary to equate danda with war. There are other ways of putting pressure which may be equally effective, e.g. in the period between two world wars, the word 'sanction' was in very common use to bring an erring state to reason. Its most effective use was against Mussolini under the League of Nations. Other methods are blockade, boycott, refusal of right of passage etc. That means any way of creating pressure either physically or economically or morally may be termed as danda.<sup>20</sup>

The new front of (A), (D), (G), (I) and (O) follow the same policy of danda as enunciated by Kautilya in his method. But it does not produce good returns. Finding no other way out, (A) and its allies adopt the fifth strategy of war.

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20. Ibid, pp. 38-39.



War :

(A) and its allies declare war against (E), (N), and their accomplices. When the war breaks out, both (E) and (N) make common cause against (A) and the company. (I) breaks its partnership with (N). Very soon, (J), (K) and (L) fall to the (A) group like ripe apples. (E), (N), and their friends threaten to use such weapons that will destroy the whole system. (A) and the party too, pose a counter threat of the same nature.

Ultimately, (E), (N) and the company get defeated and the stability restored.

But this becomes a forced stability or a forced peace. Both Kautilya and Machiavelli and their discussion here. Now, the forced stability is not a durable stability. That is why, (A) and the group go forward to make use of the last tool of order.

Reconciliation and Moderation :

Kautilya and Machiavelli do not prescribe any other means once the goal is achieved through war. But the stability established through war will not last long unless the apprehensions of the defeated party are removed by taking positive steps. So, (A) and the group is not overwhelmed by their success in the war. It can be mentioned here that they even did not want to choose war as the ultimate instrument of solution. Hence, (A) will not shun its earlier

approach of conciliatory measures.

Basically, (A) is concerned with order. (A) will try again to impress upon both (E), (N) and the defeated party that war was not thrust upon them. It is because of their bad policies that the war broke out. But, there is still the possibility of establishing mutual goodwill and peaceful interaction upon the heap of past mistakes. (A) will urge upon the defeated group to become the responsible partner and share independence, equality, stability and order with other units of the system. This will usher in a new era of ecumenical understanding which is needed most for the orderly operation of the system based on mutual trust and cooperation. In this way, the Kautilyan-Machiavellian maxims on methodology can get acelineatized with our modern norms. Kautilya and Machiavelli advised the Statesman to acquire more and more power at the expense of others. But power is a relative phenomenon. One can be powerful if others are powerless. When the powerful faces the similar powerful, it becomes a status-quo situation. Then power becomes useless. The same is the situation in the nuclearized world patterns of today. It is said that the two superpowers the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. can kill the universe twenty times over. But they cannot use this means of massive destruction against each other since it includes the physical elimination of them too.

The nuclear war heads have been rendered unproductive and useless because of their non-applicability. And the

non-applicability of the nuclear weapons reduces the chances of a show of force on the world scale. Even the talk of a "limited nuclear war" has been rightly termed as "sheer madness." Under the circumstances, one is happy to see the present global trends that the weapons manufactured by man to kill his fellow men are themselves being destroyed through mutual talks which has been described as detente.

Man makes mistakes and man remakes himself to respond to reason while he realizes his mistakes. Because, man is a rational animal. And the statesman is a man. The statesman is the harbinger of humdinger methods. He makes use of his methods to build the bridge between different peoples, different traditions and different cultures. His methods lift the humanity from higgledy piggedy situation and lead to the growth and development of human understanding and mutual cooperation of all kinds. And, his prescription for peaceful interaction of man with man is the only and effective guarantor of order and stability of the global system.

### Chapter III

#### COMPARE AND CONTRAST: INTERNAL FACTORS VS. EXTERNAL FACTORS IN THE KAUTILYAN-MACHIAVELLIAN SETTING VIZ-A-VIZ THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Internal issues of a political system reconnoitre the ground for its external behaviour. Similarly, external events beyond the system influence the operational character of the systemic framework. From the dawn of civilization, this internal-external linkage has always been recognized as a crucial determining factor in characterizing the atmosphere of the internal system and the international system. The mechanisms of political maneuverism put forward by Kautilya and Machiavelli also reflect the same notions how internal and external developments coincide with each other and affect the decisional attitudes of the actors on the both pole.

Since both Kautilya and Machiavelli were concerned with unification of and stability in their respective countries, the factors which swayed their minds most to achieve the said ends can be analysed here in the following:

#### External phenomena

Alexander's invasion of India from May 327 B.C. to May 324 B.C. and its impact inaugurated a new era of realism and expediency in political policy. It brought India for

the first time in contact with Europe and led to significant changes in the political, economic, social as well as ideological set up in India. It left the Warrior tribes of the Indus river valley weakened and broken. The monarchies and tribal republics of the north-west were exhausted by their sanguinary conflicts with the invader and their power of military resistance was much curbed.

Thus, the invasion paved the way for easy extension of Mauryan rule in the North-west and fixed the political map of the regions. This Macedonian episode also showed clearly that the emotional love of independence was no match to the disciplined strength of a determined conqueror. It also convinced the Indian regions that submission to a strong state within the country was the best protection against the recurrence of danger from outside. It demonstrated, on the part of the Indian rulers, the need for a bold and wiser political approach—both internal as well as in foreign relations. This is perhaps the motive that lies behind the strong, shrewd, clear cut diplomacy as we find in the Arthashastra.<sup>1</sup>

It is also this Macedonian intervention in the Indian affairs that helped India all in political unity for the first time under the Mauryas. In the pre-Mauryan

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1. Mukherjee, Bharati: Ibid, p.51.

age, there was no centralized administration. Because pre-mechanical ages lacked the means of speedy communication and quick transport between different and distant parts of a large empire. News would take months to travel from Pampanisus to Pataliputra. When Chandragupta Maurya's accession took place (320 B.C.), he was confronted with the distressing consequences of a foreign invasion of his country which led to national depression and disorganization. History tells us that Chandragupta Maurya was the first Indian king who established his rule over an extended India, an India greater than even British India, the boundaries of which lay beyond the frontiers of modern India along with the borders of Persia. Chandragupta was, again, the first of the Indian rulers to lead India to political unification by his conquest, by joining up the valleys of the Indus and the land of the Five Rivers with the eastern valleys of the Ganges and the Yamuna, as well as by uniting Northern India with the south, beyond the barriers of the Vindhyas, under the umbrella of one paramount sovereign.

But the secret ~~this~~ lies behind this magnificent success of the Mauryan emperor is the materialistic conception of policy of polity of his Brahmin Premier, Kautilya.

The Macedonian epoch influenced Kautilya's mind in such a big way that his immediate interest was how to

secure administrative centralization and the methodical and complete subordination of all local autonomy and initiative to one centralized monarchy. His outstanding genius saw danger in the numerous small free states, kingships and republics. Centuries of warfare, which had led to political disintegration, therefore made Kautilya recommend not only the normal methods of diplomacy, following the traditional approach like strategy, tactics, military engines, logistics of supply, political alliances etc. but also downright treachery, assassination, deception, appearement of the powerful, suppression of the weak, hypocrisy, bribery, economic exhaustion, lightning onslaught, ruthlessness, vigilance, secrecy and readiness to take fearful risks including even that of self-sacrifice. The greater cause of the mother land i.e. political unification and the demand of contemporary time and situation compelled Kautilya to advocate such an unscrupulous type of diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> Machiavelli too, faced the same situation in Italy. A protracted war-like situation prevailed in and around his country. Petty kingdoms quarreled with each other on trifling matters to establish their dominating role. Foreign powers, counting the dearth of inherent unity among the Italian states, made good use of the situation and played off one against another in a syste-

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2. Ibid, p.55.

matic manner. All these things convinced Machiavelli to prescribe such a political formula that could unite Italy and establish its glorious past under the hegemonistic control of supreme ruler.

Internal phenomena :

The internal conditions of India and Italy during Kautilya's and Machiavelli's times were surprisingly similar. The perennial internal turmoil and instability caused by social, political, economic and psychological variables tremendously influenced the Kautilyan-Machiavellian dictums of diplomatic rules.

Social condition :

When the Mauryan dynasty came to the throne, it was preceded by great political upheaval following Alexander's invasion of India. But, in spite of that, in social condition of India almost remained the same. Kautilya visualized that a disciplined social order was a pre-requisite for disciplined individual achievement. As an orthodox Brahmin he could not reject the authority of the Vedas or brush away the existing social order. He believed in the institutions and social ideas of his countrymen. That Kautilya kept close to the fundamentals of Indian tradition is seen from his categorical statement that in order to be effective and successful political power must command the support of the sacerdotal power, beside having the sound advice of



experienced statesman at his disposal. But his ideas of the traditional social order and his faith in the scriptures could not make him blind to the necessities and exigencies of the time. Of course, he wished no revolutionary changes since he was fully aware that life could not be entirely divorced from the predominating social ideals. Rather, he wanted to add a new dimension to social life by making the king all powerful as the protector and guarantor of social phenomena. So, Kautilyan society had a different flavour from the then Indian society characterized by piousness and morality. Himself a Brahmin, he advocated the withdrawal of the immunity of the Brahmins from criminal penalty and capital punishment in case of treason; the purohita was not an element of sovereignty in Kautilya, though he was an important agent in the preservation of the integrity of the state. Arthashastra did not make caste the primary basis for classes although the society was based on Varnashrama dharma. One prominent upper class is covered with specification of caste by the dual term paura-ajanapada. The first component means 'city-dweller', the second 'inhabitant of the district'. These were not just any residents but propertied citizens who had a strong following (presumably from tribal splinters), enjoyed a special position with respect to the state and constituted public opinion. The opinion was not expressed by plebiscite or vote, ascertained by spies and provoca-

teurs who served in a way for the modern public opinion poll, mass observation and sample-survey techniques.<sup>3</sup>

From these instances, we can deduce that Kautilya tried to re-stratify Indian society on the basis of economic determinants, with the secular power standing at the apex, with the monopoly of physical force, while others, whatever may be their castes, must submit to this all-comprehensive and all-powerful regal power. Of course, no better maxims and principles can be thought of for building an empire like that of Chandragupta Maurya, who had to deal with so many communities, with differing social systems and religious make-up. His vast empire comprised the foreigners in the North-west and peoples in different stages of social evolution, from aboriginal people, forest tribes and nomads, to the cultured classes of the Aryas, brought up under the Varnasrama-dharma system within India proper. It was only a broad principle of synthesis and comprehension which could accommodate so many differences and such a large amount of social and cultural diversity so as to reconcile them in a composite whole and weld them together as parts a common political

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3. Kosambi, D. D.: An Introduction to the Study of Indian History; Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1956, p.212.

system. That is the reason why Kautilya made his king Digvijayi and the possessor of unchallengable power so that it would be possible for him to introduce that principle of synthesis and comprehension which would ensure complete cultural freedom to all communities, respect their differences in language, custom and creed, and protect all their rights, social, religious and linguistic, which go to make for communal harmony.

Under the umbrella of one paramount king, society would attain cultural unity in the midst of diversity. If there were no such integrity and cohesion within society, it would not be possible for the king to devote himself fully to the increase of power of the kingdom, which according to Kautilya, should be the primary aim of a king. Thus, the aggrandizement of power at the cost of other units of the international system presupposes an integrated social system in the Kautilyan framework of diplomacy.

In Machiavelli's "Prince" too, a typical social system has been constructed to suit its demands for power and more power. In Machiavelli's own country there was no order at all. Various social groups were vying with each other to capture the political power. The medici and the Soderini comprising the main and influential groups were at political loggerheads. The result was complete lawlessness and confusion. The situation was further aggra-

vated by the role played by the church in political bungling. The ecclesiastical authority wanted to remain the pivotal broker of the power game. The atmosphere was so suffocating that Machiavelli had to think of a workable alternative as we find in the Prince.

Though he was not so rigid like Kautilya to stratify various social classes and give political authority to the noble class, he was not free from this notion in toto. In fact, in the ultimate analysis, his power structure were to consist of those who were direct descendants of the existing power groups. But, like Kautilya, Machiavelli also separated the papal authority from the political authority. Otherwise, the political authority cannot take decisions independently which is detrimental to social stability.

For Machiavelli, if there is no social stability, the state is always vulnerable to foreign attacks. But, a weak social fabric cannot produce a strong state. Hence, the need for a stable social order under the supervision of an all-powerful "Prince" which will guarantee the glorious and prestigious existence of the state and enhance the capacity to influence other actors of the international system.

Political condition :

The political condition of the then India also served as an important internal element so as to affect Mauryan diplomacy. A survey of the nature and scope of activities of the Mauryan state will show that it was largely a welfare state. It regarded itself as the trustee of the population as a whole and tried to harmonise the conflicting interests of its different classes.<sup>4</sup>

Kautilya, as we have seen earlier, was a firm believer in kingship. To him, royalty was the mainspring of all national exertions for common good. It was the embodiment of the unity of the interests of the various sections of the community. Like many of his predecessors, Kautilya was firm believer in royal paternalism. Kautilya's king was a benevolent despot - responsible only to himself, accountable to none, like the father in the management of children, guided only by his affections and the duties which affection implant in the paternal heart. But though not responsible to anyone, the king could not become a despot because his own interests should be identified with that of his subjects. Kautilya gives to the welfare of the citizens the first place in all considerations of policy; the good of the people and their sustained happiness were the main ends

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4. Altekar, A.S. : State and Government in Ancient India; Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi-6; 1962, p.332.

for the service of which he chalked out an elaborate administrative system.

In discussing the political role of the king, Kautilya says: "In the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness; in their welfare, whatever pleases himself shall not consider as good, but whatever pleases his subjects he shall consider as good".(1-19) (Arthashastra).

Though the primary function of Kautilyan state was, no doubt, to impose danda through which freedom was restrained, it was not that merely of a policeman, but of a doctor and social reformer. The state played an effective part over a man's social, economic cultural, moral and even spiritual life as an integrated whole. It held the balance for the interplay of social forces, intellectual influences, economic enterprise and spiritual traditions. The fulfilment of the material aims of life was the primary reason for the existence of the state, and it was the duty of the state to help the individual as much as possible, equitably and rationally.

The Kautilyan state subordinated moral principles and religious dictates to the political necessities of its own existence and to the welfare of the people. The state protected the consumer by preventing merchants from cornering commodities and raising their prices, it regulated the

prices of articles, traders using unauthorized measures were punished, merchants selling adulterated goods were severely dealt with. By constructing roads, ensuring the safety of traffic, by constructing emporiums, the state tried to help the traders and industrialists. The state financed irrigation works to help agriculture; it helped community projects by granting tax exemption, materials like timber and stone were supplied free to the villagers for their works of public utility.

The Mauryan state recognised its responsibility to the destitute and diseased. It offered doles to the orphans, the aged and the infirm, and also to poor women. It also supplied work to persons in temporary difficulty. Persons were not allowed to embrace asceticism without providing for their dependents. It took adequate measures against epidemics. When a famine broke out, state granaries were utilized for providing relief and seeds; and extra-taxation was imposed upon the rich to relieve the poor.

Moral welfare was also a concern for the state. Gambling, drinking and prostitution were under rigorous control. Literature and education was encouraged.

Thus the Mauryan state was really a welfare state - the friend, philosopher and guide of the citizens from their birth to death. All these activities of the state definitely presuppose a full treasury. The state therefore, was keen in increasing its resources in various ways. One

such method was mixed economy. Another important source for having additional resources was expansion of the kingdom. More expansion means more territory, more inhabitants, more natural resources and more revenue.

All in all, the object of the Kautilyan state was not merely policing. The duty of the political organization of life and property. It had a higher purpose, namely to help the individual in his self-realization, as such it had to harp on a strong economic foundation. Thus, the welfare nature of the state imposed greater economic responsibility on the shoulder of the state which in turn had to take recourse to aggrandizement and expansion to replenish the treasury as the main guiding principle of interstate relations.

Now, coming back to Machiavelli, he also advocated for a strong state under the guidance of a ruthless Prince. He too urged upon the Prince to take care of the welfare of the populace. He again subordinated the moral and religious principles to the necessities of the state. But Machiavelli was so fanatic about the definition of power that he hardly talked of any role for the individual within his political structure. Neither he discussed in detail the multifaceted activities of the state towards its citizens. Though the Machiavellian state was, to a greater extent, a model of political order in comparison with the existing systems in the then Europe, it emphasised mainly on the



military might of the state. For Machiavelli, if the state is powerful militarily, it can repulse any attack from outside. It can also embark upon ambitious designs to exhaust the enemy politically economically and militarily and to foist its own hegemony over the international system.

Economic condition :

Before we discuss the economic basis of Kautilyan diplomacy, it is necessary for us to know the economic background against which the Mauryan empire arose. Magadha emerged as the dominant Gangetic state. The economic condition was unstable. There was tremendous "increase of population on land newly cleared of forest. The virtually self-sufficient village sprouted here for the first time as the basic unit of production which would later spread over and characterize the whole of India."<sup>5</sup> This was the background against which Magadhan empire arose. Prior to the rise of the Mauryan empire, the Saisunages and the Nandas of Magadha already ushered in some kind of state-influence in economic life, as they already converted the mines and forests into royal domain.<sup>6</sup>

It was the Mauryan dynasty that led to greater economic concentration and state interference, both in agriculture,

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5. Kosambi, D.D. : Ibid, p.176.

6. Ibid, p.202.

trade and industry, for the first time, as it was necessitated by time and circumstances.

The society in which the Arthashastra was written, was engaged in large-scale commodity production and trade over long distances. The Macedonian invasion opened new trade routes between India, the Middle-East and Europe, and India became economically prosperous.

With this background, when Chandragupta Maurya came to the throne, the main motive of his Brahmin premier was how to make state comprehensive in scope and catholic in spirit. He therefore, said, 'material gain' (Artha) alone is the principal aim of morality, and the pleasures of the senses (Kāma) are rooted in material gain.<sup>7</sup> That is why in Arthashastra we find that the whole economic policy was regulated and controlled by the state. It was the largest employer of labour. The state had monopoly over all natural resources e.g. mines, forests etc. and treasure troves belonged to the state. In some profitable matters the state had a monopoly like slaughter houses, gambling houses, wines, prostitution, all metals from the ore, to the finished articles. The state possessed extensive crown lands and the uncultivated waste lands formed the property of the state.

Fishing, ferrying, and trading rights were owned by the state and there were state-owned industries. The state

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7. Kautilya : Arthashastra (1-7).

also entered the market as a trader. It had its own superintendent of commerce. The existence of modern mixed economy principles can be traced in the days of Kautilya. Private enterprises were allowed to run side by side but public traders were looked upon with suspicion and were regarded as a thorn, a public enemy just short of a national calamity and taxed and fined heavily for malpractices. The reason, perhaps, was that the king as the successor to chiefs of many different tribes, received great revenues in kind from harvested grain and local manufacture. He had to convert a substantial part of these grains into commodities to pay the army and the bureaucracy. Cash payment was made to every official according to service rendered by him, including the High priest, heir apparent mother of the king and chief queen. Expenditure on this account was not negligible. Moreover, Chandragupta had a very big army. Megasthenes reported that 400,000 men lay in single camp of Chandragupta. This vast army also created a strain upon the economy for its maintenance. So there was the need of additional resources. This necessity of additional resources was definitely another reason for the expansionist tendency of Kautilyan diplomacy.

Thus, the Mauryan political system was in its ends and functions, an economic system. Economic prosperity was its goal. Neither force nor fraud, therefore, was condemned. Force became the sole criterion of success. Fraud was rather

welcomed as a surer means of success since it smoothened all other obstacles. Militarism became the order of the day. Conquest expanded the realm of the king and with conquests the King's coffers became filled and the conqueror became more powerful and more autocratic. New territories, more numerous subjects, vast acquisition of wealth, all made princes strong and unchallengable. Kautilya was completely aware of these as he was a believer in realism. Monarchy appeared to him as the most suitable form of government to bring the political unity of the country which had been shattered by foreign invasions. He realised fully well that if the king had a command over the purse, and if he were economically self-sufficient then no other person or institution could challenge legal authority. Because economic power is the key to all other types of power. That is the reason why, with unique political insight and wisdom, he advocated those economic principles for the Mauryan political system. With his supreme materialistic outlook, Kautilya understood that once financial independence was ensured, and a regular money supply guaranteed, the king could rule by the sword, and the consolidation of empire would be possible.

But, unlike Kautilya, Machiavelli gave very little emphasis on the economic dimension. The Machiavellian state's main concern was military strength. Of course, the military dimension of power presupposes the economic variable without which nothing can be done. But except some causal references,

he did not discuss it in detail.

Psychological variable :

Though the social, political and economic matters have a tremendous bearing upon the internal-external operations, the psychological aspect has also got a lot of importance in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian setting of diplomacy.

The sixth century B.C., so remarkable in the intellectual and political history of the world, was no less so in the political history of India. While the foreign enemy (Persians and Greeks) was making headway in the border provinces of North-western India, strewn with local republics and tribal principalities, Indian life was simultaneously subjected to new forces and stresses from within. A great social and intellectual upheaval was shaking the very foundations of social life in the home land of Eastern Aryan-dom. Since the close of the ages of the Brahmanas and upanishads "the Brahmanic religion of sacrifice had become an anatholy, ... men forgot its significance and meaning and its own rotaries doubted its efficiency. Abstract speculation came into being and men enquired into the root cause of the phenomenal world, its diversities, the relations of men with nature and the causes that led to diversities in individual life. The doctrine of Karma and of rebirth on metempsychosis according to good or evil actions in life gained ground. Pleasure in life or its perpetuation with sacrifice lost its charms

and a hankering for self-realisation took place.<sup>8</sup> Pessimism came to dominate all sections of Indian philosophy: "The Buddhists harped on Dukkha and Samvega" while the orthodox systems had their enumeration of the Dukkhas.<sup>9</sup> It favoured the growth of philosophical sects which ignored the world of realities, scoffed at domestic happiness, and emphasised on super social ideals. The impact of this socio-religious upheaval was great. Men entered the Sangha, women followed them. The husband left the wife, the wife forsook the protection of the lord. "In short there dawned an age in which humanity forgot the real end of life, and yearned for death and final dissolution."<sup>10</sup>

But on excess of such rigours had its reaction. New teachers appeared who inveighed against such undue abstinence. They interpreted human life in terms of man's natural desires, his social objectives and higher spiritual aims. They pointed out the relative importance and the immediate connection of the catur-varga e.g. Dharma, Artha, Kama and Moksa. Moksa was the ultimate aim of life, but it depended upon the fruition of desires, desires ethically considered and authe-

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8. Banerjee, N.C. : Development of Hindu Polity and Political Theories; Part I, Published by the author, July, 1927, p.256.
9. Banerjee, N.C. : Kautilya: An exposition of his social ideal and political theory; Messers R. Cambray and Co. 1927, p.23.
10. Ibid, p.24.

tically regulated. At the close of this period, in the domain of politics, the Arthasastra school arose, which represented a strong current of intellectualism directed towards the solution of man's social and ethical problems. It gave a decidedly higher place to the attainment of desires in life and inculcated the necessity of acquisition of material basis for existence, its maintenance and continuance and increase. Some of the Arthasastra teachers neglected morality altogether and advocated the cause of a strong monarchy at the cost of war and intrigue. They preached the realization of sovereignty by means of political power, or diplomacy, by irresponsible Princes, who scrupled not to use any means, however, dishonourable they were in the eyes of moralists. The older idealism in politics passed away and the concept of a strong centralised state on the basis of strong military power came into existence. An age of moral irresponsibility dawned - materialism reawakened and the past ideals of pluralistic political discipline vanished away.

Against this psychological background Kautilya composed his treatise. As an ardent follower of his predecessors, he lays supreme importance on Artha because Dharma and Kama depend on it for their fruition. Kautilya, as an extreme materialist, was interested mainly in the socio-economic problems of man. He followed the older traditions about the duties of rulers to their subjects and he conceded that

Varnasramadharm should be the foundation of social order. But he was bold enough to assert that dandaniti should form the basis of purusartha. He completely ignored the sacerdotalistic principles which we find in the Brahmanas. To him, the precondition of righteousness was wealth. This was in complete harmony with prevailing attitudes and the outlook of the individual members of the political system of which Kautilya was the chief spokesman. Mauryan political system which being tired of over-pessimism aspired at a rejuvenation and a re-orientation in the light of material world. As the individual attitude and outlook towards politics among the members of the Mauryan political system was tremendously materialistic, it influenced Kautilyan diplomacy also and became unscrupulous and Machiavellian in nature in order to begin a stage of concentration under the leadership of a strong monarch.

In Italy also Machiavelli faced the same situation. People became psychologically exhausted with the prevailing situation in the then Italy. They abhorred the ceaseless schism among the political and religious groups. The involvement of the religious authority in political squabbles made the people to forget the sacredness of the religion. They started paying more and more attention to material gains which alone guaranteed surer living on earth. The sharp decline of ethical standards generated a general atmosphere of pessimism which took to expediency as the best means to



achieve the best ends. Realism was reigning over the public mood. Machiavelli took stock of the situation and constructed his philosophy on such lines that will ensure material gains for the public and which in turn will cement a ruthless political structure under the supervision of a strong and powerful ruler.

Kautilya, Machiavelli and the contemporary international system:

The contemporary international system is characterized by different values than the Kautilyan-Machiavellian ones. Both the Kautilyan and Machiavelli were concerned with the preservation of Kingdoms and Princedoms. Talking about the Indian situation during Kautilya's time Modelski<sup>11</sup> says that the "basic unit of the then social structure was the village and that remained unchanged for millenia. The stability of the village was conditional upon the stability of the caste system, dominated by the Brahmins". While in Machiavelli's Europe and in Italy particular the social customs had undergone sea change because of protracted unrest and political upheavals. But, emphasises Madeiki in a similar tone, both Kautilya and Machiavelli had the same goal in their mind. They wanted social stability at

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11. Modelski, George: Kautilya : Foreign policy and International system in the ancient Hindu world; American Political Science Review, 1964, p.550.

the price of international instability and disorder.

Now, coming to the earlier point, Kautilya and Machiavelli advocated a stable social structure because it enhanced the prospects for elevating national goals properly and smoothly in the international arena. Because, the domestic structure is "decisive finally in the elaboration of positive goals".<sup>12</sup>

But, in comparison with the present world, they had neither the democratic system nor the socialist system nor numerous other systems as we see today. The systemic inputs and outputs differ drastically only because the systems are different. As we know that the present global set-up is almost dominated by two super powers - the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R..

Ofcourse, there are some influential intermediary groups who do not subscribe to their views. While the U.S.A calls for a "free world order", the U.S.S.R. propagates the concept of "socialist global system". It is because the U.S.A. has a "democratic government" and the U.S.S.R. maintains "socialist principles" in its domestic structure.

The main difference <sup>between</sup> the Kautilyan-Machiavellian and the contemporary international system is while the former

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12. Kissinger, H.A. : American Foreign Policy: Three Essays; Published in India by A.H.Wheeler and Co. Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad, p.14.

represents outright rigidity in terms of mutual interaction among nations the latter envisages a lot of flexibility. As for example, the American concerns for "human rights" in the Soviet Union and the Soviet concerns for "imperialist" behaviour of the U.S.A. are sometimes given due considerations by the both for the sake of peaceful co-existence. Even the super powers, in many cases, give due considerations to the smallest but sensitive issues of the smallest powers in our time. Because, historical traditions, social values, economic system, administrative structures, pattern of leadership, interest groups, the role of press and opposition groups, public opinion, scientific-industrial-technological advancements etc. influence tremendously the foreign policy behaviour of a particular state unit in our nuclear age. But Kautilya and Machiavelli were not inhibited by many of these items. Hence, they talked of increased control over the domestic setting. But increased control over domestic environment is "purchased" at the price of loss of flexibility in international affairs."<sup>13</sup> Flexibility paves the way for peace. Rigidity may realise the political goals for the time being only at the cost of international stability.

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13. Ibid, p.18.

## Chapter IV

### KAUTILYA, MACHIAVELLI AND THE NATURE OF STATESMANSHIP

Historically, the concept of statesmanship has been dealt with differently by different writers in different contexts. We have already shed some light on the role played by the statesman in the complex interplay of international relations in the preceding chapters. Though efforts have been made to merge the statesman with the tactician and the diplomat, the statesman is still an extended man. The statesman is a man and a great man. The politician is hardly a statesman. But, the statesman may be a politician; he may be a tactician, an academician, a diplomat and what not. While the politician sees, the statesman foresees; the politician realizes, the statesman visualizes; the politician perceives, the statesman prophesies. The politician is the shadow of his state that shades popular interests. The diplomat is the shadow of his state that extends into an another state. And, the statesman is the shadow of history, the history of conscience, realism and ecumenism. His shadow extends to all corners of the globe. The politician and the diplomat are the men of their states, the statesman is

the worldman. If the statesman is Sun, the Politician is Moon, and, the diplomat, without the quality of statesmanship, is a little Star in the firmament of the global system.

The statesman symbolizes the acolyte and ambidextral image to attenuate the forces of evil for the establishment of righteousness on earth. The reeks of power cannot overpower his professional precocity. At times, his herculean propensity for single-mindedness and unbending spokesmanship for some essential techniques and measures in an emergency are considered to be history's flukes later on. His is the work of supererogation. He fathoms ideas that cut across generational gaps. That is why, it is said while the politician thinks of next elections, the statesman thinks of next generations.

Sometimes, he is misunderstood. Because, relying on his own intuitive power, he can forecast the possible consequences of particular policies which may not be acceptable to the ruling communities. He is the barometer of events. Hence, he has to take an apparently unpalatable decision against the wishes of many others for the greater sake of international peace and solidarity. It is only when his intuition becomes experience that the peoples start deifying or lionising him which he himself may not prefer.

Anyway, now an attempt can be made to analyse the role of the Kautilyan-Machiavellian statesman in the light of our times under the following headings:

Geopolitics :

The knowledge of geopolitics is an essential and primary pre-requisite of statesmanship. The dictates of geography on political decisions is just unavoidable. The geo-political position of the country which he belongs to and its repercussions vis-a-vis the other geo-political situations throughout the world would tell upon the method the statesman has to adopt.

Consequently, the statecraft of Kautilya and Machiavelli has been founded on force which was the sheer necessity of the geo-political contexts obtaining in the then India and Italy. The destruction of India by the Alexandrian invasion and Italy by the marauding French opened up new geopolitical frontiers both in and around India and Italy. A psychological cyclone was sweeping through the then India and Italy in favour of the unified command of a supreme ruler. It was felt that a politically, economically and militarily strong state under this unchallengeable leader would adequately deal with foreign onslaughts and consolidate internal unity so necessary for stability and material prosperity.

Hence, both Kautilya and Machiavelli have armed their

statesman with enormous amount of power and grand strategies to realise the aforesaid goals.

Strategic conception :

The statesman must have the complete conceptions about the strategic locations of his country, his opponents and friends altogether and pursue policies in that manner. The strategy of power-drive seems to be the crucial guarantor of peace in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian framework. The Kautilyan king and the Machiavellian Prince have been advised to make the state strong by adopting all strategies which will purchase prestige and international recognition. To achieve this end, they have even suggested the destruction of the weak powers by the strong state for the consolidation of its own existence.

Because, an individual may suffer martyrdom for the sake of his faith, but a state cannot and must not make such sacrifices, for it is the trustee of the generations to come. The action of government is often determined by considerations of a biological rather than a moral order; and the supreme obligation of the state to survive, may involve strategies which an individual might feel bound on ethical grounds to reject. Here is the difference between public and private morality which according to Kautilya and Machiavelli cannot be ignored. Supreme emergencies call for exceptional methods. Gooch, supporting this notion, quotes Cavour who, while placing Italy

on the map of Europe once said, "what rascals we should be if we did for ourselves what we do for our country."<sup>1</sup>

International political, economic, military and technological situations :

The statesman needs to acquire the knowledge about the totality of the nature of the international atmosphere. The conceptions about the political, economic, military and technological potentials of the friends and adversaries alike viz-a-viz his own country is of utmost importance for an effective decision-making and policy-pursuing process.

Kautilya and Machiavelli too, have urged upon their strongmen to be adept in this art through the institution of espionage. They hold that the spies should collect all informations regarding the political, economic and military positions of other actors on the international scene. These informations become the mirror of the statesman through which he can identify the friendly and hostile nature of the countries. Accordingly, they become his guide to frame policies of hostility and cordiality as the situation arise.

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1. Gooch, G.P. : "Politics and Morals"; p.18.



Style :

Style is the statesman. The statesman must adopt his own styles to deal with the intricacies of international interaction. He should be everready to face exceptional circumstances as they arise without premonitory worrying out of both peace and crisis situations. He must nurse his own ways of smiling, hand-shaking, nodding, nudging, probing, proving and disapproving. His laconic nature and stylized urbanity would land him in his desired destination. Overindulgence in cuckooing and cosseting might result in vestigial blight. Paddle gossip, plagiarism and malapropisms would seriously tell upon his professional zeal. Funking and mind-boggling must be shunned. The statesman should cultivate personal friendships with influential and powerful people in his own country and other outside countries which would enhance the qualities of statesmanship. Friendship and statesmanship are inseparable from each other. Toying with obstinacy, blackmailing and intestine partisanship can hardly compromise with the qualities of statesmanship.

Anyway, the statesman is a man of management. And, both Kautilya and Machiavelli have specially emphasised on the issue of crisis-management. As if the control of the crisis-situations is the crucial criterion of statesmanship. But, if personal fulfilment as a "statesman is only to be found in crisis, then a thrust for the specta-

cular, and an instinct to dramatize rather than to pacify and conciliate, could well finish by turning diplomacy into something gladiatorial."<sup>2</sup>

Kautilya and Machiavelli are of the opinion that the statesman must have a pre-determined course of action to reach the desired ends. Realism has been the chief yardstick in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian scheme for the statesman. To them, there is endemic risk in the "advantage of suppleness". They could not think of a peripatetic negotiator-statesman for the resolution of conflicts and the realization of peace which is the urgent need of our time. The nub of the question in Kautilya and Machiavelli is that the statesman must be brilliantly endowed with chill logic of force. He must be ebullient and must shun druidical manners to deal with the topsy-turvy atmosphere in international intercourse.

It seems that theirs is an ego-centric statesman for whom nagging suspicion is the reliable tool of bargaining and negotiating in the market-place of diplomacy. As far as the style is concerned, the intractable statesman in Kautilya and Machiavelli knows <sup>no</sup> friendship, humanity and sincerity.

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2. Jackson, Geoffrey Sir : "Concorde Diplomacy - The Ambassador's Role in the World Today"; Hamish Hamilton, London, 1981, p.26.

Cultural and Human aspects :

The statesman also should take into account the existence of dominant cultural forces throughout the world and try to elicit their supports in the fulfilment of his designs. He alone cannot make it so easily. He should merge his personality with different other cultural groups of the humanity. It eases the process of his diplomatic operation. People all over the world look towards him for the salvation from the yoke of pains of all kinds.

And, it is axiomatic that supreme emergencies call for exceptional methods. But, there arises some situations when the statesman has to make sacrifices which cements peaceful co-existence of the international community. Unfortunately, Kautilyan and Machiavellian rulers pay no attention to these aspects of international life.

It is true that precepts of rigid a] truism cannot be observed in politics. It is no less true that politics is the art in which sense of unity and proportion are the greatest importance.<sup>3</sup> Internally also coercion seems to be the cornerstone of the Kautilyan-Machiavellian ruling. Of course, they have armed their strongmen with a lot of virtues: that they should be loved by their subjects and found themselves on popular favour and goodwill; that they

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3. Rao, K.V.M. : "Studies in Kautilya"; Munshi Ram Monohar-lal - Oriental Booksellers, Delhi, 1958, p.102.

should be always on guard against all vices; that they should be apparently religious; and, that they should maintain state's life and independence. In return, the people would be ensured material prosperity. There is no question of public freedom and the change of government through popular will. Anyway, there are historical reasons for their advocacy for such views which have been analysed earlier.

Statesman Supersonic :

All in all, most of the Kautilyan-Machiavellian ideas on the nature of statesmanship seem to have become the seamy sides of international relations in our nuclear age. These mentors of diplomatic feint could think nothing more than a scheming statesman. Hence, Kautilya and Machiavelli had armed their king and Prince with so much rigidities of power that they could hardly go beyond the boundaries of their state interests. For them, power is an amorous adventure of the statesman. Power is the principal guarantor of peace. In their smugness, they found nothing wrong in the systematic destruction of the human cattle for the purpose of hoisting the supremacy of the powerful statesman. The quixotic nature of the statesman is out of their scheme. They have failed to portray the statesman supersonic. The elements of stage-craft than statecraft seem to have found strong appeal in their

framework. The power-hungry statesman in Kautilya and Machiavelli is conservative. He cannot bear the complex responsibilities of our nuclear age.

The nuclear-age statesman will have to be gregarious in determining the destiny of the international system. He will have to use the sinuosities of power with extensive care. He is shrewd and scheming when necessary. Again, he is benevolent and innocuous if necessary. He is not trapped by the power-net. He just cannot bully the weak for hoisting his hegemony over it. Because, international law and treaties would come in his ways for such operations. Even a cohort of weak powers can overpower his ingenuine schemes with international conscience on their side. Trepidation, obstinacy and a simple blarney tone are not the elements to make the skeleton of the space-age statesman. Though ultimately he takes refuge in his own intuition to serve his own national interests, he cannot use his unchallengeable force against other actors who are playing the same game. In war of interests, he chooses peaceful negotiations rather than useless confrontations. He knows that confrontation confers nothing effective. Rather, it closes all frontiers of international cooperation so necessary for peace, friendship and cordial human relations.

The Kautilyan-Machiavellian statesman is engrossed

in particularistic issues while the nuclear-age statesman must have a universal outlook. The latter takes stock of the whole international climate before he starts his operation. His world view makes him a statesman supersonic. For him, statesmanship and stability go together.

But whatever may be the faults in the Kautilyan-Machiavellian scheme, the smack of realism and professional precocity and abrasiveness in their statesman to handle the to-rings and fro-rings of international currents have not lost their supreme importance even today.

## Chapter V

### DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE: REFLECTIONS ON THE KAUTILYAN-MACHIAVELLIAN FRAMEWORK

From the earliest antiquity, the use of cryptology or intelligence in increasing national interests is viewed and valued as one of the most important ingredients of the policy-planning process. Intelligence, as an enormously helpful tool, acts as high-powered medicine to tauten the slack spirits of the strategists-statesman while operating in the "machochistic and unwholesome" atmosphere of the international system.

The guide of intelligence purveys a solid and sound ground work for him to manufacture the sophisticated superstructure of his diplomatic behaviour. Intelligence is the mirror of the diplomat through which he looks the outer world. It makes the diplomat crisp and confident and equips him with calculative qualities.

It too, enables him to shun dilettante attitudes and excogitate well-thought-out programmes of political action for the realisation of pre-planned results. It again, enhances his reasoning capacity and zooms his proclivity towards pep planning, doubtless designing and derring-do and demonstrative dexterity for decision-making.

Interpretations of Intelligence :

Since the role of intelligence in shaping policies is so rewarding, it is incumbent upon us to unfold its true nature and exact meaning. Thayer observes: "In the broadest sense, intelligence is any kind of information, but it usually means the information a statesman would like to have in making decisions on policy or a general in planning his campaign."<sup>1</sup>

R. S. Cline, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has said that intelligence is "intended to assist policy and operational officers in making decisions. The term intelligence has several meanings. In its narrowest context, intelligence is simply information. It can be collected in some clandestine manner, that is, secretly and often at personal risk because the facts sought are being deliberately withheld. In a broader sense, intelligence on foreign affairs includes such categories as press reports, foreign radio broadcasts, foreign publications, and in the government - reports from our foreign service officers and military attaches."<sup>2</sup>

Seeking a definition, a Hoover Commission task Force Surveying the American intelligence community in 1955 arrived

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1. Thayer, Charles W. : "Diplomat", p.161.
  2. Cline, R. S. : "Secrets, spies and Scholars Blueprint of the essential CIA," Washington, D.C. Aeropolis, 1976, p. 7.



at the following:

"Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action."<sup>3</sup>

According to the Dictionary of the United States Terms for Joint Usage : "Intelligence - the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning."<sup>4</sup>

Anyway, intelligence process is a dynamic and interacting process involving the association of a lot of men, materials, metals and machines. In the simplest possible interpretation, intelligence is gathering information for furthering interests.

Kautilya, Machiavelli and the need of Intelligence :

Now, coming back to Kautilya and Machiavelli, the application of intelligence seems to have been considered by them as a cementing factor for consolidation of the political structure. And, the consolidation of the base and the structure of the system can be guaranteed only

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3. Quoted in Ransom, M.H. : "Central Intelligence and National Security", Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachssets, 1958, p.6.

4. Ibid, p.7.

through the enhancement and preservation of policy goals. In turn, the enhancement of national objectives can be ensured by the institution of a ubiquitous intelligence network.

Well, it can be mentioned here that Machiavelli has hardly talked about any worth analysing aspects of intelligence. Hence, the emphasis is being given on the Kautilyan views.

Kautilya, Intelligence and the Internal Administration :

Kautilya made clear-cut distinction between the systems of internal intelligence and external intelligence. To him, internal intelligence keeps the statesman abreast with on-going events throughout the system which in turn helps him to frame such policies that cements systemic stability. Because, internal stability is conditional upon the confident behaviour of the statesman in the international arena. Kautilya believed that internal stability and international stability cannot be separated from each other. He thinks that if the internal system is diseased with disorders, it can rarely contribute to the international order. That is why, the Kautilyan system needed an extensive espionage programme to satisfy the above said goals. In Kautilya's time, the means of

communication were not developed. The existence of mobile diplomats like ours was out of question. Peregrination from one part of a kingdom to other parts took a few months. Hence percolation of current news and correct information about public opinion, about internal administration and about foreign political systems had a disturbing impact on the process of efflorescence of an effective policy. If the ruling authority could not correctly judge the effects of policy on intra-societal and extra-societal environments, and failed to grasp the demands of various sections of the domestic society, he could neither be expected to regulate the machinery of the political system properly nor to try to shape the policy in such a way so as to enhance the welfare of the people as well as to safeguard the system from outside attack.

Herein lies the necessity of spies who collected informations from different parts of the kingdom and submitted them to the proper authority. The necessity was specially intense because of vastness of the Maurayan Empire that extended from the borders of Persia to the south of Mysore. This is because of this reason why Kautilya envisaged a well-knit system of espionage both for home as well as for foreign purposes. He lists various gueses in which the spies and secret agents are to appear.

They are :

- (1) a fraudulent disciple;
- (2) a recluse;
- (3) a householder;
- (4) a merchant;
- (5) an ascetic practising austerities;
- (6) a class - mate or a colleague;
- (7) a fire brand;
- (8) a poisoner; and
- (9) a mendicant woman.

Then Kautilya clearly distributes various kinds of duties to various spies. Megasthenes calls them "Overseers" who were assigned the work of watching and making reports secretly to the king.

The Characteristics and functions of the spies in internal administration :

(1) A fraudulent disciple (Kapatika-Chhātra) :

A skillful person capable of guessing the mind of others is a fraudulent disciple. He has to inform about whatever wickedness he finds in others.

(2) A recluse (Udāsthita) :

One who practises asceticism and is possessed of foresight and pure character is a recluse. This spy, provided with much money and many disciples, "shall carry on agriculture, cattle rearing, and trade on the lands

alloted to him for the purpose. Out of the produce and profits thus acquired, he shall provide all ascetics with subsistence, clothing and lodging and send on espionage ..... ordering each of them to detect a particular kind of crime committed in connection with the king's wealth, and to report of it when they come to receive their subsistence and wages."<sup>5</sup>

3. A householder (Grihapatika) :

A cultivator, fallen from his profession, but possessed of foresight and pure character, is termed a householder spy. This spy is supposed to carry on cultivation of lands alloted to him for the purpose and maintain cultivators etc. as before.

4. A merchant (Vaidehka) :

A trader, fallen from his profession, but possessed of foresight and pure character, is a merchant spy. His profession would be restored to him to obtain his services for the state.

5. An ascetic practising austerities (Tapasa) :

A man with shaved head or braided hair and desirous to earn livelihood is a spy under the guise of an ascetic practising austerities. Such a spy surrounded by a host of disciples with shaved head and braided hair may take his

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5. Kautilya: Arthasāstra, p.18.

abode in the suburbs of a city, and pretend as a person barely living on a handful of vegetables taken once in the interval of a month or two, but he may take in secret his favourite food stuffs.

Merchant spies pretending to be his disciples may worship him as one possessed of supernatural powers. His other disciples may widely proclaim that "This ascetic is an accomplished expert of preternatural powers." Regarding those persons who, desirous of knowing their future, throng to him, he may, through palmistry, fortell such future events as he can ascertain by the nods and signs of his disciples concerning the works of high born people of the country viz. small profits, destruction by fire, fear from robbers, the execution of the seditious rewards for the good, forecast of foreign affairs, saying, "This will happen today, that tomorrow, and that this king will do." Such assertions of the ascetic will be corroborated by his disciples by adducing facts and figures.

He will also foretell not only the rewards which persons possessed of foresight, eloquence, and bravery are likely to receive at the hands of the king, but also probable changes in the appointment of ministers. The king's ministers will direct his affairs in conformity to the forecast made by the ascetic. He will appease with offer of wealth and honour those who have had some well known

cause to be disaffected and impose punishments in secret on those who are for no reason disaffected or who are plotting against the king. Honoured by the king with awards of money and titles, all the above mentioned spies will ascertain the purity of character of the rulers servants.

6. A Class-mate or a colleague (Satri) :

Those orphans who are to be necessarily fed by the state and put to study science, palmistry, sorcery, the duties of various orders of religious life, legerdemain, and augury, are class-mate spies or spies by social intercourse.

7. A Fire-brand (Tikhna) :

Such brave desperados of the country who reckless of their own life, confront elephants or tigers in fight mainly for the purpose of earning money are termed fire-brands or fiery spies.

8. A poisoner (Rasada) :

Those who have no trace of filial affection left in them and who are very cruel and indolent are to be recruited as poisoners.

9. A Mendicant woman (Bhikshuki) :

A poor widow who is very clever and desirous to earn her livelihood, is a woman ascetic. Honoured in the

king's harem, such a woman will frequent the residences of the king's prime ministers.

Now, of these spies, those who are of good family, loyal, reliable, well-trained in the art of putting on disguises appropriate to customs of the populace and possessed of knowledge of many languages and arts, will be sent by the king to espy in his own country the movements of his ministers, priests, commanders of the army, the heirapparent, the door-keepers, the officers incharge of the harem, the Magistrate, the Collector-general, the chamberlain, the Commissioner, the city constable, the officer-incharge of the city, the Superintendent of manufactories, the assembly of Councillors, heads of department, the Commissary-general, and officers-in-charge of fortifications, boundaries and wild tracts.

Fiery spies, who are employed to hold the royal umbrella, vase, fan, and shoes, or to attend at the throne, chariot and conveyance will espy the public character of these officers.

Class-mate spies will convey the information gathered by the fiery spies to the institute of espionage.

Poisoners, under the guises of a sauce-maker, a cook, procurer of water for bathing, shampooer, the spreader of bed, a barber, toilet-maker, a water servant, servants such



as have taken the appearance of a humpbacked person, a dwarf, a pigmy, the dumb, the deaf, the idiot, the blind, artisans such as actors, dancers, singers, players on musical instruments, buffoons, and a bard; as well as women will espy the private character of these officers. And, a mendicant woman will convey this information to the institute of espionage. The immediate officers of the institutes of espionage will, by making use of signs or writing, set their own spies in motion to ascertain the validity of information collected from three different sources. But the spies should not be given chance to know each other except when cooperation was necessary. Some of the spies may suddenly go out to "collect vital informations" which in fact to spy on the spies under the pretext of "long-standing disease, or lunacy or of being discharged." Kautilya also talks of creating make-believe opposition groups consisted of the spies themselves. They, in places of pilgrimage, in assemblies, houses, corporations and amid congregations of people may dispute each other's assertions about various policies, programme and attitudes of the king towards his people. This technique should be undertaken to know the public reactions towards the king and other governmental authorities. The spies are also advised to make use of prevalent rumours for success in this operation. The people who will side with the "king-group" of spies should be appeased. The opposing

people should either be silenced or punished or banished.

Thus, in every sphere of internal administration of the Kautilyan system the spies were indispensable to the king. Even judges were tested by the spies. Spies detected injustice and bribery in the court. All these works of spies were vital to ensure the stability of the internal administration.

Kautilya, intelligence and the external administration :

The application of intelligence in the conduct of external affairs was considered to be equally important to feed the acquisitive tendency of the Kautilyan system. He has listed certain essential elements of external espionage which can be discussed here in the following :

Seduction and intriguing :

Kautilya says that foreign spies are to be seduced by female spies and thus thwarted and murdered. He continues that the keepers of harlots should excite love in the minds of the leader's of the enemy's army by exhibiting women of youth and beauty. Fiery spies should bring about quarrels among them when one or two of them have fallen in love.

Another spy, under the guise of a merchant, may, under the plea of winning love of an immediate maid servant of the beautiful queen of the enemy, shower wealth upon

her and then give her up. Another one in the service of the merchant may give to another spy, employed as a servant of the maid-servant, some medical drug, telling the latter that in order to regain the love of the merchant, the drug may be applied.

On her attaining success, she may inform the sexually dissatisfied queen that the same drug may be applied to the person of the king to secure his love and then change the drug for poison and to get the enemy king killed in this process.

Spreading disinformation and sowing dissension :

Kautilya also talked of the use of the technique of spreading disinformation and sowing seeds of dissension to weaken the enemy strength and to hasten its early fall. He says that spies gaining access to the enemy corporations and finding out jealousy, hatred and other causes of quarrel sow the seeds of a well-planned dissension among them. Spies, under the guise of teachers should cause childish embroils among those of mutual enmity on occasions of disputations about certain points of science, arts, gambling or sports.<sup>6</sup>

Fiery spies may occasion quarrel among the leaders of the state corporations by instigating the inferior lea-

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6. Ibid, p.413.

ders and set them against the superior party. Even a confident son of the chief of corporations may be recruited and helped with men and money to set him against the corporations. When the object in view is realised he may be banished.

Dancers, players, and actors may, after gaining access, excite love in the minds of the chiefs of corporations by exhibiting women endowed with bewitching youth and beauty. By causing the woman to go to another person, or by pretending that another person has violently carried her off, they may bring about a quarrel among those who love that woman. Again, widows or women, employed as spies with secret instructions, may dispute among themselves about various claims and attract the chiefs of the corporations.

Besides this, Kautilya has talked of various other sex-traps to entice the chiefs of enemy corporations because they, according to him, are better to strengthen the state purse than the acquisition of an army, a friend or profits.<sup>7</sup>

He has also discussed the tactics to create dissension among the enemy king and his prime minister and other influential officers. The enemy's armies were to be seduced by lies, bribes, false promises etc. Spies attending

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7. Ibid, p.413.

upon the price kept as a hostage might break the agreement of peace. Spies known as tiksna might bring about the death of an enemy within a fort by means of weapons, fire, poison or other things. Agents helping in sowing seeds of dissension, may bribe the disgruntled persons by supplying money and grains, and thereby creating split between the enemy king and his subjects. The spies also may spread false informations about the personal life of the enemy king which would incur public wrath and hatred for him. Taking advantage of public fury against him, it would be easy to cause his destruction. Kautilya has also chalked out elaborate functions for the spies in a seige or conquered country. The Kautilyan spies were also to create division among the enemy king and his commander-in-chief and bring about the death of the latter. In this way, the enemy king could be deprived of wise advice which he could have achieved from his commander-in-chief to devise ingenious strategems of survival.

An important function of the spies was to destroy the enemy sources of supply. They also tried to strike down the enemy with the help of man kept secretly ready within the enemy camp. They were also to sabotage in the foreign country. Seditious persons within the enemy

fort were lured by the spies to cause revolt against the enemy king. And, ultimately, if the spies succeeded in assassinating the enemy king, they were highly rewarded by money and titles.

Thus, the institution of espionage was regarded by Kautilya as an indispensable integral part of a political system. As it has been argued earlier that for Kautilya, the use of intelligence in internal affairs ensures systemic longevity which in turn equips the statesman with enormous confidence to extract desired gains while dealing with his country's external affairs.

Diplomacy and Intelligence : The Kautilyan-Machiavellian perspective Vs the modern perspective :

We have already seen that the Kautilyan diplomacy cannot be put on operation without extensive aid by the sprawling intelligence system. To Kautilya, the togetherness of diplomacy and intelligence is a must for an efficient handling of the serpentine course of the international events. In fact, diplomacy without secrecy is sword without scabbard. In theory, of course, secret diplomacy is denounced. But in practice it was and is very much prevalent and expedient. By lofty idealism the governments cannot avoid its usefulness and applicability.

Sometimes, idealists try to find out harshness,

severity and outright treachery in the Kautilyan techniques of espionage. All these things are of course there is his framework of intelligence. But there is no denying the fact that affairs of nations cannot be treated phlegmatically. We have already pointed out that the diplomat cannot play the game of love where emotions dominate the scene. Throughout the ages, it has been recognised that the diplomat is a practical player for whom the aid of intelligence in making decisions is an important element of the rules of the game. Even the ultramodern democracies like France, Britain, America<sup>8</sup> etc. maintain highly sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in aid of their carefully tailored policies. It is no secret in today's world that the need of secret agents for the governments

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8. The United States at America maintains the three-tier intelligence system :
- (A) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is engaged in counter-espionage works. It is expected to spot and oversee the movements and activities of the foreign spies within the United States;
  - (B) The Central Intelligence Agency is involved in continuous competition with its counterpart the K.G.B. Komited Gosudarst Vennoy Bezopasnosti (Committed for State Security) to control over the international system; and,
  - (C) The National Security Agency, which is responsible for collecting informations and making analyses on the strategic affairs of the United States with the help of Satellites, electronic devices etc.

to meet harsh challenges and swinging blows of the hostile governments is a hard reality.

Kautilya realised it. Hence, he discussed very frankly about it in great detail without caring the least for adverse criticism. He wanted to establish a stable system under a strong monarch and so all possible means, whether they were amoral or unreligious, were tried by him. In complete elaboration, he gave even the minutest details about the objectives of espionage that might help a ruler in acquisition of new dominion and the consolidation of it on a concrete basis. Following history, after due consideration of time and circumstances, he recommended only those policies based on intelligence operations which were justified from the standpoint of practical necessity. In so doing, he did not bother whether they were disturbing the niti (morality) of Dharmasāstras or established principles of political practices as formulated by previous writers on polity.

Of course, the broad philosophic basis of political system was not unknown to him. But he was much more interested in the immediate task. Diplomacy, secrecy and immediacy - all of them put together came to produce the much needed materialism and pragmatism for him. That is why, from behind the curtain of apparent trickery, treachery, deceit, violence, blood-stains and heartless cruelty of



diplomacy through intelligence peeps his superior political insight, sharp intellect and a burning passion to unify his war-shattered motherland.<sup>9</sup> Kautilya's extraordinary thoroughness, relentless logic, practical wisdom, and realistic outlook therefore, open up a new age and a new page in the history of diplomacy and intelligence.

And, the modern age is also not an exception. Rather, the intelligence operations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the present day world tell us a lot of tragic tales. Both of them, in an attempt to get the upper hand over the international events, do not pay the slightest hesitancy to interfere in the internal affairs of other independent but less powerful countries, to assassinate the foreign leaders who show independent styles and reject the theory of political and military grouping on the international scale, and, also to destroy the human cattle in different parts of the globe.

Of course, the American government do not spare any effort to pay lip-service for human rights. It is widely known by now that Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of the U.S.A had ordered bombing of the Vietnam people even on a Christmas day. Whether one should call the American government a democracy and the Soviet Govern-

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9. Mukherjee, Bharati: Ibid, p.45.

ment a dictatorship, that still remains a polemical point. Because, as far as intelligence operations are concerned and which in almost all cases are the basis of their broad policy framework, both of them play the same vile game in an attempt to upset each other's estimates and pay exiguous attention to any kind of decency by adopting all sorts of dirty tricks under lurid and meretricious jargons like international peace, international security, proletarian internationalism, Universal brotherhood, human rights etc. etc.

Diplomacy and intelligence : The Choice for the nuclear civilization :

It has already been affirmed that pure diplomacy is unoperational. But the question arises - why this is so ? Why diplomacy is ineffective without intelligence ?

According to Edward Shils, the legitimate tasks of security apparatuses in shaping policies are "unlikely to disappear as long as the possibility of war and the need for military defense remain."<sup>10</sup>

H.H.Ranson says that the "relationship between inte-

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10. Shils, Edward: "The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies", Melbourne, Willian Heinemann, 1956, p.11.

lligence and policy is the relationship between knowledge and action."<sup>11</sup> This is the knowledge about human nature, human attitudes and human actions. Because, it is only the human beings who propagate variety of views and ideas, constitute various kind of governments and pursue varied policies. The study of human nature is really the study of varieties. Human nature, as argued by statesman, is everchanging. And, since the human nature cannot be confirmed for all the time to come (of course, it can be confirmed to a certain extent and at times, to certain predictable points too. This view sanctifies the notion of "self-interest" variable which, it seems, in most cases, remains the solid foundation of human motives), so there is the need of intelligence in verifying its different dimensions and changing courses and to deal with it accordingly.

There are many many instances of deception in history the deception of one party by another, by one group by another, by one government by another, and, of one nation by another. So, promises made and policies pursued today by one government to another are not enough guarantees for the establishment of stability and constancy. There are always possibilities of promises being broken and

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11. Ransom, H.H. : Ibid, p.2.

policies being changed and here is the need to check and regulate the opponents' behaviour frequently and constantly. These possibilities are not conjectural. This is the tendency of governments (which can be constituted only with human elements) to show particular postures at a particular time to other governments and reverse the same at another point of time when it suits their interests. That is why, espionage can be conducted even in friendly countries to confirm whether their attitude of friendliness is genuine or not. It may provide nations with knowledge about strengths and weaknesses of the friends and utilise them when they fall apart from each other. Because, in the interest market of the international system, friends and foes may take opposite turns suddenly with the occurrence of possible about-turn events. This regular checking of government policies by other governments may not necessarily include some kind of impish plans for subversion in achieving hawkish interests. The gathering of "intelligence, collection of material and information, the assessment of policies, opinions and facts are necessary functions of a modern government and vital to the conduct of foreign affairs of that country. But where under the garb of collecting information, the foreign government arrogates to itself the task of conducting clandestine activities involving danger to the freedom of another

country, it is subversion."<sup>12</sup>

Of course, there arises certain situations when even subversion becomes the need of the hour. If a nation or a set of nations indulge in intrigue to upset, alienate or destroy (politically, economically, militarily etc.) another one or a set of national actors, large-scale use of "abnormal diplomacy" is just unavoidable. In this context, intelligence forces work as go-between among the polity and the diplomatic machine.

Various techniques of policy planning through intelligence in the nuclear age :

So, it has been proved that in directing the on-going events both at home and abroad and in the process, shaping the structure of the to-be-world in the days to come, the extra-ordinary influence of the sensitive and mysterious network of clandestine operations conducted by highly sophisticated security apparatuses is just not more than hundred per cent.

In the nuclear age, the added importance of intelligence organizations in knowing the strength and weaknesses of various nations and tailoring policies accordingly

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12. Adel, Daljit Sen : "Danger of CIA", Progressive Peoples Sector Publications (P) Ltd., New Delhi, p.1.

is again a massive one. The nuclear-age actors make use of various techniques to gather intelligence input ranging from political developments, social relationships, economic conditions, scientific-technical-industrial progress to the military establishments in every crevice of the globe to suit their carefully chalked-out policy output. The globalization of intelligence in the nuclear age is necessary to quench the thrusts of the foreign policy mechanism. But, since the capacity to collect informations of vital interests is limited by the existence of sovereign boundaries and the international code of behaviour, the undercover activities by both indigenous and local agents or agents-cum-diplomat is of utmost value.

Of course, theoretically, attempts have been made to differentiate between the diplomatic behaviour and the intelligence behaviour. Even there has been the talk of intelligence despotism in determining diplomatic goals leading to detraction of diplomatic decency.

Anyway, sketching a compartmentalized differentiation between the two can better engender the systemic collapse, not to talk of policy determinants themselves. Again, sheer domination of diplomacy by intelligence or vice-versa is a good example dumvirate colonialism resulting in self-destructive machination. On the other hand the fabric of "external polity" of a political system can breed excellent

results only when it lacks no ferment for performance. This ferment may best be materialised by a happy marriage between intelligence and diplomacy. Because, an effective diplomacy needs to be fed by an equally effective information or intelligence system.

The techniques :

Though almost all the Kautilyan techniques of intelligence to create policies are very much prevalent even in our nuclear age, still his programme seems to be very very inadequate to meet the demands of our time. This is because of tremendous development of modern communications. The nuclear-age communications system has developed on such a scale that sometimes it is felt that the importance of diplomats have diminished greatly when most of their works of one day are being done within minutes with the help of globalized electronic espionage outfits and the satellite surveillance systems.

So, a graduated scheme over the Kautilyan programme would be very practical for us. Keeping that end in view, here we illuminate various stages of policy planning through the art of intelligence. Then all these techniques would be used to show the policy formulation process of a hypothetical policy.

The techniques are as in the following :

1. Observation and Collection of Data :

The primary goal of intelligence in the nuclear age is to observe the field of interests throughly. The help of hunch and hypothesis can be of great use for this purpose. Since the objective of observation is basically to provide foreknowledge, to supply national policy-makers and operators with sound evaluations of various informations like the present and future status, capabilities, and intentions of foreign powers; in doing so, a distinction must be made between the (a) knowable, and the (b) Unknowable, between what can be "predicted with reasonable certainty or only in degrees of probability."<sup>13</sup>

Sources of information: The knowable or the open sources :

By virtue of being intelligence, it epitomizes nothing but secrecy. But, there are little hazards and the problems of secrecy in collecting information from the open sources. These sources are : informations from whispered rumour to a globe-girding radio, scholarly writings in the journals, statements of foreign political and military leaders, press reports, tourists, report from foreign service officers and military attaches etc.etc.

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13. Ransom, H.H. : Ibid, p.8.



The Unknowable sources :

Since the availability of valid informations from unknowable sources is just next to impossible, it is expedient to resort to covert operations with the help of both indigenus and recruited agents. The recruitment of local secret agents becomes necessary because the indigenus agents are unable to discover the unknowable directly. The direct participation of the latter in such operations is strictly inhibited by the boundary of national sovereignty. Hence, the application of the indirect method - which helps divulging desired informations from the enemy camp.

2. Random reporting or information :

After the raw informations from various sources through observation, they should be sent back to the proper policy-planning authority. The dissemination of intelligence findings can be conducted with the help of different emergency techniques : Oral, graphic (codes), written, wireless, electronic devices, satellite surveillance and so on. But, the authority must make it sure that the deployment of various human agents to collect same informations should not know each other. This is necessary to ensure the validity of the information.

### 3. Sorting or data processing :

When the raw informations get converted into applicable data by the appropriate authority, the next process will follow. It is sifting, sorting, and judging the credibility of the collected data.

### 4. Corelating :

After the scattered data get processed adequately, efforts should be made to single out a particular group of data and to corelate them with another group of relevant data for practical necessity.

### 5. Data analysis and research :

Thus grouping them together into particular units or variables, each unit of data should be properly analysed and evaluated through rigorous research, drawing pertinent inferences from the analysis and interpreting such ingerences in keeping with the requirements of planners, policy-makers and operators.

### 6. Policy-formulation :

The evaluated data should be directed to the proper authority for the purpose of decision-making. The statesman or the decision-delivering machine would spedify various variables of the data for the solution of various kind of problems. This process of policy-formulation is very very

difficult and risky. Because, the identification of the exact nature of the problem and the application of the relevant data for its solution is the crucial test of decision-making. Since only good intentions cannot yield good results, policies should be shaped with extensive care and elaborate attention. Otherwise, good intentions coupled with valid and credible data but "ending in bad results are the signs of a bad policy."<sup>14</sup>

#### 7. Policy-prosecution :

The delivery of decision is meant for action. Policy formulation ends and policy prosecution begins. But, again a good policy has to be aided and guided by some other emergency techniques to ensure successful results. These techniques are as in the following :

##### (a) Disinformation :

While pursuing policies, sometimes the need of disinformation becomes an utmost necessity. Disinformation is deliberate dissemination of distorted information to create public disgruntlement against the political authority of a particular country. This process of poisoning public opinion is a time-honoured technique to make the adversary respond to reasonable behaviour needed to satisfy the policy goals of an another country.

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14. Singh, I.P. : Ibid, p.2.

Intelligence agents, under the cloak of "diplomats" stationed at foreign countries may carry out this drive of "biased information" aided by men and materials supplied by the home authority. The chief of such operations is supposed to recruit the local agents for the purpose. The recruitment should be based on a very well thought out plan. He should recruit only those who are sympathised with the former's cause either whole heartedly or under the pressure of circumstances prevailing in that country or by the conditions of "point of no return" imposed by the recruiting authority itself. In this connection, dissatisfied students, less pampered intellectuals, avaricious politicians, highly placed journalists, influential businessmen, famous poets and literateurs, shrewd social workers, ambitious lawyers, deglamorised generals and military officers, volatile labour leaders, unconcerned ascetics, fanatic religious leaders, the leaders of the armed gangs, leading lights of the various intelligence agencies, boastful bureaucrats, technocrats and doctors hankering higher positions, local hoodlums and hooligans, celebrated sportsmen, cinema actors, actresses, musicians, and film directors etc.etc. may be recruited for realising the purposes of the avowed policy.

The technique of disinformation is also used to create mob-violence, to confuse public opinion by information overload about various international happenings, to belittle the achievements of hostile governments, to pro-

voke insurgency among the unhappy ethnic groups of the enemy country, to exaggerate the ideological effectiveness of the respective countries, to titillate the friends in a tizzy, to cleave down the ranks of a benighted enemy and to influence its course of action, to popularise the goods of particular countries in other countries, to gain the respected position in foreign countries by propagating the richness of cultures and traditions, industrial progress, scientific and technological innovations, and to overthrow the enemy governments through large scale violence and also by organizing the military coup.

In terseness, disinformation is nothing but a form of political skullduggery, subversion and propaganda. Whitaker says, "sometimes it is synonymous with information."<sup>15</sup> He continues : "Much of what passes today for diplomacy is not diplomacy at all; it is propaganda. .... Diplomatic discussion has traditionally supplied the materials out of which the cement of agreement and understandings have been made. Discussion implies an exchange of views; it implies listening and talking. Propaganda can be clothed in the forms of diplomacy, such as an exchange of notes between heads of state, but its functions and purposes are very different. In propaganda there is no exchange of views

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15. Whitaker Urban G. Jr.ed. : "Propaganda and International relations," Howard Chandla, Publisher, 1960, pp.1-2.

or explanations of the reasons and or them. There is no listening for the intent is not mutual understanding or agreement but the presentation of a position."<sup>16</sup>

(b) Surveillance and Seduction :

All modern governments make use of this technique of surveillance and seduction. Watching each other's movements and activities and making policies accordingly is all but necessary. Seduction is generally used to get hold of the "agents of influence".

By "agents of influence", we mean the influential men who are very very closed to the highest political structure of particular countries and who have access to vital informations. These agents are recruited through the exploitation of their various weaknesses over sex, love etc. by using the services of the trollops. To ferret out the enemy positions on defence, science and technology and to influence its overall future policies, the need of these agents is monumental. This profitable tool of blackmailing can be put on operation to purchase the said agents even by bribery, intimidation and so on.

(c) Tactical and Strategic Technique :

While operating the policy, strategic matters should

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16. Ibid, p.112.

also be given due consideration. The constantly changing capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of foreign nations is of extreme importance to the planners of national security policy process. As Sherman Kent has put it :

"If foreign policy is the shield of the republic, then strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the shield to the right place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword."<sup>17</sup>

(d) Counter-intelligence :

Counter-intelligence is, in a sense, a defensive function of the policyprosecution process. It encounters the effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence operations and opposition forces within and outside the country. The purpose is to protect information against infiltrations into the intelligence systems by the foreign espionage network, to guard personnel against subversion and to secure installations and materials against sabotage of the policy. This technique can be applied both at home and abroad to guarantee the success of the projected policy.


The operationalization of the hypothetical polity :

Now, a graduated process through the art of intelli-

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17. Kent, Sherman : "Strategic Intelligence," Princeton, New Jersey, P.V.Press, 1951, p. viii.

ORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMACY THROUGH INTELLIGENCE





gence is being delineated through the diagram of a hypothetical polity as in the following :

In the polity, there is a head or the supreme authority who guides the entire systemic operation. The whole polity has been divided into two parts - the internal polity and the external polity.

Internal intelligence which obviously takes care of the internal matters is under the jurisdiction of the internal polity. The head of the polity is assisted by its secretariat which is consisted of two divisions - the internal division and the external division. The counter-intelligence corps which is under the internal division of the polity secretariat, joins hands with the intelligence actors of the internal polity to prevent infiltrations by foreign intelligence agencies and also to oversee the movements and activities of the opposition forces both at home and abroad.

The foreign policy integration council of the polity secretariat is responsible for integrating the purposes and functions of both internal and external intelligence agencies to ensure the success of the policy output. In this connection, the foreign policy integration council is supported by the advisory cells for area management. Each cell or area unit is headed by a knowledgeable and efficient adviser.

Now, the external polity has also a head who is responsible to the supreme authority of the polity. Since the external polity is exclusively responsible for collecting vital informations from these agencies know each other except when cooperations become necessary in any emergency eventuality.

Thus, grouping all these raw informations together, the external secretariat establishment passes them to the managing divisions for area research and analysis. The function of these divisions is to differentiate between the essentials and the unessentials of the raw informations and converting the essentials into applicable data. It also differentiates between various data needed for various areas. Then, each area division proceeds to the divisional liaison authority in charge of proving the credibility of data. This authority, after extensive examination of all the data of all the areas, pushes them to the rare resources regulating commission. The work of this commission is to segregate the most vital data which are immediately concerned with national security and national interests, from all other data. Then the data concerning strategic affairs would be directed to the national security branch for evaluation by its experts on various areas. This branch is also expected to advise on the possible future interna-

tional alignments, defence groupings, intentions of the friends, and foes alike and the overall reasonably predictable future course of international events and help shaping policies accordingly. Then the rare resources regulating Commission sends all other not-so-immediate but vital data to the top secret review committees. These committees would be generally considered to devise ways and means so necessary for different kinds of policy-formulation on different areas of the world.

The policy-planning commission with the help of the help of the national security branch and the top secret review committees and also with the consent of the head of the external polity, fathers the broad policy framework of the polity. Once policies are formulated, the process of policy-prosecution starts. Again, the results of various policies are to be interpreted and some other emergency techniques like disinformation, seduction, tactical and strategic and also the help of the counter-intelligence corps of the internal division of the polity secretariat and other agencies of the polity may be elicited for the success of the policy. Thus, after long gestation and heavy travail a polity has taken birth which conducts its diplomatic policies through the art of intelligence. It has not rejected the Kautilyan views on the relationship between

diplomacy and intelligence. Rather, it has embarked upon a "graduated scheme" over the Kautilyan one to suit the demands of our nuclear age. It has again brought home the point that though the art of diplomacy is generally considered to be a normal channel of interaction between independent units of the international system, the necessity of the intelligence community in producing palatable and preferable policies is altogether unavoidable.

Diplomacy and intelligence are twin brothers of the same mother the polity to ensure success of its policy goals. Intelligence strengthens diplomatic effectiveness and an effective diplomacy is a necessary pre-requisite of stability, both internal and external.

Hence, the statesman stands between diplomacy and intelligence and makes use of them with the acme of his skill to ensure the much needed internal order and the international order.

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**PART THREE**

C O N C L U S I O N

Diplomacy continues to be the strategic tool of the statecraft for the preservation of order and stability of the international system. And, the mixture of knowledge on diplomacy, both past and present, helps making the statesman's intuition and reasoning sharper and realistic for the timely action in that direction. Because, time is the best friend of a diplomacy that knows how to value it. Time is the "capricious companion of a diplomacy that forgets to look at its watch."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, international actors today are atleast to some extent prisoners of their predecessors, acting always in the shadow of history. They are brought up in traditions, memories and practices inherited from earlier times which will vitally affect the way they look at the world and the way they behave. To understand the underlying causes of actions and attitudes of today, we may need to study those of the past. Only by a "better understanding of previous international societies are we likely to be able to improve understanding of our own."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Anataliev, K. : Ibid, p.219.

2. Luard, Evan : Ibid, p.33.

In the light of this experience, the study of the dictums of diplomacy of Kautilya and Machiavelli become necessary. But, there is no need either to be serumptious or supercilious while dealing with their views on diplomacy. Neither adjectival encomium nor execratory abuses would be advisable to judge the "Unvarnished points" of their programmes.

Hence, the ground should be made crystal clear why should we study them, what should we extract from them and what we should not. Such a proper evaluation of the Kautilyan-Machiavellian diplomacy would well serve the practical and pragmatic purposes of the space-age statesman.

There is no denying the fact that in most cases the scheme of selerotic diplomacy designed by Kautilya and Machiavelli can produce nothing more than "big thunder and little raindrops" for the use of nuclear age. Modelski says, "Kautilya's work, as Machiavelli's, pursues the same values : how a prince can maintain his power and enlarge it ..... they take for granted the existing social system and only ask how to preserve it. Both value intrigue and adopt on the whole a ruthless and instrumental approach to politics, elevating success in the game above all either considerations. They study the problem of conquering power over other states and do not really accept the logic and necessary limitations of a system of states of equal

power."<sup>3</sup> Modelski calls it a "checker board model" because the basis of it is the proposition that one's neighbour is one's enemy and that one's neighbour's enemy is therefore one's obvious friend. He continues, to say that the "Checker board still is a more illuminating model of world politics than the bloc-pattern recently in vogue."<sup>4</sup>

So, the "little raindrops" have also some value for us. If we allow the mind to wander back to our earlier discussions, we will find how both Kautilya and Machiavelli stood aghast at the terrible sight of the effate civilizations of the then India and Italy. Time and circumstances made it inevitable for them to take up the cudgels for effective measures for the preservation of independence and integrity of their respective countries. For them, the "effective measures" were nothing but result-oriented policies. The result-oriented programme is that the statesman should not care for the character of the means to achieve the ends - i.e. national interests. Independence and internal stability was the need of the hour. Hence, the concepts of kingdoms and princedoms dominated their views. Because, only an all powerful king can ensure the internal stability which would contribute to the interna-

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3. Modelski, G. : Ibid, pp. 550-551

4. Ibid, p. 555.



tional stability in turn.

It seems that both Kautilya and Machiavelli wanted to purchase internal stability at the cost of international stability. But, such a conservative political philosophy as a guide to action is irrelevant and order and stability which are produced from that are at best ephemeral. It is more so because of the changed conditions in our nuclear age.

Anyway, Kautilya and Machiavelli are mistaken in many contexts from our point of view. Again, that is natural. Dean Acheson says, "The best leaders we can produce will make their mistakes too."<sup>5</sup> Because, much that is important in statecraft cannot be reduced to formulae or statistical nomenclature. Precise predictions about specific outcomes are elusive in the face of rapidly changing environments and policy contexts. Therefore, the statesman will depend upon intuition and "dead-reckoning" for certain choices. Making choices under conditions of uncertainty in international politics requires a subtle blend of skill, nerve, and accurate information distilled through the personality of the statesman. What results from this process emphasises the importance of "percep-

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5. Acheson, Dean: Power and Diplomacy; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958, p.28.

tions about the environments, actor objectives, and the characteristics of the domestic policy-making process."<sup>6</sup>

But, all the Kautilya-Machiavellian perceptions are not acceptable to US. Even, though both of them were experienced statesmen and advised governments for the application of their policies, it seems that Kautilya was much more successful than Machiavelli. So, it is not unfair to be selective in making a choice between these two historical personalities of outstanding acumen and statesmanship. It was the Kautilyan programme that made India united for the first time under the guidance of a single king. Machiavelli failed to do it in Italy. It may be because Machiavelli emphasised much more on opportunism and Kautilya on dedication. Or may be that Machiavelli's fortune deprived him of playing such a role, though he was anxiously desirous to do so.

Machiavelli used all techniques of flattery to convince the then ruler of his mother-land that his opinions should be elicited to know the art of running the government. But,

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6. Cimbala, Stephen J. : "Policy Studies and Foreign Policy: Emphases and cautions" in Merritt, Richard L. ed. : "Foreign policy Analysis", Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, Toronto, London, 1975, p.73.

it was of no avail and Machiavelli was extremely frustrated. It may be another cause why his scheme of diplomacy avoided the human aspects in their entirety. But, there is no dearth of sympathies for human sentiments in the Kautilyan programme.

Now, whatever may be their successes and failures, since all of their perceptions are not acceptable to us, that is why, we have talked of the emergence of an extended statesman out of their scheme. Such an extended statesman is supposed to nurse progressivism not conservatism; to ensure stability but not through kingship or at the cost of human freedom; and to think of good not only for his own people but for the world community also. The main task of today's statesman is to save the humanity from nuclear incineration by submerging differences and strengthening adjustments. The tenets of his programme of diplomacy should include discussion, negotiation, persuasion and agreement between governments. Because, in the final analysis, the atom is no respecter of ideology or anything. When mutual fear and respect for atom is reached, "it will be necessary to have available the means by which the required communications, negotiations and agreements can be worked out. That instrument is already at hand. It is the practice of conventional diplomacy."<sup>7</sup>

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7. Urban G. Whitaker, Jr.: Ibid, p.113.

Thus, even in the nuclear age when the strategic conceptions and the conceptions on peace and world order have gone sea change, the very meaning of diplomacy remains the same.

Diplomacy remains the same trusted tool of the statesman to deal with the Kaleidoscopic scenes of the international system, to solve the inter-state stalemate and to ensure order, stability and survival of the systemic structure, both internal and international.

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