

**THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN
THE UNITED NATIONS
THE EARLY YEARS**

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
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P R E F A C E

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There are a number of studies on the foreign policy of People's Republic of China, but very few studies on China's role in the United Nations. This study examines People's China's policy and reaction to various international issues that came up for discussion at the United Nations in the early years of its membership between the years 1971-75. Being a permanent member at the Security Council with veto power, it has a significant role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security, a basic objective of the United Nations. Beside, it has an important role to play in every other international sphere not only because of its size, population but also because of it being a strong, new, emerging Power with "militant revolutionary" flavour. Since the United Nations provides China a forum for policy statement, and an ideal place for multilateral relations, this study hopes to provide insights into China's foreign policy and international relations. The aim of this study is to make a preliminary survey over a broad spectrum with a view, later on to go deeper into the analysis of China's role in the United Nations.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

1. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The People's Republic of China, with its large size and great power potential, has an important role to play in the ever-changing state of contemporary international relations. China's foreign policy is determined by the interplay between the dynamic of international politics and two independent factors of ideology and national interest. Increasingly, China has been acting, as any other nation-state, primarily according to the dictates of national interest, rather than ideological considerations. Nevertheless, ideology is playing a crucial role as it shapes Chinese decision-makers' world view, establishes their long-range policy goals, offers a rationale for their actions and sets the tone and style of policy which has led to its being labelled as a revolutionary state. Above all, Mao's theory of contradictions help the policy-makers to explain the complex international situation. He stated that "contradiction" in a thing causes its development and he points out further: "There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions."¹ He also stated that one must "distinguish between the principal and the

1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (Peking, 1961), p. 331.

secondary contradictions, and pay special attention to grasping the principal one".² This view of Mao Zedong has greatly influenced the foreign policy decision-makers as they were quite prompt in identifying the principal contradiction and formulating suitable strategy to counter it.

Objectives of Foreign Policy

The essential urge of any individual or collective entity is to survive and therefore to achieve a tolerable degree of security from hostile external influences is its chief concern. Even apart from the tendency to fear aggression from the "imperialist camp", the United States until 1972, and now from the Soviet Union, it must be remembered that China is a divided country (between mainland and Formosa). In such divided countries, we find the United States is often allied in one way or another, and is not only an obstacle to reunification but a threat to the survival of one of the parties. Therefore the foremost concern of China is its security and survival -- whether in respect of the United States or the Soviet Union.

Although security is essential even if one lacks power, it is obvious that power is very helpful in the search for security. China remains the strongest, strictly indigenous, regime on the mainland of Asia, far ahead of its closest rivals, North and South Korea, North Vietnam, India and Pakistan; yet it still lives in the shadow of the vastly superior power of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, another crucial objective of China's foreign policy is to increase economic,

2 Ibid., p. 332.

military and political power in order to achieve greater security.

There can be no doubt that territorial unification ranks high on China's list of external objectives. This objective, like its other objectives, evidently requires a great deal of time for its fulfilment. Specifically, the People's Republic of China claims, as of right, in addition to China proper, Tibet, Taiwan and the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Tibet was "liberated" by force in 1950-51. Taiwan remains to be the most difficult trouble-spot that remains to be "liberated".

Another long term objective of China's foreign policy is to become an exemplar, and if possible, a leader, for the whole of the underdeveloped world. The Chinese Communist Party apparently hopes to make China, by the end of the twentieth century, a Super Power comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union (despite periodical disavowals of any desire to become a Super Power.) The satisfaction of this desire for Super Power status being unlikely in the foreseeable future, the People's China might decide that the best way to compensate for its limitations without entirely giving up its ambitions, is to try to play the role of a balancing Power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

These objectives are clearly revealed in the actual conduct of its foreign policy. The People's Republic was founded in 1949 against a background of the Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Under the circumstances, the "two camp" theory enunciated by the Chinese Communist leadership reflected not

only the Marxist-Leninist world view, but also the prevailing situation during the post-war years. In an article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" written in 1949, Mao Zedong portrayed the world as divided into two hostile camps -- the "socialist" camp headed by the Soviet Union and the "imperialist" camp headed by the United States. According to him, China must "lean to the side of socialism" and it was impossible to pursue neutrality or a "third road".³ Thus, at this stage, the principal contradiction was between "world imperialism" headed by the United States imperialism and the "socialist" camp headed by the Soviet Union.

People's China declared in the early years of its establishment that the Soviet Union was the only valid model on which the Chinese state could be rebuilt and acknowledged the Soviet Union as the leader of the "socialist camp", the prime exemplar and guide on the road to communism.

Although the policy was couched in ideological terms -- the inevitability of imperialist opposition to the socialist camp -- it does not follow that the Chinese leaders are motivated only by ideological considerations. No doubt, the common bond of ideology accentuated the degree of inclination to the Soviet side, just as the lack of it intensified suspicion of United States policy toward China. But within this ideological framework, alliance with the Soviet Union was dictated by

3 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. IV (Peking, 1961), pp. 415-17.

considerations of straightforward Realpolitik.

In the initial stages, China was very weak, believing itself to be directly menaced by American hostility and with no other friend to whom it could turn. Thus, in February 1950, The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union was signed, and which China regarded as the "main shield and potentially at least as its main sword as well, against the 'imperialist camp'."⁴ The chief value of this alliance to China was therefore the military and political backing which it provided at a time when the new government was at its most vulnerable and the need for "peaceful-reconstruction" at its greatest.

But the relations between China and the Soviet Union were not without contradiction even at this stage, although it was presumed to be a secondary contradiction. The serious strains in their relations, however, developed mainly from Soviet fear of involvement in a Far Eastern War (over Taiwan, in particular) and Soviet reluctance to see People's China become a nuclear Power leading finally to the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance in 1960. There was undoubtedly also a personal antipathy, and a state of rivalry for authority and leadership within the International Communist movement, between Mao Zedong and Khrushchev. Mao had undoubtedly considered himself the world's senior Communist leader since the death of Stalin (1953) and resented Khrushchev's efforts, beginning with twentieth Congress (1956) to give

4 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (New York, 1966), p. 122.

ideological and strategic guidance to the entire international Communist movement. China, on the other hand, claimed that their revolution was the model for the underdeveloped or "semi-colonial" countries. "Thus, China challenges Soviet authority as a great Power as well as an ideological leader"⁵. Above all, the Soviet Union's reluctance to confront "imperialist United States" (which became clear in the Korean and Taiwan crises), its concept of liberation without war, peaceful transition to "socialism" and its move toward detente and disarmament agreement with the United States made their conflict blow out of all proportion which made China to accuse the Soviet Union of betraying the "socialist camp" and turning itself to "revisionism". These events made China's foreign policy makers to adopt a more independent policy of trying to secure the leadership of the international communist movement and projecting itself as a champion of the "Third World".

Subsequently, Chinese leaders discarded the two-camp theory and approached the world with a more pluralistic perspective. China got rid of its isolation and sole dependence on the Soviet Union by increasing its diplomatic relations with other countries. Since then, China's "consistent policy" had in fact been "to strive for peaceful co-existence" on the basis of the Five Principles (Panchsheel) with countries having different social systems. Between the socialist countries, relations were meant to develop "in accordance with proletarian

5 John Gitting, Survey of Sino-Soviet Dispute 1963-1967 (London, 1968), p. 7.

internationalism" and China's role towards the oppressed people and nations was one of support and assistance.⁶ This shift in China's foreign policy might be due to the need for diplomatic and moral support from as many Third World countries as possible, "in the face of the perceived threat from the United States which after 1954 was symbolized by and institutionalized in SEATO".⁷

In 1964, Chinese leaders revived and expanded Mao's earlier concept of the "intermediate zone". According to this formulation, there existed between the socialist bloc and the United States vast intermediate zones consisting of the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the second intermediate zone consisting of capitalist countries of Western Europe, Canada, certain Eastern Europe countries and Japan. Initially, Beijing appealed to the two intermediate zones to join an international united front against "American imperialism". At this time, "while Soviet revisionism submitted to imperialist nuclear blackmail and betrayed people's war",⁸ it was not seen as an imperialist Power in its own right.

The Soviet Union came under stern criticism during the "Cultural Revolution". In fact, for more than two years, China's foreign policy was frozen in a sterile posture of ideological militancy and hostility to nearly everyone. This might be due

6 Peking Review, vol. 12, no. 18, 30 April 1969, p. 33.

7 Harold C. Hinton, Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States (London, 1976), p. 19.

8 Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 36, 3 September 1965, p. 31.

to frustration. The ending of Cultural Revolution might have been expected to produce an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The opposite happened, however, due to the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" and its border clashes with the Soviet Union which greatly threatened its security and existence.

These events made Lin Biao to label Soviet ideology for the first time as "social imperialism" and considered it to have acquired/^{an}independent imperialist status. Later, China accused both the Super Powers of attempting to "collude and at the same time contend to redivide the world". Thus, the predominant interest of China's foreign policy in the late 1960s has been to oppose "two Power domination of the world".⁹ The Ninth Party Congress of Central Committee of Communist Party of China in 1969 called on "all countries and people, irrespective of their belonging to two opposite world systems to unite for struggle against imperialism and 'social imperialism'".¹⁰ During this phase, China was trying to achieve its objective of leadership role for the whole of the underdeveloped areas, thereby ultimately hoping to achieve its aim of Super Power status. Thus, it ventured on the line of struggle on two fronts.

By the 1970s, China had to alter a number of key assumptions, underpinning its foreign policy. It perceived,

9 G.P. Deshpande, "Foreign Policy during Cultural Revolution and After: A View from India", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), 14 November 1971, p. 103.

10 Devendra Kaushik, China and the Third World (New Delhi, 1975), p. 32.

by this time, that the United States was subject to the economic problems and long term decline inherent in the very nature of capitalism. Underlying the new policy formulation, therefore, was the assumption that an era had begun in which the United States "imperialism" was no longer capable of the rampant aggression, which characterized its previous behaviour, particularly towards the Third World; it was on the defensive - as much from rivals with similar imperial ambitions as from the Third World peoples themselves. The other critical assumption, involved in this aspect of the reassessment was the reappraisal of the Soviet Union as "imperialist". At this stage of history, the Soviet Union was becoming strong at a time when the United States "imperialism" was in serious decline and, moreover, it was doing so under the banner of socialism. From its exploiting of the Eastern European bloc, it had now set its sight on the world, because of which China accused it of a "hegemonist" policy.

The fear of attack from the Soviet Union was the most important determining factor underlying the new foreign policy in early 1970s (a close and parallel policy with that of the United States). This led to friendly relations with the United States. The Chinese leaders justified it on the ground that "revolutionary" compromises with imperialism are possible in order to oppose "social imperialism". Beside security from the Soviet Union, China hoped that this alliance would improve its manouvering and bargaining position with respect to the Soviet Union and facilitate trade and technological contacts with the United States. Above all, China's new love for America might merely be a tactic to achieve the unification of Taiwan with the

mainland which "rank high on the People's Republic of China's list of external objectives".¹¹ Thus, the America which the Maoists for many years pictured as an object of irreconcilable hostility has now become for them quite an agreeable, almost, an ally.

The most thorny spot in their relationship is Taiwan. In the Shanghai communique signed at the end of President Nixon's visit in 1972, the Chinese side asserted that Taiwan was the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States. It claimed that Taiwan was a province of China and no one could legitimately interfere with its "liberation", that American troops, bases must be withdrawn from the island and that no separate status of any kind for Taiwan was permissible. The American side stated that it did not "challenge" this position. While the United States accepted in principle that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of it, the American side urged a peaceful settlement of the problem. The United States also made its military withdrawal conditional on the People's China's continued good behaviour not only in Taiwan Straits but also in the rest of Asia, as well as on the general growth of international stability in the region.

Until about 1973, Beijing appeared to believe that the Sino-American detente was acting as a useful constraint on the Soviet Union. But it was only after 1973 and especially after the Vladivostok summit of 1974 that Beijing came to believe strongly that it was not getting its money's worth, so to speak,

¹¹ Hinton, n. 4, p. 113.

from the United States, as against Soviet Union. The Chinese reservations related not only to the lack of specific American support for China against the Soviet Union, but to the general American policy toward the Soviet Union in such fields as arms control, Europe and the Third World. There was a similar disillusionment in Beijing's evaluation of the American performance with respect to Taiwan. "Down to that time, Beijing apparently believed that the American side not only considered 'normalization' to include diplomatic recognition and the cutting off of ties with the Republic of China, but intended to 'normalize' in that sense at the earliest practicable time"¹². But the failure of its unification of Taiwan led Beijing to doubts on this score, in spite of repeated American endorsements of the principle of "normalization".

On the American side, it appears that the resignation of President Nixon, the end of American involvement in Indo-China and frequent turmoil in Beijing's politics have resulted in a considerable downgrading of the Chinese connection. At this juncture, China adopted the strategy of threatening the United States to improve its attitude to Beijing or else it would normalize its relation with Soviet Union. "That may have been one of the messages that Beijing intended to convey when in December 1975, it released the three Soviet helicopter crewmen whom it had taken prisoner in March 1974"¹³.

¹² Hinton, n. 7, p. 60.

¹³ Ibid., p. 80.

Thus, China's choice of external alignments has been largely determined by its national interest. "China's foreign policy and foreign relations have actually and largely hinged on its relations with the two Super Powers. When its relations with one or two of them changed, its relations with many other countries invariably changed accordingly".¹⁴ To defend China and build it into a strong nation is the legitimate and dominating concern of China's foreign policy. Toward these ends, China has adopted pragmatic policies which helped it to achieve the status of a regional Power and a global presence. In both areas, China manipulates state-to-state, people-to-people and comrade-to-comrade relationship with a current emphasis on the first two of these. "The old ideology continues to be enshrined as ritual and recited as dogma but it is increasingly separated from the dynamic processes of Chinese society, in foreign as well as domestic politics".¹⁵

2. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS

The "China Question" in the United Nations had been an issue in United Nations politics for twenty one years (1949-1971). This issue influenced international politics and China's image in the world. It is of interest to trace People's China's attitude to the United Nations during this period, as it changed

14 Chun-tu Hsueh, "Introduction" in Chun-tu Hsueh, ed., China's Foreign Relations (New York, 1982), p. 2.

15 A. Robert Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 52, no. 2, January 1974, p. 382.

from time to time, according to the change in "China's domestic situation, in the United Nations itself and in the international arena. In other words, there are many attitudes, and not just one, need to be examined".¹⁶

Initial Period of Communist China

The early Chinese attitude toward international organization was, in general terms, positive and optimistic. It assumed that the change in China's representation was an inevitable reality that would not be prevented by either the Republic of China's desperate effort to cling to China's seat or by any tricks of the United States. It was anxious to capture its "rightful place" in the United Nations as it viewed the United Nations as a "place for the new regime to secure the world's recognition of its legitimacy and new power status".¹⁷ They repeatedly insisted that "peace in Asia was impossible without Beijing's representation in the United Nations and recognitions of her new stature".¹⁸

Till the outbreak of the Korean conflict on 25 June 1950, there occurred little or no change in Beijing's positive and relatively defensive attitude towards the United Nations. As the leaders of the new regime were preoccupied with the tasks

16 Byron S. Weng, "Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations", International Organization (Boston), 20, Autumn 1966, p. 678.

17 Ibid.

18 Sheldon Appleton, The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, The United States and The United Nations (East Lansing, Michigan, 1961), p. 161.

of rehabilitation and reconstruction, their initial foreign policy reflect their nationalistic and revolutionary zeal, rather than their conscious and careful evaluation of international situation. International problems were seen in rather simple, categorical terms.

Although it had repeatedly accused the United States of domination in the United Nations, it remained optimistic that the Organization could be used as a battle ground where the Communist states could struggle against the "imperialists" led by the United States. This simplistic and optimistic view was due to the fact that the international environment was not altogether unfavourable to People's China's seat in the United Nations. The UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, supported People's China's claim of its "rightful place" in the family of nations. The Secretary-General's special memorandum on legal aspects of the problem of representation in the United Nations released in March 1950, strongly supported Beijing's position.¹⁹ The prospects of seating Beijing appeared all the more favourable during this time as five of the eleven members of the Security Council had already extended recognition to the new Communist regime of Beijing. Moreover, the United States had announced at the time that it considered the "China Question" "procedural, rather than substantive",²⁰ meaning that it would accept a majority decision in the Security Council without using the

19 Weng, n. 16, p. 679.

20 Cited in Rajai Mostafa, "Communist China and the United Nations", Orbis (Philadelphia), 10 (Fall 1966), p. 826.

veto to prevent Beijing from occupying China's seat. The American attitude during this time was "wait and see", rather than to get involved in the civil war in China.²¹

Between October 1949 and June 1950, Beijing sent nine cables to the various organs of the United Nations, and nine to the related international agencies. All were formal, each trying to present Beijing's legal position on the question. This evidence clearly indicates Beijing's interest in membership of the United Nations and international organization generally during the initial period. "Further evidence of Beijing's willingness in the early 1950s to take part in the activities of the United Nations was its acceptance of ad hoc participation in the United Nations in connection with several questions relating to China".²² The only condition that Beijing made during this period was that China's seat at the United Nations should be given to Beijing's delegation, in place of the Nationalist Chinese delegation. There ^{was} / nothing absurd in this condition, as any other sovereign state would have demanded it in a similar situation. However, a Soviet draft resolution calling for acceptance of Beijing's credentials was defeated on 13 January 1950. This is the first blow to People's China at the United Nations.

Period of the Korean War (June 1950-1953)

In spite of the unfavourable stand initially taken by the

21 New York Times, 6 January 1950, pp. 1, 3 and 4.

22 Hungdah Chui, "Communist China's Attitude Towards the United Nations: A Legal Analysis", American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), 62 (January 1968), p.23.

United Nations against People's China, it did not denounce the United Nations outright. In fact, it took pains to make a technical distinction between the United Nations of the Charter and the United Nations under the United States' control -- the latter was denounced "as instrument of United States' policy". It went to the extent of declaring all decisions made by the United Nations organs without the participation of mainland China "illegal and consequently null and void". However, it did not cut off its connexion with the United Nations. On the contrary, Beijing still endeavoured to keep the United Nations channels open and tried to follow the established procedures of the World Organization.²³

It was in late August 1950, that People's China sensed the United States "design" of "aggression" against North Korea or even a general attack against itself. On 6 September, the Security Council rejected the Soviet proposal to invite the representative of People's China to participate in the debate on the Korean Question. On 8 September, Secretary-General Lie (who had been sympathetic so far to People's China's claim for a seat in the United Nations) began to toe the line of Gen. MacArthur and the US Representative, Warren R. Austin, saying: "The aim of the United Nations is, and must be, a United and Independent Korea" and that it would "not be enough to bring about the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th parallel".²⁴ Three days later, President Truman approved a recommendation of

23 Weng, n. 16, p. 681.

24 New York Times, 9 September 1950, p. 1.

the UN National Security Council that, "General MacArthur was to extend his operations north of the Parallel and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea if there was no indication [of] a threat from entry of Soviet or Chinese Communist elements in force".²⁵

When the US army under the banner of the United Nations crossed the 38th parallel with the approval of the UN General Assembly, China retaliated on its borders with strength of 270,000 to 340,000 of China's "volunteers".²⁶ People's China charged the United States that "by their criminal aggressive action in Korea, they have made the UN flag a rag to hide their shame".²⁷ To add fuel to fire, the General Assembly adopted a resolution under the instigation of the United States which, in February 1951, branded People's China and North Korea as the "aggressor". These events provoked People's China and signalled a decisive turn in Beijing's attitude towards the United Nations.

By then, the international environment had also become cold to People's China, compared with the previous period. Only a handful of additional countries accorded recognition to Beijing. Now, Washington openly took upon itself the task of defending the Taiwan regime against "Communist Chinese aggression" and military

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- 25 Matin Lichterman, "Korea: Problems in Limited War", in Gordon B. Turner and Richard D. Challner, eds, National Security in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1960), p. 34.
- 26 Allen Whiting, China Cross the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, 1960), pp. 118, 122.
- 27 Cited in Mostafa, n. 20, p. 827.

aid to Chiang Kai-shek regime was revived. People's China viewed these developments as direct interference in its domestic affairs. Above all, the United States vigorously carried out its "campaign to prevent the seating and outlaw Beijing in the United Nations".²⁸

However, throughout the Korean conflict, People's China continued its drive for a United Nations seat and Beijing's language in its communications to the United Nations was still quite restrained. Attacks against the Organization were always in the form of a warning or a regret and formal charges were directed against the US "imperialist" and a few of its "satellites", instead of the United Nations itself.

Period of People's Diplomacy
(Early 1954 - Late 1957)

People's China's readiness to meet the challenge of the United States as a Super Power and its successful performance in preventing the United States from achieving its desired end in Korea, under the garb of the United Nations, had strengthened its confidence and increased its prestige as a potential Great Power in world politics. By then, China was disenchanted with Soviet friendship as it did not get the expected support in the Korean war. Its behaviour in the international arena became more mature and sober, although it continued its rhetoric of revolutionary zeal. Realising the futility of aiming at quick results, China adopted a long-term strategy to secure its UN seat. The new strategy was to "make new China a champion and

28 Byron S. Weng, Peking's United Nations Policy: Continuity and Change (London, 1972), p. 87.

a leader of the new developing forces and guide its 'revolutionary course' more into line with its dependence on the Soviet Union".²⁹ Toward this end, China introduced the era of "peaceful coexistence", not only with socialist states but also the non-socialist states, especially the newly-emerging states.³⁰ With the initial success at the Bandung Conference (1955), Beijing adopted a new approach to the United Nations. In place of its own initiative to gain entry into United Nations, which it did upto 1953, Beijing:

seems to have initiated a policy of patiently waiting for decisive changes to take place in the character of the World Organization - a policy grounded in the expectation that the influx of new nations might transform the United Nations into what China would consider to be a World Organization more representative of world opinion. 31

China's policy then was to wait for the United Nations itself to invite it in. This policy clearly shows that Beijing's approach towards the United Nations had been transformed from active and direct to reactive and indirect.

In January 1955, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold visited Beijing on a special mission to seek release of United States personnel who were sentenced to long term imprisonment on charge of being spies. They were released in August. The Chinese message to Hammarskjold indicated specifically that the airmen were released "not because of the Assembly decision, but in order

29 Ibid., p. 94.

30 Halperin, "Communist China's Demands on the World", in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), p. 238.

31 Mostafa, n. 20, p. 829.

to maintain and strengthen friendship with the Secretary-General".³²
 Besides, China had repeatedly supported the UN Charter on several occasions and cited the Charter with approval in a number of friendship treaties.³³

The Renewed Hard Line
(Early 1958 - December 1961)

By the late 1950s, Beijing had begun to revert to its former militancy and to its old policy of launching uncompromising attacks against the United Nations out of a mistaken confidence in its own capabilities. This confidence was kindled both by Soviet breakthrough in missiles which led Mao to speak of the "East wind will prevail over West wind" and China's own achievement in the first five years. "During the couple of years after the Bandung Conference, Beijing had perceived that a degree of international status could be attained through association with Afro-Asian forum such as Bandung Conference, apart from the United Nations".³⁴ Above all, its policy of "work and wait" for the transformation of the United Nations had worked according to its expectations, as more Afro-Asian states gained independence and joined the United Nations, which led to lesser and lesser support for the moratorium against the consideration of changing the representation of China in the United Nations. Thus, Beijing comment on the United Nations became bolder and aggressive.

32 Joseph L. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold - Custodian of Brushfire Peace (New York, 1961), pp. 61-65.

33 Chiu, n. 22, p. 21.

34 Weng, n. 28, p. 110.

But all the factors which contributed to Beijing's exhilaration and confidence were founded on unreal grounds. Its economic plan of Great Leap went "backward" instead of "forward".³⁵ Inside Asia, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated,³⁶ while the Laotian crisis and the guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam brought gradually increasing US military forces closer to the Chinese border. Within the Socialist camp, the Sino-Soviet split came in the open.³⁷

Beijing's hostile and aggressive attitude towards the United Nations reached its peak of intensity in the winter of 1961-62. In December 1961, the United States succeeded in changing the issue of Chinese representation from a procedural matter, requiring a simple majority, to an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for approval. This "new trick" of the United States to bar Beijing's entry into United Nations had completely shattered China's expectation to gain its "rightful place" with an increase in Afro-Asian members in the United Nations.

China's vision of a transformed United Nations through an increase in membership also was thus thwarted by the United States manipulation. As the non-Western forces grew stronger in the General Assembly, there were signs for a time that some pivotal functions of the United Nations were being shifted to

35 Joseph Alsop, "On China's Descending Spiral", China Quarterly (London), July-September 1962, pp. 21-36.

36 A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York, 1963), pp. 306-15.

37 David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York, 1963), pp. 284-85.



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the office of the Secretary-General.³⁸

A New Direction (1962-1965)

Due to disillusionment and frustration with the United Nations, Beijing now ventured forth to find an appropriate substitute for the World Organization.

Beijing stepped up its course of "people's diplomacy". It increased its aid programmes to the Third World countries and activate its trade with ^{the} "second intermediate zone",³⁹ especially of Western European countries and Japan. Many Chinese delegations travelled to these regions, particularly from the beginning of 1963. Beijing was obviously wooing these countries in order to prevent Super Powers' influence in these regions and to secure wider support for other Afro-Asian conference. "In retrospect, it seems clear that the second Afro-Asian Conference was intended to set the stage for the creation of a 'revolutionary United Nations' of the kind Beijing had envisaged".⁴⁰ Beijing's successful explosion of the first atomic bomb in October 1964 further encouraged the idea of a "new United Nations".

A sudden climax developed in January 1965 following the "withdrawal" of Indonesia from the United Nations. "The manner in which Indonesia withdrew seems to suggest that Sukarno

38 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York, 1964), Chapter 14.

39 Harry Hamm, China: Empire of the 7000 Million (New York, 1966).

40 Mostafa, n. 20, p. 838.

[The President of Indonesia] was merely an accomplice in staging a destructive blow against the United Nations that would be the preparatory step toward setting up a rival organization to be composed of the Afro-Asians and led by the People's Republic of China⁴¹. The readiness and the enthusiasm with which Beijing welcomed the Indonesian action support the above conclusion.

Chairman Liu Shao-Chi "expressed great appreciation" of President Sukarno's statement that "the crown of independence of a country does not lie in membership of the United Nations but in self-reliance" and said that, "in pursuing self-reliance, Asian and African countries can rely on mutual assistance among themselves based on the principle of equality, but not on the so-called 'aid' from imperialism".⁴² Chen Yi called the Indonesian move "a lofty and just revolutionary move" and "the first spring thunderbolt of 1963 which resounded throughout the world", which "inspired and brought joy to all countries and peoples fighting imperialism and colonialism to safeguard their national dignity".⁴³ The Government statement of 10 January said:

... The United Nations is by no means sacred and inviolable. We can live on very well without it.... This is a great help in ending the blind faith to the United Nations. 44

41 Weng, n. 28, p. 133.

42 Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 3, 15 January 1963, p. 4.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

The People's Republic of China's polemics against the United Nations also cited new pre-conditions for joining the Organization. Whereas the expulsion of Republic of China (Formosa regime) representatives had been the only precondition before 1965, Beijing's demands now included the expulsion of "all imperialist countries", the admission of "all independent countries", the cancellation of the UN resolutions against the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the adoption of a resolution condemning the United States as an aggressor and a review and revision of the Charter.⁴⁵ The PRC then presented two sharply worded alternatives: "Either the organization rids itself of United States domination, correct its mistakes and get thoroughly reorganized, or a revolutionary United Nations will be set up to replace it."⁴⁶

Having received little attention, let alone support, for a reorganization or a replacement of the United Nations, the PRC's interest in the world organization declined rapidly during the next few years.

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1969)

Beijing's approach towards the United Nations was particularly hostile and offensive during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. On 27 December 1965, a lengthy editorial of Jen-min Jih-pao denounced the United Nations as a "market place for the United States-Soviet political deals".⁴⁷ The

45 Ibid., vol. 8, no. 42, 15 October 1965, p. 11.

46 Ibid.:

47 Cited in Ibid., vol. 1, 8 December 1967, p. 21.

twentieth session of the General Assembly, the editorial said, "was as anti-China Conference. ... a Conference for pursuing the policy of American-Soviet co-operation for domination of the world".⁴⁸ In a comment on the disappointing results of the vote on the question of Chinese representation at the 22nd session of the General Assembly the PRC declared on 8 December 1967:

Speaking frankly, the Chinese people are not at all interested in sitting in the United Nations, a body manipulated by the United States, a place for playing power politics, a stock exchange for the United States, and the Soviet Union, to strike political bargains and an organ to serve the US policies of aggression and war. 49

Shortly thereafter, PRC commentaries on the United Nations practically disappeared from the official media.

Renewed Interest (1969-1971)

The culmination of China's Cultural Revolution coincided with the beginning of a "new and revolutionary" foreign policy which was formulated at the Ninth Party Congress. Among other things, China now embarked on early entry into the United Nations. Towards this end, it adopted a conciliatory and flexible approach to the United Nations. Nevertheless, "revival of interest in the United Nations did not necessarily mean taking bold steps to knock at the United Nations front door immediately".⁵⁰

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Weng, n. 28, p. 168.

The machinery of conciliatory diplomacy was put into operation to win support for a renewed United Nations bid. It demonstrated an extra-ordinary degree of flexibility and moderation by extending ⁵¹ limited normalization towards former enemies such as the United States, Japan and Yugoslavia. "All the polemical indictments against the United Nations disappeared. Instead, the PRC launched a new and sophisticated campaign to gain entrance to the family of nations". First, the PRC quietly pursued a "banquet diplomacy", by inviting prominent Western and Third World statesmen or former statesmen to visit China. Second, Beijing resumed the people-to-people diplomacy of the Bandung period. This was an exercise in popular showmanship intended to beautify the PRC's tarnished image in the international community. Third, Beijing launched a major drive to expand the scope of state-to-state relations. Fourth, in its official media, the PRC gave unusual coverage to the question of Chinese representation on the eve of the 26th session (1971) of the General Assembly. Finally, the PRC's aid diplomacy was accelerated at an unprecedented rate in 1970 and 1971.

Once it finally gained entrance to the United Nations, by hard means in November 1971, China has behaved, by and large, according to the norms of the Organization and its opponents prediction of the destructive impact of its entry to the United Nations had been falsified. Thus, it is obvious that China's attitude towards the United Nations passed through "the stages of naive optimism, frustration, disenchantment, rebellion,

51 Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 102.

disinterest, revived hope and a sophisticated diplomacy to
 52
 gain her seat".

3. CHINA'S REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The question of representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations was one of the most serious problems that the World Organization ever faced. The heat generated during the debates on this issue for some two decades threatened the very fabric of the Organization.

China is, of course, a founder member of the United Nations. "The Republic of China" is named in Article 23 of the Charter as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto on substantive proposals. The civil war in China, between the Communists and the Nationalists brought into existence two governments claiming to represent the same country. Thus, the nagging issue in international politics for nearly twenty one years had been which of two governments had the better claim to represent China -- that of the People's Republic of China in Beijing or of the Chinese Nationalists in Taipei, capital of the Island of Taiwan.

Since the Chinese Nationalists were in power before Communist China established the Government, they continued to send their representatives to the United Nations. Not only that, the Nationalists had the backing of many states, including especially, the United States. The Western Powers

desperately tried to deny the United Nations' seat to the Beijing regime and later tried to create an independent state of Taiwan to keep this strategic islands in friendly hands. "China has at the same time, sought to become a member of the United Nations not only because it would have enhanced its prestige and reduced its diplomatic dependence on the Kremlin, but also because its admission in the United Nations and the expulsion of Taiwan would have greatly strengthened its case vis-a-vis Formosa".⁵³

The distinction between "admission" and "representation" is clear and simple. The criteria and procedure provided in the Charter are only for the "admission" of new states into the United Nations. However, there is no guidelines in the Charter in respect to "representation" of Governments when the nature of a regime within a state changes. The question of Chinese representation was the first of its kind in the history of the United Nations. The distinguished international lawyer, Clyde Egleton asserted that the Chinese representation question "is not a question for a court to answer".⁵⁴ It became obvious that political, rather than legal, factors were to be decisive in determining United Nations' action in the matter.

The question of the rightful occupant of the China seat in the United Nations was first raised by a communication dated 18 November 1949 by the Foreign Minister of "People's Republic

53 J.P. Jain, China in World Politics (New Delhi, 1976), p. 184.

54 Cited in Appleton, n. 18, p. 32.

of China" to the President of the General Assembly. This letter challenged the legal status of the Nationalist China's delegation and questioned its right to represent "China" in the United Nations. The question of Chinese representation was not raised in the Security Council until January 1950, although at the 458th meeting of the Council on 29 December 1949, the Soviet delegate, Ambassador Malik, considered "it necessary to state that it will not regard Mr. T.F. Tsiang, the Kuomintang representative on the Security Council, as representing China, nor as being empowered to represent the Chinese people in the Security Council".⁵⁵ On 8 January 1950, Chou En-lai sent another telegram declaring the presence of the Kuomintang delegate in the Security Council illegal and demanding his expulsion. On 10 January, the Soviet delegate raised the question of Chinese representation in the Security Council before it proceeded to adopt its agenda. Malik also submitted a draft resolution which declared the representation of the Kuomintang group as "illegal" and demanded its expulsion from the Council. When his proposal was rejected, Malik declared that the Soviet Union would "not recognize as legal any decision of the Security Council adopted with the participation of the representative of the Kuomintang group".⁵⁶ The question of Chinese representation thus became a Cold War issue. From 1951 onwards, until 1960, the Assembly regularly considered a proposal from the Soviet Union for the inclusion

55 Cited in Jain, n. 53, p. 185.

56 Ibid., p. 187.

of an agenda item on this matter. This, however was always rejected and instead a resolution, usually proposed by the United States, was passed in the Assembly to "postpone" or "not to consider" "the question of Chinese representation". A New York Times correspondent, H.M. Rosenthal, rightly reported: "The only important obstacle between Communist China and a seat in the United Nations is the wall of United States opposition.... It has been taken for granted here that if Washington dropped its opposition, Communist China would get a thumping majority."⁵⁷

The aggressive posture adopted by People's China in the international field, and the prospect of ^{its} becoming a nuclear-power, kindled the concern of the Western Powers. They were also aware of the "serious risk" of being outvoted in the 1961 session of the General Assembly on the question of placing the problem of Chinese representation on the "agenda". These considerations motivated some countries to propose a "Two China" solution -- i.e., providing for the representation of both People's China and the Formosa regime. United States leaders also realized the necessity of making a compromise.

The question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was, for the first time, debated in the General Assembly in 1961. Before the discussion began on the subject, Beijing criticized this "Two China" policy and stated that for its seating in the United Nations, the pre-condition was that the "Kuomintang Clique" should be expelled first. This was the

57 Cited in Appleton, n. 18, p. 104.

"only one condition which has been consistently set by the regime for membership"⁵⁸. Since the United States had no intention of sacrificing Taiwan's interest, it submitted a resolution, along with four other countries, which declared that any proposal to change the representation of China was "an important question" requiring a two thirds majority under Article 18 of the Charter. This resolution was passed in spite of the opposition from the Communist bloc and some non-aligned nations. This new criteria was a delaying tactics, as the United States could no longer muster enough votes for postponement or non-consideration of this question.

From 1963, after the deterioration in relations between China and the Soviet Union, the main resolution calling for a change in representation was sponsored by Albania and not the Soviet Union. The whole of the Communist bloc, however, continued to support it, though without apparent enthusiasm. "The pattern of voting in the United Nations on this question, however, gradually changed as more and more [new] nations were admitted to the United Nations and they were found to be very much in favour of admission of Beijing to the United Nations"⁵⁹.

Before 1970, the best vote which Beijing Government obtained was in 1965. The effect of the Cultural Revolution

58 Evan Luard, "China and the United Nations", International Affairs (London), 47(4): October 1971, p. 735.

59 R.S. Chavan, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Chou En-lai Era (New Delhi, 1979), p. 204.

and of pressures by the Nationalist Chinese on African countries, however, brought the decline in votes during the following three years. But "in 1970 saw the most spectacular change in voting since the issue first came up, with a net turnover of ten votes (from a majority of eight against Beijing to two in favour) on the main question".⁶⁰

The United States realized that its anti-China policy had not really paid off as Communist China, instead of being isolated, was acquiring more friends. Even some NATO members had extended diplomatic recognition to Beijing. Thus, the United States Administration was fully convinced that in spite of its opposition, People's China was bound to be admitted to the United Nations by 1971. Therefore they felt the need to modify their policy towards China to safeguard their national interest. People's China also started rethinking since the visit of President Nixon in Asia in 1969, when he had made a declaration of the American intention to withdraw military forces from Asia. Also, because of the Sino-Soviet rift, China felt threatened by Soviets and felt the need for establishing contacts with United States to counter this threat. Gradually, Sino-United States rapprochement developed which hastened People's China's entry into the United Nations. "In 1971, the General Assembly reversed its earlier position when by a roll-call vote of 55 in favour to 59 against with 15 abstentions rejected the draft resolution which stated that the question

60 Luard, n. 58, p. 733.

was 'an important' matter".⁶¹ This decision of the General Assembly facilitated the adoption of the historic resolution which brought to an end one of the most controversial problems of the United Nations -- Chinese representation in favour of People's Republic of China's Government in Beijing. People's China joined the United Nations in November 1971 itself and the Nationalist Government in Taipei was excluded simultaneously.

4. THE HOPES AND FEARS OF PEOPLE'S CHINA'S ENTRY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Until People's China entered the United Nations towards the end of 1971, widely divergent opinions were expressed about the likely repercussions of China's entry. These opinions serve the useful purpose of contrasting them with China's actual policy towards, and behaviour in, the United Nations, and of throwing useful light on China's long term aims.

On the one hand, there were warnings of disruptive and disastrous consequences from People's China's (PRC's) participations in the United Nations. "To seat such aggressors [as Communist China] in the United Nations", declared a US Congressional Joint consensus resolution "would mean moral bankruptcy for the United Nations and destroy every last vestige of its effectiveness as a force for world peace and security".⁶² Some opponents of the PRC also argued that

61 M.K. Nawaz, "Chinese Representation in the United Nations", Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), July 1971, p. 460.

62 Cited in Kim, n. 51, p. 105.

Beijing's hostility toward the United Nations was a manifestation of the fact that the United Nations and the PRC are two incompatible systems, that is, the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations contradict those of the foreign policy of the PRC. According to these critics, it followed that the PRC, if allowed entry into the United Nations, would either destroy the United Nations or endanger its own identity. Some of them specifically pointed out that the problem it might create in the UN Secretariat; they feared that it might demand the expulsion of the officials nominated by the Republic of China (Formosa) and replace them with inexperienced, highly politicized, nominees.

On the other hand, there were romantic revolutionaries who expected People's China to bring about revolutionary changes once it gained its "rightful" seat in the United Nations. "China would certainly seek to promote revolutionary policies in the United Nations. It would use every opportunity to denounce the United States and the Soviet Union. It would seek to make itself the leader of the battle against colonialism and perhaps of a revolutionary bloc, including Cuba, Algeria, Tanzania and other states".⁶³ They were of the opinion that China's presence in the United Nations was bound to change the manner of its functioning, if not its character. They hoped that China would be able to equalise the opportunities and initiatives of all the members, irrespective of their size and potentialities. This high expectation was largely due to China's ability "to gain

63 Luard, n. 58, p. 742.

widespread acceptance for its claim to be a far more revolutionary power than the Soviet Union".⁶⁴ This is also due to "Beijing's own demands for a revolutionising of the United Nations".⁶⁵ Even the **ordinarily** sober representative of Zambia at the United Nations stated on 15 November 1971:

It marks the end of the old and **outdated** politics of the past and the **beginning** of a new era of realism and hope.... We cannot escape the plain fact that from this day the United Nations is a new organization which will never be the same again. The balance of power, particularly in the Security Council has been substantially altered, never to be the same again. 66

However, in actual practice, China disappointed both these extreme views. China "assumed the low-profile posture of a diligent apprentice who was preoccupied in learning a new trade, rather than the high-profile posture of a revolutionary challenger attempting to impose her own concept of how the United Nations should be operated".⁶⁷ It adopted a moderate, pragmatic policy after the Cultural Revolution. Its main endeavour was to establish friendly relations with all nations, notwithstanding the different social systems. The composition of China's first delegation to the United Nations, "indicates that the Chinese have not come to the United Nations to destroy or disrupt its proceedings. While the delegates are people who

64 Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (Macmillan, N.Y., 1970), p. 280.

65 Economist (London), vol. 241, no. 6688, 30 October 1971, p. 13.

66 Cited in Peking Review, vol. 14, no. 48, 26 November 1971, pp. 22-23.

67 Kim, n. 51, p. 110.

might properly be described as the implementor, rather than the formulators, of the foreign policy, they are nevertheless among Beijing most senior and experienced diplomats".⁶⁸ Its championship of the cause of decolonization and anti-imperialism did not necessarily disrupt the procedure, nor did it revolutionize the United Nations. So far as the veto question is concerned, it showed great caution. Also, "there is already an anti-colonialist majority both in the Assembly and the Security Council; so, China would not normally have any reason to use its veto on such issue".⁶⁹

In fact, like all other nations, People's China's stated objectives of supporting revolutions all over the world were relegated to the background in order to promote its national interests of befriending all the established governments and to facilitate it to play an active role in the international arena. Surprisingly, it also did not demand the expulsion of the Republic of China's officials from the UN Secretariat. "Far from being disruptive or obsessively revolutionary in their attitude, the Chinese have been no more assertive in the United Nations than their convictions would have foretold; no more biased in their world view than some other major powers; certainly as strict as any other in their adherence to the Charter."⁷⁰

68 Michael B. Yahuda, "China's New Foreign Policy", The World Today (London), January 1972, p. 18.

69 Luard, n. 58, p. 742.

70 The Times (London), 25 October 1972.

However, PRC's membership made a considerable impact on the international system. Its membership made the United Nations "more representative, more realistic and more interesting and more able to deal with global problems".⁷¹ The burning issues that are looming over the world, such as disarmament, international security and peace, especially in Southeast Asia, cannot be solved without the active and constructive role of China. Thus, China's admission is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations. It also enabled the United Nations to bring the PRC within the range of its reins and make it observe all the obligations and pledges which all nations undertake on becoming a member.

China, on the other hand, sought to become a member of the United Nations not only "because it would have enhanced its prestige ... but also because its admission in the United Nations and expulsion of Taiwan would have greatly strengthened its case vis-a-vis Formosa. Beijing's presence at the United Nations Headquarters would also have facilitated the establishment of Chinese contacts with a large number of countries".⁷²

Because of its "toughness of mind and singleness of purpose" in negotiations, China had come to the United Nations on its terms, without compromising its principles. Those who expected an expression of gratitude from China for their support of its admission were shocked to hear its delegate

71 Kim, n. 51, p. 105.

72 Jain, n. 53, p. 184.

state merely that those countries which voted for China's entry made the United Nations more effective and representative, in other words, it benefited the World Organization and (by implication) not China.

China's general policy in the United Nations appeared to be supportive to the cause of the Third World countries and assumed itself the self-appointed leadership role of the developing countries. On the other hand, it continued to denounce on every occasion, the "collusion" of the two Super Powers and took upon itself the task of exposing the two Super Powers of their imperialist and neo-colonialist policies.

Thus, "once settled down in the World Organization, the PRC has proved neither an operational wrecker, as many of her detractors had long feared, nor a structural and procedural reformer, as some romantic revolutionaries once hoped".⁷³ It has revealed its capacity to adapt itself to international environment, proved its capability of being a party to compromise diplomacy. Like all other nations, it generally, promoted its national interest with the careful dressing of its revolutionary ideology.

73 Weng, n. 28, p. 5.

Chapter II

CHINA AND DISARMAMENT

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CHINA AND DISARMAMENT

1. ROLE IN DISARMAMENT EFFORTS

"Arms control" is an attempt to reduce the likelihood, or to moderate, the effects of military conflict by regulating and restricting armaments, so as to maintain a military balance and to reduce the probability of accidental war. Disarmament, on the other hand, is an attempt to accomplish this by depriving nations of some or all of the arms used to fight other nations. "... Real disarmament is a goal of the distant future and may only come as a result of a series of partial and selective confidence-building and tension-reducing arms control measures".¹

There are major turns in China's view and stand on the question of disarmament. It would be appropriate to trace the evolution of its disarmament policy over the following periods: (1) From 1949 to the detonation of China's first nuclear device in October 1964, (2) 1964 to Beijing's entry into the United Nations in late 1971, (3) from 1971 to 1975.

The First Period (1949-64)

"Whenever a nation develops into a major Power, it also develops a sense of insecurity",² because of the general

1 Shao-Chuan Leng, "Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global Policy", in James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, eds, China in the Global Community (New York, 1960), p. 165.

2 K. Subrahmanyam, "China's Security Outlook: Past and Present", China Report, September-December 1974, p. 142.

hostility of the existing Powers. Therefore, during the early years, Mao decided to "lean to one side". Due to this reason, and also the coincidence of the common interest, the People's Republic of China strongly supported Soviet disarmament proposals that pressed for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Probably because of the lack of accurate knowledge of modern weapons and also due to the obsession with the achievement of the army, Mao talked of the atom bomb being "a paper tiger". However, by 1950, at the time of their entrance into the Korean war, "the Chinese seemed to have developed, if anything, an exaggerated opinion of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons".³ During the late 1950s, China seems to have decided to have its own nuclear weapons as it perceived the unreliability and "high cost of security obtained through external alliance"⁴ and perhaps also because it enhances its status as a "Great Power". These ambitions and aspirations of the Chinese partly contributed to the rift in Sino-Soviet relations. This led to differences between them in various international issues, including disarmament.

It was in 1960 that China started to assert an independent line and to openly challenge Moscow over issues of arms control and disarmament. Indication of this development was Beijing's statement made on 1 January 1960 that no disarmament agreement ^{could} bind China without its full

3 Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (London, 1965), p. 50.

4 Subrahmanyam, n. 2, p. 143.

participation. On the other hand, it refused to attend such talks unless it was admitted to the United Nations.

One major disagreement between Beijing and Moscow was over the question of general and complete disarmament which Moscow had propagated since September 1959. China strongly disapproved it, as it saw the idea as a stumbling block for its military modernization and undermined its superiority in conventional warfare. It argued that there should be no illusion about achieving peace and disarmament without elimination of imperialism, and supporting wars of national liberation. It also contended that disarmament should concentrate on nuclear disarmament, rather than general and complete disarmament.

China must have taken this position to focus attention on nuclear weapons. But the crux of the matter is that "China was unwilling to accept any conventional force limitations that would neutralize its manpower advantage vis-a-vis the technological-military superiority of the Super Powers".⁵

Another major dispute between the two was regarding the Partial Test Ban Treaty. China's harsh criticism of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 revealed clearly the Chinese opposition to freeze the military status quo as they were "revolutionary regimes". Moreover, its opposition to curb nuclear testing at the time was hardly surprising, as the Chinese were on the threshold of becoming a nuclear-weapons Power. They also argued that the treaty would create a false sense of security and it was merely an expression of the

5 Ling, n. 1, p. 166.

"dangerous" detente developing between the two Super Powers to enable them to dominate the world.

In the effort to counteract the effect of their refusal to sign the Test Ban Treaty, which made China unpopular, the Chinese began to make explicit their own approach to the problem of arms control and disarmament and the conditions under which they were willing to sign the agreements. China proposed on 31 July 1963, that a world summit conference be convened to discuss the question of complete nuclear disarmament and the four concrete measures the Chinese had outlined as "first steps". The four concrete measures listed in the proposal were:

- (1) dismantling all military bases and nuclear weapons on foreign soil,
- (2) establishing nuclear free zones for Asia and the Pacific region, Central Europe, Africa and Latin America,
- (3) the non-export and non-import of nuclear weapons and the technical data for their manufacture and
- (4) agreeing to "cease all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear tests".

This, July 1963 statement, remained the official Chinese disarmament programme throughout the rest of the pre-detonation period. One gets the impression that the Chinese were not at all in favour of any kind of arms control or disarmament at this stage, as they were all-out to achieve the status of a nuclear-weapons Power and to deal with the Super Powers on an equal footing. Its disarmament programme was not at all serious or feasible.

The Second Period (1964-1971)

The detonation of a nuclear device by People's China on 19 October 1964 made it clear that China gave a very high

priority to becoming a militarily effective nuclear weapons Power. The Chinese desire for nuclear weapons springs fundamentally from the aspiration to make China/^agreat Power and to pressurize the rest of the world to admit China to the United Nations. Above all, "one of the obvious reasons for the Communist Party of China's decision to acquire nuclear weapons was a desire to enhance the Chinese security against external attack ... and to compensate for the uncertain and unreliable nature of Soviet support and protection".⁶

So after the first explosion, the late Premier Zhou En-lai called for a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss nuclear disarmament. His statement declared:

The Chinese Government has consistently advocated complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Should this have been realised, China need not have developed nuclear weapons. But this position of ours has met with stubborn resistance of the U.S. imperialism. The Chinese Government hereby formally proposes to the governments of the world that a summit conference of all countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. ⁷

The argument was that the Chinese went for nuclear programme as a consequence of refusal of the others to set an example of nuclear disarmament. "Departing from its 1963 stand,

6 H.C. Hinton, Communist China's External Policy and Behaviour as a Nuclear Power (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 49.

7 Cited in K.N. Ramachandran, "China and Non-Proliferation Issue", Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal (New Delhi), 13(1), July-September 1980, p. 97.

Chinese now endorse wholeheartedly an agreement among the nuclear Powers never to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstance".⁸

In the statement on arms control of 22 November 1964, the Chinese de-emphasized their earlier proposal for a complete ban on nuclear tests, since such an arrangement would only be to the disadvantage of states which ~~were~~^{were} aspiring to achieve nuclear weapon Power status like China. The statement also modified China's previous support for nuclear-weapons-free zones. Unless such zones were supported by a workable "no first use" agreement, China now maintained, the result would only "bind the hand and foot" of the non-nuclear countries, while "leaving the nuclear Powers to continue production, stock-piling and even the use of nuclear weapons".⁹

The no-first-use pledge has, since 1964, been a recurrent theme in China's policy on arms control and disarmament. The Chinese apparently hoped that advocating this pledge and stressing the defensive nature of its own nuclear development, the adverse effects of its nuclear testing, would be reduced and that it would also help to minimize the risks of a preventative attacks from the Super Powers.

Beyond the frequent declaration of "no first use", China's interest in arms control measures was lacking during

8 Oran R. Young, "Chinese View on the Spread of Nuclear Weapon", China Quarterly, no. 26, April-June 1966, p. 154.

9 Cited in Leng, n. 1, p. 167.

the years 1966-69. "Instead, sophisticated Chinese declaration ... elaborated on the right of all nations to develop nuclear weapons" were made. They claimed that "the more socialist and peace-loving countries that have nuclear weapons, the better will be the chance to achieve nuclear disarmament and the greater will be the security of the world".¹⁰ This argument is indistinguishable from the justification used for China's expanding nuclear capability.

When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in July 1968, the Chinese branded the treaty as a "high conspiracy and swindle" by the United States and the Soviet Union "in their attempt to consolidate nuclear monopoly, turn the non-nuclear countries into 'protectorates' and press forward with a new type of colonialism, 'nuclear colonialism'".¹¹ According to them, the treaty had totally deprived the non-nuclear states of "their right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defence and are even restricted in their use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes".¹²

This appearance of favouring nuclear proliferation might have gained China some political advantage, but the policy continued to be ambiguous, since advocating the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional countries would have negative consequences to China's own security. For this

10 Ibid., p. 168.

11 Cited in Ramachandran, n. 7, p. 97.

12 Cited in Leng, n. 1, p. 168.

reason, the Chinese had shown no willingness to actually transfer to other nations nuclear weapons or the technology necessary for it. This is clear in Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement made in 1965 where he emphasized that Afro-Asian countries would have to make the bombs themselves and it would be unrealistic for them to ask China for help.¹³

During the period 1964-71, China often accused the United States and the Soviet Union of "collusion" in their arms control "plots". On 22 October 1964, U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, suggested at a news conference that China meet other nuclear weapons Powers in order to discuss the prohibition of all nuclear tests, measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other questions of disarmament. In response to the suggestion, the People's Daily asserted in its 22 November editorial that China would not participate in the Eighteen Nation General Conference on Disarmament because "the conference was convened within the framework of the United Nations of which its legal rights as the sole and legal representative of China has not yet been restored".¹⁴ It also rejected a non-nuclear Powers meeting proposed by the United Nations in 1968.

The Third Period (1971-75)

China's representative in the United Nations towards the end of 1971 provided the Chinese with a new forum to voice

13 Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 41, 8 October 1965, pp. 8-9.

14 Cited in Hung-hag Chiu, "Communist China's Attitude towards Nuclear Tests", China Quarterly (London), January-March 1965, p. 106.

its views on international issue. However, its membership hardly changed its disarmament policy. "That China has shown the highest sensitivity to, and most active concern about arms control and disarmament issues is hardly surprising, given their direct linkage to vital national security interests",¹⁵ and prestige as a Great Power. However, two major factors have greatly complicated its position in the UN General Assembly on the question of disarmament conference: the propaganda-inspired proposals of the Soviet Union and uncertainty about the nature and scope of such a conference.

Presumably because of the imminent entry of China into the United Nations, the Soviet Union seized the initiative in mid 1971 by calling for a disarmament conference of five nuclear weapons Powers. China refused to participate in such a conference: "At no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear Powers behind the back of the non-nuclear countries".¹⁶

On 24 November 1971, only nine days after Beijing took its seat in the United Nations, Chinese representative Chiao Kuan-hua spoke before the United Nations General Assembly on the question of disarmament. In the speech, he reiterated China's support for total nuclear disarmament and opposition to the Super Powers' efforts at limited arms control. The Chinese stand on the question of disarmament was that the nuclear weapon countries, especially the two Super Powers,

15 Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, 1979), p. 170.

16 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 170.

should make "no-first use" pledge and secondly, in order to establish nuclear-free zones" it is necessary, first of all, for all the nuclear countries to guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons against these countries and zones and will withdraw all their weapons, forces and dismantle all nuclear bases and nuclear installations from these zones".¹⁷ With slight modification here and there, this policy remained consistent throughout the various United Nations debates on disarmament during the period.

By following such an unrealistic policy, China shut itself out from any United Nations negotiations on disarmament. Very often, China found itself voting against disarmament resolutions favoured by the majority of the Third World with whom China had been making a conscious effort to associate itself. Under pressure from the Third World in the twenty seventh session of the General Assembly (1972), China voted for the establishment of the thirty-five member special committee on the world disarmament conference, but it refused to participate in the committee when China was appointed as a member by the General Assembly's president.

However, on the issue of "nuclear weapons-free zone", Beijing's record has been positive and most consistent among the nuclear weapons Powers. "It has voted for the United Nations resolutions for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, the Middle-East, South Asia and South Pacific".¹⁸ China has

17 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 169.

18 Leng, n. 1, p. 170.

also signed and ratified the additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which called for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. "This is the first post-1945 arms control convention that the Chinese have signed and thus constitutes the important step toward their co-operation with other nations in establishing significant, even though partial, control on nuclear weapons"¹⁹.

China has however refused to sign the Outer Space Treaty, the Sea-Bed Treaty and the conventions banning biological warfare. The Chinese have no disagreement with the basic ideas of these treaties; its refusal to join them is essentially due to their sponsorship by the Super Powers. Their stand on the issue of chemical and biological warfare revealed the point clearly. China had supported the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical and biological weapons and ratified in 1962 of the 1925, the Geneva Protocol. Yet, China "opposed the USA-USSR sponsored conventions on biological warfare as a tool of the two Super Powers for peddling their disarmament fraud"²⁰.

Regarding SALT-I, China viewed it with scepticism and the Chinese Press argued vehemently that no real disarmament would result from the SALT negotiation.

"Every [Chinese] explanation leads to the conclusion that the Chinese assume that there is no real chance of their

19 Ralph N. Clough, The United States, China and Arms Control (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 63.

20 Cited in Kim, n. 15, p. 172.

proposals for nuclear disarmament being accepted".²¹ In fact, China is not at all interested in arms control or disarmament, for they appear to be against the stabilising effect of disarmament on the existing balance of power among nations. They are determined to break the nuclear monopoly of the Super Powers. Moreover, "Chinese lack any direct incentive of military security to favour disarmament".²² Therefore, in the near future, China will refrain from endorsing any major arms control and disarmament agreement.

2. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE

The basic approach of China was for "breaking the 'monopoly of the nuclear weapons' and/^{the}'co-domination' of the world by the Super Powers" and for this purpose, "to have as many nuclear countries in the world as possible, so that the nuclear deterrence maintained by the Super Powers in the world could be discredited".²³ This stand made many countries to think of China as adventurist, as it was one of the very few countries in the world which openly advocated nuclear proliferation. This also gave the impression that China lacks proper understanding of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons.

The 15 August 1963 statement was more specific on the issue of non-proliferation. The statement said: "Whether or

21 Young, n. 8, p. 156.

22 Ibid., p. 155.

23 Leo Yueh Liu, "China as a Nuclear Power", in World Politics (London, 1972), p. 30.

not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace, if they are in the hands of the imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the hands of the socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increases along with increase in number of nuclear powers²⁴". Occasionally, during this period, China argued in favour of nuclear proliferation without making any distinction between socialist and non-socialist states, and stated that the spread of nuclear weapons to as many countries as possible would definitely increase the prospects for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

But "development in the months immediately following the 1964 detonation seem to support the view that the strongly pro-proliferation of the Chinese in the earlier period was, above all, a tactical stand in the Chinese push for their own nuclear capability"²⁵.

Although Chinese spokesmen have continued to attack the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent other nations from conducting nuclear tests, it has done nothing to help other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. There are reports of China once turning down a request for assistance from the United Arab Republic for such aid. Addressing press conference on 29 September 1965, the late Marshal Chen Yi observed:

24 Cited in Ramachandran, n. 7, p. 96.

25 Young, n. 8, p. 150.

Any country with a fair basis in industry and agriculture, in science and technology, will be able to manufacture atom bombs with or without Chinese assistance. China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs themselves and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs. 26

This statement with minor variations, has been repeated numerous times since 1965. There has been no suggestion that China's nuclear weapons represent anything more than an inspiration in general (that is, no explicit commitment from China to assist in nuclear proliferation.) "... There is evidence suggesting that China is aware that nuclear proliferation is not, in fact, in Chinese interest.... And in fact, Beijing's arms control positions now tend to be consistent with the goal of non-proliferation".²⁷ China's strong and consistent advocacy of no-first-use pledges might be taken as an anti-proliferation policy aimed to persuade other nations of the limited utility of nuclear weapons and counter the fear of Chinese attack. The consistent advocacy of nuclear free zones in various parts of the world can also be taken as "regional non-proliferation" schemes. However, "appearing to favour nuclear proliferation [had] gain[ed] China political advantage",²⁸ for it helped China to woo certain Third World countries to their side and it also served as a

26 Cited in Ramachandran, n. 7, p. 97. But we know now (1983) that China did secretly assist Pakistan to develop at least nuclear explosions, if not nuclear weapon.

27 Clough, n. 19, p. 156.

28 Young, n. 8, p. 150.

clever argument to justify their nuclear weapons programme.

At the time of the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in May 1975 at Geneva, Beijing did not take the kind of militant posture it took in 1968. A commentary on the review conference merely criticized the US and USSR for their arms race and said nothing significant on the treaty as such.

In the near future, there is no prospect of China formally adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is doubtful whether China would even be willing to take a public position of opposition to further proliferation, for this "would place China in the category of 'nuclear overlord' along with the United States and Soviet Union".²⁹

3. NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES

The concept of Nuclear Free Zones has been part of Beijing's nuclear disarmament proposals. Whatever be the intention of the Chinese, they have been the only Power which has consistently advocated and supported the issue of Nuclear Free Zones in various parts of the world. "China is on record as favouring the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones or peace zones in Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Middle-East, Central Europe and Africa".³⁰

29 Jonathan D. Pollock, "Chinese Attitude towards Nuclear Weapons 1964-69", China Quarterly (London), April-June 1972, p. 256.

30 Leng, n. 1, p. 64.

In the beginning, Chinese officials suggested establishing Nuclear Free Zones for all regions of the world, as one of the steps towards complete nuclear disarmament. Later on, China restricted it to ^{the} Asia-Pacific region, so that it would apply to the United States and the USSR as well as China. In August 1960, Zhou En-lai even talked about a non-aggression pact involving China and the United States in order to make the whole area a nuclear-weapon free area. "These particular proposals were never amplified and seemed designed largely for their propaganda effect, but they probably reflected a serious Chinese interest in the Nuclear Free Zones idea".³¹

During December 1963-64, when Zhou visited Africa, he lent support to the concept of Africa as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. China also supported de-nuclearization of the Indian Ocean, as these gestures earned the goodwill of the Third World countries. After China's first nuclear-detonation, Beijing maintained that "no-first-use" pledge must precede, or at least accompany, any effort to establish Nuclear Free Zones. This position was repeated in Chinese disarmament statements in 1971 and thereafter. "This policy is based on the argument that even the removal of weapons and dismantling of bases in a region would not preclude the use of nuclear weapons against it from external launching points or through rapid redeployment of weapons".³² Because of this, China repeatedly insisted that

31 Clough, n. 19, p. 64.

32 Ibid., p. 65.

the nuclear Powers must take a pledge that they will not use nuclear weapons against the Nuclear Free Zones in order to make Nuclear Free Zones agreement meaningful. Otherwise, the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones would be impossible, and even if they be set up in name, all it meant is that "the non-nuclear countries would be deprived of their legitimate right to develop nuclear weapons to resist the nuclear menace and be bound hand and foot, while the nuclear Powers would in no way be effected in their continued production"³³.

China has given a high priority to discussions of Nuclear Free Zones and positive and unequivocal support for the establishment of such zones. Speaking at the General Assembly First Committee, in support of the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, in November 1974, Chinese delegate, Lin Fang, said: "To realise the desire to make Middle-East a nuclear weapon free-zones, it is imperative to oppose firmly super power hegemonism and the Zionist policies of aggression and war"³⁴. Again, explaining China's vote for the draft resolution regarding the question of South Asia being made a Nuclear Free Zone, Lin Fang said on 20 November 1974:

We hold that the Pakistani proposal for the establishment of a nuclear free-zones in South Asia is just and reasonable.... If the desire for the establishment of a nuclear free-zone in South Asia is to be realised, it is imperative to guard against and oppose Super Power hegemonism and intervention and the expansionist acts of any country. ³⁵

33 Cited in Halperin and Perkins, n. 3, p. 102.

34 Cited in Ramachandran, n. 7, p. 101.

35 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 102.

In spite of China's strong opposition, its "support for the de-nuclearization of Latin America, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Africa and South Asia constitutes an important step in the direction of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons". This in fact amounted to "regional non-proliferation".³⁶

Whatever might be the intention of China, it has distinguished itself as the only nuclear weapons Power advocating and supporting all the resolutions on the proposed establishment of Nuclear Free Zones.

4. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that started in late 1969 between the United States and the Soviet Union have been consistently denounced by Beijing. According to it, since both the United States and the Soviet Union are in conflict, the contradiction between them was an irreconcilable one. "Any compromise or collusion could only be partial, so that in the final analysis, the SALT was 'empty talk, for in fact there is no balance, nor can there be limitation'."³⁷

It appears that People's China had benefitted from the 1972 agreement of SALT-I especially in regard to restriction of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). However, the SALT-I agreement did not improve in any substantial way the Chinese strategic position vis-a-vis either of the two

36 Kim, n. 15, p. 172.

37 E.V. Robert, "China and Nuclear Arms Limitation Agreement", Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, July-September 1980, p. 111.

Super Powers. Therefore, "they have denounced SALT agreements as collusion between the Super Powers, referred to them as sham agreement that simply codify the nuclear arms race, accused the United States and the Soviet Union of building up their armaments, while insisting that other nations to forego nuclear weapons and reiterated their call for a world disarmament conference, for no-first-use pledges and other steps toward total disarmament".³⁸

China is greatly concerned about the possibility of United States-Soviet "collusion" and global hegemony. This fear was stressed in Zhou En-lai's statement in July 1972, when commenting on the United States-Soviet SALT-I agreements signed earlier. In order to contend for world hegemony, he said, the Super Powers are "engaged in an arms race, not only in nuclear armaments but also in conventional armaments, each trying to gain superiority". He continued:

The agreements they reached not long ago on the so-called limitation of strategic nuclear weapons were by no means 'a step' toward curbing the arms race as they boasted, but marked the beginning of a new stage of their arms race. The fact is that the ink on the agreements was hardly dry before one announced an increase of billions of dollars for military expenditure and the other hastened to test new type weapons, clamouring for nuclear superiority. 39

As in respect of all other disarmament talks, China will continue to find faults in the United States and Soviet Union's effort to limit strategic arms, for it goes against China's ambition to strengthen itself as a nuclear-weapons Power.

38 Clough, n. 19, p. 52.

39 Leng, n. 1, p. 177.

Chapter III

INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS

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1. SOUTH AFRICAN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES

The issue of national liberation movements became one of the primary concerns of the international Communist movement as it was linked with the eventual destruction of imperialism. Because of this crucial link, proletarian internationalism dictated that "all Communist countries should render direct aid to the revolutionary movements among the dependent and unequal nations and in the colonies".¹

People's China itself was established through protracted struggle against "imperialism" from outside and the "bourgeoisie" from within. The Chinese repeatedly point out the similarity of their experience with the Third World liberation movements and exhort them to follow their model. When the Sino-Soviet rift developed in the 1960s, it complicated the struggles for national liberation. Although both agreed upon the need for eliminating colonialism, they differed in the means of achieving this end. "The basic dispute between the Soviet and Chinese concepts of Communist strategy concerns the relation between coexistence diplomacy and revolutionary pressure in the present world situation".²

1 Cited in Harmala Kaur, "China's Foreign Policy in Africa : A Case Study of Angola" (Unpublished JNU M. Phil. dissertation, 1977), p. 7.

2 Richard Lacwenthal, "China", in Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Africa and the Communist World (Berkeley, Calif., 1963), p. 169.

By 1965, Southern Africa was the only area in Africa which was yet to achieve independence. "South Africa and Rhodesia were both perhaps technically independent but were also colonies in the sense that their governments were remnants of former colonial regimes and controlled by White supremacist minorities"³. As the colonialists were adamant in their refusal to agree to African self-determination, national liberation movements developed in various parts of Southern Africa.

From the standpoint of the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary objectives, Africa appeared to be the most promising region in the world. A secret working document of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, dating from April 1961, states that Africa had become "the centre of the anti-colonist struggle and the centre for East and West to fight for the control of an intermediate zone, so that it has become the key point of world interest"⁴. The Bandung Conference of 1955 opened the first African door to the People's China and the Chinese leaders stepped in quickly. Beijing claimed that

both China and Africa shared a history of exploitation by the same imperialist Powers and both had suffered the degrading insult of being regarded as inferior races by the same White people. Since China had freed herself from exploitation through revolution and had emerged as modern socialist state, it was therefore, in a unique position to understand

3 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (London, 1970), p. 142.

4 Cited in William E. Ratliff, "People's Republic of China", in Thomas H. Henriksen, ed., Communist Power and Sub-Saharan Africa (Stanford, Calif., 1981), p. 91.

the feelings and problems of Africans and lead them towards solution and victory over their enemies. 5

Although both China and the liberation movements agree that African revolution must be waged by African revolutionaries, involving, if possible, African revolutionary prescriptions, they both also agree that China's experience is of great value in the present independence struggles.

From the very beginning, People's China had emphasized the need of "armed struggle" to gain independence. China charged the Soviet Union with abandoning the Third World for radical and other reasons and claimed itself as its strongest champion. The Chinese also felt the necessity of instructing the African people in the details of the Chinese revolution "in order to reveal the true nature of both new and old colonialism".⁶

However, one should avoid the temptation to divide the liberation movements into neat "pro-Chinese" and "pro-Soviet" camps "because it ignores the genuinely nationalist aspirations of every liberation movement... [and also] because China has made it her business to cultivate all movements and alienate none".⁷

The Chinese revolutionary policy was generally more active and its support for liberation movements in Southern

5 Cited in Ian Greg, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (London, 1977), p. 63.

6 Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-70 (Los Angeles, 1971), p. 168.

7 Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution (London, 1975), p. 237.

Africa was always forthcoming. Considerable quantities of Chinese arms and other military supplies have reached some "liberation movements" over the last sixteen years or so. China has played a significant part in the training of guerrillas. However, the available evidence seems to indicate that, despite some dramatic reports (probably caused by the sheer novelty of the involvement of China in an area so far outside its own boundaries such as Africa) the actual volume of supplies despatched to the "liberation movements" in general was never equal to that supplied by the Soviet bloc. The vision of China being more active than any other supporters of liberation movement might be the result of success of its propaganda. However, one notices "a wide gap between declaratory and operational policies ... the result on the one hand of idealistic revolutionary aims and on the other of tactical caution"⁸. The latter is dictated by the limited resources available, for China is still a developing country. Apart from the question of geographical distance, the new Beijing regime was not yet strong enough to adopt any detrimental policy towards Africa. However "China explained this discrepancy on various levels.... Just as in economic development and in international relations, China has always stressed the value to developing countries of self-reliance, so has this virtue also been impressed on liberation movements"⁹.

8 Alan Ogunsanwa, China's Policy in Africa 1958-71 (New York, 1974), p. 4.

9 Hutchison, n. 7, p. 230.

In spite of these drawbacks, China was always at the forefront in support of national liberation movements and against the policy of apartheid in Southern Africa. According to the Chinese, apartheid was inherited in South Africa as it was rooted in the colonial system. It was of opinion that, "The only solution was for the people of Azania [South Africa] to use revolutionary tactics to overthrow the racists"¹⁰. They consider that the South African racists were able to maintain their Fascist rule mainly because they had the support of the imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist Powers. They were of the opinion that the racist and colonial regimes in Southern Africa would never abandon the struggle of their own accord. Therefore, Beijing consistently and explicitly endorsed armed struggle and developed contacts with all the major revolutionary organizations, many of which had sent delegations to Beijing. Soon after gaining its representation in the United Nations, the Chinese delegate, Fu Hao, said: "China supported Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea (Bissau) in their liberation struggle and the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia in their struggle against colonial domination and racial discrimination"¹¹. At the same time, they pointed out that as the unfavourable situations to the colonial authorities developed, in addition to the continued use of violent repression, they resorted to all kinds of tricks and schemes such as the setting up of puppet

10 GAOR, 30th session, Special Political Committee, 960th meeting (20 October 1975), p. 52.

11 Ibid., 26th session, Third Committee, 1881st meeting (23 November 1971), para 35.

authorities, splitting the liberation movements and promising what they called "autonomy".

A key strategy of China has been to afford maximum support for the annual Assembly resolutions directed against colonialism and apartheid. These resolutions have included condemnations of Portuguese policies (until independence) in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, of the White minority government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), of the illegal occupation of Namibia (South West Africa) by the Republic of South Africa and the latter's racial apartheid policies and of continued colonial rule in the remaining non-self-governing territories. Since early 1972 when the People's Republic of China joined the Soviet Union on the Special Committee on Decolonialization, anti-colonial competition has been the rule. During debates, Beijing frequently reminded the Third World that China, unlike Russia, was a long-time victim, rather than a perpetrator of imperialism. By adopting Mao's prescription of a war of national liberation, foreign domination of China was ended. Although China considered "armed struggle" fundamental, it avoided universalizing its own experience and did not exclude negotiations in the process of liberation.

In one memorable speech at the Twenty-seven session (1972) of the General Assembly, Li Chiang, Chairman of the People's China's delegation launched a bitter anti-Soviet charge, accusing the Soviet Union of "energetically pushing neo-colonialism in the Third World under the cloak of a 'natural ally' of the developing countries.... This Super Power in the guise of a friend is more greedy, insidious and unscrupulous than old-line imperialism.... No sooner than one imperialism

been compelled to withdraw than the other imperialism under the banner of 'socialism' seizes the opportunity to squeeze its way. In the current struggle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, the developing countries must especially guard against the danger of 'letting the tiger in through the back door'.¹²

China rejected the offer of "dialogue" by South Africa and said it was "a sheer lie, a tactic to reinstate the old colonial policy of 'divide and rule' and to end the isolation in which South Africa had now found itself. That policy was aimed at undermining the unity and struggle of the peoples and the countries of Southern Africa against colonialism and racism".¹³ The proposal made by the UN Secretary-General's representative to continue with "dialogue" in 1972 was rejected by China as unacceptable on the ground that there was no tangible evidence of any effect on South Africa's policy.

On the question of Namibia, China's stand was that the South African illegal rule in Namibia should be ended and that the United Nations should administer the territory. Strongly opposing the South African policy of "Bantustans", China called for the preservation of "Namibia's unity and territorial integrity and that the Namibian people should be given political and basic human rights".¹⁴

12 Cited in William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations", Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), vol. 17, no. 9, (September 1977), p. 822.

13 GAOR, 27th session, Special Political Committee, 1819th meeting (20 October 1972), p. 80.

14 Ibid., 27th session, Fourth Committee, 2018th meeting (11 December 1972), p. 332.

The question of Southern Rhodesia was in essence the Zimbabwe people's struggle against foreign colonialist rule and for national independence. Unilateral declaration of Southern Rhodesian Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 was regarded by China as just an eye wash as the White minority regime headed by Ian Smith formed the government against the wishes of majority of African people. China's representative said:

The domination of the regime of Ian Smith is the direct result of the colonial domination of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the colonial domination of the United Kingdom in the past and the racist regime of the Ian Smith at the present are both illegal. 15

Beijing also consistently endorsed armed struggle in each of the three Portuguese territories of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau and had apparently developed contacts with all the major revolutionary organizations. In fact, Beijing's representative stated:

China consistently supports the liberation struggles of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples and consider this to be her bounden internationalist duty. In Africa, we firmly support the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Azania and other regions in their struggle against colonialism and racism. 16

China expressed regret that most of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on Southern African questions had not been implemented owing to obstructions and sabotage

15 SCOR, 16th year, 1623rd meeting (30 December 1971), p. 23.

16 UN Doc. A/PV. 2252, 2 October 1974, p. 46.

by imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. China also expressed the need for strengthening and broadening the sanctions and called for severe condemnation of those nations which violated sanctions.

China vigorously criticized both the Super Powers, especially the Soviet Union, accusing them of attempting to replace old colonialism and contending for world hegemonism. Its representative charged that

the two Super Powers are resorting to every possible means, including the hard and soft tactics of threat and blandishments to beguile, suppress, infiltrate into and disintegrate the national liberation movements. Over a long period, one Super Power [the US] has employed all means, including the use of veto in the Security Council, to support the colonialist rule and racist regimes in Southern Africa ... the other Super Power [the USSR] flaunting the banner of anti-colonialism is engaged in sabotage activities against the national liberation movements. It interferes in the internal affairs of the liberation movements, incites dissension and disrupts unity. It consistently spreads fallacious allegations to benumb the fighting will of the peoples and facilitate the pursuance of its hegemonic policies. 17

It also warned the liberation movements that Super Powers' hegemonic rule would be more cunning and dangerous than the old-line colonialism and imperialism. "Therefore, only by linking the struggle against racism with that against Super Power interference, subversive and divisive activities, can African unity be preserved, the continued victorious advance of the struggle for national liberation be promoted and the complete liberation of the whole continent of Africa be achieved".

17 UN Doc. A/PV. 2317, 13 December 1974, p. 30.

18 Cited in Beijing Review, vol, 19, no. 7 (13 February 1976), p.30.

China was of the opinion that the mass liberation movements and armed struggle developed in the non-independent region of Southern Africa was a great historical trend and it was the duty of every progressive nation to render political and material support, so that they might achieve complete national independence, free from any outside interference.

While rejecting the credentials of South Africa's delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1971, Chinese delegate, Chen Chu, said that South Africa's "white colonialist ruling authorities" were a racist regime imposed on the South African people. The regime had no right to represent the people and the Chinese delegation agreed that its "so-called representatives" should be disqualified by the Assembly.¹⁹ Henceforth, China repeatedly voted for the rejection of South Africa's credentials. China also voted in favour of the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations when the Security Council discussed the question on 24 October 1974. However, that resolution was vetoed by the United States and others.

Thus, it is clear that China tried to identify itself with the Third World, especially the colonial countries and championed their causes in every international forum with the definite aim of rallying them behind its leadership to fight against the two Super Powers. It is probable that China has gained the reputation as the foremost champion of anti-colonialism.

¹⁹ African Diary (New Delhi), vol. 11 (15-28 January 1972), p. 3025.

2. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Since People's China was preoccupied with the consolidation of power and got involved in the Korean war and other pressing problems, for many years, it could not pay much attention to the happenings in other parts of the world. Moreover, "since the Middle-East [West Asia] is quite distant from China's borders and since it does not represent powerful forces in Asia and world politics, the area is not of strategic relevance to China's immediate security.... It follows that the Middle-East occupied a secondary place in China's foreign policy goals",²⁰ in the early 1950s.

Beijing's interest in West Asia became apparent during the Bandung Conference in 1955. Its interest in the Arab world increased during the Suez crisis in 1956 and has continued to grow steadily since then. China aimed to achieve certain basic objectives of its foreign policy by its relations with the Arab states. One of the foremost objectives was to acquire "international recognition of Communist China as the sole legitimate Government of China.... The acceptance and support of Communist China by the Arabs is regarded as a major prize".²¹ Secondly, the People's Republic of China (PRC) assigned to West Asia a preferred position as it saw it an important revolutionary front against the West. It considered it as "vital in surrounding

20 John F. Copper, "China's Objective in the Middle East", China Report (New Delhi), no. 5 (January-February 1969), p. 8.

21 Joseph E. Khalili, "Sino-Arab Relations", Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 8 (August 1968), p. 678.

and strangling' the 'capitalist cities' of the world"²². Thirdly, China also needed Arab's support in its battle against the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet rift broke out. Finally, China aimed to secure "Arab support in order to strengthen Communist China's position among the Afro-Asian nations and Arab endorsement of Beijing's leadership in the fight against imperialism, neo-colonialism and colonialism"²³.

Development of Sino-Arab Relationship

The Bandung Conference in 1955 opened a new phase in China's diplomatic thrust in the Arab world. When the PRC was established in 1949, there was only one Arab nation which had extended its recognition; this was Israel which Chinese regarded as "nation forged by the United States and British imperialism"²⁴. Other Arab nations, being under the influence of the United States, recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. PRC's leaders were dismayed by this posture, but it did not alter its basic outlook on West Asia and consequently it did not accept Israel's offer of recognition. This stand clearly shows that "the PRC had realised in early 1950s that to win Arab's friendship and to establish influence in West Asia ... it was necessary to support Arabs in their fight against Israel and the hostile United States"²⁵.

22 Copper, n. 20, p. 13.

23 Khalili, n. 21, p. 9.

24 Copper, n. 20, p. 9.

25 Khalili, n. 21, p. 683.

Once People's China established itself and successfully countered the menace of the United States through Korea, (which had earned great prestige to China in the Third World) China began "courting the underdeveloped nations with the intent of increasing her international influence and countering the United States' containment policy".²⁶ When Chou En-lai went to the Bandung Conference in April 1955, he went out of his way to dispel fears among the participants of China's "aggressive communist designs". He expressed unequivocal sympathy for the "Palestine tragedy". In fact, "Bandung was most rewarding to China's diplomatic thrust in the Arab world",²⁷ for, after the conference, Egypt, Syria and Yemen recognized and established diplomatic relations with China in 1956. During the Suez crisis in 1956, China strongly supported Egypt. A Government statement of 7 November said:

The Chinese Government and people, in response to the appeal of the Egyptian Government, are willing to adopt all effective measures within our ability, including the supply of material aid, to support Egypt's struggle and oppose the British and French aggression. 28

In spite of this non-commitment to specific action, "China's stand with regard to the Suez crisis was fully appreciated by Arabs".²⁹ For the first time, China named Israel as a tool of imperialist aggression.

26 Copper, n. 20, p. 9.

27 Hashim S.H. Benbehani, China's Foreign Policy in Arab World, 1955-75 (London, 1981), p. 4.

28 Cited in Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-77 (London, 1979), p. 50.

29 Ibid., p. 51.

The pace of Chinese activities in West Asia quickened in 1958, after the establishment of the permanent office of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity headquarters in Cairo, from which China could engage in diplomatic relations with other Arab and African states. With the open eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute, China sought to assert its presence and status in various ways. Chou En-lai's tour of Arab-African countries with a high-ranking delegation between December 1963 and January 1964 gave further thrust to China's West Asia policy. During the visit, Chou promised unreserved "support to the people of Palestine in restoring their legitimate rights and in returning to their homeland".³⁰ At this stage, China limited its contacts with the established Arab Governments. In any case, there were no recognised Palestine group with whom they could have relation. However, its relations with Arab governments were not smooth. "Growing economic and military needs, smaller distances and intense courting by the Russians drew the Arab states closer to the Soviet Union than to China".³¹ Furthermore, Arab leaders felt the need to give priority to the consolidation of their power and modernization over the social revolution and they resorted to crushing all those who opposed these aims, specially local communists. Since Sino-Soviet rivalry had erupted, China took upon itself the task of protesting against the persecution of Arab communists which resulted in cooling of

30 Behbehani, n. 27, p. 26.

31 R. Medzini, "China and the Palestinians: A Developing Relationship", New Middle East (London), 32 (May 1971), p. 34.

relations between Arab governments and China. This state of affairs was also due to the pressure of the Soviet Union on the Arab states to take an anti-China posture. Since the Arab states also got aid from the Soviet Union for their modernization (which China could not meet due to its own economic backwardness), they had to go along with the Soviet posture.

This situation "left the Chinese in search of other more radical, revolutionary and nationalist elements who could be induced to co-operate with Peking"³². They found in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which was established in January 1964 by the Arab heads of states in a summit conference, a suitable organization to carry out its design. PLO leaders showed close interest in China and China dealt directly and openly with the PLO. In March 1965, a PLO delegation headed by Ahimed Shuqairy arrived in Beijing and was greeted almost like a visiting head of state. The final communique contained an attack on Zionism and imperialism and assured the "resolute support" of China for the Palestinian cause. The most important development of the visit was Shuqairy's signature of a pact for Chinese diplomatic, economic and military support. "Chinese arms aid was to be channelled through the PLO to other resistance organizations -- an arrangement which apparently remained in effect until 1971"³³. After the visit, a PLO office was opened in Beijing and was recognised by the Chinese

32 Ibid.

33 John Cooley, "China and Palestinians", Journal of Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C.), vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972), p. 25.

Government, as a de facto embassy. In fact, China was the first non-Arab country to recognize the PLO as an independent entity. The PLO was specially attracted by the Chinese doctrine of "people's war". They were impressed by Chinese moral and material support without any strings attached to it, unlike some other nations.

However, their close relation with China did not come in the way of their relations with other nations, specially the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet conflict was viewed by PLO as their own hang-up and they carefully balanced their relations with the Soviet Union and China to further their own interests. In other words, China did not impose an anti-Soviet posture as a pre-condition for their help to the PLO. However, China did criticize the Soviet Union for their policy towards the PLO. They chided the Soviet Union for failure to give early support to the Palestinians. In fact, "China's support of the Palestinians and uncompromising stand against Israel were one of its very few advantages over Soviet Union in the Middle East"³⁴. For China, the Palestinian Question served as a tool with which to heckle the Soviet Union. Conversely, the Soviet Union saw China's relative success with the Palestinians as a threat to Soviet interests in the Arab world. Therefore, the Soviet Union joined the competition to woo the Arabs to its bloc but "the Arabs base their reactions only upon their own best interests which seek to achieve from any nation that is willing to be a friend, without any regard to ideological bloc struggle"³⁵.

34 Shichor, n. 28, p. 139.

35 Khalili, n. 21, p. 681.

In fact, the Arab nations followed a "non-aligned policy" towards Moscow, the United States and China and they considered it as the most profitable and safe policy to take the nations to the path of development. This is one of the major obstacles in the Chinese ambition to acquire the leadership of the Third World in their fight against developed nations, especially the two Super Powers.

However, China soon realized in the spring of 1967 that by courting the Palestinians and encouraging them to fight Israel and some Arab Governments, China only alienated the "friendship of the Arab regimes and they in turn were thus all the more ready to listen to Soviet advice".³⁶

Coincidentally, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which lasted from 5 to 10 June presented China with a unique opportunity to voice strong political support for the Arab cause and re-establish their relationship with Arab nations. The Soviet Union supported a political solution to be brought about by the GA resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 which was opposed tooth and nail by Palestinian Organization and China. They considered it as a "product of a new United States-Soviet deal" and condemned by Chinese leaders at every available opportunity. Soon, it became clear that China was using the Palestinians to discredit further the Soviet Union and establish a foothold among the Palestinians. By late 1968, China's relations with the Arab Governments, although formally restored, still remained lukewarm. On the other hand, the Chinese renewed their support

36 Medzini, n. 31, p. 35.

to the local national movements. China considered that the Palestinians had become "an important revolutionary force in the middle East", being the main obstacle to the realization of the Super Powers' scheme in the region. For this reason, China definitely preferred the Palestinians, notwithstanding its efforts to restore and rehabilitate relations with the Arab Governments. "The consistent Chinese support of the Palestinians between 1969 and 1971 provided a major source of friction in Sino-Arab relations".³⁷

Most of the Arab nations supported the PRC on the issue of ^{its} representation at the United Nations. Thus, PRC achieved one of the major objectives of its foreign policy. The Palestinians were very optimistic of People's China's entry to the United Nations. A spokesman for the PLO which hailed the event said: "It provides the first opportunity for its kind for the Arab cause -- and above all the Palestine cause -- to be represented on Security Council".³⁸ An Arab source commented: "In a way, this is correct. China at the Security Council will be the only Power that opposes the Council's resolution for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East".³⁹

China in the United Nations

However, China was more cautious than its Palestinian friends expected it to be in the World Organization. China

37 Shichor, n. 28, p. 154.

38 Cited in Lillian Crag Harris, "China's Relations with the PLO", Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VII, no. 1 (August, 1977), p. 142.

39 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 142.

often used the United Nations as a platform for political pronouncements, rather than as a vehicle for change. China's stand on the Palestine question at the United Nations, i.e. Palestinian right to self-determination and the liberation of Palestine, remained unchanged. In his first major speech on behalf of China at the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua referred to the Arab-Israeli conflict in a more direct way, putting China's priorities and stand on the matter in perspective:

The essence of the Middle East question is aggression against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples by Israeli Zionism with the support and connivance of the Super Powers. The Chinese government and people resolutely support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against aggression and believe that persevering in struggle and upholding unity the heroic Palestinian and other Arab peoples will surely be able to recover the lost territories of the Arab countries and restore the Palestinian people their national rights. The Chinese Government maintains that all countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice have the obligation to support the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, and no one has the right to engage in political deals behind their backs bartering away their right to existence and their national interests. 40

This was a repetition of China's constant rejection of "imposed", "compromise" and "super-power" solutions backed by the Soviet Union and the United States. China found itself in a complex situation in regard to the Palestine Question, mainly due to Arab states' disunity. Thus, its support has been largely one of "refusing to be party to", rather than of active promotion and initiation of the Palestinian Question. Usually, China abstained from voting on the resolution on various pretexts.

40 Cited in Behbehari, n. 27, p. 99.

When the French delegation sought the support of the four other Permanent Members for talks on the Middle-East, "China refused on the grounds that it opposed Resolution 242 as a basis for discussion".⁴¹ Nonetheless,^{the} Chinese delegates had continuously and vehemently supported the Palestinian and other Arab causes against Israel at various United Nations debates.

When the October 1973 war broke out, China's attitude was one of clear and loud support for Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian Revolutionary movement, because it was the first war initiated by the Arabs on their own without outside interference. "Whereas the 1967 war had confirmed China's disappointment with the Arab Governments and consolidated its orientation towards the Palestinians, the 1973 war only confirmed China's disappointment with the Palestinians and consolidated its orientation towards the Arab Governments".⁴²

Initially, the Chinese opposed the cease-fire resolution 338 of October 1973, because they considered that it was designed and manufactured by the Super Powers, not in order to settle the Middle East conflict, but rather to impose on the Middle East the situation of "no war, no peace" which helped to justify Super Powers' presence and influence. China also opposed GA resolution 339 which aimed to dispatch (and, later on, the extension of the mandate of) the United Nations' Emergency Force. "Such a force, in China's view would be under super-power manipulation and therefore, subservient to their schemes".⁴³

41 Ibid.

42 Shichor, n. 28, p. 184.

43 Ibid., p. 187.

However, China did not use its veto power against these resolutions. They preferred non-participation because of the Arab's appeals. The Chinese explained their position in these words:

Out of respect for the countries concerned, we would give consideration to that draft resolution [of 23 October 1973, on supervising the cease-fire].... if the countries concerned want such a thing, we have no alternative, but the maximum we can do is to refrain from opposing it. 44

And with regard to the resolution to despatch a United Nations Emergency Force, the Chinese said: "It is only out of consideration for the requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression that China feels not in a position to veto it".⁴⁵

China did, however, vote positively on both the 1974 UN General Assembly resolutions relating to the Palestinians, one affirming "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty";⁴⁶ the second resolution was regarding inviting PLO participation in General Assembly session and giving it Observer status at international conferences convened under General Assembly auspices.

A factor that determined China's policy and attitude to the Palestinian question was the Soviet posture. The PLO rejected, for some time, the Chinese theory of relentless

44 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 187.

45 *Ibid.*

46 Cited in Harris, n. 38, p. 143.

and protracted war of liberation. "This is a clear defeat for Chinese efforts and expectations".⁴⁷ Only the extremist elements of the PLO echoed the Chinese tune. The ideological connexion between the Chinese and some of the more extreme section of PLO has been watched keenly and with misgiving by the Soviet Union because "China can still evoke a revolutionary spark in the Middle East, something that Moscow has refrained from doing on purpose".⁴⁸ China was left alone to oppose the Geneva Conference on Arab-Israeli conflict which had been supported by the Soviet Union and which Arafat, the head of PLO, had agreed to attend despite opposition from other extremist groups of the PLO. China's opposition to it was based on the notion that "the conference was an attempt by the super-powers to throttle the Palestinian revolution".⁴⁹

By now, it is clear that the Palestinians had learned to play the Russians against the Chinese and to obtain the maximum benefit from both, without committing themselves irrevocably to either. "This is the reason that even as she is courting the Palestinians, China has not cut off its diplomacy, economic and cultural relations with the Arab states. They can now deal with both the Governments and the Palestinians".⁵⁰ Despite widespread press speculation in 1975, there has been no indication of serious enhancement of Sino-Palestinian relations or of an increased

47 A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran and the Persian Gulf
(New Delhi, 1982), p. 5.

48 Medzini, n. 31, p. 37.

49 Harris, n. 38, p. 149.

50 Medzini, n. 31, p. 37.

level of armament support, though the level of Chinese media support to the Palestinian has increased.

It is clear that the Chinese policy of influencing the Arab world has been greatly hampered by competition from the Soviet Union. In this race, China has proved to be the loser because of its "weakness in trade, aid and military power. The distance between them limits it even more".⁵¹

3. THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT (1971)

Although India under Nehru's leadership extended its hand of friendship to China, as he strongly believed in Asian solidarity, China did not grasp it seriously or earnestly. It has been suspicious of India's motives and was trying to compete with India. "China feared India's emergence in Asia as a strong and rival power".⁵² When the Sino-Soviet rift erupted, this suspicion and rivalry of China deepened further which ultimately exploded in the 1962 war between China and India.

Illustrative of its strategy of "co-operating with the enemy of your enemy", China developed close relations with Pakistan. This relationship was unique in the sense that even at the height of the Cold War, China maintained close relations with Pakistan which was one of the allies of the United States, opposed China's entry to United Nations, had accused China as an aggressor in the Korean war, and was also a member of the SEATO

51 Copper, n. 20, p. 12.

52 Manoranjan Mohanty, "Bangladesh - Sino-Indian Relation", China Report (New Delhi), November-December 1971, p. 40.

and the CENTO which was regarded by China (and some others too) as an "aggressive military pact". This relationship was hardly based upon ideological affinity, because of the diverse social, economic and political systems in the two countries. "Therefore, their close relations have generally been ascribed to the bitter differences that each of them have developed with India"⁵³. This "area of coincidence" in their objectives as far as it relates to India, was one of the major factors which found them linked together.

Pakistan feared India's threat to its territorial integrity and viewed with alarm the growing military strength of India. The quest for security has been the dominating factor in Pakistan's foreign policy for a long time. "Of all three major Powers, China seemed most sympathetic to Pakistan's anxiety over India and this provided a big incentive to Pakistan's moving towards China"⁵⁴.

Although Pakistan was disappointed with the United States and viewed it with distrust, it could not afford to break the relations with it because of Pakistan's dependence on American arms and economic aid. "Ayub's ability to walk on triple tightrope -- forging close relations with China without alienating the United States, whilst attempting to neutralize Soviet support of India -- was made possible by Beijing's

53 O.N. Mehrotra, "Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Review", Ibid., September-December 1976, p. 54.

54 G.W. Choudhary, "Reflection on Sino-Pakistan Relations", Pacific Community (Tokyo), January 1976, p. 250.

tolerance of Pakistan's effort to work with China's major enemies".⁵⁵ For the price of this tolerance, China had not made any specific commitment to help Pakistan in another war with India.

When the Bangladesh issue cropped up in 1971, China was faced with difficult horns of a dilemma. Ideologically, considering themselves as champion of liberation struggle, China should have supported the liberation struggle in Bangladesh, but this stand would have aided India-Soviet "designs" and have alienated Pakistan. Like all other nations, China also upheld national interest over ideological considerations and extended diplomatic support to Pakistan in the case of Bangladesh issue. "China has not only chosen to consider the liberation struggle in Bangladesh and the Pakistani attempts to suppress it as an internal affair of Pakistan, but has accused India of expansionism and of attempting to intervene in the internal affairs of Pakistan".⁵⁶ In a message to President Yahya Khan, Chou En-lai assured Pakistan that "should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and the people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence".⁵⁷ The unity of East and West Pakistan,

55 William J. Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability and Discontinuity", China Quarterly (London), September 1975, p. 472.

56 K. Subrahmanyam, "India China Relations in the Context of Bangladesh", China Report, 7(2), March-April 1971, p. 27.

57 Cited in Mehrotra, n. 53, p. 65.

he said, were vital to Pakistan's attainment of prosperity and strength. He condemned India, the Soviet Union and the United States for their "gross interference" in Pakistan's internal affairs. However, privately, China is believed to have disapproved the Pakistan army's atrocities in East Pakistan and urged a political settlement. China continued to give diplomatic support and arms aid to Pakistan throughout the struggle, but it refused to be drawn into the conflict when Pakistan was driven to a desperate situation. "Bhutto went to Beijing as President Yahya's special emissary [but] he had to return practically empty-handed".⁵⁸ Pakistan got "a declaration of support" from Beijing without China giving any specific commitment or assurance. Bhutto himself revealed in an interview that China had refused Pakistan's request for a defence pact. Nor was the United Nations helpful to Pakistan and India to settle the dispute peacefully.

No member of the United Nations nor the United Nations' Secretary-General under the provision of Article 99 of the UN Charter, bothered for months to take note of the violation of the territorial integrity and the domestic jurisdiction of India until nine months and ten million refugees later, India took certain steps in sheer desperate self-defence. 59

When the war finally broke out on 4 December between India and Pakistan, China supported Pakistan diplomatically in the United Nations' Security Council. The Chinese delegate Fu Hao

58 G.W. Choudhury, "The Emergence of Bangladesh and the South Asian Triangle", Yearbook of World Affairs 1973 (London), p. 76.

59 M.S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After", Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), Summer 1972, p. 196.

speaking in the Third Committee of the General Assembly, observed that India "continued to exploit the question of refugees to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan, to carry out subversive activities against her and to obstruct the return of East Pakistani refugees to their homeland and making reasonable settlement impossible. These tactics of interference in the internal affairs are well known to the Chinese Government and the people. In our experience, a certain country [meaning India] stepped up subversive activities in Tibet with a rebellion which was smashed by the Chinese people. It encouraged Chinese inhabitants to go into the [Indian] territory creating a question of the so-called Tibetan refugees in wild opposition against China".⁶⁰ China's first note to the Security Council was in favour of the two United States resolutions asking for cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and posting of United Nations' observers along the Indo-Pakistan border. While voting for these resolutions China made the observation that the resolutions did not condemn India as an "aggressor". China used its first veto to kill a Soviet draft resolution calling for "a political settlement in East Bengal which would inevitably result in cessation of hostilities".⁶¹ It also opposed a Soviet proposal to allow the representative of Bangladesh to present its case. Huang Hua, the Chinese delegate, thought that this would be "tantamount to asking the Security Council to interfere directly

60 Cited in Sreedhar, "Bangla Desh: China's Dilemma", China Report, November-December 1971, p. 59.

61 Cited in Mehrotra, n. 53, p. 67.

in the internal affairs of Pakistan".⁶² Beijing's own view -- "that India should be condemned for creating a 'so-called Bangladesh', that it should recall its forces from Pakistan, and that both sides should cease-fire and withdraw from the border"⁶³ -- was contained in a draft resolution that was retracted before voting.

On the eve of ^{the} Indo-Pakistan ceasefire, China assured Pakistan: "The Chinese Government and people firmly support the Pakistani Government and people in their struggle against aggression, division and subversion; we not only are doing this politically but will continue to give them material assistance". It also condemned the Soviet Government for stirring up the conflict between India and Pakistan and "setting Asians to fight Asians"⁶⁴. However, China did not intervene militarily in the conflict and its attitude to the conflict amounted only to "acquiescence in a friend's dismemberment". It continued to show solidarity with Pakistan by vetoing Bangladesh's application for membership to the United Nations till 1974. Nonetheless, China maintained that it harboured no permanent objection to Bangladesh membership. Huang Hua stated in November 1972:

We are not fundamentally opposed to the admission of "Bangladesh" into the United Nations. China always cherished profound friendship sentiments for the people of East Bengal. We hope that the "Bangladesh"

62 Cited in G.P. Deshpande, "China's Stand on Bangladesh in UN", China Report, November/December 1971, p. 41.

63 Cited in G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan and the Major Powers (London, 1975), p. 213.

64 Cited in Mehrotra, n. 53, pp. 67-68.

authorities will make their own decisions independently and meet with Pakistan leaders at an early date so as to reach a reasonable settlement of the issues between Pakistan and "Bangladesh" thus demonstrating that it is a truly independent state. However, China cannot agree to the admission of "Bangladesh" under the present circumstances, that is, before the important UN resolutions are implemented by the parties concerned and a reasonable settlement of the issues between India and Pakistan and "Bangladesh" is reached. 65

China did not recognize Bangladesh before Pakistan did so, for, it must have feared that "any shift in its policy before Pakistan had worked out new relationships with India and Bangladesh, would hurt its reputation for standing by its friends when they needed support".⁶⁶ Pakistan recognized Bangladesh at the Islamic Summit meeting in Lahore in February 1974. When Chi-P'eng-fei, Chinese Foreign Minister^{was} questioned on China's reaction to it, he said: "The question has been settled between Pakistan and Bangladesh and that is [a] good thing".⁶⁷ Bangladesh at last became a member of the United Nations in September 1974, but China's recognition was announced only after the bloody coup in Bangladesh in August 1975.

In a nutshell, one can safely conclude that China's support for Pakistan was carefully limited and confined to verbal support. Its target of attack was more the Soviet Union than India or Bangladesh. It clearly revealed that the Sino-Soviet rivalry had played havoc in South Asia. Although both China and the Soviet Union were not prepared to confront

65 Cited in Barnds, n. 55, pp. 486-87.

66 Ibid., p. 487.

67 Mehrotra, n. 53, p. 69.

militarily, their antagonistic rhetoric made the situation tense. By this conflict, "there is China's concerted effort to denounce and isolate the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union too seems to have used the United Nations forum to isolate and criticize China"⁶⁸. While on the one hand, Pakistan learnt by hard means the sincerity of China's support in a conflict-situation, India didn't overreact to China's criticism. On the contrary, India displayed "a measure of calmness and maturity"⁶⁹ during the conflict.

China's stand on the Bangladesh question, on the whole, was a source of disappointment to many, particularly those who saw China as a revolutionary Power urging and supporting revolutionary forces all over the Third World.

4. THE ANGOLAN SITUATION

People's China had supported the Angolan liberation movement since 1961. Communists in general consider it as their revolutionary duty to "render direct aid to the revolutionary movements among the dependent and unequal nations and in the colonies"⁷⁰. In spite of its adherence to "peaceful coexistence" after the Cultural Revolution, China's support of liberation movements of those groups opposing continued White rule were carried on.

The uniqueness of China's support to Angola lies in its dealings with the various national liberation movements. Unlike

68 Deshpande, n. 62, p. 43.

69 Mohanty, n. 52, p. 50.

70 Cited in Kaur, n. 1, p. 7.

the contemporaneous wars in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau where single parties pre-dominated, Angola was plagued at an early date by a three-way rivalry. "The nationalist opposition to colonial rule in Angola was weak and divided. The three main liberation movements, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA], the National Liberation Front of Angola [FNLA] and the National Unit for Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], attacked each other as well as the Portuguese and resisted attempts by other African states to encourage them to settle their differences".⁷¹

These three liberation movements had emerged not due to any major ideological differences but largely due to personality clashes, regional pulls and tribal resentment. There had never been any movement in Africa which had been so fragmented and where foreign forces played such a great role.

China's policy in Angola, as elsewhere in the Third World

has been to consistently oppose the intervention of all imperialists, support the armed struggle of the people for their independence and urge the unity of all those forces which can be united to fight the main enemy. ⁷²

Throughout the struggle, China supported and aided all three Angolan liberation organizations. In conformity with its practice, China avoided being associated with any one of the organizations and referred to the movements as people's movements.

71 Christopher Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola", African Affairs (London), vol. 75, no. 299 (April 1976), p. 137.

72 C. Clark Kissinger, "China and Angola", Monthly Review (New York), vol. 28, no. 1 (May 1976), p. 2.

Following the coup in Portugal (in April 1974), the new Portuguese government announced its intention of granting independence to Angola, and a ceasefire in Angola was arranged. To avert a full scale civil war, the Alvor Accord was reached among the three liberation movements leaders and Portugal, and the independence date was fixed for 11 November 1975. However, hardly had the ink dried on the Alvor Accord, fresh clashes among the various factions broke out which gave rise to the internationalization of Angolan problem with the intensification of Super Powers' support to different liberation organizations.

Soviet aid to MPLA was stepped up only after the Accord was reached. As neither of the three organizations was manifestly Communist, the Soviet Union's partiality for MPLA can only be interpreted as an attempt to perform a diplomatic coup against China, for Russians were very much concerned over Chinese success "in winning the confidence of the major liberation movements in Southern Africa".⁷³ In terms of size and risk, the Soviet operation in Angola went a good deal beyond its previous ventures in Africa. In their all-out support of the MPLA, the Soviets defied the policy of Organization of African Unity (OAU) which favoured national unity and called upon the foreign Powers to observe neutrality in the civil war.

On the other hand, China stopped the shipment of all military supplies to all the three liberation movements and "made their decision to withdraw their instructors from the

73 Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 54, no. 4 (July 1976), p. 747.

FNLA camps in Zaire in July 1975, in response to the OAU's call for neutrality among the three rival Angolan movements".⁷⁴ Two months later, the Chinese in fact withdrew all their military instructors from Zaire on the basis of their conviction that after the attainment of independence, the issue of the primacy of one organization over another was an internal affair of Angola. Of course, the main reason behind this move was that "Beijing was not equipped to compete with massive Soviet aid"⁷⁵ and they wanted to "impress the Africans that China pursued no Big Power ambitions in Africa".⁷⁶ Indeed, the Chinese hoped that their adherence to ^{the} OAU request for foreign withdrawal, while Moscow and Havana escalated their involvement, would in the long run improve China's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union among African governments generally.

This decision of China paved the way for the MPLA to increase its clout vis-a-vis FNLA, thanks to massive doses of Soviet aid. Subsequently, a new alignment of international forces took place in Angola. FNLA and UNITA cornered among others, American and South African aid which was intended to counter the Russian presence in Angola through the MPLA. It was in this profile of alignment and alliance that the Soviet Union made ideological capital by popularising the belief that China had sided with the United States and South Africa in

74 Ibid., p. 751.

75 Ibid.

76 Anirudha Gupta, "The Angolan Crisis and Foreign Intervention", Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), vol. 25, no. 2 (February 1976), p. 26.

backing FNLA. Further, in the absence of China's active interest in Angola after the declaration of independence, Russian assistance to the MPLA was widely interpreted as aid to an ideological ally of communism. On the other hand, because the United States and South Africa aided the FNLA and UNITA, a case was made out that these two organizations were pro-imperialist. This situation ^{was} all the more ironical, given the initial ideological neutrality of the three organizations towards communism and their readiness to accept aid from all sources. The polarization of the liberation organizations as anti-Communist and pro-communist appears therefore to be the upshot of Super Powers rivalry in Angola.

The eve of Independence Day witnessed enlarged supplies of Soviet weapons and Cuban soldiers to back MPLA. On the other hand, on 19 December, the United States Senate voted to prevent the Administration from continuing its intervention in Angola without Congressional authority which greatly slackened its support for FNLA and UNITA. The South African intervention in the civil war on the side of FNLA further complicated the situation and angered most of the African nations and gave the Russians a valid justification to intensify its massive aid. "Russian 122 m.m. rockets and the 13,500 Cuban regulars ferried to Angola by Soviet aircraft, turned back the FNLA's sieges of Luanda and the northward moving South African force".⁷⁷ Thus, Moscow-Havana intrusion was decisive without which the MPLA could not have defeated its rivals so quickly.

77 Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 71, no. 421 (November 1976), p. 155.

It was a major diplomatic setback for China, as the Soviets came out of the civil war as saviours of a liberation movement, while China cut a sorry figure for the time being. At the UN General Assembly in November 1975, the Chinese representative angrily charged that the Soviet leadership, ignoring a unity agreement reached among the three Angolan factions, had provoked the civil war by sending large quantities of arms to one group. Hence, major Chinese criticism was directed, not so much at the United States or South Africa, as at "Soviet social-imperialism" for its "hegemonic acts of hostility toward Africa" to "establish its sphere of influence in southern Africa", for casting "a covetous eye on the abundant resources of Angola" and for its "wanton sabotage of the liberation cause of the Angolan peoples".⁷⁸ The Chinese boycotted a Security Council vote in March 1976 which condemned South Africa, but not "the Soviet Union or Cuban intervention and aggression". The Chinese Ambassador, Huang Hua, charged that "150,000 black brothers in Angola were killed with Soviet weapons and many towns and villages were razed to the ground by Soviet bombshells".⁷⁹

Explaining China's stand on the question of Angola in the United Nations Security Council, Huang Hua said:

China has always supported the people of Angola in their national liberation movement against Portuguese colonialists and we gave assistance,

78 Cited in William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations", Asian Survey, vol. 17, no. 9 (September 1977), p. 821.

79 U.N. Chronicle, vol. 13, no. 4 (April 1976), p. 7.

including **military** assistance, to all the three liberation organizations; we have always urged them to take to heart their common interest of national liberation and to unite against the common enemy. In particular, the following fact should be pointed out: After the Alvor agreement was reached between the Angolan national liberation movements and Portugal in January 1975 confirming the independence of Angola, China has refrained from providing new military assistance to the three Angolan liberation organizations. 80

In a debate on Angola's application for admission to the United Nations, the Chinese representative, Lai Ya-li, said that although Angola had won its independence, its internal affairs were still being subjected to crude interference; the national unity of Angola and its independence and sovereignty were still being seriously encroached upon as a result of the policies of aggression and expansion frantically pushed by Soviet ~~social~~ Union. He further stated, "In view of the fact that Soviet social-imperialism is still hanging on in Angola, the Chinese delegation is firmly against providing it with a pretext for prolonging its acts with aggression and interference". Based on the "principled position" which had been consistently held, he said, "the Chinese delegation will not participate in the vote on the draft resolution put forward by the Soviet Union and some other countries which recommends that Angola be admitted to the United Nations".⁸¹ This resolution was, however, vetoed by the United States. When the question came up again in late 1976, the United States reversed its position and abstained in the Security Council vote. To

80 Peking Review, vol. 19, no. 15, 9 April 1976.

81 Ibid., vol. 19, no. 27, 2 July 1976.

demonstrate its opposition to the pro-Soviet MPLA government, People's China refused to participate in vote on the question.

In an emotional speech before the Assembly's plenary session on 1 December 1976, immediately following the adoption of a resolution admitting Angola into the United Nations, Foreign Minister, Jose Edvarado dos Santos of Angola, attacked both the United States and China for their positions. There had been, he charged, an "unnatural alliance" of China, U.S. imperialism and South Africa, and added that mercenaries recruited by South Africa had been paid in American dollars and killed Angolans with weapons "made by the Chinese proletariat".⁸²

The outcome of the Angolan affair did shift the balance of influence in favour of the Soviet Union in Africa. Soviet and Cuban actions in Angola were also generally well-received in the Third World. The Soviet Union had reaped the fruit of taking risks against heavy odds and clearly demonstrated its willingness and capability to offer effective military support for an ally in a strategically crucial part of Southern Africa. In doing so, the Russians succeeded in making other liberation movements to think seriously about accepting China's support. The Chinese cut a sorry figure in the midst of all rhetoric and Russians propoganda could effectively tarnish China's image in the eyes of the Third World, at least for the time being.

82 Cited in Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 229.

5. PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS

China has been opposed in principle to UN peace-keeping operations, viewing it as a tool of "imperialism" to suppress revolutions. This perception of the Chinese might be due to their bitter experiences of United Nations' involvement in the Korean Question, although the latter was not a peace-keeping operation. This also might have a link to their ideological strategy, as they consider every disorder and unrest as a fertile ground for revolution. However, their support of the United Nations' intervention and sanctions in the Suez crisis of 1956 should be viewed as an exceptional case, as they were trying to establish good relation with Egypt; it was also a crisis between colonialist countries and a Third World country which was benefited by the UN intervention.

Before China's entry in to the United Nations, doctrinal purity and logical consistency seem to have dictated China's policy of opposition to peace keeping operations. Not only that, they bitterly accused the Soviet Union of joining hands with the United States to "establish an International Gendarmerie" and criticized the revolutionary lukewarmness of the Soviet Union.

In the case of Congo operation, China said:

Again, let us examine the part played by the leaders of the CPSU in the Congo operation. Not only did they refuse to give active support to the Congolese people's armed struggle against colonialism, but they were anxious to "co-operate" with US imperialism in putting out the spark in the Congo. On 13 July 1960 the Soviet Union joined with the United States in voting for the Security Council resolution on the dispatch of United Nations' forces to the Congo. Thus, it helped the

US imperialism to use the flag of the United Nations in their armed intervention in the Congo. 83

Moreover the attitude of the new African states to the United Nations' activity in Africa and their acceptance of the United Nations as impartial was regarded by China as an illusion.

China also characterized all UN peace-keeping operations upto 1965 as having "always protected interests of imperialism and undermined the effort of the peoples to win freedom and independence" and therefore held that they "have been and remain the docile special detachments of the international gendarmarie of US imperialism and reaction". The Soviet Union's willingness to co-operate in establishing a "UN force" was regarded by China as "rendering a great service to US imperialism and have become its partners in executing its policy of aggression".⁸⁴

Thus, there was reason for apprehension about the effect on great Power co-operation within the United Nations of China's assumption of its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council. There was also hope that "her membership would induce some changes in her approach to the Organization and the other Powers. For, even if she still felt that she had little interest in the particular operations which the United Nations wished to mount, she might, in time, come to the view that those which did her no damage ought not to be opposed. In this way, she would avoid giving needless offence to her fellow members with whom she might occasionally wish to make common cause whether inside or outside the Organization".⁸⁵ This latter assessment has become valid,

83 Cited in Hutchison, n. 7, p. 31.

84 Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 17 (23 April 1965), p. 28.

85 Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping (London, 1960), p. 439.

as China avoided obstructing the United Nations' peace-keeping operations and at the same time held to its earlier principled stand. "The device to reconcile the two conflicting pressures, that is, the pressure to maintain a consistency in her own principles such as UN peace-keeping and the pressure not to obstruct the will of the majority consistent with ^{her} ~~of~~ professed claim of not behaving like a bullying Super Power, is non-participation in the vote, the device which was rarely used by the permanent members in the practice of the Security Council".⁸⁶ This enabled the United Nations to carry on its peace-keeping operations, and also enabled it to set up a new ones, without any real obstructions, to its processes.

The first test of her position on UN peace-keeping was the question of ^{the} UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) mandate on 13 December 1971. In spite of its vehement attack of UNFICYP in 1965 as United States stipulated international gendarmierie and the United Kingdom's continued major role in UNFICYP operation, China took a low-key posture during the debate preceding the vote. Huang Hua's deputy, Ch'en Chu, made a brief remark to the effect that "the dispute should be settled in a reasonable way by the countries concerned through consultation on an equal footing". As for the question of the UN forces, Chen Chu continued, "the Chinese Government has always had its own principled stance. This is well known to all the representatives. Therefore, we could not participate

86 Samuel S. Kim, "Behaviour Dimension of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy", China Quarterly (London), no. 72 (December 1977), p. 726.

in the voting on this resolution".⁸⁷ This reticent posture continued throughout the subsequent Council debates on UNFICYP. Thus, this operation could continue with little opposition from China.

The establishment of ^{the} UN Emergency Force-II (UNEF) in the wake of the October Arab-Israel war in 1973, generated much heat at the United Nations debate. The two Super Powers quickly and decisively took charge of crisis management in the Council by presenting two joint draft resolutions at short notice, taking Chinese non-participation in the vote for granted. China took it as a great offence and considered it as a tailor-made case to prove its charge of contending and colluding posture between the two Super Powers for global hegemony. The situation invited Sino-Soviet confrontation and the Soviet Union outscored and outmanoeuvred China by posing as a peace-keeper and labelling China as a warmonger in the Middle East. Huang Hua said in the Security Council on 25 October 1973 that the

so-called resolution calling for the implementation of the cease-fire decision presented jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union ... was a scrap of paper that could solve no problem.... The vivid facts before us have fully shown that the so called 'resolutions on cease-fire' which the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, hurriedly asked the Security Council to force through have had the actual effect of sapping the fighting will of the Arab people shielding Israel's further expansion of aggression. 88

China opposed the dispatch of peace-keeping forces and maintained that "such a practice can only pave the way for

87 Cited in Kim, n. 82, p. 217.

88 SCOR, 28th year, 1750th meeting (25 October 1973), p. 2.

further international intervention and control with the Super Powers as behind-the-scene's boss".⁸⁹ However, China did not participate in voting on the resolution to form UNEF-II and stated that only out of consideration for the requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression that restrained China from vetoing the resolution.

While debating on the composition of UNEF-II on 2 November 1973, Huang Hua said that if the Super Powers were not able to send in their own forces directly, "they try all means to squeeze in the forces which they can influence so as to exercise indirect control". This accusation seems to be valid by the evidence of fierce contention between the Super Powers on the question of the composition of UNEF-II. As China did not want to be "a party to the agreement on the composition of the so-called United Nations emergency force" and at the same time did not want to obstruct the United Nations activities, it opted for non-participation. It also refused to contribute to meet the cost of the force. They considered that "to regard the costs of the force as expenses of the Organization and to request all member states to participate in the financing of UNEF was tantamount to requesting all Member states to pull the chest-nuts out of the fire for the two Super Powers".⁹⁰ Ever since then, China has dissociated itself from all subsequent Council proceedings in UNEF-II and its financing.

89 Ibid.

90 GAOR, 28th session, Fifth Committee, 1604th meeting (23 November 1973), p. 63.

In sharp contrast to its attitude to UNEF-II, the authorization process of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) by the Security Council generated **no** heated debate. At its meeting on 31 May 1974, the Council adopted unanimously a draft resolution, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, which "decides to set up immediately under its authority a UNDOF and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect"⁹¹. In the debate before voting, Huang Hua's deputy, Chuang Yi, said that to seek a fundamental solution of the Middle East question, it was imperative to stop the hegemonism and power politics practised by the two Super Powers in the region, eliminate all their interference in the Middle East affairs, demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and restore completely to the Palestinians their national rights. Since they were opposed to the dispatch of troops in the name of the United Nations under whatever form, it opposed the idea but "only out of consideration for the present attitude of the victim [Syria], the Chinese delegation had decided not to participate in the vote on the draft resolution"⁹², rather than veto it. Thus UNDOF had an easy birth.

From the experiences of the formation of UNEF-II and UNDOF, it is clear that while China was opposed in principle

91 Cited in Kim, n. 82, p. 221.

92 UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 11, no. 6 (June 1974), p. 22.

to UN Peace-Keeping operations, it did not actually obstruct the functions of the United Nations. In fact, China's total dissociation from UNEF-II and UNDOF means its total non-interference in the continuing authorizing process as the mandates of these operations require periodic renewal by the Council. Such a stand by China amounts to "consent by acquiescence" in the decision making process. Any obstruction in this field by China would have invited the wrath of the international community, especially the Third World countries, as the latter values U.N. peace-keeping as an additional factor for stability in a conflict-ridden world.

Chapter IV

NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The present lopsided economic development and continuing wide economic disparities between the developed and developing countries is a major preoccupation of international fora since the 1950s. With the emergence of many new independent developing nations, the old economic system of exploitation by the developed countries became more glaring. Although decolonization kindled much hopes and aspirations, it turned out to be "only a flag and anthem ceremony, masking the reality of the continued subordination of these areas to the West through economic ties whose force condemns them to the double fate of exploitation and stagnation".¹

Developing countries gradually urged the developed nations "to help them in making the economic system more equitable. But all their pleading to change the present inequitable economic system, their demand for help and their appeals for consideration have gone unheeded".² They also used the UN forum to press their demands, but very little of substance has been achieved due to the lack of will on the part of the rich countries. The frustration of the developing nations coupled with the confluence of several economic crises

1 Tony Smith, "Changing Configuration of Power in North and South Relations since 1945", International Organization (Madison), vol. 31, no. 1 (Winter, 1977), p. 1.

2 R.P. Anand, "Towards a New International Economic Order", International Studies, vol. 15, no. 4 (October-December 1976), p. 467.

of global significance has led to the militant demand of restructuring the international economic system.

In order to put the maximum pressure on the developed countries, the developing countries managed to call two special sessions in 1974 and 1975 of the UN General Assembly, where they command absolute majority in any common issue. The diplomatic vehicle often used by developing nations is the "Group of 77".

China has come out in full support of the struggle of the developing countries for changing the present international economic structure and relations and establishing a new international economic order. This issue gave ample opportunity to China to identify itself with the Third World and champion their cause in international fora.

China attached great importance to the Sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in April 1974. It was here that Deng Hsiao Ping said: "As a result of the emergence of social imperialism, the Soviet camp which existed for a time after World War II, is no longer in existence"³. He added: "The world today actually consists of three parts or three worlds, that are both inter-connected and in contradiction to one another". The Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were put in the same category as the First World. The other, smaller developed countries of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia and South Africa were grouped in the Second World. The developing countries, chiefly of Africa, Asia and Latin America, were grouped as the Third World.

³ Cited in Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 16 (19 April 1974), p. 32.

Then, he chose the theme of "imperialism" and attacked the two Super Powers. He accused them as "the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today". Each of them was accused of attempting to bring developing countries under its control and at the same time bullying the developed countries that are not their match in strength. "In bullying others, the Super Power which flaunts the label of socialism is especially vicious".

The developed countries, which are considered to be the Second World are regarded as ^{being} controlled in varying degrees, threatened or bullied, by one Super Power or the other, and stated to be having the same aspiration as the Third World to shake off foreign domination and control.

Deng's definition of the position of the Third World is brief but pointed:

The numerous developing countries have long suffered from colonialist and imperialist oppression and exploitation. They have won political independence, yet, all of them still face the historic task of clearing out the remnant forces of colonialism, developing the national economy and consolidating national independence... They constitute a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and are the main force combating colonialism, imperialism and particularly the Super Powers.

According to him, the United States and the Soviet Union no longer represent political and philosophical alternatives because of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. He said that China had full conviction of Third World strength and stated that the future belonged to the peoples of the developing countries. He applauded the initiative of the Third

World countries to change the international economic system and enthusiastically endorsed the Arab's use of oil as a political weapon during the Arab-Israel war of 1973. He considered that it heightened the fighting spirit of the developing countries. He said, "the oil battle has broadened people's vision. What was done in the oil battle should, and can, be, done in the case of other raw materials". According to the Chinese, the only remedy for the present malady was self-reliance, inter-dependence and mutual co-operation among the developing nations. "By self-reliance, we mean that a country should rely on the strength and wisdom of its own people, control its own economic lifelines, make full use of its own resources, strive hard to increase food production and develop its national economy step by step and in a planned way. ... Self-reliance in no way means self-seclusion and rejection of foreign aid". China favoured "foreign aid based on equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with their national economy"⁴. The Chinese stress/^{was} on the independence and self-reliance as the twin pillars for building a new world order. It is theoretically sound.

In the Chinese conceptualization, this is indeed the only way that developing countries can liberate their economic thinking from the exploitive center-generated concept of 'inter-dependence'; this is the only way that developing countries can break away from vicious process of exchanges of unequal values.... All other principles in the Chinese image are either variants on or supplements to, this dominant principle. ⁵

4 Cited in Samuel S. Kim, "China and World Order", Alternatives: Journal of World Policy, vol. 3, no. 4 (May 1978), p. 564.

5 Ibid.

China's support for the just demand of the developing nations was regarded as "bounden international duty". It categorically stated: "China is not a Super Power, nor will she ever seek to be one". It took the opportunity to state that "China is a socialist and developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World".⁶

In a speech after the adoption of the Declaration of New International Economic Order (NIEO) and Programme of Action, Huang Hua stated that the Super Powers had tried all means to impede the progress of the session in order to maintain the old international economic relationships in tact. "Their multifarious tricks have gone bankrupt one after another. Indeed, they are in a deplorable plight of flowers fall off, do what one may".⁷ The Chinese Delegation supported both the documents of NIEO, the Declaration and the Programme of Action, as they considered that they reflected the earnest demands and just propositions of the Third World. Moreover, they regarded that the declaration has set forth a series of correct principles, guiding the establishment of a new international economic relations. However, the Chinese delegate pointed out their reservations on certain phraseology which seems to have been made purely for the sake of propaganda.

On the whole, China did not press any new idea or any proposal, nor did they initiate any concrete suggestions. "China has been boxed into a passive or reactive situation without a

6 Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 16 (19 April 1974), p. 11.

7 Ibid., vol. 17, no. 19 (10 May 1974), p. 10.

group basis"⁸. Moreover, it did not play an active role in the formulation of the NIEO. Therefore, its role ^{was} only supportive.

The Chinese developmental model of self-reliance which used to be laughed at in the world economic community at one time, has now become a respected concept in UN organs charged with development activities. "China had never tried to impose this cherished principle on developing countries during the [debate on the] NIEO but it functioned as a model projection that developing countries could ignore only at their own economic peril"⁹.

The Seventh Session of the UN General Assembly on the problems of development and international economic co-operation opened at UN Headquarter for two weeks from September 1975. It was in fact a session to spell out broad "implementation guidelines for all the appropriate organs and agencies of the UN developing system"¹⁰. The PRC's participation in the Seventh session remained a low-keyed tone in giving support to the Third World. In his opening speech before the plenary, Li Chiang defined the Seventh special session in the following terms:

The declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the UN General Assembly at its sixth special session have laid down a series of correct principles for the establishment of a new international economic order. Our task now

8 Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioural Dimension of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy", China Quarterly (London), (72), December 1977, p. 725.

9 Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 277.

10 Ibid., p. 283.

is to continue to uphold and conscientiously implement these principles. 11

Ling Chiang pointed out the present task as one of "combating imperialist and particularly Super Power control, plunder and exploitation thoroughly destroying the old economic order".¹²

The Chinese have repeatedly defined the NIEO process, not in terms of a North-South problem, but in terms of a united struggle of the Second and Third World against the First World. Its chief target of attack for many years was the Soviet Union and stated that the twisting of Third World demands by the Soviet and its refusal to shoulder responsibility, further confirmed the Chinese belief that the Soviet leadership was indeed practising socialism in words, but imperialism in deeds. On the other hand, China identified itself with the developing countries and said:

We, ^{the} Chinese people, shared the same historical experience with the people of the other developing countries and are now facing together with them the same historical task of combating imperialism and hegemonism and building our countries. 13

In his closing remark at the session, Huang Hua cautiously observed:

Through a series of struggles, the session finally achieved relatively positive results. The Chinese delegation supports the resolution [3362(s-7)] adopted by the current session.

11 Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 37 (12 September 1975), p. 16.

12 Ibid., p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 15.

In our opinion, this document basically reflects some of the just propositions and reasonable demands of the developing countries in the fields of international economics and trade. 14

He further stated that the resolution adopted by the session was only something on paper and it required protracted and arduous struggle to translate it into reality. Huang Hua then concluded that the proceedings of the session clearly showed that the establishment of NIEO "is by no means all plain sailing and that the obstacle comes mainly from the two Super Powers".¹⁵ Even Chiao said in the General Assembly in September that it was impossible to change it throughly at one stroke. "For this reason, the compromise approach to the Third World adopted by the Second World is praised in contrast with the American and Soviet preference for confrontation".¹⁶

One of the important conclusions to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that China's stand served as mutual legitimization. "China's own conceptualization of world order has been legitimized to a large degree by NIEO, on the one hand, and NIEO has been blessed with Chinese support, on the other".¹⁷

In spite of its moral and ideological endorsement of a new and just world order, China failed to give any coherent and viable strategies of transition. China refused to join the

14 Peking Review, vol. 18, no. 39 (26 September 1975), p. 19.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Dick Wilson, "China and the Third World", Pacific Community (Tokyo), vol. 7, no. 2 (January 1976), p. 225.

17 Kim, n. 4, p. 563.

"Group of 77", a coalition of developing countries, which is used as a vehicle to voice and negotiate Third World demands. Factional and geographical quarrels among the members made China to keep away from it. "It is difficult to imagine what China could possibly gain in the midst of such inter-group fighting".¹⁸ Under the circumstances, the Chinese posture of giving moral and political support to the broad principles and the large demands of the "Group of 77", without involving seriously in the discussion, makes sense.

However, its unqualified support to the developing countries and vigorous attack against the Super Powers, especially the Soviet Union, created some doubt about the genuineness of Chinese support. In fact, some writers have accused China of building "coalitions among Third World countries capable of sharply altering existing patterns of international relations and the Third World".¹⁹ They also alleged that "the potential of the Third World as a stick with which to knock the Super Powers is evident in China's issue".²⁰ The Soviet Union also accused China of seeking to create a separate bloc under its own aegis "based not on class principles, but on the Great Power interest of the Chinese leadership".²¹

Whatever may be the motives for China's support to the Third World, there is no denying the fact that China has not

18 Kim, n. 9, p. 332.

19 Peter Van Ness, "China and the Third World", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 67, no. 97 (September 1974), p. 107.

20 Wilson, n. 16, p. 219.

21 Ibid., p. 220.

assumed an active leadership role of the Third World, nor joined any of the Third World's producer cartels. However, it is clear that China vigorously championed the cause of the Third World in all international fora. NIEO has given China ample opportunity to give moral and ideological support to the developing countries. Obviously, "there are advantages for China in building co-operative relationships with the 'have nots' against the haves and there are potential benefits for the developing countries in accepting China as their champion"²². But the developing countries should know that they would get from China only militant verbal, rather than any substantive, support for their cherished aims.

²² Ness, n. 19, p. 133.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

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China's foreign policy, like that of all other nations, is largely determined by national interests, but overtly dressed up and justified on the basis of ideological principles. One can trace major turns in China's foreign policy. It is important to observe carefully China's relation with the two Super Powers, as its relationship with the two Super Powers has often determined its relation with other countries.

At the beginning, the "two camp" theory was enunciated by China; it decided to "lean to the side of socialism". Although the policy was couched in ideological terms, it was actually dictated by Realpolitik. This policy of alliance with Soviet Union provided the military and political backing to the new regime in Beijing when it was at its most vulnerable and the need for "peaceful-reconstruction" at its greatest.

However, the relations between China and the Soviet Union were not without contradiction. The personal rivalry and clash of national interest led to the cooling of their relations in the 1960s which forced China to search for a new field of pasture. Henceforth, China approached the world with a more pluralistic perspective. In order to get rid of its isolation and dependence on the Soviet Union, it adopted the policy of "peaceful co-existence" with countries having different social systems. During this phase, China tried to achieve its objective of leadership role in the whole of the underdeveloped areas, thereby ultimately hoping to achieve its aim of Super

Power status. Thus it ventured on the line of "struggle on two fronts".

However, because of the growing Sino-Soviet conflict, the Soviet threat to China had increased. "Out of these two evils, of US imperialism and the Soviet revisionism, Beijing preferred the first one.... China, therefore felt that it would be in her interest to have a detente with the United States"¹.

During much of the 1970s, the most dominant value in Chinese global policy was oriented toward a protracted struggle to weaken the strong and the rich and to strengthen the weak and the poor in the global community. This value expressed itself as the united struggle of the small and medium sized Powers -- the Second and Third Worlds -- against the hegemonic global reach of the two Super Powers. In practice, however the Soviet Union has been singled out as being more insidious, more aggressive and more dangerous, to world order than the "declining" capitalist Super Power.

Thus, China's choice of external alignments has been largely determined by its national interest. To defend China and build it into a strong nation is the legitimate and dominating concern of China's foreign policy. Toward these ends, China has adopted pragmatic policies which helped it to achieve the status of a regional Power and global presence.

Like all other nations, China too was eager to gain its "rightful" seat in the United Nations, but because of its own

1 R.S. Chavan, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Chou En-lie Era (New Delhi, 1979), p. 205.

strategic interests, and also due to its obsession with the likely menace China might create at the United Nations, the United States prevented China for over twenty years from joining it by various devices. Thus, the question of "Chinese representation" raged in the United Nations for two decades and threatened the very fabric of the Organization. The resulting disillusion and frustration led China to denounce ^{the} United Nations several times, but it continued to keep the channel with the United Nations open. Towards the beginning of 1970s, China demonstrated an extra-ordinary degree of flexibility and moderation by extending limited normalization towards former "enemies" such as the United States, Japan and Yugoslavia. The United States too realised that its anti-Chinese policy had not really paid off, as Communist China, instead of getting isolated, was acquiring more friends. They were convinced that in spite of US opposition, People's China was bound to be admitted to the United Nations by 1971. Therefore, they felt the need to modify their policy towards China to safeguard their national interest. Gradually, Sino-US rapprochement developed which hastened People's China's entry in the United Nations.

George Bush, the US Ambassador to the United Nations "admitted that the Beijing Government effectively controlled the destinies of one quarter of the human race; it was nuclear-armed; future peace and stability in Asia depended heavily on China's relations with its neighbours"². But he added that the new American policy of seating of the PRC in the United Nations

2 Ibid., p. 205.

did not want to sacrifice the UN membership of the Republic of China. However, on 25 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted the Albania resolution which called for the restoration to the PRC of all its rights in the United Nations as the sole, legitimate, representative of China and gave the United States a stunning defeat as the "Republic of China" was expelled from the United Nations, in spite of all-out efforts of the United States to save the ouster of the Taiwan regime from the United Nations.

It is obvious that China joined the United Nations "on its own terms and without the grace and favour of any great power patron"³. The succeeding history falsified the predictions of the destructive impact of its entry to the United Nations. On the contrary, China proved its capacity of following the traditional rules of the games of international politics.

China showed considerable imagination and skill in denouncing Big Powers and identifying itself with, and championing, the cause of the Third World countries at the United Nations. In its very first statement at the United Nations after gaining the seat, China's representative stated, "at no time will China be a Super Power subjecting others to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying"⁴. China repeatedly emphasised the similarity between itself and the Third World and categorically stated that China was a Third World country. Initially, "many least developing countries have been flattered and

3 Michael Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London, 1978), p. 212.

4 Cited in T. Israel, "The Question of Representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" (JNU, unpublished dissertation, 1972), p. 46.

impressed by Beijing's advocacy of their favourite causes and have increasingly come to view China as a useful ally in redressing the World power and economic balance⁵. However, it was obvious, later on, that China was militant in pronouncing its "principled stand" in the public fora, but showed considerable degree of caution and sensitivity in practice. In fact, China's support for the Third World amounted to a partisan spectator who cheers, moralizes and votes when necessary, rather than that of an active initiator of tangible change in world power and economic relations. Many had feared that China would become ^{the} third Super Power by assuming the leadership of the Third World countries, but this had not been realized as China was one among several leaders of the Third World grouping. Moreover the Third World is not a United body. However, China became a Power to be reckoned with, because of its military power and unique economic experience and political development.

In order to overcome the contradiction between its "principled stand" and its support of the Third World demands, it adopted a new voting procedure of "non-participation" which enabled it to avoid applying the veto power in the Security Council whenever it chose to do so. This is regarded as "dialectical exercise" to resolve, or at least to attempt to resolve, the contradictions inherent in the policy of pursuing both ideological and pragmatic interest at one and the same time. For example, disarmament, one of the major issues discussed at

5 William R. Feeney, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the United Nations", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol. 17, no. 9 (September 1977), p. 829.

the United Nations, caught China "in the cross pressures of its own perceived need for rapid nuclear development and of the growing denuclearization demands of the non-aligned countries".⁶ Its opposition to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty made it unpopular among the countries favouring disarmament. However, in order to make up for its damaged image and to keep the Third World in good humour, China advanced its own proposal for disarmament, such as "no-first-use" pledge, complete destruction of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of all armed forces from abroad, dismantling of their bases in foreign lands. The Chinese must have been quite aware of the fact that their proposals had no chance of being accepted, but they took the trouble of proposing them to save their skin from the possible attack of the Third World countries. Because of their unreasonable policy, China shut itself out from any UN negotiations on disarmament. In fact, China is not at all interested in arms control or disarmament, for they appear to be against the stabilising effect of disarmament on the existing balance of power among nations. China is determined to break the nuclear monopoly of the Super Powers. Therefore, in the near future China will refrain from endorsing any major arms control or disarmament agreement.

China identifies itself with the Third World, especially colonial countries, on the basis that it had the "same experience of exploitation and degrading insult of being regarded as inferior

6 James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim,^{ed.} China in the Global Community (New York, 1980), p. 231.

race by the same White people".⁷ It extended support to the peoples under colonial rule in their struggle for national liberation and also to the people suffering from racial discrimination. Its support for the liberation movements was always forthcoming. It had given considerable quantities of arms and military supplies to these movements, in spite of its own insecurity and economic backwardness. A strategy of China has been to afford maximum support for the annual General Assembly resolutions directed against colonialism and apartheid. China expressed regret that most of these resolutions remained unimplemented owing to obstructions and sabotage by imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. China had vehemently attacked both the Super Powers for their policy of hegemonism and world domination.

China had taken extra care to build up its image in Africa and Arab countries since the Bandung Conference. In fact, "China had attached so much importance to Africa that major portion of its foreign aid was allotted to African countries".⁸

In the case of Arab-Israeli conflict, China viewed it as a conflict between the Third World and the two Super Powers. Israeli aggression against Palestinians was taken as aggression instigated by the United States and any political solution agreed by the two Super Powers was regarded as a US-Soviet

7 Cited in Ian Greg, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (London, 1977), p. 63.

8 Chavan, n. 1, p. 197.

"deal" to "create no war, no peace situation" in the Middle East. It is clear that the Chinese policy of influencing the Arab world has been greatly hampered by the competition from the Soviet Union; China proved to be no match against the Soviet Union.

China's stand on Angola and the Bangladesh question, however, greatly tarnished its reputation as the champion of anti-colonialism and revolutionary forces. China's stand on these issues might have been dictated by its opposition to Soviet Union and its allies, for it goes against its "principled stand" of supporting colonial and oppressed nations.

China was opposed to UN Peace-Keeping Operations, viewing them as tools of imperialism to suppress revolutions. The Soviet Union's willingness to co-operate in establishing a UN force was regarded by China as "rendering a great service to US imperialism and have become its partner in executing its policy of aggression"⁹. China avoided obstructing the UN's Peace-Keeping Operations as it was favoured by the Third World countries which regarded it as a useful device in a conflict-ridden world. The device adopted to reconcile these two conflicting pressures, i.e., the pressure to maintain a consistency in its own principles such as UN Peace-Keeping Operation and the pressure not to obstruct the will of the majority was non-participation in the vote. This posture amounted to "consent by acquiescence" as Chinese total dissociation from Peace-Keeping Operations means its total non-interference in the continuing authorizing process as the mandates of Peace-Keeping Operations require periodic renewal by the Security Council.

⁹ Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 17 (23 April 1965), p. 28.

In the international economic arena, China stands apart from all other countries, especially those of the Third World. "China's abundance of natural resources, coupled with its unique system of self-reliance and virtual self-sufficiency, separate it very clearly from all the other developing countries"¹⁰. However, China has come out in full support of the struggle of the developing countries for changing the present international economic relation and establishing a new international economic order. This issue gave ample opportunity to China to identify itself with the Third World and champion their cause. According to the Chinese, the only remedy for the present malady is self-reliance, inter-dependence and mutual co-operation among the developing nations. However, in spite of its moral and ideological endorsement of a new and just world order, China failed to give any coherent and viable strategies of transition. In fact, it did not play an active role in the formulation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and its role was only supportive. Its unqualified support of the developing countries and vigorous attack against the Super Powers, especially the Soviet Union, created doubts about the genuineness of Chinese's support. The developing countries realised that they would get only militant verbal support for their cherished goals.

From the above analysis, one can draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union has now become an obsession in China's world view, distorting its analytical and perception focus and

¹⁰ Michael B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs (London, 1978), p. 281.

distracting its effort from uniting more fully with the Third World. Another point is that China is unlikely to assume a leadership role of the Third World countries, as it does not boldly initiate nor actively participate in the general concerns of the Third World, nor is the Third World a homogeneous body. In fact, PRC's UN participation has been more verbal and symbolic rather than substantive. It could engage in the image-building tactics of stating deep convictions and cherished principles, without fearing accountability. However, China is, and will be, a unique country with important contributions to make in the realm of global stability and peace.

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