

Dedicated to the fond memory
of
My late mother Smt. Ram Rati Devi
who was a constant source of
inspiration and encouragement to me.

NEGOTIATING FOR ARMS - PAKISTAN'S EXPERIENCE WITH US, 1950S

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
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PREFACE

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This brief essay is a modest attempt at the analysis of the negotiations of the US-Pak Arms deal, 1954 which was worked out in the early fifties. The focus is on the then prevailing international circumstances, motivations of the two parties and the nature of diplomatic campaign mounted by Pakistan to secure US Arms.

The first chapter sketches out the historical context and the second traces in some detail the process of forging an alliance. A few relevant conclusions are then drawn to assess the role of personalities and domestic political developments during this phase.

I would like to thank my Supervisor, Dr Pushpesh Pant and other members of the Diplomatic Studies Division for their valuable assistance and guidance. I record my appreciation of the staff of the following libraries where material for this work was collected: The Parliament Library, Indian Council of World Affairs, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, all in New Delhi.

My father, Sri Kalpnath Rai, Union Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, my sisters

Munni, Guddi and dear brother Babu have lavished upon me their affection and the completion of the dissertation, I hope, shall make them happy. Last but not the least, I would like to acknowledge the immense debt I owe to Mukti who has helped me not only with academic exertions but sustained me throughout a period of great emotional stress.


(Chandralekha Rai)

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

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Mohamed Ali the then Prime Minister of Pakistan disclosed at a Press Conference on 22 February 1954, that Pakistan had requested the United States Government on the previous day 'for military assistance' within the scope of U.S. mutual security legislation. Specific requirements were not mentioned, and it was stated that the quantity of aid would be assessed when the US government had accepted the request in principle. He emphasised that there was no question of creation of U.S. or rather foreign bases in Pakistan stationing foreign troops in the country. "Pakistan made the request", he added, "for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength designed for higher and stronger degree of economic stability to foster international peace and security within the framework of UN Charter".¹ He also added that before making this formal request Pakistan had informed herself of the requirements of U.S. mutual security legislation and found herself in agreement with them. Pakistan, he made it clear, had no

1 Keesings Contemporary Archive, 13-21 March 1954.

intention to take aggressive action against anyone.

It is important to remember that many years of ground-work had preceded the signing of this arms deal between Pakistan and the U.S.A. Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat's main anxiety was to ensure the survival of a virtually unarmed Pakistan in the face of recurrent threats of war from a much stronger neighbour. He realised that if Pakistan wanted outside material and moral support she had to lean on one side or the other, and both practical and ideological considerations pointed in the direction of America.

President Eisenhower responded to this overture on 25 February 1954. Welcoming the agreement between Pakistan and Turkey he stated: "This government welcomes the move as constructive step toward better ensuring the security of the whole middle east". Pakistan had asked the regional groupings to ensure security against aggression as it constituted the most aggressive means to assure survival and progress. This was reassuring for the USA as its government had been gravely concerned over the weakness of defensive capabilities in the middle East.

"Let me make it clear that we shall be guided by the stated purpose and requirements of the mutual security legislation. These include the provision that equipment, material or services provided will be used solely to maintain the recipient country's internal security and for its legitimate self-defense or its permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part. The arms which the USA provides for the defense of the free world will in no way threaten their own security. 2

Commenting on President Eisenhower's announcement,

Mohammed Ali declared on 25 February 1954:

Pakistan today enters what promises to be a glorious chapter in her history. She is designed to become the sheet-anchor of international stability and security in this region. U.S. military aid would enable Pakistan to achieve adequate defensive strength without the country having to assume an otherwise increasing burden on its economy. 3

The wooing of the U.S.A. began with Liaquat's visit to the United States in May 1950. Although the Pakistani statesman personally was little known to Americans but worked hard to overcome the handicaps under which he started. Reversing Nehru's slogan, he said that the purpose of his visit was to assist America to discover Pakistan.⁴

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. Also see Times of India (Delhi), 26 February 1954.

4 Nehru had called his first trip to the USA a voyage of discovery. See Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1978).

Liaquat's Astute Diplomacy

Being aware that the real reasons for the establishment of Pakistan were not sufficiently understood abroad, and that many thought of Pakistan as a backward theocratic state as compared to a forwardlooking secular India, Liaquat's first effort was to enlighten his audience on these subjects.

Partition came about, he explained, because a hundred million Muslims found themselves in a minority in British India and were convinced that under Hindu majority rule their culture was in danger of effacement and their already inferior economic position was likely to sink further. Such a large discontented minority in the vast Indo-Pakistani subcontinent would have been the greatest, single unstable element in the world.⁵ Thus he played upon US fascination with stability.

Emphasising that ideologically and strategically Pakistan held a position of great responsibility and was resolved to throw all her weight to help in the maintenance of stability in Asia, Liaquat extended a hand of friendship to the USA. Should America decide that construction is the best way to defy destruction, he said, she would find the people of Pakistan

5 For details see S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (London,), pp.123-26.

amongst its staunchest friends. He expressed the hope that the future will unfold itself in ways which will also make them (Pakistan and US) comrades, in the noble task of maintaining peace and in translating the great constructive dreams of democracy into reality.

Liaquat also tried to procure arms for the Pakistani forces, suggesting that such assistance would serve the interests of the entire free world. At a news conference in Washington he said that Pakistan occupied a very strategic position and that was the reason why he was interested in procuring upto date equipment for his armed forces. He said that because Pakistan had her own Islamic way of life, communism was not likely to find fertile ground there; the two ways of life 'exclude each other'.⁶

Thus, not only did Liaquat Ali play upon the hosts of his country but also always highlighted the community of 'anti-communist interest' between the USA and Pakistan. A few days later it was reported that the Pakistani Prime Minister had secret talks in Washington with Defence Secretary Louis Johnson and the Joint Chief of Staff during which he had outlined Pakistan's arms needs, stressing his nation's strategic

6 Ibid.

strategic position and the fighting qualities of her anti-Communist Muslim warriors.⁷

Liaquat Ali coped successfully with hecklers who wanted to his unabashed flattery of the USA in quest of arms and resented throwing Pakistan's lot with the West without any reservations. He also skillfully avoided getting bogged down with specific or complex issues side stepping these with diplomatic wit. For instance, at a press conference in Ottawa on 30 May he complained that the people who asked him why he was buying arms did not appreciate the fact that Pakistan defended the Khyber Pass through which the subcontinent had been invaded ninety times. He added that he did not know what forces the Russians, whose territory lay a few miles north of the Khyber Pass had, because "they have not given me any intimation".⁸ Reviewing his visit to the USA and Canada on Radio Pakistan, he expressed himself satisfied with the talks he had with the statesmen of both countries regarding the problems facing Pakistan and also the question of her integrity and safety, and the supply of "such material which may be needed for strengthening and stabilizing Pakistan".⁹

7 Ibid.

8 Times of India (New Delhi), 1 June 1954.

9 Cited in Burke, n.5.

That Liaquat had gone to America in preference to the USSR was generally taken to mean that he preferred friendship with the United States to friendship with the Soviet Union. At least his American hosts put this construction on the meaning of his visit to their country and on his conduct and words there. He did not flinch from a declaration before the Congress that "the Pakistanis will stand and be counted among those who are devoted to freedom, regardless of the cost".

American enthusiasm for India diminished when India abstained from the vote on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution and, even more, when Prime Minister Nehru sent identical letters to Marshal Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and President Harry Truman urging a ceasefire and negotiations in Korea as well as the seating of representatives of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. In the Congress of the United States, men like Senator William F. Knowland (Republican, California) began voicing strong criticism of India and its Prime Minister.

In contrast to this American policies in Korea were vigorously supported by the Pakistani delegate to the United Nations, Muhammed Zafrullah Khan. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan asserted that it was the duty of all nations to support the UN forces in Korea and he shrewdly linked up his support for the American position with a reference to his country's dispute with India over Kashmir. Anxious as he was to send troops to Korea, Liaquat Ali Khan said, he was unable to do so because they were needed at home to meet a serious threat to the security of Pakistan.¹⁰

Similarly, the attitude of Pakistan to the efforts of the United States to conclude a peace treaty with Japan was favourable and cooperative. It provided, in the view of many Americans, a sharp contrast to that of India. In the San Francisco Conference itself, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Zafrullah Khan, was among the most enthusiastic supporters of the American position. He hailed the American proposal as "evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and the West" and as "a harbinger of even happier consummations". James Reston wrote appreciatively in the

10 General Assembly Official Records, Seccion 5, First Committee, p.96.

New York Times about 'the intrepid Pakistani delegate' who defended the treaty "not only against the arguments of the Soviet Union but against those of his neighbour, Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru of India".¹¹

Zafrullah Khan established warm ties of personal friendship with the American architect of the peace treaty, John Foster Dulles. The outright opposition of India to the treaty, and the enthusiastic approbation of Pakistan for it could not but have made some impact on the man who was to become two years later his country's Secretary of State.

In January 1950, the prestigious organ of the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, carried an article by William Barton which, apart from championing Pakistan's claim to Kashmir, forcefully called attention to the contribution that Pakistan could make to the cause of erecting a belt of Muslim nations as a barrier against "international communism" and its designs on West Asian oil.¹²

In a book published in 1951, Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, argued that Pakistan - not India - was the key country for West Asian defence. With the

11 New York Times, 7 September 1951.

12 Sir William Barton, "Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.28, pp.299-308.

advent of their air age, Caroe argued, Britain had begun to look westward for supplies and reinforcements. The process had been completed by the partition of India. "India is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defence, it stands on the fringe of the periphery. Pakistan lies well within the grouping of south-western Asia, as seen from the air". Caroe urged that the United States, with its immense stake in West Asian security and resources, should take note of the importance of Pakistan's potential role.¹³

Pakistan also kept under close observation the evolution of the American attitude to collective security in South-East Asia and the Pacific region. The American Roving Ambassador, Philip Jessup, had stated in Bangkok on 11 February 1950 that though the United States was not attempting to set up a military alliance in East Asia, it would view with sympathy any alliance that might be set up by Asian nations on their own initiative.¹⁴

Little progress was made in that direction during the following year, but Pakistan thought it appropriate to place itself on record as favouring the move. A Pacific defence pact might be long in coming, said Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan in

13 Sir Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London, 1951), pp.168, 179-80, 184, 188.

14 New York Times, 12 February 1950.

February 1951. However, he added: "If it came into effect, I imagine that Pakistan would be in it".¹⁵

Zafrullah Khan also kept careful watch on American moves relating to West Asian defence and sought to claim the privilege of charter membership for his country. No scheme of West Asian defence would be complete unless it included Iran and Pakistan; he declared Pakistani leaders also repeatedly expressed their interest in the formation of a Consultative Organization of Muslim States to review developments of mutual interest.

Despite the decision to move ahead with the Northern Tier Scheme, there was no great hurry within the administration on the project partly because of many other concerns and partly because there was a limit to how fast a system that was "designed to grow from within could develop". Military equipment and economic aid would be the instrumentalities. Acting Assistant Secretary of State John P. Jernegan told Congress that:

Military leaders in most of these states are relatively progressive and friendly toward the West, and are acutely conscious of the deficiencies of their own forces, and their need for

15 Ibid., 27 February 1951.

additional military equipment. He added that most of them would cooperate with the West, at least on a limited basis, provided this cooperation brought them significant benefit in the form of military equipment and did not involve any encroachment on national sovereignty.

Pakistani Objectives, Aftermath to
Liagat Ali Khan's Death

Pakistan was becoming increasingly keen to obtain US military and economic assistance. This can be better comprehended in the context of domestic developments. However, cultivating USA had to be reconciled with the claim that Pakistan's foreign policy was one of neutrality - nonalignment in fact, though not in name. Understandably, it did not want to depart too far in international politics from the other Muslim states, and Arabs had generally shown their opposition to Western Defense alignments and organizations. Although the Pakistanis had no desire to antagonize the USSR, this was hardly an imperative of Pakistani foreign policy. Indeed, at this point Pakistan could not be too particular. Its economy was in trouble and it badly needed arms. Neither the Muslim states nor the USSR could or would provide the support required.

After Prime Minister Liaquat Ali's death the Muslim League proved unable to govern the country effectively. There were frequent cabinet crises and constant political instability. There was trouble in the army e.g. in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, when several Generals were arrested in 1951 and charged with preparing to seize power for a foreign country. Widespread communal riots in West Pakistan early 1953 forced the government to declare martial law and use the army to reestablish order. The attempt to cut the army's budget during a period of general economic retrenchment led Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss the government and instal a new cabinet headed by Mohammad Ali of Bogra, then Ambassador to the United States, who had no substantial political following.¹⁶

Pakistan was under the control of the men aptly labelled 'hierarchs' - the senior military officers and civil servants. The hierarchs, the most prominent of whom were Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza, and Army Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan, had initiated the earlier

16 For details refer to Burke, n.5, and Sangat Singh's Pakistan's Foreign Policy - An Appraisal (Bombay, 1970).

attempt to secure military assistance from the United States. On 1 September 1953, the Government announced a halt to retrenchment in the armed forces. Events were unfolding in a manner which made working out an arms deal with the USA an increasingly attractive proposition.

It is not surprising that efforts to get arms from the USA - who were not unwilling to begin with - were stepped up. In an attempt to pressurise Washington into an early decision on military aid, word of US Pakistani discussions was leaked to the press. The Karachi correspondent for the New York Times stated that "discussions on a military alliance were to begin soon and that Pakistan "was willing" to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment".¹⁷ A visit of Ghulam Mohammad and Ayub to Washington in November was described in the Pakistani press as designed to conclude negotiations on an arms agreement.

The initial reaction of the US government to Pakistani pressure was negative. Not only did it dislike being pressurised, it also had not laid the political groundwork for an arms programme. The State and the Defense Departments

17 The New York Times, 2 November 1953.

had not yet received Presidential clearance or clarified and coordinated the precise shape and scope of such a programme. The State Department denied a story put out by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington that the two countries were about to conclude an arms pact, claiming that only "general conversations" had taken place.¹⁸ In his News Conference on 18 November, the President said the United States would be "most cautious" about any action that might cause trouble for India.¹⁹ Moreover, some officials still doubted the value of such a pact in its effect on US relations with India and, to a lesser extent, with Afghanistan. There was awareness that Pakistan's first concern was India, and there was much dispute as to just with Pakistan's attitude toward the USSR was, although some officials saw Pakistan as willing to cooperate with the West against the Communist bloc.

The public knowledge that negotiations were underway presented Prime Minister Nehru of India with a dilemma. He

18 Department of State Bulletin, vol.30, no.766, 1 March 1954, pp.327-28.

19 Times of India, 18 November 1953.

could hardly let the Communists or the right wing Hindu parties seize the issue to exploit it; yet, if he protested too vigorously, he might force Pakistan and the United States to move ahead. Ironically at this stage, the inevitable protestations of the Government of India only served to impart further momentum to these negotiations in Nehru's initial public comments on 15 November that the reports were only a matter of "intense concern to us" and that he was "watching these developments with the greatest care"²⁰. But the next day he warned that a U.S.-Pakistani alliance would bring the cold war to India's borders, with far-reaching consequences in South Asia. Determined to protect his domestic position, Nehru directed the Indian Congress Party to mount public protests and demonstrations against the programme.

India tried to dissuade Pakistan by warning that a military pact would damage the chances of reaching a settlement on Kashmir, and to get the United States to hold back by hinting that arms aid might cause India to move closer to the USSR. The Soviets and the Chinese also denounced the proposed programme.

20 Times of India, 16 November 1953.

This only served to convince the Americans that India was in agreement with the USSR and China, and in opposition to the United States, or at least "neutral on the side of the Communists". Indignation in the United States was widespread. American newspapers led by The New York Times denounced the Indian Government for "playing with fire" by the manner in which it opposed the programme. Vice-President, Nixon, who visited Pakistan and India in December also expressed the view that any attempt to back out of the programme would strengthen neutralism throughout Asia.²¹

It seems that Secretary of State Dulles and other US leaders felt that any backing down at this point would amount to letting Nehru 'control' American foreign policy.²² The arms agreement was finally approved on 8 February 1954 by the National Security Council.

The decision was generally received well in the United States, though a few public figures, such as Senator Fulbright and former Ambassador Bowles, some Asian scholars, and an

21 Please refer to emotionally charged coverage of this issue in the New York Times, November-December 1953.

22 See Townsead & Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, (London,).

occasional newspaper like the St Louis Post Dispatch remained opposed to it.

Subsequently, a treaty of political consultation and cooperation that Pakistan had been negotiating with Turkey during the second half of 1953 was signed in April 1954. Although a step toward the realization of the concept of the Northern Tier, it was not a defence treaty. While it is not clear whether this treaty was an explicit condition of US military assistance, there was an understanding that Pakistan would in time move in the direction of a regional defence pact. The State Department's press release on the Turko-Pakistani Treaty, referring to Secretary Dulles' earlier statement on the desire in the area for a collective security system, concluded that it was "of this character", adding that this made the decision to aid Pakistan more appealing by placing it in the context of America's general alliance strategy.²³

Turkey was obviously the key nation in any Middle Eastern Security Scheme. It was the strongest state in the area, firmly anti-Soviet, and willing to work closely with

23 Ibid.

the United States and the United Kingdom to create defensive strength on its eastern borders to prevent being outflanked by a Soviet attack. The Western position in Iran was going from bad to worse, for under Mossadegh's rule, rabid anti-British nationalism and Communist influence were both growing rapidly. The situation improved dramatically with the overthrow of Mossadegh and the return of the Shah in the summer of 1953, through the new government's preoccupation with strengthening its hold on the country and uprooting the Communists entrenched in government services kept Iran from focussing on foreign affairs. Beyond Iran was Pakistan, which seemed a potential source of strength. The British-Indian Army had fought in defense of the Middle East before; perhaps its successor forces would again have that mission.

Moreover, the United States believed it could be accepted as a non-colonial Western Power. But to the Arabs the fact that it was Western, allied to colonial powers, and a supporter of Israel, were the key points. To help alleviate Middle Eastern disputes, the United States tried to foster compromise settlements concerning the Iranian oil dispute, the Suez base, and the Sudan; it also pulled back somewhat from Israel and tried to take a more even stance in Arab-Israeli affairs.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF THE US-PAK ALLIANCE

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The political changes that took place both in Pakistan and in the United States early in 1953 accelerated the process of bringing the two countries closer. In Pakistan Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin on 17 April 1953 and named in his place a person who was widely regarded as favouring ever closer relations with the United States - Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who had served as Pakistani Ambassador to Washington. The appointment gave considerable satisfaction to decision-makers in the USA. In the United States itself the victory of the Republican Party installed into the White House a famous General, Dwight Eisenhower - the most powerful member of his cabinet was a man who was wholly in favour of carrying forward, with greater vigour, the task of "containing" the Sino-Soviet bloc - John Foster Dulles.

The Pakistani leaders sought to exploit the changed circumstances by indulging in what can only be termed unabashed diplomatic psychophancy. Referring to Dulles, Zafrullah Khan said, "If I may say so without imperitence, I have long admired the lofty views and noble concepts of

Mr Dulles. I have often had occasion to repeat the words with which he inspired us in San Francisco two years ago".¹ Dulles too was fortified in his favourable evaluation of Pakistani leaders as a result of his visit to Karachi in May 1953. Softened by such adulation it is not surprising that after his return from a tour of Pakistan, in his radio report to the American people after his return, Secretary of State Dulles praised the "spiritual faith and martial spirit" of the Pakistanis and asserted that they could be counted upon to serve as "a dependable bulwark against communism". In supporting before the House Committee on Agriculture a Pakistani request for food assistance, Dulles expressed warm appreciation of the approach of the Pakistani leaders towards international problems:

One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding view which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems. I am convinced that they will resist the menace of Communism as their strength permits. You know that Pakistan and the United

1 GAOR, Session 8.

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States have commonly supported the same views in the United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese treaty. 2

Two months after the thermonuclear explosion in the Soviet Union, high level discussions took place in Washington between the Governor General and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on the one side, and the President and Secretary of State of the United States, on the other. On 5 November 1953 the New York Times declared editorially that the talks between the two Presidents would "center about exploring the possibilities of military alliance between Pakistan and the United States".

Six days later, however, a State Department spokesman asserted that though informal discussions had been going on "for the last year or two" concerning Pakistan's role in West Asian defence, there was no truth whatsoever in reports that the United States and Pakistan were negotiating a pact

2 Press Release 313, 12 June 1953, Department of State Bulletin, vol.28, pp.890-91. Testimony of Dulles, US House of Representatives, 83 Congress, Session 1, Committee on Agriculture, Hearings, Wheat Aid to Pakistan (Washington, D.C., 1953), p.6.

for provision of military aid by the former to the latter in return for bases.³ In this curious fashion the State Department started a smoke-screen and, in the months that followed - indeed till the eye of the official announcement it assiduously kept on intensifying the smoke. Why such a course was decided upon by the United States is a mystery to which the present writers, to any rate, do not have a clear answer.

Thereafter came a series of pious denials by Pakistani and American leaders. In an interview to Le Monde, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan declared that Pakistan "never was and was not at present considering participating in a military alliance".

On 23 February 1954, newspapers all the world over carried a despatch from Karachi concerning a statement at a Press conference by the Pakistani Prime Minister. Mohammed Ali announced that Pakistan had requested the United States for assistance under the Mutual Security Act "for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a

3 New York Times, 13 November 1953.

higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter".⁴

On 25 February 1954, President Eisenhower announced that the United States intended to respond favourably to Pakistan's request. In obvious effort to conciliate Indian opinion, Eisenhower stated that under the Mutual Security Legislation the recipient country was specifically directed to use the equipment received solely for its internal security and legitimate self-defence or "to participate in the defense of the area of which it is part". The President added:

Any recipient country also must undertake that it will not engage in any act of aggression against any other nation. I can say that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with Congress to further steps. 5

4 The Hindu (Madras), 23 February 1954.

5 Dawn (Karachi), 26 February 1954.

A mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed between Pakistan and the United States on 19 May 1954 in Karachi. The US Government agreed to make available to Pakistan "such equipment, material, services or other assistance" as might be authorized in accordance with "such terms and conditions as may be agreed". It was stipulated that the Government of Pakistan should not, without the prior agreement of the United States, devote such assistance "to purposes other than those for which it was furnished". Along with the Agreement the Pakistani Government issued a Press note asserting that the Agreement did not establish a military alliance. Nor did it involve, the Press note said, any obligation on the part of Pakistan to provide military bases for the use of US forces. However, in an interview to US News and World Report, the Pakistani Prime Minister stated: "Of course, we will build bases to defend Pakistan - and in an emergency there should be nothing to prevent us from asking a friendly Power, including America (sic) to use those bases to help defend this region".⁶

6 Texts of the Agreements and Pakistani Press Note in Dawn, 20 May 1954. Text of the agreement appended to the dissertation in the Appendix.

Senator William Fulbright and Congressmen Emanuel Celler (Democrat, New York) were the outstanding Congressional critics of military aid to Pakistan. Chester Bowles, who had served as Ambassador in New Delhi, voiced opposition to the proposal as did Eleanor Roosevelt.

Virtually no notice was taken by Americans of the opposition to the military aid programme within Pakistan itself. In East Pakistan the United Front, led by Maulana Bhashani, vigorously opposed the pact and, in the elections held in April 1954, it trounced the ruling Muslim League Party in a decisive fashion.⁷

When in October 1958, parliamentary democracy was interred in Pakistan and General Ayub Khan seized the reins of power, the circle of American critics of military aid widened. By that time the Foreign Relations Committee, especially the Democratic majority, had become very vocal in its attack on aid to Pakistan.

The roster of the critics was impressive: John F. Kennedy (Massachusetts), Herbert Hamphrey (Minnesota), Mike Mansfield (Montana), John Sparkman (Alabama),

7 Pakistan Times, 2 April 1954.

Wayne Morse (Oregon), and Frank Church (Idaho). Even the Republican minority in the Committee did not have a single Senator who shared Pakistan's evaluation of the alleged danger to its security from India.⁸

The American military urgently sought bases around the periphery of Sino-Soviet bloc and it fell to the lot of Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to negotiate such arrangements with various countries of Asia that were likely to give the American military as much as possible of what is wanted. In the Indian subcontinent the United States would have welcomed with enthusiasm a cooperative attitude on the part of India. Rebuffed by India, the United States found Pakistan able, ready, and most willing to accommodate American requests in return for military assistance and some assurance of security. Pakistan strove hard in the four years before its adherence to the pacts to win the goodwill of the United States by supporting the American position on important international issues. This was primarily motivated by the desire to secure US arms to confront India.

8 India Quarterly (New Delhi), vol.16, pp.51-61. Also see M.S. Venkataramani, "The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and India, 1958-9".

The alliance with Pakistan and access to Pakistani facilities made it possible to fit in with the global strategy of containing Soviet expansion and deterring a Soviet surprise attack. American leaders were convinced, as has been mentioned earlier, that the Soviet Union could be deterred from launching a surprise attack on the United States only by the fear of massive retaliatory attacks from the innumerable American bases on its perimeter. The vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack lay in the fact that fiftyfive per cent of the population of the United States and about 75 per cent of its industry were concentrated in 170 metropolitan areas. That, for a number of years - at least until 1960 - the United States would lie in great peril of a surprise attack was the considered opinion of the veteran Air Force General, Curtis LeMay. He and other military experts told a Senate sub-committee that held hearings on "Air Power" in 1956 that the Soviet Union had thousands of aircraft more, in combat units, than the United States and was producing

them at a faster rate.⁹ The progress made by the Soviet Union in another vital field was revealed when, on 26 August 1957, Nikita S. Khrushchev announced that a long distance rocket had been launched and that the "results obtained show that it is possible to direct missiles into any part of the world". A few weeks later the Soviet Union proudly proclaimed the successful launching of a sputnik.

The operations of the U-2 had thus enabled the United States to leapfrog over the Iron Curtain. Its camera eyes had made Soviet territory virtually an open book for American military planners. Its aerial maps wiped out the serious deficiency of cartographic information concerning the Sino-Soviet landmass that had plagued American planners. For over four years the U-2 gathered information that the US needed urgently in order to obtain both strategic warning concerning hostile preparation and information concerning the nature and location of Soviet targets.

9 On the vulnerability of the US to surprise attack, see the statement of General Earle E. Partridge, Commander of the Continental Air Defence Command; excerpt in Eugene M. Emme, comp., The Impact of Air Power : National Security and World Power (Princeton, N.J., 1959), p.684. Excerpts from the testimony of General Curtis LeMay and others in US Senate, Congress 85, Session 1, Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on the Armed Services, Report, Airpower (Washington, D.C., 1957).

The willingness of Pakistan to permit the United States to use the Peshawar base for the highly secret and vitally important U-2 operations was one of the important factors for the continuance of American military assistance to that country. It is likely that the helpful and cooperative attitude of Pakistani rulers was not restricted only to U-2 operations. Even if it were only the U-2, the dividends reaped by the United States were well worth the price of the military aid. The United States thus received an important quid pro quo from Pakistan, and it was this aspect that Ayub Khan might have had in mind when he asserted in 1958 that by giving military aid the Americans "would not be doing us any great favour really; it would not be just kindness, it would be in their self-interest and self-preservation".¹⁰

Perhaps no other person had been so closely and continually associated with the evolution and implementation of Pakistan's military relationship with the United States as the new ruler of the country, General Ayub Khan. American leaders viewed him as a competent and dependable man who

10 General Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Strategic Problems of the Middle East", Asian Review (London), vol.54, p.225.

might succeed in providing some stability to his hard-pressed country.

On 24 April 1959, Ayub Khan suggested that "in the event of an external threat both India and Pakistan should defend the subcontinent in cooperation with each other".¹¹

What finally assisted Pakistan's diplomatic efforts was that the idea of a U.S.-Pakistani military relationship first came under serious consideration in Washington in 1951, at the same time that General Ayub was thinking of the United States as a source of military equipment. The US Air Force was interested in possible sites for air bases; other military strategists considered the manpower the Pakistani Army might furnish for use elsewhere in Asia. There was a vague but general feeling that by extending military assistance Pakistan's friendship could be won and its opposition to the Communist nations strengthened. Selig Harrison has rightly traced official American thinking on

11 Dawn, 25 April 1959, quoted in Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia (Bombay, 1964), p.73. Correspondent Ellie Abel wrote in the New York Times, (30 April 1959) about America's interest in encouraging India and Pakistan to draw closer towards each other.

defense of the subcontinent to the writings of Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province and Foreign Secretary of the British Indian Government. In his book Wells of Power (1951), Sir Olaf set forth the argument, which was openly directed to the Americans, that Western defense of the Middle East should be based on Pakistan, just as British defense of the Middle East had previously been based upon control of the subcontinent. Caroe's argument gave clear expression to a vague outlook already held by some US officials, who set great store by British thinking on strategic issues in unfamiliar lands. Though at this stage the US officials envisioned no formal military alliance or explicit defense commitment, at least in the near future. Soon after the appointment of Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade as Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South Asia and Africa in December 1951, the Pentagon was given approval by the State to discuss with Pakistan a limited arms assistance programme. Talks were held the following spring, and an agreement in principle was apparently reached by mid-1952.¹²

12 For details see William J. Barnes, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, pp.91-97.

Ambassador Bowles in New Delhi strongly opposed any arms aid for Pakistan. Nonalignment, he was convinced, was a firmly established Indian policy and not incompatible with US needs in Asia. If the United States extended military assistance to Pakistan, it would be exacerbating the tense relations between India and Pakistan, partly by adding differences over their approaches to the Cold War to their already formidable antagonisms. The Ambassador Bowles also argued that US arms assistance to Pakistan would antagonize Afghanistan, moving it closer to the USSR. George Kennan too opposed the deal, nor was the Secretary of State Dean Acheson enthusiastic. In any case, because of the objections of Bowles and Kennan, the uncertainties of other officials, and the fact that the Truman Administration was in its last months, the United States put off a final decision.¹³

The situation changed after the visit of Secretary of State Dulles to eleven countries in the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953. Dulles reported his impressions in a speech delivered over nation-wide radio and

television networks on 1 June. One of his conclusions was that:

Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grown out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other of the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.¹⁴ The United States, he made it clear, would stand behind and strengthen those countries that wanted help.

14 Cited in Towns and Hoopes, Devil and John F. Dulles (London,).

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

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The American arms aid to Pakistan holds a place of immense significance in the history of South Asian politics as it signifies a major American shift in attitudes and provides valuable insights into its regional interests, in particular in containing Russian South Asian region.

Asia figured prominently in US calculations. By virtue of its location, population, combination of actual weakness and potential strength, and efforts at nation building, the South Asian sub-continent presented itself an important area in this struggle for influence.

USA got involved in the Indian sub-continent because of the intensity of the global struggle between the Western and the Communist nations. The US attempted to rally the non-communist nations of the world to prevent further communist expansion.

Probably nothing has been as important as determining international political relationship in South Asia as the regional conflicts involving the sub-continent itself. These conflicts were created both for opportunities and dilemmas for India and Pakistan and for the outside powers

attempting to advance their own interests and gain influence in South Asia. Their needs for economic and military assistance have been and will remain important concern for India and Pakistan.

The circumstances leading to partition set the seal upon Indo-Pak hostility that has implacably shaped development in South Asia since independence was won on 15 August 1947. At the root of this enmity has been the uneasy co-existence of Hindus and Muslims in the sub-continent.

Partition occurred because most Muslims fearing that they would be second class citizens in an independent and united India, believed that a state of their own represented the only way to ensure their security and perpetuate their way of life.

One of the basic determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy has been that perceived threat to its security from India. It was in order to meet the imagined threat that Pakistan joined the alliance floated by the United States in fifties. Pakistan's foreign policy has been thus determined by national self-interest, enlightened or not as conceived by her leaders, the geo-political factors,

political aspiration and the need for economic development have played their role; of much more importance have been the special factors, viz, the ideology and commitments made during the struggle for Pakistan, the sort of equation established by the Muslim League leaders with ex-colonial power before and after formation of Pakistan and the mode of achieving independence. Besides, the foreign policy was tailored to Pakistan's domestic needs. The primary reason of Pakistan's distrust of India is a distinct feeling that, as of now, Pakistan has not been able to establish her complete national identity and even now Pakistan suspects that India has not reconciled with the partition.

Most Pakistanis have long argued that India's refusal to accept the two-nation theory and its implications (i.e. yielding the Muslim state of Kashmir) and Indian statement expressing a desire for a re-united sub-continent indicate that India has never truly accepted partition. Hence they conclude that India intends to seize their country when the opportunity arises.

Pakistan's foreign policy was, from the beginning, based on what its leaders have chosen to describe as a quest for security.

With specious pretensions of anti-communism, Pakistan joined the Western alliance system but with the transparent purpose of arming itself against India. Pakistan joined the West primarily to continue her policy of confrontation with India from position of strength to build her military strength so that it could deal with India on Kashmir issue and also from the very beginning Pakistan was not interested in South East Asian security from communist aggression; its sole objective of joining SEATO in 1954 was to acquire more military aid.

As is well known during fifties America's basic global interest was to contain international communism from every part of the world and USA, during Dulles era, was in search of Allies for the containment of Soviet communism. John Foster Dulles dubbed non-alignment as immoral on the premise: "Those who are not with us are against us". He was imbued with a missionary zeal against what he called "International Communism".

The strategic problems posed by the emergence of Communist China and the subsequent Communist Chinese intervention in Korea profoundly influenced the Americans strategic

thinking in the region. Policy makers in Washington were thoroughly disappointed when India refused to appreciate the American decline to endorse the Japanese Peace Treaty.

It has to be recorded to the credit of Pakistan's diplomats that they constantly strove to exploit all available opportunities to their advantage. Good use was made of different channels of communication to manipulate public opinion both at home and abroad in favour of a military alliance with the USA. Farsighted Liaqat Ali had begun the wooing of USA in 1949 and he was ably assisted in the task by the brilliant Zafarulla Khan. Subsequently, with the increasing ascendancy of military in Pakistan politics, even greater urgency of purpose was lent to this task./

However, without detracting from these exertions, it has to be emphasised that Pakistan's efforts at negotiating an arms deal with the USA were greatly facilitated by the 'logic of cold war' which contributed to the US disappointment with India and encouraged American statesmen and strategists led by Dulles to seek out allies all over the world to contain Communism. Without this coincidental, congruence of interest and a series of fortuitous

circumstances - Korean war and failure of parliamentary system in Pakistan, coming into power of a hawkish Republican Administration - the Pakistani diplomatic campaign could not have met with such an easy success.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENT

Karachi, 19 May 1954

The Government of Pakistan and the Government of the
United States of America

Desiring to foster international peace and security
within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations
through measures which will further the ability of nations
dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to
participate effectively in arrangements for individual and
collective self-defence in support of those purposes and
principles;

Reaffirming their determination to give their full
cooperation to the efforts to provide the United Nations
with armed forces as contemplated defence arrangements and
measures, and to obtain agreement on universal regulation
and reduction of armaments under adequate guarantee against
violation or evasion;

Taking into consideration the support which the Govern-
ment of the United States has brought to these principles by
enacting the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, as amended,
and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended;

Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern
the furnishing of such assistance;

Have agreed;

ARTICLE 1

1. The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as the Government of the United States may authorize in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing and use of such assistance shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance as may be made available by the Government of the United States pursuant to this Agreement will be furnished under the provisions and subject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, acts amendatory or supplementary thereto, appropriation acts thereunder, or any other applicable legislative provisions. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate

self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression, against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished.

3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equipment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and no longer required or used exclusively for the purposes for which originally made available will be offered for return to the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of Pakistan will not transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, property, information, or services received under this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise

of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.

6. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations under this Agreement.

7. The two Governments will establish procedures whereby the Government of Pakistan will so deposit, segregate or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from any programme of assistance undertaken by the Government of the United States so that such funds shall not, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, be subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organisation or Government.

ARTICLE 2

The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them relating to the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defence which will expedite such exchanges and at the same time protect private interests and maintain necessary security safeguards.

ARTICLE 3

1. The Government of Pakistan will make available to the Government of the United States rupees for the use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such rupees and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such funds.
2. The Government of Pakistan will, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, grant duty-free treatment on importation or exportation and exemption from internal taxation upon products, property, material or equipment imported into its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of any other country receiving military assistance.
3. Tax relief will be accorded to all expenditures in Pakistan by, or on behalf of, the Government of the United States for the common defence effort, including expenditures for any foreign aid programme of the United States. The Government of Pakistan will establish procedures satisfactory

to both Governments so that such expenditures will be net of taxes.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Government of Pakistan will receive personnel of the Government of the United States who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities and authority to observe the progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of Pakistan operate as a part of the Embassy of the United States of America under the direction and control of Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and will have the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to other personnel with corresponding rank of the Embassy of the United States who are United States nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States the Government of Pakistan will grant full diplomatic status to the senior military member assigned under this Article and the senior Army, Navy, and Air Force Officers and their respective immediate deputies.

2. The Government of Pakistan will grant exemption from import and export duties on personal property imported for the personal use of such personnel or of their families and will take reasonable administrative measures to facilitate and expedite the importation and exportation of the personal property of such personnel and their families.

ARTICLE 5

1. The Government of Pakistan will:

- (a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace;
- (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension;
- (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world;
- (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and
- (e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States.

2. (a) The Government of Pakistan will, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, furnish to the Government of the United States, or to such other Governments as

the Parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equipment, materials, services or other assistance as may be agreed upon in order to increase their capacity for individual and collective self-defence and to facilitate their effective participation in the United Nations system for collective security.

(b) In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the Government of Pakistan will facilitate the production and transfer to the Government of the United States, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Pakistan. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements of Pakistan for domestic use and commercial export.

ARTICLE 6

In the interest of their mutual security, the Government of Pakistan will cooperate with the Government of the United States in taking measures designed to control trade with nations which threaten the maintenance of world peace.

ARTICLE 7

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will continue in force until one year after the receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of Article 1, paragraphs 2, and 4, and arrangements entered into under Article 1, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, and under Article 2, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two Governments.
2. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this Agreement.
3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations.

Done in two copies at Karachi the 19th day of May one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four.

Source: Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy - An Appraisal (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1970), pp.199-204.

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