INTER ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1991-2001

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

ALOK OJHA

CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN, CENTRAL ASIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI -110067
2005

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
School Of International Studies
New Delhi -110067

Tel: 6107676, 6167557
Extn: 2365
Fax: (+91)-11-6165886
(+91)-11-6198234
Cable: JAYENU

Centre for Russian , Central Asian and East European Studies

Date:29 July 2005

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled, **INTER ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1991-2001** submitted by me for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

ALOK OJHA

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this Dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

(Prof Ajay Patnaik)
Chair person

Prof. Ajay Patnaik
Chairperson
Centre For Russian, Cen...
& East European Studies S...
International Stu...
...arlal Nehru J...
...Delhi...

(Dr Sanjay Kumar Pandey)
Supervisor

Dedicated
To
My grand parents
Shrimati Chavi Ojha
and
Shri Ram Bali Ojha

CONTENTS

PREFACE

Ethnicity is a modern phenomenon, which gained dominance with the emergence of nation-state. Conceptually ethnicity is a socially constructed identity, for some political or social purpose. Ethnic cleavages have security dimension. Ethnic cleavages can result in ethnic conflict, threats for minorities, secessionist and separatist movement. Ethnic cleavages are also related with border disputes emerging from irredentist claim, or imposition of citizenship regime on unwilling groups. Ethnic cleavages and its security dimension have special relevance in case of Central Asia owing to large ethnic heterogeneity in Central Asia. All this has been discussed in first chapter.

Barry Buzan's framework of security has been used to analyze the security threats from ethnic cleavages emanating from the region.

Second chapter, "Ethnic cleavages and internal security of Central Asian Republics", deals with relationship of ethnic cleavages and Internal Security in Central Asian Republics. It also deals with the causes and condition which triggers ethnic conflict. The relationship between two varies from one republic to other. Examples of each of the five Central Asian Republic have been illustrated.

Third Chapter deals with, "Ethnicity and its Inter-linkage with the Border Disputes", in Central Asian Republics. Due to Russia's policy of ethnic engineering borders between the republics are ambiguous and disputed.

Irredentist claims and unilateral demarcation of border, threat of cross border infiltration of militants etc. are external dimensions of security emanating from ethnic cleavages.

In Chapter four conclusion is given. It concludes that Central Asian Republics need to develop institutions to address grievance and resolve conflicts peacefully without the use of force. Effective conflict resolution mechanism, building of civic nationalism and multicultural citizenship can improve ethnic cleavages and pave the way to inter-ethnic harmony, integration and peace. Thus it can minimize potential threats emanating from ethnic-cleavages.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I bow before the mercy of almighty, the genius creator of cosmos, whose mercy and grace helped me to accomplish this task.

I am highly indebted and obliged to my guide Dr. Sanjay Kumar Pandey, whose wise counsel and supervision not only paved my way but also improved the quality of work. His cooperation and guidance helped me to accomplish this task.

Blessing and support of my Parents motivated me to enjoy the rigors to produce this work.

Sincere thanks to all my elders, and seniors whose prudent advice and comments helped me to improve the work. Last but not least I would thank my friends, Dorothy, Durgesh Verma, Avanish Singh, Satya Prakash, whose cooperation and support helped me in completing the dissertation.

Special thanks to Sanjay Photostat (Birendra and Mahender) ,who help in giving this shape to my work and gave technical support.

21/7/2005

Place: New Delhi

Alok Ojha

iii

CHAPTER – 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER – 1

INTRODUCTION

Theories and Concepts of Ethnicity

The word ethnic originated from Greek word Ethnos, a tribe belonging to a race or kin. Ethnic groups and ethnic minorities exist by virtue of long standing association across generations, complex relations of kinships, common culture and usually religious uniformity and common territorial attachments.[1] Racial and ethnic cleavages have been significant in politics. Race refers to genetic differences among human kind which supposedly distinguish people from one another on biological grounds like skin or hair colour, physique, physiognomy and the like. In practice, racial categories are largely based upon cultural stereotypes and have little or no foundation in genetics. The term 'ethnicity' is therefore preferred by many because it refers to cultural, linguistics and social differences, not necessarily rooted in biology.[2]

Ethnicity is a modern phenomenon, which gained dominance with the emergence of modern-nation state. Ethnic nationalism[3] based on ethnicity has been regarded as inimical to the nation state. In the present day world most of the states, are multi ethnic society. After the end of the cold war[4] there has been resurgence of ethnic nationalism, which led to disintegration of Yugoslavia and USSR.

---

[1] Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought*, (London , Macmillan Press, 1983), P.157.

[2] Andrew Heywood, 3rd ed., *Political Theory: An Introduciton*, (Baringstoke , Palgrave Macmillan Press , 2004), P.48.

[3] Hans Kohn originally made the differentiation between eastern nationalism (or ethnic nationalism) and western nationalism) Hans Kohns *The idea of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. Collier-Macmillan, 1967.

[4] Term invented by the US financer and Presidential Adviser Bernard Baruch in 1947 and given currency by Walter Lippman. It denotes a state of hostility between rival blocs specifically the western and soviet, involving economic, political and subversive action without overt war. (Roger Scruton).

Theoretically ethnicity is a categorical identity. Max Weber defines "An ethnic group is one whose members entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration".[5]

Paul Brass defines an ethnic group as "a group of people that uses cultural symbols to differentiate itself as a subjectively self-conscious community".[6]

Walker Connor stipulates "Nation is the self-consciousness of an ethnic group of itself as a nation, the only difference between nation and ethnic group then being this subjective self-identification".[7]

For the purpose of this study we can use the following definition of ethnicity: Ethnicity is a constructed social phenomenon. The concept refers to the idea of shared group affinity and a sense of belonging that is based on a myth of collective ancestry and a notion of distinctiveness. The constructed bonds of ethnicity may stem from any number of distinguishing cultural characteristics, such as common language, religion, or regional differentiation. Within a polity, the "markers" are widely known, internalized, and allow for easy categorization of individuals.[8]

Anthony Smith focuses on sophisticated connection between ethnicity and national identity. He stressed the extent to which modern nations emerged by drawing upon the symbolism and mythology of pre-modern ethnic communities, which he calls 'ethnies'[9]. The nation therefore is historically

[5] Max Weber, (A German Sociologist), "Essays in Sociology, translated and ed. H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills London (1948).P.15.

[6] Paul, R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, (New Bury Park CA Sage Publication Inc. 1991).

[7] Walker, Connor, Ethno-nationalism: The Quest for Understanding, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997).

[8] Thomas S. Szayna and Ashley J. Tellis,"Introduction," in Thomas S. Szayna (ed.), Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1188-A, 2000, pp. 13–14.The above definition, with slight variations, is widely used by scholars of ethnic conflict.

[9] Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations,(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986).

embedded. The terms ethnicity and nation are linked by degree of politicization. Ethnic elites use symbols of their shared ethnicity to manipulate the masses into a sense of nationalism which results in their common identification as a nation. Eric Hobsbawm regards nationalism as a bourgeoisie construct, hence it is artificial. In a similar vein Ernest Gellener regards nationalism as modernity project.[10]

Benedict Anderson a Marxist, in his work "Imagined Communities" regards nationalism as artificial construct based on some homogenizing characteristic. This homogenizing feature is invented.[11]

Ethnicity has continued prominence in much recent discussion on nation state. Nathan Glazier, Daniel Moynihan, Anthony Smith and Paul Brass in their works focus on various aspects of ethnicity and nation-state. Nation state indicates assimilative tendencies, while ethnicity or resurgence of ethnic nationalism indicates centrifugal or secessionist tendency.

After the end of cold war, there has been resurgence of ethnic nationalism.[12] Due to ethnic nationalism, nation-state has been witnessing problems of separatism and secessionism. However, this does not mean that problem of ethnic nationalism and ethnicity did not exist during cold war period. It existed during the cold war period also. However due to hostile relations between two superpower it remained latent or dormant.

Most of the nation-states are composed of more than one ethnic group. Many of them are trying to grapple with the problem of ethnic nationalism.

---

10 Ernest Gellener, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford, Blackwell edition, 1983), P.15.

11 Benedict Anderson, (A Marxist writer who expressed his views on nationalism in conformity to the ideas of Karl Marx.), *Imagined Communities*, (London: Vergo, 1991).

12 Three major periods of ethnic nationalist unrest have been identified. The first period was during the 19th century, when several small ethnic communities claimed some form of ethnic self-determination against large empires such as Roman and other empires. Second period started in mid 20th century decolonization that many postcolonial States in Africa, Asia and the Middle East experience. Third wave of other nationalism has manifested itself as a struggle for autonomy and separation. This has happened in parts of Western European as well as in Yugoslavia, Romanian, and Poland and in many other states in the wake of the collapse of the Former Soviet Union.

3

Despite the notion of multiculturalism[13], "melting pot" and "salad bowl", ethnic nationalism based on notion of homogeneity has been regarded as serious security problem for the nation state. Ethnic conflicts, irredentism,[14] ethnic nationalism, ethnic groups having loyalty for other nation-state, and ethnic groups who do not agree to the dominant model of nation-state are regarded as serious security problem for the nation-state. Ethnic diversity at time poses challenge to governance and to the prevailing concept of nation-state.

Some of the countries facing ethnic problems are Canada (Quebec French Nationalism), U.K. (Scotland, Wales), Spain (Catalonia, Basque Nationalism), France in Corsica and Brittany, Belgium in Flanders, China in Uighur (Pan Turkish Islamic movement), Italy in Northern League in Lombardy, New Zealand (Maoris), USA (Black power movement), Australia (ethnic aborigines), Rwanda (Tutsi/Hutsi tribes). Somalia, Sudan, Yugoslavia, and India are also grappling with one or other forms of ethnic problem.

The Modernization theories given by Karl Deustch and Black stipulate that ethnic identity would gradually disappear due to modernization in form of industrialization and urbanization. However, this theory has failed to explain the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in modern countries. Ethnic problems are on the rise and are challenging the concept of nation-state. Primordialist views

---

[13] Multiculturalism first emerged as a theoretical stance through the activities of the black consciousness movement of the 1960s, primarily in the USA. Multiculturalism reflects most basically, a positive endorsement of communal diversity usually arising from racial, ethnic and language differences. For further details see the work of Bhiku Parekh *"Rethinking Multiculturalism Cultural Diversity and Political Theory"* (Harvard , Harvard University Press , 2000) ,Brian Barry *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Harvard, Harvard University Press, 2001),John Rex (University of Warwick, UK)"Multiculturalism and Political Integration in Modern Nation State" available at http://seneca.uab.es/hmic/2005/miscelania/Multiculturalism%20and%20Political%20Integration.pd

[14] Irredentism: Originally, the policy and programme of the irredentists i.e., those activists who in 1878 and thereafter strove to unity and Italian-speaking region, into a single Italian state. Now used more generally to name any attempt to unity into one states regions some of which are regarded as subject to a power with no title to rule them, and all of which are thought to belong, by tradition, law, custom, and language, or nature, together. Roger, Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political thought,* (London,Pan Books in Association with the Macmillan Press, 1983), P. 235.

of Connor, Horowitz and Issac, that 'modernization leads to reinforcement, crystallization and articulation of ethnic identity' seems to be more relevant.[15]

Concept of Security

The concept of security with its societal, political and normative dimension dates back to state formations in different societies. It is with the emergence of modern state, that security got related to private property as opposed to e.g., the security concerns of the communities in ancient times, such as practiced among vedis (a tribe) regarding the common grazing grounds.[16]

Philosophers like Marx[17] and Lyotard[18] had negative opinion upon the property- security syndrome. The concept of national security originated in U.S.A. after Second World War. Concept of national security has been continuously evolving. Initially one group of scholars regarded national security as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats. And as a field of study it refers to the attempt to analyze the manner in which nations plan, make and evaluate the decisions and policies designed to increase this ability.[19]

Core values like system maintenance, economic and political interests in the nuclear age were early concerns of the security, and policy formulation was an important field of study. This paved the path for the study of conflict and cooperation concerned with maximization of national power (realist approach).

[15] The Primordialist approach focuses on the idea that ethnicity is a fixed characteristic of individuals and communities Lake and Rothchild Lake, D. A. & Rothchild, D.. *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion, and escalation.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (1998) pp. 5-7 called it Primordialist approach. (Connor, 1994; Isaac's, 1975; Kaplan, 1993; Smith. 1986; Van Den Berghe, 1981)

[16] Prof Rakesh Gupta, "India's National Security Internal Dimension: A Framework For Analysis", *Occasional Papers*, International Centre For Peace Studies New Delhi 2000 .P 9.

[17] Karl Marx, *'On the Jewish Question'*, Karl Marx, Frederich Engel's, *Collected Works*, Vol.2, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975).

[18] Jean Francois Lyotard, *Liberty is Insecurity*,(London, Polity Press, 1988).

[19] Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Rock, *National Security, International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, eds. David L. Sills, Vol.XI , Macmillan Pp.40-43.

Earlier concept of security was primarily related to military power and hardware. However later concept of security included economic, environmental, social and political problems and threats emanating from them. Now in study of security external as well as internal threats (social, centrifugal tendencies, environmental deterioration, economic backwardness and disparities, political instability, technologically backwardness, corruption etc. are also taken into account. Realist[20] focused on security dilemma[21] during cold war era. However, liberals give primacy to democratic peace thesis[22] and domestic democratic theory to attain sustainable peace. They favor building international institutions to promote security.

Constructivist security theory has different concept of security. It addresses the idea of security communities[23] in some details. Constructivist theories of security contend that the global politics has essentially social character in contrast with the firmly asocial world depicted by neorealist scholars.

Feminist theories have challenged the conventional view of state centric and military power view of security as masculine centered. J. Ann Tickner argues that international politics with its focus on state security has always been

---

[20] Realist (Morgenthau, E.H.- Carr, Clausewitzl) etc. believe in anarchical nature of international society due to absence of any central authority. They have pessimistic view about attaining permanent peace through democratization unlike liberals. For them propensity for aggression and lust for power is rooted in human nature itself.

[21] Security Dilemma arises when the action of one state in enhancing its military capacity, and hence its overall security, cause another state or states, to feel threatened or less secure. The first state may intend only to enhance its defensive, not offensive capabilities. But it will not necessarily be seen in this way by other states that may then set about further enhancing their own military capacities to meet what they perceive as threat. Thus a race for military builds up starts. Stephanie Lawson, *International Relations*, (London, Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishing Ltd). P.80.

[22] Liberals believes that democracy do not wage war on each other and resolve their differences peacefully through institutions and negotiations. Ibid .Pp 84-89

[23] Original idea of Security Communities was first developed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s in relation to the North Atlantic region and which emphasized the efficacy of shared understandings norms and values that could develop among states. (Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957).

a highly gendered activity.[24] Feminist theories of security regard eradicating gender hierarchies and inequalities and empowering women as prime concern of security.

Environmentalist regard environmental issues such as global warming, acid rains, deforestation, pollution, ozone hole and nuclear radiation as prime issues of security.[25] Environmentalists have also marked a shift from traditional state centric security approach.

Critical theory of security, like feminism, rejects the emphasis placed on the state and takes in a much broader array of factors. Critical theory is closely related to Marxist or socialist, a key focus for critique is global capitalism. In that it generates relentless competition for materials and resources. It is global capitalism and not anarchy that must be held responsible for much conflict and violence whether this takes place within or between states. Champions of Critical theory recognize that people within a state do not simply constitute socio-economic classes. It recognizes the importance of gender, religion, language and ethnicity as highly relevant. For Critical theorists any security agenda worth its name must be primarily concerned with the quest for human emancipation. Critical theory wants to transform the order to achieve the greatest possible measure of security through human equality.[26]

---

[24] Professor J.Ann Tickner researches feminist perspectives on international relations theory, with a particular focus on ways of re conceptualizing security. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York Columbia University Press,., 1992) The feminist theory" of war does not exist. Rather, a number of feminist arguments provide sometimes contradictory explanations and prescriptions. Feminist political theorist Jean Elshtain describes a "polyphonic chorus of female voices... At the moment [1987], feminists are not only at war with war but with one another." This chorus is not simple to categorize, and to cover a range of approaches I will need to oversimplify. Available at http://www.warandgender.com/wgfemini.htm

[25] James Lovelock's gave the idea of Gaia Hypothesis.The Gaia Hypothesis proposes that our planet functions as a single organism that maintains conditions necessary for its survival. The truly startling component of the Gaia hypothesis is the idea that the Earth is a single living entity with the capacity of self regulation. sense that the Earth is more than a sphere of rock with a thin layer of air, ocean and life covering the surface.available at http://www.experiencefestival. com/gaia_hypothesis

[26] Stephanie Lawson, *International Relations,* (Cambridge, Polity Press in association with Blackwell publishing Ltd. 2003), P.88.

Postmodern approach to security intends to deconstruct realist Meta narrative. It seeks to decentre the state as well as notions such as citizenship (which are tied to the state paradigms) and propose to broaden the scope of enquiry to include other possible forms of community and identity that might require security. Postmodern approach to security gives primacy to human security paradigm.[27]

Various scholars have adopted various paradigms to study security. For example Walter Lippman writes 'a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war'.[28] Arnold Wolfers writes "Security in any objective sense measures the absences of threats to acquired values and in a subjective sense the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".[29]

Booth and Wheeler write stable security can only be achieved by people and groups if they do not deprive others of it.[30] This can be achieved if security is conceived as a process of emancipation. Al Mashat defines security in terms of tranquility.[31] Robert Jervis enumerates the concept of "security regimes". "Security regimes occur when a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behavior of others".[32] Ayoob

---

[27] Ibid, P.89.

[28] John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2nd ed. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*,.(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.255.

[29] Ibid,P.255.

[30] Ibid, P.255.

[31] M.A.L. Mashat, *National Security in The Third World*, (Boulder and Laiden ,A Westview Replica., 1985).

[32] Ibid,.P.255

defines security in terms of poverty alleviation[33] whereas Azhar and Moon view national security in terms of hardware and software.[34]

According to Buzan, "Security is a complicated concept. On one hand five major factors Military, Political, Economic and Societal and Environmental, affect the security of human collectivities". On another hand, Buzan continues, the security of human collectivities involves three levels (individual, state and international).[35]

Hooman Peimani writes "Unlike most approaches to regional security, Barry Buzan's concept of "Security complex" and security offers an appropriate analytical tool for the study of Central Asia".[36]

In the words of Barry Buzan "A Security complex involves a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered".[37] Relation between ethnicity and security in Central Asia has been analyzed within the Barry Buzan's framework of security and security complex.

Relation between Ethnicity and Security

Ethnic sentiments are often believed to pose serious security threat to international and domestic security and to be the source of violent form of nationalism. However ethnicity is not always a security threat for nation-state. There are many more ethnic groups than there are ethnic nationalist

---

[33] M Ayoob, 'The Roots of Conflict', in Mohammed Ayoob edited *Conflict and Intervention in The Third World*, (Croom Helm, London, 1980).

[34] Edward D Azhar and Chung-in-Moon, *National Security in the Third World, The Management of Internal Development and Conflict Management*, (University of Maryland, Edward E Agar Publishing Ltd. 1980).

[35] Barry Buzan, *People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, (New Delhi, Tans Asia Publishers, 1983).

[36] Hooman Peimani, *Regional Security and the future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia*, (Westport, Praeger, 1998), Pp.15-16.

[37] n.28.p.255.

9

movements. Ethnic heterogeneity can become a serious security threat if state discriminates among ethnic group or if state has lost legitimacy due to its failure to pursue socio economic development and redistribute the economic and other benefits prudently keeping the goal of social justice in view. In addition there should be institutions for conflict resolution mechanism and to ventilate the grievances of the masses. Democracy should deepen to provide enough opportunity for participation of various groups. In absence of this security problem can arise due to alienation of a particular group.

According to John Baylis, one group of security analyst regards ethno-national groups rather than nation-state as the core of security studies.[38] Security in present context has wide connotation. It not only covers external military threat but also internal problems which are posing threat, to individual life and property, society and nation-state. Various definition of security shows the linkage between ethnicity and security. For instance Barry Buzan writes in the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. Now this threat can be thwarted if socio-economic and political development is pursued adequately.

Factors of ethnicity may lead to formation of deeply divided society lacking social capital[39], hence adversely affecting social harmony and cooperation. In the case of economic development, particular ethno group may not be willing to disseminate important information about, business, technology and skills in order to enjoy the monopoly over economy or particular sector of economy. This hinders healthy economic competition and thus is inimical to economic development. Moreover ethnic conflicts and riots often force migration of minor ethnic groups thus adversely affecting market and particular

---

[38] John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2nd Ed. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), P.255.

[39] Social Capital term coined by J.S. Coleman, used by Robert Putnam in comparative study of North and South Italy. Robert Putnam also uses the concept of social capital in his book, *Bowling Alone*. Social Capital means trust and cooperation between persons and people. Recently World Bank has used social capital as an indicator of development.

sector of economy. Threat is even severe at political level; majority-minority syndrome may appear in multi-ethnic nation-state. Majorities may be suspicious about minorities and vice versa. This hinders national integration and building of strong and effective state.[40]

Moreover majoritarianism may aggravate the fear of minor ethnic groups; it has serious security implication for individuals of minority groups. Resurgence of ethnic nationalism and its conversion into secessionist movement may pose serious threat to unity and integrity of the entire nation-state. Bureaucracy and Political elites often have ethnic proclivities. Bureaucracy having ethnic loyalty is inimical to the nation-state because bureaucrats often give more importance to ethnic interest rather than national interest. This diminishes the prospect of national interest and national development. Such a partial and corrupt bureaucracy not only erodes legitimacy of state but also further aggravates ethnic tension. Political elites often politicize ethnic groups to gain legitimacy and political power. However in long run this sharpens the cleavage between various ethnic groups and may result into ethnic conflict. Last but not the least, inter-ethnic and intra ethnic conflicts may lead to loss of life, property of individual and can seriously disturb political stability, social harmony and prospects of economic development.

Environmental problems may emerge in multi ethnic society, by the logic of competitive use of common resources. Garret Hardin proposed a particularly influential model to explain why communities may over exploit shared environmental resources even where they know that they are doing so and are aware that it is against their long term interests.[41] Factors of irredentism based on ethnic factors may lead to conflict between neighboring states or may

---

[40] Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* ,(New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003) P. 4

[41] Competitive use of common resources degrades natural resources and consequently degrades environment. Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of Commons", *Science,* Vol. 162: 1968, Pp.1243-8.

lead to border disputes and strained relations. Factors of irredentism, Diaspora and ethnic nationalism may have adverse impact on security complex.

Ethnic nationalism, irredentism, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing, etc may prevent the evolution of security regimes thus reducing the capability of nation-state to manage their border disputes. This shows the linkage of ethnicity with external security. Ethnicity and irredentism may trigger border disputes, which aggravates external security of nation-state. Majority minority syndrome, based on ethnicity may deprive ethnic minorities of their right. This may promote insecurity among minorities. Ethnic conflict resulting into riots and civil war is inimical to tranquility.[42]

Thus at theoretical level there are linkages between ethnicity and security. However relation between ethnicity and security varies from one region to another and from one country to another. Security problems emanating from ethnicity varies with time and space.

Cause and Nature of Ethnicity in Central Asian Republics

Disintegration of USSR in December 1991 led to emergence of 15 independent states.[43] All the post-soviet states, including Russia, are multi-ethnic states themselves and therefore, they are faced with the problem of integration of minorities.

Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan are ethnically heterogeneous societies. Central Asian Republics are multi ethnic states in poly ethnic societies. Ethnic composition of each of the Central Asian Republics differs from each other. Hooman Peimani writes that there are three main ethnic and linguistic groups, Turkic, Iranian and

[42] Anthony Hyman "Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics," *Conflict Studies 273*, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, August 1994, Pp.8- 10.

[43] Summary of world broadcast published by BBC London,(henceforth SWB) ,SWB / SU/1257/B/2 27 December 1991

Russians. There are also small communities of Ukrainians Germans and Jews. Ethnic heterogeneity in Central Asian Republics is the product of many factors:

a) Geographical and Climatic Factor

Ellsworth Huntington said "climate governs civilization".[44] Central Asian Republics have diverse terrain, climatic condition and soil. Champions of Environmental determinism hold the view that environment and geographical condition shape the life of man.[45]These geographical factors have shaped the culture, life style and food habits of indigenous tribes like Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks. It is the climate which governs clothing and life style of man, for example man of mountainous cold area shall wear different cloth from a person of warm plain areas. Moreover life in mountains is tough in comparison to plains. Consequently lifestyle of a person dwelling in mountainous region differs from a person living in plain areas. Availability of fertile land, water and vegetation depends on the variation of geographical factors. These factors make agriculture possible and have direct bearing on lifestyle. In totality geographical and climatic factors shape life and culture of man. For instance Pamiris and Ghramis dwelling on Pamir Mountains have different lifestyle, food habits, clothing and culture from people living in plains of Ferghana. Similarly dwellers of forest and desert have different life style and habits.[46] Thus geographical factors in long run causes development of different cultures and lifestyle suited to their environment.

Keely Lange writes "The primary difference delineating Central Asians has been nomadic versus settled lifestyles. The nomads to the north and south,

---

[44] Ellsworth Huntington , *Civilization and climate,* (New Heaven, Yale University Press. 1915)

[45] E.C Semple disciple of Ratzel is founder of Environmentalism. She said "Man is the product of Earth". *Influences of Geographic Environment.*(New York: H. Holt & Co. 1911)

[46] For further details see Ellsworth Huntington,, *The Pulse of Asia: A Journey in Central Asia Illuminating the Geographic Basis of History,* (Archibald Constable and Co., London, 1907).

13

the Karakh/Kygyz and the Turkmen, respectively, recognized themselves as different from the agriculturist and the oasis city dwellers. The nomads were divided by tribe but these formed political, as opposed to ethnic/racial/linguistic, groups.[47]" Thus geographical conditions have played positive role in enhancing ethnic heterogeneity. Ethnicity based on region has been determined by geographical conditions.

b) Historical migration and commingling

The current ethnic makeup of Central Asia is the result of a process that began 1400 years ago. Today Central Asia is mainly Turkic, although its indigenous inhabitants were Iranians. In the westward migration of the Aryans various Iranian peoples settled in the Iranian plateau consisting of Central Asia. Despite the gradual settlement of other peoples the region maintained its Iranian ethnic makeup until the sixth century.[48] The ethnic link between the Turkic Central Asians and Turkey can be traced back to the migration of Central Asia Turkic tribes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. With the arrival of Turks Islam came to Central Asia. However, every indigenous tribe of Central Asia adopted Islam in modified form. Thus Islam failed to bring homogeneity in Central Asia. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turks each have adopted unique version of Islam in conformity with their culture and life style. This further promoted ethnic heterogeneity based on religion. The Turkmen Oghuz tribe led by Selijuq (Seljuk) founded the Seljuq dynasty (1040-1118) that ruled the region.[49]

---

[47] Keely Lange, "Do Borders make a nation? A New Analysis of Identities with a focus on Central Asia", *Regional Studies,* vol.15, no.4, (Autumn) 1997, Pp.75-97.

[48] Hooman Peimani, *Regional Security and the future of Cenral Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia,* (Westport, Praeger, 1998), P.44.

[49] ibid Pp. 44-45

Mongols invaded Central Asia in the Thirteenth century and completed the Turkification process of its settled part. Since most of the nomads brought to the region by the Mongols were Turkic peoples , gradually commingling of Turks Iranians and Mongols with indigenous tribes resulted into further ethnic divisions.[50]

In Pre-Soviet era there were three main languages, which served different purposes in the region. All Central Asians used the Persian script. Persian was the administrative and cultural language of most Central Asians while Arabic was their religious language. Joghatai Turkic was the oral and literary language of the Turkic peoples. Thus linguistic division has further promoted ethnic heterogeneity based on the language in the region.[51]

c) Russian Annexation

Russian Annexation of Central Asian Republics changed its ethnic and linguistic composition by introducing ethnic Russians and the Russian language to the region.[52] To appease the central Asians, Russia did not try to change completely the social structure of the region but it exercised a degree of Russification to secure its interest. Settling Russians and promoting their language in Central Asia were major elements of this policy. Russian settlers arrived in significant numbers (mainly to Kazakhstan) in the first half of the eighteenth century but their numbers increased drastically in the nineteenth century.[53] Many Russians settled in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to develop the

[50] Rashid Ahmad,*The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994)

[51] ibid P. 45

[52] ibid,. P.44.

[53] Rywkin, Michael. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia.* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1982). Examines the effectiveness of Moscow's policies for the Central Asian Republics Pp.4-5.

so-called surplus land.[54] Formal annexation of the region brought many more Russian settlers, military personnel and bureaucrats.[55]

d) Policy of Ethnic Engineering and Russification

The Bolshevik Revolution had a great impact on the social makeup of the region. The Soviet regime enthusiastically implemented a policy to change the ethnic and linguistic structure of Central Asia in order to eliminate the possibility of its future secession and to ensure its docility to Moscow. This policy of dividing and conquering was translated into two schemes: ethnic engineering and Russification. Although their essence was to secure the interests of unpopular central government, what made them distinct form the Russification program of Tsarist Russia was their objective (i.e., changing the social fabric of the region), systematic implementation and high degree of success.[56] The Soviet objective was to replace the Central Asians culture and history with an artificial sense of belonging to distinct ethnic and linguistic groups.[57] Creating a Soviet people in place of many nationalities- that is, a Russian-speaking people loyal to Moscow- was the final goal of this policy.[58]

According to Anita Sen Gupta "Soviet nationality policy was based on the assumption that ethnic differences were relics of the past and eventually doomed to dissolve under socially engineered programme of modernization".

---

[54] Ibid,, Pp.15-16.

[55] Ian Murray Matley, 'The Population and the land', in Central Asia: 120 years of Russian Rule. Ed Edward Allworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989),Pp.103-4.

[56] Hooman Peimani, n.48,.P.45.

[57] Ali-Reza Sheykh-Attar, The Roots of Political Behaviour in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Tehran: Center of Central Asian and Caucasian Research in the Institute for Political and International Studies, 1992), 146, 161, 182; Document Publishing Unit of the Center of Central Asian Research, "A Glance--Part I,"232. Iranian Cultural Heritage Organization Documentation Centre, Pp.17-21.

[58] Nicholas V. Riassanovsky, A History of Russia, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).Pp.576-77. For details of the Soviet nationality policy , see Geoffrey Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, (London: Fontana Press/Collins,1986,Pp.225-260).

The "national- linguistic" cornerstone of the territorial divisions, based on a core nationality, however, ensured the continuance of ethnic factor"[59].

The policy of ethnic engineering aimed at the creation of "ethnically based" Republics. After several divisions and re divisions of the region, the soviet regime finally created five "ethnically based" Republics, each named after one specific "dominant" ethnic group. The planners deliberately drew borders in such a way that mono ethnic regions were divided among different republics, leaving large numbers of ethnic minorities in each republic. The ethnic policy could not be completed without the imposition of a "national language" on each republic. The Soviet regime gradually imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on the Central Asians in order to cut their ties with their past and also with other Persian and Turkic speakers elsewhere, to facilitate their Russification and to minimize regional interaction.[60] During a process that lasted until the 1930s, the Soviet regime replaced the Persian script first with a modified Persian script, and then with the Latin script; the later was finally replaced by a modified Cyrillic script.[61] Each Central Asian republic adopted a unique version of the Cyrillic alphabet to further magnify linguistic differences and legitimize the division of the region along ethnic and linguistic lines.[62] Thus the ethnic engineering policy of Russia created deep ethnic cleavages and paved the ground for ethnic and linguistic discrimination thus making ethnic conflict inevitable in future. At the same time such deep ethnic cleavages posed a serious problem in building an independent nation state for these regions because such nationalism would surely awaken nationalism among the ethnic minorities and would attract the hostility of regional state.

---

[59] Anita Sengupta, "Minorities and Nationalizing States in Central Asia", *International Studies*, vol.34, no.3, 1997, Sage Publication, New Delhi. Pp. 269-300.

[60] Hooman Peimani .n.48,P.45.

[61] Shahrani, Nazif, "The Muslim Central Asia: Soviet Development Legacies and Future Challenges", Translated by Homeria Moshirazadeh", *The Journal of Central Asia and Caucasia Review* 1, No.3, (Spring 1993), P.99.

[62] Ibid., P.100.

The Soviet Russification scheme consisted of several policies. Many people of European origin, including Russians, Ukrainians, and Volga Germans, were settled in Central Asia in order to change its ethnic structure and make it more responsive to Soviet needs.[63] The majority of these Russians were not recent immigrants from Russia. They came to Central Asia in imperial waves of migration in the Tsarist period, under the cultivation expansion programme in the 1920s and 1930s or later under the Virgin Lands programme of Khrushchev. In most cases, except in Tajikistan, they were born in these states.[64] These peoples, most of whom were Russians, were mainly put in charge of sensitive affairs. The Russians also attracted, educated, and trained young Central Asians to create regional Russified elite.[65] The Russification scheme also targeted the indigenous languages in order to ensure a prominent status for Russian, the "supra ethnic language", as the means of communication of all Soviet citizens.[66] The adopted Cyrillic alphabets facilitated the Russification of the regional languages as now Russian words could easily be integrated into local languages.[67] Thus policy of Russification dominated and sidelined regional languages and culture. Local people could not get access to elite jobs. This created a discontent among the indigenous people which later resulted into hostility towards the settled Russians in various parts of region. Hence policy of Russification played vital role in creating conflict between Russians and non-Russians in future.[68]

Anita Sengupta writes "Today the post-soviet states though ethnically heterogeneous, are being conceived as nation-states and there is a project to

---

[63] Attaie, Farhad, "A Retrospctive Glance at the History and the Current Situation of the Central Asian Republics", *The Journal of Central Asia and Caucasia Review 1*, No. 3, (Winter 1993), P. 158.

[64] Anita Sen Gupta,n.59 p.272.

[65] Farhad,n.63,p. 158.

[66] United States Institute of Peace, "Afghanistan and Central Asia", Vol. 35, Hosking, History, p.249.

[67] Shahrani, Nazif,n,.61. p.99.

[68] Hooman Peimani n.48,.p.45.

promote the language, culture, demographic position economic development and political hegemony of the ethnic group after which the state is named. This programme of nationalization of political space in the region has meant that a large number of people are now left outside their own national territory or do not have one at all. This also means that in common with each stage of nation-state formation, question of "national majorities" and "national minorities" have come sharply to the forefront once again[69]". "Ethnicity in Central Asia is the result of deterritorialization caused by Soviet nationalist policy" of national delimitation.[70]

e) Sharpening Ethnic Cleavages and Conflicts

Ethnic cleavages and conflicts have intensified due to difference between privileged and disadvantaged groups. The main explanation of politicization of ethnicity stresses the importance of inequality in the distribution of available resources, social benefits and opportunities between distinct ethnic groups. In its simplest from; the argument contends that ethnic resurgence arises in response to objective exploitation of an indigenous group by an alien group or of one social class by another.[71]

With failures in governance resulting in a loss of regime legitimacy and undermining the notion of "citizenry," identity cleavages are serving to absorb the wandering loyalties of a disaffected citizenry. These identity cleavages are the nucleus around which Violent Non State Actors recruit members and develop group cohesion. Some of the most complicated identity issues in the world are found in Central Asia. While much literature regarding identity conflict is based exclusively on ethnicity, this is only part of the Central Asia

---

[69] Anita Sengupta, n.59. Pp.269-300

[70] Anita Sengupta, "Beyond Boundaries- Identity Nationality and Consciousness in Central Asia", *Contemporary Central Asia* , vol.11, no.1, March 1998,pp.54-69

[71] Shams-ud-din "The Ethnic and Religious Revivalism in Central Asia" Shams-ud-din ed. *Nationalism in Russia and Central Asian Republics: Unfinished Democratic Evolution*, (New Delhi, Lancers Books), 1999, .P.190.

Republics' identity puzzle. Other pieces include economic, regional, and religious identities.[72]

Here in the chapter Primordalist approach[73] on ethnicity is rejected and Constructivist approach has been followed.

According to Anita Sen Gupta "Soviet nationality policy was based on the assumption that ethnic differences were relics of the past and eventually doomed to dissolve under socially engineered programme of modernization". The "national- linguistic" cornerstone of the territorial divisions, based on a core nationality, however, ensured the continuance of ethnic factor".[74]

The compulsions of new state formation in the Central Asia during post Soviet era have meant an increased emphasis on national identity. In Central Asian Republics the formation of a national identity is not unproblematic since sub national ties are strong even today. Assertion of "ethnic identity", which has accompanied the current stage of state formation, has meant the compelling political need to identify the "other".

Cross border ethnicity persists in Central Asian Republics. In words of Keely Lange, "Boundary of nation and state do not coincide in case of Central Asian Republics".[75] Thus giving rise to multiple ethnic identities. Moreover, modernization project has failed to blur the ethnic distinction of us and them. The politics of scarcity, competition, ethnic mobilization of masses by political leaders etc have sharpened the ethnic cleavages. "Central Asia is characterized by a multi-ethnic population, as it includes more than 130 nations and

[72] Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser INSS Occasional Paper 43 May 2002Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State Actors in Central Asia USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy, Colorado available at http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/OCP43.pdf

[73] The Primoridalist approach essentially states sociological groupings exist in a society based on natural differences—physical, biological, and racial—which then become the criteria for social judgment and differentiation. Such an approach inevitably leads one to conclude that conflict is essentially a return to primitivism, and nothing can be done.   -

[74] Anita Sen Gupta, "Minorities and Nationalizing States in Central Asia", International Studies, vol.34, no.3, 1997, Sage Publication, New Delhi .Pp 269- 274

[75] Keely Lange, "Do Borders make a nation? A New Analysis of Identities with a focus on Central Asia", Regional Studies, vol.15, no.4, (Autumn) 1997, Pp.75-97.

nationalities".[76] There are various ethnic identities in five Central Asian Republic on which distinction of us and they exist. Anita Sengupta writes, 'numerous ethnic cleavages… complicate the situation in the region.[77]

First cleavage is between Russian and non-Russian population, second is between Muslim and non-Muslim, third is between adherents of Persian culture and Turkish culture. Fourth cleavage is between regional tribes like Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Turki, Tajiks, etc. On the basis of language, culture and clans other ethnic cleavages exist.

There are large ethnic minorities in nearly all the five Central Asian Republics. In Kazakhstan, Russian (38%), Germans (6%), Uzbeks (2%), Tatars (2%), Uyghurs(1.1%) and others (10.9%) are minorities. In Kyrgyzstan Russians (22%), Uzbeks (13%), Ukrainians (3%), Germans (2%), Tatars (2%) Tajik and Ughurs (6%) are minorities. In Tajikistan Uzbeks (23.5), Russian (7.6%) and Jews, Tatars and Ukrainian (6.6%) are minorities. In case of Turkmenistan, 72% of population is Turkmen and minorities are Russians (9.5%), Uzbeks (9%), Kazakhs (2.5%), Ukrainians and Tatars (6%) and others (1%). In Uzbekistan 71% population is Uzbek and ethnic minorities are Russians (8%), Tajiks (5%), Kazakhs (4%), Tatars (2%), Kara kalpaks (2%), Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uyghurs, Jews and Koreans (8%)[78]. Further Central Asian republics are divided on the basis of clans and family. In addition Regional ethnic heterogeneity also occurs in Central Asia. Nature of ethnic heterogeneity is described in tabular form in Appendix 1. These tables describe linguistic, religion and various ethnic groups. It also describes trend in population and main settlement area of various ethnic group.[79]

---

[76] I.S Boljurova "Central Asia-Search for Priorities" *Contemporary Central Asia* 11(2) September 1998 P.9

[77] Anita Sen Gupta,n.59,.Pp 269- 274

[78] Bess Brown, "Central Asia: The Economic Crisis Deepens", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.3, No.1, 7 January 1994, 61, P.64-68.

[79] www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

CONCLUSION

There are various definitions of ethnicity. For the purpose of the work ethnicity is regarded as socially constructed phenomena, the concept refers to the idea of shared group affinity and a sense of belonging that is based on a myth of collective ancestry and a notion of distinctiveness. Ethnic heterogeneity has security ramifications. Ethnic heterogeneity is necessary but not a sufficient cause for conflict. Various definitions and approaches of security coexist like Feminist, Realist, Liberal, Postmodern and Critical etc.

On the basis of Barry Buzan's concept of security, this study has analyzed the security threats emanating from interethnic cleavages.

At theoretical level there exists a linkage between interethnic cleavages and security. Interethnic cleavages has serious security ramification not only for the security of nation state but also for the security individuals.

Inter ethnic cleavages in general, has security ramifications for the world but in particular for the Central Asian republics. This is due to the fact that Central Asian Republic has complex ethnic heterogeneity and they are going through the process of nation state building. Such complex ethnic heterogeneity is product of geographical condition, historical invasion and migration of people, Russia's colonial rule and Russia's policy of ethnic engineering.

Regional, religious, clan, tribe, linguistic and culture based ethnic identities exist in Central Asia.

CHAPTER – 2

ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND INTERNAL SECURITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

CHAPTER – 2

ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND INTERNAL SECURITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

This chapter intends to analyze ethnic cleavages in five central Asian countries and its ramification on internal security. All five Central Asian Republics are multiethnic states in poly ethnic societies. This study examines the ethnic and socio cultural identities in the states of Central Asia and their linkages and connections, with internal security.

The study also looks into the major factors that have kept intrastate tensions and strife in check. It also analyzes why and how tension can develop between the smaller identities and the state-centric identity, resulting in reinvigoration of the transnational linkages of these identities with implications for political stability and security. Geographical political historical and cultural factors are responsible for variation in nature of ethnic cleavages in Central Asian Republics.

After 1990s, there has been growing ethnic consciousness among the people of the Central Asia[1]. In Central Asian Republics there have been numerous instances of ethnic conflict, ethnic discrimination and secessionist movement on the basis of socially constructed ethnic identity[2]. However ethnicisation is a very complex process. Till now there is no consensus on the cause and factors behind the growth of ethnic consciousness and increasing cthnic tension and ethnic conflict. Nor are there any reliable predictions of how they will develop in future. There is no one to one relation between ethnic

---

[1]   John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2nd Ed. *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*,.(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), Pp .255-256

[2]   SWB /SU/0789 B/1   13 June 1990 "Kirghiz Death Toll Reaches 139",. SWB/SU/1477 C1/3   4 September 1992 Reports Of Tajik Civil War,. etc

cleavage and security. Relation between ethnic cleavage and security varies from one Central Asian Republic to other.

By itself, ethnic heterogeneity is a necessary precondition but insufficient for ethnic conflict to occur. Even the politicization of ethnicity is an insufficient cause of conflict. Actual catalysts are tied to some form of group-level grievances and a perception of threat and insecurity at the group level[3]. Willingness to compromise and mechanisms for conflict resolution generally are not as well developed in authoritarian regimes as they are in democratic ones[4]. Moreover, authoritarian regimes, by definition, tend to be more arbitrary, less transparent in decision making, less willing to allow popular input than democratic regimes, and more prone to foster a climate of group-level insecurity[5]. For all these reasons, authoritarian regimes are not as efficient and effective in heading off severe ethnic conflict[6]. The lower restraint of authoritarian regimes toward the use of coercion amounts to an alternative mechanism for deterring ethnic conflict, but generally it is not an efficient way to deal with group-level grievances[7]. Central Asian states vary in the degree of authoritarianism. Some of them are less authoritarian like Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the most authoritarian. Mateeva Anna comments about Turkmenistan "The country's

---

[3] Thomas S. Szayna: Potential for ethnic conflict in the Caspian region. website http://www.rand.org/publications/MMMR/MR1598/MR.ch6.pdf

[2] ibid,. P.8.

[5] http://www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/061505.htm

[6] World Bank report June 2001on governance available on http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/7979cd2f8ed149a885256a940073f4e8/$FIL... -

[7] The analysis here rests on previous RAND work concerning the emergence of ethnic conflict (Szayna, *Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict*). The three-stage model developed in that work traces the development of ethnic and communitarian strife, beginning with the conditions that may lead to the formation of an ethnic group, then the group's mobilization for political action, and ultimately its competition with the state. The model integrates diverse insights offered by various theories that focus on separate aspects of ethnic and communitarian strife—such as relative deprivation of the populace or the extent of state capacity—into a comprehensive model that speaks to the entire *process* of ethnic mobilization, from the structural roots of conflict all the way to social reconciliation or state breakdown. The model also allows predictions based on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the specific state and group. Potential for Ethnic Conflict in the Caspian Region 177

tribal disunity has been one of the most influential determinants of the centralized repressive political system[8]."

In the wake of deepening socio economic crisis in recent times regimes have become more authoritarian in Central Asia. They have also become more entrenched[9]. The combination of authoritarian regimes and the presence of large ethnic minorities in most of the states of the CAR region does not mean that ethnically based conflict will necessarily occur, but it does mean that some of the preconditions for such strife are in place because individuals and groups may not have access to conflict resolution mechanisms or ways to channel their grievances in a peaceful fashion .In terms of ethnically based grievances, the pursuit of nation-building and "ethnic redress" by the regimes in power in all of the CAR states are probably the most important factors because of their symbolism and their implications for the ability of the non favored citizens to identify with the country[10].

Regimes in the CAR region have their base of support in ethnic groups eponymous with these states and, since gaining independence, each of them (with varying intensity) has pursued policies that aim to strengthen its hold on the structures of power and thereby institutionalize its newly dominant position. In short, the CAR states are "nationalizing" states (to use Rogers Brubaker's term[11]) in that they pursue policies that aim to assimilate, marginalize, or expel the non dominant ethnic groups.

Although the pace of "nationalizing" varies from country to country, the long-term goal of the regimes is clear, to build a large ethnically based pillar of support by shifting the status stratification map to ensure that the eponymous

---

[8] Mateeva Anna, Democratization , Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia, *International affairs*, vol 75(1), 1999, Jan, .Pp 23-44

[9] Kubicek Paul , Authoritarianism In Central Asia: Curse Or Cure, Third World Quaterly ,19(1), 1998 , Pp 29-43

[10] http://www.rand.org/publications/MMMR/MR1598/MR.ch6.pdf

[11] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question Reframed in the New Europe,*(Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

ethnic groups are in an unchallenged position of power. There is nothing unusual about the pattern being followed; a program of nationalist modernization fueled by creating a national identity on the basis of one major ethnic group was a common path to modernity in the 20th century.[12]

After the Soviet disintegration the communist ideology lost its glory which created an ideological vacuum. The ideological vacuum is being filled by ethnocentrism, flared up and spread by politicians attempting to prevent regionalism and intra-ethnic cleavages. All ethnic conflicts show that most participants have an entirely positive image of their own ethnic group and a mainly negative one of neighboring groups. Propaganda in support of the ethno-nationalism in the Central Asian region provokes ideas of separatism and irredentism, which are then further reinforced by the difficulties and failures of the ruling groups .[13]

According to Sergie Abashin different theories and concepts are being assessed in various academic fora in an effort to explain the current transformation of ethnic identity.[14] Discussions are heated. Two interpretations are prominent among ethnologists. One group of specialists – which comprises a relative majority in Russia and an absolute majority in Central Asia – maintains that modern Central Asian 'ethnos' as a collective group has been in existence for at least 1,000 years. The past millennium, according to advocates of this perspective, has witnessed a battle between different ethnos for influence, territory and control. Many experts view all the twentieth-century events through this prism, including the delimitation of Central Asian nations

---

[12] Thomas S. Szayna: Potential for ethnic conflict in the Caspian region. website http://www.rand.org/publications/MMMR/MR1598/MR.ch6.pdf

[13] Dr. Anara Tabyshalieva *"Researching Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Central Asia"* available at ifrs.elcat.kg/Publication/Anara,

[14] Sergei Abashin Señior Researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow The Transformation of Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A Case Study of the Uzbeks and Tajiks continued overleaf Regional Security Concerns Russian Regional Perspectives Russia's New Southern Border: Western Siberia–Central Asia 32 http://www.iiss.org/rrpfree.php?scID=45

and the present political configuration of states in the region. This approach has been dubbed Primordialism. Criticism of Primordialism has started to manifest in the past decade. Instrumentalist view of ethnicity differs from Primordial view and Constructionist view. Instrumentalist approach is more dynamic and emphasizes how changing cultural conditions are associated with changes in inter-group contact. The instrumentalist approach also focuses on identity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end.

Ethnicity is mainly a label or set of symbolic ties that is used for the political agenda of certain individuals or groups. This approach has the advantage of incorporating change, as well as viewing people as intentional and active agents.[15]

A new group of specialists – currently a minority in Russia – believes that contemporary Central Asian ethnos is the result not of ancient conflicts and population movements but of reforms that began in the middle of the nineteenth century when Russia coloniesd Central Asia and which continued in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Ethnologists know this as Constructivist approach.

The original and fundamental thesis behind the Constructivist approach[16] analyzing Central Asian history is the assertion – confirmed by numerous analytical sources – that, before Russians arrived in the region, the population

---

[15] available at http://www.mnsu.edu/dept/ethnic

[16] Constructivist approach unlike primordial approach regards that ethnic identities are dynamic and keep on changing. The third approach is a *constructionist perspective* which can be found among political scientists who study ethnic conflict. Constructionists emphasize the social origin and nature of Ethnicity (Brubaker, Brubaker, R. (1995). *National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homeland in the new Europe.* (Daedalus Spring,. 1995) pp.107-132 Lee, 1996; Young, 1993). According to this approach, ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open. Instead, ethnicity is constructed from dense webs of social interaction; it is not an individual attribute but a social phenomenon. In other words, ethnicity is not something that can be manipulated at will, like political *party* affiliation. Instead ethnicity is embedded within and influenced by the larger socio-historical context, to be understood within a relational framework (Esman, 1994; Lake & Rothchild, 1998, p. 6; Lee & Ottati, 1995; Mitchell, 2000). An individual, for example, usually has little choice of his or her ethnic identity. As social interactions change, one's ethnic identity evolves as well. Our emphasis on the role of (changing) culture in defining the markers and meaning of ethnicity is in harmony with this approach. available at http://www.mnsu.edu/dept/ethnic

26

of Central Asia did not possess ethnic self-consciousness as we know it today. The basic cultural frontiers in pre-Russian Central Asia were not shaped along ethnic or ethnic-national lines. The main divides used to differentiate 'one of us' from someone 'foreign' were based on position in the social hierarchy, religious separation into Sunni, Shi'ite or Ishmaelite, membership of different Sufi brotherhoods, economic-cultural categorization between settled, mountainous, nomadic or semi-nomadic groups, family or tribal distinctions, or by regional classification[17]. To describe oneself as being from Bukhara, Khiva, Margila or Tashkent was far more important than a 'functional' characteristic like language. Every state structure that emerged in Central Asia had its own list and order of categories for distinguishing between members of the population – that is, each had its own prestigious and less influential groups and there were conflicts over supremacy. There is no space here to discuss all of the arguments in favor of this position[18].

However, according to Vasily Barthold, a famous Russian Orientalist whose authority on this issue is beyond doubt, at the beginning of the last century, he wrote that 'A settled inhabitant of Central Asia feels he is first a Muslim and second a resident of a specific town or location; he does not think of himself as belonging to a specific nation or people. Only in more recent times under the influence of European culture (through the agency of Russia) did a striving for national unity emerge'[19]. So, according to the Constructivist point of view, this rests on the authority of Russian Orientalist academics, the need for more or less stable and simple citizens' consciousness. In case of Central Asian Republic security affects ethnic cleavages and ethinisation, at the same time ethnic cleavages and ethnic conflict affects security.

---

[17] http://www.iiss.org/rrpfree.php?scID=45

[18] Sergei Abashin "The transformation of ethnic identity in Central Asia: a case study of the Uzbeks and Tajiks " available at http://www.iiss.org/rrpfree.php?scID=45

[19] Vasily Barthold famous Russian orient list favors pro constructivist approach. Sochineniya; vol. 2, part 2, (Moscow: Nauka 1964), p. 528

Two political processes are taking place simultaneously in CAR. First process is of building of a secular and democratic state where every citizen is treated on the basis of rule of law[20]. At theoretical level all of the five Central Asian Republics toe this line. However another process is building of nation around ethnic identities. Each of the C A R is attempting to build a state based on particular ethnic group. In each of CAR particular groups wants to play major role.

Impact of Interethnic Cleavages on Internal Security

"Central Asian Republics are multinational in poly-ethnic societies where the territorial and cultural boundaries do not coincide"[21]. According to various writers like Keely Lange, Anita Sengupta, Boris Rumer, Hooman Peimani and Matieva Ann etc. serious inter-ethnic tension prevails in Central Asian Republics. Ethnic cleavages affect internal security in following way:

(a) Inter-ethnic tension makes it difficult to assimilate various groups into state, thus building a strong nation state. Central Asia is mosaic of about a hundred ethnic groups. It is diverse in ethnic terms while at the same time it is dominated by mono-ethnic elite. Constant conflict between the establishment, and ethnic and religious groups, contributes to instability in almost all the Central Asia Republic[22]. There are different socio-cultural identities. The way these socio-cultural identities interact with the national political process is crucial to shaping their disposition towards the polity.

---

[20] Samuel P. Huntington,. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). Huntington's thesis of Third wave of democratization is not apt to analyze the condition of democracy in CAR. CAR states are in a stage of transition. Pro authoritarian and pro democratic forces are operating in CAR simultaneously. It is difficult to predict future. However till now situation is stable but there are various scholars and studies have pointed out to security threats emanating from ethnic tension in CAR.

[21] Prof. Prakash Gupta"Post- Soviet State(s) in Central Asia", *Ocassional Papers,* International Centre for Peace Studies.2000 .Pp13-25.

[22] Anara Tbyshalieva "Researching Ethnic Conflict in Post-Soviet Central Asia." *Rearching Violently Divided Societies. Ethical and Methodological Issues.* Edited by Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson. United Nations University Press (Tokyo, New York, Paris), Pluto Press: London, 2001, Pp. 130-147.

The major determinants of their disposition and role are the issues of political participation, economic security, recruitment to the decision-making roles, and opportunities for political advancement.[23]. Mostly the states have faltered in this process to varying degrees and have caused insecurity and uncertainty about the future amongst the smaller identities in the state.[24] This causes alienation amongst them, and they perceive the state institutions and processes as a threat to them. If the political system cannot mitigate their distrust and is unable to accommodate them in the political domain, their perspective becomes more parochial with negative or indifferent orientations towards the state-centric national identity and the political process.[25]

This has two major implications for the relationship between the smaller identities and the state-centric entity. First, the socio cultural identity becomes an important basis of the alienated group's political identity and serves as an instrument of political mobilization. Second, the alienated group develops linkages and connections across the territorial boundaries of the state or reactivates the hitherto dormant ties with similar identity groups or those who sympathize with its grievances. Such transnational ties make the alienated group vulnerable to external penetration, and it becomes a channel for transmission of external influences, ideas, and interests which have implications for the domestic political process.[26]

Two processes facilitate transnational linkages. The "pull process" occurs when the alienated identities in a political system employ their external

[23] H. Askari Rizvi Central Asia: Domestic Politics, External Linkages, and Security http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/ Research/S&Ps/1996-1997/S&P_96-97.html

[24] Edward Allworth,. Ed. *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* (New York: Praeger, 1973) Pp.1-18.

[25] n.23.Domestic Politics, External Linkages, and Security available at http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/ Research/S&Ps/1996-1997/S&P_96-97.html

[26] ibid. P,.8.

linkages to draw in outside groups with similar orientations and interests. This takes place when the alienated groups attempt to strengthen their position within their own domestic context or to bring about a change in the authority structure of their state and to compel its ruling elite to act in a particular manner. The "push process" takes place when external parties extend support to a contending identity or a group in a conflict-ridden polity with the objective of advancing their political goals. The support could range from political and diplomatic to greater involvement in the form of material and military support, depending on the intervening actor's perception of its interests.[27]

Ethnic, linguistic, ideological-Islamic identities exist in the states of Central Asia which interact with the state-centric nationalism. These identities have cultivated interaction and connections with their ethnic brethren or the people with similar political-ideological orientations in the neighboring states. However, these identities and their transnational interaction have not so far threatened the state-centric nation and state-building processes in these states. These identities have not been politicized to the extent that could endanger the existing political order and stability. This does not mean that the political situation will stay like this forever. There is enough potential for trouble between the socio cultural identities and the state-centric identity as the Central Asian states pursue the state- and nation-building processes. The major issues that are likely to influence the future course of events and thus have implications for stability and security include the opportunities for political participation, political management by the present-day nationalist (mostly former communist) leaders and their ability to sustain the legitimacy of their rule, socioeconomic issues, especially the distributive dimension, and the role of the external actors, especially the neighboring states.[28]

---

[27] ibid .,P 9.

[28] ibid .,P 10.

(b) At times inter-ethnic tension have triggered bloody violence for example Osh tragedy, Ferghana riots and civil war in Tajikistan which have not only destructed life and property of individual and state, but has seriously crippled the states capacity to contain conflict and maintain social harmony, law, order and peace .

(c) Ethnic tension and conflicts have been problematic for smooth governance.[29] In case of Tajikistan regional ethnic conflicts have acquired a particularly tense form, with the people in the Gorno-(mountain) Badakshan region pitted against government of President Rakhmanov.

(d) At individual level serious threats exist for culture, life and property of ethnic minorities. In wake of politics of scarcity, competitions for resources and ethnic mobilization have sharpened the cleavages and distinction between us and them. Prof. Rakesh Gutpa writes "In Central Asian Republics more than six crores of people are living under the fear of being deconstructed along ethnic lines of Russians, Ukrainians, German and Kazakhs (Kazakhstan), as Russians, Ukrainians and Uzbeks (Uzbekistan); Russians, Ukrainian, Tatars, Kyrgyz and Tajiks (Tajikistan); as Russians, Uzbeks, and titular nationalities (Turkmenistan)[30]".

(e) According to Brubaker concept of external national homeland, divides the loyalty of ethnic minorities between external homeland and the nation-state in which they reside. This weakens the very base of Central Asian Republics and is also a source of security problems[31]. Boris Rumer writes "Central Asian Republics have become increasingly disunited, as each group acts to defend its own interest and ensure its survival".[32]

---

[29] Roland Dannreutter, *Creaking States Of Central Asia* Adelphi , March 1994 .,Pp 2-39.

[30] Rakesh Gupta, Occasional Papers, "Post- Soviet State(s) in Central Asia", *International Centre for Peace* ,P.1

[31] Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question Reframed in the New Europe, (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

[32] Boris Rumer,ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* ,(New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003) P. 4

(f) Various writers have pointed out, resurgence of ethnic nationalism in peripheral areas of Central Asian Republics. These centrifugal forces again are a source of security problem for Central Asian Republics. For instance the militant group Hizb e Tahrir operating in Uzbekistan wants to create a caliphate in Ferghana valley. Afghan people in border areas of Uzbekistan have aspiration to create a sovereign homeland for themselves.

(g) Boris Rumer points towards decline in the quality of human capital which is particularly striking. "Ethnic conflict, a deterioration in the status of the non-indigenous population, and the violation of the latter's rights have triggered a massive emigration- that is, an exodus of irreplaceable specialists from industry and the service branches of public health and education. Hence these sectors have suffered adversely".[33]

(h) Boris Rumer writes "Internally, the countries of Central Asia have constructed and consolidated authoritarian regimes based upon clannish, mafia-like authority structures (with the inherent patron-client relations)".[34] Such clannish authority having ethnic proclivity fails to get legitimacy and support of other clans and ethnic groups. Thus ending legitimacy of government and creating hurdles in smooth governance.

(i) Nepotism adversely affects Bureaucracy. Bureaucrats show undue favor and sympathy towards their own clans and ethnic group. Such a Bureaucracy generates corruption, nepotism and fails to deliver public services impartially and efficiently, thus further reducing the capability of state to accommodate varied interest, pursue development goals with legitimacy.

(j) Evgeniy Abduallev discusses the resurgence of Islam in Central Asia. Propagation of radical Islamism and an increase in the opportunities to

---

[33] ibid Pp. 2-3
[34] ibid P.2

recruit "Warriors for Islam" has serious security dimension.[35] In the words of Boris Rumer "It bears noting that the activity of Islamic militants has compelled all the countries of this region to increase their military expenditures, which create a heavy burden on state budgets that are already stretched to the limit".[36]

(k) Rustam Burnashev takes the view that one cannot totally preclude the possibility of sporadic or organized protests, or run mass outburst of social unrest[37]. Burnashev explicitly acknowledges that another potentially dangerous factor derives from the conflict and enmity between nationalities and clans. Although it has thus far been possible to forestall the extreme outbursts, there are periodic increases in tensions between Uzbeks and Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. For now the authorities have been able to keep the situation under control but interested forces (domestic and foreign) could seek to provoke dissatisfaction and push the ethnic and territorial question to the fore. Under these conditions, even microscopic extremist factions could have an influence on political decisions. Clannishness and behind the scenes struggles could, at any moment, burst into full public view. That scenario is likely in the event of a change in leadership either through assassination or natural death.

(l) Ethnicity and clan have security ramifications from economic viewpoint. Eshref Trushin and Eskender Trushin focus on the linkage between clan and economic problem. Lack of sustained economic development is also a serious security problem. Eshref Trushin and Eskender Trushin explain how clan based relations act as a hurdle in economic development. They write "In Central Asian Republics where the economic and political liberties of

---

[35] Evgeniy Abdullaev "The Central Asian Nexus: Islam And Politics" in Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* , (New Delhi: Aakar books 2003),Pp .245- 298

[36] Boris Rumer,ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* ,(New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003) Pp. 2-4

[37] Rustam Bunashev "Regional Security In Central Asia; Military Aspects" in Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* , (New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003).,Pp 114-168

the individual are not protected adequately, one must ensure one's self-preservation and one's family by relying on relatives- in other words, one's clansmen. Therefore, the clan is a form for the survival of the individual in the societies of Central Asia".[38]

Under the uncertain conditions at the beginning of the transition period, clan organization made it possible to reduce business risks. Hence the clans as a form of organization for economic activity to reduce transaction costs, assumed a more extensive role.

If the clan perceives a serious threat to its position, it is more likely to send these resources abroad, this creates crisis of resources in the country thus hindering the prospects of economic development. In absence of adequate economic resource investment is not possible and in absence of investment economic development cannot be sustained.

The clan can also support strategic behavior and specialization among its members.[39] For example, it often happens that some members of the clan move up the civil service ladder in the central government on in local administration, while others work in law-enforcement agencies and still others became active in business. And they all help each other. Hence the systems of corruption and cronyism naturally become embedded in the institution of the state. This is inimical to economic development.

The clan structure in Central Asia creates a specific form of economic behavior at the micro level. That is because the individual seeks to maximize personal utility through the maximizations of benefits for the clan as a whole. Hence clan dominates the internal "rules of the game". The clans limit a healthy competition. Since economic resources can flow through clan connections, with

---

[38] Eshref Trushin And Eskender Trushin" Challenges To Economic Policy In Central Asia; Is A Miracle Possible in Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* ," (New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003), Pp.376-428

[39] Prof Ajay Patnaik in his work, *Central Asia: Between Modernity Tradition*. (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996). talks about strong intraclan cooperation..

formal market mechanisms of coordination being ignored, especially in a transition period, when market mechanisms are underdeveloped and imply higher transaction costs. Clans contribute to the development of an asymmetry of business information, whereby individual clans are better informed about business opportunities than other members of society and clans prevent the public dissemination of valuable business information and block the construction of a meritocracy in the civil service.[40]

Inter-ethnic tension seriously diminishes social capital (Robert Putnam) in Central Asian Republics, which is much needed for sustained socio-economic development of these republics.

In this chapter I shall highlight some of the major cleavages existing in each of the country and analyze security threats emanating from such ethnic cleavages.

KYRGYZSTAN

On Aug. 31st 1991 Kyrgyzstan declares its independence from the Soviet Union.[41] Kyrgyzstan[42] is a multi-ethnic country with many internal divisions between city and rural populations, ethnic Kyrgyz, Russian and Uzbek minorities, and northern and southern regions. Regional divisions grew in part out of Soviet administrative policy, which fostered competition between the northern and southern regions for control over economic and political resources in the republic. In particular, between the 1960s and 1980s, one particular northern region dominated the top leadership posts of the republic, causing resentment in the south and also in other northern regions.[43]

---

[40] Eshref Trushin And Eskender Trushin n.38.Pp376-428

[41] SWB SU/1107 B/6 3 31 AUGUST 1991

[42] Kyrgygystan is based on the name of a nomadic tribe Kyrgyz.

[43] For more details of this Soviet legacy and regional cleavages in Kyrgyzstan, see Pauline Jones Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts,* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) Chapter 3.

Luong argues that Soviet institutional structures diminished traditional tribal and clan divisions within the country. Another scholar, Kathleen Collins, argues that Soviet institutions in fact reinforced preexisting clan networks, which have reemerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union.[44] It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the validity of each argument, as it would entail asking questions about the structure of Kyrgyz society prior to Soviet rule, the precise Soviet institutional legacy as pertains patronage, tribal and clan groupings, and the mechanism through which clan networks reemerged (if they indeed did).

For the purposes of this study we recognize the generally undisputed regional divisions between the north and south of the country and the subdivisions within the north of the country.

On June 4, 1990, deadly riots erupted in the south of the republic, which proved to be a political blessing for Akaev.[45] The cities of Osh and Uzgen lie in the densely populated and agriculturally rich Ferghana Valley, which extends through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[46] The Kyrgyz section of the valley is home to both ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. For two decades prior to 1990, the region had suffered from land and housing shortages due to rapid agricultural development. Over time, ethnic Uzbeks perceived themselves as disenfranchised, while ethnic Kyrgyz were convinced that Uzbeks had the best retail and consumer jobs[47].Riots erupted when ethnic Kyrgyz tried to redistribute local land from Uzbeks to ethnic Kyrgyz herders, igniting a violent reaction and the death of hundreds of people. Some Uzbeks responded with calls for Uzbek language recognition, while others went so far as to demand the

[44] Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics," *World Politics* vol 56 no., 2004

[45] SWB /SU/0789 B/1 13 JUNE 1990 "Kirghiz Death Toll Reaches 139"

[46] *Regine A. Spector,* The Transformation of Askar Akaev, President of Kyrgyzstan ,http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2004_02-spec.pdf

[47] See T.Razakov, *Oshkie sobytie* (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Renaissance, 1993) as cited in McGlinchey.McGlinchey notes that, according to the 1989 Soviet census, Uzbeks constituted 26% of the Osh oblast population and controlled 84% of all retail, yet they held only 11% of all deputy seats in the Osh oblast city and regional soviets. See p. 111.

reincorporation of the southern oblasts into Uzbekistan.[48] These events unleashed further demonstrations by reformist members of the political establishment throughout the country.[49]

The current tensions in Kyrgyzstan can be traced back to the legacy of Soviet rule in Central Asia. In the early 1920's, Moscow attempted to fortify its centralized power in the region by curbing potential ethnic nationalist movements. To achieve this objective, the Soviet regime delineated borders across ethnic lines, thus creating ethnic enclaves throughout the region (particularly evident in the Ferghana Valley). To fuel the Soviet Union's centralized economy, economic and transportation links between the republics became highly interdependent. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the region became faced with innumerable social, political and economic obstacles.[50] The crises that ensued culminated in the Osh uprising in 1990 between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz inhabitants living in southern Kyrgyzstan.[51] In June 1990 Ethnic clash erupts between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz inhabitants of Osh, near the border of Uzbekistan, in which a disputed 300-1000 people were killed.[52]

The Osh confrontation has been cited by some as laying the foundation for lingering tensions in the Ferghana Valley. Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan implemented some of the most liberal economic and political reforms in Central Asia after its independence, the state that was once referred to as the "Island of Democracy", is now characterized by persistent poverty, unemployment,

---

[48] n.46,.*Regine A. Spector* ,"The Transformation of Askar Akaev,President of Kyrgyzstan".

[49] Eugene Huskey, .Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration,. in Bremmer and Taras, eds., *New States, New Nations: Building the Post-Soviet Nations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 660-662.

[50] Pravada 12 January 1992

[51] TIMELINE (FAST, 2001) http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

[52] "Kirghiz Death Toll Reaches 139" n.45

political repression, and inter-state tensions over borders, security, and resources.[53]

There have been reports that religious intolerance is increasing in Kyrgyzstan.[54] Disagreements between representatives of various religions have been emerging in Kyrgyzstan more and more often. There have already been incident when council of elders suggested to expel Wahhabis from villages or obstructed the activity of and even used force against Jehovah's Witness.[55] Recently four former Muslims narrowly escaped punishment by villagers in southern Dzhalal-Abad region for preaching the ideas of the Baptist Christian and pentecostalistis. The villagers threatened to expel the followers of the different faith from the village. This is more than strange as the Kyrgyz people were very tolerant to various religions until recently and there were no clashes on religious ground for several hundred of year.[56]

Another potential threat emanates from growth of militant Islamic movement. Uzbekistan based IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) is gradually spreading and strengthening its strong hold in south Kyrgyzstan. Bomb blasts in Tashkent by the (IMU) took place on 16 February 1999[57]. IMU is actively propagating militant Islam (intolerant Islam).This has not only sharpened cleavages between Muslim and non Muslim in the region but at the same time it has increased suspicion and hostility between Kyrgyz and Uzbek. IMU is pro Uzbek and in turn is supported by Uzbek residing in south Kyrgyzstan. Ethnic Kyrgyz suspect that Uzbeks support IMU and are indulged in subversive activities. 1999 Feb Bomb blasts in Tashkent by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In 1999 August armed incursion by

---

[53] Bipasha Choudhury, Tara Denham, Aysen Kumser, Anthony Romanelli CIFP and NPSIA, Carleton University http://www.carleton.ca/cifp Copyright 8, October, 2002 Bipasha Choudhury, Tara Denham, Aysen Kumser, Anthony Romanelli CIFP and NPSIA, Carleton University

[54] Kyrgyz-Press International News Agency , Bishkek In Russia 1120gmt 10 Jan 2001

[55] SWB/SU4042G/2 (6) 12 JAN 2001

[56] ibid

[57] SWB/SU/3464/G/1/ 20 February 1999 "Authorities Name Taskhent Bomb Suspects"

Tajikistan-based terrorists and unsanctioned air attack by Uzbekistan on a target in Kyrgyzstan[58]. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. 2000 May 10th Trial of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) ["Party of Liberation"] members charged with inciting religious, racial, and ethnic hostility[59]. On 4 January 2001 police arrested Islamic organization members for distributing leaflets[60]. Official sources claim that Hizbe Tahrir organization is active in Kyrgyzstan. 2001 Mar. 16th Kyrgyzstan puts its troops on red alert as it anticipates a possible invasion by groups of religious extremists. 1999 Oct. 3rd Uzbek air force bombs positions of the IMU in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000, in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of Kyrgyz fleeing the area. Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.[61]

TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan is divided into four main administrative regions: the Leninabad Oblast in the north; the Khatlon Oblast, covering the Kurgan-Tyube area in the south-west and the Kulyab area in the south-east, which was recently merged from two oblasts into one; and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in the east of the country. In addition, the Republican Subordinated

---

[58] n.51. "Ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan Ethnic Minorities in the Region" .

[59] SWB/SU/3837/G/2 11 MAY 2000 "Members Of Banned Islamic Group Arrested"

[60] SWB /SU/4036 G/1 5 JANUARY 2001

[61] http://www.carleton.ca/cifp

Rayon, covering the central part of the country, comprises the Gissar and Garm Oblasts[62].

Most Tajiks are Sunni Muslims who were converted to Islam following the Arab invasion of Central Asia in the seventh century. However, the Tajiks originating from Gorno-Badakhshan, whose inhabitants are known as Pamiris after the mountain range, are Ismaili Muslims. The Pamiris consider themselves different from the other Tajiks and speak different languages. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up[63]. In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements - largely consisting of members of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power - tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. Another bloody clash between opposing armed grouping occurred on 2nd September 1992 in the oblast centre of Kurgan-Tyube, were for several months now conflicts continued unabated. The number of victims of internecine feuding had multiplied[64].Attempt to secure a ceasefire in Kurgan-Tyube failed. Fighting resumed in the second half of the day and the fratricidal war was continuing all over city and its environs.[65] Uzbek President Islam Karimov expressed fears of second Karabakh happening in Tajikistan and he appealed to U.N.O for help. He blamed the continuing conflict on external

---

[62] Report on internally displaced persons prepared by the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/57 of 3 March 1995 and Economic and Social Council decision 1995/273 of 25 July 1995 Profiles in displacement: Tajikistan available http://www.idpproject.org/IDP_documents/RSG_reports/country_reports/Tajikistan_24Oct96.pdf P.5.

[63] ibid P 6

[64] SWB/SU/1477 C1/3 4 SEPTEMBER 1992

[65] SWB/SU1479 C1/2 (10) 7 SEPTEMBER 1992

interference; certain circles abroad have been trying to set various ethnic groups against each other[66].

In 1993, the CIS authorized "peacekeeping" in Tajikistan, consisting of Russia's 201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999)[67]. Stability in Tajikistan remains fragile. An unsuccessful insurrection in northern Tajikistan in late 1998 highlights concerns by some observers about secessionist tendencies in the Soghd (formerly Leninabad) region and about ethnic tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan. Ethnic situation in Tajikistan is fragile in wake of a recent bloody civil war, weak government, which fails to address the grievances of various groups. One of the prime reasons for persisting ethnic cleavages and hostilities is soviet legacy of artificial borders. During Soviet period itself various ethnic groups coexisted but they filed to integrate. Socio and cultural differences continued between them. However under strong centralized administration of soviet these ethnic differences continued to remain dormant[68].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union a power vacuum was created in Tajikistan. In such a condition ethnic cleavages became more sharp and prominent and came to fore front. Economic recession followed by competition for local and state resources ethnic cleavages grew sharper and hostilities erupted between various regional ethnic groups. During Tajik civil war dominant Kublai and Khodjent group started attacking Pamiris and Ghramis thus showing worst kind of ethnic discrimination and hatred thus Tajik civil war jeopardized the life property and civil liberty of Pamiris and Ghramis[69].

---

[66]   SWB/SU 1481 C1/3 (6) 9 September. 1992

[67]   http://www.idpproject.org/IDP_documents/RSG_reports/country_reports/Tajikistan_24Oct96.pdf
P.5

[68]   ibid, Pp. 9-26.

[69]   Ibid,. Pp.10-33

Kublai soldiers are harassing the other ethnic minorities who have returned. They are targeting ethnic Uzbeks Arabs, Gharmis, and Pamiris throughout the country with impunity. Most of the tension in Tajikistan continues to be fueled by regional differences and the fact that the government is dominated by a single group - the Kulabis[70]. At the same time, however, tensions between Tajiks and ethnic Uzbeks, as well as between Tajiks and Afghan refugees, have mounted in certain regions of the country, creating yet another obstacle to stability. Unless the government addresses the abuses of human rights by its own security forces and takes steps to investigate and hold accountable both officials and ordinary citizens responsible for attacks against returnees and others, instability and bloodshed will continue in Tajikistan[71].

Tajik nationalism developing around the titular Tajik ethnic group is also problematic for other ethnic groups. It means alienation of all other ethnic groups. They fear being degraded to second class citizen in their home land. The Tajik nationalism emerged practically within the almost conservative state and party set up under the leadership of Kachar Machkamow[72] Especially in the case of Tajikistan the lack of a national centre of power and almost artificial territorial demarcation led to a considerable easy success in consolidating ethnic self awareness and national identity on the basis of Islam. The Islamic Renaissance Party formed in June 1990 increased popular awareness of common Islamic heritage.[73] Yet the regional disparities caused by the shattered demarcation of the state compared with its geographic feature soon overlapped with the power struggle dominance. In addition the fragmentation of regional or

---

[70] "Return toTajikistan continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions" http://hrw.org/reports/1995/Tajik.htm

[71] ibid

[72] For an emotional account or events see Mjalo Xenia\ Gontsharov Pjotr: Der FEuerschen VON Ferghana. Wieentsstehen ethischie konflikte, und wie kann man sie verhidern. In Meyer , gert 9ED)Nationallitatekonflikte in der sowjetunion, koln 1990 pp 129 ff

[73] Eva –Maria Hexamer "Some Aspects Of Transformation In Post Communist Societies of Central Asia" in Prof. Shams-ud-din ed., *Nationalism in Russia and Central Asian Republics: Unfinished Democratic Evolution*,(New Delhi, Lancers Books 1999) Pp. 210-211

clan interest initiated the struggle for political power which finally led to the outbreak of a full fledged civil war. The oppositionist forces almost managed a seizure of power.[74]

There has been report which suggests that interethnic tension also persists between Tajiks and settlers from North Afghanistan. The Afghan community in Tajikistan, located primarily in Dushanbe, consists of approximately 3,000 people; most of who fled Afghanistan after the fall of the communist regime in 1992.Tajiks at times has become hostile to the settlers from North Afghanistan. Afghans told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki that they were constant targets of violent attacks, disappearances and harassment by Tajiks during 1993.[75] While the frequency of such incidents declined significantly in 1994, there is still considerable fear among the community. According to Afghans, one of the primary reasons they are targeted is that Afghanistan is considered to be a key supporter of the Tajik opposition and thus, responsible for the instability and warfare that prevail in Tajikistan. As a result, attacks against Afghans living in Tajikistan tend to increase whenever there are serious clashes along the Tajik-Afghan border. There is also resentment on the part of Tajiks, based on the belief that all Afghans in Tajikistan are successful businessmen and that the community is, therefore, uniformly wealthy. As a result, most Afghans report that they do not speak their native Dari in public, since their accents give away their origin. Women are frightened to leave their homes alone, and some do not send their children to local schools.

Tajik 'national' ideology rivals and contradicts Uzbek ideology. The Uzbeks declared that the Tajiks were their 'historic rivals'; the history of Tajikistan is presented in school textbooks and monographs as an alternative to

---

[74]   n.70."RETURN TO TAJIKISTAN Continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions"

[75]   *Human Rights Watch/Helsinki* Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East and among the signatories of the Helsinki accords.

the Uzbek account of Central Asian history.[76] The Tajik version of Central Asian history is as ambitious as the Uzbek one in so far as they have aspirations throughout the entire region. Nevertheless, such grand ambitions are not matched by opportunities to pursue them. Tajik consciousness is acquiring a complex about this. This is particularly apparent in regard to the ostensibly Tajik towns of Bukhara and Samarkand which are located in Uzbekistan. Officially, Tajik President Inomal Rakhmonov has not made any territorial claims to these towns and only talks about 'pernicious people from other states' (easily understood to mean Uzbeks) repressing the Tajiks. Nevertheless, Tajikistan's ideology is such that Bukhara and Samarkand are still as much Tajik towns as they always were.

Uzbek-Tajik tensions of a different nature were evident in Panj district, where Uzbeks are in the minority. As discussed above, the government embarked on a policy of disarming civilians in June 1992. Although Human Rights Watch/Helsinki is not opposed to non-discriminatory disarmament of illegally armed civilians, disarmament carried out in a discriminatory manner, particularly in the context of ethnic tensions, can contribute to instability and violence. In Panj district, the government not only disarmed the population in a discriminatory fashion, but it also committed serious human rights violations in the process.[77]

Tensions between Kulabis and Uzbeks in Panj erupted in early April 1994, following three separate murders of Uzbeks by unknown assailants. Responding to what they considered to be insufficient governmental investigation of the cases and generally inadequate security, the Uzbek community protested to local authorities on April 8, 1994 and demanded higher positions for Uzbeks in the local government. Several days later, the

---

[76] Sergei Abashin ,The transformation of ethnic identity in Central Asia: a case study of the Uzbeks and Tajiks, http://www.iiss.org/rrpfree.php?scID=45

[77] n.70. "RETURN TO TAJIKISTAN Continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions"

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan dispatched Special Forces, consisting of 400 to 500 troops, to Panj, in order to disarm the local population.[78] Problem of religious extremism and religious intolerance is becoming more prominent in Tajikistan. Extremist groups are active in the region. A large group of activist, part of an extremist Islamic Movement was detained in Tajikistan. They distributed publication for armed seizure of power.[79] Hence religion is becoming another reason of further ethnic cleavage and in future such religious extremism may threat the very existence of other non Islamic groups or of moderate Muslims.

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan is a multiethnic state where sharp ethnic cleavages persist owing to growing dominance of Uzbek nationalism around Uzbek identity. This has alienated other ethnic groups from actively participating in nation-state building process. It was Birlik group which aroused consciousness for Uzbek culture language and nation. It mobilized Uzbek people to fight for building Uzbek nationalism. Birlik group forced major concession on these issues.[80] Chauncy D.Harris writes President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov is authoritarian.[81] Such authoritarian regime can suppress the ethnic conflict temporarily but shall fail to eradicate the root cause of the problem and strike a sustainable harmony between various ethnic groups. Officially Government of Uzbekistan denies any such ethnic problem.

Ethnic problem is raising its ugly head in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan radicalization of Islam by groups such as IMU and Hizbut Tahrir has caused serious problems for moderate Muslims as well as non Muslim countries. Both

---

[78] n.70. ReturntoTajikistan continued Regional and Ethnic Tensions

[79] SWB/SU/4058/G1 (2) 28 JANUARY 2001

[80] Eva –Maria Hexamer n.73 .p 212

[81] Chauncy D.Harris, "Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 and Early 1994", *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol.35, no.4, 1994,.Pp.185-203

Hiz But Tahrir and Wahhabism are active in Uzbekistan. On 23rd April 2000 leader of Hiz-but-Tahrir was arrested in Uzbekistan.[82] Wahhabism is gradually becoming a serious problem not only for the state but also for moderate muslims as well as non Muslim.[83] Two major conflicts erupted in the Ferghana Valley during the years 1989-1990. In May 1989, in the Uzbek part of the valley, Uzbeks attacked the Meskhetian Turk minority.[84] A supposed misunderstanding between an Uzbek and a Meskhetian Turk in a market led to a fight, which sparked countryside rioting that left 100 people dead. The central government decided to dispatch the Soviet army in order to end the conflict; they did so by rapidly deporting an estimated 700.000 Meskhetian Turks from the area. The hottest summer of 1990 was famous for ethnic skirmishes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the towns of Osh and Uzgen.[85] The roots of the conflict were land distribution to Kyrgyz citizens. There is no official number of dead people during these conflicts.[86] In recent past there has been severe riots Kyrgyz and Uzbek.

On the other hand Uzbek openly discriminate against ethnic Turkmen tribe. There has also been serious contention between Uzbek and Tajik in Ferghana area. Ethnic Uzbeks retaliated the killing of Uzbek in Tajikstan. Moreover serious differences exist between national ideologies of Tajik and Uzbek. There have been various reasons for rise of ethnic disputes. Growing competition for scarce resources led to ethnic competition followed by ethnic conflict. Moreover lack of effective conflict resolving mechanism further aggravates the conflict and promotes further ethnic cleavages.

---

[82] SWB/ SU/3821/G3 24 April 2000

[83] SWB/SU/3807G/2 5 April 2000

[84] SWB/SU/0456/ 13 MAY 1989

[85] SWB /SU/0789 B/1 13 JUNE 1990 "Kirghiz Death Toll Reaches 139"

[86] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan. "Territorial and Border Problems in Central Asia: Barrier to Regional Integration" | Posted: Dec 21, 2004 available at www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmen's are a nomadic nation that never experienced statehood before the twentieth century, and loyalty to regionally-based clans is still strong. Niyazov's policy of divide-and-rule has exacerbated differences among the various clans now competing for political or economic power, and there is a danger of conflict. Minorities, particularly the 10 per cent of ethnic Uzbeks, face permanent discrimination. This increases tension domestically and with neighboring Uzbekistan.[87] Turkmen's have discriminated against Armenians. Under the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, religious congregations are required to register with the government, and since re-registration of religious organizations was made compulsory in early 1997 only two groups – the Russian Orthodox Church and Sunni Muslims – obtained registration. Those belonging to religious groups that are not officially sanctioned, such as the Armenian Apostolic Church, Baha'i, Buddhists, Hare Krishna devotees, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Jews, have been denied any public religious activities and have faced imprisonment, deportation, internal exile, house eviction and harassment for years. Many have faced harassment by the authorities also for religious activities carried out in private, for example, when holding services in private homes. Amnesty International has documented many cases in which members of religious minorities were tortured or ill-treated by law enforcement officers. Many foreign missionaries have been deported from Turkmenistan in recent years and several ethnic Turkmen followers who advocated a religious belief other than those officially sanctioned have been forced into exile or have been sent into internal exile.[88] In addition, the Russian

---

[87] www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm

[88] Human right watch group report Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Turkmenistan," Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), p. 188.

Orthodox Church and the Sunni Muslim community are under strict state control and members of registered religious groups have apparently also been targeted and punished when daring to express any kind of dissent. President Niazov has implemented an aggressive policy to promote ethnic homogeneity in Turkmenistan. The government has closed minority ethnic and cultural centers, and eliminated or sharply limited instruction in foreign languages (including the native languages of ethnic minorities in the country); by 2005 the government will close down all foreign language schools and education will be conducted in Turkmen only.[89]

Ethnic minorities are treated as second class citizens. Ethnic Uzbek, Kazakh, Russian and other non-Turkmen citizens report systematic employment discrimination. Ethnic Azeris have reportedly been compelled to leave Turkmenistan in large numbers after massive purges of state institutions that involved replacing ethnic minorities with new ethnic Turkmen employees'.[90] All non-Turkmen cultural organizations are banned. Key cultural institutions, including the opera, philharmonic, ballet and circus are banned on the grounds that they are not native, and therefore not properly part of Turkmen culture. The Government also closed down the Academy of Sciences.[91] Given the nature of the Turkmen regime, political prognoses are highly problematic. Due to minimal media coverage in Turkmenistan, it is impossible to know for certain how Turkmenistan's ethnic and religious minorities are being treated.[92]

The government does not appear to be discriminating against or harassing any group solely because of its ethnic or religious orientation. While the overwhelming majority of Turkmenistan's population are Turkmen's or of Turkic origin, and some have expressed hostility toward "Russian-speakers"

---

[89] http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/turk/comment.pdfdocument of the European bank for reconstruction and development

[90] ibid

[91] ibid

[92] Amnesty International Report 1999 on Turkmenistan available onwww.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/eur61.htm - 12k

(Russians, other Slavs, Armenians and Jews), the kind of societal-level hostility against "Russian-speakers" or against Jews in many other former Soviet states does not appear to be as prevalent in Turkmenistan.. However, religious or cultural activities or organizations, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, which the government perceives as a potential source of political opposition, could put religious and cultural activists at risk. As an example, the government of Turkmenistan has not allowed religious groups -- Muslim, Jewish or Christian -- to register as official organizations. Concrete information on how many Russians, Armenians, and Jews remain in Turkmenistan is unavailable, but most sources believe that ethnic minorities are leaving for Russia, Armenia, or Israel.[93] On September 1, 1989, Agzybirlik, the Society for the Protection of the Turkmen Language, was registered with the presidium of the Academy of Sciences TSSR. Its original platform was independence from the USSR and greater emphasis being placed on Turkmen language and history[94].

KAZAKHASTAN

Kazakhstan is the largest country, in terms of geographical area, among five Central Asian Republics . Officially Kazakh government denies that there is any ethnic problem in Kazakhastan[95]. However demographic statistics illustrates mass migration of non indigenous. President Nazarbayev said "the non indigenous population decreased by nearly 2million over the 1990s,' attributing this to the fact that Kazakhstan has always been the land of resettlers"[96]. In reality migration itself is the result of worsening relation between Kazakhs and non indigenous population. Migration should be viewed as one of many strategies of adaptation employed by people confronted with the

[93] Alert Series "Turkmenistan Political Conditions In The Post-Soviet Era" [al/tkm/94.001]http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/turkme94.pdf

[94] ibid

[95] SWB /SU/3809G/1 17APR 2000.

[96] SWB /SU3809G/1 17APR 2000.

loss of status, economic hardship, ethnic violence, or a combination of the above.[97] There has been a serious ethnic cleavage in Kazakhastan. First major divide is between Slavs and ethnic Kazakh. Slavs are mostly concentrated in northern Kazakhstan while ethnic Kazakhs are concentrated in middle and southern Kazakhstan .Slavs are more educated and more well of than ethnic Kazakhs. In socio economic terms Kazakhs are backward. This divide has resulted into competition for resources between the two. Ethnic Kazakhs feel that they have been exploited by Slavs appropriating all economic resources for their own welfare. Slavs being better qualified occupy better posts in public as well as private sector. This difference between the life style of two major ethnic groups further sharpens the cleavage[98].After independence due to economic crisis condition of ethnic Kazakhs further worsened. In a bid to grab political power leaders have used ethnic symbols to mobilize people. This has further increased the ethnic consciousness of ethnic Kazakhs. Moreover building of Kazakh nationalism around ethnic Kazakh identity alienated Slavs.[99] They began to feel discriminated and alienated within their own home country. Kazakhs have shown proclivities for pro Kazakh policies aimed at redistributing wealth and opportunities. Slavs resist any type of redistribution, which is inimical to the interest of Slavs. Thus relations and trust between the two has worsened. This has adversely affected the development of Kazakhstan. Mass emigrations of Slavs have taken place. This Kazakhstan is in urgent need of skilled manpower to care if its economic development.

Further cultural and linguistic divide has been further consolidated and strengthen in the wake of growing influence of Kazakh nationalism.

[97] Tim Heleniak "The Changing Nationality Composition Of The Central Asian And Tran Caucasian States" Post soviet geography and economics, 1997,38 No .6, Pp. 357-378

[98] Eva –Maria Hexamer, n.73, p.208

[99] Samuel .P. Huntington . The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York, NY, Simon & Schuster, 1996). Has argued in his work that in future on the basis of cultural differences a conflict will occur between Slav and non Slav. However I don't agree with Huntington's view because cultural difference is not a sufficient cause for a conflict. Ethnic conflict takes place only under certain conditions which has been discussed in chapter.

Government of Kazakhstan in official document has declared Kazakhstan to be original homeland of Kazakh people.[100]

Anthony Hyman writes "Kazakhstan's most obvious weakness is a north and south divide, with Russians and other Slav settlers dominating the north, and the Kazakhs accounting for barely 40% of the total population of 18m. Recently a demand has come from Russians in the republic for a referendum to decide on secession of the north and joining and joining with Russia."[101]

More over in wake deepening socioeconomic condition ethnic Kazakhs are looking backward towards religion to get some sense of identity. Thus Islam is gradually gaining ground in Kazakhstan .Islam is also being radicalized by fundamentalist and terrorist group. Thus at social level other religious group are feeling unsecured to practice their faith. This has been gradually creating a suspicion among non Muslim identities. In media there are reports that the leader of Kazakhstan's Muslims Absattar-Kazhy Derbisali has said that only traditional religions should be allowed in the country and other should be banned. According to him traditional religions are those which have existed in the republic from time, immemorial should be left and others should be banned.[102] Such statements not only show the nature of ethnic cleavages based on the religion but at the same time also point to the security threat for other non Muslim people. However till now Kazakhstan is under the strong influence of Russia. President Nazarbayev till now has maintained a delicate balance between Slav and ethnic Kazakhs.

President Nazarbayev has asserted himself that he is leftist economically but politically centrist.[103] Political compulsion has made Nazarbayev centrist. In order to continue his regime he intends to accommodate all groups. However

---

[100] http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/turkme94.pdf

[101] Anthony Hyman, "Power And Politics In Central Asia's New Republic", *Research Institute for The study of Conflict and Terrorism* .,p 10

[102] SWB/SU/4083 G/1 (2) 1 March 2001

[103] Eva –Maria Hexamer n.73 .P, 208

at social level cleavages are getting sharp due to lack of state to ventilate grievances of people. Moreover Kazakhstan lacks effective conflict resolution mechanism to resolve any ethnic dispute.

There have been reports of the growth of Radical Islamic movements such as Hiz But Tahrir in Southern regions in June 2000.[104] This further adds to tension between followers of pro Islam and non-Islam people.[105]

CONCLUSION

After the disintegration of Soviet Union the interethnic cleavages have sharpened in Central Asian Republics due to prevailing authoritarian regime, economic recession, socio-economic problem, building of nationalism around titular ethnic group and discrimination against other ethnic groups.

Nature of interethnic cleavages varies from one country to another. All the five Central Asian republics have experienced security problems from the interethnic cleavages. At times these interethnic cleavages resulted into bloody riots like Osh tragedy, Ferghana riots and Tajik civil war etc. These interethnic cleavages have serious security ramification not only for state but also for the life and property of individuals and groups.

---

[104] SWB SU/3914 G/1 (3) 18 JUNE 2000

[105] www.crisis.org; ICG Asia Report n Osh \ Brussels: "Central Asia Border Disputes And Conflict Potential" .P.8.

CHAPTER – 3

ETHNICITY AND IT'S INTER LINKAGE WITH BORDER DISPUTES AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

CHAPTER – 3

ETHNICITY AND IT'S LINKAGE WITH BORDER DISPUTES AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

This chapter intends to study the external dimension of security, which emanates from interethnic tension or ethnic dispute. Many border disputes are the result of irredentist claim of neighboring countries At times dispute over sharing of resources such as water, land etc can fuel interethnic war across and within border. Most of the Central Asian Republics have border disputes with each other.

The border dispute is a factor hindering cooperation and integration in Central Asian states and causing ethnic conflicts in cross border zones. This chapter will focus on most problematic border areas, which are either related to ethnic disputes or which may ignite ethnic dispute.

Causes of Border Disputes in Central Asia

First a brief analysis is made about the causes of border disputes in Central Asia. From 1990–2001 various border dispute have erupted between various Central Asian countries.

Though these conflicts were termed by Moscow to be result of "petty incident" and "misunderstanding" among ethnic groups, the roots of the conflicts have been laying on the unwise Soviet policy concerning border delimitation and ethnic minorities.[1] After the disintegration of Soviet Union the five Central Asian republic have been militarily weak due to scarcity of financial resources, lack of technical knowledge and necessary infrastructure. Most of the industries producing military goods became the property of the

---

[1] www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

Russia.[2] One serious implication of this military weakness is that military becomes inefficient to guard borders and controlling the local clashes which soon spread to other regions, destabilizing the whole region.[3] Thus weak military proves propitious for spreading of any ethnic clash across borders. This further heightens sense of insecurity among the ethnic groups residing in peripheral areas. Sense of insecurity further sharpens ethnic cleavages. Sharp ethnic cleavages are a necessary condition to trigger ethnic conflict, which may engulf the whole border areas destabilizing the entire region.

Cross-border areas population lack sufficient attention, on the part of governmental bodies to, their problems. Most of the conflicts are connected with natural resources, border demarcation, and lack of legal knowledge, poverty, and unemployment, which could fire inter-ethnic tension in this region. Widespread harassment and extortion of travelers and traders by ill-trained customs and border forces help aggravate existing tension.[4] In addition, scarce natural resources- particularly arable land and access to drinking and irrigation water are also conflict reasons.[5] Christine Bichsel articulates "eventually, conflict was seen to occur in economically and socially disadvantaged rural communities composed of multiple ethnic groups or close to border. The limited availability of natural resources represents one source of conflict".[6] The dysfunctional state of the infrastructure and lack of financial means to rehabilitate it seems to contribute to this competition between ethnic groups.[7] Passon and Temirkulov state that some conflicts around natural resources or the

---

[2] The Military Balance ,(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) P. 170

[3] Rajan Menon. *The Dynamics of Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia.* Washington, DC: National Council for Research on Eastern Europe and Russia, 1995. Pp.11-44

[4] www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

[5] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan. Territorial and Border Problems in Central Asia: Barrier to Regional Integration | Posted: Dec 21, 2004 available at www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

[6] Christine Bichsel ' In Search Of Harmony: Repairing Infrastructure And Social Relation In Ferghana Valley" Central Asian Survey (March 2005) 24 (1) , P. 56

[7] Mercy Corps. *Beyond Borders:Year One Annual Report October 2001 to September 2002(*Andijan:Peaceful Communities Initiative 2002*)* P.2

border regime carry the risk of ethnicisation i.e reinterpreting socio economic problem or daily competition as interethnic conflict.[8]

Central Asia (Political Map) 1999

Another reason for increasing inter-ethnic tension in boundary regions of Central Asia lies in the current policy-making on border issues. There is a tendency for unilateral delimitation of borders and putting checkpoints and customs at borders by governments who seem to be unable to resolve border disputes.[9] In most cases rioting and other ethnic conflicts are very likely to happen at border regions. To illustrate, the southern Kyrgyzstan, which borders on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is a very conflict prone area, because of resources

---

[8] Passon and Temirkulov in Mercy Corps. *Beyond Borders:Year one annual report October 2001 to September 2002(*Andijan:Peaceful Communities Initiative 2002)REF 16, p 12

[9] SWB/SU/4095 G/2 15 MARCH 2001

scarcity, population density, ethnic mixture, etc. For example, Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, which borders on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan enclave Sokh, has a wide range of social economical problems as poverty, unemployment, migration, rational distribution of water resources and land at border zones. This region is subjected to a high-risk zone of ethnic conflicts.[10] Another reason for border dispute is Struggle for getting access to water; land and other resources could also be reason for increasing ethnic tension at border regions, particularly in Uzbekistan. Mountainous countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess hydroelectric resources because these countries have rivers, water reservoirs. Uzbekistan needs in irrigation of cotton fields. For example, fighting for water irrigation in Batken province of Kyrgyzstan took its critical shapes in Batken province of Kyrgyzstan. As Central Asian Countries are highly dependent on irrigation for much of their economies are highly dependent on irrigation for much of their economic output, there is a danger of tension or conflict between local populations of trans-boundary villages. Thus, water availability could also lead to ethnic conflicts in border areas.[11]

Another reason that prevents genuine accord along borders is ethnic diffusion, which makes resolution of border disputes difficult. Indeed, the ethnic composition along borders is diverse. Customs and traditional ways of life are almost identical among Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik living in the Ferghana Valley. For example, Uzbekistan enclave Sokh with the majority Tajik residents is surrounded by Kyrgyzstan, or Tajik village Uch-Korgon which belongs to Kyrgyzstan and is bordered by Uzbekistan. As for historical component, nomadic tribes, like Kyrgyz, lived here and moved from one place to another. So there were no clearly defined borders for nomads[12]. Madeleine Reeves

---

[10] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan. Territorial and Border Problems in Central Asia: Barrier to Regional Integration | Posted: Dec 21, 2004 available at www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

[11] ibid, p9.

[12] www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php. p11

writes that it is the ambiguity of the borders, which are officially cast as contested territory, are source of interethnic tension. It is precisely attempts to impose citizenship regimes; with their associated regalia of border controls, passports check and barbed wire fences that are liable to heighten inter ethnic tension in the region.[13] As Arslan Koichiev suggests, before Russian colonial power, Kokand Khanate occupied the whole territory of the Ferghana valley and incorporated many ethnic groups as Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazak, Uigur, Kurama, Turks, Kypchaks, Naimans, etc. This argument shows that this region was inseparable and multinational since ancient times and though during Soviet times it was delimited, in fact borders were transparent and integration level was high. People lived in one state, sharing common culture. For example, southern Kyrgyz people are influenced by Uzbek language and Tajik language because of the most Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan. Cultural and ethnical identity, former experience of co-existence in the USSR, made people of this region kin to each other.[14] This natural process went on till 1990's when Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan began identifying its territorial borders[15] which resulted in ethnic conflicts.

The last possible reason for ethnic conflicts in border regions is common infrastructure and geographical aspect. First, as the majority of Kyrgyzstan area is located in mountains, many roads were constructed through territory of Uzbekistan. People used these roads to get from remote villages to oblast centers as the shortest and the most convenient roads. Since the countries became independent the road traffic was closed because one and the same road belonged to different countries. Border checkpoints and customs blocked the traffic, thus creating problems. Such problems disturb normal routine of the

---

[13]   Madeleine Reeves, "Locating Danger:Konfliktologia And The Search For Fixity In The Ferghana Valley Borderlands" ,*Central Asian Survey* (march 2005) 24(1), P.68
[14]   available at www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php
[15]   ibid

people dwelling in border areas and promote inter ethnic tension.[16] For example, in Aksy, Kadamjai Kyrgyz people build other roads through mountains because they could not pass the border. There were several examples of conflicts between border servicemen and local population.[17]

Rustam Burnashev argues that conflicts if they erupt within the boundaries of a single state will constitute a general problem for the region as a whole, since refugees and combatants will cross into the territories of neighboring states[18]. Virtually all the ethnic groups that might be drawn into potential conflict reside on the territory of several states in Central Asia.

The state borders in case of Central Asian Republics are more porous that national security would mandate. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups, convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the Central Asian states. During the Soviet period, an overarching "Soviet" identity was stressed, but more significant was the spur, given by the delineation of republics in the 1920s-1930s, to the growth of national identities. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support these national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam. Among the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), some promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude, however, that in the foreseeable future the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region of shared identities and aspirations.[19]

---

[16] Randa Slim," The ferghana valley in the midst of a host of a crisises",in MoniqueMekenkamp,Paul Van Tongeren and Hans Van de Veen eds .*Searching For Peace In Central And South Asia: An Overview Of Conflict Prevention And Peace Building Activities*(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner, 2002) p 146

[17] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan. Territorial and Border Problems in Central Asia: Barrier to Regional Integration | Posted: Dec 21, 2004 available at www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php

[18] Rustam Bunashev "Regional Security In Central Asia; Military Aspects" in Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* (New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003) Pp. 114-168

[19] Jim Nichol IB93108: Central Asia's New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/IB93108.htm, p. 6.

Central Asia's borders, described as among the world's most convoluted, fail to accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan -- over three million -- than in Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and a million or more in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China's Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside their new "national" borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan's integrity.[20]

In early 2001, Akayev faced widespread popular criticism for agreements with both Uzbekistan and China ceding border territories. The Kyrgyz government quickly repudiated a February 2001 memorandum with Uzbekistan ceding access to Uzbekistan's Sokh enclave.[21] The Kyrgyz-China border delimitation agreement of 1999, recently submitted to the legislature for ratification, set forth an exchange of some territory. Some Kyrgyz legislators have called for Akayev's(President of Kyrgyzstan) impeachment. In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the "Shanghai treaty"[22] with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet border with China. China has used the treaty to pressure Central Asia to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China's Xinjiang province.[23] China and Russia appear recently to be converting the grouping, renamed the Shanghai Forum, into a security conclave to combat Islamic extremism and oppose U.S. influence, according to some

---

[20] ibid, P.11.

[21] SWB/SU4062 G/1 5 FEBRUARY 2001

[22] SWB /SU/3805 B/ 13 3 APRIL 2000

[23] SWB/SU/1156/G/3   19JANUARY 1997

observers.[24] Uzbek President Islam Karimov indicated interest in May 2001 in joining the Forum.

Various border disputes exist between Central Asian Republics. The issue of borders is complex in Central Asia. The countries share tens of thousands of kilometers of frontier. Beigali Turabekov, the head of Kazakhstan's border commission, offered useful insight into the scope of the problem when he announced in 2000 that he does not expect his country to resolve disputes along its 14,000 kilometers of border before 2007.[25]

In order to understand the magnitude of the challenge, one need only consider that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan alone have more than 140 disputed border points. And this shared border constitutes only a small fraction of the regional total. The Soviet Union's collapse created significant bilateral border issues for the following combinations of countries: Russia-China; Russia-Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan-Tajikistan; Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan; Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan-China; Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan; Tajikistan-China; Tajikistan-Afghanistan; Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan; Turkmenistan-Afghanistan; and Kazakhstan-China. Obviously, these border disputes are of legal and political nature.[26]

UZBEKISTAN- KAZAKHSTAN BORDER

Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have significant ethnic minorities on each other's territory, and 80-85 per cent of the 400,000 Uzbeks in Kazakhstan live in these disputed southern territories. 25 January 2000 marked the first time that Uzbekistan implemented irredentist claims on Kazakhstan's territory.[27] In early 2000, Uzbekistan's border guards were discovered undertaking a

---

[24] SWB/SU/3805/G/3   3 APRIL 2000

[25] SWB ,BBC World service, " Kazakhstan border negotiations could take years", 6 September 2000

[26] ICG Asia Report N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[27] Chimkent news (in Russia) at www.news.dolphin.kz/2000/02/25022000.htm

unilateral demarcation of the border with Kazakhstan, allegedly deep inside Kazakhstan territory in an effort that included building outposts.[28] Kazakhstan reacted with alarm. The government issued diplomatic protests on 27 January 2000.[29] Kazakhstan established a Southern Military District and quickly deployed troops in the area to forestall any further encroachment on its territory.[30]

The border issue is of particular concern for Kazakhstan, since the southern provinces are among the most densely populated areas of the country, and disagreements about water, arable land and pastures in the area come at a time when social tensions are already palpable because of economic recession, declining living standards and high unemployment. Reports of the growth of radical Islamist movements, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, in southern regions, only add to the anxieties.[31] The village of Bagys, some seven kilometres north of Tashkent, has been of particular concern. The area is part of lands given to Uzbekistan in a lease arrangement from Kazakhstan, which have remained in legal limbo following independence.[32] Most inhabitants are ethnic Kazakhs and prefer being part of Kazakhstan, yet their salaries are often paid and taxed by Uzbekistan. Uzbek police patrol the area.[33] Under an agreement signed in 1991, part of the rented land was returned back to Kazakhstan, but not Bagys village.[34] The village is next door to Turkestanets, which had been a military state farm for the Central Asian Military District during the Soviet period and remains this for Uzbekistan's armed forces. Following independence the residents of both settlements hoped they would become part of Kazakhstan.

---

[28] SWB/SU/3771 G/3 27 JANUARY 2000

[29] .SWB/SU/3772 G/3 28 JANUARY 2000

[30] Farzad Samdely, .Glass borders of Central Asia,.*Tehran resalat*, 31 January 2000, FBIS-NES-2000 0307; Interfax, 27 & 28 January 2000.

[31] SWB/SU/4095G/2 15 MARCH 2001

[32] SWB/SU/4062 G/1 5 FEBRUARY 2001

[33] Daur Dosybiev, .Village defies Uzbek government,. Reporting Central Asia (London: IWPR), No. 51, 11 May 2001, available at: http://www.iwpr.net.

[34] SWB/SU/4062 G/1 5 FEBRUARY 2001

Almost all the residents of Bagys are ethnic Kazakhs, as are 80 per cent Turkestanets.

BORDERS OF CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Residents of Bagys village are demanding that Uzbekistan should return 1900 hectares of land, including their village, which was transferred 45 years ago. Nonetheless, Tashkent has been reluctant to cede the lands, and Astana did not press because it did not want to strain relations. According to Kazakh media reports Uzbeks can be persuade to hand over to Kazakhstan only 400-500 hectares of land. This solution does not suit to villagers.[35] The result has been

---

[35] Kazakh Commercial Television, Almaty, In Russian 1400gmt 2 Feb 2001(SWB/SU/4062 G/1 5 February 2001)

an uncertain status for the residents.[36] About half hold Kazakh passports and citizenship, while the other halves have Uzbek passports but not citizenship. Those who work on the state farm are paid in Uzbek soms, while in the school and other structures are paid in Kazakh tenge. In a gesture indicating their deep frustration, residents staged a rally on 30 December 2001 during which they proclaimed the Independent Kazakh Republic of Bagys and elected a president and a legislature. Subsequently, Uzbek police swept down on the village and arrested 30 individuals. Further arrests of independence activists took place on 20 January 2002, and seven leading agitators were forced into hiding.[37]

Border controls are tightening between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Given the tightening border controls, it is little surprise that ethnic Uzbek and Kazakh minorities continue to migrate out of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at rapid rates. Even if demarcation is finalized, both countries still face the huge problem of how to ensure freedom of movement across the border. Tashkent and southern Kazakhstan were once closely tied economically, but new border controls are putting any cooperation at risk. Since these are the two major economies in the region, it is vital that they find ways to stimulate trade and freedom of movement rather than to hinder it.[38] Recently there have been reports that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan ministries signed a simplified visa regime. Migration control card has been introduced for the persons willing to cross borders. Migration control card will cost 50 or 70 Tenge. This will necessarily provide reliefs to the people reside in border areas but still much need to be done to promote harmony and peace in the area.[39] Kazakhstan and

---

[36] ICG Asia Report N° 33 *Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[37] 30 ICG interviews in Bagys, January 2002; BBC monitoring, 13-14 January 2001. There are some Contradictions in what was reported by BBC and what residents told ICG. Residents were distancing themselves available at www.crisisgroup.org

[38] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential*
4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[39] SWB/SU4099 G/4 20 MARCH 2001

Uzbekistan are trying to resolve their border disputes however Kazakhstan favors soviet border, which is not entirely acceptable to Uzbekistan.[40] Fortunately still negotiations between the countries are going ahead. Kazakh and Uzbek president have agreed to speed up border demarcation.[41]

B. UZBEKISTAN-TURKMENISTAN

Relations have become increasingly tense, with occasional shootings and frequent local disputes over border issues and resource claims. Turkmenistan has historical claims to the Uzbek regions of Khiva and Khorezm. Nationalists argue that the majority of the inhabitants there are of Turkmen descent, and Khiva was home to one of the most influential regional khanates during the1800s.[42] At the same time, Uzbek nationalists assert that the Tashauz (Dashoguz) and Turkmenabad (formerly Cherjev) areas in Turkmenistan have majority Uzbek populations and that Uzbekistan has a rightful claim to this territory[43]. Such claims would have lead to a redrawing of borders, however, and were not entertained by the authorities in Tashkent or Ashgabat the governments recognized that raising those issues would open virtually all Central Asian borders for negotiation and preferred to adhere to the Soviet administrative borders. The real issues for negotiation concerned where exactly to draw the borderline, the type of border regime, and the status of leased lands on each other's territory.[44]

Post-independence relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan quickly soured over disputes centered on territorial leases for oil and gas facilities. Turkmenistan voiced its unhappiness over Uzbekistan's long-term

---

[40] SWB/SU/3805 G/3 3APRIL 2000

[41] SWB/SU/4099 G/4 20 MARCH 2001

[42] ICG Asia Report N° 33 CENTRAL ASIA:BORDER DISPUTES AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[43] Arslan Kasymov, .Feuding Neighbours., *Reporting Central Asia*, No. 50, 4 May 2001, available at www.iwpr.net.

[44] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

leases on facilities within Turkmenistan, claiming they deprived the country of substantial revenues. In turn, Uzbekistan demanded that it be granted ownership of these facilities. Relations became so strained over the issue that trade between the two countries virtually halted in the mid-1990s, and rail, air and bus links were suspended.[45] An illustration of the potential local conflicts that can arise from such border regimes occurred in December 2001, when several hundred Uzbeks from the border district of Amudarya in Khorezm region gathered for a traditional visit to the cemetery on the other side of the border in Turkmenistan. About 200 people broke through armed border guards, refusing to pay the cross border fee. Only the arrival of reinforcements, and the threat to use force, persuaded them to return to Uzbek territory.[46]

Such localized clashes demonstrate how difficult socio-economic conditions and tough border regimes can combine to provoke unrest. In the absence of close relations at higher political levels, it is all too easy for localized conflict to slip out of control. The risk from border tensions between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan will remain a consistent danger as long as largely unaccountable leaders rule both states and neither side is willing to broker a compromise that offers freedom of movement in border regions.[47] Given Turkmenistan's negative attitude to any regional or other international organization, the outside world has little leverage to improve the situation. With relations between the two countries further complicated by water and other resource issues, the risk of future conflicts remains very real.[48]

---

[45] ibid

[46] Vitalii Ponomarev, .Uzhestochenie rezhima na Turkmeno-uzbekskoi granites vyzyvaet volneniya naseleniya v prigranichnykh rayonakh Turkmenistana., Memorial Human Rights Centre (Moscow) available at www.crisisgroup.org.

[47] ICG Asia Report N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[48] For example, Karina Insarova, .Tashkent 'Threatened' by Turkmen Reservoir., Reporting Central Asia, No. 105, 22 February 2002, available at www.iwpr.net.

UZBEKISTAN- TAJIKISTAN

Relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are tense due to presence of ethnic minorities on each side and growing threat of Islamic militant. Although Officially Taskhent does not say this openly it makes it clear that it has problems delimiting borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. It has even planted mines in dangerous sector.[49] Their mutual suspicion stems from historical claims to each other's territory. The cities of Samarkand and Bukhara are two of the most important and historic in Central Asia. They have populations that are largely ethnic Tajik.[50] The inclusion of these territories in Uzbekistan when Soviet Republic borders were drawn in 1924 deeply angered

---

[49] SWB/SU/4095 G/2 15 MARCH 2001

[50] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html

many ethnic Tajiks and inspired considerable irredentist sentiment.[51] These territorial claims were given renewed vigor in the early 1990s when, with independence, the countries embarked on rewriting their histories to establish themselves as historic nations. Redrawing borders to fit historical claims seemed a possible course of action.[52]

According to Martha Brill Olcott, the dispute between the Uzbeks and Tajiks is potentially the most contentious. Central Asia's two main Persian-speaking cities, Samarkand and Bukhara, were included in Uzbekistan, leaving the Tajiks with the backwater town of Dushanbe for their republic capital. For their part, the Uzbeks have periodically staked a claim to the entire Fergana valley, which includes Kyrgyzstan's Osh oblast, and part of the Khojent oblast in Tajikistan. The Uzbeks also argue that part of southern Kazakhstan and eastern Turkmenistan rightly belongs to them as well. The republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan disagree not only about where their border should be, but even where it is, and briefly came to blows over this question in the summer of 1989.[53]

However, Tajikistan's civil war, from 1992 to 1997, chilled pan-Tajik enthusiasm in the region. Few saw it as viable or desirable to expand that state when it was barely able to function within its current boundaries. In addition, it became increasingly clear with independence that opening the issue of historical territorial claims was highly inflammatory and would do nothing to enhance the stability of the fledgling republics. Nonetheless, as relations were often strained in the 1990s, Uzbekistan worried that irredentism could reappear.[54]

---

[51] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 source www.crisisgroup.org

[52] Bruce Pannier, .Central Asia: border dispute between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan risks triggering conflict, *RFE/RL Magazine*, 8 March 1999, available at:http://www.rferl.org/.

[53] Martha Brill Olcott"Central Asia's Post-empire Politics," *Orbis*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1992, p.256.

[54] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

Officially, some 1.25 million ethnic Tajiks continue to reside in Samarkand, Bukhara and the surrounding areas in Uzbekistan, although some claim that there are as many as seven million, and that authorities had registered many Tajiks as Uzbeks during the Soviet era.[55] Uzbekistan fears that this substantial minority could some day, be galvanized by an ethnic separatist movement. In an effort to discourage Tajik ethnic identity, the Uzbek government has banned Tajik language books in parts of the country as ideologically incorrect.[56]

Uzbekistan is also wary that the Tajik minority might be susceptible to radical Islamist groups. The civil war that erupted in Tajikistan after independence and the ensuing power sharing agreement of 1997 which allowed Islamist groups to hold 30 per cent of government positions were both viewed with unease in Uzbekistan.[57] Ethnic Tajik citizens of Uzbekistan residing along the border have come in for particularly harsh treatment, largely because the government has accused them of collaboration with the IMU. Following the IMU incursions in 2000, the Uzbek government evacuated at least 2,000 households in Surkhan-Darya Province in the south because of concerns that they could support the guerrillas. Most of those expelled were reportedly Tajik.[58]

Such heavy-handed tactics have increased resentment in the ethnic Tajik community and led some to point out that this territory was historically part of Tajikistan. Thus far, however, Dushanbe has not officially laid claim to these

---

[55] Bruce Pannier, op. cit.; ICG interview with Iskander Asadullayev, Director of Centre for Strategic Studies under the President's Administration, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 12 July 2001.

[56] Bakhtior Ergashev, .Tashkent targets Tajik minority,. *Reporting Central Asia* (London: IWPR), No. 49, 27 April 2001, available at http://www.iwpr.net.

[57] ICG interview with Iskander Asadullayev, Director of Centre for Strategic Studies under the President's Administration, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 12 July 2001 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[58] ICG interview with Safarov, leader of the National Party of Tajikistan, July 2001. According to Safarov the number of people evacuated from Surkhan-Dariya was much higher than officially reported and amounted to 36,000 Tajiks, whose homes were razed in the operation; see also Bakhtior Ergashev, .Uprooted Uzbek villagers .abandoned., *Reporting Central Asia* (London: IWPR), No. 38, 30 January 2001, available at: www.iwpr.net.

areas. Not only was Uzbekistan nervous about the potential regional ambitions of Islamist fighters in Tajikistan, but it also came to fear that ethnic Uzbek refugees from Tajikistan might sow the seeds of an uprising. At the time of independence, around 1.2 million ethnic Uzbeks lived in Tajikistan, mostly in the north.[59]

Not only was Uzbekistan nervous about the potential regional ambitions of Islamist fighters in Tajikistan, but it also came to fear that ethnic Uzbek refugees from Tajikistan might sow the seeds of an uprising[60]. At the time of independence, around 1.2 million ethnic Uzbeks lived in Tajikistan, mostly in the north.[61]

During the Tajik civil war many fled to Uzbekistan. They were viewed with wariness by Tashkent as having been influenced by Islamist parties in Tajikistan and were not offered any state support. As a result, as many as 70 percent, refugees made their way back to Tajikistan.[62] These concerns and mutual suspicions informed the subsequent difficult relations over the Uzbek-Tajik border. Uzbekistan views Tajikistan as helping to sponsor terrorism aimed directly at Tashkent; while Tajikistan sees Uzbekistan as a belligerent neighbor using direct military force to advance strategic aims.

Uzbekistan also planted mines on Tajiks border on the pretext of preventing its opposition from intruding into Uzbek territory.[63] The mines along the border reportedly had killed more than 50 people by early 2002.[64] This will further deteriorate the relation between the countries and promote

---

[59] Uzbekistan consolidates dominant hold in Central Asia., *Global Intelligence Update* 23 February 2001, Available at: www.stratfor.com.

[60] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[61] Uzbekistan consolidates dominant hold in Central Asia., *Global Intelligence Update* 23 February 2001, available at: www.stratfor.com

[62] ICG interview with Safarov, leader of the National Party of Tajikistan, July 2001.

[63] SWB/SU4010/ G/2 29 NOVEMBER 2000

[64] ICG interview with OSCE Officials, Dushanbe, February 2002. available at www.crisisgroup.org

inter ethnic tension in border areas which will have serious security ramifications for both the countries.

UZBEKISTAN-KYRGYZSTAN

Border delimitation is underway between Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzystan but serious disputes around enclaves and elsewhere continue to mar progress for some 130 km of border.[65] Recently relations between the two countries have got strained due to problem of delimitation of common border and issue of transit visa.[66]

With an ethnically diverse population, important water resources and a rich variety of historic territorial claims, the Ferghana Valley has been at the centre of border disputes between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. As with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, IMU activities in the region have made already difficult border issues even tougher to resolve.[67] Kyrgyzstan is preparing to redeploy troops in southern Batken and Osh regions because of the possibility of the armed militant incursion into the area.[68]

For much of its pre-Soviet history, the Ferghana Valley was controlled by the Khanate of Kokand, with its capital in the Uzbekistan city of Kokand. Many Uzbeks continue to view the Soviet demarcation of borders, which placed the city of Osh and other parts of the valley in Kyrgyzstan, as artificial and unfair, depriving Uzbekistan of territory.[69] This attitude is not given any official support, and it is probably unfair to accuse Uzbekistan of irredentist sentiment

---

[65] available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html

[66] SWB/SU/4083G/3 1 MARCH 2001

[67] ICG Asia Report N° 33 CENTRAL ASIA:BORDER DISPUTES AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[68] SWB/SU/4090 G/2 9 MARCH 2001

[69] 59 ICG informal conversations with Uzbeks in Osh, May 2001. available at www.crisisgroup.org

in this regard. If anything, Uzbekistan has viewed its compatriots in Kyrgyzstan with some suspicion.[70]

Nevertheless, resentment against Kyrgyzstan is apparent in Osh, and many ethnic Uzbeks feel that its government is attempting to Kyrgyzcise the country while denying them fair representation. In turn, Kyrgyzstan is clearly made nervous by its neighbor, and some Kyrgyz believe the Uzbeks could make up a fifth column that could be mobilized against their nation.[71] In 1998, Uzbekistan imposed a visa regime that applied to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. While residents of southern Kyrgyzstan are allowed to travel up to 100 kilometers into Uzbekistan, or to transit this territory, more extensive travel (such as to Tashkent) requires a visa. These restrictions have disrupted traditional patterns of trade and social interaction in the valley. Kyrgyzstan responded by instituting a similar visa regime. Neither country has a consulate in any of the border cities, leading to the ridiculous arrangement where residents of Osh, five kilometers from the Uzbek border, need to travel to the capital Bishkek, in the north, to receive a visa to travel within Uzbekistan.

Four enclaves within Kyrgyzstan all Uzbekistan territory has caused considerable difficulty. Two in particular, Sokh and Shahimardan, have received the most attention. Sokh has been in dispute since the 1920s, and none of the enclave borders have ever been fully demarcated.[72]

These borders took on added significance because Uzbekistan has consistently lobbied to be granted a corridor to the enclaves, and because the

---

[70] As of January 2001 there were 376,249 Uzbeks living in the Kyrgyz province of Osh or 31 percent of the population. This was less than in the Soviet era since there was significant out-migration after violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in 1990. Information provided to ICG from the Osh Regional Department of State Statistics for 1 January 2001. available at www.crisisgroup.org

[71] ICG interview with representatives from the political party Moia Strana in Talas, April 2001. There is no Particular evidence of widespread separatist sentiment among ethnic Uzbeks in the South. If anything, they Generally have negative attitudes to the Uzbek political and economic system. Paradoxically, a more liberal political system in Uzbekistan could change these attitudes And pose a greater threat of separatist sentiment. available at www.crisisgroup.org

[72] ICG Asia Report N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

demarcation has also involved complex issues of water rights and industry. Further, IMU activity made Uzbekistan more eager to assert itself in the demarcation process and to crack down on any groups in southern Kyrgyzstan it viewed as a security threat.[73]

Sokh was considered a potentially dangerous area after the IMU incursions since the population is almost exclusively Tajik and effectively isolated from Uzbek society. As a result, Uzbekistan continues to fear that Sokh will serve as a haven for any remaining IMU guerrillas. Uzbek forces mined the perimeter of the enclave and set up border posts to check all vehicles and persons passing through, despite the fact that the border is highly disputed.[74]

Kyrgyz officials viewed these steps as a unilateral demarcation attempt that posed direct physical threats to its citizens. Uzbekistan claimed the minefields were on Uzbek soil and marked by signs. Residents, however, noted that the signs were so small they could only be read at a short distance, and the warnings did little good for livestock.[75]

For Uzbekistan, the issue of security continues to be paramount, and a land corridor connecting the Sokh enclave to the rest of its territory is viewed as a means of ensuring control. A land corridor would allow residents easier access to Uzbekistan proper. Trade has dried up because of the constant harassment and humiliation local people face when transiting numerous customs posts (Uzbek and Kyrgyz) to get to Uzbekistan proper Unclear demarcations have led to a number of tragic incidents, including frequent mistaken shootings of villagers by border guards or other clashes. Although there is often confusion over the exact position of the frontier, Uzbekistani border guards must bear much of the responsibility for these continuing incidents. They are often very poorly trained in handling confrontations with

[73] ibid

[74] Open letter from Governor of Batken Province Mamat Aibalaev, *Batken tany* (Batken), 10 January 2000.available at .www.crisigroup.org.

[75] ICG conversations with UNDP Regional Coordinator for Batken, Bruno de Cordier, April 2001.

local residents, badly educated and frequently corrupt. It is in Uzbekistan's interests to ensure that border guards receive adequate training to deal peacefully with conflict situations.

There has been effort from both the countries to resolve their border disputes amicably. Kyrgyz foreign minister Muratbek Imanaliyev is in charge of the border delimitation issues for the Kyrgyz side.[76]

Rooting out corruption is key to improving not just relations in border regions but also security. The willingness of border guards to accept bribes does little to improve the inviolability of borders.[77]

TAJIKISTAN-KYRGYZYSTAN

Border issues between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not transparent. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have a territorial dispute regarding their boundary in the Isfara Valley. This has delayed the completion of border delimitation between the two countries.[78] There are territorial disputes concerning place "Kara' among Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where Tajiks interested in expanding their territories and receive an access to water (canal "Tort-Kul" which is situated on Kyrgyz territory).[79] The position of Kyrgyz part is not to allow Tajik population to strategic important objects to canal "Tortkul" and to the road connecting Leilek rayon (KG) with mainland Kyrgyzstan. The reason is a lack of exact demarcated border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In July, 2000, representatives of Kyrgyz local authorities started land plots distribution to villagers from Kok-Tash and Ak-takyr. During that process representative and several inhabitants of neighboring Tajik village Chorku came to threaten and to

---

[76] SWB/SU/4077 G/1 22FEBRUARY 2001

[77] ICG Asia Report N° 33 CENTRAL ASIA:BORDER DISPUTES AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[78] available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html

[79] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan ,Territorial and border problems in Central Asia: barrier to regional integration | posted: December 21, 2004 www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php?a=296

stop land distribution. The conflict did not stop at words. Tajik militia, soldiers and civilians about 200 came to the place and began mutual threats and insults. Boundary surveying agencies of two countries decided not to occupy disputable areas until the intergovernmental party committee's decision.[80]

Later, there was a case of illegal occupation and construction of sheds by the citizen of Tajikistan Boboev Jura who used the opportunity when Kyrgyz communities celebrated Day of Independence. Representatives of Kyrgyz community appealed to the head of Batken Rayon Administration as a result of talks with Tajik authorities who came to explain the situation and Boboev with his family was resettled the biggest enclave Sokh with total area of 325 sq. km, and population 428000 people. 99% makes Tajik. 0,7 % Kyrgyz, the only Uzbeks are state officials from Tashkent.[81] Recently construction of fence has been going on near the Kyrgyz and Tajik border.[82] These border fences will prohibit the movement of people residing in border areas hence it is bound to increase the wrath of local people dwelling near borders. In context of cross border ethnicity fencing of borders can be seen as an attempt to impose citizenship regime on those persons who have loyalty to the other countries. Therefore it may promote interethnic tension. Almost all cross –border regions have identical problems: acute shortage of drinking and irrigation water, water distribution, border disputes, customs crossing, land mining, transport infrastructure, and joint use of pastures.[83] Such problems could further aggravate ethnic tension and cleavages.

---

[80] ibid

[81] ibid

[82] SWB/SU/4090 G/2 9 MARCH 2001

[83] Davlatbek Aminov, Uzbekistan. Mingul Seitkazieva, Kyrgyzstan Territorial and Border Problems in Central Asia: Barrier to Regional Integration | Posted: Dec 21, 2004, Available at www. politicon. org/edit3/news.php

DISPUTED BORDERS OF TAJIKISTAN

KYRGYZSTAN- CHINA

Like all border disputes in the region, ethnicity, resources and history play roles in border talks between China and Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have voiced some displeasure over the fact that the border with China determined by agreements both between the Russian Empire and China in the late 1800s and between China and the newly established Soviet Union. This divided ethnic Kyrgyz and Kazakh minority populations. Others fled the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, there are now estimated to be some 169,000 ethnic Kyrgyz in China's Xingjian region and over 900,000 Kazakhs. The border with China was sealed until 1991 but since independence has become an increasingly important trade and transport route for both

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. China is concerned about ethnic separatist movements on its territory among its Muslim population and fears that the new freedom of movement for Uighurs and other ethnic minorities will provide them access to wider regional support from Muslim peoples in Central Asia. It has taken a particularly strong line against ethnic Uighurs, whom, it claims, are often supportive of separatist movements. China is mainly interested, therefore, in a strong border regime with easily identifiable borders, which it can use to control any links between its own ethnic minorities and the states of Central Asia.[84]

In 1996, Kyrgyzstan and China reached an initial agreement on demarcating a portion of their 1,100- kilometer border. As part of this agreement, Kyrgyzstan agreed to cede roughly 35,000 hectares of remote mountain territory.[85] The agreement was ratified by the Kyrgyz parliament, although some legislators subsequently complained that the vote was conducted without the executive branch having presented a map of the proposed concessions.[86]

However, a subsequent secret border agreement that included further concessions of territory to Beijing provoked widespread protest among the political elite in Kyrgyzstan during 2001. Part of the reason was timing. News of the arrangement became public not long after the Sokh memorandum. Detailing the potential agreement with Uzbekistan described above was leaked.[87]

---

[84] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 200 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[85] ibid

[86] Alisher Khamidov, .Dispute over China-Kyrgyz border demarcation pits president vs. parliament. *Eurasia Insight*, 2 August 2000.

[87] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

In 1999, Kyrgyzstan apparently signed an agreement that gave China an additional almost 90,000 hectares in the provinces of Naryn and Issyk-Kul, including a river in the Bedel area.[88]

While the territory itself is sparsely populated and mountainous, it provided access to a glacial watershed. An important bonus for often water starved western China.[89]

However, the government did not initially make maps of the proposed demarcation available, so considerable confusion has surrounded the exact territory in question. While the negotiating process had been relatively smooth, the talks were held behind closed doors, and there was little parliamentary debate. The agreement was controversial not only because it gave away territory, but also because of the way it was presented to the parliament for ratification. Deputies were not given a copy to examine beforehand, but were only briefly allowed to look at it before voting. Administration officials had earlier offered assurances that any subsequent deals with China would not involve territorial concessions. The disputed territory was noted even then, and deputies did not vote to ratify that particular article. Nonetheless, Akaev signed the despite constitutional provisions that the legislature must codify territorial revisions.[90] . If both agreements go through, Beijing would receive a total of 125,000 hectares. The Kyrgyz parliament vigorously denounced the agreement and even threatened to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president.[91]

---

[88] 84 ICG interview with Kyrgyzstan parliamentary deputy, Alevtina Pronenko, May 2001; ICG interview with Azimbek Beknazarov, Kyrgyzstan parliamentary deputy and member of the Parliamentary Committee for Legal Issues, June 2001. available at www.crisisgroup.org

[89] 85 ICG interview with Nikolai Bailo, Kyrgyzstan parliamentary deputy and member of the Parliamentary Committee on CIS Cooperation, June 2001; ICG interview with Deputy Governor of Issyk-Kul Province, B.U. Bozgoropoev, May 2001. available at www.crisisgroup.org

[90] ICG Asia Report *N° 33 Central Asia:Border Disputes And Conflict Potential* 4 April 2002 available at www.crisisgroup.org

[91] ibid

It did not go through with the threat but the outcry-stalled implementation of the agreements, while the parliament insisted on being allowed to examine them. The unraveling of the border agreements would clearly diminish President Akaev's credibility and damage Kyrgyz-Chinese relations. Violent street protest took place in reaction to this secret agreement. Massive hunger strike, arrest and deployment of police paralyzed normal life. Thus although there is little chance of border disputes pushing the two states to any kind of conflict, the case demonstrates the potential for controversial border demarcations conducted without due transparency to destabilize domestic politics.

1. In words of Prof. Rakesh Gupta "States as of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan may look for carving out new states which may have a tinge of irredentism and or religious revival.[92]

2. Roy Allision regards Central Asia Republics as a weak sub complex in a Russia centered large regional security complex- a sub complex whose internal dynamics are still forming and in which the involvement of Russia is strong[93]. Officially many treaties have been signed by the members of Five Central Asian Republics to build a strong security complex. For example Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a treaty in 1994 to create single economic space in 1994.Later it was joined by Kyrgyzstan. In later years Central Asian economic community was formed and from January 2001 it was known as Central Asian Economic Forum[94]. Moreover various military treaty like Treaty on Eternal Friendship (1997), Declaration on measures to create a regional security system in Central Asia (1998), and treaty on Joint measures in the struggle against Terrorism, Political and Religious Extremism, Transnational Organized Crime (April 2000) was signed.

---

[92] Rakesh Gupta, "Post- Soviet State(s) in Central Asia", *International Centre for Peace Studies*. P 9

[93] Roy, Allison, "Regional Structures, and Security Management in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, vol.80, no.3, March 2004. p 10

[94] SWB/SU/4051 G/2 30 JANUARY 2001

However most of the treaties are formal and have not been practiced on ground. Thus Central Asia still lacks a strong security complex. Rustam Burnshaev comments "most of the agreements adopted by the Central Asian Economic Community remained only on paper. Government in this region lacks the interest to create gravitational fields".[95] There is lack of political will on the parts of government to create a strong security complex in the region. This lack of will is partially due to border problems among themselves, interethnic cleavages within the country, and different strategic interest of each country. Annette Bohr commenting on regionalism in Central Asia writes "greatest threat to regions security and stability comes from within the region itself".[96] Roy Allision explaining the cause of weakness of security-related regionalism in Central Asia, regards "The exhausting demands on local states of seeking to consolidate national sovereignty in a peripheral zone in the world systems" as one of the factors among many factors responsible for weak security regionalism peripheral zone indicates towards dissenting ethnic nationalism in areas of nation-state.[97] Weak security complex further aggravates, external security problem.

3. Islamic terrorism, insurrectionists of the so-called Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are attacking Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from Tajikistan. This further aggravates external threats of terrorism and strains the relation between Central Asian Republics. Problem of Islamic terrorism is serious for whole region due to ambiguity in demarcation of border areas. Independent Uzbek political scientist Kharamon Ghulamov said that there are many reasons why gunmen feel free in Central Asia .One of the main

---

[95] Rustam Bunashev "Regional Security In Central Asia; Military Aspects" in Boris Rumer, ed *Central Asia A Gathering Storm* , (New Delhi: Aakar Books 2003) P.141

[96] Annette Bohr "Regionalism In Central Asia: New Geopolitics ,Old Regional Order" *International Affairs,* vol. 80 no. 3, 2004, March p.111

[97] Roy, Allison, "Regional Structures, and Security Management in Central Asia", *International Affairs,* vol.80, no.3, March 2004 p. 58

reasons is that there are many undefined border areas between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These are mainly in mountainous areas. For example there border sectors disputed by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley area. There are more than 140 border sectors that have not been recognized officially and have not been mutually agreed.[98] Root of the disputed border lay largely in cross border ethnicity and proclivity of republics to impose a regime of citizenship and unilaterally demarcate border. Thus there is deep linkage between ethnic cleavages, border dispute and flourishing Islamic militancy in the region.

4. Other countries may take the advantage of internal instability or problem of Central Asian Republic to pursue their own interest, while neglecting national interest of Central Asian Republics.

CONCLUSION

Ethnicity has relation with border disputes in Central Asia. In some cases they cause border disputes as a result of irredentism or cross border loyalty. In other cases border disputes may aggravate interethnic cleavages which may result in riots and internal disturbance creating serious security threat for the citizens as well as for the whole region. Ethnic war in one country may have serious security repercussions for the neighboring countries. Inter ethnic wars can spread to other region by the logic of spill over effect. Thus any inter ethnic conflict has potential to destabilize the whole region.

Central Asian Republics must establish institutions to accommodate various ethnic interests and ventilate the grievances of different ethnic groups in legitimate and transparent way. Central Asian Republics should cooperate with each other not only to resolve border tension but at the same time to allow trade through borders and movement of civilians across borders. This can ease the

---

[98] SWB/SU/4095 G/2 15 MARCH 2001

tension between two countries and will provide relief to citizens. It will also boost trade and hence will lead to prosperity and peace in long run.

CHAPTER – 4

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER – 4

CONCLUSION

After disintegration of Soviet Union ethnic consciousness became major phenomena generally in world and particularly in Central Asian Republics. Inter ethnic cleavages have sharpened in five Central Asian Republics. This work attempts to study the security threats emanating from such interethnic cleavages.

Ethnicity is a modern phenomenon which gained dominance with the emergence of modern nation state. Ethnic group is different from race because ethnic identity is a social construct and race denotes biological and cultural identity.

Many authors have given different definition of ethnicity however for the purpose of work following definition of ethnicity has been used. Ethnicity is a constructed social phenomenon. The concept refers to the idea of shared group affinity and a sense of belonging that is based on a myth of collective ancestry and a notion of distinctiveness. The constructed bonds of ethnicity may stem from any number of distinguishing cultural characteristics, such as common language, religion, or regional differentiation. Within a polity, the "markers" are widely known, internalized, and allow for easy categorization of individuals.

After the end of cold war, there has been resurgence of ethnic nationalism. Due to ethnic nationalism, nation-state has been witnessing problems of separatism and secessionism. However, this does not mean that problem of ethnic nationalism and ethnicity did not exist during cold war period. It existed during cold war period also. However due to hostile relations between two superpower it remained latent or dormant.

The concept of national security originated in U.S.A. after Second World War. The concept of security with its societal, political and normative dimension dates back to state formations in different societies. It is with the emergence of

modern state, security got related to private property as opposed to e.g., the security concerns of the communities in ancient times, for example practiced among vedis (a tribe) regarding the common grazing grounds.

There are various theories and approaches to understand security. Core values like system maintenance economic and political interests in the nuclear age were early concerns of the security and policy formulation was an important field of study. This paved the path to the study of conflict and cooperation concerned with maximization of national power (realist approach). Earlier concept of security was primarily related to military power and hardware. However later concept of security included economic, environmental, social and political problems and threats emanating from them. Now in study of security external as well as internal threats (social, centrifugal tendencies, environmental deterioration, economic backwardness and disparities, political instability, technologically backwardness, corruption etc. are also taken into account. Realist focused on security dilemma during cold war era. However, liberals give primacy to democratic peace thesis and domestic democratic theory to attain sustainable peace. They favor building international institutions to promote security.

There are various theories of security such as Constructivist security, Feminist theories, Environmentalist security, Critical theory of security and postmodern approach to security.

However frame work of Barry Buzan to analyze the security has been used to analyze security. He has offered the most comprehensive definition of security which covers political, social, military, and economic and environment spheres. According to Buzan "Security is a complicated concept on one dimension five major factors Military, Political, Economic and Societal and Environmental, affect the security of human collectivities". On another dimension, Buzan continued, the security of human collectivities involves three levels (individual, state and international). In the words of Barry Buzan "A

Security complex involves a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered". Relation between ethnicity and security in Central Asia has been analyzed within the Barry Buzan's framework of security and security complex.

There is serious debate between the relation of ethnicity and security. Ethnic sentiments are often believed to pose serious security threats to international and domestic security and to be the source of violent form of nationalism. However ethnicity is not always a security threat for nation-state. There are many more ethnic groups than there are ethnic nationalist movements.

According to John Baylis, one group of security analyst regards ethno-national groups rather than nation-state as the core of security studies. Ethnic heterogeneity can become a serious security threat if state discriminates among ethnic group or if state has lost legitimacy due to its failure to pursue socio economic development and redistribute the economic and other benefits prudently keeping the goal of social justice in view. In addition there should be institutions for conflict resolution mechanism and to ventilate the grievances of the masses. Democracy should deepen to provide enough opportunity for participation of various groups. So under such situation the security threats can be really grave.

Various types of security threats emanates from interethnic cleavage and interethnic tension. Factors of ethnicity may lead to formation of deeply divided society lacking social capital hence adversely affecting social harmony and cooperation. In the case of economic development, particular ethno group may not be willing to disseminate important information about, business, technology and skills in order to enjoy the monopoly over economy or particular sector economy. This hinders healthy economic competition and thus is inimical to economic development. Moreover ethnic conflicts and riots often forces migration of minor ethnic groups thus adversely affecting market and particular sector of economy. In addition any ethnic conflict may lead to severe damage of

property and necessary economic infrastructure. This can have serious repercussion for development of market and industry. Result may be shortage of basic commodities and hyperinflation accompanied by severe economic recession. Lack of sustained economic growth not only has security ramification for people but at the same time may lead to collapse of the entire state.

Threat is even severe at political level; majority-minority syndrome may appear in multi-ethnic nation-state. Majorities may be suspicious about minorities and vice versa. This hinders national integration and building of strong and effective state.

Moreover majoritarianism may aggravate the fear of minor ethnic groups, such a majoritarianism has serious security implication for individuals of minority groups. Resurgence of ethnic nationalism and its conversion into secessionist movement may pose serious threat to unity and integrity of the entire nation-state. Bureaucracy and Political elites often have ethnic proclivities. Bureaucracy having ethnic loyalty is inimical to the nation-state because bureaucrats often give more importance to ethnic interest rather than national interest. This diminishes the prospect of national interest and national development. Such a partial and corrupt bureaucracy not only erodes legitimacy of state but also further aggravates ethnic tension. Political elites often politicize ethnic groups to gain legitimacy and political power. However in long run this sharpens the cleavage between various ethnic groups and may result into ethnic conflict.

Interethnic cleavages have security ramifications from the environmental angle also. An inter-ethnic cleavage promotes competition to use the natural resources. Nature has natural regenerative growth rate. If the depletion of natural resources is more than the regeneration then serious environmental problems may emerge. Inter ethnic cleavages promotes competitive use of common resources. This leads to over exploitation of natural resources such as water, land, green pastures. Over use of river water is resulting in desiccation of Aral

Sea. Desiccation of Aral Sea will have serious repercussion for whole region. Over use of land is causing the infertility of land. Dispute over use of river water is becoming a new cause for conflict among state. In the context of inter ethnic cleavages it is difficult to build a consensus to protect environment and pursue sustainable development.

Last but not the least, inter-ethnic and intra ethnic conflicts may lead to loss of life, property of individual and can seriously disturb political stability, social harmony and prospects of economic development. Thus at theoretical level there is a linkage between ethnic cleavages and security.

Ethnic heterogeneity in Central Asian Republics is the product of many factors such as geographical and climatic factor gave birth to regional ethnic groups such as Pamiris , Gramis etc.

Historical migration and commingling has been another significant factor which promoted ethnic heterogeneity in Central Asia. The current ethnic makeup of Central Asia is the result of a process that began 1400 years ago. Today Central Asia is mainly Turkic, although its indigenous inhabitants were Iranians. In the westward migration of the Aryans various Iranian peoples settled in the Iranian plateau consisting of Central Asia. Despite the gradual settlement of other peoples the region maintained its Iranian ethnic makeup until the sixth century. The ethnic link between the Turkic Central Asians and turkey can be traced back to the migration of Central Asia Turkic tribes in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. With the coming of Turks, Islam came to Central Asia. However, every indigenous tribe of Central Asia adopted Islam in modified form. Thus Islam failed to bring homogeneity in Central Asia. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turks each have adopted unique version of Islam.

Russian annexation further added to ethnic heterogeneity. Russian annexation of Central Asian Republics changed its ethnic and linguistic composition by introducing ethnic Russians and the Russian language to the region. To appease the Central Asians, Russia did not try to change completely

the social structure of the region but it exercised a degree of Russification to secure its interest. Settling Russians and promoting their language in Central Asia were major elements of this policy.

Ethnic heterogeneity is product of well planned out policy of ethnic engineering and Russification by Russians. The Soviet objective was to replace the Central Asians culture and history with an artificial sense of belonging to distinct ethnic and linguistic groups. Creating a Soviet people in place of many nationalities- that is, a Russian-speaking people loyal to Moscow- was the final goal of this policy.

The policy of ethnic engineering aimed at the creation of "ethnically based" republics. After several divisions and re divisions of the region, the soviet regime finally created five "ethnically based" republics, each named after one specific "dominant" ethnic group. The planners deliberately drew borders in such a way that mono ethnic regions were divided among different republics, leaving large numbers of ethnic minorities in each republic. The soviet regime gradually imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on the Central Asians in order to cut their ties with their past and also with other Persian and Turkic speakers elsewhere, to facilitate their Russification and to minimize regional interaction. The Soviet Russification scheme consisted of several policies. Many people of European origin, including Russians, Ukrainians, and Volga Germans, were settled in Central Asia in order to change its ethnic structure and make it more responsive to Soviet needs.

After the independence of five Central Asian countries ethnic cleavages and conflict have increased due to various factors such as economic recession, building nationalism on the basis of titular ethnic groups, power vacuum, ideological vacuum, and politicization of ethnic identities to acquire power.

Each Central Asian Republic has ethnic heterogeneity. Various ethnic groups such as regional ethnic group, religious ethnic group, titular ethnic groups, linguistic and cultural ethnic groups coexist in addition to clans and family structure.

Ethnic heterogeneity is a necessary but not sufficient cause of interethnic conflict. There is no one to one relation between ethnic cleavage and security. Relation between ethnic cleavage and security varies from one Central Asian Republic to other. The combination of authoritarian regimes and the presence of large ethnic minorities in most of the states of the CAR region does not mean that ethnically based conflict will necessarily occur, but it does mean that some of the preconditions for such strife are in place because individuals and groups may not have access to conflict resolution mechanisms or ways to channel their grievances in a peaceful fashion.

In the past various ethnic conflicts have taken place. On the basis of the study of these inter ethnic conflict it can be regarded that if proper institution are not established then in future also major inter ethnic conflict can take place in a country and may lead to collapse of the state or shall take heavy toll of life and property thus causing serious security threat.

According to various writers like Keely Lange, Anita Sengupta, Boris Rumer, Hooman Peimani and Matieva Ann etc. serious inter-ethnic tension prevails in Central Asian Republics.

Inter-ethnic tension makes it difficult to assimilate various groups into state, thus building a strong nation state. At times each of the Central Asian state has witnessed ethnic conflict in one form or other. For example in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1990, deadly riots erupted in the south of the republic between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Ethnic situation in Tajikistan is fragile in wake of a recent bloody civil war between dominant Kulabi - Khodjent group and Pamiris and Ghramis. This shows worst kind of ethnic discrimination and hatred.

In case of Uzbekistan Uzbek openly discriminate against ethnic Turkmen tribe. There has also been serious contention between Uzbek and Tajik in Ferghana area.

In case of Turkmenistan, Turkmen's have discriminated against Armenians. Those belonging to religious groups that are not officially

sanctioned, such as the Armenian Apostolic Church, Baha'i, Buddhists, Hare Krishna devotees, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Jews, have been denied any public religious activities and have faced imprisonment, deportation, internal exile, house eviction and harassment for years. Ethnic minorities are treated as second class citizens. Ethnic Uzbek, Kazakh, Russian and other non-Turkmen citizens report systematic employment discrimination.

In case of Kazakhstan major divide is between Slavs and ethnic Kazakh. Although till now any open hostilities have not erupted but potential of riot between two is their in case of change in government or further worsening of socio-economic condition.

The external dimensions of security have also linkage with interethnic tension or ethnic dispute. At times dispute over sharing of resources such as water, land etc.can fuel interethnic war across and within border. Most of the border disputes are the gift of the soviet policy of ethnic engineering. Many border disputes are the result of irredentist claim of neighboring countries. Most of the Central Asian Republics have border disputes with each other. Some of the border dispute is related to ethnic problems (irredentism) on the other hands certain border dispute can weaken security regime in Central Asia making war between countries inevitable. Some border disputes have the potential to trigger ethnic disputes within a country. Various reasons for border disputes have also been discussed .Some examples have been also dealt here to show the nature of security threats emanating from contention over borders. Weak security complex exist in Central Asia due to border problems, lack of political will and inter ethnic tension.

Other countries may take the advantage of internal instability or problem of Central Asian Republic to pursue their own interest, while neglecting national interest of Central Asian Republics. Conflicts and strained relation between Central Asian Republics may be used by other countries to intervene and pursue their own interest.

Thus inter ethnic cleavages has relation with border disputes in Central Asia. In some cases they cause border disputes due to results of irredentism or cross border loyalty. In other cases border disputes may aggravate interethnic cleavages which may result in riots and internal disturbance creating serious security threat for the citizens as well as for whole region. Ethnic war in a neighboring country shall have serious security repercussions for the other neighboring country. Inter ethnic wars can spread to other region by the logic of spill over effect. Thus any inter ethnic conflict has potential to destabilize the whole region. Conflicts and strained relation between Central Asian Republics may be used by other countries to intervene and pursue their own interest.

Central Asian Republics should establish institutions to accommodate various ethnic interests and ventilate the grievances of various ethnic groups in legitimate and transparent way. They can built conflict resolution mechanism to contain and diffuse interethnic conflict. Central Asian Republics should cooperate with each other not only to resolve border tension but at same time to allow trade through borders and movement of civilians across borders. This can ease the tension between two countries and will provide relief to citizens. It will also boost trade and hence will lead to prosperity and peace in long run.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Main Ethnic Groups, Tajikistan[1]

Group	Population a	Percent and Trends b	Linguistic Group	Religion c	Main Area of Settlement
Tajik	4,598,000	69.9 (+)	Iranian	Muslim	
Uzbek	1,691,000	25.7 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Ferghana valley and southwest
Russian	68,000	1.0 (−)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	Urban centers, mainly Dushanbe
Kyrgyz	85,000	1.3 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	East
Persian	25,000	0.4 (~)	Iranian	Muslim	Southwest
Turkmen	29,000	0.4 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	Southwest
Other d	83,000	1.3 (−)			
Total	6,579,000	100.0			

a   natural increase and migration rates. The total population figure from the census differs from the CIA figure of (as of January 2000) 6,128,000 www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook /index.html.in the 1990s. The figures above are likely to have a large margin of error.

b   patterns of natural increase, and expected migration flows.
     − = relative decrease, ~ = little change.

c   Religion

d   Others

---

[1]   www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

Main Ethnic Groups, Turkmenistan

Group	Population a	Percent and Trends b	Linguistic Group	Religion c	Main Area of Settlement
Turkmen	3,613,000	78.5 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	
Uzbek	453,000	9.8 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	North and east, Dashowuz and Lebap provinces
Russian	240,000	5.2 (−)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	Urban centers and west (Balkan province)
Kazakh	98,000	2.1 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	Northwest
Azeri	37,000	0.8 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	West, Balkan province
Tatar	33,000	0.7 (−)	Turkic	Muslim	Urban centers
Baloch	30,000	0.7 (~)	Iranian	Muslim	Southeast, Mary province
Ukrainian	26,000	0.6 (−)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	Urban centers
Other d	73,000	1.6 (~)			
Total	4,603,000	100.0			

a   results subject to some debate), CIA estimates, and the 1989adjusted for natural increase and migration rates. CIA estimate in *The World Factbook,www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.* margin of error.

b   patterns of natural increase, and expected migration flows. + = relative increase, − = relative decrease, ~ = little change.

c   religious attachments.

d   The largest groups are Armenians, Lezgins, and Persians

Main Ethnic Groups, Kazakhstan

Group	Population a	Percent and Trends b	Linguistic Group	Religion c	Main Area of Settlement
Kazakh	7,985,000	53.4 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	
Russian	4,480,000	30.0 (–)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	North, northeast, and urban centers
Ukrainian	547,000	3.7 (–)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	North, northeast, and urban centers
Uzbek	371,000	2.5 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	South, Ongtusik Qazaqstan province
German	353,000	2.4 (–)	Germanic	Protestant and Catholic	North, northeast
Tatar	249,000	1.7 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	North, northeast, and urban centers
Uighur	210,000	1.4 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Southeast, Almaty province
Belarusan	112,000	0.7 (–)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	North, northeast, and urban centers
Korean	100,000	0.7 (~) .	Korean	Buddhist	East, southeast
Azeri	78,000	0.5 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	East, southeast
Polish	59,000	0.3 (–)	West Slavic	Catholic	North
Dungan	37,000	0.2 (+)	Sino-Tibetan	Muslim	Southeast, Zhambyl province
Kurd	33,000	0.2 (~)	Iranian	Muslim	East, southeast
Chechen	32,000	0.2 (~)	Caucasic	Muslim	East, southeast
Tajik	26,000	0.2 (+)	Iranian	Muslim	South, Ongtusik Qazaqstan province
Bashkir	23,000	0.2 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	North, northeast
Other d	258,000	1.7 (~)			
Total	14,953,000	100.0			

a Figures for all groups are based on the 1999 census in Kazakhstan (census results generally interpreted as reliable). The total population figure from the census differs from the CIA figure of (as of July 2001) 16,731,000. *The World Factbook*, www.odci.gov cia/publications/factbook/index.html. There has been large out-migration from Kazakhstan in the 1990s, coupled with in-migration in the late 1990s. The figures above are likely to have a moderate margin of error.

b Future trends regarding population share are based on state policies of favoritism, patterns of natural increase, and expected migration flows. + = relative increase,– = relative decrease, ~ = little change.

c Religion associated with the ethnic group; not necessarily an indication of strength of religious attachments.

d The largest groups are Moldavians, Ingush, Mordvinians, Armenians, Greeks, Chuvash, Erzya, and Udmurts.

Main Ethnic Groups, Kyrgyzstan

Group	Population a	Percent and Trends b	Linguistic Group	Religion c	Main Area of Settlement
Kyrgyz	3,130,000	64.9 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	
Uzbek	666,000	13.8 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Southwest, Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces
Russian	603,000	12.5 (−)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	North and urban centers
Ukrainian	71,000	1.5 (−)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	North and urban centers
Tatar	53,000	1.1 (−)	Turkic	Muslim	North and urban centers
Tajik	47,000	1.0 (+)	Iranian	Muslim	Southwest, Osh province
Uighur	45,000	0.9 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	East, Ysyk-Kol and Naryn provinces
Kazakh	44,000	0.9 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	North, Chuy and Talas provinces
German	40,000	0.8 (−)	Germanic	Protestant	North, Chuy province
Dungan	38,000	0.8 (+)	Sino-Tibetan	Muslim	Northeast, Chuy and Ysyk-Kol provinces
Other d	86,000	1.8 (~)			
Total	4,823,000	100.0			

a   Figures for the major groups are based on the 1999 census in Kyrgyzstan (census results subject to some debate). Figures for other groups are based on the 1999 cen-sus, and the 1989 census adjusted for natural increase and migration rates. The total population figure from the census differs from the CIA figure of (as of July 2001) 4,753,000. *The World Factbook, www.odci.gov/ cia/publications/factbook/index .html.* There has been large out-migration from Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s. The figures above are likely to have a moderate to large margin of error.

b   Future trends regarding population share are based on state policies of favoritism,patterns of natural increase, and expected migration flows. + = relative increase, − = relative decrease, ~ = little change.

c   Religion associated with the ethnic group; not necessarily an indication of strength of religious attachments.

d   The largest groups are Koreans, Azeris, and Kurds.

Main Ethnic Groups, Uzbekistan

Group	Population a	Percent and Trends b	Linguistic Group	Religion c	Main Area of Settlement
Uzbek	19,233,000	76.5 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	
Tajik	1,395,000	5.5 (+)	Iranian	Muslim	Central, southern, and eastern provinces
Russian	1,150,000	4.6 (–)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	Toshkent and other urban centers
Kazakh	1,050,000	4.2 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	West, central, and eastern provinces
Karakalpak	577,000	2.3 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Karakalpakstan
Tatar	398,000	1.6 (–)	Turkic	Muslim	Toshkent and other urban centers
Kyrgyz	219,000	0.9 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Farghona, Namangan, Andijan provinces
Korean	217,000	0.9 (~)	Korean	Buddhist	Toshkent and northeast
Turkmen	162,000	0.6 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Karakalpakstan and Khorezm province
Turk	160,000	0.6 (~)	Turkic	Muslim	Toshkent and northeast
Crimean Tatar	155,000	0.6 (–)	Turkic	Muslim	Samarqand and Nawoiy provinces
Ukrainian	107,000	0.4 (–)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	Toshkent and other urban centers
Uighur	45,000	0.2 (+)	Turkic	Muslim	Northeast
Other d	287,000	1.1 (~)			
Total	25,155,000	100.0			

a   Figures for all groups except for the Russians are derived from the 1989 census results, modified by rates of natural increase and out-migration. Figure for Russians is a 1999 estimate by the Russian State Bureau of Statistics (Goskomstat), published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* September 17, 2001. Total population figure is an estimate (as of July 2001) by CIA, *The World Factbook,* *www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ index.html.* No census has taken place in Uzbekistan since 1989. There has been large out-migration in the 1990s. The figures above are likely to have a large margin of error.

b   Future trends regarding population share are based on state policies of favoritism, patterns of natural increase, and expected migration flows. + = relative increase, – = relative decrease, ~ = little change.

c   Religion associated with the ethnic group; not necessarily an indication of strength of religious attachments.

d   The largest groups are Persians, Azeris, Armenians, Bashkirs, and Belarusans.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Border delimitation in progress.SWB/SU/4062 G/1 5 FEBRUARY 2001
Summary of World Broadcast published by BBC Monitoring,
Caversham Park, Reading, 12G48TZ

CIS Presidents Decide On "Emergency Measures" On Southern Border
SWB/SU/1478 C1/1 5SEP 1992 Summary of World Broadcast
published by BBC Monitoring, Caversham Park, Reading,
12G48TZ

Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: Country
Studies (Area Handbook Series) Glenn E. Curtis(Editor), Library
of Congress Federal Research Division, 1997

Kyrgyz Republic : Strategy for Rural Growth and Poverty Alleviation (World
Bank Discussion Papers, 394) *Kyrgyzstan Investment & Business
Opportunities Yearbook* World Investment & Business
Opportunities Library (USA International Business Publications,
1996.)

Kyrgyzstan: Social Protection in a Reforming Economy (World Bank Country
Study) Washington, DC, 1993 Kyrgyzstan : The Transition to a
Market Economy (A World Bank Country Study) (Washington,
DC, 1993)

President, Defence Minister Expect New Militant Incursions SWB/SU/4086
G/2 5 March 2001 Summary of World Broadcast published by
BBC Monitoring, Caversham Park, Reading, 12G48TZ

Profiles in displacement: Tajikistan Report on internally displaced persons
prepared by the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr.
Francis Deng, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1995/57 of 3 March 1995 and Economic and Social
Council decision 1995/273 of 25 July 1995

Uzbek President fears second Karabakh in Tajikistan;SWB/SU/1481 C1/3 9
September 1992 appeals to UN Summary of World Broadcast
published by BBC Monitoring, Caversham Park, Reading,
12G48TZ

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Ahmad, Rashid, *The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism.* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Akbarzadeh, Sh. and R.F. Abazov 'Can the Politics of Status Qua Prevent Conflicts in Central Asia'. *In: Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? Tokyo*, The United Nations University Press, 2001.

Akiner, Shirin. *Islamic People of the Soviet Union.* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1983).

Akiner, Shirin. *Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia.* (London: British Academic Press, 1994).

Akiner, Shirin. *The Formation of Kazakh Identity from Tribe to Nation State.* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1982.)

Allworth, Edward (ed.), *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

Allworth, Edward. Ed. *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* (New York: Praeger, 1973)

Allworth, Edward. *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteens Century to the Present.* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990).

Anderson, John. 2000. *Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy?*(London: Harwood Academic Press).

Anderson, John. *International Politics of Central Asia.* (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1997).

Atkin, Muriel. *The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan.* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989).

Banuazizi, Weiner (ed.), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderland* (London: I.B. Tauris and Co, Ltd. 1994).

Barkey, Henri. *New Countries in an Age of Constrains: The Emergence of Central Asia.* (Washington, DC: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1995).

Benningsen, Alexandre, and Marie Broxup. *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

Benningsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush S. Enders. *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union.*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

Blank, Stephen, *Energy, Economies, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals.*(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).

Brass, Paul, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison,*(Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publication Inc. 1991).

Bregel, Yuri, ed. *Bibliography of Islamic Central Asia. 3 vols.* (Bloomington, IN: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1995).

Bremmer and Taras (ed.), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Bremmer, Ian, and Ray Taras, eds. *Nations and Politics in Soviet Successor States*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Bichel, Anthony R. *"Contending Theories of Central Asia: The Virtual Realities of Realism, Critical IR and Internet."* (Manoa: University of Hawaii.1997) Bichel, Anthony. *Out from the Inside: A Geostrategic Examination of Central Asia Under Gorbachev, 1985-1991.* (Valdosta, GA: Valdosta State University. 1991)

Brown, Harold, *Thinking about National Security.* (Boulder: Columbia Westview Press, 1983).

Buttino, Macro (ed.), *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic conflicts and Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (Milano, Fondamione, Giangiacomo Fentrinelli, 1993).

Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear,* 2nd Ed., (Boulder Co., Lynne Reinner Pub. Co. 1991).

Cohen, Stephen,. *Rethinking The Soviet Experience. Politics & History Since 1917.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)

Colton, Timothy J., and Robert Legvold, eds. *After the Soviet Union.* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

Connor Walker, *Ethno Nationalism : The Quest for understanding,* (Princeton University Press, 1994).

Critchlow, James. "The Ethnic Factor in Central Asian Foreign Policy." *In National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of*

Eurasia, ed. Roman Szporluk. Armonk, (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994).

Critchlow, James. *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991)

Dannreuther, Roland, *Creating New States in Central Asia.* (Adelphi paper 288. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Dawisha, Adeed and Karen Dawisha, eds, *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.)

Dawishna Karen and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and The New Syayes of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

Demko, George J. *The Russian Colonisation of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).

Deutsch, Karl, *Nationalism and its Alternatives,* (New York: Alfred Knopt, 1969).

Dmitrieva, A., *Regional Development: the USSR and After.* (London: UCL Press, 1996).

Edward Allworth Ed. by. *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview.*(London: Duke University Press, 1994)

Encyclopedia of Nationalism Leaders, Movements and Concepts, vol. 2, (Boston: Academic Press, 2001), pp. 150-153.

Fierman, William, ed. *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

Forsythe, Rosemarie, *The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia.* Adelphi paper - 300. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)

Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History and Last man.* (Penguin, Publication, Harmondsworth, 1992).

Fuller, Graham E. *Central Asia: the New Geopolitics.* (Santa Monika, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1992).

Gellner Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism,* Ithaca, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Gerhard, Simon, *Nationalism and Policy towards the Nationalities in Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalin Society.* (Boulder, West View Press, 1991).

Glazer N. and D. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity Theory and Experience.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1975).

Gleason, Gregory, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence.*(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

Gleason, Gregory. *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990)

Gross, Jo-ann, (ed), *Muslim in Central Asia.* (Duke: University Press, 1992).

Hafeez Malik ed by, *Central Asia: its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects.* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994)

Hauner, Milan.. *What Is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today.* (Boston: Unwin Hymen. 1990)

Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Mohammad: The Changing face of Central Asia* (London: Harper Collins Publisher, 1994).

Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780, programme, myth, reality,* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Holmes, Leslie. *Post-Communism: An Introduction.* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1997)

Hooman Peimani, *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia, The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia,* (West Port, Praegor, 1998)

Hopkin, Peter, *The Great Game in Central Asia.* (New York: Kondasha International, 1992).

Hopkirk, Kathleen. . *A Traveller's Companion to Central Asia.* (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd.1993)

Hopkirk, Peter.. *"The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia."* (New York: Kodansha International. 1992)

Horowitz, Donald H., *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* , (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).

Humphery, Caroline. . *"The End of Nomadism?: Society, State, and the Environment in Inner Asia."*(Durham: Duke University Press. 1999).

Hunter, Shirin, *Central Asia since Independence.,* (Washington: CSIS, 1996).

100

Huntington, Ellsworth, *The Pulse of Asia: A Journey in Central Asia Illuminating the Geographic Basis of History*, (Archibald Constable and Co., London, 1907).

Huntington, S. P. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)

Huntington. S.P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

Huskey, Eugene. "Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration." *In New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, eds. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997).

Hyde-Price, Adrian. *The International Politics of East Central Europe.* (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1996).

Hyman, Anthony, *Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics.* Research Institute for the Study of Conflict, August 1994.

Jedic, Synder (ed.), *After Empire: The Emerging Geo-Politics of Central Asia.* (Washington DC: Mcnair National Defence University Press, 1996).

Jervis, Robert, *Co-operation under the Security elma.* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973).

Jo-Ann Gross Ed by *Muslims in Central Asia.*, Durham, (N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990)

John Anderson, *Kyrgyzstan : Central Asia's Island of Democracy? Postcommunist States and Nations* (Harwood Published, 1999)

Kangas, Roger *Uzbekistan in the Twenties Century.*(N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1995)

Karklines, Rasma, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below.* (London, 1986).

Kaushik, Devendra, *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from early 19th Century (ed.)* by N Khaefin (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970).

Khan, Jalazai M., *Central Asia: Political Situation and Economic Opportunities.* (Lahore, The Frontier Press, 1994).

Kohli, Atul, Migdal Joel S and Shue Vivienne (eds.), *Dominance and Transformation in the Third World .* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Kohn Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism,* 2nd ed,(Collier Macmillan, 1967).

Kux, Stephan. *Soviet Federalism: A Comparative Perspective.* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press and Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990.)

Lawson Stephanie, *International Relations,*(London, Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishing Ltd).

Lubin, Nancy, *Leadership in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan:* Views of the Led. Washington, DC: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1994

Mackenzie, David. *The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev.* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974).

Mandelbaum, Micahel (ed.), *Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan.* (New York, Council for Foreign Relations Press, 1994).

Mandelbum, Michael, *Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan.* (New York: Council Foreign Relation Press, 1990).

Melvin, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia, The Politics of National Identity.* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

Menon, Rajan. *The Dynamics of Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia.* Washington, DC: National Council for Research on Eastern Europe and Russia, 1995.

Michael Mandelbaum Ed. by *Central Asia and The World: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.* (New York: Council on Foreign Relation Press, 1994)

Michael Rywkin Ed. by *Moscow's Lost Empire.* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).

Michta, Andrew, *Politics and Society in Post Communist Countries.* (Sage Publications, 1992).

Mohinder S. Mudahar, 1998 *Kyrghyzstan (Economic Review)* Pamela J. Bradley (Editor) World Bank 1992

Naumkin, V. and S. Panarin (eds.), *State, Religion and Society in Central Asia: A Post-Soviet Critique.* (Reading, Ithaca Press, 1993).

Naumkin, Vitaly V. (ed.), *Central Asia Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict .* (Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994).

Naumkin, Vitaly, ed. *Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Ethnicity and Conflict.* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

Odom, William and Robert Dujarric, *Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus.* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1995)

Olcott, Martha B. *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security,* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).

Olcott, Martha Brill, ed. *The Kazakhs.* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

Olcott, Martha Brill, ed. *The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents.* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990).

Oommen, T.K., *Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity- Reconciling Competing Identities.* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1997).

Paksoy, H. B., ed. *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History.* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

Patnaik, Ajay, *Central Asia: Between Modernity Tradition.* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1996).

Pipes, Richard. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

Plamentaz, John, *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea,* Eugene Kamenka ed (Edward Arnold, 1976).

Poliakov, Sergei P. *Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia.* (London: M.E. Sharpe. 1992)

Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis. Ed. by Peter J. Taylor. (London: Belhaven Press, 1993).

Pomfret, Richard, *The Economies of Central Asia.*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Porter, Bruce D. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts : Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980.* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Putnam, Robert, *Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival American Community.* (New York: Simon and Schustere 2000).

R.Z. Sagadeev and S. Eisenhower Ed. by. *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change.* (Chesy Chasi (MD): CPSS PRESS, 1995).

Rex, J. and D. Mason (eds.), *Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations.* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Robert A. Lewis Ed. by *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia..* (London: Routledge, 1992)

Robert O. Matthewes Ed. by *International Conflict and Conflict Management: Reading in World Politics..* (Ontario: Prentice Hall, 1989).

Ro'I, Yaccov, ed. *The USSR and the Muslim World: Issues in Domestic and Foreign Policy.* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Roosens, Evgeen E., *Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethno genesis.* (New Bury Park, Sage Publications, 1989).

Rudolf, Richard L., and David F. Good, eds. *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union.* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

Rumer Boris ed., *Central Asia, A Gathering Storm?* (Aakar Books, New Delhi.2003)

Rumer Boris, ed., *Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development,* (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, England, 1994).

Rumer Boris, *Soviet Central Asia, A Tragic Experiment.* (Boston Unwin Hymen 1989).

Rumer, Boris (ed.). *Central Asia in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development.* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).

Ryan , Stephen, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations.* (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1990).

Rywkin, Michael, *Moscow's Lost Empire.* (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1994):

Rywkin, Michael. *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia.* (New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1982

Shams-ud-din, *Perestroika and the Nationality Question in the USSR.* (New • Delhi, 1990).

Smith Anthony , ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism,* (New York, EJ Brill, 1992).

Smith, Anthony, D., *The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World .* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Smith, Anthony, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

Tickner J.Ann *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York Columbia University Press,., 1992)

Vaidyanathan, R, *Formation of the Soviet Central Asian Republic (1917-1936).* (New Delhi: People Publishing House, 1967).

Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, State and War.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Warikoo, K. and Norbu, D. (ed)., *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia.* (New Delhi: South Asia Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1992).

Warikoo, K. and Norbu, D., *Central Asia: Emerging New Order.* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publishers, 1995).

Webber, Mark. *"CIS Integration Treads: Russia and the Former Soviet South." In Former Soviet South Projects.* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1997)

Weinerman, Eli, *'The polemics between Moscow and Central Asians or. the decline of Central Asia and tsarist Russia's role in the history of the region'. Slavonic and East* European Review, July 1993 v71 n3 p428(54)

Wheeler, Geogercy, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* . (New York: Praegers Publications, 1964).

White, Stephen, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider. *The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993)

Yaakov Ro'i Ed by *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies..* (London: Frank Cass, 1995).

Yoshihiro Kimura., Ed. by *"Ethnicity and Political Identity in Central Asia".* (Tohoku University (Japan), 1999).

Article

A. Elebayeva, "The Osh Incident: Problems for Research" *Post-Soviet Geography.* Vol. 33, February, 1992. pp. 78-86.

Annete Bohr, "Regionalism in Central Asia: new geopolitics, old regional order", *International Affairs,* vol. 80 no. 3, 2004, March.

Anthony Hyman. *Russian Minorities in the Near Abroad, (SERIES) Conflict Studies,* RISCT, 229 (1997).

Bonnor, Walker, "The Politics of Ethno-nationalism", *Journal of International Affairs,* vol.27 no.1, 1973,Pp.1-19.

Bregel, Yuri, "Rethinking Nationality in Central Asia", *Iranian Journal of International Affairs,* December 1991, Pp.92-112.

Brojklund, Ulf, "Ethnicity and the Welfare State", *International Social Science Journal,* vol. 3,pp.19-30.

Bromlei, Iu V., "Ethnic Process in the USSR", *Soviet Anthropology and Archeology,* vol.26 , no.3, 1987-88.

Bulag, Uradyn E., "Dark Quadrangle in Central Asia: Empires, Ethiogenesis, Scholars and Nation-States", *Central Asian Survey,* vol.13, no.4, 1994, Pp.459-478.

Chauney D. Harris, "Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 and early 1994", *Post- Soviet Geography,* vol.35, no.4, 1994, Pp.185-203.

Coakely, John, "Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict", The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy" *International Political Science Review,* vol.15, no.3, 1994, Pp.297-314.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland, "Ethnicity versus Nationalism", *Journal of Peace Research,* vol.28, no.3,Pp.263-278.

Fuller, Graham E, "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity", *Current History,* vol. 24, April, 1994.

Gottlieb, Gidon, "Nations without States", *Foreign Affairs,* vol.73, no.3, May/June 1994.

Harris Chauncey, "Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 and Early 1994", *Post-Soviet Geography,* vol.35, no.4, 1994,Pp.185-203.

Helgsen, Malvin M., "Central Asia: Prospects for Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict " in W. Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman eds. *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflicts: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,* Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1994.

Keely Lange, "Do Borders make a nation? A New Analysis of Identities with a focus on Central Asia", *Regional Studies,* vol.15, no.4, (Autumn) 1997, Pp.75-97.

Kuzio, Taras, "Nationalists Riots in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey, Vol.7, no.4, 1988,Pp.79-100.*

Lehman, Susan G., "Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia" , *Post-Soviet Affairs,* vol.13, January –March 1997,pp.78-101.

Marcus Ustina, and R.F. Abazov, 'Kyrgyzstan: In Search of a Regional Security System.' IN: Eurasian and East Europe Security Yearbook. Washington, DC., Brassey's, 2000.

Mirsky, George I., "Central Asia's Emergence", *Current History,* vol. 23, October, 1992,Pp.334-338.

Naby, Eden, "Ethnicity and Islam in Central Asia", Central Asia Survey, vol.12, no.2, 1993,Pp.151-167.

Olcott, Martha Brill, "Ceremony and Substance: The Illusion of Unity in Central Asia" in Michael Mardelbaum, ed, *Central Asia and the World,* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994.

Oomen, T.K., "Race, Ethnicity and Class: An Analysis in Interrelations", *International Social Science Journal,* vol.139, pp.83-93.

Patnaik, Ajay, "Ethnicity, Culture and Migration in Central Asia", *Central Asian Quarterly,* Summer 1994, pp.41-45.

R. A. Elebayeva, N. Omuraliev, R. Abazov "The Shifting Identities and Loyalties in Kyrgyzstan: The Evidence from the Field" *Nationalities Papers* 2000, (Forthcoming)

R. F. Abazov, 'A Note on the Presidential Elections of 10 January 1999 in the Republic of Kazakhstan', *Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin,* Vol. 8, No 1-2, 1999, pp. 5-9. - (it is also available via home page of The Bulletin on http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/ 99jul.htm)

R. F. Abazov, 'Economic Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan', *Post-Communist Economies,* Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999, pp. 237-252.

R. F. Abazov, 'Policy of Economic Transition in Kyrgyzstan', *Central Asian Survey,* Vol. 18, No 2, 1999, pp. 197-223

R. F. Abazov, 'Political Changes in Kyrgyzstan and the Evolution of the Presidential System', *Tsentralnaia Azia i Kavkaz,* No 1(2), 1999, pp. 23-32.

R. F. Abazov, 'Security and Developmental Issues in post-Soviet Central Asia'. *The Central Asian Post,* 27 November, No. 43, 1997.

R.F. Abazov 'Kazakhstan: New Security Environment'. IN: Eurasian and East Europe Security Yearbook. Washington, DC., Brassey's, 2001.

Rakesh Gupta, "Post- Soviet State(s) in Central Asia", *International Centre for Peace Studies.*

Ro' I, Yaacov, "Central Asian Riots and Disturbances, 1989-1990: Causes and Context", *Central Asian Survey,* vol.10(3), 1991,pp.21-54.

Robertson, Lawrance, "Ethnic Composition of Migration in Former Soviet Union", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy,* 1996, pp.113-128.

Roland Dannreuther, "Creating States of Central Asia", *Adelphi*, March, 1994.

Roy Oliver, "The Civil war in Tajikistan: Causes and Implications", Washington D.C., *United States Institute of Peace*, December 1993.

Roy, Allison, "Regional Structures, and Security Management in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, vol.80, no.3, March 2004.

Sabol, Steven, "The Creation. of Soviet Central Asia: The 1924 National Delimitation", *Central Asian Survey,* Vol.14, no.2, 1995, pp.225-241.

Sengupta Anita, "Beyond Boundaries- Identity Nationality and Consciousness in Central Asia", *Contemporary Central Asia,* vol.11, no.1, March 1998, pp.54-69.

Sengupta Anita, "Minorities and Nationalizing States in Central Asia", *International Studies,* vol.34, no.3, 1997, Sage Publication, New Delhi.

Shahrani Nazif, "Central Asia and the Challenge of the Soviet Legacy", *Central Asian Survey*, vol.12, no.2, 1993, pp.123-125.

Smith, Anthony D., "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism", *Survival,* vol.35, no.1, Spring 1993, pp.48-62.

Wimbush, Enders, "The Politics of Identity Change in Soviet Central Asia" *Central Asian Survey*, vol.3, no.3, 1984, pp.69-70.

Websites

http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/OCP43.pdf

http://hrw.org/reports/1995/Tajik.htm

http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2004_02-spec.pdf

http://seneca.uab.es/hmic/2005/miscelania/Multiculturalism%20and%20Politica
l%20Integration.pd

http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webeurcountries/TURKMENISTAN

http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1996-1997/S&P_96-97.html

http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/99jul.htm

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kz.html

http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/turk/comment.pdf

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/culture/articles/

http://www.iiss.org/rrpfree.php?scID=45

http://www.iwpr.net

http://www.rand.org/publications/MMMR/MR1598/MR.ch6.pdf

http://www.warandgender.com/wgfemini.htm

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/turkme94.pdf

www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/eur61.htm - 12k

www.crisis.org; ICG Asia Report n Osh \ Brussels:

www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/report/crs/IB93108.htm - 70k

www.idpproject.org/IDP_documents/RSG_reports/country_reports/Tajikistan_
24Oct96.pdf

www.ifrs.elcat.kg/Publication

www.odci.gov cia/publications/factbook/index.html.

www.politicon.org/edit3/news.php