

THE CONCEPT OF 'PREVENTIVE STRIKE' IN CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
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Introduction

"We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."¹

President George Bush

Twenty months into his presidency, George W. Bush released his administration's National Security Strategy (NSS). The policy paper, titled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America"—call it the Bush doctrine—is a romantic justification for easy recourse to war whenever and wherever an American president chooses. It outlines a new and muscular American posture in the world -- a posture that will rely on preemption to deal with rogue states and terrorists harboring weapons of mass destruction. It states that America will exploit its military and economic power to encourage "free and open societies." It states for the first time that the U.S. will never allow its military supremacy to be challenged as it was during the Cold War. The NSS insists that when America's vital interests are at stake, it will act alone, if necessary.

Iraq is a test case for a new Bush Doctrine to police the world and remake it in our image. The Bush team assumes that America is so powerful and its leadership so benign that other nations will ultimately accept it. But an Iraq war isn't just about

¹ Restated In "*The National Security Strategy Of The United States Of America*"(Washington; White House, Sep 2003). Hereafter Referred To As *National Security Strategy*.

Saddam. It is the proving grounds for a radical doctrine that reshapes America's role in the world.

If such a claim sounds grandiose, one need only read the President's national security strategy of Sept. 17, 2002, his "axis of evil" and West Point speeches of last year, and his recent speech on Iraq's future. The Bush Doctrine endorses preemptive action against "rogue states" that are considered to be a future danger. This post-9/11 doctrine prescribes preventive attacks on those who may not threaten US for years.

Take it from writer Robert Kagan and William Kristol, editor of the *Weekly Standard*, the journal of choice for neo conservatives who see an Iraq war as key to the new strategic doctrine. They wrote last year: "The Bush Doctrine could help undo dictatorships not only in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, but also in, for example, China and Saudi Arabia"². It is doubtful if the US can or will wage unilateral wars against those nations, but the Bush Doctrine has persuaded much of the world that the Iraq war is the first of many.

Beyond preemption, the Bush Doctrine asserts that the United States must remain number one in global power, so strong that no one else would even try to match it. That means building missile defenses and weaponizing space. The US is unquestionably number one, but enshrining this into doctrine will goad Avids to join in an arms race to confront Hertz.

For hard-nosed administration realists, like Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, weapons supremacy and preemption are the core of the doctrine. For the President and his neoconservative backers, the goals are much broader. Bush sees Iraq as the wedge to attack the roots of terrorism by aggressively spreading democracy. Building

² Kagan Robert And Kristol William " Taking The War Beyond Terrorism"; *The Washington Post*, 31 Jan 2002.

democracy in Baghdad will supposedly provoke a democratic revolution in the Middle East.³

Making such grandiose claims - which can't be fulfilled - undermines U.S. credibility in the region and makes Muslims more cynical about American democracy and Bush's goals. Especially when the President has so far failed to follow up on his repeated pledges to reengage on the Israel-Palestinian issue. A president who claims the moral high ground won't keep it by treating the rest of the world like peons. Bush should listen to his father's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who told the National Journal: "If we get to the point where everyone secretly hopes the United States gets a black eye because we're so obnoxious, then we'll be totally hamstrung in the war on terror. We'll be like Gulliver with the Lilliputians."⁴

CHAPTER ONE

Prevention to Pre-emption.

Military force, or the threat of force, has played a key role in coercive diplomacy and deterrence strategies. Credible threats are often used to protect national interests. During the Cold War, America relied on a policy of massive retaliation. The U.S. made it known that it would respond to even low-level aggression against itself or its vital interests with tactical nuclear strikes. This strategy had two problems. First, threatening to escalate low-level conflicts into nuclear war alarmed American and allied peoples and produced some public opposition to such a strategy. Second, such a strategy failed in practice to deter many low-level conflicts. Because the costs of nuclear retaliation were so high, it was not a credible threat in low-level conflict situations.

³ Gwyn Richard "A Dangerous Clash Of Culture"; *The Star*, 10 Sep 2002.

⁴ Scowcroft Brent "Don't Attack Iraq" *The National Journal*, 15 Aug 2002.

Strategy shifted during the Kennedy era to emphasize flexible, controlled and discriminating military response to aggression. The U.S. came to rely more on the threatened use of conventional forces. Conventional military forces were to be developed as tools for political use, to be deployed according to political goals and subordinate to political authority.

This shift in strategy in turn prompted its own critics, who hearkened back to the events of the Korean War. Critics of the controlled response strategy argued that political constraints on military objectives during the Korean War had forced the American forces to “fight with one hand behind their backs.”⁵ As a result many lives were lost in what was ultimately an inconclusive war. These critics argued against military interventions with limited objectives. Called the Never-Again School, they advocated, “either the United States should be prepared to do everything necessary to win or it should not intervene at all.”⁶

Other strategists had drawn a rather different lesson from the Korean War. They argued that low-level conflicts involving important U.S. interests would continue to arise. However, the costs and dangers of allowing such conflicts to escalate into nuclear wars demanded limits on the degree of military engagement. Proponents of this view were called the Limited War School.

Both of these schools of thought were influential during the Eisenhower administration, with the Never-Again school tending to dominate. However, Eisenhower’s response to the Chinese Offshore Island crisis in 1958 showed a situationally appropriate use of Limited War strategy. For reasons which remain unclear, the Never-Again school fell from favor during the Vietnam War. Presidents Johnson and Nixon both pursued a Limited War approach.

⁵ Betts Richard K; “ *Soldiers Statesmen And Cold War Crises*”; (Cambridge University Press,1997)

⁶ *ibid* p 215.

The loss of the Vietnam War led to a revival of Never-Again School thinking. Debate over these different approaches to the use of force in diplomacy came to a head once again during the Reagan administration. Secretary of Defense Weinberger tended toward a Never-Again stance. He felt that U.S. military intervention in Third World conflicts had the potential to lead it down the slippery slope of increased military commitment, landing in another futile and costly "Vietnam." U.S. interests in the world at large should be pursued and protected by providing economic aid and expertise and by diplomacy.

Weinberger set forth a set of preconditions for the use of military force in foreign affairs. First, force is only appropriate when truly vital U.S. interests are at stake. Second, the U.S. should either commit sufficient resources to win the action, or should refrain from committing any forces at all. Third, the military must be given clear objectives, both militarily and politically. Fourth, there must be reasonable public and Congressional support for military action before troops are committed.

Secretary of State Shultz favored the limited use of force. He argued that in order to be effective, diplomacy requires credible threats, including on occasion the threat of limited military action. Put in his own words: "the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual."⁷

Shultz differed with Weinberger on each of his proposed preconditions for force. Shultz argued that important though non-vital U.S. interests still required protection. Diplomatic protection of such interests needs to be backed by the ability to make credible threats. Regarding the second condition, Shultz argues "The need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement."⁸ Furthermore, while clear military

⁷ Ibid p 217.

⁸ Ibid p217.

objectives are desirable, political situations are often complex and ambiguous. As a tool of diplomacy, military force must be fitted to political reality, and military tactics must be constrained by political goals and interests. Finally, Shultz argued that decisions to use military force couldn't be left up to the vagaries of opinion polls. Often decisive leadership will win public support.

During the Reagan and Bush administrations, attitudes toward the use of force in diplomacy tended to follow Weinberger's views. This strategy was even broader than the old Never-Again School thinking. It held that "any contemplated use of force on behalf of foreign policy should be rejected unless it adhered to sound military doctrine."⁹ The successful U.S. military operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf War were all taken as confirming the wisdom of this approach.

Weinberger's approach to the use of force in foreign policy held sway until challenged by the failed effort in Somalia, and the outbreak of war in Bosnia. In Somalia, it was hoped that military intervention could be successful given a very limited political objective: distribution of humanitarian aid. The authors argue, "one can criticize the Bush administration for making a questionable effort to separate the achievement of humanitarian objectives from other problems that had to be dealt with in order to obtain the secure environment needed for establishing a stable political structure in the country."¹⁰ Fear of the potential for substantial American casualties and a lack of clearly definable military goals led the U.S. to delay taking military action in Bosnia. Without the backing of credible threats of force, U.S. diplomatic initiatives in Bosnia were ineffective, and the genocidal "ethnic cleansing" continued. When the international community finally united and showed its commitment to military action, then it was able to make and enforce limited demands on the Serbs.

⁹ *ibid.* p 218.

¹⁰ *ibid.* p219.

Backed by credible threats of force, the Sarajevo airport was reopened, and safe-havens and no-fly zones were established.

Overview Of The Formulation Of The Bush Doctrine

A war with Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would be the first test case in the Bush administration's larger strategy for projecting U.S. power and influence in the post-Cold War world. Here's an overview of the people, the events, the major statements, and the policy battles behind what's become known as the Bush Doctrine.

Feb. 28, 1991- The Gulf War's Ragged Ending; U.S. Decides on Containment Policy for Iraq

With a Gulf War cease fire declared, President Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell believe Saddam's hold on Iraq is tenuous. Bush urges Iraqis to rise up. They do, and within days Saddam has lost control of southern Iraq. But the rebellion is soon overwhelmed by Saddam's forces, which include helicopter gunships, and Bush orders U.S. troops not to intervene. It is estimated that thousands of Shiites were killed.

The failed uprising is a defining moment for neo-conservatives such as Richard Perle, William Kristol, and Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz complains that the U.S. inaction is comparable to "idly watching a mugging."¹¹

With Saddam clinging to power, Bush decides on a containment strategy towards Iraq: tough U.N. inspections, economic sanctions, and no-fly zones to protect the Kurds in the north and south of the country.

¹¹“ The Colossus With The Achilles Heel”; *New Perspective Quarterly* Fall 2000.

1992 - First Hints of a Preemption Strategy

Paul Wolfowitz, under secretary of defense for policy (the Pentagon's third-highest ranking civilian), takes the lead in drafting an internal set of military guidelines, called a "Defense Planning Guidance," which is routinely prepared every few years by the Defense Department.

Wolfowitz's draft argues for a new military and political strategy in a post-Cold War world. Containment, it says, is a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use its military power to preempt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And if America has to act alone, so be it.¹²

Controversy erupts after the draft is leaked to the press. The White House orders Defense Secretary Cheney to rewrite it. In the new draft there is no mention of preemption or U.S. willingness to act alone.

Jan. 20, 1993 - Bill Clinton Becomes President; Iraq Containment Policy Continues

During the Clinton administration, Saddam repeatedly pushes the envelope on U.N. inspections and sanctions. In 1995, Saddam's son-in-law, who is head of Iraq's WMD program, defects and tells inspectors about Iraq's arsenal. Armed with the new information, the U.N. inspectors raid Iraq's main biological weapons plant and destroy the equipment and growth medium. But most of the chemical and biological weapons the inspectors believe to have been manufactured are never found.

¹² *Defense Planning Guidance, 1992.* (Washington, White House, 1992)

Jan. 26, 1998 - Hawks Send Open Letter to Clinton

A group of neo-conservatives, who have formed *The Project for a New American Century*, argue for a much stronger U.S. global leadership exercised through "military strength and moral clarity." In an open letter to Clinton, the group warns that the policy of containing Iraq is "dangerously inadequate." They write: The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.¹³

The letter's signatories include Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, William Kristol, and other current members of George W. Bush's administration, including Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton.

Summer-Fall 1998- Saddam Blocks Weapons Inspectors

In early August, Saddam suspends cooperation with weapons inspectors and on Oct. 31 shuts down all inspections. The inspectors say they have evidence that Saddam had created thousands of tons of chemical and biological agents and that he is working on a nuclear device.

In November, Clinton -- in the midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal -- orders a bombing campaign against Iraq, but calls it off at the last minute when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan works out a deal in which Iraq promises to

¹³ Jeffery Record; "The Bush Doctrine And War With Iraq"; *Parameters: US War College Quarterly*, Spring 2003, Vol XXXIII

unconditionally cooperate with U.N. inspectors. Within days of the inspectors' return, however, Iraq returns to intimidation and withholding information.

Dec. 16-19, 1998 - Operation Desert Fox

U.S. and British military forces launch a four-day air and cruise missile campaign against approximately 100 key Iraqi military targets to punish Saddam for defying U.N. weapons inspections.

On Dec. 16, the day the bombing begins, the U.N. withdraws all weapons inspectors. [Inspections will not resume in Iraq until November 2002, following passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.]

March 1999 - George W. Bush Considers Presidential Run

Bush sets up an exploratory committee for a presidential campaign and foreign policy experts descend on Austin, Texas, to help prepare him for a White House run. His tutors include both neo-conservative hawks, such as Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, and pragmatic realists, including Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. During the campaign, neither side will really know where it stands with the candidate.

Jan. 20, 2001 - The Second Bush Presidency Begins

Both hawks and realists present Bush with candidates for foreign policy posts in the new administration. The hawks end up with three important jobs: Lewis "Scooter" Libby becomes Cheney's chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld becomes secretary of defense, and Paul Wolfowitz becomes deputy secretary of defense. But Colin Powell's nomination as secretary of state is viewed as a formidable counterweight to the Pentagon hawks.

The two groups express varying views on how to deal with Saddam Hussein. The hawks develop a military option and push for increased aid to the Iraqi opposition. Colin Powell advocates "smart sanctions" that would allow more humanitarian goods into Iraq, while tightening controls on items that could have military applications.

Sept. 11, 2001 - Terrorists Attack World Trade Center and Pentagon

In his address to the nation on the evening of Sept. 11, Bush decides to include a tough new passage about punishing those who harbor terrorists. He announces that the U.S. will "make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."¹⁴

To many observers, the president's words set the tone and direction for the Bush administration's policy on Afghanistan and Iraq.

Sept. 13, 2001 - Wolfowitz v. Powell

Two days later, Wolfowitz expands on the president's words at a Pentagon briefing. He seems to signal that the U.S. will enlarge its campaign against terror to include Iraq: "I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained campaign."¹⁵

Colin Powell and others are alarmed by what they view as Wolfowitz's inflammatory words about "ending states." Powell later responds during a press briefing: "We're after ending terrorism. And if there are states and regimes, nations that support

¹⁴ Text Of President Bush's Speech To The Nation On September 11 2001; (www.whitehouse.gov/2001)

¹⁵ Wolfowitz Paul; Pentagon Briefing On 13th Sept 2001(www.cnn.com)

terrorism, we hope to persuade them that it is in their interest to stop doing that. But I think ending terrorism is where I would like to leave it, and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for himself."¹⁶

Sept. 15, 2001 - Camp David Meeting: Iraq Debated

Four days after the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush gathers his national security team at Camp for a war council. Wolfowitz argues that now is the perfect time to move against state sponsors of terrorism, including Iraq. But Powell tells the president that an international coalition would only come together for an attack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, not an invasion of Iraq. The war council votes with Powell. Rumsfeld abstains. The president ultimately decides that the war's first phase will be Afghanistan. The question of Iraq will be reconsidered later.

Sept. 20, 2001 - Speech to Joint Session of Congress

"We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."¹⁷ Bush's speech also outlines a vision for a strong American leadership in the world, a leadership that would project America's power and influence:

"Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our

¹⁶ Powell Colin; During Press Briefing On 13 Sept 2001 (www.cnn.com)

¹⁷ President Bush's Speech To The Joint Session Of Congress On 20th Sept 2001(www.whitehouse.gov/2001)

future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail."¹⁸

Jan. 2002 - State of the Union Speech Signals Possible Action in Iraq

Bush's State of the Union address introduces the idea of an "axis of evil" that includes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and signals the U.S. will act preemptively to deal with such nations.

"North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. ...

"Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror....

"Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. ...

"States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.

"We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."¹⁹

June 2002 - Bush Calls for a Policy of Preemption

In a graduation speech at West Point, Bush cites the realities of a new post-Cold War era and outlines a major shift in national security strategy -- from containment to preemption

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ The President's State Of Union Address, Washington 29 Jan 2002 (www.whitehouse.gov/2002)

"Our security will require, all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."²⁰

The president also calls for an American hegemony: "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge." Both strategic aims -- preemption and hegemony -- echo the recommendations Paul Wolfowitz made back in 1992 in his controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft.

August 2002 - Within Administration, Open Debate on Iraq

Powell reports trouble getting U.S. allies on board for a war with Iraq and wants to consult the U.N. At a private dinner with Bush on Aug. 5, Powell warns the president that the U.S. should not act unilaterally and must fully consider the economic and political consequences of war -- particularly in the Middle East. Powell's view is championed by Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser in the Bush I administration, who publishes an op-ed in *The Wall Street Journal* on Aug. 15 in which he argues that Bush is moving too quickly on Iraq, and advocates pressing for the return of U.N. inspectors.

Soon after, Vice President Cheney emerges as the administration voice advocating action against Iraq. In a Nashville speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Cheney warns that "a return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam's] compliance with U.N. resolutions."²¹

Cheney also outlines a larger, long-term strategy whereby regime change in Iraq could transform the Middle East:

²⁰ Text Of President Bush's Speech At West Point (www.nyhmen.com/international)

²¹ Quoted In "*Washington Post*" 24 Aug 2002

"Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the Arab 'street,' the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are 'sure to erupt in joy in the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the Americans.' Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of Jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart. And our ability to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be enhanced, just as it was following the liberation of Kuwait in 1991."²² As Bush leaves for an August vacation in Crawford, Texas, he agrees to take his case to the U.N. and asks his advisers to start preparing the speech.

Sept. 12, 2002 - Bush U.N. Address on Iraq

In the United Nations speech, Bush seems to be siding with Powell in calling for a new U.N. resolution on Iraq. But the president also warns:

"The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."²³

Sept. 17, 2002 - U.S. National Security Strategy Released

Twenty months into his presidency, George W. Bush releases his administration's National Security Strategy (NSS). It is the first time the various elements of the Bush Doctrine have been formally articulated in one place. The 33-page document presents a bold and comprehensive reformulation of U.S. foreign policy. It outlines a new and

²² Ajmani Faud "Iraq And The Arab Future"; *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, Jan/Feb 2003.

²³ President Bush's Address to the UN On 12 Sept 2002 (www.bbc.com)

muscular American posture in the world -- a posture that will rely on preemption to deal with rogue states and terrorists harboring weapons of mass destruction. It states that America will exploit its military and economic power to encourage "free and open societies." It states for the first time that the U.S. will never allow its military supremacy to be challenged as it was during the Cold War. And the NSS insists that when America's vital interests are at stake, it will act alone, if necessary.²⁴

Policy analysts note that there are many elements in the 2002 NSS document which bear a strong resemblance to recommendations presented in Paul Wolfowitz's controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft written in 1992 under the first Bush administration.

²⁴ The National Security Strategy.

CHAPTER TWO

The Bush Doctrine – An Evaluation

The Bush doctrine provides a new definition for the use of American power. It uses the overwhelming military, economic, and political tools of the United States to establish a balance of power that favors human freedom and security.

The Bush Doctrine has three primary objectives:

- 1) The first objective is to combat and defeat terrorism. The threat of terrorist organizations, hostile states, and technology is defined as interrelated. Thus, states that harbor terrorists or rogue states that might supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction are targets for U.S. action.
- 2) The second objective is to construct good relations with other great powers. Russia and China are no longer identified as “strategic adversaries.” Instead, the Bush administration focuses on potential areas of cooperation – the war on terrorism, economic development, and energy.
- 3) The third objective is encouraging free and open societies around the world. The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “there is a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” The Bush administration will encourage this model through targeted aid, the encouragement of free markets and sound fiscal governance, public diplomacy, and – if necessary – force.

There are three core elements to the strategy:

1) The first is prevention. The U.S. will use an aggressive strategy of diplomacy, law enforcement, arms-control and export controls to prevent the threats of terrorism, destabilizing regional conflicts and weapons proliferation.

2) The second is preemption. At the core of the Bush doctrine is preemption – the preemptive use of force to counter the threats of terrorism and potentially dangerous rogue states. The old standard that states can order preemptive strikes when faced with an imminent threat is out. The new doctrine is that the U.S. must insist on anticipatory action to defend itself against new threats – even if there is uncertainty as to the enemy’s intentions, timetable, or target of aggression.

3) The third is defense. Despite the attention that preemption has received, the Bush administration also focuses on deterrence and defense. To deter potential adversaries, the U.S. must maintain a military capability that is so overwhelming that no country will attempt to challenge it. The U.S. will improve its defense capability by deploying a missile defense system to protect the homeland and our friends and allies.

General Evaluation

It is difficult to evaluate the specific impact of any doctrine – no doctrine can anticipate every circumstance, and there will always be a reactionary element to foreign policy. For example, the Bush doctrine would probably not exist without the shocking and unfathomable events of September 11.

There is something for everybody in the National Security Strategy. For multilateralists there is an emphasis on the importance of allies; for unilateralists there

is the determination that the U.S. reserves the right to act alone to defend its interests. For hawks there is the notion of preemptive strikes and intervention to counter new threats. For doves, there is an emphasis on increased foreign aid, development, and support for democratic institutions

The strategy is at times vague or contradictory. It proclaims freedom as a controlling mission, but fails to criticize key nations who suppress freedoms – Pakistan, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc. Instead, it trumpets closer relations with some of these nations. There is a gap between the words (“freedom”) and deeds (cooperation with repressive regimes) that opens the U.S. to criticism.

The strategy is at times shortsighted. Emphasis on preemptive strikes, ad hoc coalitions, U.S. military supremacy, and converging interests with great powers fails to address some long-term concerns. There is less attention to nation building in the aftermath of preemptive strikes, the ability of broad alliances and international institutions to further U.S. interests over the long-term, and key points of contention with great powers (e.g. Russian lack of democracy and “axis of evil” relations, Taiwan and Chinese human rights abuses).

Preemption

Preemption can be effective if it has a narrow role in U.S. policy. The new threat of terrorism demands a new response, and this doctrine is a response – no president would let an attack come to America when it could be prevented.

Stated in conjunction with terrorism, preemption is not that controversial and not a huge departure from previous U.S. policy. Intelligence and law enforcement have always acted to preempt terrorist attacks and these practices are established in international law.

Pre-empting rogue states is a dramatic change in U.S. policy that could have far-reaching implications. There are key questions raised by this notion:

1) Why abandon the tenets of containment and deterrence? The Bush administration argues that, “deterrence based upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks.” This is a questionable assertion. Throughout the Cold War, the United States deterred dangerous adversaries like Stalin and Mao who took risks. Since the Cold War ended, US has successfully deterred the very “axis of evil” states that represent the world’s most dangerous regimes. Iraq’s capability and aggression has been significantly curtailed since 1991. North Korea has frozen its weapons program and indicated a desire for further talks. Iran has begun a process of political liberalization. The Bush doctrine is based on an expectation that these regimes will dramatically alter their reaction to containment.

2) What if preemption brings about the scenarios the United States aims to prevent? Saddam Hussein did not use his weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf War after US indicated that it would respond in kind. If he were faced with the threat of a preemptive strike, why didn’t he use the weapons of mass destruction before he lost them, or give them to others who could use them?

3) What are the guidelines for preemption? The U.S. is yet to set out clear guidelines for when preemptive strikes are legitimate – how imminent must the threat be, and where do international law and the UN Security Council come in? Does the U.S. alone make these judgments?

4) What if preemption becomes a “hunting license” for other countries? Russia has already indicated its right to use preemption in Georgia. What if China preempts

Taiwanese independence? What if India strikes preemptively against Pakistan? The global system could become one of violent anarchy.

Preemption requires good intelligence. The US cannot go to war on instincts or guesses. Good intelligence can ensure a quick and overwhelming victory, and allows for immediate justification.

If tightly applied and monitored, preemption has a rightful place in national security strategy. But it must be applied carefully after confirmed intelligence and preferably with consent of the international community.

Cooperation with Allies

Bush states a preference for working with allies but always reserves the right to act unilaterally (“...we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”)²⁵

Bush asserts the importance of working with allies – “no nation can build a safer, better world alone.”²⁶ But multilateralism and coalition building are dismissed when U.S. will or capacity for action is frustrated.


The Bush administration puts an emphasis on coalitions of the willing and able, making the point that the mission should determine the coalition, not the other way around. There are three problems with this strategy:

- 1) Acting with the broadest international support simplifies things – it grants legitimacy and erodes opposition

²⁵ The National Security Strategy; p 16.

²⁶ Ibid.

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2) US needs allies for a number of practical reasons, including: basing and over-flight rights, peacekeeping and rebuilding, and helping with expenses.

3) Ad hoc coalitions do little to help American interests beyond the short-term. Key long-term interests such as weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, international crime and drug trafficking demand cooperation. Those left on the outside may prove dangerously uncooperative on some of these key issues, and may be less willing to offer support in the future (e.g. Europeans may grow increasingly lukewarm).

The Bush administration has presented a strategy for strengthening NATO by expanding membership to incorporate new European democracies, encouraging higher defense spending by allies, and updating capabilities for the new demands of rapid-response and coalition warfare. These reforms are necessary to maintain NATO's relevance as a military alliance – the risk is that it becomes merely political.

Relations with great powers

One of the most striking aspects of the national security strategy is the new nature of U.S. relations with China, Russia and India. No longer are these powers defined as “strategic adversaries”.

Russia: The strategy says “we are building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the 21st century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries.”²⁷

²⁷ *ibid*; p24.

Cooperation with Russia is emphasized in regard to the war on terrorism, the NATO-Russia Council, and U.S. support for Russian accession into the WTO. The Bush administration is also forging a new energy relationship that presents Russia as a stabilizing alternative to shocks in the Middle East and OPEC.

Lingering tensions are noted (Russia's relations with the "axis of evil countries" and questionable commitment to free-market democracy), but opportunities are stressed over divergences. Despite improved relations, questions about Russia's commitment to democracy, free-market economics, and human rights (e.g. Chechnya) remain.

China: The strategy says, "We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China." It focuses on the overlapping interests of the war on terrorism, trade, stability on the Korean peninsula, the future of Afghanistan, and environmental and health threats (HIV/AIDS).

Tensions such as the future of Taiwan, non-proliferation and China's nuclear capability, and human rights violations are not detailed at length.

India: The strategy says, "U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India." The common interests of the war on terror, representative democracy, Asian stability and free-flowing commerce in the Indian Ocean are stressed.

Bush emphasizes the opportunities for enhanced relations with other great powers in the wake of 9/11. The common threat of terrorism is repeatedly stressed as common ground, and continued differences are downplayed in relation to increased cooperation.

The emphasis on maintaining American military supremacy complicates a great-power strategy based on mutual interests. The strategy says U.S. military capability will, "dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in the hopes of

surpassing or equaling the power of the U.S.”²⁸ This raises several questions and concerns:

- 1) Who is this statement intended for? The U.S. advocates greater European capabilities, and Russia is dismantling much of its capability. China and to a lesser extent India must be the likely competitors.
- 2) How will it dissuade other powers from a military build-up? It is difficult to tell other nations not to develop a military capability – particularly when the Bush administration has been hostile to most international arms agreements (Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, CTBT). Will it act preemptively if China continues to expand its arsenal? To what extent will an attempt to expand weapons capabilities undermine bilateral relations with the U.S.?
- 3) The statement is impolitic – it asserts perpetual U.S. global military domination. This should make other powers uneasy and threatened. Practically, the effect of this military goal may be very modest. The U.S. can only do so much to constrain the potential defense spending of other nations, and is unlikely to risk war with another greater power over that nation’s defense budget.

Integrating Russia and China into the West is at the center of Bush’s plans for creating a new balance of power in the world. Great power relations based on common interests reduce threat of significant great power conflict, and grant the U.S. greater freedom of action in pursuing its interests. But key questions remain in each of these bilateral relationships.

²⁸ Ibid;p 26.

Aid and Global Economic Development

Bush advocates the forceful use of economic policy and public diplomacy to affect the future – and future attitudes – of the developing world. Economic engagement and the encouragement of free markets and free trade are presented as a key element of the Bush strategy.

Half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day. The Bush strategy identifies that as “neither just nor stable”. It sets the goal of doubling the size of the world’s poorest economies within a decade. The key strategies for doing this are:

- 1) A 50% increase in core development assistance.
- 2) Tying aid to good governance. Transparency, the rule of law, and economic freedom will become conditions of receiving aid.
- 3) Improving the effectiveness of international financial institutions. The strategy breaks from the Clinton policy of bailouts, declaring that the best strategy for financial crises is preventing their occurrence. It advocates a movement from loans to development grants.

The core of the administration’s development policy is tough love: those who embrace market reforms and sound fiscal policy will receive generous assistance.

The Bush strategy could help those who are least in need of help, and ignore those who need it the most. Failed states have the most difficult time enforcing the rule of law, transparency, sound fiscal policy and economic development strategy. The risk of a tough love strategy is that it may permit states incapable of meeting standards for reform to slip into poverty, lawlessness and, potentially, violence. International

terrorism, crime and drug trafficking tends to arise in these situations (Colombia, Somalia, Myanmar, etc).

Nation Building (Afghanistan/ Iraq)

Another important issue in the strategy is the concept of Nation Building. Bush sets two goals: preventing internal abuse of Afghanistan and Iraq, and preventing Afghanistan from remaining a safe harbor for terrorists and putting in place a democratic setup in Iraq. This does not go far enough. Violence, political conflict, are still widespread and are threatening reconstruction. Poverty is rampant, and the infrastructure devastated.

Most countries suspect the U.S. will do the minimum necessary to resuscitate Afghanistan or Iraq once its war aims have been fulfilled. The fear is that the U.S. will commit neither the resources nor the time to hold them together until it can fend for itself. Much of the world – particularly the Islamic world – is watching what develops in these countries. It is a test of American commitment to following through on pledges of freedom, security and prosperity.

Public Diplomacy

The strategy emphasizes the importance of public diplomacy in winning “a battle for the future of the Muslim world.” The U.S. is expanding its efforts at public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East – there is greater American broadcasting, more resources, and an attempt to present the American message of freedom and prosperity.

The US intends to engage the audience in the Middle East and elsewhere. The aim is to sensitize the population on religious tolerance and liberal democracy—not as luxuries—but as universal values that should be welcomed by all people.

Benevolent America?

There is much in the NSS that the world will find bellicose and challenging – the assertion of military supremacy, the right to act preemptively and unilaterally, hostility to international treaties and agreements, and the small attention given to international institutions.

The NSS lays out an ambitious and aggressive strategy that raises many questions. When will it act preemptively? To what lengths will the US go to maintain its military superiority? When will it work with friends and allies, and when go it alone? Will it continue to give the bulk of its aid to repressive governments, or will it really make aid contingent upon openness and good governance?

Bush argues that the core of his policy is that the U.S. will wield its strength to spread liberty throughout the world. Others say that the U.S. is saying we will do what we want when we feel like it – that we will go to war against anyone if we think that they are adversarial. In any view, though, it is a very ambitious strategy.

The real nature of the national security strategy will be revealed in deeds, not in policy statements. But the NSS suggests an aggressive approach to threat-assessment and the U.S. role in the world. This has caused a serious rethinking in the entire galaxy of nations on their policy option at the internal as well at external levels.

CHAPTER THREE

Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism

When President Harry S. Truman addressed a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, he asked for \$400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey to help them resist an expansion of Soviet influence and Communism. Known as the Truman Doctrine, this approach guided American diplomacy for the next 40 years. Declared Truman, "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."²⁹ That doctrine signaled America's post-war embrace of global leadership and ended its previous peacetime policy of isolationism.

Was something so dramatic ready to grip the United States after September 11, 2001? Would the Bush Doctrine emerge to dominate the definition of American foreign policy for a sustained period of time? Or would it be just another soon-forgotten presidential statement about American interests in the Middle East like the Eisenhower or Carter Doctrines? Would change in the international status quo and consequent implementation of the Bush Doctrine witness a concerted American mediation of bilateral disputes elsewhere, like the long Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir? Or perhaps the United States would once again upgrade mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Would areas of South Asia and the former republics of the Soviet Union slowly become sites for American military presence as occurred in Arab Gulf countries during the decade after the end of the 1991 Gulf War?

²⁹ Haas Richard N "*Intervention, The Use Of American Military Force In The Post Cold War Era*"; (Washington, Carnegie Endowment For World Peace, 1999)

Save for some incidental exceptions, this was the first time the mainland of America was attacked by a foreign power since the War of 1812. In declaring the War on Terrorism, President Bush said on September 27, 2001, to a joint session of Congress:

*We will direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network...We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. Our nation has been put on notice. We're not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans.*³⁰

By the time he made the speech, Congress had earmarked, not \$400 million but \$40 billion dollars to offset the attack on America and launch the war against terrorism. In 1947, the American people were reluctant to take on European Communism alone. Then-Senator Vandenburg zealously demanded a leadership role for the UN; in September 2001, no such voices were heard in the halls of Congress.³¹

As the Bush Doctrine became operative, coalition-building and multilateral cooperation were encouraged by a combination of need and justification. Among those actively participating in the war against terrorism were Pakistani, Turkish, Jordanian, Italian, German, British, French and other European and Middle Eastern leaders. A coalition had come into being in large part because countries recognized a

³⁰ The National Security Strategy.

³¹ Lobe Jim; "US And The Triumph Of Unilateralism"; *Asia Times*, Sep 10,2002.

common threat and common interest. Each state defined its own relationship to the coalition in conjunction with the United States, taking into account the degree of closeness desired with the United States, domestic public opinion, and what it could contribute. Some provided personnel, material, and information; others provided logistics, over flight rights, port-of-call privileges, stationing of troops, or money. Similarly, countries wanted or demanded different things from the United States, ranging from better trade relations, financial assistance, debt reduction, or concessions on other issues.

However, the US decision to “go it alone” has seen the international community divided like never before. The UN, which was being used by the US for its own purposes, has lost its relevance. The US launched the war against Iraq despite strong opposition by France, Russia and China. compelling the US to withdraw the resolution seeking the UN mandate for attacking Iraq. Post war, the heads of state of France, Germany and Russia held a summit meeting on 11 Apr 2003 at St Petersburg. The public statement after the meet can be summarized as under:

- 1) The Iraq war 2003 is illegal and the regime change policy bodes ill for the international order.
- 2) The UN should be brought into government formation and reconstruction.
- 3) Divide between Europe and US (especially France and Germany) as well as Russia should be quickly bridged.
- 4) “Major Powers” like India ought to be interested in the process of strengthening of the UN system.

The spectacular success of US in Iraq, against the wishes and participation of the majority of the international community and UN, has provided a further fillip to the neo conservative elements in the White House. The setbacks in stabilizing the internal situation in Iraq notwithstanding, it has resulted in apparent geopolitical changes. Libya has started cooperating, Iran has opened its nuclear facilities for IAEA inspections, and North Korea has come on the negotiating table.

The success of the strategy may become a cornerstone for the re election of George Bush and may remain the policy for foreseeable future, or the election of George Kerry may revert to the tested policy of Selective Engagement. The international community meanwhile has to reevaluate its policies in line with the existent realities.

Middle East

It is still too early for many to realize what an earthquake in the Middle East the American takeover of Iraq represents. Every major Arab country is ruled by the same elite that has dominated their politics for 30 years or more. The Assads in Syria, the royal monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the Nasserite regime of Egypt, Qaddafi in Libya, and the FSLN regime in Algeria. Even the Palestinians have been dominated by Yasser Arafat for over 30 years. The end of the Baathist party and Saddam's terror republic after 35 years in power represents the first break in the Middle East political system. The goal and hope of the neo-conservatives who launched this war is that it will not be the last.

For the first time, a major Arab country has had its political system up for grabs. Is the time right for a democracy to take roots? Can the Americans actually pull it off? And what will be the consequences for the Middle East? What will it mean for the Arab world when Baghdad is the focus of open political thought and debate, and every dissident in any Arab country will go there instead of London? What happens

when average Arabs visit a Baghdad where issues are discussed freely by the people? What affect will that have when they take those experiences home with them?

The Arab world has a huge task in front of it. If it were not for oil wealth that has artificially boosted living standards, the Arab world would have been a failure of the first rank. It is shocking to realize that OPEC oil producers have earned over 5 trillion dollars in the last 30 years by selling crude oil to the West. What have they done with that money? Who benefited in the end? What kind of just and productive societies did they build? After all that wealth, did even one Arab state create a real functioning economy? Pakistan alone exports more industrial products than all 22 Arab countries combined! It also exports more agricultural products than all 22 Arab countries combined³². Who is to blame for this failure?

Ultimately, the war in Iraq is less about oil and more about influencing the course of events in the Middle East. The United States has historically been forced to try to influence events in the region from the “outside”—relying on diplomacy to deal with subjects such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the Kurdish question. The United States has become the dominant military power in the region and will seek to influence events through direct action, as well as through diplomacy. This could result in a more meaningful impact on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the resolution of which could, in turn, hold the key to a changed view of the United States in the Muslim world.

The impact of the change in international relations in the region that is likely to result from U.S.-led regime change in Iraq is profound. Iran is flanked by a pro-U.S. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Syria is surrounded by a pro-U.S. Iraq, Israel, and Turkey. Iran and Syria are finding it more difficult to pursue policies that support international terrorist organizations. In Iran’s case, the pursuit of its nuclear ambitions has been

³² Rubin Barry; *The Tragedy Of Middle East*; (Cambridge University Press, 2003)

successfully controlled and its reactors placed under safeguards. A question mark hangs over the future of bilateral relations between the United States and these two countries. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are under increasing pressure to revise their method of governing, from emboldened domestic political sources and from direct pressure applied from the U.S.

The presence of US in Iraq has already resulted in reevaluation of foreign policy in all the states in Middle East. Qatar has already initiated elections and so has Saudi Arabia. There is a sincere effort by Saudi Arabia to eliminate the cadres of Al Qaeda operating from its soil. This has resulted in a major uprising in the population but there are concerted efforts to quell the same. More rights to the women are being considered and it seems to be a precursor to a more responsive government.

The Middle East is likely to witness a prolonged US presence and considering the facts stated above, the policy of rulers is likely to be one of appeasing rather than opposing.

Impact on other Nations

America faces no immediate great-power threat, no superpower to replace the Soviet Union. The Russian empire has contracted to a 400-year "low," and Moscow has proven militarily incapable of subduing a single insurrectionist province. More importantly, Russia seems to have lost the appetite for empire, as it has become increasingly democratic and geopolitically inclined toward the West and the United States. The immediate post-cold-war fears of Russian revanche have not been realized.

The two other candidates as great-power balancers to American primacy, the People's Republic of China and the European Union, likewise are not immediately up to the

challenge. A few observers believe that, as Europe becomes more politically integrated, it will take issue with American geopolitical leadership. "It is now Europe's turn to ascend and break away from an America that refuses to surrender its privileges of primacy,"³³ writes Charles Kupchan, a former Clinton administration official now at Georgetown University. "Europe will inevitably rise up as America's principal competitor." Some regard the defiance of France and Germany over Iraq as an occasion of "soft balancing"--the use of so-called "soft power" to offset American military might, diplomatic determination, and ideological motivation. Yet it does not seem as if the Europeans will be successful in thwarting the Bush administration's march to war. It is far more likely that Europe will remain essentially content with its status as a junior partner in the current Pax Americana, demanding a certain amount of deference--and, after Iraq, perhaps very little deference--but still fundamentally unwilling to forge or employ the tools of "hard power" needed to create a genuinely multipolar international order.

China's economic growth over the past decade has fueled a program of military modernization that poses some particularly severe problems for the United States, such as across the Taiwan Straits. Further, these localized challenges may cause larger problems for a brittle American-led regional order based upon bilateral security partnerships between the United States and its East Asian allies. But Beijing does not yet have the ability to mount a broader regional--let alone global--challenge or lead an anti-American coalition. Moreover, the weakening of communist ideology in China and the advance of capitalism pose an internal problem of legitimacy for a regime in the throes of a generational leadership change. In addition, there may be international consequences for promoting an intense and aggressive Han nationalism as a partial remedy for these domestic problems. Beijing cannot style itself, as the United States reasonably can, as a benign hegemon. However China understands the unilateral realities and is unlikely to raise a rebellion.

³³ Kupchan Charles "Whats The Legal Case For Preemption"; *Washington Post* 19 Aug 2002.

India

The US sees India as a vibrant democracy with a growing economy, and Pakistan a problem child that has to be encouraged to behave and reform. But it would be naïve to presume the State Department's views on India have changed dramatically. New Delhi will have to conduct its diplomacy with the US with firmness, tact and imagination, and realise that India will be all the more relevant and respected only if it translates into reality the hope of consistent 8 per cent growth.

Despite rhetoric about India and the US being "natural partners" as the two largest democracies in the world, the two countries have really been, in the words of American scholar Denis Kux, "estranged democracies".³⁴

Mutual bickering and distrust have clouded their relationship. Even after the end of the Cold War, the primary thrust of American diplomacy was to "cap, roll back and end" India's nuclear weapons capabilities. And to achieve this purpose the non-proliferation warriors and compulsive India-baiters like the Assistant Secretary of State, Ms Robin Raphael, were quite prepared to condone, overlook and even rationalise Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism and use Jammu and Kashmir as an issue to pressure India.

Things have substantially changed after New Delhi asserted its autonomy in nuclear matters with the Pokhran tests of 1998 and Islamabad displayed its true colours recklessness with its Kargil misadventure. The new "National Security Strategy of the United States", presented by the President, Mr. George W. Bush, reflects the winds of change that appear to be blowing away the cobwebs in American minds about India.

³⁴ Kux Denis; *"American Foreign Policy: Pattern And Process"* (New York, St Martin Press, 1999)

A report published by the CIA last year, Global Trends 2015, before the cataclysmic events of September 11, was the first manifestation of the changed thinking in the corridors of power in Washington. The report described India as an "unrivalled regional power" with "a large military including naval and nuclear capabilities and a dynamic and growing economy". It predicted that Pakistan would be more fractious, isolated and dependent on international financial assistance. It added that Pakistan would not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics and ethnic feuds. It expected that by 2015, Islamabad's writ would be confined to Punjab and urban hubs such as Karachi.

Such assessments led to Mr. Bush expressing his determination to build a new relationship with a vibrantly democratic and economically resurgent India. The war on terrorism in Afghanistan and its consequent extension to Pakistan naturally raised questions in Indian minds on whether Mr. Bush was being forced to backtrack on his earlier assertions about India and revert to the old "India-Pakistan equation syndrome" as many of the State Department mandarins would dearly like. The Bush National Security Strategy addresses such misgivings.

The misgivings that have been voiced by India about the directions that American policy appeared to be taking in response to the terror attacks of September 11 have also been addressed. These misgivings have arisen because the Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell, and his mandarins have continuously sought to view the relationship with India, post-September 11, through a Pakistani prism.

The Bush Doctrine, however, states: "The United States has transformed its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom, protected by representative Government. India is moving towards greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce,

including through the vital sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean and in creating a strategically stable Asia".³⁵

The Bush Administration acknowledges that differences with India remain on India's nuclear and missile programmers and the pace of economic reform in India. But such differences will not be allowed to compromise the "strong strategic partnership" that it seeks with India — a country that is described as a "growing world power with which we have common strategic interests".³⁶

The Bush Doctrine naturally refers to regional disputes and emphasises the need for India and Pakistan to settle their "disputes". Nowhere does the strategy document contain the dreaded "K" word! The only reference to Pakistan is: "With Pakistan, our relations have been bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war on terror and move towards building a more open and tolerant society".³⁷

It is, thus, apparent that in the perception of the strategic establishment in Washington, India is a vibrant democracy with a growing economy, while Gen Musharraf's Pakistan is a problem child that has to be encouraged to behave and reform itself.

It would, however, be naïve to presume that this document is suddenly going to change the State Department's propensity to stick to its old ways. The approach of the State Department to such issues as India's military cooperation with Israel and transfer of high technology remains rooted in past policies.

While Mr. Bush has handled the recent tensions in India-Pakistan relations with a determination that Islamabad should "permanently" end its support for cross-border

³⁵ The National Security Strategy.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

terrorism, there is no dearth of voices that seek to dilute this policy and make excuses for the "difficulties" of their favourite military dictator to fulfill promises he made.

The emergence of the international alliance against terrorism has brought positive results for India's regional security environment in South Asia. Good results have already started showing in its management of the Kashmir problem by way of pressure on Pakistan to change its policy on supporting and abetting the terrorist outfits.

The war on terrorism has indeed been a boon for India. This has resulted in the clampdown on the terrorist factory that Afghanistan had become. At a broader level the pressure on North Korea shall have a long-range effect by way of stoppage of missile technology transfer to Pakistan. At a conceptual level, India's sphere of influence is not restricted to South Asia. Keeping the unipolar nature of the international community India has succeeded in maintaining a non-adversarial relationship with the US while enhancing a mutually beneficial relation with Russia and Europe. The present dispensation has allowed India to be an important cog in the wheel thereby allowing it to resolve its long outstanding territorial dispute with China as also Pakistan.

Our diplomacy with the US will, therefore, have to be conducted with firmness, tact and imagination. India has to *play the geo politics* with tact to ensure that this opportunity of enhancing its prestige in the international arena is not lost.

Conclusion

In the second presidential debate of 2000, the one where Al Gore's subdued demeanor captured a lot of the headlines, George W. Bush was asked about projecting U.S. power overseas

“If we are an arrogant nation, they will resent us,” Bush said, speaking in general terms. “If we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us.”

The transformation of Bush from a doctrine of reluctant engagement to a global war on terrorism leaves a host of unsettling questions beyond Iraq. The consequences could be just as large as those of the two world wars of the last century.

The United States has been labeled an arrogant power in many foreign capitals — “bastards” in the infamous words of Carolyn Parrish, a Liberal member of the Canadian Parliament. It may or may not be a fair charge, but it is one that can’t be overlooked. Some Americans have big problems listening to lectures on arrogance from the French, for instance, given their history of appeasing dictators with bad intentions. But perception has become reality around the world as the United States removed Saddam Hussein from power. Incredibly, it is U.S. actions — not Saddam’s — that are seen as a bigger threat to the world in many countries long considered friends

Rarely has history pivoted this quickly. When Bush came into office, the national gaze was inward. The country was fixated on an economy that had created a class of paper millionaires but had started running into speed bumps. In the previous years, Bill Clinton’s personal adventures in office got more airtime than Saddam’s adventures in Iraq. A week before the 2000 elections, The New York Times wondered whether Bush was a dove. Asked how he would deal with building resentments of U.S. power around the globe, Bush told the Times: “Strategic humility.” The Baltimore Sun wrote about his reluctance to engage in “nation building.” The Straits Times in Singapore described Bush as a “hesitant internationalist.” What has caused such dramatic change? It’s very simple. The date of infamy: Sept. 11, 2001.

Since the terrorist attacks, the Bush Doctrine has transformed from reluctance and humility to extension and confrontation. Looking back, what rattled the United States so much on that Sept. 11 established a new framework of foreign engagement. Bush rarely appears in public without reminding his audience, in Reaganesque repetitiveness, of what he believes is at stake. “September the 11th should say to the American people that we’re now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home,” The Bush Doctrine should disincline Americans from making too many assumptions about the days ahead. Many mistakenly view Iraq as an end, when budding nuclear crises in North Korea could mean it’s only the beginning. Americans have only begun to prepare psychologically for a war that could last beyond Bush’s term in office, whether that is four or eight years.

The Bush Doctrine leaves these questions:

What are the ramifications of nation building in Iraq from a president who once expressed such obvious disdain for that prospect? The track record in Afghanistan has been spotty — and that was a far less controversial war. What happens if Donald Rumsfeld’s slam on “Old Europe” becomes manifest in a split of European allies? Will the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy inevitably shift to the old Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe?

Can Cold War tensions with Russia return if some future issues strains relationships with the two nations?

The unipolarity of the international community is likely to continue in the foreseeable future and the dictat “self interest reigns supreme” indicates that the countries with

adversarial relations with the US are likely to change their policy's to suit the environment.

At moments like these, it can be asked if history is relevant. Some think that if any nation were ever reluctant to appease dictators with a history of bad intentions, it would be the French. But when the French march against war, Bush — not Saddam — is caricatured as the new Hitler.

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