

# **INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS AMERICA'S "WAR ON TERROR"**

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**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled "INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS AMERICA'S 'WAR ON TERROR'", submitted by MOUMITA GHOSH, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University and is her own work.

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*Dedicated To*

*The victims of terrorism.....*

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
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## PREFACE

We are looking at Post Cold War and Post-Post Cold War Unipolarity as a determining factor in responses of great powers and third world states.

There are differences in each response and on each episode like NPT, War on Terror, intervention in Iraq, Nuclear Missile Defence (NMD), Nuclear Proliferation, danger of use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

We are interested in looking at Indian response to the specific issue of War on Terror, announced by the US. This has a spin off of US bilateral relations with other countries. Currently in this dissertation we are looking at the problems and prospects of Indo- U.S. relationship in pre and post September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.

The main argument that has been brought out is that though the Indo-U.S. relationship had blossomed after the Sept. 11 attack, they did not become strategic partners in the War against Terror. It is U.S.-Pakistan close relationship which became stronger after the September 11, incident because Pakistan offered America use its base to launch a fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and changed the Taliban regime.

The U.S.A.'s declaration of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, on March 19, 2004 brought up suspicion in the Indian minds, but it should not be forgotten our relation with America has stabilised, as America has realised that India is its true and natural ally in this War against Terrorism. India has made many pro U.S. resolution and has been sensitive to the U.S. positions.

The dissertation is divided into four chapters:

The first chapter deals with the concept of terrorism which has evolved and changed its nature in the present context after the September

11, attack: The focus here is on the pre September thinking on terrorism. It also deals with various definitional problems and typologies of terrorism, ultimately referring Sept. 11 as 'New Terrorism', or 'hype terrorism'.

The second chapter, extensively deals with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack which shook both U.S.A and the World order. This chapter deals with the reaction of American society, its domestic leaders and especially with the response of the U.S. President, George Bush who declared a "War on Terrorism" as a response to the deadly attack.

Chapter three, deals with the evolution of Indo-U.S. relations in post Cold War era till the barbaric act of September 11. It deals with various problems and prospects of Indo-U.S. relationships in a variety of fields like the economic, nuclear, environment and terrorism.

Chapter four, deals with the India's response to War on Terrorism, where we see how the Indo- U.S. relationship blossomed after a long time, but again the U.S.-Pakistan relationship became a matter of concern which raises question about U.S.A.'s relation in the minds of Indian policy makers.

The conclusion points to the pros and cons of the Indo-US relationship.

## CHAPTER – I

### Terrorism: Clearing of Issues

Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. It is older than the ancient civilization of Greece and Rome. Early examples include the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BC.

One of the earliest attempts to clarify the concept of terrorism in modern social science defined it as "the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence."<sup>1</sup>

Academic definition of terrorism finalized in 1988 –

"Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets from a target population) and serve as a message generator. Threat and violence – based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperiled) victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience (s)), turning it into a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought."

The word Terrorism was firstly used at the Third Conference for the Unification of Penal Law held at Brussels in 1931. In this conference terrorism was defined as:

"The deliberate use of means capable of producing a common danger to commit an act of imperiling life, physical integrity or human health or threatening to destroy substantial property."<sup>2</sup> Such acts included: "Arson; explosion, flooding or submersion; ignition of asphyxiating or noxious

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Wilkinson. *Political Terrorism*, London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974, pg. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Surya. P. Sharma. "International Law: Consensus, Still Elusive", New Delhi: *World Focus*, Vol. VII, No. 2, Feb. 1986, p.7.



substances; interruption of the normal operation of means of transport or communication, damage to or destruction of government property and public utilities; pollution; fouling, or deliberate poisoning of drinking water or staple foods; causing or propagating contagious or epidemic disease; any willful act which endangers human lives and the community and so on."<sup>3</sup>

## DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

But, who is a terrorist is difficult to define. Sometimes it's said "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter": Although this is a much overused and, to many, trite cliché, it does, nevertheless, capture a central problem in the study of terrorism: the failure to establish a universally accepted definition of the concept under study. Indeed, certain commentators believe there to be no definition of terrorism at all –merely a Babylonian confusion of meanings.<sup>4</sup> However if effective counter measures are to be framed against the threat of terrorism, one requires, at the very least, an identification of the problem at hand in a form which allows it to be addressed in an acceptable fashion. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory definition of terrorism, conceptualizing the concept in a manner that will yield more than a superficial congruence of opinion.

The greatest obstacle hindering the development of a generally accepted definition of terrorism is the fact that the term is associated with thoroughly negative connotation. It is not that terrorism is intrinsically more difficult to define than any other political concept, merely that it has escaped definition due to the tendency to embellish its meaning with value laden statements.<sup>5</sup> In essence, terrorism becomes a pejorative concept analysts not only seek to classify the act in purely objective terms, but also

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.8.

<sup>4</sup> Richard Thackrah. 'Terrorism: A Definitional Problem', in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart eds. *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989, p.25.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pg.24.

to evaluate it by such designations as 'extra-normal', 'immoral' and 'extreme'.<sup>6</sup>

The problem with this approach is that it is a basic fact of human life that different individuals will interpret the same reality in their own distinct manner. As a result, it is extremely unlikely that individualistic subjective evaluations of objective phenomenon will yield any form of general acceptance. Indeed, while most people would no doubt agree that terrorism essentially falls into the 'wicked' category of human behaviour there are also many who interpret it as a justified (and, in some cases, heroic) form of violence – an act of self defence, ethnic expression or self determination. Terrorism, it would thus seem, becomes dependent on one's point of view.

While this problem can be significantly reduced by minimizing the subjective content of the analysis, it is impossible to exclude totally a normative dimension from the discussion at hand. At the very least, in order to be able to establish the basic criminality of terrorism, it is necessary to refer, to those values and principles which have shaped the ethical and legal systems that stand opposed to the practice. For this reason, it should be stressed from the outset that the following analysis of terrorism proceeds from a liberal democratic context and the consequential standards of behaviour that are inherent in this philosophical political outlook.

A further problem is that terrorism has become a 'fad' word which has been attributed to virtually all types of illegal political activity and violence.<sup>7</sup> Most definitions of terrorism tend to be variants of a basic formula stressing political acts of violence carried out by non-state actors.

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<sup>6</sup> Peter Chalk "West European Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic", Houndsmill: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996, pg.9.

<sup>7</sup> Brian Jenkins, 'The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems', in Yonah Alexander and J. Gleason (eds), *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, Pergamon Press, 1981, pg.3.

However, such delineations fail adequately to differentiate terrorism from other activities such as assassination, sabotage and guerilla warfare. Furthermore, they fail to capture certain elements that are fundamental to the practice of terrorism including its use as a symbolic and invariably indiscriminate form of psychological political communication.

A contradictory but equally debilitating problem is that sovereign states have also been reluctant to identify certain behaviour as terroristic largely as a result of national self-interest. States have been unwilling to base their response to terrorism on definitional criteria alone for the simple reason that foreign or domestic political considerations have invariably taken precedence over legal interpretations.

Finally, one must not forget that those states which have recognized terrorism as a useful medium for furthering their own foreign policy objectives will obviously not support efforts that aim to outlaw its use on the basis of a generic legal definition of the term.

Given factors such as these, it is hardly surprising that no acceptable definition of terrorism has yet materialized. But it is certainly not the answer to adopt the attitude of the UN which many accuse of attempting to deal with the problem largely by ignoring it. If effective measures are going to be brought to bear against this problem, it is essential that one moves away from the position of 'one man's terrorist being another man's freedom fighter'. What is needed is a conceptualization of terrorism that prevents the concept from being used without qualification to mean whatever one wants it to mean.

As Wardlaw maintains, any serious student of terrorism must make a decision about how to treat the term. Should it be banished altogether since it may degenerate into little more than moralized 'name calling', or should it be retained, acknowledging that some useful distinctions can be made between different types of violence so long as one approaches the

subject in an even-handed manner?<sup>8</sup> A definition will be formulated from the salient characteristics that differentiate terrorism as a unique manifestation of organized violence. As such, terrorism will be defined by the nature of the act, rather than the identity of the perpetrators.

What then are the essential features of terrorism?

- (1) From the outset, it must be stressed that terrorism, as dealt with in this study is a political activity. Terrorism aims at more than mere criminality; its ultimate objective is not to achieve material gain but to influence political behaviour.
- (2) Although terrorism is politically motivated, it nevertheless manifests itself as a criminal activity. A major confusion in the debate over terrorism stems from the failure to distinguish between ends and means.
- (3) Terrorism should be seen as a form of psychological warfare. The immediate objective is not to destroy but, through the use or threat of violence, to create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety and collapse, exploiting this emotional reaction to influence political behaviour. Thus, terrorism is first and foremost a psychological tactic. Thornton refers to this process as 'disorientation' – the removal of the underpinnings of order in which the targets live out their daily lives.<sup>9</sup> The ultimate purpose of this tactic is to destroy the structural supports that give society its strength. Terrorists aim to both show that the government is unable to fulfill its primary security function and destroy the solidarity, cooperation and interdependence upon which social cohesion and functioning depend. Eventually the

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<sup>8</sup> Grant Wardlaw. *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter – Measures*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, Pg. 3-8.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Thornton, 'Terror as a weapon of Political Agitation' in H. Eckstein, (ed.), *Internal War*, London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964, pg. 80-81.

community is reduced to pockets of frightened individuals concerned only with their personal safety and, thus, isolated from their wider social context. The most psychologically damaging factor is the unpredictability of danger whereby no one any longer knows what to expect from anybody else.<sup>10</sup>

- (4) In order to generate the desired psychological state, terrorism has to involve an inherently indiscriminate element. Indiscrimination plays an important role in the generation of anxiety responses; the more unpredictable terrorism becomes, the more disorientating its effects tend to be. This is emphasized in one of Raymond Aron's most perceptive observations on terrorism: 'An action of violence is labeled 'terrorist' when its psychological effects are out of all proportion to its purely physical result... The lack of discrimination helps to spread fear, for if no one, in particular is a target, no one can be safe.'<sup>11</sup> When terrorism becomes predictable it loses its broader character and its effectiveness as a psychologically damaging instrument vis-à-vis a 'larger' audience.
- (5) Terrorism is essentially a form of violence that involves non combatant civilian and military victims. The attacks perpetrated by the terrorist are nearly always carried out against the civilian population. No attempt is made to minimize such casualties<sup>12</sup>.
- (6) Terrorism is systematic. It is an organized policy that aims to achieve certain political objectives through a sustained campaign of terror. It seeks to generate prolonged condition of anxiety with the objective of exploiting this emotional reaction to manipulate later

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<sup>10</sup> Martha Crenshaw, 'The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16(3), 1992, Pg. 388.

<sup>11</sup> Raymond Aron, *Peace and War*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1996, Pg.170.

<sup>12</sup> 'Black on white'. *The Economist*, 12/12/1992.

political conduct.<sup>13</sup> To realize this end, acts of violence necessarily have to be repeated.

- (7) Terrorism must be seen as a means of political communication in which violent acts are committed to gain attention and/or a hearing. It is the very essence of terrorism that it be noticed. By staging dramatic acts, terrorists are able to project themselves as a group that must be listened to and taken account of.<sup>14</sup> In so doing, terrorists are able to exploit Bakunin's theory of the propaganda of the deed which conveys the following message: 'We are here, Look what we can do. Heed us or worse will follow'<sup>15</sup> .As Laqueur argues 'The media are the terrorist's best friend. The terrorist's act by itself is nothing; publicity is all.'<sup>16</sup>
- (8) Terrorism, as presented here, is a tactic that is carried out by substate organizations, where specific form of violence is employed in an attempt to overcome the physical weakness of the group concerned. It's aim is to generate anxiety responses, indiscrimination of fear of death which may result at any moment to any person.
- (9) Finally, terrorism is a phenomenon that can be both domestic and international in nature. In general terms, domestic terrorism is that which is carried out within a particular group's country of origin against its own nationals. For an act of terrorism to qualify as an international event, it must involve the government, citizens or territory of more than one state – that is it must have clear international effects/ramifications. It must be directed against foreign

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<sup>13</sup> Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1988, Ch-1.

<sup>14</sup> Ronald Crelinsten, 'Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship between the Controller and Controlled', in Wilkinson and Steward (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989, pg.7.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, London: Macmillan, 1986, p. 111.

<sup>16</sup> Walter Laqueur, 'The Futility of Terrorism in W. Kegley (ed.) *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Control*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, pg 72.

citizens or property by groups operating in their own country of origin eg. wave of attacks conducted against foreign tourists in Egypt and Algeria by Islamic extremist since 1992. It must aim to influence the policies of a foreign government.

On the basis of the above criteria the following working definition of terrorism is proposed;

"Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub state actors as a means to achieve specific political objectives- these objectives differing according to the group concerned. It is a psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear- inducing effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate targeting of non-combatant victims and property. In so doing, it can be regarded as a means of political communication that aims to influence behaviour through the precipitation of a general state of fear and collapse that is exploited to alter political attitudes in such a way as will be beneficial to the group concerned. In order to effectively fulfill its communicative function, terrorism must aim to maximize publicity and the perpetrators must claim responsibility for their actions. Terrorism becomes international in its dimensions. When it is carried out beyond the borders that define the perpetrating group's country of origin; when it is aimed at foreign nationals within a perpetrating group's country of origin; or when it seeks to influence policies of foreign government".

So, Grant Wardlaw notes, "we all have different thresholds of fear and our personal and cultural backgrounds make certain images, experiences, or fears more terrifying to each of us than others."<sup>17</sup> This subjectiveness makes it extremely difficult to scientifically operationalize the concept of terror. And, since terror is an integral part of terrorism, it stands to reason that terrorism is equally difficult to operationalize.

Consequently , terrorism is better understood in terms of typologies.

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<sup>17</sup> Wardlaw, op. cit., pg 5

## Typologies of Terrorism

Scholars have provided for typologies on the basis of their specific interests. eg. there are those who make a distinction between out-group terrorism and in-group terror. There are others who make a distinction between state-sponsored terrorist groups and indigenous groups. A problem with the second kind of distinction is that it is possible that the state sponsored terrorism may have its linkages with the indigenous groups. If this happens, the classification will get blurred and the analysis more difficult.

The approach that provides a greater rigour to an understanding of terrorism is to regard it as warfare with double aspects – internal and external. To review terrorism as a warfare phenomenon has many advantages. First, it would lay bare the foreign and domestic linkages. It would thus be helpful in understanding the geo-political games that nations play with one another in the nuclear age. Second, it would lay bare the problem of balance of power not merely among nations but also within nations. Thirdly, it would be possible to understand terrorism as a process that may begin with sporadic acts of violence and may achieve the proportions of a mass movement. One has to look for that point of isolation, desperation and special ethical framework which may prevent terrorist acts from becoming a movement, for terrorism is precisely a failed attempt on the part of the alienated section of the society to achieve mass mobilization. The advantage of looking at terrorism as a warfare phenomenon is double. At the theoretical level, it would cover a larger canvas and more complex linkages among international, regional and domestic politics. At the empirical level, it helps in understanding the developments in India in late 1980's and early 1990's taking into account the strategic and sociological dimensions.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Rakesh Gupta, "Terrorism as a Warfare Metaphor" IDSA, New Delhi: *Strategic Analysis*, Dec. 1993. Pg. 113.



For analytical purposes, it will be useful to employ again a basic typology of terrorism that groups together organizations according to the particular issue that they are seeking to address. As in the case of a definition of terrorism there is no single classification of terrorism. Hoffman talks about ethno-nationalist or separatist terrorism, religious terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. Eqbal Ahmad<sup>19</sup> identifies five types of terrorism: state terrorism, religious terrorism (Catholics and Protestants, Sunnis and Shiites killing each other), criminal terrorism, political terrorism and oppositional terrorism. The Council on Foreign Relations discusses at least six different sorts of terrorism:<sup>20</sup> nationalist, state-sponsored, left wing, right-wing and anarchist religious,.

There are also groupings based on different characteristics of terrorists who want to use weapons of mass destruction. Laqueur, prefers to talk about six types of terrorists:<sup>21</sup> The first category consists of deranged individuals; the second, apocalyptic religious or religious nationalist groups who believe the end is near for a sinful world; the third covers fanatical nationalist groups consumed by hatred against another national group in their midst or in a neighbouring country; the fourth consists of terrorist groups engaged in a long struggle without evident success and without much hope of it; the fifth embraces terrorists acting on behalf of a state or even criminal terrorist groups and who may calculate that the damage caused and the number of victims would be devastating but still limited. The final category includes small groups of individuals who suffer from one delusion or another and have personal grievances rather political ones.

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<sup>19</sup> Eqbal Ahmad "Terrorism: theirs and Ours" *Open Media Pamphlet Series*, 2001. Pg. 13.

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.terrorismanswers.com>

<sup>21</sup> Murat Karagoz. 'September 11: A New Type fo Terrorism', *Perceptions*, Sept-Nov.2002, Pg.148..

Peter Chalk, gives five categories of sub-state terrorist actor.<sup>22</sup>

First, there are nationalist/separatist groups: These organizations profess to represent either an ethnically, territorially or nationally distinct people who are seen to be the victims of some sort of political injustice. Such organizations typically seek redress that is expressed in terms of a demand for national self-determination/separation. They have nearly all received at least some form of active/passive support from regions beyond their own home areas and characteristically tend to employ a variety of political strategies to achieve their goals of which terrorism is but one. Experts say that nationalist terror groups have tended to calibrate their use of violence, using enough to rivet world attention but not so much that they alienate supporters abroad or members of their base community. Nationalist terrorism can be difficult to define since many groups accused of the practice insist that they are not terrorist but freedom fighters. eg. al-Fatah, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC).

Second, there are extreme left-wing ideological organizations. These groups adhere to a universalistic political 'truth' and typically arise as a result of disaffection with the prevailing political structure. They tend to be highly ideologically driven and organized with well-educated members. Most advocate utopian objectives and see themselves as being at the forefront of the world wide struggle between the international proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie. Left wing terrorists are out to destroy capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime. Because they perceive most civilians are suffering under capitalist exploitation, left-wing terrorists have sometimes limited their use of violence to avoid hurting the victims they were out to save. Instead they sometimes focus on tactics such as kidnapping tycoons or symbolically bombing monuments, eg. Italian Red Brigades (BR), Japanese Red Army (JRA) America's

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<sup>22</sup> Chalk, Op. Cit, Pg. 23.

Weathermen of the 1970's, Greece RO-17 November, Spanish Oct 1<sup>st</sup> Antifascist group (GRAPO), French Action Direct (AD).

Third, there are extreme right-wing organizations. These groups generally claim to be supporting the status quo and /or defending the national interest. They tend to arise in reaction to the successes of left wing revolutionary groups or to prevent change that is perceived as threatening to favoured political arrangements and set-ups. They typically receive support from those sectors of society which feel their privileged political, economic or social positions to be under attack as a result of government reform, left-wing agitation or increased immigration. They are not, generally speaking, as well organized as the left-wing groups, nor do their members tend to be as well educated. Many of the beliefs of far right groups are based on racial or national superiority over others. Adverse economic condition have led to hostility to racial minorities and immigrants. Adolf Hitler, the Nazi dictator of Germany from 1933 to 1945 was an inspiration for far right terrorist groups. It has often been characterized as the least discriminating, most senseless type of contemporary political violence. Like other terrorist organizations, the more sophisticated right-wing groups also seek targets that are likely to advance their cause. Right-wing, terrorists frequently attack immigrants and refugees from the developing world and are racist, xenophobic and anti-semitic, eg. the German Alternative (DA), the Italian Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), the US Klu-Klux Klan (KKK) the Turkish Grey Wolves and the Japanese Shield Society.

Fourth, there are religious organization. These groups adhere to a religious dogma and generally see their 'mission' in terms of a battle between the forces of good and evil. Their members typically exhibit a very high degree of dedication with many willingly sacrificing themselves as martyrs to the cause(s) in which they believe. These groups are typically characterized by, and based on, mythologies whose origins go back many centuries. Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes

in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Religious terrorists come from all major faiths, as well as from small cults. They are concerned not with rallying a constituency of fellow nationalists or ideologies but with pursuing their own vision of the divine will, they lack one of the major constraints that historically has limited the scope of terror attacks.

For Hoffman, religious terrorism tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that directly affect the 'holy' terrorists motivation. For them, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty, executed direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified by scripture. Religion functions as a legitimising force, specifically sanctioning widespread and large scale violence against almost an open-ended category of opponents. Experts say this type of terrorism is growing swiftly. ex-Hizbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Dal Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa, Kach Movement, Kahane Chai, Dashmesh / 10<sup>th</sup> Regiment.

Finally, there are single-issue groups. These organizations are not interested in establishing a new society seeing their objectives rather in terms of a single cause. They generally reflect the problems that concern society at any one time and arise in circumstances in which people have suffered from a loss of purpose and/or identity eg. Animal Rights Militia (ARM) and the various anti abortion groups that have operated in the US such as the Army of God, God's Army and The Armies of the Living God.

Use of these classificatory divisions has limitations, given their diversity in terms of organizational structure, philosophical beliefs and groups membership no attempt to sort terrorist groups into categories will ever be entirely successful. Many nationalist groups for eg-also espouse ideological leanings such and the consistent ad vocation of hard line left wing rhetoric by Provision Irish Republican Party (PIRA), Basque Fatherland, Land and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) (ETA) and the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Equally, religious motivations can easily become bound up with nationalist or ideological sentiments eg. Hamas identification with the Palestinian cause. Since the above categories, cannot, therefore, be regarded as mutually exclusive, placement of certain organizations has necessarily, been based on subjective judgment.

Other types of Terrorism are Anarchist, Domestic Vs International, State Sponsored terrorism.

Anarchist terrorism became a major global phenomenon from 1870s until about 1920. Revolutionary seeking to overthrow established governments launched a wave of bombings and assassination of heads of state. The new interest in anarchist violence is rising out of the recent wave of protests against globalisation, eg-found in Italy and Spain.

Domestic vs. International Terrorism – In 1944, Jewish terrorist of the Stern Gang assassinated British minister Lord Moyne in Egypt, carrying out an operation outside Palestine in order to sway world opinion to their cause. In 1985, Middle Eastern groups carried out 75 terrorist attacks in Western Europe, killing 65 people. 20 of these attacks were aimed at western people or property rather than at Arab and Palestinian / Israeli and Jewish targets.

State sponsored Terrorism is a contemporary phenomenon in rise and persistence. State-sponsored terrorism describes a situation where a government gives active and often clandestine support, encouragement and assistance to a terrorist group. Radical states sponsor terrorist groups as a deliberate foreign policy tool – as Hoffman puts it, as “a cost-effective way of waging war covertly through the use of surrogate warriors or ‘guns for hire’”. With enhanced resources at their disposal, state-sponsored terrorist groups are often capable of carrying out more deadly attacks than other terrorists including aerial bombings.

Hoffman argues that acts of violence by terrorists secretly working for governments are relatively inexpensive and, if executed properly, a potentially risk-free means of anonymously attacking stronger enemies and thereby avoiding the threat of international punishment or reprisal.

### USA'S Concept of Terrorism

The US State Department says Iran is the primary state-sponsor of terrorism today. It also accuses Cuba, Iraq, Libya, N. Korea, Sudan and Syria of sponsoring terrorism.

Terrorism has been dealt extensively by the USA both before and after Sept. 11, 2001. There has been change in their definition of terrorist activities after being affected by it.

The growing fear of terrorism compelled the LON to form a committee of some experts to assure the repression of conspiracies or crimes committed with political or terrorist purpose.<sup>23</sup> These efforts of the League of Nation (LON) were included in the adoption of 2 conventions: The first one was on 16 Nov, 1937 at the Diplomatic Conference attended by 35 states, on the prevention and punishment of terrorism and the other one was on the creation of an International Criminal Court.<sup>24</sup>

US government has never issued a formal definition but its government agencies have proposed unofficial definition. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was one of the first, in 1976, with this definition of International terrorism; "The threat or use of evidence for political purposes when (1) such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than its immediate victims, and (2) its ramifications transcend national boundaries (as a result for example, of the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locale, the identity of its

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<sup>23</sup> Sharma. op. cit., Pg.14.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pp.15.

institutional or human victims, its declared objectives or the mechanics of its resolution)".

Over the years, the working of CIA definition has fluctuated. In 1980, for instance, terrorism was defined as

"The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governments authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group wider than the immediate victims."

In 1983, the U.S Army used this definition of terrorism; "The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear."<sup>25</sup>

Also in 1983 the FBI used this wording "Terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives".

However, the most influential American definition has turned out to be the one proposed by the U.S. Department of State, in 1984. Terrorism was defined as

"Premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience"

One element that kept recurring in U.S. government debates on defining terrorism was whether or not attacks on U.S. military personnel could be labelled terrorist . On Oct 23, 1983, 241 American Marines died in their barracks in Beirut, Lebanon when a suicide bomber in a truck crashed through the base's security perimeter. Was this terrorism or was the label terrorism to be reserved for attacks against non combatant civilians?

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<sup>25</sup> US Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counter Action, *TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-37*, 1984.

The U.S. Department of State solved this dilemma by interpreting the term non combatants to "include in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/ or not on duty."

It also considers "as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombing against U.S bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere".

### **Changing Nature of Terrorism**

Another important incident in era of terrorism was when in 1998, The State Department released its annual assessment of international terrorism.

The report asserts that the "total number of people killed or wounded from terrorist attacks in 1998 was the highest to date, even though the number of terrorist attacks reached their lowest point since 1971. These statistics reflect a trend which has emerged since the end of the Cold War: while terrorist attacks are down, the number of terrorist related fatalities is increasing, this is due to the changing nature of terrorism."<sup>26</sup>

International security experts disagreed on the how dangerous the current threat of terrorism really is. Some claim that terrorism existed and indeed flourished during the Cold War and yet the real impact on the United States was minimal. Other observers believed that terrorism was increasingly deadly and that a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack in the United States could result in untold damage to their nation's infrastructure and psyche.

While it is true that terrorism is an enduring historical phenomenon, it is also evident that today's terrorist groups are increasingly dissimilar to their Cold War counterparts. Issues other than politics, including religion,

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<sup>26</sup> Chris Dishman."Review Article:Trends in Modern Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.22.No.4.Oct-Dec 1999,Pg.357.



millenarianism, racism, and financial gain motivate today's terrorists. Religious terrorism in particular illustrates how the motivations of modern terrorist groups are changing.

During the Cold War, and to some extent after, terrorists used religion primarily as a banner for political agendas; today, however, more terrorist groups are using religion itself as the primary motivation behind their attacks. This new breed of religious terrorist generally relies on a much different value system than politically motivated terrorist, and its support base is spread throughout the globe rather than in district geographical clusters.

Given the changing nature of terrorism, it is important not to view terrorism narrowly. Terrorism is a tactic that can be used by a multitude of actors for a number of reasons. This is not to say that every criminal act is terrorism.

According to the State Department's *Patterns in Global Terrorism, 1998* over 40% of all terrorist attacks last year were aimed at United States citizens. The attacks producing the greatest number of U.S. fatalities were the twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. These attacks illuminate perhaps one of the most disturbing characteristics of modern terrorism: adhoc terrorists who act largely on their own, but are sparked ideologically by religious, racist, or other types of edicts.<sup>27</sup> These compartmentalized terrorists may receive financial support or direction from a large benefactor, but they operate virtually independent of each other, making it difficult for counter terrorism authorities to stop them. Moreover, these groups are difficult to respond against because clear linkages to higher sponsor may not exist or be evident.

The RAND report attempts to unravel many of the complexities of modern terrorism. In countering the New Terrorism, some of the top minds

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<sup>27</sup>Ibid, pg. 358.

on nontraditional conflict and terrorism produced essays on the future of terrorism and counter terrorism strategy.

The report begins with an essay by renowned terrorist expert Bruce Hoffman on the changing nature of terrorism. Hoffman uses the growing lethality of terrorism as a productive starting point to deduce trends in what some have coined "post modern terrorism". Hoffman efficiently lists a number of likely reasons why terrorism fatalities have steadily increased throughout the decade. Most illuminating is his discussion of religiously motivated terrorist groups which grew six-fold from 1980 to 1992 and continued to increase throughout the mid-1990's. He equates the higher lethality of religiously motivated terrorist attacks to a differing value system that allows the perpetrators to justify in their minds the deaths of large numbers of people. Hoffman writes, "for the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand and justified by scripture"<sup>28</sup>. Salient terrorist attacks that retain a strong religious component include the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma city federal office building and in 1993, a series of nearly simultaneous car and truck bombings in India that killed 400 people.

RAND report's next section, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini highlight the organizational, doctrinal, and technological changes that have occurred within modern terrorist organizations. "In Athena's camp," Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that terrorist groups have evolved from hierarchical, vertical organizational structures, to more horizontal, less command-driven groups. Leadership is derived from a "set of principles (that) can set boundaries and provide guidelines for decisions and actions so that members do not have to resort to a hierarchy – 'they know what they have to do'".<sup>29</sup> The authors contend that a network can

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<sup>28</sup> Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Aquilla, Zanini (ed.) *Countering the New Terrorism*, Washington DC: Rand Publication, 1999, Pg.20.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, pp.51.

operate in two different tiers, both of which maintain different organizational characteristics.

Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini also examine the role of information technology. While many observers believe that cyber-terrorists will aim to dismantle large technologically based infrastructures, these authors stress that many terrorist will likely avoid dismantling the Internet because they need the technology for its own communication and propaganda activities. As such, these terrorists are more interested in "systematic disruption" rather than the total destruction of information networks.

Ian Lesser nicely concludes what is a thoughtful and innovative report. The authors clearly understand that in order to develop effective counter terrorism strategies in the future, policymakers must recognize the characteristics of a changing terrorist paradigm. The RAND authors point out that counter leadership strategies, for eg., are generally ineffectual in stemming or halting the activities of modern terrorists. Indeed, the authors are correct if one looks at law enforcement efforts to decapitate the organization of the Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Juarez and Gulf Cartels.

The RAND authors also correctly stress that terrorism is a tactic that can be utilized by a variety of actors. The report states that "a decade or so ago, terrorism was a rather distinct entry on the spectrum of conflict, with its own unique attributes. Today it seems increasingly connected with [these] broader trends in irregular warfare, especially as wages by non-state actors."<sup>30</sup> Some critics prefer a stricter and more traditional definition of terrorism than the aforementioned statement, and may find that this analysis is too broad and all-encompassing to be useful. In fact, the RAND report's outlining of the characteristics of modern terrorism should be quite useful to policymakers because it illuminates the complexities and

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. pg. 42.

differences in this phenomenon that will assist them in designing sound counter terrorism strategies.

One of the few shortcomings of this report is the authors' assertion that signal intelligence (SIGINT) is more effective than human intelligence (HUMINT) in collecting information on terrorist groups. They propose "virtual HUMINT," by which unmanned aerial vehicles and reconnaissance planes should be increasingly used to eavesdrop and provide intelligence on terrorists. The authors in turn discount the utility of spies, stating that "organizations like the Hamas frequently recruit members when they are quite young, precluding infiltration by seasoned agents and making it more difficult to sway members or convince them to give up information."<sup>31</sup> There are two shortcomings of this argument. First, it assumes that the operative must deeply penetrate the terrorist organizations to be of any utility. In fact, the operatives themselves do not have to infiltrate the core of the organization to elicit crucial information from an uncertain or wary terrorist. Moreover, operatives can also glean information from the support periphery of the group; Hamas for example, retains a widespread constituency ranging from militants to political activists.

Jessica Stern's book, "The Ultimate Terrorists", attempts to find a middle ground between these two schools of thought by objectively assessing the technological obstacles to an NBC attack, (nuclear, biological, chemical) the motivation of modern terrorist groups, and the ability of these groups to purchase NBC weapons or components.

Stern discusses a number of reasons why today's terrorist would be attracted to NBC weapons. She acknowledges that "most terrorists will continue to avoid Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for a variety of reasons".<sup>32</sup> Agreeing with Hoffman in principle that the terrorists will continue

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., Pg.79.

<sup>32</sup> Jessica Stern. *The Ultimate Terrorists*, Cambridge, M.A., Harvard University Press, 1999, Pg. 70.



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using the "gun and the bomb". She stresses however that terrorist groups motivated by religion, millenarism, and racism, might use WMD as a means to attract attention, to overcome sophisticated counterterrorist measures, or simply to kill large numbers of people. She claims that contemporary terrorist groups maintain support from "amorphous constituencies" which make modern terrorists more likely to use WMD because they do not have to worry about alienating even limited political support.

Stern lays out in non-scientific jargon the technological obstacles that a terrorist would have in developing chemical or biological agents or a small nuclear weapon. She concludes that terrorists would most likely attempt to use a chemical or biological agent in liquid form within a contained area, or as a food poison, rather than the large-scale dissemination of a breathable agent. Stern also points out that disseminating a non-fissile isotope (radiological material which is unable to be used in a nuclear weapon) into a large reservoir would likely result in high casualties and that these radiological agents would only be effective in a small, self-enclosed water area.

Additionally, Stern dives into an encompassing analysis of the deterioration of safeguards on nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. She concludes that most attempts to steal nuclear ingredients have been of non-fissile radioactive isotopes rather than weapons-grade or weapons-usable plutonium or uranium. Amateurs are largely responsible for the stolen non-fissile materials, and Stern believes that the real danger in the future lies in corrupt officials who work within the WMD complex in Russia who could utilize Russian mafiya connections to smuggle plutonium or uranium out of the country. Stern claims that the psychological effect an NBC attack would have on society would be severe and that such an attack would induce a disproportionate, panicked reaction.

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Both the RAND report and Stern's book provide an insight into the characteristics of post-Cold War terrorism and discuss the critical issues that counter-terrorism officials face today. There is however an important trend in terrorism that both works fail to thoroughly address. Terrorists are increasingly engaging in other illicit activities in order to raise money for their operations. Often this results in different degrees of cooperation between terrorists and organized criminal syndicates. Just as Hoffman noted that state sponsors can act as a "force multiplier" for terrorists, organized criminal groups can also enhance the power and effectiveness of terrorists. Since by and large states have decreased their support of terrorism since the end of the Cold War, terrorists are actively looking for other groups to fill void. In this respect, there is a growing danger that organized criminal group will act as a force multiplier for contemporary terrorist groups, supplying them with money, arms, explosives, and other contraband in mutually beneficial arrangements.

Modern guerrilla movements, for instance, are increasingly engaging in other illicit activities in order to fund their violent operations. (These movements use terrorism as a tactic, and as Walter Laqueur states, the only salient difference between the two is that terrorists are usually unable or unwilling to occupy land). The crossover by terrorist into other criminal activities has important implications for counter-terrorism strategists. The aims and motivations of a terrorist group can become clouded if financial gain overtakes politics as the foremost objective of the group. Taken to the extreme, a terrorist organization with political support and vast resources can become an organized criminal group engaging in illicit activities for profit and yet maintaining a political front. This is important for counter-terrorism authorities to be cognizant for a number of reasons. Financially motivated terrorists, for example, will be more likely to follow through on their end of a kidnapping negotiation than a traditionally motivated political terrorist.

The question Stern raises in her book still remains. Will this wide array of new and old terrorist groups use Weapons of Mass Destruction against U.S. citizens? There is little historical evidence to suggest that they will.

The real inspiration of terrorism is usually a free-floating activism, which can with equal ease turn left, and right in orientation. Terrorism is not philosophy; it is always action that counts. Terrorism is believed to appear wherever people have legitimate grievances. Remove the grievances, poverty, injustice, inequality, lack of political participation and terror will cease. Given the imperfect character of human beings and social institutions, grievances can be reduced but not eradicated.

If terrorism is a manifestation of grievances, national or social, which are at least in part legitimate, the ideal approach is a mixture of political reforms and counter-terrorist means, acceding to those demands that are justified and realistic. In some cases this may lead to an armistice and eventually to the terrorist desisting from the 'armed struggle'. Elsewhere there is no alternative but to fight terrorism until it is defeated.

As 'internal terrorism' has declined over the last decade, and as international terrorism has taken a more central place, international cooperation against terrorism has been invoked a great many times. It is a hopeless undertaking as long as some states sponsor, finance, equip, train and provide sanctuaries to terrorist groups. Spokesmen for democratic societies will continue to proclaim that terrorism is abhorred and condemned by 'the whole civilized world'. Thus, the danger of international terrorism, in other words, is not in the terrorist acts per se, but in triggering off a wider and more dangerous armed conflict. For this reason, it is important to prevent an escalation; to resist state sponsored terrorism from the beginning, not to lead its sponsors into temptation.

It can be seen that the phenomenon of international terrorism could not have emerged were states not linked in complex arrangements of mutual interdependence. A characterization of the international system as one that is composed of separate sovereign entities who periodically clash, but otherwise have little to do with one another, does not accurately capture the importance of cultural, social, political and economic interaction that have become a fundamental aspect of the present international system. As Martha Crenshaw has remarked: 'Were there no tourist, no diplomats and no business travellers, terrorism could certainly not have assumed the [international] dimension that it has'<sup>33</sup>. Increasingly, terrorist organization have been able, and prepared, to exploit this interdependence to their advantage and operate on an international level.

Contemporary terrorism has move for from its origins, which were rooted in the struggle against despotism. Terrorism appeared in the secret societies and revolutionary organizations of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, fighting tyranny against which there was no legal redress. It was adopted by national movements against foreign oppressors and by sections of the extreme left and right. Circumstances still vary today from country to country and what is said about one is not necessarily true of another. Violent resistance against the authority of the state is still justified in non-democratic regimes, against severe oppression and in defence of a just cause. By and large, however, there has been an essential change in the character of terrorism over the last 100 years, with the shedding of restraints, the growth of multinational, remote-controlled terrorism usually sponsored by tyrannical regimes, and, above all, the failure or the unwillingness of terrorists to challenge effective dictatorships. Once it was the strategy that the poor and weak used against ruthless tyrants. Today its more typical representatives are no longer poor, and modern technology is giving them powerful weapon. Some present-day terrorist group have

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<sup>33</sup> Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism and International Cooperation*, New York: Institute for the East-West Security Studies, 1988, Pg.9.



quite clearly acquired the characteristics once attributed to tyranny, atrox et notoria injuria. The tyrant wants to impose his will on society and to keep it at ransom, and so do terrorists, others genuinely believe in their liberating mission, yet if their actions have any effect at all it is that of unwilling pacemakers of a new breed of tyrants.

Simon and Benjamin assert that the old paradigm of predominantly state-sponsored terrorism has been joined by new, religiously motivated terrorism, that neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by restraints on violence that state sponsors have observed or placed on their proxies. In the effort to inflict damage on grand scale, say the authors, some practitioners of new terrorism seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction.<sup>34</sup>

### **September 11,2001: The New Terrorism**

Tucker says that the new terrorism that came up after September 11, 2001 attack on the WTC and Pentagon is distinguished from the old by its unique structure, a new kind of recruit and its different attitude towards violence. The new structure is a network, facilitated by information technology; the new personnel are amateurs, who often come together in adhoc or transitory groupings; and the new attitude is an increased willingness to cause mass casualties—a willingness to go as far as using chemical biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. For him this network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by decapitation.<sup>35</sup>

Roy characterises recent radical movements with three factors. First, they are ideologically very conservative, struggling for the total implementation of Shariah and do not care for social and economic issues

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<sup>34</sup> Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, "America and the New Terrorism", *Survival*, Vol.42, No.1, Spring 2000, pp. 59-75.

<sup>35</sup> David Tucker, "What is New About New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 1-14.

as did the Islamists. Second, their only strategic agenda is to wage Jihad to reconstitute the "Muslim community" (ummah) beyond national and ethnic divides. In this sense, they are genuinely global. Third, and quite logically, they recruit among uprooted cosmopolite, "de-territorialized" militants, themselves a social product of globalisation: many migrated to find employment or educational opportunities<sup>36</sup>.

September 11 was thus neither the first nor the last terrorist act. Neither is the US the only country in history that have been subjected to such a sheer magnitude of violence. However, September 11, was in many ways unique. It encompasses particular elements from all types of terrorism. It is terrorism with radical religious mutations and aims to produce casualties on a massive scale. It is indiscriminate in selecting targets. Thus is called New Terrorism.

#### **General Characteristic of Sept. 11:**

In today's world, with modern technology and means of communication, the targets have also been globalised. Therefore, the globalisation of violence is a parallel outcome of what we call globalisation of the economy and culture in the world as a whole. In fact, the expansion of terrorism's global reach is an instance of globalisation.

Keohane asserts that often, globalism and globalisation have been defined narrowly as economic integration on a global scale, but whatever appeal such a definition may have had, it has surely disappeared after September 11. To adopt it would be to imply that "globalised informal violence" which takes advantage of modern technologies of communication transportation, explosives and potentially, biology somehow threatens to hinder or reduce the level of globalism. Keohane believes that globalised informal violence strengthens one dimension of globalism – the networks

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<sup>36</sup> Olivier Roy, Bruce Hoffman, Reuven Paz, Steven and Daniel Benjamin, "America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No.2, Summer 2000. Pg. 156-172.

through which means of violence flow – while potentially weakening globalism along other dimensions, such as economic and social exchange.<sup>37</sup>

The Arab – Israeli conflict is also referred to as one of underlying reasons of Sept. 11. September 11 has given the US the opportunity to attempt to hold the international order under its leadership and according to American priorities. It would be therefore, appropriate to consider the fight against terrorism as a long-lasting action and not to exclude its possible expansion to other phases.

It is upto America to evaluate realistically whether or not today's intensive and widely spread anti-Americanism-regardless of what one thinks of it, because it does exist – can seriously hamper, or even jeopardize “global war” against terrorism. Also, is it sufficient to wonder “how come they hate us”, and conclude “they hate us for our democratic, etc. virtues and values”, so all we should do is only to improve persuasiveness and dissemination of truth about ourselves and our propaganda. Domestic critics of America state policy, by no means small in number, point out that at least part of the problem might stem from the fact that the US doesn't always and everywhere act in accordance with its proclaimed virtues and values.

Thus it can be seen Terrorism has no geography, and no religion. Today the most distinct feature of terrorism is its globalised nature which has become more dangerous. The September 11, terror acts were persecuted by Islamist radicals who reject the western way of life and western values, revolt against modernity in general and call for jihad. Yet, these phenomena are by no means totally alien to western civilization. The concept of crusade, after all, is not Islamic: Christianity has also carried out holy wars. European fascism was also a revolt against the west, the Enlightenment and Humanism.

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<sup>37</sup> Robert O. Keohane, “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics and ‘the Liberalism of Fear’”, *Social Science Research Council: September 11 Essays*, Fall 2001.

Terrorism is an evolving process, rather than a static paradigm. A look at the ground that has been covered in this evolution from the reign of terror of the Jacobins in post-revolutionary France, to Al Qaeda and September 11 speaks for itself. Thus even this 'new terrorism' can be expected to become outdated in time. That is the challenge we will continue to face in our struggle against this menace.

## **CHAPTER – II**

### **America's Response to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack**

It has already become a cliché to assert that 9/11 changed everything, but like many cliché this one holds a grain of truth. The 9/11 terrorist attacks did transform the way any Americans think about US foreign and defense policy.

The hijackers commanded 4 commercial jet liners crashing 2 of them, into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York city and another into Pentagon, outside Washington D.C., in a coordinated terrorist attack that US President Bush called the 'acts of war' against the US. The 4<sup>th</sup> airliner crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The attacks destroyed both the towers and damaged the Pentagon, killing 5,000 people including all 265 people aboard the 4 planes. It was the deadliest strike on US soil since the 1941 Japanese surprise assault on Pearl Harbour, Naval base in Hawaii. The attacks paralysed New York and prompted the government to evacuate all Federal buildings in Washington. Both cities fell under high security alert, with helicopters and fighter jets dispatched to guard the skies.

No group or country claimed responsibility for the hijack. As radio and television stations worldwide broadcast non-stop news of the attacks, a ripple affect ensued. However, the Bush administration singled out Osama Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian exile believed to have master-minded several deadly anti US attacks as the 'prime suspect' in the case.

Bush in September 11 televised address from the White House said he had "directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to find those responsible and to bring them to justice", he further added, "We will make no distinction between the terrorist who committed these acts and those who harboured them." Addressing the country again

the next day the President proclaimed the attacks as 'acts of war' and vowed monumental struggle of good against evil.

September 11, 2001, was 'terrorist' in nature which gave a New Type of Terrorism. Though some realists assert that those attacks may testify to a defining moment but in no way to 'the reorder of the system', following September 11, Many academicians and political commentators alike seem to agree to the assessment; the world will never be the same again,' what most of the academicians seem also agreed on was that the attacks were directed not only against the US but also against all of humanity and civilization, democracy, human, rights, good governance etc.

The first declaration of War by the President was made on September 20 before a joint session of the US Congress. He identified Al Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11 and accused Afghanistan of harbouring Al Qaeda leaders, particularly Osama bin Laden. He said that the leadership of Al Qaeda had great influence in controlling most of that country. 'In Afghanistan we see Al Qaeda's vision for the world' He made demands on the Taliban 'to deliver to the US authorities all the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land', 'close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure'. By making it clear that these demands were not open to negotiation or discussions, the President was virtually giving an ultimatum to the rulers of Afghanistan.

In its early days, this was dubbed 'America's New War' by the CNN. The War was to be global in scope and for an indefinite period. 'Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.' Further, 'Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen.'

The President addressed all nation of the world and outlined the choice before them. 'Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either your are with us or you are with the terrorists.' The reason proffered was that, 'This is not just America's fight alone. V'hat is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. The attack may have taken place on American soil, but the whole world had to be mobilized because it was attack on freedom and civilization in the whole world. Any nation not joining the War on America's side was supporting terrorists'. This was hardly a choice; it was a command which brooked no disobedience. The President of the mightiest nation on earth was laying down the law for the whole world. But who was the war to be against? What was to be the nature of the War? The President had no intention of making such things clear. The agenda was left completely open-ended, to be added to, changed, amended, revised as he pleased. The rest of the world would be told bits and pieces about it as and when the US establishment saw fit. As Stanley Hoffman wrote:

The first question that came to anyone's mind has still not been answered. Whom are we fighting? If it is Bin Laden and his associates, formidable as they may be, we risk finding that dismantling their network is likely to be a slow and penetrating task in a world without walls and even successes in this particular struggle will not put an end to many other murderous forms of terrorism.... To proclaim a War on Terrorism in general, even if one means only terrorist cells and forces not directly sponsored by states, is ambitious indeed, for we need to distinguish among types of terrorists..... A determined project of ridding the world of all rogues and terrorists is a dream that would be seen abroad as a demonstration of rapid imperialism.

The second declaration of War came from President Bush as part of his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002. By that time Taliban had been ousted from power in Afghanistan and a new regime installed. President Bush said, 'what we have found in Afghanistan confirms that far

from ending there our war against terror is only beginning.' He should have actually said 'what we have not found in Afghanistan', for the Americans did not find Osama Ben Laden, whom the President had pledged to find 'alive or dead'. One of the important declared aims of the War on Terror was 'to bring Osama bin laden to justice or bring justice to him.

President Bush said that the US would continue to be steadfast, patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives.<sup>1</sup> First 'we shall shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plan and bring terrorists to justice.' This was of course a reiteration of an objective in the first declaration itself. The second objective, however, had nothing to do with responding to the September 11 attacks but related to an entirely different kind of terror. 'We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from threatening the US and the world.' The ambit was widening and the scope was expanding new enemies were being listed; new targets were being identified. The War on Terror he said, will now turn to 'regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and others with weapons of mass destruction.' He named North Korea, Iran and Iraq and said, 'States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil aiming to threaten the peace of the world'. Bush gave a clear warning to 'the axis of evil'.

In the same speech Bush referred to another kind of expansion of the War on Terror. It was expanding geographically and new fronts were being opened. In Bush's 'axis of evil' the three countries Iran, Iraq and North Korea practically had no relation and these three hardly constitute an organized alliance against the US and there is no valid comparison with the Axis of the Second World War. Iran and Iraq are at loggerheads, and despite North Korea reportedly harbouring a few members of the Japanese Red Army, it has not sponsored any terrorist attacks for a long time.

President Bush implicitly threatened to expand the war on terrorism to countries that are developing weapons of mass destructions. Although

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<sup>1</sup> 'Text of President Bush's Statements', *Facts on File*, 61, No. 3171, Sept. 13, 2001, Pg.700.



such rhetoric may be sabre rattling to intimidate those nations, the possibility of an expansion of the war is a real and dangerous possibility. This begs the question: although North Korea, Iran and Iraq may be developing or have acquired weapons of mass destruction, so have many other nations. According to the Pentagon, 12 nations have nuclear weapon programmers, 13 have biological weapons, 16 have chemical weapons and 18 have ballistic missiles. 'Is the US president prepared to attack all of these nation?' ask Ivan Eland of the Cato Institute.

A perpetual state of war – in Bush's words, 'a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have seen' – can undermine economic recovery, does not comport with the values that America claims to uphold, and will likely lead to the erosion of constitutional liberties and the accumulation of too much power in the executive branch not only in the US but also in many countries that support the War on Terror. A seemingly unprovoked war against another Muslim country – either Iran or Iraq or both-will have repercussions all over the world including the spread of terrorism. Thus an expanded US war on terrorism could generate more terrorism, rather than prevent or reduce it.

Allies of the US were confused and felt the phrase 'axis of evil' was misleading. Bush's speech seemed to have frightened America's allies quite as much as it scared its enemies – 'evil' or otherwise. Secretary of State Colin Powell's laboured explanation that 'it does not mean that 'we are ready to invade anyone or that we are not willing to engage in dialogue' was not convincing, especially because everybody knew that doors were suddenly opening in Washington, in the State Department and the Pentagon, for Iraqi opposition groups. An attack on Iraq, many thought, was imminent.

Bush took special pride in the enormous increase in the defence budget.

"My budget includes the largest increase in defence spending in two decades, because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country we will pay it" he said in his State of the Union address. Bush proposed a new budget of \$379 billion, an increase of 48 billion over the already unexpectedly high 2001 budget, the increase alone being larger than any other nation's military budget. As one commentator put it, 'the war on terror will involve more frequent military intervention with less of an attempt to placate internal sensibilities and with the constant excuse of protecting American security. It will involve more overt appeals to western cultural supremacy, although couched in universalist and moralistic terms'.

### **Domestic Reports on Sept 11, 2001**

9/11 Panel Reports Intelligence Lapses. A joint House-Senate panel investigating possible intelligence lapses leading up to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, was held on September 18 which released a 30-page report detailing the intelligence community's knowledge of the terrorist threat and the community's apparent failure to act upon its information. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the inquiry, outlined the panel's findings at its first public Congressional hearing since the committee began its investigation in June'.

The investigation has been prompted by revelations about information that intelligence agencies have possessed prior to Sept 11 that might have pointed to the possibility that the attacks were being planned. The White House in May had acknowledged that President Bush had received a briefing in August 2001 that operatives tied to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, widely blamed for the attacks, were considering the possibility of hijacking US airplanes.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had said at that time that the briefings envisioned a familiar type of hijacking in which planes were seized in order to secure demands such as the release of prisoners,

and that there had been no knowledge prior to September 11 of plans to use commercial jets as weapons.

Hill, in contrast on September 18, said the intelligence community in August 1998 had obtained a report "that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center" in New York City, one of the targets of the September 11 attacks. The disclosure was the first indication that intelligence officials had possessed, before the attacks, specific knowledge of terrorist plans to fly a plane into the trade Center. Much of the other information in the report has been previously leaked to the press.

Hill also said that the intelligence community in September 1998 had learned that Al Qaeda's next terrorist operation could involve "flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a US airport and detonating it."

Hill also disclosed that Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet in December 1998 had declared "war" against Al Qaeda, though few FBI agents interviewed by the panel had been aware of the declaration. She also reported a July 2001 briefing in which senior government officials were warned of a "spectacular" attack "designed to inflict mass casualties".

Hill conceded that the panel had found no "smoking gun", an intelligence failure that, if avoided, might have prevented the September 11 attacks. "But there was still a lot out there that was never pulled together," she said.

Intelligence officials, on September 19 disputed some of the report's findings, claiming that information had been exaggerated and taken out of context. They said that the September 1998 tip had come from a police officer in an unidentified Caribbean country who claimed that Libyan agents sought to crash a plane into the WTC on behalf of Iraq. The officials said that the report had been disseminated but could not be corroborated. They

noted that there appeared to be no connection between any such plot and the actual attacks.

The CIA, on September 19 issued a statement that the report had undercounted the number of agents assigned to Al Qaeda at the time of the attacks. The panel had found that just one FBI agent and five CIA agents had been covering Al Qaeda exclusively.

Armitage, Wolfowitz Testify – The joint committee on September 19 heard testimony from Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The Bush administration had refused to let their superiors testify, despite committee requests.<sup>2</sup>

Wolfowitz testified that the FBI, despite Tenet's war declaration against Al Qaeda, had not conducted "any specific assessment of what the threat was domestically."

The interim report had highlighted a failure of communications among the FBI, CIA and the other intelligence agencies.

Former President Bill Clinton's National Security Adviser, Samuel (Sandy) Berger on September 19 testified that the FBI had received "very little information on domestic capabilities and threats."

The panel on September 20 released a second report documenting the CIA and FBI's repeated failures to act on intelligence about two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. An FBI agent, testifying behind a screen to conceal his identity on September 20 said that he had sought to launch a criminal investigation of Almihdhar in August 2001. When his request was refused by the FBI's National Security Law Unit, the agent said, he wrote an electronic mail message to FBI headquarters.

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<sup>2</sup> "Terrorist Attack Aftermath", *Facts on File*, Vol. 61, No.3173, Sept. 27, 2001 Pg. 737-756

"Someday someone will die- and [legal] wall or not – the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain 'problems'."

The panel released a third report on September 24. The report revealed that Phoenix, Ariz. FBI agent Kenneth Williams, who in July 2001 had urged FBI headquarters to investigate, Arab men training in flight schools, had been tracking an Islamic militant tied to September 11 hijacker Hani Hanjour. The report revealed that the FBI had found William's memorandum "speculative and not particularly significant".

Williams on September 24, testifying behind a screen, attacked Congress for failing to protect his identity in May when his memo was first reported. He said he feared Al Qaeda would try to kill him.

The report also included a comment by an FBI supervisor in Minneapolis, Minn, who before the attacks had sought a search warrant against Zacarias Moussaoui. Moussaoui was indicted for conspiring in the attacks in December 2001. The agent said he had told a colleague that he sought to alert agency leaders about Moussaoui to ensure that he " did not take control of a plane and fly it into the World Trade Centre".

The report also disclosed that FBI lawyers had misunderstood the law they had cited in preventing agents from searching Moussaoui's laptop computer, where information that might had led investigators to Almihdhar and Alhazmi was stored.

Cofer Black the CIA's top counter-terrorism official at the time of the attacks, and Dale Watson, a top FBI counter terrorism official, both gave Congressional testimony September 26. Both officials hailed the agencies' accomplishments in thwarting past terrorist plots, and noted the limited staff and financial resources under which they had been operating prior to the September 11 attacks. Watson was set to retire as Assistant Director of the FBI's counter-terrorism unit September, 27.

Senate Approved Independent Inquiry: The senate on September 24 voted, 90-8 in favour of an independent Commission into governmental failure leading up to the September 11 attacks. The White House, which had previously opposed an independent inquiry on September 20 had voiced its support for such a panel. The House had approved an independent inquiry in July.

Under the Senate proposal, no federal employers or office holders could serve on the 10 person panel. The inquiry would have subpoena powers and a budget of \$ 3 million and would last one year. The House proposal had called for an 18 month inquiry.

Pressure for an independent commission had mounted, as the open hearings revealed more apparent intelligence failures and as the Congressional inquiry moved towards its October deadline. Many of the intelligence committees members were set to rotate to new Congressional assignments at the end of the term, and there was concern that the inquiry would not be completed in time.

The White House had reportedly been pressured by complaints from Committee members over the administration's failure to members over the administration's failure to declassify information. In particular, Hill had noted in her September 18 testimony, the White House's refusal to declassify briefings to senior administration officials and information surrounding a senior Al Qaeda official, reportedly Khaled Shaikh Mohamod.

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer on September 20 said the administration's decision had come after 'compelling arguments' were made by the families of victims of September 11 attacks.

Terrorism Alert Level Reduced- The Bush administration, September 24 lowered the terrorist alert. level back to yellow, or an 'elevated' risk of attack, from orange, or a "high" level of danger. Attorney General John Ashcroft and White House Office of Homeland Security Director, Tom

Ridge issued a statement citing the arrest of alleged senior Al Qaeda operative Ramzi bin al-Shibh as one of the reasons for threat level reduction.

Ashcroft and Ridge warned, though, that the public should remain "defiant and alert." They added that detained Al Qaeda operatives had said that the group would wait until the US seemed "less vigilant and less prepared before it will strike again." Anti-aircraft missiles had been removed from sites around Washington September 17.

In September 12, statement Bush goes into the specifics of the intelligence details and the nature of terrorist operation. He proclaims that USA will use all its resources to conquer the enemy.

### **Reports from the Senate and Congress**

The Senate and Congress both condemned the war in unequivocal terms. The Senate unanimously approved a resolution condemning terrorism and giving support to the President in seeking out the perpetrators of the attack. The Senate also voted to declare September 12. 'A national day of mourning and unity'.<sup>4</sup> On September 14, the Senate voted 98-0 to authorize Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force to retaliate against the terrorist. Subsequently, the US military was placed on high alert. Some 50,000 reserved forces were mobilized. They included pilots, flight crews and air traffic controllers.

The US Congress overwhelmingly approved the use of force to respond to the attack. In the back ground of such an event of extreme importance it becomes imperative to look at the way U.S has responded and taken the challenge head on.

In the following section we will look at some of news clippings that have appeared in the international media but before that let us go through the text of Bush's statement. Following is the jist of the transcripts of 2

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<sup>4</sup> *Facts on File* op. cit., Pg. 700.

statements by US President Bush about September 11, terrorist attack on the US. First America was targeted for attack because it is the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. Second, terrorist attacks according to him can shake the foundations of the biggest buildings but not the foundation of America. He openly tries to enlist support from friends and allies around the world in the war against terrorism.

Bush's proposal to Congress for new legislation that would loosen restrictions on wire tapping and would allow police and the courts to rely on foreign evidence gathered by means that did not meet US constitutional standards. Yet the fact is that Congress has raised serious questions about the administration's more draconian proposals, reminding everyone of why we insist on the importance of civil liberties in the first place. There is no reason to believe that a U.S. led campaign against terrorism will make such extensive inroads into civil liberties that anything like a police state will result.

In situation of War and National Emergency, because they require a response from government, are conducive to raising taxes, not lowering them. Already in the aftermath of the attack, one can begin to see a new centrist approach establishing itself. For one thing, the market was blamed that allowed terrorist to board planes without security. This does not mean necessarily that the federal government will assume vastly increased responsibility for airline security; once the crisis subsides, a certain amount of lobbying by groups that stand to benefit from one policy or another can be expected, and conservative Republicans in Congress have already begun to object to an expanded government role in the aftermath of the tragedy. But outside of Washington, most Americans are more likely to view the market as a means rather than as an end-to be encouraged when it works, but to be questioned when it does not.

At the same time, it is also difficult to imagine government operating blatantly in the interests of only one class of people when people from all



walks of life were killed in the attacks. The idea of cutting corporate or capital gains taxes to stimulate the economy, without offering any comparable benefits to Americans on the lower rungs of the income ladder, is likely to be a political nonstarter. Even the Congress tried to bailout the airline executives who were criticized. Bush's tax cut to reward the richest and most powerful was criticized because such kind of class-politics cannot easily be practiced in a time of war. Bush's popularity did not give him a free hand instead, ties his hands. If he wants to be the President of all the people-and he has rightly decided that he does- he cannot afford to appear to be the President of only some of them. In that sense, the terrorist attacks represented the end of the Bush campaign, even as they symbolized the beginning of the Bush Presidency. Compared to the first six months of his administration, when his popularity was relatively low and his proposals contentious, Bush's support was broadened as his proposals became more inclusive.

The sense of solidarity that emerged out of the terrorist attacks has altered the complexion of American politics. In good, bipartisan fashion, it is fair to say that Americans have not been blessed with great leaders in recent years. This may be because they did not want or need great leaders. Leadership is not about securing your political base and getting legislation passed by one or two votes; it is about speaking and acting from the heart. The more room there is for that kind of leadership, the less room there is for ideological posturing and finger-pointing. Mobilization will make it difficult for the Democrats to shift to the left in the next election, but it will also make it difficult for Republicans to shift to the right.

One of the unanswered questions stemming from September 11 attacks is Whether Americans will return to the culture of civic disengagement and lack of interest? According to critics such as Harvard-political scientist Robert Putnam, has characterized U.S society since the passing of more civic-minded generations. If rates of participation and involvement do infact vary with generations then the generation that will

deal with the aftermath of September 11, is also the generation that will change the most.

War cannot cure any of the pathologies that afflict the country. If indeed Americans have lost the sense of moral wholeness that conservatives believe that once possessed, they are unlikely to recover it just because some of their fellow citizens will be called on to sacrifice their comforts, and perhaps lives, to combat terrorism.

It's civic life has also changed as now America is more engaged with the rest of the world than before. The affects are gradual rather than dramatic. 'It is only moment of pause and to reflect on who we are now, a matured nation, which no longer feels the world's problems, could never affect us'.

#### **Domestic Leaders Reaction to the Terrorist Attack**

House Speaker Dennis Hastert- " Senators and house member Democrats and the Republicans will stand shoulder to shoulder to fight the evil that has been perpetrated on this nation. We will stand together to make sure that those who have brought forth this evil deed will pay the price".<sup>5</sup>

Senate majority leader, Thomas Daschle - 'As the representatives of the people we are to declare that our resolve has not been weakened by this horrific and cowardly acts... we Republicans and Democrats House and Senate stand strongly united behind the President, and we will work together to ensure that the full resources of the government are brought to bear in these efforts."

Attorney General John Ashcroft "These heinous acts of evidence are an assault on the security of our nation. They are an assault on security and freedom of every American citizen. We will not tolerate any such acts;

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid , Pg.703.

we will expend every effort and devote all the necessary resources to bring the people responsible for these acts, these crimes, to justice”.

Senator, John McCain. ‘These acts clearly constitute an act of war. I mean unwarranted, unprovoked attacks against innocent American citizens are clearly an act of war, and one that requires the kind of national and international response”

The U.N Security Council on September 12 adopted a resolution calling on all nations to cooperate in locating those who perpetrated the attack. Another development was NATO’s invoking the Joint Defense Laws NATO on September 12 for 1<sup>st</sup> time in its history invoked a mutual defense provision in its 1949 founding charter, suggesting that the 19 member alliance would support the US, should the US take military action against those determined to be responsible for the attacks. In a statement the alliance said if it is determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the US, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Article said “Armed attack against any member state would be interpreted as an attack against them all. The statement was seen as gesture of support for any action that US might take but not necessarily a commitment that every member state would join in military action”.

### **America's Counter Terrorist Measures**

US seeks International Coalition: The Bush administration on September 12, began asking Foreign governments to participate in preparing for response to the attacks.<sup>6</sup> Bush spoke by telephone with other heads of permanent UN Security Council Members: Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and then Chinese President Jiang Zemin, British PM Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac. Putin televised remarks on September 11 accused Bin Laden of supporting rebels in Chechnya were fighting for

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<sup>6</sup> *Facts on file*, op. cit. Pg. 705.

independence from Russia and against whom Russia was waging a self described anti-terrorist campaign.

Both Jordan and Egypt had confronted Islamic militancy and suffered terrorist attacks. Egypt had sought to crack down on militant groups, and had criticized Western nations, particularly Britain, for offering asylum to people convicted of terrorism by Egyptian military courts.

**Pakistan Pressured to Aid:** The Bush administration September 12 began to put strong pressure on Pakistan one of only three nations that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The U.S. had for several years ineffectually pressed Pakistan to aid U.S. attempts to locate bin Laden in Afghanistan, or to persuade the Taliban to surrender him.

#### **USA's Anti Terrorist Polices in Post Sept 11, 2001 Attack:**

After the terrorist attack various bills were passed like the Anti Terrorism Bill which was approved by Senate in October 24, 2001. 357-66 compromise legislation that would give law enforcement and intelligence agencies broader powers to investigate suspected terrorists.<sup>7</sup>

#### **Highlights of the Anti Terrorism Bill, 24 Oct, 2001:**

**Roving Wiretaps:** Law enforcement officials could obtain warrants to monitor any telephone a suspect might use, rather than just a particular phone line. Electronic mail communications would be considered to be the same as phone calls, allowing investigators to monitor all of a suspects phone and internet computer network use with a single warrant.

**Detention of Foreign Suspects:** US government can detain foreigners suspected of terrorism without charges for upto 7 days for questioning. If

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<sup>7</sup> "Highlights of the Antiterrorism Bill", *Facts on File*, Vol. 61, No. 317, October 25, 2001, Pg. 835.

suspects were not charged with a crime or immigration violation during that period, they could be released.

**Money Laundering:** The Treasury Department would be given more power to track and investigate the sources of funds in large overseas private banking accounts, and it could impose sanctions on nations that refused to provide information on depositors. U.S. banks would be barred from dealing with offshore "shell banks" that were not connected to the regulated banking industry.

**Nationwide Warrants:** Federal law-enforcement agencies would be able to obtain nation wide warrants in terrorist investigations.

**Interagency Cooperation:** Intelligence and unlimited justice agencies would be permitted to share more information on terrorism investigations with each other.

**Sunset Provisions:** The expanded, telephone and Internet surveillance powers would expire after four years. However, any information obtained from the expanded wiretaps during those four years would still be admitted in court, even if the case were brought many years later.

The text of U.S. Congressional Resolution on Use of Force against terrorists, adopted on September 14 proposed:<sup>8</sup>

- To authorize the use of US armed forces against the United State.
- Whereas, on September 11, 2001 acts of despicable violence were committed against the United States and its citizens.
- Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the US exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect US citizens both at home and abroad, and

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<sup>8</sup> *Facts on file* Vol. 61, No.3171, Sept 13, 2001. Pg. 705.

- Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the US posed by these grave acts of violence, and
- Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the US.
- Whereas the president has authority under the constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of International terrorism against the US.
- Resolved by the senate and the House of representations of the USA in Congress assembled.

#### Section 1. Short Title

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force".<sup>9</sup>

#### Section 2. "Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces".

(a) That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

#### (b) War Powers Resolution Requirements

(1) Specific Statutory Authorization: Consistent with Section 8 (a) (1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, Pg. 705.

- (2) Applicability of other Requirements: Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Power Resolution.

The Global Action program was launched to prevent terrorism and other forms of organized violence build on three pillars:

First policies to strengthen national and international institutions to protect human rights, prevent armed conflict, and foster non-violent conflict resolution;

Second, an interactive process of limiting and reducing national armed forces, nuclear arms, and other weapons of mass destruction, while gradually shifting the burden of keeping the peace from national to international auspices (and thereby, again, strengthening the rule of law); and

Finally, grassroots efforts in all countries to broaden school and community based education on nonviolent conflict resolution, end domestic and community violence, build respect for diversity, and foster sustainable development, environmental protection, and pluralistic, democratic institutions.

Apart from this Bush led different kind of policies to counter terrorism after the September 11 attack.<sup>10</sup>

President Bush has laid out the scope of the war on terrorism. Four enduring policy principles were laid to guide US counter-terrorism strategy:

First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. The US government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private US citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of US citizens who are held

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002.Pg..xi.

hostage. At the same time, it is US government policy to deny hostage takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.

Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. The US will track down terrorists who attack Americans and their interests, no matter how long it takes.

Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behaviour. There are 7 countries that have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.

Fourth, bolster the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the US and require assistance. Under the Anti Terrorism Assistance Program

The US provides training and related assistance to law enforcement and security services of selected friendly foreign governments. Courses cover such areas as airport security, bomb detection, hostage rescue and crisis management. A recent component of the training targets the financial underpinnings of terrorists and criminal money launders. Counter terrorist training and technical assistance teams are working with countries to identify vulnerabilities, enhance capacities, and provide targeted assistance to address the problem of terrorist financing.

At the same time, special investigative teams are working with countries to identify and then dry up money used to support terrorism; we are also developing workshops to assist countries in drafting strong laws against terrorism, including terrorist financing. During the past 18 years. We have trained more than 35,000 officials from 152 countries in various aspects of counter terrorism.



A broad range of counter terrorism training resources from other US government agencies, including military training by the Department of Defense, is being brought to bear to bolster international capabilities. We will continue to work with the world community and seek cooperation from other partner nations as well,

Our terrorist Interdiction program help friendly countries stop terrorists from freely crossing international borders.

Our Rewards for Justice Program offers rewards of up to \$ 5 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against US persons or property world wide. Secretary Powell has authorized a reward of upto \$ 25 million for information leading to the capture of Osama Bin Laden and other key al Qaida leaders.

It is impossible to discuss United States counter terrorism policy in the wake of September 11 without use of the world 'war'. US leaders have repeatedly characterized recent terrorist actions and America's response to the tragedy and horror of September 11<sup>th</sup> as a 'global war'.

### **American society's response to the New War**

In the US, the overwhelming majority closed ranks behind the US President and supported his call for a 'war against terrorism, Bush's declaration of war on terrorism in his 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001, address to a Joint session of Congress and the American people, the determined speech of the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, on 23 September 2001 calling upon the international community to make a choice between freedom and terrorism and President Bush's state of the Union address on 29 January 2002 triggered a hot debate on the scourge of terrorism and methods to fight it Academicians and politicians started to discuss the intricate and multifaceted causes, as well as the devastating consequences of September 11, including the definition scope and parameters of the concept of 'terrorism'.

The terrorist attacks against the United States, meant to divide Americans from one another, have united them as at no time since World War II.

Actually, there was no consensus on how to define the September 11, attacks. As Anne Marie Slaughter writes,<sup>11</sup> for instance, President Bush described the hideous events of September 11 at the beginning as "an apparent terrorist attack on the US" however on the next day, he called them 'acts of war' Then problem arose what kind of war is it? Hoffman's arguments was put forward by Murat Karagoz who said September 11 have fewer similarities to than differences from classic terrorism. The attacks had common denominators with almost all types of terrorism that are internationally recognised but with unique characteristic. Finally, the perpetrators of these attacks had an unusual agenda, making September 11 quite different in this regard.

But, in the eyes of US leadership, the key to preventing terrorism lies in traditional American values: protecting human rights and civil society, strengthening means of preventing armed conflict and resolving conflict peacefully, and promoting equitable, sustainable development.

We do not need to live in a land with terrorist attack and fears of such attacks. The US can afford to help protect human rights and promote economic development. And we are ideally placed to lead the world in replacing violence with the rule of law as the accepted means of resolving conflicts and pursuing political reform.

What we do need is a revitalized American dream, a dream of a world without war, a world without ethnic or religious intolerance, a world without hunger, a world in which open information and respect for the dignity and worth of every individual thrive. This dream and the policies it

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<sup>11</sup> Ann Marie Slaughter "A Defining Moment in the Passing of War", *Washington Post*, 16 September 2001.

would engender could eradicate terrorism-not just snip off its latest sprouts, but create conditions that prevent terrorism and its fundamentalist precursors from every taking root.<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, many aspects of US foreign policy have ignored traditional American values. In predominantly Muslim countries, for eg-US policies on human rights have been weak. On arms control and other measures to strengthen the rule of law the United States has been back pedaling.

Yet many, especially outside the United States, see the phrase "War on Terrorism" as a misnomer when members of the public think of war in the traditional sense, one generally thinks of nations fighting nations. When military tacticians think of war, they tend to think in terms of superior military fire power to be used against enemies who are clearly identified. Legal scholars, when they think of war, tend to think in terms of universally accepted rules of conduct or constraints. Traditionally wars end in a decisive victory or negotiated peace. But the War on Terrorism defies many if not all these notions. Most of all it is not likely to have a decisive end, On the international diplomacies front, the global war on terrorism is more akin to an initiative- an ongoing process of indefinite duration. Wars are won or lost, but initiatives are measured in degrees of success as the years pass. That is what we will face for the foreseeable: measured success, not victory.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Randall Caroline Forsberg, "Getting to the Roots of Terrorism", *Institutes for Defense and Disarmament Studies*, Nov. 25, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> US Department of State, International Information Programs, July 2, 2002.

## CHAPTER – III

### Indo-US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

We deal with India's foreign policy in the post Cold War period upto Sept 11, 2001 within the framework of constraintment. It is neither containment nor détente / entente. It is used to denote both the reality and perception of constraints posed by military unipolarity (U.S. hegemony), nuclear bi-polarity (U.S.-USSR) and economic multipolarity on India's foreign policy. This new feature of international relations implies capacity of the US to deploy its military forces at will in any part of the world from Haiti to Afghanistan, from Bosnia to Iraq, as when need arises. The Indian response on issues of ecology, economy and nuclear proliferation during 1989-1998 were determined by this fact, as we note later.

Even in the Kargil war, the fact that US soldiers / personnel's were present across the border would have had its impact. India learnt around this time that while US could bomb targets in other countries to fight its battle of terrorism, India could not engage in hot pursuits. When India expressed its desire on Kashmir she was told, by the US that was not allowed. It listened when it had to and pursued policy on its own when it could e.g. on Pokharan II. This we call constraintment.

Foreign Policy of any country is the product of the complex interplay of history, geography, past experience, present requirements perceptions of the ruling elite of national interest and ideological consensus, if one exists in the country and if not of the leaders of government.<sup>1</sup>

The general basic objective of India's foreign policy was to bring about

"a massive socio- economic transformation (of Indian society) through peaceful means and to build a secular and democratic society in which people of

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<sup>1</sup> V.P. Dutt *India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 1984, Pg.1.

different religions, languages can live, work and prosper together as one nation"<sup>2</sup>

But no foreign policy strategy is in fact one, if it at best possesses only a diffused doctrinal legitimacy. A strategy is determined by the capabilities it can generate to bend, if necessary, others to its will in the satisfaction of the goals it seeks to achieve. Non-alignment in this sense, has ceased to exist both terminologically and in substantive effect. Which, of course does not mean, it has not performed a crucial historical function in the evolution of international society.<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes, one wonders if India's present low-profile on the world / relations. If, true, this is misconceived, because the two aspect of our external policy are two sides of the same coin, and need to be in harmony with each other indeed, they ought to be mutually supportive, as is well-known in respect of developed states (USA and UK) and now China also. Currently a remarkable example (very instructive to India) is the way the United States and China adjust aspects of their economic/political relations to emerging contingencies.

India does not (should not) perceive the coordination harmonization of these two aspects of our external policy in either/or, "black and white," terms, Here again, pragmatism should guide our policy.

### **World Scenario in Post-Cold War Era**

With the end of the Cold War a new phenomenon in international relations had come into being. US had made UNO and the other western nations as its instruments to further its national interests. USA laid down the law in the name of world peace or free world. The Gulf War was an example of US determination to fight for its national interests by co-opting

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<sup>2</sup> M.S. Rajan "The goals of India's Foreign Policy", *International Studies* 35 (1) 1998, New Delhi: Sage Publications, Pg.73.

<sup>3</sup> A. P. Rana, "The Non Hegemonial Imperative: The Non Aligned regulation of India's national security being problematic , and the universalisation of international society", *The Indian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1991.

European Union, Japan, West Asian and other middle powers. USA had ensured that the Soviet Union was neutralised. China did not wish to initiate a new Cold War syndrome by vetoing US action, thus it went along with USA by abstaining from voting in the Security Council. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia had been weakened to the extent that for its survival it depends on US, G-7 and EU. Although Russia still is a great military power but then its present struggle was for bread, consumer goods, free market economy, real democracy, aid in abundance, technology transfers and environmental improvement. A politically unstable Russia, which was totally dependent on the West for its economic survival, had been made a US stooge. As a consequence USA, with the help of the Western Powers, devised suitable grounds, got the required resources, create the management structures which ensured US superiority, and through UNO evolved such mechanisms which were acceptable to the world in general to further its objectives and carry out its policy. This in fact was a clear warning to the third world that their autonomy, sovereignty and concept of nation state does not hold validity in the new scheme of things. All this was being done in the garb of a new world order or safeguarding international community of democracy and human rights.

The world order was designed very nobly to help create a better world where peace would prevail. Where the countries could carry out their own policies and objectives without outside interference as long as they did not tread on the vital interest of some other country. That new world order was designed to give UNO its rightful place for the first time since its inception, to function as World body where every member would have an equal, say. The way this world functions now has made the third world and even some of the smaller Western Powers suspicious of US intentions and role. USA arm twists smaller Western powers and the third world countries to artificially create a consensus to be able to carry out its design without much criticism, not that it bothers about criticism yet the double standards it has set for itself and the rest of the world, the more equal status that it

wants to enjoy in a world which should have equality, such consensus is important in the conduct of its foreign policy. Unfortunately USA singly or the Western World as a body had started to spell out what was best for the world, without taking note of the interests or opinions of the rest of the world. It further demanded adherence to its or their decisions under pressure or threat of sanctions. To ice the cake these decisions were not made at the UNO but in Washington. President of USA, with his advisors, determined what was best for the world, which USA wants to enslave politically and exploit economically. Thus the politics of restraint and self responsibility, which were the highlights of Cold War days, has been replaced by such moral outrage by USA which is interventionist, expansive and deals with the third world countries at various levels; favourites, not so favourite and the condemned. USA as the sole superpower has forgotten how to deal with nations of the world. It now acts as it wishes, politically, militarily and even in the global economics although it has ceased to be an economic superpower.<sup>4</sup>

When USA launched a cruise missile attack on Iraq's intelligence headquarters in order to punish it for planning and plotting to kill Bush, Clinton defined US security on television saying, "don't tread on us". When Clinton addressed UN General Assembly on 27 September, 1993 he said, "let me start by being clear about where the United States stands. The United States occupies a unique position in world affairs today. The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead". This declaration in the UNO is quite akin to US policy during Kennedy Presidency which was said to be 'to set right the erring nations', What has happened in Haiti has not happened in Burma, what has happened in Somalia has not happened in Bosnia, or other gulf states reflects very strongly on what kind of geopolitical and geo-strategic compulsions India has to deal vis-à-vis-USA.

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<sup>4</sup> Col. Ravi Nanda, AVSM, *India's Security in New World Order*, New Delhi: Lancers Book, 1994, Pg.228.

## Challenges to Indian Foreign Policy

India is facing growing political and economic challenges on the domestic front. The recent years have witnessed successively fragile coalition governments, insidious erosion of democratic norms and growing social unrest.<sup>5</sup> Pressures from ethnic diversities and religious fundamentalism are also getting more intensified. Widening economic disparities and inequities also continue to cause concern notwithstanding our creditable economic performance. More important incipient threats to its central authority and continuing civil strife in some sensitive parts of the country pose a serious challenge to India's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although Punjab has managed to put behind it the painful agony caused by sustained violence peace still remains elusive in the sensitive north-east. Assam is wracked by ULFA violence even as the problem of insurgency in Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland has yet to be completely resolved. The situation in Kashmir remains a cause for deep and continuing concern. There is no gainsaying that while India's national sovereignty and territorial integrity remain fundamentally secure, they can be severely jeopardized by the persistence of insurgency and terrorism in several parts of the country for too long. It is clear from the foregoing that an overarching framework of India's national security perspectives has to take into account both its military and non-military dimensions. Political stability, societal cohesion and economic well-being would remain central to its national integrity in the long-term. The need for self-reliance and emphasis on national power also remain imperative in this regard.

The principal objective of Indian Foreign Policy would, of course, have to be to ensure India's security against both direct and indirect external threats.<sup>6</sup> In recent years externally fomented insurgency and

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<sup>5</sup> Nancy Jetly, (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy Challenges and Prospects*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1999, pp. Xii.

<sup>6</sup> M.K. Rasgotra "India's Foreign Policy Some Perspectives" in Nancy Jetly (ed.) *India's Foreign Policy Challenges and Prospects*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1999, pp.25.



terrorism has come to pose a more potent threat to our security than any overt external threat. There is growing concern regarding linkages between subversive, militant organizations inside and hostile external forces. Such linkages have added immensely to the complexity of secessionist movement. As is recognized all over the world, terrorism in Kashmir since the 90's, and earlier in Punjab, has been intensified beyond measure by Pakistan's whole-hearted support in the shape of training of militants, supply of sophisticated weapons and unlimited finance. In the strategic north-east also, external manipulation of incipient secessionism remains a cause for deep concern. Bangladesh's involvement is well-documented. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan has also been carrying out large-scale anti-Indian activities from Nepalese and Bangladeshi soils. China's massive military presence in Myanmar underscores its potential to foment trouble, should it decide to exert pressure on India at some future date. Growing linkages between drug trafficking and organized violence, and the proliferation of small but sophisticated arms are also becoming a major source of instability in the sensitive states of the northwest and northeast. This growth of narco-terrorism would call for sustained vigilance on our part in the coming years.

India's external security environment remains equally challenging both in terms of conventional and nuclear threats<sup>7</sup> Pakistan's continued hostility and uncertainties regarding china's policies as it acquires greater power in all aspects impinge vitally on India's regional security. There is no gainsaying that India faces a direct and immediate threat to its security from Pakistan which has already fought three wars with India and is at present engaged in a proxy war against it in Kashmir. Pakistan's openly proclaimed nuclear weapon capability and even possession of some nuclear devices add immeasurably to India's security challenges. China also continues to represent a long-term threat to India's security. India can ill-afford to underestimate the challenge posed by china's emergence as a

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, xiii.

formidable power in conventional as well as nuclear capabilities. China remains engaged in augmenting its nuclear arsenal, as underlined, by its launching of inter continental ballistic missiles and under ground nuclear tests. Its armed forces continue to be deployed along India's northern and eastern borders. More important, China's major military build-up in Tibet- reportedly deploying ballistic missiles of medium and intermediate range- adds significantly to long- term strategic concerns for India.

In the context of such external threats, India can ill-afford to neglect bolstering its security by building up an adequate and credible defence capability. Given the current security scenario, growing deficiencies in India's conventional capabilities cause some concern regarding India's defence preparedness at a critical juncture of its post-independence history. Since 1987, India's defence expenditure has been declining steadily, falling from 3.6% of GDP in the mid eighties to nearly 2.6%, in nineties<sup>8</sup> India's defence budget had also shrunk in real terms. The steep decline in defence spending impinges adversely on re-equipment, modernization and training of its defence forces. It has also resulted in postponement of acquisition of some vital items with an adverse fall-out on India's defence preparedness. The development of India's missile system has also slowed down; this has long term implications for India's security. The need for giving primacy to conventional capabilities in its national security agenda can hardly be over-stressed in terms of India's preparedness to meet its over all security concerns.

#### India and the Nuclear Question

Growing vulnerability to nuclear pressures in the existing world scenario adds to the complexity of India's security perspectives. India has been in the forefront of efforts for total elimination of nuclear weapons which it views as a serious threat to international peace and security.

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, xiii.

It remains opposed to such measures as NPT or CTBT as being intrinsically discriminatory and flawed. These measures have not only failed to address the issue of global nuclear disarmament to which India remains firmly committed, but also serve to legitimize the present nuclear status quo. It is in this context that India chose to resist concerned world pressure on CTBT and walk alone in conformity with its principled stand on global disarmament.

The overarching reality today is that nuclear weapons have come to stay and would continue to play an important role as bargaining leverages in international relations in an asymmetrical nuclear world.<sup>9</sup> The nuclear powers have been steadily resisting all pressures to commit themselves to disarmament in a reasonable time frame. On the other hand, they are engaged in augmenting and upgrading their nuclear arsenals and capability. In the post-Cold War world, greater pressures have been emanating from the nuclear weapon states on others to give up their nuclear option. Those pressures are only going to intensify in the post CTBT phase.

India can thus hardly ignore the challenge of its total vulnerability in a nuclearized environment. India will also have to increasingly reckon with the challenge of major arms control measures set in motion in recent years which have a direct bearing on India's long-term strategic capability. This is particularly disturbing at a time when its security concerns have been aggravated by Pakistan's nuclear challenge and china's undeniable nuclear power. The US nuclear presence in its vicinity only heightens India's security concerns. The declared US policy of capping, reducing and legitimating nuclear capabilities in South Asia only adds to India's vulnerability. The foremost challenge would be to resist these pressure while continuing to press for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It

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<sup>9</sup> C. Raja Mohan "India's Security Challenge", in Nancy Jetly, (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy Challenges and Prospects*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1999, p.59.

may be noted here that India does not also have the protective cover of Moscow, available to it during the Cold War years, to pursue a certain ambivalence in its nuclear policy. Thus India would have to give more serious and sustained thought to the whole question of the exercise or non-exercise of its nuclear option in the coming years.<sup>10</sup>

Two or three factors would merit attention in this regard. First, on one hand, indefinite postponement of the exercise of the nuclear option would growingly invite severe international pressures on India's nuclear and missile programmers. It has already paid a high price in the terms of the burden of technology sanctions and frequent confrontation with the Great Powers on the nuclear issue. The cost of acquiring nuclear weapons would also grow prohibitive with the passage of time. On the other hand, formalization of its nuclear weapon status would enable India to engage with the global nuclear order in a more realistic framework. It would also open the way for more meaningful arms control and confidence-building measures as well as stabilizing India's deterrent relationship with both Pakistan and China.

Second, India has to reckon with the prospects of undeniable and concerted pressures from the United States, China and Russia, should it operationalise its nuclear option. India may also find itself being made the principal target of nuclear powers as they seek to limit its strategic capabilities. Merely declaring itself as a nuclear weapon power would hardly enhance India's effective projection beyond its frontiers, while at the sametime spurring a spiraling arms race in the subcontinent. Last but not

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<sup>10</sup> Jasjit Singh "India's nuclear and security policies" in Nancy Jetly (ed.) *India's Foreign Policy Challenges and Prospects*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Ltd., 1999, Pg. 77.

the least, the costs of nuclear weapons would put intolerable strain on India's developmental goals.

Third, developing a fullfledged nuclear weapon capability while pressing for total nuclear disarmament may be increasingly difficult to sustain.<sup>11</sup> Indian's commitment to disarmament is informed by not only its larger global vision of a more just and equitable world order but also by its own long term strategic and security interests. At the same time, India can ill afford a unilateral acceptance of disarmament without a firm commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers, given the current security scenario.

The nuclear debate is thus bound to acquire greater salience in India's security perspectives as it thinks through a whole range of possibilities. These would include retaining the ambiguity of the present option in the foreseeable future going for a recessed nuclear deterrence which should require a non-weaponized status where all necessary steps for weaponization and its usability have been taken, another option that is seen as maximizing its capability at minimum costs, averting the costs and risks of an overt weaponized status. Developing a full fledged nuclear weapon capability is yet another option that would increasingly engage attention, as India seeks to cope with mounting nuclear pressures. All this would at the least call for clearly defining India's security interests and evolving a coherent and comprehensive framework for its security policy.<sup>12</sup>

### **Decline on Nonalignment/Nam**

Nonalignment or the membership of the NAM have not been rendered irrelevant or invalid by the end of the Cold War, while India, of course, and ostensibly, maintains its Nonalignment and membership of NAM, we seem to have derongraded these essential and traditional

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, Pg. XV.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid pg.XV.

features of Indian Foreign Policy. Deep scepticism seems to have enveloped our activities /policy, as though the old India stance during the Cold War period is no longer relevant, at least to the same extent as before. Eg then PM, P.V. Narasimha Rao said ( in a speech at Tokyo in June 1992): " The pursuit of nonaligned foreign policy is even more relevant today than before. Non alignment basically consists of the espousal of the right of nations to independence and development, regardless of the bloc phenomenon, whether there is one bloc or more at a given moment, the urge for a nonaligned country would continue to be, to maintain its independence, to take decisions according to its light, not tagging alone itself in advance to others". He added: the "chimera of hegemonism must not be pursued"<sup>13</sup>.

This was an appropriate and even exuberant statement of India's continuing policy-stance, but has not been upheld, publicly and as assertively, as before (during the Cold War years) at least, in India's role in world affairs outside NAM conferences. This is essential for the simple reason that large sections of the news-media, intellectuals and journalists (Perhaps, influenced by western news media) no longer remain as committed to India's nonalignment as ever before. On the contrary, widespread scepticism seems to have overcome many of them. A good instance is the fact that the Indian news media hardly covered (as they used to even up to the Xth Non Alignment Summit. Conference at Jakarta, September 1992) and the deliberation of the, Eleventh Nonaligned Summit Conference in Colombia (September 1995) or even the XII Ministerial Level Nonalignment Conferences. From this enveloping seeming scepticism in India's role/stance, many foreign statesman seem to get the impression that India is no longer as devotedly committed to nonalignment as it had.

M.S. Rajan says "that while it is good that we are formally committed to the policy of nonalignment at the end of the

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<sup>13</sup> M.S. Rajan, *Non Alignment and Non-aligned Movement in the Present World Order*, Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1994, Pg. 120-371.

Cold War, we have not (in my view) adequately asserted and reiterated this policy-stance since the end of the Cold War, (moreover) pursued the implications of this stance. Apart from other nations thinking that India is no longer as devotedly (explicitly or loudly) committed to nonalignment as before, I suggest that this has marginalized India in world affairs, since the end of the Cold War".<sup>14</sup>

Nonalignment was the dominant feature of India's role (and a sort of badge) in world affairs during the Cold War years. We now seem to have lost (in the eyes of the foreign statesman and news media) this flattering name-label since the end of the Cold War for India's good, but also, we seem no longer to maintain our status as a spokesman/ model for other nonaligned states.

For, M.S. Rajan, "both these consequences have not only marginalized India, but are not also conducive to continuing India's vital national interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century".

Further, on the issue of continuing relevance of nonalignment, there is in my view a potentially developing dangerous situation in the foreseeable future. This is about India's increasing indebtedness to developed nations and international financial institutions.<sup>15</sup>

### **India's Changing Dynamics in Post Cold War Era**

The post-Cold War world is witnessing an unprecedented restructuring of international relations in a fast shaping environment. The end of ideological rivalry, which had sharpened conflict across the world, seemed to open the way for a new cooperative framework of relationships, generating hope for building a better security environment. This hope, however, has not been fulfilled. Instead, there is a great deal of uncertainty in the emerging global situation. New conflicts are surfacing in some parts

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid, Pg. 120-371.

<sup>15</sup> M.S. Rajan "Need for a New Freedom, from Foreign Debt", New Delhi: *Mainstream*, 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1993.

of the world while many old conflicts remain unresolved. Manifold pressures are emanating from the international order in terms of insidious erosion of the nation state, redefinition of the concept of self-determination and sanctity of national borders as also subtle dilution of the doctrine of non-intervention in internal affairs of other countries. There is also evidence of mounting pressures in security, nuclear and economic fields. This generates a number of challenges for the developing countries as they cope with an increasingly complex world. The need for India to come to grips with the challenges and complexities of the new configuration of international forces is therefore self-evident.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, it would have to show greater dynamism in reaching out to the new opportunities which are emerging in the current global environment. There is no gainsaying that, in the ultimate analysis, India's perspectives and policies would be governed by the needs of its national security and economic development in keeping with the logic of its own role in the world affairs. Given its vast size and power potential it is poised on the threshold of emerging as a major global power in the coming century, playing an increasingly larger role in world affairs. How soon and how effectively it plays this role would depend essentially on how credibly it is able to manage the present stage of transition both in terms of its domestic dynamics as well as its regional and global commitments.

India stands in many ways at the crossroads of history. It boasts of an unparalleled record in the developing world for its uninterrupted democratic functioning over last five decades or so. The remarkable resilience of its secular, federal framework is underlined by its fairly successful management of numerous religious, linguistic and regional diversities emanating from its plural society without damaging its national fabric.<sup>17</sup> Its vast and diversified economy which has maintained steady growth remains impressive by all accounts. It ranks high among the top

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<sup>16</sup> Nancy Jetly, (ed) 1999, op. cit, p.xii.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, pp. xii.



industrialized nations of the world. It also has one of the largest pools of scientific and technological manpower. For some years now it has been going through a phase of rapid economic transformation with major strides in the expansion of its economy and the emergence of huge markets for trade and industry, thereby getting ready to play an important role in the global economy in the coming years. It has also built an impressive defence capability underpinned by a credible and self-reliant structure. Its technological capability is underlined by the notable advances it has made in nuclear, space and missile field.

Another important challenge for India's diplomacy lies in the unfolding geopolitical dynamics in its adjacent regions which have an important bearing on its long-term political, strategic and economic interests. The need for building bridges of understanding and cooperation with a measure of political sensitivity with South East Asian countries is self-evident. There is ample scope in the post-Cold War era for building relations with these countries on basis of mutuality of interests and shared perception of the future without the distorting prism of Cold War paradigm. Apart from paying due attention to cementing ties with important regional powers, particularly in our neighborhood, India will have to make a major effort to improve its understanding with the major world powers. In this respect, the post-Cold War era presents both challenges and opportunities. India remains committed to the establishment of a just, and equitable world order working in cooperation with the largest number of countries to its end. At the same time, as a large self respecting nation it remains committed to an independent policy, retaining its autonomy of choice to look at issues on their merits in the light of its own vital national interests. Given its size and potential which underpin its own strength and assets, India cannot fit into the role of a camp follower, with any advance commitment to any country or group of countries. This is as true today as it was during the era of the Cold War. This will not create any difficulty in India's dealings with the major global powers, and at the same time will enable it to play a

constructive role in the developing world where it can contribute significantly to evolving common positions on major issues like nuclear disarmament, democratization of the UN, global economic agenda and environmental degradation.

### **The Evolution of Indo-US Relation in Post Cold War Era**

There is a growing recognition today that India's policy towards major global powers would have to fit into India's own vision of its global role, irrespective of the present difficulties and obstacles.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, given the complexities of the global order and the external powers continued interest in carving areas of influence in South Asia, India would have to give the highest priority to dialogue with these countries on bilateral issues as well as on global strategic, political and economic ones with a view to developing a common approach. This would not only call for greater diversification of its strategic political options but also more proactive strategies to forge new cooperative linkage with the countries in the neighbourhood.

In the post-Cold War world, building up a mature, mutually beneficial relationship with the United States, the only Super Power capable of shaping our regional environment today, would require the highest priority in Indian policy calculations. The US can impinge on India's interests on a whole range of issues – economic development and technology transfer; national security and India's strategic neighbourhood; nuclear disarmament and the World Order. This has added significance as India's security environment continues to remain unfavourable. The diplomatic shield of Russia against Pakistan and China is no longer available to us in the altered global scenario. Chinese threat, although not imminent, has not completely disappeared. India-Pakistan relations continue to be intractable. All this would continue to exert pressures on Indian regional security perspectives as also on its policy towards the United States.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, pg.xxiv.

In the past, Indo-US relations remained generally indifferent, plagued by a multitude of mutual misperceptions. For India, an important objection to US policy towards South Asia was its singular insensitivity to India's vital security interests in the region. Its commitment to political and military parity between India and Pakistan was seen in India as not only compounding its security problems but, more importantly, also eroding its natural preeminence in the region. There is now a favourable opportunity for reorienting Indo-US relationship based on developing understanding on promoting peace and stability in South Asia in the new international context. Happily, Indo-US relations have expanded considerably over the Cold War years. Economic interaction between the two countries has acquired greater depth as well as width. Trade and investment are fast emerging as the cornerstone of this revitalized relationship. Following its economic reforms, India is being seen increasingly as a major economic partner and potentially a significant factor in the global economy. Its large middle class and vast markets have given a fillip to the expanding ties between the two countries.

What concerns India most is the US policy on South Asia and specifically what it has so far revealed as far as India is concerned. The principles governing US global policy under Clinton, which had particular implications for South Asia were preventive diplomacy aimed at halting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missiles which carried them. The goal was to promote democracy and respect for human rights in the world. Next concern is the promotion of trade, investment opportunities, economic reform and privatization trends around the world. USA is in the process of evolving a comprehensive policy on South Asia, which would give, hopefully, due priority to one quarter of the world which is at various stages of democratic experiment. Another aim of US policy is to cap the nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia, then seek reduction in the programmes of India and Pakistan. Of course, the final aim of US is to have a nuclear weapons free, missile free, South Asia. In furtherance of

this policy USA seeks to reduce tensions and causes of instability in South Asia.

US also desires, that all countries in South Asia permits Amnesty International and other NGOs, their own and from outside, to check on their performance on human rights. To encourage the countries in South Asia, who are already well on their way towards market economies and greater openings towards, trade and investment. Clinton administration sees a unique opportunity in South Asia. "We can now deal with issues of South Asia on a direct basis and have bilateral relations with each country in South Asia not confined by constraints of the Cold War and not within the narrow Cold War environment,"

Clinton further says "We intend to pursue a balanced foreign policy in the region. We don't see this as a zero sum game. We hope we can get away from that kind of state rhetoric. We are in the process of developing dialogues between the President and heads of states of the region through letters exchanged through senior emissaries. At the same time, there is a greater convergence between India and United States on maintaining the regional status quo in South Asia. India's national interests are intrinsically tied to this status quo in view of its stakes in long-term stability and peace in the region. It is believed by some, is for a number of reasons which one need not go into here, interested instability and order in different parts of the world, including South Asia. It is this congruence that could make possible a beneficial "partnered coexistence" between India and United States, based on shared interest.<sup>19</sup>

As far as India is concerned USA will continue to support Indian economic reforms policies. USA will want access to more than 250 million middle class of India, which is an upcoming class with more and more purchasing power. US will let the Indian industry and technology grow as

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<sup>19</sup> A.P. Rana "India and the United States towards 'partnered coexistence'", in Nancy Jetly (ed.) *India's Foreign Policy Challenges and Prospects*, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 1999. Pg. 252.

purchasing power. US will let the Indian industry and technology grow as long as it does not become a challenge to US or Western interests in some particular field like space, sophisticated weaponry and avionics. USA controls the financial institutions directly or indirectly. In US world view of economic growth China, ASEAN and the Gulf countries are more important to it strategically. Thrust of US policy in yesteryears was to wean India away from the Soviet Union. That policy having become invalid with the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union having ceased to exist India is not on the same priority. In addition, Carnegie report predicts that India, over the coming years, would become a 'major economic and military power'. It further recommends that it would be in the best interest of USA This US and India to 'take India more seriously' and to develop 'cooperative relationship.' step by step.

Soon after the end of the Cold War Indo-US relations had made amends, and friendly relations were seen on the horizon. With Clinton administration those signs evaporated in thin air. There is a requirement that US displays capacity once again to have the largest secular democracy in the world as a friend. Thus the end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration and political confusion in what was the Soviet Union have facilitated a positive movement in India's relations with China and United States.

There are also some positive indications which underline a growing US desire to build an independent relationship with India. It may, however, be noted that despite expanded defence cooperation and the framework for a 'strategic dialogue' being put in place, differences persist between the two countries over a range of issues, including nuclear proliferation, and the continued relevance of Pakistan factor in the US calculations particularly on the sensitive issues of Kashmir. The two countries also have

some differences over trade related issues and restructuring of the UN, particularly membership of the Security Council. The hard fact is that even though Indo-US relations are now marked by increasing goodwill and mutual respect a major qualitative improvement would in the long run depend on United States' recognition of India's regional permanence and its willingness to engage in a wide ranging strategic dialogue with India as an independent center of power.

But, India must also accept the fact that the extra-regional Great Powers have interests in India's neighbours based upon geopolitical, economic and other factors. Those interests are not going to disappear with the end of Cold War. On the other hand they are likely to continue; they may even be reinforced in the years to come. The United States, for instance has made a heavy, long-term economic and military investment in Pakistan. The US wants to do away with Pressler restraint because the anti-US sections in the Pakistani military have grown assertive and Pakistan's defiance of the United States on the nonproliferation question has gained legitimacy. On the other hand there are pressures on the Administration from the anti-drug, human rights and anti-terrorist lobbies to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Although USA did wish to do so at one time, yet it has accepted that Pakistan as a state through ISI, and some private groups, is supporting Kashmir terrorists.

But, there was a shift in American position on Kashmir where Teresita Scheffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, during hearings held by Sub Committee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1991, stated that the UN resolutions requiring a plebiscite in Kashmir, which the United States had strongly supported in the past, were no longer tenable and that it now favoured bilateral negotiations to solve the problem within the framework of the Simla Agreement of 1972. However owing to the shift in position of US

other western countries Pakistan has not been able to raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council.<sup>20</sup>

### Issues of Indo-US Cooperation

India now promotes at the global level economic and selective political policies which are parallel to those of the United States (and its western friends): International terrorism control of international drug, traffic, environmental regulation.

The environment became a crucial component in post Cold War phase of Indian foreign policy. Even the much discussed report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on Indo-US relations studied on the issue of environment although it waxes eloquent on 'democratic and secular values' and the common security concerns of India and the United States in the years ahead. However it is more concerned about whether India could be persuaded to adhere to the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) than about the problems of the environment although it does observe that "progress in meeting the environmental challenge would itself give a powerful impetus to economic development."<sup>21</sup>

The Global Forum of 1992 was the effort made by the environmentalists to develop a holistic conception of human development, politics, and ethics to address questions such as democracy, human rights and corruption. However, environmentalists like Jonathan Porritt were against lowering their guard as intellectuals belonging to the neo-Right in the United States were equating environmentalism with the old, subversive Left wing. Second, corporate interests and Ring-wing military interests after the end of the Cold War were looking for a new enemy, and there was every possibility of their targeting Green Politics.

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<sup>20</sup> B.K. Shrivastava, "Indo-American Relations: Search for a New Equation", *International Studies* 30, 2 1993, Pg. 221.

<sup>21</sup> Selig S. Harrison and Geoffrey Kemp, 'India and America: After the Cold War', *Report of the Carnegie Endowment Study Group*, Washington DC., 1993, Pg.1-5.

However, the NGOs <sup>stirred</sup> up a hornet's nest at Rio where the Earth Summit was held, by questioning the structure of the international economic system, as also the system of distribution of power among states. The two being interlinked, it was only natural for the NGO's and Government delegates from the South first to criticize the policies of the World Bank, then pulverize the structure of the international economic system, and finally reject the international power structure. One issue which did not find mention in the Earth Summit was the subject of population growth. However, the overwhelming response to Rio was to highlight the three R's of environment – friendly resource management – to reduce, to reuse, and to recycle.<sup>22</sup>

India has only lately realized that environmental diplomacy is a new ball game. It is significant that Indian negotiators, along with their counterparts from the European Union and Brazil, played a very important role in preparing a confidential draft proposal for a work programme to identify links between trade measures and environmental priorities. It is also significant that the makers of trade policy had to bow to the environmental demand that the Uruguay Round directly addressed potential clashes between environmental policies being used as trade weapons by the industrial countries. At the same time it is good to remember that India has a vested interest in ensuring an open, equitable and strong multilateral trading system.

Indian negotiators were at their best in imparting a cutting edge to Agenda 21 – one of the most important operational outputs of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. That no fewer than 180 countries endorsed Agenda 21 is proof that there is a high degree of political commitment to its content. India played a very active role in giving shape to Agenda 21's carefully negotiated preamble. The preamble took

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<sup>22</sup> Mukund Govind Rajan, "The Alternative Rio Summit," *Bombay: Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 27, No.34, Aug. 22, 1992, Pg. 1787.



note of the fact that the developing countries would require a substantial flow of new and additional financial resources to cover the incremental costs of their actions to deal with global environmental problems and to accelerate sustainable development.<sup>23</sup>

However, India needs to exercise the utmost care in putting an end to the smuggling of its flora and fauna, particularly micro organisms. It was assertive enough to declare at the Rio conference that the advanced countries should share the benefits accruing from germ plasms.

India's negotiating strategy was tested again on the issue of restructuring Global Environmental Facility (GEF) controlled by World Bank. Indian negotiators had to brace themselves for a battle of wits while dealing with donor countries, who were expected to finalize a replenishment fund of \$2 billion at the meeting held from 7 December to 10 December 1993 at Cartagena, Columbia. They had to reckon with the fact that many projects in the pilot phase would not attain the global benefits that must accrue on account of their not being linked to an integrated GEF strategy.<sup>24</sup>

Indian diplomats will also have to reckon with the fact that in world forums they must need to plough a lonely furrow. Pakistan has already expressed its reluctance to implement the South Asia Preferential Trading Arrangements (SAPTA).<sup>25</sup> Fortunately, Bangladesh shares with India the belief that meaningful policy approaches should be evolved to deal with the global trends in regional cooperation and leading blocs as witnessed in Western Europe, the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the

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<sup>23</sup> Prodipto Ghosh and Ajay Malhotra, "Agenda 21: A Blueprint for Co-operation", New Delhi: *Economic Times*, 22 October, 1992.

<sup>24</sup> Sunil Raman, "Gene Legislation First Step to Ratifying COD", New Delhi: *Economic Times*, 29 December, 1993.

<sup>25</sup> M.K. Dhar, "Concern over Pak stand on SAPTA", New Delhi: *Hindustan Times*, 25 December, 1993.

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific region, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Indian diplomats are confronted by the uphill task of convincing India's neighbours that there is need in the coming years to focus their political and social energies on economic development and the quest for a cleaner environment.<sup>26</sup>

In respect of some other issue too India's policies have (perhaps to a lesser extent) a certain parallelism: as on reforming and strengthening of the United Nations, promotion of human rights and fundamental freedom, faithful implementation of the WTO.

Where one can easily see that the pace of growth of the value of India's exports and imports has increased in both absolute and relative terms, precisely during the period when it was implementing the Uruguay Round decisions. WTO has enhanced the significance of anti-dumping measures from a minor instrument under GATT to a major strategy. Since the inception of the WTO, such measures have become a major safeguard instrument for development countries, and are gaining increasing popularity among developing countries.

The most significant result of the Uruguay Round – the 22,500 pages listing the commitments of individual countries on import/export tariffs on special categories of goods and services – still leaves the developed countries with much lower levels of tariffs. Developed countries' tariff cuts are for the most part being phased out over five years from January 1, 1995. The result was a 40% cut in their tariff on industrial products, from an average of 6.3% to 3.8%. The value of imported industrial products that receive duty-free treatment in developed countries jumped from 20% to 44%. The proportion of imports into developed countries from all sources facing tariff rates of more than 15% declined from 7 to 5%.

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<sup>26</sup> Subrata Sengupta "Rio and Beyond: A Post-Cold-War Perspective" *International Studies* 32, 2 1995, Pg. 185.

A preliminary agreement has also been reached on reducing agricultural subsidies and protection agreed in the Uruguay Round. It can be seen that India's observance of WTO Agreements has been beneficial in increase in Foreign Direct Investment in India. Thus can, be seen WTO and economic liberalisation can help India to grow faster than its population which recently touched one billion.<sup>27</sup> India has also contributed in the UN peace keeping operations, expanding the membership of the Security Council, the pursuit of a genuine CTBT, peaceful settlement of disputes. So much so that India need not shy away from a critical role in respect of policies of continuing UN sanction against Iraq, 6 years after Iraq was pushed out of Kuwait, or the new wave of US Cold War towards China, Iran, Cuba, imposition of Western model of democracy on selective third world states (e.g. Haiti). Joint efforts were made by both India and US to tackle terrorism.

An important agreement on "Institutional dialogue" between the two countries was signed during Clinton's visit to India in March 2000. The Indian Minister for External Affairs and the US secretary of state will henceforth meet every year. In Asia, only the Chinese and the Japanese governments have been accorded this "privilege" by the USA government. Both countries will further intensify their cooperation on consulting "terrorism" by having regular "dialogues" and "forums". On the issue of terrorism, a Joint statement issued by India and the USA affirmed that a recently constituted "working group" will "continue to meet regularly and become an effective mechanism for the two countries to share information and intensify their cooperation. The Indian government has also allowed to the US (FBI) to open an office in New Delhi. The 1<sup>st</sup> FBI office to be opened abroad was in Hungary in February 2000. With this slowly Indo-US cooperation in tackling terrorism became stronger.

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<sup>27</sup> Shri Prakash, "India and the WTO," in *World Affairs*, Vol. 4(2), April-June 2000, Pg. 36-39.

While addressing to the Joint Session of the US Congress during his official visit to the US in September 2000, PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee explained the seriousness of the situation in India by revealing, "No country has faced as ferocious an attack of terrorist violence as India has over the past two decades: 21,000 were killed by foreign sponsored terrorists in Punjab alone, 16,000 have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir. At the meeting with the US House International Relations Committee, PM cautioned "Afghanistan is an unfortunate example of a country processed into anarchy by outsiders. It has emerged as a world leader of terrorism, drugs and medieval bigotry that challenges civilized societies everywhere. As a neighbour, India is naturally concerned. He further warned, "Regrettably, we in India are at frontline of the fight against terrorism. The area on our west has become the epicenter of this criminal enterprise. It is not only India's fight but yours as well, Experience has shown that hatred can explode bombs in New Delhi with as much ease as in New York or Moscow Let us work together to fight these dangers and not accommodate them". At that time the USA did not paid much heed to Vajpayee's sane advice His above statement proved prophetic exactly after one year when New York and Washington, DC, were exploded by terrorists.

Joint Indo-US statement issued by President Clinton and PM Vajpayee at the end of Indian PM's visit to the USA on September 15, 2000 agrees to counter terrorism in the following manner:

In combating international terrorism, the two leaders called on the international community to intensity its efforts, including at the current session of the UN. Noting that both India and the US are targets of continuing terrorism they expressed their determination to further reinforce bilateral cooperation in this area. They have agreed to hold another round

of counter- terrorism consultations in New Delhi, later this month, and to pursue work on a Mutual legal Assistance Treaty.<sup>28</sup>

It is possible that India is shying from criticism of such wrong US policies and action (at least publicly) in the belief that India cannot alter wrong US policies in the post-Cold War years. Many feel that in post-Cold War years, India has become unduly submissive (not only because of our domestic political/economic preoccupation) in not playing a legitimate role on the world stage, within the United Nations and outside, lest we antagonize some Great Power or the other, because we are seeking favour from them or lest we antagonize any of them. This seeming political and/or diplomatic chicken-heartedness is unbecoming of India's old leading role in world affairs. Certainly, this posture needs to be given up in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

This is particularly important, because despite the dominant US role since the end of Cold War, there is presently an incipient multipolar world, with Germany, Japan, the European Union, and likely revived super power status of the Russian Federation; the present US dominance will be challenged by some other changes.<sup>29</sup> In this incipient new world order. India has certainly a significant role to play, as a middle power of some consequences, as a candidate for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, as a major non-aligned state, as a leading Third World nation. It does seem that the end of the last wave of the Cold War does not mean that we have somehow lost our old, pre-eminent, role in world affairs, or that we need to be submissive or that, for nations, humility and modesty are commendable virtues in the conduct of international affairs.

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<sup>28</sup> Mohammed Ayoob." South Asia's Dangers and US Foreign Policy" *Orbis* (USA), Winter 2001, Vol. 45, Issue 1, Pg.37.

Rather we should play a more active role in the field of international politics because after the end of Cold War our relations with US and China has also improved and so we should work together to make this place a better place to live in free from inequality, racism, pollution and terrorism.

## CHAPTER - IV

### India's Response to America's 'War on Terror'

Despite a slight improvement in Indo-US relations after the nuclear tests by India, there are many complex problems which have been acting as hindrances in the Indo-US relation. It is ironical that despite sharing the common values of democracy, freedom and equality India and US have been unable to bridge their differences even in the post-Cold War era. The new world order has made it mandatory for almost all the countries to develop close relationship with the only superpower, the US policies and approach in the field of economic, political and security related issues make India suspicious about the US intentions and revives the old doubts. The US policies of equating India and Pakistan, preference for Pakistan, holding India responsible for the situation of security in South Asia, creates problems in Indo-US relations.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the US stand on the nuclear issue and support to Pakistan's argument that Kashmir is the central point of tension or the sorry state of relationship in South Asia is also not being appreciated by India and that has led to misunderstanding and mistrust. Actually, the Cold War trends have spilled into the new millennium and we find the Indo-US relations fluctuating between expectations and problems.

It has been a general assumption about the US foreign policy, that the US has no vital strategic interest or objectives in South Asia. The marginalisation of South Asia till the end of the Cold War, was also reflected from the fact that there was no senior official to deal with South Asia in the post and has always been governed by the needs of the containment of communism. But in the post-Cold War era, South Asia, particularly India has gained priority in the US foreign policy designs, not because of some purely positive thing like India's economic potential but also for the things mentioned by Cohen "India has been an awkward fit in

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<sup>1</sup> Annapurna Nautiyal "Indo-US relations: Present expectation and problems", B.C. Upreti, Mohan Lal Sharma and S.N. Kaushik (ed.) *India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges and Paradigms*, Vol. II, Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2003. Pg. 233.

America's post-Cold War strategy. When it has been considered at all, it has usually been in a strongly negative context, the 1990 confrontation with Pakistan over Kashmir, the suspicion that India was building nuclear weapons the certainty that it was developing intercontinental missiles, its continuing opposition to NPT, CTBT, etc."<sup>2</sup> Some of American scholars have pointed towards the fact that the US has followed a policy either favouring India or Pakistan depending on each President's attitude. Since South Asia was not very significant to the US global designs before the Soviet influence, in which Pakistan became the US ally by joining the US military alliance. India remained aloof due to its non-aligned policy. With the end of the Cold War, the need to work closely with Pakistan had ended but the US administration had been pursuing a policy of tilting both ways, seeking close ties with India but at the same time care had also been taken to avoid isolating Islamabad. But in India's view the US policies are example of the carrot and stick diplomacy and opportunism because upto 1979 the US policy regarding India and Pakistan was based on the politics of the Cold War in which India's non-aligned posture pushed the US close to Pakistan and opposed to India. India has always a feeling that the US was closer to Pakistan and opposed to India and US policies have always shown tilt in favour of Pakistan because of the fact that (A) Pakistan has always been eager to collaborate with the US; (B) Pakistan's strategic location near the major countries such as China, Russia, Iran, India, Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Central Asia could be helpful in maintaining its strategic and economic interests in the Muslim world.

Due to this factor the US sees Pakistan as a bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran, Afghanistan and also a door for establishing her presence in Central Asia. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Pakistan's role as a frontline state not only cemented this bond, but also facilitated Pakistan's nuclear development which was also

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<sup>2</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen; "The United States and India: Recovering the Lost Ground," *SAIS Review Winter*, Spring 1998, Pg. 93



overlooked by the US due to geopolitical reasons. However, after the Afghanistan crisis Pakistan's importance as a frontline state receded and aid to Pakistan was stopped under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment, it clearly shows that India and Pakistan or South Asia's importance was clearly linked to the threat of spread of communism, as, and when this threat became grave the US took interest in the region. Since, Pakistan has always shown eagerness to participate in US led military alliances, US found in Pakistan a natural ally and its policies gradually became pro-Pakistan and anti-India.

The US pro-Pak policies and antipathy towards India thus hampered the growth of good relationship and understanding between India and the US in the Cold War era. But the end of Cold War provided with an opportunity for developing close relationship. Since the threat of 21<sup>st</sup> century are no more a singular threat emanating from the Soviet Union or the Communist bloc, but a multifold one-terrorism, ethnic and racial conflicts, issues of self determination.

Sudden terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001, vindicated India's stand. For the last many years India was reminding the world community and especially the influential West about the growing danger of terrorism. Since early nineties, India was also insisting the world community to take serious view of Pakistan. Afghanistan nexus in training and exporting terrorists to different countries. India has been the worst sufferer from the activities of Pakistan. Afghanistan trained terrorists who are operating in Kashmir through some self styled groups. India for the last more than twenty years was fighting against terrorism singly handedly which began in India in the early 1980's first in state of Punjab and then in Jammu of Kashmir. But no one including the US took India's warning and concern seriously.

But when on September 11, 2001, the US became the victim of worst terrorist attack when twin towers of the WTC at New York and

Pentagon at Washington, DC were devastated by four hijacked planes killing more than 6000 or more occurred the whole world was mourning and the sorrow was truly international President G.W. Bush on the evening of the invasion said; "We have seen the first war of the 21st century". He said the day after the dastardly act that "the deliberate and deadly attacks that were carried out against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war".<sup>3</sup> Later in his speech on September 20, 2001 to the Joint Session of Congress, announced the start of a "War on Terror" and demanded of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to close all terrorist training camps and hand over all terrorist. Secretary State Colin Powell was vowing that America would use "all the tools and weapons at our disposal" to fight it.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Indo-US Relation in Post September 11, 2001**

The post- september11, 2001 US campaign for the international war against terrorism had provided India an opportunity to pursue its hegemonic designs and strengthen its efforts to emerge as the regional and global power, and so India had offered all cooperation and facilities to US military operations in its war against terrorism. Then Indian PM Vaipayee in his letter to US President Bush, dated Sept 11, 2001 wrote: "We stand ready to cooperate with you in the investigations into this crime and to strengthen our partnership in leading international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again."<sup>5</sup> India immediately identified three air bases in Jammu, Punjab and Gujarat each, in addition to unspecified port facilities, as a part of its offer for operational support to the US.<sup>6</sup> As assessed by Sultan Shahin. In Asia times, India was pleased that America was treating the attacks as a declaration of war by the terrorist groups, thus heralding a new era in which India hoped, it would be able to join the US

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Elliot, "We're at War", *Time* (Hong-Kong), September 24, 2001, pg. 38.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Pg. 38.

<sup>5</sup> [www.indianembassy.org/special/cabinet/prime\\_minister/PM\\_Sept\\_11\\_2001](http://www.indianembassy.org/special/cabinet/prime_minister/PM_Sept_11_2001).

<sup>6</sup> "Government Denies", New Delhi: *Times of India* Sept. 20, 2001, Pg.7.

and Israel in their fight against terrorism inspired by Islamic fundamentalism.

Most Indian diplomats and political commentators advocated the forging of unity between democratic forces to fight against terrorism. Indian commentator, K. Subrahmanyam wrote in the Times of India, 'now the US should ally itself with other democracies and impose quarantine on states supporting Jihadi terrorism'. In this endeavour, the Shanghai group and Iran are valuable allies. President George Bush has talked about the solidarity of democracies against terrorism and had proposed that the US and India should host a lunch for leaders of democracies during the UN General Assembly session. This idea should be pursued. During the UN session, the UN convention on terrorism should be formulated. The Security Council should be convened to monitor the state of international terrorism and formulate practical measures to quarantine states supporting or being permissive of terrorism. A global mechanism needs to be devised for nations to exchange information on terrorist activities.

Another Indian commentator, C. Raja Mohan wrote in 'The Hindu', 'The Shocking 'Super Terror Tuesday' that the United States should now force the international community to wake up to the enormity of the challenge the modern world faces from international terrorism. The World should fully recognize the kind of vulnerability it faces from the forces of international terrorism. Given the global spread of terrorist networks, there is no way of nations on an individual basis dealing with this threat. The time has come for open societies of the world to pool their resources and define a radically different strategy to counter international terrorism". Taking advantage of the active involvement of the international community in the War against terrorism, India also enhanced its diplomatic activities as an active player within the international community. Since September 2001, important officials from US, UK, France, China and other countries have visited India. In view of the international focus on the War against terrorism,

Indian officials also adopted a policy of active interaction by undertaking frequent visits and maintaining contacts through other channels.

September 11 terrorist attack actually gave both India and the USA opportunity to fulfill their commitments to fight together against terrorism. India did not hesitate to openly come forward to give USA unconditional support to tackle terrorism and PM Vajpayee, sent a letter to George Bush pledging India's support to international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again. At the press conference on September 12, 2001 he added that India was looking at rooting out terrorist internationals. In his Door Darshan address on September 14 he asserted:

"We must strike at the roots of the system that breeds terrorism. We must stamp out the infrastructure that imparts the perverse ideological poison by which the terrorist is fired up. We must hold governments wholly accountable for the terrorism that originates from their countries

For years we in India have been alerting others to the fact that terrorism is the scourge for all of humanity, that what happens in Mumbai one day is bound to happen elsewhere to-morrow, that the poison that the mercenaries and terrorists use to kill and maim people in J&K will impact the same sort to blow up people elsewhere.

The, Prime Minister's direct stake in the international agenda of terminating terrorism is in a large measure related to India's Kashmir centric worries. In the backdrop of a new situation after the attack the cross-border terrorism has taken a different dimension. It is no more cross-border terrorism but international terrorism. Vaipayee has seized the opportunity to co-operate. With the US President making a significant call to PM Vajpayee the stage has been set for a qualitative dialogue between New Delhi and Washington on international drive against terrorism.

On October 3, 2001 USA finally shed its shyness and made it explicit that its War on Terrorism would indeed address the menace that

India has been battling in Jammu and Kashmir for years. After the 9/11 events, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh held telephonic conversations with his Iranian counterpart and, British Commonwealth and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, for 'keeping up India's efforts to assist in the building of broad spectrum coalition against terrorism'. In October 2001, itself in his visit to US, Mr. Jaswant Singh stressed that the US had no option but to address terrorist operations in Kashmir. On the other hand the USA, Secretary of State Colin Powell said "We are going after terrorism in a comprehensive way, not just in the present instance of Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, but terrorism as it effects nations around the world, to include the kind of terrorism that effects India."<sup>7</sup> He termed the October 1, 2001 terrorist attack on J&K's Assembly as a "terrible act".

PM Vajpayee offered to "co-operate" with the US in its global fight against terrorism. Later on it became evident that New Delhi wanted to be in the forefront in fighting global terrorism, it did not want to annoy its traditional friends in the Islamic World, India is all for a global front against terrorism but not for confinement of the fight against an individual or one of its expression.

The Indian Home Minister Advani, on September 16, 2001 said, 'the world cannot disregard the fact that over a decade, Pakistan and now Taliban have been promoting terrorism. They have been giving refuge and asylum to all those indulging in terrorist violence.' He urged the US not to over look that fact while formulating any strategy for curbing terrorism.<sup>8</sup>

On October 12, 2001, the Indian Ambassador to the US, Lalit Man Singh, referring to US-Pakistan relations said 'India understands that in the present contests the US has to use the facilities Pakistan provides for the war against the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, but if the US goes beyond economic aid to the supply of arms to Pakistan, India will concerned.....'

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<sup>7</sup> Sridhar Krishnaswami "J & K too on US Agenda: Powell" *Hindu, Chennai*, Oct.4, 2001, Pg.1.

<sup>8</sup> "Pakistan's nexus with Taliban cannot be ignored Advani", *The Hindu, Chennai*, Sept. 16, 2001, Pg. 8.

Both India and US decided to jointly work in various fields to combat the battle of terrorism.

### **Various Fields of Cooperation:**

#### **(1) Assistance in Criminal Matters:**

In a major step forward in Indo- US law enforcement and counter-terrorism cooperation, the two countries signed a new bilateral treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on October 17, 2001. The visiting US Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Indian Union Home Minister L.K. Advani signed it on behalf of their respective governments at New Delhi. The treaty expected to enhance the ability of the two countries to pursue their common objective of law enforcement by putting in place a regularized channel for obtaining law enforcement assistance from each other. Such a channel will simplify and expedite the process of obtaining responses to requests for assistance. It will improve implementation of the Bilateral Extradition Treaty between the two countries that came into force on July 21, 1999. Both sides expressed their determination to redouble efforts to eradicate the scourge of terrorism and to use this treaty as an instrument to that end. It is both governments' common view that the "political offence" exception to mutual legal assistance should not apply to violent terrorist attacks against non-combatant targets.

#### **(2) Intelligence sharing:**

In its initial response India offered to "join forces" with America in its newly declared war against global terrorism. But India did not reveal what kind of assistance it would offer. In addition to intelligence sharing, it could involve military support and India could also be a leading player in the international alliances that the USA was launching. The Indo - US Joint Working Group on Terrorism in 2000, intelligence agencies of both the countries have been exchanging information. But India's grudge was that

the Americans were not ready to provide too much. But after September attack on the USA, its attitude was changing.

In this B. Raman criticizes that both Indian and American intelligence agencies are strong in technical intelligence, but weak in human intelligence. In his own words, "terrorism demands a multi-agency approach, with all agencies working under a common roof, a common leadership and a common national purpose." Other countries adopted it many years ago, but India has only recently woken up to the need for it. He further criticizes: "the networking of the terrorist has not been matched by a networking of the victim-states. There has been a mushrooming of intelligence-sharing mechanisms, but the agencies can only supply intelligence to the political leadership".<sup>9</sup> It is the political leadership that has to take strong and effective action covert or overt. It will be good if the USA strikes at the root cause and basis of terrorism and India takes some cudgel to take action.

The counter-terrorism and intelligence-sharing aspects of Indian Home Minister, Advani's visit to the USA in January 2002 were clear from the composition of his entourage. It included Home Secretary, Kamal Pandey and Intelligence Bureau Chief, K.P. Singh, in addition to Joint Secretaries from the Home and Foreign ministries and Sudheendra Kulkarni, OSD to and speech writer of the Prime Minister.

### (3) Lifting of Sanctions:

On 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2001 President Bush lifted sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after their 1998 nuclear tests, saying that 'maintaining the embargoes would not be in the national security interests of the US.' The sanctions had barred USA economic and military aid to both the countries. However, the Bush administration has not removed coup-related sanctions against Pakistan, imposed in 1999 after General Pervez

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<sup>9</sup> B. Raman "Wanted a Spine," New Delhi: *India Today*, September 24, 2001, Pg. 46.

Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and took over as the Chief Executive of the country. It was officially explained that the US government was legally bound to continue the sanctions till democracy was restored.

The decision was politically motivated by the need for the US to cooperate with Pakistan and India in its moves against Afghanistan. In case of Pakistan, the move is important. Doors are now open for American economic and military aid to Pakistan. In the case of India, most sanctions had already been lifted by the Clinton administration. Two major areas where there could be some relief to India are dual use technologies and international lending by multilateral agencies like World Bank and Asian Development Bank. With regard to the defence supplies, lifting the sanctions will help India go shopping for its 'mission' critical high tech components', especially in missiles development projects and spares for the existing hardware. It would make research in space, biotechnology and chemicals with dual uses easier, with free exchange of information and data worldwide.

Raising serious objections to the impression being created, that lifting of economic sanctions against India by USA was a 'reward' for its cooperation to the Bush administration in combating global terrorism. Indian government clarified that it did not need any 'reward' for its principled stand on terrorism at this stage as it has already been fighting the scourge for the past two decades. Now that USA had lifted sanctions against India, both countries would be able to focus better on strengthening democracy, particularly concentrating on cementing the coalition against terrorism.

#### (4) Banning terrorist Organizations and Freezing Assets:

As President Bush said, the war will not only be on military front, it will also be on financial and diplomatic front. As part of the operation, on September 24, 2001 President Bush signed an order to freeze the USA bank accounts and assets of Osama bin Laden, his Al-Qaeda network,



besides 27 different organizations, individuals groups and corporations with suspected ties with terrorists, Pakistan-based militant outfit Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was among the 27 individuals and groups linked to terrorism whose assets were frozen by President Bush. USA, France, Japan and Philippines heeded USA call to target terrorists' sources of funding. On India's insistence USA and Britain banned Pakistan-based militant outfit of Maulana Massod Azhar Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) whose assets were frozen. Later JeM claimed responsibility for the October 1, 2001 terrorist attack on J & K Legislative Assembly.

On its part government of India promulgated the POTO (Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance) on October 25, 2001 and banned a total of 23 terrorist organizations under the ordinance. It is the first comprehensive legal salvo against terrorism with complete safeguards to check the menace speedily and effectively.

#### (5) Frequent Diplomatic Visits and Consultations:

After 9/11 there has been frequent diplomatic consultations and visits between India and the USA. Except for its military plans, Washington has been sharing with Delhi broad details of negotiations with Pakistan and the Taliban. On September 16, 2001 Indian Prime Minister's Advisor on Security visited USA and Russia. He offered full support to the USA to fight against terrorism and urged USA not to be uni-focal in its approach. India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh visited USA, UK and France in first week of October, there he pleaded for ban on JeM, mobilized opinion on Srinagar Assembly attack and discussed future of Afghanistan. On October 6, British PM Tony Blair visited India to strengthen anti-terrorism alliance and asked India to exercise restraint. US Secretary of State Colin Powell came to India on October 17 and asked India to exercise restraint, sought resumption of Indo-Pak talks and mustered global pact to fight terrorism.

The US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld on his first visit to India on November 5, 2001 emphasized that the effort against terrorism would continue over a period of time because of the increasing availability of weapons, including those capable of mass destruction. Sharing India's concern, Rumsfeld assured that American fight against terrorism was "much bigger than Afghanistan" and that it would go after the terrorist networks wherever they were after the end of its present campaign. He appreciated India had been specific and co-operative in fighting terrorism which deeply affected both countries. The US Defence Secretary, Rumsfeld and Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes agreed to further activate the Indo-US Defence Planning Group. Rumsfeld agreed to resume defence supplies to India and has asked New Delhi to send its requirements to workout the details. US defence supplies to India put in the cold storage following Pokhran-II in May 1998; will now be resumed as a direct result of the Vajpayee – Bush Summit in Washington in November 2001.

Afghanistan, terrorism and military – defence cooperation were the three main issues that dominated during Vajpayee's visit to USA in the second week of November 2001. President George Bush recognized India's serious concern of cross border terrorism at his first summit with PM Vajpayee and declared to fight this evil in all its forms. Without naming Pakistan, the two leaders told media persons at the White House after their one-on-one meeting that "our coalition is strong and we must reject it (terrorism) in all its guises." Concurring with Bush, Vajpayee stressed, "We have to fight all forms of terrorism and win the battle."<sup>10</sup> He also reaffirmed India's complete support to USA in its fight against terrorism.

On the other hand Bush in his speech at the White House on 9<sup>th</sup> November 2001 welcomed PM Vajpayee to US for a series of discussion. Bush said

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<sup>10</sup> Hari Jai Singh, "All forms of terrorism must be curbed: Bush" *The Sunday Tribune*, November 11, 2001, Pg. 24.

"his administration is committed to developing a fundamentally different relationship with India, one based upon trust, one based upon mutual values." He further said "he was looking forward to foster ties that would help both the economies. Trade with India is going to be an important part of our growth in the future. India has got a fantastic ability to grow, because her greatest export is intelligence and brain power, as our country has learned over the last decades. We lifted sanctions on India, so that our relationship can prosper. We will fight terrorism together. Our initial discussions focused on the battle against terror, and the Prime Minister understands that we have no option but to win. And he understands that there is a commitment.... there needs to be a commitment by all of us to do more than just talk. It's to achieve certain objectives .. to cut off the finances, to put diplomatic pressure on the terrorists, in some cases, to help militarily. But, in any case, stand firm in the face of terror we also talked about the need to make sure humanitarian aid reaches those who are hurt in Afghanistan. And we discussed a post-Taliban Afghanistan that enables the country to survive and move forward, and one that represents all the interests of the people of Afghanistan. Further, we would talk about joint cyber-terrorism initiative and a civilian space cooperation program as well as discussing our mutual concerns about energy and the ability to conserve it, as well as to have plentiful supplies as we go into the future."<sup>11</sup>

In response to Bush, PM Vajpayee said "I was happy to be able to personally reiterate our sympathy, solidarity and support for the American people in the aftermath of terrible events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. We admire the decisive leadership of President Bush in the international coalition against terrorism. We also applaud the resilience and resolve of the American people in the hour of trial. This terrible tragedy has created the opportunity to fashion a determined global response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever it exists and under whatever name. I assured President Bush of India's complete support in this. At the same time, as material leaders, pluralist democracies we should clearly spread the message that the War against terrorism is not against any religion, but against terrorists whose propaganda misuses religion. In the last few months, there has been an intensive interaction between our two countries on a wide range of bilateral subjects. We have moved forward on the dialogue architecture and on defense cooperation. A resumption of the bilateral defense policy group should promote technical cooperation in defense and security."

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<sup>11</sup> <http://meaindia.nic.in/>

The Joint Working Group on Cyber-terrorism has made good progress, and we have agreed to launch a joint cyber-terrorism initiative. Economic and commercial relations are expanding. Both of us agree that the synergies and complementarities between our two countries should be more fully exploited.

We discussed the urgent need for a political order in Afghanistan which would be broad-based representative, and friendly with all countries in its neighbourhood. Equally important is sustained international assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction work in that country for which we have to work as strong partners.

Mr. Bush said the "war in Afghanistan is a different kind of war. It's a war that matches high-technology weapons with people on horse back. It's war in which the enemy thinks they can hide in caves and we'll forget about them. It is a war that's going to take a deliberate, systematic effort to achieve our objectives. And our nation has not only got the patience to achieve that objective, we've got the determination to achieve the objective. And we will achieve it".

After the summit India and USA issued a joint statement outlining seven key areas of co-operation which are:

1. Strengthening the New Strategic Framework.
2. Working jointly for peaceful purposes in nuclear sphere.
3. Joint initiative in space for civilian purposes.
4. Expanding defence co-operation.
5. Strengthening the bilateral counter-terrorism mechanism.
6. Joint campaign against cyber terrorism.
7. Holding consultations on the future of Afghanistan.

## **More Defence Co-operation and Strategic Framework**

In the Defence Policy Group meeting scheduled to be held in New Delhi in December 2001, both did not envisage a military alliance between USA and India, but a "strategic relationship "not only in the region but globally.

Indian Defence Minister: George Fernandes' US visit in January 2002 gave a new thrust to the Indo-American strategic relationship.

The highlights of the visit were:

- (1) Convergence of strategic interests between the 2 countries in the region extending from the oil rich Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. USA now recognizes Indian long-term maritime interests and has agreed to cooperate with India in this region that caters to nearly \$ 600 billion worth trade.
- (2) Renewal of contacts and clearing the political decks so that the bilateral military dialogue between the two countries can proceed at a faster pace, by accepting the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which prevents signatories from passing classified information to third countries.
- (3) Impetus to the State Department to notify the US Congress for sale of defence equipment, which was agreed prior to imposition of sanctions in 1998.
- (4) Insistence on establishing a "lab-to-lab" relationship that will aid exchange of scientists.
- (5) About 45 CEO's of US defence firms – ranging from Boeing to Raytheon-met Fernandes during his USA visit. Fernandes informed them that it was time for the USA defence majors to "chip in" and "set up" ventures in India now that private operators had been permitted in the defence sector. The budding defence market in

South-East and South Asia was also highlighted by the minister. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) would explore the possibilities of joint ventures with the USA majors to capitalize on the large south Asian market.

- (6) Fernandes' visit resulted in direct foreign military sales agreement. India may now have its arms and equipment requirements from the USA without any hassle. US President George W. Bush cleared 20 export licenses for military sales to India paving the way for purchase of GE-404 aircraft engines for the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project maritime remote operating vehicles, naval radars, weapon-locating radars, deep sea submarine – rescue vehicles, P-3C Orion maritime aircraft (under consideration) and spare parts for advanced jet trainers, helicopters, air defence systems, hand-held thermal images.

Revival of Indo-US defence relations was clear in March 2002 during the visits to the US of Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Anil Kakodkar and Department of Space's K. Kasturirangan. The nuclear scientists discussed emergency procedures and the safety of ageing nuclear plants with their US counterparts. The two sides are well on their way to convergence in the traditionally divisive area of nuclear arms control.

As a major step to enhance defence co-operation, India signed in April 2002 a 'historic' \$ 146 million arms deal with the USA to procure eight fire finder counter-battery radars.

With India supporting, the positive aspects of President George W. Bush's controversial missile defence plan, old issues like the CTBT have lost their prominence in the bilateral context. Delhi wants to expose the more active counter-proliferation method such as missile defence with Washington in the new nuclear dialogue that greatly reduce missile threat from Pakistan. It implies strengthening India's satellite surveillance capacity and adding teeth to its cruise missile programme. Delhi is trying for the US-

Israel made Arrow – 2 anti-missile system as a shield against the Chinese M-11, M-9, and the North Korean Nodong-I ballistic missiles in Pakistan's arsenal.

Indian Defence Secretary, Yogendra Narain visited USA in May-June 2002, where the India-US. Defence Policy Group (DPG) met from 20-23 May 2002 in Washington, DC. US. Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith hosted the meeting and Defence Secretary Yogendra Narain led the Indian delegation.

Here they reaffirmed the contribution that missile defenses can make to enhance cooperative security and stability. They decided to hold a future missile defense workshop in New Delhi and agreed on the value of pursuing a missile defense requirements analysis for India. The Indian delegation accepted invitation to the June 2002 Missile Defence Conference in Dallas, Texas, and the June 2003 Roving Sands Missile Defence Exercise.

They agreed that an end to terrorism is critical to ensuring a future of peace and stability in South Asia and around the world. They also reiterated their determination to continue the task of eliminating Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and entities.

US and India demonstrated progress in military cooperation aimed at enhancing mutual capabilities in combating terrorism, including joint research and development of technologies for meeting this threat. They highlighted the ongoing Special Operations Airborne Exercise in building interoperability between US and Indian armed forces, and agreed to conduct further exercises. The two sides agreed that in the coming weeks their representatives would address counter-terrorism equipments for India's special operations forces.

The two delegations approved a range of activities proposed by DPG subgroup responsible for plans for cooperation, including:

- (1) Specialized training programs and joint exercises to be carried out by armed services of the two countries during the next year.
- (2) Developing a defense supply relationship, including through the Government-to-Government Foreign Military Sales Program. The two delegations agreed on the need to work closely for speedier approvals of export licences in the US.
- (3) Resumption of technical cooperation in defense research, development and production, following the meeting of the Joint Technical Group in New Delhi in early March.

They also noted shared interest in continued cooperation and support for UN peace keeping operations India has accepted US invitation to participate in the multinational peace operations exercise in Bangladesh in September 2002 and has agreed to cohost with the US Pacific Command, a Peacekeeping Command Post Exercise to be held in New Delhi in early 2003. The sides agreed that Peacekeeping and coalition are important tools to enhance global stability. In this context, they discussed the negative impact of an International Criminal Court (ICC) on such operations. They agreed on its serious inadequacies and underlined the importance of cooperation between the US and India to oppose its applicability to non-parties, as such applicability would be an assertion of jurisdiction beyond the limits of international law.

In addition to the areas of cooperation outlined above, the DPG has set a course for cooperation in areas, including consequence management in response to weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian relief, cyber-terrorism, and environmental security. The two delegations agreed to hold the next meeting of DPG in New Delhi in February 2003.

On February 5, 2003 Washington, DC. India's Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal concluded his 3 day visit to Washington DC after meeting



with US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage in the morning and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley later in the afternoon. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> February, he had extensive discussions with Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department; Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Global Affairs (also in the St. Dept.); Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Defence at the Pentagon; and, Kenneth Juster, Under Secretary for Commerce. The Foreign Secretary met Senators and Congressmen at Capital Hill; addressed the Carnegie Endowment on "The India-US Partnership; Emerging Security challenges"; and answered questions at a Press Conference in the Indian Embassy.

India and US reached agreement on principles governing high technology commerce including trade in dual – use technology between the two countries, reflecting their new relationship and common strategic interests. The two sides agreed to take steps to promote and facilitate such trade by addressing systemic barriers; generating market awareness; undertaking promotional activities; conducting industry outreach programs; reviewing policies and processes on export of dual use goods and technologies to India; and, pursuing export control cooperation.

Foreign Secretary's visit constitutes an important milestone in the wide-ranging and intense dialogue between India and the US at the highest official level. The interface was marked by cordiality and candor which reflected the desire of the two sides to consolidate and expand the relationship.

### **Indio-US High Technology Co-operation**

Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal and the US. Under Secretary of Commerce, Kenneth Juster met in Washington, DC on 4<sup>th</sup> February 2003, and agreed on the principles that would govern India-US bilateral high technology commerce, including trade in "dual use" goods and technologies. It represents a significant step in expanding the strategic context of the relationship.

The two sides agreed to take steps to promote and facilitate such trade by addressing systemic barriers; generating market awareness; undertaking promotional activities; conducting industry outreach programs; reviewing policies and processes on export of "dual use" goods and technologies to India; and, pursuing export control cooperation. The two sides would work out arrangements for authorized transfer of goods and technologies, controlled for nuclear proliferation and missile technology, for civilian application in India.

The two governments, in cooperation with the private sector, will also conduct special outreach activities to make government officials and private entities in India and the United States aware about the policies, regulations and opportunities for "dual use" trade with India.

The principles also acknowledge importance that the US Government attaches to a supportive regulatory and institutional environment in India for robust bilateral high technology commerce. The two sides also envisage a series of promotional activities to advance high technology commerce in the broadest sense, for this, the Bilateral High Technology Cooperation Group as set up.

The terrorist attack of 9/11 became a topic of discussion at all social forums. The 11<sup>th</sup> SAARC Summit at Kathmandu on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2002 also focused to prevent and suppress terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The 23<sup>rd</sup> SARRC session of its Council of Ministers in Kathmandu on 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2002, dealt with the same problem of terrorism wherein the Council mandated the preparation of an Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, recognizing importance of updating the Convention, in order to meet the obligations devolving in terms of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001, September 28), whereby particularly by criminalizing the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of committing terrorist acts and taking further measures to prevent and suppress financing of such acts.

Another step to prevent terrorism was reflected in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) popularly known as the Almaty Act was held on June 04, 2002. Where they regarded all acts of terrorism as criminal against which they determine to cooperate on bilateral as well as multilateral basis to combat terrorism including its possible sources.

No doubt recently Indo-US relations have taken a new favourable turn and provided great opportunities in the wake of terrorism yet this new turn is also fraught with several dangers for India. It is apprehended that greater dependence on the USA may.

- (i) restrain India from dealing freely and decisively with Pakistan
- (ii) lead to international mediation on Kashmir
- (iii) Adversely affect India's traditional relationship with other countries, especially Iraq and Iran.
- (iv) Contain India's preeminence in South Asia; other countries in the region now have a super power to appeal to.
- (v) Lead to Enron-like situations and force New Delhi to grant undue concessions to American business.
- (vi) Trap into the Washington policy of containing China,
- (vii) Alienate countries highly against Uncle Sam,
- (viii) Break the domestic consensus on foreign policy
- (ix) Make coalition government vulnerable to manipulation.

In the days to come Indo-US co-operation should take more positive and constructive turn. India can be a natural ally of the USA in the next protracted phase of war against terrorism as well as in shaping the post-Taliban political set up in Afghanistan because it is well positioned

geographically, and is a secular democracy with a professional army. It has a long experience of fighting with terrorists India has a large diaspora in the US, which is known for their education, enterprise, peaceful and family values. Agrees Stephen Cohen, "I think the bet is a bet over the long run and is not a short-run advantage."<sup>12</sup>

### **US-Pakistan Relation-India's matter for concern!**

The US pro-Pak policies and antipathy towards India thus hampered the growth of good relationship and understanding between India and the US in the Cold War era. Although, in view of the recent developments in the Indo-US relations, some experts have suggest that there is a paradigm shift<sup>13</sup> in Indo-US relations, particularly, during the Kargil conflict this view surfaced. But the US posture of putting pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Kargil region is not an indicator of a shift in favour of India because as per India's request the US has refrained from declaring Pakistan a state promoting terrorism and wants to maintain close working relationship with Pakistan despite the fact that Pakistan's military regime is undemocratic. So, India should not be under any illusion that the US will come to Kashmir to wipe out terrorism. Americans are not going to fight for us, as we have not fought for America in Afghanistan. India has to fight and win its own battle against terrorism.

It will be wrong to expect the US to ditto India's interests in toto. President Bush understands the significance of India as a long-term ally, though for the present he requires General Musharraf more than Prime Minister Vajpayee. In the long run, much will depend on how prudently India plays its cards. India's role in war against terrorism can be rightly assessed by General Kofi Annan's remarks: "The world's people will judge us by our ability to perform specific tasks – not by the resounding speeches

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<sup>12</sup> V. Sudarshan and A.K. Sen "Don't stand so close to me" , New Delhi: *Outlook* Feb. 18, 2002, Pg.39.

<sup>13</sup> J. N. Dixit: "A Paradigm Shift?" New Delhi Hindustan Times, Nov. 10, 1999.

we make, or the number of decisions we reach, by the quality of those decisions, and of the service we provide."<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan, curiously, was first off the block in offering its services to the United States in the latter's war against terrorism. It offered bases and support facilities within Pakistan to facilitate the American strike against Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan, an offer which was readily accepted Pakistan had finally succeeded in getting qualified US attention.

The choice of the US to focus on Pakistan for its anti-al-Qaida/Taliban operations was based on hardcore information that Pakistan was directly involved in Taliban operations in Afghanistan. It is estimated that at the time the WTC was attacked on 9/11, there were about 3000-4000 jihadis from Pakistan fighting along with the Taliban which had been trained, equipped and advised by the ISI and Pakistani generals. The ISI is also credited with having brought about the marriage of convenience between the Taliban and al-Qaida.<sup>15</sup> An example of the depth of Pakistani involvement was the capture of Taliban in Afghanistan where more than 60 Pakistani military officers and a unit for the Special Services Group had actively participated in an "advisory and support role". They had full knowledge of the Taliban's military machine, supply lines, storage facilities and the organizational hierarchy.<sup>16</sup> The US now wanted full cooperation of the Pakistanis in fighting the same forces the latter had bred, and the latter's option were limited. The initial response of the government of Pakistan to the September 11 attacks was one of sympathy and condemnation of the loss of life and property in New York and Washington, and a call to the world to unite against terrorism in all its forms.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan expressed early misgivings about the consequences of US military attacks

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<sup>14</sup> General Secretary Kofi Annan's Address at the General Assembly's Annual High Level Debate on Nov. 10, 2001, New Delhi: *UN Newsletter*, Vol. 56, No.46, Nov. 2001, Pg.17-23.

<sup>15</sup> Kapil Kaul "US Capabilities and Intentions in the Gulf" IDSA, Delhi: *Strategic Analysis*, August 1987, Pg. 547-557.

<sup>16</sup> Ken Silverstien, "When Osama Met the Taliban," 9 October 2001 [state.msn.com/?id=116991](http://state.msn.com/?id=116991).

<sup>17</sup> [www.forisb.org](http://www.forisb.org)

on Afghanistan. Nevertheless they had to show their willingness to cooperate in order to escape the same fate which awaited Afghanistan. So, Islamabad joined US coalition after US presented it with what amounted to a virtual ultimatum. US was categorical about its response. Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that an effective response would be much beyond a war and use of military, legal, financial, diplomatic and intelligence. The US threat was subtly put across in President George Bush's statement that "we will give the Pakistani Government a chance to cooperate and to participate as we hunt down those people."<sup>18</sup> Also, US made it clear that there would be no distinction between terrorists who committed the crime and those who harbour them.

By September 13, US were ready with a blueprint for the war in Afghanistan and US demands on Pakistan. The demands were: "Stop Al-Qaeda operatives on the Pakistan – Afghanistan border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden; blanket ban over flight and landing rights; access to Pakistani naval bases, air bases and borders; immediate intelligence and immigration information; condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends or allies; cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban; and the last demand was that should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan and should Afghanistan and the Taliban continue to harbour him and his network, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban Government, end support for the Taliban and assist the US in the afore mentioned ways to destroy Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network".

General Musharraf agreed that Pakistan would support the United States with each of the seven demanded actions, though Pakistan had initially raised objections to the stationing of US troops on its soil, this

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<sup>18</sup> Ahmad Rashid, "Pakistan, Taliban and the US", *The Nation*, Lahore, 8 October 2002.

eventually changed, with Pakistan permitting large-scale American military forces, including ground forces, to be stationed on its territory. Musharraf in declaring their support for the US's war against terror had secured for themselves at least initially, Pakistan's safety, future economic benefits and an ally on their Kashmir agenda. Though Musharraf was articulate about his country's support to the "war against terror", several of the religious parties were against this idea and called for many demonstrations in Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar. The religious leaders, in a closed-door meeting, resolved that they would not allow the US forces to land in Pakistan and that any US presence would be strongly resisted. They also organized public protests to demonstrate their opposition to Musharraf's support to the US.

Musharraf was very clear that he did not carry the entire country's support on this issue, recognizing that opinion on the issue of extending support to the United States was divided. In a televised address to the nation, he stated Pakistan's integrity and solidarity; its economic revival; defence of Pakistan's 'strategic assets' and the Kashmir cause were the four critical concerns that had made him extend support to the United States. He told the nation that the US had demanded intelligence on Afghanistan and on Osama bin Laden; use of Pakistani airspace; logistical support and use of Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban as leverage in conveying US demands.<sup>19</sup> The General also noted that India had its own plans in using the situation to declare Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and damage the Kashmir cause. A trade-off on Kashmir was at the top of the Pakistani agenda.

Though Pakistan never formally announced its agreement on American use of Pakistani territory, it was clear by early October that Musharraf was resigned to such presence. His concern was increasingly focused on the shape of the post-Taliban regime in Kabul.

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<sup>19</sup> [www.pak.gov.in](http://www.pak.gov.in)

Though the American ultimatum was one reason for the swift change in Pakistan's position regarding the Taliban, the lure of American rewards were also important. Pakistan hoped for both economic assistance as well as political support on Kashmir. But its hopes remain largely unfulfilled.

In gratitude to the Pakistani support in the war against terror, the US had first announced grants worth over \$600 million in late October.<sup>20</sup> A few weeks later Musharraf confirmed that Pakistan had received an additional \$170 million in commitments from Washington and had been told informally that another \$500 million were coming. Pakistan's Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz was of the strong view that continued aid was essential to improve Pakistan's debt and fiscal position. Bush had also promised that the Administration would attempt to pass a legislation that would enable the US to improve market access for Pakistani goods, particularly in the textile sector. However most of these have not yet concretized.

During Musharraf's visit to the US in February 2002 he sought to get several of the international and US bilateral debts worth \$39 billion, adjusted and receive more economic aid and military assistance from the US. However, again, Musharraf has achieved little in concrete terms from the US.

Pakistan has, in total, received aid worth about \$200 million, inclusive of debt adjustment, which is a very meager amount. Pakistan also hoped to receive some military hardware from the US, though this remains doubtful. Besides, India would see any military aid to Pakistan as a threat since it could be used against India, about which the US is well aware.

Besides the economic aid and assistance sought by Pakistan from the US, Pakistan is to receive a total of \$300 million from the US as

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<sup>20</sup> B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Billion plus U.S. package for Pak", *The Hindu*, Chennai, Nov. 17, 2001, Pg.15.



payment towards the logistical support extended to the American forces by Pakistan during the last five-six months as part of the war against terror. Pakistan has received \$80 million and the remaining amount is due in the next few weeks, according to Pakistani government officials<sup>21</sup>

Economic aid was not the only reward that Pakistan sought. As stated earlier, Pakistan also hoped that the US would get involved in negotiating a settlement on Kashmir. For the US, avoiding an unstable situation or a war in South Asia over Kashmir has been the primary concern even while intervening occasionally in the dispute, such as during the Kargil clashes in 1999. It has been the US fear of a conflict in Kashmir escalating into a nuclear flashpoint that has been the primary driving force behind the US approach to Kashmir.

However, the US made it very clear (at least since the early 1990s) that Kashmir remains a disputed region and needs to resolve bilaterally through negotiations between India and Pakistan. This position on Kashmir is unlikely to change in the near future. Several American strategic analysts have put out possible solutions to Kashmir: converting the LOC into an international border,<sup>22</sup> but India and Pakistan has not taken up the idea very well.

Thus, Pakistani hopes about the rewards it might get for its partnership with the US in the War on terror appear to have been largely dashed. As this fact sinks in, Pakistan can again expect to blame the US as a fair-weather friend who is better at making promises than in delivering them.

In short, both the US and Pakistan are not likely to be entirely happy with each other. Though such unhappiness need not necessarily mean conflict, but Pakistan's rosy prediction about its future relations with the US

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<sup>21</sup> Bruce Riedel, "American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House". *Policy Paper Series* 2002 [www.sas.upenn.edu](http://www.sas.upenn.edu)

<sup>22</sup> Tellis, Ashleys, J. "the strategic implications of a Nuclear India" *Orbis* Winter 2002, 46 (1) Pg.13-45.

are unlikely to be realized. One assumed that the US would pursue a policy of 'co-operation and restraint' simultaneously so that it does not lose its hold on Pakistan, and at the same time, tighten the strings when necessary. However, developments after September 11, have created a suitable atmosphere for Pakistan to co-operate with the US in its "war on terror". US – Pakistan relations which had become increasingly troubled, underwent substantial changes, with Pakistan emerging as a frontline state in the US War against terror. Nevertheless the main issues in US-Pakistan ties remain as before, and have infact become more complicated in the context of the US war on terrorism. How the US and Pakistan address these issues has therefore become even more critical and this will determine whether the new closeness in US- Pakistan ties will be an enduring one ?

What is of utmost concern for India is the renewed cooperation within the US and the Pakistani military establishment. By 'catching' al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan in installments, General Musharraf has been able to keep alive the US interest in his country. The US is now keen to 'enhance security and foster the rule of law" in Pakistan for which a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism has been established. In addition to modernizing and strengthening Pakistan's law enforcement capabilities, the US in addressing President Musharraf's critical priorities of economic and social reforms by bilateral effort and support through International Financial Institution.

The interesting and also alarming part of this entire US-Pak romance is that the US is again choosing to ignore the Pakistani nuclear capabilities and intentions as it had done earlier.

Ironically in the US war against terrorism, Pakistan is part of the solution whereas India is still part of the problem. Though India has condemned the terrorist attacks and offered all possible help to US, which has been appreciated, but USA solicits help from Pakistan after thanking

India, because of USA's geopolitical compulsion and US-Pak interdependence.

Today, we still continue to be the most successful democratic state yet nobody talks about it, rather they close their eyes to Musharraf's dictatorships. India's huge market is no more talk of the USA and now Pakistan, which was seen as a failed state yesterday, is seen as the state of the future.

The recent declaration by US to make Pakistan a major non-NATO ally on March 19, 2004 has shaken India's belief in America's friendship.

War against terrorism is not going to end with the elimination of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The world cannot be rid of terrorism until the US dissuade Pakistan from pursuing the policy of supporting and abetting terrorism and from adopting terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Terrorism will survive and thrive unless its sympathizers like Pakistan are reformed, if not chastised.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

With the toppling of the World Trade Centre a core belief was destroyed that it could not happen in America. These attacks in America were not just an attack on a city or a country. Rather, they were an attack on entire humanity. The World Trade Centre symbolises the economic power, and the Pentagon represents the military might of America. By targeting both simultaneously the terrorists have warned they can send shivers down the spine of the mightiest power on the earth.

Terror came to America on September 11 not by rogue state or ballistic missile or high tech biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction -as presaged by the intelligence and the national security experts- but by an unholy network, hijacked airliners and the terrorist favourite "forced-multiplier ", prime time cable and internet weapons of mass destruction and disruption.

It changed the perception of terrorism ever since which came to be referred to as a "New Terrorism" or "hyperterrorism" which was global in nature. Thus it needs to be recognised that changing global situation and amorphous nature of international relations have changed the context and approaches in studying the phenomenon of terrorism. The context in which this subject was analysed during the past fifty years does not remain valid anymore. The experiences of those years might provide valuable clues, but exclusive reliance on these experiences in understanding the present day phenomenon of terrorism could lead to faulty conclusions. Terrorism, was used as a strategic weapon in dealing with the adversaries during the Cold War years. But, it is equally important to note that projects to tackle international terrorism cannot be stretched to settle scores and enhance the prospects of achieving strategic gains. Such approaches are bound to weaken the initiatives aiming at eliminating the menace, and even it could polarize the world. Moreover such approaches do provide a moral high

ground to the terrorists and help them in rallying support around their cause to accomplish their objectives. The terrorists could project themselves as warriors against injustices in such a situations. The US-Saudi strategic alliance and Sept 11 tragedy in New York need to be seen in this perspective as well. It seems that international community is increasingly growing conscious of this predicament.

A concerted international response against terrorism would remain illusory unless there is a universally accepted definition of the terms 'terrorism', 'terrorist', 'militant' and 'freedom fighter'. In the absence of the same, the present coalition partners, including the US might choose to define 'terrorism' in the way that fits their respective national interests and agenda.

Thus the present international coalition against War on Terrorism of US, which has no greater role than to provide moral and sympathetic support to Washington, is being used by America as a forum for legitimizing its action which otherwise could have evoked sharp reactions the entire world over. Thus viewed from a distance, Washington appears to grope in the dark over the choice between global approach and national approach, and for that matter, between altruism and egoism.

The September 11, 2001 carnage implores the international community to rise above the narrow confines of 'national self-interest' while dealing at least with the horrendous crime of terrorism. There responsibility is cast on the US, as the sole super power, to assess its position towards terrorism and relate it to its foreign policy. It is being argued that the track record of US initiatives reveals that the US has not been consistent in pursuing an objective unless it has some implications on its national self-interest. The USA has been explicitly asserting that its national self-interest was supreme, and in case of a contradiction between its national self-interest and international law, the former will prevail. Noam Chomsky remarks "that in order to avoid international isolation the US devised the

mechanism of international coalitions". According to him, the US has devised the formula of dubbing unfriendly or what he calls "protesting states" as rogues. The US defends the friendly states even if they often behave as rogues. He cites illustrations of US support to Pakistan during Bangladesh war of liberation and now also during its War against Terrorism with all, its economic assistance. It is in dilemma of declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. On the contrary it has been declared a major non-NATO ally meaning not being member of NATO still, Pakistan would be one of the close ally of America in its War on Terror.

The chapterisation scheme is as follows:

In the chapters proceeding this we have tried to trace the concept of terrorism in pre and post Sept 11, 2001 by USA and have dealt with the response to this attack with special reference to the Indian response.

In the first chapter, we have tried to bring up a universal concept of terrorism in pre Sept 11 attack and how it has evolved as a concept and changed its perception and nature from being traditional guerilla warfare to the high-tech biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It deals with basically the issue of definitional problem of the concept of terrorism, its various types and forms, and ultimately highlights how the September 11 is different from them and is referred rightly as "hyperterrorism."

The second chapter, deals with the event per-se how it occurred and what was the USA's response to it. It later deals with policies and politics of the United States to fight terrorism. It deals with Bush's declaration of "War on Terror" and other steps taken by him to gain a global coalition by declaring Sept 11 as 'war of 21<sup>st</sup> century'. He further says, 'every nation in every region has a choice to be either with us or with the terrorist'. The US Congress overwhelmingly approved the use of force to fight the War on Terror. It united the Americans as at no time since World War II.

In the third chapter, after looking into the problem of terrorism in pre and post Sept 11 we try to figure out what was India's relationship with USA in the post-Cold War era. This chapter basically deals with the India's foreign policy within the framework of constraint posed by US unipolarity.

The end of ideological rivalry, which had sharpened conflict across the world, seemed to open the way for a new cooperative framework of relationships, generating hope for building a better security environment. This did not happen during 1989-99, instead a great deal of uncertainty had arisen in the global situation. This generated a number of challenges for the developing countries as they cope with an increasingly complex world. The need for India to come to grips with the challenges and complexities of the new configuration of international forces is therefore self-evident.

At the same time, India had to cope with the growing political and economic challenges on the domestic front with successive fragile coalition governments. The principal objective of India's Foreign Policy was to tackle both external threats of insurgency and terrorism. Growing vulnerability to nuclear pressures in the existing world scenario adds to the complexity of India's security perspectives. It remained at forefront of efforts for total elimination of nuclear weapons which it views as a serious threat to international peace and security. It remained opposed to NPT or CTBT for its discriminatory nature.

With the end of Cold War though we were formally committed to the policy of Non Alignment, we have not adequately asserted and reiterated this policy-stance. M.S. Rajan says "that India's increasing indebtedness to developed nations and international financial institution is becoming the concern for the future."

Thus it can be seen how India's dependence on US has made her unduly submissive in not playing a legitimate role on the world stage.

Rather India should play an active role to remove inequality, racism, pollution and terrorism.

The fourth chapter, deals with the development of bilateral relations between Indo-US after Sept 11, 2001 which reached a high point because of India's unconditional support to America's War against Terrorism, where the then Indian PM Vajpayee wrote to US President that "we stand ready to cooperate with you in the investigations into this crime and to strengthen our partnership in leading international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again". India condemned the terrorist attack vehemently. The post-Sept 11, 2001 US campaign for international War against Terrorism has provided India an opportunity to pursue its hegemonic designs and strengthen its efforts to emerge as the regional and global power and so, India has offered all cooperation and facilities to US military cooperation in its war against terrorism.

On the other hand Pakistan, curiously was first off the block in offering its services to the US in its War against Terrorism. It offered bases and support facilities within Pakistan to facilitate the American strike against Taliban and Al-Qaida targets in Afghanistan, the offer was readily accepted by US. Thus Pakistan had finally succeeded in getting qualified US attention. Pakistan's support did not go in waste because in gratitude USA announced lot of economic grants and aid. What is of utmost concern for India is the renewed cooperation within the US and the Pakistani military establishment.

US later designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally on March 19, 2004. Even if it is a symbolic elevation of status, it indicates how desperate US is to keep the existing leadership in power in Pakistan. It is one way of putting a seal of American approval of the military rule that is continuing in Pakistan with a democratic mask. However, the way this conferment occurred, was sure to upset India very much especially when



India had stopped looking at US-Pak relationship through a Cold War prism and treasured its relationship with the US.

This faux pass on the part of US suggests that Americans are still not sensitive to the political calculus of the region. The American policy of strengthening Pakistan military may backfire in India, which US considers an invaluable partner in progress. De-hyphenating American relationship with India and Pakistan does not necessarily mean treating American relationship with each of these countries as unrelated and autonomous. And US should better draw lessons from its earlier honeymoons with Pakistan. It should ask itself, has it quite managed to tame the unruly horse that it was at one point of time? Will the honeymoon last beyond December 2004, when Musharraf has promised to up his uniform? Keeping this in mind India should accept the realities and not get anxious of their close relationship, and also not expect too much from USA to solve its Kashmir problem. India should realise that it has to fight its own battle of terrorism in Kashmir. In the whole process at least India has been successful in gaining global support against the terrorist activity in Kashmir which it has been suffering since a decade, which earlier was referred as a dispute by USA.

So, India should be optimistic in its approach and try to maximize its interest in the bilateral relationship with USA and not feel dejected because the policy of unconditional cooperation India offered though was heavily criticised, was the only method to tackle the situation keeping in mind both the internal and external situation.

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