

Library

RUPTURES OR REPETITIONS?

DECONSTRUCTING HISTORY IN GOWARDHANDE YATHRAKAL

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfillment
of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy*

RAJIV G. ARICAT

**Centre of Linguistics and English
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi – 110067
2004**



Centre of Linguistics & English
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies


जवाहरलाल नेहरू विश्वविद्यालय
Jawaharlal Nehru University


New Delhi-110067, India

CERTIFICATE

July 21, 2004

Certified that this dissertation titled **Ruptures or Repetitions?: Deconstructing History in *Gowardhande Yathrakal***, submitted by **Rajiv G. Aricat**, Centre of Linguistics and English, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy is his original work and has not been submitted, in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of this or any other university/institution. This may, therefore, be placed before the Examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.


Prof. Santosh K. Sareen
(Supervisor)


Dr. G.J.V. Prasad
(Acting Chairperson)
Acting Chairperson
CL&E/SLL&CS

DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

This dissertation titled **Ruptures or Repetitions?: Deconstructing History in *Gowardhande Yathrakal***, submitted by me to the Centre of Linguistics and English, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy, is an original work and has not been submitted so far in part or full, for any other degree or diploma of any university/institution.


Rajiv G. Aricat

Centre of Linguistics and English
School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi - 110067

CONTENTS

Section	Page Nos.
Acknowledgements	
PREFACE	i – ii
1. INTRODUCTION	1 – 21
i. Rupture and Repetition	
ii. Language and Rupture	
iii. Deconstruction	
iv. Objective of the Study	
v. Review of Literature	
vi. Fort and City	
vii. Research Questions	
viii. Methodology	
ix. About the Author and his Major Works	
2. PROBLEMS OF GENEALOGY, GENRE AND TRANSLATION	22 – 60
i. Genealogy and Nakedness	
ii. Ethics and Political Science	
iii. Genre	
iv. Translation	
v. Disappropriating One's Mother tongue	
3. TIME AND ANAND'S NARRATION	61 – 90
i. Justice for a Fulfillment of Time	
ii. Defining Repetition	
iii. Enter-the-Open: Law as being in force without signification	
iv. Divide and Drama	
v. Ali Dosth: 'Emotionless Purity' of the sixth finger	
vi. History as Will to Power	
vii. Violence of History	
viii. What is an Event in History?	
ix. Use and Abuse of History	
4. CONCLUSION	91 – 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY	96 – 101

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to many people who have helped to make this dissertation a reality. Primary among them is my supervisor, Prof. Santosh K. Sareen. His sincere advice and assistance was of the greatest help to me in completing this dissertation. Even during his hectic schedule as the Chairperson of the Centre, I found him relaxed and attentive during our discussions. My sincere thanks also goes to Prof. Franson Manjali who has always pointed out to me those unexplored areas related to my topic.

I am also extremely thankful to Dr. V. Sanil, Dr. Sunil P. Elayidom and Mr. Adarsh for their valuable and thought provoking views and comments about my work.

I am grateful to my friends Jose chettan, Bijoy and Babu, Sachin, Gokul and Santosh, for all the intellectual motivations they gave me from time to time.

Suhail and Rajakrishnan, who have helped me in translating the excerpts from the novel, *Gowardhande Yathrakal*, that were to be used in this work and who have also helped me in editing and proof reading the work, have done a tiresome job. My sincere thanks goes to them also.

My special thanks goes to Sri. Anand, who warmly welcomed me when I went to meet him and has shown the readiness to clarify many of my concepts regarding my reading of his works.

Last but not the least, I must acknowledge my deep debt and gratitude to my father, mother, brother and sister for their constant encouragement and support to all my academic endeavours.

Rajiv G. Aricat

PREFACE

Wars and crimes, violence and assaults, are not at all strange to history. Emperors defeated, persecuted and killed by their own blood relations, queens throwing themselves to fire before enemies captured them and above all innocent common men who were always destined to give nothing less than their own lives in the dictatorial competition between sovereign powers; initially they were enough for me also to convince myself about the injustice ever-present in history, about an impossible freedom in human existence. It may help to develop wisdom among men of knowledge!

It did not take too long before I could see that history is an endless expression of man's will to power and the real task is to invite all sign systems for a performance with the subject at the theatre of philosophy. And it was nothing less than a shock to perceive how far apart sovereign and its subjects, life as well as death have fallen with the author. The title struck me at once. My effort since then has been to find out the deception which presents life with a masked positivity, to shatter all efforts of the present to look for a past with its own truth at hand and to condemn the search for constants in history.

Anand's writings have not only opened up the area of the genealogy of human values in literature but have also posed themselves as texts that can function as new signposts in the realm of translation studies. At the meeting point of philosophy and literature would be the problem of translation. Thus, in the works of Anand, it is at once a question of an original and a translation. But, the decision is left to the reader; if he finds them totally translatable, they will withstand the demands of philosophy and if they are not translatable, they are outside the limits of philosophy.

Genres, whose laws have supposedly been laid by discourses outside literature, have been an area of interest for many literary critics and commentators. But for a discerning reader, the mixing of genres in many of Anand's writings is not only at the structural level but is also at the level of certain discourses, which lay down the criterion of literariness for the text in its singularity, within the text. A new relation between language and the law of genre emerges. An element's falling into a genre is no longer decided by a law abstracted outside the text, but with the very language with which both the law as well as the element of the genre have been written.

I have tried to follow the 'MLA style for Research Papers' as far as possible in writing this dissertation. But in spite of my efforts, many usages, citations and ideas in the work were hesitant to accede to that style. In taming them, however, I have been consistent with a single style throughout the work. Though initially I had only a humble motive of reading Anand differently, as the work progressed, I became aware of the capability of most of my arguments, to throw light on new areas of literary criticism. It is far less than claiming that the path followed by me in this work is self-sufficient to become at least a postulation, not to speak of a theory. On the other hand, in my opinion, this path has tremendous scope to become an alternative way of reading literary texts.

New Delhi,

July 16, 2004.

Rajiv G. Aricat

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Judgement making is an extravaganza for the enjoyment of those who are not party to events. History is the fantastic wandering place for those who keep themselves away from experiences.

- Gowardhande Yathrakal¹

Gowardhan is originally a character in Bharadendu Harischandra's (1850-1885) Hindi farce, *Andher Nagari, Chowpat Raja*, written some one and a half centuries ago. Anand, in his novel, *Gowardhande Yathrakal* (Journeys of Gowardhan), takes out this character from Harischandra's play and allows him to travel through the history of India for about six centuries (from the 14th century to the 19th century). Joining him are characters from history, epics and literature; some asking questions along with him, some getting the heat of his criticisms.

Harischandra's play goes like this: The complainant in the court of Chowpat Raja wants the king to punish those who were responsible for the death of his goat when Kallu's wall fell on it. Raja, whose justice shows a super-logic of punishing, convicts the wall responsible for the death of the goat in the first instance, followed by Kallu, the owner of the wall, then the mason who made the wall, the worker who mixed the concrete, the 'bhisti' who poured excess water in the concrete and so on. This illogicality does not stop here – When it is discovered that the size of the noose is smaller than the size of the neck of the 'kothwal', who is finally sentenced for hanging, Gowardhan, a

pedestrian whose neck has the correct size of the noose is lifted from the street to be hanged.

Harishchandra's play laughs at the nature of justice in the kingdom of Chowpat Raja. Each grocery item in the Andher Nagari bazaar (market) of Chowpat Raja is sold at the same rate - one rupee per 'ser' (a measurement of weight). The same logic operates in the 'judiciary' of his kingdom too.

In his novel *Gowardhande Yathrakal (GY)*, Anand's main objective is to show the irrationality of justice, the suppressive character of power and the impossibility of attaining freedom in human existence throughout history. But to what extent are these issues valid at each point of time where the discursive domains would obviously be different?

Rupture and Repetition

In their semantic and hermeneutic potential, these two terms, like other binaries, assume the existence of each other. Rupture qualifies its meaning within a continuous series. Repetition is the overcoming of any rupture, discontinuity within a system. However, these terms do not bear the same meanings as they used to bear, in the present study. The major difference that they necessitate in this study is the introduction of temporality within their domains. Let us go through some explanatory schemas from which 'Rupture' and 'Repetition' borrow their sense in the current context.

Though, chronologically it was Hegel's idea of history as totality that came first, only to be refuted later by Nietzsche, it cannot be inferred that a thought about rupture carries a unified whole at its background. Rather, it must be explained in terms of the

'beyond' philosophy which displaces the subject and presence. While Gilles Deleuze, a renowned French philosopher of the twentieth century, finds Nietzsche's relation to Hegel in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as oppositional, Maurice Blanchot, a French literary critic, emphasizes the necessity of the hegelian system for Nietzsche. However, for both Deleuze and Blanchot, 'Eternal Return'² is not the return or repetition of the Same. Deleuze writes, "...identity in the eternal return does not designate the nature of what comes again, but, on the contrary, the fact of coming again for that which differs" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 71). But when Blanchot emphasizes the necessity of the hegelian system for Nietzsche, he means to give a new dimension for rupture, so that it is no more an absolute discontinuity and incompleteness but an infinite rupture maintained by the simultaneous completion and incompleteness of time in the present. It keeps the present always at a distance or in a state of rupture so that there is no linearity in time from past to future nor is there the same subject which can receive the Eternal Return of things. "...that everything comes again, makes the present the abyss where no presence has ever taken place and where the 'everything comes again' has always already ruined itself. The law strikes the present with muteness ... in the future will return what could not be present, in the same way that in the past only what of the past never belonged to a present comes again." (Blanchot, *Step* 15).

Hence, repetition is not a legitimization of a continuity of time from past through future, but a simultaneous completion and incompleteness of time in the present where a rupture is always maintained. Repetition then becomes a repetition without origin and repetition of difference. Writing carries with it this rupture when it evades the monopoly

of the present. Beyond meaning and subjective centralisation of language, the 'I' as in speech, writing brings forth difference and an always already deferred signification.

Repetition, conceived likewise, marks time as ruptured and leaves the point of rupture unbridged and unbridgeable. It introduces a time that disrupts all of thought's tendencies for unity and totalization. Thus, the human subject, perceived by traditional history as a unity in time, undergoes disjunction. Genealogy bears the mark of it.³

Similarly, at the level of knowledge, at the level of systems of signs and those of discourse, we find discontinuities and ruptures. Foucault's analysis reveals that, with the Classical period, the earlier practices of knowing the world through resemblances was replaced by the representation by signs (Foucault, *Order* 65). However, these signs are thought to have been placed upon things such that they maintain a silent existence without a knowing subject. This relationship of the sign with the world supported by 'divinatio' undergoes a mutation with the advent of the seventeenth century, when "the whole domain of the sign is divided between the certain and the probable" (65). Absolute and ever-present signs of knowledge have been replaced by a network of signs which borrow their meaning from the realm of existing knowledge itself. Foucault observes that such an enclosure of signs within themselves could bring in the concepts of probability and certainty to knowledge. Such a 'reversal of direction' in the nature and function of signs mutates the object with which reflective knowledge operates. A set of questions gives way to totally new and unthought-of ones, marking a rupture in the history of ideas. Foucault also locates the conception of a single unbroken theory of knowledge and the possibility of analysing signs progressively through time at the change of play of signs (Foucault, *Order* 67). The circular world of converging signs which drew things together

and united them was replaced by their infinite progression in seventeenth century Western thought. In the circular world of signs, the analysis of signs itself allowed the space for their own constitution in their operation. Signs appearing to be stretching along time became possible when they, instead of holding the world together and close to itself, carried out an endless deployment of substitutes along an indefinitely open space. “The sign in Classical thought does not erase distances or abolish time: on the contrary, it enables one to unfold them and to traverse them step by step” (68).

In the same way, an event can demonstrate the complex logic in which rupture and repetition find their signification. At the other end would be those simplistic notions of causes and effects. Foucault explains how the incorporeality of an event’s meaning is woven into a discourse with an always displaced present (Foucault, *Language* 173). The two dimensions in which the meaning element of an event is qualified are:

- i) an intangible meaning which points to the state of things, and
- ii) the propositional element which connects and gives meaning for the event in a statement.

The former can be explained as attributes of an event, like, to be dead, to be alive etc. But they cannot be incorporated into a discourse as it is. Thus, the propositional element with its temporal inflections forms the grammar to an event within a discourse.

But this grammatical incorporation of an event into a discourse cannot be considered absolutely, as ever present. According to Foucault, the grammar of the meaning-event “revolves around two asymmetrical and insecure poles: the infinitive mode and the present tense” (174). Since we cannot consider present as singular and unique and eternal as lacking difference, the meaning-event can only but fall into a

rupture in the present. This unsettles the possibility of cognition of a meaning of an event as it occurs. An event never occurs at the same moment when it can also be given a meaning. Nor can it resist its infinite occurrence along the widthless crack made by the infinite mode and present tense within a discourse. Such is the way discourse constitutes an event within it: it gives the event its meaning in its non-occurrence at the present, but always looks for the event's repetition, levelling the rupture into which it has already fallen.

Language and Rupture

It is also possible to see how literature, as we know it today, has been possible alongside the different roles assigned to language at different periods. All that is evident in Foucault's analyses of language and literature is that, beneath the ruptures undergone by language in terms of its definition and function, literature always acted as a 'counter-discourse' concerned about the being of language (Foucault, *Order* 48). Language in its raw and primitive being existed in a simple, material form of writing like a stigma upon things. At two different levels of this uniform layer of language as a written word are commentary and underlying text. But with Renaissance, as the signs were fixed upon their binary form unlike their ternary nature earlier and as they took representative characters, the interaction of these three elements of language, i.e. the written word, commentary and the underlying text, was dissolved. From a period where signification of signs did not exist, since everything was based on the sovereignty of the Like, Western culture entered a period of 'discourse' where the profound kinship of language with the

world was dissolved. There was not any primacy of the written word, nor was there anything more than what was said.

Language from then on was only a matter of making new signs, arranging things around the signs, naming and renaming them and at the most making a secondary sign, a figurative of that which is already represented (48). And literature is the only mode in which one can still have the memory of that being of language that existed before the Classical period. “And yet, throughout the nineteenth century, and right up to our own day - from Holderlin to Mallarme and on to Artaud - literature achieved autonomous existence, and separated itself from all other language with a *deep scission*, only by forming a sort of ‘counter-discourse’, and by finding its way back from the representative or signifying function of language to this raw being that had forgotten since the sixteenth century.” (48) (italics mine).

The rupture between language and literature has already occurred. At the first instance, when literature fell into the void that language had left behind when it no longer represented the world but entered the realm of discourse; of signification and of reduplication of signs. And finally, on a day to day basis, with the impossibility of a thought about literature in terms of a theory of signification since language has already left the foundational and limiting ‘myth’ of the written word. “...henceforth, language was to grow with no point of departure, no end, and no promise. It is the traversal of this futile yet fundamental space that the text of literature traces from day to day.” (49).

Many a writer (Blanchot, Deleuze, Kafka...) has opined about literature as an introduction of a third person within the writer that strips him/her of the power to say ‘I’.

According to Deleuze, this rupture within the self, which he calls 'flight from formalization', is important in order to refute the Oedipal trajectory in writing. "To write is not to recount one's memories and travels, one's loves and griefs, one's dreams and fantasies. It is the same thing to sin through an excess of reality as through an excess of the imagination. In both cases it is the eternal daddy-mommy, an Oedipal structure that is projected, onto the real or introjected into the imaginary." (Deleuze, *Literature 2*). Unless there is no such departure from the 'I', there is every possibility that an indefinite will be taken up by the personal or the possessive. The writer then becomes the voice of the downtrodden and the voiceless instead of writing alongside them. Deleuze views writing as becoming: becoming-woman, becoming-animal, becoming-molecule to the point of becoming-imperceptible. But in all the becomings it is not that the writer acquires their formal characteristics, but he/she "enters a zone of proximity" (Deleuze, *Literature 2*).

This is how a writer can become a foreigner in his own language. In writing, it is not language as a homogenous system in equilibrium which is used for expression. But language with its newly created syntax, affectation of words, fragmented and inarticulate sounds etc. is pushed to the other within itself. Deleuze differentiates between the variations in the speech of the characters and the variations of language itself in the hands of a writer. While the former can be related to the 'I' of the writer which has not undergone a dissociation (it is the character's speech that stumbles and not his own) the latter must be seen as the stuttering of language. This newly created language of the writer is not outside the language but the outside *of* language. "It is no longer the formal or superficial syntax that governs the equilibriums of language, but a syntax in the

process of becoming, a creation of syntax that gives birth to a foreign language within language, a grammar of disequilibrium.” (Deleuze, *Stuttered* 112).

Deconstruction

According to the ‘definition’ in *Encyclopaedia of Literary Critics and Criticism*, Deconstruction, whose literal meaning is to undo or de-construct, means “taking apart a text to analyse the conflicting forces within it responsible for the production of meaning - which according to deconstruction can never be unequivocal” (*Derrida* 304). Fundamental to this idea of ‘meaning’ is the opposition between two terms (binaries) where a privileged term is usually associated with essence or origin and will give itself to analyses as “fully present”. But for Derrida, the privileged term in every opposition can only be defined by its difference from the term with which it is paired. In addition, the privileged term is also infiltrated by the other term leaving the difference within the pair itself far from being absolute. With deconstruction, it is not the reversing of privilege given to one of the terms in each opposition, instead it is “challenging the purity and unity of concept that would be necessary to sustain an opposition absolutely” (*Deconstruction* 297).

While Blanchot uses the term rupture to show the simultaneous incompleteness and completeness of time in the present, Derrida’s *différance* criticises presence at the level of meaning and signification. A presence, for Derrida, depends on its differentiation from all that it is not, its difference. But this presence, since it cannot be defined apart from its difference from the others, also cannot be itself absolutely. Hence this presence is always deferred and suspended (*Deconstruction* 297). “*Différance* is what makes the

movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be “present”, appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element.” (Derrida, *Speech* 81).

On the one hand, *différance* cannot be the same as differentiation since in its operation the latter assumes an organic or original unity which when divided, signifies a meaning rendering difference as an event. On the other hand, *différance* cannot be logical distancing (or synthesizing) of two differences (past and future) since it is through the infinite deferring of presence or the play of *différance* alone that past and future receive their sense.

Opposing Husserl’s phenomenological theory that any true expression is resultant of a meaning that the speaker’s mind wants to bring to life, Derrida proposes the self-referential character of a signifier. A sign does not substitute for an absent thing or concept, rather it plays with this absence and makes meaning possible within the totality of the system. The word ‘cat’, for example, gets its meaning not by its unique relationship with the original referent but from its difference from ‘cap’, or ‘cab’ which constitutes the system of signifiers. This is a critique of the concept of original, of self-presence and of the unique representative character of sign.

For this reason, deconstruction also refutes the division of the inside and outside of the text. The famous dictum, “there is nothing outside the text” refutes the possibility of an outside referent or ‘reality’ that the text has to constantly refer to in order that its own meaning is qualified. Since graphocentrism perceives the signifying system as a whole and the represented as always already a representation, it is not justifiable to look

for referents outside the text instead of capturing the 'play' of the meaning of words or discourses in their absence and presence in the text⁴.

Objective of the Study

A work of literature cannot be considered as a source of any kind of knowledge other than that concerning language and literature itself. It would be unsympathetic if one tries to look for any kind of truth in a work of literature. Hence, the chief focus of this study is not a material or scientific interpretation of history, a history particularly of Medieval and Modern India, which has been seriously dealt with in this novel. On the contrary, it is an attempt to analyse and deconstruct the history depicted in the novel giving it the status of a literary narrative.

Review of Literature

Debates and discussions about the emergence of modernism in Malayalam literature has been a topic that has held the literary circle in this region lively. It seems obligatory on the part of most literary critics to write about an author, to comment on any of his/her works, or to present him/her to the audience with a certain tendency of associating him/her with a literary movement, considering him/her as rising him/herself at a historical epoch and so on. Awaiting them are the dangers inevitable in established knowledge systems that give life to most of the literary works and almost all literary criticisms.

The Cosmic Principle is also present in man, who is one of its parts, as well as in his mind and in his creative acts. Matter transforms to energy and vice-versa. Matter, breaking away from its centre, flows freely in all directions as energy. This flow is

Romanticism. Energy flows back to the centre, forming matter. This can be called Modernism. Expansion at one point and contraction at the other. The expansion and contraction of the universe are nothing but the two different faces of human creativity (Devan 15).

Modern Malayalam novels developed and evolved through two tributaries, according to experts. With O. V. Vijayan's *Khasakkinte Itihasam*, it took a path which was not only philosophical but also religious, spiritual, romantic and 'Sathvik'. Anand's path was historical, humanitarian, materialistic, anti-romantic and philosophical. It denounces the 'catharsis effect' acquired through reading; and persuades the reader to analyse problems using intellectual insights (Jacob 12).

It has also been said that, with the advent of modernism, a Malayalam speaker was pushed to many philosophical and emotional crises which were entirely foreign to him. Modernism was introduced by those vernacular writers who were acquainted with the foreign (especially western) way of life, literary forms and movements etc. On the one hand, a Malayalam speaker had the anxiety of losing his own identity and on the other he was compelled to accept new and 'modern' forms of expressions in his own language and literature. Modernism, thus as a blind revenge over tradition developed in Malayalam as a literary character which lacked originality (Jacob 10). But according to Shaji Jacob, Anand's literary and philosophical endeavour stands apart as he "sketched the intellectual identity crisis of the modern individual connecting him with tradition" (11). Traditional novelists like C. V. Ramanpillai viewed history as a political and cultural happening within the context of a particular time and space. Whereas modern novelists like Anand interpret history breaking the barriers of time and space; history is

not a place where they can anchor their imagination. Nor do they view history as a chain of events or as generations in progress (9).

Anand's *Jyva Manushyan* is an attempt to study human being, treating him as an essential component of nature and society. In this collection of essays he tries to find out those elements of tradition which stood as obstacles to human development and freedom. Individuals showed the same oppositional character towards both nature and society even while an individual was the chief player between nature and society. What followed was that, with the activities of life, he was disjuncted from nature and with culture he held himself above society and emerged as an individual (18). Anand's endeavor is to find man's (lost) identity amongst the broad field of human culture and global nationalism. Rationality and scientific thinking helps him to delineate those elements in tradition detrimental to global humanism. Anand "weighs them along contemporary social culture and within the context of historical human status" (30). According to Shaji Jacob, the criterion of philosophical positions taken by Anand in the works starting from *Alkkoottam* to *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu* is such a knowledge of tradition (30).

Fort and City

Fort in *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu (MU)* is a symbol of the (monotonous) repetition of history. Rambha Ghat fort, the venue of most of the misdeeds of power in the first part of the novel, was build by Raja Mansingh. Rich and famous for his wealth and ladies, the Raja attracted the envy of Sultan Alam Khan. The latter attacked and won over the Raja only to vacate the fort himself later, realizing that there was nothing inside or around it that was attractive. Shaji Jacob opines that Rambha Ghat's history is the cross section of

the conflict between Hindu and Muslim royals during the Middle ages of Indian history. The fort was modified into a military camp under foreigners who came later and after them it was transformed into a place of visit and in the hands of the present government the same was re-designed for a strategic project. The fort which has seen power conflicts, war confrontations and streams of blood in history is being transformed into a weapon house of power in the modern period. History is being repeated here (75).

Though elsewhere Shaji observes that the thematic of *MU* is the basic character of power which is exerted upon individuals vertically by governments and laterally by society (70), for him too, the net result of this exerted power is the loss of identity and freedom of the individual. Shaji seems to propose Russell's postulation about power, for reading Anand too. Moreover, Anand also upholds the suppressive character of power in the Indian situation when he reveals that it is the re-reading of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* that has motivated him to write the novel *MU*.⁵

One of the prominent ways to analyse the concept of power in Anand's writings is to reveal their insights along Foucault's disclosures on power. So much has been said: Anand has been successful in differentiating modern strategies of power from traditional ones. Whereas power acted in a vertical, hierarchical way in earlier times, through a design of surveillance techniques, power's gaze is all-prevalent on the subjects of the modern age. "The micro-practices effected through various disciplinary establishments like the prison, hospital, security, police, intelligence, cultural management etc. are integrated to form the invisible structure of the grossly powered government." (Rajasekharan 107).

But never in Anand's novels does power help to constitute a self, a pleasure or a human nature. Power, for Anand, is only a means to dominate or to violate the freedom of others. His basic assumption about this matter is revealed when he postulates that the two fundamental states in human existence are the states of a hunter and that of a victim. In course of time, a hunter apprehends that he is going to be a victim. This anxiety motivates him to build forts to protect himself from other hunters in his weaker days. But, here also the conception of power does not go above its suppressive nature. In effect, both the above conception and the traditional idea of sovereign power become one and the same. We cannot miss the political 'double bind' of modern power that operates through a process of subjectivisation in which the individual is bound himself, to his own identity and consciousness and, at the same time, to an external power. "There are two meanings to the word *subject*, subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge." (Dreyfus, *Beyond* 43).

Conflicts between the urban and the rural have been identified by Anand as the backbone of the Indian cultural, political and ethical evolution (*Jyva Manushyan* 168-190). Cities were considered centres of freedom. They snatched the justice and freedom of the villages. In the beginning of *GY*, Anand notes that cities are constructed around those who wait for justice and those who steal it from them. Shaji reveals that city, as a metaphor in *GY*, is a point of attraction but at the same time a prohibition. Gowardhan reaches the city in order that he is given due justice. He expects reason and logic in its proceedings and verdict. But despite the fact that the city itself was the one which lured Gowardhan into it, it punishes him for having trespassed its limits (Jacob 92). The reader

may also recall here Kafka's countryman who came to the door of Law. The door was an attraction for him such that he waited in front of it till his end; but at the same time, throughout his life it remained as a prohibition before him.

Research Questions

How far can the questions, criticisms and debates raised by Gowardhan and thereby the author in *GY* be said to be relevant at a particular historical point of time; or else how far has the author been able to bring to light the actual genealogy of those concepts like freedom, justice, reason and power? What is the accuracy of the author's depiction that the question of justice is the only relevant question throughout the history of mankind? The reader is given an impression in the introduction of the novel that the endless wait for justice and the irrationality shown by the authorities in the implementation of justice is the central theme of the novel. What is the validity of this theme when the author tries to bring in a history of six centuries in his novel?

How far Foucault's observation – even when it is said that the law has become more humanitarian and less barbaric and violent in Western culture in the modern era and its exertion of power on the human body has increased manifold through various capillary mechanisms of power in the society – can be applied in the debates and observations of Gowardhan in this novel

How do different statements of history appear in *GY*? What is the socio-politico context in which each statement in the novel gets validity, a meaning and thus a relevance? (e.g. there is an observation by the author that Gowardhan had been sentenced to death though he had not done anything wrong, 'and even the people were of the

opinion that Gowardhan is innocent.' Here, by bringing in the opinion of the people, the author is judging the particular historical event in the context of democratic values. It is obvious that the context, in which the novel is written, itself made the statement appear in it. A similar instance can be seen when the famous Moroccan traveller Ibn Batuta is asked by a pedestrian in the novel where he had come from. Batuta answers: "Man uses race and colour to define themselves as well as others; he selects and brings in religion and morals (*dharma*); reach out to language, culture and philosophies. We, travellers, define nations through our journeys ..." (GY 243).

From the debates carried out in the novel, is it possible to find out some *ruptures* in the 'progression' of history? Is the impression given by the author throughout the novel, about the question of denial of justice *repeatedly* appearing in history?

Gowardhan in this novel meets various personalities in history and mythology.

Some of them are:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Kamran (16 th century): | Younger brother of Humayun, the Mughal Emperor. He led a war against his own brother only to be defeated later by him. |
| Dara Shukov (? – 1659): | Eldest son of Shah Jahan. He established friendship with Sufis and other religious thinkers and was killed by Aurangazeb, his brother. |
| Sarmad (1590 – 1657): | Sufi poet. Travelled naked. Killed by Aurangazeb. |
| Galileo (1564 – 1642): | The scientist who surrendered to the death threat. Confessed that his argument, earth revolves round the sun, was wrong. |

Maalik Khafur (? – 1316): Slave loyal to Alauddin Khalji and his later commander-in-chief. Impotent. Became ‘Sultan’ (Emperor) after the death of Alauddin, but was killed soon.

Methodology

Unless, at least three problematics of his writings are not delved into, it is unable to follow Anand completely as an author. These problematics are:

- i) a constant effort by the author to maintain a genealogical reticence throughout the text, but which ends up almost all the time with suprahistorical⁶ questions.
- ii) the obligation of an author-function which Anand takes up himself, while the narratives of an established (and therefore written) history are transformed into the genre of literature.
- iii) the innocence with which a timid genius is at work in the novel who takes a foreign tongue and stammer himself, rendering “the original itself as translation.”⁷

The entire thesis proceeds in a method of deconstruction, if deconstruction can be termed a method. The attempt is not to locate the philosophical or literary object of the debates correlating it to a literary movement or a philosophical trend. Rather, it attempts to release the text from a fixity determined by a single meaning giving way, to an infinity of meanings which will eventually take hold of its terrain.

A rupture always evades the present while looking for the origin. It is a rupture and not *différance* in that, when meaning is deferred in the latter, its own temporality is not lost. But the former loses its own temporality at the very moment it captures its own meaning i.e. in the present. Repetition would have been a different way of defining the

origin. It lacks any sense of the total-becoming it has gone through till the present moment, i.e. at the time of its quest for origin. On finding out an origin, repetition calls itself a repetition of that origin not being aware that the next moment's 'origin' would be different. Hence repetition is not aware of its own uniqueness in time.

If rupture and repetition is the inability to denote any origin, is there a rupture or a repetition which is original? Can we go on looking for an original meaning of these two, without facing ourselves with ruptures and repetitions? Finally, can 'Ruptures or Repetitions' be translated without there being a rupture or repetition in the 'translated text'?

About the Author and his Major Works:

Name: Anand (P. Sachidanandan)

Major works: *Abhayarthikal* (Refugees), *Jyva Manushyan* (Bio Man), *Veedom*

Thadavum (~~House and Surroundings~~) – All these works won Kerala Sahitya Academy Awards. *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu* (How Deserts are Formed?) won Wayalar Award. *Gowardhande Yathrakal* was first published in 1995 by D.C. Books, Kottayam. It won the Kendra Sahitya Academy award of 1997. Total number of pages: 270

¹ All the translations of *Gowardhande Yathrakal* quoted in this dissertation are my own.

-
- ² 'Eternal return' is one of the key philosophical concepts developed by Nietzsche during his philosophical endeavour. In a simple sense, this concept is the touchstone to find out for oneself how far one is successful in affirming one's life.
- ³ Chapter II carries an elaborate discussion on Genealogy's character as dissipation of history and knowledge.
- ⁴ The 'play' of meaning of words and discourses with their absence and presence in the text has been better clarified and demonstrated in Chapter III of this work.
- ⁵ Anand's analyses of the development of political practice and ethical thought in the Indian situation has been discussed in the essay *Ethical Thought and Political Science* (Jyva Manushyan pp. 168-190). I have discussed this in detail in Chapter 2 under the title 'Genealogy'. According to Anand, barring some periods, state power in the Indian historical context has always exploited common man for its economical and political sustenance. This it effectuated either under the veil of ethical thought or at times violating it.
- ⁶ Here the term 'suprahistorical' is not used completely in a Nietzschean sense where it denotes "an orientation towards the eternally valid examples of the past" (On the Genealogy of the Morals, Introduction ix). Before advocating a new historicism of his own as Genealogy, Nietzsche had distinguished between three uses of history - the antiquarian, the monumental and the critical (ibid. ix). His use of the term 'suprahistorical' seems to fit in to the second category - "while antiquarian history seeks to preserve the past (and) monumental history wishes to emulate it ..." (ibid. ix). In the present context, the meaning of 'suprahistorical' goes much with Foucault's use of it (*Nietzsche, Genealogy and History in Language, Counter-Memory and Practice*, pp. 139- 164.). Suprahistorical, for Foucault, is the character of "a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past" (152).

⁷ An idea by V. Sanil which finds further development in the present study. In *Development, Language and Philosophy: A Kerala Experience* (Vision 7:1, 1998) he argues that the 'monotonous' philosophical debates in Anand's novels is philosophy in its inverted form. This philosophical theme, in fact, produces a material for constructing the foreign tongue which will articulate the original work as translation (39).



TH-11633

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS OF GENEALOGY, GENRE AND TRANSLATION

The two novels, *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu (MU)* and *Gowardhande Yathrakal (GY)*, which exemplify two different phases of Anand's literary career, are the chief focus in this chapter. They are analysed vis-a-vis the problematics, viz. Genealogy, Genre and Translation. While analyzing the text under the thematic of genealogy, the chapter attempts to redefine the term genealogy itself, finding its possibility to be in opposition with our traditional sense of history. Genre, as we use it, does not follow a structuralist root, where the discourses that determine literature are viewed as a set of laws outside the text. On the contrary, for us, the law of genre is set by the text itself which it simultaneously tries to transgress. Under 'Translation' we try to connect the philosophical and the literary in Anand's novels. As we will see, two features of Anand's writings, his seemingly translated language and his disappropriation of his own mother tongue are the mediators of the author's philosophical and literary genius.

Genealogy and Nakedness

The master builder walked to the end of the burial ground, turned, gripped the barbed-wire fencing and gazed at the resurrected human forms: loyal subjects who fought faithfully for their kings and got hacked and shot down by their enemies; men who were slaughtered as they held aloft the standards of their countries; women who flung their bodies into the fire to save the honour of their clans and dynasties; men who slaved, coughed and spat their lives out, building forts, palaces, factories and tombs; men who

were conferred medals and trophies for their skills in enhancing their countries' pomp and splendour... The medals and trophies had vanished. The armour and costumes and vermilion marks which adorned their bodies had all withered away like dry leaves. The honours, ideals and ideologies they had invented in order to create a halo around their heads had all dissolved into thin air. They were mere naked bodies with no names or history attached to them. Exhausted, with their faces cold and expressionless, rocking their heads, rubbing their sides against each other, grunting and bleating like animals they waited, for the master builder of Pataliputra to leave them and move on ...¹

Genealogy begins from nakedness. An encounter with history in which hidden things no longer bear any meaning. One realises that one is bare, separated from all masks. Sometimes, others point it out - like the little boy who shouted at the king that he is naked. One is naked at the time of his/her birth too. Genealogy's objective is to reveal this 'pudenda origo'.²

Now, can the characters and events in history actually get rid of the desire a historian or an author would have on them? Removed from their ornaments and achievement medals, the characters stand in front of us as bare human beings on whom anything can be marked by a historian or an author. Only a traditional sense of history can claim to transgress all the desire it has on history, which in turn would demand an accuracy of facts, laws of essences and permanence of the past. "Having curbed the demands of his individual will in his knowledge, he [the traditional historian] will disclose the form of an eternal will in his object of study." (Foucault, *Language* 158).

In other instances too, Anand exposes history's body of development and conversely, history's inscription on the human body.

Taking off their clothes, they dipped it down the well, pulled it to the top, wrinkled it and satisfied their thirst from the sweat and water. Ali and Gowardhan sat there tired, keeping their clothes to get dried. They both were naked; like small children.

Some time later Gowardhan turned back and kept his hand on Ali's shoulder keeping himself close to Ali's body and called him, "brother."

After their childhood when they had played around naked, in the long period of time when they lived the life of slaves, this was the first time that Gowardhan called Ali like that. It was not that they were not aware of the fact that they were brothers. But, slavery had wiped out all relationships between them (GY 26).

Nakedness exposes all marks on the body which has traveled through history. It is equivalent to understanding history as carrying a series of jolts and surprises, "with its moments of intensity, its lapses; its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells..." (Foucault, *Language* 145). Evaluating the forces that take possession of interpretations, genealogy's main task is to explain them in terms of health and sickness. A slave³ body generates reaction and *ressentiment*⁴ from its inability to affirm itself. Even if it is empowered later, or it has become the 'master', it cannot escape its becoming sick as reaction and *ressentiment* do not change their characters. It is not in a Socratic sense, that evil is the result of a mistake or a turning away from truth, but in the sense that "the body maintains, in life and in death, through its strength or weakness, the sanction of every truth and error, as it sustains, in an inverse manner, the origin – descent" (Foucault, *Language* 147). Hence a prostrate or mutilated body need not always be that of a slave, which is destructed by history, but it can be that of a master as a field of an insurmountable conflict.

An ineffaceable connection between body and history is evident in the above two examples. Nakedness here does not mark bodies in a racial or social type nor is it used to specify any generic characteristic. Nakedness is that non-place of history where forces encounter, qualifying the strength and weakness of an instinct. Nakedness exposes those adversary forces at play, which decide that the power of interpretations do not belong to a common place. Nietzsche goes back even to the conception of human beings as a single body of species at the time when it had to struggle against adverse circumstances. What derives from this conception is that, different interpretations matter only within the domain of differences inside a species. Noble or Slave, good or evil, all belong to the single body of human species. It has to carry these characteristics as its mark of genesis; a mark which will constantly warn all those who try to take up the identity of any kind of goodness as the truth of the species.

But an insightful method of genealogy cannot content itself only with a model of the anthropological family tree or the kinship structure. Nor can it behold its findings, which themselves are interpretations, as a kind of truth. As practiced by Nietzsche, its approach is multi-faceted. "Genealogy is at times the record of a search for the roots of a cultural phenomenon, at others the pursuit of its multiple ramifications, the observation of changes in the course of its development, the insistence upon the careful distinctions to be made between root and branch, between a tree and its fruit" (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* xiv). Thus it is not the repetition of an injustice defined as the gap between professed justice and disseminated justice that interests us. It would be even more incorrect to delineate such a repetition if we go into the dynamic and evasive nature of such concepts like justice and freedom. What is more appreciable and aesthetic would be the depiction

of the transmutation of values which hold them, finding out the decadence factor at each historical juncture. For Nietzsche, it is an interpretation of the conflicting characters of self-affirmation and *ressentiment* within an individual, which he does at different levels – in religion, in music, in ethical thought, and physiologically at the level of the body.

In this manner, it is not the innocent who are punished or the endless wait of justice which merits our enduring concern, but it is the very notion of justice which demands our analysis with its differential dynamics in history. Nietzsche traces the evolution of the concepts “good” and “evil” to Pre-Aryan Rome and Early Greece. The masters, the nobles and the powerful of these periods called themselves “good”. This goodness, which preceded all its reversals in later periods, worked on this equation: good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed. Latin ‘bonus’ (good) has its etymology from the word ‘duonus’ (warrior) in the same manner ‘bellum’ (war) has synonyms duellum, duenlum. It is clear from this derivation that ‘goodness’ had a different connection in ancient Rome. German ‘gut’ (good) is also said to have had its roots in Gottlichen (godly) and in Goths (Goten), the name originally standing for nobility. Nietzsche’s genealogy tells us that, rather than having had to face a revenge from outside, the aristocracy had to confront its enemy from within – the priests.

The knightly-aristocratic features of powerful physicality, a rich, burgeoning health had to confront the intelligent priests. It is true the other way round too, the priests’ ill-health, inaction and emotional volatility gave them the power of intelligence. The priests despise everything the knightly-aristocracy had involved itself in, to preserve their natural state of abundance – war, adventure, hunting and all those activities which demanded strength, freedom and high-spirit. “The very greatest haters of world-history

have always been priests, as have the most ingenious ... Human history would be a much too stupid affair were it not for the intelligence introduced by the powerless.” (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 19).

Thus with the two terms aristocratic morality and slave morality, Nietzsche proposes that equality, justice and compassion are not the timeless absolutes they purport to be, but the outcome of a violent struggle between two opposing systems of value. While aristocratic morality stands for active and ruthless self-affirmation even to the point of death, slave morality is the reactive and resentful response of the weak to their domination by the self-affirming strong.

Is not the whole idea of injustice and a valorization of human rights of the weak a reactive thinking which aims only at the conservation and preservation of life? Is not the mental state arising from it similar to that of a will for nothingness rather than willing nothing? What is the end aimed at by ‘the morality of custom’ breeding a human who is entitled to make promises, or who is responsible? Nietzsche calls him a ‘sovereign individual,’ “the individual who resembles no one but himself, who has once again broken away from the morality of custom, the autonomous supramoral individual” (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 41). Now his consciousness of freedom and responsibility will sink into his innermost depths and will become an instinct. He would call it ‘conscience’ and abide by it. Conscience is another decadent factor that preserves impulses of the species which would weaken it as a whole in the long run.

There is not much explanation about the priest standing inside the cell when Kamran was blinded by Ali Dosth through a dreadful act. Only three sentences in the narrative mention him.

There was one more person in the room. A priest, huddled in one corner of the room, frightened. His lips were hastily chanting God's name (GY 43).

But with this symbol, a whole new dimension is given to the narrative. The priest reveals all the conflicts Humayun had to undergo when he passed the verdict upon his brother. The priest represents Humayun's prickly conscience, feeling of guilt in punishing his brother. But at the same time, the priest is the embodiment of revenge. The priestly Jew perpetrated slave ideals and succumbed to *ressentiment*, "...the Jews, that priestly people ultimately knew no other way of exacting satisfaction from its enemies and conquerors than through a radical transvaluation of their values, through an art of *the most intelligent revenge*" (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 19). The priest stood inside the cell but outside history, as a mediator of will to power and *ressentiment*.

Earlier, when confronting nobility, the priest had already started his becoming-sick. Now when he begins to organise masses (herd) in history, he has to be more sick in order to associate himself with the sick and the underprivileged. Nietzsche recognises those different roles of an ascetic priest as "saviour, shepherd and advocate of the sick herd" (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 104).

The priest is also a symbol of the author. He changes the direction of the *ressentiment*. Either the *ressentiment* is directed to someone outside the herd or they are asked to blame themselves for their sufferings. "With the priests, *everything* becomes more dangerous, not only cures and therapies but also arrogance, revenge, perspicacity, extravagance, love, the desire to dominate, virtue, illness." (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 18). In the hands of the author, humans feel too much innocence and too much guilt. Finally

Kamran, whose being punished was witnessed by a priest, takes several pilgrimages to Mecca before he dies.

At this point there is also a clear distinction between an event in history considered to be related to a necessary continuity and the event taken in its singularity. The former, according to Foucault, aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a teleological movement or a natural process. History in a theologic or rationalistic approach faces the same fate. But a “wirkliche Historie”⁵ always places singular events in the hands of chance – A chance that always makes a litmus test of the human agency’s will to power only to fall finally at the hands of an even greater chance.

Hence, by leading a set of debates to a point of convergence with a desire to extract absolutes from them is the same as finding out a primordial intention within the process. “Effective history (or genealogy) differs from traditional history in being without constants.” (Foucault, *Language* 153). If any constant were possible in history it would have nullified any effect of the grounding in the time and place of the historian. On the other hand, genealogy, which has already taken ‘origin’ not as an inviolable identity but as a disparity, acknowledges that this knowledge itself is only a perspective. It acknowledges its ‘system of injustice.’ “Its [genealogy’s] perception is slanted, being a deliberate appraisal, affirmation or negation...” (153). Thus knowledge could create its own genealogy from a historical sense and at its opposite side history could be ‘effective’ only with a genealogy of its own.

Ethics and Political Practice

A genealogy of political practice and ethical thought as they correlate with each other in Indian history has been sketched by Anand in his essay, *Ethical Thought and Political Science* in his anthology of essays Jyva Manushyan. His purpose in this essay stretches along, showing the gap existing between the ethical thought of a period and the political practice of the same period. Taking Buddha-Maurya-Gupta periods, which are also called the periods of second urban culture of India, as the chief focus, his problem is to find out how political practice of a time followed the ethical thought of the same period or how distorted were the relations between the two. The general trend is the emergence of ethical thought as a by-product of the existing political thought of a time which in turn is decided by the period's material and social demands.

Anand details how the Buddha tradition was successful in its early years to persuade the rulers to follow a benevolent despotism. But later the interaction between the political practice of Magadhan rulers and the ethical thought upheld by the Buddhist tradition underwent a major crisis. This crisis was the result of two factors which were complementary to each other. With the institutionalisation of the ethical thought introduced by Buddha, all those who had faith in it began to desert it. In addition, changing economic and social conditions as well as political practices from time to time failed to have a proper interaction with the ethical thought of the Buddhist tradition. Ethical thought and political practice went in their own way, leaving the society in a degenerated state of mutual hatred and competition (176). Anand states that on the one hand, Buddha did not try to alter the historical and social setting of his time but by suggesting the rulers to be sympathetic to the people he was acknowledging the class

structure and the sovereign political system of the period. On the other hand, when Buddhism became an organised religion, its ethical thought lost all its say over the political system.

Similarly, after benevolent despotism India witnessed the emergence of Rule of Law. It happened when foreigners invaded the country and when they later began to settle here. Unlike many native Hindu rulers, the foreigners who became 'Sultans' in the country acted with the spirit of mercantilism. Rule of Law, thus developed as a contract between the rulers and the ruled. "This equality [through a contract] leads both parties towards some abstract principles which are also above the individual and can be generally followed by them. The Rule of Law, Democracy, Secularism and the like appear in capitalist societies like this." (179). In the specific context of India, Rule of Law emerged in a way different from other industrialised countries in Europe after the Renaissance in the Middle Ages. The proponents of this idea, initially the Muslim invaders and later the British colonists, themselves corrupted it as their interests were never the welfare of the native people. If not in book, at least in practice two kinds of laws existed simultaneously - one for the people and one for those who wielded power.

Anand states that before the idea of 'beyond law' took shape, the law had degenerated in all the lands of its origin. The author identifies several factors behind this degeneration – though industrialisation and capitalism freed humans from superstitions and religiosity, over time, enhanced material production resulted in an accumulation of capital in some powerful hands. The law became a tool for wielding power.

The concept of 'beyond law' in India found its personification in Gandhi. Anand's essay which attempts to map the correlation between ethical thought and

political practice in Indian history concludes that even the principle of morality, 'the final link in the chain of ethics,' could not find a true expression in the political practice of the country. The reasons were two-fold: aiming at a speedy development of the nation there was a centralised mode of governance after independence which corrupted the administration. Its wielding of absolute power resulted in the declaration of Emergency ignoring the nation's development of over thirty years as an independent entity. According to Anand, the second reason derives from Gandhi's belief that the ability for moral judgement emerges from a supernatural power which he places above his conscience. This resulted in an increased emphasis on religion and communitarianism on one hand and a tendency on the part of the people to follow so called charismatic, superhuman and great souls in politics instead of a participatory and responsible political practice.

Anand's inferences in this essay about the history of justice in the Indian context include its gradual change in the source from which it has disseminated. From the powerful class in olden days to the independent individual in modern times, justice was 'owned' by different parties. "The thing called justice thus changed from something to be acquired to something to be created by the self." (187). But this gradual 'evolution' of ethical thought was not anchored by a proportionate and similar progress of moral feeling or conscience. On the contrary, in most cases, economic systems and class structures utilized ethical thought of a period to legitimise existing structures. Chances for the contamination of ethical thought are very high in all ages since they fall into a void with the absence of a principle of morality.

Taking a cue from this idea of morality/value/principle/conscience, Anand introduces his theoretical guidelines for the concept of justice for posterity. Man has already begun his journey towards this in two ways:

i) by acknowledging and beginning to act individually and independently in terms of moral values.

ii) through the attempts and partial successes of various Marxist revolutions which questioned existing socio-economic structures. These efforts proved that an idea which thinks and imagines beyond existing socio-economic situations is inevitable to bring forth a development in the ethical thinking of a collective.

Let's now briefly check how much the ideas formulated by Anand can withstand a genealogical investigation. A seemingly well structured and logically coherent depiction of the history of ethical thought and political practice, our chief interest in the essay would be to show how the origin has presented itself as an 'inverted image' to the author. It is a plebian understanding of history that, with powerful men began the story of injustice, hatred and all kinds of evil. That it was from them the common people had to free themselves in order to regain their self-respect and freedom. The validity of such a knowledge of history has to be understood in terms of the evaluative force at work in the historian.

Nietzsche goes back to primordial and person to person relationships like those between buyer and seller, debtor and creditor to explain the origin of all social contracts. Man learned to measure himself against others through setting prices for things, evaluating values, devising equivalents and making exchanges (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 51). Over time, this 'measuring animal' found it quite natural to think that 'everything

has its price; and everything can be paid off". "Justice at the earliest stage of its development is the goodwill which prevails among those of roughly equal power to come to terms with one another, to 'come to an understanding' once more through a settlement – and to *force* those who are less powerful to agree a settlement among themselves." (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 52).

If an individual who has normally enjoyed the care and protection of a community harms it by any means, invites its fury to the limit. The criminal is then a debtor who has deceived his creditor. Against Anand's postulation that the development of moral values/conscience in individuals would help the society to reach a high moral standard, Nietzsche would argue, "As the power and self-confidence of a community grows, so its penal legislation is always relaxed..." (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 53). The society would be similar to a wealthy creditor whose humanity has developed in proportion to his wealth.

From the proceedings it is easy to infer a clear inversion of the actual image of justice at the origin. As long as historical analyses associate just actions, good and humane with reactive forces which have always tried 'to separate active forces from what it can do,' the image would be inverted before us. "Genealogy is the art of difference or distinction, the art of nobility; but it sees itself upside down in the mirror of reactive forces." (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 56). This has endowed Anand with all sorts of categories like moral values, conscience, culture as a symbol of 'purified' individuals etc. Bringing justice and ethical thought within the 'spirit' and development of history, Anand succumbs to reactive forces which have developed *ressentiment* and ascetic ideals. Even if there is an accumulation of reactive forces, they do not triumph in history. In their nature, what they can do is to separate active forces from what they can do. This

separation rests on a fiction, on a mystification or a falsification. Historian's history is an example. "Consciousness and conscience are simply enlargements of this reactive image..." (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 56).

Nietzsche uses two terms, *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*, to record the true objective of genealogy. While *herkunft* is related to descent, *entstehung* designates emergence. Investigating descent in its genealogical sense is not the identification of an exclusive genre of a trait or an idea which will justify its belonging to a class. But, it is a search for various singular traits which have intersected in an entity to make it a difficult network to unravel. "The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events." (Foucault, *Language* 145 – 146).

Thus genealogy keeps itself away from evolution, and from a traditional way of giving meaning to human history by alleging continuity to it. The Principle of Morality can never be 'the final link in the chain of ethics' anymore than the concept of liberty fundamental to man's nature. Such notions arise when descent is considered in a traditional sense of evolution. On the other hand, genealogy traces a trait in history in order to show its inverse function, the reversal of truths caused by it and its role in accidents and forgotten events of the past. "...to follow the complex course of descent is to discover: that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents" (Foucault, *Language* 146).

Entstehung (emergence) describes all events in their singularity, in terms of the quality and strength of forces coming to the centrestage, to revert their meaning from time to time. In this attempt, the point that the quality and strength of forces do not have a

meaning which is constant and that they do not exist independent of the subject who traces its emergence in time is stressed.

According to Deleuze, the actual task of genealogy as critique is two-fold: critiquing the practice of referring back of all things to an original value and critiquing the practice of referring all values to an origin and determining their values (Deleuze, *Nietzsche 2*). Thus a genealogist can neither follow a value which stands for itself nor a value which stands for all. "In placing present needs at the origin, the metaphysician would convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realisation at the moment it arises." (Foucault, *Language* 148). When Anand says that man has already begun his journey towards the achievement of the Principle of Morality, which ^{man} he can evoke from his own conscience, rather than allowing it to be imposed from outside, ^{Anand} he emulates a metaphysician who seeks a unified human self in history. When throughout in his writings Anand emphasizes the gap that exists between professed justice and disseminated justice and when this theme in *Gowardhande Yathrakal* has been given a validity in history, he seeks a realisation of an (obscure) purpose. In Anand, punishment has not taken a humanitarian face in the modern age; justice has always been absurd. He misses the real danger of power in two ways:

i) by depicting a punishment which has never become humanitarian, the criticism goes to superficial levels which could be opposed with statistics and facts on the contrary. What is pushed to the blind spot is the real nature of modern power that has transferred its hold from the body to the soul; where 'knowing thyself' and contemplating and expressing one's true sexual nature has become an obligation for each individual.

ii) by picturing an ongoing absurdity of justice, his historicism halts at the level of certain modernist categories like the principle of morality, freedom of the individual, objective reality etc.

In another instance, when Anand writes that Gowardhan had been sentenced to death, though he had not done anything wrong, 'and even the people were of the opinion that Gowardhan is innocent', he brings in the opinion of the people in history as an episteme which seeks its realisation in the past in the same manner as in the present.

Hence genealogy considers nobility and baseness, high and low as the differential and critical elements in its investigation. Critique can only go along with finding out the emergence of new interpretations, new dominations in history. It is not the search for an absolute or relative and utilitarian emergence of values, but a search and critique of values of origin as well as origin of values. Genealogy, thus is not the interpretation of a meaning hidden in discourses but the finding out of forces which have surreptitiously appropriated the system of rules of discourses which qualifies that an essential meaning should be dispensed with. "Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination." (Foucault, *Language* 151).

A Foucauldean reading of Anand would reveal that a narrative along the lines of various technologies of the self would have been most typical of the discourse about a modern individual. It amounts to the analysis of the processes of subjectivisation, by which the individual is bound himself to his own identity and consciousness and, at the same time, to an external power. What Anand skips away is this political 'double bind' of

the modern state which has integrated subjective individualisation with procedures of objective totalisation to an unprecedented degree. Had Law not been taken as one of the grids of his narrative which parallels the juridico-institutional approach to the problem of power, and had it been a concern over the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects' very bodies and forms of life, the narrative could be said to have left the domain of history and could be said to have taken a much more insightful approach of genealogy. For, now-a-days it is not important to find ways to liberate oneself from the powers of the sovereign. What is important is to think about the point of indistinction in the body of power, where the "techniques of individualisation and totalising procedures converge" (Agamben 18). In short, as Foucault puts it, it is time to think of a power with the king's head cut off.

Genre

Engaging directly with the philosophical debates Anand invokes in his works, it is common for the reader to ask himself what marks them in the domain of literature. While talking about the abyss existing between professed justice and distributed justice throughout history, has not this author's literariness also faced an injustice, in the process of being included and excluded at the same time, in the genre of literature? The problem, as approached by Derrida, is addressed here under various concepts which could reveal the edicts of law in their representational and historical characters. Thus, our task is to analyse the processes like the play of a certain relation between literature and truth, the mimetic quality of the language which makes the law as well as which makes literature,

the impossibility of a proposition being a member of any genre but at the same time being a member of many genres etc.

The traditional way of approaching the 'what is' of literature diversified into two ways – a structural and a functional approach. Whereas a structural approach enquired about the basic units or instances that constitute 'literature,' a functional approach went on to identify what these 'units' or instances 'do' in the entity called literature. Todorov finds that instances of a weightage given to the functional approach are numerous. He locates this in the observations by Heidegger like 'art is the enactment of truth' or 'poetry is the foundation of being through language' etc. (Todorov 2).

Pursuing the structural identity of literature has brought in long lasting debates since Aristotle. The structural exercise began with a definition of "art as imitation." Inside this definition itself, literary genres like the novel, short stories and plays, unlike poetry, had to face questions of 'true' or 'false.' At this point, literature had to be categorised as fictional. The definition demanded more precision when it came to 'minor' literatures like proverbs, riddles, etc. Equally confusing was the problem, while considering myths as literature.

Ideas like beautiful, pleasing and artistic were introduced initially with a utilitarian dimension to support the definition of art as imitation. Later a non-utilitarian dimension was given to the idea of imitation and a second definition for literature and art as a whole was developed. With this, art was considered as "expression for expression's sake." Further modification of this definition took place in later periods when the idea of 'beautiful' was replaced by form and later by structure. This definition of art dominated a

major time span of its development. Literature as *system* is like “a language that attracts attention to itself through its systematicity alone, (and like) a language that becomes autotelic.” Autotelism accounts for the opacity of languages’ representational character in literature (Todorov 5). Literature, as a system of work could then easily develop a science of poetics along and within it.

This approach, according to Todorov, may well go with poetry, where the object is “accomplished in itself.” But when it comes to prose, especially novel or short story, it would be wrong to argue that the language used in it, sacrifices for the *system* its representational character anymore than it loses the same in normal conversation. The meanings of system, opacity and autotelism must be clearly differentiated. To quote an example by Todorov, a badly written history book, though systematic in nature, will not fall into literature. This is against the second definition about literature we have come across. This history will not fall in the category of literature because, the opposition here is still between ‘true’ and ‘false’ and not between ‘true/false’ and ‘fiction.’ This leads us to think about various discourses that mark the literary. But a structuralist task has to go a long way in studying these discourses since the ‘genres,’ the sub-divisions, inside literature are determined by more complex discursive practices than those which constitute ‘literature’ and ‘non literature.’

Consider this:

“Can I join you,” he asked the ants, “let us chat and walk.”

The ants said: “But if you join our ranks you may not reach the countryside by night.”

“Doesn’t matter. We will reach some village some night!” He said.

“There may not be any feast in that place that day.”

“That too doesn’t matter.”

They walked together. While walking the ants again said. "Well, Gowardhan, this concept of speed poses a strange problem. Sparking off a fight between distance and time, it turns upside down whatever has happened and whatever is yet to happen. See, you, who have started to walk with us, will find that many of the roads you have travelled along are still yet to be traversed."

"That too doesn't matter," he said, "Most of that yet to be covered can also be considered as those already covered, can't we?" (*GY 268*).

This dialogue with which the 'novelist takes leave from the act of writing the novel and assigns the reader to take up his role' helps us to think beyond the historicist and structuralist treatment of genres. First of all, it gives a symbolic expression of the truth of literature as something to be achieved. The scene of Gowardhan joining the group of ants is the author involving himself in the process of inscription. But at the very moment he decides to write, the thematic of the inscription, the initial sentences scribbled down, carry with them a law of their own. But the ants warn Gowardhan that he may not reach the village if he joins them. Entering "this strange institution called literature" is on the one hand, to appropriate an 'essence' in one's own writing, conforming oneself to the laws of the institution. But Gowardhan expresses the interest of a work in its singularity. An intention to break away from the essential nature, from the truth at a horizon. Gowardhan replies: "Doesn't matter. We will reach some village some night!" A countryside or village is the destination - a destination of literature for those who view it in terms of its laws. There would be rest and sleep there. A point of actualisation and at the same time "a promise of salvation" from the law.

Getting away from the truth of literature can be accomplished even in the treatment of metaphysical themes. The movement and journey of ants is metaphysical as

regards Gowardhan's idea of getting into a village. Derrida says, "A work laden with obvious and canonical 'metaphysical' themes can, in the operation of its writing, have more powerful 'deconstructive' effects than a text proclaiming itself radically revolutionary without in any way affecting the norms or modes of traditional writing." (Derrida, *Acts* 50).

Derrida delineates the internal division within the concept of 'mimesis' in order to show the history of literature with its "paradoxes of the supplementary double." (Derrida, *Acts* 139). Mimesis, he says, need not intend a true imitation. Plato's engagements extended either up to condemning mimesis in itself as a process of duplication or up to disqualifying mimesis in function of the model that is "imitated."

According to Derrida, the whole history of the interpretation of literature has found its limits within diverse logical possibilities opened up by the concept of mimesis. But in this process, these interpretations have always befallen to the treatment of writing in terms of the truth of Logos. "... [in all these efforts] mimesis is lined up alongside truth: either it hinders the unveiling of the thing itself by substituting a copy or double for what is; or else it works in the service of truth through the double's resemblance (homoiosis)." (Derrida, *Acts* 135).

Derrida goes on to say that there has perhaps been more than one kind of mimesis. Since, at present it is not a question of an original and its correct or incorrect imitations, but of the self-duplication of repetition itself. His critique clearly focuses on the development of logos in/of the *on* (being-present) of ontology. Accordingly, on the one hand, the being-present was defined in various forms, essence and existence, the oppositions between matter and form, objectivity and subjectivity, of reality etc. On the

other, giving a secondary position to appearance, a major doubling was accomplished. "...from anything that, presenting it *as* being-present, doubles it, re-present it, and can therefore replace and de-present it...the representation upon the present in presentation" (Derrida, *Acts* 140).

The above excerpt from the novel *GY* can also stand as a representative of the whole exercise within the novel which the author has put to work but at the same time wants to transgress. It is the call for a uniform law for the ruler and the ruled, but at the same time the exposition of the illogicality of a general, universal law. It is obvious that if Anand's writing, were "history", it would not have qualified as literature. Similarly, had the Law not fallen in an irremediable fissure, there would not have been any possibility for literature too. Or more precisely, only because the Law contradicts itself, is it called Law and we are forced to look for "the law of laws".

When many characters in the novel loom under an anxiety of general lawlessness, the narrative transgresses the law in its style. Pure events which exist only in history (Kamran being blinded by Ali Dosth) and historical characters thinking of history (Rani Kamala Devi's memories at Siri Fort) bear the mark of fictive narrativity. It is therefore no more a question of the reality of the historical referent, since for it to be achieved one has to care for the law. The events in these narrations are such that one is compelled neither to believe nor to disbelieve them. Derrida correlates fictive narration as "the simulacrum of narration and not only as the narration of an imaginary history" (Derrida, *Acts* 199). It is fiction as narration as well as fiction *of* narration at the same time. It is the story of a search for the genealogy of justice and freedom, wherein the narrative itself has to justify and make itself free. Gowardhan has to finally give his own definition to what

has already happened and what is yet to happen. He has to define himself at each moment in terms of the distance already travelled and the distance yet to be travelled.

The speed with which the ants in the excerpt travel gives space for *différance*, though not an interminable one, since as the ants themselves say, “you may not reach the countryside by night.” Gowardhan by his virtue, by virtue of the text, makes it an interminable *différance* when he says, “We will reach some village some night!” The ants’ intention was to make Gowardhan aware of the imitation he is making when he walks with them; making him aware of the deception of this double, this appearance. However, Gowardhan hesitates to represent the present which creates all knowledge of essence and existence, the oppositions between matter and form, objectivity and subjectivity, of reality etc. On the contrary, he insists on the being of becoming which is not represented – “...we will reach some village some night!”

It is the law of the law that one cannot and must not find out its subject. “It [the process of law] is neither natural nor institutional; one can never reach it, and it never reaches the depths of its original and proper taking-place.” (Derrida, *Acts* 205). In Kafka’s interpretation of nobles, they are delegated to keep the law, the essence of which is unknown to them. Unknown precisely because, there is not any essence for the law. Thus the “truth” of the law is this non-truth, the truth that there is no truth behind it. And Heidegger calls this non-truth, the truth of truth. “As such, as truth without truth, it [the law] *guards itself*, it guards without doing so...” (206).

In the excerpt above which presented itself as a story that can accommodate the entire novel, but which really is an excerpt from the novel, we see that the excerpt is

summoned before 'literature' in its singularity. Gowardhan, in this passage is the question before the law, but at the same time before whom the law has summoned itself. Persecuted and hunted by law, Gowardhan is a 'universal' icon; but this literary work stands before him in its singularity, to be judged for its 'literariness' – Gowardhan, the singular man, walking in the ranks of ants with his own law and destination. But the truth of law, the law of law is without essence, without signification. And since it has no essence, we are forced to seek its essence.

However, our interest can be focused on to the point to which the discourse of justice and/or of law in Anand's writings can attain a similar possibility as that of literature and/or *in* literature. Or else, our question would be, in Derrida's words, "what if the law, without being itself transfixed by literature, shared the conditions of its possibility with the literary object?" (Derrida, *Acts* 191). Considering a literary work as a group of propositions, it is able to classify them under different registers viz. everyday information, history, fiction, philosophy, etc. There will remain no propositions if we subtract them likewise from the work. So what holds them together as literature is their implicit movement in the text in terms of a kind of general 'framing and referentiality'. But Derrida argues that if there are no singular works, there cannot be literature. Hence each work is capable of and must be able to set its own 'law' which in turn must be transgressed by it. But the 'law' it makes for itself is 'guarded' by more powerful system of laws that are external to literature. This 'insufficient gesture', this 'singular performance' marks the 'literariness' of a work in the sense that here the "singular crosses the universal ...[and] the categorical engages the idiomatic" (213).

The system of laws outside literature which guards the law of literature must be viewed historically since the former always functions under some conventional guarantees. But the conceptual presuppositions this system of laws makes for itself remains vague and they themselves have to get their legitimisation from the law that makes literature. The guardians of these systems of laws are critics, academics, literary theorists, writers and philosophers. At this point Derrida asks, "...is it not necessary for all literature to exceed literature? What would be a literature that would be only what it is, -literature?" (215). A work in its singularity lays down conditions for its own performative which in turn is decided and guarded by a discourse outside literature. But at the same time, whenever a literary work recovers language beyond language it is limited by the rules of the game and also it lays its own limits of subversion.

According to Derrida, for a work of art, especially discursive art, in order to be identified likewise, it has to be remarked into a genre. This re-marking, this law of the law of genre is for him, "a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, a parasitical economy" (Derrida, *Acts* 227). This supplementary trait, or designation attributed to the text does not belong to the genre it fixes for the text. It belongs without belonging. Taking the genre 'novel' as an example, Derrida argues that the designation 'novel' in itself is not novelistic. This is a kind of participation without belonging. In terms of set theory, it is like the boundary of a set which comes to form an internal pocket larger than the whole by a process of 'invagination' and limitless overflowing. A more general nature of law has to be derived from this formulation – by questioning the condition for the possibility of law beyond an *a priori* of a counter-law.

Gowardhan's journey with the ants is a miniature form of the journeys he has made throughout in the novel. More than a journey, it is a kind of existence, a mode of discourse. The journey, for ants, ought to obey the law which brings with it all presentations of essence and existence, of being. But for Gowardhan who is also symbolic of the literary work, *Gowardhande Yathrakal*, it is the binding voice of the law, of the law of genre. He only wants to 'reach some village some night'. By this, he places himself within and without the work, within and without the law at the same time. His words toll the knell of historicity, overstep all boundaries of generality and genericity of the novel and the law that validates it. His own genealogy and the genericity of the text takes new forms before him which are formless themselves (note that Gowardhan was deformed in an encounter between state power and terrorists). Gowardhan agrees to walk in the company of ants; he will now obey the law pertaining to the journey of ants; he renders justice unto the law. But at the same time the injustice he has faced throughout his journeys in the novel itself has motivated him, or culminated with this journey with the ants. Again we stress our point that this excerpt at the end of the novel is the miniature form of the complete novel, *Journeys of Gowardhan*. His journeys along history, which from the very beginning, or from the very end where it begins, justify that 'distances [roads] yet to be covered can also be considered as those already covered'. The boundaries of spatial or temporal sequentiality within an objectifiable topology or chronology crumble. From the end, this passage makes an 'invagination' into the text splitting the borders and unsettling the common laws, editorial conventions etc. of our culture. The text is now without beginning, or end, without content and without edge. Or

more so, there is only content without edge – without boundary or frame – and there is only edge without content.

The author's hesitation to take the authority of the whole novel must be seen in this context. The status of the literary work remains questionable in terms of its boundaries, borderlines with other forms of discourses. But, as evident to anyone, this inclusion of historical narrative and philosophical fragments is not done by excluding literature from them. Nor does the former remain in an extraneous relationship to literature or even to a literary genre. The impossibility of Gowardhan reaching any particular destination is the impossibility of a law of genre not being overstepped by itself at its very origin; like the part exceeding the whole or like the novel beginning again from its very end.

If we consider it true that 'distances [roads] yet to be covered can also be considered as those already covered,' can we place the excerpt within the 'novel' anymore? If the excerpt is a simulacrum of the 'novel', where does it belong to, to the inside or outside of the work? The part has 'overstepped' its borders into the text, mixing the genres of literature and non-literature. The text has become larger than what appears to include it.

Analysing Maurice Blanchot's *La folie du jour* (The Madness of the Day), Derrida says that it is the singular literary work that gives law of genre its power. But finally it exerts this power on to the work itself. It, the law, like a woman, seduces these literary works to make them carry it along with them. This is the madness of the law which finally proclaims, like the woman who seduces, that it cannot be separated from the creative process anymore. "The law is mad. The law is mad, is madness; but madness is not the predicate of law. There is no madness without the law; madness cannot be

conceived before its relation to law. This is the law, the law is a madness.” (Derrida, *Acts* 251).

Our effort was to show how the ‘novel’ *Gowardhande Yathrakal* carries along with it a text which oversteps its being designated as a literary genre. Through an undecidability of those propositions, ‘distance already covered’ and ‘yet to be covered’, the literary work begins as well as ends at the same point; begins with its end and has the end as its beginning. We have also noticed how an ‘assault’ of law initiated the whole work which in turn was overstepped, disobeyed by the ‘novel’ in its narration, in making impossible a narration along the lines of the law (“if you join our ranks you may not reach the countryside by night”, “Doesn’t matter”). Also, the mimetic quality of language as law still bears its Platonian mark such that it gives a secondary position for appearance, assuming an original (origin) and essence behind every appearance. And by representing the present, it doubles it and replaces the appearance with representation.

Translation

Traditional approaches to translation foresee, on the one hand, a clear division between the author and the translator in terms of their right over their respective works, whereas on the other hand, a transparency, an unobstructed communication of the ‘unique’ meaning is demanded from the translated work. A kind of presupposition backgrounded these traditional approaches – a presupposition about a source text and a target text which are usually in two different languages⁶ and their realisation in an unchanged chronology of time i.e. Translation can only take place after or in terms of the original work. One can locate every concept that had ruled the discourse on translation, concepts like fidelity and

freedom of the translator, the 'eternity' of the original, singularity of meaning, etc. in its historicity. Besides, it is also possible to see these concepts as nothing but reflections of certain cultural practices and social demands which helped to keep certain discourses in society as dominant. Thus the entire epistemology of translation demanded a problematisation of its theory and practice. This was what happened with post-structuralist thought. "The translator is the agent of a cultural practice that is conducted under continuous self-monitoring and often with active consultation of cultural rules and resources, ranging from dictionaries and grammars to other texts, discursive strategies, and translations, both canonical and marginal." (Venuti, *Rethinking* 11).

When the entire thematic of translation has shifted its attention from finding an equivalent text in the target language to a process of transformation, an 'after-life' of the original through translation, there emerged a paradox of the text, that demands translation but at the same time is impossible to translate. This paradox is that of translation itself. Whereas, on the other end, the ontologico-temporal definition of the origin (or the original) is questioned leaving the original itself as a translation.

A rupture always evades the present while looking for the origin. It is a rupture and not *différance* in that, when meaning is deferred in the latter, its own temporality is not lost. But the former loses its own temporality at the very moment it captures its own meaning i.e. in the present. Repetition would have been a different way of defining the origin. It lacks any sense of the total-becoming it has gone through till the present moment, i.e. at the time of its quest for origin. On finding out an origin, repetition calls itself a repetition of that origin not being aware that the next moment's 'origin' would be different. Hence repetition is not aware of its own uniqueness in time.

If rupture and repetition is the inability to denote any origin, is there a rupture or a repetition which is original? Can we go on looking for an original meaning of these two, without facing ourselves with ruptures and repetitions? Finally, can 'Ruptures or Repetitions' be translated without there being a rupture or repetition in the 'translated text'?

Famine, like a swarm of locusts, from the west or the east, the south or the north, came flying and sat upon a province. It ate up voraciously all that was verdant in the region. Plants and trees became mere branches and twigs. Animals and humans got reduced to skeletons. Historians then christened the province, 1770. Then the swarm of locusts, with the same non-pre-plannedness with which they had come and roosted, took off to the sky and began their journey aiming for the next province. In that province, there remained ten lakh human skeletons. It became known by the name 1837. The swarm of locusts took off again. To a region that will later be called 1858 and where fifty lakh human skeletons were awaiting...

After many days, during a similar midnight, the extremely pretty goddess of disease wearing white clothes crossed the entrance of a town called 1403 and went floating across to a town called 1617 as if on the top of a wave. From there to 1836, to 1896, to 1907... (GY212).

Numbers, which always seem to be the most translatable, are the most untranslatable units here. Precise, countable, discrete and which have a one-to-one meaning, these numbers can perform 'equivalence' if they are translated. They seem to have an original signified too. These numbers, in fact, do not fall into any language. And therefore they do not need any translation too. But at the same time their signification is possible only within a language. They are at the same time inside and outside language.

All philosophical debates, especially those concerning mathematics and science in the novel must be seen in this context. Ramachandran the mathematician's discourses, the conversation between Galileo and Kepler, all of these make their way through the untranslatability of science and the translatability of literature; or vice-versa. Telling science in the language of literature or/and, more interestingly, telling literature in the language of science.

Being inside and outside of language poses another problem too – the impossibility of a genre. Do the numbers denote actual years of those happenings, as marked by the historians? Outside history what is the relation between a year and a happening? If they were actual years why are they anachronistic? How the law of chronology is maintained by genre, where chronology itself is a genre?

Deriving the idea of fluency of a literary narrative from the practice of translation, we reach at certain conflicting conclusions. Earlier, fluency of language in a translated text was considered a success of the translator wherein he allows a transparent communication between the foreign author and the reader. In order that the author showed his presence in the text, the translator had to make himself vanish from it. Venuti recognises various cultural and economic determinants and resultants of this practice. An increase in the proportion of translated 'transparent' texts in a language does not show an innocent exchange of cultures. On the contrary, transparency is the way of looking at the foreign with "the narcissistic experience of recognising his or her own culture in a culture other..." (Venuti, *Rethinking* 5). Transparency has increased the chances of dominant discourses in target languages becoming more dominant in the wake of an imperial foreign discourse. They legitimise each other through a discursive strategy in which

editors, publishers, reviewers, readers, and translators themselves are a part. Domestication of foreign texts increases readability and thereby their commodification. It also contributes to the cultural and economic hegemony of target language publishers.

What foreignises rather than domesticates the language of Anand is the translator within him. Always in conflict with the writer within him, the translator breaks all illusions of transparency and fluency by making himself present, pushing the author out of the text. This translator does not allow the reader to be “aggressively monolingual and culturally parochial” (Venuti, *Rethinking* 6). He takes the reader to a variety of syntactic and grammatical constructions of a language which remain foreign to the reader. Herein lies what Benjamin calls the “suprahistorical kinship of languages” (W. Benjamin, *Task* 74). And this intention of the translator to foreignise a text rather than domesticise it, exemplifies the “intention underlying each language as a whole” (W. Benjamin, *Task* 74). But if we stop here and try to analyse the problem of translation from the point of view of a single language, as Udaya Kumar’s analyses sometimes do, the task would not be complete. He states that Anand’s originals style themselves as translations. Unlike usual demands of translations, where the call for the recognition and repetition of translation arises from the “gesture made by the originals to announce and acknowledge their translatedness” (Kumar, 137), the translator of Anand’s work “has to work without the consolations of a self-sufficient original.”

It is not particular to Anand’s work alone that it acknowledges “a sense of insufficiency.” All works are insufficient and incomplete in themselves for that matter. Derrida’s formulation would make this argument clear: “The translation will truly be a moment in the growth of the original, which will complete itself in enlarging itself...”

(Venuti *Rethinking* 7, *Des Tours de Babel* 188). Paul de Man also had a similar argument: “That the original was not purely canonical is clear from the fact that it demands translation, it cannot be definitive since it can be translated...” (Venuti, *Rethinking* 7). Hence the task of the translator is not, unlike noted by Udaya Kumar, that he has to rightly respond to the original’s call for a complement which is the usual practice of every translator. Nor can he resort to a ‘resistant’ translation, keeping the translated nature of the original (here, Anand’s works), its strangeness, untouched. Udaya Kumar’s position would amount to a half postulation, i.e. the relating of the foreignisation process undergone by a text in the hands of a translator as an absolute intention from the part of a single language. Rather, the real task of the translator can be understood only if we study Benjamin’s succeeding formulation about the intention underlying each language as a whole. Benjamin adds that this intention on which the suprahistorical kinship of languages rests cannot be attained by a single language itself, “but which is realised only by the totality of their intentions supplementing each other: pure language.”⁷ (W. Benjamin, *Task* 72).

If it appears that Anand writes in a language other than literary, it is from a desire for a kernel of language which is intact, untouchable and virgin.⁸ Sanil writes about Anand’s novels, “Philosophical fragments build a wall and guard against the myth of an originary experience which awaits articulation in the novel.” (Sanil 39). A reader who looks for a literary language in these novels still holds on to the myth of this originary experience which is the non-existent kernel of a language. This demand from an unsympathetic reader is the demand of the Law. A demand from Law in its own language. A demand from Law for an intact kernel of experience. It is the author’s

foresight to nullify this 'necessity' through the discourses about farcical Law in his writings. "Over time, over time if not in book, at least in practice, two laws came to exist. One for the rulers and other for those who are ruled." (Anand, *Jyva Manushyan* 180).

Derrida calls this 'necessity', the desire for virginity (Derrida, *Ear* 116) in as much it is the irrational weightage given to presence, for being as presence, and a priority for an intact original and hence an origin. This desire, which in fact sets everything in motion gets more articulation in Anand's more recent novel, *Vyasanum Vigneshwaranum*. Here the author himself is also the reader, the reader of two incomplete works which stood ahead of time. Two processes, one that of the writer and the other that of the reader, are combined in this novel. From the part of a writer, it is a flight from an ever present kernel of experience sought after in literature.

The text carries this demand along with it only to reveal at the end that there cannot be anything (at) present outside the experience of language. "Time is the aspectual distinction of the verb. That means, what 'which is' is the verb. Since it is present, time is manifested." (Anand, *Vyasanum* 93). When the writer in *Vyasanum Vigneshwaranum* takes flight from this intact kernel of presence, which actually is non-existent, the reader within this novel emulates the desire of a common reader. His anxieties about the prophetic nature of the texts arises from the conception of an intact flow of time from past to present and then to future. Acting out himself the role of a reader, Anand in this novel is worried also about the incompleteness of the two narrations he had come across. He is worried about their virginity. It is said in the novel that the pages are torn away and those who have read it before have marked-it and scribbled many things in the margins. *Nishadapurana*, the book he was referring to, has lost its virginity. This desire of the

reader, on the other hand, itself unfolds only because the texts are incomplete; i.e. because the desire itself is interrupted and thwarted.

These two processes, that of the writer and of the reader, in its inscription makes the impression that they are philosophical and literary at the same time. At the fulcrum of time, whenever the texts appear to be easily translatable, they win the claim for a univocality of meaning. Take for example the word 'purana', the etymology of which is found to be in pura-nava (ancient and new at the same time). The option is left to the reader. If he finds it completely translatable, the author succeeds in his philosophy. If he finds it difficult to translate without an essential loss in meaning, it marks the limit of philosophy as translation.⁹

In Derrida's words, the text says, "translate me but whatever you do, don't translate me"¹⁰ (Derrida, *Ear* 104). But the whole confusion arises in and by time. On one hand, human experiences are rooted in Kriti which is as old as five thousand years and which resists their being pushed into Vismriti and Mriti. On the other hand, Kriti overloads the present with its memories of the past and a future which 'turns futile in the fury of the present'. One can see how Vardhamanan in *Vyasanum Vigneshwaranum* was branded a psychic when he walks ahead of time. This calls for an act which is at its extreme present. This calls for reading as translation. In a sense, Anand's 'violation of the orders of time' is an act of reading Kriti as an ever present inscription which at the same time is the cause of suffering. In this sense, it is also the process of translation which is an act of the present, unlike writing which is ever present.

Disappropriating One's Mother Tongue

Most of the approaches towards the idea of 'mother tongue' leave intact the sense of belongingness it generates in its speakers. This constant of appropriation which has the potential to breed different hegemonic discourses on language has undergone a deconstruction in Anand's use of the Malayalam language. The mother tongue is no more a natural property for him, which integrates him naturally into a community, but "the very language of the Law. And the Law as language" (Derrida, *Monolingualism* 39). It is through the very process of engaging in a philosophical discourse on justice and Law that Anand tries to disappropriate his own mother tongue.

Marc Crépon identifies three presuppositions inherent in such discourses on language. First is the sense of belongingness in language which defines it as a natural property. Its ownership gives rise to the possibility of identifying with a community which always becomes a political demand and need later on. Following Derrida, Crépon says that whatever constraints like institutional, academic or state exist, this sense of belongingness and identification is never put into question.

When this 'owned' language is presented as 'one' and common, identical in itself and identical for all, it makes this presentation to support the claim of 'one' culture. At the third level, the defence and promotion of a certain language calls for the preservation of a culture "identifiable in its uniqueness and its difference, in its purity and its homogeneity" (Crépon, *What* 3).

Anand's experience of Law is his experience of 'mother tongue' as 'monolingualism of the other'. It is no more a question of appropriating it at its maximum and mastering it. Nor is it a question of protecting or saving the language from

'invasions'. With his two fold experience of Law as language and language (of the other) as Law, Anand tears open the alienation which was masked under the identity of his language and culture. "The mother tongue is not, to borrow one of the most hackneyed of metaphors, the breast at which one has sucked since childhood, it is the law that others have imposed on us" (Crépon, *What* 6). Thus against charges of treason, Anand willfully brings in foreign words and grammatical and syntactic constructions of foreign languages into his own language. Following Derrida, Anand could say, "I (only) have one language; yet it is not mine" (Derrida, *Monolingualism* 21).

When Anand in his *MU* and later in *GY* attempts to unmask those lateral mechanisms of power which were outside those political theories of the State, it is also an exposition of the colonial essence of culture and language too. Conversely, all the characters in *GY*, from Chowpat Raja to Kothwal, from Gowardhan to Yaman, speak the same language, with the same intonation and the same rhythm. This is a deconstruction of the unilateral imposition of language which has made all culture essentially colonial.

Always failing to qualify as literary Malayalam, Anand's writings, on the other hand, uphold a movement towards 'promised language.' "This language exists only by translating itself into the language of the other, by deforming it, by making it undergo such a transformation that it can no longer be anyone's language. By means of this translation, monolingualism finds itself deregulated, the law is thwarted, the pseudo-property is invested with foreign bodies" (Crépon, *What* 10). And Anand's writings do this at two levels – through philosophical fragments that discuss the content of Law and nature of justice and through the language with which they are given articulation. Time and its effectuation in history come to him as an idiom.¹¹ It finds its way of expression

not through the author as a subject, but history carries his signature in getting itself articulated. Anand's 'promised language' is no longer the sacralisation of his mother tongue, but instead of it being his property, this language is a way of reaching the other through a timeless idiom.

¹ Desert Shadows, p. 141 (Trans. K.M. Sharrif), translation of *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu*. The extract is from a story told by the chief protagonist, Kundan, in the novel. Kundan wants to show how power uses its subjects merely for its own purposes.

² 'pudenda origo' (shameful origins) which appears in Nietzsche's *Dawn* (p. 102) only indicates an ignoble ancestry of an institution or a social practice. Genealogical analysis, as practised by Nietzsche is primarily opposed to the search for origins or 'Ursprung'.

³ Noble and Slave, two critical and genealogical elements introduced by Nietzsche for his genealogical investigations have been used and explained throughout this work.

⁴ The English translation of this term is resentment. Since in all of his works Nietzsche has retained this French word, we follow the same format.

⁵ "real history" – the term used by Nietzsche to represent genealogy.

⁶ There are instances where the author himself is the translator of the text into a second language. But even in such cases, the chronology is maintained.

-
- ⁷ Derrida delineates a translation contract at the root of every social contract. According to him, if a translation contract needs to take place, the bilingual person has to be equally bound to both languages. If he is not equally responsible in both the languages, resulting in a transparent translation, there is no agreement. And if there is no translation, then also there is no translation contract. Hence a Babelian situation, where one affirms the diverse nature of languages, is necessary for a translation contract. In Anand's writings, the enormity of foreign words, the designation of persons of other cultures in their own language, transliteration of foreign language verses etc. underline the existence of a responsible translation contract the author has entered.
- ⁸ "The metaphorical and musical nature of language cannot be seen in the works of Anand" (Jacob 12).
- ⁹ Udaya Kumar explains it as the 'constitutive openness to repetition – translatability ..' at the very origin of this word. Though this can be seen as openness, if it is to be identified as an 'openness to repetition', one has to subscribe to any of the two above mentioned options. i.e. either consider it as completely translatable or accept the difficulty of translating it.
- ¹⁰ Derrida uses this expression to denote the 'confusion of languages' in the biblical *récit* of Babel. According to him the word Babel can only be understood in the language in which it is written. Moreover, this proper name itself means "confusion" and which cannot be translated to any other language without confusion, without there being essential loss. "It can be confusedly understood as "confusion" – it is a word that will come to signify confusion." (Derrida, *Ear* 101).
- ¹¹ Derrida describes an idiom as 'that which is one's own.'

CHAPTER III

TIME AND ANAND'S NARRATION

Anand's works progress taking many debates along with them; let's call them philosophical debates to do justice to the contemporary readings and criticisms of it. In almost all the works, the roots and nature of such debates are self-evident. Many readings of his works move in the direction of a direct engagement with these debates; they try to derive some essence, moral or philosophy from it. One can, for example, locate and analyse the philosophical object at play in this statement, a statement by Galileo in the novel:

Knowledge is in fact knowledge alone. But those who possess it use it to rule those who do not. Man transforms knowledge into power. Knowledge, as we intended, did not bring liberation. It has bequeathed but a herd of persons who think that we know better than you and feign that we will not make mistakes. Scientists also joined the company of sorcerers, priests, commanders and the like. All of them hindering freedom (*GY* 190).

The major drawback of such readings would be that they generate a discourse about the text and thereby about the author, holding the literary object(s) they have found out to be present in the text in its 'presence,' instead of considering its play with its absence and presence at the same time¹. Nothing less than a sympathetic act, the latter would be the only way to avoid violence to the text; a violence in which the critic too would essentially find himself violated.

Criticising Anand's methodology as a whole, Vadakkedath Padmanabhan argues that the former's notion of a 'right' (or good) society is based upon a presupposition: "Those 'absolute concepts', like man, injustice, human intellect etc. placed against

religion, racial pride, faith and the madness resultant of these, which are subjected to Anand's thought are nothing but the concepts similar to those used by modern science as the basis of the universe...this [Anand's methodology] is same as the methodology of modernity which laid the foundation stone for classical physical science, mechanical rationalism and individualistic social thought." (Padmanabhan 16).

This chapter attempts not to locate the philosophical or literary object of the debates, nor does it correlate it to a literary movement or a philosophical trend. It tries to release the text from a fixity determined by a single meaning, giving way to an infinity of meanings which will further take hold of the text's terrain.

Justice for a Fulfillment of Time

Justice and history can be correlated in several ways. A changing interpretation and meaning of justice in history or the failures, absurdities and absence of justice in history – these are some of the ways in which the above two are usually connected. While all of these look upon the *what* and *how* of justice *in* history, Anand, in addition to the above, views justice to be inevitable *for* a history. To go one step forward, time in Anand is the basic unit of life as presence, which has to be constantly nourished, taken care of and revered for the fullness of Being. But who is responsible for any obstacle in its fulfillment? Or is the obstacle from the outside or is it only a matter of one's own interpretation about one's own fulfillment? These are some of the philosophico-political questions Anand tries to address. Let us go through a dialogue between Yaman, the Raja of virtue, and his assistant Chitragupta:

Yaman said, "Time originates in Justice. Injustice is but beyond time."

“Our argument was that time gets meaning with events. When events themselves cease to have meaning what can we do? When the execution of justice slips away from our control, when injustice becomes the rule of the day, when innocents are punished in the place of the guilty ...” Chitraguptan stopped (...)

“...Time becomes devoid of meaning,” Yaman completed Chitraguptan’s sentence: “It becomes so, that any event can be taken out and placed anywhere. Any person can be taken out from anywhere and placed anywhere. They will again start walking ...” (*GY* 260).

Engaging ourselves in this debate, assuming whatever premises on which it has founded itself to be true, our primary question would be, is it enough only to accept that there are meanings for events in history? What would be the nature and function of these meanings at different epochs in history?

It would be worthwhile to consider an event as one of the units that usurps discourses. An event can no longer be a pure-event as in Anand, where its relationship with the proposition it generates is final and exhaustive. Deleuze recognises three distinct relations within the proposition (Deleuze, *Logic* 12). First is denotation which chooses the image(s) that corresponds to a word in a proposition. Always faced with the question of ‘true’ or ‘false’, denotation maintains singularities, e.g. Proper names. Second is the manifestation – desires and beliefs which correspond to the proposition. ‘I’ can be considered the basic manifester, but only in the standpoint of speech, from which arise all possible denotations and other manifesters in the proposition. A major shift here is “a displacement of logical values ... (it is) no longer the true and false but veracity and illusion” (Deleuze, *Logic* 14).

Signification, the third relation, on the other hand, expresses itself in 'demonstration'. The two linguistic signifiers 'therefore' and 'implies' maintains a relation and a promise between the premises and conclusions. But its function is not to delineate truth from a group of errors. Signification carries with it only conditions for truth, the other side of which would be "that which is without signification or that which may be neither true nor false" (Deleuze, *The Logic* 15). Foucault recalls how Mendel was excluded from the discourses of nineteenth century biology when he tried to introduce a new biological object – hereditary trait – into the discipline (Foucault, *Order of Discourse* 60). Disciplines function in the premises of prior significations; in 'therefore' and 'implies'. Thus "a proposition must fulfill complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong to the grouping of a discipline; before it can be called true or false, it must be 'in the true'" (Foucault, *Order of Discourse* 60).

Defining Repetition

Without knowing externally, victims have an unworldly ability to perceive the danger going to happen (*GY* 78).

The perception of danger going to happen seems to arise from a synthesis of time rather than from a memory. Deleuze calls it a 'passive synthesis'. It is not that those forgone dangers - danger 1, danger 2 etc. are recorded in the victim's mind and from this the victim makes an apprehension of the danger to come. "The past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself in so far as it is a contraction of instants." (Deleuze, *Difference* 71). Hence we arrive at the problem of whether to look for repetition in the object or to consider it as an 'idea' by the perceiving subject; or to put it simply, what is the paradox

of repetition? Hume's and Deleuze's observation on it is similar. Trying to find out the for-itself of repetition, Deleuze develops Hume's statement, "Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it," which refers to the in-itself (or rather the inexistent in-itself) of repetition. While the in-itself of repetition causes it to disappear as it appears, leaving it unthinkable (this happens because, according to Hume, there is no change in the object whatsoever), the for-itself is related to passive synthesis. "Although it (passive synthesis) is constitutive it is not, for all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs 'in' the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and reflection." (Deleuze, *Difference* 71). It is with this process that a victim always perceives the danger ahead. But the repetition it attributes to objects derives basically from the difference its mind derives from them. To quote an example, though the four excitations which the four strikes of the four o'clock make are logically independent of one other, we rearrange them in our own axis of space and time, which makes a difference in the mind which otherwise does not have a space or time. Before differentiating the four strikes as repetition, there existed nothing between the mind and the excitations.

Now Gowardhan walks in history with questions about justice denied to him, the illogicality with which it treats the subjects and the like. Opposing it, many characters in history uphold the absoluteness of the law (the court scene where Gowardhan is subjected to trial etc.). Differences drawn from the generality of single elements are now in oppositional limits of two in such a 'case' (A repetition of this sort in history would be similar to what Deleuze considers as the tick-tock of the clock's strike rather than the tick, tick...). But it would be wrong to consider every repetition of 'cases' as open and

that between elements as closed. But rather, as Deleuze holds it, “The repetition of cases is open only by virtue of the closure of a binary opposition between elements” – the binary opposition between law and the illogicality of law. Kafka’s statement in *The Trial* approves this, “There is always an attraction between the law and the guilt.”

Enter-the-Open: Law as being in force without signification

Giorgio Agamben, an Italian philosopher and political theorist, recalls two major interpretations of Kafka’s legend, *Before the Law*. In the interpretation by Derrida, the law keeps itself without keeping itself. The doorkeeper in the story keeps nothing and the door is open and open to nothing. Whereas, the interpretation by Massimo Cacciari, talks about the impossibility of entering a door which is already open. “How can we hope to enter-the-open (*entrare-l’aperto*)?” (Agamben 50). Being in force without significance, (*Geltung ohne Bedeutung*) is the term given by Gershom Scholem to denote the function of law in everyday life. The law in Andher Nagar bazaar, that every item will be sold at the rate of one rupee per ser, has the character of being in force without any signification. Chowpat Raja’s law - that the size of the noose cannot be changed according to the neck-size of the condemned, does not also signify anything for a common man, apart from its motive of being in force.

Thinking along the lines of Agamben, Gowardhan and Kundan are always held in a state of exception by the law. The pure form of law affirms itself with the greatest force precisely at the point at which it no longer prescribes anything – “which is to say, as pure ban (Agamben 49)”. The prison manager in *MU* is the personification of a pure ban. He receives Kundan with great hospitality, and seriously engages in discussions with him.

But none of the discussions were enough to create a change in his attitude, i.e. to make a change in the being in force of the law.²

According to Agamben, life which is treated as a state of exception by the law, will bear huge losses and extreme consequences for its most innocent gesture or the smallest forgetfulness. Gowardhan was picked up from the street to be hanged only because the size of his neck was small, which does not signify anything. And later in the novel, his ears are cut off and he is banished because of a minor negligence on his part – he entered a protected area of the state unknowingly (Anand, *Gowardhan* ch. 81). It is exactly at this point that Walter Benjamin's interpretations of a law that has lost its contents and that is indistinguishable from life, as something which actually ceases to exist, get weightage over Scholem's. Scholem stops by saying that in a state where it is impossible to distinguish law from life, a pure form of law beyond its own content is maintained. This has its roots in the Kantian idea of a 'transcendental object' in the form of law. "... if we abstract every content, that is, every object of the will (as determining motive) from a law, there is nothing left but the simple form of a universal legislation" (*Practical Reason* 27).

Agamben shows how life determines itself in the two 'state(s) of exception'. In Scholem's interpretation, bare life subsists before the pure form of law and this is a state of virtual exception.³ But invoking Benjamin's 'inversion' of the thesis, Agamben says, "Law that becomes indistinguishable from life in a real state of exception is confronted by life that, in a symmetrical but inverse gesture, is entirely transformed into law." (Agamben 55). This interpretation also gives us a philosophy of history. When Kundan and Gowardhan are considered as mere instruments by power, being subjected to

suppression, their lives being taken away from themselves, the law that is being in force without signification cannot be anything but life itself. This is how Nietzschean 'self-affirmation' takes up life as 'will to power'. "I want it thus" makes a 'Yes' for life in opposition to the 'No' of decadent and reactive forces. It is in this context that Benjamin says: "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of exception' in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history that corresponds to this fact. Then we will have the production of the real state of exception before us as a task." (W. Benjamin, *Über den Begriff* 697, Agamben 55).

At the same time by releasing Gowardhan from confinement, allowing him to walk along the discourses of history, the author has done a Messianic task of converting a virtual state of exception to a real one. As Agamben observed about the old man in Kafka's *Before the Law*, who, according to him, finally succeeded to make the doorkeeper close the door of Law for ever, Gowardhan is given a chance by the author to live in a real state of exception. Now the law does not rest above him as a pure form, but rather, in him the law ceases to exist. In history, finding himself before a form of law that is in force without signifying anything, the author, using Gowardhan, tries to reveal the paradox of the state of exception, where it is unable to distinguish the transgression of the law from the execution of it.

Divide and Drama

Chowpat Raja indicates how absurdity can be rationalised. The sovereign that imposes its absurd law on the subjects rationalises its act.

The Kothwal, shepherd, Kasayi, Bhisti, whitewasher, carpenter, Kallu, everyone in this series is innocent, I know. That is not the point. In spite of all of them being innocent, the

law is right. The law you taught us... When Kothwal was taken to the gallows, the problem was that the noose didn't fit into his neck. The executioner said he would change the rope. But I said: the mechanism of law should be impartial. Don't change it in accordance with peoples' necks (*GY 13*).

This was the explanation given by Chowpat Raja to the East India Company's Resident to the country as given in the novel. Note that the Raja also ridicules Western rational thinking revealing itself in the inner coherence of the law given to him. The divide is total and complete – a divide not as much between reason and the failure of conceiving or coming into terms with this reason but as between a reason and a purposeful and goal oriented thinking in which a bare life finds always a chance to relate its actions with the sovereign power while placing itself inside a society which it has conceived itself to be true. This divide is the author. The sovereign and its subjects, life as well as death, stagnation and motion, stare at each other with a new strangeness unknown to them. “A society, if not excited by the flame of consciousness of justice, will lose its history for certain.” (*GY 7*). While Harischandra attempted a reconciliation of the sovereign and the subjects, Anand marks a divide. Gowardhan and many other characters begin to think ‘why there is injustice?’ All absurdities sketched by Harischandra in his play have been developed to a point of notoriety by Anand. It is not when the sovereign executes its subjects in a “dull festivity of punishment”⁴ that the notoriety is revealed, but at the very legitimisation of its power. At first it may seem that law's absurdity stems from a lack of reason inherent in it. Rather, it is through this absurdity that the sovereign power legitimises itself or acquires the power to rule. “The problem is not that of two laws, but that of absolute law...” (*GY 62*).

The text constantly reminds us that the characters we encounter, the events we take part, the concerns the author show, everything is fictitious, out of place from history and time, though humane to the core. It is not “I am suffering” but “I, the character, is suffering.” Take it as a dream, a mourning play, a literature – the author says; suffering will be philosophised by the characters themselves, if not I shall philosophise it, goodness will be rewarded in the text or I shall reward it in the reader’s mind. The dualities - Gowardhan/Ali Dosth, Humayun/Kamran, Shahjahan/Sarmad and the like, hence become more real than they originally were, in their attempts to stage a fiction within a fiction. The characteristic of a hedonist as well as a sufferer cancels each other. But everything is enacted on a stage, at a timeless conjuncture of fictitious history. Ibn Batuta thinks,

...which character really acts in a play, anyway? Led by the magic wand of the director, each character, with his or her life, is dancing to the director’s command... The assailants argued that they were revenging the world famous cruelties of the Emperor. But again, it is just that, the punishment was not effected upon the director, but on the characters those who were already punished... Sometimes those stark realities entering from somewhere capture the stage expelling the directors (*GY 32*).

Language also expresses what is unsaid within the matrix of a reverse logic. This is how Chowpat Raja, on knowing that Gowardhan had escaped from captivity, orders to hang the one who is standing before him in the series. Kasayi, Bisti and everyone till Kothwal could escape the death sentence earlier. But with the surface logic of language, where the unsaid has also a potential to be active in its absence, the death sentence again returns to them. Raja’s proclamation, in its future perfect tense, symbolises the sovereign’s ultimate threat to its subjects. At the limit, it effectuates the sovereign’s

monopolized possession over the temporality of language. Like Alice, the little mind unaware of the nonsensical temporality of language, the reader also shouts, “Which way, which way?”⁵ Chowpat Raja’s proclamation reveals that sense in language is not anything linear and unidirectional, but it is past and future simultaneously; whenever human subject touches it somewhere it immediately grows to the front and to the back with equal proportions.

If the convicted murderer Gowardhan who has escaped from gaol is not captured within fourteen days from now, the death sentence will be conferred back to Kothwal [the person standing just before Gowardhan in the series]. If Kothwal happens to escape in the interim, and is not captured within the next fourteen days, the shepherd [the person before Kothwal in this series] will be executed. If the shepherd disappears by then, and is not captured within the next fourteen days, Kasayi will be executed... (GY 61)⁶

But Raja’s law is innocent in its language to the extent that it could mock even the death sentence produced by it, taking meanings to the surface. Such inherent properties of language are usually termed as absurdities. Paradox is the concept used by Deleuze against a unidirectional determinism of ‘good sense.’ The latter’s characteristic feature is to demand an order orienting the arrow of time from past to future. “Good sense plays a capital role in the determination of signification” (Deleuze, *Logic* 76) which in turn forces us to choose one direction over the other. On the other hand, paradox is not the opposite direction but a revelation that sense always takes on both senses at once, or follows two directions at the same time. “If viscosity went on accelerating itself, it would eliminate the reasons behind rest in an unpredictable sense.” (Deleuze, *Logic* 77).

Ali Dosth: 'Emotionless Purity' of the sixth finger

In an age like ours, when good or bad, like or dislike is marked against everything, of all the characters in the novel, Ali Dosth would be the most incomprehensible. Every other character demands a comprehension, an understanding of unity, a privileging of reason. Though taken out from different epochs, a narrative manages to be communicative to the reader when it succeeds in making a common claim with the reader. Here, Ali Dosth is a becoming beyond of all communication. In him language does not communicate anything but it communicates itself. Ali Dosth's 'emotionless purity' of mind locates him beyond all the claims in the narrative. A slave captured alive in war and owned consecutively by those rulers who win wars, Ali Dosth was used by them to endow dreadful punishments on defeated kings and warriors. He had six fingers on both his hands, which according to him, never take part in any of the acts he does:

Where, whom he must serve - an Afghan, a Turk, a Hindu, a Prince, or the most powerful soldier; he didn't care. He didn't enquire whether his master is somebody who wins or somebody who loses. He didn't meditate on what he was doing as either good or bad.

Even his own happiness and grief were left unseen by him (*GY 70*).

Ali Dosth is a character whose distinction between work and deed cannot be differentiated either by him or by the author. Later the reader becomes aware of Ali Dosth's lack of authorial claim to his own acts. Two intentionalities emerge for this anxiety of the character – an *of* and a *for*. In a moment we understand that Ali Dosth's able-to-be has two faces, as Levinas views it; "the able-to-be is in danger of death, but the able-to-be is precisely what threatens" (Levinas, *God 47*). For his victims this character is an undefeatable threat, but for himself, he stands in danger of death.

But Ali Dosth's to-be-in-question himself would take us to a debate on ethics. "Being qua being is already to-be-in-question." (Levinas, *God* 47). Can his already to-be-in-question relieve him from all the horrendous acts he has done? What would be his being if he does not put himself to-be-in-question? What is the history of this 'Dasein' if we have not derived all sorts of histories from an actual history?

For Levinas this placing in question, this essence in question is equivalent to being-there as the humanity of man. With this placing in question, a taking charge of 'Dasein' takes place to the point of becoming properly my own. It is a mode of human being's to-be, "...which unfolds as being-there, as being-the-there, and this unfolds as being-in-the-world, which unfolds as care ..." (Levinas, *God* 46). In Heidegger, care unfolds into a triple structure: being-out-ahead-of-oneself (ec-sistance), as already-in-the-world (fatality), alongside of things (dispersion of dereliction among things).

Do ethics make an entry into this being's affair of ipseity? If so, to what extent and to how much validity can it be done in a literary work? At this level, it is not difficult to see that the whole work carries with it a conflict of being's already to-be-in-question and the threat it gives to the Other in its extreme mineness.

In a way, Ali Dosth experiences a philosopher's eternity among those rulers who try to give immortal fame to mortal things. In all dreadful acts, he maintains an iraction. Hannah Arendt marks it as "the standing now" which can occur only outside the realm of human affairs and outside the plurality of men. We can compare Ali Dosth with all his notoriety, to the philosopher in the Cave parable in Plato's *Republic*. Here the philosopher enjoys his 'singularity' when he relinquishes himself, the bonds which connected him with his fellow men. Ali Dosth's enduring silence stands for making the

eternity total and complete: "... it is decisive that the experience of the eternal, in contradiction to that of the immortal, has no correspondence with and cannot be transformed into any activity whatsoever, since even the activity of thought, which goes on within one's self by means of words, is obviously not only inadequate to render it but would interrupt and ruin the experience itself" (Arendt, *Human* 20).

History as Will to Power

The progression of the entire narrative with its internal and integral conflicts is boiled down to a key philosophical debate towards the end of the novel. This is when Ali Dosth's terrorist organisation (indeed a modern phenomenon) faces a would-be defeat in front of Aurangzeb's force. Keeping facts aside, it is a debate which brings to light human beings in history as a process of 'will to power'. Earlier in the novel we were introduced to two opposing principles of Humayun and his brother Kamran. While Humayun believed that empires are to be ruled by the descendents of the rulers, Kamran was quite convinced that the ability to rule is merely a question of strength. Aurangzeb, historically Humayun's grand-grand-son, follows the principle of Kamran. Ali Dosth recalls before he surrenders to Aurangzeb:

... the emperor [Aurangzeb] led all his wars to consolidate one and only one principle. This principle, which leads history from the time when man began to rule over man, is that, it is the one who is strong and able who has the right to rule the people. Everything else for the emperor was only instruments to accumulate power. He hated like shit, the ones who beg for power in the name of ideologies formed from decayed brains and traditions formed from decayed corpses (*GY* 248).

This is the context of a debate in the novel which makes a breakthrough in overcoming many of the flaws of major political philosophies like the Liberal and the Marxist. Ali Dosth feels guilty in front of the emperor, realising that his 'empire' has been built upon traditions, ideologies and racial supremacy. Though he was ready to fight back because his force has an edge over the emperor's in terms of technology, he was resisted by a simple thought:

When we confront the emperor's swords with assault rifles, what we are doing is attesting the emperor's principle. The principle that the basis of power is weapons is strength. In this war, even if we lose, we lose, even if we win, we lose... (GY 248).

More than locating it as a philosophical paradox, one can bring to light its tremendous possibility of deconstructing itself. Though it sounds like a universal principle, this thought's actual inherent potential is to deconstruct the process of history. The power wielded by interpretations is the only deciding factor for any discourse to be dominant over the other. Thus any interpretation can be the truth of a particular period, provided it is supported by the power structures embedded in language, social institutions, customs etc. of that period. On the other side of it, this power produces a multiplicity of discourses which function as desire in its strategic root. Now, what would be the nature of a 'will' in the entire process of history? Is it an intention to organise an event, is it a change that weighs more with the concept of this 'will' or is it a combination of forces which give an explanation to all what is done in history or what is being done at each moment? The philosophical conclusion would be that whatever be the forms and varieties of forces, with whatever twists and turns, the basic characteristic of a being in its becoming would be a 'will to power.'⁷ The excerpt above takes us to a deeper philosophical problem. Is not it true to say that, with the one and only one explanation of

the nature of being as 'will to power', a being always fails in front of 'power' no matter whether it does one thing or the other? This cannot be developed as a fear of fate, but as a failure of human existence itself in its fundamental bind to power. One more dimension can be added to this problem, which like the others can only be addressed at a genealogical level. Will the actual nature of power or the idea of power itself be known to us, if it has not differentiated those who wield power and those who are at the receiving end? In such a case, whose objective must be it in history to term it as 'power' and always keep a watch on it? A genealogical analysis along Nietzschean lines would reveal a 'slave morality' at work in all kinds of values we consider good today. If 'good', 'conscience', 'responsibility', 'sympathy' etc. as we know them today, have such an ignoble ancestry, our speculation at this point would be that the whole concept of power, the process of naming it as 'power' in order to keep it under constant check, would also be a work of that mental state, that state of existence in which it is unable to wield power, or in short, it is the work of 'slaves' or as Nietzsche puts it, of 'Jews'.⁸

Violence of History

Though it may seem that all barriers of time have been overlooked by the narrative in order to show the 'essence' or the lack of 'essence' of humanity in history, on closer examination, a certain foregrounding of a function of time can be seen. On one hand there is Gowardhan, a poser of many questions toward mankind, whom many characters seek for years, though they themselves are unaware about it. On the other hand, there is a certain function of time which changes everything to the extent of an inability of recognition, even for familiar minds.

The palanquin bearers passed through every street of Jahan Panah one by one. Crowded streets and empty ones. At last, they unloaded the palanquin in front of the fort at Siri. The queen stepped down and walked along. In the vast playground, she could not see anything but pieces of broken wall strewn here and there and broken mortar slabs. The fort and palace have disappeared. The Sultan has passed away ...When she looked back, also along the place she had covered, where Jahan Panah stood, the queen saw only thickets (GY 114).

This divide, as many critics suggest, is not a shift from a Western conception of time as linear time, to an idea of cyclical time. But this is a derivation by a human agency on lived past, foregrounding certain events in terms of their ascribed meanings. This is a forgetting of certain 'faces' of history in order to show that certain other 'faces' live forever. But this assumption, this method, itself falls within a historicity. And the same is usually located within modernism. Yet, this act of locating the text itself is not independent of a certain forgetting and foregrounding of history and it does not again underscore the idea of a cyclical time, but releases the text towards a timeless time.

When we consider the historicity of the text, is it not justified, at least to some extent, to ask what then the historicity of the author himself is? Blanchot shows how a writer strenuously remains in the habitual time, taking recourse to what he calls 'a journal.' "The journal represents the series of reference points which a writer establishes in order to keep track of himself when he begins to suspect the dangerous metamorphosis to which he is exposed." (Blanchot, *Space* 29). The literary writer is already into the fascinating realm of time's absence i.e. literature itself; it is through the 'journal' that he becomes no longer truly historical.

Once, on the basis of some criterion, a cruelty has been found out in history, whenever a 'repetition' or a 'losing forever' has been derived from it, the same interpretation of history can be extended to all diversified areas; ethical, philosophical, political etc. This exercise, which is nothing but an interpretation like others, pins down all the forces in history to a deterministic understanding. What results is a 'will to nothingness,' a nihilism. Moinudheen did whatever he could in his lifetime in order to save anyone falling prey to any kind of violence. Yet, he finds himself defeated by a certain cruelty of history.

Chowpat Raja was gone and the Company came to power. The Company went and the anarchists came. Now, the anarchists went away and the Company came again. The warrant for Kothwal's head still remains – What does it matter whether it is the Company's? Jailer Butler and Resident Williams were the ones who got outraged about Gowardhan saying that there is no such law as to hang someone on the basis of the size of his neck. Today it is not in search of the law, but the branches of trees that they run after. They hang to death whoever they find the nearest to trees. ... (GY 120).

If we can invoke Nietzsche's views, this is not an exceptional incident, but the true nature of man. Becoming-reactive is the predetermined destiny of all active forces, "... the Greek world overthrown by the theoretical man, Rome overthrown by Judea, the Renaissance by the Reformation" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 167).

If we proceed in this direction, the saga of suffering and injustice sketched in the novel cannot be given an innocent status. Along with the characters of *Desert Shadows*, the readers are taken to the heat of the desert to witness suffering. Readers certainly cannot miss the deception in it. The deception of evaluating life by a person other than the one who experiences it. It amounts to, pointing out freedom at the horizon and

making an evaluation of who is free and who is not. It amounts to the discovery that life is hard to bear. *Ressentiment* of all the parties included, the author, the characters and the reader, in the process gets legitimisation at the touchstone called reality. The free thinker, who challenged the afterworld, appropriated the reality to load himself with its burdens. He cannot say no to the old values or to the higher values. What he does is say 'no' in terms of acceptance to those values. There is no difference between his 'yes' and 'no', to the extent that he carries the values on his back. "The real, understood as the object, aim and limit of affirmation; affirmation understood as acquiescence in or adhesion to the real: this is the meaning of braying." (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 182).

Are the questions about injustice and freedom valid outside the possibility of an affirmation of life? In what all structures of existence is pure affirmation possible? Or whether affirmation can go along with any of the structures of existence? How far has dialectical thought been able to succeed in its affirmation? According to Deleuze, the Hegelian conception of a being is merely 'thought' being. It takes up affirmation as an acceptance of responsibility. Nietzsche's opposition to dialectics was that it confused affirmation with the positivity of the real. "This truthfulness of the truth or the positivity of the real are primarily manufactured by the dialectic itself with the products of the negative." (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 188). The Hegelian affirmation of the 'thought' being, though seems to be the positive functions of life, presupposes a negativity, i.e. in terms of the challenges and obstacles faced by the being. Hence in order that being, conceived as nothingness, be affirmed, it has to pass to the opposite. Thus "the becoming that this being forms with nothingness, that is to say with itself, is a perfectly nihilistic becoming" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 188).

In Feuerbach also, as quoted by Deleuze, a similar misconception of affirmation takes place; not at the 'thought' truth but at the truth of the senses. Relating being of man and the total being of reality, Feuerbach's sensuous man became a determined, real being of reality. Thus affirmation for Feuerbach was the positing of that which is. But according to Deleuze, this real in itself takes all the predicate of the divine similar to what has happened to the free thinker when the afterworld was challenged by him. In as much, it too preserves all the attributes of nihilism, for its strength and taste lies in the predicate of divine, though accepted in a different way: as the real of the sensory world.

Going a step ahead, our questions would be what are the forces at play in a person when he is condemned to carry the burden of injustice? Do the ethical inscriptions of Anand affirm the being, the true and the real? Do they attempt to give weightage to a reality outside the process of interpretation and evaluation of forces? First of all, if it is through the truthfulness of the true or the positivity of the real that one affirms himself, he is submitting to the labour of the negative as in dialectics. Self-sufficiency of the real is only the manifestation of a will. So affirming a self-sufficient real means, to go with a will that would depreciate life or to oppose life to life. An inscription which affirms through 'being', 'truth' or 'real', still carries the burden of being like a reactive man. "Where could being be better affirmed than in the desert?" Deleuze points out sarcastically, "and where could man be better preserved?" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 184).

When such metaphysical categories like being, truth and real are detected, problems of freedom, injustice are to be posed in a different way. It is now no more a question of deriving positivity from the negative. It is for the Law and for the ruler to express its will to power in its positivity but this opposes life to life with their becoming

reactive. The task of ethical inscriptions is however, to make a different evaluation; “but to evaluate from the perspective of a will which enjoys its own difference in life instead of suffering the pains of the opposition to this life that it has itself inspired” (Deleuze, *Nietzsche* 185).

What is an Event in History?

Paul Ricoeur, opposing the objectivity of history, delineates two approaches to it which he thinks to be prevalent. “All history may be understood as the advent and progress of a unique meaning and as the emergence of singularities. These singularities are either events, works or persons.” (Ricoeur, *History* 73). According to the first interpretation, in which history is understood as the advent and progress of a unique meaning, it can be explained as possessed by a single mankind. Or as Pascal puts it in *Traité du vide*, “The whole of mankind should be looked upon as one man who continues to exist and constantly learns.” With this idea in mind, wherever a human sign is encountered, it may be referred ‘a priori’ to a single field of humanity.

But this feeling is being given rise by human speech, discourse or Logos. And philosophical discourse has been the binding force that constitutes any event to a unified whole as well as that which helps it to stand out in its singularity. For Ricoeur, philosophical discourse is not the mere reflection of meaning (of or in history), but the very constituting of meaning. It manifests the twofold characteristics of all history, “which is to be both structural and event-filled, the unity of history, and the multiplicity of events, works, and men” (74).

What is interesting in his conclusion is that, the understanding of philosophical works, independent of any of the interpretations towards which they are inclined, destroy history. “Yet it is this twofold destruction of history, which reveals history as historȳ.” (75). In the first case, by a suppression of history in the system (in a unified whole). The categories which composed a history are now passed on to the logic of philosophy. “The passage from history to logic signifies the death of history.” (75). While in the second case, history is destroyed since “we live in one philosopher, then in another one, without there being any path from one to the other” (75). Here history is destroyed as these philosophers no longer belong to any epoch, “they are singularities who hover outside of history.” What can be derived is that, it is philosophy that makes history by preventing the latter from becoming either an absolute discourse or an absolute singularity. The process can be better understood if we try to see how history can become history only when it moves toward a discourse and at the same time towards a singular work surpassing the discourse.

It is time to locate the events in Anand’s literary works at the threshold of history and fiction; at the meeting point of an orchestrated reality and unreality. According to Foucault, there have been three major attempts at conceptualizing an event (Foucault, *Language* 175). They are neopositivism, phenomenology and the philosophy of history. All the three find their signification in Anand at different levels of narration.

Neopositivism is at the realm of selection of events for a narration. Events characterise themselves in front of the author in their material features. Approached by a physicalism, they are questioned to their core with mathematical precision. Neopositivism fails to grasp an event in its nullified meanings, at the surfaces of bodies.

Here an event is always encaptured in language as its state of being. Hence there is always a possibility for it to be a referent. Pushed to the density of bodies, it works with the stringent logic of a material process, instead of the play of meanings at the surfaces.

Phenomenology is the exposition of the self by the characters in a fiction. Always a self is present before or after the realm of primal significations. It exists in a tranquillity at the deposition of the world before it. Foucault criticises phenomenology for being a “logic of signification, a grammar of the first person and a metaphysics of consciousness” (175). It is the same logic with which power subjugates the self and motivates it to explain infinitely ‘what it is’ and ‘who a person is’. Whereas neopositivism pushes events into a sphere, an expression outside which is impossible, phenomenology encircles the event around meaning and the self. Problems of justice and freedom of humanity appear to take the same meaning throughout history.

Philosophy of history is at the level of ascribing historicity to events and characters in a narration. It considers events happening in time, a time coherent in its linear or cyclical progression. It respects the past for having given the present a form for its cognition. Events, along with their essences, journey through past and present to give a definition for the future. The failure of philosophy of history is that the question of posterity is not left with the infinite play of chances and the present is not considered divided between eternity and a displaced present. Philosophy of history is a centering of events in time wherein “the present is a former future where its form was prepared and the past, which will occur in the future, preserves the identity of its content” (176). Where else other than in philosophy of history can the problem of justice arise as something discovered in the past, to be pursued in the present, for a better world in the future?

Use and Abuse of History

Let us also see how Nietzsche differentiates between three ways of relating oneself to history, i.e. by being historical, unhistorical and superhistorical and further, between three ways of being historical - i.e. through monumental, antiquarian and critical history (Foucault, *Language* 174-194). Congruent to his overall philosophical thinking, Nietzsche tallies any sense of history with affirmation of life and a greater play of chance. Whenever history begins to harm the well being of a culture or that of an individual, it is necessary to escape from it and in order to act at par with life, it is necessary to be 'unhistorical'.

Nietzsche upholds forgetfulness for a healthy and powerful life. Limiting one's horizon of historical knowledge only helps one to live in the present. 'Being' is not a continual 'has been' that is condemned to remember various destroyals of 'beings' in the past. Nor is it to be tranquilized by itself by discovering a determined 'becoming' everywhere. Life, for Nietzsche, is not an eternal succession of events and becomings. "No artist will paint his picture, no general win his victory, no nation gain its freedom without having striven and yearned for it under those very 'unhistorical' conditions." (Nietzsche, *Use* 177).

Yet historical research is necessary for a 'healthy' person to deepen his own nature and roots. He assimilates it for his own purposes; whatever history he cannot subdue is eventually forgotten. But whenever one rises above life, he begins to view history in a deterministic way. Nietzsche calls it a 'superhistorical' standpoint (178). Overpowered by their wisdom, these superhistorical persons could take no impulse from

history towards any further life or work. For them, the world is complete and fulfils its aim in every single moment. "...they are unanimous in the theory that the past and the present are one and the same, typically alike in all their diversity, and forming together a picture of eternally present imperishable types of unchangeable value and significance."
(179)

On the other hand, 'historical men' believe in an unveiling of time in the future. Justice for them is something behind the veil and to be attained in course of time. They are the keepers of knowledge as a cumulative order and for them the meaning of existence will become ever clearer in the course of its evolution. If we could analyse the real motive behind these men, we could see that it is not the day to day struggles of life they are concerned with or in which they find a life in its 'living', but that their horizon is at the future tranquillity of life. "They do not know how unhistorical their thoughts and actions are in spite of all their history, and how their preoccupation with it is for the sake of life rather than mere science." (179)

Yet, human beings cannot do away with history. Nor do they keep their life being unaffected by their sense of history. Monumental, antiquarian and critical are the three kinds of history which human beings resort to so as to fulfill their urge for a historical sense demanded by life. In his *Use and Abuse of History*, Nietzsche makes a parody of each of the above types of history, going down their own pitfalls; pitfall or the function of a counter-memory they carry along with them.

The ideal function of monumental history would be the setting up of examples in past events; teaching the present about the greatness of the past, thereby motivating it for action and struggle. Foucault defines monumental history as "a history given to

reestablishing the high points of historical development and their maintenance in a perpetual presence, given to the recovery of works, actions, and creations through the monogram of their personal essence.” (Foucault, *Language* 161). Ideally it is for those who want to repeat the great things of antiquity that this kind of history is useful. At the same time, there is a differential element for such a sense of history. And this differential element is the common man who defends life to every greatness defined as a lofty thing.

Monumental history can be criticised from within, in two different ways. Firstly, for its conscious or unconscious effort to neglect differences while looking for past examples. To qualify the ‘archetypic truth’ it looks for in past events, to uphold the repeating character of certain events, monumental history makes an analogy of past and present which is possible only in a controlled experimental situation, i.e. “...when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again, the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail; so when the stars have a certain relation, a Stoic and an Epicurean will form a conspiracy to murder Caesar, and a different conjunction will show another Columbus discovering America.” (Nietzsche, *Use* 182). Secondly and supplementary to the first, for its tendency to hold on to the ‘effects in themselves’ of all events. Rather than finding out the real cause-effect relation of events which would reveal that chance is the only decisive factor, monumental history contents itself with celebrated half-truths.

But the actual parody of monumental history is within itself, when the greatness of the past is enacted in a hatred of anything great in the present. Its parody is also at a point where the reality which seemed to be delineated from the past through its veneration could only result in an unrealisation of the present. Ideally, monumental history is used to evoke the greatness of the past to motivate actions and struggles in the

present. But Nietzsche was not mistaken when he exposed the inherent parody in this process. “In reality they care as little about the great that is already here (in history), as what is about to rise ... the real meaning of this way of viewing history is disguised as its opposite ...” (Nietzsche, *Use* 184).

Similarly, ‘antiquarian history’ satisfies someone who is conservative and reverent in nature. But if this kind of history is criticised only on the basis of its inability to support an aggressive and innovative life, we miss the reactive element at play which makes the above a parody of itself. It is true that antiquarian history does not create life, but mummifies it by giving importance, perhaps more than necessary, to everything in the past. The ‘beneficiaries’ of this history may use it for justifying an identity going to its roots. But one cannot view it in opposition to the plurality of cultures and identities that has been suppressed by it, i.e. it is no longer a question of negotiation between a single dominant culture and the plurality of cultures that were suppressed, but the competition and disputes of countless systems that intersect and were preserved in the rancorous play of power. This is the parody within antiquarian history which only a genealogist can identify. “If genealogy in its own right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogeneous systems which, masked by *the self* inhibit the formation of any form of identity.” (Foucault, *Language* 162) (italics mine). So, instead of finding a different or alternative identity and continuity alongside a dominant system (since both phenomena have respect for ancient continuities), it is their systematic dissociation that matters.

Like the other two histories, critical history also serves life, but in a different manner. It always becomes necessary to judge and condemn history in order for a new

player to take up the baton of power. For years critical history enjoyed its new status as a destroyer of everything old and acted, like an unbiased judge above all the injustice of the past. A monopoly, a caste or a dynasty is critically examined and the knife of critical history is put on to the formers' roots. Was not it aware that no past is worth not to be condemned? At this point we attempt to look at the real face of this kind of history. Its task is not complete with its judgement of the past using the truth at hand in the present, but it is complete only when it sacrifices the subject of knowledge for the sake of truth. Analysing this 'will to knowledge' it becomes clearer that all knowledge rests upon injustice. The development of knowledge "is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of a free subject; rather, it creates a progressive enslavement of its instinctive violence." (Foucault, *Language* 163). Critical history's just treatment of the past, its rejection of traditional attitudes of reverence and its shattering of notions of liberation of man through history by presenting him a different trajectory of origin was reproached by Nietzsche in two ways - initially for its inability to accommodate past errors as part of human nature and later for its passion for knowledge, unmindful of the subject of knowledge. Contrary to what it thinks, rationality and objective knowledge are not the innocent goals of human nature but "arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, their spirit of competition ..." (Foucault, *Language* 142).

Beyond the arena of debates, calling into question and deriving principles, history presents itself to literary endeavours much of its lighter parts. It is true the other way round too – literature finds out a space for itself in history for its idle-talks. Hence we see a few moments of Humayun's solitude, attempt to play with the mischievous cat that

shatters Ramachander Mathur's deep philosophical thoughts and feel ourselves at home in history by flying a kite along with Ruzwa, a Persian poet. The reader's occasional, innocent sneak into the novel's glossary, to convince himself of the who, when and what of the history makes the task of the literary work complete.

¹ By the term 'play', Derrida refers to the absence of a transcendental signified, or truth (Encyclopaedia, *Derrida* 305). Derrida upholds graphocentrism, since unlike in phonocentric significations, meaning in the former "is never a matter of single intuitive evidence, absolutely present to itself. Rather, it is divided to be itself and another" (305). Thus in graphocentrism, the represented is always already a representation, not a signified.

² The priest in Kafka's *The Trial* summarizes the essence of the court in the formula: "The court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come, it relinquishes you when you go." (244).

³ Subsisting bare life before the pure form of the law which is also a state of virtual exception is almost similar to Deleuze's idea about an 'inverse image of genealogy'. This has been discussed more elaborately in the last part of this chapter.

⁴ Phrase coined by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*. Many major readings of Anand have emphasized his ability to sketch various dynamics of punishments either by the sovereign or by the state. But our interest here is an inversion of the thesis, where the absurd law is no more a matter to criticize, but a realization that it is this absurdity that gives law its power and which the sovereign or the state wants to keep untouched.

-
- ⁵ In wonderland, after eating a piece of cake which had the ability to change the size of human beings, Alice awaits the change in her size, unsure whether she was going to be bigger or smaller. (Carroll 24). Quoted by Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense*, p. 13.
- ⁶ Parenthetic information is mine
- ⁷ Based on Nietzsche's thoughts.
- ⁸ The word Jew or slave does not have anything to do with the political positioning of the Jews and any such signification deriving from it. It is used only to express a mental state and has derived its meaning completely from Nietzsche.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Among the two streams of modernism in Malayalam literature, Anand's path is said to be historical, materialistic, anti-romantic and philosophical. According to critics, it denounces the 'catharsis effect' acquired through reading; and persuades the reader to analyse problems using intellectual insights. But our effort throughout the proceedings was to 'deconstruct' chiefly two works of Anand, *Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu* and *Gowardhande Yathrakal*, rather than locating them in any philosophical or literary movement. The process of deconstruction does not consider any signification, reality or truth to be existing outside the text which the latter must allude to, in order to qualify itself. Instead of such a one to one relation with anything outside, meaning in a sign system is possible with the 'play' of opposite and contradictory concepts.

Three problematics - Genealogy, Genre and Translation - have been delineated in order to make the text itself speak. Genealogy, in its Nietzschean sense, completely encaptures the 'play' of concepts that give meaning to history. Certain concepts like quality of forces in history, slave and noble, becoming-sick, etc. are used by the method of genealogy acknowledging their interpretative multisemanticity. Genre does not have a motive of its own; but only one that goes with language. So whenever language fixes a particular narrative into a genre, it is always an excess and a limitation at the same time; a participation of different elements of the narrative without their membership in the genre. Translation is no longer a 'repetition' of the original in the same way that the original no

longer enjoys the intactness of experience or viginity. Instead, events and experiences can be located in a text in terms of their translatedness and at the same time their resistance towards translation.

Genealogy as a perspective of knowledge opposes many approaches towards history that work with preassumed categories on one hand while ignoring the subject of knowledge on the other. Noble and slave are not the two genealogical categories which determine the quality of forces going to their origin, but those which qualify their own meaning with changing interpretations. It helps us to overcome the search for a continuity of truth and a goodness of humanity throughout history and substitutes it with the exposition of various forces coming to the centrestage to revert and transmute existing interpretations and values. Thus genealogy's function as a critique is two-fold: critiquing the practice of the referring back of all things to an original value and critiquing the practice of referring all values to an origin and determining their values. Thus a genealogy of power reveals that it is originally associated with nobility and has been the life force of history. Reactive forces associated with slaves have always tried to 'separate active forces from what they can do'. Goodness has undergone a mutation with the intelligence and passion for knowledge of priests and Jews. Nietzschean genealogy reveals how *everything*, not only cures and therapies but also how arrogance, revenge, perspicacity, extravagance, love, the desire to dominate, virtue, illness, became more dangerous with the men of wisdom. *Gowardhande Yathrakal* must be located at this point of mutation where the knowledge of history by reactive forces has projected an inverse image of the genealogy of all human values. Anand's chief concerns are about the

essence of political subjectivity which can go along with such metaphysical questions like “what is the political subject?” But a true genealogical question would be “how are political subjects formed?” which inquires into the contingent, historical, discursive and non-discursive conditions of the emergence of political subjects.

Thus many questions remain to be answered: Is not it true to say that with the one and only one explanation of the nature of being as ‘will to power’, a being always fails in front of ‘power’ no matter whether it does one thing or the other? Will the actual nature of power or the idea of power itself be known to us if it has not differentiated those who wield power and those who are at the receiving end? In such a case, whose objective must be it in history to term it as ‘power’ and always keeps a watch on it?

It would be wrong if we define genre in its own language, since the elements that define a genre do not fall into it alone or else they are inside and outside the genre at the same time. Allowing the text itself to decide its own genre and simultaneously transgress the same, we have attempted to define the above process in terms of the mimetic quality of language, its ability to become the law and the law of law at the same time and in terms of an ‘invagination’ where parts of the text have become the whole by beginning again from the end. Literature can no longer be explained by Platonian mimesis since the two dimensions taken by mimesis in such a conception, as true imitation or as impure model, always assume an original. When presence is represented in such a presentation, all sorts of metaphysical categories like essence and existence, the oppositions between matter and form, objectivity and subjectivity, etc. demand signification and are automatically considered as ‘a priori’.

Translation becomes a problematic in Anand's writings since the exposition of philosophical ideas and that of his literary genius, inside the texts, cannot exist independently on their own. Whenever one of the above occurs, it assumes and brings in the other to gain validity for its actualization. The texts appear easily translatable but at the same time resistant to translation. Rupture then stands against the fluency of reading, an aesthetic determinant of dominant discourses which carry along with them their own economic and political motive. Rupture is also a critique of the notions of 'transparency' and 'equivalence' in translation, to the extent that each translated text is self-sufficient by its own virtue. The problem of repetition hence takes a different dimension. Repetition has now become the repetition of difference and repetition without origin, leaving the 'original itself as translation.'

Dialectics has failed in many ways to evaluate different events in time. Instead of viewing meaning-events in terms of a combination between their state of being and the relation they have with a group of propositions, we must allow them to revolve around the two insecure poles, the infinite mode and the present tense, of the verb. What would result is that their sense would always fall into that widthless crack created by their infinite occurrences in an always displaced present.

It is too rigid to follow the logic of material process or physicalism that pushes meaning to the density of bodies. Nor can we explain events in terms of primal significations occurring before or after the 'self'. Again, centered by the essence of events in time, philosophy of history also fails to grasp an event. What is required is an infinite play of meanings at the surface of bodies against the rigid logic of a referent; an

impersonal economy of events against their occurrence around a meaning and a self; and, a logic of chances against an essential meaning along a linear progression of time.

Finally, dialectics has also failed to affirm life since the positivity it derives, assumes a negativity at its background. In dialectics, it is through the truthfulness of the true or the positivity of the real that one affirms oneself. Thus he submits to the labour of the negative. Self-sufficiency of the real is only the manifestations of a will. So affirming a self-sufficient real, means to go with a will that depreciates life or to oppose life to life. Whereas the actual task is to evaluate from the perspective of a will which enjoys its own difference in life, instead of suffering the pains of the opposition to this life that it has itself inspired.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. California: Stanford UP, 1998.
- Anand. Charithrakandam (Historical Epoch). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2003.
- . Desert Shadows. Trans. K. M. Sherrif. New Delhi: Penguin, 1998.
- . Gowardhande Yathrakal (Journeys of Gowardhan). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 1996.
- . Jyva Manushyan (Bio Man). 6th ed. Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2002.
- . Marubhoomikal Undakunnathu (How Deserts are Formed). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 1989.
- . Vyasanum Vighneswaranum. 5th ed. Kottayam: D. C. Books, 2001.
- Appan, K.P. Maarunna Malayala Novel (Changing Malayalam Novel). Kollam: Imprint, 1997.
- . Samaya Praavahavum Sahityakalayam (The Flow of Time and Literary Art). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 1996.
- Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1970.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail M. The Dialogic Imagination. Ed. M. Hoquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and M. Hoquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
- Barthes, Roland. Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives. *Image, Music, Text*. Ed. S. Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.
- Benjamin, Andrew. Translation and the Nature of Philosophy: A New Theory of Words. London: Routledge, 1989.

- Benjamin, Walter. On Language as Such and on the Language of Man. *One Way Street and Other Writings*. Trans. E. Jephcott and K. Shorter. London: Verso, 1979. 107–123.
- . The Task of the Translator. *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zorn. London: Pimlico, 1999. 70–82.
- . Theses on the Philosophy of History. *Illuminations*. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zorn. London: Pimlico, 1999. 245–255.
- Blanchot, Maurice. The Blanchot Reader. Ed. Michael Holland. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995.
- . The Space of Literature. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989.
- . The Step Not Beyond. Trans. Lycette Nelson. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.
- . Translating. *Friendship*. Trans. E. Rottenberg. California: Stanford UP, 1995. 57–61.
- . The Writing of Disaster. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1995.
- . The Work of Fire. Trans. C. Mandell. California: Stanford UP, 1995.
- Crépon, Marc. “What We Expect From Languages.” Trans. L. Srinivas Reddy. Raisons Politiques (special issue on *La République des Langues*) May 2001: 27–40.
- “Deconstruction.” Encyclopaedia of Literary Critics and Criticism. Ed. Chris Murray. 3 vols. London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999.
- Deleuze, Gilles. The Deleuze Reader. Ed. C. V. Boundas. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
- . Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. London: Athlone, 1994.
- . He Stuttered. *Essays Critical and Clinical*. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. 107–114.

- . Literature and Life. Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. 1-6.
- . The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. London: Athlone, 1990.
- . Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. London: Athlone, 1983.
- . Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life. Trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Urzone, 2001.
- Derrida, Jacques. Between the Blinds: A Derrida Reader. Ed. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Harvester, 1991.
- . The Ear of the Other: Texts and Discussions with Jacques Derrida: Otobiography, Transference, Translation. Ed. Christie McDonald. "Roundtable on Translation". Trans. Peggy Kamuf. London: U of Nebraska P, 1994.
- "Derrida, Jacques". Encyclopaedia of Literary Critics and Criticism. Ed. Chris Murray. 3 vols. London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999.
- Derrida, Jacques, Jacques Derrida: Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge. London: Routledge, 1992.
- . Monolingualism of the Other or The Prosthesis of Origin. Trans. Patrick Mensah. California: Stanford UP, 1998.
- . Speech and Phenomena. Trans. David Allison. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973.
- . Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences. Writing and Difference. Ed. A. Bass. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1978.
- Devan, M. V. "Manushyan Thanne Prajapathi" (Man Himself is the Lord). Mathrubhoomi Weekly 29 Sept.–5 Oct. 2002: 14-15.

- Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Sussex: Harvester, 1982.
- During, Simon. Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Foucault, Michel. Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge, 2002.
- . Nietzsche, Genealogy and History. *Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977. 139-164.
- . The Order of Discourse. *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*. Ed. Robert Young. Boston: Routledge, 1981. 48-78.
- . The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 2002.
- . Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77. Ed. Colin Gordon. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham and Kate Soper. Brighton: Harvester, 1980.
- . Theatrum Philosophicum. *Language, Counter-Memory and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977. 165-196.
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
- Jacob, Shaji. Charithrathinte Raashtreeyam: Aanandinte Darsanam (The Politics of History: The Philosophy of Anand). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 1996.

- Kafka, Franz. Before the Law. *The Metamorphosis and Other Writings*. Ed. Helmuth Kiesel. New York: Continuum, 2002.
- . In the Penal Colony. *The Metamorphosis and Other Writings*. Ed. Helmuth Kiesel. New York: Continuum, 2002.
- . The Trial. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. Middlesex: Penguin, 1953.
- Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1950.
- Kumar, Udaya. "Anand and the Poetics of Incompleteness." Afterword. Vyasa and Vighneshwara. Trans. Saji Mathew. New Delhi: Katha, 2000. 135–157.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. God, Death and Time. Trans. Bettina Bergo. California: Stanford UP, 2000.
- . The Levinas Reader. Ed. Seán Hand. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
- Manjali, Franson. Literature and Infinity. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2001.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Trans. Helen Zimmern. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964.
- . Dawn of Day. London: Ruskin House, 1911.
- . Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One is? Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.
- . Human All Too Human. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. London: Penguin, 1994.
- . On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic. Trans. Douglas Smith. New York: Oxford UP, 1996.

- . Thus Spake Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981.
- . Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981.
- . The Use and Abuse of History. Trans. Adrian Collins. German Essays on History: The German Library. vol. 49. Ed. Rolf Saltzer. New York: Continuum, 1991. 174-194.
- Padmanabhan, Vadakkedath. "Aanandinte Reethisastram" (The Methodology of Anand). Paadabedham Aug. 2003: 15-16.
- Pavithran, P. Adhunikathayude Kuttasammatham (The Confession of Modrenity). Kottayam: Sahitya Pravarthaka Co-operative Society, 2000.
- Rajasekharan, P.K. Andhanaya Daivom : Malayala Novalinte Nooru Varshangal (Blind God: One Hundred Years of Malayalam Novel). Kottayam: D. C. Books, 1999.
- Ricoeur, Paul. History and Truth. Trans. Charles A. Kelbley. Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1965.
- . Narrative Time. Critical Inquiry. 7:1 (Autumn), 1980: 169-190.
- . Time and Narrative. 3 vols. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1984-85.
- Sanil, V. "Development, Language and Philosophy: A Kerala Experience." Vision Jan. 1998: 28-40.
- Todorov, Tzvetan, Genres in Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
- Venuti, Lawrence, ed. Rethinking Translation: Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology. London: Routledge, 1992.
- . The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation. London: Routledge, 1997.

