

CHINA'S THIRD WORLD POLICY
AT UNITED NATIONS
(1971 - 81)

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment
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of Philosophy

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
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CERTIFICATE

This dissertation entitled "China's Third World Policy at United Nations 1971-81" by Hamid Hussain for the Degree of Master of Philosophy has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this or any other University. We recommend that this dissertation should be placed before the examiners for the consideration for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy.


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Chapter I
I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Peoples Republic of China's entry into United Nations in 1971 made her a member of 'Family of Nations'. Her analysis of Contradictions henceforth was changed for a better track, thereby entitling Chinese decision makers with an element of realism and flexibility in Chinese foreign policy, with ever expanding set of accommodations and adjustments. Chinese foreign policy, which was in limbo, underwent a transition from revolutionary chaos, for a pragmatic reconstruction in its different dimensions, after its entry into United Nations. The new policy, specially towards Third World, swayed along from confusion tradition of cultural symbolism, unresponsiveness and passivity to political dynamics, participation and activations. The Chinese seeking to assert their leadership in the Third World started making 'strong effort to broaden their diplomatic ties on one hand and supporting the cause of the Third World at United Nations, on the other.¹

The foreign policy makers of the PRC view things in the light of 'Three World Theory' and theory of 'contradictions'. Explaining Mao's Three World Theory, Deng

1. Barnett, A. Doake, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), p.13.

Xiao Ping, the Chinese strong man had proclaimed that the world consists of three parts of three World, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. "The United States and the Soviet Union make the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and other regions make the Third World. The developed countries between the two make the Second World. He further reiterated the 'by now-standard Chinese line' that the two Super Powers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today vainly seeking world hegemony."²

In his Wan Sui volumes, Mao sees the two Super Powers as international actors with distinct personalities of their own. The lesser Colonial Powers, i.e. the Second World, also take the stage from time to time in recognizable form. The Third World, by contrast, never seem to stand out from the generalised category of 'intermediate zones' into which they have been placed. Expanded to its widest definition, by Mao, the Theory of intermediate zone embraces the ninety per cent of the World population, who want revolution or would want it in the future; the rest ten per cent around belong to the imperialist, reactionary or revisionist groups.

2. Barnett, A. Doake, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), p.13.

Chinese decision makers viewed that the antagonistic contradiction should be fought first and with a view to doing this, off hand, the non-antagonistic contradictions can be put on shelves. The Chinese, as such, believed that it is important to be one with the Third World to counter Super Powers' expansionism, hegemonism and imperialism. The Chinese position at United Nations in regard to Third World vis-a-vis the Super Powers can be better understood in the light of the basic postulates and determinants of its foreign policy.

An outstanding feature of Chinese foreign policy has been her strong opposition to colonialism and imperialism. This policy is largely the outcome of her long sufference at the hands of Western imperialism. China shows full sympathy for all those who were and are under colonial rule. It had championed the cause of Vietnam, stood for the unification of Korea and has opposed colonialism in Africa and specially in Namibia. Deng Xiao Ping held that the developing countries have been politically independent, yet all of them still face the historical test of clearing out remanants forces of colonialism, developing the national economy, consolidating the national independence and realise self-reliance.

Chinese opposed to hegemonism. It was in 1969, Lin

Piao had accused the USA and the Soviet Union of colluding in order to dominate the World. In his list, thus he put the contradiction between the Third World nations and the two Super Powers at the top. This theme was carried forward by Premier Chou-en Lai who asserted that '70s' was still an era of imperialism and proletariat revolution. He stressed the awakening of the Third World and its growing importance in the world wide struggle against the hegemonism and power politics of the Super Powers.

Emphasising upon the principle of brotherhood of man, the PRC highlighted the problem of racial discrimination at the International level and opposed the policy of racial discrimination, pursued by the racist Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. It supported the cause of Black people in America also. The Chinese delegation to the General Assembly of United Nations exercised its right to vote for the first time, against the US violation of Security Council's Resolution of imposition of trade embargo on racist regime of Rhodesia.

Despite its ideological differences with its neighbours and the Western World, the PRC has laid her faith in 'Peaceful Coexistence and Cooperation'. It would be worth noting that in 1954, Chou-en-Lai had come to India which was followed by the signing of Panch-sheel, pronouncing

thereby, Sino-Indian adherence to the principles of non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual equality and benefit and peaceful coexistence. The PRC claims that the Super Powers are sole cause of today's upheavals in international spheres and their pronouncement of peaceful coexistence is that of mere lip-service. The Third World countries, she urges, should realise it and frustrate the designs of aforesaid powers and accelerate the process of genuine peaceful coexistence.

China's role in Asia is infact the most important ingredient of Chinese foreign policy, but it is in this region that China can play an independent role with the maximum effect; it is here that Chinese power can be immediately felt and surely applied.³ Beijing, hence was obliged to pursue certain policies and to devise a strategy best calculated to break Super Powers' designs in the continent, specially in East and South East Asia. Most of the Chinese decision makers are concerned with assuming a leading role in world affairs, specially in Asia. They appeal to their fellow Asians as leaders of the anti-

3. Dutt, V.P., China's Foreign Policy 1958-62 (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.147.

imperialist block and of liberation movement, as models for dealing with the serious political, economic and social problems of Asia, as champions of Asia, new role in the World and as leaders of the peace movement.⁴ They have the allegiance or atleast substantial support of Communist Parties in most of the countries of non-communist Asia, and they have penetrated areas as distant as Africa and Latin America, but in these areas they have had to compete with the Soviet Union, the Western Countries and indigeneous non-Communist leaders and regimes and they have suffered a series of reverses as distant lands and even in neighbouring Asian countries.⁵

The Chinese analysis of the African situation had a close similarity with their own experience and the analysis made for the pre-Communist situation obtaining in China.⁶ China supports decolonization process and opposes racial discriminations and thus emphasises an racial solidarity with African peoples. China not only has been undermining the position of the Western World, but also that of Soviet Union, in the continent. All the elements of Beijing's Afro-Asian policy are prominent in

4. Palmer and Perkins, International Relations, (Boston, USA: 1969), p.705.

5. Ibid, p.708.

6. Dutt, V.P., China Foreign Policy 1958-63 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.276.

its policy towards Latin America and its Afro-Asian approach holds good for Latin America too.

"An intimate relationship has always subsisted between domestic policy and foreign policy; the one can seldom be divorced from other. In the case of Communist China the interplay between the two has been so very close that changes in foreign policy can be directly related to those in the internal situation."⁷ Besides its rift with Soviet Union, it is the need of the modernization of Chinese economy that has pushed China closer to the Western World, particularly to the U.S.A., for instance. Here it is also important to note that "Personality Factor" has played a definite role in shaping the Chinese foreign policy. For instance, it was Mao, and perhaps none else could have had made China act and behave like an independent big power. Even in the age of big K's (Kennedy and Krushchev) China attempted to upset the arrangement of big powers to settle world problems between themselves.

The objective of Beijing leadership is to achieve national power, international prestige and economic prosperity. They seem determined to exert a significant influence on the general course of events on the global stage.

7. Dutt, V.P., China Foreign Policy 1953-62 (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.1.

They are on the run to develop economic ties to overcome the domestic problems. They are also seeking to effect the balance of World forces in ways that will enhance China's security and bolster its position as a power. When basic security interests have been at stake, ideological predispositions and secondary national interests have been at stake.⁸ "No other country is so much obsessed by its own greatness. The power status of China is one of the chief concerns of the Beijing regime. China must be equal of the United States and Soviet Union (Great Britain also). It must be recognized as a great power."⁹

As soon as China entered into the United Nations, she not only claimed a special kinship with the Third World on geographical and economic pretexts, but also championed the cause of the Third World at United Nations. She started doing so, right from 1971, but it became more apparent when Deng Xiao Ping, the leader of the delegation to the United Nations General Assembly clearly identified China to be one with the Third World on various issues and problems, in 1974.

8. Barnett, A. Doak, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), p.7.

9. Dutt, V.P., China's Foreign Policy 1958-62 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964), p.29.

The basic postulates and determinants of Chinese foreign policy have given a definite shape to Chinese Third World Policy which has been reflected and re-reflected at United Nations, time and time again. Her opposition to racialism, colonialism and imperialism quiteely reconciled with Third World's struggle for equality and independence. Her opposition to the monopoly of nuclear power in few hands and her stand on Sea bed mining and Law of the Sea are in favour of Third World's demands. It's support to non-alignment movement and to the idea of New International Economic Order, has brought her closer to the Third World. And today "Support to the Third World cause" itself has become an important postulate in her foreign policy, more so, after her entry into the United Nations.

Chapter II

CHINA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF UNITED NATIONS

Chinese leaders regarded the General Assembly of United Nations as the most important United Nations' organ. Therefore, they put their principal focus on it in putting forth their view points on various international issues and problems. Chinese Third World policy appears most elaborative in the General Assembly of United Nations.

When seated in the United Nations in 1971, the PRC promptly identified itself with the Third World.¹ This identification was repeated again and again. The PRC views all nations as equal in the international forums, thereby equal voice for all countries in settling international problems. Thus it is clear indication of Chinese rejection of big power deals in settlement of international problems behind close power deals. Nevertheless, this implies a greater say for the developing countries in allocation of scarce resources of the world. This is an advocacy to accord greater economic benefits to the Third World.

The PRC has denied of having any intention to become

1. See the speech of Qiao Guan-hua in UN Document A/26/PV. 1983 (November 15, 1971), p.98.

a Super Power. In a plenary meeting Mr. Deng Xiao Ping had told:

"China is not a Super Power nor will she ever seek to be one. What is a Super Power? A Super Power is an imperialist country which everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, interference, control, subversion, plunder and strives for world hegemony. If capitalism is restored in a big socialist country, it will inevitably become a Super Power If one day China should change her colour and turn into a Super Power, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subjects others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of world should identify her as 'Social imperialism', expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it."²

Now, it is important to note that the PRC not only identifies itself with the Third World, but also she makes a common cause with the Second World. In 1972, in the General Assembly debate, Chinese delegation attacked the US - Soviet sponsored European Security Conference as European insecurity conference. It expressed Chinese support for 'European people's opposition to Super Power politics and hegemonism'.³ In 1978, Mr. Huang Hua had gone to the length of welcoming Western European economic, political and military alliances, which he thought was in the interest of the people of the countries.⁴ This is an indi-

2. PR. No.16 (April 19, 1974), p.11.

3. UN Doc. A/27/PV. 2051 (Oct. 3, 1972), p.55.

4. See UN Doc. A/33/PV. 13 (Sept. 19, 1978), p.97.

rect enforcement of NATO against the Soviet military threat.

It has been suggested that China pursued a normative image of World Order within the United Nations, based upon eight identifiable value components. "These include antihegemony, international equalitarianism, populism, antiracialism nationalism struggle to resolve all types of contradictions, self-reliance and mutual respect for state sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity."⁵ These value components were held in its participation in the General Assembly of United Nations.

The PRC sent her delegation to United Nations for the first time to the twenty sixth session of General Assembly of United Nations which was headed by Mr. Chiao-Kuan-hua. The first impression the delegation gave was that geographical feature tinged with security consideration plays the most important role in Chinese relations with other countries, specially the Asian countries. The PRC leaders seemed to be extremely apprehensive of Soviet designs for encirclement symbolised by the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty. Mr. Chiao-Kuan-hua criticised the treaty in the following words:

5. James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, China in the Global Community, (Prayger Publishers, New York, 1980), p. 49.

"The so called Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation is in effect a military alliance. Since, the conclusion of the treaty, the Indian Government has become all the more flagrant, carrying out subversion and aggression against Pakistan without any scruples. On 5th December, Tass Published a statement which is full of smell of gun powder. It clamours that the tension between India and Pakistan has threatened the so-called interest of the Security of Soviet Union and that it cannot remain indifferent. This is a blackmail and mere menace to China as well as the neighbouring countries of India and Pakistan."⁶

Then, criticising the Indian policy on the other, he told":

"India's expansionism has a long history. In his book 'The Discovery of India', Nehru openly proclaimed that South Asian sub-continent and the Indian Ocean are in the sphere of influence of India. For years, the Indian ruling class have never given up their ambitious attempt to become a Super Power or a semi Super Power. To agree that the Indian Government is justified in using the refugees question as a pretext for invading Pakistan, is tant amount to agreeing that the Indian Government will be justified in using the question of the so called Tibetan refugees as a pretext for invading China".⁷

The delegation maintained that fundamentally speaking the dispute between India and Pakistan was a legacy of the British imperialists, rule in the Indian sub-continent. However, Chinese delegation believed that the question of refugees from East Pakistan was entirely a question

6. See UN Doc. A/26/PV. 2005 (Dec. 7, 1971), p. 29.

7. Ibid, p. 28.

of Pakistan itself and hence there should not be any outside interference. The delegation mentioned that "UN should strongly condemn India's aggression against Pakistan and thoroughly expose the shameless support given by the Soviet Socialist imperialist to the Indian aggression; Secondly, call upon all countries to support the Pakistani Government and people in their just struggle against Indian aggression; thirdly, call upon the Indian Government to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Pakistani territory the armed forces which it had sent ; fourthly, call upon both to have a cease fire withdrawal of armed forces etc."⁸

The Chinese stand on it seems to be motivated by their security interest and also their friendship with Pakistan. This leads us to focus on another example of the later part of the decade. "If China's leadership under Mao extended strong support to Pakistan, during the Indo-Pak war of 1971 to prevent a Moscow-Delhi-Dacca axis on its western border, the similar rationale induced Mao's successors to oppose first by words and then by force of arms, the establishment of Vietnamese hegemony with Soviet backing throughout Indo-China."⁹

8. See UN Doc.A/26/PV. 2005 (Dec. 7, 1971), p. 29.

9. Hsiung, James C., and Kim, Samuel S., China in the Global Community, (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.147.

Immediately after Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, the PRC representative Mr. Zhao Nan in the General assembly debate declared :

"The source of the current tension in Indo-China and South East Asia is Vietnam's active persuance of national expansionism and regional hegemonism, with the support and instigation of the Soviet Union, in order to form the so called Indo-Chinese federation - and then dominate South East Asia, while the Soviet Union needs to have Vietnam as its reliable out-post and strategic base in order to realise the southward drive in its global strategy, further control the sea route from the western pacific to the Indian Ocean and link up its strategic development in these two Oceans."¹⁰

Mr. Chou Chu, the Chinese representative in the 34th Session of the General Assembly of United Nations claimed that "the credential of the delegation of the Democratic Kampuchea had been submitted in full confirmity with the relevant rules of the UN and were entirely legal and void".¹¹ Another representative, Mr. Han Ziang held that 'the crux of the Indo-Chinese situation lies in the brutal aggression imposed on Kampuchea the naked aggression of Vietnam was not only an act against Vietnamese people's desire but also a gross violation of Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and a direct threat to the South East Asian countries'.¹²

10. See UN Doc. A/33/PV.100 (May 25, 1979), p. 92.

11. See UN Doc. A/34/PV.4 (Sept. 22, 1979), p. 36.

12. See UN Doc. A/34/PV.4 (Sept. 22, 1979), p. 72.

He noted :

"We hold that the United Nations has an unshirkable responsibility to take effective measures, first to make Vietnam withdraw forth - with all its troops from Kampuchea, stop its aggression and military occupation in Kampuchea and then to solve the other related questions. We firmly support just demand of the ASEAN and all other justice upholding countries for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchean territory, for this is the key to the Indo-Chinese question."¹³

Later, on November 23, 1979, he stated :

"The Chinese Government is always opposed to aggression and upholds international justice. The unskilled striving of the Vietnamese authorities for regional hegemony and other aggression against Kampuchea, control of Laos and antagonism to China, pose a great threat to peace and stability to South East Asia, and Asia as a whole and to the security of China. The Chinese people can never take this lightly. The Chinese Government firmly condemns the aggression in a criminal attempt to annex Kampuchea by the Vietnamese authorities and resolutely supports the Kampuchean people and Kampuchean patriotic forces resisting Vietnamese aggression."¹⁴

The Korean question also figures important in Chinese eyes. Off and on, the PRC advances its support for Korean unification in the General Assembly of United Nations. Chinese view point on this is well reflected in Mr. Huang Hua's speech in the 33rd Session of UN General

13. See UN Doc. A/34/PV.4 (Sep. 22, 1979), pp. 76-77.

14. See UN Doc. A/34/PV.713 (Nov. 23, 1979), p. 3.

Assembly. In a plenary meeting, he said :

"At present the key to a solution of the Korean question is that the United State must withdraw all its troops and armaments from South Korea and that the so called 'UN Command' must be disbanded. The United States must stop all their scheming activities to create 'two Koreas'. We firmly support the position and efforts of the Government of Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the achievement of independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. The resolution for promoting the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 30th session should be implemented in earnest and without delay. The Korean question should be settled by the Korean people themselves free from any foreign interference."¹⁵

China had condemned Indonesian aggression on East Timour, in 1976, after the latter had achieved independence. Mr. Hu Miao, the Chinese delegate to General Assembly in its 31st Session stated :

"Since both Indonesia and East Timour belong to the Third World and the peoples of these two countries had shared the experience of being subjected to imperialist colonialist rule, there was nothing to prevent them from establishing normal relations on the basis of 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence'."¹⁶

Mr. Huang Hua had extended Chinese support towards East Timour in 31st session of the General Assembly and told :

15. See UN Doc. A/33/PV.13 (Sept. 28, 1978), pp. 99-100.

16. See UN Doc. A/31/PV.15 (Nov. 4, 1976), p. 10.

"We firmly support the just struggle carried on by the people of East Timour under the leadership of the Revolutionary front for independent East Timour (FRETILIN) in defence of the independence and territorial integrity of the country against foreign aggression."¹⁷

On the issue of Russian intervention in Afghanistan the PRC became most vocal against Russian hegemonism in the General Assembly of United Nations. In 1980, Mr. Chen Chu, the Chinese representative to sixth emergency special session stated :

"Soviet military aggression is a serious escalation of Soviet aggression abroad. It also makes a new stage in its expansionist activities to the Third World. This is not an isolated event, but an important component of the Soviet global strategy of pushing south-ward to the Indian Ocean, controlling the sea lanes, seizing strategic points outflanking Europe, threatening Asia and dominating the world. One may recall that on almost the same day in December, 1978, the Soviet Union incited Vietnam to launch a massive arm aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. A year later the Soviet Union itself wantonly initiated a large scale arm aggression against Afghanistan, instead of using proxies, the new Czars have now come out into open themselves, this piercing their thin veil of peace and detente. It can be seen clearly that Soviet Social imperialism is the most dangerous source of a new World War."¹⁸

He further held that in the view of the Chinese delegation, the United Nations should exercise its responsibility in response to the will of the World's people,

17. See UN Doc. A/31/PV.13 (Oct. 5, 1976), p. 26.

18. See UN Doc. A/ES-6/PV.1 (Jan. 10, 1980), p. 13.

condemn in the strongest terms, the Soviet authority is military aggression and intervention against Afghanistan unequivocally call upon the Soviet authorities to cease forth with such aggression and intervention, firmly demand the immediate and unconditional, withdrawal of all Soviet arm forces from Afghanistan and give firm support to the Afghan people, who are valiantly resisting Soviet aggression. Nonetheless, he criticized the Soviet veto on a draft resolution submitted by six Third World state members of the Security Council that condemned Soviet intervention and held that it showed Soviet Union's utter contempt for the Charter of United Nations. No gainsaying of the fact, that, the PRC has always been vocal against any sort of intervention is general and against Third World countries in particular.

Since its entry into UNO, the PRC has pursued a determined 'Pro-Arab and Anti-Israeli policy' in keeping in line its role as the Third World champion and its support for national self determination. It is against Super powers seeking hegemony in the region and consolidating their sphere of influence. In the year of Chinese entry into United Nations, the PRC made it clear that it believed that Israeli Zionists had advanced a theory of so called 'Secured Boundary' in order to perpetuate the occupation

of the territory, they have seized (the territory) which is a typical excuse for expansionism - a 'Gangster's logic'.¹⁹

Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, the Chinese delegate to General Assembly of United Nations, in a plenary meeting noted in the same year :

"We maintain that the Israeli Zionist aggression must withdraw from the Egyptian, Syrian and all the Arab territories, they have occupied. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to national existence and to return to their homeland must be restored. We firmly support the Palestiations, Egyptians, Syrians and other Arab peoples in their just struggle to restore their national rights and recover their lost territories."²⁰

In 1972, one of the Chinese delegates to the General Assembly plenary meetings held :

"The present situation in the Middle East is solely created by two Super powers for their respective interests, that the United States is openly supporting the aggression of Israeli Zionism and that the Soviet Union, though claims to be a friend of the Arab World, it demands privileges and bases and even attempts to subvert their Governments and is more dangerous than the open enemy."²¹

Two years later, Mr. Huang Hua, stated that the Palestitions question is not a question of aggression, but

19. See UN Doc. A/26/PV.2006 (Dec. 8, 1971), p. 9.

20. Ibid.

21. See UN Doc. A/27/PV.2051 (Oct. 3, 1972), p. 15.



a question of aggression vrs. anti-aggression. On account of Arab World using oil as a weapon for pressurising the West on Palestatian issue, Chinese delegate Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua held that it has opened up a new dimension for the Third World struggle in defence of national resources against imperialist plunder and exploitation.

The Chinese spirit on this issue is most pronouncing in Mr. Huang Hua's speech at a plenary meeting of General Assembly in 1978 that stated :

"The struggle of the Arab countries and people against Israeli Zionism is perfectly just and is closely linked with the struggle against hegemonism. The Chinese Government and people constantly and resolutely support the Arab and Palastanian people in their struggle to recover their lost territories and regain the Palestinian rights and we are firmly opposed to the two Super powers competing for the hegemony in the Middle East and grossly trampling upon the interests of the Arab people. We strongly condemn the Israeli Zionists. We do not recognize Israel and will have nothing to do with it."²²

Regarding peace settlement in the region, Chinese have maintained a hard line approach rejecting Security Council's resolution 242 (1967) which urged for a peace agreement recognizing Israel's right to exist within secured pre 1967 border and the just settlement for the refugees. AS the major resolutions on the Middle East since 1975 have endorsed an early convening of a General Peace Conference

22. See UN Doc. A/33/PV.13 (Sept. 28, 1978), p. 97.



under United Nations auspices and co-chaired by the United States and Soviet Union, China has chosen not to participate in the vote, in each case. The PRC used to abstain itself from numerous draft resolution on the Middle East on account of the drafts having failed to criticize the Super Powers' hegemonism and to mention that the just national rights of Palestinian people must be restored. Accordingly, the PRC has regularly opposed both the gradualist approach of the United States and the Soviet proposal for a Geneva Conference and continues to favour self solution by means of popular struggle.

The PRC has expressed continuous opposition to Israeli practices in the Israeli territories and firm support for Palestinian national independence and sovereignty and aid and assistance to the Palestinian refugees. The PRC nonetheless, has backed the establishment of nuclear free zone in the Middle East.²³

The PRC delegate had strong objection to Israeli attack on Lebanese areas, from time to time and plan of annexing Jerusalem. One of the Chinese delegates noted in the 33rd session Special Committee meeting :

23. See UN Doc. A/RES/32/82 (Dec. 12, 1977); and A/RES/33/64 (Dec. 4, 1978).

"Israeli Zionists have intensified their policies of aggression and expansionism which the year before had included the invasion of Southern Lebanon. In the occupied territories, the Israeli authorities were continuing to step up the implementation of their Judeization plan and to strengthen further their fascist rule, built new jewe's settlement and expand old ones, enforce compulsorily the legal system of Israel and deliberately change the legal status, geographical character and demographic structure of the occupied areas Recently the Israeli authorities had announced their plan to incorporate Jerusalem, the holy city of tens of millions of Muslims and Christians, completely and permanently in Israel."²⁴

The Chinese have refrained themselves in the U.N. bodies from condemning the Begin-Sadat dialogue, which has been a blow to Soviet Middle East interest and instead, has encouraged direct negotiations without Super Powers' interference. At the same time, the PRC has been very careful to avoid alienating Arab rejectionists by endorsing Israeli-Egyptian's talks. The onus for 'no war no peace' impasse has been shifted from both Super Powers to the arbit of Soviet Union exclusively.

The Chinese approach to Africa is marked by increasing evidence of racial overtones and resistance to colonialism. Their appeal to racial solidarity has become more insistent in recent age as the struggle has been expanded to include not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union too. One of the important goal of Chinese policy

24. See UN Doc. A/SPC/33/SR 31 (Nov. 22, 1978), pp. 5-6.

in Africa now is to undermine the Soviet position and to arouse African suspicion against this 'White Nation.'²⁵

On November 16, 1971, the Chinese delegation exercised its right to vote for the first time when that day's United Nations' General Assembly's plenary meeting adopted by a vote of 106 to 2 a resolution denouncing the Security Council's resolution on all round prohibition of trade with White Colonialist regime of Rhodesia by its attempt to import Chrome from Rhodesia.²⁶ The same day Mr. Huang Hua confirmed in the plenary meeting the Chinese support for OAU's earlier decision. He told:

"In October, 1965, the General Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of OAU held at Accra adopted a resolution on the application of sanction against colonial authority of Southern Rhodesia. The Chinese Government supports this resolution."²⁷

Next year Mr. Chia Kuan-hua, the Chinese delegate to U.N. General Assembly praising the African mass movement in the plenary meeting told :

"In Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, a mass movement against the white colonialists rule, racial discrimination and apartheid and for national liberation have made great new progress. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the historic people of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea, Azania, Zambabwe, Namibia and Spanish Sahara."²⁸

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26. Dutt, V.P., "China's Foreign policy 1958-62 (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1964), p. 273.
 26. See UN Resolutions A/26/PV.1984 (Nov. 10, 1971).
 27. See UN Doc. A/26/PV.1984 (Nov. 16, 1971).
 28. See UN Doc. A/27/PV.2051 (Oct. 3, 1972), p. 14.

In 1974, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua commenting on the down fall of the fascist regime in Portugal observed :

"It was a victory for the African people who have preserved a long arm struggle as well as for the Portugese people who have persistently opposed reactionary colonial rule."²⁹

If Chinese condemnation of Soviet design in Africa remained general and relatively vague upto 1975, the Angolan Civil War dramatically increased the stake involved. The PRC angrily charged that the war was instigated by the Soviet Union. In a speech in Nov. 24, 1975, Chinese delegate Mr. Lai-Ya-li noted :

"The Soviet Union harboured ulterior motives in its wantom sabotage of the liberation cause of the Angolan people in an attempt to establish its sphere of influence in Southern Africa, the Soviet Union has set its mind in placing Angola under its control and turning it into an important strong hold, in its rivalry with other Super Power over Southern Africa and for comand of the Southern Atlantic."³⁰

The Chinese delegation supported the sub-amendments put forward by the delegation of Zaire over Angolan situation. They also supported OAU's solemn position for an immediate end to all foreign intervention so that the

29. See UN Doc. A/29/PV.2252 (Oct. 2, 1974) p. 41.

30. See UN Doc. A/30/PV.2415 (Nov. 24, 1975), p. 27, and UN Doc. A/30/PV. 2419 (Nov. 26, 1975) pp. 42-46 & 81-91.

Angolan people may solve their own problems by themselves.

Mr. Lai-Ya-li on the occasion noted :

"The Chinese and African people have forged a profound militant leadership in their profected common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and such a friendship can stand the test of the time.³¹

On account of Mr. Malik, the Soviet delegate's accusation of China of having aligned with South African racist regime and imperialist forced in interfering in the internal affairs of Angola was sharply reacted by him. He held that it was a typical trick of a thief crying 'catch the thief'.

Mr. Huang Hua in a plenary meeting of 33rd session, 1978, demanded that 'the UN must follow a historical trend and perform its bounden duty of putting an end to the colonialist and racist rule of Southern Africa, in accordance with the eager desire and just demands of the African people.³²

Mrs. Huang Kuo, the leader of the Chinese delegation in the IIIrd Committee meeting of 33rd Session expressed her delegation's belief that the present racial discrimination and apartheid in Northern Africa and other regions was the direct result of colonialist and imperialist forces.

31. See UN Doc. A/30/PV.2435, (Dec. 10, 1975), p. 41.

32. See UN Doc. A/33/PV.13 (Sept. 28, 1978), p. 98.

She noted :

"The intensification of the just struggle of the people of Southern Africa was a profound blow dealt at the Super Powers. Striving to maintain its vested interest there, one Super Power was continuing to support the racist regimes in Southern Africa, while another a late comer of the African scene was trying to masquerade as the naturally of the African people in attempt to control that regions. Driving away the wolf from the first gate, while repulsing the tiger at the back door, is the real task of the Southern Africa fighting for national independence and liberation."³³

Her delegation wished to reaffirm a number of proposals aimed at ensuring more effective support of and assistance to the people of Southern Africa in their just struggle. She proposed :

"First, all countries and peoples dedicated to the upholding of justice should give active support to the people's of Zimbabwe. Azania and Namibia, secondly, the colonial rule and savage policy of racial discrimination and apartheid of the regimes of Southern Africa and Southern Rhodesia were to be vigorously condemned; the South African authorities should be required to immediately and unconditionally terminate their illegal rule over Namibia and withdraw their troops, police and all administrative bodies from that territory and both the South African authorities and those of Southern Rhodesia should be required immediately to put an end to their internal settlement schemes; the people of Namibia and Zimbabwe must be granted the attainment of independence based on territorial integrity and unity free from outside interference. Third, sanctions against Southern Rhodesian authorities should be strengthened and the arms embargo against

33. See UN Doc. A/C-3/33/SR.24 (Oct. 20, 1978), p. 5.

South African authorities strictly implemented..... Fourth, the component bodies of United Nations should scrupulously implement the General Assembly and Security Council's resolutions on combating colonialism and racial discrimination and apartheid and take all possible measures to give greater financial and material assistance to the national liberation movement of the people's of Southern Africa. Fifth, all countries and United Nations office of public information should take further measures to expose the crime of racialism, colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism, so as to mobilise world opinion in strong support for the just struggle of the people's of Southern Africa. Sixth, various measures should be taken to support and assist victims of colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa."³⁴

Chinese representation have continued to denounce Soviet policies and objective in Africa and specially in the case of Angola. The PRC demonstrated clear cut support in 1977 and 1978, for Western intervention in Zaire, in opposition to the Soviet backed invasion mounted by mercenaries from Angola and condemned 'the Soviet interference, subversion and infiltration in Sudan, Egypt and the Horn of Africa'.³⁵ The PRC also criticised Moscow for carrying out an infiltration plan in Zimbabwe and throughout Southern Africa..... in order to bring the entire region of Southern Africa, rich in resources and strategically important within its own sphere of influence.³⁶ However,

34. See UN Doc. A/C-3/33/SR.24 (Oct. 20, 1978), p. 6.

35. See UN Doc. A/C-1/32/PV.47 (Oct. 18, 1977), p. 7.

36. See UN Doc. A/C-4/33/SR-27 (Dec. 4, 1978), p. 21.

both PRC and Soviet Union have accelerated maximum support for a number of resolutions condemning the apartheid policy of White minority Government of Southern Africa.

The PRC right from the beginning is in favour of and has consistently voted in favour of implementing the 'Declaration on the De-nuclearization of Africa.'³⁷

Basically Chinese concern, however, for Africa, seems to be deeply in stressing common concern for colonialism. The Chinese analysis of the African situation as a whole has a close similarity with their own experiences and the analysis made for the pre-communist situation pertaining in China.³⁸

They have persistently campaigned against any softening of the struggle and have thrown their weight on the side of arm resistance to colonialism.

In regard to Latin America too, the PRC's policy at UN is obsessed with anti-colonialism and anti-racialism policy. China was an early backer of efforts by a number of Latin American countries to win acceptance of 200 nautical miles territorial sea. In doing this, the PRC hopes to win over the Third World countries against the Super Powers' proposal. It also tries to circumscribe navigation for

37. See UN Doc. A/RES/32/82 (Dec. 12, 1977) and A/RES/33/63 (Dec. 14, 1978).

38. Dutt, V.P., "China's Foreign policy 1958-62" (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1964). p. 276.

the Soviet navy and win over the Third World against Super Powers' expansion and particularly Soviet hegemony.

The Chinese view was that the so called freedom of the high seas was the monopoly of the high seas by the Super Powers. Chinese believed that the Super Powers' aim at maintaining and enlarging their prerogative of monopolising the seas. They believed that the Super Power which claims to be the natural ally of the developing countries, in particular is the most diehard apologist of the outdated imperialist legal regime of the seas. They believed that the coastal states could reasonably define their territorial sea taking in view the neighbouring countries interests. Secondly, as far the question of setting a reasonable maximum limit to territorial seas which is internationally acceptable, it should be decided upon by all countries jointly on equal footing. Thirdly, they also expressed that the land locked states should enjoy reasonable rights and interests in Oceanic Zones of neighbouring coastal states and have the right to transit through the territorial seas of the later. Fourthly, other than sea areas, the coastal states have the rights to regulate their straits. Next, they maintained that the foreign non-military vessels can have innocent passage, but must be abide by the regulations of the coastal states. Moreover, international sea bed should be used for peaceful

purposes and should not be monopolised by the Super Powers. Above all, Chinese representatives to the UN General Assembly have assumed that they would always support the just and principled positions of the Third World countries.

China had opted not to participate in five Assembly votes between 1974 and 1979 on the protection of human rights in Chile and in one vote in 1978 on the situation in Nicaragua. The PRC has circumvented the issue by reasoning that only through the elimination of hegemonism, colonialism and imperialism could human rights be restored in Chile.³⁹ Such stand, however, tends to reveal a contradiction in Chinese policy i.e. on one hand she did not want to aggravate its trade relation with the former and on the other, it wanted to not to violate its position of support for liberation movement. However, precisely, all the elements of Beijing's Afro-Asian policies are present in evolving and resolving policies towards Latin America and the analysis for Communist China. Afro Asian approach will, by and large, hold good for Latin America too.

As regards food problem in the Third World country China views that the food problem could be tackled successful without a massive increase in external assistance whether in the form of irons, machinery, seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural imports. In regard to the question

39. See UN Doc. A/RES/32/9 (XXIX) (Nov. 6, 1974).

of food trade, Chinese delegation to the Second Committee of the Third Session had welcomed the initiative taken at the Fifth Session of UNCTAD and hoped that the decision taken on the Session would be implemented. Eradication of hunger and malnutrition, as Chinese delegation believed, would be an important element of the Third World international development studies..

The Chinese view points on Disarmament is determined by its security consideration and Super Powers posture towards each and towards the PRC. The Chinese view points on this, are well defined right from 1971, when Mr. Chia Kuan-hua, Chairman of the delegate of the PRC in the plenary meeting of UN General Assembly spoke in connection with the proposal of Soviet delegation for convening worlds disarmament conference.

First of all, he observed the actual state of affairs of arms race is due to the imperialist and colonialist countries. Criticizing the Super Powers he noted :

"A quarter of century has elapsed, since the end of Second World War. To date, the two Super Powers are stationing ground, naval and air forces well over a million and have established thousands of military bases abroad. It is the Super Powers which have obstinately rejected the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and contending with each other for nuclear superiority, and they are doing this in order to press forward with their policies of black Mail, expansion, aggression and war. The threat to world peace and the security of the peoples of all countries originates precisely from those two Super Powers."⁴⁰

40. See UN Doc. A/26/PV. 1955 (Oct. 8, 1971), p. 5.

He read out the Chinese Government's statement of 1963 advocating, "complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, nor export nor import, nor manufacture, nor test nor stockpile them and they will destroy all the existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the World and disband all the existing establishments for the research testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons in the World!"⁴¹

He suggested that countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and particularly should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear free zones."⁴² Later, Chinese had also supported the proposal of providing guarantees for security of non-nuclear states.⁴³

Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua further urged that Soviet proposal for World Disarmament Conference might not to be put into vote in the General Assembly. In contrast to Soviet proposal, General Assembly adopted a draft resolution submi-

41. UN Doc. A/26/PV. 1955 (Oct.8, 1971), p.6.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

tted by Romania, Mexico and 25 other countries to which the PRC also extended her support.

The PRC has made it clear that she favours genuine disarmament. Secondly, she has assured the UN General Assembly that she would not be the first country to use nuclear weapons. Thirdly, she had opposed partial Test Ban Treaty and NPT as she viewed that such agreements are in essence camouflage for monopolising arms expansion in the name of nuclear disarmament, thereby consolidating, nuclear monopoly of two Super Powers' and causing nuclear blackmail of others. Fourthly, it has made it known that China has compelled to develop nuclear weapons because she was under nuclear threat of the two Super Powers. Then the PRC, off and on, had opposed Soviet proposal for World Disarmament Conference and viewed that United Nations should not be used as a tool for implementing the policies of big powers. For instance, in 50th meeting of First Committee in 31st Session, 1976, the PRC did not participate in the voting process on the draft resolution for World Disarmament Conference which was a Soviet proposal. Fifthly, the PRC viewed that the question of paramount importance to peoples of medium and small countries is not the disarmament, but that of independence and sovereignty and the winning of the right of national existence. Thus

the PRC held that it is not wrong on the part of non-nuclear countries going for nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Therefore in 50th meeting of Second Committee in 34th Session, the PRC held that the tenth preambular paragraph concerning disarmament defective as it failed to draw up a distinction between different categories of countries."⁴⁴

In 1979, Special Session of General Assembly on Disarmament Mr. Huang Hua, then Foreign Minister viewed that the Third World and other small and medium sized countries had put forward many reasonable suggestions, which are worth noting and must be considered, such as the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, the destruction of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear free zones and zones of peace and prohibition of all chemical and biological weapons and the prohibition of military bases and troops on foreign soil.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the Chinese had criticized all Soviet proposals as 'hollow talk'. Mr. Hua had gone to rail against the deliberate falsehood of the strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the lip services paid by the Soviet Union to a proposed ten per cent

44. See Un Coc. A/RES/31/189 C (Dec. 21, 1976).

45. See UN Doc. A/C-2034/L.113 (1979).

cut in military expenditures and the expansion, especially by the Soviet Union of conventional arsenals.

In a broad range the PRC has acted in its security interest. Before concluding, focusing on Chinese stand on various resolutions which speak of its security concern, would be of much worth. It has supported the zone of peace for South-East Asia proposed by the Asian countries, which the Soviet Union has been by and large, opposed to. The implementation of this zone of peace in South-East Asia, would definitely decrease the chances of threat to China from South East side. This makes China conscious about it is obvious sense of the term. Mr. Huang Hua, then Chinese Foreign Minister held that 'the points of the ASEAN for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from interference, by foreign powers should be respected.'⁴⁶

On the face of Soviet abstention, the PRC has repeatedly supported the resolution for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. This is contrary to Indian interest and concern. Then, the PRC, has voted with its erst-while enemy India, in favour of over ten resolutions in a decade on the declaration of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, where as Soviet Union

46. UN Doc. A/31/PV.13 (Oct. 5, 1976), p.26.

has abstained each time with the presumption of its impact on its naval deployment. Finally, vying with one another for North Korean support, the PRC and the Soviet Union have joined in cosponsoring numerous draft resolutions on the peaceful re-unification of Korea.

The US withdrawal from Indo-China since 1975 ceased US military threat to China, but Sino-Soviet rift had made China very conscious of its security problems. The impasse further aggravated with concentration of Soviet forces along the Chinese border line, an increase in Soviet naval capabilities and Moscow-Hanoi axis. The PRC, thus sought to structure a comprehensive global policy at the United Nations to counter such developments. In doing such, it attempted to make a common cause with the Third World Countries. Thus, though there is a definite linkage of many factors, such as ideology, leadership, global events etc., the Security consideration always remains most important, in carving out China's foreign policy. China's Third World Policy at the General Assembly of United Nations is no exception to it.

Chapter III
CHINA AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On November 23, 1971, the PRC became at one and the same time, both a participant and a decision maker in the Security Council of United Nations, from which she had been excluded for over two decades. The presence of the PRC in Security Council reminded apparently that the days of westernized council were gone symbolically and in fact, both the image and prestige of Security Council in the global community have been enhanced, after China's participation in it.

Most representatives in the Security Council expressed warm sentiments of welcome in the course of the 1959th meeting on November 23, 1971, when Mr. Huang Hua made his debut.¹ Later, the Security Council followed the General Assembly. On January 14, 1974, in adopting a resolution making 'Chinese' one of its working languages.² To this Mr Huang Hua observed that inclusion of Chinese as one of the working languages at United Nations terminated the abnormal state of affairs that existed in the

1. See UN Doc. SpPV.2599 (Nov.23, 1971)

2. Security Council Resolution, 345, (1974).

UN for a prolonged period. China's image rose high up at the international level, largely due to her participation in the Security Council. In 1976, tributes to the memory of both Mr. Chou-en lai and Mr. Chu Teh were made in the Security Council. Further, in tribute to Mao-Tse-Tung, in the month of month, the same year, the Security Council accorded him a quite exceptional tribute, devoting all but twenty minutes of the September 10, 1976, meeting, to speeches in his memory.

China's firm support to the demands of OAU and Latin American Countries to hold Security Council meetings at Addis Ababa and Panama city in 1972 and 1973, respectively, demonstrated pro-Third World policy of China at the United Nations, Security Council. China gave firm support to the demand of OAU to hold council meetings, in an African capital so as to give special attention to African questions. For the first time in the history, the council held its meetings in Addis Ababa, among from its head quarters, from January 28 to February 4, 1972. Likewise, the PRC supported equivocally, the proposal of Panama to hold council meetings in Panama city to consider "measures for strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of international cooperation in Latin America in accordance with the provision and principles of the Charter and the resolution relating

to the right of self-determination of peoples and strict respect for sovereignty and independence of States.³ The council meetings were held in Panama city, from March 15 to March 21, 1973.

During Indo-Pak War of 1971, China had voted for Assembly Resolutions for cease fire and troop withdrawal. Mr. Huang Hua criticised Soviet Veto on Indo-Pak War in Security Council as an abuse of veto Power. He said:

"This is for the first time that the Chinese delegation takes part in the United Nations. The Soviet representative has three times flagrantly abused the veto power in regard of all consequences with the obvious aim of making time so as to shield India in its occupation of East Pakistan. We are deeply shocked by such things, which we did not expect when we first took part in the work of the United Nations. This cannot but, make people think: How can a super-Power defy the opinion of ^{many countries} arrogantly and trucelently?"⁴

When the Security Council was immobilised in the matter of Indb-Pak War by Soviet Vetoes, China alongwith the U.S.A., had voted for Security Council Resolution 303 (1971), without any reservation.

3. See UN Doc. S/PV. 1684 (Jan.16, 1973), p.8.

4. PR, No.52 (Dec.24, 1971), p.11.

On August 25, 1972, China cast her veto on Bangladesh membership question, after her own draft resolution (s/10763 and Corr.1) to postpone the issue had failed earlier by a vote of 3:3:9. Sensing the mounting pressure of the majority opinion in the United Nations in favour of the admission of Bangladesh, Huang Hua considerably softened the position of his government, by indicating that the repatriation of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of War held in India could pave the way for Bangladesh's admission into United Nations. When Bangladesh membership came up again in June 1974, China supported it without any qualifications or reservations, declaring that all the relevant resolutions had now been fulfilled. In short, the PRC's veto was a proxy veto cast in favour of an ally, to delay the admission of Bangladesh into United Nations.

The PRC views that UNEF II run counter to her conceptualization of World Order, hence she did not participate in the discussions and resolutions on financing the UNEF forces in 1973. The Chinese publicists repeatedly insisted that the UN, in exercising its role in the maintenance of international peace and security should not intervene in the internal affairs of States' in violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. The uniting for peace resolution was attacked on the ground that it

undermined the unanimity principle and impaired the function of the Security Council. China specifically condemned the 'interventions' in Korea, Hungary, Congo, Cyprus, Vietnam, Tibet, Hongkong and Macov as contraventions of the charter principles.⁵

China's opposition to peace keeping became more verbal than real. She cast no negative vote on such instrumentalities of the Security Council on the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the second UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF II) established after the 1973 October War and the Rhodesian sanction Committee. As a result, the above mentioned operations continued unhampered.

In 1971, when the Council had to renew the mandate of UNFICYP operations, China took a low keyed, reticent posture during the debate proceeding the vote. Mr. Chen Chu, the Chinese representative noted that 'the dispute should be settled in a reasonable way by the countries concerned through consultations.'⁶ China voted on five resolutions and joined in two consensual resolutions on the Cyprus question, limiting her opposition to references to UNFICYP. Thus, UNFICYP continued its

5. JMJP, January, 9, 1965, p. 3.

6. See UN Doc. S/PV.1612 (Dec. 13, 1971), pp. 1-2.

operation with little opposition from China.

China plays a passively supportive role in the crisis involving East Timour. The Security Council held five meetings in December 1975 and eight meetings in April 1976, adopting two resolutions in the process. Both resolutions call upon Indonesia to withdraw all its forces from East Timaur and authorise the Secretary General to appoint a special representative for the purpose of making an on the spot investigation of the situation and of establishing contact with all parties in order to ensure the implimentation of the Council's resolutions. China voted in favour of both resulations, but expressed doubt about the necessity and usefulness of sending a representative of the Secretary General.⁷ Mr. Lai Ya li observed that the responsibility of the Secretary General was none other than to supervise the Indonesian Government's immediate withdrawal of its forces from East Timaur.⁸

In August 1976, the Security Council met three times to consider a complaint of Greece against Turkey in the Aegean territorial dispute. The Security Council adopted by consensus, the draft resolution sponsored by

7. See UN Doc. S/PV. 1869 (December 22, 1975), p.7.

8. Ibid.

France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S.A., which called on the both parties to "resume direct negotiations" so as to arrive at mutual acceptable solutions, and invited both the parties "to continue to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the I.C.J., are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they might identify in connection with their present dispute."⁹

Mr. Huang Hua supported the consensual resolution because, the spirit of the plan lied in the appeal to Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations.¹⁰

In October 1975, the Security Council was faced with the crisis of western sahara. China joined in all consensual resolutions thus supporting the role of the Council and the Secretary General in the settlement of territorial dispute. Mr. Lai Ya-li urged for particular vigilance 'to prevent the Super-Powers from seizing the opportunity to meddle in the matter.'¹¹

China vigorously supported sanction and encoerce-
ment measures under Chapter II of the Charter as applied

9. UN Doc. S/RES/395 (Aug. 25, 1976), p.2.

10. See UN DOC. S/PV. 1953 (Aug. 25, 1976), p.46.

11. See UN DOC. S/OV.1852 (Nov. 2, 1975), p.17.

to Colonialism and apartheid questions. Mr. Huang Hua had declared in the General Assembly in 1972 that the United Nations is duty bound to support the people of various countries in their struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. In the Security Council meeting of January 13, 1972, which was held in Africa for the first time in United Nations' history, Mr. Huang Hua forcefully advocated that the Council should further strengthen and expand their sanctions against Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese Colonialists.

The PRC had voted in favour of resolution approved in the Security Council in 1971, on imposing mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Huang Hua voted in favour of the resolution holding that it was in line with the basic stand of the Chinese delegation's support for the resolution did not imply that it supported the previous resolutions on the subject adopted before the arrival of Chinese delegation.¹² The PRC further viewed that sanctions against Rhodesia should be further strengthened and expanded.

In 1977, China voted for the Security Council Resolution S/12353, sponsored by Benin and six other countries, in condemnation of Smith's regime of Rhodesia

12. PR No.49 (December 3, 1971), p.21.

for its policy of apartheid. The Chinese delegation called upon all the Security Council Members to uphold justice, condemn the Smith racist regime in the strongest terms for its criminal acts of invading Mozambique and other independent African States, condemn the South African racist authorities for their criminal acts of working hand in glove with the Smith regime and firmly support the people of Zimbabwe and the rest of the Southern Africa in the just struggle for national liberation. It called upon all the states to give necessary assistance and support to the people of Zimbabwe.¹³

In the 2171st Security Council meeting, 1979, Mr. Chen Chu, condemn Southern Rhodesian attack on Zambia 'extending Chinese support for the Zambia he told:

"The continuous escalation of the acts of aggression against Zambia by the Southern Rhodesian racist not only has once again grossly violated the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia, resulting in serious loss of life and property and creating many difficulties for the economy of Zambia, but also has been a serious threat to international peace and security. The Chinese delegation strongly condemns the racist forces of Southern

13. UN DOC. S/PV.2018 (June 30, 1977), p.11.

Rhodesia for this unbridled act of aggression and takes this opportunity to express our deep sympathy with and support for the Government and people of Zambia, the victims of the aggression."¹⁴

He further noted:

"The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the just cause of the Zimbabwean people and the correct position of Zambia and other front line states of supporting the struggle of the Zimbabwean people. In our view, the Security Council should strongly condemn the racist forces of Southern Rhodesia for the act of aggression against Zambia and should adopt practical and effective measures to prevent recurrence of such armed aggression."¹⁵

The draft resolution was adopted which condemned South Rhodesian racist regime for their act of aggression on Zambia.

China has always stood for independence of Namibia (South-West Africa), which is under the control of racist regime of South Africa. The Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on Security Council Resolutions

14. UN DOC. S/PV. 2171 (November 23, 1979), p.6.

15. Ibid.

309(1972), 319(1972) and 323(1972), which called for prolongation of dialogue between the Secretary General and the South African authorities. It viewed that, to conduct a dialogue with the South African Colonialist authorities before there is any indication on their part that they would accept the United Nations Resolutions on Namibia. In the 1758th Council meeting, Mr. Huang Hua quoted south African racist regime as having said in a dialogue with the Secretary General that it might not take longer than ten years for the population of South West Africa to reach the stage, where it would be ready to exercise its right to self-determination. He told: "The so called exercise of self-determination within 10 years constitutes in itself and only a conspiracy and fraud to prolong the colonialist rule but also a gross insult to the people of Namibia and the entire African people. What deserves particular notice is that such an assertion represents in itself a brazen negation of the United Nations resolutions on Namibia. If the conspiracy of the so called 'self determination within 10 years' under the auspices of the south African authorities were to be accepted, would if not mean a nullification of all the just United Nations resolutions on Namibia through the instrumentality of the United Nations and thus a

legalization of South African Colonialist authorities' illegal occupation of Namibia ?"¹⁶

Next year, Mr. Chuang expressed Chinese support for the SWAPO's demands for the 'recognition of the right of various peoples of South-West Africa. He viewed that only the immediate withdrawal of the reactionary South African authorities from Namibia would make it possible for the indigenous people to become the masters of their own land and exercise their legitimate right.

He told:

"The South African racist regime has acted so truculently because it has all out political, diplomatic, military and economic support of imperialism. In order to strangle the national liberation movements and preserve its enormous economic and political interests in Southern Africa, imperialism has tried by all means to sustain the fascist rule of the South African authorities. Here in lies an important reason why the Namibian question has remained unsettled over the past two decades and more and why the south African authorities have dared to defy the relevant United Nations Resolutions."¹⁷

16. Un Doc. S/PV. 1758 (December 11, 1973), pp.47-48.

17. UN Doc. S/PV. 1812 (December 17, 1974), p.23.

He further noted:

"The Chinese Government and people always firmly supported the just struggle of the Namibian people. We maintain that the South African authorities must put an immediate end to their illegal occupation of Namibia, withdraw all their military and police forces as well as their administration from Namibia and let the United Nations' Council for Namibia take over and prepare for the independence of Namibia."¹⁸

The Chinese viewed that 'the South African racists, like their behind-the-scene bosses, are nothing but paper tigers; they die hards might be hard, but they were not hard upto death; that they might remain die hands forever and they would be able to escape their complete defeat in the long run.'¹⁹

After the MPLA won the Civil war in Angola, China refused to extend diplomatic recognition to the Angolan Government headed by Mr. Neto. In 1976, it abstained from voting on the Security Council Resolution. China repeated her position of non-participation on the issue of Angolan membership question on June 23, 1976, while the United

18. Ibid, pp.24-25.

19. See UN DOC. S/PV. 1806 (October 29, 1974), p.66.

States carried the burden of vetoing, when the question came once again, the USA abstained, while China opted for non-participation. Mr. Lai, the Chinese delegates to the 1932nd Security Council meeting, 1976, strongly condemned Soviet ambitions in Angola saying:

"While continuing its influence in the internal affairs of Angola, the Soviet Union is actively preparing to go a step further in sabotaging the national liberation movement in various parts of Southern Africa and to intensify its aggression and expansion there, under the hypocritical banner of 'assisting the national liberation movement.'"²⁰

Chinese delegation extended deep concern for coup d' etal in Chile. Mr Huang Hua, in the 1741st Security Council meeting told:

"The Chinese delegation has listened carefully to the speeches made by the representative of Cuba and some other countries. It can be seen from the statements that have been made during the military coup d' etate in Chile, ^{when} the Cuban Embassy in Chile and a Cuban merchant vessel were subjected to gross attacks by the coup committed by the coup d'etat forces of Chile are obviously in violation of international practice. The Chinese dele-

20. UN DOC. S/PV. 1932 (June 23, 1976).

gation cannot but express concern and regret at the occurrence of above incident."²¹

On September 10, 1972, China cast her vote on an amendment to a three power draft resolution (s/10784) on the Middle-east question. The amendment, which was defeated by a vote of 9:6:0, since two of the six negative votes were cast by China and the Soviet Union as permanent members, would have changed the phrase "the parties" in the operative paragraph of the three Power draft resolution to "all parties".

On October 21, 1973, commenting on the first Soviet American draft resolution Mr. Huang Hua commented:

"This time, these two super-Powers have hurriedly introduced a draft resolution of their conception to the Security Council and asked for its immediate adoption allowing of no full consultations, between states members of Security Council and preventing them from seeking instructions from their respective governments. This practice of imposing one's views on the Security Council is most unreasonable and is one we cannot agree to."²²

Two days later, when the Council resumed its debate

21. UN DOC. S/PV. 1741 (September 17, 1973), p.56,

22. UN DOC. S/PV (1747)(October 21, 1973), p.67.

on the second Soviet-American draft resolution, Mr. Chiao Kuan hua defied a call for a point of order saying:

"The Chinese delegation firmly opposes such a malicious practice of using the UN Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by two super-Powers at will. In our opinion, this also shows utter disrespect for the other states' members of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation cannot tolerate such a practice."²³

China had refused to participate in behind, they seems consultations among the 'Big Five', as revealed in Huang Hua's public statement at the 1751st meeting of the Council. He told:

"Mr. Malik accused China of refusing to take part in his Five Powers' consultations. The reasons are very simple: we have all along been opposed to a big Power striking political deals behind the backs of the Palestinian and Arab peoples."²³

When the council had its debate on October 24, 1973, on the establishment of UNEF II China outrage continued to run high. Huang Hua told :

"The dispatch of the UN emergency force would bring

23. UN DOC. S/PV. 1748 (October 23, 1973), p.13.

24. UN DOC. S/PV.1751 (October 26, 1973), pp. 78-80.

infinite evil consequences in its wake and pave the way for further international interventions in the Middle-east with the super-Powers as the 'behind-the-scenes-boses' If the super-Powers were not able to send in their own force directly they try by all means to squeeze in the forces which they can influence so as to exercise indirect control.' The fierce contention between the super-Powers on the question of the composition of UNEF II during the informal consultations supported the correctness of the Chinese judgement." 25

However China stopped short of resorting to the veto, simply refusing to be a party to the agreement on the composition of the so called UN Emergency Force and opted instead, for thenon-participation route. Ever since, the Chinese have disassociated themselves from all subsequent council proceedings on UNEF II and its financing.

In 1977, China had supported an Indian proposal to invite PLO to participate in the debate. The proposal was put to vote and that was adopted by 10 votes to 1, with 4 abstention. In 2219th meeting of Security Council, in 1980, Mr. Chen Chu, the Chinese delegate reaffirmed Chinese support for palestinianian people and told:

25. UN DOC. S/PV.1754 (November 2, 1973), p.7.

"Since its founding, the Committee on the Exercise of the 'Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people' has done a great deal of work for the realization of the national rights of the Palestinian people. We are in favour of those parts of the report of the Council that reaffirm and conform to General Assembly resolutions 3236(XXIX) and 3376(XXX). In our view, the Security Council is duty bound to adopt clear-cut resolutions on the settlement of the Palestinian question in the interests of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and take effective measures to implement them. This is not only a matter of great importance that concerns the upholding of justice, but is one that concerns the maintenance of peace in the Middle East and the entire world."²⁶

Earlier in 2113rd meeting of Security Council, in 1979, Mr. Chen Chu had told :

"We have steadfastly stood for the recovery of the occupied Arab territories and the realization of the Palestinian people's national rights including the right to return to their homeland and establish their own state. A real solution of the Middle East question depends on the great strength of the unity of the Arab people."²⁷

26. UN DOC. S/PV.2219 (April 29, 1980), p.4.

27. UN DOC. S/PV.2113 (June 19, 1979), p.8.

On Israel's interference in Lebanon he further told:

"The Chinese delegation has studied the draft resolution contained in Doc. S/13042. We approve of the relevant paragraphs in the draft condemning Israel's obstruction of the exercise of sovereignty by the Lebanese Government in Southern Lebanon. However, in view of the fact that the draft resolution mainly concerns the question of the United Nations Force, on which the Chinese delegation has always held a different position in principle, we did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution."²⁸

The Chinese delegation to the 2282nd meeting of Security Council 1981, condemned Israeli attack on Osirak nuclear Power plant of Iraq. Mr. Mi Guojun, the Chinese delegate told:

"In the evening of 7 June, the Israeli authorities brazenly sent war-planes to bomb the nuclear Power reactor in the vicinity of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. This was a deliberative premeditated act of naked aggression against a sovereign Arab State and another wanton crime the Israeli authorities have committed against Iraq, as well as the entire Arab nation. The Chinese Government and

28. Ibid, p.4.

people voice their indignation and condemnation in the strongest terms over this Israeli act of aggression, which has rudely trampled upon the charter of the United Nations. It was entirely necessary and justified for the Iraqi Government to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter. The Chinese delegation listened attentively to the important statement made to the Council by Mr. Saadoun Hammadi, the foreign minister of Iraq, in which he expressed Israel's criminal aggression with irrefutable facts."²⁹

Mr. Chen Chu, the Chinese delegate to the 2185th meeting of Security Council, in 1980, held that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was a naked act of aggression. He told:

"It grossly tramples upon the basic principles of the United Nations charter and constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security. The Chinese delegation firmly refutes the absurd statement the Soviet representatives has just made to justify his country's own act of aggression, and considers that the Security Council should remove the disturbances caused by the Soviet representative and immediately proceed with consideration of the question before us."³⁰

29. UN DOC. S/PV.2282 (June 15, 1981).

30. UN DOC. S/PV. 2185, (January 5, 1980), p.16.

The Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution that condemned Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and demanded for immediate withdrawal from Russian forces from Afghanistan. Mr. Chen Chu, the Chinese delegate on the Occasions told:

In view of the Chinese delegation, the draft resolution contained in document S/13729 is inadequate in that it has failed to condemn squarely Soviet armed aggression and intervention against Afghanistan. However, in view of the fact that the wording of the draft is clearly directed against Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolutions and maintains that the Soviet authorities must withdraw all its forces from Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally as called for in that draft."³¹

However this draft resolution, which was proposed by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, the Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia, could not be adopted since the Soviet Union, a permanent member along with German Democratic Republic had cast a negative vote. The result of the vote was 13 in favour, 2 against and no abstentions.³²

When the Iran-Iraq frontier incident were brought

31. UN DOC. S/PV.2190 (January 7, 1980), pp.53-55.

32. See Un

to Council's attention in February 1974, China took the position of supporting "a settlement of such questions through friendly consultations on an equal footing between the parties in disputes. China opted for non-participation in the vote that led to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 384(1974).³³ In 1980, there broke out a full fledged war between Iran and Iraq on border issue. China voted for security council draft resolution contained on Doc. S/14201, sponsored by Mexico and sincerely wished that they resolved their disputes by peaceful means. Mr. Ling Qing, the Chinese delegates to the 2248th security council meeting of 1980 told:

"Iran and Iraq belong to the Third World and both have friendly relations with China. We are deeply concerned over the armed conflict between them. We always maintain that differences among the Third World countries can and must be settled peacefully through consultations or negotiations without resort to force. We sincerely hope that Iraq and Iran take to heart the overriding interests of combating hegemonism and safeguarding world peace so that they will exercise restraint and seek a peaceful solution to their dispute through negotiations without letting the situation get out of hand. This would

33. UN DOC. S/PV. 1764 (February 28, 1974).

be in the fundamental interest of the Iraq peoples as well as that of peace and stability in the Middle east and the Gulf region."³⁴

China supported the application of south Vietnam as well as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for admission into the United Nations. Mr. Huang Hua in the 1935 th Security Council Meeting of 1975 told:

"The Republic of South Vietnam and the Democratic Vietnam submitted their application for admission to membership in the United Nations on 15 and 16 July respectively. The Chinese delegation holds that accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN charter, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam are fully qualified for membership in the United Nations. We therefore, firmly support their applications and of the opinion that the Security Council should recommend the admission of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam to membership in the United Nations. Accordingly, we have joined the co-sponsors of the two draft resolutions submitted by the non-aligned states members."³⁵

34. UN DOC. S/PV.2248 (September 28, 1980), p.33.

35. UN DOC. S/PV. 1835 (August 11, 1975), pp.19-20.

But, in 1975, the Chinese delegation objected the inclusion of the application of south Korea, when both south Korea and Democratic peoples' Republic of Korea sent their application for membership in the United Nations. Mr. Huang Hua held that linking the case of North and South Vietnam with of D.P.R. Korea and South Korea is not sound. He told:

"This is not only in total violation of the explicit provision of the United Nations Charter and the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly, but, to put it bluntly, is really aimed at the adamant pursuance of its "two Koreans" policy in an attempt to solidify and perpetuate the division of Korea, thus stubbornly obstructing the Korean people's cause of independence and peaceful reunifications. This is also contradictory to the 'consensus' on the Korean question adopted at the twenty eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly which clearly affirmed the need to promote the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea in accordance with the three principles provided for in the joint communique agreed upon by north and south of Korea in 1972. This is of course absolutely unacceptable to all the justice-upholding countries and people. Therefore, the Chinese delegation is against the inclusion of

the so-called application of South Korea in the agenda."³⁶

China had supported the membership of new independent countries who freed themselves from the clutches of Colonialism. For instance, it supported the application of membership to the United Nations of Guinea - Bissan and Grenada in 1974, and of Dominica and Solomon Islands in 1978. In 2051st Security Council meeting, 1977, Chinese representative Mr. Chen Chu expressed his concern for super Power rivalry in Red Sea and supported the resolution for membership of Djibouti in the United Nations. The resolution was adopted unanimously. In the same year in the 2167th Security Council meeting Mr. Chen Chu noted:

"St. Lucia is qualified for the membership of the United Nations. After independence, while developing the national economy and culture, the Government of St. Lucia took an active part in international affairs and promoting friendly relations with the Third World countries and all peaceloving countries. We sincerely wish the people of St. Lucia continued new victory in their just cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and building their own country."³⁷

36. UN DOC. S/PV. 1834 (August 6, 1975), p.46.

37. UN DOC. S/PV. 2167 (September 12, 1979).

A vote was taken by show hands on the admission of St Lucia into United Nations and it was unanimous. In 1980, China supported the application for membership of St Vincent and Grenadines. Subsequently, she supported the application for membership of Antigua and Barbuda.

When the Security Council discussed over Vietnam's interference Mr. Chen Chu criticized Vietnam voting :

"The Vietnamese authorities have flagrantly committed an unmarked military aggression against a weak and small neighbour, thus trampling upon the elementary principle guiding international relations and violating the charter of United Nations. The people of the whole world and all justice upholding countries are not indignant at this. The Chinese Government strongly condemns the Vietnamese authorities of their crimes of aggression and supports the Government of Democratic Kampuchea in its legitimate demand for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council. We wish to reaffirm here that the Chinese Government firmly supports the Government and people of Kampuchea in their just struggle to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity and resist the Vietnamese aggressors."³⁸

38. UN DOC. S/PV. 2108 (January 11, 1979), p.10.

The ASEAN countries had submitted a draft concerning restoration of peace stability and security in the region of South East Asia. Chinese supported the resolution. But it was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Condemning the Soviet veto he said :

"The flagrant Soviet veto of the ASEAN draft is also a dangerous signal showing that the Soviet Union and Vietnam, as major and minor hegemonism, will persistently carry on and intensify their acts of aggression and expansion in south East Asia."³⁹

Defending China on Sino-Vietnamese border clash the same year, he told:

"We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. The present grave situation on the sino-Vietnamese border is wholly the making of the Vietnamese authorities."⁴⁰

He added:

The Chinese Government has always stood for a fair and reasonable settlement of the disputes between the two countries through peaceful negotiations at any mutually agreed place between representatives of an appropriate level to discuss the restoration of peace

39. UN DOC. S/PV. 2129 (March 16, 1979), p.9.

40. Ibid, p.11.

and tranquility along the border between the two countries and proceed to settle the dispute concerning the boundary and territory. The Chinese Government is prepared to enter into concrete negotiations on any constructive measures that can ensure peace and tranquility along the border between the two countries.⁴¹

China had showed interest in both the 'who' and 'what' questions, in the Security Council. In doing such, it is apparent that China pursues a pro-Third World policy. Chinese have valued Security Council, as a sword and shield to protect the interests of the Third World and counter the imperialist and colonialist forces. China has been misunderstood sometimes for her opposition to consultative process among the Security Council members. But it needs to be understood that Chinese delegation had never been opposed to consultative - consensual practice as such, but opposed to consultative process in which the two super-Powers played a dominant role. The Chinese conceptualization of consensual decision making follows closely participatory democracy, in which all the members of the council are involved in an equal footing.

41. Ibid, pp.11-3.

Chapter IV

CHINA AND NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

Operationally, the PRC was within its iron curtain in post World War period, thereby keeping herself away from the world economic order. It was only after its entry into UNO, she gained access to different international forums to put-forth her view-points in discussions and deliberations on international economic intercourse. Slowly and steadily, on the convass of its foreign policy, she brushed the colour of support to the ideal picture of New International economic order which was mirrored, time and again, at various organs, agencies and committees of the United Nations system. The historic task of creating a new economic order gained more legitimate proportions through China's participation and her political and moral blessings to the cause of NIEO at UN system, for, without the participation of one-fifth of humanity it would have been self defeating and self contradictory. To this not only there was a definite impact of the struggle for NIEO on Chinese views of the world order, but also, the Chinese conceptualisation of world order definitely was legitimised to a great degree, subsequently and and apparently.

The call for NIEO is based on the assumption that the prevalent international order perpetuates and aggravates international inequalities and that new relationship of interdependence should replace the older pattern of dependence and unequal exchange. The spirit of the NIEO is envisaged in the Charter of Economic rights and Duties of states adopted by the 27th General Assembly Session asserting its main objectives:

"The achievement of more rational and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural changes in the world economy, the creation of conditions which permit the further expansion of trade and intensification of economic cooperation among all nations, the strengthening of the economic independence of developing countries, the establishment and promotion of international economic relations taking into account the agreed differences in development of the developing countries and their specific needs."¹

The less developed countries have been inacting persistent demands for introducing fundamental reforms in the economic, commercial and financial relationship, between themselves and the developed countries. The less deve-

1. General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974.

veloped countries hold the view that the developed countries must recognize the growing power of the commodity producers as evident from the success of OPEC in raising oil prices and accept that the locus of power has inclined in their favour. The 70's stated with persistent efforts at UN for struggle to bridge the yawning gulf between the rich and the poor nations and to establish a NIEO.

Now before analysing China's participation in the NIEO process at UN, it would be beneficial to devote a paragraph in focusing on the historical development of NIEO process itself. It was in early sixties, when U.N. General Assembly had passed a resolution recommending that the flow of international capital and assistance to developing countries should be about one per cent of the combined national income of the developed countries. But this direction remained as a mere paper work. The GATT, formed in 60's, remained primarily concerned with the interests of the developed countries. Then, in 1971, the General Assembly issued a clarion call that "the United Nations should evolve a concept of collective economic security."² The Non-aligned countries' brushed a picture of poverty and misery of the people of the Third World at 1973 Algiers

2. General Assembly Resolutions 2880 (XXVI) of 21st December, 1971.

Sumit in following words:

".... Of the 2600 million inhabitants of developing world, 800 million are illiterate, almost 1000 million are suffering from malnutrition or hunger and 900 million have a daily income of less than 30 US cents."³ Subsequently food crisis and oil crisis United the rich North and the poor South in a new partnership of economic misery. However, it was only in ^{the} 6th special session of General Assembly, a review was provided of the basic structural problems in the World economic order.

The 6th special session of the General Assembly met from April 9 to May 2, 1974 and adopted two historic resolutions concerning international economic relations "the Declaration and programme of Actions for NIEO."⁴ China did not play any direct role in the preparatory process leading to the convocation of 6th special session, but she did display in public a spectacular show of support for it. The PRC delegation headed by Mr. Deng Xiao Ping was given a warm send-off at the Beijing air-port by Premier Lai and a gathering of 4000 people and it was greeted with

3. Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Govt. of Non-aligned countries, Algiers, Sept. 5-9, 1973; Eco. Declaration, UN Doc. A/9330 (22nd Nov. 1973), p. 60.

4. See General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-IX) of 1st May 1974 and General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1st May, 1974.

equal warmth on its return.

China participated at three different levels in the process of New International Economic Order in 1974, special session. First, China participated in the general debate of the plenary meeting. In it Mr. Deng Xiao ping made a major policy speech which was perhaps one of the most important statements of the PRC's conceptualisation of world order made at any international forum. In addition to this, he also pronounced to the world audience China's new three world typology for the first time. Mr. Huang Hua, in it, summarized the 'Declaration and the programme of action for NIEO.' The Declaration of the establishment of NIEO was adopted on May 1st at the plenary meeting of the special session of the UN General Assembly with the heading "Declaration of the establishment of NIEO", which adopted :

"We the members of the United Nations solemnly proclaim our united determination to work urgently for the establishment of a NIEO make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development in peace and justice for present and future generations."⁵ The programme of actions

laid particular stress on transfer of technology, rational cooperation with and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. The programme also decided to establish a special fund to provide relief and developmental assistance.

Secondly, the PRC participated in the Ad-hoc committee of the session, where China played more effective role than in the plenary meetings, making ten statements in the course of twenty one meetings held between April 10 and May 1, 1974; China supported the resolution drafted by the group of 77 for the establishment of a NIEO.

In the Ad-hoc committee of ^{the} special session, Soviet representative Mr. Alexei Nesterenko proposed three amendments insisting on changing the phrase 'establishment of NIEO' to 'establishment and preservation of a fair and just international economic order', packing 'Disarmament' in the declaration and inclusion of items as detente, improvement of international situation, peaceful coexistence and scientific and technological cooperation etc. Opposing this, Senegalese representative pointed out that the word 'new' is the key point of the draft declaration of establishing a NIEO, for such an order can only be established by destroying the old one. The Chinese delegation supported the latter, proclaiming that Soviet revi-

sionists were trying to shift the direction of the special session by insisting to include in it controversial political problems.

In it Mr. Huang Hua, the Chinese representative had also singled out two terms 'interdependence', and international division of labour as practically susceptible to distortion by the super-Powers. Here, what the Chinese view-point drove at is that the concept of interdependence between the rich and the poor countries works ultimately to the advantages of the former. The Chinese as a whole argued that "NIEO should be aimed above all at development of the developing countries."⁶

Thirdly, Chinese delegation participated in the negotiation process between the regional groups. In order to make the draft documents as acceptable as possible to other regional groups, the group of 77 established a 18 nations negotiation committee to negotiate on its behalf. China was invited to express her views before the negotiation committee. In it Mr. Huang-Hua strongly viewed that Soviet attempt to pack disarmament into declaration to the desires explicitly stated by many Third World countries" and that "Soviet attempt was aimed

6. GAOR, 6th special session's Ad hoc Committee, 8th meeting (17th April 1974) para 49.

at leading the conference astray, sabotaging it and provoking disputes, which the Chinese delegations could not agree to."⁷ Huang Hua declared the support of his government for the declaration and the programme of action because these documents basically reflect the earnest demands and just propositions of the Third World.

On November 1974, the draft charter of the working group was introduced in the General Assembly on behalf of the Group of 77. However it is to be noted that China was not a cosponsor in it. All the amendments that were advanced by the developed countries were defeated. At its 2315th plenary meeting on December 12, 1974, the General Assembly adopted the draft charter by a roll call vote of 120 in favour, 6 against and 10 abstentions. The preamble of the final charter declared:

"To promote the establishment of NIEO, based on equality, sovereignty, independence, common interests and cooperation among all states, irrespective of the economic and social systems." Mr. Chang Hsien, the Chinese representative pointed out that "it represented a break in the old and inequitable international economic relations and establishment of a new, just and reasonable international economic order."⁸

7. Victory of Third World's struggle in Unity" - a review of the special session of General Assembly, PR, No.19, (May 10, 1974), 12.

8. UN DOC. A/PV. 2315 (12 December 1974), pp. 18-20.

However China expressed regrets that the charter contained a few "irrational and even harmful articles."⁹ Predictably, she opposed all the inserted articles that were Soviet sponsored or sponsored by pro-Soviet countries. She registered her strongest objection to the insertion of Art. 15 on Disarmament into the charter. China did not participate in the vote on Art. 20, which stated that the developing countries should give due attention to the possibility of expanding their trade with socialist countries by granting them conditions not inferior to those granted normally to the developed market economy countries and declared that she possessed a different view on it. Likewise, China opted for non-participation in the vote on Art. 26, which spoke of granting most favoured nations treatment. Above all, she showed her displeasure on Soviet item in Chapter I, i.e. peaceful coexistence, on the pretext that she had her own 'Five principles of peaceful coexistence.' Nonetheless, she had objected the insertion of the item 'interdependence' in the charter.

The dominant component in the Chinese image is the concept of interdependent and self reliant development of the national economy. In the Chinese conceptualisation,

9. UN DOC. A/C-2/29/PV. 1647 (December 16, 1974), para 30.

this is indeed the only way that developing countries can liberate their economic thinking from the exploitative centre - generated concept of 'interdependence'; this is the only way that the developing countries can break away from the vicious process of exchanges of unequal values; this is the only way that the developing countries can destroy the seemingly self-perpetuating structure of centre periphery and dominance-dependence relations.¹⁰

The PRC's participation in the 6th special session on Raw materials and Development affords us unique insight into the evolving Chinese image of a world economic order. Though she supported the two documents mentioned above, she never stated directly if those two documents also reflected the interests or demands of China in the World economic system. One analytical problem here is the tendency of the Chinese to disguise their interest in terms of principles.¹¹ However 'to say that China made no contributions or played a marginal role in the making of NIEO at the 6th special session is a misjudge on both the substance and the style of Chinese global politics.¹² Indeed China acted as if the 6th Special Session was a

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10. Samuel, S. Kim, "China, the United Nations and the World Order", Princeton University Press, 1979, 276.
 11. James C Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim, "China in the Global Community", (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.264.
 12. Ibid, p.262.

confirmation of her trend of historical analysis of world policies and that the Third World was the motive force pushing forward the wheel of history in this irreversible historical process.

The PRC's participation in the 7th Special Session resumed a key tone in giving support to the Third World.¹³ In the Ad-hoc Committee of this Special Session, the PRC gave her verbal support to the demands and propositions advanced at the conference of developing countries of Raw Materials held in Dakar in February 1975, to the China Declaration and to the plan of action. In it, Mr Li Chiang, the Chinese representative proclaimed that China had formulated a general policy of taking agriculture as a foundation and industry as the leading factor of economy and warned that .. "if a country was not basically self reliant in foodgrains ... it could be taken by neck at any time."¹⁴ He further lashed out the Soviet Union without naming it directly, as having stepped up its aggression, infiltration and expansion in the Third World and actively extending its social imperialist system of exploitation.¹⁵ In this session, Mr. Huang Hua expressed and extended China's support for the resolution, but at the same time held that

13. Ibid, p.287.

14. PR, No.37 (September 12, 1975), p.14.

15. Ibid.

'obstacles in its path mainly came from the two super-Powers'.

It is worth noting here that the Soviet Union on one hand supported the demands of the Third World verbally, but she did not view it as a North South Problem and held that Soviet Union could not be expected to shoulder any responsibility of compensation, for the problems were due to western imperialism and thus set herself apart from the mainstream of NIEO politics. The Chinese anti-Soviet stand is in part a reaction to the position the Soviet Union consistently taken through the NIEO process including the Soviet suggestion of deleting the word new from the phrase 'NIEO'.

The Chinese delegation had noted: "Capitalist World is in the grips of the most serious post war economic crisis. Under the circumstances the super Powers are stepping up arms expansion and war preparations, intensifying their scramble for sphere of influence and shifting of crisis over the Third World Countries. It is stimulating a new upsurge in the revolutionary struggle of the people of all countries particularly in the anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonistic struggle of the Third World."¹⁶

16. Beijing Review, No.37 (September 12, 1975), p.11.

Chinese representative Mr. Lin Qiang claimed that China stood by Third World and supported :

1. the transformation of inequitable International economic relations and establishment of a NIEO,
2. the Third World proposals regarding International trade, finance, currency, industrialisation, science and technology and other matters,
3. just economic and political relations based on five principles,
4. joint administration of International economic affairs by all countries, instead of monopolisation in the hands of a few.
5. independence and sovereign rights over one's own natural resources and raw materials together with self reliance and self management,
6. establishment of various associations of raw materials exporting countries for a united struggle.
7. indexation of commodity prices and integrated programme for commodities,
8. removal of all reasonable restrictions in the way of technology transfer, *and*

9. restructuring of the economic sectors of the UN system.

The same year, Chinese Press and Government had deeply appreciated the home convention of 1975 which was signed between forty six African pacific developing countries and nine West European Countries to improve their economic relations. The main point of Lone convention were : 'access to the EEC countries for 99.20 per cent of the products of African, Coribbean and Pacific countries and the establishment of a fund by EEC to compensate the ACP countries for any fall in the prices of primary products and raw materials'.

Next year, in the 30th session of the General Assembly, the Chinese delegation expressed satisfaction over the Third World countries expansion of their economic and technological cooperation theestablishment of various organizations of raw material producing countries and over the improvement in the relationship with the second World countries. The Chinese delegation noted that some developed countries have taken measures to reduce or cancel some of debts by developing countries. It also figured at that one super Power was playing with the words 'new order, but in fact still obstinately defending the old order, the other super-Power had put up the slogan of democratic reform but tried to make international economic

relations serve its interests in gaining world hegemony and such attempt of the super-Powers had been the main obstacle to the establishment of NIEO. For this, the Chinese delegation noted that unceasing and unremitting struggle is needed.

At the 34th session of the UN General Assembly, 1979, Mr. Han Nian Long, Chairman of the Chinese delegation held at the plenary meeting that the unreasonable state of affairs should not be allowed to continue. He expressed his satisfaction over the efforts of the UN conference of science and technology for development which had registered some preliminary results. He viewed that in order to bring out effective solution to the International economic problems, recognitions of the developing countries, full rights and true equality in decision making in international economic affairs is essential.¹⁶ He further noted that the correct way to settle pressing economic problems is for the developed countries and the developing countries, to sit together for full round consultation, break the present impasse, evolve and adopt effective measures to narrow down the gap between the rich and the poor countries

17. See, Beijing Review, No. 41 (October 12, 1979), p. 20; See UN Report, proceedings in 34th session of UN General Assembly, speech of Han Nianlong at the plenary meeting (September 27, 1975).

and establish a New International Economic relationship that is equitable, rational and based on equality and mutual benefit.¹⁸

The eleventh special session of the UN General Assembly ended in September 15, 1980, after a three week meeting which 153 countries attended. Chinese foreign trade Minister Li Qiang attended the session as the leader of the delegation of the people's Republic of China. He called for urgent action to end colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, hegemonism, expansionism and all forms of foreign aggression and occupation, which constitute major obstacles to the economic emancipation and development of the developing countries. The issue of global negotiation was however deadlocked over its proceedings and time-frame. A compromise proposal accepted by the Group of 77, Canada, China, the EEC and other countries was turned down by the United States, West Germany and Britain. As for the procedures of the global negotiations, the developed countries maintained that the question of foodgrains, energy, development and trade be discussed separately while the group of 77 wanted to use energy as a lever to force the developed countries

18. Ibid.

into making real concessions in matters of raw materials, trade and development as well as in monetary and financial issues.¹⁹ China as usual stood by the group of 77.

The Chinese had shown a little interest in the restructural process. For instance, they had opted not to participate in the Ad-hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and social sectors of the UN system. Likewise, China declined to be elected a member of the Ad hoc Committee on the special programme. The Group of 77 constitutes the strongest economic link and the Nonaligned countries the strongest political link to the NIEO process, yet China has excluded herself from these linkage politics. The PRC has confined herself to editorial and moral support to the Third World. As a result PRC did not participate in the Bokar Conference (1977), Manila Conference (1976) and Mexico city North-south dialogue of 1981, which provided the inputs to the NIEO process. Her participation on this country had been thus limited to the General Assembly, ECESOC, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNDP and eight of fourteen specialised agencies. Besides, she participated in the conference on Food, Refugees and Sea bed mining etc.

On the proposal of 4th Security Conference of non-aligned countries and the decisions of the 28th session of

19. Beijing Review, No. 39 (September 28, 1980), p. 39.

the UN General Assembly, the World Food Conference was held in Rome on November 5, 1973. The food problem is not an isolated one, it is inseparable from the present struggle of the Third World to combat Colonialism, imperialism and big Power hegemonism and to break down the old international economic order and establish a new one. In it Chinese delegation lashed out the Soviet Union and the USA, one for keeping quite silent about imperialist and super-Power plunder and exploitation, while talking of food problem, and other one, for threatening to use grain as a means against the Third World. However, the PRC decided not to participate in two of the offshoots of Food Conference: 'the world food council (FC) and International Food for Agricultural Development (IFAD)'. The PRC declined to be nominated as a member from the Asian group for Council membership in WFC as well.

The Chinese presented their view points on the Sea bed mining and law of the Sea in 1973, in sea bed Committee Session for the first time at UN, in subsequent sessions of the law of the sea conference those were reflected and re-reflected. Chinese representatives held the view that "Super-Powers should not be allowed exclusive control over the international machinery and that the principles of equality among big and small nations, rational geographical representation and rotation of offices by election

should be applied."²⁰ Mr. Shen Wei Liang, the Chinese representative viewed that the four Geneva Conventions on it had failed to reflect the reasonable demands of the developing countries. Mr. Chang Wen, another representative opposed Soviet proposal of setting 12 nautical miles as the maximum limit of the territorial sea and held the view that the coastal states are to determine their territorial sea limit, suiting to their own interests and conditions. China, by the way, had declared 12 nautical miles as its territorial sea zone. He accused the Soviet Union in delimiting a controlled sea zone up to 48 degrees north and 170 degrees 25 minutes east for the purpose of protecting its coastal fishing on one hand and on the other, opposing the demand of the developing countries, for a reasonable, delimitation of exclusive sea zones'.²¹

The Chinese delegation also opposed the Art.14 of Geneva Convention which held the right to innocent passage through territorial seas on the pretext that foreign military ships might enjoy the same right. Shen Wei Liang noted that the so called four freedoms i.e. freedom of the passage, freedom of fishing, freedom of laying and

20. See UN Sea Bed Committee Report of sub-Committee I (March 27, 1973); Spee of Hsia pu; also Beijing Review, No.15 (April 1973), p.13.

21. Beijing Review, No.15 (April 1973), pp.15-16.

maintenance of sub marine cables or pipelines at the sea bed and freedom of flying over high seas, in effect allowed the super Powers to enjoy hegemony while bringing disaster to the small and weak countries. Further, the Chinese delegation strongly opposed Art. 7 of it which provided fishing rights, for, it would virtually amount to providing legal justification to plunder fishing resources of other countries.

The PRC's participation in Economic and social council (ECOSOC) has been more symbolic than active. In the 54th session of the UN economic and social council, on April 27, 1973, Chinese representative Mr. Wang Yun Shang held that 'it was entirely reasonable and just for the developing countries to demand the full exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. In 1974, Mr. Pci Ming, the Chinese representative told that "the programme of Action made the council responsible for defining the policy framework and coordinating the activities of all organizations in the United Nations' systems implementing the programme."²²

In the seventh session of the UN industrial development Board, held in Vienna in May 1973, the Chinese delegation countered the Soviet proposal at the sixth session,

22. Beijing Review, No.21 (May 25, 1973), p.10.

that is, "permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of developing countries and its interconnection with the problems of industrialisation." The Chinese delegation viewed that "it was inalienable rights of the developing countries to fully exercise their natural resources, whether the level of their present industrial development was high or low."²³ It should not be affected by industrial development.

The Chinese as a member of UNIDO had repeatedly argued that the system of UN multilateral assistance should reduce red-tape to a minimum by doing away with all over elaborate procedures. "UNIDO", as Un agency for multilateral aid in the field of industry, the Chinese argued, should lay stress on providing practical and effective aid to the developing countries."²⁴ China, further, time and again, in various meetings opposed the Soviet attempt to security and disarmament into the constitution of Group of 77 that the conference of UNIDO should be the supreme organ of authority of organization.

China's voluntary contribution to UNIDO present more an extension of her bilateral aid than multilateral aid in its conventional sense. Secondly, China felt that she would contribute as much as not to bring constraint to her

23. Ibid.

24. UN DOC. A/C-2/29/PV. 1616, (October 25, 1974), para - 15.

own economy. Thirdly, she did not contribute to any UN multilateral aid programme unless she had a reasonable degree of assurance that her scarce resources were not used for politically unjust causes and economically wasteful projects. Finally, she held that the UNIDO must aim at helping developing countries to achieve self reliance.

China's role and contribution in United Nation Development programme (UNDP) has not only been symbolic, but also polemic. China believed that UNDP was neither serving her principles nor her interests. The Chinese concept of National Sovereignty seemed so absolute and so rigid that to them every UNDP action smacked an unprincipled exchange of aid for a piece of sovereign rights of recipient countries. Following this line Chinese believed that the UNDP should not regard itself as an 'alms giver' or 'super international agency'. Similarly, they rejected the view that the largest contribution would have a larger say in the decision making process in it and held this principle to be out dated and undemocratic. Therefore they called for a change in the unreasonable allocation of seats in the governing councils.

On the problem of refugees, Chinese believed that all countries should make greater contribution and provide greater material and financial help. She also viewed that ships of all countries ^{have an} obligation to rescue the 'boat

people'. In Geneva Conference on Indo-Chinese refugees of 1979, it had held that the root cause of the Indo-Chinese refugees' problems lied in the policies of aggression and expansion of Vietnamese authority alongwith the policy of genocide at home.

Now, it would be very important to peep deep into China's role and participation at UNCTAD meetings. China's independence from the Group of 77 adds curious dimension to her participation in UNCTAD. She, as an independent party participant in a wide range of UNCTAD meetings, had generally taken reactive and passive posture of supporting all the just and legitimate demands of Group of 77. It was in the twenty ninth session of General Assembly that extended the mandate of the previous working in the light of the process achieved. The Declaration of programme of Action, together with the charter of economic rights and duties of states adopted by the 29th General Assembly have been characterised by UNCTAD-IV. This laid down the foundations of the NIEO in a comprehensive seven page resolutions on the 'Integrated programme for commodities designed to implement NIEO.²⁵

The PRC had never submitted any draft or concrete proposal of its own nor did it make effort to represent to

25. See UNCTAD Resolutions 93(IV) adopted at its 145 plenary meeting (30th May 1976).

any post in the UNCTAD. The Chinese did not lobby because they did not initiate anything, there was nothing really to lobby for.²⁶ China as a whole had somehow excluded herself in the North-South negotiation in UNCTAD. However, unlike the Soviet socialist group (Group D), China's position had remained stable and predictable.

Chinese representatives at UNCTAD-IV held at Nairobi maintained that the "Declaration" and "programme of Action" adopted at the Manila meeting of the group of 77 embodied the spirit of the sixth and seventh special session of the UN General Assembly, ^{which} reflected the reasonable demands of the developing countries and should be taken as the basis for consideration at the current session of the conference."²⁷ They supported the idea of maintaining international buffer stock of various commodities, common fund for international stock piles and the indexing of commodity prices of manufactured goods and also supported the reduction of debt burdens on developing countries and reformation in International financial system etc.

In sum, the Chinese behaviour in UNCTAD politics was marked by the following characteristics: a relatively

26. Samuel S. Kim, "China, the United Nations and the World Order", (Princeton University Press: 1979), p. 303.

27. "4th UNCTAD Session: Speech by Cha Hua Min," PR, No. 21 (May 21, 1976), p. 19.

extensive participation in a wide variety of meetings; a passive and reactive support of the Group of 77, an occasional intervention to rebuff or reject the Soviet linkage of development with disarmament; an uncharacteristically active participation in any debate relating to tungster and generally modest diligent and self effacing behavioural posture.²⁸

The PRC's style of support to the cause of NIEO was marked by its efforts to undermining the position of super-Powers, especially that of Soviet Union and lift her own image up in the eyes of the Third World countries. It also presented some glimpses of political dynamics, participation and activization at least in the preparatory or formulative process if not in the implementing process of NIEO. Besides, it revealed a curious blend of its adherence to its rigid principles as well as few spells of tactical accomodations in its approach towards the probelm.

28. Samuel S. Kim, "China the United Nations and the World Order", (Princeton University Press: 1979), pp.303-4.

Chapter V

C O N C L U S I O N

The emancipation of one-fourth of mankind from semi-feudal and imperialist bondage and its advance along the socialist road, itself had a far reaching impact on the people and the countries of the 'Third World'. It was therefore obvious, that China's entry into United Nations after a little less than a quarter century's trial through various means - persuasion and pressurization, was considered not merely a victory of itself, but a victory of the have-nots over the monopoly of western and super-Powers at United Nations. Predictably, China in the last decade indentified herself with the Third World and fought for their causes in the United Nations.

There are certain factors that have posed to restrict China's influence in the Third world. First of all, China has not projected her economic capability to have impressed Third world Countries, to the extent that they would have looked towards China, for economic benefit. Secondly, many Third world countries are dependent upon the first and Second world for their military requirements, which China has not been able to provide. Besides this, Third World

countries have been suspicious about the Great Powers' role in their region and some of them put China in that category. Then, there is no, 'all the while across the board' identify between them. For instance, though China claims itself to be a Third world country, it is not a member of Group of 77. Again, most of the Third world countries are non-aligned countries. Though China support the causes of the non-alignment, it is not a member of it. However, despite these differences there is an intimate relationship between the Third world countries and China, specially at the United Nations.

The history of China's efforts, specially at the United Nations bears evidence of its striving to undermine super-Powers and ally with the Third world on various international issues. Thus, China not only claims a special kinship with the Third world on geographical and economic pretexts, but also championed the causes of the Third world at United Nations. It is identification with the Third World puts her in a better bargaining position with the super-Powers.

However it cannot be denied that China's approach to the United States has been guided more by security consideration rather than principles. The Indo-pak war of 1971-72, the Angolan war (1975-76), the Indo-China conflict and Kampuchean representation (1978-79) - all of them were viewed

by China through the prism of its own security. The Second World, of late, has become closer to China as a partner in later's modernization drive. Thus national interests - mainly economic and security, as any of the countries of the World, stands vital for China too.

China's entry into United Nations has legitimized its political status and strengthened its global prestige. Besides this, it can be safely said that there has been remarkable influence of Third World on China in its stand on various international issues. For instance, Third world influence on China managed to bend China's principled stand of opposition on UN peace keeping and it is gradually pulling China into the global network of disarmament politics. China's recent probing of its possible participation in the Bank group and the International Atomic Energy Agency would have been unthinkable a couple of years before, but for the influence of the Third world. China also increasing its participation in a variety of cultural, educational, social, scientific, technical and legal activities carried out under the auspices of the UN related bodies, specialized agencies, UN sponsored global conferences on non-political functional issues.

The PRC, identifies herself with the Third world and hence, it is but natural that she supported the demands for a New International Economic order. But her view points

and way of participation differ from that of the Third World countries. First, she views the NIEO process, not merely in terms of North-south problem, but as a United struggle of the Third world and Second World against the first world. She views the process of NIEO as an inexorable historical process in which the poor are raising an unceasing struggle against the rich. Secondly, PRC is skeptical about the welfare attitude shown by the west and hence advocates for self-reliance on the part of the Third World. The salient feature of China's model of the behavioural norms for states, is the notion that each country has its sovereign control on its resources and that economic activities should not be subject to external interference. But most of the Third world countries appear more flexible in order to make their policies befitting to the current demands. Thirdly, China views that political and economic aspects are inseparable, hence NIEO has largely been a political process. This view, many a Third countries do not share and consider it to be basically an economic process.

On the participation count we find that her support to Group of 77 in regard to NIEO has been that of political and moral support - a symbolic one. Probably, China, feels that in the process she has nothing to gain, and nothing to give, except but limited political bargaining. Secondly,

it is apparent that China's participation in the implementation process through the competent organs of the UN development system has been selective and passive but in the formulation process, upto the mark, they used to be active. Further, it is worth noting that China's participation in some of the agencies of NIEO process at UN and did not participate in some. Above all, unlike other Third World countries, her participation has been on the individual basis, without a rigid structure and group basis.

These observations should be viewed in the light of Chinese denial to join the Group of 77 i.e. the group of developing countries, fighting for the different causes of the Third world at United Nations. Immediately after her entry into United Nations, PRC was invited to join the Group of 77, but she denied on the pretext that she could be more effective in supporting the Third World causes by working outside the group. The group of 77 also did not attempt to bring her into the bargaining process in the creation of NIEO, for, the apprehension was that China's participation might politicize the issue to the detriment of their own economic interests.

China has urged unity in the Third world and between China and the Third world. It can be viewed in the light of the preamble of the Chinese constitution, which states that "we should unite with all countries subjected to aggression,

subversion, interference, control and bullying by the social imperialist and imperialist super-Powers to form the broadest possible international united front against the hegemonism of the super Powers and against a new World war, and strive for the progress and emancipation of humanity." Though Chinese Foreign Policy embraces the Second World in the united front, it is the Third World that forms the front's main body.

China speaks for zones of peace in the Third World, i.e. in the Indian Ocean, Nepal, South-East Asia and the Middle East and the like. From Beijing's vantage point, support serves two purposes: it aligns China with forces in the Third World who oppose the spill over of super Power military capabilities into their region and it may be an element in shifting global norms toward barriers against Soviet and U.S. military and naval mobility. The underlying maxim is China's call for "complete prohibition and through destruction" of nuclear weapons, which reduces a complex issue to an attractive and compelling goal.

China wants to have a close relationship with and influence upon the South East Asian countries. In doing this, first it had to compete with the USA. Later, American withdrawal from the Indo-China was followed by increasing influence of Soviet Union in the region. Thus, China remained obsessed with its security problem, all through.

Of late, China's attitude towards the Third world

has become more realistic than before. For instance, earlier its foreign policy towards Third World alternated between the people's war and peaceful coexistence. Slowly and steadily, the term 'national liberation movement', gave way to the terms 'Third World' and 'Broad and United front of small and medium states' against two super-Powers. Another instance of its realistic and flexible attitude can be cited in reference to China's interest and initiative in solving various problems with India, specially border problem. China has rightly realised that it would not be wise to have a hostile border with a leading Third world country.

China is gradually developing in scope and magnitude, its diplomatic and commercial presence in the Third world. Since China's present economic and security needs cannot only be met by the Third World, it has pushed itself closer to the Western World. China's position toward the Third world in the conduct of its multilateral diplomacy throughout the United Nations system, has been marked by the self-defined role of modesty, caution and symbolic support. This may partly be attributed to its inexperience, as it has participated in the United Nations only for a decade, and partly to urgent Chinese economic and security demands. However when China's aforesaid demands are met, it can be expected of China that her policy, at least at the United Nations becomes more active and vigorous. However, for now, it can safely be held that a decade of China's participation in the United Nations suggests that though

China has no magic formula for its Third World policy at the United Nations, she has portrayed a serious leadership acting with care to create a realistic political assets in the Third World.

B_I_B_L_I_O_G_R_A_P_H_Y

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