

**PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH ASIA IN CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE POST-COLD
WAR PERIOD**

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "Perceptions of South Asia in Chinese Foreign Policy During the Post-Cold War Period" submitted by **Y.J.S.N. Fernando** for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university. This is his original work.

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The 'cold war' is said to be a period in international history, beginning soon after the end of the second world war and ending in the early 1990s, as well as a description of the overall relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during that period. The word 'cold' refers to the presence of factors that allegedly restrained the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and prevented a 'hot' war.¹ According to a Chinese account however, for forty years after the second world war, the death of 20 million people in over 160 limited, but obviously 'hot' wars, in what is referred to as the Third World, was brought about by the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.² If one goes by the Chinese account, it seems that what is referred to as the 'cold war' was in fact a 'hot' war by proxy. Hence the phrase 'post-cold war period' is used in this study merely as a label, or a name, for what we might call the contemporary era of international history, starting in the early 1990s. Lucien Pye is said to have argued that China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations, but rather a civilisation pretending to be a state.³ G. P. Deshpande seems to concur in arguing that China as a nation-state behaves like a civilisation and lays claim to a civilisational area. He argues that the civilisational area to which a given people belong is a crucial question for China, that Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and Tibet all belong to a given Chinese civilisational area, and that China, presumably meaning the People's Republic of China, sees them as such and expects them to do so too. Deshpande argues further that, while India seems to view itself as a nation-state like any other, at the same

¹ M. Griffiths and T. O'Callghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, Routledge: Londong and New York, 2002, pp. 35-36.

² Ling Su, 'The question of balance of power in international relation', *Journal of Peking University, philosophy and social sciences edn.*, no. 3, in *Reprints of Materials from Newspapers and Journals*, D7, no. 7, 1986, p. 33, translated from Chinese and cited in G. Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, Macmillan: Houndsmills, 1999, p. 35.

³ L. Pye, 'China: erratic state, frustrated society', *Foreign Affairs*, 69/4, Autumn 1 1990, p. 58, cited in Tu Weiming, ed., *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 1994, p. 17.

time it also seems to think of itself as a civilisational area (or a civilisational-state).⁴ Moreover, elsewhere he argues that while South Asia as a geographic region is a peninsula separated from the rest of the land mass of Asia by the Himalayan, the Karakoram, and the Hindu Kush mountain ranges, it is also a civilisational area. He points out that the countries and the people's of this area have a history to share, that religious and linguistic differences between them cannot, and do not, hide the fact of a certain cultural unity, and that it is possible to argue that they are one people spread over many states or political entities.⁵

Harry Harding's study *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972*, includes a 'mutual perceptual' level as one of its four basic analytical levels, the other three being: international, regional and domestic.⁶ Therefore, while the main focus of our study is obviously Chinese perceptions of South Asia, some attention to South Asian perceptions of China is also warranted here. According to Giri Deshingkar there is a sharp divide between India's perception of China, and that of the other South Asian countries. While India is said to regard China as an adversary and long-term rival, India's neighbours, the other South Asian countries, are said to look upon China as a benign power, even a friend, with varying degrees of closeness. Furthermore, the perception of China in the eyes of the other South Asian countries is said to be shaped largely by their attitude towards India.⁷ All this indicates that Sino-Indian relations in the contemporary era of international history might be an appropriate way to initiate our study.

⁴ G.P. Deshpande, 'Verbalities and realities of foreign policy', in G.P. Deshpande and A. Acharya, eds., *Crossing a Bridge of Dreams: 50 years of India-China Relations*, Tulika: Delhi, 2001, pp. 385-387.

⁵ G.P. Deshpande, 'Chinese perspectives on South Asia: retrospect and prospect', in Ramakant, ed., *China and South Asia: South Asia Studies Series 18*, South Asian Publishers: New Delhi, 1988, pp. 1-2.

⁶ H. Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972*, Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 1991, cited in Yu Bin, 'The study of Chinese foreign policy: problems and prospect', *World Politics*, 46, January 1994, p. 260.

⁷ G. Deshingkar, 'Countervailing power: China opposes Indian hegemony in South Asia, but realizes its own limits', *HIMAL*, 11/6, June 1998, p. 12.

India and China are said to be in a state of rapprochement at least since 1988. In December of that year Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China, a visit which is said to have signalled an important reorientation of India's China policy. Premier Li Peng visited Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh in 1989, where he is said to have conveyed Beijing's desire for more cordial Sino-Indian ties. In December 1991 Li Peng had reciprocated Rajiv Gandhi's visit by going to New Delhi. High level Sino-Indian exchanges are said to have become routine during the 1990s. During Prime Minister Narashima Rao's visit to China in September 1993, agreements were signed on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control on the border. In November 1996, while PRC President Jiang Zemin was in India, the two countries agreed to a set of confidence-building measures to be implemented along the border. Many other agreements have also been signed to increase bilateral trade, foster cultural and technology exchanges and military-to-military links, and promote other co-operative ventures. Despite these developments however, Garver argues that deep tensions remain.⁸ Garver is said to argue that, New Delhi tends to view any military relationships between its neighbours in South Asia and countries outside the region as fundamentally threatening to India, while Beijing on other hand, claims the right to have whatever relations it wishes with whomever it chooses, and asserts that India's attitude smacks of 'hegemonism'. Garver is said to argue further that, the improvement of Sino-Indian relations did not weaken the Sino-Pakistan security relationship. According to him, Beijing's relationship with Pakistan remains the most serious problem in Sino-Indian relations, bringing their fundamental geopolitical differences into sharp relief, in that Beijing supports Pakistan because Pakistan is India's most troublesome adversary, and that hence, Beijing appears committed to maintaining its relationship with Pakistan even

* J.W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, University of Washington Press: Seattle and London, 2001, pp. 6-7.

if this prevents better relations with India.⁹ J. Mohan Malik seems to concur with Garver. He is said to argue that geopolitical rivalry between China and India seems inescapable, and would leave the relationship with little common ground, that China will seek to prevent India from dominating South Asia, because that would limit China's potential leadership role in Asia as a whole. Malik is said to argue further that, a genuine post-cold war détente between New Delhi and Beijing has to be ruled out, and that in the near future a serious contest in both the military and economic spheres will develop between the two.¹⁰

Both Garver and Malik cite views of the relevant Chinese involved in the foreign policy process, at least partly, in support of their arguments. According to Giri Deshingkar, during his 1996 visit to India as well as Pakistan, the first time such a high-ranking leader of the PRC has done so, Jiang Zemin laid out a policy towards South Asia as a whole.¹¹ Shortly after this visit, according to Garver, one of China's most authoritative analysts of China-South Asia relations, Wang Hongwei, points out that: 'mutual understanding and trust between the two countries (India and China) is still far from adequate, especially because in India a considerable group of people (*xiangdang yibufen ren*) have been influenced by the 'Chinese threat theory' disseminated with ulterior motives by the West, and still have suspicions about China. Added to which is the fact that the negative influence of the 1962 war has not been entirely eliminated. This creates a certain market for rumours about China disseminated with ulterior purposes'.¹² Garver is also said to have argued that many high-ranking Chinese, based on their interpretations of past

⁹ J.W. Garver, 'Sino-Indian rapprochement and the Sino-Pakistan entente', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 111, no. 2, Summer 1996, p. 346, cited in D. Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, Macmillan: London, 1998, pp. 171-173.

¹⁰ J.M. Malik, 'China-India relations in the post-Soviet era: the continuing rivalry', *China Quarterly*, no. 142, June 1995, p. 321 and p. 330, cited in Roy, *ibid.*, p. 171.

¹¹ G. Deshingkar, *op cit.*, p. 16.

¹² Wang Hongwei, 'Jointly build relations of constructive cooperative partnership facing the 21st century', *International Studies*, no. 1, gen. Issue no. 46, 1997, pp. 37-41, translated from Chinese and cited in J. W. Garver, 2001, *op cit.*, p. 7.

experiences, suspect that the Indian government is duplicitous in negotiations, and responds favourably only under the threat or use of force.¹³ Meanwhile, Malik is said to cite General Zhao Nanqi, director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, as saying that China would step in to prevent what they saw as an attempt by India to 'dominate' the Indian Ocean: 'We are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India's Ocean'.¹⁴ These views, as well as Garver's and Malik's arguments, which they are cited in support of, are arguably based on what we might call a logic-of-conflict, and on a realist/neorealist/realpolitik/geopolitical way of thinking. What our own study will attempt to do is to establish that, apart from such a set of views, there are also other different sets of views influencing and animating Chinese foreign policy, towards the post-cold war world as a whole (chapter two), as well as towards post-cold war South Asia (chapter three). However, prior to that we will have to establish the link between what we call 'views' here (which we shall be conceptualising more rigorously as 'perceptions', 'images', and 'world views', in chapters one and two), and policy actions (chapter one).

¹³ J.W. Garver, 1996, p. 343, cited in D. Roy, *op cit*, p. 170.

¹⁴ J.M. Malik, p. 328, cited in D. Roy, *op cit*, p. 170.

CHAPTER ONE

THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE INSTITUTIONAL AND PERCEPTUAL APPROACHES

CHAPTER ONE

The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: The Institutional and Perceptual Approaches

Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy

Within the sub-field of Chinese Foreign Policy Studies, a number of other sub-fields of the social sciences and humanities, such as: Area Studies; International Relations; Comparative Politics; Foreign Policy Analysis/Comparative Foreign Policy; Behavioural and Cognitive Psychology; Decision-making Analysis and so on, interact and overlap. Given such interdisciplinarity it is not an easy task to categorize the different approaches that have been, and are being taken towards the study of Chinese foreign policy. One such attempt has been made by Yu Bin. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 till the late 1960s, Chinese foreign policy studies had been dominated by three distinct approaches: the 'traditional/historical', 'Maoist/communist ideology' and 'realist/rational actor'. From the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the 'strategic triangle' and 'factional politics' approaches are said to have emerged, whereas beginning in the 1980s, the 'institutional' and 'perceptual' approaches emerge as the more contemporary generation of scholarship.¹ The focus here will be on this later generation of scholarship, and the institutional and perceptual approaches. However these later approaches can, and ought to be seen as the result of the cumulative progression of earlier approaches towards more rigor and refinement, since even as dissatisfaction with earlier approaches lead to their emergence, they still take those approaches as their 'point of departure'.²

¹ Yu Bin, 'The study of Chinese foreign policy: problems and prospects', *World Politics* 46 (January 1994), p. 236.

² *Ibid.*, p. 244.

Hence, some consideration to the earlier approaches will also have to be given here. The traditional/historical approach is said to have been exemplified mostly in the work of historians such as Fairbank, Mancall and Fitzgerald. For instance, Fairbank had argued that to 'deal with a major power like China without regard for its history, and especially the tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind.'³ This approach stressed the continuity of traditional 'Sinocentrism' and, China's experience with and conceptualisation of the outside world, as the basic determinants of its foreign behaviour. Traces of this approach are said to be there even in more recent scholarship, such as Chih-Yu Shih's 'The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: a psycho-cultural view'. This work is said to argue that traditional belief systems such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are the primary sources of Chinese foreign policy.⁴

In contrast, the Maoist/communist ideology approach sought to explain the PRC's foreign policy in terms of Marxism-Leninism and its sinified variant, Maoism. This approach tended to emphasize Mao's role and thought, and to see strategies such as 'people's war' and 'united front', which were developed during the Communist Party of China's bid for state power prior to 1949, as having a significant impact on the PRC's foreign policy. The work of Schwartz, Hinton, Gittings and Meesner have been associated with this approach. However both the traditional/historical and Maoist/communist ideology approaches are said to have taken China itself as the key factor in analysing its foreign policy, and hence to have taken the position that 'China was unique and had to be understood on its own terms.'⁵

A challenge to what Yu Bin refers to as 'China-unique thinking' in the first two approaches was posed by the realist/rational actor approach. It utilized notions of power

³ J.K. Fairbank, 'China's foreign policy in historical perspective', *Foreign Affairs* 47 (April 1969), p449, as cited in Yu Bin, op cit, p. 236

⁴ Chih-Yu Shih, *The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho-cultural View*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, as cited in Yu Bin, op cit, pp. 236-237

⁵ Yu Bin, op cit, p. 238

relations between states, 'national' interests and 'international' constraints, derived from the realist mainstream of International Relations (IR) theory⁶, in the study of Chinese foreign policy. Whiting, Zagoria and Yahuda are some of the scholars who have been associated with this approach. Having examined the PRC's behaviour in times of crises, such as during the Korean War (1950-53), border conflict with India (1962), Chinese deployment in Laos (1964), Vietnam (1965) and two Taiwan straits crises (1954-55 and 1958), Whiting had argued that the PRC's behaviour in times of crisis was similar to that of other countries, and that therefore it should not be restricted to the 'esoteric analysis of Sinologues'.⁷

However it does not follow that distinctive Chinese cultural characteristics are unimportant in the study of Chinese foreign policy. As Wang Jisi has argued in the 1990s, while a cultural approach might not provide a comprehensive interpretation of Chinese foreign policy, it must be an essential part of one. He insists that giving due importance to Chinese cultural characteristics would not isolate the study of Chinese foreign policy from the study of foreign policy in general as long as one does not insist on what he calls 'Chinese exceptionalism'. Furthermore, while arguing for the integration of the study of Chinese foreign policy with Comparative Politics and Comparative Foreign Policy, Wang expresses the hope that research on Chinese characteristics would also enrich the latter two sub-fields.⁸ Samuel Kim echoes a similar sentiment when he argues that, we can and

⁶ Hans Morgenthau, one of the most important scholars associated with realism in IR theory had argued that 'the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.... We assume that all statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power'. As cited in Yong Deng, 'The Chinese conception of national interests in International Relations', *The China Quarterly*, June 1998, p 310-311.

⁷ A.S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975, pp. xiv-xx, as cited in Yu Bin, op cit, pp. 238-239.

⁸ Wang Jisi, 'International Relations theory and the study of Chinese foreign policy: a Chinese perspective', in Robinson, T.W., and Shambaugh, D., ed., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994, pp. 499-500

must study Chinese foreign policy as if International Relations really mattered, and conversely that we must study International Relations as if China really mattered.⁹ Nevertheless, the traditional/historical, Maoist/communist ideology and realist/rational actor approaches dominated the sub-field prior to the 1970s, at a time when much of the outside world is said to have tended to see the PRC as monolithic in both elite thinking and policy behaviour, and hence all three approaches are said to have treated the PRC as 'unitary actor'.¹⁰ What is referred to as the strategic triangle approach seems to have been, in a sense, an adaptation of the realist/rational actor approach to the analysis of Chinese foreign policy in terms of its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. While this approach had gained much currency in the 1970s, it is said to have been characterised by conceptual confusion, and moreover it is also said to have treated the PRC as unitary actor. Segal, Dittmer, Lieberthal and Levine are some of the scholars who have been associated with this approach. However the 1970s also saw the emergence of the factional politics approach which, based on such sources as Red Guard documents and publications, is said to have identified factionalism among the elite as a key variable in domestic as well as foreign policy. Thus, it called into question the unitary actor assumption in the study of Chinese foreign policy, and is credited with having established the need for taking note of differences among the elite policy makers in accounting for its foreign policy behaviour.¹¹

However, while primary sources on Chinese domestic policy have been more readily available since the 1970s, sources on foreign policy have been less readily available, one of the reasons being 'Chinese fears of infringement upon areas of national security'.¹²

⁹ S.S. Kim S.S., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, third edition, Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1993, p. viii.

¹⁰ Yu Bin, *op cit*, p. 240.

¹¹ Yu Bin, *op cit*, pp 241-243

¹² D. Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1991, p. 238.

This, however, is not a problem faced only in the study of Chinese foreign policy. According to a late 1980s assessment in *Comparative Foreign Policy*, 'until relatively recently high quality, high density records (eg: verbatim transcripts) of decision-making in foreign policy have been relatively hard to come by.'¹³ This is perhaps one of the reasons why foreign policy analysis in general had shown a tendency to be dominated by 'unitary rational actor' approaches, which treat foreign policy makers and making in an undifferentiated and homogenised manner.¹⁴ Moreover, 'unitary rational actor' approaches, under the influence of realist IR theory, have tended to privilege the pursuit of 'national interests' by states, in analysing and explaining their foreign policy behaviour.¹⁵ This approach is also associated with the logic of unmediated stimulus-response models in behavioural psychology, which contend that the decision-making process that occurs between environmental conditions and policy responses do not have significantly different implications, that these processes can be placed in a 'black box' and ignored in predicting and explaining policy behaviour.¹⁶

However the need to look inside the 'black box' of foreign policy decision-making is said to have been recognised by Snyder, Bruch and Sapin in their general decision-making framework as early as the 1950s. The fundamental question they had posed was 'why do foreign policy officials (not nations) make the choices that they do?'. In reaction to 'realpolitik' analyses of foreign policy based on power and 'national interests', Snyder and associates had asserted that the analysis of human decision-making was central to the interpretation of foreign policy actions, and suggested that the answer to their

¹³ P.A. Anderson, 'What do decision makers do when they make a foreign policy decision? The implications for the comparative study of foreign policy', in C.F. Hermann, C.W. Kegley Jr, J.N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Allen and Unwin: Boston, 1987, p. 291.

¹⁴ O. Holsti, 'Foreign policy formation viewed cognitively', in R. Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 18-19.

¹⁵ D. Shambaugh, op cit, p. 17.

¹⁶ D.B. Bobrow, S. Chan, J.A. Kringen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case*, The Free Press: New York, 1979, p. 13.

fundamental question required the introduction of the entire panoply of theory and research on human behaviour, from the psychology of perception to organisational behaviour, from the analysis of communications networks to the examination of societal norms and values. Their analysis had suggested a richly differentiated view of foreign policy decision-making.¹⁷ This can be seen as having set the foundation for convincingly questioning the 'unitary actor' assumption and approaches based on it.

Similarly, important shortcomings of 'rational choice' models and approaches have also been identified. In the 1950s, Harold and Margaret Sprout had made a distinction between the 'psychological milieu' and the 'operational milieu', and it has been recognised that the psychological environment may only imperfectly correspond to the operational or 'real' environment. This had paved the way for arguments emphasising 'cognitive constraints' on rationality, which argued that the decision-makers' orientation to and interpretation of the environment is mediated by the 'beliefs' and 'images' he/she holds.¹⁸ It has also been argued that the 'task environment' of foreign policy makers is not conducive to pure rationality, that it encourages decision-making by deference to rules, rather than by cost-benefit analysis of the relative merits of all possible options. Rationality is said to be 'bounded' because the need for taking 'short cuts' in calculating decision costs encourages the acceptance of satisfactory, rather than the maximal option. Thus it is argued that foreign policy makers often choose less-than-optimal policy options in conformity with the entrenched practices and customs of a consensually grounded decision 'regime'.¹⁹ 'Regime' is understood here as an institutionalised system

¹⁷ C.F. Hermann, and G. Peacock, 'The evolution and future of theoretical research in the comparative study of foreign policy', in C.F. Hermann, et al. eds., *op cit*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁸ D. Shambaugh, *op cit*, p. 18; and O. Holsti, in R. Axelrod, ed., *op cit*, p. 19.

¹⁹ C.W. Kegley Jr, 'Decision regimes and the comparative study of foreign policy', in C.F Hermann, et al. eds., *op cit*, p. 253.

of co-operation between or among interacting parties, usually with respect to a given issue or issue-area, rather than as the central leadership of a government.²⁰

However, while the need to go beyond realist/unitary/rational actor approaches and look inside the 'black box' of foreign policy decision-making has been convincingly demonstrated, such an enterprise is not without its own, particularly methodological, difficulties. For instance, it has been pointed out that constructing and analysing 'belief systems' and 'images' to be found inside the 'black box', is severely constrained by the nature of, and access to, sources and evidence: 'unlike the analyst who can index his variables with such measures as GNP per capita, arms budgets, trade figures, votes in the UN general assembly, or public opinion polls, those interested in the beliefs of decision makers have no year book to which they can turn for comparable evidence, much less quantitative data presented in standard units.'²¹ A substantial amount of information on foreign policy decision-making has been derived from interviews, participant memoirs and second hand journalistic accounts. While it has been argued that if treated carefully, such sources provide some basis for making tentative conclusions about the beliefs and attitudes of decision-makers, the availability of qualitatively better sources such as transcripts of meetings in which decisions are taken, is dependent on declassification of documented and/or recorded materials by the state.²² Often the withholding of such materials by the state is justified on the premise that their release might infringe upon 'national security'. The case of China as one such example has already been mentioned. Hence, it seems that the material context/condition in which the study of decision-making and exploration of the 'black box' can take place, is subject to regulation by the state, and is dependent on how transparent a state is willing to be. Thus we find scholars of Comparative Foreign Policy, in the late 1980s, renewing the call to look inside the

²⁰ Ibid, p. 250.

²¹ O. Holsti, in R. Axelrod, ed., *op cit*, p. 35.

²² P. A. Anderson, in C.F. Hermann, et al, eds., *op cit*, p. 289.

'black box', as declassification by the United States government made qualitatively better sources of information on US foreign policy decision-making accessible to researchers.²³ It might not be entirely irrelevant here to briefly recall Ken Booth's rather poignant article 'Security and self: reflections of a fallen realist'. It was essentially a critique of the mainstream of the Security Studies sub-field, and an attempt at reformulating the security problematique, and redirect research on the subject, through what he called Critical Security Studies. Recognising the crucial relationship between theory and its historical/social/political context is posited as one of the cornerstones of Critical Security Studies, which aims to 'reconsider the distinctions between us and them in a political sense... ..to reconsider global political organisation in a way that will best deliver security.' Furthermore, it makes the thought provoking assertion that 'the modern state system has been a normative failure.'²⁴ Besides reinforcing the connection that has already been drawn between theory and the circumstances/context in which it emerges, the perspective of Critical Security Studies also enables us to question the citing of 'national security', as a final reason or justification for withholding of information on foreign policy decision-making, by states. To put it differently, it is arguable that in a 'perfect world' from the perspective of decision-making analysis, withholding of information for reasons of 'national security' would in itself be a decision that would be open to investigation. The connection between theory and the context in which it emerges is particularly salient when we look at the emergence of the most recent two approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy in Yu Bin's categorisation, the 'institutional' and 'perceptual' approaches, which are our principal concern here.

²³ C.A. Powell, J.W. Dyson, H.E. Purkitt, 'Opening the black box: cognitive processing and optimal choice in foreign policy decision-making', and also P.A. Anderson, in C.F. Hermann, et al, op cit, pp. 205 and 289.

²⁴ K. Booth, 'Security and self: reflections of a fallen realist', in K. Krause and M.C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, UCL Press: London, 1997, pp. 106 and 109.

The Institutional and Perceptual Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy

It was the post-Mao Deng Xiaoping's 'opening' of China to the outside world, initiated in the late 1970s, which resulted in increased access by foreigners to China's policy-making institutions, processes and personnel, as well as in the growth of scholarly studies on international relations in China, that facilitated the efforts of the contemporary generation of scholarship to focus on China's foreign policy making structures, their interrelations and the mind-set of those who staff these institutions.²⁵ Thus Bobrow, Chan and Kringen's early effort to probe the 'black box' of Chinese foreign policy decision-making²⁶, has been criticised by Shambaugh on the grounds of an inadequate data base, which had consisted of interviews conducted with refugees from the PRC in Hong Kong, and periodicals and radio broadcasts primarily aimed at foreign audiences.²⁷ While increasing access through the 1980s to formerly secret/restricted access material, new reference materials published in China, as well as increasing access to bureaucrats/diplomats involved in foreign policy, has enabled scholars such as Shambaugh and Hamrin among others, to explore the 'black box' of Chinese foreign policy decision-making more successfully.²⁸ It also encouraging to note in this regard that, according to a news report on 20/07/2004, a batch of PRC diplomatic files relating to China's relations with Asian countries from 1949-55 has been recently declassified.²⁹ The present study is concerned with both the 'institutional' and 'perceptual' approaches, although it will tend to emphasize the latter. Indeed, Yu Bin seems to suggest that these two approaches are best used in combination when he appreciates Shambaugh's *Beautiful*

²⁵ Yu Bin, op cit, p. 244.

²⁶ D.B. Bobrow, et al, op cit, pp. 13-24.

²⁷ D. Shambaugh, op cit, p. 34.

²⁸ Ibid, pp. 18 and 39; and C.L. Hamrin, 'Elite politics and the development of China's foreign relations', in T.W. Robinson, and D. Shambaugh, eds., 1994, op cit, pp. 70-72

²⁹ Press Trust of India, Beijing, 'Kashmir Princess files declassified', *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 21/07/2004, p. 7.

Imperialist for combining the institutional and perceptual approaches.¹⁰ Moreover scholars who have examined the role of perception and processes of cognition in foreign policy, including Jervis and Holsti among others, seem to have argued that perception and cognition are best considered within the broader context of foreign policy decision-making.¹¹

Before we elaborate further on the institutional and perceptual approaches, it should be kept in mind as mentioned earlier, that these two approaches, particularly the latter approach, do not represent a complete break with earlier approaches, that they represent rather the cumulative progression of at least some aspects of the earlier approaches towards more rigor and refinement. Thus for instance, it has been pointed out that even though both traditional/historical and Maoist/communist ideology approaches gave importance to the role of 'images', the former saw them as based on Chinese tradition and imperial thinking, and the latter saw them as based on sinified Marxist-Leninist/Maoist ideology. The more contemporary 'perceptual' approach is not so rigid with regard to the sources of 'images' held by Chinese foreign policy makers, and is more complex and nuanced in its analysis of the perceptual dimension of Chinese foreign policy.¹²

The institutional approach focuses on the mechanisms of government policy-making rather than on human decision-making, through the 'organisational process' and 'bureaucratic politics' models. The former model sees governmental behaviour less as a matter of deliberate choice and more as independent outputs of several large, key organisations, only partly coordinated by human intervention, the behaviour of these organizations being primarily determined by standard and routine operating procedures,

¹⁰ Yu Bin, *op cit.*, p. 247.

¹¹ R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1976. p. 15 and pp. 28-29; O. Holsti, in R. Axelrod, ed., *op cit.*, pp. 52-54; see also C.A. Powell, et al, in C.F. Hermann, et al, ed., *op cit.*, pp. 203-220.

¹² Yu Bin, *op cit.*, p. 246 ; also see D. Shambaugh, *op cit.*, pp. 29-31.

with only gradual and incremental deviations. The latter model sees intense competition among different 'units' within the government bureaucracy, and foreign policy as the result of bargaining among these different 'units'. Hence policy making is guided less by goals, but is more often the result of a compromise. Thus foreign policy outputs are seen as depending on the relative power and skill of the bargainers rather than on rational justification or organisational procedure.³³

Doak Barnett's work has been closely associated with the institutional approach. As a result of Deng Xiaoping's policy of 'opening up', Barnett's *The Making of Foreign Policy in China* (1985) is said to have been able to provide a comprehensive picture of foreign policy institutions and processes in the PRC. One of his principal findings is said to have been identifying a major shift in decision-making power through the 1980s from the Communist Party of China's Politburo to its Secretariat, as well as to the State Council. His study is also said to be the first to take account of the role of 'secondary level' institutions involved in foreign policy making, such as various specialized government and party organisations, the military and intelligence establishments, major press organisations, research institutions and universities.³⁴

The institutional approach, in a supplementary sense, will certainly be useful for the present study. For instance, Snyder, Bruck and Sapins's earlier mentioned decision-making framework, is said to place individual, human decision-makers, with their values, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, 'definitions of the situation', and cognitive processes, within a complex network of organisational and other influences.³⁵ Furthermore, Shambaugh in his *Beautiful Imperialist*, recognises that China's 'America Watchers' must work within certain bureaucratic and intellectual confines, and that when one considers

³³ Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China*, Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1997, p. 175.

³⁴ Yu Bin, op cit, p. 244; see also Lu Ning, *ibid.* pp. 175-6.

³⁵ O. Holsti, in R. Axelrod, ed., op cit, p. 24; Lu Ning, op cit, p. 172.

their perceptions of America, the relevant institutional landscape and professional roles must also be kept in mind.³⁶ In the second and third chapters, when this study considers some Chinese perceptions of the post-cold war world in general as well as Chinese perceptions of South Asia specifically, which are of relevance to Chinese foreign policy, it will keep in mind the above.

This study however is largely based on claims such as those made by Shambaugh that, 'elite images are the single most important variable in international relations', and that 'behaviour is a function of perception'.³⁷ These are perhaps strong claims, but they are not entirely unsupportable. According to J. David Singer's often cited article, 'The level of analysis problem in International Relations', phenomenology, closely associated with the German thinker Edmund Husserl, seems to provide a philosophical basis for such claims.³⁸ In discussing what he refers to as 'the phenomenological issue', Singer raises the question: do we examine our actor's behaviour in terms of 'objective' factors that allegedly influence that behaviour, or do we do so in terms of the actor's perception of these 'objective' factors? One possible answer to this question, according to him, is that individuals and groups respond in a quasi-deterministic fashion to the realities of the physical environment, the acts or power of other individuals or groups, and similar 'objective' or 'real' forces or stimuli. However, the answer from a phenomenological point of view, is said to be that individuals and groups are not influenced in their behaviour by such 'objective' forces, but by the fashion in which these forces are perceived and evaluated. From this point of view, the only reality is said to be the phenomenal- that which is discerned by the human senses, forces that are not discerned do not exist for that actor, those that do exist, do so only in the fashion in which they are

³⁶ D. Shambaugh, *op cit.*, p. 16.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 20 and 300.

³⁸ J.D. Singer, 'The level of analysis problem in International Relations', in K. Knorr and S. Verba, ed., *The International System*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, pp. 86-89.

perceived. Singer goes on to argue that while such a pure phenomenological point of view, which would argue that an individual or group is affected by such factors as climate, geographic location or a neighbour's physical power only in so far as they are recognised and appraised, is difficult to accept, one must concede that perceptions will certainly affect the way such forces are responded to. Thus for example, an individual will fall to the ground when he/she steps out of a tenth-story window regardless of his perception of gravitational forces, but on the other hand such perception is a major factor in whether or not he/she steps out of the window in the first place. The phenomenological approach is said to have been applied in social psychology primarily through the work of Koffka and Lewin, and this is the issue that had been raised by Harold and Margaret Sprout in their distinction between the 'psychological milieu' and the 'operational milieu' in the context of international politics.³⁹

Kenneth Boulding too has argued that 'the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation'.⁴⁰ Yacov Vertzberger has argued that social interaction, such as foreign policy making and behaviour, is best described not only as a process of 'strategic interaction', but also as one of 'symbolic interaction', in the sense that 'human beings define or interpret each others' action instead of merely reacting to each other's actions, their response is not made directly to the actions of one another, but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions.'⁴¹ Jervis, from whose work Shambaugh has derived much of the theoretical support for his own study, has argued that decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others, are part of the proximate cause of relevant behaviour.

³⁹ Ibid. pp. 86-87.

⁴⁰ K. Boulding, 'National images and international system', *The Journal Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, No.2, June 1959, cited in G.P. Deshpande, 'Towards a new foreign policy discourse', *China Report* 35:2, 1999, p. 113.

⁴¹ Y Y I Vertzberger. *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-making*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 1990, p. 7.

While two actors having the same perceptions is not ipso facto a guarantee that they will adopt the same response, their response will often be the same.⁴²

The distinction made by the Sprouts has enabled scholars such as Brecher to argue that while the 'operational environment' affects the results or outcomes of decisions directly, it influences the choice among policy options, that is, the decisions themselves, only as it is filtered through the images (ie: psychological environment) held by decision-makers.⁴³


We find Levine making a similar argument in the context of Chinese foreign policy, when he takes the position that international and domestic factors (ie: operational environment) rarely constrain policy makers to such an extent that they are left with no choice between alternative courses of action, their ideas about political reality (ie: psychological environment) structure their environment for choice, inform their consideration of various courses of action, and provide rationalisations for the choices that are made.⁴⁴ Thus it seems that Shambaugh is in good company when he conceptualises the beliefs and images held by decision-makers as the intervening variables between the independent variable of external stimuli (information from both the 'international' and 'domestic' environments) and the dependent variable of the decisional output (policy), in the following manner⁴⁵:

⁴² R. Jervis, op cit, pp. 28 and p31.

⁴³ M. Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1972, p. 4, cited in Lu Ning, op cit, p. 173.

⁴⁴ S.L. Levine, 'Perception and ideology in Chinese foreign policy', in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, p. 30.

⁴⁵ D. Shambaugh, op cit, p. 19.



Shambaugh also notes that, while there has been a tendency for the two terms 'image' and 'perception' to be used interchangeably, the one is distinct from the other, while being at the same time closely related.⁴⁶ He draws upon the work of Whiting, (whose study *China Eyes Japan* is also seen by Yu Bin as exemplifying the perceptual approach⁴⁷), in order to establish this distinction. For Whiting 'image refers to the preconceived stereotype of a nation, state, or people that is derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience and self-image... Perception refers to the selective cognition of statements, action or events attributed to the opposite party as framed and defined by the pre-existing image. To use a figure of speech widely found in the literature, image provides the frame and lenses through which the external world is seen or perceived.⁴⁸ At this point it is important to remind ourselves of the link drawn earlier between the perceptual approach, and the traditional/historical and Maoist/communist ideology approaches, all of which hold that perceptions of, and images held by, policy makers are important in understanding and explaining policy conduct and behaviour. From the two early approaches however, the first argued that such images are based on Chinese tradition and history, while the second held that the relevant images are drawn from sinified Marxist-Leninist/Maoist ideology.⁴⁹ Indeed, from among what Shambaugh has

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 4.

⁴⁷ Yu Bin, op cit. pp. 246-247.

⁴⁸ A.S. Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 1989, p. 19, cited in D. Shambaugh, op cit. p. 4.

⁴⁹ Yu Bin, op cit. p. 246.

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referred to as 'Chinese images of the world in the unitary actor tradition', the 'traditional' and 'normative' strands seem to correspond to the traditional/historical and Maoist/communist ideology approaches respectively.⁵⁰ While scholarship that can be seen as having significant traces of the perceptual approach does recognise both history, tradition and culture, as well as sinified Marxist-Leninist/Maoist ideology as important sources of influence on the images held by, and perceptions of, Chinese foreign policy makers, they are seen as doing so in combination with a number of other sources of influence. Thus when distinguishing between perceptions and images, Whiting sees images as being derived from a selective interpretation of history, experience and self-image. Shambaugh, in his work on images of the United States held by China's 'America watchers' from 1972-90, has identified six possible sources of influence on Chinese perceptions: exposure to the United States; professional and/or institutional role; research sources; domestic political climate; the impact of the bilateral relationship itself; and cultural difference.⁵¹

From Discourse to Perception: Some Methodological Issues.

While we can logically and intuitively recognize that perceptions, images, beliefs and the like do exist in the mind, those that are in the minds of Chinese elites involved in foreign policy are only accessible through the discourse on international affairs produced by them.⁵² This raises the issue of 'communication', for that is, at least in part, arguably what a discourse would involve. Holsti has pointed out that, barring the use of earlier materials that have made their way through government declassification procedures, scholars wanting to explore the psychological/cognitive aspects of foreign policy formation on more contemporary issues and events, are forced to rely on documents that are in the first instance intended to convey information to the public, to legislatures or foreign

⁵⁰ D. Shambaugh, *op cit.*, pp. 29-31.

⁵¹ D. Shambaugh, *op cit.*, p. 40 and pp. 283-300.

⁵² D. Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, Macmillan Press: London, 1998, p. 36.



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governments. According to Holsti such documents might also be intended to persuade, justify, threaten, cajole, manipulate, evoke sympathy and support, or otherwise influence the intended audience; while such documents may convey explicit or implicit clues about the author's 'real' beliefs, attitudes and opinions, they may also be intended to serve and advance the practical goals of the moment. The issue being raised here by Holsti is concerned with the validity of inferences about the communicator that may be drawn from his/her messages, and has been explicated by him in terms of two models of communication: the 'representational' and the 'instrumental'. The first model assumes that verbal expressions in themselves are valid indicators of the communicator's beliefs, motivations and the like. The second model begins with the premise that words may be chosen to have a certain impact on the target of communication, and insists on taking into account the context of communication in order to make valid inferences from verbal behaviour.⁵³

Roy has argued that the discourse on international affairs produced by the relevant PRC elites is a potentially enlightening window into their minds, due to at least two reasons. The first is that a foreign policy discourse creates expectations against which the conduct of policy can be judged, and hence, if policy conduct is contrary to the policy discourse, the policy makers will become vulnerable to criticism. The second is that images, even those that may have originally been formulated as propaganda may become credible if they are repeated often enough, and may even persist despite information indicating the contrary.⁵⁴ It is arguable that the first aspect indicates a set of circumstances which would make a foreign policy discourse communicate more in conformity with the representational model of communication, and less in conformity with the instrumental model of communication. Meanwhile research done in psychology on 'cognitive

⁵³ O. Holsti, in R. Axelrod, ed., *op cit*, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁴ D. Roy, *op cit*, p. 36.

consistency' (which is said to recognize that there is a strong tendency in human beings to see what they want to see), and on 'dissonance reduction' (which is said to refer to a human tendency to assimilate incoming information into pre-existing image structures), taken together, point towards a strong tendency in human beings to assimilate or reject information in such a way as to maximise the congruence among the cognitive elements of their belief system.⁵⁵ This would seem to give some basis for the second reason given above by Roy for accessing perceptions, images and beliefs through a foreign policy discourse.

In the *Beautiful Imperialist* Shambaugh chooses to focus on the perceptions articulated by (or in Roy's terms, the discourse produced by) those who advise the topmost political elite in the PRC, rather than on those of the topmost elite itself, one of the reasons for this being a lack of the required kind of access to the top elite.⁵⁶ Moreover in the same work he argues that experts and scholars who are professional specialists on the study of the US and/or its foreign policy, to be found in the central government bureaucracy, professional research institutes, New China News Agency and universities, serve as an 'interpretive prism' through which information about the US is processed before it reaches the topmost elite, and that they inform the leadership by means of oral briefings and classified government channels.⁵⁷ Many of the Chinese sources used by Shambaugh in this work are restricted circulation (*neibu*) materials. Such materials, according to him, are primarily meant for discourse among concerned specialists and elites, and hence are said to display an analytical candour in the discussion of policy issues, often absent in open source (*gongkai*) materials.⁵⁸ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, in their article 'Chinese perceptions in the post-cold war era: three images of the United States', have also argued

⁵⁵ D. Shambaugh, op cit. pp. 19-20.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p300

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p5

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p39

that internal policy discussions among Chinese analysts, unlike public official statements which have to address a targeted public, are more frank and have more depth.⁵⁹ Thus it is interesting to note at this point, that the foreign policy discourse at this level, if one goes by Shambaugh, Wang and Lin's arguments, seem to be more in conformity with the representational model of communication, and less in conformity with the instrumental model.

As we have noted earlier, Barnett had been one of the first scholars to recognise the emerging importance of 'secondary level' institutions in the making of post-Mao foreign policy. Despite this, Yu Bin had argued in the mid-1990s that China's foreign policy remains largely the domain of top elites and policy bureaucrats, and that specialists and scholars with their writings and debates play only a limited role in Chinese foreign policy making.⁶⁰ However, more recent scholarship seem to recognise the increasingly important role being played by specialists and scholars.

Xinning Song and Gerald Chan argue that starting in the 1990s scholars in China have gained greater access to the foreign policy making process. They point out that in 1990, Jiang Zemin, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and Li Ruihua, a member of the standing committee of the CPC Politburo, met twice with some senior Chinese IR scholars and heads of IR research institutes to solicit their views on China's foreign policy. Again in 1998 Jiang had requested a study of presidential systems, and in mid-2000 Jiang is said to have consulted scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences regarding 'fallen leadership in Asia'.⁶¹ Chan has also argued elsewhere that, what Chinese IR specialists think and champion is likely to influence foreign policy making in

⁵⁹ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, 'Chinese perceptions in the post-cold war era: three images of the United States', *Asian Survey*, vol. xxxii, no. 10, October 1992, p. 904.

⁶⁰ Yu Bin, *op cit*, p. 252.

⁶¹ Xinning Song and G. Chan, 'International Relations theory in China', in Weixing Hu, G. Chan, Daojiong Zha, eds., *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts*, University Press of America: Maryland, 2000, pp. 16 and p35.

China, as well as its external behaviour.⁶² Daojiong Zha has also argued that in China the field of IR research is much more active and influential than it in the 1980s.⁶³ Meanwhile, Yong Deng notes that as President of the PRC Jiang Zemin had encouraged scholars in major universities and think-tanks to come up with more independent, in-depth analyses of foreign affairs in the spirit of 'having multiple voices internally, while speaking in one voice externally', and he also argues that analyses in China's emerging field of international studies are intertwined with official thinking, and that a line between the two is hard to draw.⁶⁴ Finally, Lampton points out that, from 1978-2000 there has been a trend towards a higher level of specialised knowledge among Chinese elite and sub-elite foreign policy decision-makers, a proliferation of expert-based bureaucracies in the decision-making process, and an increased reliance by decision-makers on information provided by specialised bureaucracies.⁶⁵

The point being made here is not that the perceptions of, and images held by, top level policy makers are unimportant, for obviously their minds are not blank pieces of paper on which anything can be written. It is rather that the perceptions of, and images held by, specialists and scholars can also exert an important influence on the top-level decision-makers, and that they are arguably becoming increasingly influential in the making of Chinese foreign policy. Nor are we arguing here that perceptions and images are entirely inaccessible through open source (*gongkai*) materials or official public statements. While such sources might often be more in conformity with instrumental model of communication than with the representational one, as Holsti's discussion had pointed out, problems with regard to drawing inferences about the communicator's beliefs from

⁶² G. Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, Macmillan Press: Houndsmills, 1999, p. 139.

⁶³ Daojiong Zha, 'Chinese Understanding of International Political Economy', in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 118.

⁶⁴ Yong Deng, op cit, p. 309.

⁶⁵ D.M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and National Security Policy*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, p. 5.

his/her messages raised by the instrumental model can be mitigated by such measures as taking account of the context of communication.

CHAPTER TWO

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Chapter 2

Chinese perceptions of the Post-Cold War World

'Image' and 'World View' are perhaps the two concepts that have been most widely referred to in studies on the perceptions of Chinese foreign policy makers. An 'image' has been defined as the total cognitive, affective and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit or its internal view of itself and its universe.¹ A 'world view' on the other hand, can be said to be the sum of ideas which an individual within a group and/or that group has of the universe in and around them.² It is important to note here that an 'image' or 'world view' held by a behaviour unit, individual or group incorporates an image or view of its own self in relation to the environment, as well as an image or view of the environment itself. This chapter proposes to examine Chinese perceptions of the post-cold war world as a whole through some of the relevant writings and speeches of the leaders of the party-state, bureaucrats/diplomats and analysts/scholars involved in the PRC's foreign policy. In the process it will become apparent that China's self-images in the post-cold war world and its images of the post-cold war world, are at times rather closely, yet not entirely indistinguishably, intertwined.

In the sub-field of International Relations, it has been argued that the distribution of power in the modern state system during the post-cold war era can be seen as one in which a number of regional balances are overlaid by a unipolar pattern, unipolarity being a situation in which one state (or superpower) dominates (or hegemonises) the whole state system, with of course the United States being seen as occupying such a position in

¹ K. Boulding, 'National images and international systems', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, no. 2, June 1959, as cited in G.P. Deshpande, 'Towards a new foreign policy discourse', *China Report*, 35:2 (1999), p. 113.

² *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, 1962, p. 576.

this period.³ Therefore images of the US, of its foreign policy in particular, held by Chinese foreign policy makers would appear to be an appropriate way of approaching and eliciting Chinese perceptions and images of the post-cold war world.

Based on various papers and documents written for internal circulation in agencies and think-tanks such as the New China News Agency and the Institute for Contemporary International Relations, Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin identify three images of the US strategic intention and power position in the post-cold war era in general, and its posture towards China in particular. These three images are referred to as the Ideological, Geopolitical and Global Interdependence perspectives. Wang and Lin argue that while not necessarily mutually exclusive, each of these images has its own analytical premises, focuses and frameworks, and policy preferences, and that therefore they can be seen as representative of competing views within policy-making circles. They also inform us that: 'To protect our sources, we will not cite them in individual footnotes unless they have appeared in open publications.'⁴

Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan and Daojiong Zha argue that given China's rising power status and different perceptions of China's role in world politics, it is important to explain China's behaviour in contemporary world affairs through examining 'ideational' sources of its foreign policy.⁵ They argue that examining the theorisation of international relations by Chinese scholars and experts/specialists is a good entry point to look at 'paradigm' shifts in Chinese foreign policy.⁶ Drawing upon Thomas Khun's conceptualisation of a 'paradigm', R.H. Chilcote points out that, among other things, a

³ M. Griffiths, and T. O'Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, Routledge: London and New York, 2002, pp. 12-15.

⁴ Jianwei Wang, and Zhimin Lin, 'Chinese perceptions in the post-cold war era: three images of the United States', *Asian Survey*, vol. xxxii, no. 10, October 1992, p. 904.

⁵ Weixing Hu, G. Chan, and Daojiong Zha, eds., *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts*, University Press of America: Maryland, 2000, preface, p. xi.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 3.

paradigm is a scientific community's perspective of the world, its set of beliefs and commitments- conceptual, theoretical, methodological and instrumental.⁷

Therefore then, it is important here to take note of what the Chinese conception of 'theory' is. According to Wang Jisi, a standard definition of the Chinese word for theory (*lilun*) is: 'a system of concepts and principles, or a systematic rational knowledge; a scientific theory is established on the basis of social practice and has been proved and verified by social practice, and is a correct reflection of the essence and laws of objective things. The significance of a scientific theory lies in its ability to guide human behaviour'.⁸

Wang further notes that international relations theory as understood by the Chinese is an explanatory tool or prism through which world affairs are observed, as well as a guide for international behaviour and foreign policy. He also observes that in the PRC no distinction is made between applied theories leading to the formulation of policy, and theories with only descriptive, explanatory and predictive power.⁹ Gerald Chan too has argued that in China theory is understood as a tool to serve mainly, if not solely, as a guide to policy, and that it is expected to be derived from practice, and to serve practice in return. He argues that while applied theory as understood in the West shares some similarity with the Chinese understanding of theory, pure theory as a system of scientific understanding for the growth of knowledge is absent from the collective Chinese mind in most circumstances. He points out that while some of the younger scholars who have received training in the West do acknowledge the descriptive, explanatory and predictive functions of a theory, there is little or no attempt to link this understanding of theory to the notion of 'theory as a policy guide' as understood by the majority of Chinese

⁷ R.H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm Reconsidered*, Second Edition, Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1994, p. 58.

⁸ *Ci hai* (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 1979), p. 2766, as cited in Wang Jisi, 'International relations theory and the study of Chinese foreign policy: A Chinese perspective', in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994, p. 482.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483.

scholars.¹⁰ Moreover as Bernice Lee is said to have observed, the Chinese understanding of theory, apart from a Marxist resonance, also echoes the traditional Confucian belief in the unity of knowledge of action, or theory and action. According to Lee, in general, Chinese philosophers and theorists, past and present, seem to be less interested than their Western counterparts in theorising with abstract ideas, or problematising the notion of reality, and question of truth and falsity.¹¹ The 'Marxist resonance' that Lee is referring to is perhaps best expressed in the following words of Mao Zedong: 'Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin's statement, 'without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement'. But Marxism emphasises the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action.'¹²

Yong Deng has probed Chinese theorising of 'national interests' in the post-cold war era through a reading of some of the most influential textbooks and representative major scholarly works on International Relations (IR) published in China during the 1990s, as well as through interviews with scholars conducted in Beijing. His claim that analysing Chinese views on 'national interests' facilitates a gaze into China's broad assessment of the nature of contemporary international relations makes his study of particular interest for our purposes in the present chapter. Arguing that the Chinese definition of 'national interest' is not fixed and immutable, but rather that it is contested, he situates Chinese views on the conceptualisation of 'national interests' within/along a 'realpolitik' (ie:

¹⁰ G. Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, Macmillan: Houndsmills, 1999, pp. 15-17.

¹¹ B. Lee, 'Understanding the Chinese world order: the problem of culture in international relations', paper presented at the 2nd Pan-European conference in international relations, Paris, 13-16 September 1995, as cited in G. Chan, *ibid.*, p. 18.

¹² 'On Practice', in Mao Zedong, *Four Essays on Philosophy*, Foreign Language Press: Beijing, 1966, as cited in Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., *op cit*, p. 482.

realist/neorealist) - 'idealpolitik' (ie: liberal/neoliberal) spectrum, derived from mainstream IR theory.¹³

Although Shambaugh's study of Chinese perceptions of the US between 1972-90 is not able to take into account the end of 'the cold war', its discussion of the hegemonist cluster of images in the context of Chinese perceptions of US foreign policy will also be of use to the present study.

We shall provisionally structure our presentation of Chinese views in this chapter in terms of Wang and Lin's three perspectives. The substance and content of their 'ideological' perspective can be seen as roughly corresponding what Hu, Chan and Zha have identified as the Marxist approach (*jingdian pai*) among Chinese IR scholars.¹⁴ Meanwhile the Realist/realpolitik and Liberal/idealpolitik ends of Yong Deng's spectrum can be seen as corresponding to Wang and Lin's 'Geopolitics' and 'Global Interdependence' perspectives respectively. It should be noted here that sections two and three of this chapter, much more than section one, are very much indebted to the work of Wang and Lin, as well as Yong Deng, from which we have extracted most of the Chinese views presented herein.

An Ideological Perspective

The main conceptual premise of Wang and Lin's 'ideological' perspective in the post-cold war period is the ideological and political struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems, which is seen as continuing despite the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the end of the 'cold war' between the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁵ This perspective is said to see the US as waging another

¹³ Yong Deng, 'The Chinese conception of national interests in international relations', *China Quarterly*, 15 (June 1998), pp. 308-310. For further elaboration on realism and liberalism (and their several variants) in IR theory see pp. 310-311 and p. 316, and also the relevant entries in M. Griffiths and T. O'Callaghan, op cit.

¹⁴ Weixing Hu, et al, 'Understanding China's behaviour in world politics: an introduction', in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, pp. 6-7.

¹⁵ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, op cit, pp. 904-905.

'cold war' or anti-communist crusade against the PRC. Moreover this image tends to look at 'Western' countries as a whole and does not see any fundamental difference between the US, Western Europe and Japan for example. Instead, it emphasises the possibility that led by the US, they might work together against Socialist and Third World countries. It sees US policy towards China as inherently hostile and as pursuing a strategy of 'peaceful evolution', which is traced back to John Foster Dulles in the 1950s. This perspective is also said to see Socialism as offering a better future for mankind and China as carrying its banner after the collapse of the Soviet Union. An interesting assertion it is said to make is that, the US had erroneously assumed that China was on the right track to abandoning the socialist system due to their misunderstanding of the nature of the economic reforms in China. As one articulation of this image is said to have put it: 'The West thinks that Marxism-Leninism has finished. We should say that it is too early for them to be jubilant. We Marxists firmly believe that Communism will eventually claim a triumph.'¹⁶

Scholars who take what Hu, Chan and Zha identify as the Marxist approach to international relations in the PRC, are engaged in an effort to glean some concepts and strategems from the works of Marx, Lenin, Mao and Deng, and make them a set of 'theories' guiding the conduct China's foreign relations.¹⁷ For many who take this perspective class analysis is said to be still the basic method to study international relations because they see the relations between classes as one of the major objects of study in international relations, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as major actors in international affairs, and the substance of international relations as nothing but class struggle in the international domain.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid. , pp. 904- 907.

¹⁷ Weixing Hu, et al, in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, pp. 6-7.

¹⁸ Xinning Song and G. Chan, 'International relations theory in China', in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 25.

As Gerald Chan has argued, China is socialist country in transition and Marxism is an important legacy that is still holding sway¹⁹, and the fact that China is still a professed socialist state under the control of the CCP means that Marxism remains a potent force in shaping its foreign policy and international behaviour.²⁰ While he argues that with the passage of time it is becoming apparent that Marxist ideas do not fit very well in contemporary China²¹, he also points out that Chinese Marxism is being interpreted and reinterpreted differently to suit changing circumstances.²²

Some Chinese scholars are said to have utilised the work of Luxemburg, Bukharin, Gramsci as well as other Western Marxist approaches in order to theorise about international relations. While these scholars are said to have played down the usefulness of orthodox/traditional class analysis for study of international relations in the 1990s, they are still said to recognise the valuable contributions that Marxist theory and methodology have made and can make to the study of international relations. Thus for them Marxism is said to be one of the most important schools of thought in International Political Economy (IPE), which is considered to be a sub-field within International Relations(IR).²³

It has been argued that those who are in favour of establishing an 'IR theory with Chinese Characteristics' make-up the majority of IR scholars in China.²⁴ Li Shisheng, a professor at Peking University is said to have argued that exploration and rediscovery of Marxist-Leninist IR theory as well as the studies of Mao Zedong's, Zhou Enlai's and Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on diplomacy and international strategy are an important and indispensable component in establishing China's own IR theory. Lu Yi, a one time party

¹⁹ G. Chan, op cit, p. 48.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

²¹ Ibid., p. 49.

²² Ibid., p. 150.

²³ Xinning Song and G. Chan, in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 25.

²⁴ G. Chan, op cit, p. 144.

secretary of the Foreign Affairs College and president of the China Association of International Relations History, is said to claim that a consensus has emerged on taking Marxism, Mao Zedong thought and Deng Xiaoping theory as guiding principles in constructing China's IR theory.²⁵

Even though they are growing increasingly faint perhaps, traces of this perspective appear in public Chinese foreign policy statements throughout the 1990s. For example, during August 1995, in the context of Chinese missile testing off the coast of Taiwan, former president Jiang Zemin is quoted as saying 'The West wants to "Westernise" and "divide" our country', in the context of Chinese missile testing off the coast of Taiwan.²⁶

Furthermore, in September 1999 former foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, asserted at least twice the PRC's commitment to socialism.²⁷

Wang and Lin's 'ideological' perspective also interprets what is seen the 'offensive' nature of US post-cold war foreign policy towards socialist countries as 'new hegemonism and power politics', which is said to be 'a reflection of the nature of imperialism and capitalism in foreign policy and international relations.' In this view 'the developed countries headed by the United States intend to turn the world in to the Western model and use the value system of Western democracy, freedom and human rights to completely conquer the whole world'. It argues that the 'focal point of opposing "new hegemonism" is to oppose American hegemonism under the new situation'. It describes 'new hegemonism and power politics' as having the following features: 'military forces as

²⁵ Lu Yi, Gu Guanfu, Yu Zhengliang and Fu Yaozu, eds., *Research on International Relations Theories in China's New Era*, (Chinese version), Shishi Chubanshe: Beijing, 1999, p. 5 and pp. 26-38, translated from Chinese and cited in Yongjin Zhang, 'International relations theory in China today: the state of the field', *The China Journal*, no. 47 January 2002, pp. 102-103.

²⁶ 'China completes missile tests off Taiwan', *The Washington Times*, 26/08/1995, cited in D. Roy, *China's Foreign Relations*, Macmillan: London, 1998, p. 42.

²⁷ Tang Jiaxuan, 'China's position on current international issues', text of speech in *Beijing Review*, 11/01/1999, p. 11.

a backing, economics and trade as a bait, and human rights as a stick, flagrantly interfering with other countries' internal affairs and exporting the capitalist system as well as Western values', and argues that 'the struggle between hegemonism and anti-hegemonism is more the nature of the struggle between two systems'.²⁸ However it should be noted here that Shambaugh's discussion of the 'hegemonist' cluster of images indicates that whether hegemony is a 'system' or a 'policy', and whether 'new hegemonism' is distinct from 'old hegemonism' (or in other words the validity of the distinction between 'old' and 'new' hegemonism), has been the subject of debate among Chinese specialists/analysts and scholars.²⁹ Moreover Shambaugh's discussion also points out that geopolitics has a primary place in the hegemonist perspective³⁰, and Wang and Lin in turn recognise that their 'geopolitical' perspective share the concerns over 'new hegemonism and power politics' articulated by the 'ideological' perspective.³¹ We will come back to Shambaugh's 'hegemonist' perspective in the conclusion to this chapter.

A Geopolitical Perspective

Wang and Lin's 'geopolitical' perspective views the post-cold war world through the framework of traditional realpolitik, and sees power and interest as the two key concepts through which post-cold war world politics can be understood. It sees superior comprehensive power (*zhonghe guali*) and the imperative to maintain its sole super power status as contributing to making the post-cold war US global strategy expansionist in nature. One scholar subscribing to this perspective is said to have described the United States as having a very definite long term plan to establish a world empire. The motivation behind US global strategy, as this scholar perceives it, is said to be not some abstract value such as democracy or human rights, but rather the necessity to avoid being

²⁸ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, op cit, pp. 905-906.

²⁹ D. Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 79-80.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 246.

³¹ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, op cit, p. 910.

squeezed out in competition with Japan, Germany and other major powers in the world.³²

The discussion of 'multipolarisation', which is said to have been a part of the Chinese foreign policy discourse even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, is also included by Wang and Lin as a part of the 'geopolitical' perspective.³³ The concept of 'multipolarity' is concerned with the distribution of power in the modern state system. Li Jianying of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs traces the emergence of 'multipolarisation', or at least the recognition of that, to a speech made by President Nixon in 1971 at Kansas City, where he is said to have pointed out that there had already emerged five major forces in the world- the US, USSR, Japan, the European Community and China. Li argues that multipolarisation gradually came into being in the bi-polar distribution of power between the two super powers. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which is said to have caused and symbolised the collapse of the bipolar distribution of power, is seen as paving the way in the early 1990s for both the development of multipolarisation as well as to the US consolidation of its sole super power status. While he argues that the process of multipolarisation is an irreversible trend from the long-term point of view, in the short-term it is seen as having experienced more setbacks than progress. These setbacks are seen as resulting from US unilateralism, hegemonism and military interventionism, which appear to be referring to the US led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the US is seen as being able to play a leading role in any region and any area in the world, China, Russia, Japan and the EU are seen as being able to exert influence only in their respective regions and international organisations. Hence Li sees the current distribution of power in the state system as consisting of 'one superpower, several major

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., p. 909.

powers'.³⁴ In fact one of Shambaugh's more recent articles has argued that many military as well as civilian analysts in China see the current post-cold war distribution of power as consisting of 'one superpower, many strong powers' (*yi chao duo qiang*) or 'one pole, many powers' (*yi ji duo qiang*).³⁵

Wang and Lin's 'geopolitical' perspective also envisions a post-cold war world of unstable and shifting alliances, and hence advocate a flexible and expedient approach to policy. Thus, while one scholar subscribing to this image points out that China should try its best to find allies among countries which could become the strategic adversaries of the US such as Germany and Japan, another scholar apparently upholding the same image, argues that the US, Russia and China could co-operate to maintain world order under the United Nations, one important objective of which would be to contain the rise of Japan and Germany.³⁶

While Chinese authors in the late 80s and early 90s, perhaps reflecting the continuing influence of Marxist class analysis, had still considered national interests as predominantly a property of the ruling class³⁷, an account in 1994 is said to have emphatically placed the 'national' attribute as the primary attribute of national interests.³⁸ A still more recent study focusing exclusively on the Chinese 'national interest' is said to start with an uncompromising attack on class analysis. According to its author Yan Xuetong (Director, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations), the confusion of national interests with state interests is said to have arisen from the fact that, in the Chinese language, both nation and state are often

³⁴ Li Jianying, 'Superficial observations on the multipolarisation process', *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, no. 68 June 2003, pp. 9-16.

³⁵ D. Shambaugh, 'China's military views the world', in M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote, S.M. Lynn-Jones and S.E. Miller, eds., *The Rise of China: An International Security Reader*, The MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000, p. 116.

³⁶ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, op cit, pp. 911-912.

³⁷ Jin Yinzhong and Ni Shixiong, *A Comparative Study of International Relations Theory*, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe: Beijing, 1992, pp. 116-122, translated from Chinese and cited in Yong Deng, op cit, p 313.

³⁸ Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, *Introduction to International Politics*, Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe: Beijing, 1994, *passim*, especially pp. 75-76, 83-87, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 313.

understood to refer to the same thing, 'guojia' (or state). He is said to have made a clear distinction between 'guojia' interests in domestic and international politics. For him the former is said to refer to the interests of the state that belong to the ruling class, the latter is said to refer to interests that belong to the nation as a collectivity, which are said to be enjoyed by both the ruler and ruled.³⁹ For Chinese officials and scholars alike, national interests are said to be the embodiment of the nation as a whole, and their pursuit is said to be seen by them as the 'inalienable right' of the nation-state.⁴⁰ According to one account 'relations in interests are the fundamental factor influencing foreign behaviour, and national interests are the most long-lasting, the most influential factor and the most basic motive of the state's foreign behaviour.'⁴¹ In other words, 'national interests are the primary, direct motive. The rest of the dynamics are secondary and permeate the national interest.'⁴² Chinese officials and scholars are said to hold Deng Xiaoping's emphasis on national interests as the 'highest principle' governing international relations, as one of his major intellectual contributions.⁴³ Deng Xiaoping is said to have once told Richard Nixon that 'national self interests should be the starting point of international relations... In this way all problems can be resolved properly... Thus your trip to China in 1972 was not only wise but also bold. I know you are anti-Communist and I am a Communist. Yet we both hold our national self-interests as the highest principle when

³⁹ Yan Xuetong, *Analysis of China's National Interests*, (Chinese version), Tianjin remin chubanshe: Tianjin, 1996, pp. 4-11, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 313.

⁴⁰ Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, *op cit*, and Liang Shoude, 'The study of international politics in China', (Chinese), *Studies of International Politics*, vol. 1 1997, pp. 1-9, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 313.

⁴¹ Feng Tejun and Song Xinling, ed., *Introduction to International Politics*, Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe: Beijing, 1992, p. 123, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 313.

⁴² Liang Shoude and Hong Yinxian, *op cit*, pp. 58-60, translated from Chinese and cited in *Ibid.*, p. 313.

⁴³ Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, ed., *On Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts on Strategy*, Jiefangjun kexue chubanshe: Beijing, 1996, chapter 6; Gao Jingdian, ed., *A Study of Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts on International Strategy*, Guofang daxue chubanshe: Beijing, 1992; Wang Taiping, ed., *A Collection of Research Papers on Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts on Diplomacy*, Shijie zhishi chubanshe: Beijing, 1996, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 314.

talking about and dealing with problems.⁴⁴ One prominent scholar is said to claim that 'international sovereign national interests are mutually compatible'.⁴⁵

Moreover many Chinese officials and scholars are said to see contemporary international politics as being characterised by 'the competition for comprehensive national power' (*zhonghe guoli de jiaoliang*) in, among other things, military, political, economic and technological areas.⁴⁶ Most Chinese analysts are said to be of the view that with the end of the cold war 'bloc politics' and ideological differences are less important, and that instead national interests, especially economic interests, rise to pre-eminence.⁴⁷ An editorial in a leading Chinese official weekly publication is said to have proclaimed that the unit of the intense competition for comprehensive power is still the nation-state and that national interests take precedence over everything else.⁴⁸ The scholar He Xin is said to frequently cite Hans Morgenthau and Fredric List's arguments in support of his realpolitik worldview and neo-mercantilist policies. For He Xin, while Morgenthau paints the world as a struggle for power, List provides prescriptions for an economic nationalism centred around state intervention and protectionism in a world of limited resources and a hierarchical division of labour.⁴⁹ Another Chinese scholar Wang Jisi has argued that the Chinese conception of national interests is guided by a materialist theory: 'Compared with Westerners, Chinese are more accustomed to analyse international relations from the perspective of practical interests. They are less likely to believe that some spiritual beliefs (values, religions and ideologies) can also be a driving force behind

⁴⁴ Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works*, Renmin chubanshe: Beijing, 1993, p. 330, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 314.

⁴⁵ Liang Shoude, ed., *New Introduction to International Politics*, Beijing daxue chubanshe: Beijing, 1996, p. 60, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 314.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴⁷ Zhao Xiaochun, 'On new changes in national interests in the post-cold war era', *Journal of the Institute of International Relations*, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 1-7, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴⁸ Wei Yang, 'National interests take precedence over everything', *Liaowang (Outlook)*, vol. 19 1997, p. 1, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴⁹ He Xin, *China's Revival and the World's Future: Vols. I and II*, Sichuan renmin chubanshe: Sichuan, 1996, pp. 69, 130, 153, 628-631, 661-62, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, pp. 315-316.

diplomacy... the Chinese see international exchanges more in terms of the motives of interest and gains-losses thereof.' Wang Jisi seems to be arguing that because the Chinese analysts tend to interpret the foreign policy of Western countries from an exclusively interest-oriented point of view, there is a 'perceptual gap' obstructing China's relations with the West.⁵⁰

Thus non-Chinese scholars such as Samuel Kim and Thomas Kristensen, among others, are said to point towards a 'hardcore' well entrenched Chinese realpolitik world view, in which the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power.⁵¹ In the context of Chinese arms control policy Alistair Johnston is said to have argued that Chinese decision-makers view the world as essentially conflict prone, inter-state relations as zero-sum power struggles and violence as by no means a less common solution.⁵²

A Global Interdependence Perspective

Wang and Lin's 'global interdependence' perspective has a more positive and receptive attitude towards 'globalisation' and 'interdependence' in the post-cold war world economy and polity. This perspective is also said to recognise that international affairs should not be viewed solely from the stand point of nation-states, but rather that one should take into account the consequences of domestic or bilateral events for the international system as a whole. One articulation of this image has drawn attention to a 'so called "new thinking" in US decision-making bodies, through which a considerable part of decision-making power enjoyed by the sovereign state and government has been shifted to transnational organisations and multinational corporations, as well as to foreign

⁵⁰ Wang Jisi, ed., *Civilisations and International Politics*, Shanghai renmin chubanshe: Shanghai, 1995, pp. 189-90, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 316.

⁵¹ S.S. Kim, 'China in and out of the changing world order', *Occasional Paper* No. 21, World Order Studies Program, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1991; T. Christensen, 'Chinese realpolitik', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75 no. 5, September/October 1996, cited in *ibid.*, p. 308.

⁵² A.I. Johnston, 'Learning versus adaptation: explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s', *The China Journal*, No. 35, January 1996, p. 31, cited in *ibid.*, p. 316.

countries, and that therefore the US government has to learn how to share and coordinate power with various identities at different levels.⁵³ It is also said to see the post-cold war world order in positive-sum terms of 'interdependence' rather than in zero-sum terms. While it acknowledges that the US might genuinely want to promote its value system world wide, it is also said to be of the view that, more often than not, value concerns are constrained by complicated interaction between domestic needs and international obligations. It sees the increasing 'globalisation' of world economy and polity is as requiring a leadership for which the US is seen as the best candidate. Hence this perspective is said to have gone as far as to approve of US leadership in international affairs, particularly with reference to the first Gulf war against Iraq. One articulation of this image makes the following observation: 'Prior to the Industrial Revolution China was the most benign major power, whereas the US is the most benign major power since the Industrial Revolution'.⁵⁴ This perspective posits promoting world economy and well being as criteria for evaluating US leadership. The US role in the first Gulf war against Iraq is seen as satisfying these criteria, as well as formulating a credible deterrence to future 'regional hegemonism'. From this perspective, on one hand US leadership in world affairs is seen as not necessarily detrimental to China's interest, while on the other hand the internal stability and prosperity of China are also seen as beneficial to a new world order 'on which the US is working hard'. Thus it emphasises a commonality of interests between China and the US in maintaining stability in both East Asia and the world.⁵⁵ Wang and Lin see the 'global interdependence' perspective as corresponding to '... an image of neoliberalism of some sort', and as incorporating some popular Western theories of international relations.⁵⁶

⁵³ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, *op cit*, pp. 913-14.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 914.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 915.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 916 and 912.

Yong Deng has identified some emerging alternative views on the Chinese conception of national interests, which he characterises as idealpolitik or liberalism. The late 1980s and the 1990s is said to have seen highly frequent references to 'interdependence' in international relations, in contrast to the complete absence of the concept in Chinese analyses prior to that.⁵⁷ Addressing the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) quasi-summit in November 1994, the then President Jiang Zemin is said to have spoken like a Western liberal: 'Modern technology has narrowed the distance between regions. Many challenges facing mankind often transcend national borders. Many issues such as economic relations, trade exchanges, scientific and technological development, environmental protection, population control, disaster mitigation and relief, drug bans, crime prevention, prevention of nuclear proliferation and AIDS prevention and treatment are of a global and interdependent nature, and all of them require co-operation and commonly observed standards. Since the 1980s, trade contacts, market development, capital flows, industrial reallocations, scientific and technological exchanges and information outflows have increased noticeably among members of the Asia-pacific region, leading to closer contacts.'⁵⁸

In the post-cold war era, both Chinese officials and scholars are said to be paying more and more attention to 'globalisation'. According to Li Shenzhi (a former Vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), transnational, supranational and global forces are at work, and global problems are proliferating. In his view, because of globalisation both actors and rules in future international relations will be vastly different, challenges will not be like past ones, involving only redistribution of power and interests among existent nations and states. Instead, he sees the concepts of nations, sovereignty

⁵⁷ Yong Deng, *op cit*, p. 317.

⁵⁸ Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, (15th November 1994), in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-China*, (15th November 1994), p. 2, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 317.

and national boundaries as subject to change, with non-state actors (such as international organisations and multinational corporations) and domestic factors, including 'the individual choices and values' playing greater roles. He appears to extol multilateral co-operation as a way for all nations to seek new common solutions, and asserts that if China chooses 'chauvinism' it will be detrimental not only to China but to the world as well, while if China chooses 'globalism' it will be beneficial to both China and the world. According to Li, in the contemporary world of globalisation the solution to the continuing '*ti-yong*' debate should lie in treating the 'universal laws of globalisation' as 'essence'(*ti*) and 'Chinese characteristics' as 'function'(*yong*).⁵⁹

A monograph by Wang Yizhou is said to examine the impact of globalisation and interdependence on international relations. It lists ten factors that are challenging the traditional notion of state sovereignty: 1) incongruence between the nation and the state; 2) the weakening of state capacities and responsibilities; 3) inequality in resources and diplomatic quality; 4) weak cultural identification and regime legitimacy; 5) the strengthening of international interventions and international laws; 6) a greater role for international organisations; 7) the growing power of non-governmental forces; 8) 'borderless' economies and global interdependence; 9) the deepening global crises; and 10) air space, outer space activities and the rising consciousness of sea territories. Wang Yizhou is said to treat the concept sovereignty as a dynamic, historical notion subject to change, and sees globalisation as endowing the state with some opportunities, interests and rights, while at the same time limiting its autonomy and sovereign rights: 'the more it gets the more it loses; the more rights it enjoys, the more obligations it assumes'. He is said to assert that globalist thinking should also be a part of globalisation, 'not just because of the new threats to security and survival, but also for transforming ourselves

⁵⁹ Li Shenzhi, 'Globalisation: grand trend in the 21st century', *Science and Technology Herald*, (3rd June 1993), p. 3; 'Globalisation and Chinese culture', *American Studies*, vol. 1 1995, pp. 126-38, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 318.

and moulding ourselves as human beings according to the new characteristics of the era.⁶⁰

On the issue of 'security' as well, somewhat liberal views are said to be emerging. Yan Xuetong is said to argue that under an 'individual security system' the individual country's security depends on its own strength and that of its allies, while under a collective security system, the security of a country is protected not only by the country's own defence but also by the collective security arrangement. For him a 'collective security system' is said to differ from a military alliance, in that the former does not target a pre-determined enemy, but is directed against all threats, wherever and from whichever source they might arise.⁶¹ For the Chinese commentator Tang Tianri the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is said to represent a new approach to security because the dialogue and co-operation it promotes does not target a pre-determined common enemy, but promotes regional stability, which is seen as a kind of security attained not through armaments or military alliances, but through building mutual confidence and common interests. He is said to view the post-cold war world in terms of a 'global society with high interdependence, where one country's security and other state's interests are vitally interrelated. Safeguarding the common interest of global security is increasingly becoming a universal consensus'.⁶²

Thus Yong Deng points out that many Chinese analysts express support for confidence-building multilateral security endeavours sponsored by the official ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as for some other non-governmental, track two programmes of security dialogue in the Asia-pacific region.⁶³ As Garret and Glaser are said to have

⁶⁰ Wang Yizhou, *Analysis of Contemporary International Politics*, Shanghai renmin chubanshe: Shanghai, 1995, pp. 40-43, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, pp. 318-19.

⁶¹ Yan Xuetong, *op cit*, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 320.

⁶² Tang Tianri, 'New model in security co-operation', *Liaowang (Outlook)*, vol. 31 1997, p. 44, translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 320.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

argued, even on the issue of nuclear arms control, there is a nascent 'security interdependence' perspective as opposed to the earlier prevailing self-help views.⁶⁴

Conclusion

The foregoing presentation of Chinese views indicate that all three perspectives identified by Wang and Lin (ideological, geopolitical and global interdependence) share concerns over 'hegemonism/regional hegemonism and power politics'.⁶⁵ Hence, here again Shambaugh's discussion of a 'hegemonist' cluster of images in the context of Chinese perceptions of US foreign policy between 1972-90 becomes useful to the present study. In Shambaugh's work on Chinese perceptions of the US, with regard to the US economy, society and polity, perceptions are seen as cleaving into two major image clusters- the Marxist and non-Marxist, which in turn are further sub-divided into Stalinist and Leninist in the case of the former, and 'statist' and 'pluralist' in the case of the latter.⁶⁶ When it comes to Chinese perceptions of US foreign policy and role in world affairs however, while the Marxist (which sees US foreign policy as profit driven) and non-Marxist (which sees US foreign policy as being disaggregated and variegated) image clusters remain in evidence, Shambaugh discerns a third image cluster which cuts across the Marxist/non-Marxist dichotomy, which he categorises as 'hegemonist', which sees US foreign policy in terms of the pursuit of global hegemony.⁶⁷

The root of the Chinese term '*baquanzhuyi*' which translates into English as 'hegemony', is traced by Shambaugh to the Spring and Autumn period (722-481 B.C.). He emphasises the need to establish the Chinese etymological and philosophical origins of the term in order to fully understand its usage in the Chinese analyses of contemporary international relations, and the role it plays in their perceptions and images of the same. The character

⁶⁴ B.N. Garret and B.S. Glaser, 'Chinese perspectives on nuclear arms control', *International Security*, vol. 20 no. 3, Winter 1995/6, pp. 43-78, cited in *ibid*.

⁶⁵ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, *op cit*, pp. 905-906, 910 and 914.

⁶⁶ D. Shambaugh, *op cit*, p. 40.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283.

'ba', which is the root of 'baquanzhuyi', is said to stem from traditional Chinese political thought, and appear in a variety of ancient historical records. The term 'baquanzhuyi' is said to come from 'baquan' which literally means 'powerful ruler', 'baquan' itself being derived from 'badao', which translates in to English as 'to rule by force'. Since the Warring States period (468 –221 B.C.) 'badao' is said to have been juxtaposed against 'wangdao' or 'benevolent rule' in Chinese thought. Shambaugh goes on to argue that while in earlier history and thought the term was associated with concepts of proper governance, since the Warring States period, it has acquired a derogatory connotation, due to a realisation in Chinese thought from that time onwards that the use of force and coercion, except in the case of punishment (*xing*) or 'righteous' (ie: just) war, is profoundly illegitimate. He further argues that this notion of hegemony has become a key element in modern and contemporary China views of the world due to historical reasons. The Chinese experience of a 'century of humiliation' from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, during which China had been at the receiving end of coercive and aggressive overtures by many European powers including Russia/Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Japan, is said to be indelibly etched on the Chinese psyche.⁶⁸ After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the term hegemony is said to have been first used in 1968 to criticise the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'. The use of 'hegemony' is also seen as becoming particularly pronounced in Chinese assessments of international affairs in the post-Mao era.⁶⁹ During the 1970s, when the terms 'hegemonism' and 'hegemonist' appeared in the Chinese press, one could be reasonably sure that it referred to the Soviet Union, while in 1978-79 the term 'regional hegemonist' also began to appear with reference to Vietnam and Cuba.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 81- 83.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 78. However elsewhere Shambaugh has argued that 'Opposition to hegemony has been the explicit sine qua non (an indispensable condition) of Chinese Communist foreign policy since the 1950s,...', D. Shambaugh, in M.E. Brown, et al, eds., op cit, p. 115.

Beginning in the 1980s however, Chinese commentators had begun to use the term 'hegemony' to refer to American foreign policy as well.⁷⁰

While a range of definitions of the term 'hegemony' is given by Chinese international relations experts in research establishments such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (particularly its Institutes of Soviet and East European Studies, American Studies, and World Economics and Politics), and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations during the post-Mao era, a common denominator among them is said to be that of 'the strong imposing their will on the weak'. In other words, 'hegemony' is equated with 'power politics'. However, several had also mentioned 'interference in internal affairs' as an important aspect of hegemony. While many have privileged military subjugation as the primary means of hegemony, some had also noted non-military means such as cultural, political, economic and ideological subjugation.⁷¹ Shambaugh's 'hegemonist' cluster of images sees the US as bent on manipulating China for its own strategic purposes, wantonly interfering in its domestic affairs irrespective of Chinese dignity and sovereignty, and trying to transform China in its own vision.⁷² Wang and Lin conclude by arguing that some aspects of the 'geopolitics' and 'global interdependence' perspectives gradually gained an upper hand in internal policy debates by the end of 1992⁷³, which implies a decline in the influence of the 'ideological' perspective. Hu, Chan and Zha argue that the established paradigm that dominated the thought and action of Chinese scholars, decision-makers and bureaucrats till late 1970s was that of 'sinified' Marxism or Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. The paradigm shift that they refer to is the gradual and continuing decline of the 'sinified' Marxist paradigm in the last two decades following Deng Xiaoping's sweeping reforms,

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 80.

⁷² Ibid., p. 283.

⁷³ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, *op cit*, p. 917.

and the space created as a consequence for other ways of perceiving and conceptualising the world. This space according to them is in the process of being occupied by indigenous Chinese sources of intellect such as ancient Chinese philosophy, as well as by the adaptation of western concepts and theories.⁷⁴ Thus both Wang and Lin, as well as Hu, Chan and Zha seem to concur in seeing a decline in the influence of the ideological/sinicified Marxist perspective/paradigm on Chinese foreign policy.

However Hu, Chan and Zha have also noted that China's perception and conceptualisation of international relations is strongly influenced by its values, culture and self-image of its role in world politics.⁷⁵ As Yosef Lapid is said to have pointed out, culture and identities are emergent and constructed (rather than fixed and natural), contested and polymorphic (rather than unitary and singular), and interactive and process-like (rather than static and essence-like).⁷⁶ Wang Jisi seems to be echoing a similar sentiment with reference to China when he argues that Chinese culture is not a coherent whole, and it is subject to ongoing historical change.⁷⁷ Moreover Chan sees Chinese culture as largely an indigenous one, perhaps due to what he sees as a tendency to absorb, sinicise and merge other cultures with itself.⁷⁸ Thus for example Robert Gamer is said to have observed that 'China developed its own version of Buddhism and then cut itself off from the rest of the Buddhist world. China absorbed Marxism and by mutual agreement cut itself off from the Soviet Union.'⁷⁹ At present China is said to be developing its own socialism with Chinese characteristics, through which it is argued, socialism in China may be sinicised and absorbed into the main body of Chinese culture.

⁷⁴ Weixing Hu, et al, op cit, pp. xi-xii.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

⁷⁶ Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado and London, p. 8, cited in G. Chan, op cit, p. 55.

⁷⁷ Wang Jisi, in T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, p. 504.

⁷⁸ G. Chan, op cit, p. 56.

⁷⁹ R.E. Gamer, 'Helping history find its way: liberalisation in China', *Crossroads*, Jerusalem, no. 32 1991, p. 57, cited in G. Chan, op cit, p. 57.

The popularisation of Deng Xiaoping theory since the 15th National Congress of the CCP in 1997 is said to be indicative of such a trend.⁸⁰

As early as 1938, Mao is said to have put forward the slogan 'Sinification of Marxism' in his report to the sixth plenum of the central committee of the CCP. According to Stuart Schram, at one level 'sinification of Marxism' involved the use of a language accessible to the average Chinese, enlivened with popular proverbs and colourful turns of phrase, with an occasional quotation from traditional Chinese thought. At another deeper level, according to Schram, what Mao meant by sinification was that those who professed to analyse China's problems in Marxist terms should have a profound knowledge of China's history and relate the present to the past.⁸¹

John B. Starr has argued that Mao was exposed to and assimilated, through his experience of and education in Chinese culture, the view that the natural and social realms are inherently fraught with the interaction of opposing forces- a view which is said to be articulated in both Daoist and Confucian traditions. However, Mao had come to reject the emphasis placed in these schools of thought on the complementarity of these opposing forces. Mao is said to have rejected as well the corollary that followed from this idea of complementarity, namely, that the change in which that opposition eventuates must be cyclical or sequential in nature. In their place Mao substituted the idea, said to have been gleaned from his study of Marx, that it was conflict (or contradiction) not complementarity, that characterises the inherent opposition in nature and society, and that change must, as a result, be progressive and not cyclical.⁸²

Chan has argued that the idea of 'dialectics' bears some similarity with certain traditional Chinese thoughts, especially Daoism, in which 'yin' and 'yang' are in perpetual conflict or exist in some form of uneasy harmony. This resemblance, according to him, might

⁸⁰ *Beijing Review*, 13-19 October 1997, p. 18, cited in G. Chan, *ibid.*, p. 57.

⁸¹ S.R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1963, pp. 57-58.

explain partially why dialectical materialism finds some ready acceptance among Chinese intellectuals. He has further pointed out that there is a dialectical thinking underlying the analyses of most contemporary Chinese IR specialists.⁸³ Consider for example the following observations of Li Jianying of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs: 'The contradiction between the US attempt to create a 'unipolar world' and efforts of other countries to push for multipolarisation... ..constitutes the principal one among various contradictions of the current world. It exerts impacts and constraints on all other contradictions, on relations between the US and its former allies, on US-China and US-Russia relations, on relations among China, Russia, Europe and Japan, as well as among all countries of the world. Every country is faced with the choice of supporting or opposing US hegemonism and power politics.'⁸⁴

Yong Deng argues that even though a wide range of views exist along the realpolitik-idealpolitik spectrum in the Chinese conception of national interest, the dominant thinking or paradigm is realist. According to him, while some Chinese scholars well versed in western IR theory have introduced some liberal schools of thought, their primary interest lies in realist and neorealist variants of theory.⁸⁵

Other scholars too have made similar observations. For instance Xinning Song and Gerald Chan point out that when introducing western IR theories the focus has mainly been on realism, and that many Chinese scholars and students know very little about idealism, pluralism, neo-liberalism or critical theories of IR.⁸⁶ Wang Jisi has argued that, while it is difficult empirically to gauge the extent to which Western (diplomatic) thought has influenced Chinese foreign policy makers and their advisers, it can safely be said that

⁸² J.B. Starr, *Continuing the Revolution: the Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Princeton University Press: Princeton: New Jersey, 1979 p. 13.

⁸³ G. Chan, op cit, pp. 21 and 23.

⁸⁴ Li Jianying, op cit, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁵ Yong Deng, op cit, p. 320.

⁸⁶ Xinning Song and G. Chan, in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 27.

it is the realist approach that has made the strongest impression on them, and that if any parallel could be drawn between the development of Western IR theories and the evolution of Chinese conceptualisations of international politics, one might find that realist thinking looks akin to the Chinese vision today. According to him, the Chinese virtually insist that states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics, and even many younger scholars who have trained in the US still continue to hold this view.⁸⁷ Shambaugh in his discussion of the 'hegemonist' cluster of images also argues that the Chinese are among the most vocal proponents of state sovereignty and that one gets the sense that China wishes the world would return to the Westphalian system of reified sovereignty in 16th century Europe. He argues that the notion of immutable state sovereignty is expressed in many Chinese foreign policy pronouncements, not the least of which is said to be the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.⁸⁸ Yong Deng too has given a similar interpretation/explanation regarding the prevalence of the five principles in Chinese foreign policy pronouncements in the 1990s.⁸⁹ However, while both Yong Deng and Gerald Chan refer to a 'realism with Chinese characteristics', which for Chan means 'combining a power approach with a Chinese cultural approach',⁹⁰ Wang Jisi argues that the striking Chinese style of realism should be more theoretically and systematically interpreted against a Chinese cultural background. Wang Jisi asserts that Chinese foreign policy-makers rely heavily on and learn lessons from, Chinese classical writings such as Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *The Water Margin*, rather than from western diplomatic and military

⁸⁷ Wang Jisi, in T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, p. 498.

⁸⁸ D. Shambaugh, op cit, p. 81.

⁸⁹ Yong Deng, op cit, pp. 311-312.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 311, and G. Chan, op cit, p. 23.

experiences and writings. Nevertheless, he admits that younger leaders tend to have read less classical writings, and are hence not so much under the influence of traditional Chinese philosophies and strategies.⁹¹ He has also pointed out that at least among senior IR specialists in China, the purpose of making acquaintance with western IR theories is not so much to enrich Chinese thinking and methodology, as to know more about the foundation of western foreign policies.⁹² It is interesting to note here that the thinking underlying such a strategy, is an extension of the Chinese understanding of theory as a guide to policy to western foreign policy makers as well.

Wang and Lin see their 'geopolitical perspective' as corresponding to '... an image of crude realism that is by no means foreign to China.'⁹³ For example the image of shifting alliances and flexible, expedient policies offered by this perspective does show a close affinity with realist/neorealist IR theory. As Roy has noted, neorealists expect that alliances will be flexible, that a government will seek security co-operation with its neighbours to offset the power of the state or states it considers most threatening, but that today's ally may be tomorrow's enemy and so on.⁹⁴ However, such an image (of shifting alliances and flexible, expedient policies) can also be derived from the 'pragmatism' of Chinese philosophy. The Confucian notion of '*chung-yung*', which is said to mean that harmony and unity between men can be attained when men show moderation, avoid extremism and are always ready to compromise, is seen as forming the philosophical basis of pragmatism.⁹⁵ According to Lucien Pye, Chinese pragmatism holds that changes in circumstances should prompt changes in action. Moreover, for the Chinese to be able to adapt to the logic of a situation is said to be a sign of wisdom,

⁹¹ Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, pp. 502-503.

⁹² Ibid., p. 495.

⁹³ Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, op cit, p. 916.

⁹⁴ D. Roy, op cit, p. 4.

⁹⁵ Qingxin Wang, 'Cultural norms and the conduct of Chinese foreign policy', in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, pp. 146-147.

while to be able to order policy changes is said to be an indication of power. All of which is said to explain why Chinese leaders easily change their policy positions as circumstances change.⁹⁶ The Legalist school of thought which is said to have flourished in China amidst the blossoming of a hundred schools of thought in the absence of a single unified state power during the Spring and Autumn period(722 – 481 B.C.) and the Warring States period (480-221 B.C.)⁹⁷, is also said to resemble realism. The basic ideas of Legalism is said to include the evil nature of humanity, the rule of law, interests not morality as the dynamics of human behaviour, stop evil by evil and so on, ideas which are said to be not too far from how Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes looked at the world and human society.⁹⁸ Chan has argued that the Chinese are not new to the concept of balance of power, and that Su Qin and Zhang Yi were famous balance of power strategists during the Warring States period in ancient China.⁹⁹ Yuan Jindong is said to have argued that one of the approaches that has influenced the Chinese strategic outlook over the centuries is a *realpolitik* view of the world, which has held that conflicts are perennial and zero-sum and that the use of force is the only effective means for ensuring security, stability and peace.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, some Chinese scholars who take a 'cultural approach' (*guoxue pai*) to the study of international relations are said to have attempted to locate expressions in Chinese thought similar to the notion of 'national interests' as far back as the Zhou dynasty period (c.1025-256 B.C.).¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ L. Pye, 'China: erratic state, frustrated society', *Foreign Affairs*, 69/4, Autumn 1, 1990, p. 71, cited in Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, p. 490.

⁹⁷ G.Chan, op cit, p. 28.

⁹⁸ Xinning Song and G. Chan, in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 25.

⁹⁹ G. Chan, op cit, p. 33.

¹⁰⁰ Yuan Jindong, 'Culture matters: Chinese approaches to arms control and disarmament', paper presented for the 'Cross-cultural dimensions of the non-proliferation and arms control dialogue' project, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2nd draft, 16/04/1997, cited in G. Chan, op cit, p. 59.

¹⁰¹ Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 7.

Moreover according to Akira Iriye, in the traditional Chinese conception, a country's cultural greatness determined its power in the world, so that a state with superior cultural achievements was entitled to esteem and influence among other states.¹⁰² As Wang Jisi has observed, in the traditional Confucian worldview the principal causal force of history was the moral conduct of leaders.¹⁰³ One contemporary Chinese analyst is said to argue that tradition, culture and personal qualities of individuals should be seen as the 'software' of a nation contributing towards the composition of comprehensive national power, while acknowledging that these qualities are intangible and extremely difficult to measure.¹⁰⁴ Thus contrary to Shambaugh's and Yong Deng's interpretation/explanation of the prevalence of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in contemporary Chinese foreign policy pronouncements, Wang Jisi sees the Chinese exhortation of the five principles as reflecting their belief that the collective goodwill can be advanced if everyone acts morally and in accordance with the correct definition of his or her role.¹⁰⁵ Similarly G. Chan too has argued that the repeated references to the five principles made by the Chinese show some cultural traits on their part, that they reiterate them so often so that they feel they stand on high moral ground in preaching such principles.¹⁰⁶ In discussing 'collective security', the Chinese commentator Tang Tianri has criticised the revised US-Japan military alliance, which is seen by Yong Deng as raising questions regarding Tang's motive behind promoting collective security. Yong Deng argues that liberal views, particularly in official PRC statements, should always be taken with a grain of salt, that efforts have to be made to probe beneath the liberal proclamations to

¹⁰² Akira Iriye, 'Culture and power: international relations as intercultural relations', *Diplomatic History*, 2 1979, pp. 118-19, cited in Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, p. 502.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

¹⁰⁴ Li Yiping, 'China's conditions and China's reform', *China's National Conditions and Power*, no. 5 1995, pp. 9-11, translated and cited in G. Chan, op cit, p. 32.

¹⁰⁵ Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., op cit, pp. 501-502.

¹⁰⁶ G. Chan, op cit, p. 58.

distinguish genuine beliefs from pure rhetoric.¹⁰⁷ This seems to indicate that the articulation of 'global interdependence' or 'liberal/idealpolitik' perspectives, at least in the public Chinese foreign policy discourse, might at times be taking place more in conformity with the 'instrumental' model of communication, and less in conformity with the 'representational' model. This would seem related to a further point raised by Yong Deng about whether the appearance of liberal views in the Chinese foreign policy discourse is due to 'tactical learning', which involves 'changes in means but not in ends', or 'cognitive learning', which involves 'a modification of goals as well as means'.¹⁰⁸ In other words, concerns have been raised about whether the Chinese view interdependence as an independently valued goal in itself, or as a tool for economic modernisation.¹⁰⁹ In connection with liberalism it would also be interesting here to take note of a point made by Shambaugh concerning the distortions of meaning (at least in terms of what the author had intended to convey), that can occur in translation from English to Chinese due to what he sees as cultural differences. He points out that the Chinese perception of an individual as an inexorable part of an extended network of obligatory human relations (*guanxi*), and the concomitant subjugation of individual desires to the collective will, is quite different from the liberal belief in the dignity and importance of the individual in its own right. This cultural difference, according to Shambaugh, explains a point made by Benjamin Schwartz in his biography of Yan Fu (one of China's first intellectuals to systematically study Western liberal thought), which is that Yan's translations of Mill, Spencer, Huxely and others led him to distort the values of democracy, liberty and progress to mean that the right of an individual should not be strengthened vis-à-vis the state, but should rather be channelled to strengthen the state itself!¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Yong Deng, op cit, pp. 320 and 317.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 317-318.

¹⁰⁹ D.M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and National Security Policy*, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2000, p. 36.

¹¹⁰ D. Shambaugh, op cit, p. 299.

At the same time however, according to Xinning Song and Gerald Chan, one of the most important ideas of Confucianism and Taoism is 'he-he' (integration and peace). The first 'he' is said to mean combination, integration and equality, which is said to be reflected in the popular Chinese saying 'Tian ren heyi' (heaven and humans are combined into one). The second 'he' is said to mean kindness, gentleness, harmony and peace, which is said to be represented by the saying 'jísuo buyu, wúshì yuren' (do not do unto others what you don't want others to do unto you). They argue that pacifism is at the core of Confucianism and Taoism, as well as in 'Yi Jing' (*The Book of Change*), and that the military strategy that was regarded as the best by ancient Chinese was not how to exterminate the enemy but how to win a war without resorting to force (*buzhan er qu ren zhi bing*). They see such ideas as the above as closely resembling much of Western idealist (which Yong Deng has associated closely with, liberal) thinking on international relations.¹¹¹ These ideas could also be brought within the fold of what Yuan Jindong is said to have called the Confucian-Mencian world view. This world view is said to approach order and governance through morality, exemplars and non-violent statecraft, and to see the world as harmonious, orderly, hierarchically structured. It is also said to consider conflicts as deviant phenomena rather than the nature of things, the management of which can be done by means other than the use of brute force.¹¹²

Moreover Yong Deng argues that the plausibility of liberal views are tied to the prevalence of reformist factions in China's domestic political struggle, that domestic political and economic liberalisation will provide the social values and political ground where the intellectual reformulation of Chinese national interests along liberal lines can take place. For him the ascendancy of liberal views is also linked to generational change,

¹¹¹ Xinning Song and G. Chan, in Weixing Hu, et al, eds., op cit, p. 24.

¹¹² Yuan Jindong, cited in G. Chan, op cit, p. 59.

in that almost all liberally inclined scholars are young, have studied in the west, and have had extensive exposure to Anglo-American IR literature, while most of the core members in China's current top leadership as well as many older scholars have had little experience with the west and tend to be suspicious of the outside world. Hence, in his view as the younger generation of scholars and leaders come to replace the older ones, the liberal world view is likely to become more popular among those involved in Chinese foreign policy making.¹¹³

As Wang Jisi has pointed out, for more than a century the Chinese have been grappling with problem of how to preserve Chinese spiritual essence and social identity while at the same time absorbing foreign ideas and institutions. With gradual but profound changes in culture, mind set and attitude towards the outside world, he argues, the fundamental conceptual tensions characterising contemporary Chinese foreign policy, such as ones between sovereign rights and human rights, independence and interdependence, nationalism and internationalism, economic competition and economic cooperation/integration, might eventually be raised and brought out into the open.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Yong Deng, *op cit*, pp. 328-29.

¹¹⁴ Wang Jisi, in T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh, eds., *op cit*, p. 505.

CHAPTER THREE

**CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF SOUTH ASIA DURING THE
POST-COLD WAR PERIOD**

CHAPTER 3

Chinese Perceptions of South Asia during the Post-cold war period

As we had argued in the first chapter, it is through a foreign policy discourse that the communication of perceptions, images, beliefs and the like can take place. Therefore, we must first identify the foreign policy discourse that we will be examining to access Chinese perceptions of South Asia during the post-cold war period. It consists of relevant speeches and writings of leaders of the PRC party-state, bureaucrats/diplomats and relevant analysts/ scholars. It should be noted here that senior diplomats of the PRC after retiring from active service, can also become senior researchers at international relations and foreign policy oriented research institutes. For example, Cheng Ruisheng, many of whose writings will be useful to us in this chapter, was formerly China's ambassador to India and Myanmar, before he went on to become a Senior Adviser at the China Institute of International Studies as well as Vice-President of the Chinese Association for South Asia Studies.

There are however two difficulties with the foreign policy discourse that we shall be utilising here. The first is that it consists of English language sources. The second is that it consists of open-source or public materials rather than restricted internal circulation materials. As had been pointed out in the first chapter, the former can be seen as being more in conformity with an instrumental model of communication, while the latter can be seen as being more in conformity with a representational model of communication. As we have also noted in the first chapter, the instrumental model of communication makes the drawing of valid inferences regarding the beliefs, attitudes, opinions etc held by the communicator from his/her messages somewhat problematic, which however can be mitigated to some extent by taking into account the context of communication. We

will therefore attempt to take into account the context of communication of the open source or public materials that we will be utilising here, perhaps in a rather rudimentary fashion, by making the footnotes as detailed as possible.

In exploring Chinese perceptions of South Asia during the post-cold war period, we will also be including Chinese perceptions of South Asian history from that location in our exploration, that is to say it will also include how the Chinese see the South Asian past (during the cold war, as well as prior to that) from their location in the present.

In this chapter, we will try to apply the three distinct perspectives we have discussed in the second chapter with regard to the post-cold war scenario as a whole, the 'ideological', 'geopolitical' and 'global interdependence' perspectives, to the South Asian region. In order to adapt the 'global interdependence' perspective to suit our concern with China and South Asia in this chapter, we may usefully term it simply as an 'interdependence' perspective. As will be apparent, the third perspective as well as the other two perspectives in this chapter, reflect most of the thematic concerns of the corresponding perspectives in the previous chapter. However, if we take any one of the speeches or pieces of writing that we will be utilising here singly, it becomes apparent that more than one of these perspectives (and at times all three) intermingle in most, if not all, of these writings. This chapter then is mainly, an attempt to disentangle these different strands, interwoven in each speech and piece of writing, and place them in one or the other of the three perspectives that we have been working with. However, as we have attempted to show in the conclusion to the second chapter, we will also attempt to show in the final section of this chapter, that these three perspectives are not conclusive in any sense of the term.

An Ideological Perspective

The views presented in this section emphasise the South Asian historical experience of imperialism, and seem to perceive a commonality between China and South Asia with

regard to such an experience. It was surely evident from our presentation of the 'ideological' perspective with regard to the post-cold war scenario as a whole in the second chapter, that the concept of imperialism was very much a part of it. Hence, we are not entirely unjustified in categorising these views as a part of the 'ideological' perspective.

As Lin Liang Guang of the Institute of South and South East Asian Studies, Peking University has put it, since 1757 India had been subjected to colonial rule for about two centuries and tasted to the full the bitterness of an enslaved and oppressed nation.¹ He goes on to trace the history of this experience in the following terms:

'For a long period of time, India had been ruled by the Mughal dynasty. However beginning from the 16th century, the Portugese, Dutch, French and British arrived one after the other. Later the British prevailed and became exclusive rulers of the country. The establishment of the colonialist regime not only destroyed the feudal political system and altered the course of historical development but also changed the structure of power of the state and produced a significant impact on relationships among countries of the South Asia region. Using India as a springboard, the British speedily expanded the domain of the Indian empire. During the 18th and 19th centuries, it covered the territories of present day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, administered Aden and some areas of the Persian Gulf and exercised control over such Himalayan kingdoms as Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim. It extended its sphere of influence to Afghanistan and even tried to encroach upon Tibet, which was a part of China. Although Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was then a British colony itself, its politics, economy, social life etc could not escape the influence of the gigantic Indian empire, which was separated from the island by only a narrow strait. In a word, India became the most important political and

¹ Lin Liang Guang, 'India's role in South Asia: a Chinese perspective', in V.L.B. Mendis, ed., *India's Role in South Asia*, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike Memorial Foundation: Colombo, 1992, p. 44. This volume

economic centre of the British colonial system in the east.² According to him, while expanding the Indian empire, British colonialists deliberately inculcated the ideology of great power chauvinism and national egoism among Indian politician, administrative officials and intellectuals.³

As former President of the PRC Jiang Zemin has put it: 'In modern times, when colonialism and imperialism ran amuck in South Asia, the people here fought back with an unyielding struggle that lasted more than a century, writing a glorious chapter in the history of winning national independence by Asian peoples.'⁴ He goes on to point out that: 'China and South Asia have had similar historical experience in that they all suffered from the frenzied plunder and ruthless trampling of colonialism and imperialism. It is our common fate in bad times that makes our friendship all the more endearing.'⁵

According to Cheng Ruisheng, at the time Deputy Director-General, China Centre for International Studies, Beijing: 'Due to their common history of being ruled or oppressed by colonial powers for a long time, China and South Asian countries are very vigilant about safeguarding their sovereignty and are firmly opposed to hegemonism and interference in their internal affairs.'⁶

Ma Jiali of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, also points out that: 'Owing to the long-term exploitation and suppression by the

is the outcome of a seminar organized by the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, from 14-16th June 1991.

² Ibid., p. 45.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jiang Zemin, 'Carrying forward generations of friendly and good neighborly relations and endeavoring towards a better tomorrow for all', www.fmprc.gov.cn, a speech delivered as president of the PRC, on 2nd December 1996, at Islamabad, Pakistan, to the Pakistan Senate.

⁵ Ibid., p2.

⁶ Cheng Ruisheng, 'China and South Asia in the 21st century', in N. Jetly and M. Dubey, eds., *South Asia and Its Eastern Neighbours: Building a Relationship in the 21st Century*, Konark Publishers: New Delhi, 1999, pp. 117-118. This volume is the result of a dialogue of Asian scholars organized jointly by the Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung foundation in New Delhi, India from 19-21st April 1998.

imperialists and colonialists, economic growth rate in South Asian countries remained to be slow and economic foundation poor.’⁷

A Geopolitical Perspective

Our presentation of Chinese views from a ‘geopolitical’ perspective with regard to the post-cold war scenario as a whole in the previous chapter indicated that zero-sum power relations, strategic manoeuvring, competition and conflict were its primary concerns. As will become evident shortly, the same themes are reflected in Chinese views on South Asia that will be presented in this section.

Lin Liang Guang has pointed out that South Asia has a unique geopolitical feature in that except for the island countries of Sri Lanka and Maldives, all the others have a common border with India and are separated from one another, and that Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh in particular are enclosed on three sides by Indian territory and are not contiguous to each other. As a result, in dealing with bilateral and regional problems, India is seen as enjoying advantageous physical conditions that the other countries do not have. Land locked countries like Nepal and Bhutan are seen as being in a particularly disadvantaged position as they need access to seaports for the development of their foreign trade. As far as its external geographical position is concerned, Lin sees the subcontinent as a strategic centre of the Indian Ocean and as the hub of communication between the East and the West. With the ever-growing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean, South Asia as Lin sees it, will play a bigger and bigger role in the international political arena, while India as the biggest country in this region will hope to realize certain ambitions. He further points out that it has become a basic principle of successive Indian governments to exclude all outside forces from the affairs of the South

⁷ Ma Jiali, ‘Relations between China and SAARC’, in U. Gautam, ed., *South Asia and China: Towards Inter-regional Cooperation*, China Study Center: Kathmandu 2003, p. 76. This publication is the outcome of a seminar organized by the China Study Center, Kathmandu, Nepal, on 23rd December 2002.

Asian region.⁸ Lin also argues that although Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh came into being at the end of 1971, it still possessed the potential strength to be a countervailing force to India to a certain extent. India therefore still regarded Pakistan as the major 'stumbling block' to its control of the political situation in South Asia and tried to isolate and contain it, while speeding up the development of nuclear technology and detonating a nuclear device in 1974.⁹ According to Lin, while India is a big power in South Asia with the ability to influence its neighbours, its performance in the period since its independence has been rather disappointing: 'For most of the time India has been cool in relations with its neighbours. They suspect and distrust each other and have fallen into acute confrontation and conflicts from time to time... On the other hand the consciousness of national independence of the peoples of other South Asian countries has grown remarkably.'¹⁰

Liang Jiejung of the CICIR argues that the major objectives of India's foreign relations and security policy in the mid- 1990s were to expedite its participation in the regional and global affairs so as to raise India's international competitiveness. Efforts

were also said to have been directed to secure for India a permanent membership in the Security Council so as to achieve for itself an advantageous position in the future world configuration, and gain greater say in global affairs. In his view this would enable India to rise in stature as a 'pole' in the unfolding world order. Liang further argued that, while a reversal in the improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the mid-1990s seemed unlikely, the Kashmir dispute still defied settlement, and that there were still

⁸ Lin Liang Guang, in V.L.B. Mendis, ed., *op cit*, pp. 46-47.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

some elements in India who regarded China and Pakistan as barriers to India's national security.¹¹

According to Cheng Ruisheng, since the end of the cold war, the trend of multipolarisation in the world has risen. Multipolarisation is, according to him, the democratisation of international politics, and the developing countries as a whole, are gradually rising to greater prominence. As Cheng sees it, with further development of the comprehensive strength of China and South Asia, both will become important power centres in Asia as well as the world in the 21st century.¹² He also points out that the military strength of both India and Pakistan is quite considerable and that both have nuclear capability. Furthermore according to him, China and the countries of South Asia are in favour of promoting the mutlipolarisation of the world, because a multipolar world would give them more 'room for manoeuvre' in foreign affairs, while a unipolar world would exert great pressure on them. Cheng sees multipolarisation as producing a favourable geopolitical environment for both China and the South Asian countries.¹³

Cheng also recalls that during the cold war, South Asia was heavily involved in the rivalry between major outside powers, which tried to form different alliances in this region. Confrontation between India and Pakistan is said to have been exploited by the major outside powers for their own interests, seriously threatening peace and security in the region.¹⁴ Cheng has also argued that Pakistan has tried very hard for many years to solve the Kashmir question by military means. While two wars broke out between India and Pakistan in 1947 and 1965 due to the Kashmir issue according to him, starting in the 1980s, the militant movement in Kashmir became active and was supported by Pakistan.

¹¹ Liang Jiejun, 'Evolving Indian political scene', *Contemporary International Relations*, vol. 6 no. 6 June 1996, pp. 14-15.

¹² Cheng Ruisheng, in N. Jetly and M. Dubey, eds., op cit. p. 115.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

He goes on to argue that history has proved that it is not possible for Pakistan to win its case through military means owing to the very simple reason that the comprehensive national strength of India is much more than that of Pakistan. At the same time, he also points out that 'India as well as Pakistan put military security in the foremost and spend a lot on military procurement.'¹⁵ Cheng argues further that, 'narrow nationalism' on both sides has been a major obstacle to the implementation of agreements such as the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, and to the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. According to him, though 'narrow nationalism' aims to defend one's own national interest at the cost of the national interest of other side, it will result in its own national interest being seriously harmed due to strong reaction of 'narrow nationalism' from the other side. Armed conflicts like the Kargil conflict are seen as having raised 'narrow national' feelings to a new high, and as having created a more difficult situation for both countries.'¹⁶

According to Zhao Gancheng of India-South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), at the regional level in South Asia the security challenges are demonstrated in the asymmetrical powers of India and Pakistan. Over the decades, crises in the region are said to arise and are dispelled in a cycle, leading to continuous efforts by both India and Pakistan to enhance their respective military capability. He points out however, that there is no point in Pakistan trying to catch up with India, even though it does not mean that the less powerful side has to submit itself to the stronger side. The real question, according to him, is whether such asymmetry would result in more instability. He argues that in a situation such as this, the stronger side tends to dominate affairs, or use force to produce an outcome on its own terms, but that it does not happen

¹⁴ Cheng Ruisheng, 'The present security situation in South Asia', *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 56 June 2000, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

in South Asia. Instead, Pakistan is seen as mobilizing its capabilities to establish a position as a sufficient counterweight to its big neighbour. Zhao argues that in the case of South Asia, power asymmetry has actually created more 'potential for confrontation', not less, and thus more instability. He further points out that, the fact that the two parties possess nuclear weapon has made the other countries in the region nervous, even if the possibility of a nuclear confrontation is currently quite remote.¹⁷

Zhao sees the dispute over Kashmir as being a security focus in South Asia for more than half a century. India and Pakistan are seen as being preoccupied with a 'war mentality', in which the loss of land to the other side is expected to result in a serious threat to national security, a situation which he characterises as a zero sum game in all senses, the logic of both the parties being, the tougher its position, the more secure it would be.¹⁸

According to Zhao, with regard to the security challenges at the global level for South Asia, the major issue is the new environment in this region after the September 11th 2001 attack in the United States. The collapse of the Taliban regime is said to have resulted in a new balance of power, in which Americans are playing an increasingly important role. While nobody, including the Americans, want to see a dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan according to him, the US policy towards South Asia is seen as having been more positive towards India, which in turn is seen as being a possible source of concern for Pakistan. While this according to Zhao, is not to say that the US would give up its current (ie: post- 9/11) 'balancing policy' towards the two countries, the superpower is seen as being determined to adjust its relations with India, so as to improve its strategic status in the region. He warns that, 'it is very debatable whether the

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁷ Zhao Gancheng, 'South Asia: changes and challenges', in *A Presentation Collection*, compiled from a conference on 'India in the 21st Century: External Relations', held from 24-25th June 2002 in Shanghai, China, sponsored and published by the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai, China, pp. 12-13.

increasing American weight would help accommodate the tension in South Asia.¹⁹ He further argues that, given the US requirements, a breakdown of the anti-terrorist alliance would be most undesirable from the US point of view. Hence, the US is seen as being unlikely to support either side in an India-Pakistan dispute, while in the long run, especially when the anti-terrorist war is coming to an end, American strategists are seen as being likely to be disposed more towards taking India into serious account, which would 'let India's dream as a dominant power in the region come true.' But he further cautions that yet another nuclear power such as Pakistan may not easily acquiesce.²⁰

Zhao argues that in the short run few would be optimistic about the prospects of a resolution of the Indo-Pak dispute, since violence and conflicts over the decades have destroyed mutual trust between the two countries. He points out that the most frequently asked question in the media or public opinion is whether and when they would go to war again, and whether they would use weapons of mass destruction. But a possibly nuclear Indo-Pak war, Zhao points out, would not only be a bilateral matter, because it would have adverse consequences for the whole South Asian region as well as to China.²¹

According to Ma Jiali, China's relations with Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are 'always very smooth' while the Sino-Indian relationship, though steadily improving, is far from ideal. As he puts it, some scholars believe that 'from the bottom of its heart', India is against any other big power, including China, intruding into South Asia. According to Ma, this could be the reason why India holds a negative attitude towards any relations between SAARC and other big powers.²²

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 15-16

²¹ Ibid., pp. 23.

²² Ma Jiali, in U. Gautam, ed., op cit, p. 80.

Cheng Ruisheng argues that relations between India and Pakistan witnessed a sharp deterioration after the attack by the terrorists on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Both India and Pakistan are said to have sent large numbers of troops to the border regions between the two countries as well as to the regions along the Line of Control in Kashmir, leading to a serious military confrontation. Just when the situation relaxed a little, according to Cheng, new tension cropped up between the two countries due to the May 14th 2002 attack by terrorists on Indian army barracks, which is seen as bringing the two countries to the brink of war. According to Cheng, the reasons why the confrontation between India and Pakistan had become so serious

this time, were: '1) The plot of terrorists. It was reported that terrorists intended to provoke a war between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan would be forced to remove its troops from the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan to those between India and Pakistan and terrorists would have more room for manoeuvre in Pak-Afghan border regions; 2) India intended to use the opportunity of the international anti-terrorism struggle to press Pakistan to stop once and for all 'cross-border terrorism', so that the Kashmir question could be resolved in accordance with India's idea and to realise India's intention to turn the Line of Control in Kashmir into an international boundary; 3) Pakistan intended to use the worry of the international community for war between India and Pakistan to press India to negotiate the substantial question of Kashmir and to try to internationalise the Kashmir question; 4) Both the Indian and Pakistan governments intended to exploit the tension between the two countries to win more support from the masses in their own country.'²³

According to Cheng, before September 11th the United States was seemingly more inclined towards India, and exerted pressure on Pakistan in various ways. However,

²³ Cheng Ruisheng, 'The situation in South Asia after September 11th and China's policy', *Foreign Affairs Journal*, no. 68 June 2003, pp. 35-36.

President Musharraf is said to have made a major policy decision in Pakistan's strategy after 'September 11th' in agreeing to cooperate with the United States in the anti-terrorism war. This is said to have resulted in Pakistan once again becoming an ally of the United States. However, the relations between the US and India are also seen as improving continuously, with new developments in military cooperation. Hence the trilateral relationship between the US, India and Pakistan is seen as 'moving in a more balanced way'. Furthermore, Cheng sees the European Union's and Japan's policy towards South Asia is as conforming broadly with that of the United States.²⁴

According to an anonymous Chinese national security analyst: 'What worries China more is the possibility that it could be drawn into a conflict, not between Pakistan and India, but between Pakistan and the US, with the latter using India as a surrogate. This likelihood is becoming even more plausible with the sweeping success of the US operations in Afghanistan. The recent Indo-Pakistani conflict is unlike all previous conflicts between the two sides. It is in fact, a US-Pakistan conflict, with India serving as an American pawn. This situation puts China in a dilemma. Open support for its traditional ally Pakistan would risk jeopardizing its relations with US and India as well. At the same time if China does not support Pakistan, China's southern flank will be exposed to unrestrained Indian moves. That is perhaps the reason that China has extensively engaged in phone diplomacy with the US and India to diffuse the situation and does not want to be seen as playing favourites in South Asian crisis.'²⁵

Unlike their civilian counterparts, prior to 1998, People's Liberation Army (PLA) analysts are said to have been silent about Indian 'regional hegemony', which is surprising, given that PLA perceptions are said to be usually 'tougher' than those of civilian officials and

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 37-38.

²⁵ Anonymous Chinese national security analyst, as cited in Fazal-ur-rahman, 'Pakistan-China relations in a changing geo-strategic environment', *Strategic Studies*, vol. xxii, summer 2002, no. 2, pp. 51-52.

security specialists.²⁶ However, India's May 1998 nuclear tests are said to have alarmed the Chinese military. A headline in the *Liberation Army Daily* within days of the blasts is said to have roared, 'India's Attempt to Seek Regional Hegemony Has Been Longstanding'. Another article in the armed forces newspaper is said to have elaborated in unprecedented detail the composition and order of battle of India's conventional military forces, which it seems was described as more advanced when compared with the PLA, in virtually all conventional categories. 'Through fifty years of efforts, India now boasts a mighty army', the authors of this article are said to have observed. According to them: 'The military strategic targets of India are to seek hegemony in South Asia, contain China, control the Indian Ocean, and strive to become a military power in the contemporary world. To attain these targets, since independence India has always pursued its military strategy of hegemonist characteristics'. The authors are said to have chastised the Indian policy of 'occupying Chinese territory in the eastern sector of the border region' (saying nothing, of course, about the western sector where Chinese forces occupy 14 500 square km of Indian claimed territory), targeting its missiles on southern and southwestern China, and 'maintaining its military superiority in the Sino-Indian boundary region to consolidate its vested interests and effectively contain China'. India, the authors are said to have concluded, 'is waiting for the opportune moment for further expansion, to continue to maintain its control over weak and small countries in South Asia, advance further southward, and defend its hegemonist status in the region.' Yet other PLA commentators are said to have expressed fear of an accidental nuclear

²⁶ D. Shambaugh, 'China's military views the world', in M.E. Brown, O.R. Cote Jr., S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller, eds., *The Rise of China: An International Security Reader*, MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000, p. 106.

exchange between India and Pakistan, citing the situation in the subcontinent as 'far more serious than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962'.²⁷

Han Hua of the Institute of Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University, argues that India conducted the 1998 nuclear missile tests with the rationale of 'Chinese nuclear threat'. This is said to have been evident in Vajpayee's letter to G-8 leaders on the eve of the nuclear tests. According to Han, there are therefore legitimate grounds for Chinese suspicions about New Delhi's intentions regarding Indian nuclear weapons. She notes that while China has not yet come up with a notion of 'Indian nuclear threat', among most Chinese analysts there is a consensus that one of the objectives of India's nuclear programme is to deter China. Furthermore, Han points out that the missile tests in the 1990s has led to changes in the way the Chinese perceive India, in that, while previously India's significance in China's security calculus had been mainly in relation to the southwest area of China, with its missile programme making headway (including tests of Agni III, ranging to over 5000 km, said to have been planned for the end of 2003), some Chinese analysts are said to have called for a reappraisal of India, and for a fresh approach to it within a broader perspective beyond the borders of China.²⁸

Moreover, unlike China in 1980s, India is said to have taken a parallel approach in its modernisation efforts: economic and military developments going side by side simultaneously. Specifically, its military expenditure is said to have increased by up to

²⁷ Lin Wenguo, 'India's attempt to seek regional hegemony has been longstanding', *Liberation Army Daily*, May 26th 1998, in FBIS-CHI, June 3rd, 1998; Lin Yuang and Guo Feng, 'What is the intention of wantonly engaging in military ventures?- India's military development should be watched out for', *Liberation Army Daily*, May 19th 1998, in FBIS-CHI, May 21st 1998; Yang Haisheng, 'Harmful effects of India's Nuclear tests on the world strategic situation' *International Strategic Studies*, no. 4 1998, p. 17; translated from Chinese and cited in *ibid.*, p. 129.

²⁸ Han Hua, 'China and South Asia', in K. Santhanam and S. Kondapalli, eds., *Asian Security and China 2000-2010*, Shipra: New Delhi, 2004, pp. 290-291. This volume is the outcome of the 5th Asian Security Conference, organized by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, from 27-29th January 2003.

20% or more in a decade. India's military acquisitions are said to have increased significantly with the augmentation in foreign currency reserves, and it is seen as having become one of the biggest importers in the world arms market. Its military projection capability is said to have become extended, allowing it to patrol along the Indian Ocean. The BJP-led coalition government, which took office in 1998, is seen as having carried out a more assertive policy, and as having shown its willingness to make India a major player in world politics. Conducting nuclear weapon tests and bidding for the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, are all seen as evidence of India's great power aspiration. According to Han Hua, if one looked back into the literature and public speeches in which the Chinese commented on Indian nuclear tests, one would find that most criticisms are not directed at the Indian nuclear tests per se, or their threats to China's security, but to the Indian leaders' charges of the Chinese threats. Putting aside the rhetoric, the mainstream perception on India is said to be: 'India has the potential of being a source of strategic concern for China, and has to be watched carefully, but it is not yet a threat to China'. She further points out that in the political-military field, in recent years, India has followed a 'look-east' policy, which implies that India intends to enlarge its 'sphere of influence' and take a bigger share in political, economic and strategic benefits in South-East Asia. Finally, by producing and procuring aircraft carriers and other high-tech military equipment, India is said to have enhanced its naval capability to project power in the Indian Ocean, even as far as the South China Sea.²⁹

According to Han Hua during the cold war China carried out a zero-sum approach to Indo-Pakistan conflicts by standing with Pakistan, and she believes that this has led to a situation where some Indian analysts continue to see Sino-Pakistan cooperation, especially military cooperation, and China's ties with other South Asian countries, such as Myanmar and Bangladesh, as efforts to balance India and to shackle India in the

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 292-294.

subcontinent. She further points out that with the US military once again making its presence felt in South Asia, as it did at the end of the 1970s when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, China is now facing a new strategic configuration in the subcontinent after a decade-long direct interaction between China and South Asian countries without superpowers' intervention. According to her, some Indians believe that the time and opportunity have come for India to play a sort of balancing role between the US and China, like China did in 1970s between the US and Soviet Union. Han Hua points out that in the US, some reports suggest that the US government should play the 'India card' in dealing with China. In India, according to her, a concept of 'Quasi-alliance' between India and the US has prevailed in the debates on India's policy towards China. She notes that the notion of 'Chinese threat' is easily accepted by conservatives and hardliners in both capitals. Moreover, after September 11th, the US military transfers to India is said to have increased significantly, as a result of the lifting of US sanctions imposed on India after the 1998 nuclear missile tests. India and the United States are said to have held a joint military exercise in India, and the US is said to have hinted that India is welcome to join the US missile defence system.³⁰

According to Zhang Siqi of the CICIR, the New Delhi leadership has gradually abandoned its diplomatic tradition featuring 'internationalism' and 'romanticism' implemented in the Nehru era. Hence currently they are seen as attaching greater importance to the development of the economy and military in order to seek a great power position in the international arena, not only in name but in reality as well. They are said to no longer stick to the old conception of 'poor nations can also play a role as a big power'. They are also said to have lost interest in the non-alignment movement, which as Zhang sees it, could not bring India any real benefit. Moreover, India is seen as seeking a permanent membership in the UN Security Council in order to gain entrance to the 'big

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 294-297.

power club', as well as to gain a veto to be used in dealing with its problems with Pakistan.³¹

An Interdependence Perspective

It was surely evident from our presentation of Chinese views, with regard to the post-cold war scenario as a whole, from a 'global interdependence' perspective in the second chapter, that its main concerns were visualising, identifying and/or creating positive-sum or win-win situations, as well as cooperative and conciliatory relations. As will be apparent through the course of this section, the views regarding South Asia presented herein also reflect the same themes.

Lin Liang Guang has pointed out that big powers can be friends to their neighbours and play a positive and constructive role in the regions to which they belong. India as a big power in South Asia, according to him, has the conditions and capability, to become the base for political stability and security in South Asia, and the motive force promoting economic development as well as scientific and technical progress, through strengthening regional cooperation.³²

As Jiang Zemin has put it: 'Today the people in South Asia have, with firm steps, embarked on a new journey towards stability and development, determined to end poverty and backwardness and catch up with the trend of the times. We are pleased to see the heartening progress made by the South Asian countries in recent years in improving their relations with one another and strengthening regional cooperation. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has played a meaningful role in promoting peace, stability and economic cooperation in the region... Asia's booming economies and the unfolding economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region have presented a valuable opportunity for the economic development of South Asia,

³¹ Zhang Siqu, in Dao Shulin, Ji Zhiye, Fu Mengzi, Ma Jiali, Hu Shisheng, and Zhang Siqu, 'India's adjustment of foreign policy and Sino-Indian relations', *Contemporary International Relations*, vol. 13 no. 10, October 2003, p. 28.

whereas economic rejuvenation of South Asia will in turn facilitate Asia's rise and a more prosperous Asia-Pacific³³

According to Cheng Ruisheng, since China and the South Asian countries need to concentrate on their economic and social development, their most important common interest is to have a peaceful environment. Through joint efforts, he argues, such an environment has already been created, and for a number of years, tranquillity has been maintained successfully in the border regions between China and its neighbours in South Asia. In his view, both China and South Asia are determined to maintain this peaceful environment in the 21st century, and with the globalisation and regionalisation of the world economy, China and South Asian countries have a great common interest in further developing trade and economic cooperation between them, as well as in joint efforts with other Asian countries, in order to find better ways and means of coping with problems like the recent financial crisis in East Asia.³⁴

According to Cheng, in contrast to the strengthening of military alliances between some countries, the two agreements signed between China and India (in 1993 and 1996), together with similar agreements signed between China on the one hand, and Russia and the neighbouring countries of the former Soviet Union on the other, have served as a new model for security in Asia. According to these agreements, China and India shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the Line of Actual Control to minimum levels, compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries and consistent with the principal of mutual and equal security. The agreements are also said to mention a number of Confidence Building Measures on the questions of military exercises, preventing air intrusions across the Line of Actual Control, preventing

³² Lin Liang Guang, in V.L.B. Mendis, ed., op cit, p. 60.

³³ Jiang Zemin, www.fmprc.gov.cn, op cit, p. 2.

³⁴ Cheng Ruisheng, in N. Jetly and M. Dubey, eds., op cit, pp. 117-118.

dangerous military activities along the Line of Actual Control, etc. The Confidence Building Measures are said to reflect a new concept of security, negating cold war concepts of containment and deterrence. In Cheng's view, the implementation of these measures will ensure long-term peace and tranquillity in the border areas and greatly reduce the possibility of untoward incidents.³⁵

Cheng asserts that, regional economic cooperation between China and the South Asian countries should be put on the agenda of the 21st century, and points out that cooperation may take two possible directions. One is regional economic cooperation between China, Pakistan and the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. Another is regional economic cooperation between China, Myanmar, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. In his view, regional cooperation could be carried out step by step, could include the expansion of border trade with preferential treatment, the establishment of sub-regional economic zones, cooperation in science and technology, cooperation in education with more exchanges of students, cooperation in air transportation (more short airlines could be opened to form a network), cooperation in the development of international tourism, cooperation in the exploitation of water, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery resources. He further stresses that the most important, but also the most difficult task of all, is to construct a new continental bridge in southwest Asia. One possibility, according to him, is to build a railway from the Yunan Province of China through Myanmar to India. To achieve this goal in the 21st century, China, Myanmar and India would need to make joint efforts, together with assistance from international institutions and developed countries. Furthermore, he sees the tides of development in East Asia and South Asia as converging through sea and land channels. While regional cooperation between SAARC and ASEAN is seen as providing the sea channel, that between China and SAARC is seen as constituting the land channel.

³⁵ Cheng Ruisheng, in N. Jetly and M. Dubey, eds., *op cit*, pp. 121-122.

As Cheng sees it, once the vast poor region lying between China and South Asia becomes rich and prosperous, the whole of Asia will enter a new period of common prosperity.³⁶

According to Lin Shanglin, at the time Consul General of the PRC in Karachi: 'In enhancing China-Pakistan relations, we have to continue to promote the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences and of frankness and mutual trust. To further China Pakistan relations, we have to work for expanded economic cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure, information technology and other fields under the principle of reciprocity and mutual benefit, so as to be mutually complementary and achieve common prosperity. We have to step up people-to-people exchanges in developing China-Pakistan relations. The non-governmental organisations for friendship and business communities of our two countries have played a positive role in promoting our bilateral relations... .Economic globalisation is picking up speed at the moment, and developing countries are faced with common challenges and opportunities. It is our shared objective and responsibility to seek peace and boost development. China is ready to join hands with Pakistan and make unremitting efforts to build a bright future for the all-round friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries.'³⁷

Zhao Gancheng argues that, given the challenging situation in South Asia, the question facing China is whether China could promote economic cooperation in the region. He proposes the utilisation of SAARC in this connection, and that some kind of Chinese participation in the organisation should be put on the agenda. According to him, as the Chinese economy has been developing rapidly, and given that foreign trade is the most important and efficient part of the economy, presumably, China's initiatives for promoting sub-regional, if not regional, cooperation between China and South Asian

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 125-126.

³⁷ Lin Shanglin, 'Pakistan-China Relations', in *Pakistan Horizon*, vol 54, no 3, 2001, pp. 14-15. A text of a speech delivered at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 30th May 2001.

nations, such as the initiative to upgrade the BCIM forum from track two to track one level, may be welcome. This point is said to be based on a belief that China as a significant economic participant in South Asian affairs, would play a positive and better role, and what South Asia really needs today is a win-win environment, which economic cooperation is likely to produce. In his view starting from sub-regional cooperation, China may be able to deepen its participation by acquiring observer status in the SAARC, and when conditions mature according to him, establishing a free trade zone between China and SAARC will also not be inconceivable.³⁸

Moreover, Zhao argues that no rational country or people would possibly regard defeating or conquering another country as its ultimate national goal, that what people really expect must be a stable and peaceful environment in which the economy develops and people's living standards improve. Noting that the tension and rapidly changing situation in the South Asia has time and again attracted world attention, he argues that the basic challenge to the relevant parties remains as before, which is that, no country should and can get security at the expense of other nations' security, and common security can only be obtained through dialogue and cooperation. In the absence of dialogue, any issue, whether a small piece of land, a passage of river, or the future of certain political party, could all become strategically important.³⁹

In Ma Jiali's words, 'Economic globalisation, liberalisation, regionalisation and trade liberalisation are blossoming trends in the world today.' In his view South Asia occupies vast land, accommodates large population, contains plentiful natural resources, holds great market potential, and their mutually supplementary economies provide them with a bright future for cooperation. According to him, there are also some other advantages for these countries, which are linked by common mountains and rivers, such as

³⁸ Zhao Gancheng, in *A Presentation Collection*, op cit, p. 22.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 22-25.

traditional friendship, common humanist background, frequent personnel exchanges and close economic and trade ties. These favourable conditions are seen by him as providing a solid foundation for regional development and stability, through which a win-win outcome is said to be not impossible.⁴⁰

Han Hua stresses that China's relations with either India or Pakistan are not directed against any third country, or are at the expense of the interest of any third country. She asserts that to dispel India's suspicions and to play a constructive role in South Asia, China has learned to take India's security concerns into account, and that it has declared that its relations with all countries in this region are separate efforts and are not used against a third party.⁴¹

Conclusion

There are a few points that emerge from the foregoing presentation of Chinese views within the framework of the ideological, geopolitical and global interdependence perspectives, which we ought to take note of at this stage. First, it is clear that when

the Chinese look at South Asia, they first see India and Pakistan, and then the rest. While this was the case even before the nuclear missile tests of 1998, it has become even more so since then. Second, it seems that in China's view, India is gradually increasing in importance, while the importance of Pakistan seems, at best, to be remaining constant. Third, while China sees India as being wary of the intervention of external powers (including China) in the rest of South Asia, we can see that China is also wary of the involvement of external powers, particularly of intrusions by the global hegemon, the United States, in South Asia as a whole. Fourth, in China's eyes, while India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives (ie: the SAARC) form the core

⁴⁰ Ma Jiali, in U. Gautam, ed., op cit, pp. 77-78.

⁴¹ Han Hua, in K. Santhanam and S. Kondapalli, eds., op cit, p. 295.

of South Asia, its periphery seems to be somewhat blurred and interspersed, as Afghanistan and Myanmar also figure in their analyses and writings. Fifth, in terms of quantity, it is arguable that the geopolitical perspective is the most prevalent, followed by the global interdependence perspective, with the ideological perspective being the least prevalent. Sixth, it is also perhaps apparent and arguable that the first perspective is articulated in, what we might call, a historical-injurious tone; that the second perspective is articulated in a contemporary-descriptive/analytical vein; while the third perspective is articulated in futuristic-normative terms. However, as mentioned earlier, these three perspectives are not conclusive in any sense of the term.

It is arguable that the foreign policy discourse pertaining to South Asia, that we have so far discussed in this chapter in terms of these three perspectives, might contain other perspectives as well. What we would like to indicate through the following presentation and analysis of views is that, there might be some basis for conceptualising at least one other perspective, which we might call a 'cultural-civilisational' perspective.

Lin Liang Guang has noted that India has a civilisation of several thousand years and had once made a brilliant contribution to human progress.⁴² Jiang Zemin has observed that: 'The subcontinent of South Asia is an ancient and fascinating land. When human cultures in many parts of the world remained in their infancy, the people here had already created the resplendent Harappa Culture, adding a glowing page to ancient civilisation of mankind... .. Since ancient times we (China and South Asia) have been good neighbours, good friends and good brothers. Looking back, Chinese high monks Fa-Hsien and Hsuan-Tsang, and renowned South Asian monks Buddhahadra and Bodhidharma, were among numerous forerunners who, undeterred by the hardship of journeying through

⁴² Lin Liang Guang, in V.L.B. Mendis, ed., *op cit*, p. 44.

mountains and rivers, helped build bridges of friendly contacts between the two sides.⁴³ Lin Shanglin has pointed out that: ‘The friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people has a long history. As early as over 2000 years ago, the world-renowned Silk Road linked the two sides together. In the 7th century A.D. the eminent Chinese monk in the Tang dynasty by the name of Xuanzang travelled westward to seek the Buddhist Sutra and described, in his famous book *Records of Western Travels*, his fond memory of the land and people of Pakistan, which has turned into a historical legend in China.’⁴⁴ Han Hua observes that: ‘The 2000 year history is often quoted as a proof for those who believe that two thriving countries can get along well, and they claim that the passes in the Himalayan ridge had witnessed the peaceful and close cultural ties between the two Asian civilisations.’⁴⁵

Liang Jiejun argues that, ‘as the 20th century draws to a close, India will surely continue to speed up its pace to catch up with and overtake dynamic East Asia in the quest for a world status commensurate with its size and thousands-years-old civilisation.’⁴⁶ As we have mentioned in chapter two, Akira Iriye has argued that in the traditional Chinese conception, a country’s cultural greatness determined its power in the world, so that a state with superior cultural achievements was entitled to esteem and influence among other states. The Chinese observations regarding South Asia that we have cited above, particularly the last one, seems not only to corroborate Iriye’s line of argument, but also to indicate that what Iriye would refer to as ‘tradition’, is still very much alive in the Chinese mind.

⁴³ Jiang Zemin, www.fmprc.gov.cn, op cit, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Lin Shanglin, op cit, p. 13.

⁴⁵ Han Hua, in K. Santhanam and S. Kondapalli, eds., op cit, p. 293.

⁴⁶ Liang Jiejun, op cit, p. 2.

Pragmatism in traditional Chinese thought, as we have noted in chapter two, calls for changes in behaviour as circumstances change, and values flexibility. Gerald Chan seems to be arguing that the prominent post-Mao adage 'seeking truth from facts' (*shishi qiushi*) could be interpreted in the light of Chinese pragmatism, in saying that, 'a second reading of *shishi qiushi* reveals another interesting working rule: that is, act or behave according to circumstances, or be realistic. Since circumstances change overtime, so there is a need to change one's behaviour to suit those changing circumstances. In other words *shishi qiushi* is about changing tactics and changing perceptions of circumstances, and has little to do with principles or reality.'⁴⁷ It is perhaps this thinking that is the basis of the following observations. Zhao Gancheng notes that, 'The two countries (India and China) are yet perceiving each other with some misunderstanding that are partially the result of historical legacy. Clearly, if India perceived China as a threat, any role that China could possibly play in South Asia would be seen as negative. By the same token, if China perceived a rising India as a dangerous rival, China's behaviour would be more inclined to self-centred interests. This would be where traditional power politics played the game, and cannot be what China wants to see.'⁴⁸ Han Hua argues that, 'facing such a neighbour (as India), the challenge for China's diplomacy is to avoid two extremes: on one hand, continuously neglecting India, and on the other hand, treating India as a geopolitical rival. Both perceptions and approaches could lead to a counter-productive policy that undermines China's interests in South Asia and impede its policy options for coping with the new strategic landscape in this region.'⁴⁹ Moreover, Ling Jiejun has argued that, 'any incoming government in New Delhi would inherit the set guidelines of independence, pragmatism and flexibility'.⁵⁰ Hu Shisheng has observed that New Delhi is keeping to

⁴⁷ G. Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, Macmillan: Houndsmills, 1999, p. 19.

⁴⁸ Zhao Gancheng, *op cit*, p. 21.

⁴⁹ Han Hua, in K. Santhanam and S. Kondapalli, eds., *op cit*, p. 294.

⁵⁰ Liang Jiejun, *op cit*, p. 14.

what he refers to as its traditional foreign policy positions, which are said to be 'sovereign equality', 'non-interference in other nation's internal affairs', 'the developing countries conception of human rights and development', 'world diversification', and 'new international economic order', due to a 'combination of flexibility and pragmatism besides principled consideration'.⁵¹

⁵¹ Hu Shisheng, in Dao Shulin, et al, op cit, p. 29.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The relationship between 'perceptions', 'images' and 'world views' held by those involved in the foreign policy process, and policy actions, has been the key theoretical concern of this study. As we had demonstrated in the first chapter, Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's decision-making framework, as well as Sprout and Sprout's distinction between the psychological and the operational milieu, recognise the importance of perception in foreign policy making. The two contemporary approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy, according to Yu Bin's categorisation, the institutional and perceptual approaches, can and do draw upon the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, as well as that of the Sprouts' for theoretical support. This study has principally utilised the perceptual approach, supplementing when appropriate with the institutional approach.

However, while establishing the link between perception and policy in the first chapter, we had to confront what we might call the 'problem of accessibility' of perceptions, images, world views and the like. To at least provisionally resolve this problem, we argued in the first chapter that they can be accessed through a foreign policy discourse produced by those involved in the foreign policy process. In accessing Chinese perceptions of the post-cold war world as a whole in chapter two, and post-cold war Chinese perceptions of South Asia in chapter three, we have relied more on the discourse generated by the relevant PRC analysts/specialists/scholars and less on that generated by officials of the party-state and bureaucrats/diplomats. However we have also noted that PRC diplomats often go on to become analysts/specialists, and also moreover that there has been a trend towards increasing influence by analysts/specialists/scholars on the PRC's foreign policy.

Through examining a sample of the relevant PRC foreign policy discourse on the post-cold war world as a whole in chapter two, we were able to identify, particularly through the work of Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin as well as Yong Deng, three distinct perspectives. These

were the ideological, geopolitical/realist and global interdependence/liberal perspectives. In chapter three we argued that these three perspectives are adaptable and applicable to the post-cold war Chinese foreign policy discourse on South Asia as well. The main concern of the ideological perspective with regard to the post-cold war world as a whole was the continuing struggle between socialism and capitalism, with the PRC now assuming the role of spokesperson for socialism, while the main concern of this perspective with regard to South Asia was a common historical experience of imperialism. The principal preoccupations of the geopolitical perspective with regard to the post-cold war world as a whole, as well with regard to South Asia, were zero-sum power relations, strategic manoeuvring, competition and conflict. The main concerns of the global interdependence (in the case of South Asia, interdependence) perspective were positive sum or win-win situations, conciliatory and cooperative relations.

As mentioned in the introduction, a point of departure for this study has been arguments made by scholars such as John Garver and Mohan Malik, concerning Sino-Indian relations in the contemporary post-cold war era. While there might certainly be differences between them, they seem to concur in arguing that due to their fundamental geopolitical differences, competition, rivalry and conflict between China and India is inevitable. Whether this takes the form of a 'cold' war or a 'hot' war, this would not be in the interests of the vast majority of people living not only in China and India, but also in South Asia, and perhaps even the whole of Asia.

Both Garver and Malik have drawn upon the views of those involved in the Chinese foreign policy process, at least partly, in support of their arguments. The views that they have drawn upon to support their arguments, can arguably be categorised under the geopolitical perspective. Within the PRC foreign policy discourse we have examined, with regard to the post-cold war world as a whole, as well as with regard to South Asia, in quantitative terms, it seems to be the case that the geopolitical perspective is the most prevalent, followed by the

global interdependence/interdependence perspective, with the ideological perspective being the least prevalent. This would seem to strengthen Garver's and Malik's arguments, even though the other two perspectives being less prevalent in quantitative terms, does not mean that they should be entirely disregarded.

Moreover, as Yong Deng has argued, with the progress of domestic economic and political liberalisation in the PRC, as well as generational change among the ranks of officials and scholars, the liberal perspective is likely to become more influential in Chinese foreign policy making. However, Yong Deng makes this argument with regard to Chinese views of, and policy towards, the post-cold war world as a whole. Nevertheless, having identified a liberal perspective with regard to South Asia in chapter three, one way of problematising Garver's and Malik's position would be, by determining to what extent liberal views are influencing contemporary Chinese foreign policy towards South Asia.

Furthermore, in the conclusion to chapter two, with regard to Chinese perceptions of the post-cold war world as a whole, through emphasising the role of culture, we attempted to demonstrate that there might be a number of other perspectives as well. We drew close links between the ideological perspective and a sinified Marxist-Leninist perspective, which is arguably what Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism was all about. We also demonstrated, the close parallels between the realism of IR theory and the pragmatism and legalism of Chinese thought, as well as the resemblance between the Confucian-Mencian world view and the idealism/liberalism of IR theory. Shambaugh's 'hegemonist' perspective, or Chan's 'realism with Chinese characteristics', arguably take into consideration at least some of these interconnections.

Following this line of thought in the conclusion to chapter three, with regard to post-cold war Chinese perceptions of South Asia, we attempted to indicate that there might be some basis for conceptualising a 'cultural-civilisational' perspective. As Han Hua has observed, the passes in the Himalayan ridge have witnessed a two thousand year history of peaceful and

close cultural ties between the two ancient Asian civilisations. Determining to what extent such a perspective is influencing contemporary Chinese foreign policy towards South Asia, might also be another way to problematise, and then question, the inevitability of conflict between India and China that the geopolitical perspective appears to project.

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