

UNITED - STATES - SOVIET ARMS COMPETITION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA

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PREFACE

During recent years the impact of Super Powers — the United States and the Soviet Union, arms race on the security of South Asia has been more serious than before. In the context of the Super Power global struggle for supremacy and the emergence of the Second Cold War on the international scene, South Asia has become a sensitive area. The situation certainly requires some serious attention and hence the present study. The countries included in the study are : Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. However, main emphasis has been laid on India and Pakistan assuming that the relationship between these two countries is instrumental in establishing peace in the subcontinent. Mankind's experience has unquestionably proved the futility of war in solving human problems. Therefore the approach adopted in the study is one of peace, desiring peaceful and amicable settlement of existing problems and making some positive proposals in this direction.

I find myself short of words in expressing my gratitude to my supervisor Mr. M.L. Senchi without whose guidance and supervision this study would have been impossible. I am extremely thankful to all those who helped me in my efforts in the libraries of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, the United Service Institution and the American Center. I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express my gratefulness for my friends and well wishers for encouragement and help.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Union have been marked by the continuing mobilisation of military resources. The world since then has become divided into the respective spheres of influence and the Super Powers have demonstrated their utmost might to prevent various countries in their sphere of influence from falling in the sphere of influence of the other Super Power. The best example of this is provided by the East European countries where the Soviets demonstrated their power immediately after the second world war and more recently by their invasion of Afghanistan. Such acts on the part of Super Powers serve not only their power interests but also furthers their national goals (chapter-II). In this age though classical colonialism has died out yet the two Super Powers have evolved various means to keep these newly independent but economically backward countries under their control. Mr. Bhutto has thus rightly said, "Foreign domination has been replaced by foreign intervention, and the power to make decisions radically affected the lives of our peoples has been curtailed by the cannons of neo-colonialism".¹ Therefore economic aid is given with many 'strings' attached to it. The American aid is earmarked only for infrastructure building industries and

1. Bhutto, Z.A., The Earth of Indispensance, (Oxford University Press, 1969), P.6

The study is concerned with identifying the major turning points in the super power arms competition which have affected major policy decisions in South Asia about the prospects of war and peace. The relationship between military power and foreign policy has shaped the strategy of both the super powers in world politics. Their arms competition has spilled over to wider areas and has aggravated regional conflicts. The practical problems facing South Asian countries, in particular India and Pakistan, can be comprehended adequately only if the patterns of choices and behaviour on a regional basis are related to the relationships on a global scale.

The dependence of India and Pakistan on one or the other Super Power for military, political and economic support has enhanced the effects of the reactive processes in Super Power competition. The 'decision making' focus seeks to relate the empirical data about security relationships at the national and regional level to the international context (chapter-I).

Even since the advent of Cold War after the emergence of the concept of 'Super Power' the relationship between the two Super Powers — United States and Soviet

for the furtherance of capitalist interests. Besides, it also helps them in keeping the friendly regimes in power so as to serve their political interests. These regimes thus tow the line of Super Powers in international gatherings. It is because of this prevailing situation in which the Super Powers have developed such a great interests in the backward regions of the world so as to further their goals that Kahler has drawn an analogy between this situation and the one prevailing in 1914. He thus says, "the world has reached today close to a major war because of Super Power conflict in the unstable regions of the Third World and these areas may be to the world of 1980's what the Balkans were to pre-1914 Europe".²

The arms are the main instrument through which the Super Powers have tried to intervene in the affairs of other states. This not only leads to an arms race between the two Super Powers so as to manufacture more and more sophisticated arms but also to that between the various developing countries for acquiring more and more arms. The arms race between India and Pakistan provides a good example. The recent Pakistan decision to purchase F-16's

2. Lane Christopher, "1914 Revisited -- A Reply to Miles Kahler", ORHS, vol.24, no.4, (Winter, 1981).

from United States or rather the United States decision to supply F-16's to Pakistan forced India to go to France for Mirage 2000 and to Soviet Union for MIG's. Thus the Super Powers have aggravated regional conflicts and tensions. It is in their interest to keep alive such tensions for these countries not only provide testing grounds for their newly produced weapons but also as markets for their weapons.

Chapter three deals with the dilemma faced by the South Asian countries more particularly India and Pakistan. On the one hand these countries being economically backward need economic assistance of the Super Powers because being highly developed only they have the resources to spare, but on the other hand the developing countries have to accept their terms. Besides domestic compulsions and economic necessities, strategic interests also dictate the foreign policies of Pakistan and India and forces them to enter the orbit of Super Power rivalry. We find that almost all the developing countries are beset with border wars. The relations between them are marked by suspicion and mistrust. To further these strategic interests and fulfil war-like ambitions, they enter into subservient relations with the Super Powers.

What policy options the policy makers have in the respective countries? Steps towards controlling conflict have to be taken at global as well as regional and bilateral level. The prospects for the establishment of regional and global detente are very bright but it would require certain pre-requisites as changes in perception, limitation of arms and arms control measures. Regionally recent no-war pact offer by Pakistan can be examined as an example of an input into the policy process (chapter-IV). A great deal depends upon whether the influences of Super Power doctrines is accepted as the most important determinant of the international and regional political context of South Asian policies. Our approach in this study was to question the validity of this assumption by examining sources of evidence available in the case of one of the South Asian countries i.e., India. We posed the following questions to a sample of Indians who are professionally concerned with foreign policy and strategic thinking, and after receiving written replies more intensive interviews were conducted and recorded with 13 respondents (listed in Appendix):

QUESTIONNAIRE**SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY**

- Q.1** From a review of the military and strategic interactions in South Asia, what proposals would you advance for regional security?
- Q.2** In your view is the conflict between India and Pakistan aggravated by the lack of military self-reliance and the dependence of the two countries on different power blocks for arms supplies?
- Q.3** What have been the mistaken assumptions of India and Pakistan in relation to offers of "no-war" pacts? In your view how could the two countries adopt more successful policies to initiate a detente process at the regional level?

SUPER POWER RELATIONS AND SOUTH ASIA

- Q.4** Evaluate the repercussions of the breakdown in Super Power cooperation (following developments in Angola, Afghanistan, Poland and El Salvador etc.) on military competition and ideological rivalry in South Asia.
- Q.5** Can a system of restrictions on arms transfers to South Asian countries be devised and in your view would this help the Super Powers to disengage themselves from South Asia?

- Q.6** What are the pre-requisites for India and Pakistan to agree on qualitative and quantitative restraints on the transfer of weapons and related technology from the Super Powers? Would such an agreement stabilize the military balance in South Asia?
- Q.7** Evaluate the will and ability of the Super Powers to respect the non-aligned status of the countries of South Asia?
- Q.8** What is your assessment of the political and security requirements of the Super Powers whose fulfilment could enable them to find common ground in favour of regional security in South Asia?

CONTROL OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH ASIA

- Q.9** What are the political and strategic requirements for an acceptable plan to break the stalemate between India and Pakistan and for reconciling their security needs?
- Q.10** What are the prospects that South Asian decision-makers will generate the necessary political will for the prevention of local wars? How does the Kashmir problem pose a challenge in this respect?
- Q.11** What is the strategic rationale of Pakistan and Indian troop deployments?
- Q.12** What will be the impact of the nuclear option on the politics of conflict in South Asia?

This study has tried to develop a series of illustrative hypotheses with regard to the implications for regional security in South Asia focussing on the developing strategic in South Asia focussing on the developing strategic environment and new political economic, and military pressures on the institutional framework of policy making in India and Pakistan. Our purpose has been the construction of a new framework of study for foreign policy evaluation in the context of the historical dynamics of the United States--Soviet Arms Competition. If India and Pakistan can help to control the volatile environment in South Asia by adopting new strategies at key decision-making levels, the analytical relevance of the new framework can be extended to the other South Asian countries. The orientation of all the other South Asian states towards their regional environment will be powerfully effected by the experience of India and Pakistan. Other South Asian decision-making centres may of course adopt different foreign policy postures, but these are unlikely to disprove the analytical framework developed to meet the needs of the India--Pakistan level of analysis.

Chapter - I

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Importance of an Analytical Focus on Decision-Making

With increasing sophistication, writers have employed different theories to explain the phenomenon of international politics : Decision making, Game theory, Systems theory, Communication theory etc. Every theory, it has been found has certain drawbacks for it emphasises only on one aspect of the problem. The Game theory for instance views international situations as games where the two disputing parties sort out their problems by taking into account various options, in face to face interactions. It thus fails to consider domestic forces that might compel players to take different course of action or interactions arising out of situations which are determined by attitudes and perceptions of premises. The Systems theory likewise takes the nation as an actor in the international system, thus failing to appraise the costs and benefits arising out of the role of individual decision maker in policy outcomes. Considering the foreign policy roles of South Asian leaders, it seems appropriate that in today's changed domestic and international environment, their security policies must be viewed in

close relation to their international status and influence. The decision making approach to international politics would appear to be most relevant to the study of the complex interactions between foreign policy and security policy, for it broadens the horizons of foreign policy analysis by focusing on individuals as actors and placing them in different social and political contexts. It tries to study the foreign policy outcomes of interaction between the actor and his contexts. However, this is not to claim that decision making approach is flawless or without drawbacks. This approach is chosen for the present study simply for the reason that in South Asia, the political and strategic motivations underlying decisions on a wide range for itself but for the entire world of issues cannot be subjected to systematic scrutiny without taking into account commitments and counter-measures by decision makers at the regional and at the global level. As for instance, America's decision to supply arms to Pakistan has not had its bearing of United States and Pakistan alone, but on Soviet Union, India and other countries of Asia. It is only through a sober appraisal of compromise and adjustment among decision-makers at the Super Power level and at the regional level

that we can understand the changing profile of political and military constraints and commitments at the regional level. As M.P. Sullivan rightly says: "Decision-making models are helpful because they compel anyone investigating foreign policy decisions to put on different 'thinking caps' thereby gaining different new points and explanations."¹

A State's foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which deal with the relation between that State and other states "By decision-making then is understood an act of determining in one's own mind a course of action, following a more or less delicate consideration of alternatives and by decision is understood that which is thus determined."² Modernization has had a profound impact on the decision regarding foreign policy and its formulation. According to Edward L. Morse it has led to three major transformations -- (1) Firstly classical distinction between domestic and foreign affairs has

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1. Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence, (Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976), p.81.
 2. J. Frenkel, "Towards a Decision-Making Model in Foreign Policy", Political Studies, vol.VII, no.1, 1959, pp.7-11.
 3. Edward L.Morse, "The Transformation of Foreign Policies", World Politics, vol.XXII, no.3, April, 1970, p.371.

cost its validity. (2) Secondly, the distinction between 'high policies' (associated with security and independence of a state) and 'low policies' (these associated with welfare of the people) has lost importance because low policies have come to play a larger role in society and have come to impinge on the decision makers. (3) Thirdly, states control over external and internal events has declined due to inter-dependence.

In these changed circumstances decision-making approach to foreign policy is highly relevant and especially the analytical focus for the study of the influence of elites on foreign policy. Decision making approach has been perceived as having two primary purposes: "One is identification of crucial structures in the political realm where changes take place, where decisions are made, and where actions are initiated and carried out; while the other is a systematic analysis of the decision making behaviour which leads to action."⁴ Thus decision makers are seen as actors and the state as a decisional unit.

4. Mahendra Kumar, Theoretical Aspects of International Politics, (J. Shivalal Agarwala & Co., 1978), p.168.

Ever since the French revolution, two basic approaches to foreign policy decision making have been vied with one another in western thought - one is the ideological approach and the other is analytical approach. Ideological approach views foreign policy of a state vis-a-vis other states as merely the manifestation of its beliefs -- political, social and religious. The analytical approach however believes that there are several determinants that govern the formulation of decision like historical traditions, geographical location, national interests, security needs etc.

The analytical approach is not a new one though its renaissance is the product of partly the short comings of the ideological approach, more particularly its failure to explain the present day international developments and continuity in foreign policies of different states.

The use of analytical focus on foreign policy is that it is much broader and takes into account a variety of factors that have to be considered while arriving at decisions. Thus decision-making is not a simple and smooth process as put forth by the ideological approach. National interests of a country are the chief determinant

of foreign policy decisions and they place certain irremovable limits on the freedom of decision makers. Besides nations geographic location and its security needs are to be taken into account for making decisions. Maeridis thus says, "Not only are these interests permanent for Bolsheviks as well as Tsars, but continuity also appears in the approach of a nations statesmen, who stand guard over their country's security and whose conception of that security has been framed and moulded by the same institutions and traditions."⁵

The analytical focus lays stress on the hierarchy of a nation's interests in the sequence of their importance as greater and lesser interests. This is so because there are certain interests which have to be achieved at all costs, others that have to be safeguarded under particular circumstances and still others that can never be achieved.

The national interests of a state and its power to fulfil them sets limits and a broad framework within which the domestic political contest over external policies must be waged. Just as no Soviet Government can forge its

5. Roy G. Maeridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, (Englewood: Prentice Hall Inc., 1976), p.4.

hold over East Europe, no American Government can do this in case of Western Hemisphere. In fact both power and interests of a State respond to the changes in circumstances. For instance a peace loving state in the wake of threats to its security can utilize its resources for military purposes and a historically warlike country like Sweden can turn neutral and utilize its resources for peaceful purposes. The analytical focus explains all these changes in the decisions by taking into account a host of inputs in the decision-making process. It takes into account various circumstances, including domestic social factors, and explains why a particular decision was taken or why a particular change took place in the original decisions. Herein lies the importance of an analytical focus of decision making.

Hypotheses about policy-making systems in South Asia.

Policy-making systems-be they domestic or foreign - in all the South Asian countries are closed systems not only because of prevalence of military dictatorship in major countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh which does not permit free flow of ideas but because of a more general reason of illiteracy. It is because of

strong hold of backwardness and illiteracy that policy making has become the monopoly of a few top leaders. The ideas of the leaders are ideas of the people and the policies of the leadership are the policies of the country. As such the leaders apart from being influenced by history and geography are influenced more by psychological factors. An event assumes particular importance because of its peculiar perceptions. They take a very narrow view of a situation and decisions are based either on personal views or on views of those who form a very narrow circle around them. This is because of lack of data and information about events, this being supplied by those who are generally in agreement or in line with the top leadership. Robert Jervis concludes: "decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Indeed, their theories and images play a large part in determining what they notice. In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect".⁶ All this is very true to policy framers in South Asian countries.

Furthermore the decisions of the policy makers in regional systems are often the result of efforts to coordinate negotiations policies with those of the Super

6. Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception", World Politics, vol. XX, no. 3, April, 1968, pp. 454-79.

Powers with whom they have to reconcile defence policies doctrines are more to serve the interests of their senior partner than of either their people or country. The national leadership in attempting to overcome its sense of insecurity seeks power, influence and prestige through catchy slogans as 'Islamism Fundamentalism'; 'Year of productivity'; 'Upliftment of the poor' to maintain themselves in power by exploiting the sentiments of illiterate people. The policy making systems in South Asian countries permit decision-makers a measure of discretionary practice, which may either make them conscious of domestic complexities of the region or lead them to embrace the protective influence of the 'Big Powers' whose constraints may become decisive in policy outcomes.

Thus the policy making systems in South Asian countries are not broad to be influenced by a multiplicity of networks, political information, policy appraisal and political authorities.

Appraisals of Security in South Asia:

All the Third World countries, because of their mode of creation - they being the product of scramble for concessions on the part of western countries and their policy of divide and rule, are beset with border wars

and therefore haunted by the problems of their security. This is true of South Asian countries also. The division of Indian sub-continent and the creation of Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka was the product of British policy. The cutting of Indian nation into small bits and pieces not only laid seeds for further rivalry in the region by making it the hotbed of conflicts, but also made each nation suspicious of the other thereby making them dependent on one or the other super power for arms to meet their security requirements. This process continued till 1971 when finally Bangladesh was created out of Pakistan. No one can imagine, at the first instance, the mode of creation of Pakistan, for it is difficult for a country to exist when it is divided at the very outset into two parts and that too separated by a foreign land believed to be the major threat to its security and its chief enemy.


However except Pakistan all other countries in the region — Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Mauritius and Afghanistan have reconciled and accepted the superior position of India in the region. Besides they also know that India is not interested in attacking and annexing them for it has nothing to gain and moreover it itself is too big to control any more territory now. Though

difference of opinion exists on some bilateral issues as between India and Bangladesh over Moore islands and sharing of the Ganges water and similar problems exist between India and Nepal, yet these in no way pose a threat to the security of either country.

The major security problems are faced by India, Pakistan and Afghanistan internally within the region, but all the countries in the region are threatened by super power build up in Indian ocean. Indo-Pakistan security concern were written very largely in the creation of the latter. Pakistan's elites have articulated the belief that India poses a major threat to their security for till now important political groups have not reconciled themselves to the partition of British India. This view arises from the fact that Indian leaders neither in 1947 nor today accept the 'Two Nation Theory' as the basis of partition and creation of Pakistan. For India however, the major security concern is China, not Pakistan. It sees no threat from Pakistan itself for India realises very well that Pakistan is too weak to do any harm without external help. India's worries thus arise from US influence and interference in the region in the form of arms aid to Pakistan - arms which have been used against India in all the previous wars. India does not deny Pakistan's

right to acquire arms for self defence particularly in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, yet it is worried about the things that are actually going on. Though Pakistan is acquiring and is getting arms to meet the Soviet threat yet it is inconceivable that even if it is attacked by Soviet Union it would be able to meet it by recent \$ 3.2 billion worth of aid alone and direct American intervention in that event is simply out of question. Besides, Pakistan has stationed most of its troops along Indian border which clearly indicate that despite Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's main pre-occupation is India. This is even pointed out by Rand Corporation report on Pakistan's security. An important Indian journal's editorial notes thus: "It takes no great military insight to know that the modern tanks which Pakistan plans to add to its armoury are suitable for use in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan rather than in the mountains on the Afghan border. It is also not a credible theory that Pakistan can stop 'Soviet adventurism' with a squadron of F-16's".⁷ So India is suspicious of Pakistan's intentions. Moreover one of India's former Air Chief Marshals pointed out: "Pakistan has used in the past such United States

7. "Editorial", The Hindustan Times,
December 19, 1981.



gifted equipment against us and there is no good reason to believe that it will not do so again."⁸ This point was even emphasized by Indian Prime Minister during her recent visit to the United States. Such views have been aired by eminent Indian journalists, ambassadors and military personnel. A retired Indian Ambassador in reply to question in our questionnaire said: "In the course of its existence, Pakistan has only fought against India; it is therefore not surprising if its entire defence thinking is geared to this concept."⁹ A retired Indian military General, presently Member of Parliament, in a personal interview said: "Pakistan should have no fear from our side because we have never attacked Pakistan. Even when it was brought to its knees as a defeated nation each inch of land and soldiers were returned with dignity and no war damages were charged by India."¹⁰ He even went to the extent of saying that history is lacking such examples of generosity. Another Indian retired Air Chief Marshal said the same thing in a personal interview: "There is no doubt in the common man's mind that all the defence forces of Pakistan are facing India with a view to attack when they think it is profitable."¹¹

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8. Neelgavkar, "Coping with Boredom Pakistan", Times of India, December 4, 1981.
 9. Interview with Mr. G.J. Malik, March, 1982.
 10. Interview with Major General G.S. Sparrow, May, 1982.
 11. Interview with Air Chief Marshal (retired) Arjan Singh, June, 1982.



So it can be said without doubt that the above are the traditional assumptions and approaches which lead India to anticipate Pakistan as a continuing threat and demands appropriate strategies of response.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Soviet presence in that country has made the prospects for its freedom and independence highly problematical. It is for the time to tell what will happen to it after the Soviets leave it. But one can believe that it would have the same future as that of East European countries. The Soviet Union has never left a country without fully securing its hold and control over it. Further Afghanistan, being a land locked country, not very rich in natural resources is bound to depend on some big outside power for aid and help and help from any other quarter is inconceivable when Soviet Union is sitting next door. So the Soviet presence poses a major threat not only to Afghanistan and Pakistan but also to India and the entire region. This is so because if tomorrow Soviet Union enters Pakistan, (to fulfil its ambition of entering the warm water ports) not only would this pose a threat to Indian security but would also invite United States to take action to protect its interest in the region. So peaceful withdrawal of Soviet Union is necessary for the security of South Asia, according to any conceivable regional security structure.

Regarding Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, serious difference of opinion exist between India and these countries. Nepal's security is bound up with Indian security by the treaty of 1950 under which any attack on Nepal would be regarded as attack on India. So India is responsible for providing protection to Nepal. But Nepal seems to be suffering from self made tensions. Nepal wants it to be declared a zone of peace to which India is not giving its assent. Nepal has only two neighbours China and India. China has already accepted Nepalese proposal but India while rejecting the idea and terminology of a Peace Zone is asking Nepal from which side it expects an attack. Our former President Sanjeeva Reddy and Foreign Minister visited Nepal to assure the leaders there that India respects Nepal's sovereignty and integrity.

Besides Nepal's economy is tied up to Indian resources and technology. There are a number of rivers which flow in both the countries and projects on these rivers would be useful for both the countries. As K. Rangaswamy remarks: "The benefits, particularly from the hydro-electric schemes, which would accrue to Nepal would be colossal and the income from the supply of power to India alone would wipe out Nepal's entire trade deficit with India."¹² Thus close

12. K. Rangaswamy, "India and Its Neighbours", Front Front, February 1, 1982.

cooperation between the two countries in the region is needed.

As far as Bangladesh is concerned, India is the country due to whose efforts it came into being. As such according to New Delhi's perceptions, India does not pose a security threat to it for had India desired domination it had got the golden opportunity in 1971 to do so. Differences over some issues - the Farakka and Moore islands - exist but they are essentially bilateral issues. But now Bangladesh is also trying to internationalise these issues. The United Nations study teams sent for the purpose have rejected all Bangladesh arguments for a greater share and continuous supply of Ganges water. Bangladesh on its side without even fulfilling the terms of the agreement with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to draw up plans for sharing of water, is trying to internationalise the issue by pleading for the inclusion of Nepal and other countries in a purely bilateral issue. "Bangladesh is yet to explain to the world why it wants water from India when it allows a thousand million acre feet of water to go waste into the Bay of Bengal."¹³

Apart from Farakka issue, the dispute over New Moore islands is a recent one. It centers around the control of

13. Ibid.

these islands discovered in the Bay of Bengal. While Bangladesh claims that these islands belong to it, India has a claim counter to it. Recently new Bangladesh President General Ershad said that he would not give up his claim over the islands and would take the issue to international forums. Such acts would definitely not improve the matters but would further complicate them. It is in the best interest of both the countries to solve the issue peacefully bilaterally.

The fact however cannot be denied that in each of the South Asian country a major threat to its security arises not from external source, but from internal disturbances. India is threatened from within by such secessionist movements as demand for Khalistan and agitation in the North Eastern states for the ouster of foreigners. Like-wise Pakistan is threatened by similar secessionist moves of Pathans, Pakhtoons and Baluchis.

The threat to the countries of South Asia also arise from the super power presence and heavy build up in the Indian ocean. Soviet Union's plea for the presence of powerful units of its navy has been and is the need to guard the Indian ocean against the presence of United States battleships most of which are nuclear weapon carriers.

Despite Soviet presence, President Brezhnev has always declared and particularly during his recent visit to New Delhi that Moscow was interested in making Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and showed his readiness to keep off its fleet if United States and other European powers did so. On the contrary, not a single American administration has shown its interest in withdrawing its fleet and making it a Zone of Peace. United States has gone ahead with the programme of making Diego Garcia into a nuclear military installation. Last year when former Mauritian President Seewoosagar Rungscooan demanded that Diego Garcia - given by Great Britain to United States - from Great Britain, it refused. Besides United States has also set up a Rapid Deployment Force "for the specific purpose of capturing and holding down any country which in Washington's view constitutes a threat to its self-defined national interest and this includes the self-proclaimed right to get oil out of any of the countries of the region".¹⁴ These developments pose a major threat to all the countries of South and West-Asia.

Besides the countries of the region instead of opposing these moves are encouraging them. The New Delhi Conference of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers held in 1981 made a declaration which stressed an urgency of

14. "Commentary", Mainstream, March 14, 1981, p.4.

convening United Nation's Conference on Indian Ocean due to be held in Sri Lanka later this year. Sri Lanka however tried hard to delete reference to Diego Garcia from the New Delhi declaration lest it might refrain United States from attending the proposed Conference. Also Sri Lanka itself is not very much interested in holding this conference because of its tilt towards the United States in that it has agreed to give R and R (Rest and Recreation) facilities to the United States armed personnel at the Old British base at Trincomalee. There are also news that United States is planning to set up oil refinery at Trincomalee — "ostensibly a commercial deal but one that will help the United States navy and air force spread all over the region; obviously the crude for the proposed refinery would come from countries in the neighbourhood like Saudi Arabia, to grab whose oil fields in case of the collapse of its tottering regime would naturally be the priority job of the Rapid Deployment Force."¹⁵

To conclude, security is a very wide term and includes security not only external but also internal. Therefore threat to security arises not only from within the region alone but with presence and interference of external powers also and the best way to achieve security and stability is

15. Ibid.

to solve issues bilaterally and prevent the involvement of Super Powers as far as possible.

Super Power Foreign Policy Systems and Implications for Arms Conventions on a Regional Basis.

From an empirical perspective it can be perceived that foreign policy of a country is domestic policy writ large or the extension of domestic policies to international field. Every country seeks to achieve its national goals by one way or the other. The American and Soviet foreign policy systems are based on their domestic needs and interests. America being a capitalist country, its interest has always been economic expansion that is finding new sources which would serve as cheap supplier of raw materials and a ready-made market for their produced goods. It is also worth noting that being a democratic country, not harsh but soft and democratic means have been used to achieve the goals of economic expansionism. Thus the domestic economic needs are met through foreign policy with the help of aid, economic advisers and multi-national corporations.

The basis of Soviet foreign and domestic policy system is ideology-Maxism-Leninism. It is basically a closed system and autocratic means are used to achieve domestic as well as foreign policy goals. Internally ideology is used to justify and cover up some of the very

harsh and unattractive features of the Soviet regime and to maintain the present political identity by rigid control over social communication as the means of an ostensible campaign against capitalism. This is necessary for the regime's very survival. Externally Soviet Union uses its ideology to justify its expansionism in the name of support for national liberation movements, to crusade against capitalism and in the name of socialism. Thus Russia uses its ideological thrust to achieve its goals with pluralistic political communities.

Besides economic and ideological interests, the two Super Powers have global interests. They cannot afford to remain absent from a particular region or a country. "To be a Great Power and even more a Super Power, is to be concerned with what goes on in every corner of the globe. To be concerned is to seek to influence the turn of events wherever possible in order to secure a favourable outcome, or at least to forestall an unfavourable one."¹⁶ While America has sought to enter by economic means, the Soviet Union has made use of ideological and economic means. Penetration with the use of arms aid has also been of major importance in Super Power strategy. This not only keeps Super Power economy on wheels by regular sale of weapons

16. Butwell Richard, (ed.), Foreign Policy and Developing Nations, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), p.211.

but also fulfill the traditional objectives of dominating regional powers as well.

The task of framing the foreign policy in both the United States and the Soviet Union rests with the top leadership. In both countries the chief political executive cannot ignore the military-industrial complexes. Halseth says that the views of military advisers take on special importance during international crises. To Halperin, "The President stands at the center of the foreign policy process in the United States."¹⁷ Thus in both the countries foreign policy systems are closed, though much more in the Soviet Union where even the debate on international issues is not permitted.

The countries of South Asia beset with border wars as between India and Pakistan need arms from outer sources badly for their security. This makes them permanently dependent on one or the other Super Power for once arms are purchased, spares have also to be bought from the same source and afterwards when one is caught in the cycle of weapon modernisation one has no alternative source available for the supply of weapons, and is bound to accept difficult

17. Merton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Massachusetts Avenue, 1974), p.17.

terms and conditions. This is the vicious circle in which the South Asian countries are caught. When one country is buying arms from one Super Power, this naturally poses a threat to the security of neighbouring country who has to go to the other one for the supply of arms. This generates competition for arms among the countries of the region.

The Indo-Pakistan case illustrates this point very well. The tilting of Pakistan towards the United States since its inception, the conclusion of Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1954, entering into SEATO and CENTO, forced India to look to the Soviet Union to meet the threat that had accrued from its newly acquired might. When the United States became a regular supplier of arms to Pakistan, it was the Soviet Union in case of India. This has continued till the 1980s. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979 gave to the United States a pretext for supplying arms to Pakistan to meet that threat. On the other hand India found a direct threat to its security in Pakistan's acquisition of tanks and F-16's. It had no alternative but to tap other sources. It had already negotiated with the United Kingdom to purchase Jaguar and now it expanded its military cooperation with the Soviet Union for MIG's and finally approached

France for Mirage-2000. This one move has been responded by counter moves on the other side. So the potential for future conflict was increased by the competition for acquisition of arms on a regional basis, with an accompanying deterioration of political relations.

Indian decision-makers who were interviewed stressed the changing correlation of forces between the two Super Powers as the major factor which prevented the emergence of any arms limitation initiative for South Asia on the part of Washington or Moscow. The task is further complicated by the existence of powerful arms lobbies in the South Asian countries whose presence is acknowledged as effective by concerned officials. Whatever Western political leaders and foreign affairs specialists may say about peace and disarmament, their policy-makers are unlikely to initiate any long term ban on arms transfers to South Asia. The Soviet actions in countries like Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia and particularly the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Ethiopia and the Cuban presence in Angola, indicates conclusively that the Soviet Union is always prepared to exploit opportunities for advancement of its strategic interests in the Third World. According to Indian defence experts interviewed for this study, the

1980s will undoubtedly witness increased efforts by the Soviets to achieve a breakthrough in Pakistan and other South Asian countries (other than India) with promise of arms aid, economic assistance and general diplomatic support. It is unlikely that any new guidelines will be adopted by either of the two Super Powers or by China, Britain and France for placing restraints on the supply of arms to South Asia. If anything the trend is towards South Asia being in the danger of being linked to future upheavals in the Gulf region and especially in Saudi Arabia in view of the close Pakistani-Saudi Arabian economic and military relationship.

Linkage Between Soviet-American Relations and Evolution of Stable South-Asian Security Relationships.

Soviet-American relations are intimately linked to the security of South Asian countries. It has been the past experience that whenever relations between the two Super Powers deteriorated there was a sudden reversal of relations between the countries of the region leading to war. The case of Indo-Pakistani relations illustrate this. Historically India and Pakistan have been the main target of cold war relations between America and Soviet Union. When their relations deteriorated, there was a sudden pumping of arms in Pakistan and it got the chance of exhibiting its newly acquired might by attacking India.

This happened in 1965 when Soviet-American relations, though not worse, but certainly had not improved after the Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962 and was repeated in 1971 when United States was involved in Vietnam Crisis. This is the reason why India is worried about recent Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the United States in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

At a conceptual level area specialists interviewed for this study invariably referred to the limited benefits which South Asian countries could derive from military power. In this view the inherited problems are not leading to a modus vivendi chiefly because the leaders wielding political power make self-fulfilling prophecies of conflict. The next generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders could easily establish stable democratic regimes which would accept international role changes. The strategic analysts and writers on military affairs interviewed for this study, however, tended to see the crux of the situation in South Asia in terms of global security problems. These specialists have by and large poor expectations of behaviour modification among South Asian leaders since the influence of the Super Powers will impose behaviour patterns which are not congenial to regional consensus. Since the political and strategic concerns are interlinked we can conclude that

much will depend on the extent to which self-restraint by regional decision-makers can de-link mutually advantageous bilateral relations from the increasing strain of the paradigms of Soviet and American policies.

Experience however shows that such a connection does exist. Though Super Power relations have never been so good as to warrant their non-interference in other regions of the world, yet it can be said that when their relations were not cold, conflicts and tensions in the regions of the world were at a low ebb.

Aid, be it economic or in the form of arms, is an important instrument of national security policy for a global power like the United States and the Soviet Union. The aim of the Super Powers is to identify those countries which serve their important security objectives by their geographical location and resources. Pakistan serves America's interests well in South Asia, so it is in the interest of United States to keep the friendly military regimes in power there and to remove those regimes which try to go against its wishes. For instance, Mohammad Ali Bogra was removed from office as Prime Minister of Pakistan when he tried to accommodate with Nehru on Kashmir. The policy of Bogra conflicted with the American

South Asian policy of keeping alive limited Indo-Pakistan rivalry. On their side, Pakistani rulers need foreign help for it provides political and moral support on such sensitive issues as Kashmir in the United Nations. It has also helped to strengthen its military capabilities vis-a-vis its neighbours like India. Besides this has also been helpful in strengthening the position of Pakistani rulers at home.

Likewise Soviet Union has also been interested in having friendly relations with India and it has been the main supplier of defence equipment and economic aid, though not the sole one as in case of Pakistan. Soviet Union's diplomatic and moral support to India on Kashmir in the United Nations has defeated all the United States plans in South Asia. Soviet interests in the region require curtailing of Chinese and American influence and increasing its own influence.

It is thus obvious that when the two Super Powers are supporting two different countries having altogether different basis and motives and for different reasons it is bound to have a clash of their interests giving rise to conflicting policies. Besides it is to be noted that whenever there was a deterioration in Soviet-American

relations it was due to a third party, that is the involvement of one of the Super Powers in a weak country considered to be vital to the interests of the other Super Power or when the action of one of them in the region posed a serious threat to the countries surrounding it and thereby to the interests of the other Super Power. In other words, whenever a Super Power has tried to expand its hold or influence elsewhere, the other power has always resented and this led to deterioration of relations.

This point is very well illustrated by numerous examples in history. The cold war between the two started immediately after the Second World War because Soviet Union started strengthening its hold over the East European countries one after another. This worried America because firstly, there was no check to Soviet expansionism and secondly, because it posed serious threat to the security of West European countries, with which America had historical ties. Similarly in 1962 their relations touched a low ebb because of Soviet involvement in Cuba and thereby posing a threat to American interests in Central America. And the latest Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, is considered by America as posing a threat to its interest in South Asia by endangering Pakistan and in West Asia.

The other Super Power retaliates the expansionism of one power by creating disturbances in other regions by supplying arms. South Asia and West Asia have been the main target of adverse United States--Soviet relations. United States has always retaliated Soviet expansionism by supplying arms to Pakistan and creating instability in South Asia.

Both America and Soviet Union are interested in maintaining limited 'regional stability' in South Asia in their own interests. If there is permanent stability then all the aims of the Super Powers would be defeated. Firstly they would be losing markets for their arms. Secondly once they are absent from the region their influence would also vanish away. Finally they would cease to be called Super Powers for the term itself means a power having global interests.

Limited conflict in the region serves the interest of the Super Powers for it grants them unimpeded access to recipient countries facilities and resources that can be used against their adversaries. They do not want a total war between India and Pakistan for that would also involve them. This was the reason why United States and Soviet Union stopped arms aid to both India and Pakistan in 1965

and 1971 wars. When military aid is given it means sowing the seeds of regional military conflict in future.

The emergence of stable security relationships in South Asia is closely bounded up with domestic movement in Pakistan as well as maintaining non-aligned status by the countries of the region. As experience in the 1970's suggests, regional stability in South Asia is closely connected with the fate of democratic movement in Pakistan. Though there is no guarantee that a democratic Pakistan would be friendly towards India but it can safely be assumed that democracy "would enlarge the range of its autonomy from the global aims of its Super Power ally and hence be more conducive to regional stability".¹⁸ This in turn would require the separation of Pakistan's domestic politics from Super Power aims. This is the vicious circle in which Pakistan is caught and which can only be broken by internal mass mobilisation and democratic movement from within.

Regarding the stabilising influence of non-alignment, it has been correctly emphasised that: "If the non-aligned movement is strengthened-the Super Powers will not be able to bypass the non-aligned status of the countries of South Asia."¹⁹ A former Indian diplomatic official summed up

18. Ashwani K. Ray, "The American Stranglehold", World Focus, vol.2, no.3, 15 March, 1981, pp.13-17.

19. Interview with Dr.V.Grover, Delhi University, May,1982.

his experience by saying that the Super Powers were not interested in non-alignment in the regional context. He explicitly stated his view: "Certainly United States has no respect for non-alignment either expressed or implied. The Soviet Union professes to respect non-alignment but its behaviour casts doubts on its sincerity."²⁰ This easy attitude towards non-alignment is due to the behaviour of the countries themselves who claim to be non-aligned but in practice are not so. The case of Sri Lanka and Pakistan clarifies the point made. Speaking specially about American support for the military rulers of Pakistan an Indian journalist made the following critical judgement: "Their (Super Powers) willingness to respect our peoples' independence would depend on the willingness and capacity of the countries themselves. Pakistan is not interested in asserting its independence why should the Super Powers be bothered."²¹

The evolution of stable South Asian security relationships in overall terms depend upon the structure of domestic political interests, but the sharp cleavages of opinion have been encouraged by the Super Powers. The linkage between Soviet-American relations and the

20. Op.cit., Mr. C.J. Malik, March 1982.

21. Interview with Mr. Inder Malhotra,
31 May, 1982.

regional elites impose heavy political and economic costs to the detriment of the domestic political order in South Asian countries. Both the Super Powers have followed short term calculations so far. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has given the United States the opportunity to develop a major stake in the continuance of the military regime in Pakistan. The United States willingness and ability to promote democracy in Pakistan has almost evaporated. Only a restructuring of relations between India and Pakistan could pave the way to restoration of democracy in Pakistan and prevent Islamabad's further involvement in the Soviet-American military calculus.

Four main positions may be distinguished regarding specific policy measures in South Asia taking into account the relevant institutional environment:

1. South Asian Decision-Making : Ideological Versus Bureaucratic Considerations.

National leaders in South Asia beginning with India's Jawaharlal Nehru have played the role of foreign policy practitioners with strong ideological justifications. India's responsibility in international affairs

was explicitly stated as following from its socialistic-cum-secular ideology. Although India continued to have a pluralistic perspective on values, Pakistan moved to emphasise the single factor of Islamic religious ideology and Sri Lanka provided a notable example of dedication to Buddhist ideological objectives. These attitudes of course were used to shape overall policies with structural assistance from the respective bureaucraties. The all pervasive character of the bureaucratic approach has significantly contributed to the choices actually made in the domain of international peace and security. If South Asian foreign policies are regarded only as ideological foreign policies the sources of competitiveness would be strengthened by moral crusades. Unresolved political issues cannot always be settled by bureaucratic efforts, yet in the management of conflict bureaucratic postures undoubtedly favour conference diplomacy and multilateral agreements. South Asian foreign policies do not rest on a single factor and it would be a mistake to construe the results only from the point of view of ideological-cum-political strategies of the top leadership. Our survey of the views of former Indian foreign policy officials strongly suggests that there were fundamental

shifts in thinking entirely due to bureaucratic authority structures. A detailed study should, therefore, be undertaken of the entire spectrum of bureaucratic decision-making in conflict situations in all the South Asian countries. Bureaucratic opinions may not be well articulated like those of political decision-makers but in specific situations it would seem probable that in the South Asian context the former may provide a certain cynical realism which may provide greater scope for what Kenneth Boulding calls "reality-testing" than the utopian dreams of influential political leaders. In considering prescriptions and alternatives for regional security the major institutional role of the bureaucracy should not be underestimated.

2. The Psychological and Operational Environment of South Asian Decision-Makers.

The decolonisation process has provided a unique identification to South Asia since it was the transfer of power from the British in 1947 that led a general democratisation of international relations. The comparatively moderate successor regimes in South Asia established themselves in responsible control and established effective

relations with their former rulers. The psychological environment of South Asia has provided chances for bridge-building with both the Eastern and Western power blocs. The ostensible strengthening of ties with either of the two blocs has been operationally linked to requirements of bilateral interest arising out of short run requirements. In the period when America's Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles was practicing his diplomatic brinkmanship it appeared as if South Asia would have to fatalistically accept Soviet-American bilateralism. But this Dullesian perspective turned out to be an abnormality. South Asian decision-makers have not accepted the major assumptions of alliance structures on European lines. Ofcourse disputes have spilled over into the South Asian area but by and large entangling commitments have been avoided. It is where we come to the consideration of the burden of military effort on South Asian society that the relative level of performance suggests dependence on outside powers often to the detriment of the national image. As a general proposition it could be stated confidently that public opinion would support a regional system which could prevent external interventionism provided tensions and conflicts could be contained through functional interdependence in the region.

3. The Interplay of Global, Regional, Bilateral and Domestic Considerations and the Relationship between Conceptual and Institutional Frameworks in South Asia.

The configuration of the regional system of South Asia has generally been studied in terms of short term options and as a result hypothetical and exaggerated obstacles to regional cooperation have been highlighted. For the study of outcomes of a long term bargaining process our attention should not be focussed on parochial interests but on the patterns of social communication in the region (Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (New York, 1953) and Karl W. Deutsch, and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, 1957)). The political and military elites of South Asia can give a higher priority of emphasis to new conceptual and institutional frameworks which would promote a serious basis of negotiations for the long term equilibrium of the regional system. The South Asian decision-makers are aware of the scope of coalition politics at the United Nations, in the Group of 77 and in the Non-Aligned Conferences. In the 1980s Soviet policy activism in South West Asia is likely to generate

a pronounced trend towards regionalism in institutional terms. This trend may not lead to an OPEC-style solidarity in economic terms or to a NATO or Warsaw Pact style solidarity in military terms, but the general dynamics of policy making cannot avoid uncontrolled spiral of violence without a concerted effort to mitigate intra-regional peace and security problems with the help of new approaches.

4. South Asian Decision-Makers : Beyond the Politics of Dominance and Dependence.

South Asian leaders in the 1980s will increasingly face the problem of adjusting domestic priorities to the requirements of the far-reaching changes in the international environment. By building an enormous military establishment often a regime may succeed in only blocking the way to reforms necessary to prevent social upheaval. In the perception of elites regional imbalance may lead to either politics of dominance or of dependence. But once it is grasped that isolated decision-making processes of individual countries affect and in turn are affected by the foreign political options of other countries in the region, common goals can be formulated and effectively

pursued. In spite of existing difficulties South Asian countries cannot lose sight of the deterioration of their bargaining situations vis-a-vis the extra-regional powers. The Super Powers in particular exercise coercive influence which ultimately violates the basic position and priorities of regional powers who cannot achieve systemic stability. Based on recent experience South Asian decision-makers have in the 1980s started a search for structural policies which could reduce regional conflicts and enlarge the basic consensus. If the South Asian community is to be useful as a multi-lateral framework it would have to be convincingly shown that decision-making units in the area could overcome successfully the destabilising forces both external and internal through a coordinated approach.

Chapter - II

SUPER POWER RELATIONS

Spheres of Influence.

The Super Powers — United States and Soviet Union, though have particular spheres of influence depending on the importance of countries in economic terms, geographical location and strategic importance, it would be wrong to believe that their interests are confined to these regions and countries only. The term 'Super Power' is itself indicative of the fact that United States and Soviet Union have global interests and they cannot afford to remain totally absent from a particular region or area. "Super Powers must by definition seek influence all over the world and deny regional powers, the status the latter consider their due in their respective areas."¹ The role of Soviet Union in case of China and United States in case of India can be cited as examples whereby both the Super Powers have prevented the emergence of strong regional powers in South East and South Asia respectively.

The United States right from the very beginning regarded Latin America as its natural sphere of influence because of it being geographically close to it. Therefore

1. Girilal Jain, "Relations with Pakistan I— Prisoner of Wishful Thinking". The Times of India (Delhi), 10 February, 1982.

it has always endeavoured to preserve its unique position as the predominant and unrivaled power in the Western Hemisphere. It knew very well that its predominance in the hemisphere could not be challenged from within without the outside interference. The realization of this fact made it imperative for the United States to isolate the Western Hemisphere from the interference of European powers. It was with this aim that Monroe Doctrine was adopted. Till today it continues to guard its interests in the region. It is not only supporting weak but pro-United States military regimes in El Salvador and Nicaragua but also resisted Soviet moves in Cuba in 1962.

The place that Western Hemisphere occupies in American foreign policy, is the same that has been accorded to the East European countries in Soviet foreign policy. This is due to their strategic location and geographical congruity. Soviet Union being the first Communist state, realised the dangers of being surrounded by a host of countries not under its influence when Hitler during the second world war walked through East European corridor to enter and destroy Russia. Thus the easy access to Russia through East European countries made it inevitable

for the Russians after the war to control these countries for its own security. Russian political system being autocratic and the Marxist ideology of world revolution guiding it left no other alternative but to use force and harsh means to bring these countries under its control. Gradually all the East European countries were brought under the Russian sway, the process being started with Finland in 1939-36 and ending up with Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Western countries didn't use force against this Russian action and granted Russians a free hand in East European affairs.

However Western Europe still remains the main area of struggle and domination between the two Super Powers. "Ever since the defeat of Hitler's Germany, Western Europe has been the major arena and chief prize of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States."² It has been the main cause, chief witness and the worst sufferer of the Cold War. The primary motive of Soviet Union in strategic terms was and still remains in the West, the control of Europe for such a control would immediately transform the balance of power in its favour and leave

2. R. Conquest and others (ed.), Defending America. (New York, 1977), p.69.

United States isolated and much less in its powers and say in international politics. And if Western Europe comes under Soviet domination, China and Japan would be compelled to change their policies otherwise. It was to prevent this happening from occurring that United States forged the NATO as a part of its security policy, like the Monroe Doctrine a century ago.

Soviet Union realized as early as 1950's that the only way to conquer Western Europe was to follow a Middle Eastern policy. They thought that by bringing Mediterranean, North Africa and Middle East under their control, they would be able to cut Europe even without actually invading it. Eugene V. Rustow has very correctly described the position of Middle East in Soviet foreign policy thus: "For the Soviet Union, the Middle East is a front of strategic as well as tactical importance. It is a front on which we could lose not merely a battle, as we did in Vietnam, but the war itself. For what is at stake in the Middle East is not alone the survival of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and many other states and peoples, but the independence of Europe, and therefore the world balance of power."³

In keeping with their Middle Eastern policy the Soviets abandoned their initial policy of supporting

3. Ibid., p.63.

Israel and embraced Arab nationalism and began to intervene not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict on the side of the Arabs but also in the rivalries among the Arab states themselves. Gradually as the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese empires began to collapse the Russians ran to fill in the vacuum. The Soviets took advantage of the fact that the Arab had not yet reconciled to the existence of Israel and that they deeply believed that Israel was a threat to Arabs and aggression against Arab rights. This was the main weapon in their campaign to bring Europe under their control and to separate it from America.

The greatest achievement of the Soviet Middle Eastern policy has been its repercussions on the United States and West Europe's Middle East policies. "Bewildered, frightened and leaderless, Europe and America have stood by in silence while Arab proxies, with full Soviet support, have destroyed one Western position after another, throughout the region, have brought the industrialized nations to their knees by raising the price of oil and threatening further embargoes, and have deliberately produced what they hope will be revolutionary situations in the Third World through increases in the price of oil

and other raw materials."⁴ The latest country to get out of United States influence is Iran.

The United States and its NATO allies share common interests in the Middle East. They also share common responsibilities for the creation and survival of Israel. Therefore not only Israel, even the NATO powers are threatened by Soviet hegemony in the region that would force not only the dissolution of NATO and retreat of United States and Europe but also the reduction of West European countries to the status of Poland and Finland.

European security is closely linked to United States because of its vital stakes there. In the words of Lovell: "Europe is an area to which the United States had deep if ambivalent cultural ties and important economic links, and it was an area for which, however belatedly, American policy makers had twice in the twentieth century demonstrated a willingness to go to war."⁵ Brennan lists fundamental United States interests in Europe as follows:⁶

1. US has political interests of enjoying support of these countries for ages now. It has cultural and ancestral links.

4. Ibid., p.56.

5. John P. Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective -- Strategy Adaption, Decision-Making. (USA: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p.92.

6. D.G. Brennan, "Some Fundamental Problems of Arms Control and National Security", QRHS, vol.XV, pp.218-31.

2. US withdrawal from Europe might lead to the renewal of conflicts in West Europe which would cost it much more than its maintenance there.
3. American presence provides a degree of confidence and tranquility in the European countries for they can do with their military programs "without having to look too closely over each others shoulders".
4. US support to countries of West Europe gives them diplomatic backing and a chance to bargain with Warsaw Pact countries on the basis of equality.
5. US presence may help to achieve Mutual Balanced force reduction in the event of presence of large Soviet troops.

Thus American presence in Europe is not only vital for European security but also for the furtherance of its national interests. The United States support consists of stationing of military man power and United States troops and weapons constitute a major portion of NATO forces. Besides, United States has also given a nuclear guarantee that in the event of Soviet aggression which cannot be met by the NATO forces, United States would even employ nuclear weapons to such an attack.

"It is upon the delicate fabric of European politics and upon the still more delicate web of relations between the United States and the free nations of Europe, that the impact of the post-1972 detente policy has been felt most severely",⁷ according to Luttwak. Europe has paid the highest price for detente but benefits have not accrued accordingly. The chief benefit has been the attainment of the situation of balance of terror to avoid war. The main aim of both Soviet and American foreign policies is to avert an armed conflict here. But the most severe cost of detente has been the continuance of ideological struggle. Elsewhere in the world, people are still in need of food and shelter - which obviously are more important than ideas and ideology and in the Middle Eastern countries religious fanaticism is governing men's minds. So it is only in Europe where people are advanced so much as to be influenced by ideas, ideals and ideologies.

As Western Europe, so in Asia an important sphere of influence of both the Super Powers because of their vital interests there. Russian interests arise from the fact of its geographical location, it being a part of

7. Op.cit., p.170.

Asia as well as Europe. Robert H. Donaldson has listed various Soviet interests in the region as follows:⁶

1. The most important Soviet objective is to enlist Indian participation as a counterweight to China in the Asian "balance of power game". The attainment of this goal necessitates the elimination of Chinese influence from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thus Moscow has close relations not only with India, but also exhibits friendly postures towards Pakistan and Bangladesh.
2. Second, Soviet aim in the region is the limitation of American presence and influence in the region. Thus Moscow not only supports India's anti-US stances but also needs India's support to project its own power in vital areas of Gulf and Indian Ocean.
3. A Third Soviet aim is to encourage India, it being the leader of Third World countries, to take positions of Soviet Union.

In keeping with these aims in the region, Soviet Union right from the very beginning tried to cultivate both India and China - the two Asian giants. But when relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) Soviet Union became

6. Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in Asia: A Friend to Rely On?", Journal of International Affairs, (Fall/Winter, 1980-81), pp. 235-58.

more friendly towards India. The recent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was with a view to gain entrance to the warm water ports and to control Iranian affairs, it being in turmoil, by means of stationing its troops along Iranian borders to come to the aid of Iranian Communists in case they wish to take over power there and thus keep away the United States.

Like Soviet Union, United States has vital stakes in Asia. It has economic interests of getting raw materials cheap and sell its manufactured goods here. But the most important aim is to curtail growing Soviet influence. It is with this aim that it is supporting Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at all possible costs. The same purposes inspired United States to establish detente and reconciliation with China when the relations strained between them. The Americans are using China as their trump card to counter India in Asia. The Chinese with American help are not only encouraging and helping Pakistan against India -- construction of Karakoram highway etc. but is also earning American goodwill against Russia. It is in fulfilment of its national interests that United States has started backing the military regimes and has gone away from

Wilsonian doctrine of "making world safe for democracy". In the wake of loss of Iran after the deposition of Shah of Iran and Iraq already in the Russian hands, America has started using Pakistan as a chief instrument in its policy of containing Soviet globalism and safeguarding its interests in the gulf by supplying massive arms to Pakistan. It being a poor, backward, Muslim and a non-Arab state, "is regarded as ideally suited to acting in support of United States strategic interests in South-West Asia, also it can provide base facilities for United States naval forces at ports in Karachi and Gwadan, and its English speaking technical and officer corps can be used for back up on US military programmes in Saudi Arabia."⁹

The Rand Corporation study on the 'security of Pakistan' has pointed out various United States purposes served by Pakistan in Asia. The report says that "firstly Pakistan has a considerable negative value (for the US) as a Soviet client or ally "as this would give to the Soviet Union direct access to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean; secondly, the US can provide direct help to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and can even push westwards through

9. "Editorial", The Times of India,
February 8, 1982.

Afghanistan; thirdly, Pakistan's geo-political position would give a strategic advantage to the US for the operations of the Rapid Deployment Force now being set up; and lastly, Pakistan is the "common ally" of the US and China."¹⁰

Likewise in Africa United States and Soviet Union have vital national interests. United States is supporting regimes in Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and South Africa and all of them are securing military aid from United States. It is to be noted that despite United States open support for popular and democratic regimes it is supporting white minority government there for its economic interests there in the form of uranium supplies from there. It has thus vetoed all United Nations Resolutions against South Africa.

Soviet Union on its part is supporting all these countries which have either come out or are trying to come out of the American influence. It is thus helping and aiding Ethiopia, Namibia, Zimbabwe etc. there.

Thus not a single region in the world is out of reach of Super Powers. The fact remains that only those countries which are economically and militarily strong and have sufficient power to spare can have their own

10. Girish Mathur, "US Stakes in Pakistan", Mainstream, March 14, 1981, pp.6-10.

sphere of influence and in today's world only the two Super Powers -- United States and Soviet Union are capable of doing that.

National Goals.

James Rosenau in his 'Linkage Politics' aptly stressed the interdependence of domestic and foreign policy of a country on one another so much so that one is the reflection of the other. The current phase of international politics based on detente or tacit reconciliation between the two Super Powers -- United States and Soviet Union, is the product of a common desire to save mankind from the disasters of world wars. It is based on the phenomenon of mutual deterrence. But as we are witnessing today, the system of deterrence is highly unstable. Kenneth Boulding has pointed out the essential instability of 'threat system' because it is based on the proposition: "If you do something bad to me I will do something bad to you". United States foreign policy from this perspective may be visualized as mobilization and response to challenges to her national interests. The dominant forces of United States national interest is economic. Boulding thus says: "Plainly speaking then, the so-called 'national interests' of the United States has been shaped to

preserving and extending global capitalism, by which I mean the maintenance of ubiquitous political conditions permissive to competitive private enterprise."

Throughout its history, United States has pursued a consistent foreign policy. Beneath the peculiarities of the country, the factional controversies over different philosophies, contradictory moves of individuals on international scene, the foreign policy of United States has been simple and consistent. It has been guided chiefly by the economic interests of the country. It being a capitalist country has always sought economic control of nations so as to get raw materials cheap from there and sell its manufactured goods. United States has never been an imperialist power in the sense as we understand today, though economic control was there in the Latin American countries and it became more strong after the second world war in other developing countries of Asia and Africa.

Another goal of United States foreign policy is the support for democracy and freedom so that private enterprise could flourish there and thus further United States economic interests. This was the historical imperative for it being a melting pot country where people

from different areas came for freedom. But even these terms undergone changes in terms of their meaning. Previously they meant the right of people to go to United States to acquire land and carry on other activities which they could not perform in their own countries. Now in the wake of increased economic activities, these terms signify expansion of private enterprise. Thus United States has never practised imperialism in the territorial terms, that is having far flung empires and guarding it militarily, on the other hand United States has been imperialist in its economic potential. The economic penetration has been so affected without the use of army or actual territorial conquest that it has become impossible for the countries to free themselves of the control. The United States could build empire in a soft way through its economic potential due to historical reasons. After world war one in the 1930's when Europe was passing through severe economic depression, United States government increased its hold over world economy. The second world war also brought disaster to the European economies particularly Britain, France and also Russia which were directly involved in the war. United States entering the war late didnot suffer much from the vagaries of war as other countries. The United States economic situation was sound after the war.

This is proved by the fact that immediately after the war in 1946, Prime Minister Churchill at Fulton (US) expressed his inability to aid Greece and Turkey and urged President Truman to fill in the vacuum by helping them economically against Communist aggression. This led to the formulation of Truman Doctrine and later on to the Marshall Plan for pouring of United States dollars in these countries. In late 1950's came the Eisenhower Doctrine to assist the West Asian countries. Since then one witnesses a marked shift from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk's dictum "we are not the world policeman". One unanticipated and sudden international crisis following the other witnessed American involvement much more extensively in commitments and interventions than that could be imagined or foreseen, "because at the time there seemed to be no less objectionable alternative consistent with American interests than to resist Communist aggression or the threat of aggression".¹¹

Besides it became increasingly clear that there were compulsion for the United States economy to expand at any cost to every nook and corner of the world and containment of Communism was used as a pretext for that. At about

11. Robert E. Osgood, America and The World -- From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam, (The John Hopkins Press, 1970), p.12.

this time another factor was added to the international scene - the emergence of newly independent nations due to the powerful forces triggered by the Second World War. These newly independent countries, having experienced imperialism of the Western powers were in no need to go through the same experience after achieving their hard won freedom. On the other hand, United States national interest lay in expansion, in capturing more markets, that could be obtained only in the newly independent countries. In such circumstances force could not be used and entrance could be secured only on some other pretext. Thus emerged the voice of saving humanity from the dangers of Communism and its justification by giving aid but not entering politically.

Though the Communist threat provided immediate impetus and popular support for economic assistance to the developing countries of the Third World, but the programmes in fact were dictated by urgent United States national interests. Thus economic and military aid became the chief instrument of American foreign policy for furthering its national goals. Isaiah Frank, lists various objectives for which assistance was extended and says: "Depending on the country and the type of assistance the mix of purposes for which aid was deployed included such diverse

elements as short-run stabilisation, long-run economic development, economic support for military programmes beyond the capabilities of the country concerned, bargaining for military base rights, export promotion, support of regional integration, and the use of aid as a lever to damp down border disputes such as that between India and Pakistan.¹²

Over the years with the establishment of detente the argument of threat of Communism to weak states of the world lost ground and gave birth to a more sophisticated argument. It was argued that the process of development, which involves far-reaching social and political changes, in the initial stages unleashed highly destabilising forces and since such forces were already under way in most of the countries, United States assistance in such circumstances would provide stability to these countries and thus reduce the risks of United States involvement in the time of crisis abroad.

This argument also weakened with the gradual improvement of relations between United States and Soviet Union. As the rationale of Communist threat and provided stability deteriorated, emphasis came to be placed on humanitarian

12. Ibid., p.244.

basis. Though this aspect was never absent, it was given prominence in the stunning address in January 1961 by President Kennedy in the following words: "To those people in the huts and collages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves..."¹³

So we find that classical imperialism in the sense of territorial expansion has been replaced by neo-colonialism, which mainly believes in expanding economically. The aims in both the cases, however remain the same. The United States has thus entered these countries by economic advisers, multi-national corporations and supplying arms by creating the dangers of Communism. United States control is not visible as its Soviet counterpart and the aggressive features of its dynamic foreign policy have been so camouflaged so as not to look imperialist.

Like United States, Soviet Union is also very clear on its national goals that have to be achieved through its domestic and foreign policy. However, Dimitri K. Simes has noticed contradictions in Soviet foreign policy for it follows contradictory policies of cooperation and hostility, activism and caution simultaneously. To him,

13. *Ibid.*, p.245.

these contradictions in Soviet foreign policy: "reflect the conflicting interests of a rising Super Power with global reach that ruthlessly lacks and adequately strong economic posture. They also reflect the paradox of an increasingly conservative, non-innovative regime whose international interests and ideology call for the support of revolutionary movements abroad."¹⁴ Despite contradictions, however Soviet foreign policy is guided by certain national goals and objectives. The most important goal of Soviet policy is the security of Soviet State, both in terms of territory and in terms of social entity. To Moscow the preservation of their political system is a fundamental security requirement. But the Soviet notion of security includes both permanent and changing elements. Permanent security elements include "search for absolute security"¹⁵ against all foreign and domestic enemies.

But Soviet definition of security in this nuclear age is not a narrow one. It is not confined to the security of Soviet mainland alone but includes also the security of its friends and allies, its naval and military bases and also security for its troops stationed abroad.

14. Dimitri K. Simes, "Detente and Conflict - Soviet Foreign Policy 1972-77", Washington Review, vol.V, (Sage Publications), p.5.

15. Ibid., p.6.

It is to achieve this security that Soviet Union follows the two policies of conflict and cooperation together. It realises fully well that total conflict with the West would not pay it anything but could lead to a holocaust. It also knows that economically it is very weak and depends on the West for a number of things including American wheat. So it followed the policy of cooperation with United States which resulted in detente. The Soviets sought to achieve certain national goals by detente mostly economic. According to Robert G. Kaiser: "Many of these goals were economic; they sought both technology and capital to overcome the chronic bottlenecks in the Soviet economic system that the Soviet leadership was unwilling to address with internal reforms."¹⁶ Soviet economy, today is highly bound up with the Western economies and when Western economies face difficult times it obviously means difficult times for the Soviets too for they need their credit and technology.

Besides detente was also politically useful for it served to lessen tensions at the Western front at a time when Soviet Union was already facing difficulties with the Chinese. To Robert G. Kaiser, "it was Soviet fear of China and Chinese-American rapprochement that got the

16. Robert G. Kaiser, "US-Soviet Relations: Goodbye To Detente", Foreign Affairs, vol.59, no.3, 1981, pp.500-21.

whole thing going in the first place."¹⁷ Detente also helped Soviet Union in controlling United States strategic programmes and nuclear rivalry.

This however doesnot mean that Soviet Union would always cooperate with the West and would refrain from hostile activities even when its security interests are threatened. Soviet Union has always given highest priority to the political security of Soviet system. The Soviet definition of security is based on the legitimacy of its regime and peaceful relations with the West depends on the latter's recognition of this legitimacy. Regarding national security, Soviet Union has given highest priority to defence. They did so even when the Soviet Union was peer. The memories of past invasions and occupations haunt the Soviet leaders and they are never going to place themselves in a position from where they can be blackmailed. So Russians are prepared to guard themselves against all future attacks.

Soviet foreign policy is based on the conviction that they are riding the crest of historical trends and the world balance of forces are in their favour. To Dimitri K. Simes; "the primary obstacle in relations between the two Super powers is not so much the difference between their political and social systems, although this is a

17. Ibid., pp. 501-502.

serious factor, but rather the incompatibility of their objectives on the international scene."¹⁸ The United States wanted detente to make the world secure and stable. The Soviets accept the first goal for they know the nuclear war would destroy the entire world and so crises should be managed peacefully. The Russians, however, do not commit themselves to the latter goal for they believe that time is in their favour and world balance of power is shifting in their favour.

The Russians are also the prisoners of Marxist-Leninist ideology and they use it to sanction a Clausewitzian view of war and diplomacy because it covers some of the very harsh and unattractive features of Soviet regime both at home and abroad. So justification and furtherance of ideology is an important goal for in the absence of external enemy, Russian leadership would be forced to explain the absence of democratic freedoms, political controls and shortage of consumer goods. The ideology serves as a means to further Soviet foreign policy goal of dominating and controlling other states in the name of crusade against capitalism and imperialism.

Military Aims in the Nuclear Age.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet advancement in the sphere of armaments and the growing

18. Op.cit., Dimitri K.Simes, p.9.

Soviet power has baffled and obsessed American foreign policy makers. This has been so because, as Legvold holds, "For us, Soviet power has been the ultimate measure and the central threat, a seminal idea and a source of orientation."¹⁹ This Soviet policy in the nuclear age was the product of initial American moves which culminated in the beginning of arms race between the two Super Powers.

The emergence of United States as a very strong power sitting comfortably as the sole guardian and destroyer of the world due to its monopoly over nuclear weapons, worried the Russians. Their main aim thereafter was to break the American ice and lessen the American power of dictating the policies of other countries by acquiring nuclear parity. This was the beginning of arms race. In the initial stages the aim was to acquire parity but gradually it changed to acquiring superiority.

It is to be noted that every major new weapon system since the second world war has been first introduced by the Americans — "the atomic bomb (1945), the intercontinental bomber (1948), the hydrogen bomb (1954), the nuclear submarine (1954), the submarine launched ballistic missile (1960), the multiple independent re-entry vehicles or MIRV (1970)",²⁰ and now Neutron warheads (1981) and

19. Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power", Foreign Affairs, vol.56, no.1, October, 1979, pp.49-7

20. "Editorial", The Times of India, 2 May, 1981.

MX Missiles (1982). The Soviet Union having appeared on the international scene late and completely destroyed after the war preferred peaceful co-existence to recover from the damages done. United States had emerged with a number of advantages over Soviet Union after the war. Firstly it didn't suffer any damage at home. Secondly while war had been a boon to the American economy, it had ruined Russian economy. According to John Lovell, "In constant dollars (1953 base), the Gross National Product of the United States had risen from \$ 239.2 billion in 1944 to \$ 329.2 billion in 1944."²¹ On the other hand production declined in Soviet Union and it suffered from shortages of certain commodities. Its industries had been destroyed completely. Despite poor economic situation at home, the utterances of President Truman of dangers of Communist expansion and the necessity of containing it, the possession of nuclear weapons and the suggestion of Lillenthal Plan to seal its spread to other states, made Soviet Union all the more suspicious of American intentions. Thereupon every American move in the direction of arms build-up was responded by a similar Soviet move till it achieved parity with American which led to detente and MAD in the sixties and seventies. Thus the nature of Soviet power is, "of a late-arriving military leviathan, in the bloom of military expansion, self-satisfied at last to have matched the power of its great imperialist

21. Op.cit., Lovell, p.93.

rival and fascinated by the potential rewards in the continued accumulation of arms.²²

The chief military aim in nuclear age is to keep up with modern technological developments on the sphere of armaments so as not to lag behind and if possible to achieve a position of absolute superiority by inventing new weapons that not only give psychological advantages but also helps in furthering other political and military aims. Keeping in view these changes Robert G. Kaiser has divided US-Soviet relations into two historical periods -- the first one beginning with the end of the second world war which was characterised by what Soviets called American diplomacy from 'position of strength'. This phase ended in 1972 when America granted Soviet Union the status of a Super Power and various agreements were concluded which established and solidified detente. This phase ended in 1980 with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Polish crisis, President Reagan's decision to go ahead with the production of neutron warheads and thus it signifies the beginning of second Cold War and Second Arms Race.

The coming of Reagan on the American scene marked further the hardening of the American attitude towards Soviet Union. President Reagan, in fact came at a time

22. Op.cit., Legvold, p.2.

when America was leading strategic race. Russia sitting comfortably in the military field was in no need of pursuing the race further because of poor internal economic situation. With another poor harvest expected this year inspite of spending a quarter of state investment on farming, Russian still need American grain. The Western credit and technology is also needed for the development of Siberia. Reagan realising this went further thinking that it would be possible to develop capabilities that would keep Russia backward. Reagan has a 'black and white' view of the world and "so he is trying to achieve military superiority by embarking on a rearmament programme which is expected to cost according to his administration's estimates \$ 1500 billion in five years (\$ 1 billion : Rs.900 crore) and another 750 billion more according to the Pentagon estimates."²³ It is in keeping with this line that he has criticised SALT agreements and said that no further agreements would be concluded unless United States achieves superiority to negotiate comfortably. American fears arise from the fact that SALT II doesn't cover two of the most dangerous weapon system of Soviet Union. (1) First is the Soviet back fire bombers and (2) second are the 200 Soviet SS 20's, the strategic nuclear weapons that are targeted against all the major European cities. MX missiles have created further dangers. These movable missiles are very dangerous and have reduced military

23. "Editorial", Indian Express, 12 January, 1982.

stability because of precision.

These technological innovations have thus destroyed deterrence which is based on assured second strike capabilities. "It was only to be expected that President Brezhnev would one day put the Reagan administration on notice that the Soviet Union would not permit the United States to re-establish its old superiority in the nuclear field -- four to one at the time of the Cuban Crisis in 1962."²⁴

The American response to this growing Soviet strength is contained in the speech which President Reagan delivered to commemorate the first anniversary of his presidency in these words: "we warned the Russian bear not to provoke the American eagle and threw dark hints of future action and more money to sharpen its talons."²⁵ He thus announced the plan of going ahead with the production of neutron bombs and MX missile system as the only defensive way to check Soviet expansionism.

This decision has created dangers of nuclear war because Soviet Union has come out with strong condemnation of the decision saying that United States has started showing its "cannibalistic instincts" and that Moscow would "have to respond to the challenge".

24. "Editorial", Times of India, 10 September, 1981.

25. Ibid., 21 January, 1982.

The American argument for the production of neutron weapons runs like this: the Soviets have three times as many tanks in Europe as the NATO powers and this gap cannot be filled. Neutron weapons offer the only answer. The radiation from these weapons could kill the soldier inside the tank and possibly leave the tank itself in a repairable state to be used against the Soviets. Secondly in case of war in heavily populated cities of Europe an attempt has to be made to confine destruction to only the war areas.

The Soviet reply to this argument is that it is absurd and misleading. According to Soviet Union, the NATO powers have 3,00,000 precision guided anti-tank weapons installed in Europe and these are enough to knock out 2,50,000 tanks but there are only 1,25,000 tanks in the world today — including the United States, Soviet Union and all other countries. The NATO has all the weapons it need to destroy Soviet tanks. The Soviets may be having superiority in tanks, the NATO powers have superiority in some other areas and there is a stability and balance which will be disturbed by the introduction of neutron weapons. The Soviets further argue that no military general is going to make a distinction in Europe between a war area and non-war area, the destruction would be all pervasive.

So the Russians are not going to sit quietly and it would definitely respond to the challenge. The attainment

of superiority in the military field is not just confined to earth and under seas rather the two Super Powers are trying to use space and outer-space for this purpose also. A major step in this direction was taken by the United States in sending the space shuttle Columbia with the chief aim of conducting military tests in space and storing weapons there. The travel to space is just its secondary purpose. Even the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda came out with the news that: "Columbia will start arms race in space", by carrying secret military equipment into the orbit for the first time. Likewise Tass accused United States for preparing for war in outer space thereby making arms limitation not only difficult but impossible too. It also said: "Pentagon would develop ray weapons, including the 'X-Ray laser' which can cause intensive nuclear radiation and time-bound programmes have also been finalised by the United States for the development of chemical lasers, including those for destroying ballistic missiles and planes in space."²⁶

Race is also going on in the field of chemical weapons. Though American experts are blaming Soviet Union for starting this race, but this is only one-sided version of the story. Many feel that this is being emphasised by Reagan administration to make build-up of chemical weapons acceptable to Americans and to their NATO allies. Dr. Arthur Westing,

26. The Hindustan Times, 25 June, 1982, p.16.

Professor of Ecology at Hampshire College told a conference, "Although the US already possesses major stocks of chemical weapons, it appears to be tooling up to produce lethal new anti-personnel agents, the so-called binary weapons, which can be extra-ordinarily inhumane and environmentally devastating".²⁷ So chemical weapons are highly destructive and no nation should possess them as deterrent also. But the Super Powers are striving to achieve superiority in this field also.

Despite achieving superiority or parity, the military aim in the nuclear age is no longer to win a total war by achieving such superiority or parity rather it is only to acquire capacity that would inflict sufficient retaliatory damage to deter a nuclear attack. The view held prior to the second world war that it was possible to win a total war to protect territorial security and achieve other objectives by totally destroying enemy's forces and forcing an 'unconditional surrender' of the enemy, no longer hold good today as no state can win a total war because the devastation that would come in its wake would far outweigh the value of defeating the enemy.

Another military aim in the nuclear age is to prevent the emergence of other strong powers that would challenge their established status. Their aim is to keep sufficient

27. The Observer, 10 January, 1982.

hold over international politics so as to govern and dictate the policies of other nations by their military might and also control their economics and politics. This they have been doing very well for the once Great Powers but now second rankers — UK, France — even after acquiring nuclear forces have been unable to maintain their security or even follow an independent policy without the protection of a Super Power. Thus the possession of large and diversified nuclear weaponry by United States and Soviet Union due to their vast resources, not possessed by other nations has made them to chief guardian of central military balance and they have been guarding this position very well till today.

The Political Processes and Conflict Patterns between United States and Soviet Union.

Most of the British and American experts still hold that Cold War after the Second World War and the Second Cold War after 1980 is the product of Soviet policies and the political processes that essentially conflicted with that of America. Colin Gray is of the opinion that it was the growing Soviet power that posed "inalienable threat to Central and Western Europe, which if not rivaled would have led to Finlandisation or GDRisation of all Europe."²⁸ He strongly feels that the Soviet political system was the

28. Colin S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race, (Saxon House, 1976), p.3.

key factor in the conflict between United States and Soviet Union. Robert Legvold believes: "unable to influence others by the force of ideology, plagued by an economy that does not measure up, and discredited by its repressive habits at home and among allies, the Soviet Union has but one major trump, its military power".²⁹ In fact force is inherent in Russian political processes for it is highly centralized and autocratic. The Communist Party of Soviet Union is the key to Russian political system and its Central Committee is behind all the decisions that are taken. Force is also contained in the Communist ideology, specially that of inherent conflict between Capitalism and Socialism and world revolution which the Russians sought to achieve in the initial stages till the advent of Khrushchev. The Russian hopes, however were shattered by Yugoslav challenge to Communist unity and the recovery of Capitalism even after the Great Depression of 1930's. These failures reinforced Russian faith in force for they felt that it was the only means left to realize their goals. Besides, the coming in power of the Socialists in Russia by force and the defeat of Hitler, enforced its faith in the worthiness of force.

Thus when force is inherent in what Soviet Union does it is bound to conflict with United States for political processes of America are essentially democratic. It is

29. Op.cit., Legvold, p.4.

essentially a clash between Democracy and Communism for the former believes in diversity and liberal means, the latter in force. But it would not be wrong to say that they arrive at one point by different ways, that is, they further their national interests by different means. It is in the interest and nature of every state to justify and rationalise its own behaviour. The American desire to "make world safe for democracy" or "safe for diversity" is essential to attain that pluralism on which its political processes are based. Likewise after the Russian revolution of 1917, Russian Marxists strongly felt in favour of world revolution and bringing about a similar revolution in other countries for it was necessary for their own survival. This however had to conflict with the existing systems.

The world prior to the First World War had witnessed only two types of political systems — democracy and dictatorship. Dictatorship was based on force for it openly supported dictatorial means. After first world war a new type of system — Communism appeared on the scene which though outwardly professed democracy in its ways and means but inwardly crushed all those who failed to adhere to Communist ideology. The way in which political legitimacy has been achieved by the ruling elite in Russia - brain washing, using harsh means and educating people only in Communist ideology - stirred the democratic world. From

then onwards the clash started between the two for the Russian aim was and still is the imposition of its own system on other countries.

Not only the political and social processes and system based on force conflict with that of United States, even the Marxist-Leninist ideology which is at the base of Soviet political system conflict with the democratic one. The Marxist-Leninist ideology is based on the inherent conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems. The Russian leaders believe in the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest and that in the clash between Capitalism and Socialism, the latter is fit to survive. Being so, they always look upon Western countries as their enemies particularly the United States and it is their aim to liquidate capitalism and thus the power of United States. Besides the Russians use their ideology more strongly for it helps them in camouflaging some of its very harsh and unattractive features both at home and abroad.

Dimitri K. Sines, however is of the view that poor relations between America and Soviet Union are not due to different political and social systems and political processes but due to divergent international objectives. United States is basically a status quo power, seeking a more secure and stable world. The Soviets adhere to the first objective for to achieve a secure world nuclear war

should be avoided and crises should be managed by diplomacy and peacefully. The Russians, however are not committed to the second goal for they believe that world balance of forces are shifting in their favour.

Dynamic Properties of the Arms Race.

The arms race that ensued after the Second World War is essentially dynamic for it is inspired by technology but has dire political consequences. J. Henk Leurdijk has very aptly said: "Weapons and strategy interact because it is the quality of nuclear weapons that determine their strategic uses, while at the same time strategic thinking may be an important factor in weapon developments."³⁰ Various arguments were put forth in defense of nuclear weapons by war experts and strategists. Hans Morgenthau's various concepts as 'clean-bomb', massive-retaliation, tactical nuclear warfare and doctrines like counter-force, population defense, damage limitation and first strike postures, were all winning the war strategies whereby Super Powers would aim not to go undamaged but in Morgenthau's words: "to come out wounded but not dead". He feels that such a thinking still dominates the invention and development of arms race.

The advent of nuclear weapons and arms race has brought about a significant change in military affairs by bringing

30. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), The Dynamics of Arms Race. (Green Helm Ltd., 1975), p.2.

about a change in the attitude towards the objectives and uses of armed forces and relationship between the major powers of international system thereby challenging the prevalent concepts of international law and relations. The new relationship between the two Super Powers is based on the concept of deterrence — the terrible reality of nuclear age — thereby changing the character and meaning of offensive and defensive. The chief property of arms race is just to promote the accumulation of more and more weapons but not to encourage actual fighting particularly in which a Super Power is already involved because that war would not only be too expensive but destructive too. Thus the aim of the two Super Powers is no long winning a total war by achieving a quantitative parity or superiority but aiming at acquiring qualitative capacity that would inflict sufficient retaliatory damage to deter a nuclear attack. So the nature and use of armed forces has undergone a change. "In a framework of deterrence defensive weapons may have offensive implications while offensive weapons are regarded as defensive if they threaten the opponents population."³¹ So Morgenthau feels that in a conventional system, an arms race is functional and politically inspired, in a nuclear age it is dysfunctional and technologically oriented. In fact this is the dynamic property of arms race, for arms

31. Ibid., p.6.

being dysfunctional have till now succeeded in preventing the occurrence of Third World War. This has been possible because the concept of war itself has changed. It is no longer seen as a means to win a total war.

This realization has led to greater emphasis on humanitarianism and to the conclusion of various treaties between the two Super Powers like - SALT I, SALT II, Vladivostok agreements and now START to limit the nuclear weapons for the avoidance of war. Various arms control measures to halt the on going arms race have been taken. Thus an important dynamic property of arms race is that the moves for peace also go on simultaneously. Detente based on mutual deterrence was the product of arms race. Raymond L. Garthoff is of the view that since late 1960's when SALT I was launched, the Soviet political and military leadership has come to the conclusion that under present conditions there is a strategic balance between the two Super Powers based on mutual deterrence; "that the nuclear strategic balance is basically stable, but requires continuing military efforts to assure its stability and continuation; and that agreed strategic arms limitation can make a contribution, possibly a significant one, to reducing these otherwise necessary reciprocal military efforts".³²

32. R.L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation", Journal of International Security, vol. 3, no. 1, (Summer, 1978), pp. 112-47.

To G. Arbatov, the shift from Cold War to peaceful co-existence has been possible due to a number of developments like, "the changed alignment of world forces in favour of socialism, the consistent peace and detente policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and the more active struggle for these aims waged by the world Communist and workers' movement, and the democratic forces of our time."³³ All this, to him made America realize that "absolute position of strength" was not possible and the aims could not be achieved through "military diktat". The technological revolution and the breaking of American nuclear monopoly led America to conclude that no country could carryout its military politico aim of winning a war for it would mean defeating one's enemy at the expense of its own country. Another factor contributing to America's attitudinal change was the realization that the global economic and political changes taking place were not due to Communist plot but due to its own allies -- Japan and West European countries who were threatening its interests in the world markets. The realization of these facts led to the conclusion of series of agreements between the two Super Powers.

Whatever might be the factors, there is no denying of the fact that had arms race not acquired such intensity

33. G. Arbatov, "Strength-Policy Stalemates", Problems of Peace and Socialism, vol.II, no.2, February, 1974, pp. 71-81.

and had it not touched such heights, various agreements would not have been possible and realization of futility of arms race would not have developed.

Arms race is dynamic in the sense that it defies Newtonian Mechanics for it seems never ending. It may slow down but it never stops and has never stopped. There is not a single factor that can put a stop to it, not even economic factor, for despite poor economic conditions at home, Soviet Union has been pursuing arms race. It is all pervasive for it is not only going on between the two Super Power but also among the Third World countries for the acquisition of more and more arms. The expenditure on arms is going up day by day and according to Brandt Commission report world military expenditure is \$ 500 billion in a year. The United Nations report says: "World military expenditure in 1980, in current prices, amounted to \$ 500,000 million or approximately \$ 110 for every man, woman and child on earth. Per capita military expenditure in the developed countries taken as a group is in the order of a magnitude higher than in the developing countries but, because the disparities in over-all per capita income are even greater, the real burden of these expenditures is heavier in the developing countries. The global military effort represents about six per cent of global output,

roughly the same fraction as accounted for by the 340 million people living in Latin America or the 1.3 billion people living in Africa or South Asia. Global expenditure for education has only recently overtaken military expenditure, although if the developing countries alone are considered the latter is still predominant. Global public expenditure and, again, the asymmetry is particularly marked in the developing countries as a group. The global arms bill is roughly equivalent to the value of gross fixed capital formation in all developing countries combined."³⁴

Spill over and Side-effects.

The international situation that we are witnessing today is the spill over and as John P. Lovell says: "...the lingering effects of world war II and the struggle that developed between the two Super Powers after the war have forged many of the most troublesome of the current world problems and have defined the limits within which solutions might be reached".³⁵ Thus the international system of today, though a multipolar one is still based and governed by the policies and decisions of the two Super Powers. Suspicion continues to surround the minds of decision-makers in both the countries.

In fact the trouble started immediately after the Russian revolution. The negative role of supporting the

34. The Hindustan Times, (Sunday Magazine) 25 April, 1982.

35. Op.cit., Lovell, p.85.

anti-revolutionaries and insurgents played by the Western powers sow the seeds of tensions between Soviet Union and the Western powers. Soviet Union thereafter became suspicious of Western intentions. Throughout the inter-war period relations between Russia on one hand and Britain and France on the other were not good. Due to Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, Soviet Union joined hands with Hitler by signing Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939. The attack on Poland by Hitler on September 1, 1939 made Soviet Union, Britain and France come close to each other in declaring war against Hitler. Within three weeks of the attack Poland was overrun and divided between Germany and Soviet Union. Finland also fell victim to Soviet Union. In 1941 Soviet Union itself was attacked. Until this time United States was supporting Britain, France and Russia indirectly without actually entering into the war. It was brought into the war by Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Thus the allies succeeded in defeating the Axis powers. But when the common aim or mission of defeating the Axis power was fulfilled, the allies fell apart. The feud arose partly from the quarrels about the sharing of gains but the main cause no doubt was the fact that opposing interests among the victors which have been subordinated to the task of defeating the common enemy, had come to the surface when the enemy was

no more to unite them. Thus political affiliations are affiliations of convenience. The ideological battle started at the Potsdam and Yalta conferences over the future of Poland and Germany. Thereafter tensions between the two blocs solidified giving birth to Cold War. The effect of cold relations was that once again move started to enlist allies and supporters. The Russians moved to strengthen their hold over East European countries and make them their satellites, this move was repetitive of American action of 19th century of securing the elimination of European influence from Latin America by formulating the Monroe Doctrine. Then came up the alliance of Western Powers into NATO and that of Eastern Powers into Warsaw Pact. Since Cold War was a struggle for high stakes in which cooperation of other states of the world was also needed, this cooperation was sought mainly by the help of economic and military aid. Thus classical colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism. Prior to second world war stationing of the small troops in the colonies by the Great Powers was enough to protect their economic, political and military interests and to control these areas. The situation, however changed due to decolonisation process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The spread of the national sentiment in the Third World coupled with the technological revolution which

Second World War brought in its wake signified that Great Powers could rarely station their troops in the Third World countries. Yet Great Powers still have substantial interests in these areas which need to be protected. The instrument of economic and military aid proved useful for the newly independent countries had no other alternative but to get aid at all possible terms and conditions. This not only made the countries permanently dependent on them for capital and technical know-how but also sow the seeds of regional tensions by pumping more arms in the regions. Thus poor relations between the Super Powers had a very important impact of starting a similar arms race in the various regions of the world and thereby destroying possible chances of limited regional cooperation.

Another important side effect of poor super power relations is the diminishing democratic tradition in the world. Also lack of Super Power cooperation and their poor relations has led to the poor performance of the United Nations and its failure to fulfil its main task of maintaining international peace and security. Though no major war of the intensity of World War has taken place, yet a number of regional conflicts have taken place and are continuing to take place. The most current example is that of Iran-Iraq War which is more than a year old now.

The collective security has failed because of lack of Super Power cooperation.— being based on the assumption that the Big Five acting in cooperation would be able to meet all the crises. Such expectations of the founding fathers were soon belied by the realities of international system. We can cite only one example when collective security system was actually applied — the Korean Crisis. In this case too action was possible only because of absence of Soviet representative. Since then collective security system has become inoperative.

Even the office of Secretary General has been the target of Cold War struggles. Dag Hammarskjöld, the most powerful and innovative of the United Nations Secretary General was charged by Soviet camp of drifting towards the West. Thereafter his successor did not come out openly with their plans that might annoy the Super Powers. Even the present Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was appointed after lot of difficulties. Thus the United Nations has suffered due to exercise of veto - too frequently - by the Super Powers. Today it is no more than a silent spectator to the conflict that take place.

Finally, but one of the positive effect of Cold War was the birth of non-aligned movement which helped to defuse and stabilise the international situation to a large extent.

Chapter - III

SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY PROBLEMS

Domestic Perspectives.

The foreign policy of any country is influenced both by the nature of international relations at a given time and by the quality of its national policies. The availability of various policy options depends directly on the level of autonomy of foreign policy from domestic politics. This autonomy is derived from the domestic political consensus in the society on the broad issues relating to social and economic goals of the country. In the western democratic countries this has been achieved through highly sophisticated communication links that have been established between various layers of society and in the socialist countries through political and ideological mobilisation with the help of highly centralised Communist Party. In contrast, however, in most underdeveloped and developing countries of the Third World, this consensus is lacking and the leadership has not even tried to generate such a consensus. On the contrary the national interests of these countries are the interests of the ruling elite. This situation which is particularly true of South Asian countries is the product of domestic setting, the foundations of which were laid by the British.

The Indian sub-continent has had a very sad and unfortunate history of domestic feud and discord that encouraged the foreigners to try their luck in the region. The British, French, Dutch and Portuguese took their chances and finally British emerged successful. Once the British acquired control and supremacy over the sub-continent it realized its vast potentialities in terms of cheap suppliers of raw materials as well as human labour and as a ready-made market for its finished goods. However, beneath this economic aggrandisement lay political reasons of having vast empire for greater political influence in world affairs. Keeping in view these gains, they sought to preserve the integrity of Indian empire by creating buffer states around it. Internally it followed 'Divide and Rule' policy to prevent opposition from the domestic population and to win their confidence and support. It exploited fully the cultural and religious differences that marked the Indian society to serve its own end. The policy ultimately paid for in the wake of rising nationalism and movements for national liberation, Britain divided the Indian subcontinent on religious basis creating a separate nation for Muslims in the form of Pakistan. This helped the British to keep alive their interests in the region.

The Hindu-Muslim differences of the pre-partition days were transformed into Indo-Pakistan differences after the

partition. While Britannia ruled the waves in the 19th and early 20th century, it is America that has dominated the world after the Second World War. The vacuum of British withdrawal was filled by America. United States had important interests in the region and it found in Pakistan the chief 'regional instrument' for pursuing these interests. Thus were laid the foundations of the domestic and foreign policies of the countries of South Asia. The buffer states around Indian subcontinent emerged independent countries after the Second World War. Nepal and Bhutan are tied up to India by the treaties concluded with them in 1950. Sikkim has already joined Indian federation as its 22nd state.

India's foreign policy is rooted in the ideals of its freedom struggle led by Congress Party. It alone being the dominant party shaped the Indian foreign policy after independence. Besides, India is a democracy with its institutions closely modelled after British system, with "certain American Institutional appendages such as federalism and the principle of judicial review".¹ It follows that in constitutional terms Prime Minister, Cabinet and other governmental departments are responsible to the

1. Wayne Wilson (ed.), Asia and the International System. (Cambridge: Wmthrop Publishers, 1972), p.69.

parliament. But in practice we find this has not been the case. During the first decade after independence this power by parliament was sparingly used. The Congress Party due to overwhelming majority was able to keep down the opposition views. Its fundamental principles of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence were also accepted by the parliament. The situation changed when issues became more complex and the formulation of foreign policy a complicated task because of the deteriorating relations with important neighbours like China and Pakistan culminating in the border wars with each of them in 1962 and 1965 respectively. Thereafter foreign policy decisions involve "much more complex network of interests than in 1950's both because the external is much more diversified and internal constraints can no longer be easily ignored".² This pattern of formulation of India's foreign policy has continued till today. The opposition parties gained unparalleled influence in the formulation of foreign policy for the first time during 1969-71 after the split of the Congress Party. The coming into power of the coalition of opposition parties under the banner of 'Janata Party' at the centre in 1977 for the first time in the history of India's parliamentary democracy was spectacular. But the foreign policy of India did not witness any fundamental change except for a certain emphasis on 'genuine non-alignment' during the Janata period.

2. *Ibid.*, pp.71-72.

It follows that the basic principles governing India's foreign policy are accepted by all.

Having achieved its cherished goal, after two hundred years of colonial slavery, India's immediate concern was to rebuild its economic resources to provide better standard of living for its people and to attend to gigantic domestic problems which had acquired unprecedented dimensions in the wake of the partition of the country.

India's national leadership led by Jawaharlal Nehru decided to keep its options open by not joining either camp led by the two Super Powers. Nehru also realised that India's economy could not be sustained without external help and its overall development was impossible without foreign aid, with the option to draw help from both the power blocs. Thus came into being the policy of non-alignment. India has a vast economy and one can say that potentially on the basis of its huge resources, it can reach a high degree of self reliance and self-sufficiency. But for the time being Indian economy is heavily dependent on external help for progress and prosperity. Foreign aid, accordingly has influenced India's foreign policy and is an important determinant of politico-economic stability.

Besides in order to sustain democracy, it has been vital for the leadership to lay stress on developmental

programmes and solving such social problems as poverty. India has adopted a system of planned economy and accordingly various plans had specific objectives and goals to be achieved. The First Plan (1951-56) had two main objectives -- that of correcting the disequilibrium in the post war economy and to initiate a process of all round balanced development. The Second Plan (1956-61) had its goal as realisation of socialist pattern of society and removal of poverty and unemployment. The Third Plan (1961-66) emphasised on self-reliance and of attaining self-sufficiency in food production. The Fourth Plan (1969-74) laid stress on schemes of employment generation and improving conditions of weaker sections of society. The Fifth Plan (1974-78) stressed on removal of poverty and achieving self-reliance. The Sixth Plan (1980-81 to 1984-85) aims at reduction of poverty line from 48 per cent to 30 per cent at the end of the Plan.

Laying stress on such objectives means that India could devote only a small portion of its budget to defence needs and purchase of new weapons. India accorded a very low priority to its defence needs, the fault of which was realised when China attacked us in 1962. Thereafter defence has been accorded a place of sufficient importance not to be neglected at any cost.

This being the domestic setting, the leadership cannot afford to go against the public opinion of according highest priority to developmental goals. Defence needs have to be fulfilled from within, not totally by depending on outside powers. This has been and continues to be the policy of Indian Government.

The case of Pakistan is diametrically opposed to its Indian counterpart. Lacking any democratic tradition and mass base at home its leadership has completely tied itself to one power - the United States.

This drift towards the United States and West, itself was the result of poor domestic conditions prevailing in Pakistan immediately after independence. The most distinctive and negative aspect of its creation was its division into two wings-East and West separated by foreign land-India. This strange geography was the product of religious basis of partition. "Pakistan was at its creation" says Wilcox, "a country of two parts related to one another only by a common faith".³ In the words of Jinnah it was a "moth eaten truncated" version of the original design of the state. Apart from strange geography, economically also Pakistan was very weak. Wilcox describes the state of Pakistan immediately after independence in these words: "It contained 86 million people, with almost no industrial

3. Ibid., p.94.

base from which to begin national economic growth or on which to build a defense capacity. The total electrical generating capacity of the country in 1947 was only 75,000 k.w.h. and banking was completely in British and Hindu hands. Of the 487 offices that existed in Pakistan's territory before independence, only 69 remained thereafter. Although East Pakistan fields produced 75 per cent of the jute of British India, there was not one jute textile mill in the entire area that fell to Pakistan. Of the 395 cotton mills in British India, Pakistan inherited only 14. The country had no coal, iron ore, oil, natural gas etc. Just as the agriculture of Indus valley depended wholly upon waters from India, the industry and services of all Pakistan required access to Indian fuel, raw materials, factories and markets. After all communal riots and the Kashmir war India was the main enemy.⁴ Thus because of poor economic conditions Pakistan had no other alternative but to look to outside power for help and since American help was readily available it drifted towards it.

Besides on account of the vulnerability of democratic tradition at home, the stranglehold of military and bureaucracy over the domestic and foreign policy of the country increased. The most unfortunate happening in this regard was the demise of two most powerful and popular leaders of Pakistan — M.A. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan in the early years which paved way for military-bureaucratic

4. *Ibid.*, p.98.

dictatorship for the democratic leaders thereafter lacked a wide enough base for effective leadership. The first Constituent Assembly which started its work in 1947 was dissolved in 1954 after seven years of work on the ground that it had lost the confidence of the people. Thereafter every ruler of Pakistan has tried to give it a new constitution based on his own policies and not on national interests. Gradually with the passage of time, military and bureaucracy became very strong so much so that coups became a recurrent phenomenon leading to political instability and weakening of democratic base.

Internationally instability in Pakistan also increased due to the demand for autonomy by Pakhtoons and Baluchis. The problem is complicated by Afghanistan's concern for the welfare of the Pakhtoons.

Another factor is Pakistan's attitude towards India. The primary reason for Pakistan's distrust of India is a distinct feeling that till now it has not been able to establish her national identity and even after 35 years of independence she is still in the process of establishing her personality. It has been the constant endeavour of Pakistan to prove that the idea that led the Muslim League to seek Pakistan is sound and still holds good. Therefore Pakistan has rejected all Indian plans for cooperation, for its leaders know that once they agree to normalise relations with India, the very *raison d'etre* for the

partition would be lost. Further the Indian factor is also necessary for the survival of military bureaucratic leadership at home. Having failed to make progress at home, it is the best way of diverting the attention of the people.

The main aim behind the creation of Pakistan was to provide Indian Muslims more freedom to express their religious faith. This aim, however has been outweighed by its security considerations and its operational motto has become, "First the garrison, then the Muslim ideal". The garrison has become important because of dissidents of Pakhtoons, Baluchis, Pathans etc. and danger from India.

"Pakistan's' foreign and domestic policies, from the time the military regime was installed through external support, represent the classic example of decision making by a largely parasitical elite, that in the absence of any mass base at home, seeks to resolve its problem of legitimacy by stoking and pandering to, populist sentiments based on religious and other primordial identities as well as by forging and fortifying external economic, political and most important military linkages as a substitute for domestic political support."⁵

5. Ashwari K. Ray, "Pakistan Today : The American Stranglehold", World Focus , vol.2, no.3, March 15, 1981, pp. 13-17.

Like Pakistan, Bangladesh which was born in 1971 has military dictatorship and democratic tradition established by its founding father - Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has been completely eroded. Bangladesh is extremely poor, lacking any major resources and industrial base at home. This domestic setting makes it necessary for it to look to other powers and makes it vulnerable for being used as a pawn in their foreign policies.

Security Politics Paradigm in South Asia.

Defence is the first priority of every state - whether small or large, developed or developing. In case of developed countries the enemy is not so close and moreover their economy is sufficiently developed to generate necessary outputs for the security for the country and maintenance of huge arms. In case of developing countries the issue of security is complicated for the enemy is next door. This situation is the product of western scramble for concession which led to arbitrary division of the countries. The enemy being next door, constant vigil has to be kept and this requires huge defence establishments at the cost of other important and indispensable tasks. To take the case of South Asian countries, all the countries - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka - were under western domination under one empire but the British before leaving

the sub-continent divided at arbitrarily into small states to keep alive their interests. Thus were laid the foundations of regional conflicts and tensions.

Defence of a country arises from its security needs. Any independent country which is intent on developing and maintaining a modern defence establishment is faced at the outset and then at every successive stage, with a set of practical problems. These are grouped under two heads by D.Vital.⁶

- (i) Those posed by the nature of modern weapons and;
- (ii) Those which arise out of the impossibility of maintaining a wholly defence industry. To him the first category is the fundamental one; the second is consequent upon it.

The security politics of South Asia has to be analyzed keeping in view this background. The security of countries in the region are reconciled in two ways: (1) Firstly the small states of the region adjust their policies to that of the largest one for they see no threat to their security from that country as for instance relations between India-Bhutan, India-Nepal, India-Sri Lanka. This however does not preclude differences over some issues that might arise in course of time; (2) Secondly, a state may face the largest country on the basis of parity or equality, as for

6. D. Vital, The Inequality of States - A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p.63.

example India and Pakistan.

Thus in South Asia main security problems are between India and Pakistan. The security problems were written large in the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan consisted of two parts separated by foreign land-India. Thus genuinely it had to be afraid of India. Besides, India had never accepted the religious basis of partition, which the Pakistani leaders sought to justify. So right from the very beginning Pakistan was in search of its separate identity and wanted to establish its distinct individual personality. It is because of this that Pakistan has been shuttling between South and West Asia, identifying itself with either according to its convenience. The disappearance of democratic tradition and passing of power directly into the hands of military-bureaucratic elite further complicated problems for Pakistan. Since dictatorship is inherent in every military rule, the military rulers in order to gain popular support and to keep themselves in power took foreign help, mainly from the United States by painting India as the villain of peace. It is to be noted that security interests have taken precedence over Islamic fundamentalism and Pakistan in order to assert its parity with India attacked it three times starting as early as 1947 and ending up in 1971 with the creation of

Bangladesh. In all these wars it was Pakistan who attacked India first and started the war. This is proved by Mr. Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan's statement made during his election campaign in 1967 wherein he said, "If Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah was wrong in starting the 1947 war with India, then I am also wrong in starting the 1965 war with India".⁷

The main points of differences between India and Pakistan immediately after partition were Kashmir, Rann of Kutch and distribution of waters of rivers flowing via Punjab. While the problem of Rann of Kutch was solved after 1965 war with the help of International Tribunal and that of distribution of waters was solved by 1971 agreement, Kashmir problem still remains alive.

The basic problem between India and Pakistan is not that of security but that of rulers perception of that security. The military-bureaucratic leadership in Pakistan having failed to achieve anything concrete at the domestic front, has found in the slogan 'threat from India' a best way of diverting the attention of the people. Such a pretext is also essential for the survival of military junta there.

7. Quoted in the "Editorial" of Free Press, February 1, 1982.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a serious threat to South Asia particularly Pakistan. The Rand Corporation study on the "Security of Pakistan" mentions the following security threats:

1. Afghan and Soviet support for separatist movements along the Baluch and Pathan populations of Pakistan.
2. Soviet air and artillery strikes at refugee camps across the border.
3. An attempt by Soviet or Afghan forces to seize a salient portion of Pakistani territory in the Frontier.
4. A Soviet sponsored attack by India against Pakistan.
5. A coordinated Indian-Soviet-Afghan attack designed to fragment Pakistan along ethnic lines.⁸

Despite Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's main preoccupation is still with India. Dangers from India continue to be the main pretext for Pakistan-United States military relationship and import of huge military equipments from United States. Though United States has given \$ 3.2 billion worth of aid to meet Soviet threat,

8. Francis Fukuyama, "Security of Pakistan - A Trip Report", by Rand Corporation, September, 1980, p.v.

yet the stationing of Pakistani troops clearly indicates its pre-occupation with India. The report says thus: "Of the Pakistani Army's six corps head-quarters, only one (with two infantry divisions) is located along the Afghan border. The remaining five, which control all of the country's armor, face India."⁹ The Pakistan Government even refused United States national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's plea to change the deployment from east to west to meet Soviet threat.

It is to be noted that in no way is United States concerned with Pakistan's security vis-a-vis Soviet Union. It is concerned, "with the survival of the pro-west and conservative sheikhs in the oil rich Gulf".¹⁰ Pakistan is amply serving this interest in the region.

The main threat to India's security comes from not only overwhelming military machines and dynamic social concepts but also by the, "lengthening shadows of the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon looming large on the country's horizon".¹¹ India doesnot experience any threat

9. Ibid., p.8.

10. Op.cit., Girilal Jain.

11. Dr. V.K. Anand, "The Pincers on India - Turn Threat to India's Security", Working Paper submitted during a Symposium on Challenge to International Security, Sponsored by the 'Group of Eighty', p.11.

from Pakistan as such for it feels that Pakistan is too weak to do anything. What India is worried about is the induction of arms in Pakistan by the United States and other powers. It has been India's experience that whenever Pakistan has acquired arms from outside it has used them against India. It is because of this reason that India's Prime Minister has raised this issue in all important meetings of leaders of not only Pakistan but also that of the United States, and so also India decided to go in for the purchase of weapons from France and Russia.

As far as China is concerned, it is to be noted that Chinese leadership right from 1949 has been interested in making China at least Asian great power if not a Super Power. Accordingly it has been their ambition to curb India's growing influence and power in the region by either supporting Pakistan or by aiding and helping the insurgents in the Indian frontier states along Indo-Burmese-border. It can be suggested, for example that the Mizo insurgency could not be checked by India because of Chinese help to them. To quote an Indian defence expert: "The recent killing of at least 21 Indian army men during a masterly ambush sprung in Manipur allegedly by the 1,000 strong National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) under the Maoist T.N.Wahivah is a grim pointer."¹²

12. Ibid., p.6.

The same defence expert also sees a serious security threat to India from Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He feels that if at any stage the Russians decide to leave Afghanistan, they would be leaving behind numerous fighting factions not only in Afghanistan but also in the adjoining North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchi tribal areas of Pakistan which will convert the whole area into a danger zone of conflict and tension thus seriously threatening India's security.

Soviet Union has become a permanent factor in India's strategic thinking and has much the same position which United States occupies in Pakistan's thinking. Rajan Menon says: "In terms of India's security concerns, the Soviet Union plays a dual role as a direct supplier of arms and as a licensor of certain classes of military hardware produced in India".¹³ Besides it also provides moral support to India on issues like Kashmir.

Constraints of Relationships with Super Powers.

This being the state of affairs, it follows that the relationship between great and small powers is unequal, that the flow of aid from the developed to the developing

13. Rajan Menon, "India and Soviet Union : A New Stage of Relations", Asian Survey, vol. xviii, no. 7, July 1978, pp. 31-50.

countries whether in the form of technology, capital or military equipment is not a smooth and simple process but a complicated one, in which the developing countries are forced to surrender and sacrifice much of their scarce resources and are required to tow their lines in every sphere relating not only to domestic politics but also to international affairs. In sum aid is given with many political, economic and military 'strings' attached to it. In short, it means that there are lot of constraints in relationship with Super Powers. This picture emerges very clearly by examining Indo-Soviet relationship on the one hand and Pak-American relations on the other. Of the two countries - India and Pakistan - India is much more independent in its foreign policy postures as due to its policy of non-alignment it is not wholly and solely dependent on one power, rather it is free to move to other side. Pakistan, since its inception came out openly in support of United States and the West, the other option of going to Communist states, remain thus closed.

Economic aid may be in the form of export of capital by creation of mixed companies, imposing agreements or creation of international private funds, consortiums and corporations. Foreign trade is also used as a means

of gaining control of markets and raw materials in South Asian countries. These countries are used as dumping grounds for surpluses which not only lead to the stagnation in local agricultural production, disorganise the market, causes losses in state budget but also promotes deeper penetration of the economy. No one can overlook the fact that the wheat supplied by the United States to India under the PL-480 agreement was of extremely low quality one that had been rejected in the United States itself. The example of DDT also proves the point. It has been dumped into the Third World countries where it is in continuous use though its use has been banned in the United States for being harmful to human beings. Super Powers often resort to the creation of assembling plants and trading bases thereby creating the illusion of promoting the development of local industries, but in fact they make the countries dependent on them for the purchase of machine and equipment at prices dictated by them.

Further the trade between the Super Powers and South Asian countries is unbalanced for the Super Powers are interested in selling their products without taking the products of small states (Protectionism). This is proved by the pattern of Indo-American trade. Norman D. Palmer

thus quotes from Economic Times: "Indeed, India's contribution to total United States imports declined from 1.2 per cent in 1966 to 0.53 per cent in 1977."¹⁴ Further the Super Powers, in order to discourage the free flow of other countries goods adopt protectionist policies. As for example, the South Asian countries are very rich in jute and tea and these are the foreign exchange earning items. But the Super Powers have developed substitutes for them so as to curtail their sale in their countries.

Military aid is another form of controlling a country. As M.S. Venkataramani writes: "The donor is interested in identifying potential recipient countries whose location, facilities or resources are important for his own security objectives."¹⁵ Military aid may be in the form of grant aid, equipment, training of personnel etc. The military aid programme is evolved to force the recipient to adopt a friendly and cooperative attitude towards the donor and in turn provide it with such facilities as it may require.

There are lot of constraints attached to military aid programmes. "One of the problem that arises where

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14. Norman D. Palmer, "Indo-American Relations : The Politics of Encounter", Orbis, (Summer, 1979), pp. 403-20.
15. M.S. Venkataramani, "ABC of Arms 'Aid' Ties", Times of India, 3 February, 1982.

weapons must be drawn from foreign sources stems from the high probability that they will not be fully suitable or appropriate to the specific tactical needs of the nation in question. The second difficulty is that a state so placed can not always obtain even an approximation to its requirements."¹⁶ The reason for this may be political or economic or bound up with secrecy or non-availability due to producer nations refusal that it has to cope up with its requirements or that of its allies. Besides once the arms are purchased, the buying countries become dependent on the supplying country for the supply of spare parts. Further weapons cannot even be tested before their purchase. The buyers go by the official reports about the weapons. "Recently an air delegation went to the Soviet Union, among other matters wanted to look at the MIG-31 and MIG-33, now under tests, the Soviets even refused to show us the fighters."¹⁷

Military aid programme serves important aims of the Super Powers. The training aid is seen by the Great Powers as an important means of maintaining their influence

16. Op.cit., D.Vital, pp.72-73.

17. "Editorial", The Times of India, 7 January, 1982.

in the Third World countries where military sector has risen to great political importance. "Through training aid, armies in developing states and especially their officers, can be indoctrinated with the aiding state's ideas about the role of the army in politics, the proper ordering of society, the nature of world politics and other major issues."¹⁸ Besides, it serves two important economic purposes for Super Powers. Firstly it generates employment opportunities and thus keep the economy on its wheels. Secondly sophisticated weapons which involve huge expenses cannot be manufactured unless they are exported. So export of weapons is necessary to meet the Research and Development cost of new weapons.

The implications of military and economic aid are political. The Super Powers are interested in keeping those regimes in Power who are willing to accept their terms and conditions. The most important constraint of relationship with Super Powers is the loss of freedom and independence in foreign policy postures and at home also. To quote Mr. Bhutto: "Foreign domination has been replaced by foreign intervention and the power to make

18. F.S. Northedge (ed.), The Use of Force in International Relations, (Faber and Faber, 1974), p.153.

Decisions radically affected the lives of our people has been curtailed by the canons of Neo-colonialism".¹⁹ This is particularly true of Pakistan. "The Pakistani 'military-bureaucratic elite' has, over the years, been reduced to a kind of captive sellers market for the American administration which has the option to determine among competing rivals on whom to bestow its favours and on what terms."²⁰ The process began with Mohammad Ali Bogra and reached its peak with the exist of Agha Shahid.

The dependence of the ruling elite for its strength on foreign aid, military and economic has washed off its bargaining power and this alliance with the United States has been at the cost of its vital national interests. It has not only prevented the emergence of democratic government. In Pakistan but has also drawn Pakistan in all the cold war conflicts be it American hostages in Iran, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq war, Arab-Israeli conflict and Polish crisis.

19. Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.5.

20. Op.cit., Ashwani K.Ray, p.14.

Thus Pakistan serves American interests well.

In fact, "Pakistan after the Shah of Iran's capitulation is indispensable as the key 'forward defence area' and a 'front line state' in the Reagan administration's policy of 'containment refurbished'".²¹

An alarming symptom of dependence upon a Super Power of the political elite of a developing country is the general sense of frustration produced as a result of a pervasive fear of being victimised as a result of the loss of diplomatic and political flexibility. A keen observer of Pakistani foreign policy and security affairs, S.H. Naghmi raises the critical question of anti-Super Power attitudes in the following words: "Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is a product of the changing relationship between the two countries and it owes its existence to the despair and frustration of a disappointed and disillusioned people."²² The Super Power game has a tendency to bring up awkward issues in which the negotiating flexibility of a regional power like Pakistan is lost. Every transaction is looked upon by the Super Power ultimately in relation to the disparities in the Super

21. Ibid., p.17.

22. Naghmi, S.H., "Pakistan-U.S. Relations", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.26, no.3, September 1982, p.522.

Power strategic balance. This process creates imbalances at the regional level which become a disturbing feature and impede the process of negotiation at the regional level. The lack of mutuality with the Super Power produces a pervasive feeling that the regional power's options are being unduly restricted.

Doctrinal approaches provided by either Super Power cannot overcome the problems of asymmetrical pressures outlined above. It is only through a new context of regional political agreements that the potential for spillovers from the Super Power strategic balancing process can be avoided. In place of doctrinal rigidities, the regional powers have to take concrete measures which may create a new balance among the regional decision-making centres. Priorities must be established in line with the general democratisation of international relations.

Economic Issues and Decision-Making.

No country whether small or big can hope to fulfil all its needs from within its own territory. But the difference between small and big country is that the smaller a country the narrower the range of its domestic resources. But the range of its needs multiply with the higher level of economic and social development. To Vital: "the needs

are also likely to vary to some extent with the intensity of the political difficulties it experiences in its foreign relations; these can easily lead to the drawing up of great lists of military requirements which can be met only partly by local industry, perhaps not all".²³ This wide range of requirements need either foreign assistance on a very large scale or extensive foreign trade. Both these options, however are not smooth specially the latter one due to adverse conditions like the policy of protectionism and trade barriers prevailing in the developed countries. The prospects for the first option are also not bright for foreign assistance is given with many strings attached to it.

Ever since the end of the Second World War and the multiplication of actors on the international scene, economic issues have come to the forefront more particularly after the decline of cold war in 1960s. At present economic needs are sought to be met with the help of foreign policy. It is owing to this growing importance of economic issues that no government whether democratic or autocratic can afford to lose sight of them and it would not be wrong to conclude that only those governments which have failed

23. Op.cit., Vital, p.39.

to achieve any economic development inside the country, have took the help of enemy next door to divert the attention of the people and thus keeping military issues at the forefront. This is particularly true of Pakistan.

While economic issues alone do not influence policy formulation as political factors also affect such a process, both are complementary to each other in the sense that political power is used to achieve economic goals and economic power is used to further political objectives. Economic strength assumes special importance in a Great Power-Small Power relationship where latter in need of technology and capital submits to the power of the large partner. This is true of all the South Asian countries because all of them suffer from these twin problems.

Economic issues in decision making became important only lately. In the past the South Asian countries were fighting against colonialism and racialism and developed a politico-centric view. According to an important Indian economic decision-maker: "more and more it is realised by every country that in International relations, economic factors are very very important due to the realisation of economic interdependence and the problems of foreign

trade, capital inflows and other similar things."²⁴ The two most important economic needs of a country engaged in economic development, according to him are "flows of capital and technology from outside and the earning of foreign exchange to pay for them through exports".²⁵ The scarcity of these two vital ingredients of economic development has made the countries of South Asia dependent on their supplier and this dependence crystallises in tilts or friendly attitude towards them. The example of tilt of Pakistan towards United States and that of friendly attitude of India towards the Soviet Union. To my question whether economic issues are behind India's tilt towards Soviet Union, Mr. L.K. Jha said: "why do you assume tilt. Its only good relations. It began mainly with political considerations but later economic content also came into the picture and Soviet Union is the major country cooperating with India in building India's heavy industrial complex".²⁶

To a question whether Pakistan's favour for Western alliance and India's for non-alignment was mainly due to economic necessities of the country, Mr. L.K. Jha replied in the negative. To him it was India's desire to keep away from power blocs and not to become a "camp-follower"

24. Interview with Mr. L.K. Jha.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

that led it towards non-alignment. In his perception the economic factor was not the major one, it was important only in the sense that India wanted peace to pursue the developmental goals at home.

Undoubtedly the economic factor is the one that not only brings countries closer to each other as the European Economic Community but in the long run it also tends to solve the security dilemma. Thus we find today that as the economic conditions of the South Asian countries have improved they are talking of promoting regional economic cooperation to increase their bargaining power. Thus India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh decided to form a group for the production and sale of jute and tea. This change in the attitude, according to Mr. L.K. Jha is mainly due to the fact that previously all the countries were exporting primary products and so there was a sort of competition among them but today India being the most developed of all the South Asian nations has the capacity to export manufactured goods including plants and machinery. So there is complementarity of interests. Today we consider economic cooperation as the most feasible one, one that should precede all other forms of cooperation.

Economic cooperation assumes importance particularly when the countries of the region are beset with local wars.

It is seen as a means of bringing nations together and overcoming the suspicion and fears that surround the minds of decision-makers in each country and thus reconcile their security interests in the long run. The fact has to be kept in mind that arms which are bought to meet the security needs eat up major resources and earnings of the South Asian countries. Thus security needs are met at the great cost of their economic development at home. The decision makers have to decide how much money can their economy permit to be spent on arms. But since security interests acquire precedence over economic interests, such questions run into oblivion. So economic cooperation can not only free the decision makers of this dilemma but can also give economic issues a priority over political and security interests in decision-making. If economic issues are given due priority in decision-making which they deserve specially in the case of developing countries, it would further the establishment of the New International Economic Order, for which they are fighting.

Strategic Interests and Prospective Trends.

Asia, more particularly West and South Asia, has emerged as the main arena of Cold War and Super Power conflicts after Europe. South Asia acquires a place of special importance in the wake of Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan because of its strategic location which not only grants an access to South Asian countries but also gives a control over the West Asian affairs. Thus in the north of South Asia we find the Soviets sitting in Afghanistan and as a result of which America has started rearming Pakistan and in the South we witness massive Super Power build up in the Indian Ocean. In this atmosphere of arrival of the Second Cold War and intensification of Super Power rivalry which is manifesting itself in South Asia, it is imperative for the South Asian countries to secure themselves against these moves.

The Pakistani strategic predicament in this changed environment consists of: "The disproportion in the Indian and Pakistani battle orders; The Durand Line passing through tribal-administered territories in the North-West Frontier Province that leave the border with Afghanistan unsealable and therefore unpoliceable; the narrowness of the country which leaves it open to an easy offensive by Indian military emplacements; the nascent irrendist movements within Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan which need only a spark to be set aflame; the problem of dealing with security threats on an east-west grid while the country's infrastructure lies along the north-south line making rapid deployment of troops and material from the eastern to the western front or vice

versa all but impossible in time of war; and finally, the reality of a politically unstable and economically weak country surrounded by a disintegrating Iran, a threatening Soviet Union in Afghanistan and a militarily self-sufficient and dominant India".²⁷ In spite of all these problems, the main thrust of Pakistan's foreign policy is India. The aim of Pakistani leaders was and still remains to acquire parity with India and Kashmir was chosen to fulfil this aim. But the failure of Pakistan to achieve its goal of acquiring Kashmir through war, has not changed its strategic interest which is still governed by its obsession with India.

India's main strategic interest in the face of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and induction of arms into Pakistan is to secure its frontiers and to guard its security. For not only has Pakistan made it clear to the United States officials from time to time including the National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski that Pakistan's main pre-occupation was and still remains India, such statements even if ignored, are reinforced by India's past experiences, which Mrs. Gandhi called "real experience" — that whenever

27. Bharat Karnad, "US Arms and Pak Security — Editorial" The Hindustan Times, July, 1981.

Pakistan acquired arms it chose India as the target of attack of the newly acquired weapons. The Kashmir dispute is but a manifestation of more deeper troubles between the two countries and in this context Indian defence analyst Mr. K. Subramanyam correctly argues that: "Indian history is replete with instances of one of the disputing parties within the sub-continent inviting an outsider for help and assisting the outsider to establish himself within the sub-continent. The present role of Pakistan is viewed in this light by the overwhelming majority of Indians."²⁸ The collusion of China and Pakistan and the formation of China-Pakistan-United States axis is a testimony to this fact. Not only did Pakistan part with a substantial portion of territory of Azad Kashmir in return for petty gains from China by Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement of 1963 but more recently China is supplying arms to Pakistan and also contributing in the construction of the Karakoram Highway. Recently there were news of signing of a protocol between China and Pakistan for the opening of the Khunjerab pass in Karakoram Highway in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. India lodged its protest against this. All the three — United States, China and Pakistan

28. K. Subramanyam, "The Asian Balance of Power in the Seventies — An Indian View", IDSJ Journal, 1968, p.15.

are working on the thesis — "My friends' enemy is my enemy". Accordingly India is wary of Chinese designs in the region which consist of "an attempt to weaken the central government to encourage centrifugal forces, and to look for eventual creation of a number of separate states on the Indian sub-continent at least some of which would move into close alliance with Peking".²⁹ In pursuance of these objectives we find that China is instigating and supporting Naga and Mizo rebels in the North East frontier states in India.

Further India is also threatened by the Super Power build-up in Indian Ocean particularly installation of weapons on the Diego Garcia mostly nuclear, attempt to get R and R (Rest and Recreation) facilities at Trincomale in Sri Lanka etc.

India's strategic interest therefore lies in keeping the Super Powers out of South Asia so that they are not able to alter the existing balance of power. The interest that is common to all the countries of the region is to maintain their non-aligned status and independence of foreign policy and not dance to the tune of other powers.

Keeping in view these trends one can safely predict for future that Soviet Union would not pull out from

29. Ibid., p.24.

Afghanistan unless situation stabilises there and the Communists or Communist backed regime acquires power there. Pakistan therefore would remain vulnerable to this pressure. It being already weak politically and economically, will always look for United States' help and so its influence from the region will never vanish away. On the contrary since there is no likelihood of elections being conducted in Pakistan or in other words the return of democracy which will separate its foreign policy from its global ally, American influence will go on increasing. President Reagan made it very clear to Mrs. Gandhi during her recent visit to United States that the United States in no condition can terminate arms aid to Pakistan. In fact Pakistan is an important part in the American global perspective and it would be foolish to expect that United States would give up its interests in the region particularly when the Soviets are sitting in Afghanistan. The intensification of military activity in the region can in the later stages lead to the formation of military pacts and alliances at the regional level on the lines of NATO.

The differences between and among the South Asian countries will go on increasing for the countries are

showing no interest in solving issues and problems bilaterally. On the one hand Pakistan raised the issue of Kashmir in the United Nations Human Rights Commission at Geneva just when the successful round of talks on No-War Pact had concluded in New Delhi and on the other hand Bangladesh's Martial Law administrator General Ershad has said openly that he would never give up his claim over New Moore Islands and would raise the issue in the international forums. These moves, however do not brighten the prospects of South Asian Cooperation which everyone aspires for.

Chapter - IV

CONTROL OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH ASIA

Global and Regional Dimensions of Detente.

The period of confrontation and conflict between the two Super Powers -- United States and Soviet Union as connoted by the term 'Cold War' in the 1950's gave way to reconciliation and understanding in the 1960's which is denoted by the term 'Detente'. 'Detente' is a French word which means relaxation of international tensions. It is based on commonality and mutuality of interests of the two Super Powers in the avoidance of a nuclear war to save mankind. The process of detente between them started after the Cuban Missiles Crises of 1962 which revealed that any direct confrontation between them would not only destroy the world but also the destroyers themselves. Thereafter an understanding grew and each Super Power started recognising each others mutual sphere of influence and gave a free hand in them. As a result of this understanding a number of agreements were concluded like Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), Civil Air Agreement between Soviet Union and the United States providing for reciprocal flights between New York and Moscow, the Consular Treaty between them, Non-Proliferation Treaty, ABM Treaty, SALT I and SALT II. Apart from cooperation in the field of arms, there was greater cooperation in economic field.

However, detente did not last long and second cold war started after the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in late 1979. Theodore Draper in his article "Appeasement and Detente" has drawn an analogy between appeasement of 1930's and detente of 1970's. He believes that though the original purpose involved in both the policies was sound, yet in the end they just turned out to be 'dirty'. In case of appeasement, British Prime Minister Chamberlain felt proud of having succeeded in containing Hitler by parting off with a portion of Czechoslovakia through Munich agreement. But barely six months had passed when in March 1939 Hitler not only annexed whole of Czechoslovakia but also made Slovakia and Cartho Ukraine as German protectorates and ultimately this led to the Second World War. The reason for this was that "appeasement could not appease the unappeasable".¹

Thus appeasement became a bad word. Likewise detente has got a bad name because of its wrong use. The theory of detente as developed was based on the concept of linkage of economic, political and military aspects. But detente failed in its military aspect because the agreements concluded between them fall far short of curtailing on ongoing arms-race.

1. R. Conquest and others (eds.), Defending America, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1977), p.4.

The Americans had always held that the factors motivating Russia towards detente were primarily economic the decline in the rate of growth and productivity and a desire to 'catch-up' with the Western technology. Thus Soviet Union developed a stake in detente for economic reasons - the necessity of structural change in their economy with Western help and the prospects for it were brightened when Henry Kissinger made clear to them that they could get credit and privileged treatment, "if they engaged in what we considered responsible international behaviour"² even before the conclusion of agreements. Such incentives proved futile and served the same purpose as that of appeasement. Despite generosity Soviet Union upheld its right to support national liberation movements and justified its intervention. Thus detente had limited itself to the prevention of nuclear war.

The detente at global level failed in its various dimensions particularly military and political not because of faults in the concept but because of unwillingness of powers involved. This however does not mean that the process can not be started again. Further if detente is established at regional level among various countries, it

2. Ibid., p.2.

would logically lead to detente at the global level.

To take the case of South Asia the prospects for regional detente in sociological and psychological terms are bright because of common past experience and common problems provided they can develop modalities of co-operation. Cooperation can be much more natural in South Asia than in Western Europe which led to the formation of European Economic community.

The regional dimension of detente was explored in a preliminary way at the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries of the Seven South Asian countries at Colombo in Sri Lanka in April 1981. The economic gains from this developing relationship could only be achieved if structural changes were achieved by linking the interests of all the countries. The initial hypothesis which was accepted by the Secretaries was to develop a modest list of goals without intrusion of contentious issues. This was reflected in the five study groups set up:

<u>Study Group</u>	<u>Coordinator</u>
Agriculture	Bangladesh
Rural Development	Sri Lanka
Telecommunications	Pakistan
Meteorology	India
Health & Population	Nepal

From a regional point of view the detente process does not require that all constraints on cooperation among the regional powers must be removed at one go. On the contrary there are ideological and political obstacles which can only be overcome gradually. The methodological problems of cooperation were correctly stated by the then President of Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman, when he first mooted the idea of South Asian cooperation. The changing and unstable environment of the region could be the result of divergent perceptions which had created a gulf between the actors in the regional arena. But this gulf could be bridged by fashioning new relationships taking advantage of common values which were rooted in the "social, ethnic, cultural and historical traditions". Again if regional detente develops constructively the Super Powers would not be tempted to develop intense inter-bloc competition in the South Asian region.

The emergence of new options in the economic field have been perceived by key decision-makers. For example in his important address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (June 11, 1981) the Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao summed up the new trends: "I would, therefore, suggest that we move towards free

exchange in the economic field. I also believe that if we were to promote thorough going academic exchanges, the greater cross-fertilisation of ideas would gradually and irreversibly lead to a more sympathetic and mutual understanding, at a deeper and more profound level."³

The principal disagreement among concerned scholars appears to be over the primacy of general detente versus military detente. Although the race for arms contributes to the raising of tensions, yet a major review of interests and policies cannot be made with the help of the military factor alone. The advantage of economic cooperation is that the development of a regional trading system is likely to help in the creation of unifying bonds among economic groups in the various countries and help promote the development of equilibrium conditions within the region. The promotion of multilateralism within the region in turn generates an appropriate psychological climate which generates popular support for the development of direct foreign investment and technology transfer which can lead to longterm benefits.

The tendency to isolate one dispute, example the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, cannot be

3. Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao's Address to Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Foreign Affairs Records, July 1981, p.189.

itself promote stability in the region. A simplistic view was offered by Mr. Agha Hilaly, the Pakistani representative when he raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting. Comparing Kashmir with Palestine and Namibia only show that such an approach centres on winning tactical advantages and does not provide guidelines for policymaking for a new situation of political interdependence in the region. South Asian states have, therefore, to develop a "peace process" which would reduce the potential for further regional conflict and not weaken the strategic position of any of the regional powers. Thus in the case of Kashmir the paradigm for promoting regional stability should specify:

First, that the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir should not be violated;

Secondly, the two countries should settle all their differences without exacerbating tensions and in the case of Kashmir mutual threats should be avoided while bilateral and peaceful means are explored; and

Thirdly, on no account should either side indulge in warlike acts or propaganda which would promote volatile developments in the region and be detrimental to peaceful and harmonious relations.

The premise on which regional detente can be strengthened can only be that all parties engage in coherent peace making through normal diplomacy. A sharpening

confrontation through any talk about "Jehad" or holy war is to betray a lack of confidence in the future of the interdependent regional relationship. Such reckless propaganda can only tear into shreds the delicate fabric of regional understanding.

Soviet and American Conceptions of Regional Settlement in South Asia.

The two Super Powers because of global interests are not truly interested in complete peace anywhere in the world and the settlement of all the living disputes. Had their intentions been true to this cause United Nations would not have failed and most of the international disputes which are not fresh would have been solved and peace established by now. Their concept of peace is partial peace and their concept of regional settlement is temporary or partial settlement. They do not want any permanent settlement for that would deprive them of the leverage with which they mould the foreign policies of the countries of the region.

This being so it follows logically that it is for the regional powers to foresee the plans of the Super Powers and themselves work for regional cooperation among them. This realisation eludes the minds of decision makers in all the regional countries for it is with their consent

and approval that Super Powers are pursuing their goals in the regions.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan means that it does not believe in leaving a country to its own fate and let the people decide about their future, and the resultant arms induction in Pakistan by the United States shows that the other Super Powers in order to make its presence felt intervenes in regional affairs and does not leave it for the United Nations and other regional Powers together to decide on the future course of action. United States in supplying arms to Pakistan is not interested in its security but in the protection of its own interests in the gulf having lost an ally in Iran. The Americans never feel that by supplying arms to Pakistan they generate an arms race in the region. On the contrary they feel that arms introduces stability in the region. This was made clear by former US Ambassador to India Mrs. J. Kirkpatrick during her address in New Delhi on August 24, 1981 wherein she said: "It is our estimate that, any arms sales that we provide to Pakistan do not engage, do not threaten the security of India and that is why we undertake that policy, we think in fact that they introduce an element of stability rather than instability."⁴ This is yet the only example

4. Kirk Patrick's Address at India International Centre; Official Text, August 24, 1981, pp.1-37.

and history of South Asia is replete with such instances. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has not been solved peacefully even by the United Nations due to the casting of veto by one or the other Super Power on the resolutions of Security Council, thus making it impossible for the United Nations to take some concrete and stern measures. By bringing the issue of Kashmir in the Security Council, the Super Powers wanted to show to the world that they are the guardian of peace, truly interested in settling the issue and establishing peace but by preventing the adoption of its resolutions they clearly revealed their intentions of not being interested in the solution of conflict. Not only this, all the wars between India and Pakistan have been fought with the weapons from the two Super Powers. As the wars of 1965 and 1971 became intense both of them stopped arms supply to both India and Pakistan lest it spreads and involve them in direct confrontation. Thus on the one hand they showed their interest in promoting rivalry but to a limited extent and on the other hand they terminated the war in between thus keeping alive the conflict and not solving it fully.

The Military Framework : Priorities and Perspectives of South Asian Countries.

Every country has to cater to its defense and security needs either by external means or by internal. Except for a

few advanced countries, all other countries are dependent on external sources for meeting these requirements. These issues assume immense importance, in a condition when the enemy is sitting next door. In these circumstances the first priority in the military field is to entail a continuous supply of arms so as to keep them up to date. All other issues, as for instance economic development are sacrificed and relegated into background. This is true to a greater extent of Pakistan and to a lesser extent of India and other South Asian countries. In fact the perspectives of leaders vary but the variation is drastic in case of military dictatorships. The military leaders, being by nature more aggressive tend to view every episode in military terms. This helps them in consolidating their position by keeping military issues at the forefront. This also supplies them with the pretext of borrowing arms from abroad. However this naturally has another unwelcome affect of instigating an arms race at regional level. For it is foolish to expect other countries to sit quietly and watch the induction of arms in the region. They obviously search another, more viable source to meet the dangers of such borrowings. This is the story of South Asia, specifically India and Pakistan. Arms race between them has been going on for a long time now and such race has entered the nuclear arena also.

Ever since India's explosion of nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974, Pakistan has been determined to explode such a device. It is getting technological assistance from Canada and financial assistance from Saudi Arabia for its project.

The intentions and priorities of the countries — India and Pakistan can be judged from the deployment of troops. India's retired Air Chief Marshal revealed that India has its troops on the Western border and on its border with Tibet from Leh to Arunachal Pradesh. It would thus appear that India fears a danger from Pakistan as well as China. India's army, according to him is based on West and East coasts as they have to protect our trade through the oceans. On the contrary, inspite of having turbulent border with Afghanistan, Pakistan has stationed approximately 80 per cent forces along Indian border. This shows that Pakistan foresees a danger from India than Russians in Afghanistan. Another senior air force officer commented: "The number of troops along Afghanistan border is not even 1/10th of those stationed along Indian border. If they thought the arms were for Afghanistan they should have been placed otherwise. This creates a greater amount of tensions between India and Pakistan."⁵ India's former diplomat

5. Interview with Air Vice-Marshal P.F. Singh, July, 1982.

noted: "India has never attacked Pakistan and there is little chance that it will do so. The problem, up to the present, has been that Pakistan's rulers (generally self-imposed) have sought a military diversion every time the domestic situation has become uncomfortable for them. If Pakistan manages to acquire a popular, stable and confident government this problem should cease."⁶

This being so, no one can deny the predominance of military and defense issues in the minds of decision makers in South Asian countries. This is further corroborated by Pakistan's determination to go nuclear at any cost and for which it is also getting aid-financial and technological from different sources. Besides the countries of South Asia fear each other more than the Super Powers whether they are present in Afghanistan or in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, in spite of Soviet Union sitting next door, fears India more and India fears Pakistan and China more. More notable fact is that these countries trust the Super Powers more than their neighbours. They even enter into alliances and military pacts on the basis of inequality, to their detriment. This is proved by the fact that Pakistan entered into SEATO and CENTO in 1950's and also signed defence pact with the United States. Now after Soviet intervention

6. Op.cit., Mr. G.J.Malik.

in Afghanistan, Pakistan's leaders are trusting Soviet Union when the latter made it clear to the former that it had no intention of attacking Pakistan. They have failed to take India into confidence despite its denial of any plans of attacking it. This clearly shows that military dictatorships are interested in giving priority to military issues at the great cost of the national interests. This forces others also to give priority to such issues.

The Impact of Diplomacy in South Asia and Changes of Perceptions in the Arena of Conflict.

Diplomacy is defined by Harold Nicholson as: "the management of relations by means of negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomat".⁷ Thus diplomacy is intimately bound up with foreign policy for it is for the diplomats to realise the nations foreign policy objectives to the maximum gains and advantage to the country which they represent. Even since the conclusion of First World War with Wilson's fourteen points, the first point "open covenants shall be openly arrived at" heralded the age of Open diplomacy. No longer is diplomacy a closed process and there are a number of influencing and mitigating factors. In this age of modern means of transport and

7. Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy. (New York, 1952), p.19

communication, lot of information is available about every aspect of the other countries. In these circumstances to achieve some gains for the motherland, involve lot of tact and art. Diplomacy involves negotiations. "Negotiation" according to Gilbert R. Winham, "is an enduring art form. Its essence is artifice, the creation of expedients through the application of human ingenuity".⁸ Today negotiation involve not so much the art of outwitting their adversaries, as that of creating structures in which such a wit can be applied. Diplomat today negotiates not alone but with full group of experts. This being so diplomacy is much more complicated today than it was before.

In these changed circumstances, particularly those unleashed by the Second World War, diplomacy has had some positive and welcome affects for the South Asian countries. At least the decision makers of India and Pakistan realised the importance and value attached to diplomacy and preferred to sit across the negotiating tables to solve the issues. The first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947 did not give rise to such negotiations but 1965 and 1971 wars were followed by such diplomatic negotiations the outcome of which were Tashkent and Simla Agreements respectively.

8. Gilbert R. Winham, "Negotiation as a Management Process", World Politics, vol. XXX, no. 1, October, 1977, pp. 87-114.

In fact a process of negotiations has started among and between the South Asian countries on a bilateral and regional level. So we hear of rounds of talks going on between India and Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganges water, India and China on border problem, India and Nepal regarding economic assistance and the most important between India and Pakistan on 'No-War' pact. In the economic field lot of talks take place for regional co-operation. To promote greater co-operation and understanding between and among nations, visits of heads of states and officials of various ministries have been frequent.

The major achievement has been the progress made in the direction of conclusion of no war pact between India and Pakistan. It is here that the impact of diplomacy is most evident.

The visit by Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi to discuss the 'no-war pact' with Indian officials was an important landmark in the process of normalisation of relations between the two countries. It is to be noted that this 'offer' is not something new and its history can be traced to Jawaharlal Nehru's proposal to Liaqat Ali Khan of Pakistan on December 22, 1949 wherein he said: "The government of India and the government of Pakistan,

being desirous of promoting friendship and goodwill between their peoples who have many common ties, hereby declare that they condemn resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future disputes between them". Thereafter the same offer was repeated on various occasions by Indian Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai. The Indian Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathu offered to sign the 'no-war pact' during his Pakistan visit in February 1981.

All Indian offers, however never met with a favourable response from Pakistan. The main hurdle was Kashmir. Pakistan's position on Kashmir has not changed even now and it continues to look at Kashmir as territorial claim. As early as June 1963, Mr. Bhutto declared: "Let India arrive at an equitable and honourable settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir, we can then have not one but a thousand no war pacts..". Similarly rejecting Mrs. Gandhi's no war pact offer President Yahya Khan said: "It is our sincere conviction that amity and friendship will continue to elude India and Pakistan if our two governments run after the shadow that the peripheral issues are and evade the reality that our two outstanding disputes regarding Jammu and Kashmir and the Ganges waters represent..."

The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao pointed out certain contradictions in the Pakistan offer. First of all, the offer was made simultaneously with the formal acceptance by Pakistan of the United States offer for the sale and supply of arms. The official statement in this regard was issued on September 15, 1981 which pointed out Pakistan's readiness "to enter into immediate consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of Simla Agreements." The Pakistan newspaper of September 16, issued in headlines "Positive Turn in Dialogue with USA". The question therefore arises as to how India can be sure of Pakistan's intentions and goodwill? The context in which the offer was made was definitely not able to evoke an immediate positive response from India because an arms deal with a Super Power on the one hand and no-war pact with a regional power on the other appeared to be inconsistent. Further, historical experience of India has also showed that whenever Pakistan acquired arms from any outside power, they were used against India. Finally what can one gather from the fact that the offer was made in an entirely different context -- that of justifying its arms deal with the United States and a few days later, that is on September 21,

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, speaking to pressmen in New York: "categorically denied that Pakistan's offer was in contradiction to its 1951 position that a no war pact should follow the resolution of the Kashmir Dispute". While in January the successful round of talks between the two countries had concluded in which India proposed the establishment of a Joint Commission before the conclusion of the pact, this process was broken by Pakistan's representative in United Nations Human Rights Commission when he raised the issue of Kashmir in Geneva.

Despite these contradictory actions, one can say that at least after so many years since 1949 Pakistan came out with the offer of no war pact thus signalling to India an important change in its strategic thinking and security posture.

The Prospects for Arms Control and Force Reductions.

The prospects for any arms control and force reduction agreement in future in South Asia seem very bleak. As rightly pointed out by an Indian military strategist: "We are in a stage when most leaders talk about disarmament and keep on arming their countries and entering into military pacts. I feel that in the present day world, it

is not practical or possible to limit arms particularly where the level of arms is very low as in the case of some of the Asian countries. In many cases the arms held by many underdeveloped countries is very old and out of date and such armaments are ineffective and also more expensive to maintain. Therefore, the countries have to import arms."⁹ He further opined: "In fact the control of arms has not really worked in any area as there are many dubious ways of selling and importing arms."¹⁰ He cited the example of oil embargo to Rhodesia when in fact the country was getting much more oil than needed from other sources despite it being completely landlocked. He also pointed out that such an agreement is difficult to arrive at for the countries may not agree on the assessment of dangers.

The prospects for arms control and force reduction between India and Pakistan must be related to the strategic environment likely to exist in the 1980s and beyond. The prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, has examined policy decisions in India and Pakistan on the nuclear option in both countries and depicted the logic in the process which would impede or advance the

9. Interview with retired Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, June 1982.

10. Ibid.

process towards nuclearisation. Thus after the Pokharan Test India is at pains to explain its decision-making behaviour in terms of only peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the nature of the present situation with outside pressures building up, Pakistan will initially develop a centrifuge facility and explain its decision-making behaviour as relevant to the scientific progress of Pakistan. The question of a test-explosion will be seen by Pakistani decision-makers not only with the sole criterion of national interest but also after examining the causal links between the objectives of the military establishment and the policy choices judged to be legitimate in the network of communication within the Pakistani political system, in the regional and international environmental structure. The Pakistani nuclear test if and when it takes place will not be viewed by India as a static phenomenon, and therefore it would be natural for Pakistan to win Indian restraint by assuring India that it is suspending further nuclear developments. The study considers the possibility of further testing and nuclear stockpiling but considers such a development unlikely. Political realism could dictate a different set of perceptions to Indian and Pakistani decision makers but it is not our purpose to speculate about changing goal-values on the nuclear issue.

What is more relevant is to point out that it is only through a capacity for innovation that India and Pakistan can avoid a costly nuclear race. Whether they can work out eventually an entente nucleaire it is hardly possible to say with any certainty.¹¹

With the previous experience of strategic instability and after having fought four rounds of war, India and Pakistan can only avoid another round if arms control promotes strategic stability. With better relations and regular exchange of information, the two countries can take preliminary steps to avoid a wholly destructive arms race. To arrive at a stable balance of military capabilities is not an easy matter especially in view of the Pakistani concern with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Each country can tolerate the delivery of advanced military systems only if there is clear recognition of the security interests and there is no effort to apply an offensive operational doctrine. The transfer of vast financial resources from some Arab countries to Pakistan also creates grave uncertainties from the Indian point of view. If the acceleration of the arms race is ruled out, the Pakistanis would have to accept the framework and identity

11. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1979, (London, 1980), pp. 18-20.

as a South Asian power and resist the temptation to develop a role as a Middle Eastern Power.

Agreements between India and Pakistan on demilitarisation in specified areas could also help to defuse political crises and reinforce the moves towards political relaxation. Ultimately political concessions on a reciprocal basis can have a visible effect on international relations and pave the way to effective arms control and force reductions between India and Pakistan.

Chapter - V

C O N C L U S I O N

The Foreign Minister of India, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao observed in his address to the Pakistan Institute of International Relations on June 11, 1981: "It is our belief that the countries of the sub-continent constitute a fraternity, whose destinies are interlinked."¹ Looking at all the various schools of strategic thought in South Asia, relationships at the regional level can only be restructured if existing propositions are challenged at an empirical level. In broad outline new forms of collaboration for regional fraternity envisaged by Narasimha Rao would involve:

1. The existing military links with external powers should not result in drifting towards either limited or general war. Crises when they erupt must be seen as "situational variables" and should be subjected to control techniques decided in advance.
2. It is almost a truism to observe that if decision-makers are to be moved from obsession with military and war-like moves the traditional paradigm has to be changed by providing a framework for intensified cooperation in economic and social spheres. Military behaviour especially of a revanchist variety has to be controlled and modified by institutionalisation of economic and developmental cooperation.
3. No-war pacts or treaties of friendship have to be seen mainly as psychological concepts which have

1. Op.cit., Mr. Narasimha Rao's Address, p.189.

implications for the development of new images. Here it is necessary for decision-makers to base their judgements on a multi-level analysis and move away from the existing one level of explanation in terms of "worst case explanations".

4. Even if full scale agreements cannot be achieved at once, the transmission of new political and economic messages is important. This is important not only in the context of South Asia but of all endeavours to synthesise national efforts with larger processes. To quote the words of an Indian decision-maker: "the concept of New International Economic Order is based on a process of knitting a master-garland of small international or regional economic garlands".² South Asia has to develop a vision of itself as region of economic and technological cooperation in place of the existing nightmare of a trouble-spot region.

The two principal economic options suggested by the Indian decision-maker quoted by us earlier can help in the search of an alternative to adversary politics and disintegrative economic competition:

1. "Acceptance of the idea of a cooperative-cum-guaranteed economic planning, with the main object of optimum exploitation of inter and intra country resources for an accelerated rate of growth". This

2. Charanjit Chanas (ed.), South Asia -- The Changing Environment, (MERB Bookshelf, 1979), "Introduction", p.i.

is so because once the developing countries reach optimum level of growth, they would grow at a more consistent and faster rate. The South Asian countries are rich in important items like jute, tea, rubber. They should try to gain monopoly over their production so that they can dictate their prices.

2. Secondly, "Master Plan for South Asia should be drawn wherein the planners, including the economists, experts, administrators and the policy-makers, should get together and evolve an economic-model based on an optimum level of inter country aid, trade and exchange of technical know-how". South Asian countries can plan setting up a chain of production units for producing parts of different products which could be assembled in a country ideally suited for this purpose, similar to that of European Economic Community. Such economic unity would reduce tensions and vulnerability of the countries.

Strategic Unity of South Asia.

While it is difficult to make precise predictions about the future development of strategic thinking in the South Asian countries, both political and military motives which we have examined in the context of both conflictual and bargaining situations suggest that one can make a number of generalisations confidently:

1. Overcoming problems of "asymmetry" through long range stabilisation:

The inadequacy of existing multilateral institutions and organisations in South Asia is painfully evident. Criticism is often sharply focussed on the asymmetry produced by India's pressures against her smaller neighbours. The hard core of current problems in South Asia have less to do with India's size than with the dynamics of inherited regional rivalries. The tendency has been to ignore the macropolitical and macro-economic developments calling for a common participation by regional decision-makers and rigid political positions have been taken on problems ennumerated by a colonial past. In view of the political and strategic importance of the area it would be counter productive for India to have excessive expectations. On a multilateral basis the political, strategic and economic factors can be harmonised through peaceful negotiated settlements. Long range stabilisation can be promoted by establishing precedents to determine realistically security and arms policies. Various contradictory interests will undoubtedly come into play but they can be accomodated in a system in which the basic perspective of regional cooperation is upheld, through progressive institutionalisation.

2. South Asian patterns of consultation and options for arms restraint:

South Asian decision-makers whether meeting at individual summits or at the Nonaligned conferences and at

the United Nations have been able to develop new relationship structures. Of course sometimes they have had to omit controversial issues from the declarations embodying the results of negotiations. It is true that there has not been any evidence that the present stage of negotiations at bilateral or multilateral level which promises a political breakthrough on the question of arms restraint. Yet at an empirical level we have to take into account both the domestic sources of foreign policy and the trend of political and economic events which show that the South Asian parties concerned are under pressure to negotiate for defusing the aggravated situations. The South Asian countries themselves have initiated a process of interaction at the bureaucratic level and this may eventually help to dissolve the crisis-ridden atmosphere. On the political-diplomatic level summitry has played a large role in determining the new limitations and restraints on military and political dependencies which come in the way of improved regional relationships. It is significant that in her speech to the Foreign Policy Association during the visit to the United States, the Indian Prime Minister pointed out that the externally induced arms race had unlocked a Pandora's box. The Indian perception was that the induction of sophisticated arms in the region and the intense naval rivalry of the big powers in the Indian Ocean had resulted in the Cold War closing

in on the subcontinent. It is not surprising that India's summit diplomacy with the Reagan Administration has focussed on arms restraint, although realistically speaking there was no way of stopping the F-16s already approved reaching Pakistan.

3. The Nuclear Issue - fears and hopes:

Policy planners in both India and Pakistan may not wish precipitate a nuclear arms race, but military thought in both countries has not surprisingly considered the significance of the nuclear factor for defence policy worth nothing. Indian defence thinkers have been concerned with India's vulnerability in case of a Chinese attack with nuclear warheads. The discussion on the provision of a delivery system has been on the Indian agenda for quite sometime. Before reaching any final conclusion on Pakistan's "Islamic Bomb" the strong influence on the evolution of Pakistani strategic doctrine of the precarious dependence of the political system on the military establishment must be taken into account. The nuclear issue in Pakistan is not unrelated to the fears and hopes of the military leadership which provides the cutting edge to general policy-making in that country. It is important therefore to consider separately the military rationale in the strict sense and the general political purpose of Pakistan's nuclear efforts. Pakistan's experience of several wars with India and the separation of Bangladesh

has brought home certain truths about the costs of local and regional confrontation. Even a limited rapprochement between India and Pakistan would generate political reasons for making useful distinctions between nuclear capability and an excess competition which would inevitably escalate into nuclear war with India. The Nuclear issue in South Asia at this stage, therefore, awaits serious political decisions which would make Indian and Pakistani decision in this area predictable for each other. A great deal will depend upon the attitude of the Super Powers and France, Britain and China, and the relationships they develop for enhancing credibility of deterrence and the choices they exercise to relate nuclear and conventional weapons. India and Pakistan are both aware of the burden on their defence budgets of nuclear and delivery system. The international political context of strategic arms limitation talks and the technological competition which produce serious misunderstandings like those over the MX-missile leads to political and strategic arguments for the spread of nuclear weapons. Whatever the sophisticated theoretical logic about the nuclear role of the Super Powers, sharp disagreements among the Super Powers itself produces a momentum for acquiring nuclear striking power to meet local aggression. There can be little doubt that India and Pakistan would have incentives to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the nuclear issue in an international environment in which there was less United States

and Soviet recalcitrance on global nuclear problems than has been the case in the 1980s after the break down of the SALT process. It is doubtful if there will be any re-evaluation either by India or by Pakistan of the Non-Proliferation Treaty giving the extinct military, political and bureaucratic pressures. It is only as a coherent commitment to regional security develops and as regional detente and reconciliation proceeded that the guiding principles of restraint in nuclear matters will come into operation in South Asia. The success of the United States-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which have started in the form of exploratory negotiations at Geneva will also convey a forceful message to South Asian decision-makers.

4. Development oriented policy making and limitation of forces:

A meaningful commitment to development oriented policy making requires economic and technological cooperation on a regional basis. Also from a long term point of view unless the East-West military balance is stabilised by arms control and disarmament the developing countries like those of South Asia will not be able to change their economic circumstances for the better. The rhetoric used by South Asian countries at North-South Forums does not carry conviction unless the top decision makers accept responsibility for limitation of forces and for generating political

will to move towards arms control negotiations. The existing economic development models have raised several urgent problems in the context of the global economic crisis. The viability of the South Asian economies is now inextricably linked with the solution of the energy crisis and therefore their responsibilities and strategic interests cannot be considered in isolation from the changes that are urgently required in their development models. It is only if a new regional peace order is achieved that capital, transfer of technology and higher management styles can be utilised, to strengthen the economies. A development oriented policy based on regional economic cooperation and interdependence requires a widening of the market. The South Asian countries have before them the example of the ASEAN countries who have benefitted from the widening of the home market. It is not logical for the power elites in the South Asian countries to develop ambitious military buildup plans which will check the material improvement of their economies and prevent them reaching a certain level of development which is necessary to ensure public support for government policy.

5. Strategic Unity:

The preceding discussion illustrated the various dimensions of the threatening international situations which exist in South Asia as well as the forces which compel reconsideration of security problems. It is, however, not

enough to make declaratory proposals for improving the prospects for peace and prosperity in South Asia. If interdependence in South Asia is to be generated and economic and technological cooperation is to be promoted, important lessons have to be learnt from the failure hitherto of decision makers to recognise the strategic unity of South Asia. The policies of India and Pakistan in particular have dealt with problems of military balance in a manner which could not relate problems of military policy to the peace process in which national interest can be related to common regional interests. In particular the conditions of stable equilibrium in South Asia cannot be defined unless the concept of strategic unity is grasped. Many proposals such as NewWar Pact offers had in the past a temporary effect and led to disenchantment. Mutual obligations cannot be accepted unless there are agreed parameters, and it is here that the existing approach has failed. If the rationale of military programmes of South Asian countries is linked to a common perception of the strategic unity of the region, the decision makers will be able to cope with development like those arising out of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The Strategic Unity concept can also become a key element in any future arms control approach as well as for crisis management. The influence of the Middle East looms rather large on Pakistan's perspective, but in the

post-Afghanistan phase there was substantial evidence that Pakistani public opinion has definite longing for belonging to a South Asian community and sees close relations in both defense and economy with other South Asian countries including India. The two pulls, one to the Middle East and the other to South Asia would seem to be contradictory and indeed Pakistani decision makers find themselves in a dilemma. But it is not the isolated decision process of one country that will determine the outcome. The strategic and tactical alternatives which will flow once the concept of strategic unity is given a central place will hopefully provide a beneficial contribution to political compromise and adjustment in South Asia.

Avoiding Super Power Confrontation in South Asia.

Any long lasting and stable peace in South Asia can be established only when the countries are self-sufficient and even if they are partially dependent on Super Powers to meet their needs, are able to maintain their independent stances. Super Power intervention in the region is mainly due to the fact that the countries being economically backward depend on them for capital and technical know-how and also being beset with local conflicts are militarily dependent on Super Powers for arms supplies. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which the Russians claim was

due to 'invitation' of the Afghan government, in fact is mainly due to internal weaknesses of the country. Thus R. Rama Rao believes that once the countries of the region learn to live as good neighbours, most of their individual as well as sub-continental problems would be solved. And once the influence of the Super Powers is curtailed, there would be no reason left for their interference in the affairs of South Asian countries. The Indian aim behind Sino-Indian normalisation of relations is to avoid conflict of interests between the two major Asian partners. Likewise, 'Indias' no-war offer to Pakistan which has been renewed from time to time has been aimed at averting the dangers of recurring conflicts in the wake of increasing foreign interference in the region."³

One of the major areas in South Asia of interest and intervention to Super Powers and other equally interested powers is the Indian Ocean. This interest arises from the fact that: "the Indian ocean region contains 90 per cent of the world's natural rubber, tin, jute, and tea and also abundance of cobalt, tungsten, copper, manganese ore, silver, salt, sulphur and coal. Besides being the rice bowl of the world, the region contains about 60 per cent of the world's oil reserves, 90 per cent of diamonds, 60 per cent of the uranium and 40 per cent of gold".⁴ Its strategic

3. G.K. Reddy, The Hindu, 22 January, 1982.

4. Reese M. Paone, "The Soviet Threat in the Indian Ocean", Military Review, vol.12, December, 1970, pp.54-55.

location is no less important, it being the key to seven seas. This geo-political and economic importance of the region has led to intense Super Power rivalry which poses a major threat to the security of littoral and hinterland states.

The American interests in the Indian Ocean have been very well highlighted by the document entitled "US Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installation" brought out by the United States Senate's Foreign Relations Committee in 1979. It says: "the United States has both a conventional and perhaps a strategic nuclear military interests in the Indian Ocean region"⁵ and lists its interests as follows:

1. to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf
2. to employ or threaten force in support of American diplomatic objectives in the middle east
3. to secure the Indian Ocean air and sea routes against harassment or interdiction
4. to intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral states and related to all of these
5. to balance Soviet forces in the region and attain superiority in a crisis.

The interest of Soviet Union in the region is to counter

5. Quoted in K. Subramanyam, "Super Power Interests : The Stake is Raw Material", World Focus, January, 1981, pp. 10-11.

increasing American and Western influence. This rivalry in the Indian Ocean, however poses a serious threat to the countries of Asia and Africa. This was stressed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1981 during her visit to the Lakshadweep and Andaman Islands.

Though we find the presence of Soviet units of navy in the Indian Ocean, yet Moscow's plea all along has been that its presence has been provoked by the presence of the United States battleships most of which are nuclear-weapon carriers. President Brezhnev during his visit to New Delhi in 1981 declared his support for making Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace, provided others also agree. No such assurance has come from the American counterpart. The American plea that its military build-up was the product of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has no ground and can not be accepted for in fact Washington's plans started early in 1979, a year before Soviet armies moved into Afghanistan. One also cannot equate the American naval presence with its Soviet counterpart for the latter has no base in the Indian Ocean and it only has refuelling facilities at some of the ports of "friendly countries". United States on the other hand, not only defied the request of former Prime Minister of Mauritius Sir Seewoosagar Rangoonoo of returning Diego Garcia to it, but has gone ahead with its military programme of equipping it into a full fledged military installation. Washington has also set up a Rapid Deployment Force under a separate military command.

But the irony of the situation is that instead of realising this common danger, the countries of the region are not cooperating in overcoming it, rather they are co-operating with the helping the Super Powers in their plans. The Sri Lanka government is openly cooperating with the American government. Though it has denied having given naval base facilities to the United States, it has agreed to provide R & R (Rest and Recreation) facilities to the United States armed personnel. Reports are also there that United States has planned a giant oil refinery at Trincomalee, the crude for which will come from Saudi Arabia. Thus the United States would be able to use its Rapid Deployment Forces in the event of collapse of regimes in either of the two countries.

The dangers of Super Power confrontation in South Asia can be looked at in several ways depending upon our assessment of the implications of political, military and technological factors. Some of the most difficult operational problems for the South Asian countries may arise from the following developments:

1. Efforts of President Reagan's Administration to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union:

The South Asian countries have to recognise that the Soviet Union and the United States have serious divergence of views on strategic arms limitation and over

many of the pre-conditions of world order. During the period from 1970 to 1972 a serious effort was made by both the Super Powers to give a stimulus to the detente process and a number of agreements were reached. According to the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement of 1972 the Super Powers pledged not to seek to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly. Subsequently a series of events caused the euphoric expectations of detente to disappear, and particularly on the American side the impression has become confirmed that they made a mistake to acquiesce in the strategic Soviet military superiority. With the Reagan Administration it is an article of faith that the United States must match and surpass the Soviet arms build-up. The United States efforts to restore a margin of military power over the Soviets inevitably generates a political psychology which reverse the detente process and reduces the viability of the global system and creates stresses and strains for regional systems like that of South Asia.

2. Limited Warfare strategies and local disputes in South Asia:

The theory of limited warfare is not novel but the manner in which the Soviet-American competition is now affecting the sources of tension and instability in the

Third World gives rise to much apprehension in South Asia. Both the Palestinian issue and the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan have created direct military threats to the populations of the developing world and produced stalemated situations which lead to states of no-war-no-peace on an indefinite basis. Super Power commitments to limited war theories produce a kind of military calculus from which areas like South Asia can only suffer indefinitely. In line with this thinking it is possible for either Super Power to interpret its security interests as requiring the development of interventionist postures whether in the form of limited armed contingents or rapid deployment forces. It is quite clear from recent experience that such moves cannot provide internal stability but can only exacerbate regional tensions. The time may come when either Super Power will pressurise a South Asian power to provide permanent military or naval bases without reference to the actual security needs of the regional power. As arms suppliers the Super Powers also build up pressure on regional powers for purchase of aircrafts, tanks, missiles and naval equipment and as a result political and economic problems of the area are aggravated. The South Asian powers have to stop fooling themselves that "limited war" concepts can promote security. In fact they only increase the danger of the current crisis getting out of hand and lead to the introduction of unpredictable and uncertain factors.

3. Super Power interests and leverage in the Indian Ocean:

The geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean is evident from the contradictions in Soviet and American naval security policies. As world powers both have been uncompromising in pursuing their efforts to dominate the high seas and not prepared to take into account the viewpoints of the littoral states. In the circumstances the decision-makers of the South Asian region are left with no alternative but to persevere with their efforts at the United Nations and try to influence the consultation process through international public opinion. They have to watch helplessly the growth of Soviet and American naval commitments. Here again unless the littoral states develop cooperative arrangements among themselves it would be no surprise at all if in the coming decade the Super Power intervention in the Indian Ocean would reach higher and intolerable levels. The South Asian states have not been able to make early political assessments of Super Power intervention and must accept the blame for dismissing real threats as myths. To take an example from a neighbouring area, Iraq and Iran have been allowing regional instability to be compounded by their volatile reactions to each other, and have been indifferent to the naval buildup by the great powers while their mutual hostilities have continued. In projecting

their vision to future development in the Indian Ocean the South Asian leaders must prevent such contingencies from arising in which Super Powers could threaten regional stability or even the survival of some regional powers.

4. The Chinese role in Soviet-American balance of expectations in South Asia.

The complex problems created by the Chinese role in the Soviet-American balance of expectations must be taken into account if the South Asian decision-makers are to tackle the realignments and conflicts produced by Beijing's policy changes. The Chinese actions in 1962 against India and the example of their subsequent conduct of "teaching a lesson to Vietnam" cannot be understood unless the affect on Asian policies of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle are taken into account fully. The Chinese will continue to take unilateral advantage of the Soviet-American competition and in this sense China will continue to be a 'threat' to the South Asian stability for a long time to come. South Asian states have no alternative of dealing with Beijing but they cannot blindly rely on Chinese assurances that they are now committed to maintaining a stable environment in South Asia. When the Chinese inveigh against the hegemonial pressures from the two Super Powers South Asian countries can legitimately expect support from Beijing

on a number of practical issues. But it would be necessary to take into account the possibility of situations arising when China's role could be disruptive of regional stability. Although China aspires a Super Power status, it is still a country which has a poorly organised economy and has grave deficiencies in intra-structure. China has not yet abandoned its 'people's war' theories and if its effort to achieve economic modernisation does not succeed it could result in reversal of the much-heralded normalisation diplomacy. In the final analysis the South Asian countries have to desist from the temptation of playing the "China card" against each other and insulate their regional policies from Beijing's capricious behaviour. What emerges from this examination of the general implications of the United States-Soviet arms competition is that the South Asian countries are faced with complex structural problems which they can only overcome if they are able to visualise far reaching measures to promote regional security in South Asia. Many of the problems are in a sense self-imposed because the decision-makers in South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan proceeded upon an inadequate analysis of the contradictions between Super Power doctrines and regional stability. Normalisation efforts among the South Asian states should not remain peripheral

to the major thrust of their decision-making. The evolution of balanced diplomacies in the region requires the understanding of new domestic and external, political, social and economic arrangements and relating them to a number of factors which are meaningful in the long term context. The search for an equilibrium in South Asia would require some of the following strategic and regional perceptions to be closely related to the estimates, analyses and decisions for achievement of regional security:

1. South Asian interest in East-West Negotiations

The political and military systems in South Asia do not appear to respond to proposals for collective security if these are related to escalation of conflict between the two power blocs. For most of the period under consideration of our study, the South Asian decision-makers in spite of fear and mistrust among themselves, welcomed a comprehensive approach to the peace process among the two Super Powers. As one of the founders of Nonalignment, India's options on key issues of East West relations were invariably expressed in terms of the necessity of institutionalising the conflicts between the "East" and "West". In spite of outstanding bilateral issues, Pakistan, Nepal

and Sri Lanka in their declaration of principles did not accept a no-holds-barred Soviet-American strategic competition. The asymmetry of their strategic interests vis-a-vis the much larger neighbour India, did not lead them to unrestrained manipulation of the strategic developments among the Super Powers. Pakistan recognised the rather limited military utility of United States military aid and India carefully calculated its balance of interest and political commitment without accepting the conceptual framework of the Soviet Union as an arms supplier. In spite of regional rivalries and suspicions, a common dimension which outweighed others was the support of all the South Asian states to the general process of detente and their advocacy of flexibility in East-West negotiations suggests a regional political sensitivity to favour of world order. The South Asian countries had valid reasons for wishing the extension of Super Power detente to the Third World, and they looked for compatible approaches which would prevent the intensification of Super Power rivalry in the South Asian region. One should stress that the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 should be seen not as the involvement of a non-aligned country in the advancement of the role-playing of a Super Power, but as an effort to avoid risks of escalation in Third World conflicts. Indian decision

makers have emphasized the operational limits of the coordination of the political and strategic behaviour with the Soviets and explained it in the context of loss of confidence occasioned by the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" against India. Although Soviet pronouncements after the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty have emphasized a single strategic issue i.e., Indo-Soviet security commitments against a Sino-Pakistan-US axis, Indian decision making has refused to foreclose options relating to the multiplicity of strategic issues. The perceptions of Indian decision makers are not related to any historic confrontation between Communism and Capitalism. The collapse of detente in the late 1970s has caused rising concern to all the South Asian countries, and although the responses of India and Pakistan to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan differed, both countries had to modify their external behaviour to cope with the new strategic dilemmas. The other South Asian countries also feel in differing degrees the political and strategic insecurities arising out of the changed political context after Afghanistan. They all perceive the East-West negotiations as a very long drawn out process, but have welcomed initial moves towards resumption of negotiations. The strategic relationship between the Super Powers and their arms competition directly aggravates

the "force modernisation" problems for the South Asian decision-makers. The extent to which Soviet-American reductions of arms (if that were achieved) would affect the South Asian policy making elites cannot of course be predicted with accuracy, but it is more than likely that a return to detente and Super Power negotiations would have a beneficial affect on the regional security considerations in South Asia. South Asian countries have the strongest incentive to ensure that another Afghanistan type situation does not emerge in their region, whatever the differences in their mutual perspectives. There is some evidence that South Asian strategic thinkers and decision-makers recognise the vital import of a new momentum to Soviet-American relations and are coming to the conclusion that Soviet-American arms competition has been the major source of regional tensions.

2. Super Power commitments to regional allies:

It would seem to be contradictory for South Asians to complain about the ill affects of Soviet-American arms competition while at the same time their decision-makers do not wish to refrain from taking advantage of the military potential of one or the other Super Power. Our study

suggests that the stability of the South Asian system cannot be maintained if India and Pakistan continue to be self-centred and put each other on the defensive by threats to each other's territorial integrity. The feelings of insecurity in South Asia and particularly in India and Pakistan have not been removed by the Soviet commitment to India and the American commitment to Pakistan. The advantages of Super Power commitments should not be seen isolated in the military dimension since there is always an important political dimension. At the political level the psychological affect of Super Power commitment has generally been to produce destabilising affects. As things have turned out the visible naval presence of the Super Powers in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean have made the littoral states vulnerable to increasingly complex patterns of military competition. As Hans Rattinger has shown the insoluble dilemma created by the Super Power commitments in the Middle East had led to the exhausting experience of a succession of wars.⁶ South Asia is a completely different context from the Middle East, yet there is a parallel case as far as the effect of establishing security ties with the Super Powers is concerned. Pakistan's decision to

6. Hans Rattinger, "From War to War to War : Arms Races in the Middle East", International Studies Quarterly, vol.20, no.4, December, 1976.

withdraw from the Central Treaty Organisation in 1979 clearly demonstrated that the political disadvantages of a formal alliance far outweighed the advantages of special strategic arrangements which were adopted in the pursuit of national security. It is also profitable to look at the process of normalisation in South Asia subsequent to the Simla Agreement in 1972 and to discover that inspite of changing leadership patterns in both India and Pakistan a number of factors have contributed to the development of more cautious postures. It is, however, true that neither India nor Pakistan has been able to check the arms race on the subcontinent. Again Pakistan has been looking to the Middle East in the changing circumstances after the separation of Bangla Desh. Pakistani perceptions of the advantages of nonalignment point to certain linkages between the widespread disenchantment that has arisen in the public mind with the American alliance and the assessments that military action cannot produce solutions to all of Pakistan's political disputes.

When we turn to the assessment of the goals of any peace process between India and Pakistan we have inevitably to raise the question whether both are caught in a strategic trap leading to an exaggerated role of military force in their mutual relations. There is little public understanding of the costs and burdens of the

ruinous arms competition which has been encouraged by the Super Power commitments. It is only through political accommodation that the probability of war can be reduced. Super Power commitments aggravate the nature of security problems in South Asia since they work to reduce the already low stock of credibility of the regional powers in each other's eyes.

3. Super Powers and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia.

Although neither the Soviet Union nor the United States sees any prospect of victory in a nuclear war, their security systems are really effective on the basis of strategic nuclear concepts. China which followed the two nuclear Super Powers in pursuing a long-range trend of global power also accepted a nuclear environment for the development of its military doctrine. The strategic effort of the South Asian countries has remained essentially non-nuclear but arguments and counter-arguments have been developed by South Asian strategic experts for the future role of nuclear strike forces. The Indian political elites seemed to justify the Pokhran Test chiefly as a method of retaining diplomatic and political flexibility. The Pakistani elites, however, perceived the uncertainties

associated with the Indian nuclear test as a qualitative change in the military capability of India and hence a major disturbance of the status quo. The Pakistani decision to proceed with accelerated development of its nuclear potential was perceived by India as an attempt to implement an "Islamic Bomb" strategy. There is no adequate criteria for determining the uncertainties about the future of Indian and Pakistani nuclear developments. Undoubtedly these developments constitute a dilemma for both the United States and the Soviet Union who are committed to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Even the most limited use of nuclear weapons in South Asia would perhaps destroy the prospects for regional settlement of outstanding issues. Unfortunately neither Super Power has firmly established priorities for checking the alarming symptoms of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The Soviet Union would not like to jeopardise the basis of its special relationship with India by imposing sanctions against Indian nuclear development. The United States, despite recent disclaimers, appears to have been anxious to keep Pakistan within its own sphere of influence and has not prevented its western allies from strengthening Pakistan's commitments to its ambitions for an early nuclear explosion. Thus our study suggests scepticism about the chances that

either Super Power or both together will be able to impose absolute restraints to prevent a new spiralling nuclear-weapon race between India and Pakistan. If security in South Asia is to be safeguarded on a long term basis it is necessary at this juncture for India and Pakistan to work for a stable military balance in both conventional and nuclear spheres. It is possible, although by no means certain, that discussions on the nuclear issue in a bilateral context may help India and Pakistan to develop a wider interest in arms control measures with the cooperation ultimately of other South Asian powers. The Super Powers have a strong incentive to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons but the focus of their approach is affected by global considerations. India and Pakistan can make a positive contribution towards avoiding the risk of a major confrontation if they can mutually agree on further restraint in the development of nuclear capabilities and jointly forge certain nuclear options.

4. Arms control measures in South Asia.

Both the Super Powers have faced "watershed decisions" in their respective decisions to supply arms to the South Asian countries, particularly India and Pakistan. In spite of occasional suggestions arms-control agreements have not been formally discussed for South Asia. The problems posed

for India by the initial supply of American equipment to Pakistan resulted in formal exposition of India's objection to United States' dominance in Pakistan, but it did not result in any negotiations on arms control and disarmament questions. India's urgency to develop a rationalia to meet the political and military challenge from China in 1962 through a substantial build-up of arms. The changing military ratios in the subcontinent between the key adversaries required a much closer linkage with the two Super Powers than would have been the case if negotiation and compromise had been regionally institutionalised. If this had not been the case perhaps self-imposed restrictions would have created a common desire to concentrate on local defence. The introduction of modern weapons and warning systems provided by the Super Powers, China and the Europeans, has resulted in the development of operational doctrines which provide for escalation from local military confrontations. Although the climate of opinion in India has changed since the entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the considerable anxiety in India over the supply of F-16s to Pakistan by the United States indicates that strategic stability in the subcontinent is quite precarious. If India and Pakistan are to succeed in reducing uncertainty and competition they would have to develop common perceptions

of each other's command, control, communication and intelligence system. Otherwise the solution of political disputes is impeded by the number of character of variables involved in the arms competition. The spiralling defence expenditure in India and Pakistan is a major factor which reduces the confidence of both sides and also undermines economic and political stability in both the countries. The adjustment to lower and more stable force levels through successive rounds of negotiations would ultimately produce a different strategic environment for the whole of South Asia. The key to arms control measures would have to be the effort of the entire South Asian community to reduce the scope for Super Power competition. As long as the Super Powers continue to exert pressures and the Sino-Soviet rift spills over into the subcontinent, the logic of demilitarisation will not appeal to the Indians and Pakistanis. The setting up of the Joint Indo-Pakistan Commission after President Zia's visit to New Delhi in 1982 could lead to concrete steps to allay fears of surprise attacks and better appreciations of each other's security concerns. Once India and Pakistan develop arms control experience, negotiations could be initiated with the other South Asian countries to reduce military costs in the entire area without disturbing existing strategic relationships within the region. The latent fears of one party deploying new

weapons technology have surfaced after the recent experience in the Falkland Islands war and the fighting over Lebanon. The challenge of new technologies undoubtedly will affect the strategic concepts of the South Asian countries. If the objective of preventing the increase of influence of the Super Powers can become a major regional objective, it could make a positive contribution towards the solution of problems created by rapid technological change including the "Grey area weapons" problems. A radical break with the past can only be achieved by innovating new arms control measures in South Asia. As Headley Bull has emphasised arms control measures have to keep abreast of technological change as an independent contribution to the regulation of conflict.⁷

5. Confidence Building Measures in South Asia.

Much diplomatic activity in Europe and between the Super Powers has been devoted to developing confidence building roles. Ever since the plan for the division of India and Pakistan was drawn up for the transfer of power, the reduction of confidence of both sides has been precipitous. Diplomacy and propaganda has been geared to "worst case" assumptions and has led to escalation of tensions. Even if the South Asian countries, and particularly

7. Headley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. (London, 1961), pp. 198-99.

India and Pakistan cannot achieve the solution of outstanding political questions through political accommodation and compromise, realistic thinking is necessary to avoid confrontations and to keep the threat systems in check. It is necessary, therefore, to impose constraints as part of a confidence building process. If the ruling elites are to develop realistic conceptions they must first of all understand the strategic intentions of each other no matter what the political rhetoric demands. If the global interests of the Super Powers and their crusading ideologies are not to create Vietnams and Afghanistans, regional states must initiate steps to develop political realism which will prevent a spillover of Super Power crises into the South Asian area. Uncertainty and reckless competition in military matters can be reduced by exchange of information through regular consultation. Some localised border incidents are perhaps inevitable in such a large area, but there is no reason why suitable machinery cannot be created which will be equipped to prevent miscalculations. Similarly the nuclear policies and postures of India and Pakistan should be related to new opportunities for constructive contacts and explorations for nuclear restraint as well as nuclear cooperation in the entire region. It cannot be forecast what type of leaderships will arise in the future in South Asian countries but the purpose of confidence

building measures on a long term basis is to ensure that even if political crises erupt suddenly after political succession there are anticipatory arrangements for maintaining political and military stability.

In the area of Indian Ocean politics, and littoral diplomacy it is even more important to develop naval cooperation in place of competition in mutually harmful ways. Although Soviet and American involvement in the Indian Ocean has created a plethora of problems for the littoral states it is well to remember that the two Super Powers have themselves set an example in their Agreement for Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (1972). India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka can orient their naval regimes to incorporate constraints which avoid new sources of conflict. This cooperative experience will help prevent each one of them being sucked into a situation in which they are at the mercy of Super Power competition.

6. Towards Regional Detente.

The commencement of regional negotiations for arms control and confidence building measures will be an epochal gain in the history of South Asian relations. But developments of military significance are of lasting interest only if translated into secure political agreements. The

shortsightedness of decision makers results in advocating provocative political demands which create and sustain cold war situations. Serious moves should therefore be made to induce the regional political units to substitute the relationship of reciprocal terror by reciprocal efforts for stable peace. South Asian negotiators would have to prepare package proposals and in the process give up the practice of negotiating from strength. Regional detente can only follow cautious moves which generate a favourable climate. In many cases there would be strong national pressure from media and opposition political parties and groups to defend entrenched positions. Negotiations on the basis of equality are not easy when there are acute disparities in power potentials and there is a legacy of mistrust to overcome. The explosive force of South Asian nationalism may be an important obstacle to reach mutual accommodation. But this is a challenge which must be accepted by statesmen who can exercise positive leadership to avoid the calamity of war and even nuclear war. Regional detente can flourish if political settlements are reinforced by working arrangements for organised cooperation in political, economic and social spheres in South Asia. It would be a grave error if either India or Pakistan

commenced negotiations for peace while secretly preparing for war. Regional detente as a process must seek to continuously remove fears which each nation entertains for its security. It requires mature diplomacy on the part of all the regional partners in place of erratic leadership which indulges in destructive competition.

7. A new basis for Policy Development in South Asia :
Insulating military, political and economic
commitments from Soviet-American Arms Competition.

The foreign policy issues which have dominated South Asian relationship have been evolved from a rigid scale of priorities. All the South Asian countries have allowed themselves to be exploited by Super Power interests and opportunities. The major question therefore is : How should a new basis be found for policy development in South Asia which can encourage regional security and cooperation? As our study shows this question cannot be answered until South Asian policy evaluations are directed towards the task of insulating the area from the military, political and economic commitments flowing from the accelerating Soviet-American arms competition. We have emphasised the need for detailed study of the typology of policy-making systems in South Asia. We are at present concerned with how these systems cope with Super Power

initiated military actions which deflect the content of foreign policies as elaborated by key decision makers. In the absence of regional trust and cooperation, the regional powers are in a weak bargaining position with the Super Powers. In developing options for the future, South Asian decision makers would have to alter the existing political and strategic framework of relations which in many cases has been built on a single strategic issue leading to an obsession with military modernisation. In the early 1980s it has become abundantly clear that new principles of security cooperation must be elaborated and made flexible enough to ensure regional political co-ordination and control. Due to many reasons among which must be included the problem of understanding the decision-making process of neighbouring countries, South Asian countries were not able to work out a modus vivendi with each other and develop a relevant regional institutional environment.

The result has been to complicate South Asian security issues and to present the image of lack of solidarity. South Asian countries in the foreseeable future cannot compete effectively on the world scene unless they first of all bring about radical changes in their foreign policy orientation. It is not only the limited question of normalisation of relations between India and

Pakistan that is suggested here. Political relations in South Asia cannot improve unless all the countries come together to deal with the present realities in Asia and the world. Increased defence spending cannot solve problems which are crying out for negotiated solutions. The role of economic power in the present day world and more so the world of the future cannot be underestimated. The strategy of the South Asian situation is that the commitment to economic power of every country is being sacrificed to the military build-up plans. Political power which is retained by the ruling elites becomes increasingly meaningless as it is ultimately manipulated by the requirements of decision-makers controlling the Soviet-American arms competition. Our study indicates that rational decision-making for a peaceful environment in the South Asian area requires a new configuration of relationships which would exclude the potential for miscalculations which is fostered by extraneous commitments like those arising out of the Soviet-American Arms Competition.

Appendix- I

STRATIFIED SAMPLE FOR INTENSIVE INTERVIEWING

Occupation of Respondent	Name of Respondent
1. Senior Official Ministry of External Affairs	Mrs. Wina Sibal, Deputy Secretary.
2. Director Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses	Mr. K. Subramanyam.
3. Senior Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister	Mr. L.K. Jha, Chairman, Administrative Economic Reforms Commission.
4. Retired Senior Airforce Officer	Air Chief Marshal Arjun Singh.
5. Senior Airforce Officer (in service)	Air Vice-Marshal P.P. Singh
6. Retired Senior Army Officer	Major General S.N. Antia
7. Retired Senior Army Officer	Major General R.S. Sparrow
8. Retired Ambassador of India	Mr. G.J. Malik
9. Defence Analyst	Wing Cdr. M.K. Chopra
10. Defence Analyst	Col. Pyare Lal
11. Editor of National Newspaper	Mr. Inder Malhotra, Times of India.
12. Editor of a Weekly Newspaper	Mr. Ayoob Sayeed, Current Weekly
13. University Faculty Member	Dr. V. Grover, Delhi University.

Appendix - II**SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES — THEIR POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP**

Country	Population (million)	GNP Per Capita (US dollars)
Afghanistan	17.05 (1976)	240 (1978)
Bangladesh	88.7 (1980)	90 (1978)
India	638 (1981)	159 (1979)
Nepal	13.42 (1978)	120 (1978)
Pakistan	80.2 (1980)	230 (1978)
Sri Lanka	14.47 (1979)	200 (1979)

Source: Statemen Year Book 1981-82.

Appendix - III

COMPARATIVE MILITARY FORCES OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

Country	Army	Navy	Air Force
Afghanistan	35,000 [*]	--	8,000; perhaps 160 combat aircraft [*]
Bangladesh	70,000	4,000 ^{**}	3,000; 19 combat aircraft
India	944,000	47,000	113,000; 614 combat aircraft
Nepal	25,000	--	--
Pakistan	420,000	13,000	17,600; 220 combat aircraft
Sri Lanka	10,000	2,740	2,100; 6 combat aircraft

* Actual strength suspect due to defections.

** Spares are short; some equipment is unserviceable.

Source: Military Balance 1981-82 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies).

Appendix - IV

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS, CUMULATIVE 1975-79 BY SUPER POWERS TO SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES
(Million Current Dollars)

Country	Soviet Union	United States
Afghanistan	450	--
Bangladesh	20	--
India	1,800	40
Nepal	--	--
Pakistan	20	180
Sri Lanka	10	--

-- none or negligible

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1970-79,
(US Arms control and Disarmament Agency).

Appendix - Y**MILITARY EXPENDITURE BY SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES**

Country	Year	Military Expenditure (million dollars)		Military Expenditure	
		Current	Constant (1978)	% GNP	Per capita (constant 1978 dollars)
Afghanistan	1978	75	75	2.0	5
	1979	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bangladesh	1978	132	132	1.5	1
	1979	139	128	1.4	1
India	1978	3495	3495	2.9	5
	1979	3722	3420	3.0	5
Nepal	1978	13	13	0.8	1
	1979	16	15	0.9	1
Pakistan	1978	976	976	5.3	12
	1979	1067	980	5.0	11
Sri Lanka	1978	67	67	5.6	19
	1979	92	85	7.0	24

NA - not available

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-79.
(US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).

Appendix - VI**VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN SOUTH ASIA (1978-79)**

Country	Year	Arms Imports (Million Dollars)		Arms Export (Million Dollars)		Total Imports (Million Dollars)		Total Exports (Million Dollars)	
		Current	Constant (1978)	Current	Constant (1978)	Current	Constant (1978)	Current	Constant (1978)
Afghanistan	1978	90	90	0	0	395	395	521	521
	1979	200	183	0	0	377	346	320	294
Bangladesh	1978	5	5	0	0	1541	1541	549	549
	1979	0	0	0	0	2026	1861	646	593
India	1978	280	280	10	10	7929	7929	6668	6668
	1979	500	459	10	9	8800	8035	6939	6375
Nepal	1978	0	0	0	0	222	222	91	91
	1979	0	0	0	0	254	233	109	100
Pakistan	1978	170	170	30	30	3285	3285	1475	1475
	1979	194	174	5	4	4052	3723	2056	1889
Sri Lanka	1978	0	0	0	0	969	969	845	845
	1979	10	9	0	0	1466	1347	981	901

0 Nil or negligible

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-79,
(US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980).

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

Year	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1962			(a) Sino-Indian border clashes (b) USSR to honour MIG commitment to India			
1963	(a) Daud ousted from power, succeeded by Dr. Muhammad Yusuf		(a) India signs air-defence Agreement with USA, Britain			
1964	(a) Afghanistan becomes member of Colombo Plan		(a) Pakistani violation of ceasefire in Jammu, US 7th Fleet enters Indian Ocean.	(a) Tulsi Giri resigns (b) Development loan from India	(a) RCD formed (Pakistan, Turkey, Iran) (b) Bhutto calls Security Council meeting on Kashmir	
1965			(b) Indo-Pak Conflict			
1966			(a) Tashkent Declaration			
1967			(a) India not to renew arms aid agreement with USSR		(a) Soviet arms to Pakistan	

Year	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1968			(a) Mrs. Gandhi declares neutrality for S.E. Asia Plan on Carribeantour	(a) President Zakir Hussain visits Nepal		
1969	Kosygin visits Afghanistan				(a) Kosygin visits Pakistan (b) Ayub resigns, Yahya Khan becomes chief Martial Law administrator	
1970						
1971		(a) Bangladesh independent	(a) Indo-Soviet Treaty	(a) Trade and transit agreement with India	(a) Indo-Pak war (b) Bhutto becomes President	(a) Senate abolished
1972		(a) Indo-Bangladesh friendship treaty (b) Mujib assassinated			(a) Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India	

Year	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1973	(a) 1st coup, Republic declared		(a) Dreshnev visits India		(a) Arms from China and US (b) Bhutto Visits USA	(a) Mrs. Gandhi visits Sri Lanka
1974	(a) Afghanistan expresses doubts about Durand Line (b) Doesnot recognises Baluchistan and Pakhtoonistan as parts of Pakistan	(a) Pakistan recognises Bangladesh (b) President Gira's Visit (c) Agreement with India on border demarcation	(a) India purchases \$19.2 million worth of US jet aircrafts (b) Pokhran nuclear explosion	(a) Relations with India worsen because of inclusion of Sikkim in Indian Union (b) Trade agreement with China	(a) Pakistan withdraws from SEATO (b) China aids Pakistan in Missile production (c) Exchange agreement with USSR	(a) Boundary demarcation agreement with India in Palk-Bay
1975	(a) Relations with Pakistan worsen because of rights of Baluchis and Pakhtoons (b) Agreement with USSR and India	(a) Coup. Khondakar Mustaq Ahmed becomes President (b) Counter coup. A.N. Sayem becomes President	(a) India offers non-aggression treaty to Pakistan (b) Trade Agreement with Pakistan along with a Memorandum of understanding signed		(a) Exchange of ambassadors with Bangladesh (b) Pakistan offers naval base to USA	

contd....

Year	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1976	(a) Daud visits Pakistan, not much change in relations because of non-acceptance of border.	(a) Zia-ur Rahman becomes Chief Martial Law Administrator	(a) Resumption of diplomatic ties with Pakistan (b) Farakka barrage dispute with Bangladesh	(a) King Birendra visits India (b) Nepal endeavors to become zone of peace	(a) Bhutto calls for Third World Summit (b) Bhutto visits Afghanistan (c) US to supply light bombers	(a) Host to the Non-Aligned Summit
1977	(a) Daud Khan sworn in as President	(a) Zia-ur Rahman becomes President	(a) Janta Party comes to power (b) India offers No-War Pact to Pakistan	(a) Prime Minister Morarji Deesai and Foreign Minister A.B.Vajpayee visit Nepal	(a) Internal disturbances in Pakistan (b) Coup. Zia-ur Haq comes to power	(a) Mr. Jaywardene elected President
1978	(a) Coup, Daud overthrown, Nur Mohammad Taraki comes to power		(a) Policy of genuine Non-Alignment			
1979	(a) Taraki, ousted, replaced by Hafizullah Amin (b) Soviet troops enter Afghanistan. (c) Amin replaced by Babrak Karmal					

Year	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1980			(a) Congress-I comes to power		(a) US arms aid to Pakistan	
1981		(a) Abdus Sattar elected President	(a) Non-aligned conference in New Delhi (b) Mrs. Gandhi visits S.E. Asian countries	(a) 1st elected govt. in Nepal (b) President Sanjiva Reddy & Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao visits Nepal	(a) Pakistan renews Pact proposal	(a) Emergency declared (b) Sri Lanka joins ASEAN
1982		(a) Bloodless coup, H.M. Ershad becomes President (b) Pakska & Tin Bigha Agreement signed. (c) Indo-Bangladesh Joint economic Commission	(a) Mrs. Gandhi visits US & USSR (b) Mirage deal with France (c) Soviet Foreign Minister Ustinov visits India		(a) Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visits India. (b) Progress in No-War Pact (c) Supply of F-16's to Pakistan.	

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